

March - a Stellar Installation

As the senior Air Force base west of the Mississippi, March Field, established in 1918, has enjoyed a rich heritage and community support that rivals any military installation in the nation.

Because of March's past importance as a vital strategic base, and as a result of BRAC decisions made in 1989 and 1991, March facilities far surpass those found at most bases. There is excess capacity in virtually all on-base utilities. Since 1991, \$15 million has been spent on utility upgrades alone, including a new electrical substation opened in 1993. Almost \$200 million has been spent on facility upgrades at March in the past four years.


Quality of life issues are important considerations in maintaining our military forces. Morale, wellness, and recreational facilities at March are superb both in number and condition. Existing base housing ranges from adequate to superior and would accommodate almost 1,000 Marine families. Off-base housing is plentiful, and more affordable than almost any other metropolitan location in California. At Miramar, however, 500 new housing units would have to be built for an estimated total cost of \$50 million to accommodate these same families.

The March Opportunity Epitomizes DOD Policy Guidance

In a 7 January 1994 memorandum to the Military Services Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Perry outlined policy guidance for bases facing reduction or closure. The policy guidance specifically encouraged services to be shared by more than one service to a single base."


The March Opportunity is a perfect situation for following the guidance of March relative to other military units makes it singularly well suited to play an important role in our nation's defense. Global Reach, Global Power, Global Coordination. **The March Opportunity can be a shining example of effectiveness, and of fiscal efficiency.**

This plan works. Ask the Marines!



In addition to the MILCON savings, the Marines estimate a cumulative savings of \$29 million would be realized over a ten-year period in BAQ/VHA expenses in the March vs. Miramar scenario as shown below. The Marines have yet to complete a detailed analysis of ongoing operational and maintenance expenses, but they expect those savings to be significant.

**Cumulative BAQ/VHA Comparison
Miramar vs. March
for ten years**



Cumulative ten year savings of March scenario: \$29.0M

Note: Savings assume 10% of eligible occupants live in military family housing.

PLANNED BEDDOWN VS. TUSTIN AT MARCH BEDDOWN

MILCON COST

USMC '93 BRAC **USMC STUDY
SCENARIO 2B
(The March Opportunity)**

El Toro	0	0
Miramar	407.2	220.0
CamPen	144.6	0
March	0	350.0

NAVY '93 BRAC

Miramar	0	0
Lemoore	344.2	0
Fallon	40.1	40.1
Oceana	0.5	0.5

TOTAL - BRAC '93: 936.6 **SCENARIO 2B: 610.6**

Savings = \$326 million

BRAC '93


Requires the Navy to:

1. Move some jet fighters from Miramar 265 miles north to Lemoore 236 miles inland
2. Move the rest of its jet fighters from Miramar 480 miles east to Lemoore 236 miles inland

Requires the Marines to:

1. Move its jet fighters from El Toro 65 miles south to Miramar
2. Move its helicopters from Tustin 70 miles south to Miramar
3. Take over Miramar as a Marine base, for mixed use by high performance aircraft
4. Rely on Air Force Combat Loading Units to be flown in from distant locations, thus degrading First MEF's rapid deployment capability

MILCON Cost: \$936.6 million



Budgetary Considerations

After assessing BRAC '91 and '93 guidance relating to Tustin, El Toro and Miramar, the Marine Corps requested \$1.67 billion for the proposed moves. Of this amount, \$855 million has actually been authorized for the Marines. Total BRAC MILCON costs alone for the Navy and Marine Corps on the west coast as a result of the Tustin/El Toro moves now total \$936.6 million.

The COMCAB WEST Marine study demonstrates that \$326 million in MILCON alone can be saved by utilizing March AFB as a Marine base. Virtually all of the budgeted MILCON for Camp Pendleton and Lemoore, and several hundred million dollars programmed for Miramar would **not** be necessary if Scenario 2B (The March Opportunity) of the Marine Study were adopted. (The following charts, prepared for the BRAC '95 data call, are taken directly from the COMCAB WEST 12 December 1994 report and the 24 March 1995 revision of the same.)

Operational Considerations

From an operational and safety perspective, the single siting of fast-moving fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft is undesirable. The attempt to relocate more than 100 Tustin helicopters to Miramar where approximately 150 F-18s will be flying tens of thousands of annual airfield operations in congested airspace is an invitation to disaster. Never before in peacetime has an attempt been made to permanently combine so many aircraft with such dissimilar performance characteristics in such confined airspace. **Collocating helicopters with the relatively few larger, slower, and less frequently flown cargo and tanker aircraft at March does not pose a similar problem.**

Marine helicopters stationed at **March would be much closer to training areas in the Cleveland National Forest and Twenty-Nine Palms than if flying from Miramar.** The Marines would therefore be able to operate at existing mountainous area landing sites and confined area landing sites located in the March vicinity.

Additionally, MCAS March would reduce helicopter transient time to training ranges located at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, which would result in **better utilization of flying hours for operational training.**

Redirecting helicopter assets to March tremendously improves the worldwide rapid deployment posture of these assets by collocating them at the First Marine Expeditionary Force Aerial Port of Embarkation/Debarcation (APOE/APOD). For example, having March helicopters based at March as an APOE/APOD would save twelve to eighteen hours deployment time over any other scenario. Also, as a consequence of March becoming a Marine facility, elements of the First Marine Corps Expeditionary Force can preposition supplies, ammunition, and people to further facilitate rapid deployment. The First MEF is tasked with rapid mobility missions throughout the Pacific Theater of Operations.

SCENARIO 2B MARCH AIR FORCE BASE ★ THE MARCH OPPORTUNITY ★

Requires the Navy to:

1. Continue to operate Miramar as a joint fighter base, with add

Requires the Marines to:

1. Move its jet fighters from El Toro 65 miles south to Miramar
2. Move its helicopters from Tustin 35 miles east to March
3. Redesignate March as a Marine base, for primary use by ro use by transports and tankers

Permits the Marines to:

Provide rapid reaction transport support to Pendleton, 35 miles a 75 miles away

MILCON Cost: \$610.6 million SAVES: \$326 mil


THE MARCH OPPORTUNITY

Background

As a result of recommendations made by the Department of the Air Force and ratified by BRAC '93, March AFB is scheduled for realignment in April, 1996. March will lose its active duty force, and become a reserve base, stationing sixteen C-141s and ten KC-135s from the 452nd AMW (Reserve), and ten KC-135s from the 163rd AREFG (Air Guard).

The Department of Navy and BRAC Commission recommendations in 1991 and 1993 will result in MCAS Tustin and MCAS El Toro being closed in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Navy fighter units are slated to move from Miramar to Lemoore and Fallon to make room for over 100 Marine helicopters from Tustin and more than 100 F-18s from El Toro. Miramar will become a Marine Corps Air Base under the present plan.

Is there a better alternative available to the Department of Defense which takes advantage of the March opportunity and offers superior operational effectiveness and increased economy? The answer is a resounding **YES**. One superior option has been studied by the Marine Corps in anticipation of a BRAC '95 data call from the DOD (see *Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases Western Area Option Study* dated 12 December 1994). The plan redirects most of the Tustin rotary winged aircraft assets to March, leaves the Navy's F-14s and E-2s at Miramar, and retains the scheduled move of Marine F-18s to Miramar. This option is enthusiastically supported by the March Joint Powers Authority and communities surrounding March. The following pages summarize the *Marine Corps Study* of the March option.







**MARCH
OPPORTUNITY**



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
Relocating AFEWES Capabilities

Does It Make Sense? Does It Make "Cents" ?



AIR FORCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE EVALUATION SIMULATOR

- A Unique Laboratory For Testing Effectiveness of Aircraft Defensive Countermeasures.
- Created in 1958 as a Cost-Effective Alternative to Flight Testing B-58 Electronic Countermeasures.
- Market – Driven/Needs-Driven Growth:
 - 39,000 Sq. Ft.
 - 39 Weapon Systems Simulations
 - \$325M in Assets
- Used by Air Force, Navy, Army, International Allies and Industry From Aircraft Design Through Wartime Operations.




**AFEWES Customer Base
1990-1994**

***AFEWES Is a DOD and International Asset. Successfully
Designed and Operated Under Civilian Contract for 37 Years.***


AFEWES

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator

Located Within Air Force Plant #4 and Operated by Lockheed Fort Worth Company



The Electronic Combat Test Process



AFEWES Is a Unique Piece of the Nation's Electronic Combat Test Process

DOD BRAC Recommendations

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

RECOMMENDATION:	Disestablish the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) Activity in Fort Worth. Essential AFEWES Capabilities and the Required Test Activities Will Relocate to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) , Edwards AFB, California. Workload and Selected Equipment From AFEWES Will Be Transferred to AFFTC. AFEWES Will Be Disestablished and Any Remaining Equipment Will Be Disposed of.
JUSTIFICATION:	The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) Recommended That AFEWES's Capabilities Be Relocated to an Existing Facility at an Installation Possessing a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) Open Air Range . Projected Workload for AFEWES Was Only 28 Percent of its Available Capacity . Available Capacity at AFFTC Is Sufficient To Absorb AFEWES's Workload. AFEWES's Basic Hardware-in-the-Loop Infrastructure Is Duplicated at Other Air Force Test and Evaluation Facilities. This Action Achieves Significant Cost Savings and Workload Consolidation.
RETURN ON INVESTMENT:	The Total Estimated One-Time Cost To Implement This Recommendation Is \$5.8 Million. The Net of All Costs and Savings During the Implementation Period Is a Cost of \$2.6 Million. Annual Recurring Savings After Implementation Are \$0.8 Million With a Return on Investment Expected in Seven Years. The Net Present Value of the Costs and Savings Over 20 Years Is a Savings of \$5.8 Million .
IMPACTS:	Assuming No Economic Recovery, This Recommendation Could Result in a Maximum Potential Reduction of 9 Jobs (5 Direct Jobs and 4 Indirect Jobs) Over the 1996-to-2001 Period in the Fort Worth-Arlington, Texas Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, Which Is Less Than 0.1 Percent of the Economic Area's Employment. This Action Will Have Minimal Environmental Impact.

The Facts Dictate A Closer Look . . .

Collocation At An Open Air Range

DOD

- **"The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) Recommended That AFEWES Capabilities Be Relocated to an Existing Facility at an Installation Possessing a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) Open Air Range."**

FACTS

- **There Is No Technical Advantage to Being Near an Open Air Range.**
- **No Significant Increase In Capability From "One Stop" Shopping.**
 - *EC Systems Rarely Move Immediately From a Hardware-in-the-Loop Test to Flight Testing*
- **Networking Is the Technical and Economical Alternative**
 - *Networking of AFEWES Has Been Demonstrated and Proven Technically Feasible*

AFEWES Workload

DOD

- "Projected Workload Was Only 28 Percent of Its Available Capacity."

FACTS

- Average Workload for CY 93 and CY 94 Was 90% (Based on a 16-Hour Day). Workload Has Actually Been Increasing Because New Capabilities Have Been Coming On-Line.
- Workload Is Projected To Continue at the Same Level. Currently Planned Tests Include:

1995
C17 B-2 Band IV Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM) Advanced Tactical IRCM - Army Directional IRCM - UK/USSOCOM Sweden Germany DOD Special Access

1996 and Beyond
B-1 B-2 F-22 ALQ-135 Advanced Tactical Radar Jammer - Army Advanced Missile Warning Receiver - Army Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures System - Navy Sweden United Kingdom Italy

- The Multiple Emitter Generator Expansion (1995) and Reconfigurable Airborne Interceptor (1996) Will Also Spur Increases in Workload.

AFFTC Capacity

DOD

- **"Available Capacity at the Air Force Flight Test Center Is Sufficient To Absorb AFEWES Workload."**

FACTS

- **AFFTC May Have the Capacity To Replace The Nine Government Positions (Five Direct, Four Indirect).**
- **AFFTC Does Not Presently Have the Personnel To Operate/Maintain and Upgrade the AFEWES:**
 - *LFWC Positions To Be Replaced: Approx. 50 Engineers/Technicians in Support of Operations/Maintenance and Approx. 50 in Support of Upgrades*
 - *AFFTC Will Have To Contract for This Work*
- **AFFTC Currently Has No Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation Capability, Consequently, Test Users Must Accept AFEWES Testing "GAP" Until the Transition Is Complete.**

AFFTC Building Requirements

FACTS

- **The AFEWES Must Be in a Shielded Building With Raised Floors (To Allow Electrical Interconnections), Lowered Roof (To Allow for RF Interconnections), Special Power and Special Air Conditioning. The IR Portion Requires SEISMIC Stability.**
- **AFFTC Has Two Options:**
 - **Build a New Facility**
 - √ **100% Replacement Would Require at Least 40,000 SQ. Ft.**
 - √ **Moving Only the Newest, Highest Utilized Simulations Will Still Require a 36,000 Sq. Ft. Facility**
 - **Remodel the Existing Building Surrounding the Benefield Anechoic Chamber**
 - √ **Remodeling the West Area (Now Essentially Vacant) of the Building To Have a SEISMIC First Floor Section (900 Sq. Ft) and Adding a Second and Third Floor Within the Shell Could Make About 36,000 Sq. Ft. Available**
 - √ **Based on Historical AFEWES Costs, Estimated Remodeling Would Cost Over \$5M**

AFEWES Duplication

DOD

- "AFEWES Basic Hardware-in-the-Loop Infrastructure Is Duplicated at Other Air Force Test and Evaluation Facilities"

FACTS

- **AFEWES Has 39 Simulations. Two (Built By AFEWES Personnel) Are Duplicated at Other Air Force and Army Locations. Four Other Simulations (Older and Unvalidated) Exist at Other Air Force and Navy Locations.**
- **AFEWES Is Used by Air Force, Navy, Army, International Allies, and Industry Because It Is Unique in the World.**
 - * Australia
 - * Canada
 - * France
 - * Germany
 - * Israel
 - * Italy
 - * Korea
 - * Netherlands
 - * Norway
 - * Sweden
 - * Switzerland
 - * Turkey
 - * UK
 - * Belgium
- **It Is Contradictory To Claim Duplication and Then Make Plans To Move the Capability.**

Return on Investment

DOD

- "The Total Estimated One-Time Cost To Implement This Recommendation Is \$5.8M."

FACTS

- The Following Simulations/Support Systems Have Essential Military Value and Would Have to be Moved:

SA-4	Fulcrum	Data Processing Facility
SA-6M	Foxhound	Residual Inventory/Spare Parts
SA-8	Clutter Generator	Jammer Technique Simulator
SA-10	Basic Infrared Lab	Bus Snapshot Analyzer
SA-11	Enhanced Infrared Lab	Test Equipment
Flap Wheel	Multiple Emitter Generator Basic	Software Development Facility
Flanker	Multiple Emitter Generator Advanced	Test Director System
Gun Dish		

- Generation of the Documentation Is Essential:

- Drawings for 186 Racks
- O&M Manuals for 17 Simulations/Support Systems

- A More Realistic Estimate of Cost To Implement:

- Drawings	\$ 8,949,360
- Software and Hardware O&M Manuals	8,428,539
- Phase In/Phase Out/Training/Overlap	12,924,117
- Disassembly/Move/Reassembly/Demonstrate	6,495,263
- Facility Preparation (36,000 Sq. Ft. @ \$140/Sq. Ft)	5,040,000
- Replacement of LFWC Owned Assets	2,100,000
Total Cost for Minimim Move	\$43,937,279

Return On Investment

DOD

- "Annual Recurring Savings After Implementation Are \$0.8M With a Return on Investment Expected in Seven Years. The Net Present Value of the Cost and Savings Over 20 Years Is a Savings of \$5.8 Million."

FACTS

- The DOD Assessment Significantly Underestimates the Cost of Implementation and the Discount Rate. The More Likely Outcome Is:

	LIKELY	DOD
Cost	\$ 43.9M	\$ 5.8M
NPV (Over 20 Years)	\$ (27.7)M	\$ 5.8M
Break-Even	53 Years	7 Years

- \$0.8M in Annual Savings Can Be Realized by Simply Reducing Government Oversight of AFEWES.

The AFEWES Can Be Operated and Maintained For Less Expense If Left In Fort Worth

Because of the Contractor's Experience

- **Conceived and Developed the AFEWES Closed-Loop, Real-Time, Actual RF Threat Simulation In 1958.**
- **The Only Experience Available in AFEWES Operation (37 Years).**
- **Corporate Memory and Easy Access to Simulation Designers Enhances Maintenance and Minimizes Down Time.**
- **Resources Necessary to Link AFEWES With LFWC Test Assets (Flight Simulator) and Other DOD Test Assets (Open Air Ranges, REDCAP).**

Because the Contractor Is Organized to Accommodate a Variable Work Load

- **Government Required Simulator Work Load Is Highly Variable.**
- **An Easily Varied Cadre of Skilled Manpower Means the Customer Only Pays for Support As Needed.**

CONCLUSION

- ***Military Value*** – AFEWES' Unique, Cross-Service Support of Electronic Warfare Development and Readiness Would Be Degraded By Relocation.
- ***Return on Investment*** – AFEWES is a More Cost Effective Asset if Retained Within AF Plant 4 in Fort Worth Versus Relocation to AFFTC.
- ***Impact*** – AFEWES Economic Impact on Fort Worth is Approximately 10 Times Greater Than Stated in the DOD Recommendation (100 Engineering Jobs).

***The Proposed AFEWES Move Fails DOD's
Criteria for Closure or Realignment
On All Three Counts.***

Recommendations

- **Keep AFEWES at Fort Worth**
 - *Least Cost to the Taxpayer*
 - *Continuous Support for Users*
 - *Full Test Capability*


“Had we attempted to conduct this entire process by means of a field test, which for all practical purposes, would have been impossible, we would have used over 200 flying hours, 100 test range hours, and 4000 MJU-23/B flares at a cost of five million dollars above the cost to accomplish the process at AFEWES. Our high degree of confidence in the simulation coupled with the ability to collect a large amount of relatively inexpensive data in a short amount of time allowed us to focus our efforts in the field test. Through a combination of using digital modeling, hardware-in-the-loop simulation, and flight testing, we found a way to increase the odds that the B-1B can perform its mission and get its crew home safely.”

**-513 Engineering and Test Squadron
Presentation at 1995
Infrared Countermeasures
Specialty Group Meeting**



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The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission



Dallas Regional Hearing • April 19, 1995 • Bergstrom Presentation

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Dallas Regional Hearings - April 19, 1995

Background Memorandum - Facts and Analysis

"Bergstrom is the perfect example of base re-use this administration is looking for."
Sherri Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, June 10, 1994

"At an Austin City Council meeting on February 21, 1992, I set out the situation as it then stood. Under the recommendations of the 1991 Commission, which were accepted by the President and the Congress, the 924th was to stay at Bergstrom if certain condiditons were met."

Letter from James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in letter of May 27, 1993 to the BRACC

Summary of Contents

Part I History and Previous BRACC Decisions

In 1991 and 1993 previous BRACC's considered Bergstrom and concluded the Air Force Reserve should remain. These decisions are current public law.

Part II Mission Requirements

Objectively evaluated, Bergstrom belongs in the highest category—Green—for operational readiness and mission requirements.

Part III Cost Comparison

Objectively evaluated, Bergstrom is one of the most cost effective locations to base an Air Force Reserve unit.

Part IV Alternative Proposal

If the goal is to eliminate one F-16 unit from the Air Force Reserve and to save taxpayer monies, consolidating units at Bergstrom will save taxpayers 2-3 times the amount saved by closing Bergstrom.

Prepared by the Austin BRACC Study Group under the auspices of the City of Austin and Greater Chamber of Commerce.

History and Previous BRACC Decisions

Bergstrom Air Force Base was established in 1942 as the Del Valle Army Air Base on land purchased for that purpose by the City of Austin. For the next 50 years, the Base served our nation as the home of Continental Air Command C-47's, Strategic Air Command B-52's and KC-135's and Tactical Air Command P-82's, F-101's and RF-4's, among other aircraft. In addition to its flying operations, the base served as the home of the 12th Air Force, the TAC Senior NCO Academy, West and the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF).

The 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended and the President and Congress concurred that Bergstrom AFB be closed as an active duty Air Base. In addition, the law stated that *"The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be distributed."*

In a City Council work session on February 21, 1992, James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Military Installations, USAF, told the citizens of Austin that the 1991 BRAC law gave them until June 1993 to decide whether or not they were going to build a municipal airport at Bergstrom and that the Air Force would abide by that time line with regard to any decision about the Reserve unit. Secretary Boatright also stated, *"Our plan is still, and will remain, and our planning efforts will be toward operating that unit at Bergstrom assuming that there is going to be an airport."* and again, *"Certainly we would like to see an airport there because then we would leave the unit right where it is. But that's your decision, the community's decision, however you decide it we'll make it work for the department of the Air Force."*

May 1, 1993, the citizens of Austin by a vote of 63% to 37% overwhelmingly approved a \$400 million referendum to move the airport to the Bergstrom site. Subsequent to that vote, planning was begun on the airport master plan, to include the Reserve cantonment area. That plan includes a schedule which will move the cargo operations to the new site

by 1996 and the passenger operations by 1998. The vote preceded the law's **June 1993** deadline and this schedule meets the timetable of making Bergstrom *"an economically viable entity by the end of 1996"*.

The 1991 law also said that, *"The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there."* This facility strips and paints fighter aircraft in the most environmentally advanced airplane painting facility in the Air Force. At the same time, the RCCF saves the Air Force between \$1.5 and \$2.0 million a year over the cost of painting those 100 aircraft at a depot.

Even so, in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended to the BRAC and the '93 Brac agreed to *"Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority assumes the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date"*. Subsequently, the DOD ruled that the City must contract with an independent contractor, who would then bid on the Air Force's work. The city and DOD continue to work on this issue. Currently, the city, at its expense, has provided temporary electrical service and is rerouting utilities to the RCCF to insure its continued operation.

Also in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended, *"The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed unless . . ."* At that time, the Base had not officially closed and the airport master planning was in its early stages.

The citizens BRAC task force questioned whether the Air Force had considered all services' MILCON funds in its justification. The task force showed that the DOD (Navy) could save approximately \$57 million in MILCON funds at NAS Ft. Worth by collocating the 301st FW at Bergstrom and having the Navy utilize the buildings currently used by the 301st FW and those which would be used if the 704th FS moved there. This was substantially more than the \$6.7 million in MILCON funds which the Secretary of Defense stated would be saved with the Bergstrom move.

They also questioned whether a base which was located in airspace with

the second highest trafficked airport in the nation could effectively meet its training and unit readiness obligations. In 1991, Carswell AFB was closed in part due to, "... the worst ground and regional air space encroachment in its category. The regional air space will continue to be stressed by aggressive aviation growth in the area." Moving more aircraft onto the "closed" base than were there when it was an active duty base did not seem reasonable.

Although the BRAC did not recommend moving the 301st FW to Austin, *"The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to consider the recruiting problems that may exist by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area."* and *"The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has ground-encroachment problems and is in a high density aircraft traffic pattern."* The '93 BRAC law did reaffirm the '91 BRAC law by providing that the *"Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996."*

In September of 1993, Bergstrom Air Force Base was closed as an active duty base. The 67th Reconnaissance Wing was deactivated and the 12th Air Force Headquarters and ancillary units moved to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. With the closure, Austin lost 3,870 military and 1,256 civilian jobs in addition to 6,628 military dependents. Austin's economy lost approximately \$330 million a year due to the base closing.

Since September of 1993, the City of Austin has worked with the Air Force to identify a cantonment area(s) which minimizes the cost of any new construction for AFRES. They have designed the airport site plan based upon the location and configuration of that cantonment area. Designs are nearing completion and demolition and construction have begun with a projected opening of passenger service scheduled for October 1998.

Because of the Air Forces repeated promises, the '91 and '93 BRAC laws and Austin's commitment to the Reserves remaining, the city has committed to incurring additional costs in the design and construction of the new airport. These costs and/or design considerations include:

Part I: Previous BRACC Decisions

1. Location of the terminal and access to the north side of the site instead of south side. (location of the cantonment area)

a. North location would have required less demolition of existing leasable buildings and ramp space.

b. An additional access road would not have been required. (\$3,250,000 contract)

2. 6,200' spacing between runways required due to cantonment area and RCCF. Also, additional cross taxiway is required due to runway spacing. (FAA requires minimum 4,300' spacing for concurrent ILS approaches)

3. Secondary runway designed to be 9,000' for Reserves use, instead of 7,500' airlines wanted.

4. Relocation of cargo operations from existing airport two years prior to passenger operations, to meet '91 BRAC law. (approx. \$1,000,000 expense per year)

5. City's commitment of \$600,000 to the Reserves for the cantonment area.

6. City's commitment to reroute existing utilities to site. (\$464,897 already spent)

In recognition of the Bergstrom AFB history and the Bergstrom Air Reserve Station, the City Council voted in 1994 to name the new airport the *Austin-Bergstrom International Airport* (A-BIA).

In addition to sharing the cost of operations with a civilian airport beginning in 1996, other DOD units have committed or expressed an interest in sharing the 430 ac. cantonment area. These units include: the Army National Guard Aviation Brigade (committed), the Naval Reserve Center (currently sharing some facilities) and NASA (base U-2 airplanes). This led Sherri W. Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) in June of 1994 to say, "*Bergstrom is the perfect example of base reuse this administration is looking for.*"

*"The Air Force in the 21st Century is going to be lean, is going to be agile, and is going to be **higher-tech** than the one we know today."* The Air Force of tomorrow, which Gen. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, USAF, was referring in February 1995, will be required to be highly educated and technically competent. Austin, Texas provides just such a recruitment base. This community is the most highly educated among cities with a population of over 250,000. 83%, 25 yrs. or older, are high school graduates, 32% have bachelor's degrees and 11% have graduate or professional degrees. There are seven colleges and universities with over 100,000 students, including the third largest state University in the US, The University of Texas, located in the Austin area. Texas A&M, with 43,000 students is only 90 miles away. Austin is known as the "best read city in the nation" with more bookstores per capita than any other city in the US.

Austin is also recognized as one of three high tech centers in the United States, "Silicon Hills". Of 800 manufacturers, 300 are high-tech, employing 33,600 people, or 65% of the manufacturing workforce. Austin is also the home of "Pickle Research Center", a major defense research lab and numerous defense contractors. These include: Tracor, Lockheed, Motorola, Radian, Texas Instruments, and others.

Supporting the Air Force's recruiting efforts is a city with over 14,000 military retirees and their dependents and over 115 different military organizations with 103,000 members. Austin is a military town with all the branches of the Armed Services represented here, including the Headquarters, Texas Army and Air National Guard. In addition, there are four AFROTC and 14 AFJROTC programs in the area.

"Quality personnel are the most critical part of any organization." When Secretary Widnall said that in February 1995, instead of the Air Force as a whole, she could have been talking about the men and women of Bergstrom Air Reserve Station and Austin, Texas. For that is what Austin provides the Air Force, a quality reservist, a quality facility, a quality civilian employer and a quality environment in which to live, work and rear a family.

Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

Appendix 7, Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations (“AF Analysis”) shows the overall evaluation for several AFRES installations for each of the eight Criteria used by the Air Force in their evaluation. Criteria I.1.A and I.1.B are excluded and appear to apply only to Active Duty installations. As shown below, according to the objective criteria specified in the AF Analysis, Bergstrom ARS is an outstanding location for any Air Force Reserve Mission.

Overall, Criteria I.1, Mission (Flying) Requirements

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requireme	Yellow -	Green -

Overall, Criteria II.3, Airspace Encroachment

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -

Overall, Criteria II, Facilities and Infrastructure

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yc	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

Overall Rating for Bergstrom ARS Criteria I and II

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

I. Airfield Capabilities

Appendix 7 of the AF Analysis is further broken down into subelements. Criteria I.1.C, "Airfield Capabilities," lists Bergstrom as a Yellow Minus, but in actuality is Green. The "Airfield Capabilities" category is further broken down into subelements: runways, taxiways, and aprons to determine the rating.

A. Criteria I.1.C.1, Runway/Taxiway for Fighter mission, shows Bergstrom as Green which is correct.

B. Criteria I.1.C.2, Runway/Taxiway for Bomber mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 200 ft wide and at least 10000 ft long,
Taxiway at least 75 ft wide,
Apron at least 278400 sq. ft,
Pavement strength supports bomber mission.
Red = Anything else
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Runway - 300 ft wide and 12250 ft long
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft wide stressed/150 ft wide total
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft or 2.85 times requirement
 - (d) Pavement - will support bomber mission
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

C. Criteria I.1.C.3, Runway/Taxiway for Tanker mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft wide and at least 8000 ft long,

Taxiway at least 75 ft wide,
Apron at least 283200 sq. ft,
Pavement strength supports bomber mission.
Red = Anything else

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
- (a) Runway - 300 ft wide and 12250 ft long
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft wide stressed/150 ft wide total
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft or 2.8 times requirement
 - (d) Pavement - will support tanker mission
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

D. Criteria I.1.C.4, Runway/Taxiway for Airlift mission, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft wide and at least 8000 ft long,
Taxiway at least 75 ft wide,
Apron at least 433104 sq. ft,
Pavement strength supports airlift mission.
Red = Anything else

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
- (a) Runway - 300 ft wide and 12250 ft long,
 - (b) Taxiway - 75 ft wide stressed/150 ft wide total,
 - (c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft or 1.83 times requirement,
 - (d) Pavement - will support airlift mission.
 - (e) Source -
 - 924 SPTG/BCE
 - Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

E. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria I.1.C, Airfield Capabilities:

<u>Airfield Capability</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Fighter Mission	Green	Green
Bomber Mission	Red	Green
Tanker Mission	Red	Green
Airlift Mission	Red	Green
Overall	Yellow -	Green

II. Operational Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D, ARC Operational Effectiveness, shows Bergstrom as Yellow minus. Operational Effectiveness is further broken down (AF Analysis pages 7- 12) into subelements "Base Operating Support Integration" and "ARC Training Effectiveness" to determine the rating.

- A. Criteria I.1.D.1, Base Operating Support Integration, lists Bergstrom as overall Yellow. The rationale for the subelements is unclear and refers to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements (IX.16). Based on the subelements and the criteria listed in the document, it appears that the overall rating of Yellow is currently correct, but probably incorrect after construction of the Austin/Bergstrom Airport. For example, the criteria asks, "Are there other Government aviation units collocated on the airfield?". Based on the fact that the Texas National Guard Aviation Department will be basing their helicopters, now located at Mueller Airport, here in 1998, it seems only prudent to include them in any future plans or data.
- B. Criteria I.1.D.1.a, Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants, shows:
 (1) AF Analysis - Yellow

- (2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Based on current conditions Yellow is correct but that will probably change when the National Guard (NG) relocates here in 1998. Since they use the same fuel (JP-8), it makes sense for them to utilize the AFRES fuel farm.
 - (b) Source -
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
 - 924 SPTG/CC

C. Criteria I.1.D.1.b, Security, shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

D. Criteria I.1.D. 1 .c, Base Supply, shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

E. Criteria I.1.D.1.d, Tower/Air Traffic Control, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis Status - Yellow
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Bergstrom currently manages the ATCALs contract with a civilian contractor for the airfield at a cost of \$31,000 per month. This will continue until the end of FY 96 when the Aviation Department, City of Austin will assume the operation of the airfield and the ATCALs contract.
 - (b) Source - 924 OSS/OSA

F. Criteria I.1.D.1.e, Base Civil Engineering, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Yellow
- (2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
- (3) Criteria: Green Joint or Civil
 Yellow Tenant or Host
 Red Separate
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Based on discussions that have already been held with the National Guard (NG) and the City of Austin,

it appears that the 924 FW will be providing the NG Aviation Department with fire fighting protection from the 924 SPTG/BCE fire department. This is to comply with DoD fire protection directives.

(b) Source - 924 SPTG/BCE

G. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria I.1.D.1, Base Operating Support Integration:

<u>Base Operating Support Integration</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Yellow	Green
Security	Yellow	Yellow
Base Supply	Yellow	Yellow
Tower/Air Traffic Control	Yellow	Green
Civil Engineering	Yellow	Green
Overall	Yellow	Green

III. Training Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D.2, ARC Training Effectiveness, is further broken down into Fighter Training, Tanker Training, and Airlift Training. All data in this section was provided by HQ USAF/RT (formerly HQ USAF/XOOR). No rationale is given as to the size requirements for the MOAs. Although Bombers were addressed under Criteria I.1.C Airfield Capabilities, they are conspicuously absent under this criteria. Criteria I.1.D.2.b, Tanker Training and Criteria I.1.D.2.c, Airlift Training appear to be correct as stated in the AF Analysis. The AF Analysis contains a number of errors in its analysis of Fighter Training.

A. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.1, Supersonic Air Combat MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red +
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <= 150NM
 - Yellow 150 NM and <= 200NM
 - Red > 200 NM
 - Size: Minimum of 4200 sq. NM (nominal 75 X 56 NM)
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) W-228 is located 140 NM to the southeast of Bergstrom.
 - (b) Source - Jet Navigational Chart (JNC) 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

B. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2, Other Air Combat MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green <= 100NM
 - Yellow 100NM and <= 150NM
 - Red >150NM
 - Size: Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and 20,000 feet altitude block above 5000 feet AGL.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - Brownwood Area 96 nm north
 - Chase Area 70 nm south
 - Randolph Areas 70 nm south
 - Brady Area 50 nm northwest *
 - (a) Source -
 - Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) H-23B
 - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- (5) * Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25 NM), the 924 FW is able to fulfill approximately 75 % of its air-to-air training requirements, 75 % of its MAVERICK training requirements, and 10% of its air-to-ground training requirements in this MOA located 80 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

C. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3, Low altitude MOAs, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**

- (3) Criteria:
 - Green \leq 100 NM
 - Yellow \geq 100 NM and \leq 150 NM
 - Red $>$ 150NM
 - Size: Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and from surface up to at least 2500 feet AGL.
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) W-228 is located 140 NM southeast of Bergstrom.
Brady Area 60 nm northwest *
 - (b) Source - JNC 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- (5) *Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25 NM), the 924 FW is able to fulfill all of its low altitude training requirements in this MOA. Brady MOA is located 60 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

D. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4, Scoreable Range complexes, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Scoreable Range -
Green Criteria -1 < 100 nm and 4 < 250 nm
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Shoal Creek Range is 70 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A.
 - (b) Yankee Range is 122 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R-6312.
 - (c) Dixie Range is 128 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R- 6312.
 - (d) Peason Ridge is 225 NM east of Bergstrom inside R-3803A.
 - (e) Ft. Polk is 225 NM east of Bergstrom.
- (5) Source -
TPC H-23B
AFR 50-46
- (6) Note: The 924 FW is able to accomplish 100% of its required air-to-ground weapons delivery requirements on the first three ranges listed.

E. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5, Electronic Combat Range within 250 NM, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria: Green
 \leq 250 NM
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

- (a) Ft Hood is 65 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A
- (b) The U.S. Army has a threat array located on the east side of the impact area that simulate numerous real world threats. They also have personnel assigned to maintain, deploy, and operate the threat system. The capability exists to operate against the threats and to employ ECM pods.
- (c) Source - TPC H-23B
U.S. Army

F. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.6, Ground Forces/Tactical Aircraft Employment, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

G. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7, Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Ranges, shows Bergstrom as Red and that is correct. The closest ACMI range is W-453, 460 NM east of Bergstrom.

- (1) Note: Although a lot of emphasis is placed on ACMI ranges, they are extremely costly to build, operate, maintain and technology has made them obsolete.

H. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8, Full Scale Weapons Drop Ranges, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
Green \leq 200 NM
Yellow $>200\text{NM}$ and $\leq 250\text{NM}$
Red > 250 NM
- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Ft Hood is 60 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A and is a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range.
 - (b) Source - TPC H-23B

I. Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9, Visual Routes/Instrument Routes (VIR/IR), shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

J. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria I.1.D.2.a, ARC Fighter Training Areas:

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Supersonic Area	Red	Green
Other Areas	Red	Green
Low Altitude Areas	Red	Green
Scoreable Ranges	Red	Green
Electronic Combat	Red	Green
Ground/Tactical Area	Green	Green
ACMI Ranges	Red	Red
Weapons Drop Areas	Red	Green
Low level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Training Areas	Red +	Green -

K Overall Revised Rating for Criteria I.1.D.2, ARC Effectiveness

<u>Mission</u>	<u>DOD Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Fighter Training	Red +	Green -
Tanker Training	Green -	Green -
Airlift Training	Green	Green
Overall Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -

IV. Mission Support Facilities

Criteria II.1, Mission Support Facilities, shows Bergstrom as overall Yellow -. Any further information needed on this criteria must come from AFRes.

V. Associated Airspace

Criteria II.3.A, Existing Associated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, and Low Level Routes. There are no specific corresponding questions in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire. The analysis here appears to be a compilation of all the airspace, range, and low level data originally contained in the unit response to the Questionnaire and appears to be somewhat subjective.

A. Criteria II.3.A.1, MOAs and Restricted Airspace, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:
 - Green - Civil and commercial aviation development generally compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace.
 - Yellow - Civil and commercial aviation development impacts access to some (limited) MOAs.
 - Red - Civil and commercial aviation dominates the development of and access to MOAs or Restricted

Airspace

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

- (a) The two MOAs used the majority of the time by the 924 FW, Brady and Brownwood, are impacted very little by civil and commercial aviation. The only impact is when the Brownwood MOAs are capped because of weather problems around Dallas/Ft Worth Airport and they are seldom capped below FL 230 which allows the 924 FW to complete its mission. The Brady MOA is almost never impacted by civil aviation. The other MOA's often used - Chase, Randolph, Crystal - are seldom effected by civil aviation because of their location in south Texas, a sparsely populated region.
- (b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
 - 924 OSS/OSAM

B. Criteria II.3.A.2, Bombing Ranges, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria:

Green - Regional development generally compatible with Air to-Ground ranges

Yellow - Regional development incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to-Ground ranges

Red - Regional development severely incompatible in many areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

- (a) There is no data to support a Red rating. The three ranges predominately used by the 924 FW have NO regional development that impacts on them.
- (b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
 - 924 OSS/OSK Interview

C. Criteria II.3.A.3, Low Level Routes, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

D. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria II.3.A, Existing Associated Airspace:

<u>Existing Associated Airspace</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green
Low Level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	Red +	Green

VI. Future Airspace

Criteria II.3.B, Future Associated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, and Low Level Routes. The same comments listed above for existing airspace also apply here.

A. Criteria II.3.B.1, MOAs and Restricted Airspace, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - **Green**
- (3) Criteria:

Green Future civil and commercial aviation development generally expected to remain compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace

Yellow Future civil and commercial aviation development may impact access to some (limited) MOAs. Future development of MOAs and Restricted Airspace may be limited

Red Future civil and commercial aviation may dominate the area and access to MOAs may become severely limited. Future development Restricted Airspace incompatible.

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

- (a) No data is presented to substantiate this rating of Red. The FAA, Ft Worth Region and Houston Center over the last several years have publicized their Airspace 2000 plans and their future plans for the Austin Bergstrom International Airport. These plans indicate the 924 FW should have little conflict in meeting its future airspace needs and requirements. Houston Center at one time proposed a new MOA for the 924 FW due west of the base off the Junction TACAN that would be from surface to FL450 and have the capacity to support 100% of the unit's air-to-air requirements for airspace. Any changes to the Brownwood MOAs would have minimal impact on

The 924 FW since they have other quality airspace available in south Texas, a low air traffic region.

- (b) Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire; 924 OSS/OSAM

B. Criteria II.3.B.2, Bombing Ranges, shows:

- (1) AF Analysis - Red
- (2) Correct Status - Green
- (3) Criteria:

Green - Future regional development generally expected to remain compatible with Air-to-Ground ranges

Yellow - Future regional development may become incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to Ground ranges

Red - Future regional development may become severely incompatible in many areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges

- (4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
 - (a) Once again there are no data available to substantiate this rating and it appears to be subjective. There are no known FAA plans, including their Airspace 2000 plan, that will adversely impact 924 FW bombing ranges. Again, south Texas is a low civil air traffic region.
 - (b) Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire - 924 OSS/OSAM

C. Criteria II.3.B.3, Low Level Routes, shows Bergstrom ARS as Green and that is correct.

D. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria II.3.B, Future Associated Airspace:

<u>Future Associated Airspace</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green
Low Level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	Red +	Green

VII. Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment

Criteria II.3.C, Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

VIII. Future Airspace Encroachment

Criteria II.3.D, Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is also based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

IX. Air Quality

Criteria II.4, Air Quality, is further broken down into Attainment Status, Restrictions, and Future Growth. The data for this is from the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire, Elements VIII.1 and VIII.16

A. Criteria II.4.A, Attainment Status, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

B. Criteria II.4.B, Restrictions, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Yellow

(2) Correct Status - **Green**

(3) Criteria:

Green - Not Yellow and not Red

Yellow - 1 block \geq 40 or 2 blocks \geq 30 or 3 blocks \geq 20

Red - 1 block \geq 50 or 2 blocks \geq 40 or 3 blocks \geq 30

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) No mention is made in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire of what constitutes a block. It is not possible with the data that we have to determine how a rating of Yellow was derived. On reviewing the Questionnaire Element data, there are only two areas mentioned, VIII.E.8 Monitoring and VIII.E.9 BACT/LAER, and neither of them indicate that Bergstrom is not in complete compliance with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) rules and regulations. The City of Austin environmental compliance officer has called Bergstrom

“pristine” when compared with most airports or military bases.

- (b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire, interview with City of Austin environmental compliance officer.

C. Criteria II.4.C, Future Growth, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

D. Overall Revised Rating for Criteria II.4, Air Quality:

<u>Air Quality</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Attainment Status	Green	Green
Restrictions	Yellow	Green
Future Growth	Green	Green
Overall	Green -	Green

X. Billeting Requirements

Criteria II.6, Billeting Requirements, is broken down into Installation Billeting and Commercial Billeting. This area relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements IX.3.A and IX.3.B.

Bergstrom ARS has 1191 AF reservists assigned as of 23 March 1995. Of these a maximum of 385 require billeting during drill weekends. The 924 FW provides 155 on-base billets and 230 off-base billets during drill weekends. This equates to 32% of reservists requiring billeting, 13% on-base and 19% off-base, with the off-base billeting providing 60% of the total. This does not change the AF Analysis of Yellow but is lower than the figures shown in the Questionnaire.

XI. Economic Impact

Criteria VI, Economic Impact, shows the Percent Job Loss (All BRACs) for Bergstrom as 0.3%, Carswell as <0.1%, and Homestead as 0.1%.

XII. Community

Criteria VII, Community, really refers to recruiting data for each community. All the AFRES bases listed are Green -. This is because of Criteria VII. 11, Other Local Guard/Reserve Unit, and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Element IX. 12. All AFRES units are shown as

Yellow under this Criteria because they have > 2 units and <= 10 units in their community. It is not understood how the Carswell AFRES location can recruit effectively when competing for almost 12,000 military and reservists in the Ft. Worth area.

XIII. Environmental Impact

Criteria VIII, Environmental Impact, shows Bergstrom as overall Green with only one area rated Yellow. That area is Criteria VIII. 5, Installation Restoration Program (IRP). It is shown as Yellow and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements VIII. 13 .A - VIII. 13 F. It is interesting to note that Carswell is the only AFRES base that is shown as Green under Criteria VIII.5. Bergstrom is the only AFRES base shown as Green under Criteria VIII.2, Asbestos.

XIV. Summary

Overall, Criteria I.1, Mission (Flying) Requirements

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requireme	Yellow -	Green -

Overall, Criteria II.3, Airspace Encroachment

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green -

Overall, Criteria II, Facilities and Infrastructure

Part II: Mission Requirements

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

Overall Rating for Bergstrom ARS Criteria I and II

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>AF Analysis</u>	<u>Correct Conclusion</u>
Mission (Flying) Requirements Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow - Yellow	Green - Green -

Cost Comparison

I. The Air Force cost analysis appears inconsistent and inaccurate.

A. Inputs to the financial model suspect

The Air Force uses the "COBRA" computer model to simulate the effects of a proposed realignment or base closure. While the model may work when provided valid data, none of the inputs or assumptions are apparent from the COBRA model. There are however, several areas for concern.

1. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that they only considered Air Force monies. That is, BRACC monies, other service monies, other federal agency monies are not considered. For example, the BRACC monies saved by closing Homestead or the Navy monies saved by moving the 301 FW from Ft. Worth were not considered.
2. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that military force structure is not considered in the COBRA model. However, the Bergstrom model clearly shows the job elimination or realignment of the civilian (ART) force for Bergstrom. The civilian ART force is a large part of the "military" presence in the Reserve - in contrast with the normal active duty civilian force.
3. A review shows that the assumptions for Bergstrom are in error or the model is indecipherable. For example, the model submitted to the BRACC shows all costs for Bergstrom doubling after 1997. In fact, the overhead costs will substantially reduce as the City of Austin assumes more control of the base.
4. The Air Force submission to the BRACC shows a model for converting Bergstrom to KC-135's, closing Bergstrom, and moving the unit to MacDill. This move contemplates construction costs at MacDill about the same as Bergstrom - such a move would be at a net cost to the government.

B. Personnel costs associated with Force Structure should not be considered

The Austin BRACC Study Group believes it is unreasonable to consider military personnel costs associated with force structure to be considered in determining locations for realignment or closure. The AF Reserve civilian ART force is largely part of the force structure. When comparing AFRES units with similar missions, it is reasonable to assume that military personnel costs are approximately equal. That is, the military personnel costs associated with closing the Bergstrom F-16 unit would be about the same as the unit at Miami or New Orleans, etc.

The Austin BRACC Study Group therefore made a cost comparison between AFRES fighter locations based on two factors. First, an estimate of the overhead associated with the six F-16 fighter locations was made. This estimate was based on the Base Operating Support (BOS) budgets of each unit. Several of the units are based at an Air Force active duty location and their overhead is less than a unit located at a joint use field and substantially lower than an AFRES operated base. However, the Air Force assumes a variable cost associated with its AFRES units, and this variable overhead needs to be considered.

Second, the Austin BRACC Study Group collected the current construction costs for the services at the six AFRES fighter locations. In our analysis "opportunity cost" is taken as the construction cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer if the listed AFRES location were to close. For example, at Homestead \$88 million in new construction projects are planned

Cost Comparison

I. The Air Force cost analysis appears inconsistent and inaccurate.

A. Inputs to the financial model suspect

The Air Force uses the "COBRA" computer model to simulate the effects of a proposed realignment or base closure. While the model may work when provided valid data, none of the inputs or assumptions are apparent from the COBRA model. There are however, several areas for concern.

1. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that they only considered Air Force monies. That is, BRACC monies, other service monies, other federal agency monies are not considered. For example, the BRACC monies saved by closing Homestead or the Navy monies saved by moving the 301 FW from Ft. Worth were not considered.
2. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that military force structure is not considered in the COBRA model. However, the Bergstrom model clearly shows the job elimination or realignment of the civilian (ART) force for Bergstrom. The civilian ART force is a large part of the "military" presence in the Reserve - in contrast with the normal active duty civilian force.
3. A review shows that the assumptions for Bergstrom are in error or the model is indecipherable. For example, the model submitted to the BRACC shows all costs for Bergstrom doubling after 1997. In fact, the overhead costs will substantially reduce as the City of Austin assumes more control of the base.
4. The Air Force submission to the BRACC shows a model for converting Bergstrom to KC-135's, closing Bergstrom, and moving the unit to MacDill. This move contemplates construction costs at MacDill about the same as Bergstrom - such a move would be at a net cost to the government.

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and \$15 million has been spent. At Austin/Bergstrom, \$13 million in new construction is authorized and \$2 million has been spent. At Phoenix (Luke AFB), although the value of the AFRES facilities are close to \$50 million, only \$20 million of new construction is planned in the next 2 years.

II. Summary of Cost Savings

	1996 Opportunity Cost	Annual Overhead	Net Present Value*
Miami	-73,000,000	5,000,000	(\$118,642,728)
Fort Worth	-59,000,000	2,500,000	(\$81,821,364)
Austin	-11,000,000	3,500,000	(\$42,949,910)
Phoenix	-20,000,000	2,500,000	(\$42,821,364)
New Orleans	0	3,000,000	(\$27,385,637)
Salt Lake City	0	2,500,000	(\$22,821,364)

*Using a discount rate of 9% and a 20 year cost recovery period.

Cost to closure has not been considered, but would make the Austin location look substantially more favorable. The Air Force in their COBRA analysis estimated the cost to close Austin/Bergstrom at \$34 million and the cost to close Miami/Homestead at only \$7.9 million. Obviously, the cost to close Fort Worth, Phoenix, New Orleans, or Salt Lake City would be substantially less than Austin or Miami because they would remain as operating DOD facilities.

It should be noted that if the Air Force's estimate of \$34 million to close Austin/Bergstrom is correct, then the savings by closing Bergstrom is about \$9 million over 20 years (again, excluding military force structure).

In its final report to the BRACC the Austin BRACC Study Group intends to compare other AFRES locations to the above listed F-16 locations. It is certainly true, however, based on the above analysis, that Austin/Bergstrom is NOT the most expensive AFRES location and in fact it compares favorably.

Alternative Proposal

Proposal

The Air Force has proposed closing Bergstrom ARS for two stated reasons: eliminate one F-16 unit; and save money. To follow is one suggestion for accomplishing these two goals. There are, of course, many alternatives - this is but one alternative for the BRACC to consider.

1. Move the AFRES flying squadron from NAS Ft. Worth to Bergstrom.

In 1993 the Air Force proposed closing Bergstrom and consolidating 2 F-16 squadrons at Ft. Worth (i.e. Carswell). The Air Force estimated that such a consolidation would cost around \$6 million, but save \$20 million per year. Consolidation at Ft. Worth does not make sense for many reasons. For example, the Navy, Air Guard, and Army are moving a large number of aircraft into Ft. Worth, creating congested ground and airspace. Carswell was closed as an active duty installation for, inter alia, this ground and airspace congestion and encroachment.

Consolidating at Austin/Bergstrom does make sense both for military value and cost savings. As outlined below, Bergstrom is an ideal location for consolidation and would be cost effective.

2. Close Homestead Air Reserve Base.

In 1993 the BRACC decided to consolidate Air Force Reserve units at Homestead, with the understanding that Dade County would make the Base a joint use facility (but not a commercial air carrier facility). This decision is expensive for the United States - **\$88 million** in new construction required. Dade County argued that a Homestead consolidation made sense because, inter alia: the 301st Rescue Squadron and 302 Fighter Wing would both make use of Homestead; and with MacDill AFB closed, there was no Air Force presence in south central Florida.

1995 has brought substantial changes from the Air Force. The Air Force now proposes leaving the 30st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida. Little justification can be made for spending \$88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

3. Section I below explains how such a proposal would not have a negative effect on military value - specifically Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements. Section II below explains how this proposal would save the U.S. taxpayer almost \$200 million in overhead and an additional \$400 million in personnel savings, while eliminating only one F-16 squadron.

I. Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

A. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from Ft. Worth NAS's single runway in a high aircraft traffic area degrades operational readiness, increases operating costs, and unnecessarily increases risks.

1. It will be difficult to launch and recover from a single runway on a normal basis the 150 - 200 aircraft proposed for Ft. Worth NAS in a high aircraft traffic area, degrading operational readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

Exhibit IV-A shows the normal operational tempo for Carswell/Ft. Worth. As can be seen from Exhibit IV-A, in normal operation approximately 100 sorties, and 250 takeoffs, approaches, and landings per day can be anticipated. Allocating a takeoff and landing window of three minutes to each aircraft results in a 12 1/2 hour flying day and approximately a 14 hour duty day.

Even with such mitigation practices as staggering duty days of the various squadrons, diverting the 25 rotary sorties, and combining fighters into flights, Carswell/Ft. Worth's single runway is faced with about a 10 hour stream of takeoffs and landings with aircraft assigned several minute windows for takeoffs and recoveries. Scheduling would be dictated by takeoff and recovery allocations instead of mission requirements. Maintenance delays would result in canceled sorties and loss of training; control delays and aircraft in-flight emergencies would have a ripple effect resulting in canceling dozens of sorties. Instrument weather in the Carswell/Ft. Worth area would force cancellation of many additional sorties and the attendant unnecessary loss of training.¹

While Exhibit IV-A illustrates normal operational tempo, an important test of war time training is the ability to surge and exercise under war time conditions. Under the proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth, any exercise could only be undertaken if other flying units were willing to stand down during the exercise period. Further, a desirable characteristic of a military base is its capacity to expand and surge in times of potential hostilities - Carswell/Ft. Worth would have no excess capacity.

The proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth would result in one of the most active single runway operations during daylight hours in the world. Truly a remarkable task for a base previously closed because it had "the worst ground and regional airport encroachment in its category."²

¹The instrument weather could be mild, say 1500 foot ceilings, and yet force instrument approaches. Requiring instrument approaches would force cancellation of many sorties even though the training area weather is adequate.

²Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President 1991, p. 53

BERGSTROM

In contrast, the Bergstrom/Austin airport is a two runway operation.³ As an operating Air Force Base, Bergstrom sustained 100 takeoffs, approaches, and landings for four squadrons during a normal duty day. With the addition of commercial traffic and another suitable runway, two F-16 squadrons could easily be accommodated without any operational impediment.

2. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a high traffic area incurs a substantial hidden operational cost.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

DFW is the one of the highest traffic areas in the United States.⁴ As can be seen from Exhibit IV-B, Carswell/Ft. Worth is one of 25 airports in the Dallas-Fort Worth terminal control area. It is readily apparent from Exhibit IV-B that any departure other than to the West is difficult from Carswell/Ft. Worth.

The current plan for Carswell/Ft. Worth launch and recovery in good weather (VMC) is to depart all aircraft to the West below 4,000 ft. for 30 miles prior to permitting turns to the North or South or further climbs to altitude.⁵ Good weather recoveries are similarly restrictive with approach corridors from the Northwest and Southwest to Carswell/Ft. Worth. In most cases, the routing and altitudes are indirect, adding time and cost to operational training.

While the FAA and the military are working hard to minimize aircraft delays, because of the indirect routing and altitude restrictions, as well as the heavy volume of traffic at Carswell/Ft. Worth and in the DFW area, several minutes of additional flight time per sortie (in good weather) will occur because of the cumulative delays.⁶

Departure and approach delays into Carswell/Ft. Worth in inclement weather or at night (IMC) would impose even worse delays compared to good weather (VMC) approaches and recoveries. IMC departures for flights of fighters cannot use the VMC plan of remaining below 4000 feet for 30 miles. Many sorties will be canceled during IMC operations, reducing operational training, and the sorties that successfully launch will have significantly increased operational expense.

³Bergstrom currently has 1 large and 1 small runway. In 1998 the small runway will be eliminated and another parallel runway will be operational.

⁴Chicago O'Hare is the first.

⁵Contact Richard Baugh, Fort Worth Center Airspace Manager, for more details.

⁶Flights to the West under good conditions would experience little ground clearance or air traffic control delay, although the altitude and routing corridors will result in route delay. Departures to the East would encounter significant handling delay and the routing delay is staggering.

While estimates of increased operational costs at Carswell/Ft. Worth because of these cumulative delays are difficult to determine, approximate numbers will illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

- An F-16 squadron, such as the 301st FW at Ft. Worth, flies over 3,000 local sorties per year.
- Approximately 75% of the sorties are VMC and 25% of the sorties are IMC/night.
- A conservative estimate of these cumulative delays at Ft. Worth are 3-5 minutes (VMC) and 6-8 minutes (IMC).
- An F-16 costs over \$3000 per hour to operate.
- The added cost of Ft. Worth basing of an F-16 squadron approaches \$1,000,000 annually in operational expense when compared to a Bergstrom consolidation. The AFRES F-16's further add congestion and cost to the other aircraft at Ft. Worth NAS⁷ and civilian aircraft traffic in the DFW metroplex.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, Austin, Texas has low commercial aviation traffic and Bergstrom/Austin's two runways can handle easily two squadrons with no delay. The routings are direct to all military operating areas without added cost to other users.

3. Operating large numbers of fighter aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a populated area increases risks and diminishes operational training and readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

In the fighter business, operational requirements dictate that the fighters takeoff on time, arrive at their destinations on time, and fighters typically use their available fuel for training (ground attack or air combat) to the maximum extent possible. It is quite common for fighters to return to base with 10 minutes or less of fuel remaining in order to meet their training and operational objectives.⁸

Further, it is not uncommon for a fighter aircraft with an emergency to close a runway for a half hour or more, resulting in the diversion of all airborne aircraft to other air fields. Because Carswell/Ft. Worth will be the only military air field in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, military aircraft will be forced to recover at Alliance, Meacham, DFW, or Love in many cases.

Arriving at a single runway over a populated area presents a risk that should, if possible, be avoided. To offset the risk of running out of fuel or forced diversion into a civilian field, pilots will be forced to increase their fuel reserve - significantly reducing their effective training and operational readiness.

⁷The operational savings to the Navy by moving the F-16's to Bergstrom is also difficult to estimate with precision, but should approach \$2 million annually. (8000 local sorties; 2-3 minute takeoff, approach, or landing delays eliminated; \$4000-5000 per hour operation cost.)

⁸Because fuel is always limited, 10 - 15 minutes of fuel reserved for Carswell/Ft. Worth traffic delays typically means 10 - 15 minutes less training time. Because the tactical portion of a sortie is on the order of 30 minutes, half the operational training may be lost because of the need to guard against delays in the Carswell/Ft. Worth approach.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, the Bergstrom/Austin airport has two usable runways, practically eliminating the risk of diversion or the necessity to increase fuel reserve. Additionally, Bergstrom/Austin is fortunate to have other military air fields in the immediate area — Gray Army Air Field 54 miles to the North and Randolph AFB 50 miles to the Southwest. Finally, the approaches to Bergstrom are predominately over unpopulated areas.

II. Carswell/Ft. Worth's training air space is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed.

1. The bombing ranges reachable from Carswell/Ft. Worth are Army controlled, permit only limited tactics, and are often unavailable.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The primary range used by Carswell/Ft. Worth for bombing practice is the Falcon range on the Ft. Sill Army complex. Because the range is small, only limited tactical maneuvers are permitted, limiting the type of training available. The Air Training Command unit from Sheppard AFB unit also uses Falcon. An increasing problem is obtaining range time for Falcon. Because Falcon Range is part of an Army live fire complex, the Army often preempts all other use and sometimes even cancels other users on short notice.

Limited bombing practice can be achieved at Ft. Hood. Ft. Hood is controlled by the Army which is sometimes unable to yield time for Air Force training.

BERGSTROM

As can be seen from Exhibit IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom has available to it a greater variety of bombing ranges. Most important are the McMullen ranges - actually two ranges, Yankee and Dixie. Yankee is controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, while the Bergstrom Air Force Reserve controls Dixie. Neither range is in an Army complex, meaning access is unlimited and tactical entries can be made from the multiple low level routes leading to the ranges. Further, because Dixie is controlled by the Air Force Reserve, bombing practice is not preempted by any other user or authority.

Bergstrom has excellent access to Ft. Hood and is 60 miles (10 minutes) closer than Carswell/Ft. Worth.

Access to the Peason Tactical range at Ft. Polk is possible from Bergstrom. Bergstrom is 70 miles closer to Peason than Carswell/Ft. Worth, which means 12 minutes more time available in support of Army exercises. Because of the traffic flow at DFW, Ft. Polk is difficult to reach from Carswell/Ft. Worth.

2. The number of air combat ranges available from Carswell/Ft. Worth is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed for Carswell/Ft. Worth.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The Brownwood MOA has quality training airspace and is easily accessible from Carswell/Ft. Worth. Currently, however, the Navy schedules Brownwood in excess of six hours per day for its own use. With the addition of at least another Navy squadron using Brownwood and increasing traffic into DFW, use becomes difficult for Air Force use during normal duty hours. The result is that Air Force fighter squadrons based at Carswell/Ft. Worth will be forced to use Rivers MOA and Brady MOA a large percentage of the time. The Rivers and Brady MOA's are long distances from Carswell/Ft. Worth, substantially reducing the operational training and increasing operational costs for air combat training.⁹

BERGSTROM

Turning to Exh. IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom/Austin has a number of MOA's readily available to it for air combat training. The Brady MOA is owned by the Air Force Reserve and is only a short distance away. Equally close to Bergstrom/Austin, are the Randolph and Chase MOA's. With Navy Chase closed, the Chase MOA's are readily available. Even the Brownwood MOA can be easily used from Bergstrom/Austin for joint training with the Navy.

II. Cost Savings

A. Move 457th Flying Squadron to Bergstrom

As discussed above, the Air Force in 1993 estimated that consolidating the 704 FS from Bergstrom with the 457 FS at Carswell/Ft. Worth would cost \$6 million and save \$20 million per year. While these estimates may not be correct, they are useful for comparison.

The effects of moving the 457 FS from Ft. Worth to Bergstrom would be to eliminate the \$2.5 million per year in overhead incurred by the 301 FW in Ft. Worth. Additionally, the \$2.7 cost for military construction to move 10th Air Force to Ft. Worth would be saved, along with the \$300,000 in moving expense.

A significant savings would result from closing the 301 FW at Ft. Worth. First, the Navy would save approximately \$39 million in construction costs and complete their move to Ft. Worth earlier saving additional monies. This \$39 million is based on the estimated value of the 301 FW facilities using the Air Force pricing guide and square footage of the facilities. Additionally, the 301 FW was allocated \$18 million in new construction (it is unknown how much of this allocation has been spent).

To accommodate the 457 FS at Bergstrom under \$4.5 million would be spent. This estimate is from the Air Force Reserve and assumes a new operations building would be built and a fuel storage hanger. This estimate is not dependent on the type of airplane used by the 457 FS. The Bergstrom ramp area of 283,000 sq. ft. is of sufficient size to accommodate 36 F-16's and 8 KC-135's for example. There would be a moving cost estimated as \$1.2 million for moving the 457 FS to Bergstrom.

In Summary, the savings:

⁹ The 45-50 minute enroute time to the Rivers MOA is 45-50 minutes of valuable air combat training time lost.

In Summary, the savings:

- Move 457 FS Flying Squadron to Austin
 - » \$2.5 M Overhead saved per year
 - » Opportunity Cost \$59M
 - » Mil Con at Austin Required - (\$4.5M)
- Cost to move single squadron - (\$ 1.2 M)
- Savings from 10th Air Force remaining at Bergstrom
 - » \$2.7 Milcon
 - » \$.3 moving expense
- Present Value of Overhead and Construction Savings - \$81.5 million
- Personnel Savings additional \$182 million
(based on Air Force 1993 estimate of \$20 million per year in annual savings.)

Additional considerations:

- Ft. Worth is currently scheduled for
 - 11,500 Reservists
 - 140 Aircraft + transients and Lockheed
- 30 T/O, approach, or Landing per hour from a Single Runway in the DFW traffic area (as shown in Exhibit IV-A).
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to recruit.
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to drill.
- Closure of the 301 FW at Ft. Worth will not only save the Navy substantial military construction monies, but also save perhaps 2 years in their move completion timing.

B. Close Homestead

Homestead ARB has excellent flying airspace. The only negative from an operational training view is that there is no Army units located close enough for joint training.

As previously mentioned, reopening Homestead ARB is expensive for the United States - **\$88 million** in new construction is required. However, the Air Force now proposes leaving the 301st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida and establishing an Air Force Reserve unit. Little justification can be made for spending \$88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

In Summary, the savings from Homestead closure:

1. Construction Savings - \$73 million. This represents \$88 million allocated and the almost \$15 million already spent. See Exhibit IV-D.
2. Overhead Savings - \$5 M/year. As previously indicated, the overhead estimates are based are good faith estimates from a unit's Base Operating support budget, taking into

consideration the relative cost of running a unit, savings from joint use, and active duty associated costs.

3. Present Value of Savings - \$118 M

4. Cost to Close - \$ 7.9 M

This estimate may be low, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force in their COBRA studies.

5. Additional Personnel Savings, same as Bergstrom (~\$220 M). This is the estimated manpower savings resulting from closure. This estimate is believed to be high, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force for Bergstrom. Homestead manpower costs are at least as great as Bergstrom.

C. Summary of cost savings

- Move Carswell to Austin - \$81.5 million

- Close Homestead - \$110 million

- **Present Value of Total Overhead Savings for same combat capability- \$191.5 million**

- Additional Personnel Savings - ~\$400 million


NAS FT. WORTH PROJECTED DAILY OPERATIONAL TEMPO

	<u>LAUNCH AND RECOVERY</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE APPROACHES/ LANDINGS</u>	<u>TOTAL EVENTS</u>
TACTICAL¹	118	60	178²
MULTI-ENGINE	10	10	20
ROTARY	25	5	30
TRANSIENT	10	2	12
LOCKHEED	6	2	8
TOTALS	169	79	248

1. The Tactical projections are based on a survey of the fighter units involved. The F-16 squadron flies 16 sorties per day on a normal basis. The other projections are Navy estimates contained in its Defense Recommendation for Carswell white paper.


2. Almost 90% of the tactical sorties are daylight sorties. i.e. on 9 out of 10 days these 168+ tactical events will be attempted during normal flying hours 0830-1630, or 21 tactical events per hour. The remaining 70 events would be more evenly spread over the airport hours, or about 6 events per hour. 30 events per hour from a single runway are obviously not possible on a normal basis.

DFW Airspace




Denton


Propwash




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
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
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
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
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
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
Goode




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
Love



Bell




NAS Dallas




Redbird




Grand Prairie




Lancaster




Eagles Nest



McKinney



Hudson



SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE ¹	AVAILABILITY
McMullen Range	Actually two ranges - Yankee (north) and Dixie (south). The Navy owns the land, but their use has diminished. The Kelly Guard controls Yankee, while the Bergstrom Reserve controls Dixie. The ranges are good conventional ranges and have a number of tactical targets.	125 nm	Both ranges are fully manned and under-utilized. Could easily support more squadrons. The active duty Air Force at Randolph also uses Dixie in cooperation with Bergstrom.
Chase MOA	As the Navy leaves Chase, the entire air space becomes more available. Navy Corpus and Kingsville use the Chase MOA's to a limited extent.	70 nm	Largely available. One Chase MOA is close to Bergstrom, while another Chase MOA overlies McMullen Range.
Peason Range	Good tactical range in western Louisiana. The new Army Medium conflict exercise area. Ft. Polk.	225 nm	Will become major support area for exercises.
Ft. Hood	North Ft. Hood has a dedicated AF range - Shoal Creek. South Ft. Hood has a live bombing area. The Army sometimes limits access.	70 nm	Used increasingly to support the Army at Ft. Hood.

¹ All distances are direct from Bergstrom/Austin to the training area.

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Brownwood MOA	Brownwood includes separate air combat areas that can be used individually. Used together, the area can accommodate a big fight.	96 nm	Navy Dallas owns and uses a lot. Also, Carswell and Dyess B1's are users. Additionally, the FAA preempts military use for holding DFW traffic. Little available time left.
Brady MOA	Brady is low (23,000 ft. and below) which is advantageous for Low altitude training, but not as useful for unlimited training.	60 nm	Bergstrom owns and controls. It is close and easy to use.
Randolph MOA	The Randolph 2A MOA is large with a good altitude block for unlimited air combat training.	70 nm	Other Randolph MOA's are closer, but normally unavailable because of heavy use by Randolph.
Crystal MOA	The Crystal MOA is large, with the biggest altitude block of any MOA in Texas.	130 nm	Crystal is used and controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, and accordingly is normally available. However, its distance from Bergstrom makes it a second choice.

Encroachment Comparison



Carswell Looking North



Bergstrom Looking North

Construction and Demolition Underway




AFRES Cantonment Area







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SOUTH TEXAS ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING & MINE WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE



CORPUS CHRISTI BAY AREA MILITARY COMPLEX




Prepared by the South Texas Military Facilities Task Force
For Additional Information Contact Jerry Vernon,
P.O. Box 640, Corpus Christi, Texas 78403-0640, 512-883-5571, FAX 512-883-5027

**SOUTH
TEXAS
IS NAVY
COUNTRY**

CORPUS CHRISTI BAY AREA MILITARY COMPLEX

**OVER 2 MILLION
ACRES OF OPEN
RANCH LAND
APPROX.
80 X 50 MILE
AREA**




9 AIR MILES

30 AIR MILES

**AIRSPACE:
107,550 CUBIC MILES
OWNED & CONTROLLED
BY NAVY IN SOUTH TEXAS**

OPEN RANCH LAND



SUMMARY OF NAVY RECOMMENDATIONS

Navy Recommendation

Community Position

Single-site T-45

Agree

MH-53 Relocate to NAS Corpus Christi

Agree

Relocate CNATRA from Corpus Christi

~~Agree~~ INTERNAL NAVY,

Relocate T-34 from Corpus Christi

Agree


Relocate T-44 from Corpus Christi

Disagree

Redesignate NAS Corpus Christi to NAF

Disagree

USN -- USAF FLYING TRAINING BASES



AIRSPACE:
107,550 CUBIC MILES
OWNED & CONTROLLED
BY NAVY IN SOUTH TEXAS

MILITARY OPERATING AREA ■
DEFENSE OPERATING AREA ■

CORPUS CHRISTI BAY AREA REALIGNMENT BRAC PROPOSAL

SELECTION CRITERIA	Single Site T-45 NAS-K	HM Sqds. to NAS-CC HM15 Redirect	CNATRA Staff Relocate	Single Site T-34 Whiting Field	Move Entire T-44 Multi-Eng Program to Pensacola	Redesignate NAS Corpus Christi to NAF	COMMENTS
1. Current and Future Mission Requirements	↑	↑	↔	↔	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	1. Aggravates congestion 2. Current & future mission of approx. 8000 personnel at NAS-CC dictate NAS status
2. Availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace	↑	↑	↔	↔ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	↔	1. Primary training density concerns 2. Results in downgrade of air and station capacity
3. Availability to accommodate contingency mobilization and future requirements	↑	↑	↔	↔	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	1. NAS-CC can accept surge 2. Future expansion of mine warfare assets require NAS administration
4. Cost and Manpower Savings	↑	↑	↔	↑	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	1. NO SAVINGS to move currently single-sited T-44 2. CINCLANTFLT helo mission requires NAS status
5. Return on investment, number of years for savings to exceed costs	↑	↑	↔	↑	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	1. T-44 move COSTS money – NO SAVINGS 2. NAF status has dubious cost savings
6. Economic Impact to Community	↑	↑	↓	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	↔	1 & 2. Loss of 300 non-union civilian aircraft maintenance jobs
7. Ability of existing and receiving communities' infrastructures to support forces	↑	↑	↔	↑	↓ ⁽¹⁾	↓ ⁽²⁾	1. Current NAS-CC location idea for T-44 2. Incoming HM sqds and current tenants require NAS infrastructure
8. Environmental Impact	↔ ⁽¹⁾	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	1. T-45 AICUZ study not completed at NAS Corpus Christi



Significant Deviation

SINGLE SITING THE T-45: Would result in up-front cost savings upwards of \$200 million plus significant long-term savings



Kingsville's existing ramp and maintenance facilities can accommodate all the T-45s planned for procurement.

Kingsville and an in-place complex of auxiliary fields have the capacity to fulfill the projected Navy Strike PTR.



Corpus Christi could serve as an auxiliary/ supplemental T-45 base without a further investment in T-45 infrastructure.

THE HUMAN FACTOR VIS A VIS BASE CLOSURE/RELOCATION

Humans Can Change

- Aircraft Complements
- Facilities
- Housing
- Runways

Humans Can't Change

- Weather
- Geographic Location --
Water's Edge


Humans are fighting a losing battle against

- Encroachment
- Civil Airways Overlays


DAYS WITH STORMS AND VISIBILITY

MARCH 1992 TO FEBRUARY 1994


Days with Thunderstorms




Days with Less than 300' ceiling 1 mile visibility



Days with Less than 1000' ceiling 3 miles visibility




Days with Obstructions to Visibility




HURRICANE TRACKS 1886-1994

CORPUS CHRISTI - KINGSVILLE



**29 TROPICAL CYCLONES PASSING WITHIN
75 N. MI. OF CORPUS CHRISTI, TX 1886-1994**


PENSACOLA - WHITING FIELD



**51 TROPICAL CYCLONES PASSING WITHIN
75 N. MI. OF PENSACOLA, FL 1886-1994**


- North Atlantic weather history shows that the Florida Panhandle area is considerably more prone to tropical cyclones than South Texas.

NAS KINGSVILLE



- four 8,000-foot runways

NAS KINGSVILLE RAMP



**EXISTING RAMP & MAINTENANCE
FACILITIES CAN ACCOMODATE
ALL T-45s PLANNED FOR PROCUREMENT**



NAS KINGSVILLE CORROSION CONTROL HANGAR

Facility with depot-level capabilities that include:


- Plastic media blasting paint removal
- Five bays for painting aircraft
- \$1.5 million doors that emit only clean air
- Double plane wash rack
- Two high-pressure parts washers
- 9,000 sq. ft. shop space




NAS KINGSVILLE T-45 TRAINING SYSTEM (T45TS)

- First of its kind
- Maximum training effectiveness
- Reduced training costs

CORPUS CHRISTI BAY AREA OUTLYING FIELDS



SOUTH TEXAS MOAs & WARNING AREAS W/ OUTLYING FIELDS AND TARGETS




SOUTH TEXAS AIRFIELDS

Name	Runway Length	Distance from NAS Corpus Christi	Distance from NAS Kingsville
Alice	6,000'	38 NM	19 NM
Aransas County	5,600'	28 NM	*
Beeville	8,000'	48 NM	53 NM
Brownsville	7,400'	110 NM	99 NM
Cabaniss	5,000'	8 NM	*
Corpus Christi International	7,500'	13 NM	23 NM
Goliad	8,000'	55 NM	73 NM
Harlingen	8,300'	95 NM	76 NM
Kleberg County	6,000'	40 NM	15 NM
Orange Grove	8,000'	42 NM	24 NM
NAS Corpus Christi	8,000'	N/A	30 NM
NAS Kingsville	8,000'	30 NM	N/A
San Patricio	5,000'	24 NM	*
Victoria	9,100'	70 NM	99 NM
Waldron	5,000'	5 NM	*

NOTES

- 1) All runways > or = 5,000'
- 2) * -- not used for T-45 operations
- 3) Waldron is MH-53 operating location
- 4) Cabaniss is T-44 operating location

OLF ORANGE GROVE



- two 8,000-foot runways
- Automated Surface Observation System
- Precision Approach Radar
- Instrument Landing System
- Upgraded Lighting

POTENTIAL OLF GOLIAD

- two 8,000-foot runways



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SOUTHERN DIVISION
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
P.O. BOX 190010
2155 EAGLE DRIVE
NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. 29419-0010

11011
Code 061
31 Mar 95

Mr. Dick Messbarger
Executive Director
Greater Kingsville Economic Development Council
P.O. Box 5032
Kingsville, TX 78363

Dear Mr. Messbarger:

With regard to your letter of 28 March 1995 covering OLF Goliad, the following information is provided:

- a. OLF Goliad contains approximately 1,136 acres of land. Approximately 20 percent is covered by runways. The property is federally owned.
- b. OLF Goliad is currently licensed to the County of Goliad. This ninety (90) day license automatically renews itself.
- c. At present, the property will either be sold to Goliad County or sold to the highest bidder. The price is negotiable.
- d. It is possible for the Navy to "reclaim" the property. However, it is likely any action of this type would need the approval of the proper Chain of Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Recovery.


Please contact the undersigned if further information is required at (803) 743-0494.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "E. R. Nelson, Jr.", written over a light blue background.

E. R. NELSON, JR.
Head, Real Estate Division

POTENTIAL OLF BEEVILLE



- three 8,000-foot runways

Corpus Christi Caller Times

► MILITARY

Beeville, Kingsville join hands

Ex-competitors sign pact to help Kingsville NAS

- Beeville and Kingsville form partnership for naval air station.
- Agreement lets Kingsville pilots use Beeville runways.
- Beeville officials say it's a "good neighbor" contract.

By YVETTE HEINES
and ANNA M. TINSLEY
Caller-Times

A newly formed partnership between Beeville and Kingsville, former foes in the base-closure process, could allow Kingsville naval aviators to use Beeville's airfield for training maneuvers.

Economic development officials from both communities recently negotiated a 20-year, \$1-per-year lease agreement to allow pilots at Naval Air Station Kingsville, which remained open in the last round of base closures, to use the former Naval Air Station Chase Field in Beeville as an outlying field for landings and refuelings.

Chase Field was closed three years ago, a victim of military budget cuts.

Officials say the agreement could help NAS Kingsville during the 1995 round of hearings by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission because it demonstrates Kingsville's potential to



Alberto Martinez/Caller-Times

handle an increased load of student trainees.

And NAS Kingsville's military strength is seen as essential to the region's economic health.

"This has been in the works because we felt that if and when Chase Field closed, the day would come when Chase Field would be in a position to augment Kingsville," Bee County Judge Jay Kimbrough said.

"In South Texas, we've got the air space, we've got the weather, we've got the concrete," said Kimbrough, also vice president of the

handle an increased load of student trainees.

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"In South Texas, we've got the air space, we've got the weather, we've got the concrete," said Kimbrough, also vice president of the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Authority. "This is the logical thing to do. It is what is in the best interest of their community and our community and South Texas as a region."

The agreement was authorized recently by the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Authority and the Kingsville Area Industrial Development Foundation. The Navy would be the user of the airfield, envisioned as an outlying field for NAS Kingsville jet pilots practicing touch-and-go landings.

Touch-and-go landings, or bounces, are used by student aviators who are learning to land jets on aircraft carriers, the military's principal warships. Aircraft carrier landings are crucial to becoming a naval aviator.

Chase Field is 51 miles north of Kingsville.

"An aircraft could launch out of Kingsville, do an ACM (air combat maneuver) and drop down, then do some touch-and-go's at Chase Field, refuel, launch and land back at Kingsville. You're maximizing air space at Chase Field and it's also cost-efficient because you don't have to come back to Kingsville to refuel," said Dick Messbarger, director of the Greater Kingsville Economic Development Council.

Messbarger said he considers the lease agreement a potentially powerful tool for NAS Kingsville's future as a naval training site. However, he said, it will be up to Navy officials to decide if, how and when they want to use Chase Field.

"It has the potential of giving Kingsville additional capacity," Messbarger said. In the 1995 base closure hearings, "we're not looking at competing with Naval Air

Training bases solely. We're going to be competing with Air Force bases. Training capacity, based on additional outlying fields, is an important military value... and one of the most important things (the commission) will take into consideration."

Capt. Don Maxey, base commander at NAS Kingsville, said Navy officials will have to assess the airfield's condition before deciding whether to use Chase Field.

"This is very, very important, and I am glad that they signed this agreement," said U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz, D-Corpus Christi. "We need to keep our air space, and I think this is a key. When you look at other military fields, you'll find there is a lot of congestion. The more fields you keep open for training, the better it is for us."

Such a negotiation has been in the works since 1993, when Beeville and Bee County officials sent a letter to the base closure commission offering the use of Chase Field to other South Texas bases.

In exchange for Chase Field's runways and air space, the Navy could provide air traffic control, crash crew services, lighting and maintenance, according to the letter.

But Commission Chairman Jim Courter said then that a letter was just a letter, not a formal agreement.

This signed agreement is an extension of that letter, Kimbrough said.

The recent agreement is a preventive measure that could give Kingsville an edge over its competitors, officials said.

"This is a good neighbor policy," said Brad Arvin, executive director of the redevelopment council. "We're assisting Kingsville in putting together a strong defense if, in fact, they have to make a defense."

"This is more of a precautionary" step or a precautionary move than anything else."

Among benefits for Bee County, are that the Navy, if it chose to use Chase Field, could maintain the airfield and even make some improvements, Messbarger said.

December 23, 1994/

In addition, added use of the runways eventually could provide additional Federal Aviation Administration funding. Messbarger said that FAA funding is based on the number of operations conducted at an airfield and each touch-and-go landing counts as a landing and a takeoff.

Just three years ago, Kingsville and Beeville officials waged separate survival campaigns to avoid base closure -- an occurrence that can economically devastate a community. The South Texas bases were two of the three in the United States to provide advanced training for Navy student pilots. Naval Air Station Meridian in Mississippi is the third.

Although Bee County residents were dismayed at losing 1,500 jobs through the closure, community leaders created the redevelopment committee to attract businesses and create jobs.

One of the first -- and largest -- lessees to sign up was the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, which has since built two transfer facilities to relieve statewide overcrowding in county jails.

The number of jobs through the base has since been more than replaced through the prison.

Messbarger praised Beeville officials for their generosity in cooperating with Kingsville's efforts to strengthen the base's position.

"Some of the key people on their defense team have been great sources for us," Messbarger said. "And when we approached them about the idea of the Navy leasing Chase Field in 1993, there was no hesitation."

Ortiz said next month likely will bring an announcement about what bases will be on the 1996 base closure commission's list, and hearings should begin soon after.

Arvin said Beeville officials want to help their neighbors in Kingsville through the next round of base closure hearings.


"This community knows the challenge you face if you end up on the list. In our particular case, it has ended up extremely well. But an awful lot of hard work went into it," he added. "If there's anything we can do to help Kingsville, we are certainly willing to help."

Please see CHASE/AG

SOUTH TEXAS AVIATION COMPLEX

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI · NAS KINGSVILLE

SINGLE SITE T-45 PRODUCTION OPTIONS



Assumes most current Wing 2 daylight operations per T-45 PTR of 1473

T-45 PILOT TRAINING CAPACITY

	Days		Hours		Weather Crrctd. Ops	=	Ops Available	÷	Daytime Ops/PTR	=	PTR Capacity
NAS Kingsville	237	x	12.1	x	80	=	229,416	÷	1,473	=	155
OLF Orange Grove	237	x	11.1	x	54	=	148,457	÷	1,473	=	100
NAS Corpus Christi (w/o ext. of RWY 13L)	237	x	10.1	x	54	=	129,260	÷	1,473	=	87
NAS Corpus Christi (with extensions)	237	x	10.1	x	80	=	191,496	÷	1,473	=	130
Goliad	237	x	10.1	x	54	=	129,260	÷	1,473	=	87
Beeville	237	x	10.1	x	54	=	129,260	÷	1,473	=	87
Victoria	237	x	10.1	x	54	=	129,260	÷	1,473	=	87

Single Site T-45 Production Options (Back-Up)

**A VIEW OF NAS CORPUS CHRISTI
FROM THE TEXAS RIVIERA**



**MH-53, AVIATION COMPONENT /
MINE WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE**



**NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, FUTURE HOME OF HM-14 & HM-15
(SINGLE SITES MH-53s)**



NAVAL STATION INGLESIDE



LANMON AERIAL PHOTO
Corpus Christi, Texas

NAVAL STATION INGLESIDE

SURFACE COMPONENT, MINE WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE







**T-44 -- MULTI-ENGINE ADVANCED
TRAINING PLATFORM**

**T-34 -- SINGLE-ENGINE PRIMARY
TRAINING PLATFORM**

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI: THE WATER'S EDGE




NAS CORPUS CHRISTI PENINSULA: THREE SIDES WATER



BRAC RUNWAY IMPROVEMENTS

- Positive impact on T-45 operations
- Accomodates other tenant/transient aircraft and retention of T-44

IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT – T-44



HM
MAINT.

T-44 SIMULATORS


T-44 HANGAR

HM-14


T-44 COMPATIBLE WITH MH-53

Retention of single sited T-44 in existing maintenance and simulator space, location of MH-53 maintenance adjacent to Corpus Christi helicopter depot

200 ACRE DEPOT COMPLEX ON
NAVAL AIR STATION CORPUS CHRISTI



OLF CABANISS



- one 5,000-foot runway
- one 4,500-foot runway

OLF ARANSAS COUNTY (LEASED)




- one 5,600-foot runway
- one 4,500-foot runway
- one 4,350-foot runway

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX

CURRENT AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS

Airfield ops at
NAS/OLF (x1000)




Complex includes NAS Corpus Christi, OLF Cabaniss, OLF Waldron, and Aransas County (currently leased)

* 1993 Annual Operations

** Reflects increase due to U.S. Air Force C-130s

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI: A FEDERAL COMPLEX



- Corpus Christi Army Depot
- Chief of Naval Air Training
- Commander, Mine Warfare
- Defense Reserve Center


MAJOR TENANTS


- U.S. Coast Guard
- Naval Hospital
- Defense Logistics Agency
- U.S. Customs Service

CCAD WORKFORCE PROFILE

- Over 60 percent of the work force at Corpus Christi Army Depot consists of minority employees.

Source: Corpus Christi Army Depot





NAS Corpus Christi's runway and ramps capable of handling C-5 traffic 24 hours per day in support of Defense Logistics Agency, Army Depot, and Mine Warfare Command.

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI - U.S. CUSTOMS

SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT CENTER

■ Mission: Provide radar coverage of the southern U.S. border, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, Central and South America.

■ Assets:	4 P-3A 4 P-3B AEW \$7 Million Facility
■ Replacement Value:	\$350M
■ Flight Hours:	5,500 per year
■ Manpower:	104 Customs 81 Contract
■ Amount of Cocaine Seized	FY 92: 50,000 Lbs FY 93: 51,047 Lbs
■ Proposed Expansion:	2nd Hangar and Administrative Facility \$8M Project



P-3 AEW&C AIRCRAFT



COAST GUARD GROUP / NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

"LONE STAR SAR"

- Extends from Palacios, Texas to the Mexican Border.
- Includes:
 - Three HH-65A "Dolphin" Helicopters
 - Three HU-25A "Guardian" Fanjets
 - 37 Officers
 - 91 Enlisted
- Missions include:
 - Search & Rescue
 - Maritime Law Enforcement
 - Aids to Navigation
 - Environmental Protection



**ARMED FORCES RESERVE TRAINING CENTER
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI**




CCAD/FULL SERVICE DEPOT

AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	MANUFACTURER
AH-64 APACHE	McDonnell-Douglas
UH-60 BLACK HAWK	Sikorsky Aircraft
OH-58 KIOWA	Bell Helicopter Textron
AH-1 COBRA	Bell Helicopter Textron
CH-47 CHINOOK	Boeing Vertol
UH-1 HUEY	Bell Helicopter Textron
SH-60 SEA HAWK	Sikorsky Aircraft



Navy SH-60 Seahawk



Marine Corps AH-1W Attack Cobra

ENGINES

MANUFACTURER	ENGINE	AIRCRAFT
Lycoming	T55-L-712	CH-47D CHINOOK
	T53-L-13B	UH-1H HUEY
	T53-L-703	AH-1S COBRA
	TF-40B	NAVY LCAC
Allison	T63-A-720	OH-58C KIOWA
	T63-A-700	OH-58A KIOWA
General Electric	T700-GE-700	UH-60 BLACK HAWK
	T700-GE-701	AH-64 APACHE
	T700-GE-401	SH-60 SEA HAWK

**SOUTH
TEXAS
IS NAVY
COUNTRY**

NAVAL HOSPITAL-NAS CORPUS CHRISTI



NAS CORPUS CHRISTI SUMMARY

- **NAS Corpus Christi is A Federal Complex**
 - **47 Tenants include:**
 - **Army Depot**
 - **Naval Air Training**
 - **COMMINEWARCOM HQ**
 - **U.S. Customs**
 - **U.S. Coast Guard**
 - **Armed Forces Reserve Training Center**
- **Tenant Missions are Unique and Compatible**
- **Provides Support Services to Naval Station Ingleside and NAS Kingsville**
- **Air Space and Weather Best in the Country for Training Aviators**
- **Army Depot is the Largest Helo Depot in the Country and the Army's Only Helo Depot**

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI vs NAF CORPUS CHRISTI

NAS Jacksonville

- **Multiple tenants**
 - **Navy aviation depot**
 - **VP squadrons**
 - **Helo squadrons**
 - **Flag staff**
 - **Naval hospital**
 - **Supply center—complex support**
- **Multiple runways**
- **Large complex**
- **Over 500 buildings**

NAF Mayport

- **Few tenants**
 - **Helo squadrons**
 - **Helo wing**
- **Few buildings**
- **Single runway**

NAS Corpus Christi

- **Multiple tenants**
 - **Army aviation depot**
 - **Fixed wing units**
 - **Helo operations**
 - **Flag staff**
 - **Naval hospital**
 - **Supply support for bay area complex**
- **Multiple runways**
- **Large federal complex**
- **Over 700 buildings**

SUMMARY OF NAVY RECOMMENDATIONS

Navy Recommendation

Community Position

Single-site T-45

Agree

MH-53 Relocate to NAS Corpus Christi

Agree

Relocate CNATRA from Corpus Christi

Internal Navy

Relocate T-34 from Corpus Christi

Agree

Relocate T-44 from Corpus Christi

Disagree

Redesignate NAS Corpus Christi to NAF


Disagree

TRADITION





CORPUS CHRISTI BAY AREA MILITARY COMPLEX



**BRAC REGIONAL HEARING
DALLAS, TEXAS
19 APRIL 1995**

**STATEMENT OF MR. LOYD NEAL
CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH TEXAS JOINT MILITARY FACILITIES TASK FORCE**

I. OPENING REMARKS

MR. CHAIRMAN, I M LOYD NEAL, VOLUNTEER CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH TEXAS MILITARY FACILITIES TASK FORCE. ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR COUNTY SOUTH TEXAS AREA, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO YOU AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OUR COMMUNITY'S VIEWS ON THE NAVY'S PLANS FOR NAS CORPUS CHRISTI AND NAS KINGSVILLE.

FIRST, LET ME INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS OF OUR TEAM:

II. OVERVIEW

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM GOING TO FOCUS TODAY ON THE ISSUES OF MILITARY VALUE AND COST SAVINGS, AND DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS, FEW OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED DURING MY ORAL PRESENTATION.

FIRST, LET ME REVIEW THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATIONS THAT AFFECT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI AND NAS KINGSVILLE, AND PROVIDE YOU WITH THE COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON EACH OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS. I WILL CONCLUDE MY REMARKS BY ADDRESSING THREE MATTERS WHICH WE BELIEVE BEAR FURTHER REVIEW FROM THE COMMISSION.

III. SUMMARY OF NAVY RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE MOST PART, WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE NAVY'S RECOMMENDATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE NAVY'S APPROACH TO REDUCING OVERHEAD COSTS BY SINGLE-SITING TRAINING AIRCRAFT -- AS WELL AS SOME OTHER OPERATIONAL ASSETS -- IS SOUND. THE NAVY HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NAS CORPUS CHRISTI AND NAS KINGSVILLE:

1. SINGLE-SITE ALL ADVANCED JET STRIKE TRAINING AT NAS KINGSVILLE, AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SOME T-45 ADVANCED JET TRAINING OPERATIONS AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI. -- WE AGREE.

2. RELOCATE THE TWO T-34 PRIMARY TRAINING SQUADRONS FROM NAS CORPUS CHRISTI TO NAS WHITING FIELD. NAS CORPUS CHRISTI HAS A 52 YEAR HISTORY OF TRAINING PRIMARY NAVAL AVIATORS. MANY FORMER NAVAL PILOTS HAVE CHOSEN TO RETURN TO THE SOUTH TEXAS AREA ONCE THEIR FLYING DAYS ARE OVER. WE INCLUDE AMONG THE GRADUATES OF NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, FORMER PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, WHO RECEIVED HIS NAVY WINGS OF GOLD AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI. WE WILL BE SORRY TO LOSE THESE UNITS, BUT WE RECOGNIZE THAT CONSOLIDATION WILL ALLOW SINGLE-SITING OF THE T-34 PRIMARY AIRCRAFT AT WHITING FIELD, AND SHOULD SAVE THE NAVY OPERATING EXPENSES. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE MOVE OF THE TWO T-34 PRIMARY TRAINING SQUADRONS.

3. RELOCATE THE EAST AND WEST COAST MH-53 HELICOPTER SQUADRONS TO NAS CORPUS CHRISTI; SINGLE-SITING ALL MH-53 HELICOPTERS OF THE MINE WARFARE COMMAND FOR OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI - NAVAL STATION INGLESIDE -- WE AGREE.

4. RELOCATE T-44 MARITIME TRAINING FROM NAS CORPUS CHRISTI TO NAS PENSACOLA. WE TAKE EXCEPTION TO THIS RECOMMENDATION. THESE AIRCRAFT ALREADY SINGLE-SITED AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, ALONG WITH ALL THE SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE, MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS, AND RELATED AIRCRAFT COST. WE DO NOT BELIEVE RELOCATING THEM WILL SAVE THE NAVY ANY MONEY. IN FACT, IT WILL COST THE NAVY TO MAKE THIS

MOVE, AND THERE IS NO OPERATIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR RELOCATING THE T-44 TRAINING. THE AIRSPACE, WEATHER, AND AVAILABLE OUTLYING FIELDS OF THE NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX MAKE NAS CORPUS CHRISTI THE MOST DESIRABLE SIGHT TO CONDUCT T-44 TRAINING. WE OPPOSE THIS MOVE AND WILL OUTLINE IN DETAIL IN OUR WRITTEN SUBMISSION, THE ADVANTAGES OF LEAVING THE T-44 TRAINING SQUADRONS AND SUPPORT AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI.

5. RELOCATE THE CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING (CNATRA) FROM NAS CORPUS CHRISTI TO NAS PENSACOLA. WHILE WE WILL BE SORRY TO LOSE CNATRA FROM THE CORPUS CHRISTI AREA, THIS IS AN OPERATIONAL DECISION FOR THE UNIFORM NAVY, AND WE WILL NOT OPPOSE THE RELOCATION.

6. REDESIGNATE NAS CORPUS CHRISTI AS A NAVAL AIR FACILITY (NAF). WE TAKE EXCEPTION TO THIS RECOMMENDATION. NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, AND THE RELATED OUTLYING FIELDS, FORM THE ONLY TRUE FEDERAL MILITARY COMPLEX IN SOUTH TEXAS. NAS CORPUS CHRISTI IS NOT ONLY A NAVAL AIR STATION, BUT IT IS THE HOME OF 46 TENANTS INCLUDING THE HEAD QUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER OF MINE WARFARE COMMAND, WILL BECOME HOME OF TWO SQUADRONS OF THE MH-53 MINE WARFARE HELICOPTERS FOLLOWING REORGANIZATION, IS THE HOME OF THE LARGEST HELICOPTER REPAIR DEPOT IN THE DEFENSE FORCE STRUCTURE (CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT WITH OVER 3,000 EMPLOYEES) CONTAINS A LARGE COAST GUARD AIR DETACHMENT, A LARGE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT OPERATION, DEA, A MULTI-SERVICE RESERVE FORCES FACILITY, A MAJOR NAVAL HOSPITAL, AND MANY OTHER TENANTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE AIR FIELD AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI ON A 24-HOUR BASIS FOR THE ARMY DEPOT, AS WELL AS FOR DEA AND

CUSTOMS OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, WEEKEND OPERATIONS FOR TRAINING SQUADRONS AT KINGSVILLE ALSO BENEFIT FROM A 7 DAY A WEEK OPERATION. THE COMPLEXITY AND SIZE OF THE OPERATION AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI IS SIMPLY TOO LARGE TO BE DOWNGRADED TO AN NAF.

IV. SINGLE-SITING T-45 TRAINING AT NAS KINGSVILLE AND CONSOLIDATING ALL STRIKE TRAINING INTO THE NAS CORPUS CHRISTI - NAS KINGSVILLE COMPLEX:

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE MERIDIAN TEAM DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR PRESENTATION AT THE BIRMINGHAM HEARING TO THIS SUBJECT. I TOO WILL ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN SOME DETAIL.

THE BASICS

WHY DID THE NAVY CHOSE THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX FOR THIS MISSION? IT REALLY COMES DOWN TO THREE BASIC THINGS: AIRSPACE, WEATHER, AND CONCRETE. OBVIOUSLY, OTHER THINGS ARE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT FLIGHT TRAINING -- AIRCRAFT, INSTRUCTORS, MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, ETC. THESE ARE THINGS THAT CAN BE MOVED FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER, SOME THINGS SIMPLY CAN NOT BE MOVED. WE HAVE MAINTAINED FOR YEARS THAT THE SOUTH TEXAS COMPLEX HAS THE BEST AIRSPACE, WEATHER, CONCRETE AND OUTLYING FIELDS FOR TRAINING NAVAL AVIATORS AND CONDUCTING NAVAL AVIATION OPERATIONS.

I AM PLEASE TO NOTE, THAT THE UNIFORM NAVY HAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX HAS THE MOST TO OFFER.

LETS LOOK FOR A MOMENT AT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: THE NAVY HAS SAID THAT BY FY97 THEY MUST BE ABLE TO TRAIN 336 STRIKE PILOTS THE EQUIVALENCE OF 19 E2/C2 PILOTS UTILIZING THE T-45 TRAINER MAY BE REQUIRED AFTER T2 TRAINER RETIREMENT. THIS IS A TOTAL OF 355 STRIKE PILOTS PER YEAR BY FY99. THIS NUMBER, OF COURSE, IS SUBJECT TO FLUCTUATION DEPENDING UPON THE WORLD SITUATION, AND BASED ON THE COMMENTS OF THE CURRENT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS , ADMIRAL BOORDA, WE MUST BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE A SURGE CAPABILITY.

CAN THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI MEET THE NAVY'S STRIKE PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENT FOR THE FUTURE?

THE ANSWER SIMPLY PUT IS YES.

MUCH OF THE MERIDIAN PRESENTATION WAS DEVOTED TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF AND QUANTIFICATION FOR PTR'S (PILOT TRAINING RATE). I WILL NOT DEVOTE A LOT OF MY TIME TO TECHNICAL DETAILS OF HOW YOU DETERMINE A PTR, BUT CHOOSE TO COMMENT ON A PORTION OF THE MERIDIAN PRESENTATION REGARDING PTRS.

THE MERIDIAN TEAM, IN THEIR PRESENTATION, CORRECTLY EXPLAINED THAT THE ABILITY OF ANY BASE TO TURN OUT PILOTS IS LIMITED BY THE NUMBER OF AIRFIELD OPERATIONS IT CAN COMPLETE DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. CURRENT NAVY CERTIFIED DATE, AS OF APRIL 14, 1995, STATES THAT A TOTAL OF 1,393 AIRFIELD OPERATIONS CORRECTED TO 1,473 TO COVER WEAPONS OPS IS REQUIRED TO TRAIN A T-45 STRIKE PILOT. YOU MAY RECALL THAT THE MERIDIAN TEAM ASSERTED THE NUMBER WAS MUCH HIGHER – 1,822. IN CALCULATING THAT NUMBER THE MERIDIAN TEAM APPEARS TO HAVE MADE A SIGNIFICANT MISCALCULATION, RESULTING IN THEIR USING AN EXCESSIVE FIGURE FOR OVERHEAD. IN FACT, THE MERIDIAN

TEAM USED AN OVERHEAD PERCENTAGE OF 51.4%. IN OUR OPINION, THAT NUMBER IS SEVERELY IMPACTED BY OTHER OVERHEAD FACTORS, AND USING THE UNIFORM NAVY NUMBERS, WE AGREE THAT A MORE REASONABLE FIGURE IS 35% FOR OPERATIONAL OVERHEAD. THIS IS THE SAME PERCENTAGE NUMBER AS CURRENTLY USED FOR THE T-2 AND TA-4. IN OUR WRITTEN PRESENTATION WE WILL FURNISH YOU WITH ADDITIONAL DETAIL ON HOW THE OVERHEAD NUMBERS ARE COMPARED FOR EVALUATION PURPOSES. THAT LEAVES US WITH ONE CRUCIAL QUESTION: WHAT IS THE TRAINING CAPACITY OF THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX?

THE SHORT ANSWER IS MORE THAN 500 STRIKE PILOTS MAY BE TRAINED PER YEAR UTILIZING THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX.

TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION PROPERLY, WE HAVE CHOSEN TO USE THE UNIFORM NAVY'S 1995 CERTIFIED DATA:

AVAILABLE TRAINING DAYS PER YEAR (5 DAYS PER WEEK, NO FLYING ON HOLIDAYS, TWO WEEKS OFF FOR CHRISTMAS).	/	237
AVERAGE HOURS OF DAYLIGHT AT HOME BASE	/	12.1
AVERAGE HOURS OF DAYLIGHT AVAILABLE AT OUTLYING FIELDS	/	11.6

I INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE ACCOMPANYING CHART.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THERE ALREADY EXISTS IN SOUTH TEXAS THE CAPACITY TO TRAIN MORE THAN 500 STRIKE PILOTS ANNUALLY. AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, WE BELIEVE WE HAVE THE BEST WEATHER, BEST

AIRSPACE, AND ADEQUATE CONCRETE TO DO THE JOB. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REMIND THE COMMISSION THAT DURING THE LATER PART OF THE 1960'S AND THE EARLY PART OF THE 1970'S ALL OF THE ADVANCE JET TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED AT EITHER NAS KINGSVILLE OR NAS CHASE FIELD BEEVILLE. A PTR OF 355 AT THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX SHOULD BE PUT IN PROPER CONTEXT WITH OTHER SINGLE-SITED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING. WHEN THE PRIMARY T-34'S ARE SINGLE-SITED AT NAS WHITING, THE PTR THERE WILL BE 1200 OR MORE. IN ADDITION WHITING WILL TURN OUT HELICOPTER PILOTS AT THE RATE OF 480 PER YEAR.

LET ME FOR A MOMENT ADDRESS ADMIRAL BOORDA'S CONCERN ABOUT SURGE CAPACITY:

IF THE NAVY SINGLE-SITES T-45/STRIKE PILOT TRAINING AT THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX, WILL THAT SURGE CAPACITY BE THERE? THE ANSWER IS YES.

I DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE CHART.

AT THE PRESENT TIME NAS KINGSVILLE HAS A CONSERVATIVE PTR CAPACITY OF 155. KINGSVILLE OLF ORANGE GROVE ADDS 100, AND NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, AFTER THE PARALLEL RUNWAY EXTENSION PROPOSED IN THE BRACH 95 LANGUAGE, ADDS ANOTHER 130. THIS TOTALS 385, MORE THAN ENOUGH TO MEET THE NAVY'S STATED REQUIREMENT OF 355 PER YEAR. WE HAVE AVAILABLE AN OUTLYING FIELD AT GOLIAD AND THE USE OF THE 8,000' RUNWAYS AT BEEVILLE. GOLIAD WILL PROVIDE ANOTHER 87 PTR AND BEEVILLE WILL ADD YET ANOTHER 87 PILOTS. WITH THE OUTLYING FIELDS SHOWN, THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX HAS A CAPACITY OF 559 STRIKE PILOTS PER YEAR.

LET ME ADDRESS THE ADDITIONAL COST FOR UTILIZING THE OUTLYING FIELD AT GOLIAD AND AT BEEVILLE.

AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN EXECUTED BY THE BEEVILLE/BEE COUNTY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND THE KINGSVILLE AREA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION WHICH WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AUTHORITY AND THE NAVY FOR THE USE OF BEEVILLE AS AN OUTLYING FIELD. AS CONSIDERATION FOR THE USE OF THE RUNWAYS AT BEEVILLE, THE FOUNDATION IS OBLIGATED TO PAY THE AUTHORITY ONE DOLLAR PER YEAR. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE OUTLYING FIELD AT GOLIAD IS OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND IS BEING LEASED TO THE COMMUNITY ON A THREE MONTH REVOLVING LEASE. CURRENT PLANS ARE TO EVENTUALLY DISPOSE OF THE GOLIAD FIELDS TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER.

IN OUR OPINION, IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING IN SOUTH TEXAS, NOT THE PAST, AND TO FAIL TO UTILIZE THE AVAILABLE OUTLYING FIELDS IN THE SOUTH TEXAS AREA FOR TRAINING OF NAVAL AVIATORS WOULD BE A TRAVESTY TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND TO THE TAX PAYERS OF THIS COUNTRY.

IN SUMMARY, THE USE OF NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRIST COMPLEX AND THE AVAILABLE OUTLYING FIELDS, ARE BOTH IN THE BEST INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND OF THE TAX PAYERS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE FUTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING IS IN THE SINGLE-SITING OF THE VARIOUS AIRCRAFT AND FUNCTIONS. THE NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX NOT ONLY ALLOWS FOR THE SINGLE-SITING OF THE MH-53 HELICOPTER, THE T-44 MARITIME TRAINER, AND THE T-45 STRIKE PILOT TRAINER, BUT IT ENHANCES THE MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. IT ALSO OFFERS THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE UNITED STATES TAX PAYERS A WIN-WIN SITUATION.

THE FUTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING AND NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SOUTH TEXAS HAS NEVER LOOKED SO SECURE.

MR. CHAIRMAN I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MY REMARKS BY THANKING YOU AND THE OTHER COMMISSIONERS FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL ATTENTION.

THE CAPABILITY OF AVIATION FACILITIES IN SOUTH TEXAS
TO SUPPORT NAVY/JOINT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

The capability of an area/region to support aviation operation is defined by three major elements:

- Airfields and their associated:
 - a. Runways
 - b. Taxiways
 - c. Ramps
 - d. Outlying fields
 - e. Weapons Ranges
- Air Space
- Weather

B. THE AIRFIELDS

There are three basic elements of the South Texas airfield complex:

1. NAS Kingsville and its associated OLF, Orange Grove.
2. NAS Corpus Christi and associated OLF's, Waldron, Cabaniss and Aransas Pass.
3. Several outlying fields not currently used by the Navy, but capable of supporting Navy flight operations and with reasonable possibilities of obtaining Navy access.

Those airfields in South Texas currently being used by the Navy, and those potentially available, are listed in the formal presentation. No changes in field configurations are contemplated, except at NAS Corpus Christi where the Navy's BRAC '95 proposal includes \$7.4 million for the extension (to 6,000 ft.) of runway 13/31L and 17/35.

C. AIRSPACE

The South Texas airspace available for flight operations amounts to some 107,550 cubic miles, ranging from sea level to 18,000 feet MSL and covering a surface area of 31,630 square miles.

The areas in South Texas used for military flight operations are shown in Attachment 2.

D. WEATHER

Flying weather in South Texas is, demonstrably, the best in the United States. Comparisons with other aviation training areas are shown in formal presentation. More specifically, information used by the Base Closure Commission in 1993 included, the following percentages of scheduled flight training hours lost, attributed to weather:

NAS Kingsville	7 percent
NAS Corpus Christi	12 percent
NAS Whiting Field	17 percent
NAS Meridian	17.8 percent
NAS Pensacola	20.0 percent

E. THE AIRCRAFT

1. Current

Aircraft currently based at the respective South Texas airfields are as follows.

- a. NAS Kingsville: 49 T-45's
- b. NAS Corpus Christi: 70 T-34's; 57 T-44's; 3 USCG Falcon Jets;
3 USCG UH-25's; 6 USCS P-3 (AEW).

2. Proposed by Navy

The Navy proposal for BRAC'95 is that all T-45's be single-sited at NAS Kingsville, using Orange Grove and "NAF Corpus Christi" as OLF's. Concomitantly, all T-34's and T-44's would be moved to the NAS Whiting/NAS Pensacola complex and NAS Corpus Christi, redesignated as "NAF Corpus Christi", would receive two minesweeping helicopter squadrons, HM-14 and HM-15, each with 12 MH-53 helicopters. Ostensibly, the spaces vacated by the T-34's and T-44's, along with other space now available, would be used to accommodate the MH-53's.

3. Proposed by Community (STMFTF)

The South Texas Military Facilities Task Force concurs with the Navy proposal to single site the T-45 at NAS Kingsville. Also concurred in is the Navy's proposal to single site the T-34 at NAS Whiting Field and to use the space now occupied by the two T-34 squadrons now at NAS Corpus Christi (plus A1MD space in hangar 42 on the seawall) to accommodate HM14 and HM15.

However, the STMFTF contends that the proposed move of the T-44's to the Pensacola/Whiting area is unwarranted in that:

- a. Costs of the move per se, as well as the costs of accommodating the T-44's at any new location will never be recovered. The move, therefore, is in direct contravention of a prime BRAC objective which is to save money. There are no "economics of scale" savings as envisioned with a T-34 move.
- b. The T-44 is already single sited at NAS Corpus Christi; moreover, leaving the T-44's at NAS Corpus Christi, combined with the closure of NAS Meridian, as proposed by the Navy, and the consolidation of the T-34's at NAS Whiting, results in primary UPT being consolidated in the Pensacola area and advanced UPT in South Texas. Only one Wing Commander (and staff) is required in each area.
- c. There is no imperative dictating a T-44 move in the near term. Ample space exists at NAS Corpus Christi to absorb HM-53's and spillover T-45's without displacing the T-44's. Remaining field capacity would be sufficient to base and operate the current USCG (United States Coast Guard) and USCS (United States Customs Service) aircraft complements as well as normal transient aircraft. The latter includes the C-5's regularly used for CCAD support. Since a T-45 build-up at NAS Corpus Christi will be very slow to develop (due principally to the procurement rate of one per month), there is no reason to hurry a T-44 move. In the (unlikely) event that circumstances now unanticipated later require a move, it could be executed only when/if required, thus avoiding the unnecessary costs and disruptions of a near term move. The ability of NAS Corpus Christi and its associated OLF's to accommodate, simultaneously, all the aircraft proposed by the STMFTF is subsequently addressed here.

F. CAPACITY

1. General

Although the mix of aircraft proposed by the STMFTF involves both training (T-44, T-45) and operational flights (MH-53's, USCG, USCS), the principal determinant of capacity is the ability of the NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi complexes to produce the required student outputs (i.e. PTR's). This drives the level of utilization of both the main fields and their OLF's and in turn, constrains the ability of the main fields to support non-UPT evolutions.

In deciding what capacity it must have, the Navy looks, first, at required student output (i.e. PTR), Attachment 1 is the latest statement of PTR's by the CNO. South Texas is interested in Strike, Maritime, and E2/C2 since Strike involves T-45's, Maritime involves T-44's and E2/C2 involves both.

2. NAS Kingsville

NAS Kingsville and its OLF, Orange Grove, are dedicated, exclusively, to T-45 training. The measure of capacity of these fields depends on:

- a. Number of operations (landings and takeoffs @ one each) which the field is capable of supporting. This must be corrected for losses due to weather.
- b. The number of hours per day the field will conduct flight operations.
- c. The number of days per year the field will operate. With a five-day working week, the number of flying days per year is 237.

The values selected in each category derive from certified data provided by the Navy and recognized as authentic by the BSAT. In any case where conflict existed, the STMFTF selected the most conservative number, even in cases where a higher number might be justifiable. The following applies to T-45 operations:

<u>Site</u>	<u>WX-Corrected OPS/HR</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>OPS Avail</u>	<u>Daylight OPS/Pilot*</u>	<u>PTR</u>
Kingsville	80	12.1	237	229,416	1473	155
Orange Grove	54	11.6	237	148,457	1473	100

* Last Navy Certified number was 1393. Current CNATRA staff inclination is that 1473 correctly reflects T-45 experience todate. Both 1393 and 1473 include 35 percent overhead which has been validated by actual flight training experience.

3. NAS Corpus Christi (T-45 Operations)

The utilization of NAS Corpus Christi for T-45 training should produce the following results:

<u>Site</u>	<u>WX-Corrected OPS/HR</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>OPS Avail</u>	<u>Daylight OPS/Pilot</u>	<u>PTR</u>
Corpus Christi I	54*	10.1	237	129,260	1473	87
Corpus Christi II**	80*	10.1	237	189,581	1473	130

* T-45 operations restricted to runway 13/31; therefore, 90% of the time available.

** After planned runway extensions.

4. Use of Other OLF's

Ample airspace is available and there exist, in South Texas, a number of fields suitable for use as OLF's for T-45 training. One of the likely candidates is Beeville for which a Memorandum of Agreement has been executed by the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Authority and the Kingsville Area Industrial Development Foundation which can become effective upon a legally binding lease between the Authority and the Navy for the use of Beeville as an OLF. As consideration for the use of Beeville, the Foundation is obligated to pay the Authority one dollar a year. There is a tremendous difference between this and the cost of retraining, instead, a full-time Naval Air Station. A copy of this Agreement appears as Attachment 5 and is included in the formal presentation.

Another likely candidate is Goliad which is listed in Attachment 1. Goliad is owned by the Navy and is being leased to the community on a every-three-months renewal basis. Current plans are to eventually dispose of Goliad to the highest bidder. Attachment 6 is included in the formal presentation.

The addition of either, or both, of these facilities as OLF's would result in the following:

<u>Site</u>	<u>WX-Corrected OPS/HR</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>OPS Avail</u>	<u>Daylight OPS/Pilot</u>	<u>PTR</u>
Beeville	54	10.1	237	148,457	1473	87
Goliad	54	10.1	237	148,457	1473	87

The contributions of the several airfields being used, and/or immediately available for use for T-45 training are shown in the formal presentation and are summarized as follows:

<u>Site</u>	<u>Incremental Contribution (PTR)</u>	<u>Cumulative PTR</u>
NAS Kingsville	155	155
OLF Orange Grove	100	255
NAS Corpus Christi I	87	342
NAS Corpus Christi II	130	385
Beeville	87	472
Goliad	87	559

This confirms that the South Texas airfield complex is capable now of delivering the 336 PTR required by the CNO. Upon completion of the runway extension at NAS Corpus Christi the 355 PTR, required by the addition of E2C/C2 training in the T-45, can easily be met. However, the T-2 is expected to remain in the Navy inventory until at least year 2000. This means that E2C pilot training in the

T-45 will not be an issue for at least five years.

An important point here is that adequate capacity, in excess of needs exist to meet (and probably exceed) the "Boorda Surge" requirement mentioned by Meridian during its presentation to the Commission 4 April.

5. Considerations Impacting Strike PTR's

a. T-45 Availability

These were 49 T-45's at NAS Kingsville as of the end of March 1995. Future deliveries are programmed at 1 per month until FY 2001 and 18 per year thereafter. This means that NAS Kingsville will not receive its full complement of T-45's until after year 2000. In the interim, Strike PTR output will be some combination of T-45 (only) plus T-2/TA-4 plus (possibly) T-2/T-45. The end of the service life of the TA-4 is reportedly in 1997 or 1998. Whether or not this would be extended is not known. The T-2, however, should be available longer, possibly until year 2005. The problem facing CNATRA is the phase in/out of the involved aircraft in a manner to sustain required PTR outputs.

b. Possible Closure of NAS Meridian

Closure of NAS Meridian would require a decision:

- (1) Either to relocate, ASAP, all/or part of Meridian's T-2's and TA-4's to South Texas or to Pensacola or;
- (2) As permitted by the BRAC rules, continue training operations in the T-2 and TA-4 until the end of the TA-4's service life and then move the T-2's to South Texas or to Pensacola.

Either action would require a re-evaluation of the Strike PTR capacities of NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi in the light of the possible changes in aircraft complements involved. Neither action should present insurmountable obstacles inasmuch as the surge capacities of Beeville and Goliad would be available, provided action is taken, in the near term to protect those options for the future. It would probably make good sense to move Meridian T-2's to Pensacola. Certainly, Pensacola is more than capable of absorbing these aircraft, considering that the Navy believes Pensacola can accommodate the T-44's which the STMFTR believes should remain in place at NAS Corpus Christi. With such a move, all CNATRA aircraft would then be single sited.

c. Availability of JPATS

So far as is known, Navy planning still envisages the use of JPATS as an intermediate stage strike trainer. Until/unless JPATS becomes available, intermediate strike training will have to be conducted in the T-2 and the T-45, or both. The probable ultimate impact is higher utilization of the T-45 than originally planned. JPATS may reduce the Strike pilot training load on NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi, depending on where it is based and how it is utilized.

6. Capacity for Aviation Operations Other Than Strike Pilot Training

a. General

As envisaged by the STMFTF, NAS Corpus Christi will be basing and operating:

1. T-45's spillover from NAS Kingsville and OLF's.
2. 57 T-44's conducting;
 - a. Maritime Pilot Training
 - b. E2/C2 Pilot Training
 - c. USAF C-130 Pilot Training (150 per year)
3. The 24 MH-53's of HM 14 and HM15
4. 3 USCG Falcon jets and 3 USCG HH-65 helicopters
5. 6 USCS P-3 AEW aircraft
6. Transient aircraft of various types, including the C-5 involved in CCAD and Minecounter Measure support.

T-45 operations were discussed previously in Section F.2, F.3, and F.4.

To support its other aircraft training operations, NAS Corpus Christi is complemented by OLF's Waldron, Cabaniss, and Aransas County. Waldron is currently being used principally for T-34 operations and could be dedicated exclusively to MH-53 operation upon relocation of the T-34's. Cabaniss and Aransas County would remain dedicated to fixed wing operations.

b. Capacity of the NAS Corpus Christi Complex

The daylight capacity of the NAS Corpus Christi complex, shown graphically in Attachment 8, is as follows:

<u>Site</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Hrs/Day</u>	<u>UX Corrected OPS/Hr</u>	<u>Daytime OPS Possible</u>
NAS Corpus Christi	237	12.1	111 (1)	318,314 (4)
	237	12.1	80 (2)	229,416 (4)
OLF Cabaniss	237	12.1	74 (3)	212,209
OLF Waldron	237	12.1	74 (3)	212,209
Aransas Co. (leased)	237	8	74	140,304
TOTAL AIRFIELD OPS AVAILABLE				731,901 TO 883

- Notes: (1) & (3) FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5060-5
Weather-Corrected OPS/HR.
(2) BSAT 95
(4) Capacity at NAS Corpus Christi reflects BRAC 95 proposed runway extension.

To be subtracted from the total airfield OPS available are those to be dedicated to the T-45. These are:

<u>PTR</u>	<u>Daytime OPS Req.</u>		<u>OPS at Kingsville & Orange Grove</u>		<u>OPS Needed at Corpus Christi</u>
336	494, 928	Minus	377,873	Equals	117,055
355*	522,915	Minus	377,873	Equals	145,042

*After year 2000

An Additional 37,920 Operations are dedicated to other (than T-44 or HM-53) Daylight operations: (ie. $237 \times 2 \times 80 = 37,920$ Operations).

T-44 Training Requirements are as Follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>PTR Req</u>	<u>Day and Night OPS Req*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Maritime	233	571*	133,043
USAF (C-130)	150	780	14,400
E2/C2	36	400*	<u>117,000</u>
		TOTAL	264,443

* Data used during BRAC'93. Operations required are conservative in that they are both day and night and, therefore, higher than day OPS alone.

Summary of Requirements (OPS/Year)

T-45	117,055	or	145,042
T-44	264,443		264,443
Other (Tenants)	<u>37,920</u>		<u>37,920</u>
TOTAL	419,318	or	447,405

This means that there is remaining capacity for 312,584 to 463,718 operation per year which can be used for MH-53 operations and USCG, USCS, and transient aircraft.

G. NAF Corpus Christi or NAS Corpus Christi

The STMFTF believes that the redesignation of NAS Corpus Christi as an NAF is inconsistent with the size of the installation, the number of tenants (46), the number of assigned personnel (approximately 7500), the importance of the mission and the complexity and multiplicity of operations.

NAS Corpus Christi is a 50 million dollar (annual) business with a third of that contributed by tenants. With the accession of T-45's and MH-53' the importance of Corpus Christi will grow, not diminish. Redesignation would incur numerous risks from the standpoints of command and control, financial management, executive management, environmental impact control, and cost control.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889JG/4U661666
20 Jul 1994

From: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99
Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889J6/3U658748 of 20 Sep 1993
Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 94-99
(2) Naval Flight Officer Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 94-99

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect planned production goals for FY 94-99. These goals are intended to resolve current pool excesses, balance ongoing transitions and new production with FRS output and return to steady state force mix of 10 CVWs, 12 VP Squadrons and appropriate force support for 330 ships in FY 97.

2. Significant changes include:

- Increase VFA pilot manning from 17 to 19/squadron
- Reduction from 15 to 12 VP squadrons
- Decom of VAW 122
- Realignment of E2/C2 pilot career paths
- Adjustment for Helo pools
- WSO curriculum approved/20 to 40 plus up of FMS NFOTR

3. OPNAV point of contact is Captain Scott Krajnik, N889G/J, A/V 224-6010/6013, commercial 703-614-6010/3.


S.S. MOBLEY
By direction

Distribution:

CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
CMC (A, T, M, ASM-31, MPP-33, MMOA-2)
CG MCCDC (TE32A)
COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-2/7)
CHNAVPERS (211V, 43, 432, 433)
CNET (OOL/T25)
CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)
NAVDEPNOAA
NETSAFA
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

ATTACHMENT 1

20 JUL 94

PILOT TRAINING RATES

<u>FY-94</u>	<u>STRIKE</u>	<u>MARITIME</u>	<u>B2/C2</u>	<u>ROTARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USN	173	120	43	214	550
USMC	118	32	0	188	338
COGARD	0	15	0	35	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	321	214	43	502	1080
<u>FY-95</u>					
USN	163	140	36	184	523
USMC	110	31	0	181	322
COGARD	0	10	0	45	55
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	303	228	36	475	1042
<u>FY-96</u>					
USN	183	140	36	184	543
USMC	106	29	0	181	316
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	319	228	36	468	1051
<u>FY-97</u>					
USN	203	146	36	184	569
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	463	1068
<u>FY-98</u>					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084
<u>FY-99</u>					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084

ENCLOSURE (1)

NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES

20 Jul 1994

<u>FY-94</u>	<u>RIO</u>	<u>WSO</u>	<u>TN</u>	<u>OJN</u>	<u>ATDS</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USN	29	0	48	37	35	102	251
USMC	0	17	14	0	0	0	31
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	29	17	62	37	35	118	298
<u>FY-95</u>							
USN	39	0	38	37	35	122	271
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	20	0	0	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	38	50	37	35	138	337
<u>FY-96</u>							
USN	39	0	38	57	35	128	297
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	58	50	57	35	144	383
<u>FY-97</u>							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
<u>FY-98</u>							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
<u>FY-99</u>							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397

ENCLOSURE (2)

PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

W. A. EARNER

NAME (Please type or print)

Title

W. A. Earner

Signature

11/21/94

Date

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

This Memorandum of Agreement (Agreement) is entered into by and between the Beeville/Bee County Redevelopment Authority (Authority) and the Kingsville Area Industrial Development Foundation (Foundation). The purpose is to effectuate a lease between the two parties for the airfield portion of the property formerly known as Naval Air Station (NAS) Chase Field in Beeville, Texas.

WHEREAS the Authority has determined that a portion of Chase Field is not currently needed for exclusive public use, and

WHEREAS the Foundation wishes to secure the airfield portion of Chase Field for use by Naval Air Station (NAS) Kingsville, Texas, as an Outlying Field (OLF) in the training of student pilots,

In view above and for the consideration stated below, the parties agree as follows:

1. Property Covered

The property formerly known as NAS Chase Field is shown in Exhibit A. This Agreement covers only the airfield (Airfield) portion of that property, shown in Exhibit B.

2. Term

The term of this Agreement shall be for twenty (20) years, starting from the effective date this Agreement enters into effect in accordance with Paragraph 4 below.

3. Lease of Premises

During the term of this Agreement, the Foundation shall lease the Airfield from the Authority, subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement. The Foundation affirms that its sole purpose in leasing the Airfield is to make it available to the U. S. Navy for use as an OLF by NAS Kingsville.

4. Agreement to be Effective Upon Sublease

The terms of this Agreement shall become effective only upon the execution of a legally binding sublease between the Authority and the Navy for use of the Airfield as an OLF. Such a sublease must be approved in writing by the Foundation prior to or at the time of its execution, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld.

5. Termination

This Agreement may be terminated in either of the following ways:

A. Either party may terminate this Agreement, upon the giving of six months' written notice to the other party.

B. if the Authority and the Navy have not entered into a legally binding sublease within five years of the date of execution of this Agreement, then the Agreement shall lapse.

6. No Exclusive Use

The parties agree that the Navy shall not have exclusive use of the Airfield, and that any sublease between the Authority and the Navy shall so state. The parties further agree to negotiate a joint use agreement at the appropriate time if it is determined that such an agreement is required to delineate the respective rights and obligations of the parties with regard to the shared use of the Airfield between Navy and civil aircraft.

7. Consideration

As consideration for use of the Airfield, the Foundation shall pay \$1 per year to the Authority.

8. Expenses

All expenses associated with use of the Airfield by the Navy shall be paid either by the Foundation or directly by the Navy. Any and all expenses paid by the Authority shall be reimbursed by the Foundation or the Navy.

9. Improvements

All improvements made to the Airfield by or for the Navy shall be paid for by the Foundation or the Navy.


10. Liability and Indemnification


The parties agree that the Authority shall have no liability for (i) loss of or damage to property or (ii) injury or death of any person as a result of activities conducted by the Foundation or the Navy pursuant to this Agreement. The Foundation agrees to indemnify, save, hold harmless and defend the Authority against all suits, claims or actions related to or arising from any activities conducted at or from the Airfield in connection with this Agreement.

This Agreement is executed this 17 day of December, 1994.

BEEVILLE/BEE COUNTY
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

KINGSVILLE AREA INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION


By: 

By: 


Title: Chairman

Title: President

EXHIBIT A





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Joint Flying Training and BRAC 95

The View From South Texas






P.O. Box 640

Corpus Christi

Texas 78403

(512) 883-5571



A COOPERATIVE
EFFORT BY ARANSAS,
KLEBERG, NUECES,
& SAN PATRICIO
C O U N T I E S

October 1994

SUBJECT: "Joint Flying Training and BRAC 95: The View From South Texas"

The South Texas Military Facilities Task Force, a coalition of community volunteers from the four county Corpus Christi Bay Area, supports the missions of Naval Air Station Kingsville, Naval Station Ingleside, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and its major tenant, Corpus Christi Army Depot.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent defense budget cuts mandate significant reductions in the DOD infrastructure. However, it is essential that the BRAC 95 retain those bases providing the greatest long term capacity, capability, flexibility and versatility necessary to enhance military training well into the next century.

There are certain economies to be obtained with "jointness". DOD has directed a number of studies in this regard including "Joint Pilot Training". The South Texas Military Facilities Task Force has retained several retired Navy and Air Force senior aviators to review the requirements and assets of both services in the training of aviators. These senior aviators have visited all Navy and Air Force bases involved in aviation training and have produced the attached report.

We invite you to review this document which we believe to be an objective analysis of our current aviation training assets and continuously changing requirements.

Loyd Neal
Chairman

Joint Flying Training and BRAC 95

The View From South Texas

October 1994

*Prepared by the
South Texas Military Facilities Task Force
1201 N. Shoreline
P.O. Box 640
Corpus Christi, TX 78403
(512) 883-5571*

P R E F A C E

JOINT AVIATION TRAINING: THE CASE FOR SOUTH TEXAS

The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent defense budget cuts mandate significant reductions in the DoD infrastructure to render it more compatible with the size and characteristics of a shrinking force structure. This requires the closure of certain military bases and/or the relocation of essential support activities.

A. MILITARY VALUE

During BRAC 95 each military base will be evaluated in terms of its 'military value' with respect to:

1. Utility vis a vis current and future mission requirements and contribution to the operational readiness of the DoD's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated air space.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and total force requirements.
4. Cost and manpower savings realistically realizable from base closure/relocation.

In assessing military value, distinction must be made between features that are humanly possible to change (e.g. aircraft complements, facilities, housing, runways, etc.) and those which are beyond human control (e.g. weather, proximity to salt water, proximity to Mexico, etc.). Moreover, such considerations as encroachments and civil airways overlays over pilot/aircrew training area, while humanly possible to arrest, are in some areas, moving inexorably in directions which can only aggravate current problems.

South Texas is especially suited to joint pilot training because of the large volume of uncrowded airspace and excellent flying weather. These features are unique to south Texas and cannot be matched by any Navy or Air Force pilot training bases in any other area. With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiations with Mexico might make even more unencumbered airspace and real estate for such special missions as low-level navigation, ground attack ranges, basic air-to-air training and low level intercepts.

Corpus Christi and Kingsville enjoy an additional advantage for Navy pilot training because of their proximity to salt water and deep water, aircraft-carrier-capable port (Naval Station Ingleside). Lore of the sea, an important element of Navy pilot training, is best imparted at the water's edge, not deep inland.

Nowhere, in the United States, are the natural advantages of the South Texas training environment matched, let alone surpassed. Once they are given up by a base closure decision they can never be recovered and the flying training system will remain, thereafter, less efficient than it was before.

B. SOUTH TEXAS AIRCREW TRAINING BASE COMPLEX

The South Texas aircrew training base complex consists of NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville, Laughlin AFB and Randolph AFB. These bases are currently involved in conducting all categories of Navy/Air Force pilot training (except helicopter training). In addition, Randolph AFB is participating, with NAS Pensacola, in the conduct of joint training for NFO's, WSO's and EWO's. Additionally, NAS Corpus Christi has been tasked to provide C-130 pilot training for Air Force student pilots (Joint primary pilot training is being initiated at Reese AFB and NAS Whiting Field.).

NAS Corpus Christi stands out among the ten other undergraduate aircrew training sites nationwide in that it is, more properly, a Federal Support Complex whose tenants pay about one third of its annual operating costs. Undergraduate pilot training is an included (but not the major) activity. A major tenant, is the Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) which is the Army's only and the world's largest helicopter repair activity. CCAD employs over 3000 civilians, 58% of which are Hispanic. Other major tenants include the U.S. Customs Service with P-3A and P-3B AEW assets which require basing at Corpus Christi in order to perform their drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean, Mexico and Central and South America. Corpus Christi is also the U.S. Coast Guard's site for the operation of its HH-65A "Dolphin" helicopters and HU 25A "FALCON" fanjets employed in its Southwest mission. The Naval Hospital at NAS Corpus Christi is the only military hospital south of San Antonio and serves an area 150 miles to the north to 120 miles south. Services are provided for personnel stationed at NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville, NAS Dallas and Naval Station Ingleside as well as for a large community of military retirees. 'Interdependence' is a key feature of the Corpus Christi complex in that all of the activities on or near NAS Corpus Christi are importantly dependent on it for operational, personnel and/or logistic support. Of particular military value is the C-5 capable runway which supports both CCAD and MINEWARCOM logistics. It should also be recognized that while BRAC 95 will be a Department of Defense exercise, any decision which requires the relocation of non-DoD- organizations will incur costs which will have to be defrayed somewhere in the federal budget. Moreover, if the only action is to relocate NAS Corpus Christi's pilot training assets, the result will be merely cost shifting, not cost savings.

NAS Kingsville is currently the only operational site for the T-45, the Navy's first-of-a-kind pilot training system. The T-45 training system includes flight simulators and state-of-the art computer-aided ground training. The system is the prototype for future undergraduate pilot training systems such as the Joint Primary Aviation Training System (JPATS). NAS Kingsville has existing ramp and maintenance facilities capable

of accommodating the entire T-45 buy now planned, Moreover, NAS Kingsville, with the complex of auxiliary fields available in the area, has the capacity to train all the Navy strike pilots who will fly the T-45 during the current decade and beyond. NAS Corpus Christi, because of its proximity to Kingsville, could serve as a supplementary/auxiliary T-45 training base without any further investment in T-45 infrastructure beyond that planned for NAS Kingsville. Single siting the T-45 would enable short term cost avoidance upwards of \$200 million and long term savings several times that.

Laughlin AFB is ideally sited for undergraduate pilot training and has in place the facilities as assets required for significant increases in student output with little, if any, requirement for additional capital investment.

Randolph AFB is, justifiably, the centerpiece of the Air Force's aircrew training programs, is one of the two major participants in the joint aircrew training program, and the Air Force's focal point for the formulation, direction and management of its elements of the joint aircrew training program.

C. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITY TO PERFORM

Infrastructures currently in-place in the South Texas undergraduate pilot training complex will support an annual output of 800-1000 primary students and at least 1300 advanced students without further capital investment. Current Navy/Air Force statements of pilot training requirements (PTR's) through FY 1999 indicate the need for an input of 1800 to 2300 primary students per year. About two thirds of these will be Navy students. Since joint training plans provide only for the exchange of 100 students, the irreducible minimum of primary training bases appears to be three Air Force and two Navy. A 'safer' mix would be four Air Force and two Navy in order to provide increased 'surge' capacity to deal with (currently) unforeseen contingencies.

D. SUMMARY

NAS Corpus Christi is much more than a Naval Air Station; it is a Federal Support Complex. Experience at Corpus Christi has proven the efficacies of the co-location and consolidation of a family of interdependent activities. This extends beyond the boundaries of the Naval Air Station to Naval Station Ingleside's MINEWARCOM for which the personnel, operational and maintenance support are essential to mission performance. Moreover, the co-location of CCAD at NAS Corpus Christi and Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity and Navy drydock at NAVSTA Ingleside provides the potential for a Regional Maintenance Facility. NAS Corpus Christi's runways are capable (now) of operating the JPATS and there is, in-place, adequate ramp and hangar space for the JPATS and/or the Air Force's T-1 as well as the MINEWARCOM's MH-53 helicopter. The base is C-5 capable and currently provides that service to CCAD.

NAS Kingsville has the capabilities and capacity to train, in the T-45, all the strike pilots the Navy will require during the current decade and beyond. The cost savings potentially realizable from single-siting the T-45 at Kingsville merit honest, serious, objective consideration.

Finally, since BRAC 95 will determine what complex of bases will be available to conduct aircrew training well into the next century, it is essential that those bases provide the best available in the way of capacity, capability, flexibility and versatility. In South Texas these already existing qualities are materially enhanced by the natural advantages of airspace and weather unmatched anywhere else in the continental United States. The Navy came to Texas 50 years ago to train pilots because of good weather and air space. Much has changed in 50 years; however, weather has not. In 50 years South Texas air space has only become more attractive for pilot training relative to the alternatives. The route to training efficiencies and cost savings runs through South Texas.

NOTE: This preface is based on the study: "Joint Flying Training and BRAC 95: The View From South Texas."

JOINT FLYING TRAINING AND BRAC 95:

THE VIEW FROM SOUTH TEXAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report consists, first, of an appreciation of the nature and scope of the Joint Flying Training Program (JFTP) of the Department of Defense which is now being implemented. It then addresses the potential impact of BRAC '95 and the factors influencing the decision-making process which, it is hoped, will result in a complex of flying training bases best suited for executing the JFTP in 1995 and on into the next century. Included is the justification for the inclusion, in that complex, of the Navy and Air Force bases located in South Texas.

The principal elements of the report are:

- A. **JOINT FLYING TRAINING**
What is involved with Pilot, Naval flight Officer (NFO), Weapons Systems Officers (WSO), and Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) training.
- B. **FLYING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS**
The derivation of training requirements from force structure and aircraft procurement projections...and the resultant student training requirements.
- C. **FIXED-WING FLYING TRAINING BASES**
An inventory of the existing flying training bases, a comparative evaluation of their worth to the training program and a look at student capacities (because the latter will likely be the principal factor influencing base closure/relocation decisions).
- D. **BASE CLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS**
A review of the selection criteria, a caution against over-dependence on numerical quantification, and a discussion of some of the "real world" considerations which need to influence the decision-making process for BRAC '95.
- E. **IMPLEMENTATION AND BRAC '95**
The influence of student capacity estimates, variables which mandate against premature foreclosure on future options/alternatives and a preview of future possibilities for joint pilot training. Highlighted is the importance of the role that the training bases in South Texas can/should play in all this.

The South Texas training base complex consists of NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville, Laughlin AFB, and Randolph AFB. These bases are currently involved in conducting all categories of Navy/Air Force joint flight training (except helicopter training). In addition, Randolph AFB is participating with NAS Pensacola in the conduct of joint training for NFO's, WSO's, and EWO's. Corpus Christi stands out among the other aircraft training sites nationwide in that it is, more properly, a Federal Support Complex with 47 tenants wherein flight training is an included (but not the major) activity. If the only BRAC '95 action is to relocate NAS Corpus Christi's training assets, the result will be cost shifting, not cost savings.

Current in-place infrastructures in the South Texas complex will support an annual output of 800-1000 primary students and at least 1300 advanced students without further capital investment. Certain efficiencies and economies, such as those which could be realized by single-siting the T-45 at NAS Kingsville, merit special consideration.

South Texas is especially suited to joint pilot training because of the large volume of uncrowded airspace and excellent flying weather. These features are unique to South Texas and cannot be matched by any Navy or Air Force pilot training bases in any other area. With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiations with Mexico might make even more unencumbered airspace and real estate available for such special missions as low-level navigation, ground attack ranges, basic air-to-air training and low level intercepts.

Corpus Christi and Kingsville enjoy an additional advantage for Navy pilot training because of their proximity to salt water. Lore of the sea, an important element of Navy pilot training, is best imparted at the water's edge, not deep inland.

Nowhere, in the United States, are the natural advantages of the training environment matched, let alone surpassed. Once they are given up by a base closure decision they can never be recovered and the flying training system will remain, thereafter, less efficient that it was before.

The View From South Texas derives from on-site visits to six Air Force and five Navy bases, conversations with highly placed officials in the DoD and Congress and a thorough search of contemporary documentation on the subject of joint aircrew training.

A. JOINT FLYING TRAINING

1. OVERVIEW

The military services are implementing a group of fixed-wing aircraft training initiatives in response to the 15 April, 1993 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on "The Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the U.S.," Plans purport to consolidate certain elements of fixed-wing training for Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard students. Implicit in the planning is the accommodation of ongoing training programs for NATO, FMS and NOAA students.

Near-term focus is on joint training in three categories:

- Fixed-wing Primary
- Advanced Airlift/Tanker/Maritime Patrol
- Advanced training for Naval Flight Officers/ Weapons Systems Officers/ Electronic Warfare Officers.

Present planning for joint training does not extend to Navy strike pilot training or to Air Force fighter/fighter-bomber or heavy bomber training. To date, plans have been developed for personnel exchanges which provide that Navy and Air Force will exchange instructors and each will train 100 of the other's primary students per year.

Following examinations of training capacity and infrastructure, Navy and Air Force have stated jointly that neither has the aircraft or base capacity to train all DoD fixed-wing pilot trainees projected for FY '99 and beyond. It goes without saying that BRAC '95 decisions should reflect, inter alia: 1) near-term (pre FY '99) steady state requirements plus some surge capacity; 2) long-term (FY '99 and after) requirements which must be recognized in 1995 in order not to seriously inhibit or preclude the exercise of future options.

Pursuant to a SECDEF Memorandum of 23 May, 1993, the subject of rotary wing training is being addressed separately. The Air Force has already consolidated its rotary wing pilot training with the Army at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Remaining issues are the consolidation at Fort Rucker, of Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard rotary wing pilot training, existing differences in training helicopters and training syllabi and the (Navy's) practice of using fixed-wing training in the T-34 to select and train students enroute to rotary wing training. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter pilots are currently being trained at Whiting Field. The Air Force is considering primary fixed wing training for prospective helicopter pilots.

2. FIXED WING PILOT TRAINING

Although differing in some particulars, both Air Force and Navy pilot training programs are the product of similar training philosophies. Both embody the teaching of basic military flying skills during a primary training phase with progression to service-

specific training in (subsequent) advanced phases. The Air Force program differs from the Navy's in that Air Force student pilot candidates go through a pre-primary screening phase in the T-3. Navy pilots do not. There are no comparative data available with which to judge the relative efficiencies of these two approaches. Air Force and Navy pilot training flows are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

USAF PILOT TRAINING




FIGURE 1

USN PILOT TRAINING




FIGURE 2

3. JOINT PILOT TRAINING

a. Primary Training

Projections for the implementation of a joint pilot training system provide for the orderly transition from primary training in either the T-37 (Air Force) or T-34 (Navy) to a single joint primary trainer, the JPATS, flown by both, commencing late in the 1990's or early in the 2000's. In all cases, primary training will feed four pipelines:

- Navy fighter/attack
- Air Force fighter/bomber
- Joint airlift/tanker/maritime patrol
- Joint helicopters

Figure 3 depicts the four pipelines after the JPATS becomes operational.

JOINT TRAINING PROJECTION -- JPATS




FIGURE 3

Interim (pre JPATS) joint pilot training flow, embodying training in the Air Force's T-37, is shown by Figure 4. The Navy counterpart to the Air Force program, involving primary training in the T-34, is shown by Figure 5.

INTERIM JOINT TRAINING FLOW AIR FORCE T-37 PROGRAM




FIGURE 4

INTERIM JOINT TRAINING FLOW NAVY T-34 PROGRAM




FIGURE 5

The plan is to build, first, two prototype joint primary training squadrons (one each Navy and Air Force) with alternating Air Force/Navy/Marine Corps commanders and 30 instructor pilots. The goal is an annual exchange student pilot load of 100 by 1998. Again, it should be emphasized that this is principally a student exchange program and may impact base closure considerations differently from a joint training program involving about 2000 pilots annually, in which student pilot exchanges might not be balanced between the two services.

At present it appears that the selection of bases to receive the JPATS may be influenced by requirements to provide a training complex of a main field and one or more auxiliary fields, all with runways with a minimum of 5000 feet in length. The principal determinant of the number of runways required will be the expected/required student output. All the existing Air Force training bases meet JPATS runway standards as do the Navy's Corpus Christi, Kingsville, Pensacola and Meridian. Navy Whiting's mainside runways are adequate for JPATS but only one of its current auxiliary fields (BREWTON) meets the 5000 feet runway requirement. ALF Choctaw, currently being used by NAS Pensacola for T-2 touch and go landings, with its single 8,000-ft. runway, would be required to support both NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field.

b. Airlift/Tanker/Maritime Patrol Training

The Air Force and Navy have stated jointly that undergraduate flight training for airlift/tanker/maritime patrol pilots requires one Navy T-44 squadron and four Air Force T-1 squadrons – and that neither service has the capacity to meet the total training requirement. "Total training requirement" may also eventually include fixed-wing multi-engine conversion training for Army rotary-wing pilots. Thinking to date is that this would be best conducted in the Navy's T-44.

Advanced joint multi-engine fixed-wing training plans provide that turboprop pilots will train in the T-44 and turbojet pilots in the T-1. This means that Air Force C-130 pilots (approximately 150 per year) will be trained by the Navy. Navy E-6 pilots (approximately 25 per year) will be trained by the Air Force as will Air Force turbojet airlift and tanker pilots. Navy P-3, E2C and C-2 pilots will train in the T-44. E2C and C-2 pilots will be carrier-qualified, in the near term, in the Navy T-2 and, eventually, in the Navy's T-45. A joint service instructor force will be involved in all T-44 and part of T-1 training.

Figure 6 depicts the Air Force C-130/Navy E-6 pilot training track. Figure 7 depicts the Navy E-6/Air Force C-130 pilot training track.

USAF C-130/USN E-6 TRACK SELECT




FIGURE 6

USN E-6/USAF C-130 TRACK SELECT




FIGURE 7

c. NFO/Weapon Systems Officer (WSO)/EWO Training

Training for non-pilot aircrews generally mirrors the fundamental approach to pilot training in that it starts with the teaching of basic skills and progresses to service-specific training. The current Air Force Specialized Undergraduate Navigator training program is depicted in Figure 8. The current Navy NFO training program is depicted in Figure 9.

USAF NAVIGATOR TRAINING




FIGURE 8

USN NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING




FIGURE 9

The joint training proposed for NFO/WSO/EWO's purports to provide the highest quality of training and the optimum use of resources. Student flow is depicted in Figure 10.

JOINT STRIKE/SO/EWO TRAINING




FIGURE 10

All Air Force WSO's and Navy NFO's slated for strike aircraft are to be trained at Navy Pensacola. Navy/Marine Corps navigators and NFO's assigned to transports and land-based patrol aircraft will continue to train at Randolph AFB.

Air Force WSO's will complete core training and receive basic aviation indoctrination and fundamental navigation training at Randolph. Track selection occurs at the 22 week point. Air Force officers selected for WSO training at Pensacola will receive additional training in the T-37 and then enter, with students at Pensacola, into the intermediate phase in the T-39. Thereafter, both Navy and Air Force students will receive the same training.

In 1995 the Air Force will commence training in its Simulator for Electronic Warfare Training at Randolph. Thereupon, Navy NFO's requiring EW training will train at Randolph after completing training at Pensacola. This will be in lieu of training now being conducted at the Navy EW school at Corry Field (Pensacola area). Air Force Trainees slated for EW duty will receive this same training prior to going to Pensacola.

Overall, there are several differences in syllabi and training equipment which have to be ironed out in order to optimize the joint training program. The end product, however, will be the better use of in-place, proven training systems which best replicate operational systems and realistically simulate combat environments. This program is more "joint" than the planned pilot training program. The retention of both Pensacola and Randolph is essential to the realization of these objectives.

B. FLYING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. OVERVIEW

The principal determinant of flying training requirements is the planned force structure. This translates to requisite manning levels which, in turn, determine the rate at which new aircrews must be trained to compensate for attrition from all causes. An indication of future aircrew requirements is also provided by aircraft procurement plans which provide a measure of the extent to which the force structure can/will be fleshed out. There are few, if any, indications that the force structure will grow in the future.

Both Navy and Air Force take all these factors into account when formulating their aircrew training requirements. These provide the basis for sizing the training infrastructure (viz. aircraft, facilities, equipment, personnel).

There is in all this, of course, a predominant imponderable: an unpredictable international community of nations which may create problems beyond the premises of contemporary strategic plans. Prudence requires, therefore, that allowances must be made for a reasonable surge in student output should some future military contingency require it.

Another factor, impossible to quantify at this time in terms of pilot training requirements, is possible changes in the current roles and missions of the military services. The DoD has formed a Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Services which commenced work in September 1994. The findings of the Commission are certain to be of great interest to certain luminaries, such as Senator Sam Nunn, who, for some time, has led Congress in pressing for change.

It is reasonable to assume that emphasis in the future will continue to be on "jointness." Few, if any, issues in the flying training arena will be addressed unilaterally by any single service. BRAC 95 actions must be in the same context, taking especial care not to foreclose prematurely on any options which might later evolve from a dynamic situation.

2. FORCE STRUCTURE

a. <u>Navy</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
<i>Aircraft Carriers</i>					
Active Duty	11	?	?	?	?
Reserve	1	?	?	?	?
<i>Tactical Air Forces USN Air Wings</i>					
Active Duty	10*	?	?	?	?
Reserve	1*	?	?	?	?
<i>USMC Air Wings</i>					
Active Duty	3	?	?	?	?
Reserve	1	?	?	?	?
<i>Patrol Squadrons</i>					
S-3 ASW Squadrons	15	?	?	?	?
	4/8 & ?	?	?	?	?
	6/6**				

* 50 tactical aircraft ** 4-8 plane; 6-6 plane

b. <u>Air Force</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
<i>Fighter Units (Wings & Groups)</i>					
Active	25	?	?	?	?
Reserve	4	?	?	?	?
National Guard	45	?	?	?	?
<i>Bomber Units</i>					
Active	10	?	?	?	?
Reserve	0	?	?	?	?
National Guard	2-B-52 ?	?	?	?	?
<i>Airlift Units</i>					
Active	13	?	?	?	?
Reserve	14	?	?	?	?
National Guard	4	?	?	?	?
<i>Tanker Units</i>					
Active	8	?	?	?	?
Reserve	1	?	?	?	?
National Guard	15	?	?	?	?

3. AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

a. <u>Navy</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
AV-88 Harrier	4	7	12	13	18
F/A-18C/D Hornet	24	24	24		
F/A-18E/F Hornet			12	24	24
E2C Hawkeye	4	4	4	4	4
AH-1 Sea Cobra	12	9	9		
T-45A Goshawk	12	12	12	12	24
JPATS**			8	24	24
SH-60R Seahawk				2	15

* Remanufacture

** Under Reconsideration

b. <u>Air Force</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
F-22			4	4	12
AC-130 U	9				
C-17	6	8	8	8	12
C-130J		4	4	4	4
F-16	20	24	3		
B-2	3	5	1	2	
E-8		2	2	2	2
NDAAs			3		
C-32A					1
OC-135B		2			
T-1A	35	36	23		
T-3A	42	17			
JPATS**			5	16	27

** Under Reconsideration

4. AIRCREW TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

a. <u>Navy</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
(1) Pilots Strike	303	309	336	336	336
Maritime	228	228	271	271	271
E2/C2	43	43	53	53	53
<u>Rotary</u>	<u>497</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>485</u>	<u>485</u>	<u>485</u>
TOTALS	1071	1070	1145	1145	1145

Navy also committed to train 150 USAF C-130 pilots and 95 (equivalent PTR) Army rotary-to-fixed wing per year.

(2) <u>NFO's</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
RIO	57	57	68	68	68
TN (Tactical Navigator)	50	50	50	50	50
OJN (Overwater Jet Nav.)	37	37	52	52	52
ATDS (Adv.Tact. Data Sys.)	37	37	41	41	41
<u>Interservice UNT (NAV)</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>137</u>
TOTALS	319	321	348	348	348

Source: CNO letter 1542, Serial N889J6/3U6587, dated 20 September 1993, Subject: "Pilot and Naval Flight Officer Training Rates, FY 94-99" and modifications thorough 10 March 1994.

b. <u>Air Force</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
(1) Pilots Undergraduate (Total)	500	525	525	525	900
Pilots Fighter/Bomber	185	194	194	194	333
Airlift/Tanker	290	305	305	305	522
Helicopter	25	26	26	26	45

Typical Student Output:

Fighters 28 percent
 Bombers 9 percent
 Tankers 18 percent
 Airlift 40 percent
 Helicopter 5 percent

(2) Navigators	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
WSO	24	24	51	51	51
EWO	26	26	61	61	61
<u>NAV</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>136</u>
TOTALS	169	174	247	247	248

C. FIXED-WING FLYING TRAINING BASES

1. CURRENT BASES

<u>Service</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
Air Force	Columbus AFB	Mississippi	T-37,T-1,AT-38
	Laughlin AFB	South Texas	T-37,T-1,T-38
	Randolph AFB	South Texas	T-1,T-3,C-21,T-37
			T-38,T-41,T-43,AT-38
	Reese AFB	Texas	T-37,T-1,T-38
	Sheppard AFB	Texas	T-37,T-38,AT-38
	Vance AFB	Oklahoma	T-37,T-1,T-38
Navy	NAS Corpus Christi	South Texas	T-34,T-44
	NAS Kingsville	South Texas	T-45
	Meridian	Mississippi	T-2,TA-4
	NAS Pensacola	Florida	T-34,T-2,T-39
	NAS Whiting	Florida	T-34,TH-57

The totals are six (6) Air Force and five (5) Navy. The type(s) of training being performed is connoted by the types of aircraft assigned. Figure 11 is a map showing the approximate locations of each of the foregoing. Field configurations are shown by Figures 12-A through 12-K.





FIGURE 11

91318 **AIRPORT DIAGRAM** AFD-91 (USAF) COLUMBUS AFB (KCBM) COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI




AIRPORT DIAGRAM COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI COLUMBUS AFB (KCBM)

FIGURE 12-A

91346
AIRPORT DIAGRAM

CORPUS CHRISTI NAS (TRUAX FLD)(KNGP)
 AFD-98 (USN) CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS



AIRPORT DIAGRAM


CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
 CORPUS CHRISTI NAS (TRUAX FLD)(KNGP)

FIGURE 12-B

93315
AIRPORT DIAGRAM

AFD-918 (USN)

KINGSVILLE NAS (KNQI)
 KINGSVILLE, TEXAS



ATIS ★
 276.2
 KINGSVILLE TOWER ★
 124.1 346.0
 GND CON
 352.4
 CLNC DEL
 328.4

NOVEMBER 1993
 ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
 0.1"W

AIRPORT DIAGRAM

KINGSVILLE, TEXAS
 KINGSVILLE NAS (KNQI)


FIGURE 12-C

AIRPORT DIAGRAM

AFD-5079(USN)

MERIDIAN NAS (MC CAIN FIELD) (KNMM)


MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI



AIRPORT DIAGRAM

MERIDIAN NAS (MC CAIN FIELD) (KNMM)
MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

FIGURE 12-E




AIRPORT DIAGRAM PENSACOLA, FLORIDA
 PENSACOLA NAS
 (FORREST SHERMAN FLD)(KNPA)

94174
AIRPORT DIAGRAM

AFD-240 (USAF)


REESE AFB (KREE)
 LUBBOCK, TEXAS



AIRPORT DIAGRAM

LUBBOCK, TEXAS
 REESE AFB (KREE)

FIGURE 12-H



AIRPORT DIAGRAM

ENID, OKLAHOMA
 VANCE AFB (KEND)

FIGURE 12-J




FIGURE 12-K

A notable difference between the existing Air Force and Navy pilot training systems is that Air Force fixed-wing student pilots can complete the entire undergraduate training syllabus at a single base while Navy students are generally required to make at least one move and occasionally, two or three. The nearest Navy equivalent to the Air Force single site system is at Whiting Field, for helicopter pilot training, and in South Texas, where Corpus Christi and Kingsville function, essentially, as a single site for strike pilot training: in cases where primary training is performed at Corpus Christi or for maritime patrol pilots completing both primary training (in the T-34) and advanced training (in the T-44) at Corpus Christi. Corpus Christi's utility and versatility as a joint service multi-engine training site would be materially enhanced by the addition of one or more Air Force T-1 squadrons. This would increase its capacity for single site pilot training. There is ample room for such an addition.

2. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

A rough order of magnitude appreciation of the military value of the eleven Air Force and Navy bases currently involved in undergraduate pilot training appears in Figure 13. No attempt has been made to assign a relative weighting to the various factors listed as criteria of military value: either in comparing one criterion (category) to another, or with respect to absolute numerical values of the ratings (i.e. Green, Yellow or Red) within each category. Nevertheless, even the simplistic approach taken resulted in relative rankings quite consistent with conclusions reached during actual on-site visits to each of the bases listed, as well as data used during BRAC 93.

DoD AVIATION TRAINING FACILITIES




FIGURE 13-A

NOTES

1. Weather based on ceiling and visibility averages.
2. "Joint" = Navy plus other DoD and non-DoD government agencies.
3. Suitability of runways for JPATS operations at both main side and auxiliary fields (minimum of 5,000 feet required).
4. Geographically located to best exploit NAFTA opportunities (e.g. for flight training: low-level routes and bombing targets).
5. Rating appears to be inverted in that base closings offering best cost savings are rated 'R' and those providing least cost savings are rated 'G.' This contributes to the military value ratings in that comparatively low savings from closing is a reason for keeping a base open.
6. Former SAC base. Tremendous cost to replace bomber/tanker-capable airways, taxiways, and ramps.
7. 5,000-foot parallel runways easily extendible to 8,000 feet. C-5 capabilities essential for CCAD support.
8. Major tenants: CCAD, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard. Tenants' contributions to base operating support (BOS) materially reduce Navy expenditures.
9. Sub-par operations and maintenance facilities.
10. All runways JPATS capable.
11. Ample room to accommodate one or two T-1 training squadrons or more primary trainers.
12. Pilot training represents only a small percentage of BOS costs. Moving it would only *shift*, not eliminate, costs.
13. Strike training, Border Patrol, ROTHF support. More scheduled.
14. Would be difficult and costly to relocate the T-45 training system, especially the OFT's and the corrosion control facility.
15. Capable of pilot training only.
16. Configured as a strike base. Runway configuration not suitable for high-volume pilot training operation.
17. More than 150 miles from coastline.
18. 40 percent of Navy near misses/midairs have occurred in the Pensacola/Whiting area.
19. Lacks JPATS-capable auxiliary fields.
20. Pensacola is an ante bellum base with several outdated facilities. They are basically adequate for the present mission, but growth would require substantial capital investment. Navy will protect Pensacola as "The Cradle of Naval Aviation."
21. Randolph is an old but well-maintained base. Future growth will require substantial capital investment. USAF is committed to protection of Randolph.
22. Field elevation, temperature extremes, and frequency of crosswinds are additional considerations.
23. Old/refurbished.
24. Near saturation now.
25. NATO pilot training. Major foreign investment. Definitely not a candidate for closure.
26. San Antonio building/expanding toward Randolph.
27. Inhibited by encroachment on San Antonio.
28. Adequate for T-34 and TH-59 training operations.
29. Field configuration and facilities limit future mission expansion. Congestion a factor.

3. LOOKING BEHIND THE RATINGS

In interpreting Figure 13, it is especially important that cognizance be taken of the notes accompanying the Green/Yellow/Red treatment of rankings. Even then, however, it is difficult to properly attribute to those bases located in South Texas (viz. Laughlin, Kingsville and Corpus Christi) the significant advantages accruing from air space and weather. Distinction must also be made between features which it is humanly possible to change (e.g. aircraft complements, facilities, housing, runways) and those which are beyond human control (e.g. weather, proximity to salt water, closeness to Mexico (re NAFTA). Moreover, such considerations as encroachment and civil airways overlays over training areas, while humanly possible to arrest, are, in some areas, moving inexorably in a direction which will aggravate current problems.

Differences in present missions, or present base configurations, complicate comparative analyses of future potentials as undergraduate pilot training bases. Laughlin, Reese, Vance, Columbus, Kingsville and Meridian are, essentially single mission bases although Laughlin and Columbus have prior Strategic Air Command ties. Meridian's runway configuration is unique and reflects the non-training mission for which it was designed. Corpus Christi is, more properly, a Federal Support Complex wherein flight training is an included (but not the major) activity. If the only BRAC 95 action at Corpus Christi is to relocate Corpus Christi's training-mission-essential T-34's and T-44's, the result will be merely cost-shifting, not cost savings. Moreover, any decision to close Corpus Christi in its entirety must consider the impact on at least two other non-DoD government departments, not to mention the significance of the contributions of Corpus Christi's tenants to its Base Operating Support costs.

Phase-in of the JPATS, and phase-out of the T-37, T-34, T-2 and TA-4 will all affect training syllabi and the complex of bases needed to execute them. JPATS will eventually ease the training load on the T-45 by absorbing part of the intermediate pilot training load. Unless Pensacola could pick up the interim strike pilot training load on the T-2 and TA-4, Meridian will have to continue to operate these aircraft until they reach the end of their service lives or enough T-45's are available to deliver the entire Navy strike PTR. Kingsville is currently capable of basing and operating all the T-45's the Navy plans to buy. This, coupled with the costs of the T-45 infrastructure and economies of scale, suggests that BRAC 95 should look carefully at the cost issues related to the dual basing of the T-45 as currently planned. The proximity of Corpus Christi to Kingsville would prevent its use as an alternate/supplementary T-45 base without a requirement for additional T-45 infrastructure.

BRAC 95 should consider, also, the implications of the expiration of the service lives of the T-38 and T-44, both of which require consideration of possible replacements and the associated basing schemes. The concept of a streamlined stable of training aircraft is discussed in Section D.

4. STUDENT CAPACITIES

None of the flying training bases is currently operating up to its capacity. In some cases, a ratio of one instructor per student exists. While there may be considerable debate over maximum attainable capacity, on-site visits revealed general agreement that increases in present student outputs could be attained, drawing on the on-board complements of training aircraft and existing infrastructures with little or no additional capital investment. Some Air Force wing commanders felt that, for the 'no augmentation' condition postulated, present student outputs could be doubled. There should be little argument, therefore, over the reasonableness of the following conservative estimates of current capacity.

<u>Base</u>	<u>Annual Student Output (Potential)</u>	<u>Types</u>
Columbus	300	F/METJ *
Laughlin	300	F/METJ *
Reese	250	F/METJ *
Sheppard	200	F
Vance	300	F/METJ *
Corpus Christi	500-759 **	Primary (T-34)
Corpus Christi	450-791 **	Airlift/Maritime (T-44)
Meridian	225-232 **	Strike (T-2/TA4)
Kingsville	121-336 ***	Strike
Whiting	1100-2989 **	Primary (T-34)

* Fighter/Multi-engine Turbojet

** Capacity cited by CNATRA during briefing of the Base Closure Commission on 5 June 1993 vs. capabilities used by the Commission staff during hearings, BRAC 93.


*** Student output ranges from 121 in FY 95 to ultimate capacity of 336 in 2002. Output peaks at 336, regardless of whether the T-45 is dual-based at Meridian and Kingsville or single-sited at Kingsville.

While the estimates of Air Force capacity correlate well with the projections of Figure 14, the Navy numbers are considerably higher than those stated in the joint report to SecDef (see Figure 15). It should be noted, however, that estimates for the Air Force are based on information obtained during on-site visits during May and June, 1994, and are deliberately conservative. Navy figures have a firmer basis in fact inasmuch as they represent publicly iterated command positions and/or data used during the deliberations of BRAC 93.

The bottom line is that the capacities of both the Air Force and the Navy are probably understated in Figures 14 and 15.

The Air Force possesses 307 T-37 aircraft that have been modified, via a structural life extension program (SLEP), and are located at their four remaining undergraduate training bases. Maximum student production capacity of these assigned aircraft is 1,404 per year. The reduced Air Force requirement due to force downsizing in the steady state by FY99 is 1,212. This leaves an excess capacity to produce only 212 USN pilots at Air Force bases.

USAF PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS VS. CAPACITY




SOURCE: Joint Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Acting Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, respectively, dated 9 July, 1993.

FIGURE 14

The Navy capacity for primary student production at their two locations is 1,253 per year. Seventy-four excess T-34 aircraft are being retired, resulting in 225 used to meet this requirement. There is no excess capacity when compared to the projected FY99 production of 1,253.

USN PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS VS. CAPACITY



SOURCE: Joint Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Acting Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy, respectively, dated 9 July, 1993.

FIGURE 15

D. BASE CLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS

1. SELECTION CRITERIA

The deliberations of the Base Closure Commission in 1995 will focus on eight final selection criteria in three major areas of concern:

- **MILITARY VALUE**
 - a. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness on the DoD's total force.
 - b. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
 - c. The availability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
 - d. The cost and manpower implications.
- **RETURN ON INVESTMENT**
 - e. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
- **IMPACTS**
 - f. The economic impact on communities.
 - g. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
 - h. The environmental impact.

2. QUANTIFICATION

If prior Base Closure Commission deliberations may be accepted as indicative, an attempt will be made to reduce as much as possible of this to numerical values since most people are more comfortable with numbers as decision-making tools. Numbers alone, however, may not be sufficiently indicative of specific features/aspects which give one base an edge over another.

Undoubtedly, BRAC 95 will focus early on the aggregate capacity of the existing Air Force and Navy undergraduate aircrew training bases. This has already been addressed, as evidenced by Figures 14 and 15. If the PTR projections for the 'out years' (i.e. FY 1996 and subsequently) are correct, then there is only enough capacity to accommodate requirements, plus an approximate 10% surge capacity.

The question, then, is what is to be inferred from the force structure and aircraft procurement projections appearing in Section B earlier herein. Very likely the 'out year' PTR requirements are unjustifiably inflated and there is, in fact, existing capacity in excess of projected requirements. Whether or not this is provable, however, BRAC 95 will very likely result in the closure of one or more undergraduate aircrew training bases. The challenge, therefore, is to assure that those bases which are, in fact, of the greatest value are kept open and that they can, indeed, meet the training requirements most likely to be imposed. This leads to some 'real world' observations, not necessarily quantifiable numerically.

3. BEYOND NUMERICAL VALUES

- a. Undoubtedly, both Navy and Air Force will each seek to sustain their 'service culture' during the prosecution of the joint flight training programs. This cannot be achieved merely by placing one service's personnel in the other's training environment as the sole (or principal) means of propagating the service culture. A subtle element of Navy culture, impossible to quantify numerically, is the omnipresent influence of salt water. Learning to deal with the sea as both a trusted friend and implacable enemy is an indispensable element of any Navy training curriculum. The lore of the sea is best imparted at the water's edge, not deep inland.
- b. Proof of culture as a prime consideration is provided by the Air Force's insistence that the historic importance of Randolph AFB be emphasized by its retention and the Navy's vigorous advocacy of NAS Pensacola as "The Cradle of Naval Aviation."
- c. "Jointness" may be earlier and more easily achievable with NFO/SO/EWO training because of the focus on technology and techniques and the perception that cultural differences in these specialized areas are not so large as they are perceived to be in the pilot arena.
- d. Planning to date has not progressed beyond the student/instructor exchange point for fixed-wing aircrew training. The introduction of the JPATS might expedite progress toward a truly joint undergraduate pilot training program, but this is not assured. Moreover, there are already some signs that the introduction of the JPATS might be delayed well beyond current projections. This is due not only to the usual uncertainties of a new procurement, but recent questions by some (e.g. the Congress-

sional Budget Office) who are asking why a new trainer is required when the T-34's service life extends to 2010 and alternatives for extending the service life of the T-37 exist. Overlaying all this are the fiscal demands of competing DoD programs, such as the C-17 and the F-22, and the obvious priorities the Administration accords to social programs anent health care, crime prevention and welfare reform. Any decision to delay the JPATS could impact the base closure process. For example, Whiting, which appears vulnerable with JPATS in the offing, would retain its credentials and justification as a T-34 operating base. Any JPATS delay would also impact Navy strike pilot training where the present plan is to optimally utilize the T-2 and TA-4 until the end of their service lives and then shift part of the intermediate training load to the JPATS, thus reducing the load on the T-45. The bottom line for BRAC 95 is that such possibilities are in the air and decisions should not be made which foreclose on any of the reasonable options/alternatives.

- e. The acceptance of the JPATS as a joint service primary trainer suggests that, in the long term, the Navy-Air Force joint flying training program could be further 'streamlined'. The end product would be a screening stage in the T-3A and an inventory of three principal trainers: JPATS, T-1 and T-45. The rationale is as follows:

The JPATS will be a training system, as is the T-45. For a large number of pilot trainees this would/will ease their transition to the advanced training phase in the T-45.

The Navy's T-44's will eventually require SLEP or replacement. The T-1 could be, starting now, placed at Corpus Christi as the eventual replacement for the T-44. In the interim, it could serve both the Navy and the Air Force as it does now; as the tanker/airlift/E-6 training aircraft.

*The T-45 is a training system, is a better trainer than the T-38, and has longer to go on its service life. The most significant requisite for a Navy strike pilot, as compared to his/her Air Force counterpart, is carrier landing qualification. Some Air Force pilots on exchange duty receive even this. A joint syllabus could be devised which graduates Air Force pilots at the point of carrier qualification. This would require the procurement of more T-45's than is now planned and the establishment of at least one Air Force T-45 training base. In the long run, it could be cheaper and result in upgraded training efficiencies not realizable with any plan to SLEP T-38's or procure a new replacement. The savings in operations and maintenance costs by retiring the T-38 would be quite significant.

There would continue to exist a requirement for special purpose aircrew trainers, such as the C-21, T-39, T-41 and T-43. In the interests of "Jointness" the Navy and Air Force should evaluate the utility of the T-3 as a pre-primary screening tool for both services. Comparative empirical data on washout rates of Air Force and Navy primary students should provide useful clues. Again, the significance of such possibilities in the context of base closure is that BRAC 95 decisions should not prematurely foreclose on such alternatives/options.

- f. Of all the factors influencing flying training, none are more important than the airspace to do it in and the weather to permit it. These factors will become even more important as the base structure shrinks. For example, weather work-arounds possible with light student loadings become increasingly difficult as student loads increase. Similarly, moving more aircraft into an area already experiencing a high near-miss and mid-air collision rate will only aggravate the situation. It is likely also that vertical airspace limitations, already being imposed by overlays of the civil aviation routes, will continue to tighten, not ease. Records clearly show the weather and airspace advantages over all other flying training bases enjoyed by training bases in South Texas. Defense Mapping Agency ONC (series) charts (Scale 1:250,000) with overlays of civil airways superimposed dramatically demonstrate the superiority of both the size and utility of the air space available for flight training in South Texas. This advantage is much easier to see than to calculate (Figure 16 shows the scheduled traffic routes between large and hub airports). However, should it be lost in the base closure process, it will never be retrieved and the ultimate cost of that loss cannot be accurately calculated.




FIGURE 16
SCHEDULED TRAFFICE BETWEEN LARGE HUB AIRPORTS
(SOURCE: BLUE AIR UPDATE)

- g. "Jointness" sure to be emphasized by BRAC 95 is nowhere better exemplified within the eleven flying training base complex than at Corpus Christi which hosts 47 tenants, including a major Army depot, A Defense Logistics Agency operation and major operational elements of two other government departments (viz. U.S. Customs Service/Treasury and U.S. Coast Guard/Transportation). The contributions of its tenants to Base Operating Support costs renders Corpus Christi a real bargain when compared to its training base contemporaries. (In fact, over one third of Corpus Christi's operations costs are reimbursed). Since Base Closure is a DoD exercise, its impact on other government departments could raise (as yet) unanticipated cost issues. At Corpus Christi, for example, both Treasury and Transportation might bill the DoD for the costs of disruption and moving. Even if the DoD were not billed, however, such costs would have to be defrayed somewhere in the federal budget. Finally, it should again be noted that any move of flight training out of Corpus Christi unless the entire base were closed would result only in cost shifting, not cost savings. There would, in fact, be additional costs: those of the move.
- h. Another subtle aspect of the situation at Corpus Christi, difficult to quantify numerically, is the interdependence of activities which, if disrupted, would cost tax dollars and impact efficiencies. Examples are CCAD's dependence on Corpus Christi's runways and ramps for C-5 operations and Naval Station Ingleside's reliance for support of the mine warfare staff and other personnel support. In addition, Corpus Christi is required for the support of mine warfare training operations, including the basing, operation and maintenance support of MH-53 mine warfare helicopters. Corpus Christi also supports a very large Armed Forces Reserve training activity and serves as the headquarters of the Chief, Naval Air Training (CNATRA). None of these activities limits Corpus Christi's capacity for joint pilot training.
- i. Looking to the future, it is not difficult to envisage that Ingleside's carrier-capable pier and the availability of all the air training requisites in the Corpus Christi area could permit supplanting the now-occasional carrier deployments to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for intensive training. The potential exists, in South Texas, for higher fleet training efficiencies, cost savings and a boost in the morale of crews which will be subjected to steadily growing absences from CONUS as the force structure shrinks. Corpus Christi could easily accommodate the Fleet Training Group now stationed at Guantanamo Bay..... and its mission.
- j. While BRAC 95 will, ostensibly, transpire sans political influences, the impact of decisions remains among the factors to be considered. This would seem to mitigate against any arbitrary concentration of base closure actions in any area. This suggests that very strong justification

should be required in order to close all the flying training bases in Mississippi or Florida or to restrict flying training base closures to Texas. In Oklahoma, the closure of both Vance AFB and the Tinker Depot would appear to be unreasonable on its face. Finally, for 'cultural' reasons, if for no other, it would be unrealistic to close only Navy training bases or only Air Force training bases. "Jointness" can go only so far without a Congressional mandate providing for complete unification.

- k. At least one base (viz. Sheppard) can reasonably be removed from consideration for closure because of the international implications of closing this NATO pilot training base in which there is substantial foreign financial investment. Sheppard does contribute to the U.S. Air Force pilot pool by graduating about 150 students (fighter pilots) annually. This could probably be doubled.
- l. It is reasonable to assume that the institutional defense of Randolph and Pensacola coupled with their demonstrable importance to aircrew training will ensure their survival. Therefore, if Sheppard is also out of harm's way, eight flying training bases are left on the list of possible candidates for closure.
- m. There is little question that the principal focus of BRAC 95 will be on joint flying training student capacity. It is essential, therefore, that BRAC 95 decisions derive from accurate data. As discussed in Section C, there were wide variances in capacity data available during BRAC 93.

It must be recognized that the natural tendency of the military services is to provide the lowest estimates which can possibly be validated because of the consequences of excess capacity. On the other hand, the Commission, with a mandate to enable the economies realizable from base closure and relocation, is ready to accept the highest numbers that can possibly be corroborated because they provide an unimpeachable *raison de 'etre* for closure/relocation. It stands to reason that somewhere between these two extremes is a realistic/accurate statement of capacities which is the only one which should be considered in deciding what complex of bases is required to perform the aircrew training mission during 1995 and into the next century.

E. IMPLEMENTATION AND BRAC 95

1. OVERVIEW

The sine qua non of the output of BRAC 95 vis a vis joint flying training is that there must remain, when all decisions have been rendered, a complex of bases which can deliver the required PTR's, have spare capacity for some surge in output to accommodate (now) unforeseen contingencies, and are capable of absorbing new aircraft/training systems (e.g. JPATS) with minimum disruptions and costs. Because of the overwhelming importance of capacity estimates to the decision making process, it is absolutely essential that the DoD and the Commission be in agreement on capacity estimates.

2. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

a. Pilot Training

Reese AFB (Lubbock, Texas) and NAS Whiting Field (Milton, Florida) have already been chosen to be the first to implement (primary) joint pilot training. Concurrently, NAS Corpus Christi (Texas) is being jointly manned to conduct airlift/maritime training in the T-44. The other bases will phase into joint pilot training when the JPATS becomes operational somewhere around year 2000. Because the JPATS contract has not been awarded, and because there may be some obstacles placed in the way of its procurement, operational capability of the JPATS by 2000 may be optimistic. In the meantime, both Navy and Air Force must maintain a training air base structure which includes the T-34 and the T-37, but capable of accommodating the JPATS when it becomes available. It is probable, for example, that the JPATS will require more vertical airspace and longer runways than the T-34. Moreover, it should be possible to conduct, in the JPATS, the intermediate Navy strike pilot training now being conducted in the T-2 and T-45.

Instructor pilot and student pilot exchanges at Reese, Whiting and Corpus Christi have begun and will expand on an annual basis. Advanced pilot training is being organized into four separate tracks:

Air Force Fighter/Bomber (T-38 and AT-38)

Navy Strike (T-2, TA-4 and T-45)

Air Force Airlift/Tanker (T-1)

Navy Maritime Patrol (T-44)

There is a test program underway between Reese and Corpus Christi. Instructor pilot and student exchanges are underway:

- Air Force will train Navy E-6 (Boeing 707) pilots.
- Navy will train approximately 150 Air Force C-130 pilots per year.
- Corpus Christi will continue to train P-3, E2C and C-2 pilots.
- Corpus Christi may be tasked to undertake the rotary wing to fixed wing conversion of approximately 200 (95 PTR-equivalent) Army pilots per year. (This proposal is being reviewed due to the limited number of T-44s available.)

Helicopter. The Army is training both Army and Air Force helicopter pilots at Fort Rucker (Alabama).

- Navy Marine Corps and Coast Guard helicopter pilots are being trained at Whiting and the Secretary of the Navy has been tasked to examine the practicability of integrating the Navy's helicopter training with the Army and Air Force at Fort Rucker.
- Air Force tentatively plans to emulate the Navy in providing preliminary fixed-wing training for rotary wing pilot candidates, commencing in 1995. This practice may require a re-evaluation, by both services, when the JPATS becomes available or if delays in JPATS procurement force modification of training load projections for the T-37 and T-34.

b. NFO/WSO/EWO Training

In parallel with the implementation of the joint pilot training program, joint training syllabi for NFO'S/WSO'S/EWO'S are being set up at Randolph AFB, San Antonio (Texas) and NAS Pensacola (Florida). Details were provided earlier herein in Section A. The services agree that the joint aircrew training program may incur slight additional costs over the unilateral programs they supplant but that joint initiatives will best exploit the existing hardware and programs to produce the best qualified graduates ever.

c. Service Commitment

The commitment of the services to making joint training work is probably best expressed by the following extract from the Executive Summary of the 9 July 1993 joint Navy/Air Force memorandum to SecDef:

"In summary, joint training has enormous potential. Our approach will be to start this year, build the program year by year, learn as we go, and produce the world's best joint pilot and systems officer training programs. Young aviators will be exposed to the joint service environment, while field grade officers will earn joint duty credit, thus promoting future joint operations. Services will gain from each others' training strengths, resulting in better training overall. Economies of scale will be attainable in every joint training venture, especially with a common aircraft, ground training system, and logistics system. The services are prepared to step smartly into joint training and take full advantage of common training systems like JPATS. The remainder of this report outlines the details of our plan and schedule, and offers a first look at costs and cost avoidance. As we train together, we will continue to improve the quality of our graduates and work toward further efficiencies."

3. BASE REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT AIRCREW TRAINING

a. Setting the Stage

Air Force and Navy have opined that the closure of flying training bases in prior years (viz. NAS Chase, Mather AFB and Williams AFB) will result in annual savings, to the DoD, of \$189 million per year against the up-front \$322 million base closure costs. It is unlikely that BRAC 95 will settle for this and that further cuts will be sought. Of the eleven bases 'under the gun', it appears, as discussed in Section D, that the roles and commitments of Pensacola, Randolph and Sheppard are the most defensible. This, then, leaves a total of eight bases from which closure/relocation candidates will most likely be selected.

b. Student Training Requirements

(1) Primary Training

PTR projections indicate that an average annual output of 1610 fixed-wing primary students will be required to feed the four joint pipelines until FY-1999. This number will be higher (by approximately 40) if the Air Force initiates a fixed-wing primary phase for rotary wing students. If allowance is made for an overall attrition of twelve percent, then the requisite annual primary student input ranges from a low of about 1800 to a high of approximately 2300.

Referring to Section C, the Air Force primary training bases (viz Columbus, Laughlin, Reese, Sheppard and Vance) can produce a total of at least 1400 primary students annually while Navy's Whiting and Corpus Christi (combined) can produce at least 1600. (It should be noted that the Navy number of 1600 is more than the 1200 shown in Figure 15, but is consistent

with the capacity estimates used during BRAC 93). If the higher Navy capacity number is, in fact, correct, then at least one Air Force primary training base probably could be closed and still retain a primary flight training complex with adequate steady-state-plus-surge capability.

Looking ahead, if Whiting cannot accommodate the JPATS, then the remaining bases in the complex might be hard-pressed to deliver 2000 primary students per year. This suggests that it would be prudent to examine how the time and cost factors involved in rendering the Whiting complex (Mainside and auxiliaries) JPATS-capable as compared with the closure (or retention) of one Air Force base. At the same time, the practicability of a pre-rotary fixed wing training phase in the JPATS (after phase-out of T-37's and T-34's) should be included in the deliberations of BRAC 95. This is because of the impact of this practice on fixed-wing primary student outputs and because decisions made in 1995 should not foreclose on future options/alternatives.

At this point it appears that the irreducible minimum is a complex of four Air Force and two Navy primary training bases. Corpus Christi is an especially strong candidate for retention because it is already making an important (and probably irreplaceable) contribution to the annual output of primary students, has JPATS-capable runways to accommodate future primary training requirements and has been assigned a major role in joint Airlift/Maritime/Army (?) pilot training in the T-44. The T-44 is a required training asset. Moving it would only shift, not reduce, costs and would, in fact, incur extra costs the costs of the move sans long term savings.

(2) Advanced Pilot Training

(a) Air Force

The Air Force figures in three of the four tracks laid out for advanced pilot training:

- Fighter/Bomber pilots being trained at Columbus, Laughlin, Reese, Sheppard, and Vance.
- Tanker Pilots and Jet Airlift pilots being trained at Columbus, Laughlin, Reese and Vance.
- C-130 Airlift pilots being trained at NAS Corpus Christi.
- Helicopter pilots being trained with the Army at Fort Rucker.

If a fixed-wing prelude to helicopter training is required that primary training can be performed at any Air Force or Navy primary training base.

There are two uniquely distinguishing features of Air Force fixed-wing pilot training:

- Except for C-130 pilots, Air Force students can complete both primary and advanced training at the same base.
- The Air Force fixed-wing pilot training program includes a pre-primary screening phase in the T-3 (Navy does not similarly pre-screen its students).

Student capacity limitations, if any, at Air Force bases appear to derive more from primary training requirements than from advanced training PTR's.

(b) Navy

The Navy figures in two of the four tracks for advanced pilot training:

- Navy/Marine Corps/FMS (Foreign Military Sales) Strike pilots are being trained at Meridian (T-2 and TA-4) and Kingsville (T-45). Kingsville commenced flight training in the T-45 in early 1994. Student output is currently limited by aircraft on board. It will continue to expand, depending on the rate of increase in aircraft inventory. CNATRA estimates, inter alia, that the JPATS will pick up part of the intermediate training load circa 2002. Kingsville's strike pilot outputs in the T-45 will be complemented by Meridian's output in the T-2 and TA-4. These aircraft are approaching the end of their service lives. Navy planning provides for the phase-out of its T-2's and TA-4's apace with the build-up of the T-45 inventory. Present Navy planning envisages Meridian's outfitting with "Cockpit 21" (digital cockpit display) T-45's, commencing with the 73rd T-45. (Present plans are to retrofit all of Kingsville's analog aircraft, commencing in FY 1999). CNATRA envisages that Meridian will be producing 168 T-45 pilot graduates by year 2001. Thereafter, the strike pilot training load will be balanced between Kingsville and Meridian.

Experience during BRAC 93 was that CNATRA's estimates of strike pilot training capacities were quite conservative. This appears to have been carried forward to current planning which continues to reflect CNATRA's 1993 contention that one and one half Navy strike pilot training bases were required. BRAC 95 should be able to develop adequate evidence that:

- Kingsville's capacity for strike pilot training has been consistently understated.

- Kingsville is fully capable of basing and operating all the T-45's the Navy plans to procure. Cost savings accruing from this action would be quite significant.
- Corpus Christi could serve as an alternate/supplemental T-45 base without any further requirements for T-45 infrastructure beyond that planned for Kingsville.
- Navy P-3, E2C and C-2 pilots are being trained in the T-44 at Corpus Christi. Navy E-6 pilots will be trained by the Air Force in the T-1. Corpus Christi is capable of absorbing at least one squadron of T-1's. This should be examined in the light of its potential, in the short term, for enhancements in the scope and depth of advanced joint pilot training at Corpus Christi and, in the longer term, the practicability of replacement of the T-44 with the T-1.
- As mentioned earlier, the possibility of co-locating Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard helicopter training with the Army and Air Force at Fort Rucker is under consideration.

4. THE CASE FOR JOINT PILOT TRAINING IN SOUTH TEXAS

South Texas is especially suited to joint pilot training because of the large volume of uncrowded airspace and excellent flying weather. These features are unique to South Texas and cannot be matched by any Navy or Air Force pilot training bases in any other area. With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiations with Mexico might make even more unencumbered airspace and real estate available for such special missions as low-level navigation, ground attack ranges, basic air-to-air training and low level intercepts.

Corpus Christi and Kingsville enjoy an additional advantage for Navy pilot training because of their proximity to salt water. As mentioned earlier, the lore of the sea is best taught at the water's edge, not deep inland.

By creating a South Texas complex of flying bases, all elements of both Air Force and Navy training (except for helicopter training) can be accommodated. The South Texas components of the joint training base system and their functions are:

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

- Primary Flying Training (T-34 and JPATS): 500-700 students
- Airlift/Tanker Training (T-44 and T-1(?)): 150 students
- Maritime Patrol Training (T-44): 450-600 students
- Instructor Pilot Upgrade Training (T-34, T44)

- Fixed Wing Multi-Engine Conversion Training for Army pilots (T-44): 95 (PTR equivalent) students (under review ??)
- Advanced Fighter/Attack Training Detachment (T-45)?

NAS KINGSVILLE

- Advanced Fighter/Attack Training (T-45): 336-375 students (by single siting the T-45)

Kingsville would also figure importantly in any action to reduce the training aircraft 'stable' to three aircraft: JPATS, T-1 and T-45 sometime in the future. Such a 'stable' would support the "economy of scale" argument advanced by the services in their 9 July 1993 memorandum to SecDef.

LAUGHLIN AFB

- Primary Flying Training (T-37, JPATS): 300 students
- Advanced Bomber/Fighter Training (T-38, AT-38, T45(?)):150-300 students
- Advanced Airlift/Tanker Training (T-1):150-300 students

RANDOLPH AFB


- HQ Joint Flying Training Instructor Pilot Upgrade Training (T-37, T-1, T-38)

The currently in-place infrastructures in the South Texas pilot training complex will support an annual output of 800-1000 primary students and at least 1300 advanced students without further capital investment.

All South Texas bases are surrounded by complexes of outlying fields where training operations can be conducted. Several are in use now and more are available. This translates to readily achievable increases in student outputs.


NOWHERE, IN THE UNITED STATES, ARE THE NATURAL ADVANTAGES OF THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH TEXAS EVEN MATCHED, LET ALONE SURPASSED. ONCE THEY ARE GIVEN UP, BY A BASE CLOSURE DECISION, THEY CAN NEVER BE RECOVERED AND THE FLYING TRAINING SYSTEM WILL REMAIN, THEREAFTER, LESS EFFICIENT THAN IT WAS BEFORE.

EXHIBIT B



BLDG. NO.	DESCRIPTIVE TITLE (CURRENT USE)	UNIT OF MEAS URE	
1015	OPS MAINT HANGAR (OH)	SF	42,095
1063	SM ARMS RANGE	FP	25
2009	HANGAR (VT-24)	SF	89,328
2014	CRASH CREW SHELTER	SF	80
2015	HANGAR (VT-25)	SF	89,329
2051	OPERATIONS	SF	19,694
2137	HANGAR/AMMO	SF	138,667
2193	RAITC CTR (AN/FPN 47)	SF	1,352
2194	RADAR TOWER	SF	1
2196	STO TANK - NON POTABLE	EA	1,000
2925	REMOTE TRANSMITTER BLDG	GA	2,455
2933	WELL (TRANSMITTER SITE)	SF	29
		KG	


BASE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS TEAM COMMERCIAL AIR TRAFFIC



**U.S. AIRLINE-HUB
SYSTEM TRAFFIC
FLOWS**
.....
**SOUTH TEXAS
DESIGNATED HIGH
ALTITUDE ROUTES**


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8V-191



**Pilot
Training
Capacity
in
South Texas**

**7 JUNE 1995
UPDATE**



PILOT TRAINING CAPACITY IN SOUTH TEXAS

I. CAPSULATION:

The South Texas Military Facilities Task Force has consistently taken a conservative approach when dealing with pilot training capacity in South Texas. A recent change of circumstances, driven by the unprecedented release of a Navy letter six weeks prior to the final voting of the BRAC 95 Commission increasing pilot training requirements, dictates a "re-review" of South Texas capabilities. Surge capabilities in the range of 20 percent of requirement have also been mentioned as additional Department of the Navy concerns as final BRAC 95 decisions are being formulated.

An analysis of the impact of these changes on Naval pilot training indicates that while they require some changes in the organization of pilot training in South Texas, they confirm that the Navy's decision to single-site Strike training in South Texas is still a sound one. However, the analysis reveals a fatal flaw to the Navy's recommendation to realign T-44 training to NAS Pensacola.

Additionally, the proposal to redesignate NAS Corpus Christi to NAF status appears to have been made solely on the basis of future UPT utilization envisioned by the bases current major claimant. This proposal clearly ignores the nature of the present federal complex involving 46 tenant activities or proposed addition of Minewarfare helicopter squadrons. See **Attachment (1)**. The savings associated with the proposed redesignation are debatable and were taken without consideration of the impact on non-UPT missions. As a result of the growth in the Mine Warfare mission of the base, action has been initiated to change the claimancy of the base. The NAS vs NAF issue should be removed from the BRAC process. Language should be included in the final report returning this decision to the Navy as an internal Navy matter for resolution when the full impact of the 95 BRAC process on NAS Corpus Christi has been resolved and the request for a change in claimancy decided.

II. REALIGNMENT OF T-44 MULTI-ENGINE PILOT TRAINING:

The Navy reportedly has recommended the relocation of undergraduate pilot training (UPT) from NAS Corpus Christi in order to avoid MILCON costs of relocating the Mine Warfare aviation assets to NAS Corpus Christi.

While there is some merit to this position, the relocation of T-34 training out of NAS Corpus Christi achieves sufficient space for the HM squadrons. Review of NAVFAC P-80, Basic Facilities Requirements, indicates total facility requirements of less than 80,000 SF for a HM helicopter squadron of 12 aircraft. Approximately 52,000 SF of this requirement is for maintenance hangar space. NAS Corpus Christi has five (5) flight-line hangars of approximately 60,000 SF each. One of the five is used primarily for station flight line operations and station aircraft as well as for ceremonies. This leaves four (4) flight-line hangars of approximately 240,000 SF. This space is currently occupied by T-34 and T-44 squadrons and related activities. In addition to the flight-line hangars, NAS Corpus Christi has available a 100,000 SF hangar adjacent to the Corpus Christi Army Depot (the world's largest helicopter repair facility) that could prove ideal space for aircraft and equipment maintenance and storage for both HM squadrons. See **Attachment (2)** as to available capacity.

Therefore, there appears to be no justification to relocate the T-44 squadron based on MILCON cost avoidance. The only apparent savings for realignment of T-44 training to NAS Pensacola appears to be approximately \$500,000 per year in permanent change of station (PCS) costs. However, there are several costs to move the T-44 that were omitted by the COBRA. There appears to be some question of the availability of Bachelor Officer Quarters to accommodate the increased student loading of T-44 training along with increased base loading of Air Force NFO training. The original certified data from NAS Pensacola indicated a requirement for BOQ MILCON for 65 officers at over \$7 million that was deleted during a BSEC meeting. In addition, maintenance contract expenses associated with relocating the T-44 were not identified in the COBRA. We estimate those conservatively to be \$4 million per year for the transition years of FY96, FY97 and FY98. However, these costs are overshadowed by the fact that NAS Pensacola lacks the operational capacity to accomplish the Multi-engine T-44 training.

A. Why it can't be done (THE FATAL FLAW):

NAS Pensacola / Choctaw Complex has a total operations capacity of between 341,355 (using the conservative BRAC 95 data) and 424,027 (using Joint Cross-Service Group/FAA data). Current base operations and a 260% growth in joint NFO training by FY97, coupled with the BRAC 95 proposal to relocate the T-44 Multi-engine joint pilot training program to Pensacola puts the operations required of the complex at over 525,000 annually. This exceeds even the most optimistic capacity projections by over 100,000 operations. See Attachment 3.

B. Why it shouldn't be done:

Measures were taken in the 1970s to ensure adequate safety margins in the Pensacola complex. The current proposal will erode those safety margins to a dangerous and unacceptable level by overloading Pensacola's main field, OLFs and airspace.

C. How it can be done:

- Redirect closure of OLF Goliad. BRAC 95 should retain OLF Goliad for T-45 Strike surge capability and the protection of the airspace in northern military operating areas. This has the additional effect of reducing the Strike training load on NAS Corpus Christi facilitating T-44 training at NAS Corpus Christi even under the excessively conservative capacity used in the 95 data. **OLF Goliad can be re-opened for daylight-only operations for approximately \$3 million and operated for approximately \$1 million annually as compared to a \$30 (+) million annual operating cost for an additional UPT base.**

- Leave the T-44 where it is ideally suited - in Texas. If it ain't broke, don't spend lots of money and reduce safety margins to "fix it".

- Use the best airspace in CONUS (South Texas).

- Use two existing Outlying Fields - OLF Cabaniss and Aransas County (with movement of T-34's to the Pensacola area), both dedicated to T-44 ops and both in close proximity to mainfield.

- Retain the good fit with aircraft currently assigned at NAS Corpus Christi and BRAC 95 base utilization proposals. See Attachment (4).

III. SINGLE-SITING OF T-45 / STRIKE PILOT TRAINING:

The T-45 is being procured by the Navy to replace both the retiring TA-4 and T-2 Strike trainers. It has become obvious that as the TA-4 inventory draws down in the FY 98/99 timeframe the new Strike Pilot Training rate (PTR) increase from 336 to 360 will have its full impact. The T-45, at its current one per month delivery rate, will now and in the foreseeable future be the limiting factor in strike pilot production in South Texas, not airspace, weather or concrete infrastructure (Figure 1). Since the limitation will be aircraft, it's all the more important that the T-45 be single-sited in South Texas where airspace, weather and concrete allow the greatest utilization of the aircraft available.

Under the Navy recommendation NAS Corpus Christi becomes an OLF to NAS Kingsville to support single-siting the T-45. Using FAA capacity at NAS Corpus Christi of 318,314 annual homefield operations and 883,036 annual complex operations, it is apparent that NAS Corpus Christi is of considerable value as a turbo-prop training and utility / support site and to a lesser extent, jet training spill-over site. The BRAC-proposed (2) 1000 foot runway extensions are necessary to meet increased jet requirements. However, once these runway extensions are completed, NAS Corpus Christi, when combined with the NAS Kingsville complex, can accomplish all its USCG, Customs, HM operations and the 350 Multi-engine T-44 PTR requirement and still produce the 385 (+) Strike PTR envisioned. See Attachments (4) and (5).

Assuming ultra conservative T-45 Strike PTR capacity at NAS Kingsville in the 250 range, NAS Corpus Christi without T-44 multi-engine training and using only conservative total operations available of 229,416 at NAS Corpus Christi will produce a 375 strike T-2/T-45 PTR. Extended staggered parallel runways at NAS Corpus Christi increases VFR traffic capacity by one third. This along with FAA methodology (certified and used in the Joint Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training) indicates a 318,314 daylight field operations capacity for NAS Corpus Christi. This will support a 387 T-2/T-45 Strike PTR with T-44 multi-engine training at NAS Corpus Christi and a 434 T-2/T-45 Strike PTR without T-44 multi-engine training impact at NAS Corpus Christi. See Attachment (6).

Surge capacity of 20% in Strike training has been suggested by the Department of the Navy. What is often overlooked, however, is a 20% surge in Strike training grows in impact as you move to earlier stages in training. Primary training must surge to almost 30% to achieve this 20% objective. This places additional capacity requirements on the primary training at Whiting Field as well as all aviation training at NAS Pensacola. OLF Goliad, if redirected for retention by the Navy, will provide excellent surge capability for Strike training in South Texas at minimal cost, when and if UPT dictates.

The option that uses Goliad as a Strike OLF with NAS Corpus Christi as a spill-over, touch-and-go and instrument approach site for T-2/T-45 while retaining T-44 Multi-engine training, is clearly the most effective utilization of the Navy's South Texas assets. The northern Military Operating Areas (MOAs) are preserved for the future while operating NAS Corpus Christi closer to capacity in its traditional utility mission. The costs and disruption to training of an unnecessary move of presently single-sited Navy / Air Force joint T-44 training is avoided. Spill-over TA-4/T-2 operations and limited C-5, C-9, T-1, T-39, T-37, T-38, Customs and USCG operations over the past 20 years are indicative of NAS Corpus Christi's versatility. The retention / redirect of Goliad as an outlying field avoids the potential AICUZ impact that concentrated jet touch-and-go operations could bring to NAS Corpus Christi while inexpensively covering a 20% surge requirement for both the T-45 and T-44. Finally, this option allows the real closure of a UPT base currently proposed by the Secretary of Defense BRAC recommendation. **The South Texas Complex including OLF Goliad can train more Strike pilots for the 21st century than the Navy will have planes for them to fly.**

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI vs NAF CORPUS CHRISTI

NAS Jacksonville

- **Multiple tenants**
 - **Navy aviation depot**
 - **VP squadrons**
 - **Helo squadrons**
 - **Flag staff**
 - **Naval hospital**
 - **Supply center—complex support**
- **Multiple runways**
- **Large complex**
- **Over 500 buildings**

NAF Mayport

- **Few tenants**
 - **Helo squadrons**
 - **Helo wing**
- **Few buildings**
- **Single runway**

- **Which one does Corpus Christi look like?** •
- **Why does this have to be a BRAC issue?** •


NAS Corpus Christi

- **Multiple tenants**
 - **Army aviation depot**
 - **Fixed wing units**
 - **Helo operations**
 - **Flag staff**

- **Naval hospital**
- **Supply support for bay area complex**
- **Multiple runways**
- **Large federal complex**
- **Over 700 buildings**

HM & T-44 SQUADRON SPACE REQUIREMENTS

in thousands of square feet



* Assumes one additional hangar & equipment for base ops ground support.


NAS PENSACOLA COMPLEX

CURRENT AND PROPOSED OPERATIONS

Airfield ops at
NAS/OLF (x1000)

Complex includes NAS Pensacola and OLF Chocktaw

NAS PNS.	187,400	270,072
OLF Chocktaw	<u>153,955</u>	<u>153,955</u>
TOTAL OPS	341,355	424,027




* Under new pilot and naval flight officer requirements letter, Pensacola must absorb an over 240% increase in NFO training. With this new requirement, there is inadequate capacity at the Pensacola complex to accommodate T-44 training.

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI COMPLEX

CURRENT AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS

Airfield ops at
NAS/OLF (x1000)




Complex includes NAS Corpus Christi, OLF Cabaniss, OLF Waldron, and Aransas County (currently leased)

* 1993 Annual Operations

** Reflects increase due to
U.S. Air Force C-130s
and 5/10/95 CNO PTR letter

COMMON SENSE T-45 PTR CAPACITY

SOUTH TEXAS COMPLEX – SINGLE SITE T-45 STRIKE PRODUCTION OPTIONS



* 10 May 95
FY 98 PTR
requirement

BRAC 93/JCSG
on UPT *

BRAC 93 data *
(with T-44 and other
remaining missions)

BRAC 95/BSAT
testimony and 1393
ops per T-45 PTR
(with T-44 and other
remaining missions)


BRAC 93 data *
(with T-44 and other
remaining missions)

* Assumes 1473 ops/T-45 Strike/PTR

- Aircraft shortages, not airfield capacity, in '98/'99 will dictate Saturday flying to fill major share of surge requirements if and when they occur.

COMMON SENSE STRIKE PTR CAPACITY

SOUTH TEXAS COMPLEX – SINGLE SITE STRIKE T2/T-45 PRODUCTION OPTIONS



- Assumes worst case T-2/T-45 and T-45 syllabi and 1511 daylight ops/PTR (BSAT estimate)
- Aircraft shortages, not airfield capacity, in '98/'99 will dictate Saturday flying to fill major share of surge requirements if and when they occur.

DERIVATION DATA:

(FIGURE 1) T-45 CURRENT DELIVERY RATE AND IMPACT

	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>	<u>FY00</u>	<u>FY01</u>
T-45's on board	60	72	84	96	108	120
Max PTR (T-45 constrained) *	187	224	262	299	336	374
PTR Required (CNO ltr of 20 July '94)	319	336	336	336	336	336
PTR Required (CNO ltr of 10 May '95)	319	336	360	360	360	360

* 720 Flt hrs/T-45/YR and 231T-45 Flt hrs/PTR

(FIGURE 2) T-45 FIELD CAPACITIES

	<u>'93 BRAC Certified</u>	<u>95 BRAC/BSAT CERT.</u>
Kingsville	195	164
Orange Grove	121	106
Corpus Christi	<u>121*</u>	<u>157</u>
Total	437	427

* Using very conservative 65 OPS/Hr. for T-45 - (93 data indicated 65 ops/hr for Orange Grove with no parallel runway)

DERIVATION DATA (CONTINUED):

(FIGURE 3) SUMMARY OF FIELD OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR STRIKE PTR:

Assumes T-2/T-45 Syllabus @ 1511 OPS/PTR.
And T-45 only Syllabus @ 1473 OPS/PTR

<u>Strike PTR</u>	<u>OPS Required (5)</u> <u>T-2/T-45</u>	<u>OPS Required (6)</u> <u>T-45</u>
336 (1)	507,896	494,928
360 (2)	543,960	530,280
379 (3)	572,669	558,267
451 (4)	681,461	664,323

- Note (1)** Reflects 20 July 94 CNO PTR LTR strike requirement for FY97.
- Note (2)** Reflects recent 10 May 95 FY 98 Strike PTR requirement for FY98.
- Note (3)** Includes E2/C2 Strike impact (19). Location of this training is currently in Pensacola and its future location and need with the introduction of full motion/visual trainers is the subject of occasional debate and future planning in a world of decreasing funding and aircraft assets. E2/C2 PTR requirement did not change with the 10 May 1995 PTR letter.
- Note (4)** Includes a 20% surge. USAF uses a 12% surge and Navy's reluctance to address the retention of OLF Goliad as an additional NAS Kingsville OLF to be used and funded when and if required in the out years is baffling. Aircraft shortages in '98/'99 will necessitate Saturday flying. In South Texas it's apparent that we will run out of air planes long before there is a shortage of runway, airspace or OLFs.
- Note (5)** 1511 OPS/PTR reflects a weighted average T-45 and T-2/T-45 spli syllabust used by the BSAT.
- Note (6)** 1473 OPS/PTR reflects last T-45 certified 1393 OPS/PTR plus 80 detachment OPS. Recent syllabus change awaiting final OPNAV approval after BRAC proposes 1385 OPS/PTR (Daylight)

DERIVATION DATA (CONTINUED):

(FIGURE 4) SUMMARY OF FIELD OPERATIONS AVAILABLE TO GENERATE STRIKE PTR IN SOUTH TEXAS

<u>Site</u>	<u>Daylight OPS. Avail.</u>	<u>T2/T45 PTR</u>	<u>T45 PTR</u>
NAS Kingsville (12.1 Hrs)	229,416 (1)	151	155
NAS Kingsville (12.1 Hrs)	286,770 (2)	189	194
OLF Orange Grove (11.6 Hrs.)	148,457 (1)	98	100
OLF Orange Grove (11.6 Hrs)	178,698 (3)	118	121
NAS Corpus Christi (12.1 Hrs.)	280,394 (4)	185	190
NAS Corpus Christi (12.1 Hrs.)	208,880 (5)	138	141
NAS Corpus Christi (12.1 Hrs.)	191,496 (6)	126	130
NAS Corpus Christi (12.1 Hrs.)	119,982 (7)	79	81
OLF Goliad (10.1 Hrs.)	129,260	85	87
OLF BEEVILLE (10.1 Hrs.)	129,260	85	87

- Note (1)** Most conservative of all previous certified and historical data. NASMOD Study estimates NAS Kingsville / Orange Grove with continued occasional use of NAS Corpus Christi for spill-over instrument approaches and out-and-in flights characteristic of the tempo of operations while the T-2/T-A4 operated at NAS Kingsville / NAS Chase Field will easily allow PTR production capability in the 350 range.
- Note (2)** BRAC 93 Certified Data (100 OPS/HR Daylight Capacity)
- Note (3)** BRAC 93 Certified Data (65 OPS/HR Daylight Capacity)
- Note (4)** Reflects JCSG on UPT/FAA Advisory Circular capacity of 111 ops/hr, 318,314 (certified for Joint UPT Study) and reduced by 37,920 for HM, USCG, Customs, Army Depot, station aircraft and historical transient ops. Assumes runway extensions in BRAC95 proposal to 6000 FT (Parallel runway 13L extension will have largest impact on NAS Corpus Christi's jet Ops capacity).
- Note (5)** Note 4 Plus T-44 required homefield OPS of 71,514 deleted from daylight operations available balance.
- Note (6)** Reflects ultra-conservative OPS available of 229,416 used by BSAT with Note (4) deletions.
- Note (7)** Reflects ultra conservative OPS available of 229,416 and deletes required homefield OPS to support T-44 (Note 5) plus Note 4 other tenant deductions).

DERIVATION DATA (CONTINUED):

(FIGURE 5) STRIKE TRAINING SITE PTR PRODUCTION COMBINATIONS:

NAS Kingsville provides the Lion's share of requirement, however field operations capacity appears to be significantly understated during BRAC 95. No explanation exists for the substantial reductions in capacity. Field configurations have not changed since 1993. NASMOD estimated a solid 350 PTR capability at the Kingsville / Orange Grove with over-spill instrument / PCN approaches at NAS Corpus Christi, while FAA capacity analysis yielded a total of 591, 865 equating to a strike T-2/T-45 PTR of 391 and a T-45 only PTR of 401. NASMOD also envisioned NAS Corpus in a support role handling the instrument approach load and the form/ACM, out and in events. This would maximize the NAS Kingsville complex while minimizing any potential AICUZ noise impact associated with concentrated jet touch and go operations at NAS Corpus Christi. Considerable surge capability is available with Saturday operations and the retention / redirect of OLF Goliad.

	<u>BRAC 95 Data</u>		<u>BRAC 93 Data</u>	
	<u>PTR (1)</u> <u>T2/T45</u>	<u>PTR (2)</u> <u>T45</u>	<u>PTR (1)</u> <u>T2/T45</u>	<u>PTR2</u> <u>T45</u>
NAS Kingsville	151	155	189	194
OLF Orange Grove	<u>98</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>121</u>
Sub-total	249	255	307	315
NAS Corpus Christi (3)	<u>79</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>118**</u>	<u>121**</u>
Sub-total with T-44 retained *	328	336	425	436
OLF Goliad	<u>98</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>121</u>
Sub-total	426	436	543	557
OLF Beeville	<u>98</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>121</u>
TOTAL	524	536	661	678

Note (1) 1511 ops / PTR associated with T-45 and T-2/T-45 syllabus required until T-45 picks up entire strike training load in 2001.

Note (2) 1473 ops / PTR

Note (3) Includes BRAC 95 proposed additions plus retains T-44 training.

* NAS Corpus Christi's 'Sub-total with T-44 relocated' could provide an additional 47 PTR with T2/T-45 or an additional 51 PTR with T-45 only syllabus.

** Conservative estimate of T-45 PTR contribution capacity is 65 ops / hr x 11.6 hr / day x 237 days (BRAC 93 data stated 160 ops / hr for T-34 and T44).

Document Separator