THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

DCN 689

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950328-16

FROM: TROTTER, MAX	TO: DIXON, ALAN
TITLE: PRESIDENT, LOCAL 1728	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: NAT. FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT CHAFFEE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR FORT CHAFFEE.
SUPPORTING DATA INCLUDED.

Due Date: 950404	Routing Date: 950328	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date:

National Federation of Federal Employees

Local 1728 - Building 1181, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905-5000

March 27, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950328-16

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman, Base Realignment and
Closure Commission
1700 N. Moore St. Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Senator Dixon:

As you are aware, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas was recommended for closure by the Secretary of Defense in his BRAC 95 submission. The recommendation was to close Fort Chaffee "except" minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave." The recommendation further state "Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard."

If Fort Chaffee was the best location for the home of the newly established JRTC in 1987, how can i t be the lowest in military value in 1995 with all the improvements made during JRTC era. The JRTC continues to train the Army's elite war fighting units. From FY 88-92 JRTC trained in excess of 110,000 soldiers from the finest combat units in the Army. Only in FY 90 did the number of soldiers training at Fort Chaffee decrease and that was because of Desert Storm. Coincidentally, the 82d ABN Div, first unit trained at JRTC, was the first unit deployed to Desert Storm. During the same time frame (FY 88-92) an additional 182,000 Reserve Component soldiers trained at Fort Chaffee.

One of the greatest lessons learned by the Army during the Persian Gulf War was that it could no longer operate as it had in the past. Specifically as three distinct Army's within the Army; the Active Component, the Reserves and National Guard. Congress, having observed the readiness rifts between these organizations, directed that the Army dedicate more of its active component resources to the support of the readiness effort of the other two. The result is what is referred to as the "Total Army" and is now proudly named "America's Army." The term "America's Army" is meant to be a seamless organization whose sole goal is to be able to rapidly project its entire military power anywhere in the world in defense of our national interest. To do this, the training requirements and resources allocated to this effort must be equally seamless as no part

of the force can function without the other. In response to laws passed by Congress, the Army has responded to this mandate in the form of an organization called the Regional Training Brigade. Fort Chaffee has been designated as the home of a significant portion of this brigade specifically to support Reserve units in this region. The recent decision to "close" Fort Chaffee is an indication that the leadership of the Army has failed to support its commitments with its resources the proverbial "put your money where your mouth is."

Even since the end of WWII, Fort Chaffee has been a military post where "America's Army" trained long before it became a fashionable phrase. The National Guard has used it in significant numbers every year of its existence, as has the Army Reserve. Active Component use, with the exception of the JRTC period, has been constant but to a lesser degree than the other two members of the triad. Sadly, it is one of the very few installations that can honestly say that no one member of the triad has priority over the others. This should be a fundamental truth throughout "America's Army."

If that is the beauty of Fort Chaffee, an installation dedicated to all of America's Army, the 1995 SECDEF recommendation illustrates that it is equally the installations Achilles heel. As it shares its assets equally, there is no one use who therefore claims it as its own and preserve it for the others. This, remembering the ideals behind America's Army, shouldn't be necessary, but the reality of the situation, as highlighted by the SECDEF decision for closure, reveals the painful truth behind the phrase.

Incredibly, Fort Chaffee has historically been the responsibility of the Active Component's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); a major command with virtually no vested interest in its continued operation. TRADOC is the Army's schoolhouse. None of the missions assigned by DA to TRADOC are executed at Fort Chaffee. In fact, none of the 50,000 soldiers trained at Fort Chaffee in 1994 were for TRADOC missions. Fort Chaffee is by definition a major training area, whose primary purpose is to provide an environment for units of all components to train collectively on the war fighting skills. This is the mission of the Army's Forces Command or its subordinate U. S. Army Reserve Command. Unfortunately in years of declining resources, Forces Command was unwilling to add to its list of responsibilities. Generally, this training population was 40% National Guard, 40% Reserves and 20% Active Army. It must be noted that no one has anywhere close to a 100% interest except TRADOC; who's sole interest is in removing Fort Chaffee from its roles; simply, TRADOC is no longer willing to pay the bill for a FORSCOM mission. This does not speak well for "America's Army." This unfortunately also means that no one is willing, due to the bureaucrat seems in "America's Army," to contribute anything more than a piece of the resourcing necessary to keep it open to all; thus, it will be closed.

But will it? If one reads the fine print of the Army's closure recommendation, it calls for establishment of what it calls enclaves for both the National Guard and the Reserves. It also allows for current tenant activities to remain if their missions can be accomplished there. It allows for the continuance of the functions necessary to support these "enclaves." The interesting aspects of this is that when one combines these enclaves and tenants, the "closed" Fort Chaffee will resemble the current Fort Chaffee in size, shape and, most importantly, resourcing. The National Guard wants barracks, vehicle parking and a large area for collective training. The Reserves will want certain on-post training small arms ranges and some training area. To do this, all will need ammunition, food, power, water and roads to travel. If the training area exists, the active force will continue to use it like they have in the past (largely due to overcrowding at their own installations). All that will remain is a large portion of already unwanted infrastructure which has already been laid aside awaiting funds to have them removed. What will have changed? In essence, nothing.

What purpose is served by "closing" Fort Chaffee is not the reduction of operational infrastructure and the corresponding resources. It, in essence will be a realignment by another name. Maybe like the Presideio of Monterey, TRADOC's newest post. Fort Ord was closed by BRAC 91 but a "footprint" of the post was retained and is being run by an Active Army Garrison. The tragedy of this is that a lot of people will go through a lot of unnecessary effort and pain to end up with a realigned Fort Chaffee. Why was it not called a realignment when clearly that is what is occurring? Perhaps the need to appear as though great sacrifice is being made. Fort Chaffee is not a major installation as represented by the SECDEF. It is a subinstallation of Fort Sill with a budget that quickly identifies it as anything but a major installation.

The BRAC process recommendation to "close" Fort Chaffee highlights the fact that even the best of processes can fail to present decision makers an accurate picture of the ground truth. It very simply, was not designed to serve "America's Army" collectively but individually address the needs of each of its components. It is a disservice to America and its Army and, if the Army can not overcome this obstacle, that essential task must regretfully fall to the committee and/or concerned elected representatives.

The comparison data upon which the SECDEF decision was based was skewed. The BRAC Report does not take into account the other significant activities at the Fort but only looks at the AT/IDT figures. The recommendation stated "The post is managed by Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants". What about the Regional Training Brigade (RTB)? The RTB was

place at Fort Chaffee to support Reserve units in the region. The RTB is manned entirely by Active Component soldiers and is expected to grow to 170-200 by 1 March 1996. The fact is that the active Army has continued significant use of the Fort with no less than 6 major exercises since the departure of the JRTC, to include a JRTC special operations rotation, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Polk) and two major XVIII Airborne Corps exercises. If the JRTC and other units at Fort Polk cannot accomplish their training requirements at Fort Polk, why did they move there? The BRAC data indicates that Fort Polk has 163,000 acres of maneuver space while Fort Chaffee has only 62,000 acres. What is conveniently not stated is that approximately half of Fort Polk's acreage is national forest lands with limited use and that it has a major endangered species which further reduces useability. If the available acreage from the national forests surrounding Fort Chaffee had been included the 62,000 acres grows to 2 million plus acres. The net effect is that Fort Chaffee has a large more useable training area. This is not just conjecture, for once just ask the soldiers who use both, the 2d ACR. The data also places too great an emphasis for training areas on modern facilities for Quality of Life. Soldiers' time in a training area is too precious to be spent in the barracks, so the best training area is one that wastes very little of its asset on such mission nonessential items. The focus for a training area should be the training are - a novel concept but one that has been missed by the statisticians. If you look at it from the customers point of view - how many times have any of the premier active units gone to Fort Dix to train? Answer - none; yet it rates higher than Fort Chaffee as a training area. Fort Chaffee and Fort Polk were listed as equals in endangered species. Fort Chaffee has the burying beetle and Forts Polk and Bragg have the red-cocaded woodpecker. The beetle, essentially has no adverse impact on training as evidenced by the intense training at Fort Chaffee by the JRTC from 1988-1992 and our current training customers. This is not the case with the red-cocaded woodpecker which has a tremendous adverse impact on training at Forts Polk and Bragg. Retired General Carl Stiner who headed U. S. Special Operations Forces, in the Persian Gulf War and commanded the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg from 1988 to 1990, said it was "unconscionable" to send troops out into the field without fully training them. Stiner told the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee that the woodpecker restrictions curtail tank gunnery and helicopter gunship practice, night maneuvers and antiaircraft drills. He said readiness of the Army units at Fort Bragg "has been on a steady decline," since 1990.

In comparing miles of river training, Fort Chaffee was listed as 589 miles from the nearest port. Fort Dix was listed as only 45 miles from the deployable port. The gross error is that a major navigable river runs through Fort Chaffee and has been used by units (101st ABN) coming to Fort Chaffee to train and deploying from Fort Chaffee to home station. In fact, Fort Chaffee is the only installation in CONUS that owns land on

both sides of a major navigable river and has been declared as the "best water crossing area" in CONUS. A Lock and Dam ran by the Corps of Engineers is located within two miles of the crossing site and can adjust the flow of water based on water training capability of the unit.

The suggestion that the current AT load can be accommodated at installations like Fort Polk, Fort Sill, etc is ludricrous. Fort Polk cannot even accommodate their own active component training load as evidenced by the activities they continue to conduct at Fort Chaffee. Fort Sill can accommodate artillery fire, but has virtually no usable maneuver space. the logical progression of this line of thought is:

- Chaffee closed
- Units in fact cannot be accommodated as stated.
- Units must travel further to train
- Training days (cost) increase to meet mission requirement.
- Travel/transportation costs escalate.
- Units are eliminated, then the net result of this of this action places RC units in the eastern 1/2 of the 5th Army area at a great disadvantage (Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma) while those in other parts of the nation prosper. These states stand to loose millions of dollars if these units are eliminated. This means that the closure of Fort Chaffee is just the tip of the iceberg in overall economic impact. Eventually, virtually every community in the region will feel the adverse financial impact.

It is clear the Army has abrogated its responsibility in this action. They say close the Post but save some training area and buildings as enclaves for the NG and USARC, probably duplicating facilities at great expense rather than taking the responsibility to realign the Post to accommodate the needs of the Reserve Component units. After all, in America's Army, who is responsible for total combat readiness - the Army leadership or the NG or USAR? Clearly in this instance, nothing is broke except the alignment of Fort Chaffee. Fort Chaffee should remain just as it is; serving all America's Army with a small skilled workforce working as part of a full time active garrison. This is how it has been run since WWII and, in its mission and customers remain unchanged, this is how it should continue. If there is a change to be made, it should be rectify the long recognized malalignment by placing it in Forces Command. Status quo was the result of studies that were conducted in 1986 to 1991. The 1986 study (attached) was directed by the Secretary of Army and listed four alternatives to study: 1) Retain Fort Chaffee as a subinstallation of Fort Sill will use of AC military and DAC; 2) State Control. Arkansas ARNG assume full operational control using combination of ARNG, AGRS, and State employees. Fort Chaffee operated as a stand alone installation; 3) Active Army control (USAR AGR W/DAC). AC military are replaced with USAR AGR

personnel and DAC are retained. Fort Chaffee remains a subinstallation of Fort Sill; 4) NGB control. AC military are replace with five ARNG AGR personnel and DAC remain. Fort Chaffee is operated as stand alone installation of NGB. BRAC 91 was the second study. In both instances, the most feasible way to maintain Fort Chaffee as a training installation in support of combat readiness was leave it as it is.

I will appreciate your support on behalf of Fort Chaffee and its employees.

Max Trotter

Max Trotter
President
NFFE, Local 1728
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FORT CHAFFEE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD

DECISION BRIEFING

9 JUNE 1986

PURPOSE

- TO PROVIDE RESULTS OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FORT CHAFFEE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD

- TO OBTAIN CHIEF OF STAFF APPROVAL OF STUDY

BRIEFING OUTLINE

- OBJECTIVES
- BACKGROUND
- ALTERNATIVES
- RECOMMENDATION
- STUDY PARAMETERS
- STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
- IMPACTS
  - RESOURCES
  - MANPOWER
  - SOCIOECONOMIC/ENVIRONMENTAL
- OTHER RELATED ACTIONS
- COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION
- ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
- SUMMARY
- RECOMMENDATION
- MILESTONES

HQDA OBJECTIVES

- INCREASE THE ARNG SHARE OF THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF ACTIVE ARMY TROOPS.

BACKGROUND

- STUDY ORIGINATED FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECARMY FOR INSTALLATION & LOGISTICS.
- HQDA MSG 071500Z OCT 85, DIRECTED A REALIGNMENT SUMMARY IAW AR 5-10 OF FIVE SEMI-ACTIVE INSTALLATIONS:
  - FORT CHAFFEE, AR
  - FORT PICKETT, VA
  - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
  - FORT BUCHANAN, PR
  - FORT MC COY, WI
- ORIGINAL STUDY GUIDANCE WAS CHANGED AND TWO ALTERNATIVES WERE ADDED (ALT C & D) BY MR. SHANNON (ASA I&L) ON 21 FEB 86.
- ON 10 APR 86 MG TEMPLE, DIR ARNG, ANNOUNCED THAT THE NGB COULDN'T SUPPORT MR. SHANNON'S GUIDANCE.

STUDY ALTERNATIVES

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO. RETAIN FORT CHAFFEE AS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL WITH USE OF AC MILITARY AND DAC.

- ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL. ARKANSAS ARNG ASSUMES FULL OPERATIONAL CONTROL USING COMBINATION OF ARNG AGRS AND STATE EMPLOYEES. FORT CHAFFEE OPERATED AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.

- ALTERNATIVE C. - ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL (USAR AGR W/DAC). AC MILITARY ARE REPLACED WITH USAR AGR PERSONNEL AND DAC ARE RETAINED. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.

- ALTERNATIVE D. - NGB CONTROL. AC MILITARY ARE REPLACED WITH FIVE ARNG AGR PERSONNEL AND DAC REMAIN. FORT CHAFFEE IS OPERATED AS STAND ALONE INSTALLATION OF NGB.

RECOMMENDATION

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO BE APPROVED AS THE MOST FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

STUDY PARAMETERS

- FY 86 IS THE BASE YEAR. FY 87 IS THE IMPLEMENTATION YEAR AND FY 88 IS STEADY STATE YEAR.
- BASE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS CONSIDERED IN THE BROADEST TERMS, NOT LIMITED TO BASOPS AND RPMA ACCOUNTS.
- THE ARNG WILL OPERATE STAND ALONE INSTALLATIONS AND SERVE AS THE HOST. HOST TENANT RELATIONSHIPS ARE GOVERNED BY EXISTING ARMY REGULATIONS AND TENANTS WILL FUND ONLY EXTRAORDINARY REQUIREMENTS.
- NO NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE REQUIRED. ALL CONSTRUCTION CURRENTLY PLANNED THROUGH FY 91 WILL CONTINUE AND BE MANAGED BY FORT CHAFFEE AND THE SPONSORING (PROGRAMMING) MACOM.
- NO REAL PROPERTY WILL BE ACQUIRED OR EXCESSED.
- TENANT ACTIVE ARMY, USAR, AND NON-ARMY ACTIVITIES WILL NOT RELOCATE.
- ARNG AND FORSCOM WILL SCHEDULE ANNUAL TRAINING (AT). ARNG WILL SCHEDULE INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (IDT).
- TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY WILL NOT CHANGE. ARNG US PROPERTY AND FISCAL OFFICER (USP&FO) WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY.

STUDY PARAMETERS

- ALL CURRENTLY USED AND REQUIRED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ARNG. EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSFERRED "AS IS".
- EXISTING MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICES, COMMUNICATIONS AND POST EXCHANGES WILL CONTINUE TO BE PROVIDED BY HSC, ISC AND AAFES RESPECTIVELY.
- FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE BEING STUDIED UNDER THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM AND HAVE NOT YET REACHED THE SOLICITATION OF BIDS PHASE WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE DONE IN-HOUSE.
- IF TRANSFER OCCURS, THE ARNG WILL ASSUME EXISTING CONTRACTS.
- AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE USED.
- ALL AR 5-9 SUPPORT, BOTH ON AND OFF POST, IS TRANSFERRABLE TO THE ARNG UNLESS PROHIBITED BY LAW/STATUTE. (NO FUNCTIONS ARE PROHIBITED BY LAW)
- CURRENT "HEAD TAX", OPENING AND CLOSING COSTS, ARE NOT A STUDY CONSIDERATION. THESE FEES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ASA I&L REVIEW FOR ELIMINATION. IF THESE FEES ARE NOT ELIMINATED A SIGNIFICANT DOLLAR IMPACT WOULD BE IMPOSED ON USAR AND ACTIVE COMPONENT UNITS WHICH MAY REDUCE USE.
- ARNG WOULD BE PROVIDED FUNDING FOR ALL FUNCTIONS PRIOR TO FY 88. THE FUNDING WILL BE TRANSFERRED IN THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM).

STUDY ASSUMPTIONS

- THE OVERALL MISSION OF THE INSTALLATION WILL NOT CHANGE.
- ARNG WILL PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO TENANTS AND UNITS CONDUCTING TRAINING AS THEY RECEIVE AT THIS TIME.
- ARNG AND USAR UNIT TRAINING WILL NOT INCREASE OR DECREASE FROM THAT CURRENTLY PROJECTED FOR FY 86 AND BEYOND.
- BECAUSE THIS ACTION WAS NOT PROGRAMMED, NO NG TECHNICIANS AND ONLY FIVE ARNG AGR SPACES PER INSTALLATION CAN BE SUPPORTED BY THE NGB.
- ARNG AGR AND USAR AGR PERSONNEL WILL BE THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF THE AUTHORIZED ACTIVE MILITARY THAT THEY WOULD BE REPLACING.
- TRAINING READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS WILL REMAIN THE SAME.

RESOURCE IMPACTS

- STEADY STATE ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS OF THE ACTION BY ALTERNATIVES IN FY 86 DOLLARS (MILLIONS).

ALTERNATIVE	OMA	MPA*	OTHER	TOTAL
A - STATUS QUO	.316	.606	7.814	8.736
B - STATE CONTROL	0	.232	10.811	11.043
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	.316	.606	7.814	8.736
D - NGB CONTROL	.280	.476	10.211	10.967

* THE ARNG AGR AND USAR AGR PERSONNEL WOULD BE PAID WITH THE NGPA AND RPA APPROPRIATIONS.

- ONE TIME COSTS OF THE ACTION BY ALTERNATIVES IN FY 86 DOLLARS.

ALTERNATIVE	ONE TIME COSTS ($000)
B - STATE CONTROL	1,825.0
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	19.7
D - NGB CONTROL	14.1*

* REPRESENTS PCS COST ONLY. SUBSTANTIAL ONE TIME COSTS WILL BE INCURRED TO OPERATE FORT CHAFFEE AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.

RECURRING COSTS

ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO

	OMA	MPA	OTHER	TOTAL
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	2016.4	2525.4
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	43.5			43.5
FT SILL AV SEC	36.2	130.0		166.2
TOTAL	315.8	606.0	7813.5	8735.3

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

	OMANG	NGPA	TOTAL
MISSION	509.5		509.5
BASOPS (-)	4113.6	186.0	4299.6
RPMA	6188.2	46.0	6234.2
TOTAL	10811.3	232.0	11043.3

RECURRING COSTS

ALTERNATIVE C - USAR AGR W/DAC

	OMA	MPA	OTHER	TOTAL
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	2016.4	2525.4
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	43.5			43.5
FT SILL AV SEC	36.2	130.0		166.2
TOTAL	315.8	606.0	7813.5	8735.3

ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

	OMANG	NGPA	OTHER	TOTAL
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	4413.5	4922.5
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	43.5			43.5
TOTAL	279.6	476.0	10210.6	10966.2

ONE TIME COSTS

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

MILITARY RELOCATION (7 PERSONNEL)	$ 20K
CIVILIAN RELOCATION (47 PERSONNEL)	1479
TERMINAL LEAVE COSTS (73 PERSONNEL)	77
SEVERANCE PAY (73 PERSONNEL)	249
TOTAL	$1825K

ALTERNATIVE C - USAR AGR W/DAC

MILITARY RELOCATION (7 PERSONNEL)	$19.7K

ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

MILITARY RELOCATION (3 PERSONNEL)	$14.1K

MANPOWER IMPACTS

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE MANNING LEVELS, BY ALTERNATIVES, REGARDLESS OF STATUS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FORT CHAFFEE.

ALTERNATIVE	MILITARY	CIVILIAN (INCL PT)	TOTAL
A - STATUS QUO	14	178	192
B - STATE CONTROL	5	255	260
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	14	178	192
D - NGB CONTROL	11	240	251

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE ACCOUNTABLE END STRENGTH THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION FOR OTHER INITIATIVES AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

ALTERNATIVE	MILITARY	CIVILIAN (INCL PT)	TOTAL
A - STATUS QUO	0	0	0
B - STATE CONTROL	14	171	185
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11	0	11
D - NGB CONTROL	8	0	8

MANPOWER IMPACTS

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE MANNING LEVELS, BY ALTERNATIVES, REGARDLESS OF STATUS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FORT CHAFFEE.

ALTERNATIVE	MILITARY	CIVILIAN (INCL PT)	TOTAL
A - STATUS QUO	11 (+3 FT SILL)	176 (+2 FT SILL)	187 (+5)
B - STATE CONTROL	5 (ARNG AGR)	255 (STATE)	260
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11 (+3 FT SILL)	176 (+2 FT SILL)	187 (+5)
D - NGB CONTROL	11 (6 AC, 5 AGR)	238 (+2 FT SILL)	249 (+2)

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE ACCOUNTABLE END STRENGTH THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION FOR OTHER INITIATIVES AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

ALTERNATIVE	MILITARY	CIVILIAN (INCL PT)	TOTAL
A - STATUS QUO	0	0	0
B - STATE CONTROL	11 (+3 FT SILL)	169* (+2 FT SILL)	180 (+5)
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11	0	11
D - NGB CONTROL	5 (+3 FT SILL)	0	5 (+3)

* SEVEN TASC SPACES WILL REMAIN AND BECOME A TENANT.

MANPOWER IMPACTS

- AN INCREASE OF 62 CIVILIANS WERE ESTIMATED TO BE REQUIRED FOR THE STAND-ALONE OPERATION OF ALTERNATIVE D.
- ANALYSIS ACCOMPLISHED USING CARLISLE BARRACKS (- WAR COLLEGE) AS A MODEL.
- FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL MANPOWER THAT NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED AND/OR INCREASED ARE:
  - FINANCE & ACCOUNTING +20
  - ADP +4
  - CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE +11
  - COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES MANAGEMENT +3
  - PUBLIC AFFAIRS +1
  - LOGISTICS +3
  - EEO +1
  - CHAPLAIN +1
  - PURCHASING & CONTRACTING +9
  - SAFETY +1
  - STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE +2
  - PROTOCOL +1
  - DEH +2
  - RECREATION SERVICES OFF. +1
  - DPCA +2
- BASOPS MANPOWER STAFFING ONLY

	CIVILIAN	MILITARY		
	FTP	O	W	E
CARLISLE BARRACKS (-WAR COLLEGE)	229	17	2	44
FORT CHAFFEE PRESENTLY	153	5	0	6
FORT CHAFFEE WITH ADDITIONAL STAFFING	215	5	0	6

SOCIOECONOMIC/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

- ENVIRONMENTAL.
  - THERE IS NO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.
  - A TRADOC FORM 161-R, CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION, HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.

- SOCIOECONOMIC.
  - CONDUCTED AN ASSESSMENT USING THE CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABORATORY'S (CERL), ECONOMIC IMPACT FORECAST SYSTEM (EIFS).
  - IMPACTS ARE BELOW THE HISTORICAL RATIONAL THRESHOLD VALUES (RTV).
  - MODEL INDICATES THE ACTION WOULD CAUSE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY OF THE AREA.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS

- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER ONGOING INITIATIVES AT FORT CHAFFEE THAT MAY BE IMPACTED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION.
  - COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY REVIEW.
    - UNDER ALTERNATIVES A, C, AND D THE CA REVIEW WOULD CONTINUE.
    - NGB (ALT D) HAS STATED THAT THEY WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON FUNCTIONS BEING CONTRACTED OUT.
    - THE STATE (ALT B) IS NOT SUBJECT TO CA REVIEW BUT COULD CONTRACT OUT ON THEIR OWN.
  - THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (JRTC).
    - WOULD HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON FORT CHAFFEE, REGARDLESS OF WHO HAD OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
    - UNDER A BARE BONES STRATEGY AND HEAVY USE OF CONTRACTING THE BASOPS PLUS-UP IS ANTICIPATED TO BE 25 MILITARY AND 63 CIVILIANS.
    - THIS PLUS-UP IS CONSIDERED SUPPORTABLE UNDER ALL ALTERNATIVES.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS

- THE 5TH ARMY REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER
  - PRESENTLY BEING TESTED AT FORT CHAFFEE.
  - PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE YEAR ROUND INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING AT ONE LOCATION FOR THE USAR.
  - STAFFING ISSUES ARE STILL NOT FIRM BUT WILL BE A MIXTURE OF AGR PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS.

- WATER OBSTACLE TRAINING SITE (WOTS).
  - IT IS DESIGNED TO TRAIN AC, RC, AND NG ENGINEER UNITS IN BRIDGE BUILDING AND RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS.
  - WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 25 PERSONNEL.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO. THE AC COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE FORT SILL COMMANDER. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS AS A SUBINSTALLATION FOR FORT SILL.

- ADVANTAGES
  - EXPERIENCED IN THE OPERATION.
  - ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS.
  - PROVEN EFFICIENCY.
  - LEAST TRAUMATIC.
  - NO IMPACT ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.
  - ALLOWS CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND NO DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT.
  - NO ONE TIME COST WILL BE INCURRED.
  - OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE LESS THAN ALTERNATIVES B AND D. THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE C.
  - NO LOSS OF EXPERIENCE OR INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

- DISADVANTAGES

  - DOES NOT ALLOW THE ARNG TO ASSUME A GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
  - DOES NOT PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL.
  - DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION

COMMAND TRADOC STAFF	PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE	RATIONALE
DCSPAL	A	LEAST IMPACT.
DCST	A	MOBILIZATION, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, SAVINGS NOT WORTH THE TURMOIL.
USAR SR ADV	A	COST EFFICIENCY, LEAST TURMOIL.
DCSENGR	A	IN ANTICIPATION OF THE JRTC TRAINING BEING AT FORT CHAFFEE, THE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND FUNDING SHOULD STAY WITHIN THE SAME HQ. UNDER STATE CONTROL THE EXISTING DEH DISAPPEARS AND THEREFORE THE LOSS OF CONTROL OVER CONSTRUCTION.
DCSRM	A	IF JRTC IS APPROVED. TRANSFER TO FORSCOM IF THE JRTC IS NOT APPROVED.
PA	NONE	ALTERNATIVES B AND D HAVE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT. ALTERNATIVES A AND C HAVE MINIMAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT.
SJA	NONE	

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL. THE ARNG AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE ARKANSAS TAG. FORT CHAFFEE WOULD BE OPERATED AS A STAND-ALONE INSTALLATION.

- ADVANTAGES.
  - ALLOWS THE ARNG A GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
  - PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.
  - FREES UP 171 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
  - FREES PARTIAL MANYEARS OF EFFORT AT FORT SILL FOR OTHER FUNCTIONS.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

- DISADVANTAGES

  - COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS WOULD START ANEW AND WOULD REQUIRE AN ADJUSTMENT PERIOD.
  - COMPLICATES MOBILIZATION.
  - LOSE CONTROL FOR NEW INITIATIVES.
  - UTILIZATION MAY DECREASE DUE TO A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES.
  - ACTIVE ARMY WILL NOT DETERMINE TRAINING PRIORITIES.
  - DOES NOT ALLOW ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
  - DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL, THEIR DEPENDENTS, FEDERAL WORK FORCE, AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.
  - CONTINUITY OF OPERATION COULD BE LOST AND A DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT MAY RESULT UNLESS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE OBTAINS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE STATE.
  - ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE THE HIGHEST OF ALL ALTERNATIVES.
  - ONE TIME COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ALTERNATIVE ARE THE HIGHEST AT $1.825 MILLION.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE C - ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL (USAR AGR WITH DAC). THE USAR AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE FORT SILL COMMANDER. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS AS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.

- ADVANTAGES.
  - NO CHANGE IN ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS.
  - PROVEN EFFICIENCY.
  - PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.
  - NO IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.
  - CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT WOULD BE MINIMUM SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE WORK FORCE WOULD REMAIN.
  - ONE TIME COST ARE MINIMAL (19.7K).
  - OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE LESS THAN ALTERNATIVES B AND D. THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE A.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

- DISADVANTAGES
  - DOES NOT ALLOW ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
  - DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.
  - DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE D - NBG CONTROL. THE ARNG AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE DIRECTOR ARNG. AND THE CHIEF NGB. FORT CHAFFEE WOULD BE OPERATED AS A STAND-ALONE INSTALLATION.

- ADVANTAGES.
  - ALLOWS ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
  - PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 5 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.
  - NO IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.
  - LOSS OF EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE MINIMUM SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE WORK FORCE WOULD REMAIN.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

- DISADVANTAGES

  - NGB HAS NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A MAJOR INSTALLATION.
  - DEPARTMENTAL AGENCY BECOMES AN OPERATIONAL CONTROLLING ACTIVITY.
  - COMPLICATES MOBILIZATION.
  - SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED.
  - LOSE CONTROL FOR NEW INITIATIVES.
  - UTILIZATION MAY DECREASE DUE TO A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES.
  - ACTIVE ARMY WILL NOT DETERMINE TRAINING PRIORITIES.
  - DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.
  - REPLACES ONLY 5 OF THE 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES.
  - DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
  - EXTENDED LINES OF COMMUNICATION, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT MAY CAUSE DEGRADATION OF THE CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND SUPPORT.
  - OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE MORE THAN ALTERNATIVES A AND C.
  - IN THE CAPACITY OF A "STAND-ALONE" INSTALLATION AN INCREASE IN DOLLARS AND MANPOWER WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SUPPORT PRESENTLY INTEGRATED AND RECEIVED FROM FORT SILL.

SUMMARY

RESOURCES - RECAP

	ALTERNATIVES			
	A	B	C	D
MANPOWER	192	260	192	251
MANPOWER DIFFERENTIAL		+68	0	+59
ACTIVE MILITARY END STRENGTH SAVED	0	14	11	8
RECURRING COSTS ($MIL)	8.736	11.043	8.736	10.967
RECURRING COSTS DIFFERENTIAL ($MIL)		+2.308	0	+2.231
ONE TIME COSTS ($000)	0	1,825.0	19.7	14.1*

* REPRESENTS PCS COST ONLY. SUBSTANTIAL ONE TIME COSTS WILL BE INCURRED TO OPERATE FORT CHAFFEE AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.

SUMMARY

- ALTERNATIVE A IS THE LEAST COSTLY IN ONE TIME AND THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE C IN RECURRING COSTS.
- ALTERNATIVE B HAS THE GREATEST IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE.
- ALTERNATIVE A DOES NOT PERMIT THE REASSIGNMENT OF AC MILITARY OR FREE UP 178 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- ALTERNATIVE A IS LEAST TRAUMATIC FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, SUPPORT STRUCTURE, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL.
- ALTERNATIVE A IS LEAST PROBLEMATIC FOR OTHER RELATED ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (JRTC).
- ALTERNATIVE B PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 14 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES, AND FREES UP 171 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- ALTERNATIVE C PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES.
- ALTERNATIVE D PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 8 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES.
- ALTERNATIVES B AND D PERMITS THE ARNG A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

RECOMMENDATION

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO BE APPROVED AS THE MOST FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT (LEAST)	1	4	2	3
COMMUNITY IMPACT (LEAST)	1	4	2	3
FLEXIBILITY FOR NEW INITIATIVES	1	4	2	3
POSSIBLE TRAINING IMPACT	1	4	2	3
ANTICIPATED USE OF FACILITIES	1	4	2	3

GOV. CLINTON HAS STATED THAT HE PREFERS TO KEEP FORT CHAFFEE UNDER ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL, BUT WILL TAKE IT OVER RATHER THAN HAVE IT CLOSED.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

JRTC

ASSUMPTIONS

- THE ACTIVE ARMY WILL BECOME THE MOST SIGNIFICANT USER OF FORT CHAFFEE ON A YEAR ROUND BASIS.
- AN INCREASE IN BASOPS SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE JRTC MISSION.
- UNDER ALTERNATIVES A AND C. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.
- BASOPS MANPOWER AND DOLLAR COSTS WOULD BE DIFFERENT UNDER ALTERNATIVES B AND D SINCE THE POST WOULD BE OPERATED UNDER A "STAND ALONE" CONCEPT.

MILITARY:	26
TOTAL:	208

MILITARY:	26
TOTAL:	208

	DOLLARS (MIL)
NON PERSONNEL:	$ 5.122
CIV. PERSONNEL:	2.952
TOTAL:	$ 8.074

	DOLLARS (MIL)
NON PERSONNEL:	$ 3.070
CIV. PERSONNEL:	4.350
TOTAL:	$ 7.420

COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION

COMMAND	PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE	RATIONALE
ARKANSAS TAG	A	STATE GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT ALT B ONLY IF DA DECIDES TO CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE
COMMANDER, FORT SILL	A	MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING.
NGB	D	OVERALL THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS.
OCAR	A	WILL SUPPORT ALT C IF NECESSARY.
FORSCOM	A	MINIMUM IMPACT ON MILITARY, CIVILIAN AND LOCAL COMMUNITY. NO DISRUPTION TO THE EFFICIENCY OR EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONS. MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND CONTINUED GROWTH IN TRAINING FACILITY UTILIZATION WOULD CONTINUE UNABATED. ALLOWS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS.

JRTC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

ADVANTAGES

- STATE HAS EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A TRAINING POST.
- ARNG ASSUMES A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- IT WOULD NOT COST THE ARMY ANY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

DISADVANTAGES

- ARNG WANTS A GREATER SHARE OF THE BATTALION ROTATIONS AT THE JRTC.
- STATE GOVERNMENT WANTS THE ACTIVE ARMY TO OPERATE THE POST.
- FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE LOST.
- THE STATE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE POST.

ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

ADVANTAGES

- ARNG ASSUMES A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

DISADVANTAGES

- NGB HAS NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A MAJOR INSTALLATION.
- ARNG WANTS A GREATER SHARE OF THE BATTALION ROTATIONS AT THE JRTC.
- NGB HAS STATED THEY CAN ONLY SUPPORT MINIMUM AGR STAFFING (5).
- A DEPARTMENTAL AGENCY BECOMES AN OPERATIONAL CONTROLLING ACTIVITY.

SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE POST.

- IF THE JRTC DOES NOT OPERATE AT FORT CHAFFEE, THE POST SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO FORSCOM, AS HAS BEEN FORTS PICKETT AND A.P. HILL.

MAR-28-95 TUE 09:56 AM NFFE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE 501 484 2484 P.50

MILESTONES

• PUBLISH FINAL STUDY	11 JUN 86
• SUBMIT STUDY TO HQDA	13 JUN 86

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

Mr. Max Trotter
President, NFFE Local 1728
Building 1181
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905-5000

Please refer to this number when responding 950328-16

Dear Mr. Trotter:

Thank you for providing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with your letter expressing your concerns about the recommendation of the Department of Defense to close Fort Chaffee.

I want to assure you that the Commission is thoroughly reviewing the information used by the Department of Defense in making its recommendations. The information you have provided in your letter has been distributed to the appropriate members of the Commission and will be carefully considered during our analysis of the Defense Department's proposal to close Fort Chaffee.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of additional assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-1

FROM: COMBEST, LARRY	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (TX)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: REESE AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INVITING COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF TO A DINNER ON APRIL 4 DURING THEIR VISIT TO REESE AFB.

* HANDLED BY PHONE *

Due Date: 950331	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950328	Mail Date:

LARRY COMBEST
19TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHAIRMAN
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

ROOM 1511
LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4319
(202) 225-4005

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

DISTRICT OFFICES:

ROOM 611
GEORGE H. MAHON
FEDERAL BUILDING
LUBBOCK, TX 79401-4089
(806) 763-1611

SUITE 205
3800 E. 42ND STREET
ODESSA, TX 79762-5941
(915) 550-0743

SUITE 205
5809 S. WESTERN
AMARILLO, TX 79110-3626
(806) 353-3945

March 28, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-1

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Rosslyn, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to extend an invitation to the Base Closure and Realignment Commissioners and staff who are planning on visiting Reese Air Force Base next month, to join me at a dinner in Lubbock, Texas on the evening of April 4, 1995

I would like the opportunity to share with the BRAC folks some of the special hospitality we West Texans are famous for, not to mention absolutely the best food they will ever taste. Being together at dinner will give the Commissioners and their staff a clearer appreciation of the tremendous quality of life and support that the citizens and City of Lubbock offer our military friends.

It is my understanding that all of the Commissioners will arrive by 7:00 p.m. in Lubbock on April 4. The City of Lubbock will ensure that transportation to the dinner and back to the base is arranged. Further details will be provided as soon as they are finalized.

I certainly appreciate your consideration of this invitation and hope the Commissioners will be able to join me.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

Larry

Larry Combest

LC/rdl

LARRY COMBEST
19TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHAIRMAN
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

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ODESSA, TX 79767-5941
(915) 550-0743

SUITE 205
3809 S. WESTERN
AMARILLO, TX 79110-3626
(806) 353-3945

COVER PAGE

Bond - This needs to be entered. Jim

TO: Jim ~~Schutreider~~

FROM: Rob Lehman (WASHINGTON)

TIME: _____ (P.M.) (A.M.)

NO. OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: _____

RE: Reese AFB

DATE: _____

If transmission is incomplete please call (202) 225-4005.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-2

FROM: NIEVES, DENNISE M.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: MANAGEMENT ANALYST	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: FORT BUCHANAN	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT BUCHANAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING INFORMATION REGARDING NUMBER OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES THAT ARE WORKING AT FORT BUCHANAN.

Due Date: 950405	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date:

USAG FORT BUCHANAN
FT BUCHANAN, PUERTO RICO 00934

27 March 1995

Mr. Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Realignment
& Closure Commission
1700 North Moore St.
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding: 950329-2

Dear Mr. Dixon:

As a civilian employee of the Resource Management office at Fort Buchanan, I feel it is my duty to alert the BRAC Commission that data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding the number of employees at this installation is **incorrect**. Apparently due to intimidation, higher staff is hesitant in setting the record straight.

At enclosure 1 is our current Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Since Fort Buchanan is a sub-installation (not a major installation as stated on the DOD Press release) of USAG Fort McPherson, GA, we are included in their TDA. (I am forwarding only our section in the TDA, paragraphs 050 through 083E). This document shows a total of 515 Requirements and 398 Authorizations. As of Feb 95, we had a total of 264 appropriated civilians on board (see Encl 2). The DOD press release dated 28 February 1995 (see Encl 3) states that this installation has a "maximum potential reduction of 289 jobs (182 directjobs and 107 indirect jobs)." In addition to these appropriated employees, we have 235 non-appropriated employees that would also be affected by Fort Buchanan's realignment. This information can be verified with our parent installation's Resource Management Office.

Sir, our civilian workforce has expressed, through the media, their concern about this and other issues. We have been informed by your office that only 10 minutes will be allocated to Fort Buchanan at the hearing to be held in Alabama on 4 Apr 95 and that the Governor of Puerto Rico's representative will be using that time. Since our employee population is higher than what was originally reported, we respectfully request that more time be allocated to Fort Buchanan so that a spokesperson from our civilian workforce can address the commission.

Please contact our Public Affairs Officer, Mr. Jose Pagan, (809) 273-3205, to notify us of your decision.

Sincerely,

Dennise M. Nieves

Dennise M. Nieves
Management Analyst
DAC, GS11

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FORT MCPHERSON
FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFZK-RM-M (1-1a) 1 [illegible] 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Approved Authorization Document - TDA FCW0U8AA FC2095

1. Enclosed is approved authorization document for organization of United States Army Garrison, Fort McPherson, Georgia, TDA FCW0U8AA FC2095, EDATE 941017.

2. Strength Recap:

a. Strength Summary Change: Yes

b. Strength Summary:

Military Structure Strength: 38 OFF, 4 WO, 537 ENL, 579 AGGR.
Military Authorized Strength: 33 OFF, 4 WO, 437 ENL, 474 AGGR.
Civilian Structure Strength: 1646.
Civilian Authorized Strength: 1330.

3. Authority is granted to initiate personnel and logistics actions to implement the document effective 17 October 1994.

C. T. CATCHINGS
LTC, IN
Acting Commander

Encl
as

Encl 1

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
048K	07	ELEC WKR		08	02805		WG	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	2	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									12	8			
050	00	WOU828 CMD GP	FM												
050	01	INSTL CDR		06	01A00	6Y		K	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			
050	02	DEP INSTL CDR		05	01A00	6Y		K	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			
050	03	USAR MOB PL		05	54A00			K	51999262XQZ	ARTM	1	0			92
050	04	CSM		E9	0025L	LA	NC	I	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			11 RE
050	05	ADMIN OFF		11	00301		GS	C	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			
050	06	AUDITOR		11	00511		GS	C	202096NBCGA	QNMG	1	0			
050	07	SECY (STENO/OA)		08	00318		GS	C	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			
050	08	SECY (STENO)		07	00318		GS	C	202096NABAH	QNMG	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									7	6			
051	00	WOU828 DRM	FM												
051	01	FIN MGR		13	00505		GM	C	202096UAYAJ	QDRM	1	1			XW
051	02	FIN MGR		12	00505		GS	C	202096UAYAJ	QDRM	1	1			XW
051	03	SECY (STENO/OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096UAYAJ	QDRM	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	3			
051A	00	WOU828 BUD DIV	FM												
051A	01	S/BUD ANAL		11	00560		GS	C	202096UBFFE	QDRM	1	1			XW
051A	02	BUD ANAL		11	00560		GS	C	202096UBFFE	QDRM	1	1	-		XW
051A	03	BUD ANAL		09	00560		GS	C	202096UBFFE	QDRM	3	3			XW
051A	04	BUD ANAL		09	00560		GS	C	202096HBJEB	QUPH	1	1			
051A	05	BUD ASST		07	00561		GS	C	202096UBFFE	QDRM	4	4			XW
051A	06	BUDGET ASST		07	00561		GS	C	202096HBJEB	QUPH	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									11	11			
051B	00	WOU828 MMD	FM												
051B	01	S/MGT ANAL		12	00343		GS	C	202096UBFGB	QDRM	1	1			XW
051B	02	MGT ANAL		11	00343		GS	C	202096UBOBB	QDRM	1	1			XW
051B	03	MGT ANAL		11	00343		GS	C	202096UBOBB	QDRM	1	1			CN XW
051B	04	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096UBFGB	QDRM	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	4			
052	00	WOU828 IG	FM												
052	01	IG		04	01A00	5N		K	202096NBBNA	QNMG	1	1			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	SR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
052	02	ASST IG		E7	71L4L	LA	NC	I	202096NBBNA	QNMG	2	2			RE
052	03	OFC SV ASST(OA)		O7	00303		GS	C	202096NBBNA	QNMG	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	4			
053	00	WOU828 SJA	FM												
053	01	SJA		05	55A00			K	202096NBBPA	QNMG	1	1			
053	02	ASST SJA		03	55A00			K	202096NBBPA	QNMG	1	1			
053	03	GEN ATTORNEY		13	00905		GS	C	202096NBBUD	QNMG	1	1			
053	04	COURT REPORTER		07	00950		GS	C	202096NBBXD	QNMG	1	1			
053	05	PARALEG SP(OA)		07	00986		GS	C	202096NBBUA	QNMG	1	1			
053	06	LOSS/DMG/CLM		07	00992		GS	C	202096NBBXD	QNMG	1	1			
053	07	LEGAL CLK		05	00986		GS	C	202096NBBUA	QNMG	1	0			
053	08	CLMS CLK(S/OA)		05	00998		GS	C	202096NBBXD	QNMG	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	7			
054	00	WOU828 PAO	FM												
054	01	PA SP		11	01035		GS	C	202096NBBHB	QNMG	1	1			
054	02	PA SP		09	01035		GS	C	202096NBBHB	QNMG	1	0			
054	03	PA SPEC		09	01035		GS	C	202096GBBHB	QPSG	1	0			
054	04	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096NBBHB	QNMG	1	1			
054	05	JOURNALIST		05	01082		GS	C	202096NBBHB	QNMG	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	2			
055	00	WOU828 CHAPLAIN	FM												
055	01	STAFF CHAP		04	56A00	LA		K	202096NBBZA	QNMG	1	1			
055	02	CHAPLAIN		03	56A00	LA		K	202096NBBZF	QNMG	1	1			
055	03	CHAP ASST		E4	71M10	LA		I	202096NBBZB	QNMG	1	1			
055	04	CHAP ASST		05	00303		GS	C	202096NBBZF	QNMG	1	1			
055	05	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096NBBZA	QNMG	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	5			
056	00	WOU828 SAFETY	FM												
056	01	SAFETY/OH MGR		11	00018		GS	C	202096NBCHB	QNMG	1	1			XW
056	02	SAFETY/OH SP		07	00018		GS	C	202096NBCHB	QNMG	1	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	1			
057	00	WOU828 HQ CMD	FM												
057	01	CDR		03	01A00			K	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
057	02	1SG		E8	71L5M	LA	NC	I	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW
057	03	OPNS SGT		E7	11B40		NC	I	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW
057	04	UNIT CLK		E5	75B20		NC	I	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW
057	05	SUP SGT		E5	92Y20		NC	I	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW
057	06	CLK TYP		03	00322		GS	C	202096NABAA	QNMG	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	6			
057A	00	WOU828 DINING FAC	FM												
057A	01	DIN FAC MGR		09	01101		GS	C	202096FCKEA	QFOD	1	1			XW TD
057A	02	SUPPLY CLERK		04	02005		GS	C	202096FCKEA	QFOD	1	1			TD
057A	03	COOK		08	07404		WG	C	202096FCKEA	QFOD	2	2			XW TD
057A	04	COOK		05	07404		WG	C	202096FCKEA	QFOD	2	2			XW TD
057A	05	FOOD SVC WKR		02	07408		WG	C	202096FCKEA	QFOD	4	4			XW TD
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									10	10			
058	00	WOU828 DPCA	FM												
058	01	DIRECTOR		13	00340		GS	C	202096GAPAA	QPSG	1	1			
058	02	ADMIN NCO		E7	71L40	LA	NC	I	202096GAPAA	QPSG	1	1			NB
058	03	SECY (STENO/OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096GAPAA	QPSG	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	3			
058A	00	WOU828 EO	FM												
058A	01	EO PROG COORD		E7	71L4Q	LA	NC	I	202096NBRFB	QNMG	1	1			NC
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									1	1			
058B	00	WOU828 ADAP	FM												
058B	01	ADA CON OFF		11	00101		GS	C	87878900RFC	VCND	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									1	1			
058C	00	WOU828 EDUCATION	FM												
058C	01	EDUC SVCS OFF		11	01710		GS	C	87973230USB	VACE	1	1			XW
058C	02	GUIDN COUNSLR		09	01710		GS	C	87973230USB	VACE	1	0			XW
058C	03	SECY (OA)		04	00318		GS	C	87973230USB	VACE	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	2			
059	00	WOU828 ICM	FM												
059	01	ADCFA		12	00340		GS	C	202096BNOSB	QDPC	1	1			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
059	02	FOOD SVC MGR		09	01667		GS	C	202096SNQSB	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	1			
060	00	WOU828 C&F MGT	FM												
060	01	MGMT ANAL		11	00343		GS	C	202096SJQHA	QDPC	1	1			
060	02	MGT ASST		06	00344		GS	C	202096SJQHA	QDPC	1	1			
060	03	OPERATION ASST		05	00303		GS	C	202096SJQYB	QDPC	1	1			
060	04	SUP CLK (PBO)		05	02005		GS	C	202096GAQYB	QPSG	1	0			
060	05	CLK TYP		03	00322		GS	C	202096GAQYB	QPSG	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	3			
061	00	WOU828 COM REC	FM												
061	01	COM REC OFF		10	00301		GS	C	202096SJQHA	QDPC	1	1			
061	02	OFC SVCS CLK		04	00303		GS	C	202096SJQHA	QDPC	1	0			
061	03	SECY (TYP)		04	00318		GS	C	202096SJQHA	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	1			
061A	00	WOU828 ARTS & CRAFTS	FM												
061A	01	ASST REC OFF		09	00301		GS	C	202096SEQJB	QDPC	1	0			
061A	02	REC ASST (WOOD)		05	00189		GS	C	202096SEQJD	QDPC	1	1			
061A	03	REC ASST(AUTO)		05	00189		GS	C	202096SMQJC	QDPC	1	0			
061A	04	REC ASST (CER)		05	00189		GS	C	202096SEQJB	QDPC	1	0			
061A	05	TOOL/PARTS AT		05	06904		WG	C	202096SMQJC	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	1			
061B	00	WOU828 SPORTS	FM												
061B	01	S/SPORTS SP		07	00030		GS	C	202096SHQLA	QDPC	1	1			
061B	02	RECR ASST		05	00189		GS	C	202096SHQLA	QDPC	3	1			
061B	03	LD REC AID		05	00189		GS	C	202096SHQLA	QDPC	1	0			
061B	04	MGR (POOL)		04	00301		GS	C	202096SHQLH	QDPC	1	0			
061B	05	LABORER		02	03502		WG	C	202096SHQLA	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									7	2			
061C	00	WOU828 LIBRARY	FM												
061C	01	LIBRARIAN		09	01410		GS	C	202096SKQWB	QDPC	2	1			XW
061C	02	LIBRARIAN TECH		06	01411		GS	C	202096SKQWB	QDPC	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	2			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
061D	00	WOU828 OUTDOOR REC	FM												
061D	01	SUPV REC SP		08	00188		GS	C	202096SLQLD	QDPC	1	0			
061D	02	REC SP (SCUBA)		06	00188		GS	C	202096SLQLD	QDPC	1	0			
061D	03	RECR ASST		04	00189		GS	C	202096SLQLD	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	0			
061E	00	WOU828 ITT	FM												
061E	01	RECR SP		05	00188		GS	C	202096SDQKB	QDPC	1	0			
061E	02	REC AID		03	00189		GS	C	202096SDQKB	QDPC	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	0			
062	00	WOU828 FSD	FM												
062	01	FS PROG MGR		11	00340		GS	C	202096SJQVA	QDPC	1	0			XW
062	02	SECY (STENO)		05	00318		GS	C	202096SJQVA	QDPC	1	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	0			
062A	00	WOU828 ACS	FM												
062A	01	ACS OFFICER		11	00101		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
062A	02	SOCIAL WORKER		11	00185		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
062A	03	ADMIN ASST		09	00301		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
062A	04	CONSUM/FIN AFF		09	00343		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
062A	05	SOC SVC ASST		08	00186		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
062A	06	SOC SVC ASST		07	00186		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	0			
062A	07	SECY (STENO)		04	00318		GS	C	872020000UB	QACS	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									7	6			
062B	00	WOU828 CHILD CARE	FM												
062B	01	CDS COORD		11	01701		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	02	FCC DIR		09	01701		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	03	EDUC SP		09	01710		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	04	PROG DIR		08	01701		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	05	ELEM TEACHER		07	01710		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	3	3			
062B	06	SALK PROG SP		07	01701		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	07	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			
062B	08	ADMIN CLK (TYP)		05	00341		GS	C	872019000UA	QCCS	1	1			UY
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									10	10			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
062D	00	WOU828 YOUTH ACT	FM												
062D	01	YA DIR		07	00188		GS	C	872008000KC	QYDP	1	1			
062D	02	REC SP (YA)		07	00188		GS	C	872008000KC	QYDP	1	1			
062D	03	REC AID		05	00189		GS	C	872008000KC	QYDP	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	2			
063	00	WOU828 MILPER	FM												
063	01	S/MIL PERS SP		09	00205		GS	C	202096GDPBD	QPSG	1	1			XW
063	02	SR MRTY AFF NCO		E7	57F4L	LA	NC	I	202096GDPTZ	QPSG	1	1			RE
063	03	PSNCO		E7	7524L	LA	NC	I	202096GDPTC	QPSG	1	1			XW RE
063	04	MORTRY AFF SP		E4	57F10	LA		I	202096GDPTZ	QPSG	2	1			RD
063	05	MORT AFF TECH		06	00303		GS	C	202096GDPTZ	QPSG	1	1			XW
063	06	MILPER CLK (T)		05	00204		GS	C	202096GDPUE	QPSG	2	2			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	7			
064	00	WOU828 RET SVC	FM												
064	01	S/CONTACT REP		09	00962		GS	C	202096GDPUN	QPSG	1	1			XW
064	02	CONTACT REP		07	00962		GS	C	202096GDPUN	QPSG	2	1			XW
064	03	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096GDADM	QPSG	1	1			XW
064	04	MIL PERS CLK		04	00204		GS	C	202096GDPUE	QPSG	2	2			XW
064	05	RATION CD CLK		03	00303		GS	C	202096GDPUF	QPSG	3	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									9	6			
066	00	WOU828 PMO	FM												
066	01	PM		04	31A00			K	202096TATFF	QPMA	1	1			11 XW
066	02	PROVOST SGT		E7	95B40		NC	I	202096TATFF	QPMA	1	1			XA VV
066	03	SECY (OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096TATFF	QPMA	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	3			
066A	00	WOU828 OPS	FM												
066A	01	S/POLICE OFF		10	00083		GS	C	202096TATFE	QPMA	1	1			11 XW
066A	02	OPNS SGT		E7	95B40	LA	NC	I	202096TATFE	QPMA	1	1			XA VV
066A	03	MP		E4	95B10			I	202096TATFE	QPMA	1	1			XA
066A	04	SECY (OA)		04	00318		GS	C	202096TATFE	QPMA	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	4			
066B	00	WOU828 PATROL	FM												
066B	01	SECTION SGT		E7	95B40		NC	I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	1	1			XA

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
066B	02	SQD LDR		E6	95B3L	LA	NC	I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	4	2			TF
066B	03	SQD LDR		E6	95B30		NC	I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	2	2			XA
066B	04	ASST SQD LDR		E5	95B20		NC	I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	14	10			XA
066B	05	MP		E4	95B1L	LA		I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	7	7			TF XW
066B	06	MP		E4	95B10			I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	7	7			XA
066B	07	MP		E3	95B1L	LA		I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	9	8			TF VV
066B	08	MP		E3	95B10			I	202096TBTFC	QPMA	13	10			XA
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									57	47			
066C	00	WOU828 LIAISON	FM												
066C	01	LIAISON NCO		E5	95B2L	LA	NC	I	202096TBTGA	QPMA	1	1			TB VV
066C	02	MP		E4	95B1L	LA		I	202096TBTGA	QPMA	1	1			TF
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	2			
066D	00	WOU828 TRAFFIC PTL	FM												
066D	01	TFC NCO INV		E5	95B2L	Q9 LA	NC	I	202096TCTFD	QPMA	2	2			TB XW
066D	02	TFC ACCDT INV		E4	95B10	Q9		I	202096TCTFD	QPMA	3	2			XA
066D	03	CLERK TYPIST		O4	00322		GS	C	202096TCTJB	QPMA	1	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	4			
066E	00	WOU828 PHYSICAL SEC	FM												
066E	01	PHY SEC SP		O9	00080		GS	C	202096THTJB	QPMA	1	1			11 XW
066E	02	PHY SEC INSP		E6	95B30	H3	NC	I	202096THTJB	QPMA	1	1			XA
066E	03	CRIME PVNT NCO		E6	95B30	V5	NC	I	202096THTJB	QPMA	1	0			XB
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	2			
066F	00	WOU828 DESK OPS	FM												
066F	01	DESK SGT		E6	95B3L	LA	NC	I	202096TBTFH	QPMA	6	4			TF
066F	02	RADIO/USIIDS		E3	95B10			I	202096TBTFH	QPMA	2	0			XW
066F	03	RADIO/USIIDS		E3	95B10			I	202096TBTFH	QPMA	2	2			UV XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									10	6			
066G	00	WOU828 MPI	FM												
066G	01	MP INVES SUPV		E6	95B3L	V5 LA	NC	I	202096TFTBD	QPMA	1	1			TB
066G	02	MP INVES		E5	95B2L	V5 LA	NC	I	202096TFTBD	QPMA	2	2			TB XW
066G	03	MP INVES		E4	95B10	V5		I	202096TFTBD	QPMA	2	2			11 XW
066G	04	MP INVES		E4	95B1L	V5 LA		I	202096TFTBD	QPMA	1	1			TB XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	6			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
066H	00	WOU828 MIL WORKING D	FM												
066H	01	KENNELMASTER		E7	95B40	A9	NC	I	202096TBTFB	QPMA	1	1			XA
066H	02	D/DOG HNDLR(E)		E6	95B30	Z6	NC	I	202096TBTFB	QPMA	2	2			XA
066H	03	D/DOG HNDLR(N)		E5	95B20	Z6	NC	I	202096TBTFB	QPMA	2	2			XA
066H	04	PTL DOG HDLR		E4	95B10	A9		I	202096TBTFB	QPMA	4	3			XA
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									9	8			
066I	00	WOU828 ADMIN	FM												
066I	01	ADMIN ASST		07	00303		GS	C	202096TFTFA	QPMA	1	1			XW
066I	02	SECY TYP		05	00318		GS	C	202096TFTFA	QPMA	1	0			XW
066I	03	VEH REG CLK		04	00303		GS	C	202096TFTFA	QPMA	3	1			XW
066I	04	CLK TYPIST		03	00322		GS	C	202096TFTFA	QPMA	2	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									7	2			
068	00	WOU828 DPTMS	FM												
068	01	DPTMSEC		04	54A00			K	202096NBYAX	QPTM	1	1			UX
068	02	DPN NCO		E7	11B40		NC	I	20209211YAX	VSCW	1	1			NC
068	03	INTEL SGT		E7	96B40	LA	NC	I	202096TDIGZ	QSEC	1	1			XW
068	04	SR TEST CONNCO		E7	75Z4L	LA	NC	I	20209211YAX	VSCW	1	1			
068	05	MOB PLNS/OFF		12	00301		GS	C	20209211YAX	VSCW	1	1			
068	06	SECURITY SP		11	00080		GS	C	202096TDIPZ	QSEC	1	1			
068	07	MIL TNG SP		07	00204		GS	C	20209211YAX	VSCW	1	0			
068	08	SECY (STENO/OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096NBIRZ	QPTM	1	1			
068	09	SECY (OA)		04	00318		GS	C	20209211YAL	VSCW	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									9	8			
068A	00	WOU828 CTR TER	FM												
068A	01	S/SECURITY SP		11	00080		GS	C	202096TDILA	QSEC	1	0			
068A	02	OPNS SGT		E7	96B40		NC	I	202096TDILA	QSEC	1	1			
068A	03	PHYS SCTY INSP		E6	95B30	H3	NC	I	202096TDILA	QSEC	1	0			
068A	04	RADIO OP/JSIID		E3	71L10			I	202096TDILA	QSEC	1	1			
068A	05	SCTY SP		10	00080		GS	C	202096TDILA	QSEC	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	3			
069	00	WOU828 AVIATION	FM												
069	01	PILOT		03	15B00	B1		K	20209210XEB	VSCW	1	1			
069	02	PILOT INSTR RW		W4	153BF		SW	P	20209210XEB	VSCW	1	1			
069	03	UTIL HEL TI		E6	67N30		NC	I	20209210LNF	VSCW	1	1			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
069	04	U/HEL CREW CH		E5	67N2F		NC	I	20209210LNG	VSCW	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	4			
070	00	WOU828 TASC	FM												
070	01	S/AV INFO OFF		11	01001		GS	C	20809010DFA	MU1M	1	1			
070	02	VIS INFO CLK		06	00303		GS	C	20809010DFA	MU1M	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	2			
070A	00	WOU828 PROD BR	FM												
070A	01	VIS INFO SP		11	01084		GS	C	20809020DFF	MU1M	1	1			
070A	02	AV INFO SP		09	01001		GS	C	20809020DFD	MU1M	1	1			
070A	03	PHOTO (STILL)		07	01060		GS	C	20809020DFB	MU1M	2	1			
070A	04	VIS INFO SP		07	01084		GS	C	20809020DFF	MU1M	1	1			
070A	05	PHOTO (STILL)		05	01060		GS	C	20809020DFB	MU1M	1	1			
070A	06	TV PROD SP		05	01071		GS	C	20809020DFC	MU1M	1	1			
070A	07	MODEL MAKER		10	04714		WG	C	20809020DFE	MU1M	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	7			
070B	00	WOU828 SVCS BR	FM												
070B	01	TNG AIDS/AV MGR		09	01001		GS	C	20809030DFF	MU1M	1	1			
070B	02	SUPPLY CLERK		05	02005		GS	C	20809030DFF	MU1M	1	1			
070B	03	SUPPLY CLERK		04	02005		GS	C	20809030DFF	MU1M	1	1			
070B	04	ELECT MECH		10	02604		WG	C	20809030DFF	MU1M	2	2			
070B	05	WHSMN		05	06907		WG	C	20809030DFF	MU1M	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	5			
070C	00	WOU828 MILES	FM												
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									0	0			
071	00	WOU828 DOL	FM												
071	01	DOL		04	90A00	6Y		K	202096BDYAS	QSUP	1	0			
071	02	S/LOG MGT SP		11	00346		GS	C	202096BDYAS	QSUP	1	1			
071	03	LOG MGT SP		09	00346		GS	C	202096BDYAS	QSUP	2	2			
071	04	MAINT COORD		07	01601		GS	C	202096CFYAS	QMNT	1	1			
071	05	SECY (STENO/OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096BDYAS	QSUP	1	1			
071	06	WORK ORDER CLK		04	00303		GS	C	202096CFYAS	QMNT	1	0			
071	07	CLK STENO		04	00312		GS	C	202096BDYAS	QSUP	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	6			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
071A	00	WOU828 FOOD SVC	FM												
071A	01	FOOD SVC SP		07	00301		GS	C	202096FCKFB	QFOD	1	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									1	0			
072	00	WOU828 TRANS DIV	FM												
072	01	TRAFFIC MGR		11	02130		GS	C	202096DBKRA	QTRN	1	1			XW
072	02	SECY (STENO/OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096DBADE	QTRN	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	2			
072A	00	WOU828 MOVEMENTS	FM												
072A	01	S/TRANS SP		08	02101		GS	C	202096DBKRB	QTRN	1	1			XW
072A	02	PACKING INSP		07	00303		GS	C	202096DBKSC	QTRN	1	0			
072A	03	PASS/FRT SP		07	02102		GS	C	202096DBKRC	QTRN	2	1			XW
072A	04	TRAVEL CLK (OA)		06	02132		GS	C	202096DBKVA	QTRN	1	1			XW
072A	05	TRAVEL CLK (OA)		05	02132		GS	C	202096DBKVA	QTRN	3	1			XW
072A	06	SHIPMENT CLERK		05	02134		GS	C	202096DBKSB	QTRN	2	2			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									10	6			
072B	00	WOU828 MOTOR POOL	FM												
072B	01	MTR VEH DP FMN		06	05703		WS	C	202096DALBA	QTRN	1	1			XW
072B	02	LT VEH DVR		E4	88M10			I	202096DALBD	QTRN	1	1			XW
072B	03	MTR VEH DISP		04	02151		GS	C	202096DALBC	QTRN	1	1			XW
072B	04	MTR VEH OP		08	05703		WG	C	202096DALBC	QTRN	2	2			XW
072B	05	MTR VEH OP		07	05703		WG	C	202096DALBD	QTRN	2	2			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									7	7			
073	00	WOU828 SUPPLY	FM												
073	01	SUP MGT OFF		09	02003		GS	C	202096BCMCB	QSUP	1	1			XW
073	02	GEN SUP SPEC		09	02001		GS	C	202096BCADD	QSUP	1	1			XW
073	03	S/SUP TECH		07	02005		GS	C	202096BCADD	QSUP	1	1			XW
073	04	SUP CLK (OA)		05	02005		GS	C	202096BCNQB	QSUP	2	1			XW
073	05	SUPPLY CLK		05	02005		GS	C	202096BCNQB	QSUP	1	1			XW
073	06	MOTOR VEH OP		06	05703		WG	C	202096BCNQB	QSUP	1	0			XW
073	07	MATL HANDLER		06	06907		WG	C	202096BCMPB	QSUP	4	2			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									11	7			
073A	00	WOU828 TISA	FM												

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
073A	01	S/SUP TECH		09	02001		GS	C	72289210KHA	VTSS	1	1			XW
073A	02	ACCT TECH		05	00525		GS	C	72289210KHA	VTSS	1	1			XW
073A	03	SUP CLK		04	02005		GS	C	72289210KHA	VTSS	2	2			XW
073A	04	SUP CLK (OA)		03	02005		GS	C	72289210KHA	VTSS	2	2			XW
073A	05	MATL HANDLER		06	06907		WG	C	72289220KHA	VTSS	6	4			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									12	10			
075	00	WOU828 DEH	FM												
075	01	DEH		04	21D00	6Y		K	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	0			
075	02	S/GEN ENGR		13	00801		GM	C	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	1			
075	03	ENVIR PROT SP		11	00028		GS	C	20205690JFA	VENC	2	1			
075	04	OPNS OFF		11	00303		GS	C	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	0			
075	05	SECY (STENO/OA)		06	00318		GS	C	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	1			
075	06	OFF SV ASST(OA)		05	00303		GS	C	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	1			
075	07	CLK TYP		03	00322		GS	C	202096M4JAA	QDEH	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	4			
077	00	WOU828 EP & S	FM												
077	01	S/GEN ENGR		12	00801		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	1			
077	02	INTERDISP ENGR		11	00801		GS	C	202096M4JDD	QDEH	1	1			
077	03	REALTY TECH		07	00303		GS	C	202096M4JCC	QDEH	1	0			
077	04	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	1			
077	05	DATA TRANS		03	00356		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	3			
077A	00	WOU828 ENGR SVC	FM												
077A	01	S/MECH ENGR		12	00830		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	1	1			
077A	02	ARCHITECT		11	00808		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	1	1			
077A	03	CIVIL ENGR		11	00810		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	3	1			
077A	04	MECH ENGR		11	00830		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	1	1			
077A	05	ELEC ENGR		11	00850		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	1	1			
077A	06	ENGR DRAFTSMN		06	00818		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	3	2			
077A	07	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096M4JDB	QDEH	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									11	8			
077B	00	WOU828 INSP	FM												
077B	01	S/CIVIL ENGR		11	00810		GS	C	202096M4JDC	QDEH	1	1			
077B	02	CONSTR INSP		08	00809		GS	C	202096M4JDC	QDEH	3	3			
077B	03	CONSTR INSP		07	00303		GS	C	202096M4JDC	QDEH	1	1			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
077B	04	CUSTODIAL INSP		08	03601		WG	C	202096M4JDC	QDEH	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	5			
078	00	WOU828 SUPPLY	FM												
078	01	SUP MGT OFF		11	02003		GS	C	202096M7MEA	QDEH	1	1			XW
078	02	ACCT TECH		05	00525		GS	C	202096M7NFA	QDEH	2	1			XW
078	03	PURCH AGT		05	01105		GS	C	202096M7NFA	QDEH	1	1			XW
078	04	PURCH AGT (OA)		05	01105		GS	C	202096M7NFA	QDEH	1	0			XW
078	05	TOOL/PARTS ATT		06	06904		WG	C	202096M7MPB	QDEH	1	1			XW
078	06	MATL HAND (FLO)		06	06907		WG	C	202096M7MPB	QDEH	1	1			XW
078	07	MATL HAND (FLO)		05	06907		WG	C	202096M7MPB	QDEH	1	0			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	5			
079	00	WOU828 O&M DIV	FM												
079	01	S/GEN ENGR		12	00801		GS	C	202096M4JGA	QDEH	1	1			
079	02	UTIL CLK (OA)		05	00303		GS	C	202096M4JGA	QDEH	1	1			
079	03	SECY (OA)		05	00318		GS	C	202096M4JGA	QDEH	1	1			
079	04	ENGR TECH		05	00802		GS	C	202096M4JGA	QDEH	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	3			
079A	00	WOU828 B&G	FM												
079A	01	MAINT MECH FMN		10	04701		WS	C	202078KOJHA	QRPA	1	1			
079A	02	MASON		10	03603		WG	C	202078KOJHB	QRPA	2	2			
079A	03	PAINTER		09	04102		WG	C	202078KOJHD	QRPA	2	2			
079A	04	CARPENTER		09	04607		WG	C	202078KOJHA	QRPA	6	6			
079A	05	CPTR WKR		07	04607		WG	C	202078KOJHA	QRPA	3	1			
079A	06	PAINTER HELPER		05	04102		WG	C	202078KOJHD	QRPA	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									15	13			
079B	00	WOU828 ROADS & GROUN	FM												
079B	01	ROAD MAINT FMN		10	04701		WS	C	202078KOJHK	QRPA	1	1			
079B	02	MGT AGRON		09	00471		GS	C	202078KOJHL	QRPA	1	0			
079B	03	LABORER LDR		03	03502		WL	C	202078KOJHK	QRPA	1	1			
079B	04	PEST CON		10	05026		WG	C	202096M2JHR	QDEH	1	1			
079B	05	ENGR EQ OPR		10	05716		WG	C	202078KOJHK	QRPA	3	2			
079B	06	PEST CON		09	05026		WG	C	202096M2JHR	QDEH	2	0			
079B	07	TRACTOR OPR		06	05705		WG	C	202078KOJHK	QRPA	4	4			
079B	08	LABORER		03	03502		WG	C	202078KOJHK	QRPA	11	11			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									24	20			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
079C	00	WOU828 PM	FM												
079C	01	MNT MECH LDR		07	04749		WL	C	202078KOJHE	QRPA	1	1			
079C	02	MAINT MECH		09	04749		WG	C	202078KOJHE	QRPA	5	5			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	6			
079D	00	WOU828 ORG MT	FM												
079D	01	HME MECH		10	05803		WG	C	202096M7JHG	QDEH	1	1			
079D	02	HME RPR		08	05803		WG	C	202096M7JHG	QDEH	2	2			
079D	03	MAT EQUIP CLK		04	00303		GS	C	202096M7JHG	QDEH	1	0			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	3			
079E	00	WOU828 MECH	FM												
079E	01	AC EQ FMN		09	05306		WS	C	202078KOJJB	QRPA	1	1			
079E	02	S/MECH ENGR		11	00830		GS	C	202078KOJJB	QRPA	1	0			
079E	03	AC EQUIP MECH		10	05306		WG	C	202078KOJJB	QRPA	6	5			
079E	04	PLUMBER		09	04206		WG	C	202078KOJJF	QRPA	4	4			
079E	05	PLUMBER WKR		07	04206		WG	C	202078KOJJF	QRPA	2	1			
079E	06	AC EQ HELPER		05	05306		WG	C	202078KOJJB	QRPA	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									15	12			
079F	00	WOU828 ELEC	FM												
079F	01	ELEC FMN		09	02805		WS	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	1	1			
079F	02	ELEC		10	02805		WG	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	5	5			
079F	03	ELEC (HV)		10	02810		WG	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	2	2			
079F	04	ELEC WKR HV		08	02810		WG	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	2	0			
079F	05	ELEC HLPR		05	02805		WG	C	202078KOJJJ	QRPA	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									11	9			
080	00	WOU828 FIRE	FM												
080	01	FIRE CHIEF		09	00081		GS	C	202096M1JMD	QDEH	1	1			XW
080	02	LEAD FIREFGTR		07	00081		GS	C	202096M1JMA	QDEH	2	2			XW
080	03	FR PRT INSP AST		07	00081		GS	C	202096M1JNA	QDEH	1	1			XW
080	04	ALARM RM OP		07	00081		GS	C	202096M1JMA	QDEH	2	1			XW
080	05	FIREFIGHTER		06	00081		GS	C	202096M1JMA	QDEH	7	6			XW
080	06	FIREFIGHTER		05	00081		GS	C	202096M1JMA	QDEH	2	2			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									15	13			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
081	00	WOUB28 ERMD	FM												
081	01	S/IND ENGR		11	00896		GS	C	202096M4JCE	QDEH	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									1	1			
081A	00	WOU828 WORK REC	FM												
081A	01	FAC MGT ASST		07	00303		GS	C	202096M4JCA	QDEH	1	1			
081A	02	WO CLERK		04	00303		GS	C	202096M4JCA	QDEH	2	2			
081A	03	MATL EXPED		07	06910		WG	C	202096M4JCA	QDEH	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	4			
081B	00	WOU828 EST	FM												
081B	01	PROD CON		09	01152		GS	C	202096M4JCB	QDEH	2	2			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									2	2			
081C	00	WOU828 MESB	FM												
081C	01	IND ENGR		11	00896		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	1			
081C	02	ENGR TECH		07	00802		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	0			
081C	03	MGT ASST		05	00344		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	1			
081C	04	SECY (OA)		04	00318		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	0			
081C	05	DATA TRANS (OA)		04	00356		GS	C	202096M4JDA	QDEH	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									5	3			
082	00	WOU828 HSG	FM												
082	01	HSG MGR		09	01173		GS	C	202096HBJEB	QUPH	1	1			XW
082	02	HSG MGT ASST		07	01173		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	1			XW
082	03	S/SUP TECH		06	02005		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	1			XW
082	04	FAM HSG INSP		05	00303		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	1			XW
082	05	HSG MGT CLK(OA)		05	00305		GS	C	202096HBJEB	QUPH	1	1			XW
082	06	SUPPLY CLK		05	02005		GS	C	202096HBJEZ	QUPH	1	1			XW
082	07	SUP CLK (OA)		04	02005		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	1			XW
082	08	HSG CLK (T)		03	00322		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	0			XW
082	09	CLK TYP		03	00322		GS	C	19100000JEC	E32H	1	1			XW
082	10	MATERIALS HAND		06	06907		WG	C	202096HBJED	QUPH	1	1			XW
082	11	LABORER		02	03502		WG	C	202096HBJED	QUPH	1	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									11	10			
083	00	WOU828 DOIM	FM												
083	01	DIRECTOR		13	00301		GM	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			

PARA	LINE	DESCRIPTION	ITAADS CD	GR	MOS	ASI/LIC	BR	ID	AMSC	MDEP	STRENGTH REQ	STRENGTH AUTH	NET CHANGE REQ	NET CHANGE AUTH	RMKS
083	02	SECY STENO (OA)		06	00318		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			
083	03	CLK TYPIST		04	00322		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			TR
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									3	3			
083A	00	WOU828 OPS & SYS INT	FM												
083A	01	S/INFO MGT SP		12	00301		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									1	1			
083B	00	WOU828 TELECOM BRANC	FM												
083B	01	COMM SPEC		06	00392		GS	C	20809500DMA	MXFC	1	1			XW
083B	02	RDO OPR		05	00389		GS	C	20861100DMA	MXFC	1	1			
083B	03	COMM EQUIP OP		05	00392		GS	C	20809500DMA	MXFC	2	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	3			
083C	00	WOU828 AUTOMATION BR	FM												
083C	01	INFO SYS SUPV		E7	74D40		NC	I	202096PODNC	MXFC	1	1			XW
083C	02	COMPT PROG		09	00334		GS	C	202096PODNC	MXFC	1	1			XW
083C	03	COMPT PROG		07	00334		GS	C	202096PODNC	MXFC	1	0			XW
083C	04	COMPT OPR		07	00332		GS	C	202096PODNC	MXFC	1	0			XW
083C	05	COMPT OPR		05	00332		GS	C	202096PODNC	MXFC	2	1			XW
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									6	3			
083D	00	WOU828 ADMIN SVCS BR	FM												
083D	01	SPT SVC SUPV		09	00342		GS	C	202096YOADB	MXFC	1	1			
083D	02	MAIL CLK		05	00305		GS	C	202096YOADB	MXFC	2	1			TR
083D	03	DUP MACH OP (R)		04	00350		GS	C	202096YOADB	MXFC	2	1			
083D	04	SUP CLK (R)		04	02005		GS	C	202096YOADB	MXFC	1	1			
083D	05	MAIL CLK		03	00305		GS	C	202096YOADB	MXFC	2	1			TR
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									8	5			
083E	00	WOU828 LOG SUPPORT D	FM												
083E	01	S/COMM MGT SP		09	00391		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			ZZ
083E	02	ELEC TECH		09	00856		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	2	1			TR
083E	03	CLK TYP		03	00322		GS	C	20861100DGA	MXFC	1	1			
		PARAGRAPH TOTAL									4	3			
084	00	MACOM RESOURCES	FM												

GRAND TOTAL 515 398

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER STATUS
TDA 2095/950416
AS OF 28 FEB 95

DIRECTORATE/ACCT		MILITARY REQ O-E		MILITARY AUTH O-E		MILITARY ACT O-E		CIVILIAN REQ	CIVILIAN AUTH	CIVILIAN CORE	CIVILIAN PERM	CIVILIAN TEMP	CIVILIAN TOTAL	CIVILIAN VAC	CIVILIAN OVER CORE
--BA11--															
COMMAND GP	NA	2 -	1	2 -	1	2 -	1	4	4	3	3		3		
IG	NB	1 -	2	1 -	2	1 -	2	1	1	1	1		1		
SJA	NB	2 -	0	2 -	0	2 -	0	6	5	4	4		4		
PAO	NB							6	4	2	2		2		
CHAPLAIN	NB	2 -	2	2 -	2	2 -	1	1	1	1	1		1		
SAFETY	NB							2	1	1	1		1		
HQCO	NA	1 -	4	1 -	4	0 -	5	1	1	0	0		0		
DIN FAC	F							10	10	10	10	1	11 *	1	
DRM	U							16	15	14	13		13	1	
	H							2	2	2	0		0	2	
PMO	T	1 -	94	1 -	76	1 -	89 **	12	5	3	3		3		
DPCA	G	0 -	6	0 -	5	0 -	6	16	13	10	10		10		
	S							32	15	6	5		5	1	
YOUTH SVCS	117708							3	2	0	0		0		
CHILD CARE	117719							10	10	7	6		6	1	
ACS	117720							7	4	4	4		4		
DPTMS															
ADM/SEC/MOB	N/T	1 -	3	1 -	3	2 -	3	5	3	3	3		3		
TSC	X101							16	14	14	14		14		
TCAT	X103	0 -	3	0 -	1	1 -	2	2	2	0	0		0		
AVN	V218	2 -	2	2 -	2	2 -	2	0	0	0	0		0		
DOL	B/F	1 -	0	0 -	0	1 -	0	17	12	12	9		9	3	
	C	0 -	0	0 -	0	0 -	0	2	1	1	1		1		
	D	0 -	1	0 -	1	0 -	0	18	16	14	13		13	1	
DPW	M/J	1 -	0	0 -	0	1 -	0	73	57	61	55	7	62	3	4
	K							68	57	48	44	19	63	2	17
	H							3	2	2	2		2		
	ENVIRON.							2	1	2	2		2		
DOIM															
INFO MGT/LOG	X117							8	6	5	4		4	1	
BASE COMMO	X118							4	4	2	2		2		
AUTOMATION	P	0 -	1	0 -	1	0 -	1	6	5	3	3		3		
ADMIN SVCS	Y							8	3	4	3		3	1	
-TOTAL BA11-		14 -	119	12 -	98	15 -	112	361	276	239	218	27	245	17	21

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER STATUS
TDA 2095/950416
AS OF 28 FEB 95

DIRECTORATE/ACCT		MILITARY REQ O-E	MILITARY AUTH O-E	MILITARY ACT O-E	CIVILIAN REQ	CIVILIAN AUTH	CIVILIAN CORE	CIVILIAN PERM	CIVILIAN TEMP	CIVILIAN TOTAL	CIVILIAN VAC	CIVILIAN OVER CORE
--OTHER PROGRAMS--												
FAMILY HSG (R)	191000	0 - 0	0 - 0	0 - 2	8	6	6	5		5	1	
TISA	423892				12	10	9	10 ***		10		1
AFAP/OSD	101000				0	0	1	1	1	2		1
EDUCATION	333733				3	2	2	2		2		
TOTAL OTHER PROGRAMS					23	18	18	18	1	19	1	2
--GRAND TOTAL--		14 - 119	12 - 98	15 - 112	384	294	257	236	28	264	18	23

REMARKS:

* HQ CO Includes:
1I CIV +1 VAC = 10.5 Manyears IAW MEO

** PMO Includes:
3 ENL at Cmd Gp
2 ENL at HQ CO
2 ENL at CID
1 ENL at CARICOM

*** TISA Includes:
1 CIV Funded by AFMIS
(Not part of core)

NEWS RELEASE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE

No. 095-95
(703)695-0192(media)
(703)697-3189(copies)
(703)697-5737(public/industry)

IMMEDIATE RELEASE February 28, 1995

SECRETARY PERRY RECOMMENDS CLOSING, REALIGNING 146 BASES

Secretary of Defense William Perry today announced the Department's recommendations to close or realign 146 military installations in the United States. The recommendations are being forwarded to the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

"These recommendations, though painful, are necessary to achieve the levels of readiness and modernization we need within the budget we have," said Secretary Perry. "Our armed forces and our budget have been cut by one-third or more, but our infrastructure only about half that. Today's recommendations will save the taxpayers and the Department some $18 billion over the next two decades."

The Secretary's recommendations were developed by each of the military services in accordance with the strict procedures laid down by the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Each base was evaluated using a set of published criteria, giving priority first to the military value of the facility, and then to the savings and the economic and other effects that the closure would have. The evaluation data is certified for accuracy by each Service, and then reviewed by both the Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the General Accounting Office.

During a press conference at the Pentagon, Perry said that both he and General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had approved the recommendations made by the military departments without exception. "These actions are necessary so that we can carefully shape our armed forces to support the National Military Strategy and the Bottom Up Review," the Secretary explained.

The BRAC 95 recommendations will cost less than the BRAC 95 round ($3.8 billion vs. $6.9 billion) and will generate savings more quickly. Over the six-year implementation period prescribed by law, the closures and realignments are expected to generate net savings of approximately $4 billion. Recurring savings thereafter are expected to reach $1.8 billion per year. Total savings over 20 years, discounted to present value, are estimated to be $18 billion.

-MORE-

INTERNET AVAILABILITY: This document is available on DefenseLINK, a World Wide Web Server on the Internet, at http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/

Encl 3

Perry also announced that he will recommend that the current BRAC authority be extended to permit another base closure round in three or four years. "We need time to absorb the closure of over a hundred major bases," the Secretary said, "but we are continuing to refine our force structure and our mission. Each service has told me that, ultimately, they can do more."

While some of these actions will have significant economic impact upon local communities, Perry said that he did not remove any Service recommendations for this reason. However, he pledged to continue and expand the Department's efforts to encourage recovery and reuse. Department of Defense assistance programs include personnel transition and job training assistance, local reuse planning grants, on-site transition coordinators, accelerated property disposal, and faster environmental cleanup that supports reuse needs.

"These installations offer an opportunity for communities to diversify and reshape their economic futures. We have already seen impressive redevelopment successes in such diverse communities as Sacramento, Calif.; Alexandria, La.; and Rantoul, Ill. They prove that new jobs can be created to replace those that are lost. There is no doubt that it takes strong local leadership and a lot of hard work., but the President has committed us to help, and we will," Secretary Perry said.

Attached are summaries of the impacts of each BRAC action, listed by state.

-END-

Fort Buchanan, PR

1. **Recommendation:** Realign Fort Buchanan by reducing garrison management functions and disposing of family housing. Retain an enclave for the reserve components, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School.

2. **Justification:** Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, provides administrative, logistical and mobilization support to Army units and activities in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region. Tenants include a U.S. Army Reserve headquarters, AAFES and a DoD-operated school complex. Although the post is managed by an active component garrison, it supports relatively few active component tenants. The family housing will close. The activities providing area support will relocate to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base and other sites. The Army intends to license buildings to the Army National Guard, that they currently occupy.

3. **Return on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is $7[illegible] million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $50 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $10 million with a return on investment expected in 7 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $45 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 289 jobs (182 direct jobs and 107 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Juan, PR area which represents 0.4 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

Part II: Major Base Realignments

Army

Fort Greely, Alaska
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Sierra Army Depot, California
Fort Meade, Maryland
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Hamilton, New York
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Air Force

McClellan Air Force Base, California
Onizuka Air Station, California
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

Ms. Dennise M. Nieves
Management Analyst
United States Adjutant General Fort Buchanan
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico 00934

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-2R1

Dear Ms. Nieves:

Thank you for your letter regarding Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Fort Buchanan.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cmc

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-3

FROM: PIRIE, ROBERT B.	TO: HORN, STEPHEN
TITLE: ASST SEC. OF THE NAVY	TITLE: REP (CA)
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE NAVY	ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONSE TO LETTER REGARDING THE FLOATING DRYDOCK AFOB-8 BEING MOVED TO SAN DIEGO.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950314	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MAR 14 1995

The Honorable Stephen Horn
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0538

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-3

Dear Mr. Horn:

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When comparing costs of homeporting CVNs at San Diego or Long Beach, drydock construction or relocation should not be included. The Navy does not plan to relocate the MACHINIST to San Diego, or build an additional drydock there to support CVNs. A feasibility study to evaluate possible drydocking alternatives was completed in September 1994. We concluded that relocating the MACHINIST to San Diego was not economically viable.

The Navy, now and in the foreseeable future, will only have five aircraft carriers homeported on the west coast. Therefore, we do not require additional west coast aircraft carrier homeport capacity than that already planned or established. Building additional infrastructure at Long Beach to support the homeporting of a CVN would create excess naval station capacity that the Navy cannot afford to operate and maintain. Homeporting at Long Beach would also cause the Navy to lose "economy of scale" savings realized by homeporting and operating aircraft carriers from a large fleet concentration like San Diego.

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At the request of the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Navy recently completed planning level estimates for several hypothetical CVN homeporting alternatives at Long Beach and North Island. Homeporting three CVNs at Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island is the most economical alternative. The other alternatives, which considered from one to three CVNs at Long Beach, exceeded the NAS North Island costs by approximately $160 million to $280 million depending on the alternative. The final estimates and report of findings will be forwarded to the GAO shortly.

Although I understand your interest in homeporting CVNs at Long Beach, the current Navy plan to homeport CVNs in San Diego is in the best interest of the Navy. This plan saves significant additional infrastructure costs, prevents the creation of excess naval station capacity, avoids the loss of BRAC savings, avoids impacts on personnel readiness due to reduced availability of quality of life related infrastructure, and prevents significant disruption of ship deployment and maintenance schedules.

I will be responding to the additional questions you asked in your letter of January 26, 1995 in the near future. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR.

BCC
BCRC

STEPHEN HORN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

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(310) 425-1336

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0538

COMMITTEE:
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SUBCOMMITTEES:
INFORMATION, JUSTICE, TRANSPORTATION AND AGRICULTURE
COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND MONETARY AFFAIRS

December 28, 1994

personal

The Honorable Robert B. Pirie
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Installations and Environment
1000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On, December 21, 1994, I wrote you regarding a floating drydock, AFDB-8, the MACHINIST, to ask why the Navy would consider assigning it to San Diego when a larger capacity, graving dock, DD#1, already exists at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

Since then, new information has reached me which provides a reason to believe that the costs are expected to exceed $60 million for transportation, site preparation and overhaul of the MACHINIST. Expenditures will be necessary to:

1. Extend the length of the pier currently occupied by AFDM-14, STEADFAST;

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3. Upgrade and extend utilities (primarily electrical, but all other utilities as well) along the length of the pier.

I find such projections and required upgrades of great concern, since:

1. The MACHINIST, a floating dry dock, still cannot replace DD#1, a graving dock, for those critical repairs and alignments requiring a stationary environment; and

2. After the expenses associated with relocating and upgrading the MACHINIST and its new San Diego site, the Navy will still require DD#1 for CV/CVN readiness.

Clearly, the close proximity of DD#1 does not warrant appropriations to move and position the MACHINIST in San Diego. It would seem more appropriate to improve Long Beach Naval Shipyard's Pier E as a CV/CVN Homeport. To that end, I have obtained reliable estimates of $23.4 million for necessary improvements and dredging, considerably less than the $742.1 million estimated for dredging and wharf improvements to accommodate CV/CVN vessels at San Diego's North Island.

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5L002011

Such utilization of existing and modern facilities at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard would further negate need for the MACHINIST. If the transportation, site preparation, and overhaul of the MACHINIST is to cost an added $60 million in addition to the $742.1 million already estimated without a 20% contingency budget I would think that an $800 million to $1 billion cost for this luxury would bother some in the Navy in these tight budget times. I would hope that the budget experts would find such an expenditure in San Diego totally duplicative and unnecessary. If the Navy does not, I would think Congress will.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely Yours,

Stephen Horn

STEPHEN HORN
Member of Congress

ATTACHMENT A

COST COMPARISON of HOMEPORTING CV/CVNs at SAN DIEGO and LONG BEACH

	San Diego	Long Beach
DREDGING- one time	$251.5 mil [1]	$14 mil [2]
DREDGING- annual	$? [3]	$0 [4]
MILCON	$155.6 mil [5]	$5.5 mil [2]
DRYDOCK CONSTRUCTION	$335.0 mil [6]	$0 [7]
CONTINGENCIES (@20%)		$3.9 mil
TOTAL	$742.1 mil	$23.4 mil

1. Per Navy as reported to California Coastal Commission
2. Lee & Ro 1994 report.
3. $ unknown
4. Dredging by Port of Long Beach at no charge to the Navy.
5. Per FY96 and FY97 Defense Appropriation Budgets
6. Per 1979 engineering study done by the Navy on constructing a 4th drydock at Long Beach. Dollars were inflated to 1994 dollars.
7. No drydock construction necessary at Long Beach.

We hope the information presented in this addendum to the 1985 CV/CVN Homeporting Concept Study is of value to SOS in its continuing efforts on behalf of the LBNSY and the surrounding communities. We appreciate having the opportunity to provide our services to your organization. If you should have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

LEE & RO Consulting Engineers, Inc.

M. Steve Ro, P.E.
President

Attachment

MSR:KC:es

ATTACHMENT A
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF UPDATED COST DATA
FOR CVN HOMEPORTING AT LBNSY PIER E

I. Capital Costs-Primary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost
Utility Improvements:	
Potable Water	$450,000
TV Antenna	40,000
Telephone	75,000
Electricity	2,500,000
Berthing Improvements:	
Dredging	$14,000,000

II. Capital Costs-Secondary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost
Ind. Support Improvements:	
Supply Storage Bldg.	$1,110,000
SFOMS Operations Bldg.	$1,200,000
Safety Improvements:	
Fire Fighting Apparatus	$125,000

III. Total Capital Costs

Primary Facilities	$17,065,000
Secondary Facilities	$2,435,000
Subtotal	$19,500,000
Contingencies (@20%)	$3,900,000
Total Capital Cost =	**$23,400,000**

IV. Annual Costs **

Item Description	Item Cost
Personnel Support:	
Vehicle Rental	$25,000
Nuclear Support:	
Grade "A" Pure Water	$48,000
Radioactive Waste Processing	$180,000
Nitrogen Gas	$96,000
Total Annual Costs =	**$349,000**

** Annual costs are based on homeporting one CVN for 6 months per year



Long Beach Naval Complex
Surrounding Military Facilities

Figure 2-3

WEST COAST DRYDOCK STATUS

- PUGET SOUND DRYDOCK #6
  PRIMARY WEST COAST NUCLEAR CARRIER DOCK

- LONG BEACH DRYDOCK #1
  SECONDARY WEST COAST NUCLEAR CARRIER DOCK. THE ONLY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA DRYDOCK CAPABLE OF DOCKING LHA, LHD, CV, CVN, CGN AND AOE CLASS SHIPS

- PEARL HARBOR DRYDOCK #4
  CAPABLE, BUT PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM THE HOMEPORTS OF PACIFIC FLEET CARRIERS BY 2600 MILES



REV1094

a2924.002

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-3

MAR 14 1995

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ATTACHMENT B

LEE&RO
Consulting Engineers, Inc.

P.O. Box 93070
City of Industry, CA 91715-3070
Tel: (818) 912-3391
FAX: (818) 912-2015

1199 South Fullerton Road, City of Industry, CA 91748

December 7, 1994

Southern California Committee
to SAVE OUR SHIPYARD (SOS)
200 Pine Avenue, Suite 400
Long Beach, California 90802

Attention: William R. Gurzi, Chairman

Subject: Cost Updating Addendum to Concept Study for Homeporting CV/CVN at Pier E

File: 200-44

Dear Mr. Gurzi:

In accordance with our proposal of November 4, 1994, this letter is provided as an addendum to the August, 1985 report "Concept Study for Homeporting Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVN) at Naval Station Long Beach (NSLB) Pier E" prepared by LEE & RO under Navy Contract No. N62474-84-C-2146. The purpose of this letter addendum is to update the cost data presented in the original report to the 1994 cost level, with some consideration given to organizational changes recently made at the NSLB and Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNSY). This addendum provides general cost information and should not be used for the purposes of planning or budgeting for specific capital improvements. The scope of this update did not include reevaluating the condition of existing utilities and other equipment; therefore, changes in the condition of such facilities since 1985 are not reflected in this cost update. Additionally, it has been assumed that the requirements for homeporting a CV or CVN have remained unchanged since completion of the original study.

The 1985 Concept Study was commissioned by the Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command for the purpose of determining the feasibility of homeporting an aircraft carrier vessel (CV) or carrier vessel-nuclear (CVN) at NSLB Pier E. The report presented the requirements for homeporting either a CV or a CVN, evaluated the existing facilities that would be used, identified the infrastructure improvements needed to meet the requirements and developed opinions of probable costs for these improvements. Cost data were included for both capital improvements and recurring annual improvements based upon berthing one CV or CVN along the west side of Pier E for a maximum of 6 months out of the year. There is also sufficient space to dock a CV or CVN along the south side of Pier E; however, a separate study would need to be completed to identify the required improvements and estimate the costs associated with homeporting a second carrier at that location. The scope of the Concept Study also did not include addressing costs associated with separate improvements required to provide maintenance services for CV/CVNs.

Since the requirements are more extensive for berthing a CVN than for a CV, the total costs were higher to accommodate the CVN. Therefore this addendum updates the cost estimates for the improvements needed to meet the requirements for a CVN.

The basis used for updating the cost estimates differed for the various categories of facilities described below and is identified in the discussion under each item. In those instances when cost indices were used to update the costs, the Engineering News-Record (ENR) Construction Cost Index (CCI) for the Los Angeles area from October, 1994 of 6551 was compared to the ENR CCI from February, 1985 of 5264 to develop a cost factor of 1.25. Given the limited scope of this addendum, the cost data presented herein are considered to be "Order-of-Magnitude" estimates or opinions of cost, with an accuracy within +50 to -30 percent, in accordance with the definition provided by the American Association of Cost Estimating Engineers.

The following paragraphs list the facilities for which the Concept Study identified conditions that needed upgrading to meet the requirements for homeporting a CVN. Along with the updated cost data, brief discussions are presented on the recommended improvements and the method used to update the cost data. Those additional facilities evaluated in the report for which no improvements were found to be necessary are not listed here. The Concept Study should be referred to for descriptions of the facilities and discussions of the CV/CVN homeporting requirements.

A. UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS

1. Potable Water

To meet the maximum flow and pressure requirements, the Concept Study recommended that a water tank, three booster pumps, and the associated piping, valves and electrical service be installed at Pier E. The updated costs for the water tank and pumps have been estimated using Means Facilities Construction Cost Data (R. S. Means Co., Inc.; 1994). The other costs have been updated using the ENR CCI. The updated cost for the potable water improvements is estimated to be $450,000.

2. Cable TV Antenna

The Concept Study included the cost for a cable TV antenna. This cost has been updated using the ENR CCI to $40,000.

3. Telephone/Communications

To provide the required telephone cables, the installation of an additional 40 pairs of twisted wire was recommended. Using Means Cost Data, the updated cost for this item is estimated at $75,000.

4. Electricity

The original report recommended the use of Mobile Utility Support Equipment (MUSE), in lieu of permanently installed equipment, to provide the necessary 4160V electrical service for a CVN. However, SOS has supplied a cost estimate recently developed by the Navy for the installation of permanent power service at the LBNSY for a CVN. The cost estimate for permanent electrical service includes the installation of a 20MVA transformer and the associated electrical equipment and duct work. Lee & Ro reviewed this estimate and revised the costs in accordance with recent experience on projects involving this type of work. The updated cost for the electrical service is estimated to be approximately $2,500,000.

B. BERTHING FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS - DREDGING

A recently prepared Navy document provided by SOS estimated the quantity of dredging required to facilitate the docking of a CVN to be 1,000,000 cubic yards. It is not clear, however, whether this estimate is based on the use of Pier E only or whether this dredging would accommodate other piers. The original Concept Study estimated that approximately 300,000 cubic yards of dredging would be needed to meet the depth requirements for docking a CVN at Pier E. The discrepancy between these estimates may indicate that the larger amount would apply to additional docking locations; however, to be conservative an intermediate quantity of 700,000 cubic yards has been used here. A more detailed study would need to be performed to better define the extent of dredging required for homeporting at Pier E.

Based upon recent dredging work completed by the Port of Los Angeles and past experience, the unit cost of the dredging is estimated to be $20 per cubic yard. As a result the updated cost estimate for dredging is $14,000,000.

C. INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS

1. Supply Storage

The Concept Study identified the need for an 18,500 square foot (sf) metal building to provide storage space. Based on Means Cost Data, an updated unit cost of $60/sf has been used to place the estimated the cost of this facility at $1,110,000. It must be pointed out, however, that at the time the original study was prepared space was at a premium on Pier E, whereas currently many of the facilities, including building 303, are not utilized to their capacity. Therefore, it may be appropriate to further investigate the use of existing storage space for this purpose.

2. Ships Force Overhaul Management Systems (SFOMS) Area

To meet the requirements for SFOMS operations it was recommended that a 20,000 sf metal building be constructed. Based on the updated unit cost of $60/sf, the updated cost estimate for this building is $1,200,000. As indicated above, an investigation into the use

of existing building space for these operations may be warranted due to the reduction in activities since the original study was completed.

D. PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES

1. Parking

It was estimated in the Concept Study that 16 acres would be required to provide sufficient parking space for homeporting a CVN. Due to the lack of available parking on and near Pier E in 1985, the study recommended leasing land for parking. Currently, however, the existing parking lots on and near Pier E are not used to capacity due to the reduction in personnel working at the shipyard. The LBNSY has also obtained additional space as a result of the transfer of NSLB land. Consequently, it appears that sufficient parking space should be available to facilitate the homeporting of a CVN without leasing additional land.

2. Housing

The original Concept Study identified a need for 387 officer's family housing units; 1,228 Enlisted Personnel family housing units; 109 Bachelor Officer's units; and 1,676 Bachelor Enlisted Personnel units. Recommendations and a cost estimate for meeting the housing requirements were beyond the scope of the Concept Study; therefore, no updated cost can be provided within the scope of this addendum. It should be pointed out, however, that the NSLB facilities that have been transferred to the LBNSY include bachelor quarters with the capacity for 159 Officers and 1621 Enlisted Personnel. Additionally, the availability of affordable housing in Long Beach has increased significantly in the last several years due to the recent economic downturn.

3. Rental Vehicles

It was recommended that 12 vehicles be leased or rented to meet the vehicle requirements. Based upon renting 12 vehicles for 6 months out of the year, the Concept Study estimated that this requirement would result in an annual cost of $18,000. To account for inflation, this cost has been updated to $25,000.

3. Shuttle Bus

The Concept Study included the cost of purchasing two shuttle buses, each with a capacity of 50 people. Discussions with SOS have indicated that it may be feasible to obtain the use of buses from the City of Long Beach for shuttle service. Additionally, the City has indicated a willingness to modify existing bus routes to the shipyard to provide increased service. Because of the potential for obtaining these services from the City, the cost for purchasing these shuttle buses has not been included here.

E. SAFETY AND ADMINISTRATION - FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

The Concept Study included $100,000 for high pressure fire fighting apparatus. Using the ENR CCI, this cost has been updated to $125,000.

F. NUCLEAR SUPPORT FACILITIES

1. Grade "A" Pure Water

To meet the requirement for deionized, demineralized water for a CVN, the concept study recommended that trailer mounted water treatment equipment be leased from a supplier. Based on updated budget cost information provided by an equipment supplier, it is estimated that the updated cost for this service would be $0.08/gallon. At 100,000 gallons per month for 6 months, the annual cost is estimated at $48,000.

2. Radioactive Waste Facility

This service would have to be provided by a contractor licensed to process the contaminated water and dispose of the residue. The company identified in the Concept Study for this service is apparently no longer in business in Southern California. To provide a conservative estimate for this item, the original $0.06/gallon cost estimate for handling the waste has been updated to a unit cost of $0.15/gallon. Based on processing 200,000 gallons per month for 6 months, the estimated annual cost for this item would be approximately $180,000.

3. Nitrogen Gas System

This service would be provided by leasing equipment from a supplier. Based on budget cost information provided by an equipment supplier, it is estimated that the updated cost for this item would be $0.20/cf. At 80,000 cf per month for 6 months, the annual cost is estimated at $96,000.

A summary of the updated cost estimates is presented in Table 1 (see Attachment A). The cost data have been separated into capital and annually recurring costs. The capital costs have in turn been separated into those associated with primary facilities and those representing secondary facilities. Primary facilities are required for docking a CVN; whereas secondary facilities provide support for activities associated with homeporting a CVN. The capital costs are estimates of installed costs and include a 15 percent allowance for overhead and profit. A 20 percent contingency has been added to the estimated total capital cost to provide an allowance for the limitations of a preliminary "Order-of-Magnitude" estimate.

We hope the information presented in this addendum to the 1985 CV/CVN Homeporting Concept Study is of value to SOS in its continuing efforts on behalf of the LBNSY and the surrounding communities. We appreciate having the opportunity to provide our services to your organization. If you should have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

LEE & RO Consulting Engineers, Inc.

M. Steve Ro, P.E.
President

Attachment

MSR:KC:es

ATTACHMENT A
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF UPDATED COST DATA
FOR CVN HOMEPORTING AT LBNSY PIER E

I. Capital Costs-Primary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost
Utility Improvements:	
Potable Water	$450,000
TV Antenna	40,000
Telephone	75,000
Electricity	2,500,000
Berthing Improvements:	
Dredging	$14,000,000

II. Capital Costs-Secondary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost
Ind. Support Improvements:	
Supply Storage Bldg.	$1,110,000
SFOMS Operations Bldg.	$1,200,000
Safety Improvements:	
Fire Fighting Apparatus	$125,000

III. Total Capital Costs

Primary Facilities	$17,065,000
Secondary Facilities	$2,435,000
Subtotal	$19,500,000
Contingencies (@20%)	$3,900,000
Total Capital Cost =	**$23,400,000**

IV. Annual Costs **

Item Description	Item Cost
Personnel Support:	
Vehicle Rental	$25,000
Nuclear Support:	
Grade "A" Pure Water	$48,000
Radioactive Waste Processing	$180,000
Nitrogen Gas	$96,000
Total Annual Costs =	**$349,000**

** Annual costs are based on homeporting one CVN for 6 months per year



Long Beach Naval Complex
Surrounding Military Facilities

Figure 2-3

WEST COAST DRYDOCK STATUS

- PUGET SOUND DRYDOCK #6
  PRIMARY WEST COAST NUCLEAR CARRIER DOCK

- LONG BEACH DRYDOCK #1
  SECONDARY WEST COAST NUCLEAR CARRIER DOCK. THE ONLY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA DRYDOCK CAPABLE OF DOCKING LHA, LHD, CV, CVN, CGN AND AOE CLASS SHIPS

- PEARL HARBOR DRYDOCK #4
  CAPABLE, BUT PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM THE HOMEPORTS OF PACIFIC FLEET CARRIERS BY 2600 MILES



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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-4

FROM: WIDNALL, SHEILA E.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SEC OF THE AIRFORCE	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE AIRFORCE	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS	✓			REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				TONI FORKIN	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:
RESPONSES TO THE "QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD" FROM THE MARCH 6 HEARING

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950328	Mail Date:

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

'28 MAR 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It was my pleasure to provide testimony concerning the Air Force portion of the Secretary of Defense's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission. By letter dated March 9, 1995, you provided a number of additional questions to be answered for the record. The responses to those questions are attached.

You will note in some cases that I have referred questions to the Department of Defense for response. I did so only where I believed that the answer required their perspective, or called for an explanation of a Joint Cross-Service Group decision. I trust this will not excessively inconvenience your staff.

We remain prepared to support any further requests you may have.

Sincerely,

Sheila Widnall

Attachment

General

Page 1, Question 1: Secretary Widnall, will the Air Force have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

Answer: In our operations categories, we have intentionally retained some reserve capacity to accommodate future contingencies, including the potential return of forces currently based overseas. If one were to examine only aircraft parking capability, one could conclude there is excess infrastructure. However, my examination of a number of base closure and realignment scenarios in the operations categories raised significant operational or logistical support concerns and convinced me that no recommendations beyond those I have made would be operationally sound. In the depot category, the BRAC actions recommended, coupled with the efforts to downsize, reduce to core, and contract out, will bring our installations down to the size necessary to support our needs. Additionally, our support structure recommendations were accomplished in a manner that was fiscally prudent and represents a sound investment strategy in the BRAC process.

Page 1, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, have you provided to the commission all of the information that you used during your decision-making process? If not, would you please provided it within the next five days?.

Answer: Yes, all information used in the Air Force decision-making process has been provided.

<u>Page 1, Question 3:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from local base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to DoD proposals.

What guidance did the Air Force give base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

<u>Answer:</u> Air Force Public Affairs sent a message to all commanders and public affairs officers on base realignment and closure issues. That message is attached.

PENTAGON
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

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TO ALMAJCOM-FOA//CC//PA
AIG 9333//CC//PA

UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 SECTION 01 OF 03
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC) ISSUES
1. THE PUBLIC IS INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN THE BRAC PROCESS AND HOW IT WILL AFFECT THEIR LOCAL AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS. THIS MESSAGE GIVES GUIDANCE TO COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ON RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM BOTH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PUBLICS.
2. THIS MESSAGE IS IN FOUR PARTS: I. COMMUNITY "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS; II. PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIES; III. 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRES; AND IV. MEDIA INTEREST AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.
PART I: COMMUNITY "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS
3. MANY COMMUNITIES WHO ARE ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN THE WELFARE OF THEIR LOCAL AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS HAVE FORMED GROUPS IN ANTICIPATION OF POTENTIAL BRAC ACTIONS IN THE UPCOMING ROUND (BRAC 95). THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS (OFTEN SUB COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) USUALLY INCLUDE:
A. LOBBYING LOCAL, STATE, FEDERAL, AND AIR FORCE OFFICIALS TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THEIR BASE'S CURRENT STATUS OR OBTAIN "NEW" MISSIONS.
B. UPGRADING COMMUNITY RESOURCES THEY BELIEVE COULD AFFECT BASE CLOSURE ANALYSIS.
C. KEEPING THEIR COMMUNITIES INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS THROUGH THE LOCAL MEDIA, THEREBY MAINTAINING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON BRAC ISSUES.
D. FUND-RAISING.
E. SEEKING ACCESS TO BASE DATA AND DOCUMENTS (SEE PARTS III AND IV).
4. DO NOT BECOME ADVOCATES FOR KEEPING YOUR BASE OPEN, PROMOTING CLOSURE, OR OFFERING ALTERNATIVE USE OPTIONS; AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH GIVE THE PERCEPTION OF SUCH ROLES. BRAC PUBLIC LAW STIPULATES THAT SECDEF MAKES CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AT A PRESCRIBED TIME TO THE BRAC COMMISSION (BRACC).
5. DOD REGULATIONS AND BRAC PUBLIC LAW GOVERN THE EXTENT TO WHICH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES CAN PARTICIPATE IN "SAVE THE BASE" GROUP ACTIVITIES AND HOW DOD FACILITIES AND RESOURCES MAY BE USED. SEE DOD STANDARDS OF CONDUCT REGULATIONS (DOD 5500.7-R) AND YOUR LOCAL STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IS APPLICABLE:
A. COMMANDERS MUST NOT HOST OR ORGANIZE MEETINGS, SEND INVITATIONS, OR ASSIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AS GROUP MEMBERS. HOWEVER, COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES MAY OBSERVE GROUP MEETINGS AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT HOLD OFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP OR ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE GROUP. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES MAY PARTICIPATE IN GROUP ACTIVITIES IF THEIR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY AND IS DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS OR LEAVE TIME.
B. COMMANDERS SHOULD NOT AUTHORIZE FUND-RAISING EVENTS ON BASE (EXAMPLE: "SAVE THE BASE" CAMPAIGN DINNERS). AFR 11-32, CHAPTER 4, PROVIDES THAT OFF-THE-JOB FUND-RAISING SOLICITATIONS ARE AT THE COMMANDER'S DISCRETION. COMMANDERS MUST REFRAIN FROM ANY OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF SUCH ACTIVITIES AND SHOULD DENY ANY DISCRETIONARY USE OF

*** AF SECTION MESSAGE ***
WHEN RECEIVING A SARAH-LITE PACKAGE FROM THE PTC, YOU MUST EXCHANGE A 3.5" OR 5.25" HIGH DENSITY FLOPPY DISK. IF YOUR SYSTEM USES DOUBLE DENSITY DISK THEN ONLY THE 3.5" DOUBLE DENSITY DISK WILL BE ACCEPTED.

** LOCAL DISTRO 14
ACTION CC(1) (A,F)
INFO AFCOS(1) HQ AFBCA(1) CMS(1) DP(1) 7CG(2) AFSAA(1)
PA(1) AFAA(1) AFPEO(2) AFRBA(1) AFCAA(1)

MCN=94111/31137 TOR=94111/1758Z TAD=94111/1820Z CDSN=MAN472

PENTAGON
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

THE BASE FOR SUCH PURPOSES.
C. GENERALLY, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MAY PARTICIPATE IN PRIVATE FUND-RAISING IF THEY ARE VOLUNTEERS, OFF DUTY, NOT IN UNIFORM, AND ARE NOT ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
6. COOPERATE WITH "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS IN PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE BRAC PROCESS. IF ASKED, FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE MISSION BRIEFINGS AND BASE TOURS AT YOUR BASE TO ENHANCE THE INFORMATION FLOW. HOWEVER, DO NOT TAKE LOCAL GROUPS TO OTHER BASES FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPILING BRAC-RELATED DATA. (NOTE: SAF/PAM WILL PROVIDE A BRAC PROCESS INFORMATION GUIDE FOR YOUR USE. LOCAL BRIEFINGS ON THE BRAC PROCESS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THAT GUIDE; DEVIATIONS MUST BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY SAF/PAM.)
7. IN SUM: COOPERATE WITH "SAVE THE BASE" GROUPS BY PROVIDING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION BUT DO NOT TAKE A LEADERSHIP ROLE OR ACTIVELY SUPPORT THEIR OBJECTIVES.
PART II: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIES
8. KEY MESSAGES:
A. CUTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING AND DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HAVE NECESSITATED FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS THAT DICTATE CLOSING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
B. AIR FORCE LEADERS VALUE AND APPRECIATE THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OUR BASES OVER THE YEARS AND REGRET ANY NEGATIVE IMPACT RESULTING FROM CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT ACTIONS.
C. ALL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS MEETING THE CRITERIA DEFINED IN BRAC LAW ARE CONSIDERED FOR CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT.
D. THE AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS IS ACCOMPLISHED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH AN INTERNAL CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPED TO COMPLY WITH ALL OF THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW.
E. THE AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY ASSISTS IN VALIDATING THE PROCESS AND THE DATA BASE USED IN THE ANALYSIS. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AUDITS THE PROCESS AND REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS AND THE BRACC. THE RESULTS OF THE AIR FORCE ANALYSIS ARE SUBMITTED TO SECDEF. SECDEF USES SERVICE INPUTS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC.
9. TARGET AUDIENCES:
A. THE ENTIRE AIR FORCE COMMUNITY (ACTIVE DUTY, GUARD, AND RESERVE), INCLUDING FAMILIES, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, AND CONTRACTORS.
B. NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL MEDIA (PARTICULARLY IN AREAS NEAR AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS).
C. LEADERS AND CITIZENS IN COMMUNITIES NEAR AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS.
D. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
10. TACTICS FOR INTERNAL PUBLIC:
A. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH BRAC PROCEDURES AND THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF THE PROCESS. USE THE PROCESS INFORMATION GUIDE DEVELOPED BY SAF/PAM TO PROMOTE A STANDARDIZED RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS.
B. SINCE INTERNAL INTEREST IN BRAC ISSUES IS PRESUMED TO BE HIGH, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS NEED TO RESPOND TO A DEMAND FOR INFORMATION THROUGH PUBLISHING DOD NEWS SERVICE AND AFNEWS ARTICLES IN BASE NEWSPAPERS.
C. CAUTION BASE PERSONNEL THEY MUST NOT SPECULATE ON THE OUTCOME OF BRAC 95.
D. SAF/PAM WILL SEND ELECTRONIC MESSAGES TO COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM OATSD/PA.
11. TACTICS FOR EXTERNAL PUBLIC:
A. BE CAUTIOUS IN YOUR STATEMENTS TO NEWS MEDIA AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. YOU WILL LIKELY BE PRESSED FOR COMMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF YOUR BASE, BUT SUCH COMMENTS WOULD BE SPECULATIVE AND INAPPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, YOU MAY DISCUSS THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA USED BY THE AIR FORCE, DOD, AND THE BRACC IN MAKING THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS (SEE THE PROCESS GUIDE). BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF ANY OF ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES.
B. AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS, REFER QUERIES ON BRAC 95 TO OATSD/PA (THRU MAJCOM/PA AND SAF/PA).

C. AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, LIMIT RESPONSES TO MEDIA QUERIES TO THE KEY
BT
UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 SECTION 02 OF 03
MESSAGES ABOVE. DO NOT COMMENT ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF ANY INSTALLATION BEFORE THE RECOMMENDATIONS BECOME FINAL.
PART III: 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRES
12. THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE (WHETHER BLANK OR COMPLETED), ALL QUESTIONNAIRE DATA AND ANSWERS, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY AND PROVIDED TO THE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP (BCEG) TO DETERMINE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS BECOME BCEG RECORDS AND MUST BE MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." IAW DOD POLICY, THIS INFORMATION IS NOT RELEASABLE UNDER THE FOIA OR OTHERWISE TO THE PUBLIC WHEN THE DELIBERATIVE, PRE-DECISIONAL PROCESS IS UNDERWAY. ONCE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS ARE PROVIDED TO THE BRACC (NLT 1 MAR 95), ALL NON-CLASSIFIED DATA USED IN THE PROCESS MAY BE RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC.
13. THIS RESTRICTION ON RELEASING BASE CLOSURE INFORMATION DOES NOT PROHIBIT INSTALLATIONS FROM OBTAINING DATA FROM THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WHEN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IS THE ONLY SOURCE OF INFORMATION (EXAMPLES: PUPIL-TO-TEACHER RATIO, CRIME STATISTICS, ETC.).
IT DOES, HOWEVER, PROHIBIT INSTALLATIONS FROM GIVING THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. ONLY DESIGNATED DOD PERSONNEL MAY ANSWER THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
14. HANDLE REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLOSURE PROCESS IAW THE FOIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. HOWEVER, COORDINATE THESE REQUESTS THROUGH BOTH PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE BASE CLOSURE POC TO ENSURE THAT THE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS NOT SIMILAR TO OR THE SAME AS INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE BRAC 95 QUESTIONNAIRE. IF THE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE AND TRACKS WITH THE BRAC 95 QUESTIONNAIRE, MAKE SURE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE PUBLIC IS SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME AS THAT PROVIDED ON THE BRAC 95 QUESTIONNAIRE. INCLUDE THE BASE FOIA OFFICE IF A RECORDS REQUEST IS INVOLVED.
PART IV: MEDIA INTEREST AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
15. AS COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN THE BRAC PROCESS, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN QUERIES REGARDING THE PROCESS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LOCAL IMPACT FROM MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.
A. THE PERCEPTION EXISTS THAT BRAC 95 WILL BE THE MOST DRAMATIC ROUND YET, AND REPORTERS ARE PROCEEDING ACCORDINGLY. THE FACT THAT SOME COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE VISITING SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS AND OTHER COMMUNITIES, AND ARE OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY INVESTMENTS FOR LOCAL BASES, HAS FURTHER PIQUED MEDIA INTEREST. THE MEDIA ARE VERY INTERESTED IN GETTING AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES TO SPECULATE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL BASE CLOSINGS.
B. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES SPECULATE OR RANK THEIR BASES AGAINST OTHER INSTALLATIONS. BASE CLOSING IS A VERY EMOTIONAL ISSUE FOR COMMUNITIES TO DEAL WITH, AND REGARDLESS OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BASES DEVELOP WITH THEIR LOCAL COMMUNITIES, THE MILITARY MUST REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THIS ENTIRE PROCESS.
16. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN PROVIDING FACTUAL, ACCURATE, AND NON-SPECULATIVE INFORMATION TO ENSURE THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS WILL PROCEED ACCORDING TO STATED LAWS. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE DESIGNED TO HELP YOU ANSWER QUERIES AND REMAIN NEUTRAL IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE MEDIA AND COMMUNITY LEADERS.
17. Q: HOW MANY AIR FORCE BASES WILL BE CLOSED IN BRAC 95?
A: THERE IS NO TARGET NUMBER OR QUOTA OF BASES TO BE CLOSED. HOWEVER, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHED A GOAL OF A 15% REDUCTION OF THE DOD-WIDE PHYSICAL PLANT FOR BRAC 95. THIS GOAL DOES NOT TRANSLATE INTO A NUMBER OR QUOTA OF BASES TO BE CLOSED. SECDEF'S CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE BASED ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN AND THE CLOSURE CRITERIA. UNDER THE LAW, EVERY BASE MEETING THE CRITERIA IN THE LAW MUST BE CONSIDERED FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT.
18. Q: HOW WILL THE CURRENT COURT CASES CHALLENGING THE PROCESS

AFFECT BRAC 95?
A: WE CANNOT COMMENT ON CASES UNTIL THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (INCLUDING ANY APPEALS) IS COMPLETE.
19. Q: IF THE MILITARY SAYS THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY "BAD BASES," THEN WHY ARE WE STILL CLOSING INSTALLATIONS?
A: THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT A MUCH LARGER MILITARY FORCE. WITH THE DRAWDOWN, WE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE OUR FORCES AND OPERATE MORE EFFICIENTLY. BASE CLOSINGS AND REALIGNMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE OUR FORCES ARE LOCATED WHERE WE NEED THEM AND IN FACILITIES THAT WILL SUPPORT THEM.
20. Q: WHEN WILL WE KNOW WHICH BASES WILL BE CLOSED?
A: THE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BRACC NLT 1 MAR 95. THE COMMISSION IS SCHEDULED TO START ITS REVIEW IN MARCH 1995.
21. Q: WHO WILL SIT ON THE BRAC COMMISSION THIS YEAR?
A: COMMISSIONERS WILL BE NOMINATED BY THE PRESIDENT NLT 3 JAN 95.
22. Q: HOW ARE BRAC COMMISSIONERS SELECTED?
A: THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, AND IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.
23. Q: IF A BASE SCORED POORLY IN SEVERAL AREAS IN THE LAST ROUND, HOW WILL THAT AFFECT ITS CHANCES FOR CLOSURE IN THE 1995 ROUND?
A: EVERY BASE BEGINS THE PROCESS WITH A CLEAN SLATE. THE DATA USED FOR EVALUATION IN THE 1995 ROUND IS CURRENTLY BEING COLLECTED. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS CHANGES IN FORCE STRUCTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND PERSONNEL SINCE THE PREVIOUS ROUND, SO USING DATA FROM THE 1993 OR 1991 ROUND WOULD NOT PROVIDE A FACTUAL PICTURE FOR BRAC 95.
24. Q: WHICH BASES WILL BE EVALUATED DURING BRAC 95?
A: ALL BASES WITH AT LEAST 300 DIRECT-HIRE CIVILIAN AUTHORIZATIONS MUST BE EVALUATED AND HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SUBMIT REPLIES TO A STANDARDIZED QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH FORMS THE MASTER DATA BASE. (BASES WITH LESS THAN 300 DIRECT-HIRE CIVILIAN AUTHORIZATIONS MAY ALSO BE INCLUDED.)
25. Q: HOW IS THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED?
A: THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE GOES THROUGH THE MAJCOM TO THE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP (BCEG). THE BCEG USES THE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS TO EVALUATE EACH BASE IN LIGHT OF THE SELECTION CRITERIA AND FORWARDS ITS ANALYSIS TO SECAF, WHO THEN DEVELOPS THE AIR FORCE'S RECOMMENDATION FOR SUBMISSION TO DOD. THE BRACC USES ALL THIS INFORMATION TO HELP IN MAKING ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.
26. Q: WHO IS ON THE BCEG?
A: THE BCEG IS MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY 12 AIR FORCE GENERAL OFFICERS AND SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE CIVILIANS FROM A VARIETY OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS. SECAF SELECTS THE BCEG MEMBERS.
27. Q: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF QUESTIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE?
A: THE BASIC QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO COLLECT DATA TO SUPPORT EVALUATION OF EACH OF THE DOD CRITERIA. AS A RESULT, QUESTIONNAIRE TOPICS RANGE FROM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS TO BASE CAPACITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE. THE COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING SERVICES AS WELL AS ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE ALSO TOPIC AREAS.
28. Q: HOW LONG DO BASES HAVE TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE?
A: INPUTS ARE DUE TO HQ USAF FROM THE BASES VIA THE MAJCOMS IN EARLY
BT
UNCLAS ALMAJCOM-FOA 0170/94 FINAL SECTION OF 03
MAY 1994. HOWEVER, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA MAY BE GATHERED THROUGH THE SUMMER AND FALL.
29. Q: HOW IS THE INFORMATION DETERMINED TO BE CORRECT?
A: THE AIR FORCE INTERNAL CONTROL PLAN PROVIDES A SERIES OF STEPS FOR ENSURING ACCURATE DATA IS PROVIDED. THE DATA IS REVIEWED AT BASE, MAJCOM, AND AIR STAFF LEVELS. AT EACH STEP, OFFICIALS ARE REQUIRED TO CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION IS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE. THE PROCESS IS DESIGNED TO BE DELIBERATE, AUDITABLE, AND ACCOUNTABLE.
30. Q: WHY IS THE QUESTIONNAIRE NOT RELEASABLE?
A: OSD HAS DIRECTED THAT THE DATA AND ANALYSES USED TO EVALUATE

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MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL AFTER DOD HAS FORWARDED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC (REFERENCE SOURCE DOCUMENT). WE DO NOT RELEASE THE QUESTIONS OR ANSWERS BECAUSE THEY ARE PART OF AN INTERNAL DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND DISCLOSURE COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THAT PROCESS.
31. Q: CAN THE QUESTIONNAIRE BE REQUESTED THROUGH FOIA?
A: YES. THE QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE FULLY RELEASABLE AFTER DOD HAS FORWARDED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BRACC. SEND ALL QUESTIONNAIRE FOIA REQUESTS TO SAF/AAIS.
32. Q: WHY CAN'T THE LOCAL COMMUNITY GIVE INPUTS?
A: THE COMMUNITY CAN GIVE INPUTS, BUT NOT THROUGH THE OFFICIAL AIR FORCE QUESTIONNAIRE. THE OFFICIAL QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE USED BY THE AIR FORCE IN ITS DELIBERATION; THEREFORE, ONLY DESIGNATED DOD PERSONNEL CAN PROVIDE INPUTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
33. Q: WHAT IS THE PROCESS FOR THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO GIVE INPUT?
A: LOCAL COMMUNITIES CAN BE HEARD THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND BEFORE THE BRACC. AFTER THE DOD PHASE OF THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS IS COMPLETE, THE BRACC MEETS WITH COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES, HOLDS REGIONAL HEARINGS, VISITS MILITARY FACILITIES, AND HEARS FROM EXPERT WITNESSES, INCLUDING CONGRESS. HEARINGS, DELIBERATIONS, AND RECORDS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. THE BRACC ALSO RECEIVES LETTERS FROM CONCERNED CITIZENS.
34. Q: DOES IT BENEFIT THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO SEND A DELEGATION TO MEET WITH SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICIALS LIKE SECAF OR CSAF?
A: SUCH VISITS ARE OF LIMITED VALUE SINCE THE SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS TO SECDEF ARE BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF MISSION NEEDS AND THE SELECTION CRITERIA. HOWEVER, THE AIR FORCE DOES ENDORSE COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS. IN THAT REGARD, THE AIR FORCE WILL ADDRESS COMMUNITY BRAC PROCESS INQUIRIES.
35. Q: DOES IT BENEFIT THE LOCAL COMMUNITY TO "PUT THEIR MONEY WHERE THEIR BASE IS;" THAT IS, OFFERING TO INVEST LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO BUILD NEW RUNWAYS, MOVE HOUSING AREAS, BUY LAND, ETC.?
A: COMMUNITY OFFERS THAT MUST BE APPROVED/ENDORSED BY THE AIR FORCE WILL BE DENIED. HOWEVER, LOCAL COMMUNITIES ARE FREE TO PURSUE ACTIONS NOT REQUIRING AIR FORCE APPROVAL AT THEIR DISCRETION. (EXAMPLE: THE CONDEMNATION OF HOUSING IN THE VICINITY OF A MILITARY INSTALLATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE ENCROACHMENT.)
36. Q: WHAT IS THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY?
A: THIS IS A SURVEY OF ALL AIR FORCE BASES TO DETERMINE WHAT LEVEL OF CAPACITY IS AVAILABLE AND WHAT IS CURRENTLY BEING USED. THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS INVOLVES LOOKING AT TWO MAJOR AREAS: OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND FACILITIES. THE INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED IN VALIDATING AIR FORCE EXCESS CAPACITY AND IN DETERMINING BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS.
37. Q: DOES THE EXISTENCE OF EXCESS CAPACITY AT A BASE MEAN IT WILL CLOSE?
A: NO, ALL OF OUR BASES HAVE EXCESS CAPACITY TO A DEGREE; HOWEVER, WE DO NOT PLAN TO OPERATE OUR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES AT 100%. IF WE DID, WE WOULD NOT HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MINOR MOVEMENTS OF DOD FORCE STRUCTURE, MISSION, AND/OR PERSONNEL. THEREFORE, EXCESS CAPACITY ALONE WILL NOT DRIVE A CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION. HOWEVER, EXCESS CAPACITY CAN RESULT IN REALIGNMENTS TO REDUCE THE EXCESS OR NO ACTION.
38. Q: WHEN IS THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY TO BE COMPLETED?
A: THE BASES HAVE MADE THEIR INPUTS AND IT IS BEING PROCESSED BY MAJCOMS AT THIS TIME. RESULTS WERE DUE TO HQ USAF BY 15 APR 94.
39. Q: WILL THE CAPACITY ANALYSIS SURVEY BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC?
A: IT WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN THE DOD RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FORWARDED TO THE BRACC, NLT 1 MAR 95. (NOTE: THIS SURVEY IS ALWAYS CONSIDERED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.")
40. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH SAF/MI, SAF/GC, AF/JA, AND AF/XO. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POC FOR BASE CLOSURE ISSUES IS MAJOR MARY FELTAULT, SAF/PAM, DSN 225-0640. POC FOR THE BASE CLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE IS LT COL JOHN PLUMMER, AF/XOOR, DSN 225-6766. POC FOR FOIA QUESTIONS IS MS. ANNE TURNER, SAF/AAIQ, DSN 227-3491.

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<u>Page 1, Question 4:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, which of your recommendations are a direct result of alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Groups? Please explain the use of information by Joint Cross-Service Groups. Please furnish Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) analyses for the cross-service groups scenario alternatives in accordance with the 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC) Policy Memorandum Three dated December 29, 1994.

<u>Answer:</u> The recommendation to close Rome Lab, and some of the distribution of activities to Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth, resulted from a Laboratory Joint Group alternative. The retention of the Phillips Lab portion of Kirtland AFB is consistent with the Laboratory Joint Group. The REDCAP and AFEWES actions are the result of alternatives developed by the T&E Joint Group. The recommended closure of Reese AFB is consistent with the UPT Joint Group's evaluation and alternatives.

The Air Force fully integrated the Joint Group process into its 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

The Air Force also analyzed Joint Group alternatives, examined the capacity and capability appropriateness of alternatives, and participated in COBRA analysis where an Air Force installation was either the losing or gaining installation in the alternative. The Air Force provided its analysis to the Joint Groups as appropriate, with a clear communication of the prospects for implementation of the alternatives.

COBRA information is in a notebook titled "Department of the Air Force Joint Cross-Service Groups COBRA Run Summaries" which has already been provided.

Depots

<u>Page 2, Question 1</u>: Secretary Widnall, Deputy Secretary Deutch presented an Air Force Depot Proposal Chart at his February 28th press conference which suggested, at least in the case of the Air Force, that it is more cost effective to consolidate or downsize depots than it is to close them. According to that chart, consolidation as opposed to a two depot closure, would reduce one-time costs by $924 million, while increasing the net present value by another $292 million.

Please explain how the consolidation option, which retains 18 million more square feet and 763 more people than the closure option, can produce these savings?

<u>Answer:</u> Significant costs can be avoided by consolidating rather than closing depots. Large cost avoidances include personnel and equipment transfers, MILCON requirements, and other one-time unique costs associated with a closure. A dual closure option closed the entire installation and all depot maintenance and non-depot maintenance personnel authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs were transferred to new installations, cantoned, or eliminated. Although we examined a dual closure option, we identified excess capacity in our depots of only 1.5 depot equivalents. It is important to note the number of non-depot maintenance personnel authorizations at each site is significant and would have a dramatic impact on cost to close. The following chart identifies the number of depot maintenance and non-depot maintenance authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs.

Comparison of Depot Maintenance vs. Non-Depot Maintenance Authorizations at Kelly and McClellan AFBs



The consolidation option assumed the installation remains open and impacted primarily the depot maintenance activities and associated personnel. Since the Air Force selected for consolidation the commodities/processes which produced the most benefits, costs were low and savings were high. As a result, large MILCON requirements for the tenant population, military family housing, and renovation/new administrative space were avoided.

The savings noted in this question refer to the net present value of each option in the year 2015. The consolidation option has one-time costs of $183M and produces annual savings of approximately $89M. The dual closure option has one-time costs of $1200M and annual savings of approximately $163M. Although the annual savings of the consolidation option is approximately one-half that of the closure option, it produces a higher net present value during this period because the one-time costs to implement this option are significantly less than the one-time cost to implement the dual closure scenario.

<u>Page 2, Question 2:</u> Secretary Widnall, the Air Force option would consolidate similar workloads to the least number of sites as does the cross service alternative of closing two Air Logistics Centers. Both options would require some personnel to transfer from one location to another.

Why does the Air Force downsize option involve realignment of 251 civilian personnel, compared to almost 19,000 personnel who would be realigned if two Air Logistics Centers were closed?

<u>Answer:</u> The dual closure option closed both Kelly AFB and McClellan AFBs in their entirety. This approach required the transfer, cantonment, or elimination of all personnel authorizations at these installations and resulted in the transfer of nearly 19,000 personnel authorizations. The Kelly/Lackland cantonment accounts for approximately 5300 transfers. It should be noted that there are no costs associated with these transfers since the COBRA model considers all moves under 50 miles to be "no cost" transfers.

The downsizing option assumed that the installation remained open and involved only depot maintenance personnel and their associated BOS tail. Since the installation remained open, there was no requirement to move the people. Furthermore, it was assumed the personnel could be retrained rather than transferred to a new location if a workload was realigned. Personnel authorizations were transferred only when a location was a net workload gainer. For example, a depot may lose 100 authorizations as a result of workloads realigned to new sites and gain 110 authorizations as a result of workload realigned in. This scenario would result in a net gain of 10 authorizations and would require the transfer of 10 authorizations.

<u>Page 2, Question 3</u>: Secretary Widnall, during the DOD hearing last week, Secretary Perry presented a chart which compared the costs and savings of downsizing and retaining all five Air Logistics Centers to the costs of closing two of these centers. Nearly two-thirds of the savings under the "downsizing" alternative came from "non-BRAC actions."

What are these "non-BRAC actions" and why are they included in this analysis?

Answer: The "non-BRAC actions" reflect the impact of force structure reductions, downsizing to core, contracting out, and other non-BRAC initiatives. The chart portrayed the real effort, both BRAC and non-BRAC, that the Air Force brought to bear on the issue of reducing depot infrastructure.

<u>Page 2, Question 3b</u>: Would these "non-BRAC actions" be realized even if one or two Air Logistics Centers were closed?

<u>Answer:</u> No. The movement of workload into remaining Air Logistics Centers would preclude many of these actions.

<u>Page 2, Question 3c:</u> What are the total savings that these "non BRAC actions" would provide if the Air Force closes one or two Air Logistics Centers?

<u>Answer:</u> Some savings would be achieved, but these savings would be substantially reduced because the infrastructure eliminated by these actions may either be eliminated by the closure, or may be required for receiving work from closed Air Logistics Center bases. These savings have not been calculated. The savings should not be added directly to a depot closure calculation.

Page 3, Question 3d: How would the alternatives compare if you remove the "non-BRAC actions" from the downsizing alternative and then compare that alternative to closing only the one air logistics center that provides the greatest savings?

Answer: The financial aspects of the recommended downsizing option, with no consideration of non-BRAC actions, are as follows:

One-time costs	Annual savings	20 Yr NPV	ROI	Personnel
$183 M	$89 M	($991.2 M)	2	1905

The financial aspects of the options for closure of either Kelly or McClellan alone are as follows:

	One-time costs	Annual savings	20 Yr NPV	ROI	Personnel
Kelly AFB	$545 M	$74 M	($341 M)	7	1201
McClellan AFB	$559 M	$89 M	($487 M)	6	1500

<u>Page 3, Question 4</u>: Secretary Widnall, the chart also shows that the one time cost to close Air Logistics Centers at San Antonio and Sacramento are approximately $1.1 billion. Cost of Base Realignment Actions analysis in support of these recommendations reflect that the estimate includes about $249 million in construction costs, $330 million in personnel moving costs, and approximately $257 million in "unique" one time costs.

Please explain in as much detail as possible why the Air Force would need to spend $249 million for construction, when excess capacity already exists at all Air Logistics Centers. (It was indicated during the hearing that an insert for the record detailing the construction requirements would be provided).

<u>Answer:</u> A large percentage of the total MILCON costs are associated with tenant requirements, renovation/new administrative space, and military family housing. Refer to the following tables for specific projects and costs.

MILCON Requirements for Kelly Closure

Losing Base	Gaining Base	Organization	Description	Cost ($M)
Kelly	Lackland	Multiple (cantonment)	Utilities	1.5
Kelly	Lackland	Multiple (cantonment)	Fences, Security, Roads	0.3
Kelly	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Cold Storage Facility	0.5
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Bldg 214 GTE Test Facility	0.7
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Fuel/Air Facility	1.1
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Bldg 3902 Fuel Test	1.7
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Bldg 3703 Fuel Test	5.0
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	C-5 Repair Facilities	52.1
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Renovate Engine Test Cells	8.7
Kelly	Tinker	Multiple	New/Renovate Admin Space	19.9
Kelly	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	93 new MFH Units	12.1
			Kelly Total	**104.6**

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MILCON Requirements for McClellan Closure

Losing Base	Gaining Base	Organization	Description	Cost ($M)
McClellan	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	New A/C Maintenance Dock	0.3
McClellan	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Hydraulics Reconfiguration	1.0
McClellan	Tinker	Special Mission	SCIF and Secure Storage	15.4
McClellan	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Instruments	0.5
McClellan	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	New/Renovate Admin Space	3.3
McClellan	Offutt	AFTAC	Renovate Facilities	4.4
McClellan	Offutt	AFTAC	Airman Dormitory	1.7
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	3&6 Story Tower	1.5
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	40,000 sf High Bay	8.2
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Renovate Bldg 100C	0.1
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Renovate Bldg 5N	1.5
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Construct Test Platform	0.4
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Tower Supports	0.2
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Renovate Bldg 265	1.3
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Construct Test Cells	0.3
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Renovate Bldg 11	1.0
McClellan	Hill	Air Logistics Center	New/Renovate Admin Space	9.5
McClellan	Moffett	US Coast Guard	Beddown 4 C-130 Aircraft	22.1
McClellan	Travis	Multiple	Dormitory	1.3
McClellan	Travis	Det 42	Secure Facilities	23.5
			McClellan Total	**97.5**

MILCON Requirements for Dual Closure

(Close Kelly and McClellan AFBs Simultaneously)

Losing Base	Gaining Base	Organization	Description	Cost $(M)
Dual Closure	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	TTB Hangar	12.6
Dual Closure	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Add'l Admin MILCON	8.8
Dual Closure	Tinker	Air Logistics Center	Add'l 90 MFH Units	11.7
Dual Closure	Hill	Air Logistics Center	Add'l Admin MILCON	10.7
			MILCON For Kelly Closure	104.6
			MILCON for McClellan Closure	97.5
			Dual Closure Total	**245.9**

<u>Page 3, Question 4a</u>: The $330 million cost estimate to accommodate personnel movements would apparently move almost 19,000 civilian and 6,600 military personnel. Considering that the five Air Logistics Centers will employ only 27,000 civilians, is it really necessary to relocate 19,000 (67%) civilians to accommodate two aviation logistics center closures. (Mr. Beach indicated he also questioned this percentage and would provide an insert for the record on this point.)

<u>Answer:</u> When the closure of the Air Logistics Center bases are considered, a total base closure is the scenario. There are more than 79,000 civilian and military positions in five Air Logistic Centers. The two depot closure option involved 28,664 military and civilian position. (17,660 at Kelly, and 11,004 at McClellan) From that number, 2,683 positions were eliminated as a result of base operating support and consolidation efficiencies. The remaining positions were moved. Approximately 5,300 positions moved to Lackland, at no cost because of the 50 mile limit on costed moves. The remainder were moved to other Air Force installations, the majority of which were Air Logistic Centers, and were transferred with the relocated workload.

<u>Page 3, Question 4b</u>: Why is the cost of moving 6600 military personnel included as a cost to close the Air Logistics Centers when nearly all depot personnel are civilian employees. Please provide details used in calculating costs.

Answer: Although most depot personnel are civilians, there are other AF or DOD tenants on the installation that must be transferred if the entire installation is closed. The Kelly/Lackland cantonment accounts for approximately 3300 military personnel transfers. There are no costs associated with these transfers since the COBRA model considers all moves under 50 miles to be "no cost" transfers. The remainder move to other military installations, at a cost in the scenario of approximately $15 Million.

Page 3, Question 4c: Please explain in as much detail as possible what is meant by "one-time unique closing costs?" Please itemize the one time unique costs.

Answer: The COBRA model is well suited to estimate the cost of operational units but does not capture all costs associated with closing a depot. As a result, a number of "one-time unique costs" are computed off-line and entered into COBRA. These costs generally include production transition costs, environmental studies, line rearrangement costs, and Base Conversion Agency overhead. Production transition costs reflect the cost of overtime, contractor support, and temporary hires necessary to support depot requirements during the transition period. Environmental studies reflect those studies needed to determine disposal/reuse potential for closure and realignment actions. Line rearrangement costs result when a product line must be changed either to accommodate more workload or moved to a new building/installation. If an installation is closed, the Base Conversion Agency (BCA) establishes an office during the closure period. This cost represents the estimated cost for the BCA. Refer to the following table for one-time unique costs used in the COBRA model for each option.

One-Time Unique Costs for Dual Closure Option

Category	Cost ($M)
Production Transition Costs	112.7
Environmental Studies	6.9
Civilian Terminal Leave	15.1
Rearrangement Costs	41.0
Base Conversion Agency	60.0
Shutdown Neutron Radiography Facility	20.0
Total	**255.7**

One-Time Unique Costs for Consolidation Option

Category	Cost ($M)
Retraining Costs	9.0
Productivity Losses	14.9
Facility Demolition Costs	25.9
Total	**49.8***

* Varies slightly from COBRA report due to inputs associated with facility demolition costs.

The consolidation option also includes $44.1 million for rearrangement costs. Unlike the closure option, these costs are reflected in the MILCON category.

Page 3, Question 5: Secretary Widnall, your alternative to downsizing was the closure of two depots. Did you examine the alternative to close one depot?

Answer: Each Air Logistics Center installation was examined for the same eight criteria by which all Air Force installations were examined. This analysis led to each installation being placed in one of three tiers. Based upon the tiering of all five installations, we examined three closure options: Kelly only, McClellan only, and both installations together. We identified, however, an excess capacity of only 1.5 depot equivalents in our process.

<u>Page 4, Question 6:</u> Secretary Widnall, in testimony last week, Mr. Gotbaum indicated that the Depot Joint Cross-Service Group calculated capacity of depots based on a 40-hour work week, or just one shift per activity. This is a very conservative way of measuring capacity since people work more than one shift in times of crisis. Using only one shift, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

Answer: The Air Force calculated an excess capacity of approximately one-and-one-half depots of excess capacity. The Air Force peacetime CORE requirement is calculated based upon a 40 hour, single shift workweek. This CORE peacetime requirement is necessary to ensure sufficient personnel, facilities, and resources, are available to support JCS wartime scenarios as required by Title 10. The wartime requirement will be greater than that experienced in peacetime. This will be met by surging our peacetime capability (through increased shift operations). The CORE determination is an approved DOD methodology used by all services.

<u>Page 4, Question 6a</u>: If you used one and one half or two shifts, how much excess capacity does the Air Force have?

<u>Answer:</u> For given workloads, the number of shifts required is a function of the amount of work, facilities, and personnel available. The Air Force currently utilizes multi-shift operations at its depots for given workloads.

It is important to understand that excess capacity is not solely based upon single/multi-shift utilization. The Air Force must be able to support its wartime requirements and other statutory requirements. The Air Force must maintain sufficient capacity in peacetime to surge to meet our wartime requirement. Excess capacity can be determined after meeting our peacetime, wartime, and statutory capacity requirements. The Air Force must also comply with the law which requires that no more than 40 percent of our appropriated funds be obligated for the performance of depot level maintenance by non-Government employees.

<u>Page 4, Question 7</u>: Secretary Widnall, in May 1994 the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated "...depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the *minimum facilities, equipment, and skill personnel necessary* to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence.

Will the Air Force base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

Answer: The Air Force proposal (BRAC and non-BRAC) reduces excess depot capacity across all depots. The recommended realignments will consolidate production lines and move workloads to a minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction of personnel, infrastructure, and other costs. The net effect of the realignments along with other downsizing actions reduce Air Force capacity from 39.5 million hours to 30.7 million hours. These actions will reduce excess capacity and enhance efficiencies. As a result of all Air Force actions, depot maintenance capabilities will comprise the minimum necessary resources to accomplish the workload.

Product Centers and Laboratories

<u>Page 4, Question 1:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, an April 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) report states that the Defense Laboratory System is an "obsolescent artifact of the Cold War that has not kept pace with the shrinking military force structure and changing patterns of technology advancement generation." The DSB recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995-99. These cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction by the end of the century. Have you recommended base closures or realignments as a result of these personnel reductions?

<u>Answer</u>: The recommended closure of Brooks AFB and relocation of the Human Systems Center and the closure of Rome Lab will bring total personnel down to the level the Air Force will need to effectively operate in this area. The closures and realignments were recommended as a result of an analysis of force structure and the eight selection criteria.

Page 5, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, your recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, involved closing all activities and facilities, including family housing. We understand that there is a large waiting list for family housing at nearby Lackland Air Force Base.

Why did your recommendation not include the retention of family housing at Brooks to help satisfy Air Force family housing requirements in the San Antonio metropolitan area? (Major General Blume agreed to revisit this issue and to provide an insert for the record.)

Answer: Brooks AFB Family Housing was not recommended for retention so that Brooks AFB could be recommended for total closure. The Air Force receives most benefit from the total closure of an installation and the elimination of its entire base operating support. However, in response to the question from the Commission, AETC and AFMC are evaluating the possibility of transferring the responsibility for Brooks base housing to Kelly AFB or Lackland AFB. The Air Force will provide a position on this issue in the near future.

<u>Page 5, Question 3:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, we recently received a copy of a memorandum dated February 15, 1995, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) expressing interest in the U.S. Army Reserve Command acquiring approximately 57 acres and 13 permanent buildings at Brooks AFB--should it become available from the Air Force (see attachment). Transfer of this Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to (1) eliminate a costly lease, (2) reduce the need for newly programmed military construction, and (3) provides facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. According to Army officials, the Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost saving of $218,655 and a fiscal year 1999 military construction project with an estimated cost saving of $11.4 million.

Was this request discussed and resolved during deliberations by either the BRAC 95 Steering Group or BRAC 95 Review Group, which were established to consider such inter-service needs? If not, why not? (During the hearing, testimony indicated a record reply was in order.)

<u>Answer:</u> This question was not discussed during any deliberation of the Review or Steering Group. Moreover, this request was not discussed by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group nor presented to the Secretary of the Air Force for consideration. This type of request seems most appropriate for consideration during the screening period associated with base closures after those closures are approved. During the screening period, conducted immediately following closure approval, DoD organizations have priority to request real property.

<u>Page 5, Question 4:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, an alternative was received by the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group to consolidate the lab at Brooks Air Force Base to a Naval Installation in Orlando, Florida. Instead, the Air Force chose to relocate the lab to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

What was the Air Force's rationale for this action?

<u>Answer:</u> The rationale for the Air Force decision regarding the Brooks AFB receiver was (1) cost, (2) use of available capacity, and (3) consolidation of related activities. Specifically, because the LJCSG proposed relocation of part of Brooks AFB activities was to leased space, the LJCSG alternative would not use available DoD capacity and would be more costly than using existing Air Force capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB. Additionally, since the primary customer for the products and services of the Human Systems Center and Armstrong Lab are the activities at Wright-Patterson AFB (e.g., ASC and WL), the collocation made sense from a synergistic perspective.

<u>Page 5 Question 4a:</u> Why did the Air Force reject the alternative submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force did not reject the alternative submitted by the Lab Joint Group. Instead, the alternative was considered as one option, along with options involving Air Force sites as the consolidation receivers. For reasons of costs and compatibility, the Air Force option was selected. The Air Force's analysis of this alternative was consistent with the principle that Joint Group alternatives are provided for Service consideration, in parallel with broader Service considerations.

Test and Evaluation

<u>Page 6, Question 1:</u> <u>General Fogleman</u>, several studies have pointed out that great opportunities for reduction in the test and evaluation infrastructure exist in testing of high performance aircraft, test support aircraft, and electronic warfare testing. Do you believe the Air Force and Navy should combine activities such as Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center with China Lake Naval Weapons Center and Edwards Air Force Base?

<u>Answer:</u> No. Analysis of certified data indicates that both Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB and Naval Air Weapons Center, Patuxent River, are needed to support Air Vehicle Fixed-Wing T&E. We recognize the unique capabilities of many of the Test and Evaluation ranges, particularly relating to geographic or topographical characteristics. There are testing advantages to keeping a diversity of environments, e.g., water, beach, desert, and forest areas; low temperature, high temperature; and humid and arid areas. The Air Force has, over a long period of time, consolidated its Electronic Combat, Air Vehicle, and Armament/Weapons test activities into only a few locations. The resulting locations, such as Eglin AFB and Edwards AFB, represent full-service capabilities over the full life-cycle of components.

<u>Page 6, Question 2:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, regarding the realignment recommendation that would relocate electronic warfare capability from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base, did the Air Force consider an alternate proposal by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross Service Group that would have transferred certain Eglin missions to China Lake Naval Weapons Center?

<u>Answer:</u> No. The Test & Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-TE) chose to exclude "core" activities from its analysis for closure and realignment, limiting these activities to receiver status only. As a result, there was no JCSG-TE alternative to transfer any Eglin missions to China Lake. Some additional "core" activity options were presented by the JCSG-TE co-chairs. The Air Force did not analyze these options as no supporting analysis was provided. Our Air Force internal analysis, using Joint Group data and the Joint Group analysis plan on core activities, demonstrated that relocation of Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC) to NAWC (China Lake) from Eglin was not viable in terms of cost or capability. Further, relocation of only one portion of the Eglin AFB capabilities presented no benefits, and disrupted a consolidated, full-service test center.

Undergraduate Pilot Training

Page 6, Question 1: General Fogleman, what was the impact, if any, of basing considerations of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System on your BRAC 95 basing decisions? Will the final selection of a jet or prop Joint Primary Aircraft Training System aircraft affect your basing decisions? What Joint Primary Aircraft Training System selection criteria, such as range, airspace, and cross-wind limitations, were or were not considered as factors in your basing decision and why? This criteria is relevant, since Reese AFB, Texas was downgraded in these areas. Absent a decision on which JPAT aircraft candidate will be selected until this summer, and recognizing that the planned introduction of the JPAT into the Service's Pilot Training programs will not occur until 2001 and stretch over a decade, how much weight did JPAT considerations carry in your decision-making during this round?

Answer: The specific evaluation of the training capabilities of the pilot training installations was conducted by the Joint Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training. I have referred your questions to that Group. The Air Force accepted the functional values provided by the Joint Group and used an average of the Joint Group functional values for each installation as the basis for its Criterion I grading. In the evaluation of the other criteria, JPATS-related issues were not a factor.

<u>Page 7, Question 2:</u> <u>General Fogleman</u>, the Air Force selected Reese AFB, Texas as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training site, introduced the T-1 training aircraft there, and initiated the consolidation of Undergraduate Pilot Training with the Navy in a joint program there as well. Based on these decisions, many are of the impression that the Air Force places a high value on Reese AFB. Why has the Air Force now rated Reese so low in comparison to the other Undergraduate Pilot Training category bases?

<u>Answer</u>: The 1995 BRAC process included a Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training (JCSG-UPT) to evaluate the functional effectiveness of each UPT base to perform pilot training. The Air Force accepted the functional values derived by the JCSG-UPT as the basis for its Criterion I grading. All eight criteria were then examined to produce the tiering of Undergraduate Flying Training bases.

Reese AFB is a highly valuable pilot training base, as are all the Air Force pilot training bases. The selection for closure of any Air Force flying training will involve closure of an excellent installation. Nonetheless, using the evaluations of the Joint Group and the Air Force analysis provides a reliable means of retaining the most capable installations.

<u>Page 7, Question 2b:</u> Please explain the Air Force rationale for recommending the closing of Reese and transferring all of its aircraft, in particular, the newly introduced T-1 aircraft, along with the Joint Training Program, to Vance, Laughlin, and Columbus, when these bases have yet to transition to these programs, as opposed to leaving these assets in-place at Reese, and simply closing one of these other bases, and avoiding the need for these transfers altogether.

<u>Answer:</u> The costs of relocating all missions, aircraft, and personnel were included in the final COBRA analyses of Air Force recommendations. Those costs were not sufficient to warrant the selection for closure of a base other than Reese AFB. It should be noted that T-1 training is currently being performed at Randolph, Reese, and Laughlin AFBs. It will also be performed at Vance AFB this fall, and Columbus AFB in the spring of 1996. Each of these bases is fully capable and will to a great extent participate in the Joint Training Program.

Large Aircraft And Missile Systems

Page 8, Question 1a: General Fogleman, with the transfer of aircraft from Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is the Air Force reopening a closed base and adding infrastructure to the inventory?

Answer: The Air Force is not recommending that a closed base be reopened. MacDill AFB was not recommended for closure, but was realigned and provides the entire support for the two Unified Commands located there. The Air Force did recommend retention of the airfield as an active duty Air Force airfield, rather than transferring control to the Department of Commerce or other non-DoD agency.

The requirement for the Air Force to provide support for recently-validated Unified Command requirements substantially increases Air Force costs of airfield operations. There is no benefit to transferring the airfield if the Air Force must contribute approximately 95 percent of the airfield's operating costs. The proposed retention provides an opportunity to receive limited, compatible force structure. Closing the airfield at Malmstrom AFB removes infrastructure, and personnel overhead, roughly equal to that gained by the MacDill airfield action. In addition, placing tanker assets on MacDill airfield reduces a tanker shortage in the Southeastern United States. Both actions taken together provide a cost-effective means of providing necessary support to the Unified Commands and solving an operational issue, without increasing Air Force infrastructure. Each of these actions is exclusive and may be accomplished independently.

<u>Page 8, Question 1b:</u> Savings estimates from the previous BRAC recommendations will not be realized as a result of the new recommendation. Has this been taken into account in estimating the current savings?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, the manpower authorizations associated with the closure of the airfield at Malmstrom AFB will be used to establish Air Force operations on the airfield at MacDill AFB. If those manpower authorizations were not used, there would be a cost for the Air Force to run the airfield. Those costs, however, would be substantially the same as the Air Force costs that will be incurred to support the airfield if transferred to the Department of Commerce.

<u>Page 8, Question 1c:</u> How will additional cost savings be achieved by this action, as the current recommendation indicates?

<u>Answer:</u> The primary savings come from the fact that the Air Force will be paying for the operation of one airfield, MacDill (which it must now continue to operate to satisfy the recently validated Unified Command requirements), versus the current situation of operating two airfields, MacDill and Malmstrom.

<u>Page 8 Question 1d:</u> Why is the base being opened as an active component installation rather than a Reserve installation as recommended in 1993?

<u>Answer:</u> The 1993 recommendation was to temporarily operate the airfield until conversion to a civil airport. The AFRES unit which was to have operated the airfield was directed by the 1993 Commission to remain in a cantonment at Homestead AFB.

The 1995 recommendation reflects current force structure, operational considerations, and the 1993 Commission direction regarding the AFRES unit at Homestead ARB. . A scenario was considered which involved movement of an AFRES unit to the airfield, but the movement of the Malmstrom unit was considered more cost-effective, given the recommendation to close the Malmstrom airfield. Materials that document this decision were supplied to the Commission as part of the initial Air Force data submission.

Small Aircraft Bases

Page 8, Question 1a: Secretary Widnall, the Air Force has reduced its fighter aircraft force from 36 fighter wings at the end of the Cold War to the 20 wings now projected in your current Force Structure Plan. Simultaneously, it has reconfigured the size of the typical fighter wing from 72 to 54 aircraft, and the typical squadron from 24 to 18 aircraft. Similarly, the size of reserve units has also decreased. What was the Air Force's rationale for these smaller units?

Answer: In the past five years, the Air Force has structurally reorganized to achieve the deployment and employment flexibility and global forward presence necessary to deter or respond to aggression by any emerging threats in the Post Cold War era. As outlined in the Bottom Up Review, increases in reliability and maintainability of newer weapons systems, coupled with improved accuracy and lethality of precision weapons, allow us to field combat firepower of yesterday with fewer combat aircraft per wing. The higher number of smaller squadrons provides a 33 percent greater deployment and employment flexibility. Additionally, decreasing the squadron size helped mitigate the increased span of command and control for the squadron commander associated with integrating the flight line maintenance functions organically within the fighter squadrons. The additional manpower associated with more smaller squadrons was more than offset by the savings associated with restructuring maintenance within the flying squadrons and reorganizing our logistics from a three- to a two-level maintenance structure.

<u>Page 8, Question 1b:</u> In light of the excess capacity at fighter bases that results from smaller wings, would it be feasible to increase the number of squadrons assigned to a fighter wing, or the number of fighter wings assigned to a base?

<u>Answer:</u> When discussing excess capacity at fighter bases several factors beyond base facilities infrastructure must be considered. As we have modernized our forces, our peacetime as well as our wartime operations tempo (sorties per training day) have increased noticeably. This has increased the number of aircraft movements (takeoffs, landings, and practice approaches) per aircraft as well as the demand on our special use training airspace and ranges. These, as opposed to base facility infrastructure, are the factors that generally tend to limit the amount of aircraft that can be assigned to a particular base. Additionally, as we have downsized our force structure, we have also fielded weapons systems and munitions with increased target acquisition and delivery ranges which require larger volumes of airspace to meet effective training. Many of our fighter bases are currently operating at, or above, historical high water marks for PAA aircraft. Other fighter bases now support Composite Wing bases operating significant numbers of other types of aircraft. The imperative to maintain engine and avionic compatibility at the wing and base level to the maximum extent possible constrains force structure realignment opportunities. Finally, some reserve capacity in the small aircraft base category is desirable to provide the flexibility to return forces from overseas should future national policy so dictate. In short, the Air Force looked at the capacity of our small aircraft bases and concluded that, considering all the above factors, there was no operationally sound opportunity to achieve a base closure recommendation.

<u>Page 8, Question 1c:</u> Is it reasonable to assume if the fighter wing structure is realigned to 72 aircraft that more bases could be closed?

<u>Answer:</u> There are many factors that mitigate realigning our fighter wings to 72 aircraft. The Air Force organizes its forces to efficiently meet National Security imperatives, provide overseas forward presence, and preserve readiness of the force. Our overseas forward presence is dictated by and tailored to meet multiple bi- and multi-lateral international security arrangements. Additionally, the Air Force has tailored three CONUS Composite Wings to meet specific missionized rapid reaction response requirements. The wings, designed to meet specific requirements, are critical elements of our Post-Cold War era Air Force. Several of our small aircraft bases are operating at or above their historical high water mark for operations tempo. Four of our small aircraft bases are operating at approximately 75 percent of their operations tempo high water mark. Of these, two are F-15 bases and two are F-16 bases. The Air Force reviewed realignment options which would allow the recommendation for a base closure. All these options provided either mixed aircraft beddowns with logistical concerns or beddowns which significantly exceeded operations tempo capacity at one or more receiving bases.

<u>Page 9, Question 1d:</u> Was the wing size taken into consideration during the Air Force analysis of closure and recommendations?

<u>Answer:</u> The wing size was taken into consideration during the Air Force base closure deliberative process. Many of our wings have aircraft PAA in addition to that which is accounted for in the FWE force but that nonetheless contribute to the operations tempo at the base. For example, Seymour-Johnson AFB has 36 PAA TF-coded F-15Es and Shaw AFB and Davis-Monthan AFB have OA-10 aircraft embedded in A/OA-10 squadrons. The total flying force structure assigned to a base must be used in determining excess capacity available. After complete analysis, the Air Force stands by its recommendation to retain all its small aircraft bases.

<u>Page 9, Question 2:</u> <u>General Fogleman</u>, the current Force Structure Plan reduces the fighter aircraft inventory by six Fighter Wing Equivalents from 26 to 20 wings. During this drawdown, the Air Force has recommended closure of one small aircraft base, Homestead Air Force Base, in 1993. Can you explain why the Air Force has been unable to identify any additional small aircraft bases for closure despite this significant reduction in fighter aircraft? (This was discussed but a record response would amplify this issue.)

<u>Answer:</u> This answer was not provided by General Fogleman, due to his disqualification from participation in Air Force considerations of the Small Aircraft subcategory. The reduction from the Base Force of 26.5 Fighter Wing Equivalents to the Bottom Up Review Force of 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWEs) was accomplished by reducing the Active Component from 15.25 FWEs to 13 FWEs and the Reserve Component from 13.25 to 7 FWEs. In the Active Component reduction of 2.25 FWEs from the Base Force to the BUR Force, 1.0 FWE was reduced in Europe and 0.17 FWEs were reduced in the Pacific. The resulting CONUS Active Component reduction from the Base Force was slightly more than 1 FWE. In 1993, the Air Force recommended Homestead AFB, Florida for closure. The 1993 Commission included Homestead AFB in their closure recommendation to the President and it was subsequently approved for closure. Additionally, the Air Force has, subsequent to the Base Force, formed three missionized Composite Wings and collocated some TF-coded fighters and A/OA-10s not counted in the FWE force structure on fighter bases. This has resulted in near high water mark operations tempo at many of our small aircraft bases. As stressed previously, the Air Force analyzed closure scenarios for each small aircraft base in the bottom and middle tiers. No operationally sound or cost-effective option was revealed. The record of this analysis is contained in the minutes of the Base Closure Executive Group.

Hospital Issues

Page 10, Question 1: **Secretary Widnall, during Mr. Boatright's testimony, he indicated that the Air Force does not agree with the hospital bed requirement figure used by the Hospital Joint Cross Service Group.**

What is the correct figure for the Air Force's requirement for hospital beds in the United States?

Answer: The Air Force's operating bed requirement for peacetime support in the United States is 2255. This figure is based on workload demand and reflects a percentage of the average daily patient load at our medical facilities.

<u>Page 10, Question 1a:</u> Does this requirement figure take into consideration the capacities of the Army and Navy, as well as the contingency beds provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

<u>Answer:</u> No. Wartime, contingency operations and disaster casualty requirements include but exceed this baseline number. Expansion bed missions are in addition to this number. The number, therefore, is limited to Air Force, peacetime inpatient workload only and does not account for Army, Navy, Department of Veteran's Affairs or NDMS beds availability.

Page 10, Question 2:. Secretary Widnall, Mr Boatright also stated that the Air Force believes that hospital closure and realignment decisions are premature at this point and that they should follow this round of base closures and realignments.

Why didn't the Air Force develop a list of hospital closures and realignments that is predicated on the acceptance of the rest of the Air Force BRAC list?

Answer: Recommendation on the closure of medical treatment facilities are integral to the Air Force recommendations. However, not only Air Force but all DoD closures and realignments must be considered in order to develop a list such as that proposed by the Medical Joint Group. Mission transfers, with the associated personnel moves, will impact the health care delivery systems in all regions where a realignment or mission change associated with BRAC occurs. The Air Force has aggressively been sizing the Medical Service separate from the BRAC actions. During the period FY 94-96, the following actions have been or are planned to occur: Three hospitals have been downsized to clinics, 4 more are being evaluated, and 18 emergency rooms are being modified. Three obstetrics services have been closed, 1 is awaiting approval to close and 8 are being evaluated for closure. Strategic Resourcing has reduced manpower requirements by 10 percent and 1,050 operating beds have been reduced. Joint staffing has been initiated at 5 MTFs and is being considered at 2 more. AFMS Medical Force Review has been initiated to identify the baseline medical readiness needs with an estimated completion date of May 95. Finally, the Strategic Resourcing process, initiated for the first time in Dec 94, is designed to size our medical facilities based on the most economical source of care for our total beneficiary population. This process will continue to drive proper sizing of the AFMS into the next century. The vast majority of proposed actions can be accomplished without resort to BRAC.

Page 10, Question 3: **Secretary Widnall, Mr. Boatright testified that hospitals can be closed and realigned outside of the BRAC process.**

While this is likely to be true for small and medium hospitals, is it true for large hospitals?

Answer: Closing or realigning even large hospitals would likely not break the BRAC thresholds. In addition, since only portions of those hospitals would be relocated, there is even less likelihood that a BRAC threshold would be broken.

<u>Page 10, Question 3a:</u> Does the Air Force intend to address the potential cost effectiveness of realigning large hospitals, such as the three medical centers identified by the joint cross service group?

<u>Answer:</u> Yes, but not through the BRAC process. Strategic Resourcing is being developed to address present and future resource requirements of the total AFMS. This process considers the total MILPERS and Direct Care dollars (O&M, CHAMPUS) required to operate a medical facility in each catchment area. The decision process will include a cost comparison of the sources of care, quality considerations, and access impacts. The goal of the entire process is to ensure that the most cost effective source of high quality, appropriate access to care is provided to our beneficiary population. Since medical facilities are being closed at bases being closed or realigned under BRAC, the Air Force is realizing a substantial reduction in medical facilities. Through Strategic Resourcing the remaining medical facilities will be rightsized based on cost effectiveness.

Page 10, Question 4: **Secretary Widnall, how did the Air Force consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel, retirees, and their family members remaining in the area of hospitals to be closed?**

Answer: Statutory requirements dictate that a joint services working group shall solicit the views of persons adversely affected by installation closures and realignments on the issue of suitable substitutes for furnishing health care. In most cases, no hospital or clinic will remain after the closure or major realignment of an installation.

Economic Impact

<u>Page 11, Question 1</u>: <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, how did you assess the impact of your closure and realignment recommendations on existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure? Please elaborate. What factors were considered?

<u>Answer</u>: As a general rule, AF active installations are located adjacent to communities that provide outstanding support. In rating community support, we were faced with the difficult task of distinguishing the best of the best. Nevertheless, we approached the evaluation of community support in a very systematic fashion. We adopted essentially the same process and factors for BRAC-95 as used for BRAC-93 to evaluate the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, mission and people. In evaluating Criterion VII, the AF Base Closure Executive Group(BCEG) assessed a number of factors. Nine factors--referred to as subelements--were evaluated: Availability of Housing, Transportation, Shopping, and Recreation; Quality of Education and Medical Services; Proximity to Metro Area; Likelihood of Obtaining Employment and Local Crime Rates. Questions and corresponding grading elements (or goalposts) were developed by the BCEG to assess a community's capability to meet AF needs relative to the nine subelements. The BCEG used an objective, color coded rating scale in order to quantify specific data points relative to the established criterion; "green" represented the highest capability, yellow less so, and red the lowest. Weights were assigned and an overall score was mathematically derived for each installation. Of the 43 active bases evaluated, 18 received ratings of G-; 16-Y+; and 9-Y. The overall Criterion VII grades were considered by the BCEG in the tiering process, and were reviewed by the Secretary of the Air Force.

Environmental Impact

<u>Page 11, Question 1:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, according to DoD Guidance, "environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations."

Were any bases not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems? Please elaborate.

<u>Answer:</u> Environmental restoration costs at Air Force bases were not considered in closure cost calculations. There were no unique contamination problems which caused any base to be excluded from closure or realignment consideration or recommendation.

Page 11, Question 2: Secretary Widnall, did the overall cost of environmental restoration at all bases affect the size of the list presented to the Commission?

Answer: The Air Force has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed, realigned or remains open. The overall cost of environment and restoration did not affect the decision to recommend a base for closure or realignment. In the case of depot installations, although the recommendation to consider a downsizing option was based only on COBRA-related expenses, a further analysis of the impact of environmental restoration expenses at depot installations further supported the wisdom of the downsizing approach.

Page 11, Question 3: Secretary Widnall, DoD policy also states that "unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse." Were any installations eliminated from closure consideration due to unique contamination problems? If so please elaborate.

Answer: No.

Page 11, Question 4a: Secretary Widnall, in making closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

Answer: Environmental compliance was considered in the overall analysis. Compliance costs were factored into the COBRA model. Compliance costs in COBRA may be savings associated with a closure, or may be costs incurred at a receiving location.

To the extent that air quality concerns are viewed as environmental compliance issues, there was considerable attention given. Air Quality was a Criterion II subelement, and included analysis of attainment status, current restrictions, and restrictions on future growth.

Air Quality issues were also considered when selecting potential receiver bases in closure scenarios. Receivers that held the prospect of difficulty in achieving a positive conformity determination were generally not used in the scenarios.

<u>Page 12, Question 4b:</u> Did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis?

<u>Answer:</u> Expansion potential (capacity) was looked at to determine if any environmental issue (e.g., threatened or endangered species, unique habitat, etc.) could constrain the existing or future mission. Although there are identified constraints on some Air Force installations, in no instance did these constraints impact on a decision to close or realign and installation. Constraints were considered in the evaluation of Criteria VIII grading, as well as the Air Quality portion of Criterion II.

<u>Page 12, Question 4c:</u> Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

<u>Answer:</u> The attainment status of the area in which an installation is located formed a portion of the Criterion II grade for that installation. In addition, air quality issues were considered in selecting receivers when developing potential closure scenarios for analysis.

Bases in nonattainment areas received further analysis to determine the affect on capacity. The Clean Air Act Amendments mandate that when the Federal government proposes any action in an area designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as nonattainment, with reference to National Ambient Air Quality Standards, it must document that the impact of those actions conform to the purpose of the applicable State or Federal implementation plan. Force structure moves are considered Federal actions, whether resulting from a base closure or realignment.

The conformity analysis examines the impacts of foreseeable direct and indirect emissions created only from the proposed action. It must also demonstrate, by EPA standards, that the Federal action will not cause or contribute to new violations of any national air quality standard in the nonattainment area, nor increase the frequency or severity of an existing violation. The impact of the action is determined with respect to the nonattainment status of the entire air quality district, not just its immediate vicinity.

The necessity of a conformity analysis alone does not bar a Federal action. Conformity may be shown after analysis, or the emissions associated with the action may be viewed as de minimis. Even where the action by itself might violate conformity, mitigation measures may be implemented which, when coupled with the action, will achieve positive conformity.

When considering receivers for closure scenarios, the BCEG reviewed conformity issues. If a base appeared to be unable to accept a mission due to conformity issues, other receivers were selected for the closure scenarios.

Page 12, Question 5a: Secretary Widnall, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

Answer: At the twenty-seven Air Force bases closed under the 1988 and 1990 BRAC Realignment and Closure Laws, we have 80,409 acres available for reuse. While cleanup activities are required on 36,703 of these acres, there are no "unique" contamination problems preventing us from transferring these acres when remedial actions are in-place. Right now, most of these remedies will be in-place by end of FY 97 for BRAC '88 bases, by end of FY 99 for BRAC '91 bases, and by end of FY 2001 for BRAC 93 bases. This will "free up" most of the property on the 27 installations for transfer by deed.

<u>Page 12, Question 5b:</u> How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

<u>Answer:</u> Caretaker requirements are currently programmed through FY 2001 as we expect to have to maintain facilities until cleanup remedies are in place and longer if reuse of some parcels occurs beyond FY 2001.

<u>Page 12, Question 6:</u> <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration. Do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?

<u>Answer:</u> We do not believe there are necessarily substantial differences between the cleanup costs at a closing base as compared to an active base. Our experience shows that the costs to complete cleanups are much better defined at closure bases because more dollars have been invested in completing investigations, hence the real cost of cleanup is more clearly understood. In some cases, costs are not increased, but are expended more rapidly. This acceleration of expenses has budgetary impact. We do not believe the environmental costs should be considered in the cost to close an installation because these are dollars we have to expend regardless of whether the base closes or remains open.

Air Force Space Command Bases

Page 12, Question 1a: General Fogleman, The Secretary of Defense recommended realignment of the Onizuka Air Force Station, including the inactivation of the 750th Space Group and moving its functions to Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, and relocation of Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center to Falcon Air Force Base. What are the projected future Air Force satellite control requirements and how do they differ from current requirements?

Answer: In the past, dual satellite control nodes were deemed essential. The current Air Force policy concerning the degree of duplication required to protect satellite operations has changed. In the past, an entire alternate satellite control node was required. Presently, requirements only call for duplicate communication infrastructure at a geographically separated site. We plan to meet this requirement by adding communication capabilities to the existing infrastructure.

<u>Page 13, Question 1b:</u> In the Space-Satellite Subcategory, what percent of excess capacity currently exists at Onizuka Air Station?

<u>Answer:</u> Currently, there is no excess capacity at Onizuka Air Station. Existing facility shortfalls are met by leasing facility space off station. However, there is excess capacity in the category. It was this excess capacity that had to be addressed and which resulted in the recommendation related to Onizuka AFB.

<u>Page 13, Question 1b.1:</u> Based on projected future Air Force satellite control requirements, what percent of excess capacity is expected to be found at Onizuka Air Station

<u>Answer:</u> Although an excess of one satellite control node was identified in the Air Force process, this excess was not associated with a particular base. Either Onizuka AS or Falcon AFB could support Air Force control node requirements.

Page 13, Question 1b.2: **Does realignment of Onizuka Air Station leave sufficient capacity to adequately support projected future requirements?**

Answer: Yes.

Page 13, Question 1c: **If the Air Force has one more Satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future requirements, then why did the Air Force not recommend closing Onizuka Air Station?**

Answer: Onizuka AFS is required to support tenant missions beyond the year 2001 that are not cost effective to relocate to another location. The Air Force's vision is to downsize Onizuka AFS by reliance on contract or civilian operations. It is anticipated that Onizuka AFB will eventually close as tenant missions phase out.

<u>Page 13, Question 1c.1:</u> What other tenants would be affected by a decision to close the facility?

<u>Answer:</u> Discussion of this subject requires an appropriate security classification.

Air Reserve Components

<u>Page 13, Question 1</u>: <u>Secretary Widnall</u>, during the 1993 base closing process, the Air Force identified the basing of Air Reserve Component units as an issue that would be addressed during this round. Further, the size of Air Reserve Component units has recently been reduced. How have you addressed the Air Reserve Component during this round of base closure?

<u>Answer:</u> The base closure and realignment process evaluates Air Force installations, both active and reserve, against the eight selection criteria and the force structure requirements. The Air Force subdivided the Air Force Reserve mission into four weapon system groups: Fighter, Strategic Airlift, Aerial Refueling (Tankers), and Tactical Airlift. Each group was analyzed using the eight criteria, and cost effective closures and realignments identified and analyzed. Two Reserve bases were recommended for closure (Bergstrom ARB, TX and Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS, PA). Additionally, four other Reserve units will be impacted by the current Air Force recommendations.

The Air National Guard (ANG) operates on a cost effective basis on a large number of civilian airfields. We examined ANG bases for cost effective opportunities that made sense for relocation to active Air Force bases as recommended by the Secretary of Defense's kick-off memorandum. Generally, it is impractical for ANG units to cross state lines. The new location's capacity analysis and recruiting factors were also taken into consideration. The Air Force recommended a number of closures of Air Guard Stations, including several that were stand alone installations (North Highland, CA; Ontario AGS, CA), and others that were in leased space at other airfields (Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA; Greater Pittsburgh AGS, PA; Roslyn AGS, NY).

<u>Page 13, Question 1b:</u> How have opportunities to consolidate reserve squadrons been affected by reductions in the size of Air Reserve component units?

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force Reserve looked for opportunities to consolidate force structure and reduce overall operating costs. The reductions in the size of units reduced the costs of consolidating aircraft such as C-130s from closed units to bases where we previously had a like number of aircraft (Peterson AFB, CO) and at a base where the capacity analysis showed that no military construction (MILCON) would be required (Dobbins ARB, GA). This resulted in an opportunity for the Air Force Reserve to achieve savings.

The Air National Guard (ANG) is a community-based defense force. Therefore, it is imperative the ANG maintain a presence in the communities throughout the nation. Further consolidations of ANG units will erode the importance and magnitude needed to maintain that community based support. Also, with the present force structure, it is still economically viable to retain existing ANG units rather than to combine ANG fighter units. Several units would be at or beyond their maximum capacity if required to absorb additional force structure from overseas or from the active Air Force inventory; therefore, further opportunities to consolidate were not presented.

<u>Page 14, Question 2:</u> <u>General Fogleman</u>, the Air Force is recommending the transfer of a few Air National Guard units to larger active and reserve bases, such as McClellan and March Air Force Bases in California. Also, the Air Force has recommended the closure of the Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station and the realignment of its eight C-130 aircraft to two other Reserve units. The justification for this action states, "The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 aircraft operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan." However, there are many Air Reserve Component units that were not recommended for consolidation. For example, no major Air National Guard unit (as identified in Appendix VI of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations) was identified for closure or realignment? Since there appears to be considerable savings to be gained by this type of consolidation of resources, what opportunities exist for further consolidations throughout the Air Reserve Component, especially in the fighter force structure where there have been reductions in the size of the units?

<u>Answer:</u> As the Air Force analysis demonstrates, the Air Force considered a number of closure scenarios involving Reserve or Guard installations. The record also supports the decision involving each potential closure scenario. All reasonably cost-effective and operationally sound closure opportunities were recommended for implementation. Many of the fighter units were located at airports or other locations in very cost-effective situations, such that closures or movements would have been very costly or would have produced lengthy payback periods.

<u>Page 14, Question 2b</u>: What distinguished the Air Reserve Component units from the Air Force recommended for relocation to other bases as candidates for this action?

<u>Answer:</u> After consideration of the eight selection criteria, the final determination of actions related to ARC bases typically rested on cost-effectiveness, recruiting and retention considerations, and opportunities to consolidate at other locations.

<u>Page 14, Question 2c:</u> Why was the Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport not identified for relocation in light of the fact the Air Force Reserve unit at the same location was recommended for relocation.

<u>Answer</u>: The Air National Guard unit at Pittsburgh International Airport is not collocated with the Air Reserve unit. It is located across the runway from the Air Reserve unit. The ANG unit operates cost effectively and independently of the Air Force Reserve unit. There are no other locations within the State of Pennsylvania to which this unit could be economically relocated.

<u>Page 14, Question 2d:</u> Since the Air National Guard unit will remain at Pittsburgh International Airport, how will this affect the closure of the Air Force Reserve station at the airport?

<u>Answer:</u> The closure of the C-130 unit at Pittsburgh IAP will have little, if any, effect on the Air National Guard KC-135 unit also located at the airport. Likewise, the continued operations of the Air National Guard unit will have little, if any, effect on the closure of the Air Force Reserve Station.

Congressional Questions for the Record

Rep Boehlert (NY)

<u>Page 15, Question 1:</u> In last weeks testimony before this commission, Defense Secretary Perry described Lowry Air Force Base's reuse plan as a successful consequence of the BRAC process. In the BRAC 95 process, did you consider the communities' reuse plans as a result of previous BRAC closure or realignment decisions? Should already completed , well developed reuse planning efforts be a part of subsequent BRAC decisions?

<u>Answer:</u> There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

<u>Page 15, Question 2:</u> As you know, Griffiss Air Force Base was realigned as part of BRAC 1993. During that process the Air Force stated in a letter to the commission that "the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory within the next five years." Since then the community has united behind a reuse plan with the lab as its linchpin. Was the impact to the community's reuse plan taken into consideration in the decision to close Rome Lab?

<u>Answer:</u> There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

At the time of the referenced letter, the Air Force had no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory. The recommendation to close Rome Laboratory is a direct result of the 1995 BRAC analysis.

<u>Page 15, Question 3:</u> How does the Air Force define interservicing? How was interservicing applied to Air Force labs in total? How did the Air Force apply interservicing to C3I labs?

<u>Answer:</u> Interservicing can take a variety of forms - from collocation of activities to assignment of individuals to joint activities to transfer of responsibility for the function to a single service. The Air Force agreed with the LJCSG and recommended C3I interservicing in the laboratory category consisting of the relocation of a portion of Rome Laboratory to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, for eventual integration with the Army Laboratory. During the BRAC 95 analysis process, other Air Force laboratory activities were offered for interservicing but were not accepted.

<u>Page 15, Question 4:</u> What criteria did the LJCSG use to determine if excess capacity existed in its labs? In the Air Force, where and to what extent does excess capacity in labs exist?

<u>Answer:</u> Without addressing the method used by the LJCSG, the capacity review was based on man-years, based on demonstrated available capacity versus future requirements. The briefing on lab capacity was provided in the BCEG minutes for the November 9, 1994, meeting. Those minutes note the difficulty of attempting to define a capacity reduction targets because of the diversity in size and variety of missions among the lab facilities. A total of 2,806 man-years of excess lab capacity were identified.

<u>Page 15, Question 5:</u> Having received the highest ranking of its labs, why did the Air Force decide that Rome Lab was one to be slated for closure?

<u>Answer:</u> Rome Lab did not receive the highest ranking of Air Force Labs. Rather, it was placed in the top tier based on preliminary analysis. Subsequently, the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group requested the Air Force to analyze Rome Lab for closure. We found significant costs that could be avoided by an innovative sharing of the Rome Lab activities between Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth. An additional advantage is increased inter-service cooperation. In contrast to the level-playing field analysis in which the tiering was based, we found cost-effective options for a Rome Lab closure after reviewing in depth the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation.

Representative Combest (Tx)

Ranking of Bases

<u>Page 16, Question 1</u>: The Air Force rated Reese Air Force Base number two among five UPT bases in 1991. What has changed at Reese or at other bases that would make the Air Force rank Reese AFB last, well below its other UPT bases in the 1995 analysis?

<u>Answer:</u> In 1991, the Air Force closed Williams AFB because it was clearly ranked below the retained UPT bases. The information regarding Reese AFB's ranking as #2 cannot be substantiated and did not come from Air Force analysis. There was no tiering done by the Air Force in 1991 to indicate any such ranking. The Pilot Training Subcategory, of which Reese AFB was a member, was excluded from consideration in 1993 based upon capacity analysis. Tiering in 1995 placed bases in one of three tiers to show relative value of the bases to the Air Force. There was no ranking within the tiers.

During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. The JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base for several pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) against measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for undergraduate flying training.

In many cases, changes in force structure, facilities, measures of merit, and the cross-service evaluation of categories resulted in different outcomes from previous rounds.

Quality of Life

<u>Page 16, Question 1:</u> Reese AFB is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in AETC for base of assignment. Obviously, they think that the Quality of Life at Reese is better than that at other UPT bases. Why would the Air Force ignore this very clear Quality of Life indicator and recommend Reese AFB for closure?

<u>Answer</u>: Aspects of community support important to military members and their families are measured in the Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

<u>Page 16, Question 2</u>: With respect to educational opportunities, Reese AFB in Lubbock Texas is rated below Vance AFB in Enid, Oklahoma. Are you aware that Enid, Oklahoma has one private university with a permanent enrollment of over 700 students? Lubbock, Texas has two private universities, a private college, and Texas Technical University with a permanent enrollment of over 17,000 students, nine undergraduate schools, two graduate schools, and a 1 million volume library. Knowing that one of the important features of an assignment for our highly skilled officer pilots and their talented spouses is the availability of graduate education programs, how is it that the Air Force rated Vance AFB higher than Reese AFB in educational opportunities?

<u>Answer:</u> The Education subelement under Criterion VII consists of measuring and grading Pupil Teacher Ratio, Four Year Programs, Honors Programs, College Attendance, and Off-base Education. Reese AFB scored a Red for Pupil Teacher Ratio (Greater than 30 to 1 Pupil to Teacher Ratio in Grades K-12). Reese received Green grades for the remaining elements within the Education subelement, for an overall grade of Green Minus. Vance AFB received all Greens with the exception of a Yellow grade for College Attendance. Vance received an overall Green grade in Education, while Reese's overall grade was Green Minus. The details of the Criteria VII analysis, including data, subelements, and weighted grades are provided in the base questionnaire and the Air Force Report, Volume V of the DoD Report.

Operations

<u>Page 16, Question 1</u>: Reese AFB was the choice of the Air Force, the Navy, and the DoD for implementation of Joint Undergraduate Primary Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training of the Air Force. How is it that the Air Force, now in 1995, rates its capability in all of these areas as less than that of Columbus, Randolph, and Vance AFB's?

<u>Answer:</u> All UPT bases underwent a qualitative analysis in regard to Airlift/Tanker and Maritime functional aspects of pilot training. In fact, each base was examined for many functional areas. Measures of merit were derived to judge the effectiveness of each base in each functional area, with the measures weighted slightly differently for the different functions. When the analysis was complete, Reese AFB ranked last by the JCSG-UPT in the Primary and Airlift/Tanker functional areas, and ahead of only Laughlin AFB in the Maritime training function. These analyses were based on data requested by the JCSG-UPT and certified at the base, Major Command and Air Staff levels in accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan.

<u>Page 17, Question 2</u>: Reese and Laughlin AFB's have fully implemented T-1 training and have completed all the facility construction necessary to support that training. Did the Air Force consider the fact that Vance AFB has not implemented T-1 training and has not yet built the necessary T-1 facilities?

<u>Answer:</u> Military construction is currently ongoing at Vance AFB to prepare for the arrival of the T-1 aircraft. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as savings if they were programmed in 1996 or beyond.

<u>Page 17, Question 3</u>: Did you consider the savings that would accrue from stopping construction and implementation of the T-1 program at Vance?

<u>Answer:</u> No. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as a savings if there were programmed funds in 1996 or beyond. A review of the COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis reveals no MILCON cost avoidance.

<u>Page 17, Question 4</u>: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

<u>Page 17, Question 5</u>: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

<u>Page 17, Question 6</u>: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighing total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

<u>Answer</u>: Since this question addresses the internal deliberations of the UPT Joint Group, it will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

Previous Rankings

<u>Page 17, Question 1</u>: In the 1991 Base Closure round, Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training bases were reviewed and Reese AFB was rated very highly - number two out of five Air Force bases. What accounts for this disparity?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not rank the UPT bases in 1991 and cannot substantiate the claimed ranking. However, each round of base closures is independent of other rounds. Different methods of analysis, refined data, changes at the installation level, and force structure changes contribute to a variance in grading from one round to the next.

Page 17, Question 2: The Air Force itself and the DoD have placed great confidence in Reese AFB by choosing it as: the first base to implement Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first base to receive the new T-1 airlift/tanker training aircraft; the first and only base to implement the Air Force's portion of Joint Primary Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first and only base to do Joint Maritime Training for the Navy in the T-1; and Reese is the Air Force's choice as the first base to receive the new JPATS aircraft. Why would the Air Force want to close its premier UPT base?

Answer: During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. A JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training was chartered to consider cross-service evaluations of UPT bases. The JCSG used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base against a number of pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) using measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for pilot training. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group accepted the JCSG functional value analysis as the basis for the Air Force's Criterion I score. However, the subsequent tiering accomplished by the BCEG was based on an evaluation of all eight DoD criteria. This tiering was provided to the SECAF, who also reviewed the eight criteria grades and data. In addition to the Air Force analysis, the SECAF reviewed the JCSG-UPT alternatives that included the closure of the UPT function at Reese AFB in each alternative.

Page 18, Question 3: The Air Force analysis rates Reese below three UPT bases (Columbus, Randolph, and Vance) in its ability to perform Primary, Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training. If this is the case, why did the Air Force choose Reese as the first base to perform joint training with the Navy in all three of these categories?

Answer: The analysis referred to was accomplished by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT. The initiation of joint UPT activities significantly preceded BRAC '95 and was the beginning of a joint initiative to consolidate all primary pilot training activities. Reese AFB was just the first of all UPT bases that will participate in such joint activity.

Quality of Life

<u>Page 18, Question 1</u>: Reese AFB is the number one choice of preference for base assignment of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Force's AETC (confirmed in a statement to the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 2, 1995). This kind of choice is made on the basis of Quality of Life. Why would the Department of Defense, newly committed to stressing "people over programs" (John Deutch, 09/94), want to close the base that its personnel rate as the best for Quality of Life?

<u>Answer</u>: Aspects of community support that are important to military members and their families are measured in Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

Page 18, Response to Commentary: Reese and Vance received overall Green Minus grades for the Transportation subelement under Criterion VII. Within the subelement of Transportation, Reese AFB received a Red grade for Public Transportation, and Green grades for the other subelements. The Red grade resulted from the lack of regularly-scheduled public transportation to the base. Vance AFB was graded Green for all of the Transportation subelement, with the exception of a Red for Municipal Airport Carriers. The overall grade reflected a "roll-up" of these grades. Since both bases had three Greens and one Red, and the weighting of these two subelements was equal, both bases received the same overall grade for Transportation.

Operations - Airspace

<u>Page 18, Question not numbered</u>: Airspace is one area that was weighted very heavily during this round's analysis. We are firmly convinced that Reese AFB has access to adequate airspace to do its mission and it is unthreatened by encroachment. We are concerned that sheer volume of airspace owned and controlled by each base was emphasized and that usability was not adequately considered. Some bases may own/control more airspace than Reese in terms of sheer volume, however, much of their airspace is unusable for basic Undergraduate Pilot Training. Reese has readily available visual routes and alternate training fields.

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT. The Air Force process did analyze airspace encroachment under Criterion II. All Air Force UPT bases received a Green score under Encroachment except Randolph AFB, which received a Green Minus.

Savings

<u>Page 19, Question not numbered</u>: The objective of any BRAC process is to save our tax dollars. Reese's T-1 program is fully implemented with all facilities in place. Vance AFB is still constructing their T-1 hangar. Stopping construction would save MILCON dollars.

<u>Answer</u>: COBRA cost analysis would consider any halt to MILCON projects as a savings, if the costs were programmed in 1996 or later. Review of COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis at Vance shows no MILCON savings.

Sen Santorum (PA)

<u>Page 19, Question 1:</u> The DoD justification for closure of the Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station was that, "although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective in supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields." Can you tell me what exactly are the components of "operating costs?"

<u>Answer:</u> The following are components of Base Operating Support: Public Affairs; Ground Safety; Administration; Contracting; Comptroller/Budget; CBPO; Civilian Personnel; Supply/Fuels; Transportation; Security/Law Enforcement; Civil Engineering; Fire Protection; MWR; Services/Billeting; Base Operations; Aircrew Life Support; Disaster Preparedness.

<u>Page 19, Question 2:</u> Are the costs associated with successfully manning at 110% considered relative to other bases which are below 100% total manning?

<u>Answer:</u> The costs were compiled for requirements, not assigned personnel. This ensures that all organizations are equally evaluated using the same criteria.

<u>Page 19, Question 3:</u> Are the costs incurred in maintaining a higher state of readiness (exercise, contingency, and humanitarian deployments, etc.) held against the unit in computing "operating costs?"

<u>Answer:</u> No. The operating costs that are considered are fixed irrespective of operations of the unit. The costs are related to the unit's facilities and operating location arrangements.

Rep Hansen (UT)

Page 19, Question 1: Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration, foreclosure, or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistics Centers that would keep McClellan open?

Answer: No.

Rep Tejeda (TX)

<u>Page 19, Question 1:</u> In 1993, the Air Force excluded three bases in the Industrial/Technical Support Category-Product Center and Laboratory Subcategory from further consideration for closure/realignment. Those bases were Brooks AFB, Hanscom AFB, and Los Angeles AFB. The Air Force stated that, "...there is not sufficient excess capacity to close any of these bases without replicating a significant portion of these facilities.. at another location. The cost to do this is prohibitive." What has changed in the past two years that the Air Force now recommends closing Brooks AFB and moving Armstrong Lab and the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine to Wright-Patterson AFB?

<u>Answer</u>: Since BRAC 93, the Air Force has been required to absorb major personnel reductions in its acquisition and sustainment workforce. In addition, the work of the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group provided a much more refined analysis for evaluating the excess capacity of DoD laboratory facilities. Finally, excess capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB provides a cost-effective beddown of the activities from Brooks AFB.

Rep Scarborough (FL)

Page 20, Question 1: The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a Master Plan for the final disposition of all Electronic Combat (EC) facilities before relocating any EC equipment or making any EC realignments. How does the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations to move eight EC threat simulators and two EC pod systems from Eglin Air Force Base, as well as the movement of REDCAP and AFEWES equipment to Edwards Air Force Base, comply with this Congressional directive?

Answer: This question will be referred to OSD for response, since it concerns the OSD recommendation and consideration of Authorization Bill provisions.

Representative Montgomery (MS)

Page 20, Question 1: The Navy testified on March 6, 1995 that there was excess capacity at Air Training Stations. If the pilot training rate is the same for both services in the year 2001 and the Air Force is transferring substantial numbers of Air Force flight officers to the Navy, and the Navy is going from five Air Training Bases to three, how is it that the Air Force can now have after BRAC 95, seven Air Training Bases that include the two additional Air Force Bases conducting flight screening?

Answer: The Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) recommendations for undergraduate flying training reflect sizing by several independent methods. The UPT JCSG determined the infrastructure needed to support total DoD requirements. The Air Force and the Navy completed independent analyses which confirmed they each retained the appropriate level of resources. The Department of the Navy specifically stated it did not need additional training capability. Several facts bear explanation.

There is no single number which represents a "pilot training rate". For example, the JCSG estimated rotary-wing aircraft use less than 20% of the infrastructure of light fixed-wing aircraft per flying operation. In 2001, the rotary-wing track represents about 44% of the Navy-generated advanced track requirements, and less than 4% of Air Force-generated requirements. Primary training (which includes the Navy's T-34 primary and intermediate tracks) is the most directly comparable. The Air Force and Navy are moving toward consolidation in primary training and are exchanging students on a one-to-one basis. Their rotary-wing students as well as fixed-wing students complete primary training. In primary, the Air Force "pilot training rate" is about 30% higher than the Navy rate. Additionally, about a third of the Navy's students only complete 66 hours of primary flight training rather than the 92 hours their counterparts fly. All Air Force students complete the entire track.

Counting "bases" also requires some caveats. The flight screening locations are unsuitable for undergraduate pilot training. Their prospective closure offers limited savings or payback

potential. For example, the Air Force contract flight screening operation at Hondo, Texas, uses the airfield under a no-fee lease. The JCSG considered flight screening sites as outlying fields, not as "bases". This brings a more accurate post BRAC count to five Air Force bases and three Navy bases. Shepherd AFB represents a unique training activity that provides training to a number of foreign aviation students and a limited number of USAF students. Randolph AFB provides no undergraduate pilot training, but instead provides navigation and pilot instructor training. Air Force primary pilot training is accomplished at only four bases, and the 1995 recommendation would decrease this by 25 percent. Also of note, while the Navy realigned the NAS Corpus Christi UPT mission, they retained the runway and airspace capacity. In fact, they propose to extend one NAS Corpus Christi runway to further increase capacity to service NAS Kingsville UPT requirements.

In summary, the BRAC recommendations reflect a confluence of joint and Service analyses. The Air Force and the Navy have retained the infrastructure they require to accomplish their respective missions.

New Mexico Delegation

<u>Page 21, Question 1:</u> How much money was appropriated for military construction at Kirtland AFB for fiscal years 1994 and 1995? How does this compare with other Air Force bases and facilities, scheduled for closure or realignment in the 1995 BRAC?

<u>Answer</u>: In FY94 Air Force military construction appropriated for Kirtland AFB was $35.1M. For FY95 the amount was $10.5M, for a total for the two years of $45.6M. Military construction at all other Air Force bases recommended for closure or realignment in this Commission for both FY94 and FY95 is $164.4M. I must emphasize that in the vast majority of these cases this military construction funding remains necessary and a high priority because it is taking place at realigned bases.

<u>Page 21, Question 2:</u> According to the Air Force's proposal for the 1995 BRAC, Kirtland AFB has tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, which will require continued support. Would there exist recurring costs if the Air Force had transferred the Space and Missile Systems Center and Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB and closed Los Angeles Air Force Base.

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force examined a closure of Los Angeles AFB, but determined that this was not a viable option due to a loss of its interconnectivity with the aerospace community and excessive costs for the savings. Since no focused analysis was accomplished on the closure of Los Angeles AFB with a move to Kirtland AFB, that information is unavailable.

<u>Page 21, Question 3:</u> Is there any plan in existence determining which facilities at Kirtland AFB, to be abandoned as a result of realignment, will be turned over to other government agencies or private enterprise? Will the existing fence perimeter be altered?

<u>Answer:</u> The details of property disposal, transfer, and reuse will be worked out in a cooperative process among the Air Force, the community, and the remaining activities at Kirtland AFB. The goal of that process will be to effectively and efficiently accommodate the needs of all affected parties. The issue of the fence perimeter will be addressed in that process.

<u>Page 21, Question 4:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, had the Air Force consulted with DOE as to the effect of realignment on the Department's nuclear deterrence mission and/or the fiscal impact of the realignment of the DOE with respect to nuclear deterrence programs? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE? Was the response in writing?

<u>Answer:</u> The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with DOE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

<u>Page 22, Question 5:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, had the Air Force consulted with DOE or Sandia National Laboratories as to the effect of realignment on Sandia National Laboratories? Did the Air Force receive any response from the DOE or Sandia? Was the response in writing?

<u>Answer:</u> The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult informally with DOE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

<u>Page 22, Question 6:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with all of Kirtland's scheduled remaining tenants, both Air Force and non-Air Force, about the effect of the realignment on their respective missions and the fiscal cost to them of the realignment? Did the Air Force receive any responses? Were they in writing?

<u>Answer:</u> The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with some agencies, both Air Force and non-Air Force, during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on those agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

<u>Page 22, Question 7:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with the Department of Veteran's Affairs about the effect of no longer supporting the joint Air Force-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Albuquerque? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force did not consult with the Department of Veteran's Affairs prior to submitting its recommendations to the Department of Defense. The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with some agencies, both Air Force and non-Air Force, during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on those agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

<u>Page 22, Question 8:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the SECDEF, did the Air Force consult with the City of Albuquerque on the effect of the withdrawal of the Air Force crash-fire support to the Albuquerque International Airport? Did the Air Force receive any response? Was it in writing?

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force did not consult with the City of Albuquerque prior to making its recommendations to the Department of Defense. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with those affected by the Kirtland recommendation to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

<u>Page 22, Question 9:</u> By the date that the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendations were sent to the Secretary of Defense, did the Air Force consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy about the effect of removing the Field Command of the Defense Nuclear Agency from Kirtland? Did the Air Force receive any response from the Assistant to the Secretary? Did he address the adverse impact on DNA's mission of separating the Field Command from DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office and Sandia and Los Alamos Laboratories?

<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force did not consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy concerning its recommendations at Kirtland. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

The Air Force Special Assistant for Base Closure and Transition contacted senior leadership in DNA relative to the proposed Air Force action at Kirtland AFB. Air Force was advised by DNA that relocation was not as preferred as remaining at Kirtland but could be accomplished in a workable manner with a small contingent remaining as liaison with DOE. Impacts on DNA's mission were discussed and weighed.

<u>Page 23, Question 10:</u> Was it appropriate to categorize Kirtland AFB as a Laboratory and Product Center when the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory represents only a small fraction of the installation work force?

<u>Answer:</u> Installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base.

Page 23, Question 11: Wouldn't it have been more appropriate to look at Kirtland AFB as a federal installation with significant Department of Defense and Department of Energy activities, rather than as an Air Force Laboratory and Product Center.

Answer: The BRAC law requires that all military installations with 300 or more DoD civilian authorizations be reviewed for closure or realignment. Characterization of this installation as a non-Air Force facility would have been inconsistent with the law. All installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base. The value of the other DoD and federal activities was duly recognized, and was in fact the basis for retaining those activities in their present facilities.

<u>Page 23, Question 12</u>: An Air Force justification indicates that the Sandia and Phillips Laboratories can be cantoned. Does the cantonment plan envision cantoning the 60 square miles of specialized testing and storage areas and facilities used by both laboratories? Was the cost of such an extensive cantonment properly assessed?

<u>Answer</u>: The implementation plan for the realignment has not been finalized. On-site surveys will further refine the projected costs of the proposal in the BRAC analysis process. We believe that the cantonment requirements can be met with reasonable costs as projected in our analysis. If the recommendation regarding Kirtland becomes law, the Air Force will work cooperatively with the community, the other agencies at Kirtland AFB, and other interested activities to ensure that the ultimate plan accommodates the reasonable needs of those parties.

Page 23, Question 13: With respect to the move of the 58th Special Operations Wing, what are the total costs for relocating this wing? How much of these costs are associated with moving the flight simulators?

Answer: The Air Force estimated a cost of approximately $109 M in military construction, including housing, for the move to Holloman. Of that expense, $5.95M was for construction of simulator facilities. The $109M figure does not include $9.6M in projects currently funded for Kirtland for simulator facilities. These projects will be transferred to Holloman under the Air Force recommendation. An additional expense of $3M will be incurred for shipment of the simulators from Kirtland to Holloman.

Page 23, Question 14: Does your estimate of the cost savings of realigning Kirtland include the new security cost for the 898th Munitions Support Squadron, whose mission is control and security of nuclear weapons? Are these security forces costed as high-quality police with special training equipment and procedures or as the standard security forces associated with a normal Air Force Base?

Answer: There is no new security requirement. Instead, the military personnel of the security police will be converted to the appropriate level of civilian personnel, with necessary training and equipment. Since we have security personnel at many of our installations with special weapon responsibility or other sensitive concerns, we are confident the quality and training of these personnel will be sufficient.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable James V. Hansen
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number 950329-4R1

Dear Representative Hansen:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Rep Hansen (UT)

Page 19, Question 1: Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration, foreclosure, or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistics Centers that would keep McClellan open?

Answer: No.

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March 30, 1995

Please refer to this number
95039-4R1

The Honorable G.V. Sonny Montgomery
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Sonny:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Representative Montgomery (MS)

<u>Page 20, Question 1</u>: The Navy testified on March 6, 1995 that there was excess capacity at Air Training Stations. If the pilot training rate is the same for both services in the year 2001 and the Air Force is transferring substantial numbers of Air Force flight officers to the Navy, and the Navy is going from five Air Training Bases to three, how is it that the Air Force can now have after BRAC 95, seven Air Training Bases that include the two additional Air Force Bases conducting flight screening?

<u>Answer:</u> The Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) recommendations for undergraduate flying training reflect sizing by several independent methods. The UPT JCSG determined the infrastructure needed to support total DoD requirements. The Air Force and the Navy completed independent analyses which confirmed they each retained the appropriate level of resources. The Department of the Navy specifically stated it did not need additional training capability. Several facts bear explanation.

There is no single number which represents a "pilot training rate". For example, the JCSG estimated rotary-wing aircraft use less than 20% of the infrastructure of light fixed-wing aircraft per flying operation. In 2001, the rotary-wing track represents about 44% of the Navy-generated advanced track requirements, and less than 4% of Air Force-generated requirements. Primary training (which includes the Navy's T-34 primary and intermediate tracks) is the most directly comparable. The Air Force and Navy are moving toward consolidation in primary training and are exchanging students on a one-to-one basis. Their rotary-wing students as well as fixed-wing students complete primary training. In primary, the Air Force "pilot training rate" is about 30% higher than the Navy rate. Additionally, about a third of the Navy's students only complete 66 hours of primary flight training rather than the 92 hours their counterparts fly. All Air Force students complete the entire track.

Counting "bases" also requires some caveats. The flight screening locations are unsuitable for undergraduate pilot training. Their prospective closure offers limited savings or payback

potential. For example, the Air Force contract flight screening operation at Hondo, Texas, uses the airfield under a no-fee lease. The JCSG considered flight screening sites as outlying fields, not as "bases". This brings a more accurate post BRAC count to five Air Force bases and three Navy bases. Shepherd AFB represents a unique training activity that provides training to a number of foreign aviation students and a limited number of USAF students. Randolph AFB provides no undergraduate pilot training, but instead provides navigation and pilot instructor training. Air Force primary pilot training is accomplished at only four bases, and the 1995 recommendation would decrease this by 25 percent. Also of note, while the Navy realigned the NAS Corpus Christi UPT mission, they retained the runway and airspace capacity. In fact, they propose to extend one NAS Corpus Christi runway to further increase capacity to service NAS Kingsville UPT requirements.

In summary, the BRAC recommendations reflect a confluence of joint and Service analyses. The Air Force and the Navy have retained the infrastructure they require to accomplish their respective missions.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable Joe Scarborough
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4R1

Dear Representative Scarborough:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Rep Scarborough (FL)

<u>Page 20, Question 1</u>: The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a Master Plan for the final disposition of all Electronic Combat (EC) facilities before relocating any EC equipment or making any EC realignments. How does the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations to move eight EC threat simulators and two EC pod systems from Eglin Air Force Base, as well as the movement of REDCAP and AFEWES equipment to Edwards Air Force Base, comply with this Congressional directive?

<u>Answer:</u> This question will be referred to OSD for response, since it concerns the OSD recommendation and consideration of Authorization Bill provisions.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable Frank Tejeda
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4R1

Dear Representative Tejeda:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Rep Tejeda (TX)

<u>Page 19, Question 1:</u> In 1993, the Air Force excluded three bases in the Industrial/Technical Support Category-Product Center and Laboratory Subcategory from further consideration for closure/realignment. Those bases were Brooks AFB, Hanscom AFB, and Los Angeles AFB. The Air Force stated that, "...there is not sufficient excess capacity to close any of these bases without replicating a significant portion of these facilities... at another location. The cost to do this is prohibitive." What has changed in the past two years that the Air Force now recommends closing Brooks AFB and moving Armstrong Lab and the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine to Wright-Patterson AFB?

<u>Answer</u>: Since BRAC 93, the Air Force has been required to absorb major personnel reductions in its acquisition and sustainment workforce. In addition, the work of the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group provided a much more refined analysis for evaluating the excess capacity of DoD laboratory facilities. Finally, excess capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB provides a cost-effective beddown of the activities from Brooks AFB.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4R1

The Honorable Rick Santorum
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Santorum:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Sen Santorum (PA)

<u>Page 19, Question 1:</u> The DoD justification for closure of the Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station was that, "although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective in supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields." Can you tell me what exactly are the components of "operating costs?"

<u>Answer:</u> The following are components of Base Operating Support: Public Affairs; Ground Safety; Administration; Contracting; Comptroller/Budget; CBPO; Civilian Personnel; Supply/Fuels; Transportation; Security/Law Enforcement; Civil Engineering; Fire Protection; MWR; Services/Billeting; Base Operations; Aircrew Life Support; Disaster Preparedness.

Page 19, Question 2: Are the costs associated with successfully manning at 110% considered relative to other bases which are below 100% total manning?

Answer: The costs were compiled for requirements, not assigned personnel. This ensures that all organizations are equally evaluated using the same criteria.

<u>Page 19, Question 3:</u> Are the costs incurred in maintaining a higher state of readiness (exercise, contingency, and humanitarian deployments, etc.) held against the unit in computing "operating costs?"

<u>Answer:</u> No. The operating costs that are considered are fixed irrespective of operations of the unit. The costs are related to the unit's facilities and operating location arrangements.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable Larry Combest
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when corresponding 950329-4R1

Dear Representative Combest:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
Enclosures

Representative Combest (Tx)

Ranking of Bases

<u>Page 16, Question 1</u>: The Air Force rated Reese Air Force Base number two among five UPT bases in 1991. What has changed at Reese or at other bases that would make the Air Force rank Reese AFB last, well below its other UPT bases in the 1995 analysis?

<u>Answer:</u> In 1991, the Air Force closed Williams AFB because it was clearly ranked below the retained UPT bases. The information regarding Reese AFB's ranking as #2 cannot be substantiated and did not come from Air Force analysis. There was no tiering done by the Air Force in 1991 to indicate any such ranking. The Pilot Training Subcategory, of which Reese AFB was a member, was excluded from consideration in 1993 based upon capacity analysis. Tiering in 1995 placed bases in one of three tiers to show relative value of the bases to the Air Force. There was no ranking within the tiers.

During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. The JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base for several pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) against measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for undergraduate flying training.

In many cases, changes in force structure, facilities, measures of merit, and the cross-service evaluation of categories resulted in different outcomes from previous rounds.

Quality of Life

<u>Page 16, Question 1:</u> Reese AFB is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in AETC for base of assignment. Obviously, they think that the Quality of Life at Reese is better than that at other UPT bases. Why would the Air Force ignore this very clear Quality of Life indicator and recommend Reese AFB for closure?

<u>Answer</u>: Aspects of community support important to military members and their families are measured in the Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

<u>Page 16, Question 2</u>: With respect to educational opportunities, Reese AFB in Lubbock Texas is rated below Vance AFB in Enid, Oklahoma. Are you aware that Enid, Oklahoma has one private university with a permanent enrollment of over 700 students? Lubbock, Texas has two private universities, a private college, and Texas Technical University with a permanent enrollment of over 17,000 students, nine undergraduate schools, two graduate schools, and a 1 million volume library. Knowing that one of the important features of an assignment for our highly skilled officer pilots and their talented spouses is the availability of graduate education programs, how is it that the Air Force rated Vance AFB higher than Reese AFB in educational opportunities?

<u>Answer:</u> The Education subelement under Criterion VII consists of measuring and grading Pupil Teacher Ratio, Four Year Programs, Honors Programs, College Attendance, and Off-base Education. Reese AFB scored a Red for Pupil Teacher Ratio (Greater than 30 to 1 Pupil to Teacher Ratio in Grades K-12). Reese received Green grades for the remaining elements within the Education subelement, for an overall grade of Green Minus. Vance AFB received all Greens with the exception of a Yellow grade for College Attendance. Vance received an overall Green grade in Education, while Reese's overall grade was Green Minus. The details of the Criteria VII analysis, including data, subelements, and weighted grades are provided in the base questionnaire and the Air Force Report, Volume V of the DoD Report.

Operations

<u>Page 16, Question 1</u>: Reese AFB was the choice of the Air Force, the Navy, and the DoD for implementation of Joint Undergraduate Primary Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training of the Air Force. How is it that the Air Force, now in 1995, rates its capability in all of these areas as less than that of Columbus, Randolph, and Vance AFB's?

<u>Answer:</u> All UPT bases underwent a qualitative analysis in regard to Airlift/Tanker and Maritime functional aspects of pilot training. In fact, each base was examined for many functional areas. Measures of merit were derived to judge the effectiveness of each base in each functional area, with the measures weighted slightly differently for the different functions. When the analysis was complete, Reese AFB ranked last by the JCSG-UPT in the Primary and Airlift/Tanker functional areas, and ahead of only Laughlin AFB in the Maritime training function. These analyses were based on data requested by the JCSG-UPT and certified at the base, Major Command and Air Staff levels in accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan.

Page 17, Question 2: Reese and Laughlin AFB's have fully implemented T-1 training and have completed all the facility construction necessary to support that training. Did the Air Force consider the fact that Vance AFB has not implemented T-1 training and has not yet built the necessary T-1 facilities?

Answer: Military construction is currently ongoing at Vance AFB to prepare for the arrival of the T-1 aircraft. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as savings if they were programmed in 1996 or beyond.

<u>Page 17, Question 3</u>: Did you consider the savings that would accrue from stopping construction and implementation of the T-1 program at Vance?

<u>Answer:</u> No. COBRA cost analysis considered projects as a savings if there were programmed funds in 1996 or beyond. A review of the COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis reveals no MILCON cost avoidance.

<u>Page 17, Question 4</u>: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

<u>Page 17, Question 5</u>: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

<u>Page 17, Question 6</u>: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighing total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

<u>Answer</u>: Since this question addresses the internal deliberations of the UPT Joint Group, it will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT.

Previous Rankings

<u>Page 17, Question 1</u>: In the 1991 Base Closure round, Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training bases were reviewed and Reese AFB was rated very highly - number two out of five Air Force bases. What accounts for this disparity?

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not rank the UPT bases in 1991 and cannot substantiate the claimed ranking. However, each round of base closures is independent of other rounds. Different methods of analysis, refined data, changes at the installation level, and force structure changes contribute to a variance in grading from one round to the next.

Page 17, Question 2: The Air Force itself and the DoD have placed great confidence in Reese AFB by choosing it as: the first base to implement Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first base to receive the new T-1 airlift/tanker training aircraft; the first and only base to implement the Air Force's portion of Joint Primary Undergraduate Pilot Training; the first and only base to do Joint Maritime Training for the Navy in the T-1; and Reese is the Air Force's choice as the first base to receive the new JPATS aircraft. Why would the Air Force want to close its premier UPT base?

Answer: During the 1995 process the SECDEF created several Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to examine and recommend to the services basing alternatives that could reduce excess capacity. A JCSG for Undergraduate Pilot Training was chartered to consider cross-service evaluations of UPT bases. The JCSG used quantitative analyses to determine the functional value of each pilot training base to perform the mission of producing rated aviators. The JCSG-UPT evaluated each UPT base against a number of pilot training functions (e.g., primary, airlift/tanker, bomber/fighter, etc) using measures of merit that encompassed the requirements for pilot training. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group accepted the JCSG functional value analysis as the basis for the Air Force's Criterion I score. However, the subsequent tiering accomplished by the BCEG was based on an evaluation of all eight DoD criteria. This tiering was provided to the SECAF, who also reviewed the eight criteria grades and data. In addition to the Air Force analysis, the SECAF reviewed the JCSG-UPT alternatives that included the closure of the UPT function at Reese AFB in each alternative.

<u>Page 18, Question 3</u>: The Air Force analysis rates Reese below three UPT bases (Columbus, Randolph, and Vance) in its ability to perform Primary, Airlift/Tanker and Maritime training. If this is the case, why did the Air Force choose Reese as the first base to perform joint training with the Navy in all three of these categories?

<u>Answer</u>: The analysis referred to was accomplished by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT. The initiation of joint UPT activities significantly preceded BRAC '95 and was the beginning of a joint initiative to consolidate all primary pilot training activities. Reese AFB was just the first of all UPT bases that will participate in such joint activity.

Quality of Life

<u>Page 18, Question 1</u>: Reese AFB is the number one choice of preference for base assignment of Student and Instructor Pilots in the Air Force's AETC (confirmed in a statement to the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 2, 1995). This kind of choice is made on the basis of Quality of Life. Why would the Department of Defense, newly committed to stressing "people over programs" (John Deutch, 09/94), want to close the base that its personnel rate as the best for Quality of Life?

<u>Answer</u>: Aspects of community support that are important to military members and their families are measured in Criterion VII evaluation through a series of objective subelements. There are a number of reasons why people request assignments; it is not a useful measure.

Page 18, Response to Commentary: Reese and Vance received overall Green Minus grades for the Transportation subelement under Criterion VII. Within the subelement of Transportation, Reese AFB received a Red grade for Public Transportation, and Green grades for the other subelements. The Red grade resulted from the lack of regularly-scheduled public transportation to the base. Vance AFB was graded Green for all of the Transportation subelement, with the exception of a Red for Municipal Airport Carriers. The overall grade reflected a "roll-up" of these grades. Since both bases had three Greens and one Red, and the weighting of these two subelements was equal, both bases received the same overall grade for Transportation.

Operations - Airspace

<u>Page 18, Question not numbered</u>: Airspace is one area that was weighted very heavily during this round's analysis. We are firmly convinced that Reese AFB has access to adequate airspace to do its mission and it is unthreatened by encroachment. We are concerned that sheer volume of airspace owned and controlled by each base was emphasized and that usability was not adequately considered. Some bases may own/control more airspace than Reese in terms of sheer volume, however, much of their airspace is unusable for basic Undergraduate Pilot Training. Reese has readily available visual routes and alternate training fields.

<u>Answer</u>: The Air Force did not evaluate airspace related to pilot training. Instead, the Air Force accepted the functional values for UPT bases provided by the Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT as the basis for its Criterion I evaluation. This question will be referred to OSD for response by the JCSG-UPT. The Air Force process did analyze airspace encroachment under Criterion II. All Air Force UPT bases received a Green score under Encroachment except Randolph AFB, which received a Green Minus.

Savings

<u>Page 19, Question not numbered</u>: The objective of any BRAC process is to save our tax dollars. Reese's T-1 program is fully implemented with all facilities in place. Vance AFB is still constructing their T-1 hangar. Stopping construction would save MILCON dollars.

<u>Answer</u>: COBRA cost analysis would consider any halt to MILCON projects as a savings, if the costs were programmed in 1996 or later. Review of COBRA data for the level-playing field analysis at Vance shows no MILCON savings.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4R1

Dear Representative Boehlert:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 6, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw
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Congressional Questions for the Record

Rep Boehlert (NY)

<u>Page 15, Question 1:</u> In last weeks testimony before this commission, Defense Secretary Perry described Lowry Air Force Base's reuse plan as a successful consequence of the BRAC process. In the BRAC 95 process, did you consider the communities' reuse plans as a result of previous BRAC closure or realignment decisions? Should already completed , well developed reuse planning efforts be a part of subsequent BRAC decisions?

<u>Answer:</u> There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

<u>Page 15, Question 2:</u> As you know, Griffiss Air Force Base was realigned as part of BRAC 1993. During that process the Air Force stated in a letter to the commission that "the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory within the next five years." Since then the community has united behind a reuse plan with the lab as its linchpin. Was the impact to the community's reuse plan taken into consideration in the decision to close Rome Lab?

<u>Answer:</u> There is no formal consideration of a reuse plan in the Air Force process. However, past BRAC actions are reflected in the economic impact criterion and its supporting data. Additionally, we are well aware of the past actions at all our installations, and are sensitive to both the reality and perception in the community when multiple actions are taken. On the other hand, the law makes no provision for exempting locations that have been impacted in previous BRAC rounds and in fact requires them to be considered if the remaining activities meet the BRAC threshold.

At the time of the referenced letter, the Air Force had no plans to close or relocate Rome Laboratory. The recommendation to close Rome Laboratory is a direct result of the 1995 BRAC analysis.

<u>Page 15, Question 3:</u> How does the Air Force define interservicing? How was interservicing applied to Air Force labs in total? How did the Air Force apply interservicing to C3I labs?

<u>Answer:</u> Interservicing can take a variety of forms - from collocation of activities to assignment of individuals to joint activities to transfer of responsibility for the function to a single service. The Air Force agreed with the LJCSG and recommended C3I interservicing in the laboratory category consisting of the relocation of a portion of Rome Laboratory to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, for eventual integration with the Army Laboratory. During the BRAC 95 analysis process, other Air Force laboratory activities were offered for interservicing but were not accepted.

<u>Page 15, Question 4:</u> What criteria did the LJCSG use to determine if excess capacity existed in its labs? In the Air Force, where and to what extent does excess capacity in labs exist?

<u>Answer:</u> Without addressing the method used by the LJCSG, the capacity review was based on man-years, based on demonstrated available capacity versus future requirements. The briefing on lab capacity was provided in the BCEG minutes for the November 9, 1994, meeting. Those minutes note the difficulty of attempting to define a capacity reduction targets because of the diversity in size and variety of missions among the lab facilities. A total of 2,806 man-years of excess lab capacity were identified.

<u>Page 15, Question 5:</u> Having received the highest ranking of its labs, why did the Air Force decide that Rome Lab was one to be slated for closure?

<u>Answer:</u> Rome Lab did not receive the highest ranking of Air Force Labs. Rather, it was placed in the top tier based on preliminary analysis. Subsequently, the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group requested the Air Force to analyze Rome Lab for closure. We found significant costs that could be avoided by an innovative sharing of the Rome Lab activities between Hanscom AFB and Fort Monmouth. An additional advantage is increased inter-service cooperation. In contrast to the level-playing field analysis in which the tiering was based, we found cost-effective options for a Rome Lab closure after reviewing in depth the Lab Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation.

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March 30, 1995

The Honorable Pete Domenici
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Enclosures

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<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force examined a closure of Los Angeles AFB, but determined that this was not a viable option due to a loss of its interconnectivity with the aerospace community and excessive costs for the savings. Since no focused analysis was accomplished on the closure of Los Angeles AFB with a move to Kirtland AFB, that information is unavailable.

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<u>Answer:</u> The details of property disposal, transfer, and reuse will be worked out in a cooperative process among the Air Force, the community, and the remaining activities at Kirtland AFB. The goal of that process will be to effectively and efficiently accommodate the needs of all affected parties. The issue of the fence perimeter will be addressed in that process.

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Answer: The sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. We did consult with DOE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information we possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Under the DoD COBRA guidance, costs of actions to other agencies are not normally included in the calculations. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

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<u>Answer:</u> The Air Force did not consult with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy concerning its recommendations at Kirtland. Following the announcement of the recommendations, we sent teams to meet with DOE, Sandia, and the other agencies at Kirtland to assess needs and impact. We will send another team soon, and will continue this cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

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<u>Answer:</u> Installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base.

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Answer: The BRAC law requires that all military installations with 300 or more DoD civilian authorizations be reviewed for closure or realignment. Characterization of this installation as a non-Air Force facility would have been inconsistent with the law. All installations were categorized according to their predominant Air Force mission. The Phillips Laboratory operation is the primary mission of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. No other category more accurately characterizes the operations of the base. The value of the other DoD and federal activities was duly recognized, and was in fact the basis for retaining those activities in their present facilities.

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Answer: The implementation plan for the realignment has not been finalized. On-site surveys will further refine the projected costs of the proposal in the BRAC analysis process. We believe that the cantonment requirements can be met with reasonable costs as projected in our analysis. If the recommendation regarding Kirtland becomes law, the Air Force will work cooperatively with the community, the other agencies at Kirtland AFB, and other interested activities to ensure that the ultimate plan accommodates the reasonable needs of those parties.

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March 30, 1995

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Please refer to this number
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The Honorable Steven Schiff
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March 30, 1995

The Honorable Joe Skeen
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Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-4R1

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Answer: The implementation plan for the realignment has not been finalized. On-site surveys will further refine the projected costs of the proposal in the BRAC analysis process. We believe that the cantonment requirements can be met with reasonable costs as projected in our analysis. If the recommendation regarding Kirtland becomes law, the Air Force will work cooperatively with the community, the other agencies at Kirtland AFB, and other interested activities to ensure that the ultimate plan accommodates the reasonable needs of those parties.

Page 23, Question 13: With respect to the move of the 58th Special Operations Wing, what are the total costs for relocating this wing? How much of these costs are associated with moving the flight simulators?

Answer: The Air Force estimated a cost of approximately $109 M in military construction, including housing, for the move to Holloman. Of that expense, $5.95M was for construction of simulator facilities. The $109M figure does not include $9.6M in projects currently funded for Kirtland for simulator facilities. These projects will be transferred to Holloman under the Air Force recommendation. An additional expense of $3M will be incurred for shipment of the simulators from Kirtland to Holloman.

Page 23, Question 14: Does your estimate of the cost savings of realigning Kirtland include the new security cost for the 898th Munitions Support Squadron, whose mission is control and security of nuclear weapons? Are these security forces costed as high-quality police with special training equipment and procedures or as the standard security forces associated with a normal Air Force Base?

Answer: There is no new security requirement. Instead, the military personnel of the security police will be converted to the appropriate level of civilian personnel, with necessary training and equipment. Since we have security personnel at many of our installations with special weapon responsibility or other sensitive concerns, we are confident the quality and training of these personnel will be sufficient.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

MARCH 6

20 APR 1995

Mr. Ben Borden
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Borden:

Enclosed is a response to a question for the record submitted to the Air Force by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. We are responding to the question due to its policy perspective.

I trust this information will be useful.

Sincerely,

R.L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Enclosure

cc: USAF/RT (Col Mayfield)

Question: The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a Master Plan for the final disposition of all Electronic Combat (EC) facilities before relocating any EC equipment or making any EC realignments. How does the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations to move eight EC threat simulators and two EC pod systems from Eglin Air Force Base, as well as the movement of REDCAP and AFEWES equipment to Edwards Air Force Base, comply with this Congressional directive?

Answer: The BRAC 95 recommendations to consolidate certain Electronic Combat test and evaluation activities, including a realignment at Eglin AFB, were made pursuant to the requirements of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Section 2903. These recommendations, and the consequent elimination of underutilized infrastructure, are expected to generate a relatively high return on the front-end investment needed to implement the recommendations. The Department believes that making these cost-effective recommendations is not inconsistent with the FY 1995 Appropriations Committee Report language requesting the Department to justify any Electronic Combat test facility consolidations on economic grounds.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

MARCH 6 HEARING

8 APR 1995

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

Attached are responses from the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training regarding questions for the record which were submitted to the Air Force by the Commission.

I trust this information is useful.

Sincerely,

R. L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Attachment

~~103~~
104

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

March 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE CLOSURE AND UTILIZATION

SUBJECT: Commission Questions for the Record

The response to your request for answers to the BRAC Commission questions for the record regarding the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional analyses is provided as Attachment One.

Louis C. Finch
Chairman
Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
1. Qs & As

1. QUESTION: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

ANSWER: The analysis did not restrict airspace credit to the volume a base owned or controlled.

2. QUESTION: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

ANSWER: Usable or useful airspace is a key ingredient to the training mission. The existence of other special use airspace can add flexibility or the ability to accommodate expansion and/or mission changes.

3. QUESTION: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighting total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

ANSWER: Assigning weights in the model was one of the Groups biggest challenges. All members agreed that airspace should be heavily weighted, so the discussion centered on what types of airspace to credit. In the end, the Group reached and implemented a consensus.

Attachment 1

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-5

FROM: CHAFEE, JOHN H.	TO: YELLIN, ALEX
TITLE: SENATOR (RI)	TITLE: NAVY TEAM LEADER
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER AT NEWPORT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUPPORTING MOVE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO NEWPORT.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date:

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JOHN H. CHAFEE
RHODE ISLAND

March 27, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-5

S. Alexander Yellin, P.E.
Navy Team Leader, Review and Analysis
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Alex:

It was so nice to see you again at breakfast on the 17th, and I appreciate the time you took to meet with John Seggerman and me.

As I pointed out, there are major new facilities at Newport either in place or under construction to accommodate the additional personnel planned to come from New London to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport.

The same is true regarding facilities for the students that would come from Meridian, Mississippi in connection with the proposed transfer of the NTTC.

Obviously I am anxious for these proposals to go through. I stand ready to answer any questions you and members of the Commission might have.

The Commission is fortunate to have you serving once again. You certainly know these issues backwards and forwards.

Very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

John

John H. Chafee

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-6

FROM: TELFORD, BARRY B.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: STATE REP. (TX)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR RED RIVER.

Due Date: 950331	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950323	Mail Date: 950403

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-6

State of Texas
House of Representatives

BARRY B. TELFORD
STATE REPRESENTATIVE
DISTRICT 1
DISTRICT OFFICE:
206 N.W. FRONT
DE KALB, TEXAS 75559
903-667-5514
AUSTIN OFFICE:
P.O. BOX 2910
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78768-2910
512-463-0692

COMMITTEES:
PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS
CHAIRMAN
CORRECTIONS
MEMBER
HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
MEMBER

March 23, 1995

The Hon. Allen Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Dixon:

I am writing in regard to the Department of Defense's decision to place Red River Army Depot on the 1995 BRAC listing recommending it for closure.

RRAD is one of our largest defense depots in terms of people and workload and has played a vital role in our nation's defense since being established in 1941. RRAD continues to serve as a vital ammunition storage center and has an huge maintainence mission built around the Army's light tracked combat vehicle fleet. Vehicles rebuilt under this mission come off the end of the line better than new.

My argument against closing this facility is twofold: the enormous cost of closing the facility and moving its mission to other depots and the continued excellence and work ethic displayed by the employees at RRAD.

After touring RRAD and learning firsthand the true costs of closing this facility, I feel the Pentagon's estimate of $60 million to close it is grossly underestimated. I was advised that one project alone at the depot would cost $35 million to shut down, while a building currently under construction would cost $35 million to satisfy the contractor's contract if stopped. The cost of moving all the equipment in just one lot at RRAD would be $30-35 million if the facility was closed.

I am also advised that many of the missions the Pentagon listed RRAD as unable to do have in fact can and have been done at the facility. Also, the part of the depot's mission that would be moved to Anniston, Alabama, would put that facility at 100 percent capacity in peacetime. What would happen then if there was a national emergency and production had to be increased?

RRAD is committed to the principles of the National Peformance Review and has become a model in changing the way the federal government does business, with many agencies visiting RRAD to witness this new management philosophy and adopting it. RRAD was the winner of the 1995 President's Quality Improvement Prototype Award and the 1991-93 winner of the Army Communities of Excellence within the Army Depot System Command. Also in 1993, the depot was runner-up in the Army Communities in Excellence, Small Installation Category at the DA level; in 1994, it was named the best small installation in the continental U.S. RRAD was the AMC level winner of the DA Chief of Staff Supply Excellence Award in 1993, runner-up in 1994 and AMC level winner in 1995. The facility also was AMC level winner of the Maintenance Excellence Award in 1986, 1988, 1991 and first runner-up in 1989, 1990, and 1992.

Closing this facility would be a detriment to the defense of this great nation and would have a devestating economic impact to the communities in four states -- Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Louisiana. It is hard for me to understand why the Department of Army would consider closing a facility that has meet every challenge from World War II to Desert Storm. I solicit your help in removing Red River Army Depot from the closure list based strictly on its military value, its vital role in the defense of our nation and because of the tremendous cost to the American taxpayer.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Barry B. Telford

BBT/kw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

The Honorable Barry B. Telford
State Representative, District 1
House of Representatives
206 N.W. Front Street
DeKalb, Texas 75559

Please refer to this number when responding 950324-6

Dear Representative Telford:

Thank you for providing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with your letter expressing your support for the Red River Army Depot.

I want to assure you that the Commission is thoroughly reviewing the information used by the Department of Defense in making its recommendations. The information you have provided in your letter has been distributed to the appropriate members of the Commission and will be carefully considered during our analysis of the Defense Department's proposal to close the facility.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of additional assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-7

FROM: SGROI, CAROL L.	TO: COX, REBECCA
TITLE: CITIZEN	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: CHAMBERSBURG, PA	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COMMISSION VISIT LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT.

Due Date: 950405	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950326	Mail Date:

Please refer to this number when responding 950329-7

Carol L. Sgroi
2913 Adams Drive
Chambersburg, PA 17201
March 26, 1995

Dear Commissioner Cox,

I am writing to invite you to make a return visit to Letterkenny Army Depot.

I feel that BRAC '93 made a wise decision when it consolidated tactical missiles and artillery at Letterkenny and initiated interservicing and partnerships at this location.

Much has been accomplished since your last visit. Over half of the missile systems are now in place and construction is almost completed insuring that we can remain on track with the established target dates for the remaining systems. We have entered into a successful partnership with United Defense. Discussions are proceeding with other private sector contractors.

As you will remember Letterkenny had many important people against the depot remaining open in '93; let alone becoming even more vital to the military.

The arrival of the missile systems

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number 950329-7R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

Ms. Carol L. Sgroi
2913 Adams Drive
Chambersburg, PA 17201

Dear Ms. Sgroi:

Thank you for your kind letter of invitation to visit the Letterkenny Army Depot. I appreciate your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

I have been informed that my fellow Commissioner, Al Cornella, had a productive visit to the depot on March 24. You may be certain that I will attempt to visit Letterkenny if my schedule permits.

The Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendation regarding Letterkenny Army Depot. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

Again, thank you for contacting the Commission. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you feel I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Rebecca G. Cox

Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner

RGC:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-8

FROM: LANGSTON, DAVID R.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: MAYOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CITY OF LUBBOCK	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: REESE AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL	✓			CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INVITING COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF TO LUNCHEON ON MAY 5.

* PHONE RESPONSE *

Due Date: 950331	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950329	Mail Date:

CITY OF LUBBOCK

LUBBOCK, TEXAS

LUBBOCK TEXAS

DAVID R. LANGSTON
MAYOR

March 29, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Rosalyn, Virginia 22209

Via Telefax 703/696-0550

Please refer to this number
when responding 950329-8

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to extend an invitation to the Commissioners and staff who will be making a site visit to Reese Air Force Base to a luncheon on April 5th. It is my understanding that the site visit will have been completed and that the flight schedules for departure would allow time for a luncheon in Lubbock.

The luncheon would be small and informal and would not require any kind of presentation by the Commissioners or staff.

We would be pleased to provide transportation from the base to the luncheon and then on to the airport.

I certainly appreciate your consideration of this invitation and hope the commissioners and staff will be able to join me. Please let me know at your convenience if such a luncheon is possible. My office phone number is 806/767-2010, and the telefax number is 806/767-2051.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

Mr. David R. Langston
Mayor
City of Lubbock

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950329-9

FROM: DIXON	TO: OHLINGER, CHARLES T.
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: COMMANDER, 6th AIR BASE WING
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: MACDILL AFB
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: MACDILL AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE DURING MY VISIT.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950329	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date: 950329

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 27, 1995

Colonel Charles T. Ohlinger III, USAF
Commander
6th Air Base Wing
MacDill AFB, FL 33608

Please refer to this number
when responding 950329-9

Dear Colonel Ohlinger:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to MacDill Air Force Base. The briefings and discussions with you, General Downing, Lieutenant General Neal, your staff, and the community officials provided us with a great deal of valuable information about the operations of MacDill. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the members of your staff for their assistance. The briefings and tour you conducted were very informative. I would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Tom Johnson and Captain Lisa Rappa for their efforts in planning and coordinating the base visit, and Master Sergeant David K. Houser for his informative briefing on the fuel system.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-1

FROM: O'CONNELL, BRIAN	TO: DIXON
TITLE: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: NAID	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
				SYLVIA THOMPSON		✓	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

NAID'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REUSE.

Due Date: 950406	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950329	Mail Date: 950403

N A I D

National Association of Installation Developers

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-1

Chairman Alan P. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

March 29, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman,

During the March 16 Commission hearing on reuse of closing military bases you asked our witness, Mr. Brad Arvin, to provide the Commission with a prioritization of our recommendations. This letter provides our response.

Our opinion is that the President and Congress have set a proper direction in law and policy that, if conscientiously pursued by all participants in the federal government and is matched with hard work and persistence to succeed by affected local communities, stands a decent chance to result in economic recovery in most locations. The assets to be redeveloped and market forces are certainly not to be underestimated as influences in eventual success, but unless the local community coalesces toward a realistic plan that can be supported by a cooperative federal government, progress will be frustrated. What that suggests is that we don't need more laws or better regulation, so much as consistent , good faith execution of the policy direction that has *already been provided.* In our testimony we urged a greater sense of partnership between the Department of Defense, the federal government and the local communities pursuing reuse. This is an opportunity to truly reinvent government and throw out "business as usual". The cooperation shown in drafting and passage of the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 is an example of cooperative efforts that addressed a problem and provides the opportunity for more win-win base reuse.

Our top priority recommendations are neither legislative nor policy changes, but involve protecting budget resources. Base reuse cannot happen in either near term or for the ultimate reuse if **environmental cleanup** is not properly funded. Likewise, even though most of the capital needs for redevelopment will come from the private sector, the transition assistance support from the **Economic Development Administration** is often the critical first funding of infrastructure adaptation to enable bringing in the first users to create jobs and start a cash flow that helps the reuse authority to attract further development.

We have attached the integrated NAID recommendations on needed improvements in the original form as submitted with our testimony(attachment 1) and prioritized version, (attachment 2), indicating whether the improvement is legislative, policy, regulatory (federal or state) or budgetary. We intend to work with the organizations who testified with us as well as the

1725 Duke Street, Suite 630 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (703) 836-7973 Fax: (703) 836-8273

Department of Defense and Congress with the aim of giving support to communities so that they can guide the reuse efforts toward economic recovery and other community needs that they see for their locations.

Once again, we thank you for your interest in reuse of closing bases. We appreciate the opportunity to share our members' experiences. We would be pleased to work with the Commission and staff on any other questions you may have on the state of reuse.

Brian O'Connell
Executive Director

Attachments

National Association of Installation Developers
1995 Legislative and Policy Improvement Objectives
for
Improved Prospects of
Economic Adjustment and Reuse
at Closing Military Bases

- Longer lease period for **interim use** (currently one year) until permanent transfer.
- Financial indemnification to leasehold tenants that lose value of improvements if early termination required by the military department.
- **Native American** claims considered through local reuse organization for tribes impacted by the base closure.
- Personal property transfer for military needs elsewhere vs. functional needs in reuse. Dispute resolution sometimes needed.
- Grant streamlining and expanded eligibility to all local redevelopment authorities.
- Greater cooperation in development and review of environmental documentation(**NEPA**).
- **Air emission** "credits" (Clean Air Act) and water rights retained at the closed base for use by the next user(s).
- Prevent waste water treatment facility permit lapse during hiatus between closure and reuse.
- "Preserve and protect" obligations for historic, archeological , cultural or natural resources should be factored into fair market value of property.
- Greater flexibility to convey property to **501(c)(3)** entities established or designated by local redevelopment authority.
- EDA loan guarantee authority program...and **EDA at ALL**!
- Improve DOD and Federal **screening** timeliness and community consideration.
- More cooperative approach to **utilities** transfer to maintain continuity of service and thus, the ability to attract reuse. (Some state regulatory relief may be needed.)
- Protect **environmental** cleanup funds under BRAC.

AND... IN GENERAL, A LOT MORE REINVENTING GOVERNMENT AND LESS BUSINESS AS USUAL...WE'RE HURTING OUT THERE

National Association of Installation Developers
Prioritized Recommendations
to the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Note: These recommendations are extracted from the testimony of Mr. Brad Arvin of NAID to the Commission on March 16, 1995. Please refer to the full testimony.

$ 1. Environmental cleanup funds

Assure adequate and timely availability of Defense funds to fulfill DoD responsibilities to cleanup contamination on closing bases. Property must be certified suitable for transfer/lease before reuse is possible.

$ 2. Economic Development Administration

EDA is the principle source of federal assistance in infrastructure investment for closing bases. Sustain or increase funds available. Consider establishing a revolving loan fund to focus attention to conversion needs.

L/P 3. Longer term leases

The Federal Real Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 or BRAC law may need amendment to permit longer term leases. Assistant Secretary Gotbaum's testimony that the 30 day termination clause may be waived is welcomed but it needs to become common practice rather than an exception.

P 4. Community considerations on personal property

While the stated DoD policy on personal property seems to enable transfer of personal property that supports the reuse plan, practice in some instances appears to ignore intent of the Pryor Amendment and DOD policy direction. Air emission "credits" are likewise personal property that should remain with the installation for reuse by the community.

P 5. DoD/Federal screening more timely and community input considered

Improve the timeliness of screening for both DOD and other federal screening. BRAC process has milestones for community to produce reuse plan even as DOD and other federal screening decisions are not complete. In those cases the community does not know what property to plan for reuse. Community views should be sought and respected.

Code: P= Policy L= Legislative $ = Budget

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

Mr. Brian O'Connell
Executive Director
National Association of Installation Developers
1725 Duke Street, Suite 630
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-1

Dear Mr. O'Connell:

Thank you for your letter of March 29, 1995 in which you answered follow-up questions for the Commission's record. Your information will be very helpful to the Commission as we continue in our analysis of the base reuse process. You may be assured that the information has been placed in the Commission's library.

Again, we are grateful to NAID for the assistance provided to the Commission.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-2

FROM: BLUME, JAY D.	TO: REESE, ANN
TITLE: SPECIAL ASST TO SEC OF AF	TITLE: CROSS SERVICE OD ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: HEADQUARTERS USA/RT	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				ANN REESE	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONSE TO MARCH 16 AND 18 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING DEPOT INFO.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950329	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-2

29 MAR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Ms Ann Reese)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT

SUBJECT: USAF BRAC '95 Depot Information

The attached data is forwarded in response to your request for depot information (reference questions to AF/LGM on 16 March and fax to AF/RTR on 18 March). Please note the two requests were combined due to some duplication. Some information is still pending and will be forwarded upon receipt from HQ AFMC.

Please feel free to call if there are any questions. My point of contact is Lt Col Louise Eckhardt, DSN 225-4578.

Jay D. Blume Jr

JAY D. BLUME, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the CSAF for
Realignment and Transition

Attachments:
78-02b
78-04a
78-04b
78-04c
78-05f
80-03
80-04c
80-07d

* Note This is all part of tasker 247

OPR: AF/LGMM / LTC Pitcher

78-02b: What was the basis for the 15% factor for eliminating positions through consolidation of like workload?

Answer: The 15% efficiency factor was predicated on the assumption that all processes supporting consolidating workloads at gaining sites would be reengineered to the most efficient industrial layouts possible during the transfer process. This reengineering would retain only the minimum capacity needed to support the workload at 85 % utilization. HQ AFMC and ALCs senior managers estimated the resulting improved industrial processes would yield (on average) a productivity increase of 15%. This efficiency factor was applied to reduce the workforce accordingly.

Question: How was the 15% "industrial [*reengineering*] benefit factor" considered when sizing the ALCs?

Answer: (Derived from Certified Data). The 15% "industrial reengineering benefit factor" is an efficiency factor developed during the AFMC TRC Review process based on the assumption that all processes supporting consolidating workloads at gaining sites (and downsizing workloads at retaining sites) would be reengineered to the most efficient industrial layouts possible in conjunction with these adjustments. Reengineering will retain only the minimum capacity needed to support the Core workload at a targeted 85 % utilization rate. HQ AFMC and ALCs senior managers estimated the resulting improved industrial processes will yield (on average) a productivity increase of 15%. The AFMC TRC Review process applied this 15% efficiency factor to all the commodities and process workloads recommended for transfer / consolidation at other ALCs, and to those workloads recommended for downsizing in place. As a result, this factor eliminated over 2.7 million hours of depot workload at the ALCs as it was applied to the workloads programmed for consolidation and those workloads that are programmed to downsize in place.

Due to miscommunication, the 15% "industrial reengineering benefit factor" was incorrectly applied to all JCSG-DM commodity groups in the "workload laydown" worksheets submitted to OADUSD (MP) / L on 24 Feb 95, instead of just the commodity groups and processes being realigned under the AFMC TRC review process. Also, this application is not consistent with the other services' application of efficiency factors. As a result, revised workload laydown worksheets will be developed.

Question: Why was CORE reduced 15%?

Answer: (Derived from Certified Data). Core workloads may be reduced 15% in the areas where industrial reengineering is accomplished as noted in the preceding answer. The process improvements resulting from this industrial reengineering are expected to enable maintenance personnel to accomplish the workload more efficiently, thereby effectively reducing the projected workloads by 15%. This effect is indicated by the documented Core workload reductions in the JCSG-DM data file.

Due to miscommunication, the 15% "industrial reengineering benefit factor" was incorrectly applied to all JCSG-DM commodity groups in the "workload laydown" worksheets submitted to OADUSD (MP) / L on 24 Feb 95, instead of just the commodity groups and processes being realigned under the AFMC TRC review process. Also, this application is not consistent with the other services' application of efficiency factors. As a result, revised workload laydown worksheets will be developed.

Question: Why does capacity now equal the previous CORE workload?

Answer: (Derived from Certified Data) The capacity in the JCSG-DM data file was reduced to 27 million hours to reflect 85% utilization rate against the recomputed core of 23.0 million hours. As cited earlier in answering question 78-04b, the core workload sheets are being revised. The new capacity should be 30.7 million hours.

OPR: AF/LGMM / LTC Pitcher

78-05f: Why weren't the numbers based on requirements certified by local commanders?

Answer: The facilities and square footage cited for demolition / mothballing in the announced AF depot downsizing decision were extracted from the AFMC Resources Management Plan. This formal plan is developed at each AFMC installation, approved by each of the Commanders and ultimately rolled up into a single Command plan and adopted by HQ AFMC. Accordingly, we view this data as having been developed and approved by local commanders.

080-03. Base operating costs for Depot Activities, referring to COBRA screen 4, provide depot Industrial Fund totals for the fund total for equivalent RPMA and BOS non-payroll line for each ALC.

The RPMA and BOS factors used in the COBRA analysis is for the entire installation. The RPMA and BOS factors used were taken off the BRAC Questionnaire submitted by each installation.

Real Property Maintenance requirements for the Air Force depot are budgeted within the Defense Base Operation Fund. The Real Property Maintenance amount budgeted by each Depot is included in the stabilized rate for depot maintenance services. Costs for maintenance of depot facilities are paid for directly by the Defense Business Operation Funds.

The amount budgeted for BOS in the Depot Maintenance rates is based upon Interservice Support Agreements (ISA) between each Depot and host base. The ISAs are negotiated in accordance with DoD 4000.19-R, Defense Interservice Support Regulation. The regulation identifies mandatory costs must be included in the ISA and are allocated according to the methodology in the regulation. The optional costs may be negotiated based upon desired level of support by the tenant.

The BOS amount budgeted by each Depot is included in the stabilized rates developed for depot maintenance services. During the execution year, BOS is collected as part of the overall rate to customers for services provided and reimbursed by each Depot to its host base.

HQ AFMC has been requested to provide the Depot non-payroll RPMA and BOS for each Depot activity. This information will be forwarded to the Commission upon receipt from AFMC.

80-04C

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
OC-ALC	FMS	OFF	8	4	4	4	4	4	3
		ENL	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
		CIV	493	502	437	423	388	366	421
		TOT	501	506	441	428	393	371	424
OC-ALC	MAINT	OFF	45	45	45	46	46	46	45
		ENL	109	108	109	109	109	128	128
		CIV	7844	7851	7800	6070	5991	6389	6140
		TOT	7998	8004	7954	6225	6146	6563	6313
OC-ALC	MM	OFF	91	91	82	82	80	71	76
		ENL	18	18	18	57	17	17	17
		CIV	3321	3077	2922	2766	3072	2446	1954
		TOT	3430	3186	3022	2905	3169	2534	2047
OC-ALC	PK	OFF	17	17	17	15	15	13	12
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	561	538	473	420	409	334	268
		TOT	578	555	490	435	424	347	280
OC-ALC	MGMT	OFF	7	7	8	8	8	8	7
		ENL	11	11	11	12	12	3	3
		CIV	83	86	91	83	79	81	76
		TOT	101	104	110	103	99	92	86
OC-ALC	COMM/ COMP	OFF	2	2	2	6	9	9	8
		ENL	0	0	0	150	162	226	193
		CIV	538	517	487	507	455	424	92
		TOT	540	519	489	663	626	659	293
OC-ALC	MED	OFF	106	111	118	123	133	142	147
		ENL	253	258	277	272	271	291	320
		CIV	117	123	139	152	154	143	144
		TOT	476	492	534	547	558	576	611
OC-ALC	BOS	OFF	69	70	71	76	75	70	64
		ENL	973	1015	1039	1133	1097	885	836
		CIV	3964	3825	3554	3301	1730	1517	1382
		TOT	5006	4910	4664	4510	2902	2472	2282
OC-ALC	**TOTAL**	**OFF**	**345**	**347**	**347**	**360**	**370**	**363**	**362**
		ENL	**1364**	**1410**	**1454**	**1734**	**1669**	**1551**	**1497**
		CIV	**16921**	**16519**	**15903**	**13722**	**12278**	**11700**	**10477**
		TOT	**18630**	**18276**	**17704**	**15816**	**14317**	**13614**	**12336**

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
OO-ALC	FMS	OFF	9	10	8	8	3	6	6
		ENL	3	3	1	1	4	4	4
		CIV	713	770	671	599	487	577	761
		TOT	725	783	680	608	494	587	771
OO-ALC	MAINT	OFF	45	47	46	45	45	27	27
		ENL	356	358	357	355	355	352	353
		CIV	6634	6553	6696	5611	5567	5427	4571
		TOT	7035	6958	7099	6011	5967	5806	4951
OO-ALC	MM	OFF	126	119	107	108	112	105	109
		ENL	106	102	102	102	112	94	65
		CIV	2392	2150	1854	1631	1583	1082	930
		TOT	2624	2371	2063	1841	1807	1281	1104
OO-ALC	PK	OFF	16	16	16	15	11	12	12
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	437	410	410	380	324	233	162
		TOT	453	426	426	395	335	245	174
OO-ALC	MGMT	OFF	9	10	10	10	9	8	7
		ENL	11	13	13	12	12	12	12
		CIV	67	71	77	74	67	58	55
		TOT	87	94	100	96	88	78	74
OO-ALC	COMM/ COMP	OFF	5	5	5	8	11	12	8
		ENL	0	0	0	93	99	134	101
		CIV	523	497	472	451	397	358	82
		TOT	528	502	477	552	507	504	191
OO-ALC	MED	OFF	72	81	89	90	101	98	104
		ENL	179	180	190	196	202	194	197
		CIV	87	85	97	118	136	129	128
		TOT	338	346	376	404	439	421	429
OO-ALC	BOS	OFF	73	73	71	79	81	76	74
		ENL	1066	1067	1062	1093	1053	993	948
		CIV	3504	3378	3238	3186	2228	1623	1576
		TOT	4643	4518	4371	4358	3362	2692	2598
OO-ALC	**TOTAL**	**OFF**	**355**	**361**	**352**	**363**	**373**	**344**	**347**
		ENL	**1721**	**1723**	**1725**	**1852**	**1837**	**1783**	**1680**
		CIV	**14357**	**13914**	**13515**	**12050**	**10789**	**9487**	**8265**
		TOT	**16433**	**15998**	**15592**	**14265**	**12999**	**11614**	**10292**

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
SA-ALC	FMS	OFF	17	18	19	17	17	16	15
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	762	705	616	573	684	578	681
		TOT	779	723	635	590	701	594	696
SA-ALC	MAINT	OFF	43	39	38	38	37	35	35
		ENL	146	143	143	143	143	159	159
		CIV	7600	7584	7448	6660	6817	7048	5661
		TOT	7789	7766	7629	6841	6997	7242	5855
SA-ALC	MM	OFF	150	149	131	127	127	117	107
		ENL	352	352	347	320	331	347	135
		CIV	2940	2797	2519	2357	2803	2639	2174
		TOT	3442	3298	2997	2804	3261	3103	2416
SA-ALC	PK	OFF	17	17	17	16	13	13	13
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	646	598	586	538	492	431	373
		TOT	663	615	603	554	505	444	386
SA-ALC	MGMT	OFF	7	6	7	7	8	9	9
		ENL	12	12	12	11	11	11	11
		CIV	73	79	85	87	70	56	48
		TOT	92	97	104	105	89	76	68
SA-ALC	COMM/ COMP	OFF	4	4	4	7	8	7	5
		ENL	0	0	0	152	166	171	150
		CIV	408	392	374	431	358	278	96
		TOT	412	396	378	590	532	456	251
SA-ALC	MED	OFF	8	9	11	12	46	42	43
		ENL	20	20	19	20	104	105	110
		CIV	31	31	30	33	74	73	75
		TOT	59	60	60	65	224	220	228
SA-ALC	BOS	OFF	65	67	69	66	64	54	63
		ENL	559	568	556	527	474	466	455
		CIV	4235	4071	3976	3666	2889	1447	1400
		TOT	4859	4706	4601	4259	3427	1967	1918
SA-ALC	**TOTAL**	**OFF**	**311**	**309**	**296**	**290**	**320**	**293**	**290**
		ENL	**1089**	**1095**	**1077**	**1173**	**1229**	**1259**	**1020**
		CIV	**16695**	**16257**	**15634**	**14345**	**14187**	**12550**	**10508**
		TOT	**18095**	**17661**	**17007**	**15808**	**15736**	**14102**	**11818**

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
SM-ALC	FMS	OFF	13	10	8	8	4	4	4
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	527	401	279	212	203	187	367
		TOT	540	411	287	220	207	191	371
SM-ALC	MAINT	OFF	40	40	40	40	40	40	33
		ENL	263	263	262	260	259	252	248
		CIV	6026	6035	6045	5415	5322	5354	5104
		TOT	6329	6338	6347	5715	5621	5646	5385
SM-ALC	MM	OFF	104	105	100	100	112	97	96
		ENL	90	91	93	91	153	30	29
		CIV	2283	2301	2297	2093	2421	1884	1634
		TOT	2477	2497	2490	2284	2686	2011	1759
SM-ALC	PK	OFF	16	16	16	14	11	11	11
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	326	333	304	280	251	174	121
		TOT	342	349	320	294	262	185	132
SM-ALC	MGMT	OFF	13	13	13	14	13	10	7
		ENL	22	22	22	22	22	12	14
		CIV	61	64	72	71	64	58	38
		TOT	96	99	107	107	99	80	59
SM-ALC	COMM/ COMP	OFF	3	3	3	11	11	26	35
		ENL	0	0	22	269	293	292	299
		CIV	477	458	443	457	356	346	157
		TOT	480	461	468	737	660	664	491
SM-ALC	MED	OFF	38	40	46	54	57	146	157
		ENL	110	109	121	124	127	346	365
		CIV	84	83	91	92	94	161	167
		TOT	232	232	258	270	278	653	689
SM-ALC	BOS	OFF	62	64	64	61	52	56	54
		ENL	738	729	700	726	662	706	714
		CIV	3249	3171	3014	1950	1478	1282	1103
		TOT	4049	3964	3778	2737	2192	2044	1871
SM-ALC	**TOTAL**	**OFF**	**289**	**291**	**290**	**302**	**300**	**390**	**397**
		ENL	**1223**	**1214**	**1220**	**1492**	**1516**	**1638**	**1669**
		CIV	**13033**	**12846**	**12545**	**10570**	**10189**	**9446**	**8691**
		TOT	**14545**	**14351**	**14055**	**12364**	**12005**	**11474**	**10757**

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
WR-ALC	FMS	OFF	7	7	7	7	6	4	8
		ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		CIV	589	598	490	489	577	448	471
		TOT	596	605	497	496	583	452	479
WR-ALC	MAINT	OFF	39	39	39	40	37	37	37
		ENL	136	136	135	135	135	138	138
		CIV	6132	6213	6399	5913	6147	6308	6349
		TOT	6307	6388	6573	6088	6319	6483	6524
WR-ALC	MM	OFF	108	103	87	88	96	95	97
		ENL	18	18	19	20	83	38	28
		CIV	2887	2634	2286	2122	2817	2205	1730
		TOT	3013	2755	2392	2230	2996	2338	1855
WR-ALC	PK	OFF	18	18	17	17	15	15	14
		ENL	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
		CIV	575	540	515	425	386	314	234
		TOT	594	559	533	443	401	329	248
WR-ALC	MGMT	OFF	7	7	7	6	6	6	6
		ENL	4	4	3	4	4	5	5
		CIV	72	76	80	77	78	58	51
		TOT	83	87	90	87	88	69	62
WR-ALC	COMM/ COMP	OFF	6	6	6	9	9	10	8
		ENL	1	1	1	71	85	120	108
		CIV	405	389	368	351	292	240	58
		TOT	412	396	375	431	386	370	174
WR-ALC	MED	OFF	82	86	89	91	100	102	104
		ENL	181	183	189	185	194	198	207
		CIV	86	95	107	115	109	126	127
		TOT	349	364	385	391	403	426	438
WR-ALC	BOS	OFF	74	75	76	80	69	63	59
		ENL	894	895	852	880	793	726	708
		CIV	3749	3507	3159	3418	2499	1401	1367
		TOT	4717	4477	4087	4378	3361	2190	2134
WR-ALC	**TOTAL**	**OFF**	**341**	**341**	**328**	**338**	**338**	**332**	**333**
		ENL	**1235**	**1238**	**1200**	**1296**	**1294**	**1225**	**1194**
		CIV	**14495**	**14052**	**13404**	**12910**	**12905**	**11100**	**10387**
		TOT	**16071**	**15631**	**14932**	**14544**	**14537**	**12657**	**11914**

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
TOTAL	FMS	OFF	54	49	46	44	34	34	36
		ENL	3	3	1	2	5	5	4
		CIV	3084	2976	2493	2296	2339	2156	2701
		TOT	3141	3028	2540	2342	2378	2195	2741
TOTAL	MAINT	OFF	212	210	208	209	205	185	177
		ENL	1010	1008	1006	1002	1001	1029	1026
		CIV	34236	34236	34388	29669	29844	30526	27825
		TOT	35458	35454	35602	30880	31050	31740	29028
TOTAL	MM	OFF	579	567	507	505	527	485	485
		ENL	584	581	579	590	696	526	274
		CIV	13823	12959	11878	10969	12696	10256	8422
		TOT	14986	14107	12964	12064	13919	11267	9181
TOTAL	PK	OFF	84	84	83	77	65	64	62
		ENL	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
		CIV	2545	2419	2288	2043	1862	1486	1158
		TOT	2630	2504	2372	2121	1927	1550	1220
TOTAL	MGMT	OFF	43	43	45	45	44	41	36
		ENL	60	62	61	61	61	43	45
		CIV	356	376	405	392	358	311	268
		TOT	459	481	511	498	463	395	349
TOTAL	COMM/ COMP	OFF	20	20	20	41	48	64	64
		ENL	1	1	23	735	805	943	851
		CIV	2351	2253	2144	2197	1858	1646	485
		TOT	2372	2274	2187	2973	2711	2653	1400
TOTAL	MED	OFF	306	327	353	370	437	530	555
		ENL	743	750	796	797	898	1134	1199
		CIV	405	417	464	510	567	632	641
		TOT	1454	1494	1613	1677	1902	2296	2395
TOTAL	BOS	OFF	343	349	351	362	341	319	314
		ENL	4230	4274	4209	4359	4079	3776	3661
		CIV	18701	17952	16941	15521	10824	7270	6828
		TOT	23274	22575	21501	20242	15244	11365	10803
TOTAL	ALL ALCs	OFF	1641	1649	1613	1653	1701	1722	1729
		ENL	6632	6680	6676	7547	7545	7456	7060
		CIV	75501	73588	71001	63597	60348	54283	48328
		TOT	83774	81917	79290	72797	69594	63461	57117

MANPOWER HISTORY OF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS

CENTER	TYPE	CAT	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94

LEGEND:

FMS: Foreign Military Sales - PECs A2XXXX, XXXXXS (including PECs below with suffix "S")

MAINT: Depot Maintenance - PECs 72007, 72207, 78211

MM: Materiel Management - PECs 71112, 78065B, 78202A, 78070 except A & C, MFP 2 not in BOS Mission Element. Includes Item Management, System Management, Engineering, Provisioning.

PK: Central Contracting - PECs 71113, 78065C, 78070C, 78202C . Excludes Base Contracting.

MGMT: Management Overhead - PEC 72829

COMM/COMP: Communications & Computers - PECs 78012, 78201B, 78202B, MFP 3 except 31XXX.

MED: Medical - PEC 877XXX

BOS: Base Operating Support (Excludes Medical). Includes Depot Supply and GDIP.

Question: Provide documentation to show agreements to use available space by depot, by ALC, by installation.

Answer: (Uncertified Data). No specific agreements have been reached on use of available space. Site surveys are currently underway to identify space being made available because of TRC consolidations. Specific placement of other organizations in available space will be worked after the site survey results have been reviewed. Further information will be provided at that time.

The Air Force recommendation was not contingent upon the use of available space by any organization. It will, however, be made available where possible.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

28 MAR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Ms Ann Reese)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-2

SUBJECT: USAF BRAC '95 Depot Information

The attached data is forwarded in response to your request for separate COBRA files for each installation in the Air Force's consolidation recommendation (reference questions to AF/LGM on 16 March and fax to AF/RTR on 18 March). Please note the five COBRA files were created with the same data used in our Air Force consolidation recommendation. That recommendation was based on aggregate actions for all five depots, so it is not appropriate to compare or examine each installation in isolation.

Please feel free to call if there are any questions. My point of contact is Lt Col Louise Eckhardt, DSN 225-4578.

Jay D. Blume Jr.

JAY D. BLUME, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the CSAF for
Realignment and Transition

Attachment:
80-05g

Note: this is part of tasker # RT 247

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:17 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1996
ROI Year : Never

NPV in 2015($K): 46,726
1-Time Cost($K): 41,917

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	6,197	3,098	3,098	3,098	3,098	0	18,590	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	445	750	854	959	863	767	4,639	426
Moving	2,706	2,706	2,788	0	0	0	8,200	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	4,412	4,412	4,546	0	0	0	13,370	0
TOTAL	13,760	10,966	11,287	4,057	3,961	767	44,799	426

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Summary:

COBRA File 1 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:17 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	6,197	3,098	3,098	3,098	3,098	0	18,590	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	493	893	1,093	1,293	1,293	1,293	6,357	1,000
Moving	2,706	2,706	2,788	0	0	0	8,200	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	4,412	4,412	4,546	0	0	0	13,370	0
TOTAL	13,807	11,109	11,525	4,391	4,391	1,293	46,517	1,000

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	48	143	238	334	430	526	1,719	574
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	48	143	238	334	430	526	1,719	574

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:03 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	18,590,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		18,590,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,757,500	
Total - Overhead		1,757,500
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	8,200,000	
Total - Moving		8,200,000
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	13,370,000	
Total - Other		13,370,000
Total One-Time Costs		41,917,500
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		41,917,500

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:03 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
HILL, UT	Realignment
KELLY, TX	Realignment
MCCLELLAN, CA	Realignment
ROBINS, GA	Realignment
TINKER, OK	Realignment

Summary:

COBRA File 1 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) were based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
HILL, UT	KELLY, TX	1,363 mi
HILL, UT	MCCLELLAN, CA	671 mi
HILL, UT	ROBINS, GA	2,006 mi
HILL, UT	TINKER, OK	1,152 mi
KELLY, TX	MCCLELLAN, CA	1,733 mi
KELLY, TX	ROBINS, GA	1,045 mi
KELLY, TX	TINKER, OK	488 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	ROBINS, GA	2,570 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	TINKER, OK	1,641 mi
ROBINS, GA	TINKER, OK	929 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Total Officer Employees:	617	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,020
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,949	Communications ($K/Year):	2,402
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,024
Total Civilian Employees:	8,691	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	9,588
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.91
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,772	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	38
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	26		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:03 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

Total Officer Employees:	801	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,993
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,419	Communications ($K/Year):	3,681
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,945
Total Civilian Employees:	12,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	14.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	2,870
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.84
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	16,316	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	106	Activity Code:	43
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Total Officer Employees:	449	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,663
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,325	Communications ($K/Year):	2,978
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,097
Total Civilian Employees:	8,882	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	32.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,330
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	11,516	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	168	Activity Code:	58
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	126		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ROBINS, GA

Total Officer Employees:	739	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,269	Communications ($K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,119	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.85
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	56	Activity Code:	76
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	35		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	69	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: TINKER, OK

Total Officer Employees:	1,430	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,616
Total Enlisted Employees:	5,995	Communications ($K/Year):	6,714
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	26,012
Total Civilian Employees:	11,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	7.5%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	3,068
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	14,607	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	16	Activity Code:	83
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	19		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	77	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:03 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	4,412	4,412	4,546	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	2,706	2,706	2,788	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	200	600	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 1,406 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
TRC Rearr/Renovate	OTHER	0	204,000	4,590
Squeeze down Cost	OTHER	0	404,000	14,000

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:03 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Hill AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\HILL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Depot Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	9,142.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	5,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:18 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1998
ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015($K): -265,174
1-Time Cost($K): 29,731

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	10,053	5,027	0	-5,100	0	0	9,980	0
Person	0	0	-9,679	-21,776	-21,776	-21,776	-75,007	-21,776
Overhd	239	629	1,531	-503	-503	-503	890	-503
Moving	808	808	4,806	0	0	0	6,422	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,760	1,760	1,813	0	0	0	5,333	0
TOTAL	12,860	8,224	-1,529	-27,379	-22,279	-22,279	-52,381	-22,279

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civ	0	0	458	0	0	0	458
TOT	0	0	468	0	0	0	468
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Summary:

COBRA File 2 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:18 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
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Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	10,053	5,027	0	0	0	0	15,080	0
Person	0	0	1,213	0	0	0	1,213	0
Overhd	239	629	2,414	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,282	1,000
Moving	808	808	4,806	0	0	0	6,422	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,760	1,760	1,813	0	0	0	5,333	0
TOTAL	12,860	8,224	10,247	1,000	1,000	1,000	34,331	1,000

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	5,100	0	0	5,100	0
Person	0	0	10,893	21,776	21,776	21,776	76,221	21,776
Overhd	0	0	883	1,503	1,503	1,503	5,391	1,503
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	11,776	28,379	23,279	23,279	86,712	23,279

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:08 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	15,080,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		15,080,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	818,567	
Civilian Early Retirement	193,098	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	60,991	
Unemployment	140,940	
Total - Personnel		1,213,596
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	89,312	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,592,500	
Total - Overhead		1,681,812
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	3,974,400	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	2,448,000	
Total - Moving		6,422,400
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	5,333,000	
Total - Other		5,333,000
Total One-Time Costs		29,730,808
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	5,100,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		5,100,000
Total Net One-Time Costs		24,630,808

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:08 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
HILL, UT	Realignment
KELLY, TX	Realignment
MCCLELLAN, CA	Realignment
ROBINS, GA	Realignment
TINKER, OK	Realignment

Summary:

COBRA File 2 of 5. This is not a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) were based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
HILL, UT	KELLY, TX	1,363 mi
HILL, UT	MCCLELLAN, CA	671 mi
HILL, UT	ROBINS, GA	2,006 mi
HILL, UT	TINKER, OK	1,152 mi
KELLY, TX	MCCLELLAN, CA	1,733 mi
KELLY, TX	ROBINS, GA	1,045 mi
KELLY, TX	TINKER, OK	488 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	ROBINS, GA	2,570 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	TINKER, OK	1,641 mi
ROBINS, GA	TINKER, OK	929 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Total Officer Employees:	617	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,020
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,949	Communications ($K/Year):	2,402
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,024
Total Civilian Employees:	8,691	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	9,588
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.91
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,772	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	38
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	26		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

Total Officer Employees:	801	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,993
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,419	Communications ($K/Year):	3,681
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,945
Total Civilian Employees:	12,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	14.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	2,870
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.84
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	16,316	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	106	Activity Code:	43
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Total Officer Employees:	449	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,663
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,325	Communications ($K/Year):	2,978
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,097
Total Civilian Employees:	8,882	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	32.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,330
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	11,516	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	168	Activity Code:	58
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	126		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ROBINS, GA

Total Officer Employees:	739	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,269	Communications ($K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,119	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.85
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	56	Activity Code:	76
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	35		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	69	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: TINKER, OK

Total Officer Employees:	1,430	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,616
Total Enlisted Employees:	5,995	Communications ($K/Year):	6,714
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	26,012
Total Civilian Employees:	11,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	7.5%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	3,068
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	14,607	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	16	Activity Code:	83
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	19		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	77	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:08 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	1,760	1,760	1,813	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	808	808	832	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	200	600	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	5,100	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	1,274	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-9	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-458	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:08 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
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INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
TRC Rearr/Renovate	OTHER	0	181,000	4,080
Squeeze Down Costs	OTHER	0	316,000	11,000

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Depot Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	9,142.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	5,761.00

Data As Of 17:59 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:08 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Kelly AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\KELL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:19 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1996
ROI Year : Never

NPV in 2015($K): 44,305
1-Time Cost($K): 41,680

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	6,357	3,178	3,178	3,178	3,178	0	19,070	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	476	752	828	904	779	654	4,394	253
Moving	1,757	1,757	1,811	0	0	0	5,325	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	5,034	5,034	5,187	0	0	0	15,255	0
TOTAL	13,624	10,722	11,004	4,082	3,957	654	44,044	253

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Summary:

COBRA File 3 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:19 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	6,357	3,178	3,178	3,178	3,178	0	19,070	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	538	938	1,138	1,338	1,338	1,338	6,630	1,000
Moving	1,757	1,757	1,811	0	0	0	5,325	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	5,034	5,034	5,187	0	0	0	15,255	0
TOTAL	13,686	10,908	11,315	4,517	4,517	1,338	46,280	1,000

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overhd	62	186	310	434	559	684	2,236	746
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	62	186	310	434	559	684	2,236	746

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:10 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	19,070,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		19,070,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	2,030,000	
Total - Overhead		2,030,000
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	5,325,000	
Total - Moving		5,325,000
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	15,255,000	
Total - Other		15,255,000
Total One-Time Costs		41,680,000
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		41,680,000

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:10 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
HILL, UT	Realignment
KELLY, TX	Realignment
MCCLELLAN, CA	Realignment
ROBINS, GA	Realignment
TINKER, OK	Realignment

Summary:

COBRA File 3 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) were based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
HILL, UT	KELLY, TX	1,363 mi
HILL, UT	MCCLELLAN, CA	671 mi
HILL, UT	ROBINS, GA	2,006 mi
HILL, UT	TINKER, OK	1,152 mi
KELLY, TX	MCCLELLAN, CA	1,733 mi
KELLY, TX	ROBINS, GA	1,045 mi
KELLY, TX	TINKER, OK	488 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	ROBINS, GA	2,570 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	TINKER, OK	1,641 mi
ROBINS, GA	TINKER, OK	929 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Total Officer Employees:	617	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,020
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,949	Communications ($K/Year):	2,402
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,024
Total Civilian Employees:	8,691	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	9,588
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.91
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,772	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	38
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	26		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

Total Officer Employees:	801	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,993
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,419	Communications ($K/Year):	3,681
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,945
Total Civilian Employees:	12,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	14.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	2,870
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.84
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	16,316	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	106	Activity Code:	43
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Total Officer Employees:	449	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,663
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,325	Communications ($K/Year):	2,978
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,097
Total Civilian Employees:	8,882	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	32.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,330
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	11,516	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	168	Activity Code:	58
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	126		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ROBINS, GA

Total Officer Employees:	739	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,269	Communications ($K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,119	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.85
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	56	Activity Code:	76
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	35		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	69	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: TINKER, OK

Total Officer Employees:	1,430	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,616
Total Enlisted Employees:	5,995	Communications ($K/Year):	6,714
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	26,012
Total Civilian Employees:	11,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	7.5%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	3,068
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	14,607	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	16	Activity Code:	83
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	19		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	77	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:10 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	5,034	5,034	5,187	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	1,757	1,757	1,811	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	200	600	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	1,624	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
TRC Rearr/Renovate	OTHER	0	834,000	18,770
Squeeze Down Costs	OTHER	0	8,000	300

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:10 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : McClellan AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\MCCL0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Depot Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	9,142.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	5,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1998
ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015($K): -205,930
1-Time Cost($K): 29,387

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	7,193	3,597	0	-10,600	0	0	190	0
Person	115	115	-7,997	-17,499	-17,499	-17,499	-60,265	-17,499
Overhd	391	731	1,402	187	187	187	3,086	187
Moving	2,342	2,342	5,948	0	0	0	10,633	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,798	1,798	1,853	0	0	0	5,449	0
TOTAL	11,840	8,584	1,206	-27,912	-17,312	-17,312	-40,906	-17,312

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civ	0	0	368	0	0	0	368
TOT	0	0	376	0	0	0	376
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	40	40	38	0	0	0	118
TOT	40	40	38	0	0	0	118

Summary:

COBRA File 4 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/2
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	7,193	3,597	0	0	0	0	10,790	0
Person	115	115	755	0	0	0	985	0
Overhd	410	822	2,076	1,088	1,088	1,088	6,573	1,088
Moving	2,342	2,342	5,948	0	0	0	10,633	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1,798	1,798	1,853	0	0	0	5,449	0
TOTAL	11,859	8,675	10,632	1,088	1,088	1,088	34,431	1,088

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	10,600	0	0	10,600	0
Person	0	0	8,751	17,499	17,499	17,499	61,250	17,499
Overhd	18	91	674	901	901	901	3,487	901
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	18	91	9,426	29,000	18,400	18,400	75,337	18,400

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	10,790,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		10,790,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	527,521	
Civilian Early Retirement	205,691	
Civilian New Hires	112,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	49,469	
Unemployment	90,828	
Total - Personnel		985,509
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	158,597	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,371,250	
Total - Overhead		1,529,847
Moving		
Civilian Moving	2,691,435	
Civilian PPS	3,196,800	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	26,851	
One-Time Moving Costs	4,718,000	
Total - Moving		10,633,087
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	5,449,000	
Total - Other		5,449,000
Total One-Time Costs		29,387,443
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	10,600,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		10,600,000
Total Net One-Time Costs		18,787,443

ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/6
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Base: HILL, UT
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	112,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		112,000
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
Total One-Time Costs		112,000
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		112,000

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Base: ROBINS, GA
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	10,790,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		10,790,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	527,521	
Civilian Early Retirement	205,691	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	49,469	
Unemployment	90,828	
Total - Personnel		873,509
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	158,597	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,371,250	
Total - Overhead		1,529,847
Moving		
Civilian Moving	2,691,435	
Civilian PPS	3,196,800	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	26,851	
One-Time Moving Costs	4,718,000	
Total - Moving		10,633,087
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	5,449,000	
Total - Other		5,449,000
Total One-Time Costs		29,275,443
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	10,600,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		10,600,000
Total Net One-Time Costs		18,675,443

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
HILL, UT	Realignment
KELLY, TX	Realignment
MCCLELLAN, CA	Realignment
ROBINS, GA	Realignment
TINKER, OK	Realignment

Summary:

COBRA File 4 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
HILL, UT	KELLY, TX	1,363 mi
HILL, UT	MCCLELLAN, CA	671 mi
HILL, UT	ROBINS, GA	2,006 mi
HILL, UT	TINKER, OK	1,152 mi
KELLY, TX	MCCLELLAN, CA	1,733 mi
KELLY, TX	ROBINS, GA	1,045 mi
KELLY, TX	TINKER, OK	488 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	ROBINS, GA	2,570 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	TINKER, OK	1,641 mi
ROBINS, GA	TINKER, OK	929 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from ROBINS, GA to HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	40	40	38	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Total Officer Employees:	617	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,020
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,949	Communications ($K/Year):	2,402
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,024
Total Civilian Employees:	8,691	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	9,588
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.91
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,772	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	38
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	26		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: KELLY, TX

Total Officer Employees:	801	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,993
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,419	Communications ($K/Year):	3,681
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,945
Total Civilian Employees:	12,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	14.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	2,870
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.84
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	16,316	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	106	Activity Code:	43
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Total Officer Employees:	449	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,663
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,325	Communications ($K/Year):	2,978
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,097
Total Civilian Employees:	8,882	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	32.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,330
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	11,516	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	168	Activity Code:	58
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	126		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: ROBINS, GA

Total Officer Employees:	739	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,269	Communications ($K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,119	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.85
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	56	Activity Code:	76
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	35		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	69	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
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INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: TINKER, OK

Total Officer Employees:	1,430	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,616
Total Enlisted Employees:	5,995	Communications ($K/Year):	6,714
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	26,012
Total Civilian Employees:	11,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	7.5%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	3,068
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	14,607	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	16	Activity Code:	83
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	19		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	77	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	1,798	1,798	1,853	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	1,557	1,557	1,604	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	200	600	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	10,600	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 1,097 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 0 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-7	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-368	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
TRC Rearr/Renovate	OTHER	0	386,000	8,690
Squeeze Down Costs	OTHER	0	64,000	2,100

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Depot Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:13 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Robins AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\ROBI0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	9,142.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	5,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1998
ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015($K): -569,615
1-Time Cost($K): 39,704

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	7,760	3,880	0	0	0	0	11,640	0
Person	128	128	-20,870	-46,443	-46,443	-46,443	-159,943	-46,443
Overhd	451	794	1,369	-272	-272	-272	1,798	-272
Moving	1,861	1,861	10,764	0	0	0	14,486	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2,940	2,940	3,029	0	0	0	8,909	0
TOTAL	13,140	9,603	-5,708	-46,715	-46,715	-46,715	-123,110	-46,715

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
Civ	0	0	980	0	0	0	980
TOT	0	0	999	0	0	0	999
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	45	45	43	0	0	0	133
TOT	45	45	43	0	0	0	133

Summary:

COBRA File 5 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	7,760	3,880	0	0	0	0	11,640	0
Person	128	128	2,353	0	0	0	2,609	0
Overhd	457	854	2,560	1,105	1,105	1,105	7,186	1,105
Moving	1,861	1,861	10,764	0	0	0	14,486	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2,940	2,940	3,029	0	0	0	8,909	0
TOTAL	13,146	9,663	18,706	1,105	1,105	1,105	44,830	1,105

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	23,223	46,443	46,443	46,443	162,552	46,443
Overhd	6	60	1,191	1,377	1,377	1,377	5,387	1,377
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	6	60	24,414	47,819	47,819	47,819	167,939	47,819

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/6
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	11,640,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		11,640,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	1,618,944	
Civilian Early Retirement	470,151	
Civilian New Hires	128,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	112,840	
Unemployment	278,748	
Total - Personnel		2,608,683
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	356,451	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,703,750	
Total - Overhead		2,060,201
Moving		
Civilian Moving	2,902,809	
Civilian PPS	8,467,200	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	28,111	
One-Time Moving Costs	3,088,000	
Total - Moving		14,486,121
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	8,909,000	
Total - Other		8,909,000
Total One-Time Costs		39,704,005
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		39,704,005

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Base: HILL, UT
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	112,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		112,000
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
Total One-Time Costs		112,000
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		112,000

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Base: MCCLELLAN, CA
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	16,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		16,000
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
Total One-Time Costs		16,000
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		16,000

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

Base: TINKER, OK
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	11,640,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		11,640,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	1,618,944	
Civilian Early Retirement	470,151	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	112,840	
Unemployment	278,748	
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Overhead		
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Mothball / Shutdown	1,703,750	
Total - Overhead		2,060,201
Moving		
Civilian Moving	2,902,809	
Civilian PPS	8,467,200	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	28,111	
One-Time Moving Costs	3,088,000	
Total - Moving		14,486,121
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	8,909,000	
Total - Other		8,909,000
Total One-Time Costs		39,576,005
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		39,576,005

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
HILL, UT	Realignment
KELLY, TX	Realignment
MCCLELLAN, CA	Realignment
ROBINS, GA	Realignment
TINKER, OK	Realignment

Summary:

COBRA File 5 of 5. This IS NOT a stand-alone file.

At the request of the DBRCA, separate COBRA files for each installation were created using the same data previously used for the Air Force's consolidation recommendation. The recommendation (and data used to develop the COBRA files) was based on a package approach and it is not appropriate to examine each installation in isolation. The data used in this file is simply a shred-out of the data used for the TRC portion of the recommendation.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
HILL, UT	KELLY, TX	1,363 mi
HILL, UT	MCCLELLAN, CA	671 mi
HILL, UT	ROBINS, GA	2,006 mi
HILL, UT	TINKER, OK	1,152 mi
KELLY, TX	MCCLELLAN, CA	1,733 mi
KELLY, TX	ROBINS, GA	1,045 mi
KELLY, TX	TINKER, OK	488 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	ROBINS, GA	2,570 mi
MCCLELLAN, CA	TINKER, OK	1,641 mi
ROBINS, GA	TINKER, OK	929 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from TINKER, OK to HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	40	40	39	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from TINKER, OK to MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	5	5	4	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

Total Officer Employees:	617	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,020
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,949	Communications ($K/Year):	2,402
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,024
Total Civilian Employees:	8,691	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	9,588
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.91
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,772	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	38
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	26		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	98	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: KELLY, TX

Total Officer Employees:	801	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	16,993
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,419	Communications ($K/Year):	3,681
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,945
Total Civilian Employees:	12,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	14.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	2,870
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.84
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	16,316	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	106	Activity Code:	43
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

Total Officer Employees:	449	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,663
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,325	Communications ($K/Year):	2,978
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,097
Total Civilian Employees:	8,882	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	32.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,330
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.24
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	11,516	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	168	Activity Code:	58
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	126		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: ROBINS, GA

Total Officer Employees:	739	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,269	Communications ($K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,119	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.85
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	56	Activity Code:	76
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	35		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	69	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: TINKER, OK

Total Officer Employees:	1,430	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,616
Total Enlisted Employees:	5,995	Communications ($K/Year):	6,714
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	26,012
Total Civilian Employees:	11,678	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	7.5%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	3,068
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	14,607	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	16	Activity Code:	83
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	19		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	77	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HILL, UT

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: KELLY, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: MCCLELLAN, CA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: ROBINS, GA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	2,940	2,940	3,029	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	1,019	1,019	1,050	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	200	600	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Facil ShutDown(KSF): 1,363 Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: TINKER, OK

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-18	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-980	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: TINKER, OK

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
TRC Rearr/Renovate	OTHER	0	357,000	8,040
Squeeze Down Costs	OTHER	0	151,000	3,600

Data As Of 18:12 03/23/1995, Report Created 10:15 03/28/1995

Department : Air Force
Option Package : Tinker AFB
Scenario File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\TINK0323.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA508\BREAKOUT\DEPOT.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Depot Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	9,142.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	5,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

28 MAR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Ms Ann Reese)

FROM: HQ USAF/RT

SUBJECT: USAF BRAC '95 Depot Information

Attached is an updated status of the questions and information requested by your office. Please note a column has been added to indicate whether our response is based on certified or uncertified data (in accordance with Mr. Robert E. Bayer's 17 March memo).

Any questions can be referred to my point of contact, Lt Col Louise Eckhardt, DSN 225-4578.

JAY D. BLUME, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF
Special Assistant to the CSAF for
Realignment and Transition

Questions/Information Requested by Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff

Ref Num	Question	Date Rec	Rec From	Data Type	OPR	Comments
078-01a	Describe structures of ALC	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AFMC/XP Mr. Van Gilst	Provided 22 March 1995
078-01b	List major organizational components of each ALC	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AFMC/XP Mr. Van Gilst	Provided 22 March 1995
078-01c	Provide numbers of personnel for each ALC (authorizations FY 88-95 and projections 95-01)	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-04a
078-01d	Provide numbers of personnel for each ALC installation, each ALC, and each ALC major organizational component (actual on-board as of 1 October, 1994)	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-04b
078-01e	Provide numbers of personnel for each major organization within each ALC (authorizations FY 88-95)	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-04c
078-01f	Provide numbers of supervisors and numbers of "hands-on" personnel for each ALC and for each major organizational component of each ALC	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-04d
078-01g	Describe relationship of maintenance function to other function within ALC	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AFMC/XP	Information provided during Mr. Orr's briefing. BRAC staff has hard copy
078-01h	List other functions collocated with the ALCs (i.e. DISA Megacenters)	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP Lt Col Eckhardt	Superceded by 080-04e
078-02a	Why are personnel eliminated numbers based on efficiency factor rather than specific workload data utilized by Army and Navy	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AFMC/XP	Answer Provided 21March 1995
078-02b	What was the basis for the 15% factor for eliminating positions through consolidation of like workload?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AFMC/XP	Answer Provided 21 March 1995
078-02c	Why were positions eliminated on the Air Force depot closure scenarios based on a 6% efficiency factor?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	Capt Coggins Lt Col Callahan	Answer Provided 22 March 1995
078-02d	What was the basis for the % of positions moved vs. eliminated as a result of a closure action?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/PEP Lt Col Callahan	Answer Provided 22 March 1995
078-03a	One time cost to close vs. one time cost to realign	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Superceded by 080-05a-g If further infomration is needed, please provide more specific questions
078-03b	Cost of annual maintenance of 5 depots vs. 3	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Answer Provided 22 March 1995
078-03c	Cost of modernizing 5 depots vs. 3	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Answer Provided 22 March 1995
078-04a	How was the 15% "industrial benefit factor" considered when sizing the ALCs?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer provided on 27 March 1995

D-Certified Data, DRD-Derived from Certified Data, UCD- Uncertified Data

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epared by Major Kevin Gamache, AF/LGMM, 703-697-8775, DSN 227-8775, Fax 783-2811, email:kgamache@pafosu2.hq.af.mil

Questions/Information Requested by Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff

Ref Num	Question	Date Rec	Rec From	Data Type	OPR	Comments
078-04b	Why was CORE reduced 15%?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer Provided on 27 March 1995
078-04c	Why does capcity now equal the CORE workload?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer Provided on 27 March 1995
078-05a	What percentage of the ALC activity square footage will be mothballed or demolished and why?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-07g
078-05b	What is the basis of support for $24 million in demolition costs?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/XP	Superceded by 080-07g
078-05c	What is the remaining useable square footage of each ALC?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	N/A	AFMC/CE	Superceded by 080-07e
078-05d	What is the basis for the $44 million cost for the renovation of shop space?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese		AFMC/CE	
078-05e	Why is the Air Force only now identifying/validating specific buildings for demolition/mothballing?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer Provided on 21 March 1995
078-05f	Why weren't the numbers based on requirements certified by local commanders?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer Provided on 21 March 1995
078-06	Installation tiering vs. depot activity tiering: which was given to the Joint Cross Service Group and why?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col Echols	Answer Provided on 22 March 1995
078-07a	Describe workload transfers in terms of hours, by commodity, to and from each ALC	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Supplemented by 78-07a Answer provided 21 March 1995
078-08a	Please discuss in general terms the environmental condition of each ALC installation. Provide costs for compliance and clean-up (information should be available from data calls)	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	CD	AF/CEV Jack Bush	Superceded by 080-06a Answer provided 21 March 1995
078-08b	Did the Air Force consider environmental costs during the BRAC process?	16 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AF/CEV Jack Bush	Answer provided 21 March 1995
079-01	Please provide copy of 23 Jan 95 Depot Closure briefing from BCEG meeting	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	CD	AF/RTR Lt Col Eckhardt	No BCEG meeting on 23 Jan 95. Briefing was on 26 Jan 1995. Briefing provided on 21 March 1995
079-02	Please provide details behind downsizing option. Please provide COBRA run if one was done.	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	CD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Superceded by 080-05g
079-03	Please provide date/details of first time downsizing was discussed	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col Eckhardt	Minutes of 1 February 1995 BCEG provided on 20 March 1995
079-04	Provide "Air Force only" depot closure COBRA runs briefed during the 23 January 95 BCEG	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Superceded by 080-05a-f

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epared by Major Kevin Gamache, AF/LGMM, 703-697-8775, DSN 227-8775, Fax XX5-2811, email:kgamache@pafosu2.hq.af.mil

Questions/Information Requested by Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff

Ref Num	Question	Date Rec	Rec From	Data Type	OPR	Comments
079-05	Do AF COBRA runs include MILCON cost avoidances?	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Answer provided on 21 March 1995
079-05a	What were the military construction projects cost avoidance associated with each depot closure option?	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/RTR Lt Col O'Neill	Answer provided on 21 March 1995
079-06	What is the variance in cost of labor hour between ALC	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	CD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Answer provided 21 March 1995
079-07	Provide the 3 charts prepared by Capt Coggins depicting payback associated with depot closure and downsizing options.	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	DCD	AF/LGMM Major Gamache	Provided on 21 March 1995
079-08	Provide a copy of the letter from Mr. Boatright to the JCSG with the military values/tiers for depots	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	CD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Provided on 21 March 1995
079-09	When will a decision be made on which facilities will be mothballed, destroyed, or utilized by other organizations?	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AF/LGMM Lt Col Pitcher	Provided on 22 March 1995
079-10	Provide support data on 6.8 million square feet of space to be effected by downsizing.	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese	UCD	AF/LGMM Lt col Pitcher	Provided on 21 March 1995
079-11	Provide information on effect of 2-Level vs. 3-Level Maintenance on depot workload What impact will there be on manpower numbers when fully implemented?	17 Mar 95	Ann Reese		AFMC/XP	
080-01a	Provide manpower authorizations that match force structure plan (based on 1995 BRAC recommendations)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/PEP	Answer Provided on 22 March 1995
080-01b	Provide details of migration of position authorizations (military and civilian) in and outs for each ALC function (reductions and reallocations)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-01c	Provide list of buildings and square footage to be disposed of or mothballed or used by others (indicate category)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-02a	Provide military construction projects authorized and projects executed - dollar value of each and description by ALC, by year 1985-1995	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-02b	Provide military construction projects programmed - dollar value of each and description by ALC, by year 1996-2001	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-03	Base operating costs for Depot Activities, referring to COBRA screen 4, provide depot Industrial Fund totals for the fund total for equivalent RPMA and BOS non-payroll line for each ALC (See attached screen 4)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	Interim Answer Provided on 27 March 1995
080-04a	Provide numbers of personnel for each ALC (authorizations FY 88-95 and projections 96-01)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/PEP	Supplements 078-01c Adds request for FY 95 data Answer Provided on 22 March 1995
080-04b	Provide numbers of personnel for each ALC installation, each ALC, and each ALC major organizational component (actual on-board as of August 1994)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	Supplements 078-01d Changes reference date

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prepared by Major Kevin Gamache, AF/LGMM, 703-697-8775, DSN [illegible], Fax [illegible]-2811, email:kgamache@pafosu2.hq.af.mil

Questions/Information Requested by Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff

Ref Num	Question	Date Rec	Rec From	Data Type	OPR	Comments
080-04c	Provide numbers of personnel for each major organization within each ALC (authorizations FY 88-95)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 078-01e Changes reference dates. Info for FY 88-94 provided on 21 March 1995
080-04d	Provide numbers of supervisors and numbers of "hands-on" personnel for each ALC and for each major organizational component of each ALC	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	Supercedes 078-01f
080-04e	Provide number of personnel at each function collocated with each ALC (DISA, DFAS, DLA)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supplements 078-01h Adds numbers of personnel. This infomration is available in Section 1.1A of the BRAC Questionnaire
080-04f	Provide authorization migration and eliminations based on downsize in place strategy (1995 BRAC recommendation)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-05a	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close Kelly AFB	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-05b	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close McClellan AFB	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-05c	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close Kelly and McClellan AFB	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-05d	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close Kelly ALC	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995 Depot Mnx Only Option provided. We did not do an ALC only option. BRAC staff needs to provide assumptions so we can run an ALC only option
080-05e	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close McClellan ALC	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995 Depot Mnx Only Option provided. We did not do an ALC only option. BRAC staff needs to provide assumptions so we can run an ALC only option
080-05f	Provide Air Force version of COBRA to close Kelly and McClellan ALCs	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995 Depot Mnx Only Option provided. We did not do an ALC only option. BRAC staff needs to provide assumptions so we can run an ALC only option
080-05g	Provide COBRA for each installation with an ALC for the downsize strategy (1995 BRAC recommendation)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 079-04 Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-06a	Provide programmed environmental compliance costs for each ALC installation and	20 Mar 95	Frank	CD		Supercedes 078-08a

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pared by Major Kevin Gamache, AF/LGMM, 703-697-8775, DSN 227-8775, Fax 8X5-2811, email:kgamache@pafosu2.hq.af.mil

Questions/Information Requested by Base Realignment and Closure Commission Staff

Ref Num	Question	Date Rec	Rec From	Data Type	OPR	Comments
	each ALC, 1995-01		Cirillo			Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-06b	Provide Projected environmental cleanup costs for each ALC installation and each ALC (indicate that portion already contained in the funded program)	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD		Supercedes 078-08a Answer provided on 21 March 1995
080-07a	Provide total square footage by depot in years 1991, 1993, 1995	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-07b	Provide total square footage to be mothballed by depot, by ALC, by installation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-07c	Provide total square footage to be demolished by depot, by ALC, by installation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-07d	Provide documentation to show agreements to use available space by depot, by ALC, by installation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	UCD	AFMC/XP	Interim answer provided on 27 March 1995
080-07e	Provide remaining useable square footage by depot, by ALC, by installation after implementation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-07f	Identify funding currently programmed to be mothballed and demolished by depot, by ALC, by installation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-07g	Identify square footage currently programmed to be mothballed and demolished by depot, by ALC, by installation	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo		AFMC/XP	
080-08a	Provide workload movement from each ALC by commodity in hours for the downsize in place strategy	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08b	Provide workload movement to each ALC by commodity in hours for the downsize in place strategy.	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08c	Provide workload movements from each ALC by commodity in hours for the Air Force version of close Kelly option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08d	Provide workload movements to each ALC by commodity in hours for the Air Force version of the close Kelly option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08e	Provide workload movements from each ALC by commodity in hours for the Air Force version close McClellan option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08f	Provide workload movements to each ALC by commidity in hours for the Air Force version close McClellan option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08g	Provide workload movements from each ALC by commodity in hours for the Air Force version close McClellan and Kelly option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995
080-08h	Provide workload movements to each ALC by commidity in hours for the Air Force version close McClellan and Kelly option	20 Mar 95	Frank Cirillo	CD	AF/LGMM	Provided 22 March 1995

D-Certified Data, DRD-Derived from Certified Data, UCD-Uncertified Data

s of : 03/27/95 3:22 PM

pared by Major Kevin Gamache, AF/LGMM, 703-697-8775, DSN [illegible] 87[illegible] Fax 8X5-2811, email:kgamache@pafosu2.hq.af.mil

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-3

FROM: CORNELLA, AL	TO: KNICKMEIER, LONNIE
TITLE: COMMISSIONER	TITLE: MILITARY AFFAIRS COMM
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: FORT RITCHIE
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT RITCHIE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE DURING VISIT TO FORT RITCHIE

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950328	Mail Date: 950330

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 28, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-3

Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier
Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee
Professional Arts Building
Suite 601, Five Public Square
Hagerstown, Maryland 21740

Dear Mr. Knickmeier:

I want to thank you for the briefings and discussions during my visit to Fort Ritchie. You provided us with valuable information about the operations of the installation. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the members of the Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee for their assistance in making my visit productive.

Sincerely,

Al Cornella
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-4

FROM: COX, REBECCA	TO: SUBIN, MICHAEL
TITLE: COMMISSIONER	TITLE: MONTGOMERY CO. COUNCIL
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: NSWC DAHLGREN
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR ASSISTANCE DURING VISIT TO NSWC DAHLGREN AND NSWC GARDEROCK

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950328	Mail Date: 950330

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 28, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-4

CAPT James E. Baskerville, USN
Commander, Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center
Headquarters, David Taylor Model Basin
Bethesda, MD 20084-5000

Dear Captain Baskerville:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to NSWC Carderock Division, Annapolis Detachment. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff and the community officials provided us with a great deal of valuable information about the operations at Annapolis. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the members of your staff for their assistance. The overview briefing and tour conducted by Commander Walker and Mr. Tim Doyle were very informative. I would also like to thank Mr. James Scott for his efforts in planning and coordinating the base visit.

Sincerely,

Rebecca G. Cox

Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 28, 1995

Mr. Michael L. Subin
Montgomery County Council
Stella B. Werner Council Office Building
Rockville, MD 20850

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-4

Dear Mr. Subin:

I want to thank you for your coordination of the community briefs we received during my recent visit to NSWC Dahlgren Division White Oak Detachment. The presentations provided us with a great deal of valuable information about the operations at White Oak. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the speakers at the presentation: Mr. John Tino, Ms. Betty Gay, Mr. Frank Pierce, Ms. Betsy Bretz, and Mr. Mike Levin. Their enthusiasm spoke volumes about the community support that White Oak enjoys. Lastly, the pie presented to me by Betsy was delicious; its baker's renown is richly deserved.

Sincerely,

Rebecca G. Cox

Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 28, 1995

CAPT J. Overton, USN
Commander, Dahlgren Division Naval Surface Warfare Center
17320 Dahlgren Road
Dahlgren, VA 22448-5700

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-4

Dear Captain Overton:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to NSWC Dahlgren Division White Oak Detachment. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff and the community officials provided us with a great deal of valuable information about the operations at White Oak. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the members of your staff for their assistance. The overview briefing and tour conducted by Captain Perry were very informative. I would also like to thank Ms. Deanna Zook, Ms. Marcia Westermeyer, and Commander Silvestri for their efforts in planning and coordinating the base visit.

Sincerely,

Rebecca G. Cox

Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-5

FROM: YELLIN, ALEX	TO: BENNET, D. M-VICE AD
TITLE: NAVY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: I G OF THE NAVY
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE NAVY
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION, LOUISVILLE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING A COPY OF THE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT AND ALL SUPPORTING DATA INVOLVING THE INVESTIGATION OF DATA CALLS FOR NOS, LOUISVILLE.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950330	Mail Date: 950330

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
901 M STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
950447
Ser 05/ 1 4 1 4

10 APR 1995

Mr. Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-5Ra

Dear Mr. Yellin:

I am responding to your letter of March 30, 1995, reference number 950330-5, concerning my ongoing review of a Naval Audit Service inquiry into alleged irregularities with respect to the collection of BRAC 95 closure scenario data at Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville. My office became involved in this matter March 23, 1995, at the request of the Naval Sea Systems Command Inspector General (NAVSEA IG), in order to ensure the independence and objectivity of the overall investigation into the Louisville allegations.

As you requested, I have enclosed with this letter the auditors' report of March 3, 1995, and the NAVSEA IG's letter of transmittal to me of March 23, 1995. There is no separate NAVSEA IG report, as that office was still in the process of analyzing the audit report at the time the matter was referred to me. Further, my staff is still in the process of reviewing and analyzing the issues, and no report has been issued or drafted. You also requested all supporting documentation, and I have enclosed, as well, two binders which contain the auditors' principal supporting documents. The auditors accumulated several boxes of additional materials, including complete copies of all of the scenario data calls, which I believe are not critical to your review and which, for the most part, are probably already available to you. Those documents are available for review, and I will provide copies of any individual document upon request.

In reviewing the enclosures, you will note that while the auditors found that some of the individual allegations were substantiated, their overall conclusion was that there was "no apparent impact on the overall BRAC 95 process." My efforts to date in reviewing the auditors' findings have focused on verification of that bottom-line conclusion of "no apparent impact." On April 6, 1995, I provided the Under Secretary of the Navy an update which reported that I now concur with the auditors' conclusion, and I indicated to him the steps taken in reaching that conclusion. A copy of that memorandum is also enclosed.

Having made that initial determination, my efforts are now focused on reviewing the auditors' individual findings and conclusions. You may notice that their adverse findings are more

technical, than substantive, in nature and appear to be based on their individual opinions. I believe that much of what they have said is open to interpretation and differing opinions. I propose to analyze those findings and ensure that each is considered in a proper context.

Should you have any further questions or desire to review the additional audit documentation, my action officer in this matter is Mr. William C. Kellum at (202) 433-4703.

Sincerely,

D. M. BENNETT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Encl:
(1) Naval Audit Service ltr of March 3, 1995
(2) NAVSEA IG ltr of March 23, 1995
(3) Two binders of supporting documentation for the audit report
(4) NAVINSGEN's memorandum of April 6, 1995

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 30, 1995

Vice Admiral D.M. Bennett
Inspector General of the Navy
Washington Navy Yard
Building 200
901 M Street SE
Washington, DC. 20374-5006

Please refer to this number
when responding 950330-5

Dear Vice Admiral Bennett:

I understand the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Inspector General asked the Naval Audit Service to investigate both the process and the accuracy of data submitted by, and for, the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville in response to BRAC 95 scenario data calls. It is our understanding that the investigation came about as a result of claims that the initial Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville data call responses were altered in ways which may have lead to inaccurate data.

The investigation was apparently initiated following a complaint to the Inspector General regarding the handling of scenario data call responses pertaining to the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville. The Naval Audit Service has prepared an investigative report pursuant to Job Order 95-0044 from the Inspector General (NAVSEA). In order to facilitate our review of the Secretary's recommendations to close the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, we ask that you provide a copy of this investigative report (whether in a draft or final version) and all supporting documentation.

It is also our understanding that this investigative report has now gone to your office, and is currently under investigation. We have been advised that this NAVSEA Inspector General investigation is assigned case number 1493C. We would like a copy of this investigative report (whether in a draft or final version) and all supporting documentation. In addition, if you have any transmittal information we would request a copy of those documents.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Because this commission is on a time constraint to report our findings to the President, we request that you act expeditiously to review this investigation. Please report your information to us by April 14, 1995 or as soon thereafter as feasible.

Please feel free to contact us if necessary. Thank you for your prompt attention to this urgent matter.

Sincerely,

Alex Yellin
Navy Team Leader

cc: Navy Auditor General
Naval Sea Systems Command Inspector General
Navy Base Structure Analysis Team

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
901 M STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
950447
Ser 05/ 14 4

10 APR 1995

Mr. Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

950330-5R1

Dear Mr. Yellin:

I am responding to your letter of March 30, 1995, reference number 950330-5, concerning my ongoing review of a Naval Audit Service inquiry into alleged irregularities with respect to the collection of BRAC 95 closure scenario data at Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville. My office became involved in this matter March 23, 1995, at the request of the Naval Sea Systems Command Inspector General (NAVSEA IG), in order to ensure the independence and objectivity of the overall investigation into the Louisville allegations.

As you requested, I have enclosed with this letter the auditors' report of March 3, 1995, and the NAVSEA IG's letter of transmittal to me of March 23, 1995. There is no separate NAVSEA IG report, as that office was still in the process of analyzing the audit report at the time the matter was referred to me. Further, my staff is still in the process of reviewing and analyzing the issues, and no report has been issued or drafted. You also requested all supporting documentation, and I have enclosed, as well, two binders which contain the auditors' principal supporting documents. The auditors accumulated several boxes of additional materials, including complete copies of all of the scenario data calls, which I believe are not critical to your review and which, for the most part, are probably already available to you. Those documents are available for review, and I will provide copies of any individual document upon request.

In reviewing the enclosures, you will note that while the auditors found that some of the individual allegations were substantiated, their overall conclusion was that there was "no apparent impact on the overall BRAC 95 process." My efforts to date in reviewing the auditors' findings have focused on verification of that bottom-line conclusion of "no apparent impact." On April 6, 1995, I provided the Under Secretary of the Navy an update which reported that I now concur with the auditors' conclusion, and I indicated to him the steps taken in reaching that conclusion. A copy of that memorandum is also enclosed.

Having made that initial determination, my efforts are now focused on reviewing the auditors' individual findings and conclusions. You may notice that their adverse findings are more

technical, than substantive, in nature and appear to be based on their individual opinions. I believe that much of what they have said is open to interpretation and differing opinions. I propose to analyze those findings and ensure that each is considered in a proper context.

Should you have any further questions or desire to review the additional audit documentation, my action officer in this matter is Mr. William C. Kellum at (202) 433-4703.

Sincerely,

D. M. BENNETT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Encl:
(1) Naval Audit Service ltr of March 3, 1995
(2) NAVSEA IG ltr of March 23, 1995
(3) Two binders of supporting documentation for the audit report
(4) NAVINSGEN's memorandum of April 6, 1995

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-6

FROM: BOND, CHRISTOPHER	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (MO)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: ARMY'S AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING ARMY'S AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND BE TAKEN OFF THE CLOSURE LIST. SUPPORTING DATA INCLUDED.

Due Date: 950403	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950329	Mail Date:

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

March 29, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-6

Dear Chairman Dixon:

We are writing to urge that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission remove the Army's Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) from the list of military installations to be closed. We look forward to meeting with you to discuss this matter fully, and would like to take this opportunity to outline the reasons why ATCOM should remain open.

Established in 1991, ATCOM has sole responsibility for the research, development, engineering and logistical support for the Army's airborne systems and for field and troop support equipment. As the Army Public Affairs office noted in April 1994, ATCOM "is the only command in the Army that affects every soldier, every day." It operates from leased space at the St. Louis Federal Center, a facility owned by the General Services Administration.

As you know, the Army has recommended that ATCOM be disestablished and that its aviation functions be transferred to Redstone Arsenal; its soldier systems functions be transferred to Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center (RDEC); its communications and electronics functions be transferred to Fort Monmouth; and its automotive functions be transferred to Detroit Arsenal. We believe that this proposal should be rejected by the BRAC Commission based on our initial findings that in recommending ATCOM for closure, the Army:

(1) failed to comply with the base closure law's requirement that all closure recommendations be based on the final selection criteria;

(2) failed to comply with the objectives of its own Stationing Strategy;

(3) overestimated the cost savings to the government, which are much lower than represented; and,

(4) failed to consider more cost-effective alternatives.

These findings have led us to conclude that the Army deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in recommending that ATCOM be closed. We would like to present these findings in order to provide you with critical information in advance of the BRAC regional hearing on April 12. We also plan to provide additional information that will further substantiate our conclusion that ATCOM must be removed from the Defense Department's BRAC list.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE BASE CLOSURE LAW

As you know, the base closure law requires that the Defense Department make recommendations to close or realign military installations, including leased facilities, "on the basis of the force structure plan and the final criteria." In keeping with this requirement, the Defense Department delineated eight final criteria and instructed each Service to give priority consideration to the first four, which measure military value.

We have found that the Army failed to consider any of the military value criteria when selecting leased facilities for closure, despite the law's requirement that these facilities be evaluated in the same manner as all other installations. The Army's Management Control Plan for the 1995 base closure process indicates that the Army evaluated installations on the basis of the military value criteria during its "Installation Assessment" phase. It states that during this phase, "each category of installations is compared using a set of attributes," and that "each attribute is linked to one of the four DOD selection criteria that measure Military Value." This was the only phase of the Army's base closure selection process in which the first four criteria were used as the basis for developing closure recommendations.

The Army's Management Control Plan clearly shows that leased facilities were excluded from this phase of the process. These facilities were reviewed by the Army only after all other facilities had been evaluated on the basis of the first four criteria and had received military value rankings (see Attachment A). As indicated in the materials presented to the Army leadership for base closure decisions, ATCOM and other leased facilities were not assigned military value ratings by which to evaluate whether closure was appropriate. The Army leadership based its decision to close ATCOM not on the basis of the eight final criteria as required by the law, but solely on the basis of a cost/savings analysis (which itself was flawed -- see below).

In light of the above, it is evident that the Army did not simply deviate substantially from the four military value criteria in recommending ATCOM and other leased facilities for closure. It deviated entirely from these criteria by excluding leased facilities from its military value analysis of installations.

The Army's analysis of leased facilities for the 1995 base closure process differed from the manner in which these facilities were considered in 1993. During that base closure round, the Army considered leased facilities within categories associated with their individual missions, which enabled each to be evaluated on the basis of the military value criteria. It appears that the Army considered leased facilities differently in 1995 in order to address the 1993 BRAC Commission's suggestion that the Services include a separate category for leased facilities during the 1995 process. While the Army succeeded in addressing this suggestion, it clearly violated the requirements of the base closure law by failing to evaluate leased facilities on the basis of the military value criteria. It should be noted that the Army was the only Service to make this error; both the Navy and the Air Force performed military value analyses of their leased facilities.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ARMY'S STATIONING STRATEGY

In recommending ATCOM for closure, the Army failed to comply with its own Stationing Strategy, which was intended to provide an operational context for base closure planning and analysis.

In 1993, the Army evaluated ATCOM in the Commodity Installations category, along with other facilities responsible for research, development, engineering, fielding and sustainment of weapons systems. The Army has now recommended that ATCOM's functions be transferred to four installations in this same category. The Army's Stationing Strategy states that "efficiency... should be the key consideration in stationing commodity-oriented organizations," and that such efficiency can be "achieved through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduced overhead."

Contrary to this guiding strategy, the Army's own data demonstrates that the transfer of ATCOM's functions to the bases scheduled to receive them will reduce efficiency and increase overhead. As Attachment B shows, ATCOM's annual overhead costs of $7.6 million annually or $1,831 per person are much lower than any of the bases recommended to receive its functions -- 83 percent lower than Redstone Arsenal, 86 percent lower than Fort Monmouth and Detroit Arsenal, and 94 percent lower than Natick RDEC. In addition, the transfer of ATCOM's functions to the proposed receiving bases would increase the Army's annual overhead costs by 46 percent -- from $7.6 million to $11.1 million (see Attachment C).

This data is similar to the Army's findings during the 1993 base closure process. At that time, the Army evaluated the operational efficiency of ATCOM and other Commodity Installations and found that ATCOM (along with associated activities in the St. Louis area) was more efficient than three of the four installation now being recommended to receive its functions. Despite these facts, the Army's 1995 analysis precluded any consideration of moving functions to ATCOM in order to take advantage of its significant efficiencies.

As you know, St. Louis is a world center for the military and civilian aviation industry. Numerous businesses have located in the St. Louis metropolitan area to provide the Army with the most efficient and cost-effective method of conducting product development and procurement. Uniquely skilled personnel associated with ATCOM's aviation operations, local contractors and academic institutions provide the Army with unmatched aviation expertise. Moving ATCOM's aviation support functions to Redstone Arsenal would terminate the efficiencies that have developed as a result of this streamlined and unified command and decimate the synergistic relationship between Army aviation activities and their suppliers. This loss of efficiencies would be in addition to the higher overhead costs that would be incurred by the Army at each of the proposed receiving bases.

In light of the above, it is clear that closing ATCOM and moving its functions to the bases proposed by the Army would contradict its own Stationing Strategy to increase efficiency and reduce overhead.

OVERESTIMATION OF COST SAVINGS AND FAILURE TO CONSIDER BETTER ALTERNATIVES

We have found that in recommending that ATCOM be closed, the Army contradicted its own cost analyses from prior base closure rounds, overestimated the savings associated with its closure, and failed to consider more cost-effective alternatives.

During the 1991 base closure process, the Army created ATCOM through the merger of the Aviation Systems Command and the Troop Support Command. In justifying this merger, the Army stated that "military value in the form of management and costs efficiency was the driving factor for this recommendation."

In 1993, the Army acted on a recommendation by the 1991 BRAC Commission and evaluated the possibility of moving ATCOM's functions to Army-owned facilities. In its report to the 1993 BRAC Commission, the Army stated that "the high relocation costs make realignment or closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."

Despite these earlier determinations, the Army now asserts that the closure of ATCOM would generate considerable savings. Specifically, the Army claims that the total one-time cost to close ATCOM would be $146 million, and that annual recurring savings after its implementation would be $46 million with a return on investment expected three years after closure. It also claims that the net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years would be a savings of $453 million. We believe that the Army overestimated these savings and failed to consider alternatives that would result in much higher savings.

First, the Army failed to examine the source of costs and savings generated by the closure of ATCOM and the personnel reductions being undertaken by ATCOM itself. The Army's COBRA analysis indicates that nearly all of the costs associated with the closure of ATCOM would consist of moving, military construction, and annual overhead costs at the bases receiving ATCOM functions ($144 million in one-time costs, $12 million in annual recurring costs). At the same time, nearly all of the savings would come from the elimination of 1,066 military and civilian positions at ATCOM ($50.5 million in annual savings). Given the source of these costs and savings -- along with ATCOM's much lower overhead costs -- the Army should have considered retaining ATCOM in St. Louis and examined ATCOM's own plans to reduce personnel.

We have found that the number of military and civilian employees at ATCOM has been reduced by approximately 178 since the Army collected personnel data for the 1995 base closure process. Consequently, the Army has already gained $8.2 million of the $50.5 million in salary-based savings it claims to achieve through ATCOM's closure. As a result, the Army's estimate of annual personnel savings generated by closing ATCOM should be reduced to $42.3 million.

The personnel reductions noted above are part of a downsizing effort ATCOM has undertaken in order to meet the Army's own projections of future personnel levels. This downsizing, if allowed to continue, will result in a reduction of at least 1,051 positions

(83 military, 968 civilian) at ATCOM by 1999. This in turn will produce at least $44.5 million in savings annually -- without incurring any of the costs associated with moving ATCOM's functions to other bases. The Army's own estimates indicate that the vast majority of these personnel reductions could be accomplished through retirements, attrition and placement of personnel at other government facilities.

Second, the Army failed to acknowledge that vacating the leased facility that houses ATCOM would not generate any savings for the U.S. Government. In prior base closure rounds, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that the Defense Department consider the governmentwide costs and savings associated with base closure recommendations. The GAO stated in its report on the 1993 base closure process that

> DOD counts the reductions in rent as savings even when the buildings are federally owned facilities. In some cases, the moves require construction of new DOD facilities and the rental savings are used to offset and justify the construction costs. In actuality, this may not represent an overall savings to the government.

This statement describes precisely the actions taken by the Army in calculating the costs and savings associated with the closure of ATCOM. ATCOM operates from leased space at the St. Louis Federal Center, which is owned by the General Services Administration (GSA). Consequently, the Army's departure from this leased space will not result in savings to the government because the GSA will continue to own the facility. Therefore, the Army's estimate of annual savings from the closure of ATCOM should be reduced by the lease cost of $7.6 million.

Third, the Army failed to consider the alternative of vacating leased facilities currently held by the four bases recommended to receive ATCOM functions. The Army has reported that leases currently held by Redstone Arsenal, Detroit Arsenal, Fort Monmouth and Natick RDEC cost a total of $16.1 million annually (see Attachment D). Terminating these leases and moving their activities to the nearby bases could generate considerable savings for the Army and incur much lower costs than the estimated $60.6 million that would be required to move functions from St. Louis.

Based on the above, the savings that could be expected from the closure of ATCOM are much lower than estimated by the Army. By adjusting the Army's COBRA analysis for the personnel reductions already implemented at ATCOM and the fact that vacating the GSA lease will not result in savings to the government, we have found that the actual one-time cost to close ATCOM would remain about $146 million, and the annual recurring savings after its implementation would be $29 million -- $17 million less than claimed by the Army. Also, the return on investment would not occur until 2004 -- twice as long as originally expected. In addition, the net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years would be approximately $213 million less than claimed by the Army.

Alternatively, by allowing ATCOM to remain in St. Louis and continue downsizing in accordance with Army projections, the Army would incur a total one-time cost of only about $1.6 million (early retirement, etc.) and achieve annual recurring savings of at least $44.5 million. In

this scenario, the Army would obtain an immediate return on investment, and the net present value over 20 years would be about $621 million in savings -- $168 million more than the Army itself expects to realize by closing ATCOM.

In light of the above, retaining ATCOM would allow the government to save $144 million in one-time costs and $12 million in annual overhead costs associated with performing ATCOM's functions at other bases. It would also generate at least $44.5 million in savings annually through ATCOM's 1995-99 downsizing efforts.

* * * * *

We hope you will give the above information full consideration as you review all relevant materials regarding the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM. Based on our initial analysis, it appears that by failing to consider ATCOM and other leased facilities on the basis of the four military value criteria and by overestimating the savings associated with ATCOM's closure, the Army deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In doing so, the Army also contradicted the objective of its own Stationing Strategy to increase efficiency. We believe that these facts merit the removal of ATCOM from the Defense Department's base closure and realignment list.

We appreciate your attention to this matter, which is of critical importance to our nation's defense capabilities and the citizens of the St. Louis area.

Sincerely,

Christopher S. Bond
United States Senator

Richard A. Gephardt
Member of Congress

John Ashcroft
United States Senator

William Clay
Member of Congress

James M. Talent
Member of Congress

Harold L. Volkmer
Member of Congress

Attachments

TABS DETAILED ANALYSIS (12)



Attachment A

Facility Overhead Cost Per Employee

Based on Lease, Real Property Maintenance, and Base Operations Support costs



Source: 1995 Army COBRA Input Screen Four - Static Base Information
1995 Army COBRA Personnel Summary Report

Attachment B

Annual Facilities Costs to Support ATCOM Missions



Source: 1995 Army COBRA Appropriations Detail Report

Attachment C

Attachment D

Annual Cost of Existing Leased Facilities at ATCOM and Proposed Receiving Bases



Redstone Arsenal
Detroit Arsenal
Fort Monmouth
Natick RDEC

Source: Army BRAC 1995 Real Property Index for Army Installations
Army BRAC 1995 COBRA Report for ATCOM

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

950330-6K

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MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Kit:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
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MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable John Ashcroft
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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95D332-61

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MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable William Clay
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Clay:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
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Please refer to this number when responding 950330-6R

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

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RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable James M. Talent
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Talent:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 6, 1995

The Honorable Harold L. Volkmer
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Volkmer:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding ATCOM.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DACS-TABS

20 Apr 95

9503306
R2

MEMORANDUM FOR BRAC 95 - COMMISSION STAFF - MR. EDWARD BROWN

SUBJECT: Data from The Army Basing Study (TABS) regarding ATCOM

1. Forwarded to your office, is a Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition, dated 6 Apr 95, Subject: Aviation -Troop Command (ATCOM). This memorandum is in response to the Congressional correspondence from Senator Bond, Senator Ashcroft, Mr. Gephardt, Mr. Clay, Mr. Talent and Mr. Volkmer, dated March 29 1995.

2. The information forwarded is accurate and complete to the best our knowledge and belief.

3. The DACS-TABS POC is Cathy Polmateer, (703)693-0077/8.

MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
103 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0103

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SARD-ZT

06 APR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMY BASING STUDY

SUBJECT: Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM)

Reference: Congressional Correspondence from Senator Bond, Senator Ashcroft, Mr. Gephardt, Mr. Clay, Mr. Talent and Mr. Volkmer, March 29, 1995.

In the referenced letter members of the Missouri Delegation state their belief that the Army has not complied with the Army Stationing Strategy in recommending ATCOM for closure. They question whether the strategy has been complied with; specifically that "efficiency ...should be the key consideration in stationing commodity-oriented organizations," and that such efficiency can be "achieved through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduced overhead."

Significant functional efficiencies will be achieved by separating aviation and troop support commodities and relocating the materiel management functions.

Aviation & Missile technologies rely on the same fundamental engineering disciplines, aerospace and mechanical engineering. Relocating the Aviation Research, Development and Engineering Center (AVRDEC), Program Executive Office Aviation, and related aviation materiel management functions to the Missile Command (MICOM), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama will create a more capable organization.

As aviation systems become more mission equipment intensive, there is an increased need to develop weapon systems and platforms side-by-side. MICOM has substantial capabilities in micro-electronics, sensors, command and control, and displays. These capabilities combined with the rotorcraft technology expertise from AVRDEC will result in superior technology integration and ultimately in increased operational capabilities.

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The close proximity to the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama will also enhance interaction with the warfighting customer.

Functional efficiency is increased by consolidating and integrating the troop materiel management functions previously at ATCOM with the appropriate commands. Soldier systems functions will be relocated to Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center, Massachusetts to align with the Soldier Systems Command. Communications-electronics functions will be relocated to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to align with the Communications-Electronics Command. Automotive functions will be relocated to the Detroit Arsenal, Michigan to align with Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. These relocations will integrate the materiel management portion of the life-cycle and ongoing research and development at the gaining commands.

All of the proposed realignments required in order to disestablish and close ATCOM will result in the collocation and consolidation of similar life-cycle functions and commodities, and will achieve improved functional efficiencies and effectiveness.

John D. Stanek
Chief, Laboratory Coordination Office

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

April 14, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-6R3

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Ste. 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Thank you for providing us with a copy of the attached letter from the Missouri Congressional Delegation (the "MCD Letter"), which suggests that the Secretary of Defense improperly recommended to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission the closure of Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM). I would like to respond on behalf of the Army, and I appreciate this opportunity to present the Army's views on the several issues that the MCD Letter raises, and to explain why these issues should not lead the 1995 Commission to reject the ATCOM recommendation.

Because we believe that many of these issues stem from a misunderstanding of the way in which the Army's closure and realignment recommendations were formulated, we feel it is useful to provide a brief description of the Army's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process before turning to the particular issues raised by the MCD Letter.

I. THE ARMY'S BRAC PROCESS AND ITS STATIONING STRATEGY

As you are aware, the BRAC process is designed to facilitate objective, fair, and open decisions with respect to necessary reductions in military infrastructure. Accordingly, each recommended closure or realignment is arrived at through uniform application of the eight, published Department of Defense (DoD) Selection Criteria. Through evenhanded application of these Selection Criteria within categories, the military value of each particular facility or installation is assessed separately, after which the effects associated with any potential closure or realignment--including the costs to the military, and the implications for affected local communities and the environment--are determined.

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A. The Stationing Strategy

Although the BRAC law establishes a process by which closure and realignment recommendations are to be made, it does not provide any specific objectives with respect to the type, number, and magnitude of the necessary reductions. Accordingly, before the Army could begin its BRAC process, it had to articulate its generalized, strategic and operational basing requirements. The Army elected to do this in a comprehensive planning document: the Army Stationing Strategy.

The Army's Stationing Strategy does not outline specific stationing decisions, nor does it recommend the closure or realignment of any particular installations or facilities. Indeed, the Army elected, wholly apart from any BRAC legal requirement to do so, to develop this Stationing Strategy because of its independent planning utility. Thus, the Army's Stationing Strategy provides an operational foundation upon which BRAC planning and analysis can proceed. It is both antecedent to the BRAC process, insofar as it establishes the parameters within which BRAC decisionmaking takes place, and it is integral to the process, insofar as an assessment of the military value of any particular Army installation or facility must be determined with reference to the objectives set forth in its Stationing Strategy.

B. The BRAC Process

After developing its Stationing Strategy, the Army began its formal BRAC process with a comprehensive review and inventory of all of its installations. To facilitate fair comparisons, and consistent with Department of Defense policy, the Army assigned each installation or facility to one of 14 categories, each of which contained installations or facilities with similar characteristics. Pursuant to a 1993 BRAC Commission recommendation, and consistent with DoD policy guidance, the Army established a separate, Leased Facilities Category ("LFC") within which leased facilities could be compared to one another.[1]

---

[1]See, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission: 1993 Report to the President, 1 July 1993, p. 2-3 ("The Commission suggests DoD direct the services to include a separate category for leased

(continued...)

(1) Military Value Assessments

The Army then applied the Military Value Criteria ("MVC)--i.e., the first four of the published DoD Selection Criteria--to each installation or facility within a category.[2] Like all the published criteria, the MVC were applied uniformly within each category so that, consistent with BRAC law, all installations or facilities would be considered equally, and the military value of each such installation or facility would be assessed separately. Uniform application of the MVC within each category yielded a Military Value Assessment ("MVA") for each particular installation or facility within that category. This MVA was a combination of both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the worth of a particular installation or facility.

In most instances, the quantitative component of the MVA was developed according to the Army's BRAC 95 Installation Assessment Program (IAP), a decision pad

---

[1](...continued)
facilities during the 1995 process to ensure a bottom-up review of all leased space."). DoD's policy guidance subsequently left to each of the services the decision as to whether to create a separate category for the review of leased facilities. Although the other military departments chose not to create a separate LFC, the Army nonetheless concurred with the 1993 Commission and believed that a separate LFC would yield better analysis of leased facilities.

[2]Consistent with DoD policy guidance and applicable legal requirements, only those activities that were performed in leased space and which share a common mission, have permanently authorized personnel, have a separate support structure, and cost more than $200K annually were considered in the LFC. As directed by DoD's policy guidance, "[c]ivilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization [that is either located] on a nearby military installation or . . . [is located] within the same metropolitan statistical area, shall be considered part of the civilian personnel authorizations of that installation." See, "1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Three," 29 December 1994, pp. 1-2. Accordingly, these adjunct leases were assessed as part of their host installations.

computer model that was designed to assist in the comparison of installations according to a common set of weighted attributes, each of which related to one of the MVC. Thus, certified data were collected for each of these attributes. This data was then entered into the IAP, which in turn produced an Installation Assessment--i.e., a quantitative ranking of installations within a particular category.

With respect to the LFC, however, the IAP was not employed, because its list of weighted attributes was designed to assist in the comparison of particular *installations*, rather than in the comparison of particular (leased) *facilities*.[3] In other words, installations and leased facilities are fundamentally different, and thus they cannot be evaluated according to the same list of attributes. For example, comparing leased facilities based on things such as each leased facility's aviation maintenance facilities, ranges, hard surface staging areas, and other such attributes incorporated in the IAP model would not have been instructive as to the relative merit of each such facility: no leased facilities possess these attributes, and thus all would have received equally low scores in these areas.

Accordingly, an Installation Assessment was not prepared for facilities within the LFC, and, perhaps in this limited respect, the Army's BRAC process for leased facilities might be said to have differed slightly from its process for other types of installations. In lieu of an Installation Assessment, however, the Army did, as described more fully below, undertake a quantitative assessment of each leased facility according to consideration of empirical attributes that were more directly relevant to comparisons of leased facilities.

Once these quantitative assessments were completed--either through the IAP or, in the LFC, through consideration of other relevant empirical attributes--the qualitative portion of the MVA was undertaken. These qualitative assessments sought to ascertain the consistency of the quantitative assessments with the objectives outlined in the Army's Stationing Strategy. Thus, the Stationing Strategy

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[3]Groups of leases in the same headquarters and same geographical area were deemed a single facility for the purposes of the Military Value Assessment.

served as a qualitative template against which the quantitative assessments could be measured and revised accordingly.

Therefore, as with other categories, the MVA for each leased facility within the LFC was determined separately. Each such MVA was a combination of both quantitative assessments, which were arrived at through comparisons of relevant empirical data, and qualitative assessments, which were provided by the Army's Stationing Strategy. Although the Army determined separately the Military Value of each leased facility without reference to an Installation Assessment, the MVA of each leased facility was nonetheless composed of a similar quantitative assessment tempered by the qualitative guidance provided by the Stationing Strategy. In no instance did the Army assess the military value of a leased facility solely according to the qualitative guidance provided by the Army's Stationing Strategy.

(2) Identification of Study Candidates

After completing the aforementioned quantitative and qualitative assessments, each installation or facility within a category received a Military Value Assessment relative to other installations of facilities within that category. In turn, those installations or facilities that were deemed to possess relatively low military value within the category were designated as candidates for further study for possible closure or realignment. With respect to the LFC, all facilities within the category were deemed to be of relatively low military value, especially with respect to MVC two and four, and thus all facilities were designated as candidates for further study.

(3) Development of Alternatives and Application of DoD Selection Criteria Four through Eight

Once the Study Candidates were identified for each category, the Army developed between one and six specific base closure and realignment alternatives for each such candidate. These alternatives were derived from force structure decisions, the Stationing Strategy, previous BRAC reviews, Major Army Command recommendations, staff proposals, and Joint Cross-Service Group alternatives. Each of these competing alternatives was then assessed and refined according to affordability, economic and environmental analyses.

More particularly, the fifth DoD Selection Criterion--"[t]he extent and timing of potential cost savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs"--was applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category through use of The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model, DoD's model for resource analysis and measurement of the affordability of each potential closure or realignment. Thus once relevant data was plugged in for each of the alternatives, the COBRA analysis indicated the likely costs and savings associated with each potential closure or realignment.

The sixth and seventh DoD Selection Criteria--"[t]he economic impact on communities[,]" and "[t]he ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel[,]" respectively--were applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category through use of DoD's standard model for the calculation of economic impacts. Thus, once relevant data for each of the alternatives was plugged in, this model indicated the likely economic and infrastructure impacts associated with the potential closure or realignment.

Finally, the eighth DoD Selection Criteria--"[t]he environmental impact"--was applied uniformly to all study candidates within a category by an Environmental Review Committee, which collected and analyzed Environmental Baseline Summaries and produced an initial assessment for each installation or facility. Subsequent analysis then refined these assessments, and they were factored into analysis of each of the alternatives.

II. THE ARMY DID, ACCORDING TO CRITERIA ONE THROUGH FOUR, ASSESS MILITARY VALUE IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS ATCOM RECOMMENDATION.

The charge that the Army failed to assess military value in the formulation of its ATCOM recommendation is without foundation. MVAs were fundamental to all of the Army's BRAC analysis--including its analysis of leased facilities at ATCOM and elsewhere. Although, for the reasons identified above, facilities within the leasing category were not ranked pursuant to an *Installation Assessment*, a *Military Value Assessment* was nonetheless prepared for each facility within this

category.[4]

The quantitative component of these MVAs took the form of assessments of lease costs, space, features, and other common attributes of leased facilities. The qualitative component of these MVAs consisted of evaluating the utility of each facility in light of both the Stationing Strategy's general operational objectives--i.e., "[e]liminate excess capacity[,] . . . [m]inimize use of leased space[,] . . . [and] [c]ollocate tenants from different major commands where functional synergy can be obtained and facility support is available"--and its more particular operational objectives with respect to commodity-oriented commands such as ATCOM--i.e., achieve "[e]fficiency . . . through collocation and integration of research, engineering, acquisition and logistics functions, as well as reduce[] overhead[.]"

Just as with other categories of installations, *MVAs* for each facility within the LFC category were arrived at through uniform application of each of the four Military Value Criteria. With respect to the ATCOM leases, each of the four criteria was applied to arrive at a MVA for the facility.

---

[4]It appears that in part, the MCD Letter may have mistaken an "Installation Assessment" for a "Military Value Assessment", and the MCD therefore concluded that since the former was not prepared for facilities within the leasing category, no Military Value Assessments were undertaken for facilities within the category. As noted above, the two are not the same. An Installation Assessment is merely a discretionary, quantitative ranking of installations within a category according to a decision pad computer model. It may form the quantitative component of a Military Value Assessment, but it alone does not comprise the Military Value Assessment. Conversely, a Military Value Assessment in a mandatory determination, consisting of both quantitative and qualitative measures of the worth of each installation or facility within a category. Thus a Military Value Assessment may depend in part upon an Installation Assessment--if such an assessment is appropriate for facilities or installations within a particular category--but it need not be based upon such an Installation Assessment.

A. Application of the First Criterion: "current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of DoD's total force."

The Army considered, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, ATCOM's current and future mission requirements and their impact on the operational readiness of the armed forces. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes of leased facilities that bore on such requirements and readiness, such as the size of the facilities according to their type, the population housed, the costs of the lease, and the penalties to terminate the lease. Qualitatively, the Army assessed existing ATCOM leased facilities in light of the aforementioned general and more particularized objectives of the Stationing Strategy.

B. Application of the Second Criterion: "availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations."

The Army considered, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the availability and condition of land and facilities at ATCOM's existing leased sites and at potential receiving sites such as Redstone Arsenal, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Detroit Arsenal, Fort Monmouth, and Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes of leased facilities that bore on such matters, collecting information on such things as the percent of permanent facilitates at an existing leased site and potential receiving sites, the average age of facilities at each location, and the features and size of such facilities accordingly to their type. As part of this analysis, the Army used its corporate facility data base to determine whether facilities were available at potential receiving locations, and, if so, whether they required renovation to accommodate a relocating function. If facilities were not available, then the data base was used to determine what facilities would have to be constructed to accommodate such relocations. Qualitatively, the Army once again assessed its quantitative analysis in light of the aforementioned general and more particularized objectives of its Stationing Strategy.

C. Application of the Third Criterion: "ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations."

The Army considered, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, ATCOM's ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future requirements at both its present location and at other potential locations. Quantitatively, the Army considered the attributes of leased facilities and potential receiving locations that bore on such abilities, examining things such as buildable acres or unused space or buildings, the ability of information systems at both locations to accommodate expansions, the sites' proximity to or possession of an airport. Qualitatively, the Army again reviewed its quantitative findings in light of the general and more particularized objectives set forth in its stationing strategy.

D. Application of the Fourth Criterion: "cost and manpower implications."

The Army considered, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, the manpower and cost implications of retaining ATCOM at its existing leased sites or relocating functions to several other installations. Quantitatively, it considered the attributes that bore on such manpower and cost factors, collecting data on things such as the square footage requirements at existing and potential receiving sites, the costs per square foot of existing leased space and space elsewhere, the manpower-to-square-footage requirements of ATCOM at its existing and potential receiving locations. Qualitatively, and as with the other criteria, the Army assessed its quantitative assessments with reference to the general and more particularized objectives outlined in its Stationing Strategy.

III. THE ARMY COMPLIED WITH ITS STATIONING STRATEGY IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS ATCOM RECOMMENDATION.

The charge that the Army has not complied with its Stationing Strategy in the formulation of its ATCOM recommendation is incorrect. As explained above, the Army's Stationing Strategy is a planning document that provides guidance to its managers with respect to future operational requirements. This operational blueprint does, as noted above, encourage increased efficiency and reductions in overhead. It also, however, encourages the Army to minimize the use of

leased space, eliminate excess capacity, and collocate activities where functional synergy can be achieved and facility support is available.

The ATCOM recommendation complies fully with all of the Army's Stationing Strategy's objectives and guidance. This recommendation increases efficiency through collocation, integration, or relocation of discrete research, engineering, acquisition, and logistics functions at several installations. In turn, the synergies achieved through such collocations, integrations, and relocations assist in reducing overhead costs--in large part because once they are relocated, fewer personnel are required to accomplish the same functions. Moreover, the ATCOM recommendation is fully consist with the Stationing Strategy's other objectives insofar as it minimizes the use of leased space, eliminates excess capacity at receiving locations, and, as noted above, achieves a number of functional synergies.

IV. THE ARMY DID NOT OVERSTATE THE SAVINGS IT WOULD EXPECT TO REALIZE FROM THE CLOSURE OF ATCOM.

The allegation that the Army has overstated the savings it expects to realize from the closure of ATCOM is without merit. The Army would save nearly $50 million annually as a result of the synergies, efficiencies, and consolidations it expects to realize from the closure of ATCOM.

Contrary to the suggestion in the MCD Letter, the DoD COBRA model does not consider, or take credit for, any savings that might result from any previously planned personnel reductions or reductions that are otherwise independent of the BRAC process; only those savings associated with personnel reductions generated by a proposed closure or realignment are considered. Moreover, the DoD COBRA model is designed to assess only the potential savings that DoD likely would realize from the closure or realignment of any particular installation or facility. Whether the Federal Government would also likely save money as a result of any particular closure or realignment is a broader question that the current process was simply not designed to address. Nonetheless, we note that if the Army vacates GSA leased space, then GSA could make such space available to another Federal agency, or it could dispose of the property entirely--either of which could result in savings to the Federal Government.

Finally, the Army did conclude in its 1993 BRAC analysis that the relocation of ATCOM to a *single* installation would be too expensive. However, the 1995 recommendation, by relocating functions to *several* installations, avoids many of the significant construction costs, that, in large part, were responsible for the high costs associated with relocation in 1993. Indeed, if the Army had considered disestablishing ATCOM and relocating its functions to several installations during its 1993 BRAC process, then it likely would have forwarded such a recommendation to the 1993 Commission.

V. THE ARMY CONSIDERED ALL PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVES IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE ATCOM.

The suggestion that the Army failed to consider more cost-effective alternatives to the closure of ATCOM is inaccurate. As explained above, BRAC analysis necessarily considers feasible, competing alternatives, and the recommended closure of ATCOM was the best of these alternatives. The Army did consider alternatives to the ATCOM recommendation, such as relocating Headquarters, Strategic Space and Defense Command ("SSDC") from a leased facility to Redstone Arsenal. However, the COBRA analysis performed for this alternative indicated that it would cost more and save less. Moreover, this alternative was less consistent with the Army's Stationing Strategy, since relocation of SSDC to Redstone Arsenal would not increase efficiency, reduce overhead, or create any functional synergies.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, we do not believe that any of the issues raised by the MCD Letter can withstand close scrutiny. Through uniform application of the Military Value Criteria within each category, the Army developed a separate Military Value Assessment for each installation and facility--including those in the Leased Facility Category. The ATCOM recommendation is fully consistent with the Stationing Strategy's guidance, and the Army did not overstate or improperly calculate the savings that would be realized from the recommended closure of ATCOM. Lastly, the Army's BRAC process ensured that all practicable and feasible alternatives were considered.

Thank you again for allowing us to address these issues. We hope that this letter will assist the Commission in understanding the Army's BRAC processes in general, and its recommendation respecting ATCOM in particular.

James E. Shane

James E. Shane, Jr.
Brigadier General, US Army
Director of Management

Attachment

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-7

FROM: THURMOND, STROM	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: SENATOR (SC)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				JIM SCHAFFEIDER	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

COPY OF SOUTH CAROLINA STATEMENT FOR BIRMINGHAM REGIONAL HEARING.

* HANDLED PHONE CONVERSATION *

Due Date: 950403	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950324	Mail Date:

South Carolina Budget and Control Board
Office of Local Government Post Office Box 11876, 1st Floor State House, Columbia, South Carolina 29211

FAX COVER SHEET

FROM:
MR. O.J. "SKIP" FINK
Coordinator for Local Government Assistance

PHONE: (803) 734-0509
FAX: (803) 734-2383 or (803) 734-0548

DATE: 3-30-95

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 3

TO: MR CHIP WALGREN

VOICE NUMBER: 703-696-0504

FAX NUMBER: 703-696-0550

RE: BRAC Hearing, 4 APRIL 95

COMMENT: Chip: ① COPY OF S.C. STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FOR BIRMINGHAM HEARING. ORIGINAL TO BE DELIVERED 4 APRIL.
② Please FAX A COPY OF BRAC STAFF Roster, including MILITARY AUGMENTS — THANKS —
Skip

CC:

Note: If there are any problems with your fax, please call Sabra at (803) 734-0500. Thank you.

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

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WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
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RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR
ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

March 24, 1995

Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission:

As elected representatives for the citizens of the State of South Carolina, we want to take this opportunity to restate our position relative to the current status of the base closure and realignment process.

We understand the need to press ahead with the critical decisions associated with the downsizing of the Department of Defense (DOD) given the change in the military threat, and stand ready to assist, as appropriate, without unfairly penalizing our citizens. Notwithstanding the activities slated for closure on this round, we are heartened by the Secretary of Defense's recommendations with regard to realignments and redirects into South Carolina.

Our State has suffered proportionately more than any other state in terms of cumulative economic impact resulting from the three closure rounds to date. The loss of Myrtle Beach Air Force Base in 1991, coupled with the closure in 1993 of the third largest Naval Base in the world and the most efficient shipyard in the country at Charleston, speaks for itself. As a small state with limited resources, and a per capita income of only 77% of the national average, we have already given our fair share.

We appreciate the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission's decision to realign some DOD activities into the Charleston area, and at the same time are hopeful that similar efforts will prevail in your 1995 deliberations. The specific DOD recommendations for moving various activities into the Charleston, Beaufort and Columbia areas are welcome news for a state still working to overcome the negative impact of earlier closures. Please be assured that we, at every level of government, are prepared to assist in any way to bring these recommendations to fruition.

In that regard we make the following points in support of our South Carolina bases:

-- MCAS Beaufort possesses the best training airspace on the East Coast of the United States and has the capacity to accommodate the two additional F/A-18 squadrons recommended by DOD with virtually zero military construction requirements.

-- Naval Weapons Station Charleston already houses the follow-on nuclear power training facilities for the schoolhouse training recommended for realignment from Orlando, Florida. Collocating these training activities at the Weapons Station makes eminent sense from both efficiency and cost standpoints.

-- Fort Jackson continues to be a dynamic center of learning for our soldiers. The addition of the Polygraph School will afford more of our young Army students an opportunity to benefit from the superior training environment and facilities already existing on the installation.

-- Shaw Air Force Base, with its dual runways and new, post-Hurricane Hugo infrastructure, stands ready for additional missions in support of DOD restructuring.

In summary, South Carolina, has a long and distinguished history of supporting our Nation's military interest. It is a bargain in terms of cost-of-living and quality-of-life for our military personnel and their families. It has no equal in its support of our Armed Forces.

We appreciate the challenges you face in the coming months and your willingness to consider these offerings in support of our South Carolina military installations.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Strom Thurmond
U.S. Senator

David Beasley
Governor of S.C.

Ernest F. Hollings
U.S. Senator

Floyd Spence
U.S. Representative

John M. Spratt
U.S. Representative

James E. Clyburn
U.S. Representative

Bob Inglis
U.S. Representative

Mark Sanford
U.S. Representative

Lindsey O. Graham
U.S. Representative

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

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RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 3, 1995

The Honorable David Beasley
Governor, State of South Carolina
State House
P.O. Box 11369
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Please refer to this number
when responding 950330-7R1

Dear Governor Beasley:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of the statement of the South Carolina delegation on behalf of the South Carolina military facilities. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the statement will be included in the record of the Birmingham Regional Hearing of the Commission on April 4, 1995. I can assure you that the information you have provided in the statement will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:js
ECTS#: 950330-7

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 3, 1995

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-7R

Dear Strom:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of the statement of the South Carolina delegation on behalf of the South Carolina military facilities. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 3, 1995

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Dear Fritz:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of the statement of the South Carolina delegation on behalf of the South Carolina military facilities. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 3, 1995

The Honorable Floyd Spence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-7R1

Dear Representative Spence:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of the statement of the South Carolina delegation on behalf of the South Carolina military facilities. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

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April 3, 1995

The Honorable Mark Sanford, Jr.
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-7R1

Dear Representative Sanford:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of the statement of the South Carolina delegation on behalf of the South Carolina military facilities. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

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April 3, 1995

The Honorable James E. Clyburn
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Dear Representative Clyburn:

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April 3, 1995

The Honorable John M. Spratt
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Dear Representative Spratt:

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April 3, 1995

The Honorable Bob Inglis
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Dear Representative Inglis:

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Chairman

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ECTS#: 950330-7

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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 3, 1995

The Honorable Lindsey O. Graham
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:js
ECTS#: 950330-7

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-8

FROM: CHAPMAN, Jim	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (TX)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUGGESTING WE MOVE DALLAS HEARING SITE TO LARGER AUDITORIUM ON CAMPUS.

* PHONE RESPONSE *

Due Date: 950403	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950329	Mail Date:

JIM CHAPMAN
FIRST DISTRICT
TEXAS

2417 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4301
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3035

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4301

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

March 29, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-8

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter informing me of the details of the Commission's April 19 regional hearing in Dallas, Texas. As the Congressman from the First District of Texas, which includes Red River Army Depot and Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas, I appreciate your writing to let me know of the Commission's plans.

Although I had requested that Texarkana be considered as the location for the regional hearing, I believe the choice of Dallas will provide an adequately accessible site for my constituents and myself to present testimony to the Commission. Further, as an alumnus of Southern Methodist University School of Law, I am proud to have the opportunity for the Commission to receive our presentation at my alma mater.

I am concerned, however, that the choice of the Hughes-Trigg Theatre will not provide sufficient seating space to accommodate the Red River contingent that is planning to make the trip to Dallas. Published reports indicate that this theatre has a maximum seating capacity of about 500 persons. Currently, a great number of potentially-impacted people from Bowie County and the surrounding area look forward to the Dallas hearing as an opportunity to participate in the Commission's deliberations. While a 500-seat facility does not offer sufficient seating capacity, I understand that the McFarland Auditorium, also on the university's campus, will hold as many as 2500 people.

Please consider re-scheduling the April 19 Dallas hearing to be held at the McFarland Auditorium. Thank you in advance for your consideration of this request. Please let me know if I may provide any assistance to you as you prepare to visit Texas.

Sincerely,

Jim Chapman
Member of Congress

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950330-9

FROM: NICKLES, DON	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (OK)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF "DEPOT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS INDICATORS REPORT".

Due Date: 950403	Routing Date: 950330	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date: 950403

DON NICKLES
OKLAHOMA

COMMITTEES
FINANCE
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
BUDGET
INDIAN AFFAIRS
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHIINGTON, DC 20510

March 27, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950330-9

Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St.
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear ~~Chairman Dixon~~ Alan:

As you work through issues pertaining to depot maintenance, I thought the Depot Operations Indicators Report prepared by the Department of Defense would be of use to you in your analysis of the depots. Therefore, I have enclosed the Air Force section of the latest copy of this report for your review.

For each depot an introductory page provides supplementary data and an executive summary. The supplemental data includes: depot name, depot location, major workload, personnel levels and current year budget.

The following pages for each depot reflect a graphic portrayal of all the indicators for that depot with analyses, when appropriate. The fourth page shows that data, the formula for each indicator and the goal for that indicator.

I hope you find this report useful in your analysis of Air Force Air Logistics Centers.

Sincerely,

Don

Don Nickles
U.S. Senator

1820 LIBERTY TOWER
100 NORTH BROADWAY
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
(405) 231-4941

3310 MID-CONTINENT TOWER
409 SOUTH BOSTON
TULSA, OK 74103-4007
(918) 581-7651

NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
601 D AVENUE, SUITE 201
LAWTON, OK 73501
(405) 357-9878

1916 LAKE ROAD
PONCA CITY, OK 74604
(405) 767-1270

DON NICKLES
OKLAHOMA

Refer to ECTS # 950330-9

COMMITTEES
FINANCE
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
BUDGET
INDIAN AFFAIRS
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHIINGTON, DC 20510

letter originally sent to Dixon

March 27, 1995

Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St.
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Cirillo:

As you work through issues pertaining to depot maintenance, I thought the Depot Operations Indicators Report prepared by the Department of Defense would be of use to you in your analysis of the depots. Therefore, I have enclosed the Air Force section of the latest copy of this report for your review.

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Sincerely,

Don Nickles
U.S. Senator

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PONCA CITY, OK 74604
(405) 767-1270

DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

OPERATIONS

INDICATORS

REPORT

1st Quarter FY93 Through 4th Quarter FY94

FOREWORD

This report presents joint Service and DLA organic maintenance depot performance data reflected in the Depot Maintenance Operational Indicators System (DMOIS). It is the result of an evolutionary process of developing and enhancing depot performance indicator data.

The latest stage in this process began in early 1992, when the Joint Policy Coordinating Group on Depot Maintenance (JPCG-DM) directed the Joint Performance Measurement Group (JPMG) to develop indicators relating to the Theory of Constraints. At that time, there was a view among the Services that the existing Performance Measurement System Report had achieved commonality, but lacked comparability. As a result, the JPCG-DM directed the JPMG to look at other measures. The JPMG reviewed several sources for measurements including Competitive Edges, the Theory of Constraints, and the measures required by the Chief Financial Officers Act. The DMOIS Report is the result of the effort to revise the DMPMS. The JPMG is also developing additional indicators for quality and inventory.

The joint effort to identify and report depot performance data was first begun in response to a 1990 tasking by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC). The DDMC commissioned a Performance Measurement Task Force whose report of 26 November 1990 recommended establishment of a Depot Maintenance Performance Measurement System (DMPMS). Subsequently, the JPCG-DM established the Joint Performance Measurement Group (JPMG) to implement and maintain the DMPMS.

The DMOIS reports are published semi-annually. The data presented covers two fiscal years by quarter, current fiscal year and past fiscal year. Since the first submission of the fiscal year is a mid-year submission (1st and 2nd quarters), there are six quarters of data displayed. The last submission for the fiscal year (3rd and 4th quarters) will display eight quarters of data.

The JPMG will continue to review and enhance the DMOIS to ensure that its indicators provide significant management information.

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Description of the Key Areas and Their Indicators

The Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators System (DMOIS) Report is comprised of three key areas: Theory of Constraints, Timeliness, and Financial. Each key area has one or more indicators that are described below. The formulas employed by each Service and DLA in computing the indicators are documented in the DMOIS Handbook.

1.1.1 Theory of Constraints Indicators

The Theory of Constraints (TOC) represents a philosophy of global system improvement designed to assist organizations in achieving their goals. The TOC indicators are:

a. Throughput. Throughput is defined as the rate at which the system generates money through sales. The formula used to determine Throughput is revenue minus direct material. Revenue is defined as the realized result from the sale of a product or service. Direct material is defined as the material specifically required for the performance of depot maintenance as specified by a work authorization document. Throughput and Operating Expense are displayed on the same chart.

b. Operating Expense. Operating Expense is defined as all the money the system spends in turning inventory into Throughput. The formula used to determine Operating Expense is total actual cost minus direct material. Total actual cost is defined as amounts determined on the basis of costs incurred as distinguished from forecasted costs. Operating Expense and Throughput are displayed on the same chart.

c. Capital Investment Effectiveness. Capital Investment Effectiveness is the ratio of throughput to long term inventory. Long term inventory is defined as the total depreciated value of all capital assets (equipment, buildings, software), excluding land and fixed assets not in use, owned by the depot maintenance activity.

1.1.2 Timeliness

Timeliness Indicators provide information regarding a depot's ability to complete the workload in the agreed upon time. The timeliness indicators are:

a. Schedule Indicator. The Schedule Indicator is a ratio of the units completed on time to the units scheduled. Schedule is defined as the most current schedule for completion of planned or programmed work. Completion is defined as the date when a product is physically completed. On time is defined as completing the workload at the time promised. The Schedule Indicator is reported only by NAVAIR, Air Force and DLA.

b. Process Days. Process Days is calculated as an average for varying commodities. The formula used to calculate Process Days (except by NAVSEA) is the number of days (date completed minus date inducted) divided by the number of items. The formula used by NAVSEA to compute Process Days is scheduled flow days divided by actual flow days.

1.1.3 Financial Indicators

Financial indicators provide information about a depot's ability to manage to its budget. The financial indicators are:

a. Net Operating Results. Net Operating Results are calculated and displayed as two separate indexes, cumulative budgeted and cumulative actual. The cumulative budgeted is a ratio of the cumulative budgeted revenue to the cumulative budgeted cost. The cumulative actual is a ratio of the cumulative actual revenue to the cumulative actual cost.

b. Labor Hour Cost. Labor Hour Cost is a ratio of budgeted labor hour cost to actual labor hour cost. Budgeted labor hour cost is calculated as the total budgeted cost divided by the budgeted total direct labor hours. Actual labor hour cost is calculated as the total actual cost divided by the actual total direct labor hours.

2.1 Structure of the Report

This report portrays data for each Service, or Service Activity Group, and DLA. The depots are presented alphabetically within each Service and DLA grouping. The report presents the Service and DLA data in the following order:

Army
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Shipyards
Air Force
Marine Corps
Defense Logistics Agency.

The operations indicators for each depot are in the following order for each reporting depot:

Throughput & Operating Expense
Capital Investment Effectiveness
Schedule Indicator
Process Days
Net Operating Results
Labor Hour Cost

2.2 Data Portrayal

For each depot, an introductory page provides supplementary data and an executive summary. The supplementary data includes: depot name, depot location, major workload, personnel levels, and current year budget. The following two pages for each depot reflect a graphic portrayal of all the indicators for that depot with analyses, when appropriate. The fourth page shows the data, the formula for each indicator, and the goal for that indicator.

The data presented covers two fiscal years by quarter, current fiscal year and past fiscal year. Since the first submission of the fiscal year is a mid year submission (1st and 2nd quarters), there are six quarters of data displayed. The last submission for the fiscal year (3rd and 4th quarters) will display eight quarters of data.

3.1 Reporting Activities

The depot maintenance activities that will report to the DMOIS are noted in Appendix A of this report. Depots that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have voted to close are not required to report.

4.1 Points of Contact

Any inquiries regarding data presented in this report should be referred to the respective Service or DLA representative to the JPMG. These individuals are identified in Appendix B.

5.1 Glossary

A glossary of acronyms used in this report is provided in Appendix C.

AIR FORCE AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS AND SPECIALIZED CENTERS

AEROSPACE GUIDANCE AND METROLOGY CENTER
NEWARK AFB, OH

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

Minuteman III MGS	Peacekeeper MGCS	B-1B INU	F-15 IMU	F-16 INU
F-117 IMU	KC-135 INU	PADs IMU	DMINS IMU	TMDE
Carousel IMU	SPN-GEANS IMU	ESGN IMU	Displacement Gyro	

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian:	828
Military:	5

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$81,600,000

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center 3rd and 4th quarter operations indicators were adversely affected by higher than anticipated Reparable Support Division (RSD) material costs and a planned FY94 budgeted loss of $7.5 million. Our Direct Product Labor Hours (DPAH) were also less than budgeted due to decreased customer requirements in the following workloads: LN-39, Carousel, CN1375, 7901A, PADS, and software development. These three factors have reduced our revenue, increased total cost, affected our schedule indicator and increased our labor hour costs.

AEROSPACE GUIDANCE AND METROLOGY CENTER

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



A decrease in 3rd & 4th quarter customer requirements, causing reduced revenue, coupled with increased material and RSD charges has resulted in decreased throughput and an increase in our operating expenses.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Continually Increase



An increase of $20 million in funded/unfunded equipment has increased our long term inventory value. This increase was driven by the purchase of 11 Automatic Depot Inertial Navigation Test Stations (ADINTS) in support of the B-1B, F-16, and Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) workloads. The reduction in throughput and this increase in long term inventory value has resulted in a decrease in our capital investment effectiveness.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



The main driver for our 3rd quarter schedule indicator was a result of a late start of our new Ring Laser Gyro workload. The 4th quarter schedule indicator was caused by the lack of parts used in the repair of our Carousel module workload.

AEROSPACE GUIDANCE AND METROLOGY CENTER

PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



AGMC uses 7 workloads as "pacing items" (3 IMU/INU, 2 Gyro, 1 Velocity Meter and the Minuteman III Missile Guidance Set). Two of our pacing workloads, 7901 Gyro and Carousel IMU, had significantly longer turn around times. These two workloads produced units with longer than average time awaiting parts. These units coupled with reduced receipts increased our overall process days indicator.

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR/Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



The FY94 2nd quarter actual costs were higher as a result of an erroneous RSD charge of $1.3 million for 20 Fuel Saver computers. This error was corrected in the 3rd quarter, causing our cumulative actual cost to be artificially higher in the 2nd quarter and lower in the 3rd quarter.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



Reduced customer requirements in the following workloads have caused a decrease in our total direct labor hours: LN-39, Carousel, CN 1375 Gyro, 7901A Gyro, PADS and software development. These 6 workloads account for 107 thousand production hours that were budgeted but did not generate.

AEROSPACE GUIDANCE AND METROLOGY CENTER

Quarter/Fiscal Year	1.93	2.93	3.93	4.93	1.94	2.94	3.94	4.94

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue($)	20,300,000	19,800,000	32,200,000	10,000,000	19,506,000	18,381,000	18,735,000	16,244,000
Total Cost ($)	19,466,000	17,929,000	31,255,000	9,054,000	17,122,000	20,675,000	18,859,000	21,789,000
Direct Materials ($)	3,957,000	4,575,000	5,333,000	2,485,000	7,388,000	11,196,000	3,584,000	7,447,000
Throughput ($)	16,343,000	15,225,000	26,867,000	7,515,000	11,618,000	7,185,000	15,151,000	8,797,000
Operating Expense ($)	15,509,000	13,354,000	25,922,000	6,569,000	9,234,000	9,479,000	15,275,000	14,342,000

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	16,343,000	15,225,000	26,867,000	7,515,000	11,618,000	7,185,000	15,151,000	8,797,000
Longterm Inventory ($)	153,627,378	152,125,269	151,005,859	147,948,833	137,182,208	133,719,085	146,014,132	166,225,597
INDEX	0.11	0.10	0.18	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.05

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

UNITS COMPLETED ON TIME/UNITS SCHEDULED

Components Scheduled	3,379	2,941	2,855	2,995	2,985	2,903	2,938	2,680
Components Completed	3,099	2,688	2,545	2,812	2,684	2,724	2,662	2,431
INDEX	0.92	0.91	0.89	0.94	0.90	0.94	0.91	0.91

PROCESS DAYS

DATE INDUCTED - DATE COMPLETED = PROCESS DAYS

Components Process Days	57,895	33,371	29,210	31,109	51,010	53,913	54,557	48,266
Number of Items	907	824	833	966	1,034	1,048	1,004	645
AVG PROCESS DAYS	63.83	40.50	35.07	32.20	49.33	51.44	54.34	74.83

NET OPERATING RESULTS

(CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST) /

CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST)=NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	20,678,000	45,381,000	70,655,000	95,217,000	19,569,000	40,779,000	61,423,000	81,754,000
Cum Budg Cost ($)	20,091,000	44,372,000	69,082,000	93,717,000	18,432,000	40,437,000	64,916,000	89,283,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	1.03	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.06	1.01	0.95	0.92
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	20,339,000	40,059,000	72,288,000	82,272,000	19,506,000	37,887,000	56,622,000	72,866,000
Cum Actual Cost ($)	19,466,000	37,395,000	68,650,000	77,704,000	17,122,000	37,797,000	56,656,000	78,445,000
Actual NOR INDEX	1.04	1.07	1.05	1.06	1.14	1.00	1.00	0.93
NOR INDEX	1.02	1.05	1.03	1.04	1.07	0.99	1.06	1.01

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	20,091,000	44,372,000	69,082,000	93,717,000	18,432,000	40,437,000	64,916,000	89,283,000
Budgeted Total DLH	279,802	573,612	873,642	1,165,012	241,126	505,517	765,146	1,019,722
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$71.80	$77.36	$79.07	$80.44	$76.44	$79.99	$84.84	$87.56
Total Actual Cost ($)	19,466,000	37,395,000	68,650,000	77,704,000	17,122,000	37,797,000	56,656,000	78,445,000
Actual Total DLH	268,532	527,816	744,189	954,954	205,779	422,747	628,270	811,675
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$72.49	$70.85	$92.25	$81.37	$83.21	$89.41	$90.18	$96.65
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	1.01	0.92	1.17	1.01	1.09	1.12	1.06	1.10

AEROSPACE MAINT AND REGENERATION CENTER
DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, AZ

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

Prepare A/C for long/short term storage, represerve A/C in storage and maintain A/C in storage. Withdraw A/C from storage and prepare them for flyaway. Remove parts and assemblies from stored aircraft and cover overland deliveries. Deliver A/C to museums and transport of A/C to gunnery/bombing ranges. EPA clean-up on static display A/C and miscellaneous special projects. Also elimination site for B-52's under terms of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian: 570
Military:

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$41,355,000

AMARC is a service organization that provides for storage, regeneration and disposal of aircraft and related aerospace items as well as selected non-aero-space, out-sized and specialized items. Encompassing 2,600 acres, AMARC currently has more than 4,950 aircraft in storage with an acquisition value of nearly $15.9B. Related aerospace items in storage include production tooling, engines, pylons, pylon load adapters and airframe components. In FY94, AMARC received 735 aircraft valued at $4B. In addition, nearly 3,000 line items of tooling were added to the inventory. In FY94, AMARC returned 197 aircraft and 28,612 parts and components valued at $994M. With an operating budget of $49M, this equates to a return of $20 in goods and services for every dollar spent. AMARC eliminated 57% of the 350 B-52 heavy bombers in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and manages over 104,000 line items of aircraft production tooling, including equipment from the B-1, C-141 and A-10 production lines.

Performance of the indicators was affected by a requirement to meet a programmed loss of $7.7M for FY94, a change in the method of depreciation occurring in the 2nd and 3rd Qtr of FY93, the completion of the F-106 Full Scale Aerial Target Program, construction to primary facilities involved in the process-in activity and non-materialization of the jet engine intermediate maintenance (JEIM) workload.

AEROSPACE MAINT AND REGENERATION CENTER

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



Headquarters requirement mandating a $7.7M loss for FY94 and a reduction in revenue generated from existing project workloads caused expenses to be greater than throughput.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Continuously Increase



Downward movement resulted from audit finding leading to adjustments in depreciation accounts and inventory build-up in preparation for the F-4 drone program.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



OUT: 1st half FY94 downturn due to end of F106 program & increase in parts and manhour requirements from earlier priority demands. 2nd half upturn due to end of F106 program and improvement in workload preplanning activity. OUT: FY94 trend impacted by large number of F16s needing det. cord removal. Small upturn result of A/C undergoing minimum preservation in per designated requirements. RECLAMATION: Procedures used to establish delivery date under 29% increase in demand for prioroty removal items led

AEROSPACE MAINT AND REGENERATION CENTER

PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR/Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



Experience with prior drone programs contributed to AMARC's ability to more accurately forecast drone program costs.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



Donor aircraft were identified to supply parts/components for drone program aircraft, thereby reducing RSD costs to the customer. Better resource utilization among AMARC's processes lowered costs.

AEROSPACE MAINT AND REGENERATION CENTER

Quarter/Fiscal Year	1.93	2.93	3.93	4.93	1.94	2.94	3.94	4.94

THROUGHPUT / OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue ($)	8,065,290	8,771,277	17,392,903	12,076,475	11,186,659	7,756,327	7,251,886	8,128,640
Total Cost ($)	7,304,171	9,122,414	16,613,840	11,576,115	10,842,390	9,578,398	9,764,927	10,927,247
Direct Materials ($)	2,707,077	2,107,650	2,795,750	2,847,166	3,136,783	1,174,951	539,444	1,967,852
Throughput ($)	5,358,213	6,663,627	14,597,153	9,229,309	8,049,876	6,581,376	6,712,442	6,160,788
Operating Expense ($)	4,597,094	7,014,764	13,818,090	8,730,949	7,705,607	8,403,447	9,225,483	8,959,395

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	5,358,213	6,663,627	14,597,153	9,229,309	8,049,876	6,581,376	6,712,442	6,160,788
Longterm Inventory ($)	14,069,828	22,428,755	22,235,538	12,114,305	11,979,928	13,511,504	13,989,677	14,520,569
INDEX	0.38	0.30	0.66	[illegible]	0.68	0.49	0.48	0.42

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

UNITS COMPLETED ON TIME/UNITS SCHEDULED

Process In Scheduled	103	45	73	103	93	95	95	75
Process In Completed	0	6	58	96	31	29	36	42
INDEX	0.00	0.13	0.87	[illegible]	0.87	0.34	0.38	0.56
Process Out Scheduled	13	20	29	12	16	13	15	6
Process Out Completed	10	10	26	11	9	6	7	6
INDEX	0.77	0.66	0.90	[illegible]	0.56	0.38	0.47	1.00
Reclamation Scheduled	903	906	865	858	847	772	1164	1577
Reclamation Completed	872	897	857	852	841	753	1093	1385
INDEX	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.94	0.88

PROCESS DAYS

TOTAL PROCESS DAYS NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS

NET OPERATING RESULTS

(CUM ACTUAL REVENUE-CUM ACTUAL COST) /

(CUM BUDGETED REVENUE-CUM BUDGETED COST)=NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	7,672,000	16,843,000	26,295,000	35,702,000	10,050,000	19,860,000	30,523,000	41,355,000
Cum Budg Cost ($)	8,719,000	17,423,000	26,110,000	35,017,000	11,509,000	23,445,000	35,632,000	48,145,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	0.88	0.97	1.01	1.02	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.86
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	8,065,290	16,836,567	34,229,470	46,305,945	11,866,659	18,942,590	26,194,872	34,323,512
Cum Actual Cost ($)	7,304,171	16,425,585	33,040,425	44,618,540	10,842,390	20,420,788	30,185,715	41,675,866
Actual NOR INDEX	1.10	1.03	1.04	1.04	1.09	0.93	0.87	0.82
NOR INDEX	1.25	1.06	1.03	1.02	1.25	1.10	1.01	0.96

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	8,719,000	17,423,000	26,110,000	35,017,000	11,509,000	23,445,000	35,632,000	48,145,000
Budgeted Total DLH	154,550	312,821	470,687	628,309	160,778	321,348	491,006	662,792
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$56.42	$55.70	$55.47	$55.73	$71.58	$72.96	$72.57	$72.64
Total Actual Cost ($)	7,304,171	16,425,585	33,040,425	44,618,540	10,842,390	20,420,788	30,185,715	41,112,962
Actual Total DLH	148,291	304,328	477,494	640,995	149,750	307,696	470,764	635,085
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$49.26	$53.97	$69.20	$69.61	$72.40	$66.37	$64.12	$64.74
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	0.87	0.97	1.25	1.25	1.01	0.91	0.88	0.89

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HILL AFB, UT

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

F/RF-4 Phantom, F-16 Fighting Falcon, LGM-30 Minuteman Missile, LGM-118A Peacekeeper Missile, GBU-15 Laser Guided Bomb, Simulators/Training Devices, AGM-65 Maverick Missile, Cruise Missiles, Landing Gear, Wheels & Brakes, Air Munitions, Explosives, Photonics, Aircraft Instruments, and Aircraft Guns.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVELS:

Civilian:	[illegible]
Military:	[illegible]

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$41[illegible]8,000

There are at least four items of interest that have had a significant impact on the performance of these indicators. During the 1st Qtr FY93, DMRD 904 became effective, which required the costs of Repairable Support Division (RSD) material be added to the data systems that track production costs and revenue. RSD material is used to repair an item that belongs to an organization other than the depot (such as Air Combat Command). The costs associated with this material are then considered in the profit and loss aspect of depot performance, which makes those costs more accurate when considering the total cost of doing business. When the data systems were reprogrammed to address RSD material, the systems did not consistently recognize the costs in the debit and credit accounting format. Most of these problems have been resolved; there are a few, however, which are being dealt with on a case by case basis. The second item was a change in the accounting procedures called "Revenue Recognition." In the past some of the costs and most of the revenues were counted in the data system once the end product was completed. Under revenue recognition, costs and revenues are counted as the product moves through the WIP phase. This new procedure became effective during the 3rd Qtr FY93, at which time costs and revenues accumulated to date for those items in the WIP were added to the system in a "lump sum" entry. This caused the costs to be artifically high for the Qtr. Both of these items will have a short term impact on these performance measures. The third item is anticipated workload did not materialize as planned. Fourth, materials for the F/A-18 workload were not available in a timely manner causing the schedule and flowdays indicators for aircraft to show an undesirable trend.

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THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



At the beginning of FY93, data system problems resulted from the implementation of DMRD 904. The data system was prevented from recognizing all of the costs and revenues accumulated during the Qtr. The large increase in total cost and revenue during 3rd Qtr FY93 was due to the change in revenue recognition. T has been lower than OE since 4th Qtr FY93 because workload has not materialized at the anticipated rate. In the 4th Qtr FY94, T was down because fewer hours were sold than in the previous quarter.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Continually Increase



The inception of DMRD 904 resulted in data system problems that caused the system to show costs and sales to be lower than they actually were during 1st Qtr FY93. The accounting procedure change in revenue recognition (costs and sales) has caused throughput to be artificially high in 3rd Qtr FY93. The trend from 4th Qtr FY93 through 4th Qtr FY94 is the result of a "wall to wall" inventory of capital equipment as well as significant adjustments to the G017 System to correct programming problems.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



Components dropped during 4th Qtr FY93, 1st Qtr FY94 and 4th Qtr FY94 due to carryover of workload. Second Qtr FY94 data improved once these assets began to produce. This is an annual cycle due to the manner in which workload is inducted. Aircraft dropped during 3rd and 4th Qtr FY94 due to non-availibility of kit components and other aircraft material specifically related to the F/A-18 workload. F-16 aircraft were on time 100% for all of FY94, and C-130 aircraft were on time 96% for all of FY94.

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PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



The component data represents the average number of process days per item of the 20 unique stock numbered items tracked. Changes to the sample population may be required to make this indicator as meaningful as possible. The increasing trend in aircraft flowdays during 2nd Qtr through 4th Qtr FY94 is due to an increase of modification work packages, contract workload, and parts/material problems associated with the F/A-18 aircraft.

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR/Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



The downward movement in NOR from 1st Qtr FY93 to 2nd Qtr FY94 was due to workload not materializing at the expected level. In 4th Qtr FY94 a loss occured in aircraft due to overhead and G&A costs being spread across a smaller workload base. Production hours in aircraft were 12% below target. Additional losses occurred in depreciation, RSD material and labor.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



LHC continues to be above 1.0 for several reasons. Large credits in RSD material were recognized in FY93, but the offsetting debits were recorded in FY94. There was little history when the RSD targets were being developed which hindered our budgeting accuracy. Other reasons for the trend in FY94 were: operational TDY continued to be higher than targeted due to unplanned FMS TDY, increased missile transportation by truck rather than by aircraft, a change in missile storage sites, and excess manpower.

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Quarter Fiscal Year	1 93	2 93	3 93	4 93	1 94	2 94	3 94	4 94

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue($)	94,469,584	118,478,007	173,399,132	102,308,869	89,526,439	89,689,031	102,929,530	102,154,277
Total Cost ($)	84,290,145	105,944,813	148,133,848	111,076,294	93,5[illegible],121	103,617,908	109,317,971	111,097,879
Direct Materials ($)	5,727,736	27,109,843	13,187,951	13,866,514	20,410,394	17,953,619	19,757,987	21,798,124
Throughput ($)	88,741,848	91,368,164	160,211,181	88,442,355	69,116,045	71,735,412	83,171,543	80,356,153
Operating Expense ($)	78,562,409	78,834,970	134,945,897	97,209,780	73,149,727	85,664,289	89,559,984	89,299,755

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	88,741,848	91,368,164	160,211,181	88,442,355	69,116,045	71,735,412	83,171,543	80,356,153
Longterm Inventory ($)	96,481,834	98,873,535	[illegible]	[illegible]	124,885,988	[illegible]	119,710,432	160,112,844
INDEX	0.92	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.55	0.56	0.69	0.50

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

UNITS COMPLETED ON TIME / UNITS SCHEDULED

Aircraft Scheduled	86	84	74	66	55	65	78	74
Aircraft Completed	86	84	74	66	54	65	74	62
INDEX	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.95	0.84
Components Scheduled	20,845	20,650	[illegible]	20,524	22,432	19,902	18,678	17,177
Components Completed	18,153	19,523	19,293	19,292	17,873	17,855	18,243	15,665
INDEX	0.87	0.95	0.92	0.92	0.80	0.90	0.98	0.91
Missiles Scheduled	70	36	41	39	54	39	52	43
Missiles Completed	36	36	41	39	54	39	52	43
INDEX	0.51	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

PROCESS DAYS

TOTAL PROCESS DAYS/NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS

Aircraft Process Days	6,837	6,955	6,823	4,620	6,050	5,018	6,897	6,286
Number of Items	86	84	74	66	55	65	78	64
AVG PROCESS DAYS	79.50	82.80	92.20	70.00	110.00	77.20	88.42	98.22
Missiles Process Days	2,621	1,746	2,324	2,582	2,737	3,019	2,742	2,087
Number of Items	36	36	41	39	54	39	52	43
AVG PROCESS DAYS	72.81	48.50	56.68	66.21	50.69	77.41	52.73	48.53
Components Process Days					3,658	1,882	481	503
Number of Items					112	68	20	28
AVG PROCESS DAYS					32.66	27.68	24.05	17.96

NET OPERATING RESULTS

(CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST) /

CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST)=NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	94,469,000	228,316,000	336,991,000	450,223,000	80,270,000	189,730,000	294,902,000	407,240,000
Cum Budg Cost ($)	88,785,000	209,724,000	316,290,000	426,665,000	80,662,000	196,913,000	305,419,000	424,153,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	1.06	1.09	1.07	1.06	1.00	0.96	0.97	0.96
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	94,469,584	212,947,591	386,346,723	488,655,592	89,526,439	179,215,470	282,145,000	384,299,000
Cum Actual Cost ($)	84,290,145	190,234,958	338,368,806	449,445,100	93,560,121	197,178,029	306,496,000	417,594,000
Actual NOR INDEX	1.12	1.12	1.14	1.09	0.96	0.91	0.92	0.92
NOR INDEX	1.05	1.03	1.07	1.03	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.96

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	90175215	203138000	311596000	420453000	101466000	206047000	312865000	417116000
Budgeted Total DLH	1703164	3354717	5032074	6735238	1393723	2824704	4326000	5786350
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$52.95	$60.55	$61.92	$62.43	$72.80	$72.94	$72.32	$72.09
Total Actual Cost ($)	90175218	202190348	298836564	407467689	104447446	212470714	314991000	422144000
Actual Total DLH	1604374	3220679	4765986	6296586	1397284	2834744	4174000	5491000
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$56.21	$62.78	$62.70	$64.71	$74.75	$74.95	$75.47	$76.88
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	1.06	1.04	1.01	1.04	1.03	1.03	1.04	1.07

OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
TINKER AFB, OK

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

Bombers (B-52 and B-1), tankers (KC-135), and other special purpose aircraft, (C/EC-135, E-3, and E-6), missile and aircraft engines, aircraft, engine, and exchangeable components (aircraft structural components, engine accessories, pneudraulics/hydraulics/pneumatics, oxygen/gas generating equipment, engine and flight instruments, unique avionics and software).

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian:	6174
Military:	6

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$926,007,000

Oklahoma City ALC has successfully delivered ahead of schedule or on-time all aircraft, engines, and exchangeables for third and fourth quarter of FY94. Throughput has increased $36.6M during FY94. The Capital Investment Index continued to improve in FY94 for a total increase of 65% with a reduction in inventory value of $40.5M. The overall trend in Process Days continues in a positive direction with a total decrease of 56 days for aircraft, engines, and exchangeables in the fourth quarter of FY94. Actual Labor Hour Cost has continued to be lower than Budgeted Labor Hour Cost for the past eight quarters by an average of $12.00.

Innovations to improve C/KC-135 inspection processes, aggressive parts procurement, and establishment of C/KC-135 work center structural repair team had a positive effect on Throughput, Scheduling, and Process Days indicators. The work center team,comprised of highly trained structural repair mechanics; has expedited aircraft structural repair processes. The team is activated when the aircraft has completed the normal repair process and is then moved to the task team area to accomplish identified repairs. Their goal is to meet customer schedules, reduce cost, and improve production flow.

OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



FY94 Operating Expense exceeds Throughput due to Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) which included the return of FY92 profits. Increased training to develop a multi-skilled workforce has resulted in an Operating Expense increase of only 1.2% and will result in cost avoidance [illegible].

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Continually Increase



The index continues to improve in FY94 for a total increase of 65% from FY93. Long Term Inventory shows a positive trend with a decrease of $40.5M from FY93 to FY94.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



Acft: New inspection processes, specialty repair teams, and improved parts availability are showing positive results for all aircraft. Eng: Increased emphasis on "just in time" scheduling of manpower, equipment, and facilities has improved scheduling function. Exch: Production percentage increase can be attributed to a team effort identifying manpower, capacity, parts, and dollars, earlier in the repair process.

OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



Acft: The positive trend during FY93 and FY94 is driven by improved inspection and repair processes. The perturbation in FY94 is resultant of E-3 and C-135 corrosion control and structural repair process changes. Eng: improved training, management emphasis, and process improvement have resulted in decreased flow days on all engines. Excn: The decrease can be attributed to a process improvement which allows for a "just in time" induction of assets to the overhaul shop.

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR/Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



Budgeted Operating results for FY94 reflect a $60.9M loss driven by Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) which directed the return of profits for FY92. Actual loss was reduced to $29.5M by cost reduction initiatives. The cost reduction initiatives resulted in the actual NOR Index exceeding the budgeted NOR Index by 1.5%.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



During the past eight quarters actual labor hour cost averaged $12.00 less than the budgeted labor hour cost. The total labor hour cost for 4/93 and 4/94 is $91.99 and $106.20, respectively. This includes material, which is much higher at an engine repair center. Without material, the labor hour cost for 4/94 is $59.44.

OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Quarter Fiscal Year	1 93	2 93	3 93	4 93	1 94	2 94	3 94	4 94

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue ($)	117,502,000	138,627,163	233,208,862	153,290,905	147,566,860	176,519,491	189,718,187	196,948,197
Total Cost ($)	113,852,000	131,353,149	223,252,393	162,147,819	164,401,016	177,851,233	191,028,734	206,942,939
Direct Materials ($)	23,895,981	45,511,616	75,000,527	73,942,834	64,263,796	85,740,413	92,004,387	80,929,679
Throughput ($)	93,606,019	93,115,547	158,208,335	79,348,071	83,303,064	90,779,078	97,713,800	116,018,518
Operating Expense ($)	89,956,019	85,841,533	148,251,866	88,204,985	100,137,220	92,110,820	99,024,347	126,013,260

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	93,606,019	93,115,547	158,208,335	79,348,071	83,303,064	90,779,078	97,713,800	116,018,518
Longterm Inventory ($)	351,988,721	350,285,649	355,792,000	348,470,647	290,375,602	291,461,574	304,710,727	304,935,946
INDEX	0.27	[illegible]	0.45	[illegible]	0.29	0.31	0.32	0.38

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

UNITS COMPLETED ON TIME / UNITS SCHEDULED

Aircraft Scheduled	16	26	24	23	25	25	19	23
Aircraft Completed	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	24	23	19	23
INDEX	0.69	0.81	0.92	1.00	0.96	0.92	1.00	1.00
Engines Scheduled	240	240	105	[illegible]	194	198	179	169
Engines Completed	240	231	105	[illegible]	194	194	179	169
INDEX	1.00	0.96	1.00	[illegible]	1.00	0.98	1.00	1.00
Exchangeables Scheduled	26,859	26,865	21,800	22,247	22,248	23,620	22,129	22,795
Exchangeables Completed	26,393	27,063	21,300	21,966	21,933	22,254	21,729	22,795
INDEX	0.98	0.96	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.94	0.98	1.00

PROCESS DAYS

TOTAL PROCESS DAYS/NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS

Aircraft Process Days	2,617	4,198	3,731	3,432	4,312	3,720	3,689	3,356
Number of Items	16	26	24	23	26	24	19	23
AVG PROCESS DAYS	163.56	161.46	155.46	149.22	165.85	155.00	194.16	145.91
Engines Process Days	5,062	4,250	3,074	3,125	2,622	5,046	3,792	3,702
Number of Items	52	40	30	30	28	52	41	44
AVG PROCESS DAYS	97.35	106.25	102.47	104.17	93.64	97.04	92.49	84.14
Exchangeables Process Days				248	249	193	128	117.9
Number of Items				10	10	10	10	10
AVG PROCESS DAYS				24.80	24.90	19.30	12.80	11.79

NET OPERATING RESULTS

CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST /

CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST = NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	142,801,000	335,215,000	516,948,000	715,369,000	175,038,000	386,774,000	606,292,000	828,635,000
Cum Budg Cost ($)	142,705,000	322,365,000	497,760,000	689,315,000	189,402,000	415,368,000	651,124,000	889,566,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.93
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	117,502,000	256,129,163	489,338,025	642,628,930	147,566,860	324,086,351	513,804,538	710,752,735
Cum Actual Cost ($)	113,852,000	245,205,149	468,457,542	630,605,361	164,401,016	342,252,250	533,280,985	740,223,924
Actual NOR INDEX	1.03	1.04	1.04	1.02	0.90	0.95	0.96	0.96
NOR INDEX	0.99	1.00	1.01	0.98	0.97	1.02	1.03	1.03

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	171443000	340932000	519857000	699902000	198873000	415781000	638238000	859844000
Budgeted Total DLH	1814193	3508224	5293716	7131928	1732095	3567953	5455344	7375334
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$94.50	$97.18	$98.20	$98.14	$114.82	$116.53	$116.99	$116.58
Total Actual Cost ($)	112839126	287826316	416035753	599381670	167559503	354234453	534060387	733053440
Actual Total DLH	1554166	3212236	4855629	6515892	1634596	3384351	5120934	6902256
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$72.60	$89.60	$85.68	$91.99	$102.51	$104.67	$104.29	$106.20
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	0.77	0.92	0.87	0.94	0.89	0.90	0.89	0.91

SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
McCLELLAN AFB, CA

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

F-111, F-15, A-10, KC-135, Communications-Electronics, Space Systems, Ground Power Generators

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian:	5386
Military:	[illegible]

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$509,000,000

External factors, of which we have limited control, affecting all centers, influenced Throughput and increased Operating Expense. To compensate for these and other drivers, all Directorates met in March 94 to identify ideas and areas that could reduce targeted losses. Through the targeted $20M to reduce loss was not met, varied efforts resulted in a $5M loss savings. Labor Hour Costs were negatively affected due to workloads not generating. The steady trend of increase in Capital Investment Effectiveness was a result of the turn in of excess and outdated industrial plant equipment. Total inventory was reduced by $30M since October 1993. This trend is expected to continue. The negative trend in Net Operating Results is due to KC-135 structural problems and learning curves associated with KC-135 PDM. Process Days Indicator reduction was due to unplanned repair work on the KC-135s during the quarters that these aircraft were originally scheduled to produce (3rd Qtr FY93 to 3rd Qtr FY94), and an increase for the quarters that they are adjusted to (4th Qtr FY94). The A-10s, F-15s, and F-111s were on or ahead of schedule. The Schedule Indicator downward direction was due to manpower shortages, facility constraints, and outgoing fuel leaks.

SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



Though final operating expenses were greatly reduced through cost cutting initiatives, Throughput was still exceeded. This was due to reduced revenue rates which were [illegible] to return back to a profitable operating results.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Continue to Increase



The capital equipment inventory has decreased by 110 line items since 1 Oct 93. This was driven by efforts to turn in excess and out-dated industrial plant equipment. The total inventory value was reduced by $30M since 1 Oct 93. Additionally, the Capital Purchases Program allocation has been reduced in FY95, significantly affecting the acquisition of additional capital equipment items.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



Five KC-135s and one A-10 missed their Aircraft and Missile Maintenance, Production Compression Report (AMREP) dates. Manpower shortages, facility constraints and outgoing fuel leaks were primary causes of the downward direction of the indicator in 4th Qtr FY94. Implementation of Programmed Depot Maintenance Standard System (PDMSS), modification of facilities, and fuel process review are being accomplished to reduce these problems.

SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



Average process days increased in 4th Qtr FY94 due to production of 10 long flow aircraft. 8 F-111s exceeded 260 flow days & two KC-135s exceeded 250 flow days. Major unplanned repair work on KC-135s (wing attach fitting replacement) caused reduction of Process Days indicator during the Qtrs that these aircraft were first scheduled to produce (3/93 to 3/94), an increase for the Qtrs that they are adjusted to (4/94). The KC-135 increases were approved by the SPD.

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR/Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



There we continued inefficiencies as a result of higher than budgeted indirect costs and lower than projected yields. Higher than the Budgeted Repairable Support Division (RSD) material costs associated with PDM of F-15s and F-111s were contributors. KC-135 structural problems and the learning curve associated with KC-135 PDM were major influences in the loss position.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



The actual labor cost index exceeds the 1% criteria due strictly to budgeted versus actual total DLH. Total actual DLH was 716K below budget. The 716K variance in DLH directly caused the actual labor hour cost rate to be substantially higher than originally projected. Projected total DLH was not met due to workloads not generating, inefficiency, and overly ambitious projection. Total actual versus projected cost variance was only $4.3M or 0.8% below budget.

SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Quarter Fiscal Year	1.93	2.93	3.93	4.93	1.94	2.94	3.94	4.94

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue($)	77,812,754	109,303,513	202,402,302	115,396,797	97,751,519	114,967,486	117,521,936	117,037,805
Total Cost ($)	70,670,158	90,604,249	170,958,547	168,706,901	114,925,022	134,649,095	125,043,649	116,426,076
Direct Materials ($)	671,414	12,363,222	32,592,933	16,531,454	33,664,149	48,410,631	37,732,565	23,874,837
Throughput ($)	77,141,340	96,940,291	169,809,369	76,865,343	64,087,370	66,556,855	79,789,371	93,162,968
Operating Expense ($)	69,998,744	78,241,027	138,365,614	130,175,447	81,260,873	86,238,464	87,311,084	92,551,239

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	77,141,340	96,940,291	169,809,369	76,865,343	64,087,370	66,556,855	79,789,371	93,162,968
Longterm Inventory ($)	311,521,589	306,441,546	304,879,562	297,006,083	294,640,703	229,188,312	226,867,766	225,770,092
INDEX	0.25	0.32	0.56	0.26	0.22	0.29	0.35	0.41

[illegible]

UNITS COMPLETED IN [illegible] / UNITS SCHEDULED

Aircraft Scheduled	42	52	34	34	27	27	31	30
Aircraft Completed	29	38	29	33	27	21	30	24
INDEX	0.69	0.73	0.85	0.88	1.00	0.78	0.97	0.80
Components Scheduled	26,748	24,706	24,344	25,030	24,641	23,889	24,684	21,263
Components Completed	25,266	23,889	23,598	24,756	23,514	23,034	23,446	23,420
INDEX	0.97	0.97	[illegible]	0.98	0.96	0.98	0.95	1.10

PROCESS DAYS

TOTAL PROCESS DAYS/NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS

Aircraft Process Days					3,375	3,931	4,055	5,330
Number of Items					27	24	32	28
AVG PROCESS DAYS	218.00	137.00	57.00	114.00	125.00	163.79	126.72	190.36

NET OPERATING RESULTS

CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST =

CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST = NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	77,812,754	187,116,267	296,792,267	412,040,267	103,616,338	219,975,338	346,740,338	470,503,338
Cum Budg Cost ($)	70,670,157	161,274,406	296,280,406	405,847,406	109,832,179	228,018,179	358,887,179	495,397,179
Budgeted NOR INDEX	1.10	1.16	1.00	1.02	0.94	0.96	0.97	0.95
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	77,812,754	187,116,267	389,518,569	504,915,366	97,751,519	212,719,005	330,240,941	447,278,746
Cum Actual Cost ($)	70,670,158	161,274,407	332,232,954	500,939,855	114,925,052	249,574,147	374,617,796	491,043,872
Actual NOR INDEX	1.10	1.16	1.17	1.01	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.91
NOR INDEX	1.00	1.00	1.17	0.99	0.90	0.88	0.91	0.96

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	70670157	161274406	296280406	405847406	109832179	228018179	358887179	495397179
Budgeted Total DLH	1694134	3415386	5044557	6659180	1579848	3281620	4947550	6589975
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$41.71	$47.22	$58.73	$60.95	$69.52	$69.48	$72.54	$75.17
Total Actual Cost ($)	70670158	161274407	332232954	500939855	114925052	249574147	374617796	491043872
Actual Total DLH	1467067	3057101	4592907	6106839	1415762	2927025	4844446	5873794
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$48.17	$52.75	$72.34	$82.03	$81.18	$85.27	$77.33	$83.60
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	1.15	1.12	1.23	1.35	1.17	1.23	1.07	1.11

SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
KELLY AFB, TX

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

C-5 Cargo Aircraft, TF39 Engine (C-5 Aircraft), F100 Engine (F-15 & F-16 Aircraft), T56 Engine (C-130 Aircraft) and related exchangeables. Gas turbine engines, secondary power systems, auxiliary power units, starters and related exchangeables. Manual and automatic test equipment exchangeables, fuel accessories and nuclear components.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian: [illegible]
Military: [illegible]

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$759,700,000

Both the depot maintenance personnel level and current year industrial fund budget numbers above have increased since the last submission of this report. Both increases are the result of increased workload at this center. SA-ALC has been instrumental in attaining local manufacturing workload from the Navy depot at Pensacola as well as T56 engine workload from Alameda. SA-ALC also acquired T-38 and F-5 gearbox workload from the Navy. All of these efforts are the result of base closures and pursuit of consolidations of like workloads to achieve both economies of scale in production as well as to preclude the cost of establishing another organic repair source.

In addition to the above, SA-ALC was instrumental in the early completion of a modification to the large aircraft paint hanger. This early completion allowed SA-ALC to terminate a contract to paint C-5 aircraft at a contractor's facility. This resulted in both dollar and flow day savings to the customer.

SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



A 3rd Qtr FY94 reversal of credit returns accumulated over a period of time and resulted in a higher than normal direct material expense. This caused an inflated [illegible] for that time period.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: [illegible] Should Increase



The fluctuation in the 3rd and 4th Qtr FY94 time period is due to a 3rd Qtr FY94 recapture of improper credit returns coupled with historically higher revenue in the 4th Qtr.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



The reduction to Schedule Conformance for engines is caused by the early completion of five F100 engines. The engines were produced in 3rd Qtr FY93, but the close-out project directive verifying a schedule change is not available.

SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



The engine reported for this measure has changed. SA-ALC previously reported on the TF39 engine. This engine is no longer produced as a "whole up" engine, but is totally under the two levels of maintenance concept. We have revised the input to reflect F100-PW-220E [illegible]

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR Budgeted NOR should equal 1.00



The relative stability of this indicator is the result of increased management emphasis on maintaining cost to budget tolerances.

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



Increased emphasis on forecasting costs has contributed to the low relative variance in this indicator.

SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Quarter Fiscal Year	1 93	2 93	3 93	4 93	1 94	2 94	3 94	4 94
THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE								
REVENUE - DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT								
TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE								
Revenue($)	114,906,000	143,451,000	204,073,000	155,321,000	144,886,000	144,650,000	179,375,000	198,236,000
Total Cost ($)	116,225,000	132,863,000	219,247,000	193,463,000	150,582,000	161,380,000	205,497,000	195,184,000
Direct Materials ($)	27,907,000	44,251,000	50,121,000	66,367,000	56,483,000	66,550,000	116,148,000	93,355,000
Throughput ($)	86,999,000	99,200,000	153,952,000	88,954,000	88,383,000	78,100,000	63,227,000	104,881,000
Operating Expense ($)	88,318,000	88,612,000	169,126,000	127,096,000	94,099,000	94,830,000	89,349,000	101,829,000
CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS								
THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY								
Throughput ($)	86,999,000	99,200,000	153,952,000	88,954,000	88,383,000	78,100,000	63,227,000	104,881,000
Longterm Inventory ($)	171,710,000	172,233,000	163,443,000	171,160,000	156,722,000	151,386,000	145,897,000	143,670,000
INDEX	0.51	0.58	0.94	0.52	0.56	0.52	0.43	0.73
NOR REVENUE INDEX								
ACTUAL CUMULATIVE NOR REVENUE/BUDGETED								
Aircraft Scheduled	3	3	[illegible]	2	5	6	5	4
Aircraft Completed	2	2	1	1	2	2	0	2
INDEX	0.25	0.00	0.74	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Engines Scheduled	62	59	55	46	37	37	25	22
Engines Completed	61	59	50	46	50	38	23	11
INDEX	0.98	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.97	0.92	0.50
Exchangeables Scheduled	28,179	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	22,513	19,435
Exchangeables Completed	26,213	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	19,562	21,557	18,421
INDEX	0.95	0.97	0.99	[illegible]	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.95
PROCESS DAYS								
TOTAL PROCESS DAYS/NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS								
Aircraft Process Days	1,452	1,604	2,354	1,220	1,311	1,003	1,005	1,119
Number of Items	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
AVG PROCESS DAYS	290.40	267.33	94.26	244.00	262.20	200.60	201.00	223.80
Engines Process Days	1,537	1,324	475	1,479	1,007	371	265	0
Number of Items	29	24	25	29	19	7	5	0
AVG PROCESS DAYS	53.00	55.20	19.00	51.00	53.00	53.00	53.00	
Exchangeables Process Days	2,345	1,461	4,793	13,070	9,909	5,482	12,288	11,446
Number of Items	33	43	119	330	174	187	243	229
AVG PROCESS DAYS	73.17	33.47	40.28	39.91	56.95	32.79	50.57	49.98
NET OPERATING RESULTS								
CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST								
CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST = NOR INDEX								
Cum Budg Revenue ($)	114,906,000	296,249,000	470,991,000	647,539,000	144,886,000	322,708,000	537,410,000	722,299,999
Cum Budg Cost ($)	116,225,000	288,525,000	461,219,000	642,011,000	150,582,000	359,152,000	602,207,000	800,879,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	0.99	1.03	1.02	1.01	0.96	0.90	0.89	0.90
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	114,906,000	258,357,000	462,430,000	617,751,000	144,886,000	289,536,000	468,911,000	667,147,000
Cum Actual Cost ($)	116,225,000	249,088,000	468,335,000	661,798,000	150,582,000	311,962,000	517,458,000	712,642,000
Actual NOR INDEX	0.99	1.04	0.99	0.93	0.96	0.93	0.91	0.94
NOR INDEX	1.00	1.01	0.97	0.93	1.00	1.03	1.02	1.04
LABOR HOUR COST								
(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /								
(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX								
Total Budgeted Cost ($)	98280000	309663000	490755000	664822000	158308000	391014000	610342000	802803000
Budgeted Total DLH	1862000	3849000	5842000	7857000	1580000	3356000	5227000	6838000
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$52.78	$80.45	$84.00	$84.62	$100.19	$116.51	$116.77	$117.40
Total Actual Cost ($)	98280000	291955000	428855000	616493000	158308000	363025000	544104000	735401000
Actual Total DLH	1804000	3696000	5560000	7437000	1580000	3149000	4557000	6116000
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$54.48	$78.99	$77.13	$82.90	$100.19	$115.28	$119.40	$120.24
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	1.03	0.98	0.92	0.98	1.00	0.99	1.02	1.02

WARNER ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

ROBINS AFB, GA

MAJOR WORKLOAD ACCOMPLISHED:

F-15, C-130 & C-141, various missiles, Electronic Warfare Systems and Avionics Systems, Vehicles & Special Operations Forces (SOF) aircraft.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL LEVEL:

Civilian:	6142
Military	30

CURRENT YEAR INDUSTRIAL FUND BUDGET ($):

$605,285,000

In adition to the major workload previously described, the WR-ALC Team manages approximately 190,000 items that range from gunnery equipment to aerospace comm/nav equipment, including Global Positioning Systems. WR-ALC is the only organic source for the F-15 Multi-Stage Improvement Program modification which averages approximately 64 process days over and above the typical PDM aircraft. The F-15 production effort here continues to show a reduction in process days. Aircraft process days in the C-141 area showed an increase in 4th Qtr FY94 due to a parts supportability problem for the lower wing panel replacement on one particular aircraft. This as well as inside facility constraints caused delays in the PDM area as well. Decreasing unprogrammed C-141 aircraft inputs will also help to concentrate resources in critical areas. Additional work package requirements added by our customers caused the C-130 production area to increase its process days. There are improvement initiatives in C-130 production, like the purchase of a wiring analyzer to check flowdays. The devastating flood which occurred at the beginning of the 4th Qtr provided an opportunity of service to surrounding communities; however, it had an adverse impact on operations. This can be seen in the area of Operating Expense which exceeded Throughput. Wr-ALC would have experienced a higher Throughput for 4th Qtr if not for the flood which brought about a $6.3M loss of revenue. Even so, Throughput has managed to increase slightly for 3rd to 4th Qtr. This resulted in a positive effect on Capital Investment Effectiveness. NOR remains above the index because of end-of-year adjustments to labor material. Despite all turmoil of the flood and the challenge of downsizing, Team Robins is continuing to strive for continuous improvement.

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THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

GOAL: OE Should Increase Slower or Decrease Faster than Throughput, or Decrease when Throughput is Constant



$13M in unallocated direct material expenses were captured as production overhead in 4th Qtr FY94. This overstated both Throughput and Operating Expenses by this amount. Additionally, $12M in expenses were captured in the last quarter (versus throughout the first 3 quarters), further overstating 4th Qtr FY94 Operating Expenses. Major drivers were labor acceleration factor ($8M), hazardous waste disposal ($1.3M), equipment/maintenance ($.6M), HQ & DFAS costs ($2.2M), and backorder cancellation ($.3M).

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GOAL: Index Should Consistently Increase



Long term inventory continues a steady decline due to increased focus on capacity utilization. Throughput has increased over 3rd Qtr FY93 because of accelerated end-of-year sales.

SCHEDULE INDICATOR

GOAL: Index Should Equal 1



As with process days, parts supportability problems with the C-141 wing panel replacement have resulted in aircraft not making their scheduled completion dates. Facility constraints are also a major factor particularly when panel replacements are unscheduled. C-130 had one late aircraft in 3rd Qtr FY94. This aircraft was the first to receive a PDM in conjunction with the Special Operations Forces Improvement and Night Vision Imaging System. F-15s were at 93% for 3rd Qtr FY94 and 100% for the 4th Qtr.

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PROCESS DAYS

GOAL: Process Days Should show Continual Reduction



C-130 flow days increased due to additional work requirements added to the aircraft by the customer after the aircraft was put in work. C-141 flow days increased in 4th Qtr FY94 [illegible] aircraft which spent 183 days in storage awaiting parts for lower wing panel replacement. [illegible] would be 13 less, excluding this aircraft. F-15 flow days (PDM, PDM/MSIP, ACI) remained constant throughout the year.

NET OPERATING RESULTS

GOAL: Actual NOR Budgeted NOR [illegible] 1.00



NOR is above the 1.0 goal due to efforts to reduce overhead costs which were $11.5M less than planned for 4th Qtr FY94. This is the result of lowered expenses in utilities ($1.1M), depreciation ($4.4M), and JLSC ($6.0M).

LABOR HOUR COST

GOAL: The Labor Hour Cost Index should consistently be at or below 1.00.



Normal trend is for end-of-year cost to be higher due to end-of-year accounting adjustments in labor and material. Adjustments typically include posting actual expenses versus estimated expenses and capturing any unallocated expenses before the end of the year.

WARNER ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Quarter/Fiscal Year	1/93	2/93	3/93	4/93	1/94	2/94	3/94	4/94

THROUGHPUT & OPERATING EXPENSE

REVENUE-DIRECT MATERIAL = THROUGHPUT

TOTAL COST-DIRECT MATERIAL = OPERATING EXPENSE

Revenue($)	120,016,000	118,443,000	224,659,000	132,683,000	127,708,000	163,946,000	140,619,000	151,838,000
Total Cost ($)	104,296,000	107,109,000	146,352,000	133,816,000	129,196,000	148,223,000	139,506,000	166,818,000
Direct Materials ($)	18,127,000	13,982,000	55,132,000	37,302,000	10,509,000	49,793,000	44,125,000	46,108,000
Throughput ($)	101,889,000	104,461,000	169,527,000	95,381,000	87,199,000	114,153,000	96,494,000	105,730,000
Operating Expense ($)	86,169,000	93,127,000	91,220,000	131,514,000	88,687,000	98,430,000	95,381,000	120,710,000

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY

Throughput ($)	101,889,000	104,461,000	169,527,000	95,381,000	87,199,000	114,153,000	96,494,000	105,730,000
Longterm Inventory ($)	294,130,000	292,109,000	286,146,000	[illegible]	263,830,000	307,216,000	304,157,000	300,929,000
INDEX	0.35	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.33	0.37	0.32	0.35

SCHEDULE INDEX

UNITS COMPLETED IN THE MONTH/UNITS SCHEDULED

Aircraft Scheduled	34	34	[illegible]	[illegible]	23	29	24	35
Aircraft Completed	26	34	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	20	21	28
INDEX	0.76	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.95	0.65	0.69	0.88	0.80
Components Scheduled	27,116	26,126	[illegible]	[illegible]846	30,220,000	31,389,000	26,031	22,747
Components Completed	23,856	22,498	[illegible]	[illegible]078	22,225,000	29,814,000	23,363	20,148
INDEX	0.88	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.74	0.95	0.90	0.89

PROCESS DAYS

TOTAL PROCESS DAYS/NUMBER OF ITEMS = AVERAGE PROCESS DAYS

Aircraft Process Days								
Number of Items								
AVG PROCESS DAYS	146.00	[illegible]	[illegible]	131.00	127.00	166.00	166.00	175.00
Components Process Days								
Number of Items								
AVG PROCESS DAYS					24.00	19.00	17.00	17.00

NET OPERATING RESULTS

(CUM ACTUAL REVENUE/CUM ACTUAL COST)/

(CUM BUDGETED REVENUE/CUM BUDGETED COST)=NOR INDEX

Cum Budg Revenue ($)	115,562,000	244,490,000	378,739,000	510,124,000	127,702,000	289,398,000	433,209,000	575,642,000
Cum Budg Cost ($)	113,477,000	246,185,000	378,052,000	501,699,000	119,964,000	301,309,000	452,038,000	605,673,000
Budgeted NOR INDEX	0.98	0.99	1.00	1.02	1.06	0.96	0.96	0.95
Cum Actual Revenue ($)	120,015,000	238,459,000	369,707,000	595,800,000	127,708,000	291,653,000	432,471,000	582,910,000
Cum Actual Cost ($)	104,296,000	211,405,000	357,757,000	526,573,000	129,196,000	277,418,000	408,458,000	583,362,000
Actual NOR INDEX	1.15	1.13	1.03	1.13	0.99	1.05	1.06	1.00
NOR INDEX	1.18	1.14	1.03	1.11	0.93	1.09	1.10	1.05

LABOR HOUR COST

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL ACTUAL COST/CUMULATIVE ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) /

(CUMULATIVE TOTAL BUDGET COST/CUMULATIVE BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = LABOR HOUR COST INDEX

Total Budgeted Cost ($)	120386000	245015000	369707000	494646000	129186000	300894000	451623000	605258000
Budgeted Total DLH	1776000	3610000	5510000	7402000	1867000	3853000	5887000	7888000
Bud Labor Hour Cost	$67.78	$67.87	$67.10	$66.83	$69.19	$78.09	$76.72	$76.73
Total Actual Cost ($)	104296000	211405000	357757000	526573000	129196000	277418000	416926000	583743000
Actual Total DLH	1832000	3737000	5655000	7595000	1844000	3854000	5713000	7533000
Actual Labor Hour Cost	$56.93	$56.57	$63.26	$69.33	$70.06	$71.98	$72.98	$77.49
Labor Hour Cost INDEX	0.84	0.83	0.94	1.04	1.01	0.92	0.95	1.01

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
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MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

March 31, 1995

The Honorable Don Nickles
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Please refer to this number
when responding 950330-9R1

Dear Don:

Thank you for your courtesy in providing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with a copy of the Department of Defense's "Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators Report." I appreicate your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome information relevant to Commission's deliberations.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations on Air Force air logistics centers. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:cw