DCN 502

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION, TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1995

Chairman Dixon and Members of the Commission, yesterday you heard that the permits required to move the Army's Chemical School and its training facilities from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood are in complete disarray. How did this happen when your instructions were so clear? To try to understand what occurred, we need to examine the process the Army used to get to this point.

When the previous BRAC Commission decided in 1993 to continue the Chemical School's training program at Fort McClellan, that Commission wisely recommended "if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense Training Facility in the future, that the Army pursue all the required permits and certifications from the new site prior to the 1995 Base Closure process." (emphasis added). (See page 207 of June 23, 1993, BRAC hearing transcript attached at Tab A). Moreover, it was clear from the 1993 BRAC Commission's discussion that (a) they expected the Army to obtain the necessary permits in the two year interim between 1993 and 1995, and (b) the Army should have the required permits in hand "before they bring it back to BRAC '95." (emphasis added). (See 1993 BRAC transcript at Tab A, pages 200-201 and 205). However, not a single permit application was submitted to anyone until March 1, 1995, after the Secretary of Defense made his 1995 base closure recommendations.

When you began your review of the Defense Secretary's closure recommendations in March of this year, you wisely picked up where the previous Commission left off. During

hearings between March 1 and March 7, 1995, Chairman Dixon and several of you Commissioners clarified this Commission's position that "it's clear that we would have to have before us clear evidence that all permits were in place" before you could support the Defense Department's recommendation to close Fort McClellan. (See page 103 of March 1, 1995, BRAC hearing transcript attached at Tab B). Moreover, you pointed out that not just any piece of paper will do, but that the Army must present you with all the permits sufficient to guarantee continuation of the Chemical School's full training capability in Missouri as it is now done in Alabama. You made it clear that the Chemical School's vital mission in providing its full complement of nuclear, biological and chemical defense training is not to be degraded as a result of this potential move. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch and Army Secretary Togo West stated they understood that all the permit issues had to be resolved before June 22, 1995. (See March 1, 1995, BRAC transcript at Tab B, page 103 and pages 53-54 of March 7, 1995, BRAC hearing transcript attached at Tab C).

Despite the 1993 BRAC Commission's advice to obtain the permits first, Army Secretary West explained in testimony presented to this Commission on March 7, 1995, that in his view obtaining the required permits before Fort McClellan was recommended for closure would have been premature. Secretary West testified: "we did not start the permitting process until after the base closure . . . list was announced by the Secretary of Defense (on February 28, 1995). That was at my express direction." (See BRAC transcript at Tab C, page 37). Time-wise, that delay put the Army behind the permitting eight ball from the beginning.

Consistent with Army Headquarters' initial methodical approach, on March 10, 1995, ten days after the Defense Secretary made his February 28th closure recommendation, Major General John Herrling, Chief of Staff at TRADOC Headquarters in Virginia, informed Major

General Ballard, Commander at Fort Leonard Wood, in writing that Secretary Perry had recommended relocation of the Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood "conditioned 'upon receipt of the required permits,'" before June 22, 1995. General Herrling instructed General Ballard to obtain the necessary permits from the State of Missouri and furnish them to TRADOC "as quickly as possible, but no later than 1 June 1995," and to "coordinate directly with (the) Commander of Fort McClellan to ensure all necessary permits are identified." (See copy of March 10, 1995, memorandum attached at Tab D).

On March 10, 1995, the Commanders of both Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan were sent another memorandum by TRADOC Headquarters asking (a) what permits had been applied for and when, (b) whether the permit applications were public, and (c) was an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") done at Fort McClellan, and, if so, how long did it take? (See copy of March 10, 1995, memorandum attached at Tab E).

In response, on March 13, 1995, Fort McClellan replied (a) they did not know what permit applications, if any, had been filed by Fort Leonard Wood, (b) they had not been asked to supply any information to Fort Leonard Wood pertaining to environmental permit requirements, and (c) an EIS was done at Fort McClellan on the Chemical Defense Training Facility ("CDTF"), which took over four years to complete (from January 1981 to June 1985). (See copy of March 13, 1995, memorandum attached at Tab F).

Unfortunately, despite these very explicit instructions from TRADOC to Fort Leonard Wood to coordinate the permit application process with Fort McClellan, that was not done. Perhaps that was because at the local level the rush to accelerate and short-cut Missouri's normal twelve-to-twenty-four months long permit process had already begun. In fact, on March 1,

1995, only 24 hours after the Defense Secretary's closure recommendations were announced, Fort Leonard Wood hurriedly filed two applications with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") for air permits -- one to construct the CDTF and one to construct a fog oil smoke training facility. The following day, on March 2, 1995, Fort Leonard Wood submitted a water permit application to MDNR for modification of the Fort's existing stormwater permit to allow for the proposed fog oil smoke training. (See copies of excerpts from all three permit applications attached at Tab G). In spite of this frenetic activity, it is clear that as late as two weeks after Fort Leonard Wood's permit applications had been submitted to the State of Missouri the required coordination with Fort McClellan on the permit applications had not been done by Fort Leonard Wood.

Perhaps because of the pressure created by TRADOC's impossibly short 60-day permit deadline of June 1, only one of the four key officials from Fort Leonard Wood who were involved in the preparation and submission of the Fort's three permit applications had ever visited Fort McClellan to discuss the permit requirements until the week of April 2, 1995, after the permit applications were already in the final review process by the state. In fact, the air permit to construct (but not to operate) the CDTF was issued on April 11, 1995, only four days after their return from Alabama. (See copy of CDTF permit excerpt pages attached at Tab H). The permit was issued without any amendments or modifications being requested by Fort Leonard Wood personnel following their on-site visit to Fort McClellan, during which time they observed for the first time how the CDTF operates and how the fog oil training is conducted.

Perhaps this pell mell rush to obtain the permits also helps explain why Fort Leonard Wood submitted a permit application to the State of Missouri that bears little factual resemblance to how the CDTF at Fort McClellan is actually built and operated. Because they did not

coordinate with Fort McClellan as they were clearly ordered to do by TRADOC, Fort Leonard Wood personnel prepared their CDTF air permit application based on outdated and superseded 1983 through 1985 data and information. Some of that information was copied from Fort McClellan's original October 12, 1983 permit application and other engineering data which had been prepared as a preliminary step to the burn tests conducted on Fort McClellan's incinerator in late 1986 before it became operational in February of 1987. (See pages 4-5 of Fort Leonard Wood's CDTF permit application excerpts at Tab G). In their haste, Fort Leonard Wood's personnel apparently did not realize that over the years dozens of changes and major substantive modifications had been made to Fort McClellan's CDTF, and as a result Fort McClellan had been issued a major air permit modification for the CDTF on December 17, 1992, which superseded and replaced Fort McClellan's June 1, 1987, operating permit. (See copies of Fort McClellan's 1987 and 1992 air permit excerpts attached at Tab I). To illustrate this point, when you compare the process flow diagram in Fort Leonard Wood's permit application (See Tab G, page 3) to the process flow diagram in Fort McClellan's 1992 permit modification application (See Tab I, page 9) you can see they are vastly different facilities. Consequently, the application information which Fort Leonard Wood personnel copied and submitted to the state, and which the State of Missouri used to issue the Army's air permit, does not authorize construction of the same kind of CDTF now in operation in Alabama. In fact, the Missouri air permit is for the Army's original CDTF which is at least 10 years out of date and in reality no longer exists.

Perhaps that's also why the State of Missouri doesn't understand why Fort Leonard Wood also needs a hazardous waste permit to build the incinerator which is a vital component of the CDTF. On April 5, 1995, Col. Anders Aadland, Chief of Staff at Fort Leonard Wood, wrote Cong. Glen Browder that Fort Leonard Wood <u>had submitted a hazardous waste permit</u>

application for the CDTF incinerator to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. (See copy of April 5, 1995, letter attached at Tab J). Once again, that hazardous waste permit application also contained the same outdated 1985 data and information from Fort McClellan which Fort Leonard Wood personnel attached to their CDTF air permit application. Consequently, when the Director of Missouri's Department of Natural Resources, David Shorr, testified before this BRAC Commission at your public hearing in Chicago on April 12, 1995, that no hazardous waste permit is needed by the Army in Missouri, he was acting on the inaccurate and incomplete information which had been submitted to his Department by Fort Leonard Wood. Moreover, in sworn depositions taken during the weeks of May 15, 1995, and May 22, 1995, in an Air Conservation Commission proceeding in Missouri, the key officials from MDNR who dealt with Fort Leonard Wood's permit applications all testified that they had never ever visited Fort McClellan. They had relied on the information supplied them by Fort Leonard Wood, which we now know was at best inaccurate, incomplete and erroneous, and at worst perhaps fraudulently submitted to the state's permitting agency.

As if the CDTF and hazardous waste issues aren't bad enough, the facts pertaining to the fog oil smoke permitting process are even worse. Either because they didn't know enough about the fog oil training process, or because in their rush to get the permits they didn't take time to understand the requirements of Missouri's air regulations, or both, Fort Leonard Wood personnel did not realize until mid-April they needed a variance from the state's air regulations which impose a 20% limit on emissions opacity. The state's opacity limit means air emissions cannot obscure vision more than 20% when one looks through the smoke at objects on the other side of the emissions. Naturally, the whole purpose of fog oil smoke training is to teach our soldiers to obscure vision by 100% in order to keep the enemy from detecting our troop

movements. Consequently, on April 21, 1995, more than seven weeks after they hurriedly submitted their March 1 fog oil air permit application, Fort Leonard Wood personnel submitted an air variance application to the state. (See copy of variance application attached at Tab K). During the Missouri Air Conservation Commission's consideration of the variance application at its meeting on April 27, 1995, the Missouri Coalition for the Environment, the Ozark Chapter of the Sierra Club, and several individuals opposed the issuance of the variance. (See copies of news stories attached at Tab L). As a result, the Army's variance application became the subject of a full-blown formal administrative review process conducted by the Missouri Air Conservation Commission. A decision on the fog oil air permit could not be made by MDNR until after a decision was made on the variance. The variance was granted on June 6, 1995; however, it has already been appealed to the State Circuit Court in Missouri which could further impede the state's ability to grant the Army's fog oil air permit. Subsequently, MDNR issued the final fog oil permit on June 7, 1995. This final permit is identical to the draft fog oil permit. (See attachment at Tab M).

To compound the Army's permit problems, because Fort Leonard Wood hastily submitted an inadequate and incomplete fog oil permit application, MDNR has issued a draft air permit for the Army's proposed fog oil smoke operations in Missouri which is so restrictive it will be a training disaster for the Army. On April 11, 1995, MDNR issued a draft air permit to construct a fog oil smoke training facility at Fort Leonard Wood. (See copy of draft permit attached at Tab M). The draft permit was subjected to a 30-day public comment period which has now closed. The restrictive nature of the state's draft air permit, which will clearly not allow the Army to do the kind and extent of smoke training presently done at Fort McClellan, has caused concern within the Army's chain of command. In May, Major Craig Teller, a

lawyer in the Environmental Division at the Department of the Army in Washington, DC, contacted personnel in the Chemical School at Fort McClellan to discuss the draft fog oil permit.[1] In response to Maj. Teller's request, on May 16, 1995, the Special Assistant to the Commandant at Fort McClellan, LTC Edward Newing, who is recognized as a world class expert on fog oil with eighteen years of "hands on" and research and development experience, responded that the state of Missouri's draft fog oil air permit restrictions "will create overwhelming degradation to Chemical Mission readiness." (See copy of May 16, 1995, memorandum attached at Tab N). The draft state permit limits Fort Leonard Wood to a maximum throughput of only 65,000 gallons of fog oil per year. As was shown in a March 23, 1995, letter from the Chemical School to Mr. John Young at MDNR in response to the state's request under the Freedom of Information Act, the Army's average annual fog oil throughput during the past five years at Fort McClellan was 77,476 gallons per year. (See copy of March 23, 1995, letter attached at Tab O). Moreover, the Army's actual fog oil usage in 1994 was 93,800 gallons and in 1993 was 116,350 gallons. In addition, the Air Force also does fog oil training at the Chemical School which was <u>not</u> included in either Fort Leonard Wood's permit

[1] Although in their depositions Fort Leonard Wood's personnel testified they had not talked to him, Fort Leonard Wood's April 21 variance application to MDNR states that Major Teller rendered advice or furnished information which Fort Leonard Wood relied upon in the preparation of its variance application. (See Tab K, page 5). Major Teller attended some of the depositions in the Missouri Air Conservation Commission's variance proceeding in Missouri during the week of May 15, 1995, as did a Major Michael Corbin, a colleague from Department of Army Headquarters in Washington. (See page 109 of deposition at Tab P).

application or in MDNR's draft permit. According to LTC Newing's May 16, 1995, memo, based on the military's projected training needs, the Chemical School's needs for future fog oil usage for both the Army and Air Force is at least 95,000 gallons per year. (See memorandum at Tab N).

The state's draft permit also limits Fort Leonard Wood to a maximum use of 3,700 pounds of fog oil during a 24-hour period. This translates to a maximum generation of fog oil smoke for only one hour per day for a maximum of 135 days per year at Fort Leonard Wood. Presently, in order to meet the Army's and the Air Force's training requirements, Fort McClellan's Chemical School generates fog oil smoke on 250 or more days per year, consisting of one to four exercises per day, with each exercise averaging one hour each. LTC Newing's March 23, 1995, letter to MDNR also pointed out that other types of obscurants are used at Fort McClellan, including colored dye smoke grenades, infrared defeating obscurant grenades (brass flakes), hexachloroethane smoke pots, and large area infrared defeating obscurants (graphite powder). (See Tab O). The use of these training devices was not included in Fort Leonard Wood's permit application and is also not included in MDNR's draft air permit. Numerous other serious defects in the draft air permit are described in detail in LTC Newing's May 16 memo to Major Teller. In summary, LTC Newing concluded: "The restrictions will cut back the minimum amount of annual fog oil use by 30%. The daily allowance for smoke training time (at Fort Leonard Wood) will be cut by 75%. After suffering these unacceptable losses, it further limits our Joint forces to smoke operations during weather conditions which may exist only 60% of the year. The smoke permit virtually eliminates more than one smoke event per day . . . the Missouri smoke permit allows us to conduct roughly 25% of training to standards, <u>these restrictions would kill both the US Army and US Air Force smoke training</u>" (emphasis in

original). (See memorandum at Tab N). LTC Newing's May 16 memo goes on to say: "The Missouri smoke permit restrictions will . . . tragically cripple the capability to conduct smoke training. One of the most stunning restrictions of this permit is the loss of capability to train with smoke hand grenades, vehicular smoke grenades, smoke pots, infrared defeating grenades, riot control agents, and large area infrared obscurants. The Reserve Component smoke training at the Chemical School would also be a casualty." (See memorandum at Tab N).

Vital questions which we must all ask are: (1) How and why did the Army submit such a tragically deficient fog oil permit application? (2) Why did Fort Leonard Wood accept such a woefully inadequate draft permit which seriously fails to meet the Army's and the Air Force's smoke training requirements? It appears to me to be the result of either (a) haste and/or incompetence on the part of Fort Leonard Wood's personnel, or (b) a major change in the military's training mission planned by higher headquarters without either the Chemical School's or the BRAC Commission's knowledge. As LTC Newing pointed out in his May 16, 1995, memo to Major Teller: "Fort Leonard Wood, <u>unfortunately without coordination with the Chemical School</u> (at Fort McClellan), applied for a smoke permit and variance." (Emphasis added). (See memorandum at Tab N). As part of his sworn deposition taken in the variance proceeding before the Missouri Air Conservation Commission on May 15, 1995, LTC John P. Johnson, Fort Leonard Wood's Base Realignment and Closure Planning Officer, testified that he was directly responsible for securing the environmental permits at Ft. Leonard Wood, but he did not give any consideration to any aspect of the proposed smoke training at Fort Leonard Wood until February 28, 1995, when the Secretary of Defense announced his recommendation to move the Chemical School. (See pages 44-46 and 55-57 of LTC Johnson's deposition excerpts attached at Tab P). LTC Johnson further testified that he had no personal involvement

in the proposed move of the fog oil operation to Fort Leonard Wood in 1993, and that he was not appointed the Fort's BRAC Planning Officer until late 1994. (See pages 38-42 and 89-90 of deposition at Tab P). The only time LTC Johnson ever visited Fort McClellan was for a one week period from 2-7 April 1995, and during that tour he observed smoke training for only one hour. Despite the fact that LTC Johnson's expertise is predominately as a civil engineer, that he has no substantial expertise in chemical engineering, and that he did not discuss the smoke training with the commander of the Chemical School (See pages 18 and 67-68 of deposition at Tab P), LTC Johnson testified that after discussing the smoke training with LTC Newing and others: "I did not seek their concurrence on the adequacy of the one-hour training. I simply asked them how did they conduct the training, how to verify. I visited the training . . . and drew my own conclusion that one hour would be sufficient for our permitting activity here (Fort Leonard Wood) and meet the Army's requirement for training" (emphasis added). (See pages 69-70 of deposition at Tab P). Although LTC Johnson testified that "the mission as it's trained at Fort McClellan will be transferred in total to Fort Leonard Wood as I know it at this hour," he also testified that although he "suspected" that Fort McClellan trained with other obscurants, such as hexachloroethane smoke pots, colored dye smoke grenades, infrared defeating grenades (brass flakes), and large area infrared defeating obscurants (graphite powder), he didn't know the magnitude of that use at Fort McClellan. (See pages 86-88 of deposition at Tab P). He also concluded that in any event those devices couldn't be used under the Army's draft permit at Fort Leonard Wood. Regarding the Missouri draft permit limitations on meteorological conditions, despite testifying he was not an expert in meteorology, LTC Johnson concluded "our proposed permit has a set of performance measures in it as it relates to the training in concert with the weather. Those conditions will either be met or we will not train. That was our intent all along

was (sic) to comply with DNR's requirements and to train with some degree of respect for those." (See pages 100-101 of deposition at Tab P).

Regarding the 63,000 gallons of fog oil per year limitation in Fort Leonard Wood's permit application (increased in MDNR's draft permit to a throughput limit of 65,000 gallons per year), LTC Johnson credited that decision to higher headquarters. In his May 15, 1993, deposition in the Missouri Air Conservation Commission's variance proceeding, LTC Johnson stated: "The 63,000 gallon throughput was a figure that we determined by simply asking our higher headquarters what rate of training they wanted us to do. The answer came back 63,000 gallons. . . . the fact is that's what we are preparing to train at." (See pages 64-65 of deposition at Tab P). LTC Johnson further identified the higher headquarters as TRADOC (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In other testimony on May 15, 1995, LTC Johnson stated: "It was, as I explained to you, our belief that our higher headquarters expected us to train at a rate of 63,000 gallons. That's what's in our permit. We have had information that McClellan does procure more than that, but that's irrelevant to me. My job is to train at 63,000 gallons and that's why the permit reflects that." (See page 85 of deposition at Tab P). Finally, regarding the combined fog oil training for both the Army and Air Force, LTC Johnson indicated he realized that other services, such as the U.S. Air Force, also trained with smoke at Fort McClellan. However, he concluded: "But the point is we have received our ceiling for fog oil consumption from our headquarters. That would be an all-encompassing training requirement." (See pages 87-88 of deposition at Tab P). Consequently, the Air Force's fog oil training consumption requirements will reduce the amount available for the Army's use.

Members of the Commission, it appears to me someone in the Army isn't telling you the

truth. They're not telling the Congress the truth, they're not telling the officers in the Chemical Corps the truth, and they're not telling the American people the truth about any of these permits in Missouri -- the CDTF permit, the water permit, the hazardous waste permit, or the fog oil smoke permit. The Army has foisted an inaccurate, hastily constructed and perhaps fraudulent permit application process off on everyone, including the elected officials and the citizens of Missouri, as well as the regulators at the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. The scary part is the Army has done this under the guise of military efficiency and cost savings while ignoring the great risk to our military preparedness and to our country's national and internal security.

As a result of the Army's seriously inadequate permitting process, the Department of Defense ("DOD") has significantly threatened the future mission requirements and the future operational readiness of DOD's total force with their recommendation to you to relocate the Chemical School from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. Please don't be fooled by any so-called "state approved permits" the Army presents to you, because in terms of military value they won't be worth the paper they're written on. That's because they simply won't allow the military to do the same type, extent and quality of nuclear, biological and chemical training in Missouri that is currently done at Fort McClellan.

In its April 14, 1995, report to you, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") clearly pointed out that, like the 1993 BRAC Commission, this Commission should also closely examine and seriously question the wisdom of relocating the CDTF and the Chemical School. This is not only because this is the third time the Chemical School has been examined via the BRAC process, but also because of the more permanent nature of the 1995 BRAC decision. As you know, this 1995 BRAC process is the last round of base closure reviews authorized under the

1990 legislation. GAO correctly pointed out that previous BRAC Commissions in 1991 and 1993 ruled on changes to prior BRAC round decisions. In fact, you are being asked this year to change a 1991 BRAC Commission closure recommendation relating to a facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, which the Army now says should not be closed. However, because the Department of Defense cannot unilaterally change a BRAC Commission decision and the legislative authority for the BRAC Commission will soon expire, no process will exist to authorize future changes to the decisions which you BRAC Commissioners will shortly be making.

As a result of the Army's seriously deficient permit process in Missouri, any permits they do receive will not only be inadequate to meet the military's training needs, but they are already being subjected to lengthy and vociferous administrative and judicial appeals. That appeals process alone will take years to complete, during which time the Army's ability to relocate the Chemical School will be uncertain. In addition, should any of the Army's permits eventually be denied or revoked or their issuance overturned, there will be no process to reverse or modify any decision you might make to close Fort McClellan. Unless Congress passes new legislation, there simply won't be an opportunity for you or anyone else to reexamine and/or reverse your decision if implementation problems later arise, as they are almost certain to do. The military readiness and national security value of the Chemical School and its training facilities are too important to our county to risk them on a high stakes gamble that the Army will ever successfully accomplish this move to Fort Leonard Wood. Please cast your vote with the American people to keep this important training capability fully functional at Fort McClellan. Thank you very much for your attention and your consideration.

1 themselves. Is that correct?
2 MS. CHESTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
3 CHAIRMAN COURTER: That is correct, Counsel. I
4 appreciate it. Is there any other business or statements
5 that should be made at this time by any of the Commissioners?
6 (No response.)
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: If not, we will proceed with the
8 Army and Mr. Behrmann, if you would proceed.
9 MR. BEHRMANN: Mr. Chairman, could I just say one
10 thing about the motions? We have drafted just about every
11 conceivable option. There's no prejudice on our part. We've
12 tried to use it as a means of facilitation. I think that
13 there is a dearth of options for you to select from, and I
14 just wanted that to be clear for the record.
15 We'll move right to Ed Brown, who is going to start
16 the brief for us on Army bases.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, you are recognized.
18 You may proceed.
19 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I have
20 with me today the entire Army team. The analysts will be
21 talking to you in their respective areas where they have done
22 the work, starting off with me today at the table. On my

1 left is LTC Brian Duffy and to his left is Mr. John Graham.
2 If I may direct your attention to Slide 1, the top portion of
3 the chart shows the number of categories into which the Army
4 divided its installations for consideration.
5 The number on the right-hand column represents
6 those subjected to military value assessments within each
7 category. Highlighted categories, initial entry training,
8 branch schools, professional schools, command and control,
9 depots and commodity-oriented, have recommended for closure
10 or realignment by the Secretary of Defense or recommendations
11 added for further consideration by the Commission during its
12 hearings on the 29th of March and on May 21st.
13 The box at the bottom reflects the Commissioners'
14 addition of the U.S. Army Reserve Training Facility at Marcus
15 Hook, Pennsylvania, for consideration. This category was not
16 considered by the Army in its military value assessments;
17 therefore, I have separated it from the others.
18 If I may now direct your attention to Tab 1, we
19 have the first category that will be discussed, Initial Entry
20 Training and Branch Schools. The map, which is Slide 2, and
21 the accompanying chart, Slide 3, show the names and locations
22 of the Army's 13 initial entry training/branch school

1 installations.
2 The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort
3 McClellan, Alabama be closed, and the Commissioners added
4 Fort Lee, Virginia, for further consideration. Before
5 discussing each installation, I would like to outline the
6 staff's evaluation of the impact of force structure
7 reductions on training loads at these installations.
8 In looking at these charts, it must be remembered
9 that both active and reserve component soldiers are trained,
10 so there cannot be a direct one-to-one correlation in force
11 structure reductions to reduction in the training load.
12 Slide 4 compares the training load at the Army's basic
13 training installations for fiscal years 1992 and 1997.
14 This chart assumes a force structure of 12 active
15 divisions. Through the period, there is a reduction of
16 almost 20 percent. That compares with a total force
17 reduction, both active and reserve, of approximately 15
18 percent.
19 Slide 5 shows the same information for the combined
20 arms installations, those that train the infantry, their
21 defense artillery, armor, aviation and artillery soldiers.
22 Through the period, there's a reduction of about six-and-a

1 half percent.
2 Slide 6 shows the same information for combat
3 support installations, Fort Leonard Wood where they tra
4 engineers; Fort Gordon trains signal soldiers; Fort
5 McClellan, both chemical and military police; Fort Huachuca,
6 military intelligence; and Fort Devens, which is in the
7 process of being closed and the training load is being
8 transferred from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. In this
9 category, there was a reduction of about nine percent.
10 Slide 7 shows the information for combat service
11 support installations. The installations shown along the
12 bottom, I will not detail them. There is a reduction of
13 about 18 percent in training load in these installations
14 through the period.
15 At Tab 2, we have the first installation to be
16 considered, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Slide 8 pictorially
17 shows the DOD recommendation. This recommendation is to
18 close Fort McClellan, move the Chemical School, the Military
19 Police School and the DOD, Department of Defense Polygraph
20 Institute, to Fort Leonard Wood, retain Pelham Range, and
21 establish a reserve component enclave at Fort McClellan and
22 retain the capability for live agent training, the Chemical

1 Decontamination Training Facility, at Fort McClellan.
2 Slide 9 shows the relative locations of Fort
3 McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood. LTC Brian Duffy will
4 discuss Fort McClellan.
5 LTC DUFFY: Mr. Chairman, I'm just waiting for the
6 first slide.
7 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Would you move the mike closer,
8 please, so we have no problem hearing you? Thank you.
9 LTC DUFFY: I think you have a copy of this slide
10 in your packets, Slide No. 10. On this slide, you see
11 various statistics for the base.
12 I point your attention to the last row, that shows
13 that the recommendation made by the Department of Defense
14 carries with it a one-time construction cost of $113.9
15 million. It has a steady state savings of approximately $34
16 million and pays back in the year 2002, which would be three
17 years after the six-year BRAC period. I also point your
18 attention to the cumulative economic impact which is 16.8
19 percent cumulative economic impact.
20 Next slide, please. These are the major issues
21 that I would like to review. Those listed on the left are
22 what I would consider the driving issues for this

1 recommendation. Those are the ones I will cover. If you
2 have any questions about the issues on the right, I will be
3 glad to cover those, also.
4 Next slide, please. The first issue, military
5 value, four installations ranked lower than Fort McClellan.
6 Forts Lee and Eustis in Virginia, Fort Rucker in Alabama,
7 also, and Fort Huachuca. Fort Lee is the Quartermaster
8 Center and School. It has been studied for consolidation
9 along with Fort Eustis and I think that the Commission has
10 taken it under consideration and understands those
11 installations.
12 Fort Rucker is the Army's Aviation Center and
13 School. It's a unique installation that trains aviators. It
14 has 23 stage fields of various sizes, all adding up to a
15 couple hundred acres each. They are located on the outskirts
16 of the installation that makes it rather unique and difficult
17 to replicate.
18 Fort Huachuca is a gaining installation from BRAC
19 '91 and in the Army's recommendation was a gainer in BRAC
20 '93. So, for that reason, it was not considered for closure
21 or realignment.
22 I think the point I would like to make is that

1 military value is merely the beginning part of the analysis,
and the service did not use military value as the sole
determinant of whether a base should be closed or realigned.
4 It did allow them to start the study.
5 At this point, I'd like to talk about the
6 separation of the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense
7 Training Facility. What I thought would be more useful was
8 to show you a picture of what the Chemical Defense Training
9 Facility is for those Commissioners who did not have an
10 opportunity to view it.
11 Mark, if I may have Slide No. 6, this is what the
12 facility looks like. Those buildings with the roofs that are
13 colored in orange are the areas where the agent is actually
14 contained, either in a laboratory, in a training area, or
15 being evacuated or incinerated. The blue building is an
16 administration building and classrooms.
17 Could I have the next slide, please? This shows
18 you some of the training that is conducted inside. Liquid
19 agent is poured on military equipment and soldiers are then
20 given a chance to practice their decontamination skills with
21 a live agent. Naturally, you can imagine it's rather a
22 fearful exercise. It's been proven to build their confidence

1 and competence and it makes them better trainers. Thank you,
2 Mark.
3 The CDTF, if I may use that acronym, is a one-of-a
4 kind facility. It was built in 1987. Studies commissioned
5 by the Army have shown this training actually does produce a
6 higher level of confidence in decontamination equipment and
7 skills than training in a simulated environment.
8 Within this facility, binary components are mixed
9 to produce a live, toxic agent. After completion of the
training, contaminated products are incinerated; thus, it has
a hazardous waste incinerator contained as part of this
12 facility.
13 This facility currently operates within the State
14 of Alabama with a clean air permit and that, to date, is the
15 only permit that has been required by the State of Alabama.
16 There has never been an accident or a discharge of toxic
17 chemicals or any other matter into the environment from this
18 facility.
19 As you see on the issues slide, the DOD
20 recommendation including leaving the CDTF at Fort McClellan.
21 This was done because it was believed that movement may not
22 be possible, and the Army saw value in the consolidation of

1 the three branch schools. Although separation produces
2 difficult logistics problems, the potential savings to close
3 the remainder of Fort McClellan, as well as combine three
4 maneuver combat branch schools as more attractive.
5 This part of the DOD recommendation has produced
6 almost unanimous disagreement with the DOD position from the
7 community. Their argument is that besides the logistical
8 nightmare, the resulting effect on doctrine and equipment
9 testing would be devastating to the development community.
10 Also, the community has presented the Commission
11 with the perception that the State of Alabama may require
12 additional permits for a stand-alone facility, requiring
13 response forces and adding additional costs if it were to be
14 left in place while the school moved. Of course, no one
15 knows the answer to that question, but it is a possibility.
16 We have looked at the economics of moving the CDTF
17 with the Chemical School and results show an additional $10
million savings would be saved each year. This represents
savings in base operations support as well as the movement of
soldiers between Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan.
21 I think this naturally leads to the question of
22 whether or not the CDTF can be relocated at Fort Leonard

1 Wood, which is the next issue. The community has presented
2 the Commission with arguments that the CDTF either cannot be
3 permitted in Missouri, environmental permits, or if possible
4 it requires so much time that the movement could not be
5 completed within the six-year time frame required by law.
6 They base the argument on the time it took to construct the
7 CDTF in Alabama.
8 The permit process there was started in 1981.
9 Construction began in 1983. It was finished in 1986 and then
10 tested with the first students being trained in 1987. It
11 was, indeed, a six-year process for this first facility.
12 community at the Birmingham regional hearing suggested it
13 would be eight-and-a-half years before you could begin
14 training students in Missouri.
15 The Commission communicated with the Missouri
16 Department of Natural Resources to determine how long permits
17 would actually take and if there would be a problem. Their
18 response to the Commission suggests that the entire
19 permitting process would require from one-and-a-half to two
20 years for both part one and part two.
21 This does not include the time it takes to
22 construct, which would be an additional two years. This

1 leaves two years for problems to be resolved, that is, with
2 the information that they know today about the Chemical
3 Defense Training Facility. They have seen a copy of the
4 plans and they have also a copy of the operating SOPs.
5 In addition, we received two letters from local
6 Chambers of Commerce and a citizens group that they have not
7 found any public opposition to the relocation of the Chemical
8 School activities. Another question was posed back to the
9 Director of Missouri Natural Resources about the type of
10 opposition that could be expected from such a facility.
11 They replied that the public generally does not
12 oppose hazardous waste generators if they are actually
13 incinerating material within the state, that is produced
14 within the state. If the material comes from out of the
15 state, they have a violent public opposition. In particular,
16 they mentioned the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant which
17 itself has a hazardous waste incinerator. It was permitted
18 within nine months after the application was received by the
19 State of Missouri.
20 I don't mean to suggest that the permitting is a
21 sure thing. I can only tell you what the State has said. My
22 impressions of the area down there are that public opposition

1 would not be significant, if any at all, and that the state
2 and the post have a very cooperative relationship that will
3 allow permitting to proceed as quickly as can be expected;
4 however, I cannot find anybody that would promise that this
5 will be a sure thing.
6 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't understand your
7 last sentence.
8 LTC DUFFY: I'm sorry, sir?
9 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I didn't hear your last
10 sentence.
11 LTC DUFFY: What I said was that I cannot guarantee
12 100 percent and neither can the state, that this facility
13 will be built in the four-year time frame that they think it
14 can, nor that there will be no public opposition.
15 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I can guarantee there's going to
16 be public opposition to it from my experience in the real
17 world. I know you're not quite finished your first
18 presentation.
19 But this is an issue that we've been living with
20 and I've been living with for three years, and this
21 Commission for the last three-and-a-half or four months.
22 feel very, very strongly about it, so I'm not going to bring

1 a motion myself at this particular time, but I'd like to open
2 a discussion.
It basically goes as follows. In 1991, the
Department of Defense, the Army recommendation was to close
5 the CDTF, close McClellan, keep Anniston open, and rid the
6 free world of the only live agent training capability that
7 I'm aware of or anybody is aware of. Indeed, it might be the
8 only, at the present time, functioning live agent training
9 facility in the entire world.
10 We, the Commission, rejected the proposal of the
11 Army in 1991, and the Army wasn't very pleased with that,
12 simply because they are always, as all the services,
13 correctly want to justify their actions and their proposals.
14 Then it was a surprise to me that they, in fact, backed down
15 from their 1991 position.
16 We heard the Army testify in lockstep that, indeed,
17 a CDTF facility, live agent training facility and
18 decontamination facility, is essential, and is imperative;
19 that it's more important for the instructors than anybody
20 else, because obviously, all recruits can't go through this
21 facility but it is a major component, and that they had erred
22 in making that recommendation in 1991.

1 In 1993, this year, their proposal is saying,
2 "We'll keep the CDTF open but, in essence, close down
3 everything else. Move the smoke training to Leonard Wood.
4 Separate the chemical school by moving that out, moving out
5 the DOD Polygraph Institute, and leaving just the facility,
6 the live agent training facility."
7 As far as I'm concerned, they have it half right
8 now, but they still don't have it all right, because I'm very
9 concerned about a number of things. One is the fact that I
10 don't have great confidence -- and the Army and I, as an
individual, agree that live agent training is important.
I don't have any great confidence that it can
13 possibly stay or will stay if the chemical school and the
14 CDTF training is bifurcated and one is in one location and
15 one is in another. That led, obviously, the very competent
16 people at Fort Leonard Wood, and they are, and the community
17 to come back and say, "No problem. We will do the permitting
18 to build one of these facilities."
19 Now, a decade ago or more, it took six to seven
20 years and today, with the increased environmental sensitivity
21 that communities have, with the great flexibility given to,
22 and properly, I suppose, latitude given to plaintiffs to sue

1 and tie up all sorts of important public works projects
2 throughout the land for decades.
3 I remember in my State of New Jersey, an interstate
4 highway wasn't completed for 25 years, and a highway is far
5 different than a CDTF, than chemical, live agent
6 capabilities, so it seems to me that if a community, not for
7 any fault of its own, not because there was official public
8 resistance to it but private individual resistance
9 manifesting itself in all sorts of litigation.
10 And, therefore, difficult funding questions, can
11 tie up a road for 20 years or 25 years, in almost any state,
12 not to mention landfills, hazardous waste facilities, burn
13 facilities, throughout this country, it could be an awfully
14 long time before a similar capability is built someplace else
15 and I'm very concerned about that.
16 And, therefore, it seems to me if you want to err,
17 you err on the side of giving our men and women the type of
18 training that everybody recognizes they need. Don't
bifurcate these two capabilities and make sure that they
20 exist. To me, it's not a pro Fort McClellan argument. It's
21 a pro-recruit argument and Army argument and Air Force
22 argument.

1 It's for our men and women in uniform that we want
2 this capability and I just don't want to do anything
3 conscience to degrade it. I think separating it will c
4 it and possibly lead to its demise, which the Army and many
5 of us agree with at this particular time that it should not
6 happen.
7 Also, I'm concerned. I know there's conflicting
8 information the Commission received with regard to Fort
9 Leonard Wood and its capability with regard to smoke
10 training. Ed, I believe that -- I mean, we had testimony one
11 week and then we had the harshest letter you'd ever heard, or
12 you repeated to me that you'd ever seen, where the Army
13 criticized, I guess, the commanding officer.
14 MR. BROWN: It was from the Commander of Fort
15 Leonard Wood to the Commander of Fort McClellan, Mr.
16 Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Okay. So, there's an internal
18 disagreement with respect to that, and I don't know who to
19 believe with regard to the smoke training at Leonard Wood at
20 the present time.
21 Also, I'm concerned about the economic impact and I
22 know it's a smaller criterion and we want to make sure that

1 it's given its proper weight and it doesn't have the weight
2 of military criteria, but it seems to me that in this
3 community, what we're telling this community is that what
4 we're going to do is to close the base, in essence.
5 We're going to remove the jobs and the revenue
6 stream from the community and what we're leaving is a
7 Chemical Defense Training Facility, live agent training
8 facility, and a bunch of chemical weapons that have to be de
9 milled, so it's the worst of all worlds.
10 I've said earlier in this process and I've said it
11 today and I've kept my mind open, and I will listen to
12 other Commissioners. The deliberative process requires
13 but it seems to me that it's the worst of all scenarios where
14 you're telling a community you're not only closing their
15 facility, but basically you can't use it because that which
16 remains is that which no one community in America really
17 wants, and that is chemical weapons and chemical
18 demilitarization training facilities.
19 So, from the standpoint of the economies of that, I
20 don't know what all that land could be used for. On the
21 argument of military value and the degradation of the type of
22 training, I'm fearful. Based on those two arguments, I feel

1 very strongly that the Commission would be making a mistake
2 if they accepted the Army's recommendations, even though they
3 came a long way from 1991. They're getting close, but I
4 think these two capabilities should be co-located, and I
5 guess I've said enough at the present time.
6 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, may I add on to
7 what you have said? I think one of the things that this
8 Commission has a responsibility, as we address the list that
9 was presented to us, and the first four criteria are military
10 value. I think you spoke very dramatically and correctly, of
11 the military value of an existing facility, the only one we
12 know of in the free world and I have to agree with you.
13 probably the only one in the world.
14 It hasn't been too long ago when this nation
15 agonized with a potential threat for a chemical environment
16 of our troops a half a world away, and the fact that we had
17 an opportunity, at least, to train and to build that troop
18 force up to understand how to operate in that type of an
19 environment.
20 If we loose this training facility, I think the
21 next time it is going to be needed, we will not have that
22 much leeway and I think we will be in a much worse position

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you very much. There's a couple of other things I want to mention and that is, I can see, I mean, the State of Alabama making the argument. Now, this facility is either grandfathered or permitted in Alabama, but I am quite sure since it was permitted and created and became a reality, the environmental standards of Alabama are getting more strict, just like they are anyplace else.

It wouldn't surprise me if based on the fact that there's now a substantial changed use of that facility that even Alabama, if the CDTF was left there and nothing else, that the State of Alabama would want a reconsideration of the permitting process and reconsideration as to whether this type of use is consistent with the new, now upgraded environmental standards that properly the State of Alabama now has. That is something that concerns me, as well.

Finally, I know that this decision costs money and the Commission's function, as much as anything else, is to save money. I know that, by virtue of not closing Fort McClellan, at least at the present time, and the requirement that these two capabilities, the school and the CDTF, be collocated, means $25-30 million per year. At least, those

are the numbers that were brought to my attention.

But I feel so strongly about the fact that we are duty bound to give the very best capabilities to our men and women in uniform, who are charged with the responsibility of going out in battle and the battlefield may, in the future, contain chemical agents, that it's worth the cost.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. McPherson.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I feel like the guy who said, "Outside of that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?" I mean, after these very powerful statements, what is the Army's rationale? COL Duffy, if you'd take a few minutes to make the Army's case, it ought to go in the record.

LTC DUFFY: My conversations with various people in the Army, the communication we've received from the Director of the Army Basing Study, GEN Ballard, there seem to be two reasons. One is that initially, in 1991, the CDTF would start to be a luxury that the Army could no longer afford. It was not that it was not a requirement. It was a requirement.

Everybody recognizes the value of such a facility but when all the requirements were put together, it could not

be afforded. Many important requirements end up being unfunded.

The second thing is the reason it may have fallen below the cut line, if you will, is that the importance never really was studied. It was only after the '91 Commission that the Army asked the Health Services Command to do a study, which they did, and it was a very detailed study. It involved physiological testing in order to make assumptions about a person's competence level, et cetera, which they did, that conclusively proved that the confidence of a soldier is raised.

Again, these are the soldiers that train the trainers. These are not the soldiers that actually are out there on the front lines, but those are the ones that are training the ones going to the front lines.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Why do they want to move it to Leonard Wood? Why is the recommendation before us to move it to Leonard Wood?

LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation?

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: I mean the '93 recommendation. Why is that here before us?

LTC DUFFY: The original recommendation was to

leave the Chemical Defense Training Facility mothballed at Fort McClellan in 1991. In 1993, initially, the Army studied the option of moving this to Fort Leonard Wood together with the chemical school, realizing they should be collocated. We do not know the reason why, but at some point in the decision process from the documents we've been provided, it was decided to leave it at Fort McClellan.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But a bigger question is: Why move it to Fort Leonard Wood? As I understand the Army position, very legitimately wanted to take care of the synergism between chemical, military police, engineering, and all that.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That's the reason it was given to us a few weeks ago.

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, these are the --

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Would you address that?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. These three branches are the combat support arms that are the direct support for the fighting force, the infantry, the armor, et cetera. They are side by side with them somewhere on the battlefield. They are also the maneuver combat support elements versus those that are fairly stationary or fixed, so they are peas in a

pod, if you will. There is a synergy to collocating them because their operations, military operations, entail a combined arms approach.

The engineer depends on the chemical branch and vice-versa. All of us depend on the military police. There is an opportunity here for the combat support arms to develop joint combat support doctrine, to test it at Fort Leonard Wood and by so doing, increase the readiness of the forces. That's the real value of collocating these schools.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that is a genuine value, in your mind?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir. As an engineer, I can tell you that's a value.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: All right. So, if it were possible to have these three collocated, those three, training engineers and military police and chemical, in the same place, and to have the chemical facility with them, that would be the ideal situation?

LTC DUFFY: Yes, sir, it would.

COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: The problem here is that if you leave behind the chemical weapons, the problem the Chairman has been addressing is that if you leave behind the

chemical weapons and move the chemical training, that sooner or later, the emphasis on chemical training will dissipate and if, indeed, it is ever possible to build the facility for the chemical weapons in Missouri, it's going to be some time before that can be done, quite a long time. Is that right?

LTC DUFFY: Sir, again, this is an opinion. This is an opinion based on documents we've received, a careful study by the State of Missouri, my discussions with people in the State of Missouri. I am left with the impression that the facility can be built.

Similar facilities have been built in the State of Missouri, facilities more onerous than this facility, without much public opposition. I use the example of Lake City Army Ammunition Plant because it's a military facility. Military facilities tend to gather a lot of attention just by their nature.

This facility burns explosive matter. It releases, it has the potential which will release hazardous chemicals into the atmosphere. During the permitting process for the facility, a public hearing was requested. In that public hearing, four questions were received from the public. Those questions were successfully answered.

1 From what I gather, the state requires technology
2 that will produce a 99.5 percent pure product outside of the
3 stack. I think there's a lot of confidence in the state's
4 ability to ensure that the environment is taken care of by
5 the public, so I personally have not yet found the reason to
6 doubt the fact that it could be built. I can't foresee the
7 future, but I have searched and I have just not found it yet.
8 Now, that is owing, of course, for the bias, naturally, of
9 the State of Missouri for the people in that region.
10 COMMISSIONER STUART: Brian, your answer to Mr.
11 McPherson really is that there are advantages of collocation
12 and as you've shown on your chart, the collocation saves
13 money. The Army has basically recommended that the training,
14 except for the live agent training, be given at Fort Leonard
15 Wood.
16 So, my question really is not taking a back seat to
17 the Chairman's concern about live chemical training, because
18 I think the poor man's nuclear bomb is probably the chemical
19 warfare, and I think it's tremendously important that we
20 maintain this capability, but I do sense that it would be a
21 greater cost effectiveness and long-run, that it would be a
22 better solution if we were to accept the Army's

1 recommendation to close the McClellan base, providing that we
2 can maintain that capability for live agent training.
3 It seems to me that's where the point of
4 disagreement is. I think we're all deeply concerned about
5 the maintenance of this capability. Wouldn't it be possible
6 to support the recommendations of DOD and, at the same time,
7 condition it upon having secured the environmental approvals
8 that are necessary, to make sure that we maintain the
9 capability if, as the Chairman has brought out, it sometimes
10 takes longer than we think?
11 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: As Brian mentioned earlier,
12 sir, it will require at least two years to get that
13 permitting and I'm prepared in a few minutes to offer a
14 motion which would require the Army to get the permitting
15 before they bring it back to BRAC '95. Nothing would happen
16 before then, anyway, and then there would be no question
17 about whether it could be moved or not.
18 In visiting Fort McClellan and listening to
19 everyone and reading all the expert advice we've gotten, I'm
20 convinced that the school and the live agent test facility
21 must be together, if it's going to do what's needed, not only
22 for our country but internationally.

1 It's an international asset to have those two
2 together and operating, and I believe that we ought to keep
3 it at Fort McClellan and ask the Secretary to have the Army
4 gain the permits before they bring it up again in '95, if
5 they desire. That will take care of all the concerns that we
6 have.
7 It also will take away the what-ifs. It will take
8 away -- maybe Missouri doesn't want it or someone else
9 doesn't want it. I'm prepared to make a motion when you're
10 ready, Mr. Chairman.
11 LTC DUFFY: Sir, if I may just mention something
12 about the permitting process, the permitting process starts
13 with the permission to build. That generally takes from nine
14 to 14 months. At that point, then, you can build.
15 The second permit is the important one which takes
16 place after construction and that is the operational test
17 permit. That is where they ensure that the technology
18 installed in the incinerator actually does clean by
19 byproducts to the state standard. That is the difficult one,
20 really.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: I think the first one is the
22 difficult one. There's no doubt in my mind that from a

1 technological standpoint, given no resistance and all
2 cooperation, the facility can be duplicated. I mean, it was
3 built once. It can be built again.
4 But, whether you get the permit to build, I think
5 is the crucial one and, therefore, I agree with Commissioner
6 Johnson.
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: I just would like to ask
8 Commissioner Johnson, since our mission is to endeavor to
9 save money, move the process along of cutting back on bases
10 as recommended, and we've heard that collocation is the
11 ultimate answer here, why couldn't we accept the DOD's
12 recommendations subject to assurance that they had the
13 environmental approval and the facilities were in place?
14 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The problem is, number one,
15 you put the community of Fort McClellan in limbo for many,
16 many years, and you don't have a time table. If we go the
17 opposite direction, it will happen just as quickly if they
18 can gain those permits and certifications.
19 COMMISSIONER STUART: I would like to contend that
20 we keep them on pins and needles, anyway, because logic is
21 the Army thinks these should be collocated and they think
22 Leonard Wood is the place to go.

1 COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Stuart, it's my
2 understanding that in the recommendation by DOD, it was not
3 to move the CDTF. It was to move the other facilities.
4 COMMISSIONER STUART: Yes.
5 COMMISSIONER BYRON: My understanding in your
6 suggestion right now is to also incorporate moving the CDTF?
7 COMMISSIONER STUART: Right.
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me mention something about
9 doing something subject to. My only concern there is
10 found from experience that unless our motions are drawn
11 carefully, with no weasel words whatsoever, no discretion,
12 totally, clearly defined, they're going to be -- the
13 recommendations are not going to be followed or they're going
14 to be tied up in court forever.
15 I found that experience with respect to Fort Ord in
16 California when the intention of the Commission was to do one
17 thing, and it turned out because we weren't artful and
18 careful in our language, something else occurred.
19 Also, when you say "subject to," there's going to
20 be, I think, arguments as to how long that contingency is
21 there. There's going to be legal arguments and I think,
22 perhaps, with merit that this Commission's job was to accept

1 or reject the recommendations of the services with regard to
2 specific closures and realignments and, if we have to, make
3 other recommendations, but not to do things subject to future
4 actions.
5 I have problems with that in the sense that I'm not
6 sure that is within the parameters of what Congress intended
7 by giving us this responsibility.
8 COMMISSIONER STUART: Well, Mr. Chairman, you
9 wanted us to be fiercely independent.
10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes, I did.
11 COMMISSIONER STUART: I submit that at Fort Ord, we
12 made that decision in '91 and we got the largest part of that
13 decision made. We have objected and been concerned in
14 discussing the Presidio, which will come up later, that they
15 kept more of that than was necessary, but basically, we made
16 that decision and it stuck.
17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Well, it's going to stick
18 because we're going to revisit the question later on this
19 week. Words in motions -- this is my opinion and it may
20 be others, but I want our work to be so clear, so concise
21 because if we, in one motion, have the words "subject to."

22 and the next motion we're going to have the words "contingent

upon," and the next motion, it's going to be based on words such as "subsequent to," and I don't think those are the types of scenarios that we should get involved with.

I think we have to make decisions that are clear cut based on all the information we have today rather than on events that may or may not take place in the future. I think that's the cleanest way to do it and in the perfect world, if we were both the Congress and the Executive Branch and the Secretary of Defense, I wouldn't mind those words, and the courts.

COMMISSIONER STUART: The reason I'm concerned about GEN Johnson's proposal is we're postponing a decision.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: No, we're not postponing anything. My belief is that we should reject the Department of Defense's recommendations. If the Department of Defense feels strongly that McClellan is closed or should be closed, they should get their ducks in order with regard to the collocation of these facilities before they come back to another Commission.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And that's what I propose in my motion, sir, when you're ready.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I empathize with Commissioner

Stuart but I agree with the Chairman.

COMMISSIONER BYRON: Mr. Chairman, let me very quickly talk about the difficulty any time you are talking about moving munitions, any time you are talking about trying to re-locate a chemical environment, you not only have to go through the existing state, but you have to get permits from each and every state that is adjacent or that you're going through, and those permits are extremely difficult to get. This is a very, very difficult thing.

This country is fortunate that we happen to have a facility that is operational and was there when we needed it not too long ago.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any further discussion before I entertain a motion?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson, do you have a motion? You indicated you may have a motion.

MOTION

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, sir. I move that the Commission find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria in making his recommendation on Fort McClellan,

Alabama.

Therefore, the Commission rejects the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to close Fort McClellan, relocate U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

It also rejects transfer accountability of Pelham Range and other required training support facilities through licensing to the Army National Guard, and rejects retaining an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves and retaining the capability for live agent training at Fort McClellan.

The Commission does recommend, if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense Training Facility in the future, that the Army pursue all the required permits and certifications from the new site prior to the 1995 Base Closure process.

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion?

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: I second.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: The motion has been seconded by

22 Commissioner Bowman. Any discussion on the motion?

COMMISSIONER STUART: Could I --

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER STUART: I have a variation, a second motion, an alternative, and basically, it is what I've been discussing, collocation subject to the CDTF closure being accomplished with the Army getting the permits in accordance with the environmental laws and regulations of Missouri. So, shall I read the --

MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart, I'm having a hard time hearing you. Are you making a motion now or are you discussing your alternative motion? I thought I heard you say that you were discussing a possible alternative, and I might suggest that before you actually make a second motion, that there be a vote on the first that is pending.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Thank you, Counsel. I appreciate it. That would simplify things and simplify my life quite a bit, but I think what we said in the very beginning, that if a Commissioner felt compelled to offer a substitute motion, the substitute motion would be recognized; if it has a second, seconded; there would be discussion; and then the vote would be on the substitute then followed by the original motion.

MS. CHESTON: Perhaps I'm just having a hard time hearing him. I didn't hear him say that what he's doing is amending the first motion.

COMMISSIONER STUART: No, I'm offering a substitute motion.

MS. CHESTON: Offering a substitute motion.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart is offering a substitute motion which, of course, will require a second. Commissioner Stuart, do you want to read your substitute motion?

MOTION

COMMISSIONER STUART: The language is lengthy, but I will read it.

I move the Commission find the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from Criteria 1 and 4 and, therefore, the Commission adopted the following recommendation.

Close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed through the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves, relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, close the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan and

construct a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood, subject to the CDTF closure being accomplished and the permits secured by the Army, in accordance with environmental laws and regulations, and following this, relocate the Defense Polygraphic Institute to another location determined by the Department of Defense.

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Is there a second to the motion, to the substitute motion?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN COURTER: There is no second to the substitute motion. The motion fails. Any further discussion on the original motion, the original motion made by Commissioner Johnson?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN COURTER: No further discussion. We will call for a vote, and we will start to my far right with Commissioner Peter Bowman.

COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.

MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Bowman votes "aye."

22 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Cox.

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Aye.
MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Cox votes "aye."
CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner McPherson.
4 COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Aye.
5 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner McPherson votes "aye."
6 CHAIRMAN COURTER: The Chair votes "aye."
7 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Courter votes "aye."
8 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Stuart.
9 COMMISSIONER STUART: No.
10 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Stuart votes "nay."
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Commissioner Byron.
12 COMMISSIONER BOWMAN: Aye.
13 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Byron votes "aye."
14 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Commissioner Johnson.
15 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
16 MS. CHESTON: Commissioner Johnson votes "aye."
17 The motion is to reject the Secretary of Defense's
18 recommendation with respect to Fort McClellan, Alabama. The
19 vote on the motion is six in favor, one opposed. The motion
20 passes.
21 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Mr. Brown, why don't you
22 proceed?

1 MR. BROWN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, at Tab
2 3, we have the next installation to be discussed, Fort Lee,
3 Virginia. Fort Lee was added for further consideration on
4 May 21st.
5 Slide 16 pictorially shows the option under
6 consideration, the closure of Fort Lee, the relocation of
7 Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster School and
8 Center, and the Army Logistics Management College to Fort
9 Eustis, Virginia, and the Defense Commissary Agency to
10 Quantico, Virginia.
11 Slide 17 shows the relative locations of Fort Lee,
12 Fort Eustis and Quantico. Mr. John Graham will now discuss
13 Fort Lee. It's in your book at Tab 3.
14 MR. GRAHAM: Slide No. 18 shows the static
15 information for Fort Lee. What I'd like to do is highlight
16 the bottom line. The one-time cost for this proposal would
17 be a little over $529 million, a steady state savings of 28.5
18 million and the payback would be in excess of 100 years.
19 Next slide.
20 These are the issues that staff has reviewed in
21 regards to Fort Lee. I'd like to go through each of them and
22 I'll start on the next charts. Next slide. First off is

1 military value. Fort Lee was ranked 11 of 13 within its
2 category of Initial Entry Training/Branch Schools by the
3 Army.
4 The community argued that it was a multi-purpose
5 installation, that it was both command and control,
6 professional schooling, as well as initial entry training
7 and, therefore, should be viewed from the other Initial Entry
8 Training/Branch Schools, that it was more than a training
9 center.
10 Our review showed that the primary mission of Fort
11 Lee is the training of soldiers, noncommissioned officers and
12 officers, and that the Army did treat it fairly and it was
13 consistent in its assignment of installations to this
14 category, and it was ranked fairly against the others, so the
15 11 of 13 is a valid military value assessment.
16 The second issue is that of combat service support
17 training consolidation. The Army has consolidated some of
18 its combat service support training at Fort Lee, most notably
19 in officer training. It is also finalizing plans to
20 consolidate combat developments, doctrine developments and
21 training developments and standardization at Fort Lee.

22 Lieutenant General Wakefield, the Commanding

1 General at Fort Lee, under whose command this initiat
2 ongoing, stated that this initiative would save the Ar
3 million a year.
4 Our review of what has happened at Fort Lee shows
5 that there is a consolidation ongoing of the officer courses
6 and that there is in development, but not yet approved by the
7 Department of the Army or Department of Defense, a plan to
8 consolidate the training and doctrine development at Fort
9 Lee, and there will be considerable savings from this
10 consolidation.
11 The third issue is unique facilities. The Army
12 argues that there are four unique facilities, truly unique
13 facilities on Fort Lee. The first is the Petroleum Training
14 Facility, which was opened in 1993. This is new. It's an
15 environmentally safe facility where we train -- we, the
16 nation -- train soldiers and Marines in inland distribution
17 of petroleum and bulk petroleum storage.
18 The second facility that the Army claims is unique
19 is water purification training where they train all of the
20 Army soldiers on how to purify water, which, as we found out
21 in the Gulf War, is a vital requirement.
22 The Battle Support Center is a computer-assisted

1 wargaming center, which has the capability to be uplinked to
2 worldwide organizations from Korea to Germany, and it saves
3 money from bringing the soldiers to a central location to do
4 this type of training. The second is as part of the Army
5 Logistics Management Staff College, there is a satellite
6 education uplink at the center.
7 Our review shows that two of these are truly
8 unique. The POL training facility is the only one in DOD
9 that does this type of inland distribution and bulk storage
10 training and the water purification training facility
11 only one within the Army and would have to be replicated.
12 The other two, the Battle Support Center and the
13 Satellite Education Center, are not as unique in that they
14 are not one of a kind, but since they are part of the
15 instructional requirements for the activities at Fort Lee,
16 they would have to be replicated wherever we decided to move
17 those organizations from Fort Lee.
18 Next slide, Mark. The Army stated that the
19 Combined Arms Support Command, which is the headquarters at
20 Fort Lee and is also the command and control element for all
21 of the combat service support schools within the Army, the
22 Quartermaster's School, the Army Logistics Management

1 College, and associated activities, all needed to be
2 collocated at a given installation.
3 The Defense Commissary Agency and the Troop Support
4 Agency, the Troop Support Agency was the Army predecessor to
5 the Defense Commissary Agency, it is slowly going out of
6 business but until it does, they need to be collocated. The
7 remaining units can go anywhere that we can find room for
8 them on an Army or other service installation.
9 Our analysis showed that the collocations stated by
10 the Army were reasonable, that you do get some synergies from
11 collocating the activities stated. You reduce the overhead
12 in instructional requirements. You don't have to duplicate
13 any classrooms or other training facilities by collocating
14 those activities.
15 The next item is tenant synergy, which goes along
16 with the collocation. What we're really saying is that it
17 exists between these units that need to be collocated. As
18 mentioned, they share instructional staff. They share
19 facilities, and that's the DOD position, and we found it
20 also was reasonable.
21 However, if you move the Quartermaster School, the

Wednesday, March 1st, 1995

Testimony from: The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense

General John Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Honorable John Deutch
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Joshua Gotbaum
Asst. Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)

Robert E. Bayer
Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense (Installations)

Pages attached: 100-103

1 excuse me a moment, Mr. Secretary, while I talk to my staff?

2 (A discussion was held off the record.)

3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Secretary, I have questions

4 from certain Members of the Congress here and, frankly, my

5 staff believes that some would be better directed to the

6 service, chiefs of the service secretaries, but I want to ask

7 you this one because the distinguished Congressman is in the

8 room, I'm told, and we think you perhaps can answer this

9 question and, if you find that it's one better handled by

10 someone else, we'll pursue it more later.

11 I have represented to Members of the Congress that

12 this would be their instrument for asking the tough questions

13 and, frankly, the reason I've done that, Mr. Secretary, is

14 because I've been pretty vocal in saying that I'm going to

15 avoid a huge cosmetic add-on that will cause great expense

16 and concern in the country, and so we want to be pretty tough

17 about how we evaluate everything, frankly, that you've done.

18 * This question is from Congressman Browder:

19 Secretary Deutch, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment

20 Commission removed from the list proposed by the Department

21 of Defense and directed the -- let's get this right. Yes.

22 Secretary Deutch, the 1993 -- there's been a little

1 scratching on this. I've got to be a little careful how I do
2 this, to get it correct.
3 Secretary Deutch, the 1993 Base Closure and
4 Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan in Alabama from
5 the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed
6 the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits
7 and certification for the construction of facilities at a new
8 location prior to the 1995 base closure process before the
9 DOD could again place that installation on the 1995 BRAC
10 list.
11 Fort McClellan is recommended for closure again
12 this year. Have any of the necessary permits been obtained
13 by the Army at the receiving installation?
14 MR. DEUTCH: No, they have not. Let me make a
15 philosophical remark and then return to this particular case.
16 Bill Perry mentioned that, when the list from the different
17 services came forward, that we carefully evaluated each and
18 every list and there were six or seven extremely difficult
19 cases that received our personal attention.
20 He mentioned the Missile Wing at Grand Forks
21 because of its treaty implications, and here is another
22 instance which was discussed extensively as being one of the

1 five or six really tough questions before us. That is both
2 whether we would be able to maintain our chemical defense
3 preparedness and, secondly, whether in combination
4 McClellan's proximity to the Anniston, Alabama chemical
5 decommissioning work -- it would be possible it would be
6 impaired by this recommendation.
7 So this was a very close call and one that we did
8 spend a great deal of time on.
9 I believe that the proposal before the Commission
10 says, the proposals to move the Chemical Warfare School
11 element up to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri -- it would not go
12 to Fort Leonard Wood, the proposal says, unless the proper
13 permits are received from the State of Missouri. So that is
14 a process that the Army has got to go through before we would
15 be happy to close or would be willing to close Fort
16 McClellan.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Would you excuse me a moment while
18 I talk to staff about that?
19 (A discussion was held off the record.)
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Secretary, as I understand
21 that, in discussing this with staff -- and, in saying this,
22 may I say to the Congressmen in question and everybody in

1 this room, we do not yet determine the correctness of your
2 decision, of course. That's part of our process, which will
3 be an ongoing process for many months.
4 But, as I understand this now, in the event, in the
5 end, that we would support your decision, it's clear that we
6 would have to have before us clear evidence that all permits
7 were in place.
8 MR. DEUTCH: That's our recommendation to you, Mr.
9 Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it is our statement to you
11 that we would not act unless they were in place, I take it.
12 MR. DEUTCH: That's our recommendation to you, as
13 well.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.
15 (A discussion was held off the record.) **
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we're going to pick on you a
17 little more because they say, since you came from Energy, you
18 may be more conversant with this than many others, anyway.
19 The New Mexico congressional delegation, Senators
20 Pete Domenici and Jeff Bingaman and Representatives Joe
21 Skeen, Bill Richardson, and Steve Schiff, asked the Chair to
22 ask this:

Tuesday, March 7th, 1995

Testimony from: Hon. Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

General Gordon Sullivan
Chief of Staff of the Army

Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr.
Principal Deputy Director, Defense Logistics Agency

John D. Donnelly
Director, Defense Investigative Service

Pages attached: 35-39, 50-54, 141-142

1 like to be heard on that.

2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Posts are multi-faceted.

3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: This is General Sullivan.

4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: General Sullivan. Madam

5 Commissioner, land, infrastructure, training facilities,

6 maintenance facilities, power projection platforms and

7 quality of life, that all enters into it, quality of life for

8 our people. We have to have barracks and so forth. And all

9 of that entered into our decision making.

10 And also I have a -- we have a real burden in the

11 Army, because we have in fact mobilized about four times this

12 century, fairly significant mobilizations, and we need the

13 capability to expand the organization without overdrawing

14 that. Okay? Because we are in fact eliminating a lot of

15 World War II wood which was used for mobilization. We're

16 getting rid of that infrastructure on the bases, and we have

17 dropped some maneuver bases.

18 I think what you have now is what we'll need for a

19 10-division force, a million men and women, with some

20 capacity to increase. And I wouldn't want to predict what

21 the future would hold.

22 MRS. STEELE: Thank you. Switching to Fort

1 McClellan, reading from your report, there is a line that
2 says the governor of the State of Missouri has indicated an
3 expeditious review of the permit application can be
4 accomplished. I read that only because it says that, but it
5 does not mention whether there is any guarantee or percentage
6 of a guarantee that it will be granted.
7 So my question is, Mr. Secretary, the Army has
8 again recommended relocating the chemical school from Fort
9 McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. Responding to a similar
10 request, the '93 commission recommended that the Army, quote,
11 pursue all of the required permits and certification for the
12 new site prior to the '95 BRAC process.
13 Has the Army received these permits? Is the Army
14 pursuing these permits? And in the absence of such permits,
15 how do you believe the Commission should respond to your
16 request?
17 SECRETARY WEST: I think that the Commission -- I
18 recommend that the Commission respond in the way that we
19 presented it to you. Let me say, Commissioner Steele, that
20 you've hit, with respect to Fort Drum and Fort McClellan, on
21 two decisions that in the final analysis ended up right on my
22 desk as they sort of came up, advised by the Chief of Staff.

1 So I'm pleased to give the direct explanation.

2 I would say that there are no guarantees in the

3 permitting process. The one thing that I, as a lawyer, over

4 the years have learned, is that we have no real indication as

5 to how the process could turn out when a community and a

6 permitting authority begin to come to grips with the reality.

7 For that reason -- and incidentally, let me answer

8 a second question that is implicit in that -- and we did not

9 start the permitting process until after the base closure

10 announcement was made by this -- the list was announced by

11 the Secretary of Defense. That was at my express direction,

12 again, I think, advised by those who have -- with whom I've

13 been working here at the table.

14 That was because that would have, in our view, been

15 premature. It would have been before the decision. It would

16 have been pre-decisional. So first we had to decide what our

17 recommendation would be this year, and then we would be free,

18 perhaps, to proceed with the initial public steps to get the

19 permit. And so our recommendation to the Secretary of

20 Defense, which he has approved and forwarded to you, is that

21 if we don't get the permits, then we don't close the base.

22 MRS. STEELE: Thank you. My time has expired.

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
2 Steele. Commissioner Cornella.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 Good morning, gentlemen. Just a follow-up on the Fort
5 McClellan question. For General Sullivan: why does the Army
6 need to continue operation of the chemical defense training
7 facility, and can that training be simulated without using
8 live agents?
9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Less than -- probably less than
10 2 percent of the people in the United States Army have gone
11 through the facility, as you probably know. There's probably
12 other ways of doing -- there's probably other ways of doing
13 that training. This is a pluralistic society, though. There
14 are strong opinions on the other side of that issue, which
15 I'm sure I'll hear about before the day is over.
16 But at any rate, it's a good question. I have a
17 view on it. We could, in fact -- there's a couple of ways of
18 handling it, which we tried to do in the past. It's a matter
19 of official record. It's a matter of testimony last year --
20 not last year, two years ago. There are other alternatives.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: General, in recommending
22 the closure of Fort McClellan, what weight did the Army give

1 to the effects of the move on the prospective chemical
2 demilitarization facility at the Anniston Army Depot, and
3 what do you consider those effects to be?
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: We gave a lot of -- we gave a
5 lot of consideration to that. General Shane and Mr. Walker
6 can speak to the details of it, but the Secretary and I
7 thought a lot about it. And I believe that we're able to
8 meet our commitments to the chemical de-mil program over at
9 Anniston very well from the capabilities that we have there
10 at the depot. And we've spent an enormous amount of dollar
11 resources there improving the infrastructure to accommodate
12 that effort.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We'll change the subject
14 here for a moment, General Sullivan. In the 1993 Army
15 recommendation, the Army considered closure or realignment at
16 Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Ultimately it was extended --
17 pardon me, ultimately it was excluded.
18 Due to its unique capability to conduct chemical or
19 biological testing, the 1995 recommendation calls for
20 realignment of Dugway by relocating the smoke and obscurant
21 emission to Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and some elements
22 of the chemical-biological research to Aberdeen Proving

1 Letterkenny, as I recall, there was a sort of joint public-
2 private partnership -- I'm not probably putting it
3 correctly -- on the Palladin?
4 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's correct.
5 COMMISSIONER. COX: Right. And that hadn't started
6 in 1993. Has that project started, and has it been
7 successful? It's one of your biggest contracts, I think.
8 SECRETARY WALKER: Yes, Commissioner Cox.
9 Secretary Walker. Yes, it's been very successful, and
10 those -- the Palladin operations will continue until FY '97.
11 COMMISSIONER. COX: And that is being handled at
12 Letterkenny?
13 SECRETARY WALKER: That is correct.
14 * COMMISSIONER. COX: Okay. Thank you very much.
15 One -- do I have more time? One last question. Going back,
16 then, to another issue from 1993. And I'm sorry, I want to
17 ask one last question on McClellan, because I want to make
18 sure I understand you.
19 If you all do not have the permits, and I
20 understand you didn't start for good reason till now, do you
21 think we should close it, close Fort McClellan without having
22 permits in hand?

1 SECRETARY WEST: Our recommendation is conditioned
2 on getting the permits.
3 COMMISSIONER. COX: I guess maybe it's a legal
4 question, then. Can we conditionally close? A procedure --
5 I mean, is that your view, that we could -- I know that the
6 Congress can't statutorily pass conditional legislation.
7 That's why I'm concerned about it.
8 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I think it's quite -- I
9 think it's quite possible to say that we've decided to close
10 it, unless we don't get the permits, and to make sure that
11 the timing of the process -- we certainly wouldn't start
12 unless we had the permits. The timing of the process awaits
13 that.
14 COMMISSIONER. COX: Right.
15 SECRETARY WEST: I don't think there is a problem
16 with that, Commissioner, although --
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If I may intervene, Commissioner
18 and Secretary West, I'm reminded by staff that Secretary
19 Deutch's testimony was that we would not close unless all
20 permits were in place and approved for the transfer.
21 SECRETARY WEST: And that was our recommendation,
22 too.

1 COMMISSIONER. COX: All right. So we wouldn't get
2 to the question of conditionally closing it, because your
3 recommendations may not act unless the permits are approved.
4 SECRETARY WEST: Right.
5 COMMISSIONER. COX: In time for us to act. All
6 right. Thank you very much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner.
8 Commissioner Davis.
9 SECRETARY WEST: Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Secretary.
11 SECRETARY WEST: I'm sorry, there was just one last
12 comment that Commissioner Cox added at the end that I'm not
13 quite ready to go along with.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Please -- please answer.
15 COMMISSIONER. COX: Okay.
16 SECRETARY WEST: Unless they're approved in time
17 for you to act.
18 COMMISSIONER. COX: Right. We will have to act --
19 well, we have to get a report to the President by July 1st,
20 and we will obviously be acting before that, you know,
21 sometime in the week or so, I assume, before that. And I
22 guess -- what I understood the Deputy Secretary to say, and

1 then what I was asking you: if we -- if you do not have the
2 permits by June whatever that is, would it be your
3 recommendation that we simply not close McClellan?
4 SECRETARY WEST: That was not my recommendation.
5 My recommendation is that McClellan be authorized to be
6 closed, except it cannot close until the permits are
7 obtained. And if they are never obtained, it can never
8 close.
9 COMMISSIONER. COX: I see.
10 SECRETARY WEST: That's our recommendation.
11 COMMISSIONER. COX: Okay.
12 SECRETARY WEST: So that you'd want to give us more
13 time than just June. I don't know how long that permitting
14 process takes, Commissioner.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, if I may intervene, again,
16 Commissioner Cox, we have approved, subject to final approval
17 of all of you, our schedule throughout the balance of the
18 time until we give the list to the President of the United
19 States, and it will become public shortly.
20 And so with respect to this question on permits,
21 with respect to the treaty question that was raised
22 yesterday, and other things, if those things aren't resolved

1 by Thursday, June 22nd, it would be difficult for us to
2 accommodate the services and their recommendations, because
3 beginning on that day we start voting.
4 SECRETARY WEST: Understand.
5 COMMISSIONER. COX: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner. ** Commissioner Davis.
7
8 GENERAL DAVIS: Secretary West, Secretary Walker,
9 General Sullivan, and General Shane, as I said yesterday,
10 it's a pleasure to sit on this side of the dais. I've sat
11 over there often enough.
12 Mr. Secretary, clearly this Commission is going to
13 have to make a recommendation as to future BRAC actions.
14 Clearly your counsel would be most appreciated, as to what
15 you thought it ought to be in the future, when it ought to
16 be, what kind of substance it ought to take, et cetera.
17 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner, we have found that
18 this procedure has worked well for the Army. Just look at
19 the success in closing Army bases before '88 and now, and
20 certainly I think that has been the report that you have
21 received from the Secretary of Defense as well. We also
22 believe that we have done the job that needs to be done. The

17

1 Chief of Staff of the Army -- Sullivan is my name. These are
2 tough calls. But we've got to make them.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I appreciate that, General
4 Sullivan. My wife was watching me on television the other
5 day, and she said, "Don't be so mean with those people,
6 they're just doing their job." I hope you understand I
7 respect that, and I hope you understand that I'm not any more
8 delighted with this job than you are.
9 I'm a draftee, not a volunteer. And this is
10 painful for all of us, and the worst part of it is, it's the
11 fourth round and everybody's been through this four times and
12 by now, we're down to the real good stuff. And, you know, it
13 ain't no fun. But anyway, we have to ask the questions. I
14 hope you understand that.
15 * Representative Glen Browder -- and this is somewhat
16 repetitive, but we want to get these things in the record.
17 What contacts has the Army or OSD had with the Governor of
18 Missouri's staff, concerning environmental permits for this
19 facility? In other words, we know that the permits have to
20 be obtained; we respect that.
21 SECRETARY WEST: We have had staff-level contacts
22 in which the Governor and leadership in Missouri have

2

1 promised their support and their belief that the permits will
2 be obtained in reasonable time.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. And there again, a series
4 of questions, Mr. Secretary, that will be sent to you on this
5 whole issue, again. And by now, there are several of these
6 things running through here where, unless we can get the job
7 done, we can't do the -- we can't support the
8 recommendations, quite obviously. **
9 Congressman George Gekas asks the Secretary, Mr.
10 Secretary, regarding Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. And
11 he asks, the Army states that annual training for a reserve
12 component units, which now use Fort Indiantown Gap, can be
13 conducted at other installations in the region, including
14 Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill, and Fort Drum.
15 Has any study been done to make sure that these
16 other facilities actually have the training facilities equal
17 to the facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap are sufficient for
18 the needs of these units, such as Tank Table 8 qualification
19 ranges? And do these other facilities have training time
20 available in their schedules to accommodate the needs of our
21 training units? And additionally, has the DOD investigated
22 the cost of transport and equipment associated with using

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

S: 1 Jun 95

10 MAR 1995

ATCS-OR (5-10c)

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL JOE N. BALLARD, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER AND FORT LEONARD WOOD, FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO 65473-5000

SUBJECT: Permits for Relocation of Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood

1. Secretary of Defense recommended relocation of the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood as part of his recommendation for the closure of Fort McClellan to the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. This relocation was conditioned "upon receipt of the required permits."

2. During testimony by the Army leadership before the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission on 7 March, Commission Chairman Dixon indicated that the permits are required before 22 June 95.

3. Request the necessary permits be obtained from the State of Missouri for relocation of the Military Police and Chemical Schools to Fort Leonard Wood. Two copies of the permits are to be furnished to the TRADOC Base Realignment and Closure Office (ATCS-OR) as quickly as possible, but no later than 1 June 1995.

4. Coordinate directly with Commander of Fort McClellan to ensure all necessary permits are identified. The most critical permits are for the construction and operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John P. Herrling

JOHN P. HERRLING
Major General, GS
Chief of Staff

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

S: 13 Mar 95

ATCS-OR

MAR 10 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

Commander, U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, ATTN: ATZT-CS, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-5000
Commander, U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan, ATTN: ATZN-CS, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000

SUBJECT: Fort McClellan Permits

1. Request Fort Leonard Wood and Fort McClellan provide information in response to following questions from The Army Basing Study:

a. What permits have been applied for and when, in regards to the closure of Fort McClellan and realignment of Military Police and Chemical Schools?

b. Are the applications public; if so, how can the public obtain them?

c. Was an EIS done at Fort McClellan when the CDTF was built; if so, how long did it take?

2. Response requested by 1500 hours on 13 Mar 95. Fort McClellan should provide data to Ms. Francine Cole, who will be on site for BRAC 95 installation visit. Fort Leonard Wood should prof data to Ms. Francine Cole, PROFS ID: MON1(COLEF) with copy furnished to Mr. David Taylor, PROFS ID: MON1(TAYLORBD).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOSEPH A. ROSZKOWSKI
Colonel, GS
Director, Operations

ATZN-CM-SAC 13 Mar 95

MEMORANDUM FOR STRATEGIC PLANS OFFICE, FORT McCLELLAN, AL

SUBJECT: Fort McClellan Permits

1. Reference TRADOC letter, dated 10 Mar 95, SAB, the proposed reply is provided:

a. Fort McClellan has no knowledge of permit applications submitted in regards to the proposed closure and realignment. The Chemical School, Chemical Defense Training Facility, and Environmental Management Officer have not been asked nor supplied any information to the Department of the Army, Fort Leonard Wood, or the State of Missouri pertaining to environmental permit requirements.

b. Fort McClellan personnel do not know anything regarding publicity of the applications. Furthermore, no one knows what applications, if any, were filed. Permits submitted to State agencies would be considered part of a public record, attainable through the Freedom of Information Act, or upon public request.

c. Environmental Assessments for construction of the CDTF at Fort McClellan began in Feb 81 and were completed in Jun 85. Additional environmental documentation, RCRA Part B, was completed under contract by Rust International and was reviewed by EPA Region IV and the State of Alabama Department of Environmental Management. NEPA documentation (environmental assessment/environmental impact statement) is mandatory, however the requirements in regards to a full EIS or RCRA Part B submissions are not well understood. In today's climate, most incinerators require an EIS. The CDTF incinerator and air filtration system required both Federal and State certification.

2. Point of Contact for these issues is LTC Newing, USACMLS, DSN 865-6228.

Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Air Pollution Control Program
New Source Review Unit
P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102

RECEIVED
'95 MAR 1 PM 3 40
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PGM

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT

APCP USE ONLY	
Filing Fee: 100.00	
Check No.: 4187	Check Recd: 3/1/95
Check Amount: $ 100.00	Check Date: 3/1/95
Project Number: 3860-0028	

NOTE: INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF THIS SHEET

NAME OF COMPANY/FACILITY TO RECEIVE PERMIT:
U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

COMPANY/FACILITY STREET ADDRESS:
ATTN: ATZT -DPW-EE

COMPANY/FACILITY MAILING ADDRESS:
Same

COMPANY/FACILITY CITY: Fort Leonard Wood | STATE: MO | ZIP CODE: 65473

COUNTY: Pulaski | 35N | Section: 21 | Township: 8W | Range:

WHAT MISSOURI SENATORIAL DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN?

WHAT MISSOURI REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN?

NAME OF PARENT COMPANY:
Department of Defence

PARENT COMPANY MAILING ADDRESS:

PARENT COMPANY CITY: | STATE: | ZIP CODE:

THIS APPLICATION IS FOR: ☐ MODIFICATION OR ADDITION TO AN EXISTING FACILITY ☒ NEW FACILITY

PROJECTED DATE TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION:

PROJECTED DATE OF STARTUP:

DESCRIPTION OF NEW OR MODIFIED PROCESSES/EQUIPMENT:
Thermal Treatment Unit to treat waste from a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility

ESTIMATED COST OF BASIC EQUIPMENT:
$ 43M

ESTIMATED COST OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT:
$ Included in basic equipment

All Applications Must be Accompanied by a $100 Filing Fee. Processing Fees at the Rate of $50 per Hour of Staff Time will be Assessed at the End of the Review.

APPLICANT'S CERTIFICATION STATEMENT:
I certify that I have personally examined and am familiar with the information in this application and believe that the information submitted is accurate and complete. I am aware that making a false statement or misrepresentation in this application is grounds for denying or revoking the construction permit. I may also be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment.

SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE COMPANY: Scott Murrell | DATE: 3/1/95

TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF SIGNER: Scott Murrell

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SIGNER: Cheif, Environmental Division | TELEPHONE NUMBER: 314 596-0869

State of Missouri

Department of Natural Resources
Air Pollution Control Program
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

PERMIT APPLICATION

RECEIVED
'95 MAR 1 PM 3 40
AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL PGM

Emissions Inventory Questionnaire (EIQ)

FORM 1.0 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
Chemical Decontamination Training Facility Thermal Treatment Unit	3860		1983

Facility Street Address	County Name	Classification
ATZT-DPW, Northwest Training Area 246	Pulaski	

City	ZIP Code	Facility Phone Number
Fort Leonard Wood	65473-5000	314-596-0840

Facility Mailing Address	Product/Principal Activity
USAEC & FLW, ATZT-DPW	Thermal treatment of materials

City	ZIP Code	Number of Employees	Land in Acres
Fort Leonard Wood	65473-5000	51	8

Facility Contact Person	Where to Send EIQ in Future (Check One)
Scott Murrell	[ ] Facility Mailing Address [X] Parent Co. Mailing Address

	Latitude	Longitude	UTM Coordinates	CTSR Coordinates		
Degrees	37	92	Horizontal (Km) 5755	Township	Section	Range
Minutes	44	09	Vertical (Km) 41770	35 north	21	8 west
Seconds	30	00				

Parent Company Name	Contact Person	Phone Number
US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood	Scott Murrell	314-596-0869

Mailing Address	City	State	ZIP Code
ATZT-DPW-EE	Fort Leonard Wood	MO	65473-5000

EMISSIONS STATEMENT

TOTAL PLANT EMISSIONS (TONS PER YEAR)

TSP	PM10	SOx	NOx	VOC	CO	LEAD/Toxic	Other
.25	.35	6.41	1.51	.06	.42	0.00/0.00	.038 lb/yr .055 lb/yr .01 lb/yr

The undersigned hereby certifies that they have personally examined and are familiar with the information and statements contained herein and further certifies that they believe this information and statements to be true, accurate and complete. The undersigned certifies that knowingly making a false statement or misrepresenting the facts presented in this document is a violation of state law.

Name of Person Completing Form	Signature	Date
Rory McCarthy Environmental Engineer	Rory McCarthy	1 Mar 95
Name of Authorized Company Representative	**Signature**	**Date**
Scott Murrell	Scott Murrell	1 Mar 95

Form Number MO 780-1431 (10/93)

RM 1.1 PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
S. Army Engineer Center	3860	0004	1995

Please use this page or a separate sheet to provide a Process Flow Diagram per the instructions for Form 1.1 in the Instruction Packet. Do not forget to include all processes used in your facility. Make sure to label each process and piece of equipment and provide an identification number for all emission points (including fugitive emissions) and air pollution control equipment.
MAKE SURE TO USE THE SAME IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EIQ.



7/8/85

Case - 6

Typical Daily Load, Wastewater 15,000 gals/week, RFR 2200F,

- Typical Daily Load

	No	Item Description	No of Bags	Wt (lbs)	Vol (cu ft)
	1	Wet Sludge in plastic lined fiber drum	1	180	3.5
	2	Chemistry Lab. Trash	1	25	5
	3	Training Bay Trash	4	100	20
	4	Medical Lab Trash	1	15	5
	5	Laundry Trash	1	15	5
	6	Office & Classroom Trash	4	60	20
	7	Grounds Trash	1	25	5
revised *	8	Carbon Filters in PVC bags	2	44.84	18
	9	Extra PVC Bags	5	20	5
	10	Hoods, Boots & Gloves	1	6	1
	11	Overgarments (Hoods, Boots & Gloves)	1	8	1
	12	Overgarments	6	80	30
	13	Gas Mask Filters	1	18	1
		Totals	29	1000.4	119.5

- Garbage Composition

	1.	Wet Sludge	95% water, 2% solids, 3% drum paper + pvc ba
	2.	Chem Lab Trash	20% glass, 10% metal, 20% rags, 50% paper + pvc ba
	3.	Training Bay Trash	10% glass, 10% metal, 40% rags, 40% paper + bag
	4.	Medical Lab Trash	40% plastic, 30% paper, 30% rags + ba
	5.	Laundry Trash	50% cloth, 50% paper + ba
	6.	Office & classroom trash	100% paper + ba
	7.	Grounds Trash	30% paper, 30% plastic, 20% glass, 20% metal + ba
revised *	8.	Carbon Filters in PVC bags	28% water, 33% metal, 39% carbon + ba
	9.	PVC bags	100% PVC
	10.	Hoods, boots & gloves	rubberized material 100% + ba
	11.	" from overgarments	" 100% + ba
	12.	Overgarments	" 100% + ba
	13.	gas mask filters	inerts 30%, 30% carbon, 20% metal, 20% plastic + b

Revised FLOWS

7/8/85

Case-No.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Description	Oil Firing	Oil Firing	Oil Firing	Oil Firing	Oil Firing	Oil Firing
—	20% xsair	≈ 100% xsair	20% xsair	20% xsair	20% xsair	20% xsair
—	≈ 2800F RFI	2200F RFI	2200F RFI	2200F RFI	2200F RFI	2200F RFI
—	No Pyrolysis	No Pyrolysis	No Pyrolysis	400 lbs/hr PVC	1000 lbs/hr PVC	Avg Daily Load
—	No wastewater	No wastewater	3130 lb/hr water	3130 lb/hr water	3130 lbs/hr water	3130 lbs/hr water
—	12,000 lb/hr steam 60psig	12000 lb/hr steam 60psig	12000 lb/hr steam 60psig	12000 lb/hr steam 60psig	12000 lb/hr steam 60psig	12000 lb/hr steam 60psig
Pyrolysis Furnace: OIL	—	—	—	52.65 lbs/hr	57.65 lbs/hr	52.65 lbs/hr
BTU/hr	—	—	—	1.0×10^6	1.0×10^6	1.0×10^6
Combn Air	—	—	—	913.96 lbs/hr	913.96 lbs/hr	913.96 lbs/hr
RFI Temp °F	~2800	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200
• PILOTS OIL	26.325	26.325	26.325	26.325	26.325	26.325 lbs/hr
BTU/hr	0.5×10^6	0.5×10^6	0.5×10^6	0.5×10^6	0.5×10^6	0.5×10^6 BTU
Combustion Air	456.98	456.98	456.98	456.98	456.98	456.98 lbs/h
• Wastewater	3130	3130	3130	3130	3130	3130 lbs/h
BTU/hr	41,043	41043	41043	41043	41043	41043 BTU
Combustion Air	46.02	46.02	46.02	46.02	46.02	46.02 lb.
• Oil Combustion	763.37	830.594	1024.0705	837.5648	525.4286	854.08 lbs/h
BTU/hr	14.5×10^6	15.775×10^6	19.45×10^6	15.91×10^6	9.98×10^6	16.22×10^6 BTU/hr
Combustion Air	13251	23365	17777	17777	17777	17777 lbs/h
Boiler Stack gas Temp	500	500	582	656	662	714 °F
RFR/BOILER FLOWS						
O_2	525	2627	699	740	856	409
N_2	10435	18134	13916	14612	14613	14625
CO_2	2523	2648	3364	3599	3595	4022
H_2O	1009	1174	4470	4484	4367	4958
SO_2	6.00	6.52	7.99	8.10	7.40	11.78
HCl	—	—	0.80	187.56	467.70	28.61
HF	—	—	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018
P_2O_5	—	—	0.0092	0.0092	0.0092	0.0092
Inerts / Ash	0.0826	0.0826	1.5439	3.1784	5.6193	7.2487
NaOH	—	—	0.2297	0.2297	0.2297	0.2297
TOTALS	14498	24590	22460	23634	23912	24062

Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Air Pollution Control Program
New Source Review Unit
P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102

RECEIVED '95 MAR 1 PM 3 CONTROL P 3 M

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT

APCP USE ONLY	
Filing Fee: 100.00	
Check No.: 40 4188	Check Recd.: 3/1/95
Check Amount: $ 100.00	Check Date: 3/1/95
Project Number: 3860-0027	

NOTE: INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF THIS SHEET

NAME OF COMPANY/FACILITY TO RECEIVE PERMIT:
U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

COMPANY/FACILITY STREET ADDRESS:
ATTN: ATZP -DPW-ER

COMPANY/FACILITY MAILING ADDRESS:
Same

COMPANY/FACILITY CITY: Fort Leonard Wood | STATE: MO | ZIP CODE: 65473

COUNTY: Pulaski | URBAN | Section: 21 | Township: 8W | Range:

WHAT MISSOURI SENATORIAL DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN? | WHAT MISSOURI REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT IS COMPANY/FACILITY IN?

NAME OF PARENT COMPANY:
Department of Defence

PARENT COMPANY MAILING ADDRESS:

PARENT COMPANY CITY: | STATE: | ZIP CODE:

THIS APPLICATION IS FOR: ☐ MODIFICATION OR ADDITION TO AN EXISTING FACILITY ☒ NEW FACILITY

PROJECTED DATE TO COMMENCE CONSTRUCTION: | PROJECTED DATE OF STARTUP:

DESCRIPTION OF NEW OR MODIFIED PROCESSES/EQUIPMENT:

Static and mobile fog oil smoke training.

ESTIMATED COST OF BASIC EQUIPMENT: $ | ESTIMATED COST OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT: $

All Applications Must be Accompanied by a $100 Filing Fee. Processing Fees at the Rate of $50 per Hour of Staff Time will be Assessed at the End of the Revie

APPLICANT'S CERTIFICATION STATEMENT:
I certify that I have personally examined and am familiar with the information in this application and believe that the information submitted is accurate and complete I am aware that making a false statement or misrepresentation in this application is grounds for denying or revoking the construction permit. I may also be guilty o misdemeanor and upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment.

SIGNATURE OF RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE COMPANY: Scott Murrell | DATE: 3/1/95

TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF SIGNER: Scott Murrell

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SIGNER: Cheif, Environmental Division | TELEPHONE NUMBER: 314 596-0869

State of Missouri

Department of Natural Resources
Air Pollution Control Program
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

PERMIT APPLICATION RECEIVED

'95 MAR 1 PM 3 40

AIR POLLUTION CONT

Emissions Inventory Questionnaire (EIQ)

FORM 1.0 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
U.S. Army Engineer Center Fog Oil Smoke Generation	3860	0004	1995

Facility Street Address	County Name	Classification
ATZT-DPW-EE	Pulaski	

City	ZIP Code	Facility Phone Number
Fort Leonard Wood	65473	314 596-0840

Facility Mailing Address	Product/Principal Activity
USAEC & FLW ATTN: ATZT-DPW	Obscurant Training

City	ZIP Code	Number of Employees	Land in Acres
Fort Leonard Wood	65473		

Facility Contact Person	Title	Where to Send EIQ in Future (Check One)
Scott Murrell	Chief, Environmental	[X] Facility Mailing Address [ ] Parent Co. Mailing Address

	Latitude	Longitude	UTM Coordinates	CTSR Coordinates		
Degrees	37	92	Horizontal (Km) 579.9	Township	Section	Range
Minutes	45	5	Vertical (Km) 4180.1			
Seconds	59	40				

Parent Company Name	Contact Person	Phone Number	
Mailing Address	**City**	**State**	**ZIP Code**

EMISSIONS STATEMENT

TOTAL PLANT EMISSIONS (TONS PER YEAR)

TSP	PM10	SOx	NOx	VOC	CO	LEAD	HAPs
				233.73			

The undersigned hereby certifies that they have personally examined and are familiar with the information and statements contained herein and further certifies that they believe this information and statements to be true, accurate and complete. The undersigned certifies that knowingly making a false statement or misrepresenting the facts presented in this document is a violation of state law.

Name of Person Completing Form	Title	Signature	Date
Rory McCarthy	Environmental Engineer	Rory McCarthy	1 MAR 95

Name of Authorized Company Representative	Title	Signature	Date
Scott Murrell	Chief, Environmental Division	Scott Murrell	1 Mar 95

Form Number MO 780-1510 (11/94)

ORM 1.1 PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
U.S. Army Engineer Center	3860	0004	1995

Please use this page or a separate sheet to provide a Process Flow Diagram per the instructions for Form 1.1 in the Instruction Packet. Do not forget to include all processes used in your facility. Make sure to label each process and piece of equipment and provide an identification number for all emission points (including fugitive emissions) and air pollution control equipment.
MAKE SURE TO USE THE SAME IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EIQ.



FORM 1.2 SUMMARY OF EMISSION POINTS

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
U.S. Army Engineer Center Fog Oil Smoke Generation	3860	0004	1995

[1] Total Number of Emission Points

1

[2] Point No.	[3] Point Description	[4] Worksheet(s) Used with Form 2.0
31	Static and Mobile Fog Oil Smoke Generation	2.3.1.1

Form Number MO 780-1431 (10/93) Duplicate this form as needed.

Form 2.0 EMISSION POINT INFORMATION

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER	3860	0004	1995

[1] POINT IDENTIFICATION

Point No.		SIC Code	Point Description
31			Fog Oil Smoke Training

Source Classification Code (SCC)	Emission Factor Unit	Number of SCCs Used with this Point	
	1000 Gallons		

SCC Description

[2] STACK/VENT PARAMETERS

Stack No.		Height (Ft)	Diameter (Ft)	For a non-circular stack: Diameter = (1.128A)^1/2 (A = Cross Sectional Area in sq. feet)

Temperature (F)	Velocity (Ft/Min)	Flow Rate (Cu Ft/Min)	List other points sharing this stack.

[3] AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Device No.	Device Code	Description of Control Device	CONTROL DEVICE EFFICIENCY TSP	PM10	SOx	NOx	VOC	CO	Lead	Toxics

[4] OPERATING RATE/SCHEDULE

Annual Throughput	Units	Hours/Day	Jan-Mar (%)	Apr-Jun (%)
63	1000 Gallons	2	25.00	25.00
Maximum Hourly Design Rate	**Units**	**Days/Week**	**Jul-Sep (%)**	**Oct-Dec (%)**
.126	1000 Gallons	5	25.00	25.00
		Weeks/Year 50		

EMISSIONS CALCULATIONS

Source of Emission Factor : 1 CEM 2 Stack Test 3 Mass Balance 4 SCC Factor 5 AP42 6 Other (List below in [5])

[5] List other worksheets used with this form.

Air Pollutant	[6] Source	[7] Emission Factor (Lbs/Unit)	[8] Ash or Sulfur (%)	[9] Control Efficiency (%)	[10] Actual Emissions (Tons/Yr)	Maximum Hourly (Lbs/Hr)	Potential Controlled (Tons/Yr)	Potential Uncontrolled (Tons/Yr)
TSP								
PM10								
SOx								
NOx								
VOC	3	7422.6			233.73			
CO								
Lead								
Toxics								

ORM 2.3 VOC PROCESS MASS-BALANCE WORKSHEET

Facility Name	County No.	Plant No.	Year of Data
U.S. Army Engineer Center	3860	0004	1995

Point No.		Source Classification Code (SCC)
31		

[1] TOTAL ANNUAL THROUGHPUT AND TOTAL POUNDS OF VOC

Application Method	Material Type	Annual Throughput (SCC Units/Yr)	% by Wt of VOC in Material	Density (Lbs/Gal)	Lbs of VOC Per Unit	Total VOC (Lbs/Yr)
Obscurant Training	Fog Oil	1000 Gallons/unit	100	7.42	7422.6	467,460 = 233.7 Tons/yr
		x 63 units/year			x 63	
					467,623.8	

TOTAL ANNUAL THROUGHPUT (SCC Units)	Total Lbs VOC
6	

Enter the total ANNUAL THROUGHPUT amount calculated above in Block 4 on Form 2.0, Emission Point Information.

[2] CALCULATION OF VOC RECOVERED

LBS OF VOC RECOVERED =
{Material Shipped as Hazardous Waste} x {% VOC Content of Waste}

Material Shipped as Hazardous Waste	% VOC Content of Waste	Lbs of VOC Recovered
		0

[3] CALCULATION OF VOC EMITTED PRIOR TO CONTROL

LBS OF VOC EMITTED PRIOR TO CONTROL EQUIPMENT =
{Total Lbs of VOC} - {Lbs of VOC Recovered}

Lbs of VOC Emitted Prior to Control

[4] BACK CALCULATION OF EMISSION FACTOR

EMISSION FACTOR =
{Lbs of VOC Emitted Prior to Control Equipment} / {Total Annual Throughput}
467,460/63

Emission Factor	Lbs/SCC Units
7422.6	7422.6

Enter the EMISSION FACTOR in VOC Box of Block 7 on Form 2.0, Emission Point Information.

Form Number MO 780-1440 (10/93) Duplicate this form as needed.

FILE: (smoke.buff.11)
LOCATION: Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473-8900

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

March 2, 1995

Mr. Tim L. Stallman
Environmental Specialist - Geologist
Water Pollution Control Program
Division of Environmental Quality
Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102-0176

Dear Mr. Stallman

Please review the attached map of Fort Leonard Wood showing locations which have been considered as possible sites for large area smoke training. These areas were considered in 1993 for this type of training and, due to the recent Base Realignment and Closure Commission anouncement, could be used for this activity in the future. As you realize, modifications might be required in the non point source water discharge permit for the installation.

Sincerely,

Scott Murrell
Scott Murrell
Chief/ Environment, Energy
and Natural Resources Div.
Directorate of Public Works

Enclosure

Center for Excellence

Software: GRASS

TITLE: (smoke.buff.11)
LOCATION: Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY TRAINING CENTER ENGINEER AND FORT LEONARD WOOD
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

January 10, 1994

Environmental Office

JAN 24 1994

Mr. Richard Laux
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Division of Environmental Quality
Post Office Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

Dear Mr. Laux:

In accordance with requirements of the Clean Water Act, a stormwater runoff permit application must be submitted to your department for industrial activities. Industrial activities include maintenance facilities, recycling facilities and landfills.

Please find enclosed the completed permit application for all discharge outfalls associated with these activities located on Fort Leonard Wood. If there are any questions, or if additional information is required, contact Carl Stenger at (314) 596-0869.

Sincerely,

Scott Murrell
Scott L. Murrell
Chief, Environmental Division
Directorate of Public Works

Enclosure

Green 2078

STATE OF MISSOURI

Mel Carnahan, Governor • David A. Shorr, Director

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176

April 11, 1995

HAND DELIVERED: SHARON TURPIN, Environmental Engineer

Mr. Scott Murrell
Chief, Environmental Division
U.S. Army Engineering Center and
Fort Leonard Wood
ATZT-DPW-EE
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

RE: Air Permit Application - Project/Facility No. 3860-0004-026

Dear Mr. Murrell:

Enclosed with this letter is your permit to construct. Please note the special conditions, if any, on accompanying pages. Operation in accordance with these conditions and your permit application is necessary for continued compliance. The document entitled "Review of Application for Authority to Construct" is part of the permit as well and should be kept with the permit in your files.

The reverse side of your permit certificate has important information concerning standard permit conditions, and your rights and obligations under the laws and regulations of the State of Missouri.

If you have any questions or need additional information regarding this permit, you can contact me by phone at (314) 751-4817 or you may write to me at the Department of Natural Resources, Air Pollution Control Program, P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102.

Sincerely,

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM

Michael J. Stansfield

Michael J. Stansfield, P. E.
Environmental Engineer

MJS:tb

Enclosures

c: Jefferson City Regional Office
Source File

Permit No.: 0495-013

RECYCLED PAPER

STATE OF MISSOURI

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT

Under the authority of RSMo 643 and the Federal Clean Air Act the applicant is authorized to construct the facility described below, in accordance with the laws, rules, and conditions as set forth herein.

Permit Number: 0495-013 Facility I.D. Number: 3860-0004-026

Owner: U.S. Army Engineering Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Owner's Address: ATZT-DPW-EE, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Facility Name: U.S. Army Engineering Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Facility Address: ATZT-DPW-EE, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Legal Description: Pulaski County, S21, T35N, R8W

Application for Authority to Construct was made for:

**** a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility and Thermal Treatment Unit. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (5), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." ****

☐ Special Conditions are not applicable to this permit.

☒ Special Conditions do apply to this permit and are listed as attachments starting on page 2.

April 10, 1995
EFFECTIVE DATE

John A. Young
DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

MO 780-1204 (3-95)

ADEM

ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Leigh Pegues, Director

1751 Cong. W. L.
Dickinson Drive
Montgomery, AL
36130
(205) 271-7700
FAX 271-7950
270-5612

Field Offices:

110 Vulcan Road
Birmingham, AL
35209
(205) 942-6168
FAX 941-1603

P.O. Box 953
Decatur, AL
35602
(205) 353-1713
FAX 340-9359

[redacted] Perimeter Road
Mobile, AL
36615
(205) 450-3400
FAX 479-2593

Guy Hunt
Governor

December 17, 1992

Department of the Army
U. S. Army Chemical and Military
Police Center and Fort McClellan
Director of Engineering and Housing
ATTN: Environmental Management Division
Mr. Shih-Chi Wang
Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000

Dear Mr. Wang:

RE: Permit No. 301-0017-Z007 (CDTF)

The enclosed revised Air Permit is issued pursuant to the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations. It reflects the installation of a steam autoclave at the CDTF to recycle Battle Dress Overgarments. Note the conditions which must be observed in order to retain this permit. Please return the original copy of Air Permit No. 301-0017-Z007 dated June 1, 1987 which you presently hold.

If you have any questions or require clarification of permit conditions, please write or call Nathan Hartman at 205/271-7861 in Montgomery.

Sincerely,

Richard E. Grusnick, Chief
Air Division

REG/NH:klh

Enclosure

cc: Doug Lipsey

Printed on Recycled Paper

ADEM

Alabama
Department of Environmental Management

AIR PERMIT

PERMITTEE: U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS AND FORT MCCLELLAN

LOCATION: FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA

PERMIT NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT, ARTICLE OR DEVICE
301-0017-Z007	Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) Incinerator with Wet Scrubber

*In accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act of 1971, as amended, **Code of Alabama 1975**, §§22-28-1 to 22-28-23 (the "AAPCA") and the Alabama Environmental Management Act, as amended, **Code of Alabama 1975**, §§22-22A-1 to 22-22A-15, and rules and regulations adopted thereunder, and subject further to the conditions set forth in this permit, the Permittee is hereby authorized to construct, install and use the equipment, device or other article described above.*

ISSUANCE DATE: December 17, 1992

Alabama Department of Environmental Management

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS AND FORT MCCLELLAN

Permit No. 301-0017-Z007

1. This permit is issued on the basis of Rules and Regulations existing on the date of issuance. In the event additional Rules and Regulations are adopted, it shall be the permit holder's responsibility to comply with such rules.

2. This permit is not transferable. Upon sale or legal transfer, the new owner or operator must apply for a permit within 30 days.

3. A new permit application must be made for new sources, replacements, alterations or design changes which may result in the issuance of, or an increase in the issuance of, air contaminants, or the use of which may eliminate or reduce or control the issuance of air contaminants.

4. Each point of emission will be provided with sampling ports, ladders, platforms, and other safety equipment to facilitate testing performed in accordance with procedures established by Part 60 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as the same may be amended or revised.

5. In the event there is a breakdown of equipment in such a manner as to cause increased emission of air contaminants, the waste feed will be stopped immediately and not resumed until the problem is corrected. The Department shall be notified when the breakdown has been corrected.

6. All air pollution control devices and capture systems for which this permit is issued shall be maintained and operated at all times in a manner so as to minimize the emissions of air contaminants. Procedures for ensuring that the above equipment is properly operated and maintained so as to minimize the emission of air contaminants shall be established.

7. The system will continuously monitor and record the temperatures of the Pyrolizer Furnace and the Rich Fume Incinerator (RFI), the pH and flow rate of the scrubbing brine, the liquid waste feed rate, the combustion gas velocity and the exhaust gas CO concentration in ppm. System capability to record data at 2 minute intervals is considered continuous monitoring and recording. The weight of solid waste and numer of batteries fed to the Pyrolizer Furnace will be manually recorded. These records will be maintained in a manner suitable for inspection of a period of at least two years.

8. Liquid waste feed and gases/condensate feed from the autoclaves to the RFI will not start and will automatically stop when any of the following conditions occur:

   a. The temperature of the RFI falls below 1,700° F for more than 30 seconds when burning GB and VX decontamination waste water.

   b. The temperature of the RFI falls below 2,200° F for more than 30 seconds when burning HD decontamination waste water.

   c. The pH of the scrubber brine falls below 7.5 for more than 60 seconds.

   d. The stack gas CO concentration exceeds 200 ppm for more than 30 seconds.

   e. A positive pressure exists in the RFI for more than 30 seconds.

9. A temperature of at least 1,500° F (1,000° F when decontaminating lithium/sulfur dioxide batteries and/or wherlerlite filters) will be maintained for a minimum of 15 minutes for each load of solid waste placed in the Pyrolizer Furnace. Temperature will not exceed 2,500° F. Maximum total load to the Pyrolizer is 1,000 pounds. Maximum battery load is 10. The following conditions will be maintained when the pyrolizer is in operation:

   (a) RFI temperature $\geq$ 1,700° F when burning GB and VX contaminated residue.

   (b) RFI temperature $\geq$ 2,200° F when burning HD contaminated residue.

   (c) Scrubber brine pH $\geq$ 7.5.

   (d) Stack Gas CO concentration $\leq$ 200 ppm.

   (e) Negative RFI pressure.

10. Gases and or condensate from the autoclave system will not be fed to the RFI when the pyrolizer is in use.

11. Submission of other reports regarding monitoring records, fuel analyses, operating rates, and equipment malfunctions may be required as authorized in the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations. The Department may require stack emission testing at any time.

Permit No. 301-0017-Z007

12. Additions and revisions to the conditions of this Permit will be made, if necessary, to ensure that the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations are not violated.

13. Nothing in this permit or conditions thereto shall negate any authority granted to the Department pursuant to the Alabama Environmental Management Act or regulations issued thereunder.

14. All instances of automatic cut off of the waste feed, or manual cut off required by Proviso Nos. 5 and 8 above, will be noted in a log book to show date/time of occurrence, duration of occurrence, cause and corrective action taken. This record will be maintained in a manner suitable for inspection for a period of at least two years.

December 17, 1992
Date

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
AIR DIVISION

PERMIT APPLICATION FOR
MANUFACTURING OR PROCESSING OPERATION

Do Not Write in This Space

1. Type of unit or process (e.g., calcining kiln, cupola furnace)

To be determined

Make _____ Model _____ Date Installed _____

Capacity (manufacturer's or designer's guaranteed maximum) _____

Operating capacity (specify units) _____

Briefly describe the operation of this unit or process in your facility:

[redacted]

2. Normal operating schedule

Hours per day 24 Days per week 7 Weeks per year 35 (Approximately)

Peak production season (if any) Directly dependent on training load

3. Materials used in unit or process (including solid fuels)

Material	Process Weight Average	(lb/hour) Maximum	Quantity/year	Units of Consumption
Battle Dress Overgarments	Appr. 800 lb	Appr. 800 lb	Appr. 10 loads per month	Appr. 10,000 units

4. Fuels used (excluding heat supplied by indirect heat exchangers)

Coal _____ tons/yr Percent sulfur _____ Percent ash _____

Oil _____ gal/yr Percent sulfur _____ Grade No. _____

Natural gas 440,050 Thousand cu.ft/yr L.P. gas _____ gal/yr

ADEM-105a Rev.6/83
(ADEM 105 replaces APC 102)

[redacted]

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
AIR DIVISION

NOTE:

This form (APC-106) is intended to be an application for those methods of waste disposal with a potential for causing air pollution. This form does not replace or substitute for the forms of approval necessary for refuse disposal sites. Applications for such approval should be made to:

Permit Coordination Center
Alabama Department of Environmental Management
State Capitol
Montgomery, AL 36130

DATA SHEET
FOR
REFUSE DISPOSAL

SECTION I
General

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

1. NAME OF FIRM OR ORGANIZATION Department of Army

2. PLANT LOCATION Ft. McClellan, AL

3. DATA ARE SUBMITTED FOR:

- [ ] EXISTING FACILITY (Initial Application)
- [ ] NEW EQUIPMENT (To Be Constructed)
- [X] MODIFICATION
- [ ] CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP
- [ ] CHANGE OF LOCATION
- [ ] OTHER (Specify) _____

4. IS REFUSE DISPOSED OF BY OPEN BURNING? [ ] Yes [X] No

5. IS ANY ASBESTOS CONTAINING WASTE GENERATED AT THIS SITE? [ ] Yes [X] No

6. IS THERE AN INCINERATOR AT THIS SITE? [X] Yes [ ] No
If "yes", please complete Section II.

NAME OF PERSON SUBMITTING APPLICATION Doug Lipsey

TITLE Project Manager SIGNATURE

DATE August 25, 1992 PHONE (205) 820-7848

ADEM-106a Rev. 6/83
(ADEM 106 replaces APC 103)

[redacted]

SECTION II

Incinerators

1. MANUFACTURER'S INFORMATION:

A. NAME OF MANUFACTURER Midland Ross

B. MODEL NUMBER JC 3056

C. RATED CAPACITY 1000 Lbs Solids
(Specify Units)

D. TYPE OF WASTE Assorted trash previously used for toxic training

2. TYPE OF INCINERATOR (Check All Applicable)

- [ ] SINGLE CHAMBER
- [X] MULTIPLE CHAMBER
- [ ] MODIFIED WITH CONTROL (An "APPLICATION FOR PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICE," Form ADEM-110, must be completed and attached.)
- [ ] OTHER (Specify) _____

3. AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT (Check All Applicable)

- [ ] PRIMARY BURNER
  - FUEL Natural Gas (Type)
  - BTU/hr. RATING _____
- [ ] SECONDARY BURNER
  - FUEL Natural Gas (Type)
  - BTU/hr. RATING 567,000
- [ ] BAROMETRIC DAMPER
- [ ] GUILLOTINE DAMPER
- [X] OTHER (Specify) Butterfly Dampers

4. STACK DATA

INSIDE DIAMETER 42" (Inches)

HEIGHT ABOVE GRADE 100' (Feet)

5. COMBUSTION AIR

- [ ] NATURAL DRAFT
- [X] INDUCED DRAFT
- [ ] FORCED DRAFT
- [ ] STARVED AIR
- [ ] OTHER (Specify) _____


STACK
I.D. FAN
14500 ACFM
185 F 16 OSI
CAUSTIC
PACKED TOWER
RECIRCULATION PUMP
500 GPM 40 PSIG
EMERGENCY QUENCH
VENTURI SCRUBBER
Natural Gas
COMBUSTION AIR
600 SCFH 24 OSI
Natural Gas
COMBUSTION AIR
6575 SCFM
12 OSI
Natural Gas
PILOT
SOLID WASTE AND SLUDGE
PYROBATCH
RICH FUME REACTOR
WASTE WATER
6.25 GPM
DWELL CHAMBER
FEED WATER SUPPLY
12000 #/HR
60 PSIG
STEAM
12000 LB/HR
60 PSIG
CHEMICAL TREATMENT
STEAM DRUM
CONTINUOUS BLOWDOWN
FIRE TUBE BOILER
BY PASS
AUTO-CLAVE #1
AUTO-CLAVE #2
Door
Door
Steam Discharged Dwell Chamber
250 lb Steam Introduced into Autoclave #1 & #2
Condensate Pump

6 ATTACHMENT #5



NEW MOPP SUIT (STORAGE)

1. REUSABLE MOPP SUITS WILL BE ISSUED FIRST. ONCE A SIZE IS NOT AVAILABLE, A NEW SUIT WILL BE INSPECTED AND ISSUED.

MOPP SUIT ISSUE AND DONNING

2.

TOXIC AGENT EXPOSURE IN CDTF TRAINING BUILDING

GB AND VX CONCENTRATIONS WILL NOT EXCEED IDLH (IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE OR HEALTH)

3.

DOFF AREA

1) DOFF OPERATOR INSPECTS MOPP SUITS FOR DAMAGE

1) DAMAGED AND NON-REUSABLE MOPP SUITS ARE PLACED IN CLOTHES BIN

2) NON-DAMAGED AND REUSABLE MOPP SUITS ARE PLACED IN SEALED CABINET

4.

NO GO

GO

HOT LAUNDRY ROOM

--ALLOW BOTH AREAS TO OFFGAS

--CONDUCT SAMPLING WITH MINICAMS TO CERTIFY CLOTHING IS 3X (XXX)

--ALL ITEMS WILL BE BROUGHT TO 3X LEVEL BEFORE AUTOCLAVE OR INCINERATION

CLOTHES BIN

SEALED CABINET

AUTOCLAVE

1) DECON MOPP SUIT IAW OPERATING PROCEDURES.

2) MONITOR ALL AUTOCLAVE EXHAUST CONTINUOUSLY WITH MINICAM.

3) EXHAUST AUTOCLAVES AND MOVE DECONNED SUITS TO COLD LAUNDRY.

5.

GO

6.

COLD LAUNDRY AREA

1) INSPECT MOPP SUITS FOR DAMAGE

2) MARK NUMBER OF USES ON EACH SUIT.

3) ROTATE TO SERVICEABLE STOCK

NO GO

3X TRASH

1). UNSERVICEABLE MOPP SUITS BAGGED, SEALED, AND MARKED 3X.

2). UNSERVICEABLE 3X BAGGED SUITS ARE INCINERATED.

INCINERATION

1) INCINERATED TO 5X

2) ASHES SEALED AND BURIED IN LAND FILL (IAW ADEM PERMIT)

MINICAM MONITOR LEVELS

VX---.00001 mg/m3

GB--- .0001 mg/m3

14. If application is being made to construct or modify, provide the following:

Name of installer or contractor EG&G Ft. McClellan

Mailing address P.O. Box 5398, Ft. McClellan, AL Phone (205) 820-7848

Date construction or modification to begin To Be Determined

Date construction or modification to be complete To Be Determined

15. Does the input material or product from this process or unit contain finely divided materials which could become airborne? Yes ☐ No ☒

Is this material stored in piles or in some other way as to make possible the creation of dust problems? Yes ☐ No ☒

List storage piles (if any)

Type of Material	Particle Size (diameter or screen size)	Pile Size (average tons on piles)	Pile Wetted (Yes or No)	Pile Covered (Yes or No)

Name of person submitting this report Doug Lipsey

Title Project Manager

Date 8/25/92 Phone (205) 820-7848

ADEM-105d Rev. 6/83
(ADEM 105 replaces APC 102)

ADEM

ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Guy Hunt
Governor

Leigh Pegues, Director

1751 Federal Drive
Montgomery, AL
36130
205/271-7700

Field Offices:

Unit 805, Building 8
225 Oxmoor Circle
Birmingham, AL
35209
205/942-6168

P.O. Box 953
Decatur, AL
35602
205/353-1713

2204 Perimeter Road
Mobile, AL
36615
205/479-2336

June 1, 1987

Department of the Army
U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Centers
and Fort McClellan
Director of Engineering and Housing
(Lt. Col. George S. Pincince)
ATTN: Natural Resources Management Division
Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5000

Dear Col. Pincince:

Re: Facility No. 301-0017

The enclosed Air Permit is issued pursuant to the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations. Please note the conditions which must be observed in order to retain this permit.

If you have questions or require clarification of permit conditions, please write or call Bob Cowne at 271-7861 in Montgomery.

Sincerely,

Richard E. Grusnick, Chief
Air Division

REG/BC:um

Enc.

ADEM

ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

AIR PERMIT

PERMITTEE: U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS AND FORT McCLELLAN

LOCATION: FORT McCLELLAN, ALABAMA

PERMIT NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT, ARTICLE OR DEVICE
301-0017-Z007	Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) Incinerator with Wet Scrubber

In accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act of 1971, as amended, Code of Alabama 1975, §§ 22-28-1 to 22-28-23 (the "AAPCA") and the Alabama Environmental Management Act, as amended, Code of Alabama 1975, §§ 22-22A-1 to 22-22A-15, and rules and regulations adopted thereunder, and subject further to the conditions set forth in this permit, the Permittee is hereby authorized to construct, install and use the equipment, device or other article described above.

ISSUANCE DATE: June 1, 1987

Alabama Department of Environmental Management

U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL AND MILITARY POLICE CENTERS AND FORT McCLELLAN

Permit No. 301-0017-Z007

1. This permit is issued on the basis of Rules and Regulations existing on the date of issuance. In the event additional Rules and Regulations are adopted, it shall be the permit holder's responsibility to comply with such rules.

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3. A new permit application must be made for new sources, replacements, alterations or design changes which may result in the issuance of, or an increase in the issuance of, air contaminants, or the use of which may eliminate or reduce or control the issuance of air contaminants.

4. In the event there is a breakdown of equipment in such a manner as to cause increased emission of air contaminants, the waste feed will be stopped immediately and not resumed until the problem is corrected.

5. All air pollution control devices and capture systems for which this permit is issued shall be maintained and operated at all times in a manner so as to minimize the emissions of air contaminants. Procedures for ensuring that the above equipment is properly operated and maintained so as to minimize the emission of air contaminants shall be established.

6. The system will continuously monitor and record the temperatures of the Pyrolizer Furnace and the Rich Fume Incinerator (RFI), the pH and flow rate of the scrubbing brine, the liquid waste feed rate, the combustion gas velocity and the exhaust gas CO concentration in ppm. The weight of solid waste fed to the Pyrolizer Furnace will be manually recorded. These records will be maintained in a manner suitable for inspection for a period of at least two years.

7. Liquid waste fed to the RFI will automatically stop when any of the following conditions occur:

   (a) The temperature of the RFI falls below 2,200°F for more than 30 seconds.

   (b) The pH of the scrubber brine falls below 7.5 for more than 60 seconds.

   (c) The stack gas CO concentration exceeds 200 ppm for more than 30 seconds.

   (d) A positive pressure exists in the RFI for more than 30 seconds.

8. A temperature of at least 1500°F will be maintained for a minimum of 15 minutes for each load of solid waste placed in the Pyrolizer Furnace.

9. Submission of other reports regarding monitoring records, fuel analyses, operating rates, and equipment malfunctions may be required as authorized in the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations.

10. Additions and revisions to the conditions of this Permit will be made, if necessary, to ensure that the Department's air pollution control rules and regulations are not violated.

11. Nothing in this permit or conditions thereto shall negate any authority granted to the Department pursuant to the Alabama Environmental Management Act or regulations issued thereunder.

12. All instances of automatic cut off of the waste feed, or manual cut off required by Proviso 4 above, will be noted in a log book to show date/time of occurrence, duration of occurrence, cause and corrective action taken. This record will be maintained in a manner suitable for inspection for a period of at least two years.

June 1, 1987
Date

UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473-6600

21 April 1995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Environmental Division

Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Attention: Roger Randolf
Director of Air Pollution Control Program
P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, MO 65102

Dear Mr. Randolf

Enclosed please find a completed Variance Application Form for the Smoke Training operation at Fort Leonard Wood. It is our understanding that this application will be considered at the April 27, 1995 meeting of the Air Conservation Commission.

If you have any questions concerning the application or need more information please call Scott Murrell or Rory McCarthy at 314 596-0869.

Sincerely

Scott Murrell
Chief, Environmental Division

Center for Excellence

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

VARIANCE APPLICATION FORM

Complete and return. Separate sheets may be used in the event that space provided is insufficient.

The affiant states the following are true and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief;

1. Date of application: April 1995

2. Name of applicant: U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood.

____Corporation _____Partnership ____Sole Proprietorship

If not a corporation, give name and address of owners:

Name: Department of Defence

Address: Fort Leonard Wood

3. Home office address or headquarters of applicant:

USAEC & FLW
ATTN: ATZT-CG
FORT LEONARD WOOD MO 65473-5000

Telephone: 314 596-0869

4. Source of air contaminant for which variance is sought:

Mailing address:

USAEC & FLW
ATTN: ATZT-CG
FORT LEONARD WOOD MO 65473-5000

Telephone: 314 596-0869

Geographical location (if not situated at numbered street address, give grid coordinates according to Missouri Coordinate System)

37 DEGREES 92 MINUTES LATITUDE 45 DEGREES 07 MINUTES LONGITUDE

Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N, R10, 11, 12W.

5. Person authorized to represent the applicant for purposes of this application and to accept service of process in behalf of the applicant:

Name: Major General Joe N. Ballard Title: Commanding General

Address:

USAEC & FLW
ATTN: ATZT-CG
FORT LEONARD WOOD MO 65473-5000

Telephone: 314 596-0869

6. Person responsible for operation of the source:

Name: Major General Joe N. Ballard Title: Commanding General
Address

USAEC & FLW
ATTN: ATZT-CG
FORT LEONARD WOOD MO 65473-5000

Telephone: 314 596-0869

7. Description of type of business:

Department of Defense training for use of obscurants.

8. Description of source operation for which variance is sought. Use Form or Form if applicable.

For the generation of fog/smoke/obscurant. An SAE 20 oil without additives, SGF2, is vaporized by a generator. The vaporized oil, condences when it exits the generator, into a white cloud of small oil droplets. The generators are positioned so that the cloud is directed by winds to a target that is to be obscured. Soldiers are trained in the mechanical and tactical use of the generators.

9. Terms and conditions, in detail, of variance applied for. Include description of control equipment, both existing and proposed, emission limit to be achieved, laws of operation. Use Form or Form if applicable.

The variance applied for is from the new installation opacity limit requirement of 10 CSR 10-3.080 (4). The operation is the subject of a prelimanry permit determination Project/Facility No. 3860-0004-015, currently out for public comment. As stated in the BACT Analysis portion of the Prelimanary Determination, "any control devise defeats the purpose of the generating for smoke training."

10. In support of application, furnish names of all attorneys, accountants, agents, appraisers, consultants, engineers, salesmen, supplier representatives and all other parties who have rendered services or advice or furnished informaiton relied upon, with their addresses, telephone numbers and nature of service or advice rendered, or informaion furnished:

Glen Rubel U.S. Army Environmental Center Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Maryland 410 671-2395. He has done extensive modeling for the disperaion of fog oil obscurants.

Paul Josephson U.S. Army Environmental Center Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Maryland 410 671-1209. He is responsible for centralizing information currently available on the subject of fog oil smoke.

Rochelle Williams U.S. Army Forces Command Atlanta, Georgia, 404 669-7695. She is the Forces Command point of contact for fog oil obscurant training.

Block Andrews Burns and McDonnell Kansas City, Missouri, 816 822-3455. Has worked with Fort Leonard Wood on permitting and modeling of smoke operations on the 1993, and 1995 Base Realignment and Closure actions.

Larry Weber U.S. Army Environmental Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Maryland, 410 671-1204. He is a technical point of contact for Clean Air Act compliance issues.

Lieutenant Colonel Sutton, Training and Doctrine Command Smoke Integration Proponancy Office, Fort McClellan, Alabama 205 848-4435. He was consulted about the need for the training, and on the use of new types of fog oil generators.

Major Teller, Environmental Law Division of the Department of Army. He covers Army compliance issues related to Clean Air Act, and has worked in the past with operation and permit issues as they relate to obscurant training.

11. Reason variance is sought:

(a) If application is based on the contention that compliance with the applicable regulation would result in an unreasonable cost without corresponding public benefit, or that it would result in an economic hardship for the plant, installation or operation, the application shall include a statennent setting forth in detail a comparison of the cost of installation and operation if operated under of the variance sought and the cost of installation and operation if the terms of the variance sought and the cost of installation and operation if operated in compliance with the applicable regulation. Use Form or Form if applicable. Comlplete financial information forms (Form) for source. (This form may be submitted in facsimile as long as all information requested is included and the order and general format is

maintained.)

The training is conducted to assure the proficiency of soldiers in battlefield operations related to visual obscuration. Obscurants are used to conceal friendly forces from enemy fire, and to allow evasive maneuvers to be conducted. The training occurs at static sites where soldiers are taught the mechanical operation of the generator, and at mobile or tactical sites where the soldiers are taught the tactical uses of obscurants.

11. (continued)
(b) If application is based on contention that compliance with regulations would result in economic hardship to the applicant whether a firm, corporation or individual, the application shall include, in addition to the informlation required in (a) above, photo duplicates of the three federal income tax returns for the three years immediately preceding the application, and a list of the principal officers and their salaries, Give any other income derived from the operation, include both the number of persons employed at the installation for which the variance is sought, and the total number of persons employed by the applicant:

NA

12. Notarize certification of all information on the application:

Signature of applicant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

21st day of April, 1995

Ellen K. York
Notary Public

ELLEN K. YORK
Notary Public – Notary Seal
STATE OF MISSOURI
Pulaski County
My Commission Expires: June 30, 1997

Jefferson City Post-Tribune

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VOL. 130, NO. 56 JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 28, 1995

Environmentalists fight plan to move chemical training to Fort Wood

The Associated Press

Rebecca Gibbs worries that a thick, white oil-based fog might some day float through the air and into her back yard from nearby Fort Leonard Wood.

"What I hear is that it coats things when it settles to the earth — the grass, the trees, the streams, the bugs, my kids," Ms. Gibbs said. "I have no idea what the potential effects could be."

So Ms. Gibbs contacted an environmental attorney to try to delay a plan to move the Army's only chemical defense training base from Fort McClellan, Ala., to Fort Leonard Wood in southern Missouri.

On Thursday, Gibbs and an environmental group filed petitions with the Department of Natural Resources alleging that the Army failed to assess the "potential threat to health" posed by the fog used in its training.

Army officials said those concerns have no validity.

As for the oil-fog sprayed from jeep-bound canisters: "I've observed it, I've walked through it, and it has no effect at all," said Fort Leonard Wood environmental chief Scott Murrell.

The Coalition for the Environment also is appealing a state permit issued April 17, giving the Army the go-ahead to build and operate an incinerator that would burn chemically decontaminated materials. Environmentalists want the permit overturned until a public hearing is held.

Approval of both permits is vital to proceed with moving the Army's chemical school to Missouri. The federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission plans to make its final recommendations to President Clinton by July 1.

If the commission doesn't have the state permits approved by June 22, "they cannot consider the recommended move," said Fort Leonard Wood spokesman Brad Rose.

During a meeting Thursday with state environmental officials, Army officials stressed the need for quick action on their requests.

"This is essential for the defense of the country and it does need to be done," Murrell said.



St. Louis environmental lawyer Lewis Green presses his case to the Air Conservation Commission. AP

The base relocation would bring an additional 4,200 soldiers yearly to Fort Leonard Wood, plus 1,800 permanent jobs and 400 civilian jobs, Rose said. It also could pump up to $150 million in salaries and construction contracts into the state economy, he said.

But environmentalists and nearby residents fear the new mission could spew tons of contaminants.

Among the chemicals used in Army training is Sarin, the colorless vapor that recently killed 10 people and injured hundreds more on a Tokyo train.

Army officials said concerns about a similar disaster in Missouri are unwarranted.

Murrell said Sarin and other nerve gases only are produced in small quantities and are kept inside at all times. Furthermore, polluted materials are decontaminated before being incinerated, he said.

The petitions filed Thursday allege that the Army underestimated the incinerator's potential sulfur emissions, failed to identify some waste products to be burned and overlooked the oil-fog's potential effect on endangered species, such as the bald eagle and Indiana bat.

See FT. WOOD, page 8

☆Ft. Wood

From page one

"This is serious business. We're talking about nerve gases, biological agents and chemicals," environmental attorney Lewis Green said in a session with three members of the Missouri Air Conservation Commission. A formal hearing before the commission was canceled Thursday because four of its seven members were absent.

"We're not trying to stop the darn thing. We're trying to get information out to the public," Green said.

Commission chairman Harriet Beard said the panel will "take the concerns under advisement" and try to reach some decision by June.

Officials at the Department of Natural Resources, which grants the permits, said they already had done a thorough job of evaluating the permit applications.

"Some of the stuff they brought up we've already talked about with our staff. It's not an issue," said Roger Randolph, director of DNR's air pollution control program.

Commissioners and DNR employees plan to hear public comments about the oil-fog training on May 12 in Waynesville, near Fort Leonard Wood. A hearing about the state waiver is set for May 25 in Kansas City.

In response to the petitions, an appeal hearing also must be held on the incinerator permit. No hearing date has been set.

The Birmingham News
April 28, 1995

Group fights Missouri OK of chem unit



Lewis Green
Enviromental attorney.

JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. (AP) — An environmental group filed petitions with the state Thursday seeking to slow down the process of approving a plan to relocate the Army's only chemical defense training base to Fort Leonard Wood.

The petitions filed with the Department of Natural Resources allege the Army has "not accurately and truthfully described" the operations of an incinerator that would burn chemically decontaminated clothing and other materials.

The Coalition for the Environment is appealing a state permit issued April 17, giving the Army the go-ahead for the incinerator. Environmentalists want the permit overturned until a public hearing is held.

The petitions also seek to delay state approval of a waiver allowing the Army to spray a white oil-based fog into the air as part of its training for soldiers.

Approval of both permits is vital to move the Army's chemical defense training base from Fort McClellan, Ala., to Fort Leonard Wood, military officials said.

The federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission plans to make its final recommendations to President Clinton by July 1.

If the commission doesn't have the state permits approved by June 22, "they cannot consider the recommended move," said Fort Leonard Wood spokesman Brad Rose.

During a meeting Thursday with state environmental officials, Army officials stressed the need for quick action on their requests.

"This is essential for the defense of the country and it does need to be done," said Scott Murrell, the Army's environmental chief at Fort Leonard Wood.

But environmentalists and some nearby residents fear the new mission could spew tons of contaminants. Among the chemicals used in Army training is Sarin, the gas that recently killed 10 people and injured hundreds more in Tokyo.

Army officials said the fears are unwarranted.

Neither the thick fog, the potentially fatal chemicals nor the incinerator pose any danger to nearby residents, Murrell said.

He said Sarin and other nerve gases only are produced in small quantities and are kept inside at all times. Furthermore, polluted materials are decontaminated and incinerated, Murrell said.

"This is serious business. We're talking about nerve gases, biological agents and chemicals," environmental attorney Lewis Green said in a session with three members of the Air Conservation Commission.

"We're not trying to stop the darn thing. We're trying to get information out to the public," he said.

Environmentalists seek to delay OK of incinerator

The Associated Press

JEFFERSON CITY — An environmentalist group filed petitions with the state Thursday seeking to slow down the process of approving a plan to relocate the Army's only chemical defense training base to Fort Leonard Wood.

The petitions filed with the Department of Natural Resources allege that the Army has "not accurately and truthfully described" the operations of an incinerator that would burn chemically decontaminated clothing and other materials.

The Coalition for the Environment is appealing a state permit issued April 17, giving the Army the go-ahead to build and operate the incinerator. Environmentalists want the permit overturned until a public hearing is held.

The petitions also seek to delay state approval of a waiver allowing the Army to spray a white oil-based fog into the air as part of its training for soldiers.

Approval of both permits is vital to move the Army's chemical defense training base from Fort McClellan, Ala., to Fort Leonard Wood in southern Missouri, military officials said.

The federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission plans to make its final recommendations to President Clinton by July 1.

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During a meeting Thursday with state environmental officials, Army officials stressed the need for quick action on their requests.

"This is essential for the defense of the country and it does need to be done," said Scott Murrell, the Army's environmental chief at Fort Leonard Wood.

The base relocation would bring an additional 4,200 soldiers yearly to Fort Leonard Wood, plus 1,800 permanent jobs and 400 civilian jobs, Rose said. It also could pump up to $150 million in salaries and construction contracts into the state economy, he said.

But environmentalists and some nearby residents fear the new mission could spew tons of contaminants.

Among the chemicals used in Army training is Sarin, the colorless vapor that recently killed 10 people and injured hundreds more on a Tokyo train.

But Army officials said any fears are unwarranted and caused by misleading information.

Neither the thick fog, the potentially fatal chemicals nor the incinerator pose any danger to nearby residents, Murrell said.

He said Sarin and other nerve gases only are produced in small quantities and are kept inside at all times. Furthermore, polluted materials are decontaminated before being incinerated, Murrell said.

As for the oil-fog sprayed from canisters on jeeps: "I've observed it, I've walked through it, and it has no effect at all," Murrell said.

Nonetheless, the Army needs an exemption from state environmental laws to spray the thick substance. A waiver hearing before the Missouri Air Conservation Commission was canceled Thursday because four of its seven members were absent.

Commissioners and DNR employees plan to hear public comments about the oil-fog training on May 12 in Waynesville, near Fort Leonard Wood. A hearing about the state waiver is set for May 25 in Kansas City.

In response to the petitions filed Thursday, an appeal hearing also must be held on the incinerator permit. No hearing date has been set.

The petitions allege that the Army underestimated the incinerator's potential sulfur emissions, failed to identify some waste products to be burned and overlooked the oil-fog's potential effect on endangered species, such as the bald eagle and Indiana bat.

"We're not trying to stop the darn thing. We're trying to get information out to the public," environmental attorney Lewis Green said.

Air Conservation Commission chairman Harriet Beard said the panel will "take the concerns under advisement" and try to reach some decision by June.

ANNISTON STAR

Missouri Sierra Club opposes all smoke training

By Eric Larson
Star Military Writer

The Missouri chapter of the Sierra Club announced Friday it not only opposes the state permit that would allow the Army's chemical school to move from Fort McClellan to Missouri, but is going a step further in encouraging the government to halt the training in Calhoun County as well.

"We are convinced that this type of abuse is not suitable anywhere," said a news release from the environmental group.

The State of Missouri is reviewing the Army's application to conduct smoke obscurant training at Fort Leonard Wood. A public comment period on the permit application culminates May 12 in a public hearing in Waynesville, Mo., a town near the base.

Sierra Club representatives plan to be at the meeting to argue against the permit, citing an Army study they say proves the training would harm plants and animals near the training grounds, including the Indiana bat and the gray bat, which are listed as endangered species.

While the Army says its numerous studies on obscurant smokes have been inconclusive, Sierra Club members who have seen portions of one study believe the evidence is clear:

"I don't think there's any question that plants and animals will be damaged," said Ken Midkiff, program director of the Missouri chapter. "We don't see how you could spray 65,000 gallons of oil in the course of a year and not do any damage."

"I don't think there's any question that plants and animals will be damaged."

Ken Midkiff, program director, Missouri Sierra Club

The document Midkiff cites, "Preliminary Study of Effects of Military Obscurant Smokes on Flora and Fauna during Field and Laboratory Exposures" is the final report of a study conducted by the Army in 1986.

Fog oil was one of three smokes tested on living cells, plants and rodents. The study found that each of the smokes "exerted varying degrees of physiological and mutagenic effects" on the subjects.

The executive summary of the study says that plants and animals could take years or decades to show the effects of exposure to obscurant smokes, and that by the time symptoms appear, "the system may be damaged beyond repair."

The smoke permit is the only environmental permit the Army lacks before it can move the chemical school. The Army has already received permission from Missouri's Department of Natural Resources to build a live-agent training facility at Leonard Wood like the one at McClellan.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which has the final word on whether the school would move, has said the Army must receive all the permits it needs by June 22. The commission must make its final recommendations to Congress by July 1.

Smoke training has been done at McClellan's Pelham Range since 1951, except from 1973 to 1979 when the school was relocated to a base in Maryland. The practice has the tacit approval of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management.

The smoke is actually a white vapor produced by heating fog oil, which is similar to 20-weight motor oil without additives. Soldiers learn to use the smoke to cloak the movement of troops.

Some neighbors of Pelham Range have complained of burning eyes resulting from smoke that strays beyond the boundary of the range. They're concerned about the long-term health effects.

Midkiff said he is more worried about the effect of the smoke on the ecosystem of Mark Twain National Forest, which surrounds Fort Leonard Wood on three sides. Canoeists and bass and trout fisherman use rivers and streams in the area for recreation. The bats feed on insects Midkiff believes will be affected by the smoke.

Not all environmentalists oppose moving the smoke training, however.

"It's the greatest thing to happen to Fort Leonard Wood since Fort Leonard Wood was a fort," said G.A. Maxwell, president of the Roubidoux Fly Fishers Association and an employee at the base.

While the transfer of McClellan's chemical and military police schools would drain Calhoun County of vital jobs and income, it would bring $10 million worth of construction and more than 2,000 new jobs to the Missouri base.

"The environmental groups are working to whip up a lather around this. We know it's safe for the people and the environment," said Keith Prichard, head of a booster group for Leonard Wood. "Where better than to check this than around Anniston. Do you see desolate forests around there?"

Midkiff does not think ADEM or the Army has monitored the effect of the smoke on the ecosystem of Pelham Range, which encompasses more than 20,000 acres. He also says differing weather conditions at the two bases could mean that what may be safe for McClellan may not be safe for Leonard Wood.

Troy Gordon's testimony before the DNR hearing Friday, May 12 —

Don't know his title — I assume he's just a member -

He used to live near the Fort (Wood) on the Little Piney River, I hear —

Ken Midkiff
Program Director
1005 Belleview Ct.
Columbia, MO 6520.

Ozark Chapter / Sierra Club

Troy Gordon → 314 · 442 7411
4pp 2

My name is Troy Gordon, representing the Ozark Chapter Sierra Club. We have members that live in this area, and many others which use this area for recreation, including camping and hiking, and canoeing, fishing and swimming in the rivers and streams which would be affected by this proposed facility. I also used to live just west of Newburg, directly down wind of this proposed facility.

The Ozark Chapter Sierra Club is strongly opposed to the relocation of the Chemical Warfare Training Unit to Fort Leonard Wood. We believe that the proposed facility will be environmentally damaging to the area, and the existing facility at Fort McClellan in Alabama is equally damaging. The U.S. Army should reassess the entire training process to find less objectionable methods of conducting such training.

We are concerned that there has been no Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the U.S. Army for the transfer of the Chemical Warfare Training facility to Fort Leonard Wood. The entire facility as proposed would have major environmental impacts and can be construed to be a major federal action requiring the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement under the provision of the National Environmental Policy Act. No air permits can be applied for or issued without such an Environmental Impact Statement.

We are extremely concerned about the "fast track" process that has been used to attempt to permit the facility prior to the June 22, 1995. The environmental review process has been designed to allow the regulatory agencies and the public to gather complete information about a proposed permit and make an informed decision. In this case, adequate information has not been available, and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources has attempted to set permit parameters without full information on what limits and monitoring parameters should be included. Further, in an attempt to avoid the lengthy process of applying for a RCRA permit for the incinerator, the inadequate "Thermal Treatment Unit" has been proposed, despite David Shorr's comments in 1993 that indicate a RCRA permit would be necessary.

Regarding the specific air permit for the fog-oil obscurant, we are completely opposed to the issuance of this permit for any reason. The U.S. Army's own documentation states that "All of the smokes field-tested exerted varying degrees of lethal, physiological, and mutagenic effects...." (emphasis added). "Direct effects found include decreased fertility, changes in energy production, and decreased survivability in both plants and animals, increased genotoxic damage in plants, and increased genotoxic damage in animals" (Source: "Preliminary Study of Effects of

Military Obscurant Smokes on Flora and Fauna during Field and Laboratory Exposures - Final Report", dated Dec. 1986 by Schaeffer et al - USA-CERL Technical Report N-86/22). Issuing this permit and allowing this fog would damage the Roubidoux Creek and the Big Piney River, threaten the health of local residents, and harm the federally Endangered Gray and Indiana bats, all while driving away tourism dollars from the region. The fog-oil obscurant would also violate the Missouri Clean Air opacity requirements, far exceeding the allowed 20% opacity limits for new sources.

We also oppose the permit for the proposed Thermal Treatment Unit. It is apparent from the proposed waste streams that the incinerator should be categorized as a Hazardous Waste Incinerator and the applicant should be required to apply for a RCRA permit. It is evident from a review of the permit application that the waste streams have been carefully crafted to attempt to avoid the necessity of applying for a RCRA permit. Nor does the application take into account the eventual need for changes in the waste stream as technology and materials change, or the training regime increases. As proposed, the permit would allow the incineration of chlorinated lime in the wet scrubber sludge, which would produce dioxins upon incineration. The waste stream as proposed also would be approximately 17% metals, or 170 pounds per day. Neither is listed in the emissions calculations. Even if chlorine and metals were not to be incinerated, to allow full flexibility and prevent a costly rebuilding or retrofitting of the facility when the Thermal Treatment Unit is found to be inadequate, it is far preferable to meet the requirements and apply for a RCRA permit at this time.

Finally, we recommend that environmental degradations not be condoned in the name of "economic development". Damage to ecological systems is extremely expensive to rectify, far outweighing any localized, short-lived profits. The economic benefits of a healthy environment have been demonstrated conclusively. While the communities surrounding Ft. Leonard Wood may receive short term economic benefits, the damages to the local environment will be extremely costly. Outdoor recreationists do not use areas that are or have been degraded. The cost from the loss of tourism and long term environmental damages may far outweigh any benefits to local retail outlets.

The statutory responsibility of the Department of Natural Resources is to protect the environment and the public health and safety, not to expedite permits for economic development purposes or at the request of the governor. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources should live up to its mandate and deny both of the proposed permits.

The Anniston Star - The Front Page
Thursday - April 13, 1995

Sierra Club angry over Missouri permits

☆Commission to hear GAO report/9A

From Staff and Wire Reports

WASHINGTON — Environmentalists are seething over preparations for the transfer of an Army chemical weapons facility from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.

The Missouri Department of Natural Resources has granted a permit for construction of such a facility at the military base. Members of the Sierra Club said Wednesday they fear the process is moving too quickly for safety issues to be considered, and they objected to the permit being granted without public hearings.

"I'm outraged that this permit was issued without a public comment, period," said Kathy Grandfield, chairwoman of the Sierra Club's Missouri Toxic Committee. "All this defies logic."

David A. Shorr, director of the state environmental department, said public hearings were not necessary because only a small amount of chemical weapons would be involved.

Shorr said he was surprised by the complaints. "We have not, to date, seen any coalescing of opposition to this project," he said.

Ms. Grandfield acknowledged that no group has formally announced opposition, but added: "We have some serious questions about the relocation of this facility to Missouri."

Earlier this month, Ken Midkiff, the Sierra Club's Missouri program director, said he didn't view the nerve

Permits

From Page 1A

agents and gasses used at the Chemical Defense Training Facility as a major concern for the residents around Fort Leonard Wood. He said his group was more concerned about the fog oil the Army uses to train soldiers in screening techniques.

Midkiff said he was worried that the smoke would leave an oily film over everything in the area, causing problems for the wildlife in the Mark Twain National Forest that surrounds the Missouri military installation.

Despite that concern, the Sierra Club has yet to file a objection to moving the chemical school from McClellan to Leonard Wood.

Fort McClellan, home of the only active chemical weapons training center in the United States, was on the Army's list of proposed base closings released Feb. 28. Part of the budget-cutting plan was to move the training program to Fort Leonard Wood in south-central Missouri.

"This is going to be a classic case of environmental injustice," said Bill Redding, the midwestern representative at the Sierra Club's headquarters in Madison, Wis. "Most of the people living next to that base are poor. And if the Army starts out with chemical weapons training, the fear is that this will escalate somehow."

Ms. Grandfield said the Sierra Club had asked for an extended period of public hearings on the proposal to move the training center.

"Apparently, our request was not granted," she said.

Star Military Writer Eric Larson contributed to this Associated Press report.

The Birmingham Post-Herald
April 13, 1994

Sierra: Permit pace is too fast

By Thomas Hargrove
Post-Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Missouri environmentalists have been complaining that the plans to move the Army's chemical weapons defense training program there from Alabama are unfolding too quickly to allow study of safety issues.

Members of the Sierra Club reacted with anger yesterday when they learned that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources has already granted a permit for construction of a chemical decontamination training facility at Fort Leonard Wood.

They objected that the action — necessary to meet the Army's June 22 deadline for all permits necessary to close Anniston's Fort McClellan — was taken without public hearings.

"I'm outraged that this permit was issued without a public comment, period. I thought the siting of any incinerators for hazardous materials requires public comment. All this defies logic," said Kathy Grandfield, chairwoman of the Missouri Toxics Committee for the environmental group.

But the director of the state environmental department, David A. Shorr, said such hearings were not necessary for a construction permit after he decided the amount of chemical weapons involved are so small that the Army does not need a chemical waste disposal permit.

Shorr also said state officials have not received significant opposition to relocating the program and its annual payroll worth $138 million. "We have not, to date, seen any coalescing of opposition to this project," he said when announcing the permits Tuesday.

The environmentalists agreed that no major group has formally objected to the plan, yet.

"This whole thing took us by surprise," Ms. Grandfield said.

"We have been gathering information now for only the last few weeks. But we have some serious questions about the relocation of this facility to Missouri."

The Army originally had not planned the close all of Fort McClellan when preparing its list of military bases to be slashed in budget realignments. But Pentagon officials changed their recommendation in the final days before issuing their Feb. 28 recommendations after learning the only way to save money at the Anniston facility was to close it completely.

The Army first asked for Missouri Gov. Mel Carnahan's help in obtaining necessary environmental permits in mid-February, allowing only four months for a process that can take two years. Carnahan promised to put the process "on a fast track."

"We can see how they are rushed with that June 22 deadline," Ms. Grandfield said. "But the regulatory process must be followed, even by the governor's office. We can't set aside that process for special cases."

The Ozark chapter of the Sierra Club recommended that the Army increase the amount of storm water discharge monitoring conducted at Fort Leonard Wood because of an oil-based spray used to simulate battlefield conditions during part of the training.

The state agreed with the recommendation, and placed directions for increased monitoring in a second permit issued this week for the relocation plan.

But environmentalists complained the basic issue of whether it is safe to incinerate clothing and other materials contaminated with chemical weapons has not been settled.

"This is going to be a classic case of environmental injustice," said Bill Redding, the midwestern representative at the Sierra Club's headquarters in Madison, Wis.

"Most of the people living next to that base are poor. And if the Army starts out with chemical weapons training, the fear is that this will escalate somehow."

Neither the Sierra Club nor any other environmental group has taken legal action to slow Missouri's pace in granting permits for the program. "But we want to know a lot more information," Ms. Grandfield said.

"We also asked for an extension of time on the comment period in all of this. Apparently, our request was not granted," she said.

3860-0004-015

U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Department of Defense

U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N, R10, 11, 12W

**** Permission to construct a static and mobile fog oil smoke training facility. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (8), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." ****

Proposed Draft Air Permit
Ft. Leonard Wood Smoke Training
April 11, 1995

Emissions Limitations

1. *Annual Throughput*. Fort Leonard Wood (the "Permittee") shall process no more than 65,000 gallons of SGF-2 fog oil during any 12-month period. This total shall include the fog oil used in the mobile (valley) operations and the static (introductory) operations.

2. *Daily Throughput*. The Permittee shall process no more than 3700 pounds of SGF-2 fog oil during any 24-hour period. This total shall include the fog oil used in the mobile (valley) operations and the static (introductory) operations.

3. *Emissions Limitation*. The Permittee shall not emit PM_{10} at a rate in excess of 2600 pounds per hour. This rate corresponds to processing fog oil at 3700 pounds per hour with a particulate conversion factor of 70%.

4. *Recordkeeping*. The Permittee shall record the amount of fog oil processed by the smoke generators during the previous month and the previous twelve months. During any month in which smoke training occurs, the Permittee shall record daily and hourly consumption of fog oil. The Permittee shall maintain said records and provide them to APCP personnel on request.

5. *Reporting of Violations*. The Permittee shall report to the Enforcement Section, Air Pollution Control Program (APCP), no later than ten days after the end of each month during which the preceding 12-month cumulative total of fog oil processed exceeds 65,000 gallons of fog oil (Condition Number 1).

6. *Reporting of Violations*. The Permittee shall report to the Enforcement Section, APCP, no later than ten days after an

exceedance of the 3700 pound daily limit of fog oil (Condition 2).

Ambient Air Monitoring

7. *Quality Assurance Project Plan*. The Permittee shall file two copies of a Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) within 90 days of issuance of this permit for approval by the Staff Director, APCP. The QAPP shall describe the method and manner for collecting air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone required by this permit.

8. *Pre-Startup Monitoring*. The Permittee shall collect at least one year of continuous air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone at locations to be determined by the APCP beginning as soon as possible after this permit is issued. Collection of monitoring data shall begin no later than eighteen months immediately prior to the beginning of smoke training. Ozone monitoring is only required from April 1 through October 31.

9. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall submit to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the air quality monitoring data collected pursuant to Condition 8.

10. *Post-Startup Monitoring*. The Permittee shall collect at least two years of continuous air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone at locations to be determined by the APCP beginning after smoke training begins. Ozone monitoring is only required from April 1 through October 31.

11. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall submit to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the air quality monitoring data collected pursuant to Condition 10.

Meteorological Monitoring

12. *Observers*. At all times during the operation of the smoke generators, a network of observers shall be stationed at locations from which they can observe whether smoke crosses the Fort Leonard Wood property boundary. The observers shall maintain continuous electronic or visual communications with the smoke generator operators.

13. *Meteorological Monitoring*. For the entire period beginning no less than one hour prior to generating smoke and ending no less than one hour after ceasing generating smoke, the Permittee shall measure and record no less frequently than hourly (including the beginning and ending conditions) on-site meteorological data including ambient air temperature, atmospheric pressure, relative humidity, atmospheric stability, mixing height, and wind speed and direction.

14. *Limitations on Operations*. Smoke training shall only be conducted at the locations and under the meteorological conditions as outlined in Attachment A.

15. *Forecasting Acceptable Conditions*. Smoke training may take place only if the Permittee forecasts no earlier than two hours prior to commencement of smoke training that the meteorological conditions of Attachment A will exist during smoke.

16. *Prohibitions*. Generation of smoke shall cease if:

    a) Meteorological conditions are not within the conditions approved for smoke training as described in Attachment A, or

    b) Visible smoke drifts beyond the Fort Leonard Wood

property boundary, or

c) Under other conditions as may be determined by the Director.

Soil and Vegetation Sampling

17. *Soil and Vegetation Sampling Plan (SVSP)*. Within 180 days of the issuance of this permit, the Permittee shall submit two copies of a SVSP to the APCP for review and approval. The SVSP shall describe the method and manner of collecting and analyzing soil and vegetation samples and of monitoring the impact of smoke training activities on soils and vegetation.

18. *Pre-Startup Sampling*. For no less than one year prior to the commencement of smoke training, the Permittee shall collect and analyze soil and vegetation samples no less frequently than quarterly at each location described in Attachment A. The Permittee shall comply with the sampling and monitoring conditions of Missouri State Operating Permit No. MO-0117251 granted by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Missouri Clean Water Commission.

19. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall report the results of the sampling and analysis required by Condition 18 to the APCP within 60 days of the date the samples are collected.

20. *Post-Startup Sampling*. Upon commencement of smoke training, the Permittee shall collect and analyze soil and vegetation samples no less frequently than monthly at each location described in Attachment A. After two years of sampling, the Permittee may petition the Director, APCP, for modification of the sampling schedule and frequency.

21. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall report to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the soil and vegetation sampling data collected pursuant to Condition 20.

Other Special Conditions

22. *Record Retention*. All records required by this permit shall be maintained and available for inspection by MDNR personnel for no less than five years from the date the record is created.

23. *Public Information*. The Permittee shall cooperate with the APCP in presenting the air quality monitoring data of Condition 8 to the public at an informational meeting to be convened by the APCP. If the data does not substantially conform with the assumptions and conclusions of air quality modelling or if the smoke training is shown to cause or contribute to a violation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), the Director may require the Permittee to take corrective action or may revoke the permit.

24. *Corrective Action*. If in the opinion of the Director, APCP, the presence of PM_{10} in the ambient air exists in quantities and durations that directly or proximately cause or contribute to injury to human, plant, or animal life or health, or to property, or that unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of life or the use of property, the Director, APCP, may require the Permittee to submit a corrective action plan adequate to timely and significantly mitigate the emission of PM_{10}. The Permittee shall implement any such plan immediately upon its approval by the Director, APCP. Failure to either submit or implement such a plan shall be a violation of the permit.

Attachment A
Wind Directions during Smoke Training*

Site	A Stability	B Stability	C Stability	D Stability	E* Stability
Musgrave	130 - 220	150 - 220	160 - 215	170-215(1)	150 - 225
Ballard	340 - 35	340 - 35	340 - 35	350 - 35	340 - 35
Mush Paddle	195 - 275	195 - 275	195 - 270	195 - 240(2)	195 - 270
Bailey	All direction except 120 deg.	340 - 40 175 - 325	340 - 40 175 - 325	None	230 -240

(1) 45 minute limit for wind directions 190 - 210 degrees
(2) 45 minute limit for wind directions 220 - 240 degrees
+ A 3 minute exclusion is requested
* A-D stabilities are not restricted based on wind speed, however, E stability is limited to wind speeds of 4 m/s and greater.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL
FORT MCCLELLAN, ALABAMA 36205-5020

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

ATZN-CM-SAC

16 May 95

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ TELLER, HQDA, OSJA, ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE

SUBJECT: Review of Draft Air Permit, Fort Leonard Wood Smoke Training

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide comments on the subject document per your request. More detailed comments are found at the enclosure.

2. The State of Missouri smoke permit restrictions, if implemented, will create overwhelming degradation to Chemical Mission readiness. The restrictions will cut back the minimum amount of annual fog oil use by 30%. The daily allowance for smoke training time will be cut by 75%. After suffering these unacceptable losses, it further limits our Joint forces to smoke operations during weather conditions which may exist only 60% of the year. The smoke permit virtually eliminates more than one smoke event per day. The impact would be violations (subject to fines) for 92 days when two events are trained, another 56 days when three events are trained, and another 21 days when four separate events are underway at one time. If allowed to stand, the Missouri smoke permit allows us to conduct roughly 25% of training to standards, these restrictions would kill both the US Army and US Air Force smoke training.

3. During the Chemical Functional Area Analysis on 31 Oct 94, the Vice Chief of Staff challenged the Army to "take the lead on proactive involvement with agencies drafting environmental regulatory requirements that impact on chemical training on Army ranges. Focus on leading towards the least restrictive measures that provide the maximum training opportunities. (Action ODCSOPS)"

4. Under Base Realignment and Closure actions, Fort Leonard Wood, unfortunately without coordination with the Chemical School, applied for a smoke permit and variance. The Missouri smoke permit restrictions will inadvertently squash the VCSA's goal and tragically cripple the capability to conduct smoke training. One of the most stunning restrictions of this permit is the loss of capability to train with smoke hand grenades, vehicular smoke grenades, smoke pots, infrared defeating grenades, riot control agents, and large area infrared obscurants. The Reserve Component smoke training at the Chemical School would also be a casualty.

5. If you have questions regarding this quick assessment of the smoke and obscurants issue, please call me, DSN 865-6228 or commercial 205-848-6228 or Fax 865-6786.

Encl

EDWARD W. NEWING
LTC, CM
Special Assistant to the Commandant

COMMENTS ON DRAFT AIR PERMIT, FORT LEONARD WOOD SMOKE TRAINING, 11 APRIL 1995

1. pg 1, title Fort Wood provided you a draft air permit. Since the issue is now at the variance hearing stage, where is the "final"? Considering the impact this has on Chemical Mission Area training, we need to see the real thing.

2. pg 1, title The basis for permission is to "construct a static and mobile fog oil smoke *training facility*. This nomenclature is not descriptive of what the Army proposes to do. Could it be that Missouri Clean Air laws do not cover field military training and ranges? The only "facility" being constructed is a storage area for fog oil drums. Fort Wood will blaze road networks through some wetland areas and possibly construct some observation towers throughout the maneuver area which is already dedicated to other types of training. This curious interpolation of a smoke training area to a "facility" deceives the public as to what the purpose of the permit is for. Since the permit was gained without public comment, it would be difficult for people to know what this is. Since the variance does require comment, perhaps they will understand smoke will not occur in what could reasonably called a fixed facility.

3. pg 1, title If Missouri has authority for Title V of the Clean Air Act, it would seem prudent to mention the Federal statutes, beyond their laws. They still must comply with federal standards and ensure these activities, especially since it is a Federal installation, meet standards. This legal footing is important and not just a cosmetic touch.

4. pg 2, para 1, The annual throughput of only 65,000 gallons is unacceptable. We do not know how this figure was calculated, but it appears to be an average of sort. Forgot the averages over a five year period. We calculate training requirements on operational tempo, current and projected. The projected consumption needs to be at least 95,000 gallons per year which includes both the Army and Air Force course loads and training plans. Additionally, all US Army Chemical units (70% of the Chemical Corps) are required to mobilize at the Chemical School. The potential to emit must be written into the permit, which as was explained to DNR previously would roughly double the emissions.

5. pg 2, para 2, The limit of 3,700 lbs during a 24 hour period is unacceptable. The Army and Air Force need more than one hour per day on many occasions. As stated in the cover letter the number of two, three, and four events per day is critical to training loads. If not adjusted, this limitation will cut out 75% of our training capability. Additionally, there is no mention of other types of obscurants used by the Chemical School. Smoke hand grenades (various colors), vehicle grenades (red phosphorus and brass flakes), HC smoke pots, safer smoke pots (teraphalic acid), and large area infrared obscurant materials are essential portions of training and qualifying chemical soldiers. This permit excludes this type smoke.

6. pg 2, para 3 The PM10 less than 2,600 lbs per hour cannot ever be met. Even though droplet sizes average about one micron, we would violate this limit every time we turn a generator on, drive through dust, or use infrared obscurants (by design greater than 10-14 microns in size). IR obscuration is a critical skill to countermeasure enemy IR target acquisition devices. It is not possible to simulate this sensor/obscuration phenomenon at this time. It is a learned behavior at the institutional level.

7. pg 2, para 5 Reporting of violations appears to be too slow. A lot of damage could ensue unless a more rapid methodology is adopted. This permit needs to adjust threshold limits beyond 65,000 gallons per year to at least the combined total of current and projected training loads (we could live with a bare bones of 95,000 gal/yr). Scaling back training by 30% is unacceptable to readiness

8. pg 3, para 7 How will the QAPP plan effect the "users" the Chemical School and Air Force Disaster Preparedness Technical Training? The QA plan must be coordinated with potential users.

9. pg 3, para 8 Someone needs to calculate the voluminous record keeping costs. Who is the Permitee: Fort Wood personnel or the Chemical School? How is Fort Wood going to implement this? Why is only fog oil record keeping necessary? Other obscurants need to be tallied and contribute to the entire atmospheric load. The emissions from the diesel engines of HMWWVs and APCs as well as the MOGAS powering the smoke generators are sources. Does this add to the poundage allowed per day? Other military vehicular training, automobiles, electrical generators, construction equipment, railroad activities, on Fort Wood apparently need to be part of the daily total as well.

9. pg 4, para 13 What equipment should be used or is available for MET data? Who collects it? If soldiers and airmen are to do this who certifies them and when, how often? Calculation of mixing height is of particular concern, from where is it measured and how does it apply to each site and length of plume.

10. pg 4, para 14 Limitations on Operations. How often (per month) do these conditions exist? Need to go back at least 5 years to see if we are handcuffed by artificial restraints. This has the potential, when synergistically combined with reduction in annual gallons allowable and only one hour per day could absolutely shut down smoke training.

11. pg 4, para 15 I do not understand how a state agency can dictate the forecasting lead times. They establish a standard and now want to tell the Army how to suck eggs. This State agency is really beyond their authority to tell us *how* to manage compliance with standards.

12. pg 4, para 16 Does this mean MET conditions (air stability and wind direction) are to be continuously monitored/measured or just before the event. Need to evaluate the percent of time wind directions and speeds are unfavorable. Quick reference indicates unfavorable conditions exist around 35% of the time. The only available wind rose is twenty years old.

13. pg 5, para 16c If the Director is meant to be the Director of DNR, this presents an interesting legal situation for the Army. This blanket authority seems to be a catch-all phrase which allows the Director to unilaterally terminate Army smoke operations. This is absurd. If permit violations occur, enforce it, but the Director should have no legal basis terminate smoke for "to be determined" reasons. Perhaps this is the place where an insert can state the Director might be overruled by the EPA or other Federal Agencies. These mysterious powers of the Director place the Army at risk and should be eliminated.

14. pg 6, para 23 We would be automatically in violation if tried to maintain current training levels. The air quality modeling standards need to be addressed in this document. Air models used by the EPA are not as specific for cloud dynamics and concentration as the ones established by the Army (formally the Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory). EPA models use industrial chemical stack emissions and translate that to smoke generator sources, some of which are mobile. No known EPA model is an accurate representation. The Combined Obscurant Model for Battlefield Induced Contaminants (COMBIC) is the worlds best model and should be used, especially since it is possible to model all types of obscurants, not just fog oil. Other sources are the Joint Technical Group for Munitions Effectiveness-Smoke and Aerosols Group assessment reports which have tailored smoke munitions and generators for the past ten years. If we are going to use models, we should do it correctly.

15. pg 6, para 24 Injury to plants and animal life have not been thoroughly documented. Sierra Club and others note (quite accurately) the Army analyses are subjective and most are inconclusive. The Army cannot avoid the challenge that specific tests have not been done at Fort Wood or Fort McClellan. Army references cite known studies which treat flora and fauna with about 5,000 times the amount that might be expected from Army fog oil operations. I intuitively believe it is safe, one cannot measure the downwind deposition, but it is hard to avoid the criticism that it has to go somewhere. The worst case is a challenge of fog oil spillage at the generator sites. Fort Wood will mitigate this with their Installation Spill Contingency Plan. It is difficult to attribute direct or approximate damage to plants and animals if no base line is available. How does the other obscurants affect plants and animals? DNR has the Army assessment data, but chose not to allow these in the air permit. What is different about fog oil? Unreasonable enjoyment of life is another nebulous term. Smoke by its very nature may be considered a nuisance and IR obscurants are defined as nuisance dust. I see big problems here. It is a legal tarpit which places the entire art of smoke generation for the survival of fighting forces at tremendous risk.

16. pg 7, Attachment A These four sites have not been measured. The only data which exists at Fort Wood is measured from the airfield. Historical wind data is ancient. Considering the relation of specificity required to comply with this permit, microclimatic studies should be performed at each of these sites. As stated in Fort McClellan's 1993 Smoke Report (but rejected by Fort Wood) seasonal wind patterns and speeds limit smoke training at these sites because of the potential for offpost migration or interference with other post activities. Conservative estimates are that between 25-50% of the time, smoke operations will be limited. Since we use smoke 250 days of the year, further erosion of training opportunities are certain. Exclude the non trafficable terrain, avoidance of endangered species areas, small ponds, wetlands, impact areas, the infamous million dollar hole area, cantonment area, standoff distances between the installation boundary and smoke areas, the major thoroughfare bisecting the installation, the bombing range and there is less space than it appears. The bottomline is that weather is one of the most limiting factors of all. We can schedule classes, ranges, locations, but we cannot schedule Mother Nature. From someone with over twenty years of smoke generator experience I am telling you this smoke permit is a disaster for the future of the Army's smoke program.

March 23, 1995

Special Assistant to the Commandant

Subject: Request Under the Freedom of Information Act

Mr. John A. Young
State of Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Division of Environmental Quality
Post Office Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

Dear Mr. Young,

This letter is in reference to your request regarding fog oil use at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The military stock number of fog oil is 9150-00-261-7895. Other data helpful for identification is Fog Oil: 55 gallon drum (81349) MILF12070 Type SGF-2.

year (gallons of fog oil) (variance due to US Army Reserve training flux)

1994 (93,800) 1993 (116,350) 1992 (56,400) 1991 (54,970) 1990 (65, 860)

If this request is the basis for determining air emission calculations, you should be aware of other types of fuel and obscurants used on Fort McClellan. Smoke generators use gasoline to aerosolize fog oil droplets. The consumption rate is 3 1/2 gallons of gasoline per 55 gallons of fog oil.

Other sources include hexachloroethane smoke pots, colored dye smoke grenades, infrared defeating obscurant grenades (brass flakes) and large area infrared defeating obscurants (graphite powder). Millimeter wave obscurants (similar to radar chaff) are expected to be available for use in the next two years. Environmental assessment information for some of these items are enclosed. The "potential to emit" with 20 mobilizing chemical units, would roughly double the gasoline and fog oil totals per year.

Sincerely,

Edward W. Newing
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Special Assistant to the Commandant

Enclosures
Environmental Assessments for Red, White, Plasticized White Phosphorus; Dye Colored Smokes; Hexachloroethane (HC) Smoke

95-36
A: 13 Mar 95

STATE OF MISSOURI
Mel Carnahan, Governor • David A. Shorr, Director
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176

FEB 22 1995

Commander
USACML&MPCEN&FM
ATTN: Ms. Koonce
ATZN-IM
Ft. McClellan, AL 36205-5000

RE: Request Under the Freedom of Information Act

Dear Ms. Koonce:

I am requesting information regarding the use of fog oil at Ft. McClellan. Specifically, I am asking for the amount of fog oil actually expended in conducting smoke training operations for the Chemical School by stock number and type. The time period I am interested in is from 1990 through and including 1994. Please indicate the amount used in each calendar year. Please forward this information as soon as possible.

For any costs involved in retrieving this information, please submit an invoice for payment to me at the above address. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Mr. David L. Walker at (314) 751-3176. Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

John A. Young

John A. Young
Director

JAY:dwjs

Rec'd Records Mgt 2/28/95 AK

BEFORE THE MISSOURI
AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

WILLIAM A. GIBBS, REBECCA I. GIBBS, WENDY PELTON, and THE COALITION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,	)	
Petitioner,	)	
vs.	)	Cause No. 95-12-V
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,	)	
Respondent,	)	
and	)	
U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER AND FORT LEONARD WOOD,	)	
Applicant.	)	

DEPOSITION OF LT. COL. JOHN JOHNSON
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

May 15, 1995

RICHARD E. SCHROEDER
Registered Professional Reporters
400 N. Fourth Street - Suite 2510
St. Louis, MO 63102
(314) 621-0107

BEFORE THE MISSOURI
AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

WILLIAM A. GIBBS, REBECCA I. GIBBS, WENDY PELTON, and THE COALITION FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,	)	
Petitioner,	)	
vs.	)	Cause No. 95-12-V
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,	)	
Respondent,	)	
and	)	
U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER and FORT LEONARD WOOD,	)	
Applicant.	)	

DEPOSITION OF LT. COL. JOHN JOHNSON, produced, sworn and examined on the part of the Petitioners between the hours of eight o'clock in the forenoon and eight o'clock in the afternoon of May 15, 1995, at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, East 8th Street, Bldg. No. 1705, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, before me, Tina M. Givens, a Notary Public and Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri in a certain cause now pending before the Missouri Air Conservation Commission.

APPEARANCES:

For the Petitioners: Green, Hennings & Henry
314 N. Broadway
St. Louis, MO 63102
By: Lewis C. Green

1 Armstrong & Teasdale
One Metropolitan Center
2 St. Louis, MO 63102
By: Susan B. Knowles
3
For the Respondent: Attorney General's Office
4 Supreme Court Building
P.O. Box 899
5 Jefferson City, MO 65102
By: Deborah Neff
6
For the Applicant: Uldric L. Fiore, Jr.
7 Staff Judge Advocate
U.S. Army Engineer Center
8 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473
9
Also Present: Emily Brown, Kevin Hebl, Bryan
10 Williams, Major Michael Corbin
11
12 INDEX

Page
13 Direct Examination by Mr. Green 3

14
15
16 LT. COL. JOHN JOHNSON
17 being produced, sworn and examined on behalf of the
18 Petitioners, deposes and says:
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION
20 BY MR. GREEN:
21 Q Colonel Johnson, would you state your full
22 name, please?
23 A John P. Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel U. S.
24 Army.
25 Q Colonel Johnson, I'm Lewis Green, and I'm

1 going to try to ask you some questions here for a
2 while. And if you don't understand the question,
3 which is entirely likely if it's technical, all you
4 got to do is say so and ask that it be rephrased and
5 verify the answer as best you can. If you want to
6 take a recess, just holler and we'll go ahead from
7 there, okay?
8 A Yeah.
9 Q What is your present position here?
10 A I have two jobs, Mr. Green. One is I'm the
11 Director of Public Works here at Fort Leonard Wood.
12 And the second, I'm the Fort Leonard Wood Base
13 Realignment and Closure Planning Officer currently.
14 Two jobs, to answer your question.
15 Q How long have you been Director of Public
16 Works?
17 A Little over two and a half years at this
18 point.
19 Q What do you do as Director of Public Works,
20 just briefly?
21 A I'm responsible in the Army termination for
22 all of the real estate, property maintenance on the
23 Post. And what that means is my job's to take care of
24 all of the base from the structures, the facilities,
25 roads, railroads, utilities systems. I also operate

1 Officer?

2 A Mr. Green, to my knowledge there was no

3 specific set of orders or instructions to me. I just

4 recall that General Ballard appointed me that position

5 at some point some time ago, but I don't recall the

6 exact date. I really don't. And I don't recall ever

7 seeing a set of orders or anything that would document

8 that, so.

9 Q So much for the general picture of your

10 present duties. Let's go back to college or

11 postgraduate work. Can you give me a brief summary?

12 LT. COL. FIORE: One moment, please. We may

13 have something a little more responsive to your

14 question. Is this helpful?

15 THE WITNESS: No.

16 LT. COL. FIORE: Okay. Fine. Thank you.

17 Q You went to college, did you?

18 A Yes, sir.

19 Q Where and what degree and when?

20 A I went to Virginia Military Institute.

21 Q VMI?

22 A Yes. And graduated 1976.

23 Q I don't know much about military institutes,

24 do you get degrees in various subjects there?

25 A Yes. I received a B. S. degree in civil

1 engineering. I subsequently went on to earn a
2 master's degree at University of Kansas.
3 Q Master's in what?
4 A Civil engineering.
5 Q Beyond those two degrees, have you had any
6 other pretty much normal education? I will ask you in
7 a minute about professional courses or specialized
8 courses you've taken in the Army, but I'm thinking
9 about university-type education.
10 A That's the extent of my civilian education.
11 Q You got out of the University of Kansas when?
12 A 1983.
13 Q Between '76 and '83 what were you doing?
14 A I was on active duty in the Army, sir.
15 Q In the Corps of Engineers?
16 A Yes.
17 Q So you went directly from VMI into the Corps
18 of Engineers?
19 A That's correct.
20 Q Where were you stationed first?
21 A Fort Knox, Kentucky.
22 Q And then where? After that where?
23 A Kansas City Corps of Engineers District.
24 Q When were you there?
25 A 1980 to 1983.

1 Director of Public Works orientation course.
2 Q What else?
3 A That was a two-week course. I took a
4 contract administration course at the Corps of
5 Engineers.
6 Q What else?
7 A And I took an earth work inspection course
8 for the Corps of Engineers.
9 Q Earth work?
10 A Earth work.
11 Q What is earth work inspection?
12 A In my case it was dam inspection, dam
13 construction inspection.
14 Q What else?
15 A I don't recall another, sir. There may be
16 one, but I don't recall.
17 Q Would you say that your expertise in
18 engineering is predominantly mechanical engineering?
19 A No, sir. Predominantly civil engineering.
20 Q Would you consider that your expertise -- do
21 you have a substantial expertise in chemical
22 engineering?
23 A No, I would not say I do.
24 Q Have you taken any courses that might be
25 either labeled or described as environmental courses?

1 A I've taken a number of environmental courses.
2 Q Can you tell me what some of those were and
3 where you took them?
4 A I don't recall the exact course titles or how
5 many, sir, but I took some in both my bachelor's and
6 master's programs.
7 Q Can you tell me generally what kinds of
8 things you studied in those courses?
9 A I recall taking an environmental engineering
10 course, environmental law course.
11 Q Would you consider that you have a
12 significant expertise in meteorology?
13 A In what, sir?
14 Q Meteorology?
15 A That's -- I wouldn't say that. It's not
16 normally part of a civil engineer program.
17 Q Or dispersion modeling?
18 A I am familiar with some modeling programs,
19 yes.
20 Q Have you used any yourself?
21 A Modeling programs, yes.
22 Q On what occasions have you used them?
23 A I've used the program developed by the Corps
24 of Engineers and Soil Conservation Service. I don't
25 recall the exact year but flood prediction model, and

1 direction?

2 A Well, there were quite possibly were other

3 Leonard Wood personnel involved, for example, range

4 control, what we call Director of Plans Training and

5 Mobilization and the PW personnel, but I do not recall

6 by name who the people were.

7 Q And do you have any recollection that any

8 outside contractors were asked to evaluate that event?

9 A I do not recall specifically outside contract

10 involvement.

11 Q I think you just said that you were not the

12 BRAC Planning Officer at that time. Who was?

13 A Lieutenant Colonel Maher.

14 Q Maher. To whom did he report?

15 A I do not know who he reported to, sir. I do

16 not recall.

17 Q You've been the BRAC Planning Officer as

18 nearly as you can recall I think you said about six

19 months?

20 A Longer than six months, Mr. Green, but I

21 don't recall the exact date I was appointed to that

22 position.

23 Q Sometime in 1994?

24 A Correct.

25 Q Who appointed you that?

1 A Major General Ballard.

2 Q Is that appointment in writing?

3 A I do not recall if General Ballard ever

4 appointed me in writing.

5 Q What written document here at Fort Leonard

6 Wood shows that there is a BRAC Planning Officer?

7 LT. COL. FIORE: Mr. Green, the BRAC Planning

8 Office and BRAC Planning Officer is an ad hoc grouping

9 that is designed in a task force-type operation where

10 the appropriate people that need to be involved are

11 gathered for either regular or irregular input to that

12 process. There is no formal table of authorizations

13 for that particular office. As we say, it's taken out

14 of the hide. And that's why Colonel Johnson is

15 running two hats.

16 MR. GREEN: Taken out of what?

17 LT. COL. FIORE: Taken out of the hide. You

18 don't get extra bodies to do it, you have to make do

19 with what your current duties as well as the

20 additional duties that the ad hoc office lays upon you

21 and that personnel.

22 Q Did General Ballard communicate this

23 appointment to you orally?

24 A He did, in fact, communicate that orally.

25 Q And where did that communication take place?

1 A Not instructions, Mr. Green. He -- at that
2 time of the appointment he did not provide any
3 specific directions or instructions, no.
4 Q Well, your response not instructions suggests
5 to me that I probably used the wrong word. Guidance?
6 Advice? What did he give you when he appointed you?
7 A The only conversation I recall was more of a
8 -- was his philosophy. It was definitely not
9 directive or instructive in nature, but it was his
10 philosophy that the BRAC planning activity would best
11 be suited for the Director of Public Works and its
12 framework due to the master planning requirements that
13 are involved.
14 Q Did he tell you what would be the duties of
15 the BRAC Planning Officer?
16 A During that initial appointment discussion I
17 do not recall. But I don't believe he did, sir.
18 Q Let me broaden the question then to include
19 that conversation and later conversations. At any
20 time did he tell you what are the duties of the BRAC
21 Planning Officer?
22 A Mr. Green, your question the best way I can
23 answer it is probably, again, General Ballard
24 appointed me BRAC Planning Officer for 1995.
25 Essentially I understood the duties and it was just an

1 applied specific piece of what I otherwise do. That
2 was his philosophy anyway. And as I mentioned, it was
3 because of our master planning activities that he felt
4 that was best suited. So it wasn't necessary in my
5 mind for General Ballard to provide more specific
6 guidance on that.
7 Q You already knew what BRAC was?
8 A From the standpoint of his philosophy as a
9 master planning, which equates to our facility
10 requirements, instruction requirements, yes.
11 Q Did you have an understanding at the time he
12 appointed you that you were to be considering the
13 possible move of the training schools at Fort
14 McClellan to Leonard Wood?
15 A Well, in that -- the 1993 BRAC Commission
16 tabled the decision on that pending environmental
17 permitting. It was very probable that that would be
18 their 1995 recommendation, again, but we did not know
19 obviously until 28 February of this year what the
20 actual recommendation would be.
21 Q So what was your understanding of your
22 responsibility as BRAC Planning Officer from the time
23 of your appointment?
24 LT. COL. FIORE: Mr. Green, can we move on to
25 fogging operations here? This is not designed to be

1 are relevant to the variance hearing, which has to do
2 with opacity and fog oil training. And I'm not going
3 to keep my personnel here till all hours of the night
4 to do a fishing expedition on the base realignment and
5 closing process. If you want to stick to rationally
6 related issues related to the variance hearing, we can
7 continue. But I will instruct my witness not to
8 answer that question or any other questions that are
9 merely going to mechanics of the base realignment and
10 closure process.
11 Q Colonel Johnson, you're going to follow that
12 instruction?
13 A I'll take the advice of our counsel, yes, and
14 not answer the question.
15 Q You refuse to answer that question, right?
16 Did you at any time up until March of 1995 give any
17 consideration to any aspect of the obscurant training
18 effort at Fort McClellan and the possibility of moving
19 it here?
20 A Mr. Green, I've already said that the BRAC
21 decision as it was tabled in 1993 was only a -- was
22 only a departure point or a basic idea as to what
23 might happen in 1993 -- or '95. Excuse me. It is the
24 Army's policy during the base realignment and closure
25 activities to not conduct any operations for business

1 that is to be decisional. Therefore, it was our
2 approach to this to wait, as did most Army and
3 Department Defense activity, for the 1995 nomination.
4 We had no real basis for which to do any items until
5 the '95 recommendation was in fact official so.
6 Q I don't think that's a direct answer. Am I
7 to understand then that from the time you were
8 appointed to that position until the BRAC Commission
9 made a -- what do you call it? A recommendation?
10 A Right.
11 Q In March; is that correct?
12 A It was made on the 28th day of February.
13 Q February 28th. Until that time you didn't do
14 anything to get ready for or think about how to get
15 ready for the move of that fogging operation here?
16 A We did a great deal of work in the master
17 planning area, but only in the sense of assessing the
18 capacity of Fort Leonard Wood to accommodate mission,
19 being whenever it might be. And we also did have a
20 number of departments of the Army requisite data
21 collection efforts in, as I recall, July of '94 to
22 communicate to them what our current utilization of
23 Fort Leonard Wood was at.
24 Q Did you communicate with MDNR, that's
25 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, as far as

1 you know on the subject of the move from McClellan to
2 here prior to February 28, 1995?
3 MS. NEFF: Now, that's other than what was
4 already put in as your exhibits for those documents in
5 1993?
6 MR. GREEN: Yes. I'm talking about from the
7 time he was appointed sometime in 1994 up till
8 February 28th, 1995, in that area.
9 MAJ. CORBIN: As it relates to fog oil?
10 MR. GREEN: Well, sure fog oil. Sure.
11 THE WITNESS: Mr. Green, we will -- the
12 reason I'm speaking advice here is I don't recall all
13 the details or the reasons. But we had a meeting
14 approximately two weeks prior to the February 28th
15 announcement at the office of Missouri Department of
16 Natural Resources. I can't be any more accurate than
17 two weeks prior, but that's my answer as to when it
18 occurred. Myself and Ms. Emily Brown and Scott
19 Murrell as I recall attended that meeting at MDNR
20 regarding potential requirements in the event of
21 another recommendation to send mission gain to Fort
22 Leonard Wood from Fort McClellan. But that's all I
23 can recall on that.
24 MR. GREEN: Let's take a short break here.
25 (A brief recess was taken.)

1 to Fort McClellan made on February 22nd of 1995?
2 Q Will you answer the question?
3 LT. COL. FIORE: Go ahead and answer. It's a
4 waste of time.
5 A Mr. Green, I am aware that DNR did that, but
6 I don't know what day I became aware of that. I have
7 every belief that it was well past the 28 February
8 date that I became aware of that and by virtue of
9 being provided that commentary, I believe by Mr. John
10 Young at the DNR, but I know that was well after the
11 28 February date. What I've already answered the
12 question on one previous occasion and that I don't
13 have any recollection or knowledge of what DNR did on
14 their own behalf since essentially from the time of
15 the 1993 commission adjourned until the 28th of
16 February of that year.
17 Q At any time as far as you know did anybody at
18 Fort Leonard Wood request of Fort McClellan
19 information concerning the amount of fog oil actually
20 expended in conducting smoke training operations
21 there?
22 MS. NEFF: I'll object to the relevance of
23 that, if I may. The permit application is what DNR
24 has based their decisions on and what's going on at
25 Fort McClellan is perhaps helpful as a reference

1 MR. GREEN: I'm not sure that's true. We
2 don't plan on being here and I'm trying to move on.
3 Q Do you recall what the question was,
4 Colonel? We do need to get an answer now if you don't
5 mind repeating.
6 A I don't recall, sir, if anyone from Fort
7 Leonard Wood made such a request.
8 Q Did you at any time discuss with Mr. Murrell
9 or anybody else at Leonard Wood the possibility of
10 making such a request?
11 A I do not recall any such conversation, no.
12 Q Now, let's move on to February 28. At that
13 time I think you've told me the BRAC Commission made
14 its recommendation and whatever it made?
15 A It publicly announced the Department of
16 Defense nomination for various base closures and
17 realignment.
18 Q Now, after that announcement was made, what
19 did you understand were your responsibilities as the
20 BRAC Planning Officer?
21 A My duties at that time on the 28th of
22 February, Mr. Green, were to do several things, one of
23 which was to immediately convene a team of, I call it
24 a committee of BRAC planning experts, and begin with
25 all due course and effort the Fort Leonard Wood

1 long-range planning to receive the new mission from
2 Fort McClellan as ordered by Department of the Army
3 headquarters trade op and Department of Defense.
4 Q Was it part of this project that you've just
5 described the obtaining of any permits from DNR?
6 A Yes. The 1993 BRAC decision was tabled at
7 the end of the deliberations and the commission
8 adjourned with an item written into the record that
9 the nomination to close Fort McClellan would again
10 surface in 1995, or could, and that the State of
11 Missouri and Fort Leonard Wood should be prepared to
12 obtain all requisite permits, and we proceeded to do
13 that.
14 Q Did General Ballard at any time ask you to
15 make sure that all requisite permits were obtained?
16 A He, General Ballard, was anxiously watching
17 the Department of Defense announcement on the 28th day
18 of February, and upon hearing that ordered us to
19 proceed with all permit applications. And I delivered
20 those to DNR on 1 March, '95.
21 Q Did he issue that order in writing?
22 A No, sir, he did not.
23 Q Was that oral?
24 A Correct, as I recall.
25 Q Where was that conversation?

1 A That particular conversation, Mr. Green, I
2 don't recall where it occurred.
3 Q Was anybody present?
4 A I don't recall.
5 Q But am I to understand that you've understood
6 at least after that conversation, if not before, that
7 it was part of your duties to obtain the permits from
8 DNR that would be necessary to permit the smoke
9 training school to be moved from McClellan to Leonard
10 Wood?
11 A Yes. I'd say that's a correct understanding
12 on your part. The only thing I would add to that is
13 Fort Leonard Wood submitted the permit application on
14 1 March, but it was not known to us at that particular
15 hour whether DNR would in fact require that permit
16 prior to the training.
17 MR. GREEN: Off the record.
18 (Petitioner's Deposition Exhibit K was marked
19 for identification.)
20 Q I've handed you what's been marked Exhibit K,
21 which purports to be an application for authority to
22 construct; however, I want to make that clear it has
23 various attachments at the back of it and I can't
24 guarantee for sure how much of this stuff at the back
25 was part of the application or not, so I'm not

1 gallons. Then down below that do you see about little
2 more than halfway down "Annual Throughput: 63" and
3 "Units: 1000 gallons"? Do you see those entries?
4 A I see them, yes, sir.
5 Q Do you understand that to be the annual
6 throughput being applied for is 63,000 gallons?
7 A Yes. I'd say that is correct.
8 Q Do you recall any discussion with anybody
9 here at Leonard Wood about what number to put in
10 there?
11 A I don't recall any discussion directly
12 related, sir, to that document, I mean, what total
13 annual gallon throughput to put in this particular
14 form, no.
15 Q Do you recall any discussion with anybody
16 either at Leonard Wood or at DNR about what the total
17 annual throughput would be?
18 A Mr. Green, let me get to the point here. The
19 63,000 gallon throughput was a figure that we
20 determined by simply asking our higher headquarters
21 what rate of training they wanted us to do. The
22 answer came back 63,000 gallons.
23 Q Okay. What is the higher headquarters?
24 A I don't know where that is or whatever
25 documents, but the fact is that's what we are

1 preparing to train at.

2 Q Now, what higher headquarters is that?

3 A Headquarters. TRADOC, T-R-A-D-O-C.

4 LT. COL. FIORE: U.S. Army Training and

5 Doctrine Command.

6 THE WITNESS: They are at Fort Monroe,

7 Virginia.

8 Q Leonard Wood has asked TRADOC; is that right?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Did you authorize that request?

11 A In keeping with the spirit of allowing my

12 Division Chief to take care of daily and routine

13 planning matters, you bet.

14 Q I have not seen any document memorializing

15 that request. Do you know if he made that request in

16 writing?

17 A I don't know that he did, quote, memorialized

18 or not. But the fact is that was our training figure

19 that when we went through various forms I believe we

20 had their directive to train at.

21 Q Did he tell you that he made that inquiry to

22 train at?

23 A I don't recall him telling me anything

24 relative to inquiring.

25 Q How do you know that such inquiry was made?

1 was subsequently reduced. What I know is that during
2 our visitation to Fort McClellan we had an opportunity
3 to observe training in detail, and I relayed those
4 training techniques to Mr. Murrell here at Leonard
5 Wood and cleared him to process the training
6 management and air modeling at the rate of one hour
7 per day.
8 Q When was that that you had a visitation at
9 McClellan?
10 A I don't know, sir. It was in the month of
11 April. I believe the third week of April.
12 Q You personally went?
13 A Yes, I did.
14 Q Did Mr. Murrell accompany you?
15 A Mr. Murrell stayed at home stationed during
16 that week, sir.
17 Q Who did go from Leonard Wood to McClellan
18 with you for that visit?
19 A I had a number of people with me at Fort
20 McClellan, sir, from Fort Leonard Wood Corps of
21 Engineers, Army Audit Agency and a number of other
22 people.
23 Q Well, environmental people in your
24 Environmental Division. Did any of them go with you?
25 A Yes. I had Ms. Emily Brown and Rory,

1 R-O-R-Y, McCarthy with me.
2 Q Those are the only two?
3 A Yes, sir. That's correct.
4 Q Were you there more than a day?
5 A Yes.
6 Q How long?
7 A We were there for five days, five working
8 days.
9 Q Did you discuss the fog training operation
10 with the commander of the fog training there?
11 A Mr. Green, there is no such thing as
12 commander of fog training. There's a commander of the
13 U.S. Army Chemical School, and he has a number of
14 assistants that help manage that. But I discussed
15 those issues numerous occasions while at Fort
16 McClellan.
17 Q What about did you discuss them with the
18 commander of the school?
19 A The commander of the chemical school himself,
20 no, sir.
21 Q Whom did you discuss them with there?
22 A I discussed the --
23 LT. COL. FIORE: Objection. What relevance
24 is discussion with someone at Fort McClellan to a
25 variance request to an MDNR permit, draft permit for

1 opacity?

2 MR. GREEN: I think all discussions with

3 McClellan personnel about the fogging might very well

4 be very relevant here.

5 LT. COL. FIORE: Not relevant to the variance

6 issues.

7 MR. GREEN: Oh, yes, I think so, very much

8 so. Quantities are obviously relevant and other

9 things as well. Frequency is relevant. All these are

10 terms of the permit.

11 LT. COL. FIORE: We have already outlines and

12 restrictions in which the way the training would be

13 conducted. How someone else does it is not relevant.

14 MR. GREEN: It may or may not be relevant,

15 but discussions may be.

16 Q With whom did you discuss these matters?

17 A The only gentleman I can recall by name, Mr.

18 Green, is Lieutenant Colonel Ted, I call him Ted,

19 Newing, N-E-W-I-N-G. I also discussed those matters

20 with another Lieutenant Colonel, whose name I do not

21 recall, and several noncommissioned officers whose

22 names I do not recall.

23 Q Did you discuss with either Lieutenant

24 Colonel the adequacy of a one hour a day limitation

25 for the training the school conducts?

1 A Yes, sir. I understand your question in that
2 -- in that Fort McClellan is not regulated in the way
3 that we are obtaining this permit for this training.
4 I did not seek their concurrence on the adequacy of
5 the one-hour training. I simply asked them how did
6 they conduct the training, how to verify. I visited
7 the training, I witnessed the training, and I also
8 discussed those things at length with those various
9 people and drew my own conclusion that one hour would
10 be sufficient for our permitting activity here and
11 meet the Army's requirement for training.
12 Q That was your personal conclusion, right?
13 A That is correct.
14 Q Can you tell me what facts led you to that
15 conclusion?
16 LT. COL. FIORE: I believe you've already
17 asked that question. He just explained to you how he
18 was led to that conclusion.
19 MR. GREEN: He has explained the process.
20 I'm asking what facts he may have to support that.
21 LT. COL. FIORE: How is that relevant to the
22 variance, sir?
23 MR. GREEN: It's very relevant, very
24 relevant.
25 LT. COL. FIORE: I would prefer for you to

1 that right?
2 A That's correct.
3 Q So on March 1 you filed this permit
4 application we just went through; is that right?
5 A Mr. Green, Fort Leonard Wood filed our permit
6 applications on 1 March.
7 Q Right.
8 A Whether it was that document that you have
9 obtained from DNR's files in that form, I can't say.
10 Q That's a very good answer. Okay. Now, was
11 there any reason why you did not file your application
12 for variance on March 1?
13 A I don't personally have a reason for that,
14 Mr. Green. I know that was several days, perhaps
15 weeks beyond 1 March before we were advised by DNR to
16 do so, and that was as a result of the permit being on
17 its way to being prepared it became obvious we needed
18 to do that. We were not advised early on to do the
19 variance.
20 Q But we've -- earlier this afternoon you and I
21 have looked at the variance application of 1993,
22 remember that?
23 A Yes, I do.
24 Q And Mr. Murrell at least, even if you knew
25 nothing about it, knew very well that a variance

1 application was going to be required, didn't he?
2 A I wouldn't say that, Mr. Green, in my
3 opinion. And the reason for that disagreement is the
4 fact that the --
5 LT. COL. FIORE: I object. There's no way to
6 speculate on what Mr. Murrell knew or didn't know
7 except asking Mr. Murrell.
8 Q You adopt the Colonel's answer?
9 A Yeah. I like his answer.
10 Q I thought you would. He didn't even have to
11 write you a message that time. Okay. Now, do you
12 recall discussing with Mr. Murrell or anybody else at
13 any time the reason for delaying a variance
14 application request until April 21?
15 A I don't recall any discussions on that, sir,
16 as to why we would have waited to a certain point to
17 date other than advice by DNR.
18 MR. GREEN: Off the record.
19 (A discussion was held off the record.)
20 (Petitioner's Deposition Exhibit L was marked
21 for identification.)
22 (A brief recess was taken.)
23 Q Colonel, I want to hand you what's been
24 marked as Exhibit L, a single page, and ask you if you
25 recognize that.

1 way of knowing and I guess the witness can't tell me.
2 All right.
3 LT. COL. FIORE: That other reference is
4 actually the final page of what is Exhibit K.
5 MR. GREEN: I'm sorry?
6 LT. COL. FIORE: The transmittal. That other
7 place that header shows up is the final page of
8 Exhibit K with the same received date stamp on it.
9 MR. GREEN: Right.
10 (Petitioner's Deposition Exhibit N was marked
11 for identification.)
12 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit
13 N. Have you ever seen a copy of that before?
14 A Yes. Mr. Young from Missouri DNR on the date
15 that I do not recall showed me that document at
16 Missouri DNR.
17 Q Did that happen when you -- at some time when
18 you visited DNR?
19 A Yes, sir. That's correct.
20 Q How many times have you been over there
21 talking to the air pollution officials?
22 A I don't recall exactly how many, sir. I'd
23 say three or four times approximately.
24 Q I'm talking since 1 March.
25 A Okay.

1 Q Now, did you have any conversation with Mr.
2 Young about this letter?
3 A Very slight. Just a few words.
4 Q What were they?
5 A I don't even recall the meat of the
6 conversation, Mr. Green. I was on my way out of the
7 building in a rush and spoke just with him a couple
8 words there. He showed me the document and I
9 acknowledged that he had it and I left.
10 Q So before that conversation were you aware
11 that the quantity 63,000 gallons which you applied for
12 the permit for was substantially less than the
13 quantity in fact used at the school in 1993 and in
14 1994?
15 A In answer to your question, Mr. Green, I was
16 not aware of the relative terms one way or the other
17 on the 63,000 gallons. It was, as I explained to you,
18 our belief that our higher headquarters expected us to
19 train at a rate of 63,000 gallons. That's what's in
20 our permit. We have had information that McClellan
21 does procure more than that, but that's irrelevant to
22 me. My job is to train at 63,000 gallons and that's
23 why the permit reflects that.
24 Q Would you read the last paragraph? I don't
25 mean read it into the record, but just read it so that

1 you have it in mind. Do you understand the sentence
2 that says, "Other sources include hexachlorethane
3 smoke pots ..."? Are they used to generate the
4 obscurant as you understand it? Is that what Colonel
5 Newing is saying?
6 A Those are materials, sir, that are utilized
7 elsewhere in the military, but they are not related to
8 smoke training as we have been discussing it here.
9 Q Are they not a part of the smoke training
10 which goes on at Fort McClellan?
11 A I don't know if they train that or not, sir.
12 If they do train it I suspect -- let me rephrase my
13 answer. I suspect they do train it, but I have no
14 idea as to the magnitude of the consumption of those
15 materials, and he's not specifying the consumption of
16 those materials either.
17 Q At any rate, that obscurant would not be
18 permitted under the fogging permit that you have
19 applied for?
20 A That is correct. Our permit only specifies a
21 certain fuel oil, fog oil, and that was not what that
22 item means.
23 Q I would ask you the same questions about the
24 colored dye smoke grenades, the infrared defeating
25 obscurant grenades (grass flakes) and large area

1 infrared defeating obscurants (graphite powder), if
2 the Colonel and Debbie don't object on that one, and
3 then leave this alone.
4 LT. COL. FIORE: I certainly want to object
5 to it.
6 Q Do you understand that those various items
7 are used as part of the smoke training school at
8 McClellan?
9 A He is saying that. Colonel Newing is
10 indicating that, sir. I don't know the magnitude of
11 the training at Fort McClellan, but they are not fog
12 oil, which is the only relevant.
13 Q So these also would not be permitted on the
14 permit that you applied for?
15 A Under our permit, that is correct.
16 Q Are you aware that other services other than
17 the Army participate in the smoke training at
18 McClellan?
19 A Yes. I would say there are other services
20 training at Fort McClellan other than the Army.
21 Q Such as what?
22 A United States Air Force.
23 Q Any others?
24 LT. COL. FIORE: We'll stipulate there are
25 other services that train at Fort McClellan. What's

1 the relevance of it? They will train to the same
2 standards subject to the subject permit if they train
3 here.
4 THE WITNESS: If they're trained. But the
5 point is we have received our ceiling for fog oil
6 consumption from our headquarters. That would be an
7 all-encompassing training requirement.
8 Q Do you have any understanding whether the
9 Army, this great institution, plans that those other
10 services would get their training here if the school
11 moves here?
12 A The other -- the mission as it's trained at
13 Fort McClellan will be transferred in total to Fort
14 Leonard Wood as I know it at this hour.
15 Q I'd like to direct your attention to the last
16 sentence of this Exhibit N. Do you understand that
17 sentence?
18 A Yes, I understand that sentence.
19 Q What does that sentence mean, translated for
20 a layman like me?
21 A What that --
22 LT. COL. FIORE: I object. You'd have to ask
23 Colonel Newing what he meant.
24 MR. GREEN: Well, this gentleman said he
25 understood it, which is good work. I'm pleased. I'd

1 like to know what he understands.

2 LT. COL. FIORE: Well, I'm going to object

3 anyway. The document speaks for itself. It was

4 addressed to DNR from Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard

5 Wood is not a party to the letter and can't be

6 expected to understand the background information that

7 goes with that sentence.

8 MR. GREEN: Maybe it can't be expected to,

9 but Colonel Johnson went above and beyond the call of

10 duty, 'cause he does understand.

11 Q So what is your understanding, Colonel?

12 A Mr. Green, on the advice of counsel I prefer

13 to answer that that probably would best be obtained

14 from Colonel Newing.

15 Q Well, then you decline to answer?

16 A Yes, I do.

17 Q Have you in the last three years personally

18 been involved in discussions over the effect of the

19 fog training operations, potential effect of them here

20 on flora and fauna?

21 A Mr. Green, our discussions involving smoke

22 training as it relates to --

23 MS. KNOWLES: He's writing him another note.

24 MR. GREEN: Another note. I really would

25 like to get Colonel Johnson's testimony whenever

1 possible, not Colonel Fiore's.

2 LT. COL. FIORE: Believe me, you're getting

3 it in excrutiating detail.

4 MR. GREEN: Yeah, but getting -- what I'm

5 getting is Colonel Fiore's answers with all these

6 notes passing by. I'd like to know what Colonel

7 Johnson knows.

8 THE WITNESS: The discussions of the last

9 three years are unknown to me as they pertain to all

10 this. As I already mentioned to you, I've only been

11 the Director of Public Works for two and a half years,

12 so anything prior to that I have no involvement in.

13 Furthermore, I don't have any involvement in any of

14 those discussions as they related to BRAC 1993. What

15 has transpired in recent months centers around the

16 fact that smog or rather smoke training fog oil use

17 has in the air quality monitoring been considered as

18 it relates to soil and vegetation impact off the

19 installation and the fact that those would be handled

20 in full detail under deeper processes in the future.

21 Q Are you aware that Scott Murrell has

22 apparently decided either with or without consultation

23 with you that some samples of soil and vegetation

24 taken in 1993 are suspect and should not be used?

25 A Yes. I am aware of that particular item.

1 A Restate your question, sir.

2 Q Fair enough. We have a proposed permit that

3 I think you've referred to for the fogging operation;

4 is that right?

5 A Yes, sir.

6 Q Do you understand that it includes

7 limitations based on meteorological conditions?

8 A Yes, sir, I understand that.

9 Q You only fog at a given place when the wind

10 is blowing one direction or another and it's all

11 specified, right?

12 A Well, I differ with your term "all

13 specified," but the training's been carefully worked

14 out to accommodate weather conditions.

15 Q Do you understand what happens if after you

16 have been fogging for an hour and there's fog in the

17 air and the wind suddenly changes and doesn't do what

18 you planned it to do? Do you understand what you can

19 do about that?

20 LT. COL. FIORE: Mr. Green, that calls for

21 speculation. The witness is not a meteorologist, nor

22 is he a chemist, nor is he an air specialist.

23 MR. GREEN: Well, he's supposed to be in

24 charge, I thought.

25 LT. COL. FIORE: That doesn't make him an

1 expert on all the things that his subordinates do.
2 MR. GREEN: Isn't he the man that's going to
3 have to do something if the wind changes when people
4 didn't expect it to?
5 THE WITNESS: Mr. Green, our permit, excuse
6 me, proposed permit has a set of performance measures
7 in it as it relates to the training in concert with
8 the weather. Those conditions will either be met or
9 we will not train. That was our intent all along was
10 to comply with DNR's requirements and to train with
11 some degree of respect for those.
12 Q This Exhibit P that's been put in front of
13 you has a lot of pages with little tiny numbers and
14 nothing else on them. This kind of page. I'm not
15 competent to deal with that at all. Are you competent
16 to read those pages and extract information from them?
17 A Counsel's already advised, sir, I am not a
18 meteorologist nor am I a chemist or a chemical
19 engineer. That's why we hire Burns & McDonnell to do
20 that for us.
21 Q You don't review those and try to figure out
22 what conclusions to draw from those things; is that
23 right?
24 A I have reviewed the documents in various
25 meetings and at the same time my other staff members

1 A No, it doesn't.

2 Q What about at the same location do you recall

3 a Paul Josephson?

4 A I do not.

5 Q At the Army -- U.S. Army Forces Command

6 Atlanta, Georgia do you recall a Rochelle Williams?

7 A I do not know Rochelle Williams.

8 Q At Aberdeen Proving Ground in Edgewood,

9 again, do you recall a Larry Weber?

10 A I do not.

11 Q Is Lieutenant Colonel Sutton the Fort

12 McClellan Lieutenant Colonel you mentioned earlier

13 that you couldn't remember the name of offhand?

14 A I really don't recall the gentleman's name,

15 sir. I don't know if it's Sutton or not.

16 Q Do you recall a Major Teller of the

17 Environmental Law Division of the Department of Army?

18 LT. COL. FIORE: For the record, Major Teller

19 is a colleague of Major Corbin and he will be here

20 tomorrow. He is an Army attorney assigned to the

21 Environmental Law Division.

22 MR. GREEN: I appreciate that.

23 Q Do you have any recollection of him?

24 A No, I do not.

25 Q Now, can you tell me as the man in charge of

1 A My answer to the question, sir, goes back to
2 one that I've stated about numerous times here. I
3 applied through my staff for the permits on 1 March of
4 1995.
5 Q Then let me hand you what's been marked here
6 Exhibit S. Have you seen this paper before, a copy of
7 it?
8 A Let me read this right now. I don't recall
9 this document, Mr. Green.
10 Q Then I'll ask you one follow-up question.
11 Please don't be upset about this. Do you recall any
12 effort to respond to this letter?
13 A I've already said I don't recognize the
14 document, sir; therefore, my answer is I don't recall
15 any effort to respond to that, of course.
16 Q Do you recall any communication shortly after
17 March 10, 1995 from Leonard Wood to the requesting
18 Colonel Roszkowski furnishing the information that
19 happens to be requested in this letter?
20 A I don't recall specifically these items, no,
21 sir.
22 Q Let's try Exhibit T. Have you -- I realize
23 this is not from or to Leonard Wood, but have you seen
24 a copy of that before?
25 A I've never seen a copy of that, sir, that I

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

1995 HEARINGS

BOOK IV

23. June 13, 1995 (Congressional)
24. June 14, 1995 (DoD)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

8:30 a.m.

216 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, June 13, 1995

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Senator Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Mr. Alton W. Cornella
Ms. Rebecca G. Cox
General J.B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)
Mr. S. Lee Kling
Major General Josue Robles, USA (Ret.)
Mrs. Wendi Louise Steele

* * * * *

C O N T E N T S

PAGE

Opening Remarks of The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 7

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY:

MICHIGAN:

Representative Bonior 124

MISSISSIPPI:

Senator Thad Cochran 9
Senator Trent Lott 12
Representative Sonny Montgomery 19

MISSOURI:

Sen Kit Bond 23
Senator John Ashcroft 29
Representative Dick Gephardt 36
Representative William Clay 40
Representative James Talent 45
Representative Ike Skelton 51

MONTANA:

Senator Max Baucus 63
Senator Conrad Burns 54

NEW JERSEY:

Senator Bill Bradley 58
Senator Frank Lautenberg 68
Representative Jim Saxton 73
Representative Chris Smith 77
Representative Frank Pallone 81
Representative Robert Menendez 87
Representative Dick Zimmer 91

NEW YORK:

Senator Pat Moynihan 96
Senator Al D'Amato 99
Representative Gary Ackerman 102
Representative Susan Molinari 105
Representative Sherwood Boehlert 110
Representative Jack Quinn 114
Representative John LaFalce 119

NORTH CAROLINA:

Representative Walter Jones 129

NORTH DAKOTA:

Senator Kent Conrad 132
Senator Byron Dorgan 139
Representative Earl Pomeroy 135

OHIO:

Senator John Glenn 143
Senator Mike Dewine 148
Representative Tony Hall 152
Representative Dave Hobson 155
Representative Jim Traficant 160
Representative Rob Portman 511
Representative John Kasich 454

OKLAHOMA:

Senator Don Nickles 165
Senator Jim Inhofe 170
Representative Bill Brewster 174
Representative J.C. Watts 181
Representative Ernst Istook 185
Representative Frank Lucas 177

PENNSYLVANIA:

Senator Rick Santorum 225
Representative Tom Foglietta 234
Representative Robert Borski 221
Representative Jon Fox 205
Representative Tim Holden 191
Representative Curt Weldon 266
Representative Bud Shuster 216
Representative Ron Klink 261
Representative Mike Doyle 247
Representative Frank Mascara 251
Representative Phil English 516
Representative George Gekas 195
Representative Paul Kanjorski 231
Representative Joe McDade 201

PUERTO RICO:

Delegate Carlos Romero-Barcelo 255

RHODE ISLAND:

Senator Claiborne Pell 443
Senator Chafee 271
Representative Jack Reed 275

TENNESSEE:

Senator Bill Frist 281
Senator Fred Thompson 285
Representative Harold Ford 289
Representative Ed Bryant 294

TEXAS:

Senator Phil Gramm 297
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison 301
Representative Jim Chapman 305
Representative Joe Barton 309
Representative Lloyd Doggett 314
Representative Charles Stenholm 331
Representative Larry Combest 323
Representative Henry Gonzalez 336
Representative Lamar Smith 339
Representative Henry Bonilla 343
Representative Martin Frost 328
Representative Greg Laughlin 351
Representative Kika de la Garza 354

UTAH:

Senator Orrin Hatch 357
Senator Bob Bennett 361
Representative Jim Hansen 364
Representative Enid Waldholtz 370

VIRGINIA:

Senator John Warner 308
Senator Chuck Robb 378
Representative Owen Pickett 384
Representative Bobby Scott 403
Representative Norm Sisisky 395
Representative Jim Moran 407
Representative Tom Davis 412

WISCONSIN:

Senator Herb Kohl 417
Senator Russ Feingold 421
Representative Thomas Barrett 425

MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS:

Senator Richard Shelby 428
Representative Bud Cramer 434
Representative Maxine Waters 439
Representative Sam Gejdenson 446
Representative Rosa DeLauro 457
Representative Ileana Ros Lehtinen 450
Representative Charles Canady 462
Representative Andy Jacobs 465
Representative Patrick Kennedy 278
Representative Tim Hutchinson 301
Representative Chris Shays 478
Representative Dick Durbin 493
Representative Anna Eshoo 500
Representative Bill Orton 374
Representative Steve Horn 473
Representative Solomon Ortiz 488

* * * * *

Page 7

1 PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, ladies and
[illegible]lemen, and welcome to today's hearing of the Defense Base
[illegible]sure and Realignment Commission. My name is Alan Dixon.
5 I'm Chairman of the Commission. With us today are my
6 colleagues, Commissioners Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, S. Lee
7 Kling, Joe Robles, and Wendi Steele. Other commissioners
8 will be arriving through the morning.
9 As most of you know, this Commission is heading
10 into the final three weeks of its difficult and unpleasant
11 task of recommending to the President of the United States
12 which domestic military bases should be closed or realigned.
13 Since we received the closure list from Secretary Perry 15
14 weeks ago, the commissioners have held ten hearings here in
15 Washington, D.C., 16 regional hearings around the country,
16 and made 200 visits to 75 military bases.
17 Yesterday, we heard testimony from 82 Members of
18 the Congress whose states or districts are affected by the
19 base closure list, and today, believe it or not, we will hear
20 from 121 more. This is an important part of the process.
21 For the past three-and-a-half months, commissioners
22 and staff have been in regular contact with elected officials

Page 8

1 and community members, but our hearings yesterday and today
2 will give us one more chance to hear sharply focused
3 arguments regarding bases on the list.
4 Let me assure Members of the Congress and everyone
5 else, this Commission has made no decisions yet regarding
6 which bases will close and which ones will not. Information
7 regarding many installations is still coming in and is still
8 being evaluated by the Commission and the Commission staff.
9 That process will continue right up until the 22nd day of
[illegible]e of this month when the Commission begins its final
[illegible]berations. That is why we regard these two days of
[illegible]timony as extremely valuable to us.
13 As was the case yesterday, we will today hear
14 testimony state-by-state, and each member will be limited to
15 five minutes. We will be required to enforce that limit
16 strictly, because 121 Members of the House and Senate will
17 testify today. Anyone who has longer remarks, or who wishes
18 to submit additional testimony for the record, is welcome to
19 do so.
20 Let me also say that the Base Closure Act requires
21 that all testimony given before the Commission be made under
22 oath. Our staff counsel will swear in Members before they

Page 9

1 testify so that we can keep things moving, and we usually do
2 it before they come in the door.
3 With that, I believe we're ready to begin. We
4 begin today with the great State of Mississippi, and we have
5 here the distinguished Senior Senator from the State of
6 Mississippi, my old friend, Senator Thad Cochran; and we're
7 delighted to have him. Senator Cochran, pleased to have you
8 here, sir.
9 SENATOR COCHRAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
10 Chairman, we appreciate very much the opportunity to talk
11 with you this morning about Columbus Air Force Base and
12 Meridian Naval Air Station, both of which are located in the
13 State of Mississippi.
14 I think it's clear from the facts that military
15 requirements support keeping both bases open. The Department
16 of Defense has not recommended closing Columbus Air Force
17 Base. The Air Force continues to support keeping that base
18 open, and it was clearly stated by General Boles, who was in
[illegible] lumbus just last week. He's the incoming commander of the
[illegible]vice's Air Education and Training Command, and I was
[illegible]ased to be able to attend that site visit. Air Force
22 The base is up to date, it's modern in every way,

Page 10

1 it's efficient. It has excellent air space and weather, a
2 bombing range that would be very difficult to recreate
3 anywhere else, excellent or magnificent runways, as one
4 person has described them, no encroachment problems, and it
5 has the enthusiastic support of the state and local
6 community.
7 Meridian Naval Air Station has been scrutinized by
8 three successive Base Closure Commissions. The question
9 before the Commission is whether the Navy can single-site all
10 undergraduate pilot training at one base. The primary
11 mission of Naval Air Station Meridian is to conduct
12 undergraduate pilot training.
13 The pilot training rate provided by the Navy to the
14 Commission is wrong, by the Navy's own admission. Only last
15 week there was an article in Defense News, which I'd like to
16 submit to the Commission for inclusion in the record, where
17 senior Navy officials say that the Navy will have to keep six
18 additional squadrons in its force structure, six more than it
19 had planned to decommission by 1997.
20 I would also like to submit, Mr. Chairman, for the
21 record, a recent memorandum from Admiral Boorda, the Chief of
22 Naval Operations, dated May 10, 1995, which directs his staff

Page 11

1 to increase the pilot training rate from 336, the number
2 supplied to the Commission by the Navy, to 360, the result of
3 keeping six additional squadrons in the force structure.
4 The facts clearly show that one base cannot conduct
5 all of the required strike undergraduate pilot training.
6 Admiral Hayden, the Chief of Naval Air Training, has
7 acknowledged that, at a PTR -- pilot training rate -- out of
8 360, there is no surge capability and, when the E2C2 training
9 rate is included in this, as it must be, the pilot training
10 rate comes out to be 382.
11 Your charter, as you well know and have eloquently
12 stated, is to save the Department of Defense money by closing
13 or realigning unnecessary infrastructure while, at the same
14 time, maintaining infrastructure for the military to be able
15 to carry out its missions. I hope you will ask the Chief of
16 Naval Operations tomorrow if he believes the Navy can meet
17 its mission requirements with Naval Air Station Meridian.
18 Back in December, Mr. Chairman, when you were
19 talking to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, you said, very
20 correctly:
21 "Base closing should not be simply a budget-cutting
22 tactic. It should be undertaken to reduce our defense

Page 12

1 infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve our
2 long-term military readiness and ensure that we are spending
3 taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible. We
4 should not make hasty decisions that will eliminate important
5 military assets based on our near-term budget imperatives."
6 Mr. Chairman, you will have the facts to
7 demonstrate that military requirements necessitate keeping
8 both Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station.
9 Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my old friend, the
11 distinguished Senior Senator from the great State of
12 Mississippi.
13 We're delighted to have here with him his
14 colleague, my old friend, the Majority Whip, the fine Senator
15 from the State of Mississippi. I served with him as chairman
16 of the Readiness Subcommittee. He was my ally and friend,
17 the Ranking Member, and nobody ever had a better-mannered
18 friend to work with in the United States Senate -- Senator
19 Trent Lott of Mississippi.
20 SENATOR LOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we
21 did some good work together.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Amen, brother.

Page 13

1 SENATOR LOTT: It's a pleasure to appear before you
2 today and, of course, I remember those experiences as we sat
3 beside each other in committee hearings. Members of the
4 Commission, thank you very much for giving us the opportunity
5 to testify to you regarding the two Mississippi bases that
6 are under consideration by you today.
7 As my distinguished colleague has just said, of
8 course, there has been a recommendation to close Meridian
9 Naval Air Station. That was on the list that came from the
10 Pentagon. But you added Columbus Air Force Base in order to
11 fully evaluate the Department's decision to recommend closure
12 of Reese Air Force Base.
13 I'd like to start with Columbus Air Force Base.
14 Columbus was not recommended for closure by the Secretary for
15 three very sound reasons.
16 First, it is a top-ranked pilot training base in
17 the Air Force today. Columbus has great weather, great
18 facilities, and an outstanding record of training pilots for
19 the Air Force.
20 Second, Columbus has the best facilities of all Air
21 Force pilot training bases. As an old SAC base, its 12,000-
22 foot runway and top-of-the-line support facilities provides

Page 14

1 Columbus with the flexibility needed by the Air Force as it
2 continues to train our undergraduate pilots for the future,
3 even with fewer bases.
4 Third, the cost of training pilots at Columbus is
5 the second lowest in the entire Air Force. Based on the
6 future defense budget, of course, it's essential that we
7 retain one of our most cost-effective bases.
8 For these reasons, I believe the Department was
9 correct when it identified the military value of Columbus Air
10 Force Base and recommended retention of that base, and I
11 encourage you to follow the Secretary's recommendations and
12 keep Columbus, simply because the Department did not deviate
13 from closure criteria.
14 Regarding Meridian Naval Air Station, you are
15 largely being asked to review the work of the two previous
16 Commissions. It has been quite an experience. What was it?
17 I think that we had a great Prime Minister of England one
18 time who said, "There's nothing more exhilarating than being
19 shot at and missed." We've been shot at twice and missed,
20 and we'd like to do that one more time.
21 We think that the Commissions made the right
22 decisions in the past. They rejected the Department's

Page 15

1 recommendations, and I think that you should do the same.
2 I can tell you that the previous Commissions
3 carefully reviewed the closure recommendations in the past
4 and determined that the Navy could not meet their pilot
5 training rate requirements if Meridian was closed. That is a
6 critical part of that decision, and I think that was the
7 point that the Commission made the decision on two years ago.
8 This year, you're in the same situation faced by
9 these previous Commissions. If Meridian Naval Air Station is
10 closed, the Navy will not be able to meet their strike pilot
11 requirement. As my colleague just pointed out, there would
12 be a tremendous responsibility on the one remaining base.
13 In order to meet their strike training requirement,
14 that one base at Kingsville, they would have to operate that
15 base 16 hours a day, five days a week, all year long. Under
16 this scenario, we can provide the only surge capacity
17 available, and this surge capability will cost you time-and-
18 a-half on Saturdays and double time on Sundays.
19 This op. tempo would equate to 26 aircraft taking
20 off every hour, one every 2.3 minutes and, during that hour,
21 an average of six jets are in the landing pattern at the home
22 field, six at Corpus Christi, and four jets in the pattern at

Page 16

1 Alice Orange Grove, all day, five days a week, all year long.
2 It's just not practical, not safe, and probably not even
3 possible.
4 After the Meridian community presented this
5 information to you in Birmingham, the Navy re-evaluated their
6 pilot training rate calculations and made several changes.
7 First -- and this is important -- they delayed the
8 closure date of Meridian from 1999 to 2001. This was done
9 primarily to delay the impact of increasing the extremely
10 high op. tempo required at Kingsville. In effect, the Navy
11 has agreed that the op. tempo at Kingsville, due to the
12 Secretary's recommendation, is difficult and stressful, so
13 much so that they want to delay its impact as long as
14 possible.
15 Secondly, the Navy increased their strike PTR
16 requirement from 336 to 360 and expedited the shift of the
17 E2C2 training mission to a strike base. This increase in PTR
18 exemplifies the difficulty of predicting the Navy's pilot
19 requirements in the future. It could go up again and, if it
20 does, the Navy has an even bigger problem in the future.
21 The cumulative impact of these changes validates
22 the essential need to maintain two strike training bases for

Page 17

1 the Navy. Without two bases, they have no flexibility, very
2 limited surge capability, and face an undue and unacceptable
3 risk.
4 You essentially face four questions regarding the
5 proposed Meridian closure:
6 Can the Navy meet their strike PTR requirements
7 with only one base? The answer is no.
8 Does one strike base provide the Navy sufficient
9 surge capability in the event of war or other PTR increases
10 in the future? The answer is clearly no.
11 Is it reasonable to safely expect student pilots to
12 learn to fly jets at one base, particularly when that one
13 base forces you to operate with very small margins for error,
14 delay, or precision? And I think the answer is no.
15 Is Meridian, Lauderdale County, and the State of
16 Mississippi receiving equitable treatment compared to the
17 exemptions granted to California bases due to impact
18 economic? According to the GAO, the answer is no.
19 In closing, I want to repeat the statement made by
20 the Meridian community every year that the Commission has
21 reviewed their fate: if a fair review of the numbers showed
22 that Meridian should not be closed and that there was a

Page 18

1 substantial deviation existing, then shouldn't the base be
2 kept open?
3 I urge you to accept the recommendation to retain
4 Columbus Air Force Base and reject the idea that the United
5 States Navy can meet their strike pilot requirements at only
6 one base. If you support these two positions, the Air Force
7 and Navy will be better off and the country will benefit from
8 your wisdom. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
9 of the Commission.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
11 Lott, and the Commission is indebted to both you and your
12 colleague, Senator Cochran, for your great work on behalf of
13 your state and your fine testimony.
14 We simply want to say that I know you're now going
15 to introduce your congressional friend from the House side --
16 SENATOR LOTT: I just want to say, Mr. Chairman,
17 besides that, both of these bases are in Sonny's district.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, let me tell you, I just want
19 to say this about Representative Sonny Montgomery. We've had
20 ten hearings in Washington, D.C. and Congressman Montgomery
21 has been at all ten, and that's more than I can say for my
22 commissioners.

Page 19

1 So Sonny, you're not a strange looking fellow.
2 We've seen you here before. So I guess you might as well
3 your whole load now. Representative Sonny Montgomery
4 [illegible] the great State of Mississippi.
5 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: I don't know whether I
6 really need to say anything or not, Mr. Chairman.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've been doing pretty good just
8 staring at us, Sonny.
9 (Laughter.)
10 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: He thinks that I'm
11 tired of looking at him every day.
12 (Laughter.)
13 REPRESENTATIVE MONTGOMERY: Mr. Chairman and
14 Commissioners, I moved from the front row to the pulpit this
15 morning. Now, tomorrow, I'll be back on the front row.
16 As has been said, I speak on behalf of the two
17 bases, Meridian Naval Air Station and Columbus Air Force
18 Base. Three of you have been to the Meridian Naval Air
19 Station, and General J.B. Davis has agreed to go there on
20 Friday, to the Meridian Naval Air Station.
21 Commissioners Cornella and Steele visited Meridian
22 on June the 8th. It was 90- degree weather, but over 20,00

Page 20

1 people turned out in support of the base. When General
2 Robles was in Meridian, we had 12,000 people and 70 degrees.
3 The Navy Meridian team makes a strong case that the
4 Navy was on shaky ground in saying it could meet future pilot
5 training requirements at just one base. Since Meridian was
6 put on the closure list, things have changed, as has been
7 pointed out by my colleagues this morning.
8 The Navy says it needs more air squadrons and has
9 revised the pilot training rate, and we have charts there
10 that will follow my remarks. The training rate was at 336
11 now it has been moved up by the Navy to 382, to train
12 [illegible]ts. Now the Navy says if Meridian is closed, it needs to
13 [illegible] kept open for two more years, from 1999 to the year 2001.
14 You've seen the letter to me from Admiral Mike
15 Boorda, where he says that, operating at maximum capacity --
16 these are his words -- that one base, to meet the projected
17 PTR, the pilot training, would be difficult and
18 uncomfortable. The admiral also says it would be
19 unsatisfactory if the Navy had to increase pilot training for
20 a significant surge requirement.
21 To reach the required pilot training, or PTRs, on
22 only one base, NAS Kingsville would have to operate at near

Page 21

1 capacity, including increased work days. Operating at that
2 level simply does not allow for a surge in pilot training.
3 Also, with one strike base, a tornado or hurricane hitting
4 Kingsville puts the Navy out of business in training carrier
5 pilots.
6 In voting to keep Meridian open in 1993, BRAC
7 commissioners found that two full strike training bases were
8 needed when the PTR, pilot training, was 384. The projected
9 PTR is now up to 382.
10 NAS Meridian has different missions. We are fully
11 utilizing that base.
12 First, it's the training of aviators to land in fly
13 off of carriers.
14 Second, the base has a Naval Technical Training
15 Center which trains 5,000 sailors and Marines.
16 Third, the anti-drug school, that was not
17 recommended for closure. Some of you have seen that school.
18 Fourth, the Chief of the Naval Reserve has said if
19 Meridian is not closed, he will move a 200-person Reserve
20 [illegible]t from Jackson, Mississippi to Meridian.
21 The criteria guiding this Commission gives priority
22 [illegible] military value. The facts are clear that, for operational

Page 22

1 readiness, the Navy needs two strike training bases.
2 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that your
3 commissioners visited Columbus Air Force Base on June the 7th
4 and June the 8th, and four commissioners did come. The key
5 word with Columbus is flexibility. It can support any of the
6 five Air Force flying missions.
7 Having once been a Strategic Air Command base, it
8 has, as has been mentioned, the longest runway in the South,
9 at 12,000 feet. It can accommodate any aircraft that's in
10 the Air Force inventory, large or small.
11 In addition, Columbus is the only undergraduate
12 pilot training base with the use of a gun range. That is a
13 big plus. It has an abundance of air space and no
14 encroachment problems of any kind.
15 Strong community support brought the base to
16 Columbus in 1941 and that relationship is just as strong
17 today. The Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Study Group
18 both rank Columbus as the number one undergraduate pilot
19 training base.
20 The highest priority ought to be given to bases
21 with the ability to adapt to new missions. Columbus is in
22 that category. Columbus has updated facilities, air space,

Page 23

1 and community support, which makes a compelling case to keep
2 Columbus Air Force Base open.
3 Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I'll
4 be back tomorrow.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, it's great to finally hear
6 from you, Sonny.
7 We're indebted to the great State of Mississippi,
8 its fine Senators and its fine Congressman for a first-class
9 presentation. Thank you very much.
10 We'll now hear from the great State of Missouri and
11 Senator Kit Bond, its distinguished Senior Senator. My old
12 friend, Senator Kit Bond. I'm telling all these stories
13 about being ranking. I was chairman of a Subcommittee on
14 Banking. My old friend, Senator Bond, was ranking on that,
15 and we had a fine, warm relationship, and I'm delighted to
16 see an old friend and neighbor, the distinguished senior
17 Senator from the great State of Missouri, Senator Kit Bond.
18 SENATOR BOND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
19 Those are the good old days when the Cardinals weren't 12
20 games out, as well.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're not going to make it this
22 year, Kit.

Page 24

1 SENATOR BOND: Well, practice, I guess, makes
2 perfect.
3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I thank you for
4 affording all of us, the Senators and the Congressmen from
5 Missouri, an opportunity to address you on this issue of
6 great national importance, the streamlining of our national
7 defense system.
8 There are three specific issues we need to address:
9 the Army Publications Center in St. Louis, Fort Leonard Wood,
10 and ATCOM.
11 First, we fully support the Army's plan to
12 consolidate the Army Publications Center in St. Louis. The
13 construction of an additional loading bay, scheduled to begin
14 this year, has been approved by the Secretary of the Army,
15 and the funds have been released to accomplish this. We are
16 well on our way to ensuring the move will occur with minimal,
17 if any, impact on operations.
18 Now, with respect to the more of the Army's
19 Chemical Warfare Training School and Military Police School
20 to new facilities at Fort Leonard Wood, this has been a
21 contentious issue, though I don't think it should be. I know
22 the Commission is well aware of the commitment and support of

Page 25

1 the people of Missouri for this move. I've seen it firsthand
2 and I can explain it at great length to anybody who has any
3 questions about it.
4 We've had to face what's been a well-financed and
5 clever onslaught by the friends of Fort McClellan. I do
6 believe we have successfully defended the Army's plan and
7 exposed some of the subterfuges used by those opposed to the
8 move.
9 Time Magazine, you may have seen, in its May 22
10 issue, characterized the opposition as conducting guerilla
11 warfare to sabotage the move and blackmail -- harsh words,
12 not mine, they're Time Magazine's. But I have seen some of
13 the desperate methods employed by these people.
14 They've created havoc during the process, extending
15 even to attempts on the floor of the Congress to slip, into
16 unrelated legislation during the dark of night, draconian
17 regulatory restrictions on future Army facilities while
18 exempting the Alabama site from even a modicum of regulation.
19 Fortunately, we were able to undo that effort.
20 We're aware that there is a classified meeting to
21 be held shortly that was requested by the friends of Fort
22 McClellan. We have spoken with the Department of Defense and

Page 26

1 have been assured that there is no threat to our national
2 security or our ability to meet our commitments due to the
3 move, and that this has been fully considered and examined by
4 the DOD. The commissioners will learn of that firsthand.
5 I also submit to the Commission a survey conducted
6 by the people of Missouri of the people of Missouri, not some
7 group employed by Missouri's opposition, showing that this is
8 well supported. And I would ask that the Commission make
9 that a part of the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be a part of the record,
11 Senator.
12 SENATOR BOND: I also know you're aware of
13 extensive regulatory oversight and permitting requirements
14 this move has required of the Army and the State of Missouri.
15 I'm proud to let you know that Governor Carnahan has signed
16 the final permit. I have a copy of that here. Again, I ask
17 that that be accepted as part of the record.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be put in the record,
19 Senator.
20 SENATOR BOND: This oversight and regulation
21 process on the chemical warfare facilities may seem tedious
22 to some, but I really think it's necessary to ensure the

Page 27

1 safety of the personnel at the facilities, the local resident
2 population, the environment, and national security overall.
3 These tests have been met. This will be the finest
4 state-of-the-art facilities, designed to keep our soldiers
5 superbly trained and ready. I think that's extremely
6 important.
7 Mr. Chairman, on the other hand, the proposal to
8 disperse the Army's Aviation and Troop Command from St.
9 Louis, I believe will be found to be unwise and outdated, as
10 it does not reflect proposal of the DOD's Roles and Missions
11 Commission. The Army Management Control Plan clearly shows
12 that leased facilities were excluded from a military value
13 assessment, a critical factor for all other base closure
14 determinations, but GAO found no documentation that they'd
15 done so.
16 The Army based its decision to close ATCOM
17 primarily on personnel savings, but the 780 positions they
18 anticipate to eliminate did not include the 533 positions
19 that must be retained if ATCOM is closed.
20 The Army also has created a new command
21 infrastructure to include a general officer and staff at the
22 Soldier System Command at Natick. To the best of our

Page 28

1 knowledge, the Army has not calculated this in its personnel
2 savings assumption.
3 In our opinion, this expands, rather than
4 consolidates, the Army's infrastructure, in direct opposition
5 to the BRAC mandate. Additionally, leaving behind hundreds
6 of highly trained workers, re-establishing their positions,
7 training their replacements, essentially rebuilding the
8 program from scratch, will affect readiness.
9 The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
10 Forces, chaired by Mr. John White, has recommended that DOD
11 co-locate all Army, Navy, and Air Force program management
12 officers responsible for development, production, and support
13 of military aircraft and related equipment.
14 As the deputy secretary, Mr. White will be
15 responsible for that, and we should not want to spend
16 millions of dollars to disperse ATCOM to the four corners of
17 the United States only to have it reconsolidated and
18 relocated to a DOD-wide site in a few years. That means the
19 return on our investment won't occur until well after our
20 children have children so, in all likelihood, the savings
21 will never be achieved.
22 Mr. Chairman, I ask your consent that a copy of my

Page 29

1 full statement be included in the record.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your entire statement, Senator,
3 will be included in the record and we're indebted to you for
4 those fine remarks.
5 SENATOR BOND: I thank the Chair and the
6 Commission. Thank you very much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior
8 senator from the great State of Missouri.
9 Now, if his colleague would want to catch his
10 breath for a moment, we can take another member of the
11 delegation. Or is the Senator ready? We're delighted to se
12 the distinguished Senator from the great State of Missouri,
13 Senator John Ashcroft.
14 SENATOR ASHCROFT: Good morning, and thank you Mr
15 Chairman and members of the Commission.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, Senator.
17 SENATOR ASHCROFT: I want to thank the Commission
18 for this opportunity to testify before you.
19 Every community affected by the base closure
20 process asks, at a minimum, that it be given a fair
21 evaluation, an honest review, and even-handed deliberations,
22 and I thank you for your participation in the development of

Page 30

1 this process.
2 Unfortunately, in the case of the Army's decision
3 concerning ATCOM and St. Louis, the Army has not followed
4 these basic requirements of fairness. It's true that, in
5 1993, the BRAC instructed the armed services to include a
6 separate category for leased facilities in the 1995 process.
7 While that instruction somewhat altered the
8 evaluation process, the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air
9 Force, evidently used the instruction as a basis for
10 excluding leased facilities from any evaluation based on the
11 military value criteria established by the Department of
12 Defense. As a result, the Army has targeted leased
13 facilities for closure, while failing to comply with the
14 law's requirement that leased facilities be evaluated in the
15 same manner as other military installations, based on
16 "military value."
17 Let me repeat this for emphasis: of the eight
18 specific criteria identified by the Department of Defense for
19 closing facilities, the Army failed to evaluate ATCOM based
20 on the first four criteria related to military value, despite
21 the Department of Defense's instruction that these four
22 military value criteria be given priority in all evaluations.

Page 31

1 Let me just briefly review a few facts concerning
2 ATCOM, the failure of ATCOM to receive the military value
3 assessment.
4 First, the Army Management Control Plan. The
5 framework used by the Army in its closure and realignment
6 review process shows that ATCOM and other leased facilities
7 were not included in the installation assessment phase of the
8 process until after the Army had evaluated all other
9 facilities and assigned them military values.
10 Second, military value assessment summaries for
11 leased facilities should have been presented to the Secretary
12 of the Army before his decisions were made, but the record
13 shows that such a value assessment was simply not there for
14 ATCOM at that stage of the decision-making process.
15 The Army's response to this glaring omission was
16 the blanket and clearly erroneous statement that, "Leased
17 facilities in general, not necessarily the operations they
18 house, have low military value." This sweeping conclusion
19 obviously has no military value assessment to back it up,
20 which is why Missouri's entire Congressional delegation is
21 concerned about this issue and is making the kind of appeal
22 to you that it is today.

Page 32

1 The last, and perhaps most incriminating evidence
2 of the Army's failure to evaluate ATCOM's military value as
3 required by law, is the fact that, in the Army's own report
4 to the Commission, military value assessment summaries are
5 included for all facilities' categories except one -- leased
6 facilities.
7 As the Chairman of the Commission will recall,
8 Brigadier General Shane, in his April 14 letter to the
9 Chairman, stated categorically that the Army's evaluation
10 process for leased facilities, "might be said to have
11 differed slightly from its process for other types of
12 installations." Well, the General Accounting Office said the
13 same thing more forcefully when it found that the Army, "did
14 not formally adhere to its regular process for installations
15 in assessing military value when recommending minor and
16 leased facilities for closure."
17 GAO also found no documentation "supporting an
18 analysis of or addressing the military value of leases" and
19 the GAO recommended that the Commission, and I quote, "make a
20 determination, under its legislative authority, whether these
21 variances represent substantial deviation from the selection
22 criteria."

Page 33

1 Again, as I stated earlier, the Army was the only
2 -- the only -- service that did not evaluate its leased
3 facilities for their military value. Both the Navy and the
4 Air Force performed military value analysis of their leased
5 facilities. The bottom line is that the Army's own documents
6 show that its decision to close ATCOM in St. Louis was based
7 solely on a flawed cost-savings analysis and not on all eight
8 criteria of the evaluation, as required by the law.
9 The second issue I'd like to address is the
10 Pentagon's recommendation to transfer the Army's Chemical and
11 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan in Alabama to
12 Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri.
13 As the Commission is aware, the state-of-the-art
14 Military Engineer Center at Fort Leonard Wood now conducts
15 training for officers, non-commissioned officers, and
16 enlisted personnel for the Army and other personnel from the
17 Department of Defense. The addition of the Chemical and
18 Military Police Schools from Fort McClellan would allow for
19 joint development of doctrine, and expand opportunities
20 training in all three of the schools.
21 Thus, combining al three schools at Fort Leonard
22 Wood would create a synergy that will do more than just save

Page 34

1 money. It will improve the Army's ability to meet its
2 mission.
3 I want to remind the Commission that Missouri state
4 officials worked tirelessly to ensure that a series of
5 necessary environmental and construction permits and one
6 variance were secured in accordance with a 1993 BRAC
7 directive. The final permit, issued just last week by the
8 Missouri Department of Natural Resources, will allow for the
9 construction of a smoke training facility at Fort Leonard
10 Wood to teach soldiers how to perform in smokescreen type
11 conditions.
12 While we're on the subject of smokescreens, I want
13 to briefly call attention to several concerns that have been
14 raised about this measure by environmental groups and their
15 concerns about the use of real chemical agents at the site.
16 Exhaustive research by the Missouri Department of Natural
17 Resources, and others, makes it clear that the chemicals will
18 pose no danger, because there is never more than milliliter
19 -- a fraction of an ounce -- of agent mixed at any one time.
20 Fort Leonard Wood has already coordinated its
21 proposed new training with both the Missouri Department of
22 Natural Resources and the Army's Training and Doctrine

Page 35

1 Command, to ensure that the required training standards will
2 be met and that the environment is protected.
3 Another smokescreen that's been raised would have
4 us believe that the U.S. national security interests would be
5 adversely affected by moving the Army's Military Police and
6 Chemical Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood.
7 Given the fact that the move will be a phased operation, not
8 a wholesale move at once, there will be no lag time as the
9 transition occurs.
10 Simply stated, as the individual facilities are
11 completed in Missouri, the corresponding facilities in
12 Alabama will close. Let me add, in closing, that Fort
13 Leonard Wood is enthusiastically supported by the surrounding
14 community. The Army could not find a better home for the
15 Army's Military Police and Chemical Schools.
16 I want to thank you again for the care and concern
17 with which this Commission has addressed these issues and for
18 the fact that, on numerous occasions, you've allowed us to
19 participate in your discussions, including your visit to St.
20 Louis at ATCOM, and it's my pleasure to be with you and to be
21 with you today.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator.

Page 36

1 We're delighted to welcome to the rostrum the
2 distinguished Democratic leader of the United States House of
3 Representatives, Representative Dick Gephardt. Congressman
4 Gephardt, thank you for coming.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 very much. I'm very appreciative of the opportunity to be
7 here and make this testimony to this distinguished
8 Commission. I know how hard you're all working to do your
9 responsibilities and to do the right thing for our country.
10 For weeks now, you've heard testimony against
11 various base closings, often arguing that the armed services'
12 numbers simply don't add up. While that sort of argument may
13 seem compelling, that's not the argument that I intend to
14 make. In the case of the Army's Aviation and Troop Command,
15 the numbers do add up. The problem, in my view, is that
16 they're the wrong numbers. Let me explain.
17 The Army claims that, while the closure of ATCOM
18 will cost $152 million, it will also result in the
19 elimination of 786 jobs, saving $56 million each year and
20 yielding a return on the investment in just three years.
21 Despite requests from your staff, the Army has not
22 provided any analysis to support these reductions. At the

Page 37

1 same time, your staff has received Army data which shows that
2 only 48 positions could be eliminated through the closure of
3 ATCOM. I'd like to summarize the data briefly for you.
4 The Army has included savings from 205 positions
5 that will be eliminated at ATCOM regardless of any base
6 closure. The Army's own base closure plan agrees that these
7 positions should not be counted as savings.
8 The Army claims savings from 56 positions that must
9 remain in St. Louis to fulfill contractual obligations to
10 other agencies, such as Defense Finance Accounting Service,
11 FEMA, and the Department of Agriculture.
12 The Army claims savings from 90 positions that must
13 be maintained and transferred to receiving bases to perform
14 base operations functions.
15 The Army claims savings from 387 positions that
16 must be maintained and transferred to receiving bases in
17 order to keep performing ATCOM's functions at these other
18 sites.
19 The bottom line is that, if you subtract these
20 positions from the Army's claims of 786 personnel cuts, then
21 only 48 positions can be eliminated by closing ATCOM.
22 Translating this into costs and savings, ATCOM's closure will

Page 38

1 still cost $152 million but will achieve no annual savings
2 and no return on investment, ever.
3 You don't have to take it from me. Take it from
4 the Army's own officers, the people who have to put this into
5 practice.
6 First, Army's deputy commander has confirmed that
7 these personnel must be kept, regardless of their location,
8 for the Army to continue to perform its support functions.
9 Second, the Tank Command in Detroit and the
10 Communications Command in New Jersey have confirmed that
11 additional personnel will have to be transferred from ATCOM
12 to ensure the Army's operations in these areas continue.
13 Finally, for Red Stone Arsenal, the Army Materiel
14 Command has determined that any shortfall in the number of
15 personnel transferred from ATCOM will be filled by excess
16 personnel presently at Red Stone.
17 When I learned this last piece of information, I
18 asked how many excess personnel does Red Stone Arsenal have?
19 According to the Army's own stationing and installation plan,
20 Red Stone Arsenal currently has 900 more personnel than it
21 needs to perform its mission. This is astounding to me. By
22 the Army's own admission, it's planning to use the closure of

Page 39

1 ATCOM to solve an overstaffing problem at Red Stone Arsenal.
2 As far as I'm concerned, if the Army has too many
3 people at Red Stone, it should downsize there. It shouldn't
4 waste over $150 million to move ATCOM functions and kick 700
5 people out the door in St. Louis -- people who, as you know,
6 have dedicated their lives to the nation's defense -- in
7 order to avoid hard choices at Red Stone.
8 ATCOM has made these tough decisions over the past
9 several years, reducing over 3,000 personnel since 1989. I
10 think now it may be Red Stone's turn.
11 You all know that the BRAC process was not intended
12 to allow DOD to arbitrarily pick winners and loses among
13 civilian personnel. It was intended to reduce the cost of
14 government to the taxpayer and to make the Department of
15 Defense more efficient. Closing ATCOM, in my view, will
16 simply not achieve this goal.
17 Finally, the strength of our Defense Department
18 comes from its people. These are some of the most highly
19 skilled, trained, dedicated people in our entire nation.
20 This is true for each unit of the military, and I know it's
21 particularly true of the individuals that make up ATCOM.
22 I know this Commission is seriously looking at all

Page 40

1 of these issues. I tremendously admire the dedication and
2 work that you're all doing to make the right decisions. I
3 urge you to look at these facts on ATCOM. They are, I think,
4 compelling facts, and I believe that, if you look at them
5 closely, you may come to the conclusion I have. And that is
6 that closing ATCOM in St. Louis will not increase the
7 efficiency, will not increase the savings to the United
8 States Government.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished
10 Democratic leader of the House for his fine remarks, and we
11 are pleased to welcome his distinguished colleague from the
12 Missouri delegation, Representative William Clay.
13 REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT: Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman.
15 Congressman Bill Clay. We're delighted to have
16 you, sir.
17 REPRESENTATIVE CLAY: Mr. Chairman and members of
18 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear this
19 morning.
20 The Army Aviation and Troop Command should be
21 retained in St. Louis, which is the world center for the
22 military and civilian aviation industry. In addition to the

Page 41

1 highly skilled personnel at ATCOM, which have just been
2 described by my colleague, Mr. Gephardt, numerous businesses
3 located in St. Louis support the Army with the most efficient
4 and cost-effective methods of conducting product development
5 and procurement.
6 Uniquely skilled personnel associated with ATCOM's
7 aviation operations, local contractors, and academic
8 institutions combine to provide the Army with an ideal pool
9 of aviation expertise. Moving ATCOM's aviation support
10 functions to Red Stone Arsenal would be counterproductive and
11 definitely cannot achieve the projected cost savings.
12 It seems that the Army has over-estimated cost
13 savings by failing to account for the downsizing already
14 underway at ATCOM and the Army has also failed to adequately
15 access the viable alternatives that would generate genuine
16 cost savings. Fair consideration to alternatives to ATCOM's
17 closure were not given.
18 ATCOM's efforts to reduce personnel and increase
19 efficiency were not thoroughly examined. Plans to reduce
20 personnel by over 200 positions in the next five years will
21 result in savings of almost $10 million annually with an
22 immediate return on investment.

Page 42

1 Moreover, this staff reduction will increase
2 efficiency, reduce overhead, permit a reduction in the amount
3 of space leased from the General Services Administration, and
4 streamline activities, thus accomplishing all of the goals of
5 the Army's stationing strategy.
6 The Army did give some attention to the possibility
7 of relocating the Space and Strategic Defense Command -- SSDC
8 -- from a leased facility in Huntsville, Alabama to Red Stone
9 Arsenal, but this suggestion should have been thoroughly
10 addressed. Apparently, the SSDC proposal was dismissed on
11 the mistaken notion that it would be more costly than closing
12 ATCOM and would not achieve the same efficiencies, synergies,
13 or cost reductions.
14 However, there is no basis for this contention and,
15 in fact, the Army's own data supports the notion that
16 disestablishing SSDC and downsizing ATCOM is a superior
17 choice. Documentation presented by the Army to the
18 Commission indicates that the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
19 Arsenal would cost much less than the closure at ATCOM -- $21
20 million versus $150 million in one-time costs and $2 million
21 versus $12 million in recurring cost.
22 There's reason to believe the one-time costs may be

Page 43

1 even less than the $21 million claimed by the Army, since the
2 Army assumed that a new facility would have to be constructed
3 at Red Stone to accommodate SSD personnel when, in fact, both
4 the Army Materiel Command and the Office of the Assistant
5 Chief of Staff for Installation Management have stated that
6 Red Stone Arsenal currently possesses sufficient space to
7 accommodate approximately 1,500 personnel.
8 The BRAC staff has also confirmed this fact and
9 determined that minimal renovation would be required for Red
10 Stone to accommodate SSD's 950 employees. Based on the BRAC
11 Commission staff's renovation estimates, it may be calculated
12 that the actual one-time costs required to relocate SSDC to
13 Red Stone Arsenal is approximately $1 million, not $21
14 million as claimed by the Army.
15 Using this data, the relocation of SSDC would
16 generate an immediate return on investment, annual savings of
17 at least $1.3 million, and a 20-year net present value of as
18 much as $23 million. This is a much more cost-effective
19 prospect than the closure at ATCOM.
20 Further, the relocation of SSDC to Red Stone
21 Arsenal is entirely consistent with the Army's stationing
22 strategy. The Army's COBRA report for SSDC demonstrates that

Page 44

1 it's relocation would increase efficiency and reduce overhead
2 by eliminating $3.8 million in lease costs and generating
3 only $2.5 million in additional overhead costs at Red Stone
4 Arsenal, for a net savings of $1.3 million annually.
5 Documentation presented by the Army Basing Study
6 Office to the under secretary of the Army stated that the
7 relocation of SSDC would achieve synergy with major program
8 managers and Missile Command and Red Stone. The Army's own
9 data and assertions to its leadership demonstrate that the
10 relocation of SSDC would fulfill the goals of a stationing
11 strategy to reduce overhead and lease space, eliminate excess
12 capacity, and co-locate activities.
13 Finally, if the Department of Defense is to achieve
14 maximum cost savings and the most efficient realignment of
15 its facilities' infrastructure, ATCOM should not be
16 disestablished before SSDC. This action would be wholly
17 contrary to the Army's own findings of just two years ago.
18 When referring to ATCOM, the Army stated that, and
19 I quote: "The high relocation costs make realignment or
20 closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."
21 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission, I
22 thank you for this opportunity and hope that you give it the

Page 45

1 kind of weight that I think it should be given. Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
3 Clay.
4 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the
5 distinguished Congressman from Missouri, Representative James
6 Talent.
7 REPRESENTATIVE TALENT: I thank the Chairman. And,
8 before I start, I'd like to, as the other Members have,
9 extend my appreciation to the commissioners and your staff.
10 You're working diligently to assess the merits of each
11 recommendation and argument put before you, and I really
12 congratulate you on your tenacity and patience in listening
13 to all this testimony.
14 Having said that, I want to discuss Army readiness
15 this morning as it relates to the proposed disestablishment
16 of the Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis. Much of the
17 discussion so far has concerned the actual cost, in terms of
18 new buildings, real estate, leased facilities,
19 infrastructure, and additional overhead of moving the ATCOM
20 functions.
21 I concur in the comments that have been made by my
22 colleagues here this morning, but I want to focus attention

Page 46

1 this morning squarely on the issue of Army aviation
2 readiness, rather than solely on cost issues, especially as
3 it relates to the proposed closing of the ATCOM installation
4 in St. Louis and specifically on whether or not the Army will
5 retain the skilled personnel who represent an enormous asset
6 to our services and to this particular function.
7 By my estimates, we will probably lose between 50
8 and 80 percent of the roughly 400 engineers and 400 logistics
9 personnel who presently work at the ATCOM, if we go ahead
10 with this move. These people represent a collective body of
11 knowledge that the Army will simply lose, and then have to c
12 completely recreate at another installation.
13 Without wanting to exaggerate the point, this
14 relearning process will take many years. It could take as
15 many as three to five years. In the meantime, this crawl,
16 walk, run scenario will, at the user level in the Army,
17 manifest itself in terms of shortcomings in acquisitions,
18 logistics, and engineering.
19 For example, because so many of the more
20 experienced ATCOM employees will remain in the St. Louis area
21 and will not make the move, we can realistically expect
22 greater delays in parts requisitions for helicopters, which

Page 47

1 will be reflected in greater maintenance backlogs, because
2 parts will be slower in working their way through the
3 pipeline.
4 This, in turn, means that any given aviation
5 battalion's operational readiness rate will drop
6 considerably. The average Army aviation unit's fully
7 mission-capable OR -- its operational readiness rating --
8 today is about 70 to 75 percent. If the proposed relocation
9 takes place, we can expect that rating to drop, possibly to
10 as low as 50 percent, at least in the short term, and remain
11 below average for as long as it takes to reconstitute the
12 command's expertise.
13 In addition, we can also expect that response time
14 to safety of flight decisions will be delayed, due to the
15 loss of experienced engineering personnel. Let me convey the
16 importance of this matter. When a given fleet of, for
17 example, CH-47s is grounded for some reason, ATCOM engineers
18 are the ones who must issue a safety of flight authorization
19 before those helicopters can once again fly. Until then, the
20 whole fleet is grounded. Over the pat year, ATCOM has issued
21 16 such safety of flight authorizations.
22 Finally, I'd like to use an example which

Page 48

1 illustrates the importance of ATCOM's day-to-day operations.
2 It's very timely, given what's happened in the last couple
3 weeks.
4 We all recall the tragedy of Desert One, which was
5 the rescue mission for the hostages in Iran in the late
6 1970s. At that time, we put a total of, I think, about six
7 SH-53s into the air in support of that rescue mission. It
8 would have been ideal, at the time, to have had a great many
9 more helicopters involved, but the unfortunate truth was that
10 maintenance problems, among other concerns, made that mission
11 much less likely to succeed, from the start. The support
12 system that ATCOM maintains today was not there when it was
13 needed, in the late 1970s.
14 Contrast that tragedy with the success of last
15 week's rescue mission. Everything worked as it had to work.
16 It's ATCOM's business, in part, to keep those helicopters in
17 the air.
18 I want to mention one other consideration. The
19 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, led by
20 Mr. John White, has recommended that the Department of
21 Defense co-locate or consolidate all Army, Navy, and Air
22 Force program management offices responsible for development,

Page 49

1 production, and support of military aircraft and related
2 equipment. In other words, the services are seeking to
3 consolidate to have joint, inter-service management of these
4 programs.
5 As the deputy secretary of defense, Mr. White will
6 have primary responsibility for implementing this
7 recommendation. Since implementation of the recommendation
8 will cause ATCOM's aviation functions to be consolidated with
9 similar functions from the other services at a yet-to-be-
10 determined site, the transfer of ATCOM's aviation functions
11 now to Huntsville would, if that co-location or consolidation
12 subsequently occurs, be an expense of over $100 million in
13 moving and construction costs that are just going to have to
14 be duplicated down the road when we do the consolidation
15 within the services.
16 Our long-term strategy has to be the same as the
17 Army's stationing strategy to optimize the operational
18 efficiency of the Army's research, development, testing, and
19 evaluation and material maintenance management functions.
20 Based on this reasoning, even apart from the other
21 cost considerations which we've discussed today, we ought to
22 set aside the proposal and, instead, seek to integrate the

Page 50

1 command's responsibility within a reorganization concept that
2 is more strategic in scope, and which the services are
3 considering even as we speak.
4 In closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to repeat a very
5 keen and simple observation that General Shalikashvili made
6 in testimony before the House National Security Committee
7 earlier this spring, that our personnel, especially those
8 with years of leadership experience and specialized
9 knowledge, are the Army's greatest asset.
10 While it may take ten years to design and produce a
11 given weapons system, it usually takes about 18 years to
12 prepare an officer for command and well over 20 years for
13 division command. The critical investment that we've made in
14 each of these individuals is, in many respects, immeasurable.
15 Much the same can be made of our more experienced
16 ATCOM personnel. They are part of a proven team that, I
17 submit, will simply go away if this relocation takes place.
18 Again, I want to thank the Commission.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Talent.
20 We're delighted to welcome your colleague, the
21 distinguished Congressman from the State of Missouri,
22 Representative Ike Skelton.

Page 51

1 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Mr. Chairman and members
2 of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to testify
3 before you.
4 I support the Department of Defense and the Army's
5 recommendation to move the Army Chemical and Military Police
6 Schools from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. Because of
7 the ending of the Cold War, our country has downsized its
8 military considerably and it continues to do so.
9 The Army, just prior to the Gulf War in 1990, Mr.
10 Chairman, had 764,000 active duty soldiers. Today, there are
11 532,000 active duty soldiers. Pentagon plans call for an
12 Army of 475,000, which I don't like, but that's what the
13 Pentagon wants.
14 Thus, it's necessary for the Army to close bases.
15 If the Army is forced to keep unneeded infrastructure, we
16 will be forced to have a hollow Army in the future. The Army
17 must maintain its effectiveness and become more efficient.
18 America does not need a financially strapped or bankrupt
19 Army.
20 A recent TRADOC memorandum states: "The relocation
21 of the Chemical and Military Police Schools is the first
22 piece in the TRADOC commanding general's strategic vision for

Page 52

1 the future structure of the command." General Norman
2 Schwarzkopf, back in 1973, was involved in an attempt to
3 close Army bases, including Fort McClellan. General
4 Schwarzkopf has written that the Fort McClellan base was the
5 least efficient in the entire U.S. Army.
6 Today, it makes sense not only to reduce the Army
7 infrastructure, but to co-locate various branches and
8 schools. There are two major standards or criteria this
9 Commission should consider: military value and return on
10 investment.
11 Concerning the first, military value, a transfer to
12 Fort Leonard Wood would increase readiness by co-locating the
13 Chemical, Military Police, and Engineering Schools,
14 especially in river crossing training, counter-drug
15 operations, operations in rear areas, and protection of
16 supply routes training.
17 Second, Fort Leonard Wood is a logical location for
18 all these schools. It has 63,000 acres -- 17,000 more than
19 Fort McClellan. Fort Leonard Wood has 26 percent more work
20 space, 66 percent more family housing, and 32 percent more
21 barracks. Fort Leonard Wood facilities can easily
22 accommodate contingencies, as it is near transportation

Page 53

1 outlets. Consolidation allows better use of Army manpower,
2 integrating all three branches in one place.
3 Concerning return on investment, the Army computes
4 that there will be a return on investment in six years by
5 moving the schools to Fort Leonard Wood. There will be a 45
6 million dollar per year savings.
7 The last Base Closure Commission stated the Army
8 should pursue all the required permits and certification for
9 the new site. The permits have been applied for by the Army
10 and they have been granted.
11 The Army recently sent this Commission a letter,
12 concluding six points. We have the environmental permits.
13 The smoke training has no impact on unit readiness.
14 Relocating the Military Police and Chemical Schools is an
15 integral component of the Army's strategic vision. The
16 relocation will cause minimal disruption, if any, to
17 training. No linkage exists between Fort McClellan and
18 international treaties, such as the still unratified Chemical
19 Weapons Convention. And care should be taken not to confuse
20 the installation of Fort McClellan with the institution
21 Chemical School.
22 There's been a major public relations effort, Mr.

Page 54

1 Chairman, to collaterally attack the Army and the Department
2 of Defense's recommendation. The necessary permits have been
3 issued. They've been issued by the State of Missouri.
4 Taxpayer dollars will be saved, and the Army will be made all
5 the more ready to perform its mission with its new, smaller
6 size.
7 I urge this Commission to approve the
8 recommendations of the Department of Defense and of the
9 United States Army to move the Chemical School and the
10 Military Police School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SKELTON: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman Skelton. We're indebted to you, sir. And thank
13 you, from the Commission, for the fine presentation by the
14 State of Missouri.
15 We are delighted to see the distinguished Senator
16 from the great State of Montana, Senator Conrad Burns, here.
17 Pleased to have you, Senator Burns.
18 SENATOR BURNS: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
19 thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to testify
20 before you this morning, taking time to take my comments, and
21 I commend you on the effort that you're making with regard to
22 your duties, and I look forward, as chairman of the Military

Page 55

1 Construction and Appropriations Subcommittee, to help you
2 execute whatever your decision may be.
This morning, I'd like to address my cost and
[illegible]gs logic to various options with regard to Malmstrom Air
[illegible]ce Base in Montana. I strongly believe realigning
6 Malmstrom's 12 KC-135s is a foolish idea, and I give these
7 reasons:
8 It generates a suspect, at best, half million
9 dollars in annual savings; it generates a 20-year net present
10 value cost of around $8.3 million; and it ignores and would
11 mothball, over $100 million of state-of-the-art tanker
12 support facilities. The cost savings analysis of a realigned
13 Malmstrom scenario is based on what I think is an error in
14 the Air Force data which count as savings in the cost to run
15 MacDill Air Force Base's runway, which is over $4 million.
16 The reopening of MacDill's runway is a separate
17 recommendation, and the costs associated with that
18 independent action, which the Air Force says must occur
19 regardless of Commission recommendations on tankers to
20 MacDill, is inappropriate to count in the Malmstrom
21 recommendation.
22 The corrected projected savings of less than a half

Page 56

1 a million dollars annually does not take into account the
2 cost to continue the missiles operation at Malmstrom, and
3 these costs include new commercial airport hot pad, critical
4 parts support, medical evacuation flights, commercial
5 mobilization support, helicopter traffic control, and, of
6 course, weather support. After these changes are in place
7 and paid for, annual net costs will accrue from the realigned
8 Malmstrom recommendation.
9 Now, to me, what makes sense is the complete
10 closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota; and I
[illegible] this because it maximizes savings with a total closure.
[illegible]ther words, it is clean. The action pays back in only
[illegible] year. It produces reoccurring annual savings of over $87
14 million and it produces a 20-year net present value of over
15 $1.88 billion -- not million, billion.
16 Also Mr. Chairman and other Commissioners,
17 Malmstrom Air Force Base is a prime location to keep the
18 tankers. If you look at the facts surrounding the cost,
19 you'll see that it also makes sense financially.
20 Thank you very much for letting me present these
21 figures to you, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Burns, we're indebted to

Page 57

1 you for that outstanding presentation. Now, let me mention
2 to you that the time frame for the great State of Montana is
3 9:26 through 9:41. I understand that your colleagues have,
4 in the one case, some traffic difficulty and, in the other
5 case, another problem.
6 But I hope you'll understand, with 121 members
7 testifying today, the Chair is obligated to be very, very
8 strict about time so that, if your delegation doesn't get
9 here on time, I will have to go to the State of New Jersey at
10 9:44.
11 SENATOR BURNS: I understand that, and I would ask
12 the Chairman, if they do not make it, can their testimony be
13 made part of the record?
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It can be made part of the record
15 and, unless we get into too late an hour, they could come in
16 at the end of the day, although the Chair admonishes my good
17 friend that we are working through the 7 O'clock hour
18 already, and so the hour may get somewhat late.
19 SENATOR BURNS: I was here early, because I know
[illegible]v tight your schedule is, and I know mine is just as tight
[illegible]ours, so I'm going to --
[illegible] CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'd like to accommodate, but you

Page 58

1 can see that we have 120 Members.
2 SENATOR BURNS: I understand. I understand. And
3 the Chairman, when I served with him in the United States
4 Senate, was always known to be a fair Senator, and I would
5 imagine he's the same kind of a Chairman. Thank you very
6 much.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much for those
8 kind remarks and I thank you for your contribution, Senator.
9 Ladies and gentlemen, Senator Burns's colleague is
10 stuck in traffic. That's happened to this former Member a
11 lot of times. The State of New Jersey has been called, and
12 we will be in temporary recess for about six or seven
13 minutes.
14 (A brief recess was taken.)
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair takes note of the fact
16 that the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of
17 New Jersey is here. As usual, he is early, which is to his
18 credit, and we are pleased to welcome before the Commission
19 the distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New
20 Jersey, Senator Bill Bradley.
21 SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
22 and Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Cox for giving me the

Page 59

1 opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of two very
2 important military assets.
3 I've already had the opportunity to appear before
4 some of you at the Commission's regional hearing in New York
5 to demonstrate why closing the Military Ocean Terminal at
6 Bayonne and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst would
7 undermine the goals of this Commission.
8 Shutting down these installations would not reduce
9 unnecessary infrastructure and would not save taxpayer money.
10 What it would do is cause a dangerous reduction in the level
11 of military readiness that is critical to maintaining our
12 strong national defense.
13 I testified then and I maintain today that
14 decisions to close these installations were based upon
15 incorrect premises, incomplete analysis, and insufficient
16 understanding of their unique attributes. As you well know,
17 I'm certainly not alone in the assessment on these two bases.
18 The director of the largest general cargo port on
19 the East and Gulf Coasts successfully challenged the premise
20 for closing Bayonne. Lillian Liburdie conveyed to you on May
21 5th that commercial ports are increasingly unable to deal
22 with the disruptions that result from military activity.

Page 60

1 They have, in fact, turned away military shipments, due to
2 the pressures of commercial business.
3 And yet, the Army wants to close the Bayonne
4 terminal, because it believes, "Bayonne provides the Army
5 with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at
6 commercial ports."
7 I must ask, where is the study and the accompanying
8 analysis to back up this assertion? What evidence does the
9 Army use as a basis for eliminating -- not moving, not
10 downsizing, but eliminating -- the capability that Bayonne
11 provides.
12 Mr. Chairman, there is no study, and there is no
13 evidence, and the conclusion is simply indefensible. It
14 would be a grave mistake to force shipments of munitions and
15 equipment for our troops to wait in line behind commercial
16 cargo. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
17 delays this move may cause to deploying troops and equipment
18 cannot be quantified.
19 To sacrifice Bayonne would be to sacrifice a
20 military asset that has proven its value to this nation again
21 and again. This move would come to haunt our military in the
22 event of another sudden deployment, such as Desert Storm or

Page 61

1 Operation Restore Hope.
2 Mr. Chairman, those of you who were present at the
3 hearing on May 5th will no doubt remember the powerful
4 testimony of another expert, Commander Michael Hagy of the
5 Save Lakehurst Committee. I'm sure you remember. It was a
6 very dramatic moment, one of the more dramatic moments that
7 I've participated in in these base closure hearings.
8 He demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the
9 recommendation to tear apart Lakehurst is not just unfounded
10 and misguided, it is downright senseless. Lakehurst designs
11 and tests aircraft catapult and arresting gear. This is the
12 gear that ensures that our pilots can safely take off from
13 and land on aircraft carriers.
14 Our pilots put their lives in the hands of the
15 people at Lakehurst and the Lakehurst team's virtually
16 perfect safety record has demonstrated that those lives are
17 in good hands. Yet, the recommendation demands that the Navy
18 rip apart this model of excellence and scatter it up and down
19 the East Coast of the United States.
20 The Navy recommends that we tear machines and
21 equipment out of the ground in New Jersey and then rebuild
22 those same machines in Florida. How is this going to save

Page 62

1 taxpayers any money? How does this scenario relieve the
2 military of unnecessary infrastructure? And, most
3 importantly, how does this continue to ensure that our pilots
4 are in capable and experienced hands?
5 The answer to all these questions is the same. It
6 does not. This move would put hundreds of miles between
7 people who engineer catapult and arresting gear and the
8 experts that test them to ensure that it is safe for our
9 pilots to rely on them.
10 Today, if a piece of equipment for an aircraft
11 carrier needs to be reworked or fine tuned, it is shipped
12 across the grounds at Lakehurst to the machine shop. In this
13 new scenario, it will have to be shipped from Florida all the
14 way back up to Lakehurst and then back to Florida again --
15 Mr. Chairman, a senseless plan.
16 This Commission has a number of difficult decisions
17 to make during this process. It must scrutinize an extensive
18 list of recommended closures and realignments and make sure
19 that these recommendations were based upon a fair and
20 rational assessment of the value of those bases.
21 Mr. Chairman, I hope we in New Jersey have helped
22 to demonstrate to you that fair and rational are not words

Page 63

1 that can be used to describe the recommendations to close
2 Bayonne and to realign Lakehurst. I hope the facts will lead
3 you to reject those recommendations. Thank you very much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank the distinguished senior
5 Senator from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Bill
6 Bradley.
7 We are going to revert to Montana very briefly, to
8 hear from the distinguished senior Senator from Montana,
9 Senator Max Baucus.
10 SENATOR BAUCUS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
11 Before I begin, I just want to thank all of you, all the
12 commissioners, for performing a great public service in
13 taking the time, frankly, to go to all the communities
14 affected around our country, ask a lot of questions, dig deep
15 into what's going on here.
16 I must say that's one way to help restore some of
17 the lost confidence the American people have in the federal
18 government -- that is, your extra effort in going to listen
19 to people and talk to people; and I just want to commend you
20 all for it.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you again for calling this
22 hearing and giving me an opportunity to testify. This

Page 64

1 process, as you know better than I, was created to keep
2 politics out of base closing. You will decide to keep a base
3 and its missions going if they are cost effective parts of a
4 national security strategy.
5 I believe the air refueling mission at Malmstrom
6 Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana is just that. As home
7 of the 341st Missile Wing, Malmstrom is our country's premier
8 Minuteman-III missile base, undisputed and, as the base of
9 the 43rd Air Refueling Group, it supports virtually every
10 major contingency operation, including refueling flights to
11 Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Central America.
12 In March, the Department of Defense reviewed these
13 missions and it concluded that the missile mission ranked as
14 one of the nation's best, and should remain in place, but it
15 also said the flying mission had limited utility at should
16 move to Florida.
17 The main reason for this latter recommendation
18 seems to be the general conclusion that the Southeast needs
19 more tankers, and they have to come from somewhere. Maybe,
20 Commissioners, the Southeast does need some more tankers but,
21 before reviewing the data in detail, I must say that they
22 should not come from the Northwest.

Page 65

1 Malmstrom is ideal for peacetime training and
2 wartime operations. We have more air space, fewer big
3 cities, and a drier climate than almost any part of the
4 country. As several of you commissioners saw when you
5 visited Malmstrom, encroachment, noise abatement, and
6 restricted flight paths are not a problem. They don't call
7 us the Big Sky State for nothing. We've got a lot of wide
8 open space.
9 In conflicts, tankers from the Northwest and
10 Malmstrom, in particular, can reach their destinations faster
11 than tankers from the Southeast, by flying over the North
12 Pole to Asia or Russia. These are the places where politics
13 are unstable, armies are large, and potential threats are
14 high.
15 Now, let's look at the numbers. Here, Malmstrom's
16 flying mission comes up just as well as the common sense look
17 at the big picture would suggest, and much better than the
18 principal competitor in Grand Forks.
19 The Air Force itself, in its February 1995 report
20 to BRAC, rates Malmstrom's flying mission -- underline the
21 word "flying" -- very high. On a scale of green, down
22 through yellow to red -- green being the best, red the worst

Page 66

1 -- Malmstrom's flying mission was rated a green-minus.
2 Malmstrom has an excellent alternative air field
3 with extra runway capacity at Great Falls International
4 Airport. The dry air prevents rust and corrosion, meaning
5 that aircraft based at Malmstrom have low maintenance and
6 operating costs, and the Air Force rated all these factors,
7 along with the basic weather and other flying conditions, a
8 green.
9 When it comes to condition and support, Malmstrom
10 again fares well. Its infrastructure and buildings are in
11 excellent condition. Its utilities have great excess
12 capacity. The lack of nearby urban development means
13 Malmstrom can expand significantly if necessary during a war.
14 The Defense Department has invested millions of
15 dollars to give Malmstrom state-of-the-art support equipment,
16 such as a new fuel dispensing center and a three-bay hangar,
17 so Malmstrom's facilities are more than adequate for its
18 flying mission and, at relatively minor expense, it could
19 handle a larger mission than it has today.
20 To give both sides, the major complaint in the Air
21 Force report was that Malmstrom has relatively small runway
22 and parking capabilities. Yet the Air Force also rated the

Page 67

1 air field capabilities, the runways, the taxis, and the
2 [illegible]ons, a perfect green for the tanker mission and even for
3 [illegible]e-bodied aircraft.
4 In comparison, Grand Forks Air Force Base received
5 an overall flying mission rating of yellow-plus. Its
6 infrastructure got a yellow-plus, while the building
7 condition ranked yellow. So the choice boils down to a
8 choice between a student earning As and Bs -- Malmstrom --
9 and another student earnings Cs and Ds. The choice should
10 not be difficult.
11 If Grand Forks were completely closed, as now being
12 considered by BRAC, a squadron or more of its four tanker
13 squadrons could move to the Southeast and a squadron to
14 Malmstrom. This would satisfy the Air Force's need for more
15 tankers in the Southeast and, as the Air Force also requires,
16 it would still keep a solid presence in the North.
17 Finally, a word on behalf of our service personnel.
18 They work very hard, take big risks for their country. They
19 do not make much money for it. To them, Great Falls offers a
20 high quality of life at a low cost. There is plenty of on-
21 base and off-base housing, transportation is convenient,
22 school system excellent; and all of it is cheap, especially

Page 68

1 compared to a place like Tampa Bay, where they're supposed to
2 move.
3 In closing, whether you're looking at national
4 security, the budget, or the morale of our servicemen and
5 women, Malmstrom makes sense. It's a good deal, and I
6 believe the flying mission should stay there. Again, thank
7 you once again. I very much appreciate the job you're doing.
8 You're not being praised very much for all that you're doing
9 but it's a job that has to be done, and I thank you very much
10 [illegible] your service.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank the distinguished senior
12 [illegible]ator from the great State of Montana.
13 We're delighted to have the distinguished Senator
14 from the great State of New Jersey, Senator Frank Lautenberg.
15 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: Good morning. Chairman Dixon,
16 welcome to Washington, sir.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.
18 SENATOR LAUTENBERG: It's nice to see all of you
19 again and to thank you for the work that you and your staffs
20 have done these past months and, on behalf of New Jersey and
21 the country, I want to thank you. It is not a task for which
22 you're often complimented, but the fact is that you've been

Page 69

1 assigned this duty and you're doing it, in my view, fully
2 comprehensively and without question.
3 America's current military strategy depends so much
4 on forward deployment, power projection, and rapid
5 reinforcement. Each of New Jersey's bases on the Pentagon's
6 list -- Lakehurst Naval Engineering Station, Military Ocean
7 Terminal Bayonne, and Fort Dix -- plays an essential role in
8 making our strategy a success.
9 As America's permanent military presence overseas
10 is reduced, our forward deployment depends more and more on
11 the Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups. And, with that,
12 it's critical to note that the Lakehurst Naval Air
13 Engineering Station is the key to our carrier operations.
14 Lakehurst is an acknowledged pioneer in something
15 called concurrent engineering. By developing, testing and,
16 in the case of some critical components, manufacturing
17 catapult and arresting gear, Lakehurst brings the entire
18 research, development, testing, engineering cycle under one
19 [illegible]of.
20 The result has been an astounding, near perfect
21 [illegible]ree of reliability and safety in American carrier
22 [illegible]perations, with over 2 million -- 2 million -- successful

Page 70

1 launches and retrievals in just the past five years. Even
2 reducing the reliability of the Lakehurst mission by one-half
3 percent could mean that six aircraft and their crews would be
4 lost each day of carrier operations.
5 At that rate, America's strategic choices would be
6 grim -- either shut down carrier operations or suffer losses
7 that, in a year, would exceed our entire inventory of
8 carrier-based aircraft. And yet, the Pentagon's plans are to
9 dismantle this unique facility and scatter it to the winds,
10 hoping that Lakehurst skills can be duplicated elsewhere.
11 Doing so would not save as much money as the
12 Pentagon would have us believe. We've seen those questions
13 raised.
14 For example, in its report on the BRAC, the GAO
15 noted the Pentagon's recommendation to close Lakehurst is
16 based on substantial changes to original estimates by the
17 Navy's BRAC team. These changes artificially reduce the cost
18 of closing comparisons for Lakehurst from almost $220 million
19 to just under $97 million.
20 Commissioners, the Pentagon's plans to close
21 Lakehurst are shortsighted and unsound. They spell a high-
22 risk gamble for American carrier operations and for our

Page 71

1 strategy of forward deployment.
2 Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne is a perfect
3 complement with Lakehurst, with America's efforts to project
4 military power from the Continental United States to overseas
5 in time of crisis. No other port on the East or the Gulf
6 Coast, commercial or military, can duplicate Bayonne's unique
7 combination of capabilities.
8 Unlike commercial ports, moving mixed cargo to
9 Bayonne is fast, economical, and unimpeded. Bayonne
10 straddles the huge, highly developed multi-modal
11 transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor.
12 Now, unlike most commercial ports, once cargo
13 arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast
14 covered and uncovered staging areas in a secure mode and,
15 unlike any commercial ports, these staging areas are fully
16 protected and any military cargo can be accommodated there.
17 Unlike any commercial port, all types of cargo --
18 from heavy, outsized, non-containerized weapons, like the M-
19 182 Abrams tanks to munitions to provisions -- can be loaded
20 by Bayonne's very, very unique, well-trained labor force,
21 using state-of-the-art dedicated rail lines.
22 Bayonne has the best steaming time to Europe -- a

Page 72

1 full day's advantage, potentially the difference between life
2 and death in combat -- of any U.S. port, bar none.
3 Beyond all of these advantages, however, one thing
4 about Bayonne stands out above all else, as our recent
5 operations in the Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti have proven beyond
6 doubt. Bayonne's heavy sealift capabilities are always
7 available to us.
8 Unlike commercial ports, which can be commandeered
9 only in times of a declared national emergency, Bayonne has
10 no for-profit impediments. No contracts need to be broken,
11 no commercial cargo to displace.
12 So, Commissioners, I would ask that you please
13 consider that the Pentagon has recommended closing Bayonne in
14 favor of using commercial ports without first examining
15 whether these ports are both available and able to handle
16 Bayonne's mission.
17 I thank you once again for hearing us, for the
18 visits that many of you have made to these installations in
19 New Jersey. I'm sure that, having done that, those who have
20 had a chance to see it recognize the unique excellence of all
21 of these facilities; and I thank you for your time and your
22 efforts.

Page 73

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank you very much, Senator
2 Lautenberg.
3 And, from your House delegation, we're delighted to
4 welcome Representative Jim Saxton. Representative Saxton,
5 from the great State of New Jersey.
6 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you
7 very much, and Commissioners. It's -- gee, I'm so used to
8 starting speeches by saying "It's a pleasure to be here," but
9 it doesn't seem quite appropriate. But it is, really.
10 (Laughter.)
11 REPRESENTATIVE SAXTON: I'd just like to do two
12 things.
13 First, I'd like to thank you very much for your
14 cooperation with regard to fine-tuning that was necessary on
15 the recommendation for Fort Dix. The Chief of Staff of the
16 Army, General Reimer, the Commander of the Reserve force, the
17 U.S. Army Reserve, General Barritz and their staffs and your
18 staff, have been wonderful partners in making sure that we
19 end up with a recommendation with regard to the new mission
20 at Fort Dix that is workable and staffed correctly; and we
21 thank you very much for that.
22 Let me secondly talk about some success stories

Page 74

1 which will lead up to, I think, the crux of the issue with
2 regard to Lakehurst Naval War Center, success stories that
3 we're able to experience through BRAC and through our
4 military services, otherwise. I think there are three very
5 good examples that I'm very, very close to.
6 First of all, Commissioner Cox was here two years
7 ago when a decision was made with regard to McGuire Air Force
8 Base and the power projection facility that was made possible
9 because of a decision that was made here. That facility, in
10 conjunction with Fort Dix, is now the power projection
11 platform for the northeastern part of the country through
12 which people and material fly off to far parts of the world
13 on a daily basis.
14 It is, in fact, a success story that was brought
15 about because of a consolidation -- a very key word, I
16 believe -- a consolidation of activities that took place,
17 that now take place on a very efficient basis.
18 Secondly, I'm intimately familiar with one of the
19 Navy's weapon systems that is a tremendous success story and
20 advances each year into new and better facilities. That, of
21 course, is known as the AEGIS System, which is a weapon
22 system that is, for all practical purposes, the backbone of

Page 75

1 our Naval tactical defense system, in that it protects our
2 fleets when they're out to sea
3 The facilities are consolidated at the now
4 Lockheed-Martin facility in Morristown, New Jersey where the
5 components are brought together and engineered and put
6 together in a way that makes the AEGIS system a very, very
7 good system and, as a matter of fact, I would say, without
8 question, second to none of anyplace in the world.
9 The third success story currently takes place at
10 Lakehurst where the facilities that are necessary to carry
11 out our Naval air carrier activities are engineered and
12 designed in one compact, efficient operation which is
13 currently in place at Lakehurst. I don't think anybody
14 questions how important it is to have a facility coordinated,
15 an activity carried out, where engineer and design and
16 testing and production all take place simultaneously in one
17 location.
18 The recommendation of the Navy, to my way of
19 thinking at least, destroys that third success story, because
20 it separates the engineering and design, testing and
21 production, and sends part of it to Florida, sends part of it
22 to Virginia, and keeps part of it in New Jersey.

Page 76

1 It has been successful, and the third success story
2 that I speak of, because of the mere fact that we've been
3 able to carry out -- in a successful way, in a productive
4 way, in an efficient way, in a cost-effective way -- the
5 activities that have gone on at Lakehurst and to destroy
6 that, to separate it, and to diminish it, as Senator
7 Lautenberg says, by as little as one-half of one percent
8 costs lives, costs efficiency, costs dollars.
9 We appeal to you today -- and I know that
10 Commissioner Cox will be -- hopefully, I'll be able to
11 accompany her on Friday, if my schedule allows, to take a
12 second look at Lakehurst and, of course, Commissioner
13 Cornella was already there, to experience that success story
14 that I speak of.
15 So we thank you very much for giving us the
16 opportunity to make these points this morning and we look
17 forward to keeping that success story alive. Thank you very
18 much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Saxton, we thank you
20 for your important contribution.
21 We're delighted to have your colleague,
22 Representative Chris Smith.

Page 77

1 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
2 members of the Commission.
3 Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon's recommendation to
4 radically realign the missions of Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare
5 Center puts carrier aviation at risk, especially in the short
6 term, and may cost two or three times more than the Pentagon
7 suggests. Navy Lakehurst is a unique, one of a kind, world
8 class facility whose primary function is to ensure that
9 aircraft safely launch and recover from the deck of a carrier
10 or other platform, and that support equipment assists in the
11 service of planes, parts, and ordnance at sea.
12 Navy Lakehurst has long been distinguished, and had
13 a long and distinguished record in technological development,
14 engineering, developmental evaluation and verification,
15 systems integration, prototype manufacturing of air launch
16 and recovery equipment, known by the acronym ARA, and support
17 equipment.
18 There is no doubt that the Navy benefits from the
19 synergy of co-locating the means of development,
20 manufacturing and testing of aircraft carrier, catapult and
21 arresting gear, and support equipment. The burden, it seems
22 to me, Mr. Chairman, is on the Navy to clearly demonstrate

Page 78

1 how carrier aviation is improved or at least remains the
2 same, by proceeding with realignment. It is a burden they
3 cannot meet.
4 Research conducted over the past several months by
5 our Save Lakehurst Committee has raised serious questions
6 that flight ops may suffer and the fleet may become
7 unnecessarily vulnerable if the Lakehurst mission is torn
8 apart. It is impossible for the Navy to replicate its almost
9 perfect success rate of carrier takeoffs and landings without
10 first experiencing a costly and potentially dangerous period
11 of interruption. Why, Mr. Chairman, should we put the
12 linchpin of Navy aviation at risk?
13 Interestingly, our concerns are echoed, to some
14 extent, by BCEG itself. In a May letter to the Commission by
15 Charlie Nemfakos, the vice chairman of BCEG, he pointed out,
16 and I quote: "Some industrial, economic, performance
17 advantages may be lost by separating ARA, manufacturing, and
18 prototyping and support equipment from ARA testing.
19 One has to ask, Mr. Chairman, if performance
20 advantages may be lost, wy break it up? In almost every
21 instance at sea, our planes now launch as advertised. Our
22 aircraft are recovered without incident. If a glitch is

Page 79

1 found in design of a flight-critical item, they call
2 Lakehurst.
3 There at Lakehurst, the requisite problem solvers
4 immediately available, in close proximity to one another,
5 design it, to manufacture it, and to fix it without delay.
6 The DOD scenario says, relocate the prototype
7 manufacturing of ARA to the Navy depot in Jacksonville, and
8 the support equipment to Pax River. Artificially separating
9 the evaluation and testing capabilities from the prototype
10 manufacturing function defies logic. Our research shows
11 that, in a crisis situation, this could mean delays, costly
12 delays, that put a mission in jeopardy.
13 Here again, Mr. Nemfakos agrees. In his letter he
14 explains that the distance between the functions that
15 remained at Lakehurst and those that were moved to
16 Jacksonville will mean -- and I quote -- "two additional days
17 to transport between a shop in Jacksonville to a Lakehurst
18 test site."
19 You know, it reminds me of the song by Willie
20 Nelson, On The Road Again. We will have flight critical
21 items going back and forth, back and forth, being retested
22 over and over again. Where it could have just gone two

Page 80

1 miles, they now will be going hundreds of miles.
2 Delays, whether measured in hours or days, during a
3 crisis could quickly put the lives of our pilots, our crews,
4 and our sailors at risk. Any delays are likely to mean a
5 degradation of mission competence and safety, and I defy
6 anyone to make the case that flight readiness and safety are
7 improved or even remain the same when design and manufacture
8 of flight-critical prototype items are separated from the
9 test and evaluation function.
10 Mr. Chairman, the question has to be raised, can
11 ring apart a textbook case of concurrent engineering which
12 proven itself over and over again be justified to save
13 money? I think not. But, incredibly, the DOD scenario
14 doesn't even save money. It actually costs taxpayers more
15 money than keeping the current system in place.
16 The actual cost of realignment is likely to be
17 between two and three times higher than what DOD said it
18 would be. That is not a minor miscalculation. That's a
19 gross error. The DOD recommendation estimates a one-time
20 cost of realignment at just $97 million. The certified data
21 from Admiral Bowes put it at 162, the Save Lakehurst
22 Committee at 218, and a more recent figure puts it at $260

Page 81

1 million.
2 We're seeing a doubling, perhaps as much as a
3 tripling of the cost and again, it puts our mission
4 competence at grave risk.
5 I know that Commissioner Cox will be making a trip
6 to Lakehurst on Friday. Commissioner Cornella has been kind
7 enough to come and take a good, hard look. I strongly invite
8 other Commissioners to come. Seeing is believing, and I
9 think when you see what goes on there and the importance of
10 concurrent engineering, you, too, will be convinced we should
11 not break up Lakehurst. It works. It works well. It would
12 be a gross error to break it up.
13 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Smith.
16 (Applause.)
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We are delighted to have
18 Congressman Frank Pallone here.
19 REPRESENTATIVE PALLONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
20 and Commissioners. I do appreciate the opportunity to be
21 here to testify before you today.
22 I'm going to talk about primarily Fort Monmouth, as

Page 82

1 a facility for C4I capabilities. As I think you know, your
2 Commission essentially has an opportunity today to begin the
3 process of consolidation and co-location of C4I capability --
4 which is command, control, communication, computers, and
5 intelligence -- and the opportunity for cross-servicing these
6 functions. A goal which so often has been sought and so
7 consistently eluded, I think, by the Pentagon will not arise
8 again soon.
9 My real statement to you today is to say please,
10 take this opportunity, which is unique with the BRAC, to go
11 ahead with the cross-servicing notion, with regard to Fort
12 Monmouth.
13 I think you know that the concept of cross-
14 servicing is not new. The '93 BRAC report to the President
15 noted that the Department of Defense has been attempting, for
16 about 20 years, without significant success, to inter-service
17 and, as a result, the '93 Commission recommended exhaustive
18 review of the issue of cross-servicing for this BRAC '95
19 deliberations.
20 During the '95 process, the Laboratory Joint Cross-
21 Service Group recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for C4I
22 relocation. Unfortunately, the only co-location that was

Page 83

1 recommended as part of the Pentagon's recommendation to you
2 was with regard to the Air Force and the Rome Labs.
3 There were other opportunities there, but they were
4 missed, and the Accounting Office, the General Accounting
5 Office actually noted that it would have been a good idea if
6 there were more opportunities, but this is the only one,
7 essentially, that you have before you today.
8 You've heard from the Rome Labs supporters, who I'm
9 sure are going to be also talking again today, and they've
10 argued that it's too expensive to close the Rome Labs but,
11 after close examination, I believe it is apparent that
12 dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom Air
13 Force Base does produce annual savings and a return on
14 investment within four to six years, and significant return
15 on investment.
16 The first COBRA, which some of the Rome people have
17 cited, dated October 13th of '94, indicated an estimated one-
18 time cost of $133 million and estimated it would take more
19 than 100 years to recoup the costs, but that was before the
20 Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs suggested relocation and,
21 in a sense, dividing the Rome Labs between Fort Monmouth and
22 Hanscom.

Page 84

1 Once that alternative was calculated and the COBRA
2 was done again, in February 23rd of this year, it illustrated
3 the one-time cost at $52.8 million with a four-year return on
4 investment and, as you know, another COBRA was conducted just
5 a few weeks ago on May 23rd. And, although the one-time cost
6 under that COBRA increased to $79.2 million, the return on
7 investment would still be only six years, which is a short
8 time.
9 In addition, the latest COBRA analysis found the
10 most cost savings, $13 million per year. Over a 20-year
11 period, in excess of $180 million would be saved by this
12 closure.
13 I know that you've looked at this and you're going
14 to look at it again over the next few weeks or so, but there
15 are significant savings resulting from Rome being split
16 essentially between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom, and I think
17 that the Air Force has shown that.
18 Fort Monmouth, I think as you know -- Commissioner
19 Cornella has been there and Commissioner Cox was there a
20 couple of years ago -- provides an excellent environment for
21 the co-location of C4I capabilities for a number of reasons.
22 We have an ideal integrated command structure. We

Page 85

1 already have existing C4I joint activities in many areas. We
2 have the physical space to accommodate the Rome Labs, and we
3 have the technological academic base to make cross-servicing
4 of C4I activities a success.
5 We've been the center of gravity for C4I activities
6 and innovations for many years, and I think that we're
7 uniquely postured to achieve the vision, if you will, of
8 cross-servicing that has been talked about by the previous
9 BRAC, as well as by the Joint Cross Service Working Group on
10 Labs.
11 I wanted to also mention two other suggestions for
12 additional functions to come to Fort Monmouth.
13 One is with regard to the Aviation Troop Command at
14 St. Louis. There, we are asking basically or the Pentagon
15 has asked that the realigning research and development
16 portion of the life cycle of six ATCOM business areas be
17 relocated to Fort Monmouth.
18 By realigning the rest of the life cycle to CECOM,
19 BRAC '95 would eliminate duplication of efforts and achieves
20 the efficiencies and mission enhancement of one command
21 managing the entire life cycle. We already have a number of
22 these functions at Fort Monmouth, pursuant to the previous

Page 86

1 BRAC, and it only makes sense for this one from ATCOM to come
2 here.
3 Lastly, I wanted to talk about Bayonne. I wanted
4 to add to the others from the New Jersey delegation who do
5 not support the closure of Bayonne. I don't think it should
6 close. I think that would be a mistake.
7 But, as you may know, and I'm sure you've looked at
8 it, the Pentagon recommendation says that if Bayonne does
9 close, then significant functions are suggested to come to
10 Fort Monmouth, and I would suggest that, if you do mistakenly
11 close Bayonne, that it would certainly make sense for those
12 functions to come to Fort Monmouth, because of our proximity
13 to the port facilities and the fact that it would lessen the
14 personal impact of this BRAC recommendation if those
15 employees, who are primarily in New Jersey, were allowed to
16 come to Fort Monmouth.
17 I appreciate your involvement in this, and thank
18 you very much.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Pallone.
21 We're delighted to see your distinguished
22 colleague, Representative Robert Menendez here.

Page 87

1 REPRESENTATIVE MENENDEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
2 members of the Commission. I want to thank all the
3 commissioners for continuing to be engaged, Commissioners
4 Kling and Cornella for their visit to the site, Commissioner
5 Cox, who had an opportunity to speak, and others. We
6 appreciate your continuing involvement. I hope you will not
7 disappoint Congressman Pallone and make sure that he doesn't
8 have to get all that excess out of Bayonne to his site.
9 The MOPF closure recommendation is still, still
10 based on the unstudied and untested assumption that dedicated
11 military port facilities can be eliminated and that
12 commercial capacity will be available to handle all current
13 and future mission requirements, and it's a very tenuous
14 assumption, because in closing MOPF, you're not reducing
15 excess capacity, you are losing an essential military
16 capability which cannot be reestablished.
17 We believe the Army proposal to close MOPF
18 substantially deviates from the four selection criteria,
19 starting with number one, the impact on the operational
20 readiness of the DOD's total force.
21 There still is no study or test which examines,
22 evaluates, or supports the assumption that sufficient

Page 88

1 commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts are
2 available to support power projection requirements with a
3 minimum loss to operational capacity. MTMC first started
4 looking at this in April of this year, after the decisions
5 were made.
6 Availability of facilities at both the existing and
7 potential receiving locations is the second criteria.
8 Existence of commercial port capacity is not the same as
9 availability. Lillian Liburdie, one of the nation's leading
10 experts on the New York-New Jersey Port Authority testified
11 to this before the full Commission, in essence stating that
12 exactly that is the case.
13 The third criteria is the ability to accommodate
14 contingency mobilization and future total force requirements
15 at both existing and potential receiving locations. The
16 operational impacts and risks to rapid mobilization and
17 future force projection needs, I think, are incalculable now
18 that both MOPF and MOFFA could be closed.
19 Criterion four is cost and manpower implications.
20 As I said, there are no costs related to the mission, the
21 cost studies, the movement of cargo and, without the cost
22 studies, we may never be able to control costs for the

Page 89

1 movement of cargo.
2 The Army tab study has been forced to change, as we
3 suggested to you at the hearing that it would have to change
4 its COBRA costs and savings estimates and, while they're
5 termed "refinements," I would consider the initial figures to
6 be drastically wrong.
7 As I suggested in our full presentation, and now by
8 their own admission, the MOPF estimates were off -- 20
9 percent off for return on investment, 75 percent off on
10 changes to costs and savings over the implementation period,
11 and 77 percent off net present value change; and those are
12 only the figures for the Army.
13 You've heard, at the presentations and the site
14 visits, that the enclave supposedly left behind, they
15 basically take the position that they cannot do it on their
16 own; there will be significant cost to them if they become
17 the landlords at the base. That has not been calculated
18 here. So the percentages that are off are just dealing what
19 Army costs.
20 They've acknowledge the gross error in the assembly
21 of its COBRA model. Our figures from our financial analysts,
22 Coopers and Lybrand, indicate that it will take over 30 years

Page 90

1 for the Army to recoup the costs necessary to close MOPF and
2 create a stand-along enclave for selective tenants, and these
3 areas seriously call into question the assumptions on which
4 this closure recommendation is based.
5 Finally, the most overarching cost problem is
6 totally unstudied. It is the cost to the military for the
7 mission of moving military cargo and the disruption of
8 commercial ports. Military port usage is already among the
9 most commercialized activities in the entire DOD.
10 Defense agencies must pay for services on the basis
11 of commercial tariffs and are responsible for all costs
12 arising from the loss of business, and no labor costs were
13 included in the estimates of the cost of purchasing
14 commercial port services.
15 There's no legal authority to disrupt commercial
16 port operation in the absence of a declared emergency. By
17 that time, it would be long after the need to mobilize and
18 use the ports. The Kuwait invasion, as an example, was in
19 August of 1990. Congress authorized the use of force five
20 months later. That's not going to be able to work at
21 commercial port activities.
22 Now, there's no absolute assurance and timely

Page 91

1 access to ports for fast power projection without MOPF. MTMC
2 claims that MOPF will result in the loss of few capabilities.
3 I reject that. These capabilities are critical, time-
4 sensitive. I've talked a lot about costs, but that's not
5 all the decisions you have to make.
6 Military value is about things we can't buy. We
7 can't buy back time when there is delay in the arrival of
8 equipment. We cannot buy back an American soldier's life
9 when reinforcements come too late. The selection criteria
10 are right. The MOPF decision to close is wrong. And I'll be
11 submitting additional information to the Commissioners for
12 their consideration. Thank you so much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And your additional information
14 will be reproduced in the record. Thank you, Congressman
15 Menendez.
16 We're delighted to have your distinguished
17 colleague, Representative Dick Zimmer.
18 REPRESENTATIVE ZIMMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 members of the Commission. I would like to address the issue
20 that my colleague, Frank Pallone, discussed, which is the
21 consolidation and co-location of functions from the Rome Lab
22 to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Page 92

1 Operation Desert Storm demonstrated dramatically
2 the transformation of modern warfare. It showed that a fully
3 integrated battlefield is increasingly important to our
4 country's military success. Because of the importance of
5 interoperability of information systems in battle space,
6 United States technology supervision must be maximized to
7 fully integrate all elements of the sea, land, air
8 battlefield. This can best be done through cross-servicing.
9 The Joint Cross-Service Group on Labs agreed with
10 this assessment, recommending Fort Monmouth as the site for
11 C4I co-location, one of few inter-servicing steps taken by
12 the Department of Defense in BRAC '95, and right in line with
13 BRAC '93 guidance for more cross-servicing.
14 Co-location of the leading Air Force and Army C4I
15 centers will ensure that a coordinated C4I development
16 procurement test and implementation plan is pursued. It will
17 promote joint interoperability and create a world class C4I
18 center, a national center of information warfare.
19 I believe Fort Monmouth has the expert, experienced
20 staff to lead the DOD effort in C4I. Fort Monmouth is the
21 leader in four mission areas chosen for consolidation at Fort
22 Monmouth -- photonics, electromagnetics, radio communication,

Page 93

1 and communications networks.
2 The fort has 68 research and development agreements
3 with leading edge academic institutions, including nearby
4 Princeton, Rutgers, New Jersey Institute of Technology, and
5 Stevens Institute. It has public-private partnerships with
6 New Jersey leaders in C4I technology, such as AT&T, Bell
7 Labs, and IT&T, and is located in the state that enjoys the
8 highest concentration of scientists and engineers in the
9 nation per capita.
10 In terms of physical space, Fort Monmouth possesses
11 extensive, low-cost expansion capacity. The fort includes
12 more than 1,000 acres on the main post and Charles Wood area,
13 and, because of previous BRAC decisions, has available more
14 than 500,000 square feet of fully modernized, professional
15 work space.
16 The fort has state-of-the-art facilities to support
17 C4I mission, including a variety of unique high-technology
18 facilities, such as the digital integrated lab, the Myers
19 Center and, in particular, includes world-class laboratory
20 space and state-of-the-art infrastructure to house the
21 thousands of engineers and scientists who work there today,
22 the cutting edge of information technology.

Page 94

1 BRAC and non-BRAC-related movements from the post
2 have created significant expansion potential for cross-
3 servicing. This potential is complemented by available
4 housing for military families and the full range of medical,
5 dental, shopping, and recreational activities on post to
6 support them.
7 Fort Monmouth has the ideal integrated commodity
8 command structure, already predominates the C4I joint arena,
9 and has the physical space and technological and academic
10 environment to make cross-servicing of C4I activities there a
11 success.
12 I strongly support the Joint Cross-Service Group
13 recommendations. Thank you very much.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
15 Representative Zimmer. We thank the distinguished New Jersey
16 delegation for their very fine presentation and we ask our
17 friends from Lakehurst to file out silently, and we thank
18 them for being here.
19 We will go next to the New York delegation. Let
20 the Chair first make this announcement, please, as the folks
21 from New Jersey are leaving the room. Yesterday, we had 81
22 Members of the House and Senate and, from 8:30 until 6:10

Page 95

1 p.m., in direct compliance with the schedule, we heard 81
2 Members of the House and Senate.
3 There's something in the water today, and the Chair
4 is obligated to say that he and the Commission are obligated
5 to hear today 121 Members of the House and Senate. Of the
6 first 18 this morning, only three of the 18 testified within
7 the five-minute framework.
8 I am obligated to say to my friends in the Congress
9 -- and I guess only a Member can say this -- five minutes is
10 five minutes and, whenever you talk longer, we go later; and
11 we are going to do the very best we can to slog through 121
12 Members. But I would hope, in all fairness to everybody
13 involved, everyone would try to honor the five-minute sign.
14 There is the green light, the red light, and the
15 yellow light. The colors are red, yellow, green. There's a
16 green light, a yellow light, and a red light. No one
17 realizes more than a man who spent 42 years in elected public
18 service how wonderful it is to hear one's own voice.
19 (Laughter.)
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Spare us. Spare us.
21 (Laughter.)
22 COMMISSIONER COX: We are delighted -- and I say

Page 96

1 this on the verge of hearing two of the most eloquent men in
2 the United States Senate, so this is probably a terrible time
3 to make this speech, because I am so pleased to see the great
4 senior Senator from the great State of New York, my friend,
5 Senator Pat Moynihan.
6 SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Mr. Chairman, members of this
7 honorable Commission, I will speak as the voice of
8 disinterested science, principally on behalf of the Rome
9 Laboratories, and to say to you, in great seriousness, that I
10 am formerly a member of the President's Science Advisory
11 Committee, which President Eisenhower established to provide
12 an independent source of advice on weapons development.
13 I'm formerly vice chairman and member of the board
14 of directors of the American Association for the Advance of
15 Science and I am now chairman of the Commission on the
16 Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy, which was
17 established by statute in the last Congress.
18 I'll say two things. The work at Rome Labs,
19 primarily in photonics, is now in its third generation. It
20 is science at its most fundamental. It concerns photonics,
21 which I think can fairly be judged, at this point, as much as
22 you would know. What electronics has been to the 20th

Page 97

1 century, photonics will be to the next century.
2 On Sunday, I gave the commencement address at Union
3 College in Schenectady, its 200th anniversary. One of the
4 honorees, who got a medal, was the inventor, Class of '41, of
5 laser -- LASER, light amplification by stimulated emission of
6 radiation.
7 This work has been going along from roughly
8 Schenectady, across the Mohawk Valley, to Rochester, the
9 Kodak Labs, down to Cornell, and back by way of Corning and
10 Alfred and Syracuse. It is not a warehouse. This is not an
11 Air Force Base. This is an intellectual activity in its
12 third generation and its moment of peak productivity.
13 To rip it out by the roots would be a form of
14 vandalism, and the Air Force apparently is prepared to do
15 that. I don't know what's happened to their sense of
16 science.
17 One of the problems is that what's going on there
18 is classified, and it ought not be. In 1971, the Pentagon
19 set up a Commission under Frederick Sites, who was then
20 chairman of the Rockefeller University, and Jack Rouena from
21 MIT, Edward from California were on it. They recommended
22 that all weapons development secrecy would be stopped at the

Page 98

1 science level, just stop it. It gets in your way, it slows
2 you down. At best, no more than five years.
3 So the people at Rome have been pathetic with
4 respect to telling people what they do. They don't dare even
5 hint, for fear of some awful transgression of rules which
6 ought not to be there in the first place, but that is the
7 case.
8 The state of photonics is evidence of the work
9 done. I tell you, it would be seriously, grievously set back
10 if it's not continued in the research mode that has been
11 established. Thirty years ago, you began to hear about light
12 in those circles, and now you begin to see the consequences.
13 My distinguished colleague, Senator D'Amato, will
14 continue in this matter. I have friends on the other body
15 who will speak about specific places.
16 I would add a special word, though, for the Niagara
17 base. It is the only Air Force Reserve unit in the State of
18 New York. You ripped out two great Air Force bases -- not
19 you, but the last time around -- including the oldest
20 military base in the United States, built to fight off the
21 British on the shores of Lake Champlain, and a stone barracks
22 in 1818, standing there abandoned and forlorn. I'm hoping,

Page 99

1 in some measure of equity, you might at least save Niagara
2 and Rome. Thank you very much.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my erudite friend, the
4 distinguished senior Senator from the great State of New York
5 for continuing to educate me and others, and we appreciate
6 his contribution.
7 We're delighted to see his distinguished friend and
8 colleague, the great Senator from the State of New York, the
9 chairman of the Banking Committee, my old friend, Senator Al
10 D'Amato.
11 SENATOR D'AMATO: Mr. Chairman, it's good to be
12 here. Let me first thank you and the Commission and really
13 thank the Commission for the work that you do. I mean,
14 having 80-plus and then 100-plus Members come in is more
15 than, I think, anyone could possibly be asked to endure. It
16 goes beyond public service. You could call it something
17 else.
18 (Laughter.)
19 SENATOR D'AMATO: So I'm going to attempt to do
20 something that most people would say is impossible, and that
21 is to keep within the time constraints. I'm going to ask
22 that my full statement be entered into the record as if read

Page 100

1 in its entirety, and I am sure that you will read every
2 single word of the statement, even though it is 92 pages.
3 (Laughter.)
4 SENATOR D'AMATO: Let me say that, number one, I
5 honestly believe that, Mr. Chairman, that what was done, for
6 whatever reason, was that a decision was first made and
7 formulated to close the Rome Lab, not on economics, not in
8 terms of what work they were doing or weren't and that, once
9 that decision was made, we had to find numbers to justify it.
10 I don't think there's any other case where the
11 books were cooked more than in this particular case --
12 cooked. The numbers don't add up.
13 I'm simply saying to this Commission, let's do the
14 right thing. What is the right thing to do? You're going to
15 lose, as Senator Moynihan has testified to, a great team.
16 Then we hear about now, we have this new thing that we're
17 going to get into this joint cross-service business, and it
18 just doesn't apply here.
19 Let me say the Joint Cross-Service Report issued by
20 the Special Department of Defense BRAC Task Force is
21 supposedly of one the reasons for this move -- just cooked it
22 up. Let's look at the record. There will be no cross-

Page 101

1 servicing because there is no Navy at Hanscom, there's no
2 Army at Hanscom, there's none at Monmouth, either. In fact,
3 the Army's Electronic Technological Device Lab, currently at
4 Fort Monmouth, is being moved to Maryland.
5 This is a fiasco. It's a farce. And let me not
6 say here for the Commission's benefit what I believe has
7 empowered it, because I think the Commission and its members
8 have their own expertise and understands the body politic.
9 There's a time for politics and there's a time for
10 doing what's right. We were promised -- we being the people
11 at Rome, the State of New York -- that this lab would be kept
12 open and, based upon that, we made very specific commitments.
13 Millions of dollars, both by the state and the
14 private sector, have been poured in as it relates to a re-use
15 program; and I daresay there are very few others throughout
16 this country that can demonstrate that. We took up Mr.
17 Boatright on his promise. We pointed that out to the
18 Commission in the past.
19 I just ask this Commission to do the right thing,
20 because it's the right thing to do. No savings here. Pure
21 politics. It's wrong. You don't spend the time that you do
22 here because of political concerns but, rather, you do it

Page 102

1 because you're trying to make a difference for this country
2 and you have touch decisions to make.
3 I feel confident, if you take a look at all the
4 facts and really look at this carefully, based upon what the
5 state has committed, what we have done, and what the facts
6 are, this lab will be preserved. I thank the Commission.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank our friend, the
8 distinguished Senator from New York State and his
9 distinguished colleague.
10 We're pleased to have your Member from the House of
11 Representatives, Gary Ackerman. Congressman Ackerman.
12 REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.
13 Chairman, members of the Commission. I'm testifying on
14 behalf of Fort Totten, which is in Queens County on the North
15 Shore.
16 As I noted in my testimony last month, the current
17 proposal regarding Fort Totten is to close the fort, except
18 for an enclave reserved for the headquarters of the 77th Army
19 Reserve Command. That command will actually increase at the
20 end of this fiscal year by 2,000 Reservists.
21 The increase will also bring additional full-time
22 military personnel, which leaves us with the question of

Page 103

here to house service members and their families. The
y's answer foolishly continues to be that Fort Totten be
ed and the Army pay $3.1 million to the Navy to house
vice members and their families at Mitchell Field.
Despite the fact that the Army will pay the Navy
$3.1 million to upgrade their housing, the Army is guaranteed
as much as one cot for housing, as the Navy will continue to
give the right of first refusal to Navy and Marine personnel.
This may force Army personnel to look for housing
on the open market, in arguably one of the most, if not the
most, expensive markets in the country. I believe the
proposal is both unfair and unwise.
The proposal is unfair to service members, who
would prefer to live in Bayside, where easy access to major
transportation arteries places the entire tri-state area and
its military facilities well within reach of the base.
Closing Fort Totten would also deprive service members of the
ability to enroll their children in two of New York's top-
rated school districts, Numbers 25 and 26. It's also unfair
to force service members and their families to search for
housing in such an expensive market.
Army personnel in New York will receive a 6 percent

Page 104

COLA for a maximum additional payment of $270 a month. Even
with this additional $270 in their pocket, that payment is
unlikely to provide them the ability to find adequate housing
at all and certainly not near the high-quality schools and
shopping and easy transportation that Fort Totten provides.
It is unwise for the Army to pay the Navy to
upgrade Navy housing when the Army could spend that $3
million to upgrade housing at Fort Totten and permit the
ntinuation of residences which are close to the expanding
erve facility in a superior location.
Closing Fort Totten would be also unwise from the
ndpoint of morale. Secretary Perry and the President have
both committed to upholding the morale and the welfare of
service members and their families. The combination of
amenities and superior quality of life in the Bayside market
make Fort Totten an attractive housing option for service
members and their families. In fact, the Citizens Committee
of New York rated the Bayside area one of the top communities
in which to raise a child within the City of New York.
The Fort Totten community, in the Bay Terrace
section of Bayside, is right on the Long Island Sound. It's
on the water's edge. It's a little peninsula jutting out.

Page 105

It overlooks the Long Island Sound. It overlooks New York
Harbor. It looks straight through the Whitestone and four
different bridges. It is one of the most prime pieces of
real estate in the entire northeast region, and it would be
foolhardy for the Army to give this up.
In short, Fort Totten should remain open because of
the continuing military housing needs in New York, the high
cost of housing in the New York area, and because it will
improve the morale and welfare of service members and their
families, and I urge the Commission to remove Fort Totten
from the list of facilities to be closed. The savings, if
any, certainly are not worth it.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: We thank Congressman Gary Ackerman
for those very enlightening and fine remarks.
We're delighted to see his distinguished colleague,
Representative Susan Molinari.
REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you and good
morning.
Let me just follow up on the comments that have
prepared by my colleague, Congressman Ackerman, and talk
efly about Fort Hamilton, which is basically going through
the same growing pains.

Page 106

Before I get into the meat and potatoes of my
presentation, I'd like to just ask you to please, in your
deliberations, note that there have been revised figures
since last we met. The Army's original projections for
savings were approximately $7.2 in annual savings and they
have since concluded that they made a mistake and it's a
little over $3 million.
That being said, we don't disagree with the
fundamental concept that the Department of Defense is trying
to put forth, particularly in light of the fact that, coming
from New York city, we have developers that we've talked to
who have indicated that they would be interested and willing
to work with the community to come into Brooklyn, revitalize
the housing, and lease it out back to the military.
However, there is going to be a gap if this
Commission accepts the Army's recommendations between when
that is legitimately possible and the military families can,
in fact, move into suitable housing.
The Army, as you know, has recommended to divest
itself of 442 units at Fort Hamilton. At the same time, the
Army has concluded that those military missions at Fort
Hamilton are necessary and, gratefully, this committee

Page 107

concluded the same thing, and did not put to close Fort
Hamilton's mission on the final list.
So now you have 442 families who are going to look
for a place to live. Remember one thing. The Department of
the Army is counting on legislation passing in order to do
what needs to be done. That legislation is moving through
the House this week. It has yet to see the Senate. Will it
be attached to a piece of legislation signed into law by the
President? None of us know.
So now we are going to create a gap where 442
members of our armed services are going to be put out on the
Brooklyn economy, getting a variable housing allowance plus
basic pay for an E-3, which is approximately what is the
predominant makeup of Fort Hamilton, which is about $600.
I'm sending you attachments that you should have
before you show you that the average advertisement for
housing in and around the base is about $1,500. Where are
these military personnel going to go on a housing allowance
of $600?
You have stated that their mission is valuable and,
therefore, the fort must remain open. You have stated, the
Department of Defense has stated that they want private

Page 108

developers to come over and they want you to make that
decision now, not knowing when legislatively that is going to
be capable. So we're going to create a gap for a member of
our armed services to try and live on $600 in an economy that
demands $1,500 for affordable housing, and that's not luxury
housing.
Let me suggest to you, Chairman -- and I will
conclude with this -- and members of the Commission, 442
housing units does not need Base Closure Commission
recommendations.
You can recommend that these housing units stay in
the Department of the Army and, at any point in time that is
below the threshold the Department of the Army can negotiate
with developers in the New York City area when the
legislation is passed, when it's signed into law, and when
there can be an orderly transition for our members of the
armed services to proceed out and back in.
We can do that. We cannot do that in the amount of
time that will be allowed if you vote to close us down on 442
housing units that legislation allows to be rented back out
to developers.
We are going to supply you, as I said, with the

Page 109

1 names of the building construction industry we've been
2 working with in New York to show you, in good faith, we're
3 willing to proceed on this. In fact, the community thinks it
4 would benefit by having private developers take over the
5 housing, revamp it, and lease it back to the Army.
6 But what we are creating is a disaster in the
7 making for our military families if the Base Closure
8 Commission votes to do it before we are ready to proceed on
9 that course, from both a legislative standpoint where we're
10 allowed to do it and negotiations with the developers.
11 Last line, I'll say it again: this does not need
12 base closure action. It's below the threshold. So nothing
13 stands to be gained except for another line under the
14 Department of the Army to say "closure" and, in the best
15 interests of our military families, we can accomplish the
16 same purpose with an orderly transition if you vote to remove
17 Fort Hamilton from the realignment list.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much,
19 Representative Molinari.
20 REPRESENTATIVE MOLINARI: Thank you, Chairman
21 Dixon.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We're indebted to you for that

Page 110

1 fine contribution. May I observe, I hope that you and my
2 friend, Senator D'Amato, and others that are referencing
3 printed material and other information, be sure to give it to
4 our staff. Thank you very much.
5 We're delighted to have your colleague and friend,
6 Representative Sherwood Boehlert here. Congressman Boehlert.
7 REPRESENTATIVE BOEHLERT: Mr. Chairman and members
8 of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify
9 once again on behalf of Rome Laboratory.
10 Today, I want to focus on just two issues that have
11 arisen since your New York City hearing last month -- the
12 revised Air Force cost estimates and state funding of the re-
13 use plan for Griffiss Air Force Base.
14 I'm afraid my discussion of the latest Air Force
15 figures will sound painfully familiar. That's because the
16 Air Force continues to overestimate the annual savings from
17 relocating Rome Lab while underestimating the cost. Indeed,
18 the Air Force has done exactly what we predicted in our New
19 York testimony -- come back with slightly more realistic cost
20 estimates while further distorting the savings estimates.
21 The May estimate is just a new ruse to obscure one
22 central fact: relocating Rome Lab will cost money, lots of

Page 111

1 it, not save any. As you well know, the Army has costed out
2 the relocation of Rome Laboratory on several occasions, with
3 wildly different results. In the latest figures, as in
4 February, the projected annual saving is the fatal flaw.
5 The Air Force now maintains it would save almost
6 $13 million a year by moving Rome Lab. The actual figure is
7 closer to $1 million a year, resulting in an impossibly long
8 payback period. Remember, these are not net savings but,
9 rather, savings that must be used to offset the cost of
10 moving, costs in excess of $100 million. Spending $100
11 million up front, to save an estimate $1 million per year --
12 not a very prudent or wise business decision.
13 How could this discrepancy occur? First, the Air
14 Force chose to grossly overestimate the cost of real property
15 maintenance at Rome. For the Air Force's figures to be
16 accurate, Rome would have to be paying $45 per square foot
17 for maintenance while comparable Air Force facilities pay
18 only 60 cents per square foot.
19 Here's another problem. Even though the test sites
20 at Rome must remain in operation, the Air Force assumes that
21 every last square foot of space at Rome will be shut down and
22 mothballed. That's not going to happen. And the Air Force

Page 112

1 estimate of total square footage at Rome is off by almost an
2 order of magnitude. The Air Force 177,000 square feet at a
3 facility that site surveys has over 1.3 million square feet
4 of space.
5 These kinds of glaring, obvious, demonstrable
6 errors hardly build confidence in the Air Force's
7 calculation, and these are not minor mistakes. If we correct
8 just these errors in maintenance costs and square footage,
9 and accept absolutely every other Air Force assumption, the
10 payback period for shutting down Rome Lab jumps to 16 years.
11 That's right -- 16 years.
12 Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners,
13 that the Air Force itself has said that base closures are not
14 economical if the payback period goes into double digits.
15 Indeed, Mr. Boatright and General Blume reiterated that point
16 in a meeting with representatives of the Rome community on
17 June 1st, and no BRAC Commission has closed an Air Force
18 facility with a payback of more than eight years.
19 Of course, maintenance costs and square footage are
20 not the only problems with the Air Force's latest estimates.
21 The Air Force now says Rome's support manpower levels will be
22 cut by 93 positions, almost double the figure in the February

Page 113

1 estimate. What has happened since February to justify this
2 conclusion? The Air Force has provided no credible answer to
3 that question.
4 I will submit, for the record, our enumeration of
5 that other faulty assumptions in the Air Force's latest COBRA
6 estimates, and it's voluminous. When all of them are taken
7 into account, it turns out that the payback period for
8 closing Rome Laboratory is in excess of 100 years, just as
9 the Air Force itself had concluded in October of last year.
10 The Air Force's proposal to dismember Rome
11 Laboratory contrasts starkly with the community's effort to
12 strengthen it, so let me now turn to the Griffiss reuse plan
13 in which the Commission has shown so much interest.
14 Commissioners have repeatedly asked us for evidence
15 that the commitment for the reuse plan is real. New York
16 State just concluded its budget process and the new budget
17 continues to make good New York State's commitment of $12
18 million to the New York State Technology Enterprise
19 Corporation.
20 In short, the decision to take Rome Lab off the
21 closure list should be an easy one. In New York, we've
22 demonstrated that the relocation of Rome meets none of the

Page 114

1 BRAC criteria. The events of the past six weeks have done
2 nothing but strengthen our case. Closing Rome Lab will cost
3 money and damage a vital military asset. It will be
4 excessively costly and totally disruptive of critically
5 important research and development. I urge you to remove
6 Rome Lab from the list; and I think you for your courtesy.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Boehlert.
8 We're delighted to see your friend, the
9 distinguished member of the New York House delegation,
10 Representative Jack Quinn, here.
11 REPRESENTATIVE QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
12 good morning, Commissioners.
13 As you may know, this is my second appearance
14 before the Commission, as well, as I join other colleagues
15 here and, since we last testified in New York City, for the
16 U.S.S. Intrepid, new news has surface that the Niagara Falls
17 Air Force Base has been added to the list so, this morning, I
18 would briefly like to talk to the Commission about the
19 Niagara Falls Air Force Base, as well as REDCAP in the
20 Calspan Corporation in Buffalo.
21 For the record, just once, REDCAP, as you know, we
22 all do, is the Realtime Digitally Controlled Analyzer

Page 115

1 Processing Facility. Thank goodness for abbreviations like
2 REDCAP.
3 Although I do not envy the task that you have here
4 today, listening to all of these Members, plus all the
5 testimony that you've already heard over these past months
6 and will hear in these next few weeks, I have to tell you
7 that, as a proponent of both deficit and wasteful government
8 spending reduction as well as a strong national defense, I
9 commend all of you for your efforts.
10 I'd also like to take a minute just to thank
11 General Davis for his visit to Western New York some weeks
12 ago at the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station last month. The
13 entire community remains grateful for your visit to see,
14 firsthand, the activities there.
15 I'm here also as a representative, of course, of
16 constituents in my district, the 30th District of New York,
17 Buffalo and Western New York. Even though the Niagara Falls
18 Air Force Base isn't located in my district, I think we all
19 understand and we're aware that congressional boundaries
20 isn't where these kinds of things begin and end.
21 Indeed, I've talked with several representatives,
22 also constituents in Buffalo and Western New York, about the

Page 116

1 importance of this, and I also want to take a minute right
2 now, if I can, to congratulate my colleague, John LaFalce, a
3 member of the other party. I think we're pointing up now,
4 we're different parties, but this issue is one that's
5 bipartisan in nature and importance. I congratulate John for
6 the great effort he's put together on behalf of the Niagara
7 Falls Air Force Base.
8 It's also my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the
9 base has the support of the Defense Department, the Air
10 Force, of course the entire congressional delegation from New
11 York. General MacIntosh, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve,
12 recently, has indicated the Air Force's strong support, also,
13 for the retention of the base.
14 The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station and the 914th
15 Air Lift Wing are valuable, combat-proven assets to the Air
16 Force. The 914th Air Lift Wing has operated both
17 independently and in conjunction with active forces in
18 Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Any action to close this station
19 will sacrifice the cohesion of a unit that has been battle-
20 tested and recognized for the performance by the Department
21 of Defense.
22 We also know, as Mr. LaFalce will point out, it's

Page 117

1 the only C-130 unit activated for Operation Desert Storm. No
2 other Air Force Reserve C-130 unit has received a higher
3 ranking during the last nine years.
4 In addition, closure of the base will not achieve
5 any significant savings over any other C-130 Reserve base
6 currently under study.
7 Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn my comments
8 toward the REDCAP facility. It's apparent that I believe,
9 and others, that it's in the best interest of the country to
10 keep the REDCAP in Buffalo. I think, when we last discussed
11 this issue in New York, many of us agreed that we weren't
12 even certain how and why REDCAP got on the list in the first
13 place.
14 This facility is being currently being fully
15 utilized. Any move simply would change the location of the
16 work, without providing any consolidation or savings. In
17 fact, costs would probably increase.
18 The Calspan Corporation, which has operated the
19 REDCAP facility, is a private company that has operated it
20 for over 30 years. It's built up a unique body of knowledge
21 that enables the facility to provide high value to their test
22 customers at a very, very low cost. Moving the facility,

Page 118

1 therefore, would destroy a valuable asset that the taxpayers
2 of this country have built over many years.
3 In addition, something that we're talking about in
4 the Congress now, and we have for some time, as many of you
5 are aware, this move at this facility for REDCAP would simply
6 take jobs that are out of the private sector and move them
7 into the government sector. At this time, with shrinking
8 budgets, I think most of us are trying to do the opposite.
9 Finally, we believe, as I said, in New York, and
10 others have agreed, that REDCAP simply doesn't meet the
11 criteria for consideration under the BRAC process. It has
12 far less than the required 300 employees and it's not even a
13 base, in the first place. It's providing a significant
14 service, as is evidenced by its high utilization. The facts
15 show that New York has been hit hard. We know that from the
16 other testimony.
17 I appreciate your time this morning and the time in
18 the past, and wish you all well in your deliberations.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
20 Quinn. We appreciate those very helpful remarks.
21 We're delighted to have a distinguished Member of
22 your House delegation, my old friend, Representative John

Page 119

1 LaFalce, here.
2 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Chairman Dixon and members
3 of the Commission, it's a pleasure to appear before you
4 again. This is my third appearance before either General
5 Davis or the Commission.
6 I appear before you today with respect to both the
7 Niagara Falls Air Force Base and REDCAP, joining forces with
8 Congressman Jack Quinn, in whose district REDCAP resides. A
9 brief word about that, first.
10 REDCAP has been operated by either Calspan or its
11 predecessor, Cornell Aeronautical Labs, for over 30 years. I
12 know a bit about this because, in my prior incarnation as an
13 attorney, my law firm represented the employees at Calspan.
14 They're some of the most brilliant Ph.D.'s in the world. I
15 don't think you'll find a finer group.
16 It's inconceivable to me that this recommendation
17 would be before this Commission. This is not a base
18 realignment or closing. This is not a government employee
19 group. These are some of the best civilian Ph.D.s in the
20 world, doing work under private contract with the United
21 States Government that cannot be done by any other group.
22 It shouldn't be before you. You shouldn't be

Page 120

1 considering that. If the Air Force wants to do this, the Air
2 Force can do it on their own, although they would get
3 considerable objection. They couldn't perform the type of
4 in-flight testing that it would be necessary to accomplish
5 for a fraction of the cost that these simulated tests can do.
6 Take this off the possible closing list. It
7 doesn't belong there.
8 Now, with respect to Niagara Falls, Chairman Dixon
9 and each and every Commissioner, when you think of Niagara
10 Falls, don't even think of the Air Reserve Station. Just
11 think of the honeymoon capital of the world and where you
12 should go for your second honeymoon.
13 (Laughter.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Don't let my wife hear that, John.
15 REPRESENTATIVE LaFALCE: Because, when you go on a
16 honeymoon in Niagara Falls, you have a virtual perfect
17 marriage, the type of perfect marriage that has existed
18 between the Air Force and the Niagara Falls community since
19 the Niagara Falls community has been host to the 914th Air
20 Lift Wing. Don't mess around with this perfect marriage.
21 Now, why is it such a perfect marriage? Because
22 you have this union of Air Force wants and desires and needs,

Page 121

1 and community wants, desires, and needs.
2 Let me talk about the Air Force desires and needs.
3 What does the Air Force desire? They desire to have the very
4 best C-130 outfit in the world continue. And you know what?
5 According to last year's ORI -- overall readiness inspection
6 -- we received an excellent rating, and there is no unit in
7 the United States that's received a higher rating in the past
8 nine years.
9 For the past five years, we've done it. We've done
10 it with outstanding excellence. We did it in Operation
11 Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We did it in Bosnia. We did
12 it in Somalia. We did it in Turkey and Iraq, et cetera. We
13 want to continue doing it.
14 Now, the Air Force also needs us. I don't just
15 assert that. I can cite data which prove it, letters that
16 prove it.
17 First of all, when they made a recommendation
18 earlier this year, they recommended that Pittsburgh be
19 closed, and they did this on the assumption that Chicago
20 O'Hare was going to be closed -- not closed, but relocated,
21 not closed, because the '93 BRAC commission said, "Well,
22 Chicago O'Hare should be relocated to Rockport at the City of

Page 122

1 Chicago's expense. But the City of Chicago couldn't afford
2 that.
3 When they recommended Pittsburgh, they said
4 "because Pittsburgh is so close to Youngstown that we won't
5 lost the Reservists." Now, on Friday, they sent the
6 Commission a new letter saying:
7 "It's imperative that we only close one C-130. We
8 cannot close two and, if it's going to be one, we now want to
9 revise our opinion and recommend Chicago O'Hare, because the
10 City of Chicago, as testified in the Chicago hearing, doesn't
11 want it there. They need that space for commercial
12 expansion. And so we now recommend that BRAC close it at
13 BRAC expense for the Air Reserve and let the City of Chicago
14 handle the expense of relocating the Air National Guard,
15 which they can afford."
16 But, underlying either their Pittsburgh or their
17 O'Hare recommendation is that, if they closed either of
18 those, they would not be losing the most important ingredient
19 that any military has -- its people, its personnel -- because
20 the Reservists at Pittsburgh could go to Youngstown, or vice
21 versa, and the Reservists at O'Hare could go to Milwaukee or
22 vice versa, because each is within approximately a one-hour

Page 123

1 drive of the other whereas, at Niagara Falls, if you were to
2 close the 914th, you'd lost the Reservists, because it's at
3 least a four-to-five-hour drive to the next closest base.
4 That's why the Air Force wants and needs our 914th
5 so much, and we want and need it, I think more than any other
6 unit. Now, how do you know that? How do you quantify
7 community support?
8 Well, you can quantify community need by looking at
9 the data, and the revised data show that our job loss would
10 be 1.1 percent, Youngstown's .5 percent, three of the others
11 .1 percent, and Chicago O'Hare is .0 percent.
12 Now, what does that mean? That means that our need
13 and, therefore, our community support, is more than twice as
14 great as Youngstown, 11 times greater than Pittsburgh or
15 Minneapolis or Milwaukee and, Chairman Dixon, infinitely
16 greater than Chicago's, which has a .0 job loss.
17 Again, when you have such a union, a marriage,
18 between Air Force wants and needs and community wants and
19 needs, you do not put that marriage asunder. Again, come to
20 Niagara Falls for your second honeymoon. Thank you very
21 much.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman

Page 124

1 LaFalce. We thank the great New York State delegation. The
2 Chair observes that, out of seven there, five were able to do
3 it in five minutes. The quality of presentations is
4 substantially improving in length and the Chair urges other
5 delegations to emulate the great State of New York. Let the
6 word go forth to the Congress and the world that five of
7 their seven did it in the five minutes.
8 There is out there some delegation desperately
9 wanting to please the Chair by having 100 percent of their
10 delegation make their presentation within the magic time of
11 five minutes.
12 The State of New York is concluded.
13 COMMISSIONER COX (presiding): We are now most
14 pleased and honored to have with us the distinguished
15 Minority Whip, on behalf of the State of Michigan.
16 REPRESENTATIVE BONIOR: Thank you, Madam Chairman
17 and Commissioners. I want to thank you for the opportunity
18 to speak with you this morning about the Army garrison at
19 Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and for your hard work and
20 your patience during this process.
21 In particular, I want to think Commissioner Steele
22 for taking the time last April to come to Selfridge and hear

Page 125

1 our concerns firsthand, as well as the Chairman for all the
2 courtesies that he has extended me.
3 I want to echo, this morning, some of the comments
4 made last night by my distinguished colleagues, Senators
5 Levin and Abraham. We in Michigan, as you know, are very,
6 very proud of our Selfridge Air National Guard base and proud
7 of the role it continues to play in the defense of our
8 country.
9 As much as we all recognize the need to downsize
10 the military, we believe that closing the Army garrison at
11 Selfridge is a bad idea, for two reasons: first, because it
12 would seriously undermine the morale and quality of life of
13 the military families who serve at Selfridge and, second,
14 that it would do so needlessly, because closing the Army
15 garrison wouldn't save the taxpayers or the DOD a dime.
16 Now, to understand why, you have to understand one
17 thing. Selfridge is the premier joint military base in the
18 country and a perfect model of the kind of base this
19 Commission is working so hard to promote. At Selfridge, we
20 have the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, the
21 Coast Guard, the National Guard, both active duty and
22 Reserve, and they're all working together as a team.

Page 126

1 The reason they work so well together is because
2 they've made a special effort at Selfridge to make military
3 life compatible with family life. We do so because, as
4 Secretary of Defense Perry pointed out in a statement on the
5 8th of May, we recognize that the key to maintaining
6 readiness and the key to retaining good quality soldiers is
7 to provide good quality housing, because we recognize that
8 most soldiers today have families and they have to come to
9 expect more than just a bunk. They have to expect a home.
10 694 military families, 78 unaccompanied service
11 members who call Selfridge home share family housing,
12 education, counseling services, and recreational facilities.
13 By closing the Army garrison we will, in effect, be evicting
14 nearly all of those families and dismantling the very
15 structure that promotes the quality of life that Secretary
16 Perry said was so important.
17 Here is the worst part: closing this facility
18 won't save the taxpayers a dime, because we believe the Army
19 based its COBRA model, on erroneous calculations and
20 incorrect information. When the Army prepared its COBRA
21 model, it only took into account the cost of providing the
22 substitute housing for Army personnel.

Page 127

The problem is, less than half of the families and military personnel at Selfridge are Army personnel. In other words, as Commissioner Cornella pointed out at a hearing seven weeks ago, it appears as though the Army's projected savings at Selfridge come only as a result of making housing somebody else's problem, and that's just plain wrong.

The Army has an agreement with other branches at Selfridge. They can't just up and leave. Yet, none of the other branches were even consulted about this move.

What's more, the Army also assumed that families at Selfridge could find affordable housing elsewhere but this, too, isn't supported by the facts. Nearly 85 percent of the families affected by this closure are enlisted personnel -- and listen to this -- with a monthly housing allowance ranging from $427 a month to $740 a month.

A recent study in the area around the base showed an insufficient number of houses available for rent, at an average cost of $736 a month. Not only is there not enough housing available, there's no way these families could afford to pay even if they could find housing. Unless you want the men and women who defend our country being forced to live in seedy motels, the other branches are going to have to come up

Page 128

with the additional housing money, and that will all but wipe out the cost savings projected by the Army.

Keep in mind, this isn't a run-down facility that we're talking about. If we close the Army garrison at Selfridge, we will be shutting down a state-of-the-art facility. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and members of the board, I know you have a difficult decision to make, and it seems to me that if we truly want to improve the quality of life for military families, as Secretary Perry has said time and time again, we should be providing more of what is offered at Selfridge, not less.

I would urge that, before you make a decision that will significantly affect the lives of over 1,800 men, women, and children at Selfridge, you reconsider the Army's recommendations because, if you do, I am convinced that you will reach the same conclusions we have -- that the Army garrison at Selfridge should be removed from the base closure list.

I thank you for your time and your courtesies this morning.

COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much for that fine and concise explanation.

Page 129

Now, we'll move on to the great State of North Carolina, and we're pleased to see Congressman Walter Jones.

REPRESENTATIVE JONES: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Commissioners. I am Walter Jones, Jr., Congressman from the Third District of Eastern North Carolina, home for Camp LeJeune, Cherry Point Marine Air Station, and the 2nd Marine Air Wing. Thank you for taking time to hear my testimony.

At issue is the final disposition of the 10 squadrons F-18 Hornets from Cecil Field, Florida which were directed by the '93 BRAC Commission to Cherry Point Marine Air Station. I am here to express three simple ideas:

First, I will ask you to consider, in the context of the integrity of the BRAC process, why the '93 BRAC Commission's recommendation to use Cherry Point was reversed by the Department of Defense.

Secondly, I would like to talk about the simple matter of fairness. Many or all of the airplanes in question, if stationed at Oceana, will operate in the air over Eastern North Carolina, which means we would receive air and noise pollution without receiving the benefit connected with the presence of those planes on the ground.

Finally, I would ask you to take a second look at

Page 130

the long-term costs associated with maintaining and operating these squadrons at Oceana. The case for Oceana may not be as clear cut as once believed.

First, the integrity of the BRAC process. Madam Chairman, less than 18 months after the '93 BRAC Commission rendered its decision to designate Cherry Point as the prime operating base for the Hornets, DOD had developed a plan to change the decision to Oceana. However, Cherry Point made so much sense that millions of dollars were spent in preparation.

At the recommendation by Secretary Perry that the F-18s be sent to Oceana, I immediately questioned the reversal, since the previous BRAC panel had conducted extensive studies on both bases in the areas of military value, cost savings, and environment impact.

In addition to the basic criteria, Cherry Point was also cited, by the '93 BRAC, as an excellent location to conduct joint use training. It should be especially noted that joint use training is not possible at Oceana. Our staff has briefed your staff on the detailed background on the departure from the '93 recommendation.

Now, the issue of fairness. Eastern North Carolina

Page 131

and the Cherry Point area are well-known for their flight training and ground target areas. The Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, and Navy planes regularly make use of these areas which also means that we receive the noise and pollution associated with these planes. The noise and pollution will only increase if the planes in question operate from Oceana.

Our citizens are well aware of both the pros and cons connected with the arrival of jet squadrons, but the environmental cost of these planes in the air, without the economic benefit of having them stationed on the ground, would become a burden our citizens will not want to bear, nor should our citizens bear such a burden, without the benefits.

Finally, some comments on costs. I was very pleased that your staff recently visited Cherry Point Air Station. The main point I would like to make is that a second look at the whole picture at Oceana will raise serious questions regarding the wisdom of the move.

Aerial photos of both Oceana and Cherry Point clearly show the tremendous difference in the safety factor due to crowding around Oceana. The presentation we made to you at the public hearing in Baltimore on May 4th cited a difference between the 1993 and 1995 cost estimates of $385

Page 132

million. I have yet to hear a satisfactory answer for why there is this nearly half-a-billion dollar discrepancy. The bottom line is that there is more to the costs at Oceana than meets the eye.

Madam Chairman, in conclusion, I think we all know that any issue can be seen in different ways by different people, but I believe that whatever time you spend on this issue will bring to you and to our country a more secure position for all.

The civilians and military personnel who represent Cherry Point are ready and able to take on the future, whatever it may bring. We just want to be treated fairly, based upon the facts which have been made available to us. Please do not forget us in the shuffle and please do not forget the integrity of the BRAC process itself.

Thank you for hearing me today.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman, for those excellent remarks.

We're now pleased to move on to the great State of North Dakota, and hope to have Senator Kent Conrad start. Thank you, sir.

SENATOR CONRAD: Thank you very much. I especially

Page 133

1 want to thank the commissioners who came to North Dakota,
2 Commissioner Cox, Commissioner Kling, Commissioner Steele.
3 We deeply appreciate that you would take the time to come and
4 see, firsthand, the base that we are defending here today.
5 Here is what our top military leaders have told us.
6 The Secretary of Defense, Josh Gotbaum, who is Assistant
7 Secretary who is in charge of the base closure process, he
8 said, and I quote, "Although complete closure may appear
9 attractive from a cost savings perspective, it does not take
10 account of the preeminent military factors considered by the
11 department in its realignment considerations."
12 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman, said,
13 "I can not overstate my support for retention of a core
14 refueling wing at Grand Forks." Admiral Hank Chiles, head of
15 the Strategic Command, said, and I quote, "U.S. Strategic
16 Command views retention of a core tanker wing at Grand Forks
17 as an important element in support of our nation's strategic
18 deterrent capability."
19 And most recently, General Rutherford, head of the
20 Transportation Command, has said, and I quote, "Grand Forks
21 Air Force Base with its strategic central location and
22 extensive infrastructure is ideally suited to support the

Page 134

1 single integrated operational plan force deployments to
2 Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific area."
3 You know, in real estate -- Commissioner Kling, you
4 know this well -- they always say location, location,
5 location. That is Grand Forks. We have got the location.
6 No other base has got it. That is why you ought to keep
7 Grand Forks.
8 First and foremost, Grand Forks supports our
9 nuclear deterrent as a part of the single integrated
10 operational plan. Tankers at Grand Forks have quick response
11 time, maximum range -- maximum range -- and a secure position
12 from which to operate. Other bases being considered simply
13 don't meet those tests.
14 Grand Forks is also perfectly suited to support a
15 variety of conventional contingencies. Tankers from Grand
16 Forks can reach Europe or Asia faster than tankers from any
17 other base. That is why General Rutherford said in a letter
18 to you, "Keep Grand Forks." Location, location, location.
19 Strategic location is one of the reasons Grand Forks was the
20 busiest tanker base in the Air Mobility Command last year.
21 General Tonoso in Chicago, you may recall, said to
22 you, "Importance of Grand Forks as a war fighting base is

Page 135

1 key." He stressed that we select our combat bases to prepare
2 for war. To prepare for war. That is why Grand Forks became
3 a core tanker base and that is why it ought to be retained.
4 One final note on location, if you will permit me.
5 Grand Forks, under the ABM treaty, is our chosen site for a
6 ballistic missile defense system. Congress is taking steps
7 to speed up possible deployment of such a system. One option
8 would use Minuteman boosters from Grand Forks to launch
9 missile interceptors. Missile defense options reinforce the
10 importance of keeping Grand Forks.
11 If you close Grand Forks, you lose all of those
12 advantages. Closing Grand Forks will damage our ability to
13 effectively respond to crises and conflicts, to carry out
14 national policy, and to fight and to win a war.
15 For those reasons, we urge you to retain Grand
16 Forks. Thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
18 and we are pleased to move to the distinguished Congressman
19 from North Dakota, Congressman Pomeroy.
20 REPRESENTATIVE POMEROY: Thank you very much,
21 Commissioner Cox. I want to echo my appreciation for each of
22 you who took the time to visit the outstanding bases in North

Page 136

1 Dakota. I have enjoyed becoming personally acquainted with
2 you in the course of your visits and believe that you are
3 bringing terrific talent and dedication to the difficult
4 judgments before you.
5 I used to practice law in a small town, and as I
6 would approach a case would try and figure out what are the
7 key issues relevant to the determination before you. Here
8 the key issue is whether or not the Grand Forks tanker
9 mission ought to be added to the base closure list.
10 The key burden of proof attaching to that
11 determination is whether or not the Department of Defense
12 substantially deviated from the base closure criteria in not
13 having it on their recommended closure list. The criteria
14 are eightfold. The first four involve military value. Just
15 to briefly summarize: impact on operational readiness;
16 availability of land facilities and air space; availability
17 to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force
18 requirements; and, finally, cost and manpower implications.
19 Now, the record before you shows that these
20 considerations were very much at the heart of the decision to
21 establish core tankers bases and place one in Grand Forks.
22 The move is a natural response to the closure of twelve bases

Page 137

1 formerly housing tankers. It established operational
2 efficiencies and long-term stability for tankers charged with
3 maintaining global reach, a worldwide presence based
4 increasingly on domestic military basing considerations.
5 Grand Forks was chosen because of infrastructure, location,
6 and capacity. There is not another base that offers those
7 three considerations as an alternative.
8 Your decision to add the Grand Forks flying mission
9 to the base closure list for review has given our commanders
10 an opportunity to show you exactly why they made the
11 decisions that they did, and they have been rather emphatic
12 in their demonstration to you.
13 Chief of Staff Fogleman spoke to both the readiness
14 and the facilities issue when he, in his correspondence to
15 you, noted why they established a core mission at Grand
16 Forks. He cited national military strategy, including the
17 two major regional conflict issue, strategic nuclear
18 deterrence, as well as peacetime operations. He noted the
19 base's capacity, its infrastructure, and the importance in
20 terms of readiness for the military personnel which have been
21 relocated and shuffled about throughout this closure period.
22 Admiral Chiles, taking a slightly different

Page 138

1 perspective, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stressing
2 the importance of Grand Forks in terms of supporting the
3 SIOP. He called it "an important element in support of our
4 nation's strategic deterrent capability due to its strategic
5 location to support the bomber leg of the triad."
6 Yet another perspective on the importance of the
7 Grand Forks Air Force Base, General Rutherford, commander of
8 TRANSCOM, responsible for delivering our military forces to
9 any theater in the globe, because Grand Forks is now
10 structured as a cohesive, integrated core tanker base capable
11 of supporting operations in both Asian and European theaters,
12 General Rutherford has stated in correspondence to you that
13 the closure of Grand Forks would "impair our ability to
14 effectively execute national military missions."
15 Viewed in this framework, the Department of Defense
16 concurred with the Air Force determination that there ought
17 to be a core tanker base and it ought to be based in Grand
18 Forks. Assistant Secretary Gotbaum in correspondence to you
19 said that, "The Pentagon's analysis supported this
20 determination as militarily and fiscally sound."
21 Again, the issue before you is whether the DOD and
22 the Air Force have substantially deviated from base closure

Page 139

1 criteria by including the flying mission at Grand Forks Air
2 Force Base in their future operational and strategic
3 planning. The information has been emphatic. Fogleman,
4 Miles, Rutherford and Gotbaum all have made it very clear
5 there was no substantial deviation from the criteria and, in
6 fact, those criteria of military value were at the heart of
7 why they established core bases and placed one in Grand
8 Forks.
9 I am confident that after you evaluate carefully
10 all of these considerations you will find no substantial
11 deviation and, in fact, that the Air Force have done just
12 what we wanted them to: build a defense strategy for the
13 21st Century by creating efficient core tanker bases and
14 utilizing the outstanding facilities and location of Grand
15 Forks for this mission.
16 North Dakota is proud to be a host for the Grand
17 Forks Air Force Base and hopes to continue this role for a
18 long time to come. Thank you.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, and now we
20 are pleased to have the Senator from North Dakota, Senator
21 Byron Dorgan.
22 SENATOR DORGAN: Madame Chairman, thank you very

Page 140

1 much. Mercifully, I suppose, for the commission that you are
2 nearing the end of a packed agenda yesterday and today and
3 you are no doubt on the edge of your chairs on every word
4 with respect to every base, because all of us who come here
5 believe that our military installation is the most important
6 installation for this country. We understand that and we
7 make the best cases we can.
8 But we in North Dakota are not here to make the
9 case on our behalf. We are here to make the case that has
10 been made to the commission by General Fogleman, by Admiral
11 Miles, by Assistant Secretary Gotbaum and others, who say
12 that they made the determination that Grand Forks should be
13 one of three supertanker bases, and they believe in the
14 interests of this country, both strategically and for
15 military value purposes, that that flying mission of the
16 Grand Forks Air Force Base should remain.
17 All of these issues are put in the context of the
18 larger case. Let me give you a quote from Staff Sergeant
19 Merrifield, who is at Grand Forks. He is with the tanker
20 mission. He spent 300 days TDY last year from Grand Forks in
21 almost every theater -- SOUTHCOM and South America, Saudi
22 Arabia, England, Turkey. He says, "I am very proud to serve

Page 141

1 my country in all hotbed theaters where the action is. I am
2 proud to see the Grand Forks tail flash on airplanes all
3 around the world."
4 His point is that he is part of a unit, a core
5 tanker unit, one of three supertanker bases at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base, and they have moved all across the
7 world at the request of the Pentagon to do this country's
8 military business. Fortunately, we have never had to have a
9 live test of our nuclear war fighting capability, but General
10 Fogleman's recent white paper makes it crystal clear, I
11 think, to you and to us that Grand Forks would be a premiere
12 refueler for SIOP contingencies because he said, "It can ease
13 command and control issues and minimize turmoil when tanker
14 assets are transferred to the United States Strategic
15 Command."
16 Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
17 STRATCOM, stated in a letter to you that, "The core refueling
18 wing at the Grand Forks Air Force Base provides critical
19 support to strategic and contingency operations."
20 And General Rutherford, Commander in Chief of U.S.
21 TRANSCOM, made the same thing clear to you. "The wisdom of
22 establishing a refueling wing at Grand Forks was validated

Page 142

1 during the recent high priority operations, including Vigil
2 Warrior in Iraq and Support Hope in Rwanda."
3 We are very proud of this space, proud of its
4 mission, and proud of its contribution to this country. But
5 we don't, again, come to you as a Congressional delegation or
6 as a community or a state to say save this base because it's
7 in our state. We come to you and say that the Chief of Staff
8 of the Air Force, that the Defense Department itself, says
9 this base is strategically critical for this country's
10 military mission.
11 And that is why we believe that this commission
12 should make a decision to keep the flying wing at the Grand
13 Forks Air Force Base up, open, and operating and helping be
14 part of the defense of this country for the long-term future.
15 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I was
16 offering an amendment on the floor of the Senate a few
17 moments ago and then rushed as quickly as I could to the
18 Cannon Caucus Room to be there at 11:08. And when I
19 discovered you were not at the Cannon Caucus Room, which was
20 my error, I have set a new record in running from the Cannon
21 Building to the Hart Building only so that I would not be
22 late to present this vital testimony.

Page 143

1 And I hope that even as I perspire about the run I
2 have just made and perspire also about the decision you are
3 going to make in the coming days, that you will be guided in
4 that decision by the wisdom of the Chief of Staff of the Air
5 Force and so many others who viewed this mission at the Grand
6 Forks Air Force Base as critically important to the military
7 mission of our country.
8 Thank you very much.
9 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much, Senator,
10 and we are indeed pleased that you were able to make it and
11 present those fine remarks. And I might also say on behalf
12 of the chairman that we are also pleased that the North
13 Dakota delegation and the North Carolina delegation have both
14 100 percent made their five-minute limit. We are deeply
15 appreciative of that, and I know that the chairman, when he
16 returns, will be very happy to hear it.
17 We are also happy now to move on to the great State
18 of Ohio and recognize Senator John Glenn.
19 SENATOR GLENN: Thank you, Madame Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. And I just came down from upstairs so I
21 didn't have any problem getting here this morning. But I
22 don't envy you your task. You do have a tough task and

Page 144

1 everybody wants to defend what is in their state, of course.
2 The first issue I wanted to bring up this morning
3 relates to a 1993 recommendation by the commission which I
4 have questioned. It is a recommendation to privatize the
5 Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at NORC Air Force
6 Base in Heath, Ohio. The commission approved the
7 recommendation to close NORC in '93, but as that continued
8 the cost data became available and I asked GAO to take a look
9 at this whole thing. And it looks as though it may actually
10 cost the government taxpayer money, perhaps as much as $456
11 million over the next five years, instead of saving money.
12 Now, I think the GAO -- this is the only time that
13 GAO has done a study and recommended that a former decision
14 be reconsidered. And I would recommend that to you because
15 everything we have seen so far at least looks like it is
16 going to cost more than it will save if NORC is closed.
17 As it currently stands, the Air Force will receive
18 privatization proposals on June 17th. That is the deadline,
19 so right up on that. And the Air Force has already alerted
20 the commission that it may need to reevaluate what happens at
21 NORC, and all of our indications are that that should be
22 done. So I urge the commission to consider revisiting that

Page 145

1 '93 closure decision, particularly if those proposals
2 demonstrate that privatization will actually cost more than
3 current operations.
4 A second closure issue is the proposed closure of
5 Brooks Air Force Base and the realignment of its Armstrong
6 Laboratory Human Systems Center School of Aerospace Medicine
7 and Systems Acquisition School to Wright-Patt in Dayton. As
8 I understand it, the commission is considering an alternative
9 proposal under which these activities would be cantoned at
10 Brooks. In terms of military value, consolidation of these
11 activities at Wright-Patt takes advantage of the outstanding
12 aerospace research and development work already located there
13 while reducing overall Air Force infrastructure.
14 Further, the Air Force provided the commission with
15 its cost analysis on the cantonment proposal and found that
16 while the up-front costs, the up-front cost of base closure,
17 could be avoided through cantonment, movement of these
18 activities to Wright-Patt is more cost-effective than
19 cantonment because after a six-year payback period then there
20 are annual recurring savings in excess of $20 million per
21 year on into the future. So it appeared to me that that was
22 certainly the best way to go. These are Air Force figures,

Page 146

1 also, so they have made a good estimate of this.
2 Disapproving a recommendation merely to avoid up-front costs
3 of base closure seems to me to be at odds with the whole base
4 closure process and the purpose of it.
5 A third issue involves the proposed closure of the
6 Springfield Air National Guard Base and the groups, the
7 units, based there. Let me say first that a similar
8 recommendation was made in '93 but the Air Force reversed its
9 position before the commission when the costs of the move
10 were questioned. They have questioned those costs again this
11 year, questioned by the local community.
12 And according to the local community's cost data,
13 it would take 23 years before the Air Force would obtain a
14 return on its $30 million investment. That would be a $30
15 million investment essentially to walk away from the fully
16 modern taxpayer-purchased facilities at Springfield. Given
17 the past record on Springfield and the issues that have been
18 raised this year by the local community, I urge you to look
19 very carefully at the Air Force's figures on this.
20 Congressman Hobson, who is with us here this morning, will be
21 giving more detail on that.
22 And, finally, I urge the commission to reconsider

Page 147

1 its actions with respect to the Youngstown Air Reserve
2 Station. The commission added this facility to the closure
3 list along with several other C-130 reserve bases. Neither
4 the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of the Air Force
5 recommended closing Youngstown; rather, the Air Force
6 recognizes Youngstown's military value and plans to expand
7 the number of C-130 aircraft at Youngstown, making the 910th
8 Airlift Wing the largest C-130 wing in the Air Force Reserve.
9 The 910th also performs the aerial spray mission.
10 They are the only unit in the Air Force that has that as an
11 assigned mission, either Reserve or regular, the only unit
12 that performs a technically demanding mission and for which
13 unique maintenance facilities have been constructed and are
14 there at Youngstown now. It is an extremely modern facility.
15 Eighty-six percent of its buildings have been constructed or
16 upgraded in the last ten years.
17 So I would conclude my remarks by noting that the
18 costs associated with the closure argue against closure, I
19 believe. Youngstown has the lowest operating cost of the
20 bases under construction, would have among the highest
21 closure costs because more aircraft would have to be
22 relocated and the facilities and training associated with the

Page 148

1 aerial spray mission would have to be reduced elsewhere.
2 So thank you for your opportunity to appear before
3 the commission. I know I am running through these rapidly.
4 I am glad to see our chairman, my friend, Alan
5 Dixon, back in the chair there again this morning. I am
6 sorry you missed my brilliant expose, Alan, this morning
7 here, but we do -- I don't envy any of you your jobs on this
8 commission. I know it is a tough job. We hope you can
9 reconsider these here as I present them this morning. I had
10 a handout down here earlier to be given to each one of the
11 commissioners, if you wanted to review that.
12 Thank you very much.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank my good friend, the
14 distinguished senior senator from the great State of Ohio,
15 Senator Glenn, for his good remarks this morning and his
16 great service to his state and nation. We are delighted to
17 have Senator Mike Dewine here as well. Thank you for coming
18 this morning, Senator Dewine.
19 SENATOR DEWINE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank
20 you very much. I am very grateful for the opportunity to be
21 here today to discuss four specific issues facing the
22 commission.

Page 149

1 First is NORC. It has been recommended that the
2 NORC Air Force Base be privatized in place. It is our
3 understanding based on GAO report that this proposed
4 privatization would really not be cost-effective. The GAO
5 says privatizing NORC in place would actually cost more than
6 closing the base outright.
7 On June 17th, the Air Force expects to receive bids
8 on that privatization project and if indeed, as we are led to
9 believe, this project will be too expensive, I certainly
10 recommend that status quo be maintained. The only conclusion
11 we can draw from the analysis that has been made and what the
12 facts are is that NORC should, in fact, be kept open.
13 Let me turn second to Youngstown. A proposal has
14 been made to close the Youngstown Air Reserve Station. Our
15 summary of this would indicate that, really, it's a one-of-a-
16 kind project. It has a runway that has been paid for, a
17 bigger facility than its counterparts, and to shut down this
18 base would really incur costs that could not -- that would
19 not be incurred by closing any of the other five bases. The
20 additional costs of closing the Youngstown station will
21 really be in the millions of dollars. BRAC, we believe,
22 should reconsider this decision to shut down the Youngstown

Page 150

1 station.
2 Third, let me turn to Springfield. The proposal
3 has been made to relocate the 178th Air National Guard
4 Fighter Group from the Springfield Air National Guard Base in
5 Springfield to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Mr.
6 Chairman, the total cost of moving the 178th and closing the
7 Springfield base is 29.8 million. That is nearly $30
8 million. It will take the taxpayers at least 13 years, and
9 perhaps as long as 23 years, to recoup that investment. We
10 believe that the 30 million could certainly be spent more
11 wisely. Congressman Hobson, as Senator Glenn, has indicated,
12 will give you more details and statistics that we believe
13 demonstrate that even that, even that $30 million figure, is
14 flawed and that it will cost even more than that.
15 Fourth, let me turn to Wright-Patterson. The Air
16 Force has proposed moving most of the functions of the Brooks
17 Air Force Base in Texas to Wright-Patterson. The case for
18 keeping Brooks open is based on a plan that would divide up
19 the base so that parts of it can be kept running. It is
20 argued that this would avoid the cost of closing Brooks by
21 keeping part of the base open.
22 I don't think, though, that we should make any

Page 151

mistake. This option represents savings only over the emely short term. The cost of operations at Wright-erson is so much lower than at Brooks that the relocating uld pay for itself within just six years. And the Air Force's own estimate named Wright-Patterson as the highest rated research and development center and Brooks as the lowest R & D center. If we can consolidate the functions of the lowest rated facility into the highest rated facility and make back the investment on that consolidation in just six years, I believe that that is a pretty good outcome. That, in fact, is the kind of outcome that certainly BRAC was established to achieve.

I appreciate the opportunity to address members of the commission. I don't envy your very, very tough task. Following me, of course, will be some members of the Ohio delegation from the House. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Dewine, we thank you and your distinguished colleague for a fine presentation on behalf of the State of Ohio. We are delighted to have one of your distinguished members from the House, Representative Tony Hall, here.

Page 152

REPRESENTATIVE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the commission. I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today. I am here to testify in support of the Defense Department's recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base and move some of the functions to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, which is partially in my district.

I want to leave you with three points: One, my community of Dayton, Ohio, was hit very hard by the Base osure Commission in 1991 and '93; two, locating all the Air rce human systems functions at Wright-Patterson will nefit the Defense Department and will produce the greatest military value; and, three, if the goal of this process is to reduce excess capacity and consolidate activities, then Brooks should be closed.

My first point is that my community has already lost a large number of defense jobs. In the last four years we lost about 10,000 government defense related jobs with the closure of Gentille Air Force Station, the closure of The Mound Defense Nuclear Production Facility, the loss of the 4950 Test Wing, and downsizing in the Air Force Materiel Command. The number of jobs from Brooks is a fraction of the

Page 153

very deep losses my community has already suffered from defense downsizing.

My second point is that combining the functions at Brooks with Wright-Patterson is a move that offers the greatest military value. By co-locating the human systems activity now at Brooks with the aeronautical activities at Wright-Patterson, we will create a complete system for the research, development, and acquisition of manned air vehicles. This approach offers enormous advantages for the Defense Department. It is the most effective way of integrating pilot and aircraft to create a total weapons system.

I want to stress that Wright-Patterson and the Dayton area are already home to a great deal of medical research and teaching. It was, in fact, at Wright-Patterson where Captain Harry G. Armstrong founded the first aerospace medicine research unit, and since that time Wright-Patterson continuously has been a major center of aerospace medical research and conducts joint efforts with the Army, Navy, ASA, and other federal agencies. Some of the human systems ctivities now at Brooks were originally transferred from Wright-Patterson in a time of expanding military, and now in

Page 154

a time of shrinking military those activities can be transferred back to Wright-Patterson with little disruption in mission.

There is also the potential for a powerful working relationship between Wright-Patterson and Wright State Medical School, which is immediately adjacent to the base. Wright State is the nation's only civilian degree-granting university for aerospace medicine. The Air Force continues to emphasize the importance of the military value of this move. As recently as last week, the Air Force provided the commission a detailed point paper again underscoring the military value, which is this point right here. That was issued last week. And I would urge the members of the commission to study this paper before making a decision.

My third point is that the purpose of this commission is to reduce excess capacity, consolidate functions, and eliminate overhead costs. Let us not confuse the military value of Brooks with the military value of its mission. The human systems activities that take place at Brooks are very important, but they can be done at Wright-Patterson. The military value of the physical facilities at Brooks does not justify maintaining this expensive plant in

Page 155

the long term.

The Defense Department financial calculations demonstrate conclusively that there are long-term cost savings with closing Brooks. The Defense Department recommendation satisfies all the criteria for this commission: It will have a long-term increase in the military value for the Department of Defense; it will produce the greatest return on investment; and it satisfies the impact criteria. In sum, this is a move that works for the Defense Department and our nation's taxpayers and I would urge you to accept the Defense Department's recommendation.

Thank you for the chance to be here, Mr. Chairman and members. I appreciate it.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman Hall, for that excellent presentation that is most helpful to us. We are delighted to have you, and we welcome Representative David Hobson.

REPRESENTATIVE HOBSON: Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, I would like to say I am delighted to be here today but, as Commissioner Cox will recall, this is a little deja vu for me and I am sorry that I have to come back.

But I have five minutes to convince you not to

Page 156

waste $30 million. My arguments are based solely on the numbers. Although the community will survive, the numbers are flawed and, frankly, this just isn't fair.

This decision results from a desire on the part of the Air Force to fill a hole at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base with pointed-nose airplanes. The numbers were backed into in an attempt to prove this as a cost-effective move. Just as in 1993, the numbers are flawed. They are based on improper assumptions. Had the right assumptions been used in the COBRA model, the base wouldn't even be on the list in the first place. Even using the current flawed COBRA run, which you see in red there which just arrived Friday afternoon, June 9th, 1995, there is an 11-year return on investment, 24.6 million one-time cost, a 2.8 million annual savings. The base shouldn't even be on the list.

Let me show you a few problems from the numbers and why this should be investigated further. One, a major dispute is manpower saving. AFMC and the Guard say 31 people are needed and authorized at Wright-Patterson to accommodate the move. Air Force headquarters says only 13 will be allowed because they assume that the current regulation may be changed sometime in the future, although no one knows

Page 157

1 when. Annual recurrent savings at Wright-Patterson are
2 reduced by $1 million if you take the assumption that was
3 there in 1993. This blows the Air Force's whole position on
4 the move. In '93 this wasn't an issue; however, in order to
5 make the numbers look bad for Springfield, the Air Force
6 makes this assumption -- in my opinion, cooks the books.
7 Number two, there are asbestos and lead paint in
8 the buildings to be provided at Wright-Patterson. No
9 contractor is going to go in and renovate around asbestos.
10 The liability is just too great. But that is the position
11 taken by Wright-Patterson. We believe that there is going to
12 be an estimated increase in military construction costs by $5
13 million due to the asbestos.
14 And let me give you really one that blows my mind.
15 The telephone bill currently at Springfield is $13,000, but
16 it is assumed to be, and this is the number that the Air
17 Force gave us, $82,020 at Wright-Patterson. This is
18 ridiculously stupid and part of why I question the numbers.
19 Number four, the Air Force refuses to admit that an
20 expanded dining hall is needed. Just wait. A military
21 construction request for more capacity will come down the
22 pike in a year or two after the move. This is just another

Page 158

1 one million in mil con costs.
2 Number five, in questioning these and other open or
3 disputed areas, the Air Force says don't worry, we'll take
4 care of it after the move. If you want to see how these
5 things are taken care of, go back and look at the General
6 Accounting Office study and, specifically, the move of the
7 445th Air Force Reserve Unit. Compare the lower assumed
8 costs versus the higher actual costs to the result from these
9 moves.
10 Springfield has always received more than a fair
11 hearing from the BRAC staff. I believe your analysts
12 understand the problem and how the numbers are being cooked
13 to put pointed-nose airplanes at
14 Wright-Patterson. Why waste $30 million plus and take, even
15 by Air Force flawed assumptions -- and we think it would be
16 much higher than 11 years, more as to what Senator Glenn and
17 Senator Dewine have testified to -- to change what is already
18 at Springfield?
19 We should not build a hole at Wright-Patterson in
20 this costly manner and waste taxpayers' dollars just because
21 they are available through the BRAC process. The Air Force
22 should bring back on Wright-Pat the tenants for whom their

Page 159

1 leasing space are based and use this space for that purpose.
2 Springfield should not be abandoned. It is a well-
3 functioning facility and needs nothing and has already a new
4 engine shop completed. Springfield should be allowed to
5 continue to do the cost-effective job it has been doing. Do
6 this by the numbers and I am confident, just as in '93, it
7 will be reversed.
8 I implore you to look at the numbers. It is
9 irresponsible to put a base on the list with false numbers
10 and continue to use false assumptions. Think about the
11 taxpayer and what is cost-effective, not what some general
12 would like to see on the flight line.
13 I am also submitting some material in support of
14 the material which has been testified to on the move from
15 other places into Wright-Patterson, but we have had great
16 difficulty getting the right numbers because people want to
17 see pointed-nose airplanes. And I don't blame them, but it
18 is just not cost-effective to do at Wright-Patterson in
19 comparison to the way they are operating in Springfield.
20 I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
22 Congressman Hobson, for your valuable contribution on behalf

Page 160

1 of the State of Ohio, and we are pleased to see your clean-up
2 man is here, Representative Jim Traficant from the great
3 State of Ohio.
4 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Thank you, Chairman,
5 General Davis, members of the commission. I am glad to be
6 here with you again. I believe that you have heard the
7 salient points of my testimony. I would ask that my official
8 document here submitted be incorporated into the record.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be in the record,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE TRAFICANT: Fine. Thank you. And I
12 would just like to say several things. I know you have this
13 little library somewhere and there is some rumors that have
14 been persisting about our base. The airport used to be under
15 the control of the City of Youngstown. They have fallen on
16 hard times economically and there are those that say that the
17 City of Youngstown can't afford to keep that airport open and
18 the Air Force would have to pick up a big, huge cost in
19 maintaining that great infrastructure.
20 That is the furthest from the truth. We are able
21 to politically bring together all the components of those two
22 county areas and create a regional port authority. That port

Page 161

1 authority is now on solid ground. That airport in itself is
2 growing. The State of Ohio, through workings with myself and
3 others, have designated that airport as a future air cargo
4 international jet port. That is a tremendous facility.
5 There is no financial problems that bear on that airport
6 whatsoever as far as the Air Force is concerned. In fact,
7 for very small fees they have an unlimited use of one of the
8 finest infrastructures in the entire country, I am sure, as
9 General Davis can attest to.
10 Let me also say this: Because of the near
11 proximity of Cleveland and Pittsburgh, all those big planes
12 are landing in Cleveland and Pittsburgh taking away the
13 passenger service from our airport, which means that we have
14 an under-utilized commercial airport that is extremely open
15 and available for the complete unlimited use of the Air
16 Force.
17 With nearby Ravenna Arsenal and Lake Erie and with
18 the joint cooperation now of the Air Force Reserve and the
19 Coast Guard, there is oil spill abatement programs underway
20 and we are actively involved in that. So I would like to
21 state here that the financial aspects of that airport have
22 been completely mitigated and removed and there are no

Page 162

1 overlying factors there.
2 Let me say one other thing: You could take the
3 troops and you can move them; you can take the planes and you
4 can move them, but we have the aerial spray mission, the only
5 one of its kind for the entire Pentagon. We not only go
6 around the country and spray military bases, but FEMA in some
7 of their hurricane activities have called upon our unit, the
8 910th Aerial Spray Mission, to, in fact, go around the nation
9 for specific mitigation of some of these pesticide problems
10 and that comes from us.
11 And let me say this: The only building of its kind
12 in the world, state-of-the-art, is located at that base. The
13 only short filled runway in the Air Force Reserve located at
14 that base. There is not a wetland problem on that base and
15 there is not one environmental problem that down the road can
16 cause financial factor process engagement for the Pentagon.
17 Now, there are people in our community who are saying, look,
18 when the bombs were flying we made those bombs, we built the
19 helmets, we built the guns and the steel mills. The steel
20 industry is now gone. We have fallen on hard times. The
21 only double digit unemployment in the entire state.
22 But that isn't a reason to keep our base open. The

Page 163

reason to keep our base open, quite frankly, is the value it exists there for the Pentagon. So I would just like to y to you that hopefully when this process is all over you will come out there and pay us a visit.

But I would like the BRAC Commission to endorse the expansion that is planned there by the Pentagon -- the building and development of a regional air service facility to service planes from around the nation -- because of that good availability without traffic congestion that exists there.

So there has been some talk about Congressional add-ons. I don't apologize for them. I don't apologize for any member that takes care of the Pentagon, first of all, and, second of all, for taking a look at the issues that the Pentagon experiences in their own district. I am proud of that record. I will continue to support that record and fight hard to make sure the procurement by the Pentagon, in fact, does most of its activity in the states here.

So that is where I am. I would like my record incorporated into the minutes. I want, when it is all over, your endorsement of our expansion. That is unusual testimony, I am sure, that you have had, but I know you have

Page 164

an important mission. I don't want to slight that mission. I wish you the very best in doing what you can to keep our military forces at a level that can protect our great nation and, in fact, do it in a way that is cost-effective for our taxpayers for that mutual marriage that is so necessary to keep America free.

So we are very proud to have General Davis there. I want to say that. And people are very impressed with the fact of his knowledge of his mission and what we do there.

So I am very proud to have had the opportunity to stify again before you and all those people who come down ere and want to punch everybody in the nose, I think, if you would talk about closing it. That is how important that base is, the fourth largest employer in our community but, in fact, a very effective training facility, one of the best -- in fact, the model of its kind in all of America.

So, with that, I appreciate your goodwill in accepting my testimony.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman Traficant, and we thank the great State of Ohio and its distinguished delegation for an outstanding contribution.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, the chair labored

Page 165

mightily earlier this morning and fell behind and fell behind. And as we always see, we gave the job to a woman and she did an outstanding job and Commissioner Rebecca Cox straightened everybody out and now we have caught up.

And because of the good work of the women, we are presently in a position where the next delegation testifies at 12:04, the Oklahoma delegation. Now, we have called them and told them if they can get here early we would like to hear them. But in fairness to that delegation, Commissioner Rebecca Cox and her excellent service have served to bring us up to date and we are going to have a recess for a few minutes till someone from Oklahoma arrives.

(A brief recess was taken.)

CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair will declare the commission back in session. We are pleased to see our friends from the Oklahoma delegation here. We have been with them in the last several days at a visitation in their great state, and we are honored and delighted to have the stinguished senior senator from the great State of klahoma, my old friend, Senator Don Nickles, here to lead ff for the Oklahoma delegation.

SENATOR NICKLES: Chairman Dixon, thank you very

Page 166

much. And to Commissioner Cornella and Commissioner Steele, we appreciate your patience and endurance. We were delighted to have all of you in Oklahoma last Wednesday. I had the pleasure of speaking to you also in Fort Worth, as well as my colleague, Senator Inhofe, and several of the Oklahoma delegation. So we know that you have been more than attentive. We know that this has been a 100 percent job for you for the last several months and we compliment you for the work that you have done and the work of your staff.

This may be repetitive for a couple of us because we have talked to you now for, let's see, this will be the third time within a week, but it nevertheless shows the importance of the issue because you have a very, very difficult job and I think you are on the right path.

I don't envy you for your task but I compliment you for your diligence and I know that you look forward to the conclusion of it. But I look forward to you doing a good job and having the results of your work be something that will be successful, both with the administration and with Congress, and so I compliment you.

You have a difficult job in concerning the Oklahoma bases because you are dealing with both the air logistics

Page 167

centers and the undergraduate pilot training bases. On the ALCs, Air Force has made it very clear we have got excess capacity, and you have a couple of options. You can downsize all five or you can close one or two.

A couple years ago the Air Force said we ought to close at least one. When I found out the capacity rates were only working on an average about 50 percent capacity of all five, that tells you we have a lot of excess capacity. My background is in the business field, and in the business field that would say that's really not the way to do it and the real solution isn't just to downsize all of them. That's not a very effective management.

And so my guess is that, ultimately, one or two are going to have to be closed. Air Force recommended closing one a couple of years ago. The Joint Cross Service Group for depot maintenance recommended closing one or two. That was this year. And the Air Force Base Closure Group Executive Group recommended closing one or two. I think they are probably right.

I feel somewhat comfortable in Tinker Air Force Base because I think if you look and compare the five, we come out on top in almost any scenario. We have the

Page 168

location, we have the two large runways, we have the large maintenance facility, we do joint work with the Navy. And it has worked very well.

We do work on time. I asked my staff to do an on-time delivery comparison of Tinker versus Kelly on aircraft and we were 91 percent on time. Kelly was only 10 percent. There is a big difference there. And also on parts, the parts were pretty close. We were 97 percent on time and Kelly was 96 percent on time. On engines we were 99 percent on time and Kelly was 93 percent on time. And also the comparisons on aircraft where we were 91 percent and McLellan was 80 percent.

So I submit those. Those, I think, have already been given to you. But we do work on time. We do quality work and Air Force people -- I know General Davis will tell you -- want to have their work done at Tinker because they do such quality work.

At Vance Air Force Base, likewise, I know that you are going to have to close one pilot training base. Vance should not be that one base. It is the least costly of any of the bases. It saves money, and one of the purposes of this commission is to try to save money.

Page 169

1 We have more airspace than any other pilot training
2 bases, and that airspace is closer to Vance. It is closer to
3 the air base. They don't have to fly. We don't have an
4 encroachment problem. We don't have a big city. We don't
5 have a city surrounding the base. We have the economy, we
6 have the community support.
7 If you close Vance, the economic impact would be
8 devastating. Enid, which some of you had the opportunity to
9 visit, is population of 45,000. Compare that to Lubbock.
10 It's a population of almost 200,000. There is a lot of
11 difference, so the economic impact would be much, much
12 greater in Enid than it would be in Vance.
13 We have the community support. We have a
14 scholarship program at Vance. And this didn't just start as
15 an effort to show our love and support of Vance Air Force
16 Base, but we pay -- the government pays 75 percent of the
17 cost of a pilot's extra education or tuition. We pay the
18 other 25 percent and we pay 50 percent for a spouse if they
19 wish to have continued education and 50 percent for their
20 dependents. That is already done so the community support is
21 very strong for both bases and I think it is certainly in the
22 best interest of Oklahoma, but also in the best interest of

Page 170

1 our country to keep both Vance and Tinker Air Force Base.
2 And I compliment the commission for doing an
3 outstanding job. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank the distinguished
5 senior senator from the great State of Oklahoma for doing a
6 good job and we are pleased to see his colleague and friend,
7 Senator Jim Inhofe here. Senator Inhofe, we are delighted to
8 have you, sir.
9 SENATOR INHOFE: Thank you very much. I suspect
10 you folks are just about as happy that this is coming to a
11 close as we are. I think we have all heard so many
12 presentations, seen so many charts, and it has to be
13 confusing. But I have to tell you and compliment all of you.
14 You have been out hands-on to the site and have been willing
15 to really take it seriously enough that you get beyond the
16 rhetoric and into the actual details of what we have, what
17 resources are out there.
18 And I think you have done a wonderful job but it's
19 coming very rapidly to a close. And you know a lot of this
20 would be redundant from some of our previous presentations,
21 but I can remember during the confirmation hearings that took
22 place right in this room -- it seems like several months ago,

Page 171

1 it was a few months ago -- and we talked about the criteria
2 that was going to be used by the commission. And I think we
3 came to the conclusion that the military recommendation
4 probably should be the first criteria that should be
5 considered. And so I think that is what I hope that we can
6 leave you with is to look and see how the military is -- what
7 they are recommending.
8 As far as Tinker is concerned, you know, I think
9 Senator Nickles stated it very well. Tinker stands alone in
10 two respects, anyway. One is in its facilities and the other
11 is in readiness, because we approach the readiness from two
12 fronts. We have the Air Force with its AWACS and the Navy
13 with the TACAMO. And I commented, I guess somewhat jokingly,
14 down in Fort Worth that our Navy and Air Force actually talk
15 to each other and like each other. And I don't think anyone
16 will question that we have been the model for inter-servicing
17 throughout the nation.
18 So I hope when you look at Tinker that you will
19 agree that the three areas where we are number one would be
20 in the facilities and the quality of the facilities, the
21 inter-servicing and then, of course, the greatest
22 contribution to readiness.

Page 172

1 Now, at Vance you have heard from Senator Nickles
2 and others the impact on the community, and certainly no one
3 could question that it has such tremendous impact on the
4 community, being in Oklahoma a relatively small community.
5 But also the contribution of the community too to Vance in
6 terms of land. You have seen the charts and the maps and all
7 of the contributions that have been made -- the educational
8 contributions. Down in Fort Worth I saw a banner of St.
9 Mary's Hospital. They were holding it up. Well, St. Mary's
10 Hospital has directly saved the Department of Defense $58,000
11 in the first six months of this year.
12 Don mentioned the airspace. I am a pilot. That is
13 what I was professionally. And I look down every time I go
14 across there and I see we have closer airspace, 24 low-level
15 routes that are much closer, within 50 nautical miles of
16 Vance. You can't say that about Columbus, you can't say that
17 about Reese, you can't say that about Laughland.
18 And so I think that we -- the conclusion is that we
19 can train cheaper and better, and that is what we are
20 supposed to be doing. But I would like to ask you to take it
21 out of the sense that you are listening today to -- I don't
22 know how many members of the House and of the Senate -- who

Page 173

1 are all prejudiced. You know, we all want to protect our own
2 bases.
3 So I would ask you to look at the professional
4 people who really don't have a horse in the race and the ones
5 that are looking at this through the objective criteria that
6 they are using to make analyses. One was the Air Force
7 analysis. The Air Force analysis came out with the
8 conclusion that in the case of Vance we can train better and
9 cheaper than the rest of them can.
10 In the case of the Joint Cross Services Group, they
11 came to the same conclusion: Vance trains better and trains
12 cheaper. The Air Education Training Command, the AETC, that
13 is General Facilio. I mean, you stop and realize he doesn't
14 do anything else for a living. His job is to make a
15 determination as to how we can train better and cheaper, and
16 he came to this conclusion.
17 So, lastly, I would suggest to you that I got on
18 the House Armed Services Committee and the House of
19 Representatives when I represented only Tulsa County. There
20 weren't any facilities there. Then I came over to the Senate
21 Armed Services Committee. I didn't have any axe to grind. I
22 was concerned about one thing, and that is what is happening

Page 174

1 to our military today. We are operating on a budget that
2 deeply concerns me and it is that much more important that we
3 get the very most out of the resources we have today.
4 So I would like to suggest to you that when you
5 look at Vance and you look at Tinker, that you can only come
6 to the conclusion as you listen not to the politicians but to
7 the experts who are trained in making these decisions, that
8 both Vance and Tinker should be not only saved but should be
9 expanded in the best national security interests of our
10 nation.
11 Thanks so much for all of your hard work.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much, Senator
13 Inhofe. We are indebted to you and your distinguished
14 colleague, Senator Nickles, for a fine presentation on behalf
15 of the folks in Oklahoma. And we are delighted to see
16 distinguished members of your House delegation here, and the
17 chair recognizes Representative Bill Brewster.
18 REPRESENTATIVE BREWSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 commissioners. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
20 before you today. I appreciate the time and effort each of
21 you has spent to bring this round of the BRAC process to a
22 close. I certainly do not envy your task.

Page 175

1 I am here with the Oklahoma colleagues to testify
2 upport of Tinker Air Force Base in the defense of our
3 ntry, as well as the important role Tinker plays in the
4 conomy of Oklahoma. Tinker's past record speaks for itself.
5 Tinker has consistently been ranked as one of the Air Force
6 superior depots. This record has been achieved while working
7 on some of the Air Force's most complex planes, such as the
8 B-52, B-1, KC-135, and the maintenance of the B-2 bomber will
9 soon be underway at Tinker.
10 We in Oklahoma do not understand why a base like
11 Tinker, with its excellent record of performance, could even
12 be considered a target for downsizing. In fact, every entity
13 which has reviewed the situation except the Pentagon has
14 recommended the closure of one or more bases less efficient
15 than Tinker. Moreover, I am confident Tinker's capabilities
16 will keep it off any list the commission may propose.
17 We have now reached a point where the optimal
18 operating levels may be sacrificed if we continue personnel
19 reductions; however, increased savings could be achieved by
20 efficiently utilizing the facility, thereby reducing the
21 overhead expenses per person. By downsizing personnel levels
22 below efficient levels, more overhead costs are borne by the

Page 176

1 remaining work force.
2 Currently, it costs $60 per man/hour to operate
3 Tinker; however, if the base were operating at capacity the
4 cost would be reduced to $50 per man/hour. The increased
5 operating capacity could be achieved by reassigning work
6 currently being done at other facilities. Tinker has excess
7 capacity available to absorb a significant increase in
8 duties. Its potential for sizable growth will allow Tinker
9 to absorb new missions with minimal construction.
10 For example, Tinker once maintained approximately
11 0 B-52 bombers. The number has now dropped to around 100.
12 As a result of the lower number of B-52s, Tinker has
13 sufficient excess ramp space to absorb up to five million
14 man-hours of additional duties without additional
15 construction. The C-5 mission is representative of a mission
16 which Tinker could absorb with minimal additional
17 construction.
18 With the exception of the state government, Tinker
19 Air Force Base is the single largest employer in the State of
20 Oklahoma. Employees live in 37 of our state's 77 counties.
21 The positive economic impact on the State of Oklahoma by the
22 base is tremendous. Likewise, the loss of this employment

Page 177

1 source would be devastating. Tinker's positive impact is not
2 restricted to the Oklahoma City metro area or the State of
3 Oklahoma, but to the nation as a whole. Thank you, Mr.
4 Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank you very much,
6 Congressman Brewster. We are delighted to have that fine
7 testimony. We recognize your colleague, Representative Frank
8 Lucas.
9 REPRESENTATIVE LUCAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
10 commissioners, for granting me the opportunity to visit with
11 you again on behalf of Vance Air Force in Enid, Oklahoma.
12 And thank you for your patience as you listen to testimony
13 you have heard again and again over the past weeks.
14 Vance is a necessary and integral part of the Air
15 Force's readiness efforts. It is a superior training
16 facility with a successful history and a bright future.
17 Community support for Vance is very strong, as some of you
18 witnessed at the base visit last Wednesday. An estimated
19 ,000 people attended the rally to welcome the commissioners
20 d cheer for Vance. In a town with a population of
21 pproximately 40,000, that is a pretty impressive feat, I
22 think.

Page 178

1 Further evidence was the huge crowd of over 1,000
2 at the regional hearing in Fort Worth just this past
3 Saturday. Enid is at least a five-hour drive from Fort
4 Worth, longer, I am sure, for the 17 bus loads of folks who
5 came down for the hearing.
6 Vance is clearly the pride of Enid and the pride of
7 America. If you were to drive around Enid you would see huge
8 billboard signs on the way into town and at the entrances of
9 the base that sum up the Vance/Enid relationship as such.
10 The pride of Enid, the pride of America. And also you would
11 see signs in every retail store, on many vehicles, on many,
12 many tee shirts throughout the town that state Vance and
13 Enid, partners in the sky.
14 We in northwest Oklahoma obviously realize how
15 important the base is to our survival. Vance has been a
16 stable pillar of the community, especially during some of the
17 area's darkest days, such as the oil bust, farm crisis, and
18 the resulting loss of many small businesses in the area.
19 Enid works to make the Air Force feel welcome and
20 it is evident that they succeed. Many former pilots who
21 trained at Vance retire to the Enid area and make it their
22 permanent home. The morale of the student pilots at Vance is

Page 179

1 high. While touring the base last Wednesday, the
2 commissioners got an opportunity to talk to some of those
3 students and many told that Vance was their first choice.
4 They chose Vance because their buddies who had
5 trained there told them it was the best. They commented on
6 the education program available to them and their spouses by
7 the community of Enid. Most of the pilots we met that day
8 were furthering their education because of this program.
9 They were also pleased with the accessibility of housing in
10 Enid and believed it to be a great place to raise their
11 families. And, finally, even a couple stated that the bigger
12 cities might perhaps offer too many distractions. On paper,
13 Vance is equally impressive. If the reason for the base
14 closure process is to save money, then clearly Vance should
15 remain open. Being a contractor-operated base, it makes for
16 the most cost-effective UPT base, saving over $81,000 per
17 graduate over the command average. That totals more than $10
18 million this year alone.
19 The base has one of the best, if not the best,
20 training environments in the country. As a result, Vance has
21 trained some of the finest pilots in the Air Force. No one
22 in the Air Force trains as well, primarily because of the

Page 180

1 close and unencumbered Oklahoma airspace, which is the
2 largest of all the UPT bases, at 8,400 square miles. As a
3 result, Vance students get up to 15 percent more training
4 time than any other UPT base.
5 Perhaps most importantly, the hardworking people at
6 Vance make it stand out above the crowd. Throughout this
7 past year, my first year to represent this area, I have had
8 the privilege, I should say, of visiting Vance often and have
9 been impressed with every visit. The people take their jobs
10 seriously and they serve their country with dignity. You
11 will not find a stronger work ethic anywhere else in the
12 nation. Oklahomans today are direct descendants of the
13 pioneers who settled this vast, rough region of the heartland
14 only 100 years ago.
15 After visiting the base and after all of your
16 deliberations and analysis, I hope you will come to the same
17 conclusion I have: The Air Force made the right decision in
18 leaving Vance open. No substantial deviation from the Air
19 Force recommendation has been found. I thank the
20 commissioners again for your dedicated efforts.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to thank you,
22 Congressman Lucas, for that fine presentation. We appreciate

Page 181

1 your contribution on behalf of the great State of Oklahoma.
2 We are delighted to see Representative J.C. Watts here.
3 Congressman Watts.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WATTS: Good morning, and thank you,
5 Mr. Chairman and distinguished commissioners. Let me again,
6 by stating my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to
7 tell the Tinker story, as we have done several times in the
8 last couple months.
9 The Oklahoma Air Logistics Center will be the
10 centerpiece of my comments today, obviously, and in the past
11 two days lawmakers have come before you to state their case.
12 You have heard these messages before during on-site visits
13 and regional hearings. You have listened to success stories
14 and had a chance to witness firsthand the excellence that is
15 at work at these depots, bases, posts, and ports across this
16 great country.
17 We talk and you listen, and now the process is
18 concluding. It is the time for summary and a final
19 opportunity to recommend a course of action. You have heard
20 the men and women of the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center tell
21 their story. It is a story of pride, commitment to customer
22 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the

Page 182

1 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.
2 We have demonstrated an unmatched work ethic that
3 serves as the linchpin for Tinker's day-to-day activities,
4 which are integral to the military readiness of this great
5 country. Those contributions include fabricating parts to
6 keep our most sophisticated aircraft, like the B-2 bomber in
7 the mission ready status.
8 We have shown how the men and women of Tinker
9 perform a unique maintenance task on missiles such as the air
10 launch cruise missile, the short-range attack missile, the
11 Navy's Harpoon, or advanced cruise missile. Tinker has shown
12 their capable stewardship in managing a current year-end
13 industrial fund budget of almost $1 billion and supervising
14 the maintenance of more than 17,000 jet engines.
15 In this regard, the Department of Defense's own
16 depot maintenance operations indicators reports states that
17 during the period ending in the second quarter of fiscal year
18 1994, Tinker's average engine process days were greater than
19 one-third better than the competition. In addition, Tinker's
20 schedule indicator index for the period between April '93 and
21 February '94 was second best in Air Force Material Command.
22 We have shown that Tinker led the fleet in the area

Page 183

1 of technology innovation and partnering. Tinker's technology
2 advancement coalitions address a wide spectrum of
3 environmental issues. One such venture joins all Department
4 of Defense installations in Oklahoma as a coalition to cross-
5 feed information on compliance actions and improve the
6 partnership between the Environmental Protection Agency and
7 other federal agencies.
8 Further, Tinker blazes a trail in alternative fuel
9 use by adapting some 551 vehicles to run on propane,
10 compressed natural gas, and electric battery power. Nearly
11 300 fleet vehicles have been converted to dual fuel clean
12 natural gas, giving Tinker the distinction of having one of
13 the largest dual fuel armada in the nation.
14 In summary, you saw pride, commitment to customer
15 satisfaction, and a willingness to cooperate with the
16 changing profile of the American military industrial complex.
17 That being the case, let me close with the recommended course
18 of action.
19 I have confidence in the commission's objectivity.
20 I know you will be making some of the most difficult
21 decisions since the BRAC process began. While those
22 decisions will not be easy, they must be made. I know that

Page 184

1 you will honor the data that is put before you and not allow
2 politics to play an overwhelming role.
3 The American military industrial complex is
4 changing. This change is forcing people to disrupt their
5 professional lives, the lives of the families, and the lives
6 of the communities in which they live. The duty owed to the
7 citizens of this country is to make that change as rational a
8 decision as possible and avoid political correctness.
9 The people have told their story. The politicians
10 have told their story. Now let demonstrated performance and
11 proven statistics tell their story. I am confident the data
12 representing Tinker Air Force Base and, more specifically,
13 the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center, tell the story of a work
14 force committed to pride, customer satisfaction, and a
15 willingness to pursue excellence at every turn.
16 Mr. Chairman and honorable commissioners, I thank
17 you for your listening ear.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Watts, we
19 certainly thank you and we thank the entire Oklahoma
20 delegation, which gets the accolades of the commission for
21 giving their presentations in every individual case within
22 the five minutes allotted to their eternal credit. We are

Page 185

1 grateful. Ever since Commissioner Rebecca Cox took over,
2 things have immeasurably improved and we are indebted to her
3 We thank the great State of Oklahoma.
4 The only thing I could object to is Commissioner
5 Cox has done such a fine job that the chairman is obligated
6 to declare another recess until we can find some more people
7 to come over here. We are running now a little ahead of
8 schedule, briefly. May I say to my friends in the Congress
9 in both houses, please do not interpret this to mean we
10 encourage you to exceed your five minutes. We thank the
11 Oklahoma delegation once again for their 100 percent
12 performance.
13 (A brief recess was taken.)
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chair is delighted to see
15 Congressman Ernest Istook here and we are pleased to have him
16 be the clean-up man for the Oklahoma delegation, which has
17 done extremely well and will now do even better.
18 Congressman Istook.
19 REPRESENTATIVE ISTOOK: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
20 I appreciate the opportunity. I didn't realize with the time
21 change that I might be clean-up, but I will accept whatever
22 position in the batting order is available.

Page 186

1 As the commission well knows, I am here to testify
2 on behalf of Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. Tinker
3 is one of five air logistics centers. From my perspective,
4 not only as a person who has been very, or tried to be very
5 tight-fisted with the taxpayers' dollar, but also as a member
6 of the Appropriations Committee and a member of the Military
7 Construction Subcommittee, I am very sensitive to the
8 interest in changing the current structure of the air
9 logistics centers. And I realize that this commission seeks
10 to honor its oath and its obligations to take an objective
11 look at what is the right size, what is the proper size, to
12 be able to fulfill the military mission to meet the needs of
13 our national security, and yet have the most economical
14 circumstances for the taxpayer.
15 Now, there is only two viable ways to squeeze the
16 most bang for the buck out of our shrinking defense budget to
17 make the most of what you've got and look for the synergy
18 that you can through things such as inter-servicing. If you
19 maximize the use of existing military facilities, and I know
20 you have heard testimony regarding what are the needs when it
21 comes to the logistics centers of the Air Force, the needs
22 are to find if you can locate things in a smaller number of

Page 187

1 locations and not only have overall savings but put them into
ilities that are most cost-effective, I believe that
ker Air Force Base satisfies those objectives.
It certainly has the flexibility. I think you have
5 received prior testimony that Tinker, for example, could
6 maintain all of the engines in the Air Force, that only what
7 are comparatively minor modifications are necessary to be
8 able to house all of the aircrafts for servicing purposes,
9 such as the C-5, I believe, was mentioned in particular. The
10 main servicing building at Tinker, which is Building 3001, is
11 flexible in the types of configurations in which it can be
12 utilized.
13 I think you have probably seen this chart
14 previously, which shows the ability to simultaneously be
15 doing air frame work on larger aircraft and smaller aircraft
16 and it is capable of being reconfigured in many different
17 ways. With depots, these are very expensive facilities.
18 Just in the last couple of years, the military construction
19 budget in FY '94 for air logistics centers was $120 million
20 when spread over five facilities; for FY '95, $70 million
21 when spread over five facilities. FY '96, of course, is
22 still unknown.

Page 188

1 But if you have the opportunity to minimize the
2 cost of military construction as well as the cost of military
3 maintenance and performing the mission, I believe that Tinker
4 offers the cost advantages. It was pointed out in the
5 hearing Saturday that one of the comparative figures from one
6 of the other ALCs evidently misstated the cost advantage that
7 actually exists per hour for Tinker personnel being able to
8 perform the services for $11 per man/hour less than the
9 comparable ALC in that.
I agree wholeheartedly with the former chairman of
s commission, Jim Courter, where he said that if we
aintain excess capacity it only takes resources away from
13 the ability to modernize, to train, to procure, and to take
14 care of the quality of life for our current servicemen.
15 That is why I take seriously the interest that this
16 commission has in decreasing the number of ALCs and believe
17 that Tinker Air Force Base not only has proven by its
18 performance, by its on-time delivery of engines of avionics
19 and of air frames; has proven that it operates more
20 efficiently and effectively and more flexibly than other ALCs
21 and has the existing facilities that can absorb additional
22 work: that can absorb transfers of missions, which is one of

Page 189

1 your criteria in considering realignment, a very important
2 one.
3 If Tinker can do more for less than is being done
4 at the other ALCs, I believe it should be considered as a
5 candidate not for closing but for receiving missions that may
6 come from ALCs that are closed because they are not as
7 efficient, they are not as effective, they do not deliver on
8 time, they do not have the history of inter-servicing such as
9 Tinker has established with Navy aircraft, air frames, and
10 engines.
11 I thank you for your time and I appreciate it.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Congressman
13 Istook, for your fine contribution. Let me say that I see
14 several members of the Pennsylvania delegation, in their
15 usual interest to serve their constituency, arriving a little
16 early. We are grateful.
17 As soon as a couple more come so that the chair
18 sees some continuity, in the next couple of minutes, we will
art on the Pennsylvania delegation. You are slated to
gin at 12:37. You are here early. I see several more
oming. I appreciate it. In about a minute or two we will
22 take up Pennsylvania. We will be right with you and I thank

Page 190

1 you very much.
2 (A brief recess was taken.)
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, ladies and gentlemen, we're
4 indebted to the distinguished members of the Pennsylvania
5 delegation for coming here early. I've noted the order of
6 their arrival. There are four of them here. We appreciate
7 the fact that Congressman Holden, Congressman Gekas,
8 Congressman McDade, and Congressman Fox would all be here.
9 We're going to start a little early, because
10 they're on the ball, and they got here early. And my
11 understanding is that in the Senate right now, there's an
12 amendment about to be pending in which a member of your
13 delegation will be required to be working the well, which I
14 understand as a member of the Senate for a few years.
15 And so we're going to, if it's all right with your
16 delegation, start with your House members and let the
17 Senators come in as they're able to come in. And we'll
18 recognize the four of you in the order in which you arrived.
19 And the Commission is indebted to you for accommodating us
20 and the country by being so prompt.
21 And we're going to hear first from Representative
22 Tim Holden. And Congressman Holden, we thank you for being

Page 191

1 here, sir.
2 REPRESENTATIVE HOLDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 And good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and commissioner. I would
4 like to thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
5 on matters relating to Fort Indiantown Gap and to Tobyhanna
6 Army Depot.
7 I would first like to discuss Fort Indiantown Gap.
8 As you are probably aware, the Army's financial analysis of
9 the savings was based on bad data and flawed analysis,
10 resulting in a serious overestimation of the projected
11 savings. The Army, using more accurate data from the Fort
12 Indiantown Gap Coalition, revised its annual projected
13 savings down from 23 million to $6.7 million, admittedly a 75
14 percent error and correction.
15 Using actual expenditure figures for the
16 elimination of on-hand civilians as opposed to those
17 authorized but not funded, the actual repair and maintenance
18 data, the annual cost savings is only $2.3 million. The
19 Army's final $6.7 million annual savings is further
20 undermined in that they did not include all the costs in
21 their analysis, and only the cost of moving active component
22 units and functions were considered.

Page 192

1 Their ignoring the cost of moving the U.S. Army
2 Reserve equipment concentration site to Fort Dix and the cost
3 to move the Pennsylvania Guard's equipment site currently
4 located at Fort Pickett, Virginia, to another site is a
5 serious mistake.
6 Significantly, the Army has seriously
7 underestimated the Gap in military value in a number of other
8 ways. The Army clearly did not fully understand the
9 complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to
10 the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In fact, the other
11 services were not even questioned as to their training
12 requirements at Fort Indiantown Gap.
13 The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force, and the
14 Navy all train at the installation and on the bombing and
15 staffing range, a national asset which is nearly impossible
16 to replace. Not included was the Northern training area at
17 Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square
18 miles used for Army aviation training.
19 Tank qualification ranges, Tank Table 8, were not
20 considered in the Army's analysis of the military value. The
21 Army wants to shift training to Fort Dix and AP Hill, neither
22 of which can support tank qualification gunnery. The Army

Page 193

1 did not recognize the number and types of Reserve component
2 schools, the Reserve component units, and maintenance
3 activities which are assigned to the Gap.
4 None of the seven schools, design Reserve component
5 units, and the aviation and ground maintenance activities are
6 scheduled to leave the Gap upon closure. The active Army is
7 attempting to pass the cost of running the infrastructure of
8 the post to the state. Thereby, the state would be in the
9 business of subsidizing the training of federal troops, a
10 responsibility which clearly should remain with the federal
11 government.
12 The Army's analysis determined Reserve component
13 annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in
14 that its results are based on a 12-month availability of
15 Reserve component units and that the proposed alternative
16 training sites are not able to accommodate the additional
17 training load.
18 This impact of an increased training load on the
19 alternative training sites was not part of the Army's
20 analysis. The affected installations were not consulted.
21 Representatives from Fort Drumm have told Fort Indiantown Gap
22 before the Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition, number one, that

Page 194

1 they were already saturated for annual training, and number
2 two, the increased training load will adversely affect range
3 and training facility maintenance and increase existing
4 environmental problems in the training areas.
5 Two of the proposed alternative training sites are
6 unsuitable for the required kind of training. The Army
7 erred, in that proposed sites cannot meet all existing
8 training requirements of the units which currently train at
9 the Gap.
10 Given the totality of these errors and omissions,
11 it is clear that the Army substantially deviated from the DOD
12 selection criteria, and as a result of its higher than
13 estimated military value to all the Department of Defense,
14 Fort Indiantown Gap should be removed from the closure list.
15 Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly turn your
16 attention to the Tobyhanna Army Depot. I urge you and the
17 Commission members to accept the recommendation of the
18 Secretary of Defense and keep Tobyhanna open, because it is
19 an outstanding facility. Tobyhanna offers the highest
20 military value and is very cost-effective. Tobyhanna is a
21 truly valuable military asset to the Department of Defense
22 which should be retained.

Page 195

1 Tobyhanna is a great bargain for the taxpayers, and
2 its modern facilities provide great potential for
3 interservicing agreements. The state-of-the-art facilities
4 and highly skilled workforce at Tobyhanna provide an
5 outstanding opportunity for the communications and
6 electronics work for other services to be consolidated as
7 part of interservicing agreements.
8 In today's modern, digitized battlefield, the high
9 tech facilities at Tobyhanna are critical to our national
10 security. Pennsylvanians have always answered the call to
11 duty, but the proposed cuts in BRAC 1995 would have an unfair
12 and drastic effect on the Commonwealth.
13 I deeply appreciate your consideration in this
14 matter and ask that you remove Fort Indiantown Gap and
15 Tobyhanna from the BRAC list. Thank you very much,
16 commissioners.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
18 Holden.
19 And we will now call upon your distinguished
20 colleague, Representative George Gekas.
21 REPRESENTATIVE GEKAS: I thank you. To the
22 chairman and to the members of the Commission, we bring you

Page 196

1 greetings from Lebanon Valley, Pennsylvania, the heart of
2 Central Pennsylvania. And Indiantown Gap is the heart of the
3 heart of Central Pennsylvania.
4 The written statement that I wish to submit to the
5 Commission, with your consent, contains the fact sheet that
6 replicates what Representative Holden was able to convey to
7 you. And the numbers are adequately presented in the record
8 already in the previous functions that brought forth the
9 story of Indiantown Gap.
10 What I would like to concentrate on with the
11 Commission, if it please the Commission, is as follows: When
12 last the BRAC considered Indiantown Gap, it was the Pentagon
13 which urged the Commission, along with the advocates of
14 maintaining Indiantown Gap, the Pentagon itself who pressed
15 for retention of the Indiantown Gap facility; that is, your
16 predecessor in the Commission was listing it as a possible
17 closure or realignment.
18 But the Pentagon felt that the military value and
19 the investment that they had thus far up to that juncture
20 made justified its being removed from the BRAC consideration.
21 Now, we have a reversal of form, as it were. And I need to
22 focus the attention of the Commission on the rationale for

Page 197

1 that change, that 360 turnaround in the Pentagon and in the
2 BRAC considerations.
3 If, indeed, the Pentagon and BRAC, your
4 predecessors, already had found that Indiantown Gap should
5 remain open, then they found that the economic impact of
6 closure would be adverse to the community, which we all would
7 know. That's a matter of fact. And secondly, more
8 importantly, the military value required that it remain in
9 its present state.
10 Now, what has happened since then? Not only did
11 the Pentagon endorse its remaining in place, that Indiantown
12 Gap remain in place with its function, but also poured
13 additional dollars into it to modernize certain facilities
14 and to make the training that Indiantown Gap has historically
15 been performing even more feasible and more valuable, more
16 worthwhile, to the Pentagon itself.
17 And so we have now the anomaly of a Pentagon
18 endorsement in the last BRAC round, a Pentagon increased and
19 a Congressionally increased investment in Indiantown Gap, an
20 upgrading of its functions, its training capacities. And
21 then, we have Desert Storm data to show that immediate
22 mobilization was a factor that was commented on by every

Page 198

1 person of military strength in the whole nation as being a
2 remarkable feat for Indiantown Gap or any mobilization point.
3 And now, we have the BRAC Commission considering
4 closing the new investment made in Indiantown Gap. That has
5 to be taken into consideration by the Commission. It would
6 be like throwing bad dollars after good dollars. We have
7 heard that trite expression thousands of times, but it
8 pertains here.
9 Why increase the tank artillery range capacity of
10 Indiantown Gap and then close it down? Why invest more money
11 and then determine, "Well, we'll realign it or close it down
12 altogether"? These are the kinds of considerations that go
13 beyond just the fact sheets which we present to you but go
14 onto questions of common sense, application of the value in
15 Indiantown Gap.
16 I want to close with two anecdotes. A high Cabinet
17 official in a previous Administration, a resident of Virginia
18 who himself served in the Reserves of that state, commented
19 to me after he heard about it. He said, "How are they going
20 to close Indiantown Gap?"
21 This was a member of a previous Cabinet in a
22 previous Administration. "That's where I trained," he told

Page 199

me, as a Reserve, "and there was no other place for us in rginia," he felt, or perhaps some regions of Virginia, "to for this type of training except Indiantown Gap. Anything e would be cost-defective," if that's a phrase. I'll incorporate it into my testimony, coin a new phrase, "cost-defective."

And so I was pleased to hear that, because that's our contention. And this was from an out-of-state, other state resident who served in the Reserves and who trained in Indiantown Gap.

Second anecdote. Right after Desert Storm had been completed successfully, on a chance stop at the Chalet Restaurant in Dillsburg, also in Central Pennsylvania, I happened to see sitting in a booth a familiar face. And I went down to join him for a cup of coffee. It was General Gus Pagonas, who was the officer in charge of all the logistics required in Desert Storm.

And I sat down with him and asked him just on a casual basis how would he evaluate the role of New Cumberland Army Depot, which is in Central Pennsylvania, and Indiantown Gap and Mechanicsburg Naval Depot in what happened so successfully in Desert Storm. He was quick to tell me that

Page 200

the mobilization that took place in Indiantown Gap and the logistics capacity of New Cumberland were key measures in the successful exercise of Desert Storm.

That was very important to me, because then what he had told me justified the additional funding that the Pentagon and the Congress poured into Indiantown Gap following Desert Storm for an update and modernization and fulfillment of the capacity of Indiantown Gap. That was very important to me.

I speak for, of course, on a parochial, selfish, tical basis, many would ascribe my testimony as being. d I accept that, because I want Indiantown Gap to be saved. But what I've tried to outline here is objective data, the Pentagon's opinion in the last BRAC, the BRAC's last BRAC opinion, the gentleman from Virginia who served in a Cabinet of a previous Administration, and the general that was in charge of all the Indiantown Gap and other facilities in the country were able to do during Desert Storm.

This is the gist of my testimony to you, and I would urge you to review the record of your predecessor BRAC as to the value of Indiantown Gap.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Gekas.

Page 201

We're delighted to have you here, and we're pleased to have my old friend, Congressman Joe McDade.

Representative McDade.

REPRESENTATIVE McDADE: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you once again for the privilege of having the opportunity to speak to you again on behalf of what I consider to be the best depot in the entire DOD system, Tobyhanna Army Depot.

Let me say that I know that you've had thousands of miles and thousands of hours of information presented to you, and I'm going to try to be brief and certainly not present to you any more slides today or charts. I know you've probably seen the ultimate in every slide possible.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I did bring a piece of hardware. It's a little, tiny radio. It weighs about two pounds. It's designed to operate for about 15 hours on a single battery. It is called a PRC-111 in the jargon of the military, and it is maintained, enhanced, and ired at the Tobyhanna Army Depot.

There's something else about it I want you to know, This is the kind of survival radio that was used by Scott O'Grady to be recovered in conjunction with all the

Page 202

rest of our forces in Bosnia.

Tobyhanna does this for everybody in the military, and it indicates the unique nature of their interservicing capabilities and, in my opinion, as well, the requirement that we have absolutely well-maintained equipment if our youngsters are to survive. That's the kind of radio that we see maintained at Tobyhanna, enhanced at Tobyhanna, kept ready there so that it can help our youngsters to get on back.

I want to say that I know that you've had enormous data presented to you and mountains of briefing papers and point papers. I only want you to keep in mind, if I might ask you to, as you come to your conclusion just a couple of points about the Tobyhanna Army Depot that I think really cut to the core, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, and something that we all have to do as we try to make decisions in a committee environment, where we get an awful lot of material presented to us.

What are those salient points? First, we need to realize that Tobyhanna Army Depot is the single largest communications electronics depot in the entire Department of Defense. It is a single commodity, dedicated facility used

Page 203

by the Department with the largest single concentration in that one depot on this one single commodity.

It is also, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the lowest cost, most productive by DOD standards GCE facility in the entire system. Now, we can do a lot and you've heard a lot about rates here and there, but I want to give you two rates, both of which are published DOD rates. One is the Air Force commodity rate for electronics at Sacramento ALC. And the rate per hour in that particular depot is $88.35.

For the same work at Tobyhanna Army Depot, the rate published by the Army Depot Systems is $55.95, a savings of $30 an hour for work performed on similar work, identical work at Tobyhanna.

And all of you are faced with this enormous problem of figuring out how to deal with the shortages that confront not just our military; but everybody in the country has to look at that, because any dollar you spend that has that kind of a wage rate differential at Tobyhanna indicates that you can get the job done much less costly and, indeed, enhance readiness by making these scarce dollars available at other places.

Page 204

I want to indicate, too, that in the Commission's decision last time to eliminate the Sacramento Army Depot, Tobyhanna was permitted to compete against McClellan Air Force Base on five occasions. Head to head, as you mandated in competition, four out of five of those competitions were won on bid rate packages by Tobyhanna. They were lower, they were of equal quality, they did the work better. They deserve to be rewarded for that, Mr. Chairman.

So I submit to you that the only logical place that we can look at is Tobyhanna because of that wage rate, because of its efficiency, and because it has the capacity. If we were to say today, "What is the depot in the United States of America that can expand in ground control communications electronics and make these type survival radios with efficiency and cost efficiency and material efficiency?" the resounding answer is, "Tobyhanna Army Depot."

It is the only depot that could accept additional work without one cent of military construction dollars required. There would be, of course, some minor facilitation dollars, but that's it. I submit to the Commission -- and you've heard it many times, and I know you know it's

Page 205

1 accurate -- Tobyhanna is the best GCE depot in the system.
2 We need to keep the best for our country and for
3 the Scott O'Gradys who might have to use its resources later
4 on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission.
5 Thank you very much.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you for an excellent
7 presentation. We appreciate it very much. Representative
8 Joe McDade.
9 Our next presentation will be by Congressman Jon
10 Fox of the Pennsylvania delegation. Representative Fox,
11 we're delighted to have you. My wife's maiden name was Fox,
12 so you have a gentle audience.
13 REPRESENTATIVE FOX: I hope you'll be thinking of
14 your wife as you decide for Pennsylvania affirmatively on all
15 of our requests. From one Fox to another, I thank you very
16 much for her help. I hope she'll talk to you after hours
17 like I'm talking to you during hours.
18 Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, thank
19 you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I also
20 join the expressions of Colonel Burton, who led the rescue
21 mission for Scott O'Grady. He's from my district, and he
22 joins me in the spirit of these remarks.

Page 206

1 As a new member of Congress, I certainly appreciate
2 the importance of your mission of cost-cutting and
3 consolidation, and I salute you for your efforts to preserve
4 our national defense by streamlining and reducing
5 inefficiencies.
6 And while I do believe that we all must share in
7 the burden of reducing the size and cost of the federal
8 government, I must emphasize the tremendous impact of base
9 closures and realignments on Philadelphia and on Pennsylvania
10 as a whole. Pennsylvania had 45,435 total defense personnel
11 as of September 30, 1994; as a result of action by the '88,
12 '91, and '93 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
13 Commissions, Pennsylvania lost 13,305 of those positions.
14 Including the 1995 Department of Defense
15 recommendations, Pennsylvania will have lost 16,600 jobs.
16 This is a 36.6 percent cut in defense personnel, higher than
17 any other state in the Union. Moreover, Philadelphia
18 closures account for more than 75 percent of Pennsylvania job
19 losses.
20 Mr. Chairman and fellow commissioners, Pennsylvania
21 has given its fair share towards accomplishing our goal. I
22 would like to take this opportunity to share my thoughts with

Page 207

1 you concerning four specific issues before the Commission,
2 the Navy facilities in Warminster, Pennsylvania; the defense
3 industrial supply center in Philadelphia; realignment and
4 consolidation affecting Naval Surface Warfare Center in
5 Philadelphia; and the Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
6 These issues are of great importance to me and our
7 colleagues here in Pennsylvania and the citizens of
8 Montgomery County who I'm privileged to represent.
9 First, I would like to urge the Commission to
10 closely examine the options for the naval air warfare center
11 in Warminster, Pennsylvania. I believe that we must do
12 everything possible to ensure the success of reuse efforts
13 and to protect the regional economy.
14 Moreover, I would like to bring to your attention
15 the value of the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance
16 Center, the RDT&E divisions detachment in Warminster. As you
17 know, the Navy has erroneously proposed that the functions of
18 this detachment be relocated to the Naval command in San
19 Diego and the Naval Oceanographic Office in St. Louis.
20 It should be noted that the Philadelphia detachment
21 is of great military value to both the Navy and joint forces
22 programs. The proposed transfer would have an extremely

Page 208

1 negative effect on the detachment's core capability to
2 continue to support these programs.
3 Moreover, the cost assumptions for the move do not
4 include personnel and equipment transfer costs and do not
5 consider the detachment's locally employed outsourced
6 technical support. We are concerned that the Department did
7 not investigate the possibility of relocating locally.
8 Secondly, as I emphasized in my letter to you of
9 April 14th, I strongly support the defense industrial supply
10 center in Philadelphia. As you know, the Defense Logistics
11 Agency has recommended that DISC be disestablished. Although
12 the DLA claimed that this action will eliminate 385 direct
13 jobs, I understand that the jobs of more than 1,800 other
14 employees at DISC would be at risk because the current
15 employees would have no right of placement or transfer
16 function entitlement at any job within the DLA's inventory
17 control point.
18 In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overruled the
19 Department of Defense's recommendation to close DISC. This
20 facility is still crucial to military readiness, and I urge
21 you to uphold the decision of the '93 Commission.
22 The workforce at DISC has been recognized as a

Page 209

1 model of efficiency. DISC has the highest proportion of
2 military requisitions and still maintains the highest level
3 of support of all hardware centers. In addition, DISC has
4 the lowest number of below goal systems and consistently
5 provides better availability to weapons systems items than
6 any other ICPs.
7 Because DISC is housed along with a Navy weapons
8 management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, a talented
9 pool of experienced logistics personnel has developed. As a
10 result, DISC and the Aviation Supply Office have developed a
11 strong working relationship that promotes cooperation and
12 productivity. There is no rationale for choosing to
13 eliminate DISC among the four Defense Logistics Agencies.
14 Of all four ICPs, DISC manages 35 percent of all
15 weapons systems hardware and processes 40 percent of all
16 military customer requisitions. In spite of these facts,
17 Defense Logistics Agency recommended moving DISC's weapons
18 coded workload to the general supply center, which currently
19 manages the least amount of weapons coded workload of the
20 ICPs.
21 It is essential that we preserve DISC in order to
22 maintain our defense logistics at the highest level of

Page 210

1 readiness, promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness and save
2 the jobs, of course, of dedicated DISC employees.
3 Third, I would like to speak in support of the DOD
4 recommendations to realign Naval Surface Warfare Center
5 Annapolis with Naval Service Warfare Center Philadelphia, as
6 well as the City of Philadelphia's recommendation to
7 consolidate NAVSEA 03 with the Naval Surface Warfare Center
8 in Philadelphia.
9 As the former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
10 is quoted as saying, "Realigning NSWC Annapolis with the NSWC
11 Philadelphia center of excellence is of critical importance
12 to the Navy." Consolidation of the machinery engineering
13 life cycle will improve the operational readiness of the
14 fleet and save 14.5 million a year, for a total 20-year
15 savings of 175.1 million.
16 I would also like to finally strongly urge the
17 Commission to approve the City of Philadelphia's proposal to
18 consolidate NAVSEA 03650 employees with the Naval Surface
19 Warfare Center Philadelphia, 1,600 employees and tremendous
20 facility infrastructure. The consolidation will eliminate
21 unnecessary duplication, save about $166 million over 20
22 years.

Page 211

1 Finally, I'm pleased to offer my support for Fort
2 ntown Gap. I'm concerned about the harm that a closure
3 his fort would cause to our national security and our
4 al security. I believe that the fort is essential for
5 military readiness.
6 In addition, as I stated in my letter to the
7 Commission of May 12th, Fort Indiantown Gap is the only
8 convenient training site for Reserve and National Guard units
9 in our area. Elimination of Fort Indiantown Gap would be a
10 grave error, and I urge the Commission to reexamine this
11 proposal.
12 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you
13 for consideration of my thoughts. With your permission, I
14 would like to have my remarks submitted for the record.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your remarks will be reproduced in
16 the record in full, Congressman Fox. We're indebted to you.
17 May I ask my friend, the distinguished Senator from
18 Pennsylvania, whether he has voted? You have voted. Then,
19 if you don't object, Senator, I'm going to go by the numbers
20 here as the folks have arrived.
21 And we now recognize Congressman Paul McHale.
22 CONGRESSMAN McHALE: Mr. Chairman, members of the

Page 212

1 Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before
2 you today. My colleagues in the Pennsylvania delegation who
3 preceded me to the microphone have eloquently defended the
4 capabilities available at Fort Indiantown Gap.
5 Although I'm a member of Congress and a member of
6 the National Security Committee and previously a member of
7 the Armed Services Committee, I bring a slightly different
8 perspective to the comments that I make regarding Fort
9 Indiantown Gap. I'm a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps
10 erve, and I often have said and think of myself as a
11 ine rifleman on temporary duty with the United States
12 ngress.
13 From 1984 to 1987, I served as a Marine infantry
14 officer with the Reserve unit located in Harrisburg,
15 Pennsylvania. That's Echo Company 225. For a year, I was a
16 rifle platoon commander with that unit. For the last two
17 years, 1985 to '87, I was the commanding officer of that
18 unit. That unit is located 20 miles from Fort Indiantown Gap
19 and on many, many, many occasions, I trained at the Gap.
20 Following the Gulf War in which I had the
21 opportunity to serve, I was the operations officer of the 2nd
22 Battalion 25th Marines. That battalion frequently trained,

Page 213

1 in whole or in part, at Fort Indiantown Gap. I know every
2 range at the Gap. I have fired virtually every infantry
3 weapon that is available to the American Armed Services at
4 the Gap, and I've scheduled training and supervised training
5 at the Gap.
6 I'm a grunt. I clean rifles. And I am familiar
7 with the training that takes place at the Gap. Let me assure
8 you as sincerely and as forcefully as I can, the live fire
9 training opportunities now available at Fort Indiantown Gap
10 are among the finest in the nation. I've been training as a
11 Marine for over 20 years. I have never had better live fire
12 training opportunities on the East Coast of the United States
13 than I have experienced at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 I've said that modern warfare is not brain surgery;
15 it is more complicated than that. When we move combined
16 armed forces forward on the battlefield, particularly if we
17 are to retain the protection of our air power, it is
18 absolutely essential that we have synchronized utilization of
19 various weapons systems available to us.
20 At Fort Indiantown Gap as nowhere else that I have
21 experienced it on the East Coast of the United States --
22 and I'm including places that are much better known, such as

Page 214

1 Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; Quantico, Virginia -- nowhere
2 else have I and the Marines that I served with had an
3 opportunity such as that available at Fort Indiantown Gap to
4 combine and synchronize tank, artillery, mortar, machine gun,
5 and close air support.
6 If you close the Gap for our active duty and
7 particularly for our Reserve forces, there will be no
8 substitute for the training opportunities, particularly the
9 live fire training opportunities now routinely available and
10 readily accessible at Fort Indiantown Gap. You can spend a
11 lot of time in uniform without having the opportunity to
12 exercise live fire the way it is available during the week
13 and on every weekend at Fort Indiantown Gap.
14 Let me close with this, if I may. We make a
15 serious mistake of judgement, a mistake of judgement that
16 will cost lives, if in the interest of economy, we foreclose
17 training opportunities that very nearly replicate what real
18 combat is about.
19 I am a firm believer in training during peacetime
20 in a manner that as nearly as possible duplicates that which
21 we expect of our soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen in
22 time of war. And I'm telling you, what is available at Fort

Page 215

1 Indiantown Gap is unique.
2 If you close those live fire ranges, there will be
3 nowhere else on the East Coast within a reasonable distance
4 of the units to be trained where that kind of live fire
5 training, exactly the kind of utilization of live fire that
6 won the Gulf War, will be available to such units.
7 I have no parochial interest in Fort Indiantown
8 Gap. My district is two hours away. There are no jobs
9 affected, to the best of my knowledge, in any significant
10 number within my district by your decision one way or the
11 other.
12 But please, I urge you, before you close the Gap,
13 before you make what I believe to be a serious misjudgment,
14 look at the live fire training opportunities available at
15 Fort Indiantown Gap, realize as I have that those training
16 opportunities are not available elsewhere, and reconsider any
17 decisions that you might have otherwise made to close those
18 training ranges.
19 Nowhere else on the East Coast will our Reserve
20 units in particular have the chance to go out and coordinate
21 mortars, artillery, tanks, and air power as they will be
22 expected to do so in the next conflict. Please reconsider

Page 216

1 your decision and think about the training of those young men
2 who are dependent upon your judgement. I thank you very
3 much.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman McHale. We
5 appreciate it very much. The Chair would remind everybody
6 again, as a former member of the Congress speaking to the
7 Congress, this is green, this is yellow, this is red. I know
8 it's difficult.
9 The Chair is delighted to recognize a distinguished
10 member of the House from the great Pennsylvania delegation,
11 Congressman Bud Shuster.
12 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Thank you very much for the
13 opportunity to appear here today to highlight the reasons why
14 we believe this Commission should reaffirm the BRAC '93
15 unanimous decision to consolidate missiles at Letterkenny and
16 continue the teaming of track vehicles.
17 Just as DOD did in 1993 and as the 1993 BRAC
18 Commission concluded at that time, the Department has again
19 substantially deviated from criteria 1 and criteria 4. The
20 methodology they use to compute capacity drives both of these
21 criteria and is not based on true military worth. The
22 capacity computation ignores the value of the actual

Page 217

1 maintenance mission performed, and it rewards installations
2 who work on small items.
3 How can Letterkenny have more land, more
4 facilities, more square feet, and be ranked last in capacity?
5 A better assessment of military worth would be to look at the
6 requirements of the future and consider the successes in
7 interservicing and in teaming and the overall value to DOD.
8 In this case, Letterkenny would rank at the top of all the
9 depots.
10 Additionally, we have recently become aware of an
11 important new development that supports the BRAC 1993
12 decision. We have seen an internal Army document dated 31
13 May to the Undersecretary of the Army which states -- and I
14 quote -- "The Army's recommendation to realign Letterkenny's
15 tactical missile workload was footed in a faulty stationing
16 strategy. Due to an oversight in the document's preparation,
17 provision of a tactical missile capability was neglected,
18 even though this commodity is key to DOD's war fighting
19 capability."
20 As the Commission knows, Letterkenny is not a
21 single depot like most in the inventory. We perform several
22 missions, including ammunition storage, joint service missile

Page 218

1 maintenance, and combat vehicle maintenance. We're the only
2 depot with these capabilities. To realign Letterkenny simply
3 does not make sound business sense.
4 The way to save money is to have a clean kill. It
5 is to totally close an installation. We all know that
6 Letterkenny will not be totally closed because of the
7 strategic need to maintain the ammo storage mission. It's
8 true that base operation costs will go down, but the cost to
9 maintain 19,000 acres and a staff of 672 for the continued
10 support and several million square feet of building space
11 will remain.
12 So to realign the joint tactical missiles will cost
13 MILCON, training, transportation of equipment, and personnel
14 costs. The best estimate is that the cost to realign the
15 depot is definitely not only the $53 million that is the TABS
16 estimate, because that TABS estimate does not include DLA,
17 SYMAC, and the logistics support activity.
18 More probably, the best evidence indicates it will
19 cost in excess of $230 million to realign, along with the
20 recurring annual costs to operate the remaining functions at
21 Letterkenny.
22 The point that seems to often be missed is that

Page 219

1 there are zero added costs to retain Letterkenny, not to
2 realign Letterkenny. After four years of tactical missile
3 studies and several DODIG investigations, it has been
4 conclusively concluded that Letterkenny is the best of the 19
5 depots studied to perform the joint services tactical missile
6 maintenance program.
7 As a result of this decision, Letterkenny already
8 has completed the transition of 13 of the 21 missile systems,
9 shipped and installed over $100 million in specialized
10 equipment, and hired and trained an additional 262 technical
11 missile experts. What businessman would recommend changing
12 course this far into a business decision without overwhelming
13 justification?
14 No other depot in the United States can perform
15 joint missile integration. None have adequate storage
16 capability. None have adequate maintenance space. And none
17 have the capacity for missile ground support equipment. To
18 claim otherwise without significant construction and other
19 major associated costs is simply false.
20 As the DODIG concluded last month, this program,
21 the BRAC '93 program of consolidation of missiles, is within
22 budget and on schedule. We're also aware of the Army Chief

Page 220

1 of Staff's letter of just 8 June which reinforces the closure
2 of Red River and states that the justification is
3 "compelling."
4 Well, with the closure of Red River, keeping
5 Letterkenny open is even more important. Because Letterkenny
6 is the only other depot which can provide surge capacity to
7 Anniston in time of war.
8 Currently, Letterkenny is performing vehicle
9 maintenance on Palladin, as well as others. We have entered
10 into a partnership agreement with United Defense on the
11 program and in two short years have saved over $60 million.
12 This model procurement program has already eliminated
13 substantial bureaucracy.
14 In summary, Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen,
15 the Department has again substantially deviated from criteria
16 1 and 4. The 1993 BRAC decision was a sound decision. And
17 we urge this Commission to reaffirm that BRAC 1993 decision
18 to consolidate missiles and to continue the public-private
19 teaming of track vehicles at Letterkenny. Thank you very
20 much.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
22 Bud Shuster.

Page 221

1 And on behalf of the Pennsylvania delegation,
2 Representative Robert Borski.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BORSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
4 members of the Commission, for giving me the opportunity to
5 testify today. Two years ago, I came before you to argue
6 against the Pentagon's proposal to close and relocate nearly
7 every defense facility in the City of Philadelphia.
8 Recognizing that the true military value of these
9 facilities is its skilled workforces, the Commission wisely
10 rejected the Pentagon's proposal and instead approved a more
11 cost-effective alternative that consolidated these facilities
12 at the ASO compound in Philadelphia.
13 Regrettably, in BRAC '95, the Pentagon has chosen
14 to ignore the wisdom of your decision. DLA has proposed to
15 disestablish DISC on the ASO combat. This proposal does not
16 close a base. Eighty percent of its claimed savings come
17 from eliminating personnel positions.
18 I will not go into the details of the flaws behind
19 DLA's stated savings. The employees at DISC have already
20 provided you with detailed information. Instead, as you
21 examine whether this proposal will save any money, I ask that
22 you keep in mind the following points about this proposal's

Page 222

1 impact on military readiness.
2 DLA is disestablishing DISC, which by every measure
3 is DLA's most efficient weapons supply center. DISC manages
4 the most weapons system items and has the highest customer
5 support rate, yet has the lowest rate of error. Because DISC
6 is DLA's best supply center, it has served as a prototype for
7 DLA's future missions requirement.
8 The employees at DISC have been reinventing government long
9 before Vice President Gore's initiatives.
10 Disestablishing DISC will also result in the
11 permanent loss of a unique joint service synergy that exists
12 between DISC and ASO. In BRAC '93, the Commission pointed to
13 this synergy as a reason for keeping both on the same
14 compound.
15 DLA's proposal will throw the items it manages into
16 a whirlwind beyond its control. If this proposal is
17 approved, more than 66 percent of DLA's workload will move
18 from one facility to another in the next four years. No item
19 transfer of this magnitude has ever been accomplished.
20 Disestablishing DISC will not close any bases. It
21 will only reshuffle workload. DLA is essentially asking the
22 Commission established to close bases to endorse its agency

Page 223

1 reorganization plan.
2 Mr. Chairman and commissioners, each of these
3 ts begs a fundamental question: Is this really worth the
4 k? This mission is still essential to the reliability of
5 our high technology weapons systems and military missions
6 around the world.
7 For example, DISC manages 41 percent of the
8 consumable items on the CH-53 Superstallion helicopters that
9 rescued Captain Scott O'Grady in Bosnia. We often take for
10 granted the role that supplies play in these missions. If
11 these helicopters are not equipped with the proper parts,
12 they risk malfunction or worse. It would have been tragic if
13 this mission had not succeeded because of a malfunction
14 caused by inexperienced supply management.
15 As you examine DLA's proposal and look at the
16 disruption it will cause, ask yourself whether it's worth the
17 risk of jeopardizing the future success of missions such as
18 this, all for savings which are questionable at best and do
19 not even involve a base closure.
20 Mr. Chairman, I support the goals of DLA's
21 reorganization, which would ultimately consolidate DLA's
22 weapons workload into two supply centers. But clearly, DISC

Page 224

1 deserves to be one of these weapons centers. The Commission
2 should reject this misguided proposal, so the DLA can
3 reorganize in a more sensible manner and time frame outside
4 of the BRAC process. To do otherwise would place an
5 unacceptable risk to the reediness of our armed services.
6 I would also like, Mr. Chairman, to briefly discuss
7 the Navy's proposed relocations of the Naval air technical
8 services facility and the Naval engineering service unit to
9 California. Like the DISC proposal, the Navy proposals do
10 close bases. They merely move these facilities from
11 adelphia to the other side of the country.
12 Such a move would completely dismantle two skilled
13 workforces that are still essential to the readiness of our
14 armed services. In response to the Navy's proposal, the
15 employees of NAVSAV and NAVSU have developed counterproposals
16 that preserve their workforces and achieve even better
17 savings by consolidating their functions with ASO. These
18 proposals provide the Commission with an opportunity to
19 consolidate without sacrificing military value.
20 Finally, I would like to express support for DOD's
21 proposed realignment of Naval Surface Warfare Center from
22 Annapolis to Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia's

Page 225

1 proposal to consolidate the NAVSEA headquarters engineering
2 directorate with Philadelphia. These proposals will result
3 in a combined savings of nearly 340 million over seven years
4 and are strongly supported by former Secretary of the Navy
5 John Lehman.
6 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the
7 employees of Philadelphia's defense facilities are the true
8 military value of these facilities. Since BRAC '93, they
9 have risen to the challenge of doing more and better with
10 less. I hope the Commission recognizes this valuable asset
11 to our country and builds on the correct ruling it made in
12 1993. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Borski.
14 And we're delighted to have the distinguished
15 Senator from the State of Pennsylvania, Senator Rick
16 Santorum, here. Senator Santorum.
17 SENATOR SANTORUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
18 appreciate the opportunity to come now for the third time and
19 k before the Commission. I appreciate your indulgence in
20 ng me do so. And I want to thank you for the fine work
21 continued participation that we have had. And I
22 appreciate that, also, very much.

Page 226

1 As we all know, the BRAC process is a necessary
2 process for all services. And I want to emphasize again that
3 all services should share in this process. And that's why I
4 have testified that I am troubled to see that with respect to
5 depots, not all services are participating. It frankly sort
6 of angers me to see what the Air Force is doing relative to
7 what the Army is doing.
8 In the past BRACs, the Army has closed three major
9 depots -- Lexington in '88; Sacramento in '91; and Tooele in
10 1993. The Air Force has only closed one very small base in
11 1993, the Aerospace Guidance and Meteorology Center in
12 Newark, Ohio.
13 In this round, the Air Force comes to the table
14 with no depot closings, zero. They basically shuffle the
15 deck tiers in the Titanic but keep in place all of their
16 ALCs.
17 In addition, they go through a six-year realignment
18 instead of the two- to four-year period that the other
19 departments are proposing and what was recommended by the
20 BRAC. And they don't eliminate positions until the sixth
21 year. This is punting. This was not what this Commission is
22 all about. This is not what the Congress wanted to see from

Page 227

1 the United States Air Force.
2 Mr. Chairman, what I am proposing and what's being
3 proposed, as you heard in testimony from Congressman Shuster
4 and Congressman McDade, is to have a little shared sacrifice
5 between the services, between the Air Force and the Army.
6 And Pennsylvania is a place where you can see some of that
7 shared sacrifice be brought to bear.
8 In the case of ground communications, you heard
9 Congressman McDade talk about the excess capacity at
10 Tobyhanna and the ability for them to consolidate ground
11 communications from Sacramento to Tobyhanna. The same thing
12 is in the case with Letterkenny with respect to the missile
13 consolidation which was proposed in the BRAC round of 1993
14 and should be sustained in this BRAC round. We should share.
15 I know that there is concerns with at least members
16 of the Armed Services Committee about the Army eating its
17 seed core with reducing to the depot level that they have
18 suggested. I would hope that this Commission would look very
19 carefully at sharing the sacrifice across the bases.
20 With respect to the Pittsburgh Air Force Reserve
21 Station, as you all know, the numbers that were thrown in the
22 COBRA models initially were wrong. The Air Force has

Page 228

1 admitted they're wrong.
2 The numbers as they have been recranked out again
3 have Pittsburgh in much better shape and, in fact, provide
4 not only good numbers and good cost and military value
5 numbers, but also the fact that there's 77 acres of ready
6 ramp space sitting there from the former Pittsburgh Airport
7 terminal sitting there ready to deal with surge operation or
8 any other contingency that may come along makes this a very
9 valuable piece of property because of the fact that it's at a
10 major airport with lots of runway space, et cetera.
11 In addition, as you know, the Secretary of the Air
12 Force sent a letter dated June 9 to the chairman -- and I
13 quote -- "In view of these circumstances" -- the
14 "circumstances" are referring to the problems of relocating
15 Chicago O'Hare -- "it would appear that the inactivation of
16 the Air Force Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare IAP, instead of
17 the C-130 unit at Pittsburgh IAP is a reasonable
18 alternative."
19 So now, you have the Secretary of the Air Force
20 suggesting that O'Hare because of the problems with the City
21 of Chicago and being able to finance it really is the better
22 place to close, as opposed to the Pittsburgh base. I would

Page 229

1 agree with Congressmen McHale and Gekas who testified on Fort
2 Indiantown Gap.
3 I speak for Governor Ridge. I know there was some
4 question about the governor's position on this. He is
5 strongly behind Indiantown Gap and it remaining open. And
6 the fact of the matter is, this is not going to save money.
7 This is a basis -- Congressman McHale testified, a
8 vibrant and active base is going to stay active with its
9 Guard and Reserve and all the other training components that
10 it has. And we're going to have to come back for
11 supplemental appropriations to fund the Reserve operations
12 there if we don't do it through an active unit. So if you're
13 looking to save money, the Gap is not the place to do it.
14 I would also support one DOD recommendation with
15 the consolidation of Annapolis and NSWC at the Philadelphia
16 NSWC. We have the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, which was hit
17 worse, biggest closure in the entire BRAC process. We need
18 at least some sort of economic development draw. And having
19 NSWC there and the work that they're doing consolidated -- in
20 addition, the City of Philadelphia has suggested NAVSEA
21 from -- the NAVSEA center here in Crystal City to move up to
22 Philadelphia to consolidate into a more manageable plan.

Page 230

1 It would be another, I think, big thing for the
2 City of Philadelphia. I'm gong to submit the rest of my
3 testimony for the record, as my light came on, and try to
4 keep with the chairman's recommendation. Thank you.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Senator Rick
6 Santorum. We appreciate it.
7 Now, the Chair is advised that a vote is going on
8 in the House and that it would accommodate the Pennsylvania
9 delegation for me to tell you the order in which the Chair
10 shows you arriving. Senator Santorum was the eighth person
11 to testify for Pennsylvania.
12 The next that we have noted in attendance -- I hope
13 you'll not blame the Chair if we didn't note him correctly --
14 is Representative Paul Kanjorski, number nine. We show
15 Representative Tom Foglietta as number 10. Representative
16 James Greenwood is number 11. The distinguished senior
17 Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre, number 12, was in the room
18 and I presume is at hand. Representative Kurt Weldon, number
19 13, and Representative Ron Klink, number 14.
20 Now, there may be others here that the Chair has
21 not been told about, but this is the order. I'm hopeful to
22 accommodate the Pennsylvania delegation in any manner that I

Page 231

1 can. I'm going to call Representative Paul Kanjorski.
2 Please note that we have staff here that will work with you.
3 We're trying to solve your problem. I want you to know, it's
4 difficult, with the kind of day we have, with 121 witnesses.
5 We're delighted to recognize Representative Paul
6 Kanjorski.
7 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Thank you very much, Mr.
8 Chairman. And I'm going to ask unanimous consent that my
9 formal testimony be admitted into the record.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That will be done.
11 REPRESENTATIVE KANJORSKI: Mr. Chairman, I thought
12 that the proposition before the Commission is very important,
13 because you're going to have a very tough decision. And
14 those of us that have been in the Congress for the last
15 several years probably -- I've been there 10 years -- have
16 discovered the Commission form of answering very serious
17 political and other national questions has been reliable.
18 Certainly, the BRAC Commission has proved that over the
19 years.
20 But probably the decisions made by this BRAC
21 Commission will bring into question the decisions that are
22 not based on fact, on recommendations, and efficiency and

Page 232

1 effectiveness of our military alignment.
2 When I argue for the Tobyhanna depot, I make a very
3 simple argument. We have the facts, we have the
4 recommendations, and we have the community support. Before
5 the Commission, I know some of the commissioners had the
6 opportunity to come up and see Tobyhanna. You know what that
7 community is like.
8 Before you are over 15,000 personal letters and
9 more than 100,000 signatures on petitions. This has been a
10 very traumatic experience for Northeastern Pennsylvania
11 because up to four weeks ago, we didn't think we had a
12 problem. Now, we do have a problem.
13 Those of us that represent Pennsylvania and
14 Northeastern Pennsylvania were rather shocked with this
15 opening up and putting Tobyhanna on the list. I hope it
16 never happens again. It is a very traumatic experience for
17 communities.
18 I cannot see the justification or the reason why
19 Tobyhanna would be closed. I can understand some alignment.
20 I can understand some additions. All I would urge you is,
21 the facts are very simple. The Defense Department has said
22 it's the most effective and efficient depot system in the

Page 233

1 United States Army. The recommendation from the United
2 States Army and the Defense Department is that it is number
3 one in depots and should be kept open.
4 Finally, for the community, I don't think you'll
5 have experienced a stronger support system from a community
6 behind the depot and in support of it the activities they
7 have taken.
8 As a member of Congress representing half of the
9 depot area with Joe McDade, I just think that anything less
10 than retaining Tobyhanna would send probably the most
11 negative message to Congress to ever exercise the Commission
12 form of activity again to solve serious national problems
13 where the legislature of this country cannot face the
14 political problem that needs to be solved.
15 So I urge this Commission to use your charge and
16 your conscience to resolve the question for Tobyhanna. And
17 if you do, I'm sure you'll keep the best. Thank you.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
19 Kanjorski. That was a very moving presentation on behalf of
20 your Congressional district. The Chair knows a little about
21 politics and recognizes there's a little division in the
22 Pennsylvania delegation. So I'm going to have to request

Page 234

1 that you take the boxes out of the front of the room so that
2 others who represent another district will not be embarrassed
3 by having the wrong sign in the television picture.
4 Can the folks do that as quickly as they can? I'm
5 going to go on with the work, but I would appreciate it.
6 Congressman Tom Foglietta, we're delighted to see
7 you here, Congressman. Thank you for coming.
8 REPRESENTATIVE FOGLIETTA: First of all, I would
9 like to thank you, Chairman Dixon and other members of the
10 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, for
11 convening today's hearing. My appearance today is much
12 different than the last time I spoke before the Commission in
13 Newark, New Jersey.
14 In 1991, the Commission was reviewing the Navy's
15 recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
16 This September, when the overhaul is complete on the USS John
17 F. Kennedy on time and on budget, she will steam out of the
18 Navy yard, and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard will close.
19 Based on that decision and others, Philadelphia has
20 the unfortunate distinction of being the only city to be
21 impacted on every base closure around. All totalled, the
22 Philadelphia region will lose 38,000 jobs as a result of

Page 235

1 these three BRAC rounds.
I'm here today to urge your support of the Navy's
[illegible]mmendation to consolidate Navy engineering functions at
[illegible] Naval Surface Warfare Center in Philadelphia.
5 Additionally, I strongly support the proposal submitted to
6 the Commission by the City of Philadelphia to build on the
7 Navy's recommendation by further consolidating Navy
8 engineering functions by realigning the engineering
9 directorate at Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters in
10 Philadelphia.
11 The recommendations will promote the readiness of
12 our armed forces, lower our Navy machinery life cycle costs,
13 and improve efficiency while assisting the conversion of the
14 Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
15 I also strongly urge the members of the Commission
16 to maintain the 1993 Commission's decision to move the
17 Defense Personnel Support Center from its present location to
18 the site of the Navy Aviation Supply Office in Northeast
19 Philadelphia. The DPSC performs the critical task of buying
20 and moving clothing, medical supplies, and other support
21 products for the military services.
22 In this capacity, DPSC played an important role in

Page 236

1 restoring credibility to military procurement, putting to
2 rest the images of gold-plated toilet seats, hammers, and
3 ashtrays.
4 Furthermore, it is important that the Commission
5 give certainty to past Commission orders rather than exposing
6 the Defense Department to a revolving door of inconsistent
7 decisions. The Commission can build on the success of DPSC's
8 imposing track record by merging it with the Defense
9 Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia.
These important activities could be consolidated
[illegible]er one base operating support structure. This alternative
[illegible]uld enhance military readiness, better utilize a valued
13 workforce, and achieve significant cost savings. The NSWC
14 Philadelphia is the Navy's only source for in-service
15 engineering and for testing and evaluating ship machinery
16 systems.
17 A full 20 percent of the Navy's annual budget is
18 devoted to life cycle costs for these vital systems. By
19 continuing the consolidation of Philadelphia engineering
20 functions in Philadelphia, a process which began as a result
21 of the 1991 BRAC decision, the Navy estimates that they can
22 save $175 million over the next 20 years.

Page 237

1 Furthermore, this realignment can be completed in a
2 cost-effective manner. The Navy calculates that the
3 realignment will cost $25 million. This recommendation will
4 also greatly improve operational efficiency and military
5 readiness by consolidating life cycle support for machinery
6 systems in one central location. This would streamline the
7 Navy's acquisition and development process and enable the
8 purchases of more capable systems at lower costs.
9 The second proposal which I mentioned earlier would
10 build on the Navy's recommendation by moving NAVSEA's
11 engineering directorate to Philadelphia. This consolidation
12 would provide a major return on investment by reducing
13 duplication of activities between the 650 employees at NAVSEA
14 and the 1,600 workers at NSWC in Philadelphia.
15 The Navy's own internal studies have confirmed that
16 there is duplication and that NAVSEA's engineers should be
17 separated from headquarters and moved to the field.
18 Furthermore, it has been estimated that this proposal would
[illegible] the Navy $13.4 million per year and a total savings over
[illegible]ears of $165 million.
[illegible] As I mentioned earlier, Philadelphia has been
22 battered by the base closure process. However, efforts to

Page 238

1 convert the Philadelphia Naval Yard and develop commercial
2 ship-building in place of the Navy work are succeeding. Even
3 before the Kennedy leaves, we have two established commercial
4 maritime operations which are interested in building ships at
5 the yard -- building ships, reviving the ship-building
6 industry in this country. This would mean 3,800 new jobs for
7 Navy yard workers.
8 Additionally, the Westinghouse Corporation and the
9 Garvey Precision Machine Company have committed to moving to
10 the yard and creating 150 jobs. All of these businesses have
11 cited NSWC's location at the Navy yard as a major factor in
12 their decision to come to Philadelphia. These are excellent
13 recommendations which will boost military readiness, save
14 money, and greatly assist our work to revitalize the
15 commercial ship-building industry at the Philadelphia Naval
16 Shipyard.
17 The experts agree. Former Navy Secretaries John
18 Lehman and Shaun O'Keefe have strongly endorsed these
19 proposals. In fact, Secretary Lehman testified before the
20 Commission at the regional hearings in Baltimore in support
21 of these recommendations.
22 With these outstanding benefits in mind, saving

Page 239

1 money, enhancing readiness, and boosting defense conversion
2 in Philadelphia, I sincerely and strongly urge the Commission
3 to adopt these recommendations. And I thank you.
4 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And I thank you very much,
5 Congressman Foglietta, for that fine contribution on behalf
6 of the State of Pennsylvania.
7 Now, let me say, the situation is this -- there's a
8 vote in the House. Members of the delegation have left us,
9 as is their responsibility to their constituency, to vote.
10 Thank you. You are excused, Congressman Foglietta. Thank
11 you so much.
12 Senator Spectre was in the room. He had on a prior
13 occasion when it was his time to testify been obligated to
14 work the floor in connection with an amendment. I see him
15 walking in at this very moment. He left his lunch, let the
16 people of Pennsylvania know. We see this poor, starving man
17 walking into the room.
18 Senator, let me say before you begin, I'm not quite
19 sure what we'll do about the balance of your delegation. We
20 have heard from 10 of your Congresspeople or 11, as the case
21 may be, counting Senator Santorum. There's a vote in the
22 House. Many have gone back to discharge their obligations to

Page 240

1 their constituency in that connection.
2 I can't find places to work them in in the next few
3 minutes or so if they don't get in here by 1:50. But I say
4 that so far as this Commission is concerned, if the Chair's
5 the only one here, we'll hear them this evening at the end if
6 they want to, but it's going to be in the seven-ish to eight-
7 ish hour, I'm afraid. I'm sorry about that, Senator.
8 I hope you understand, there's 121 members of the
9 Congress wanting to be heard, and the schedule is just a
10 couple of pages. But anyway, we'll try to work with you,
11 sir, as the senior Senator from the great State of
12 Pennsylvania, and we're honored to have the distinguished
13 senior Senator, Senator Arlin Spectre.
14 SENATOR SPECTRE: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for
15 your comments and for your diligent work. And I thank the
16 Commission for undertaking this arduous task. And I
17 understand with the lengthy list of those who are to appear
18 before you that it is an Herculean job on scheduling.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: If I may interrupt once more,
20 Senator, that would be six members of the House who were
21 listed to testify and had to leave. And we can supply your
22 office with the names of those members. Senator Spectre.

Page 241

1 SENATOR SPECTRE: All right. I shall transmit that
2 to those who could not be here, and they can then come back.
3 I know how arduous the job is for this Commission.
4 And in a sense, it is a very difficult matter to sit here
5 listening to witness after witness making the argument,
6 almost cruel and unusual punishment for the commissioners and
7 really hard to ingest and digest it all.
8 This is the third time that I have appeared before
9 this distinguished Commission in Baltimore and Boston and now
10 here in Washington. There have been very strenuous arguments
11 made on behalf of the many installations in Pennsylvania.
12 And without going through the details on the substantive
13 arguments, they're all set forth in my brief, and they're all
14 set forth by others who have argued.
15 In alphabetical order, I would submit that the
16 Kelly Support facility and the Defense Industrial Supply
17 Center and the Fort Indiantown Gap and Letterkenny and the
18 Naval Air Technical Service and Naval Surface Warfare 9th Air
19 Lift Unit in Pittsburgh and Tobyhanna all have very, very
20 substantial national defense purposes.
21 And I say that to you based on my experience on the
22 Defense Appropriation Subcommittee. And I know the

Page 242

1 distinguished chairman has had extensive experience on the
2 Armed Services Committee.
3 What I would submit to you is a little different
4 kind of an argument, after having considered the military
5 capabilities of all of these units, and with special emphasis
6 on Letterkenny and Tobyhanna. That poses an unusual problem
7 for those of us who are statewide officeholders, as I
8 analogize it to a dispute between my two sons. In trying to
9 be as fair and as evenhanded as possible, I submit that both
10 have a very, very high military purpose.
11 And in alphabetical order, Letterkenny did not get
12 a fair shake on some of the military evaluations which were
13 done early in the process. And I know this distinguished
14 Commission has all those facts before it.
15 Tobyhanna has been given extraordinarily high
16 ratings for all who have taken a look at it. And while the
17 closure of any of the facilities would be very problemsome,
18 not only for the individuals involved, but also for the
19 communities, the closure of either of these installations
20 would be absolutely devastating, Letterkenny in South Central
21 Pennsylvania and Tobyhanna in the Northeastern part of the
22 state with a very large number of individuals employed at

Page 243

1 each of these installations.
2 But let me give you a broader picture, if I may,
3 which I know you will impart to your fellow commissioners.
4 And that is an overall assessment as to what has happened to
5 Pennsylvania in all of the base closures, going back to 1991.
6 We have had only 2.6 percent of the national military
7 installations but have suffered approximately 11 percent of
8 the job loss. And that is a valid consideration by this
9 Commission.
10 And in making those representations to you under
11 oath, that's to the best of my knowledge, information, and
12 belief as supplied to me. When the Philadelphia Navy Yard
13 was closed, Pennsylvania took a very hard hit. And it was
14 broader than just the City of Philadelphia and the Delaware
15 Valley Region. It was statewide. It rippled throughout the
16 state.
17 And I ask the Commission to consider that
18 especially, because it was the expectation of the Commission
19 at that time and it was the expectation of the Congress at
20 that time that there would be judicial review on the
21 contention which I made that material evidence was withheld
22 because we were not advised that two Navy admirals had said

Page 244

1 the base should be kept open but downsized.
2 And I know you, Chairman Dixon, will recall in your
3 capacity as Senator, when you provided on the subcommittee
4 reviewing the work when we took the matter to the Congress
5 after the Commission had ruled and the President had signed
6 off, as you said and the record will show -- and I know you
7 recall from your nods now -- that there would be judicial
8 review.
9 You said, "Senator, take it to the court," which we
10 did, with the full expectation that there would be judicial
11 review. And in a very complex case, the Court of Appeals for
12 the Third Circuit said we were entitled to judicial review.
13 And then, on a very complex argument in the Supreme Court on
14 separation of power and delegation of authority, the Supreme
15 Court disagreed. So we never had that judicial review.
16 And I think that that has impacted really unfairly
17 on Pennsylvania without an opportunity to have had what was
18 the expectation of the Commission and the Congress at that
19 time. So I would ask this Commission to weigh that factor in
20 addition to the other factors before the Commission. And I
21 think as a matter of fairness, Pennsylvania really ought to
22 be spared these closures.

Page 245

1 And I would ask it as the Senator from Pennsylvania
2 on behalf of all of the ones which I have enumerated, where
3 those communities have been very hard hit. And the people
4 who were displaced as the ripple effect went up across
5 Pennsylvania have taken other jobs that if any of these
6 facilities were to be closed, it would limit the employment
7 opportunities of those who would be put out of work on any of
8 these facilities.
9 We are unique in that respect. That is the only
10 case which went to the Supreme Court of the United States
11 where there had been the expectation of judicial review and
12 that did not occur. So I ask for that special consideration
13 for the Commission on Pennsylvania's military installations.
14 In conclusion, I thank you, commissioners, Mr.
15 Chairman, for your diligent service. I know what it's like.
16 I have been in that chair as chairman of the Intelligence
17 Committee or the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism or the
18 various other committees. You have an arduous task, and you
19 have our thanks. And we do ask you for your special
20 consideration for the working men and women of Pennsylvania.
21 Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Senator Spectre, for

Page 246

1 your fine presentation, the distinguished senior Senator from
2 the State of Pennsylvania.
3 The Chair is advised that Representative Mike Doyle
4 has arrived. We're delighted to have you, Representative
5 Doyle.
6 REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Mr. Chairman, my speech was
7 to be in conjunction with the Western Pennsylvania
8 delegation, Congressmen Klink, Coyne, myself, and Mr.
9 Mascara. And we just got called for a vote. And I've
10 already voted. And I think they're on their way. And the
11 way our presentation is intended is to go in a certain order.
12 So I would ask to defer from speaking until the rest of my
13 delegation is able to do so.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I'm greatly distressed that I
15 cannot honor your request, Representative Doyle. Let me tell
16 you the problem. I recognize the obligation to vote. It is
17 a duty to your constituency that the Chair is very sensitive
18 to, having served 12 years in this place. But I have an
19 obligation to the entire Congress to hear everybody in order.
20 At 1:50, we go to Puerto Rico. So I'm going to
21 have to hear whoever comes here and put the rest of you at
22 the end of the evening. Now, I hate to do that, but the

SUMMARY PLAN VICTOR
TO
HQ AFMC PROGRAMMING PLAN (PPLAN) 94-04

AFEWES DISPOSITION

V.1. This section supports moving AFEWES capabilities from the LFWC facility in Ft Worth, Texas to AFFTC. For the purposes of this plan, referral to AFEWES means more than short term management of the existing AFEWES program. It also means re-establishment of essential AFEWES capabilities at AFFTC and AFDTC - selected *parts* of AFEWES, not re-creating the *whole* AFEWES program.

V.2. Specific AFEWES capabilities slated for reconstitution include:

-IR Labs - Carco & Bendix (to be reconstituted at AFDTC)
-MEG - Basic and Advanced
-Reconfigurable AI & Development Facility
-Bus Snapshot Analyzer
-SA-6M & 11M
-JETS & JEDI
-TACAN/IFF
-Clutter Generator
-Vendor Documentation & Secured Storage
-Test Observation Center
-Waveguide Networks
-Test Director's System
-Test Equipment, Carts/Work Stations
-Power Distribution Units

V.3. Timeframe for physically moving AFEWES capabilities is FY97 - FY01. Specific start and completion dates within this window should be driven by customer requirements.

V.4 Appendix I lists actions required to move the IR labs to AFDTC (Note: The IR labs moving to AFDTC is predicated on fielding the IR portion of ECIT on time. Should this not occur, the basing of the IR labs must be re-addressed. The IR SAMS are to transition to AFFTC upon fielding ECIT's IR capability in any case.)

V.5. Appendix II lists required actions for moving essential AFEWES capabilities to AFFTC.

APPENDIX I
TO
SUMMARY PLAN VICTOR

Time Phased Actions
Concept of Operations - IR Lab (Eglin)

MILESTONE/ ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION	AGENCY	SCHEDULE START	COMPLETION DATE
V100/000	Develop Plan	46 TW/TSWG	1 Oct 96	1 Apr 98
005	Transfer Software	46 TW/TSWG	1 Oct 96	30 Sep 97
010	Rehost Software in GWEF	46 TW/TSWG	1 Jan 97	30 Jun 98
015	OJT for VITRO	46 TW/TSWG VITRO	1 Oct 97	30 Sep 98
020	Benchmark Testing	46 TW/TSWG VITRO	1 Oct 97	1 Apr 98
025	Label Equipment	46 TW/TSWG VITRO	1 Oct 97	1 Jan 98
030	ID GWEF Mods	46 TW/TSWG	1 Jul 97	1 Oct 97
035	Dissasemble Equipment	46 TW/TSWG VITRO	1 Oct 98	1 Jan 99
040	Transport Equipment	TBD	1 Aug 98	1 Nov 98
045	Modify GWEF	AFDTC/DE	1 Jan 98	1 Jul 98
050	Reassemble Equipment	46 TW/TSWG VITRO	1 Oct 98	1 Jan 99
055	Conduct V&V	46 TW/TSWG	1 Jan 99	1 Apr 99

APPENDIX I
TO
SUMMARY PLAN VICTOR

Time Phased Actions
Concept of Operations - RF (Edwards)

MILESTONE/ ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION	AGENCY	SCHEDULE START	COMPLETION DATE
V110/000	Site Visit	412 TW/EWWA	9 Oct 95	20 Oct 95
003	Develop Plan	412TW/EWWA	30 Oct 95	30 Sep 96
005	Transfer Software	412 TW/EWWA	1 Oct 96	31 Mar 97
008	ECIT 100% Ph 1 Design	412 TW/EWD	1 Oct 95	1 Feb 96
010	Rehost Software in ATIC	412 TW/EWWA	1 Jan 97	30 Sep 97
015	OJT	412 TW/EWWA	1 Oct 96	30 Sep 97
020	Benchmark Testing	412 TW/EWWA	1 Nov 96	1 Apr 97
025	ID/Label Equipment	412 TW/EWWA	1 Jun 97	31 Aug 97
028	ECIT Phase 1 Construction	412 TW/EWD	1 Mar 96	10 Feb 97
035	Dissasemble Equipment	412 TW/EWWA	1 Oct 97	1 Jan 98
040	Transport Equipment	412 TW/EW	1 Nov 97	30 Mar 98
050	Reassemble Equipment	412 TW/EWWA	1 Jan 98	30 Nov 98
055	Conduct V&V	412 TW/EWWA	1 Dec 98	31 Aug 99

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

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MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/AQ

FROM: HQ USAF/CC
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Electronic Combat Test and Evaluation Capability

Air Force Materiel Command's Mission Need Statement (AFMC 003-93) for an Electronic Combat Test and Evaluation Capability is approved.

MERRILL A. McPEAK, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

cc:
HQ AFMC/CC

DIR:
C/ASST:
M/ASST:
EXEC: 5/27
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SUSPENSE:
CC TO: XRX XRC

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FINAL

MISSION NEED STATEMENT

AFMC 003-93

ELECTRONIC COMBAT (EC) TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E) CAPABILITIES

ACAT Level III/IV

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MISSION NEED STATEMENT

FOR

ELECTRONIC COMBAT (EC) TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E) CAPABILITIES

AFMC 003-93

1. Defense Planning Guidance Element.

a. This mission need statement (MNS) responds to the following sections of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document: Section IV.C., Science and Technology; Section IV.C., Systems Acquisition; and Section IV.C., Infrastructure and Overhead. This MNS also addresses RDT&E elements of programs in support of the following DUSD(A) mission areas: 200 - Tactical Warfare Programs, 220 - Air Warfare, 313 - Classified Programs, 370 - Electronic Combat, 400 - Defense-wide Mission Support, 440 - Technical Integration/Studies and Analysis, 450 - T&E Support, 451 - Major Range Test Facility Base, 453 - Joint T&E, 454 - Other T&E, 455 - Operational T&E, 460 - International Cooperative RDT&E, 480 - T&E Facilities & Management, 503 - Engineering Technology (ATD), 523 - Engineering Technology (ED).

b. This MNS describes the baseline for the EC T&E requirements defined in the United States Air Force Test Investment Strategic Plan (TISP). The TISP is the strategic plan for long-range T&E infrastructure investments. It also provides the Air Force input to the Tri-Service Reliance Test Capability Master Plans (TCMP), which in turn serves as the basis for the DoD Test Resource Master Plan (TRMP).

2. Mission and Threat Analysis.

a. The Air Force has instituted the EC Test Process to provide a framework for efficient and complete EC T&E. The process is a disciplined, scientific approach to conducting T&E throughout all phases of system development. The objectives of the EC Test Process include early assessment of system concepts and performance, thorough evaluation of technical performance parameters and credible, timely test results to support program decisions. Extensive use of computer simulations is required along with increasingly stressful tests as the system progresses from breadboard component to complete system installed in a weapon system platform. To do this, the EC test infrastructure includes facilities categorized according to their capabilities:

(1) Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is used to estimate the performance of proposed concepts, conduct pretest analysis to structure tests and predict results, and develop a digital system model (DSM) of the EC system. The DSM is used to make predictions of system performance in a wide variety of conditions and against threats for which there is no test capability. The operational effectiveness and suitability of the system are determined using actual test data, the DSM, and the results of engineering and platform level simulations. Proposed upgrades to the system are examined by computer analysis.

(2) Measurement facilities are used to measure multi-spectral characteristic signatures of platforms or EC system components (e.g., aircraft radar cross section, flare infrared signature, antenna receive/transmit pattern).

(3) Systems Integration Laboratories (SILs) are used to test the integration of components of an EC system and to assess revisions to existing system software.

(4) Hardware-in-the-Loop (HITL) test facilities are used to test breadboard, brassboard, subsystem, and system technical performance and effectiveness. HITL facilities have open-loop threat simulations to test receiver performance in an operationally realistic high density, wide variety threat environment. Closed-loop threat simulations are also used for countermeasures technique optimization and transmitter effectiveness measurements.

(5) Installed Systems Test Facilities (ISTFs) are used to stimulate a fully integrated EC system installed on a weapon system platform. The effects of electromagnetic interference on system performance as well as functional compatibility and interoperability with the airframe and other platform avionics are measured.

(6) Open Air Ranges (OAR) are used to flight test EC systems in test bed aircraft or in the intended weapon system platforms. These tests are conducted in an environment that provides realistic phenomenon (such as atmospheric absorption, clutter, multipath) and a replication of operational threat arrays that include high-fidelity simulators and actual systems. This is the only environment in which some types of expendables can be tested.

b. Deficiencies exist in the current EC T&E infrastructure. Not all Red threats are represented in each test category. Blue threat representations are limited; Grey threat capabilities are virtually nonexistent. US EC systems are being fielded without being tested against all potential adversary threats. Operational testing is not realistic either in threat variety or density. The objectives of the EC Test Process cannot be fully satisfied unless these shortfalls and others are overcome and the EC test infrastructure is continuously upgraded to keep pace with technology advancements and the threat environment. These needs must be met as soon as possible.

(1) EC Test Infrastructure Needs:

(a) Standardized data formats, test and analysis methodologies, and instrumentation to allow correlation of data among different test facilities are needed. This will allow increased test process efficiency and comparability of system performance data throughout development.

(b) A method of electronically linking all types of test facilities is needed to increase the test capabilities available at a single site. This will allow test capabilities to be brought to the system under test rather than the reverse.

(2) Modeling and Simulation Needs:

(a) Models and simulations of threats, environments, and technologies are needed to the level of fidelity required for the computer simulation tasks described in the EC Test Process. These needs include:

1. All air defense systems listed in current weapon system ORDs. M&S assets must possess the ability to model new threat systems when identified by a program in time to be used as required in the Test Process.

2. All combat environments for which contingency plans exist or are in development in operational commands. Simulations must include high-fidelity phenomenology models (atmospheric absorption, clutter, multipath, etc.).

3. New technology areas. This includes phased array radars, dynamic radar cross section, multi-spectral systems, and environment phenomenology such as multipath, clutter, and atmospheric absorption.

(b) A method to allow various models and simulations to communicate interoperably is needed. This will require interfaces at the component, platform, and mission levels.

(c) An M&S control process is needed that is compatible with the tasks and timelines of EC system testing and includes standards for:

1. Validation, verification, and accreditation of threat models, mission level simulations, DSMs, and environment phenomenology models,

2. Configuration control, and

3. Updates to threat and mission scenario data.

(3) Measurement Facility Needs:

(a) Improved abilities to measure multi-spectral target signatures and other parametrics for low observable objects in static and dynamic environments are needed. This need includes coherent bistatic measurement capabilities and a low background pylon to support aircraft being tested.

(b) A capability is needed to measure the performance of large planar and conformal phased array antennas for aircraft and very large, lightweight space-based phased array antennas. This need involves both near and far field elevated range performance testing.

(4) Systems Integration Laboratory Needs:

Instrumentation and equipment to provide multi-spectral sources are needed. This equipment must be programmable (flexible) to allow rapid evaluation of the performance capabilities of systems down to the component level.

(5) Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL) Needs:

(a) Simulations are needed to expand the current HITL closed-loop capability to include all Red, Blue, and Grey air defense system (direct threats and supporting systems in the integrated air defense system) called for in all Air Force weapon system Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs). Simulations are needed for those air defense systems where the effect of US EC actions (jamming, deployment of expendables, tactics) are to be measured. These simulations must include Man-in-the-Loop capabilities.

(b) Simulation capabilities are needed to generate open loop signal environments that duplicate the emitter densities, system varieties and signal fidelities present in current and projected real world scenarios. Every air defense system called for in Air Force weapon system ORDs must be included. These test capabilities must be flexible and rapidly responsive to new worldwide scenarios with all potential levels of conflict.

(c) A capability is needed to simulate multi-engine aircraft with multiple port ejection flares. This capability must be able to simulate different types of flares (aerodynamic, activated metal decoy, standard, and kinematic).

(6) ISTF Needs:

(a) Simulation capabilities are needed to generate open loop signal environments that duplicate the emitter densities, system varieties, and signal fidelities present in current and projected real world scenarios. Every air defense system called for in Air Force weapon system ORDs must be included. These test capabilities must be flexible and rapidly responsive to new worldwide scenarios with all potential levels of conflict.

(7) Open Air Range Needs:

(a) Threat system simulators (emitter-receiver-processor) or actual systems are needed to expand the current OAR capability to include every Red, Blue, and Grey air defense system (direct threats and supporting systems in the integrated air defense network) called for in all Air Force weapon system Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs).

(b) Simulation capabilities are needed to generate open loop signal environments that duplicate the emitter densities, system varieties, and signal fidelities present in current and projected real world scenarios. Every air defense system called for in Air Force weapon system ORDs must be included. These test capabilities must be flexible and rapidly responsive to new worldwide scenarios with all potential levels of conflict.

(c) Improved range tracking accuracy, test control, and data acquisition and analysis capabilities are needed. These needs apply to both OAR ground and airborne testbed capabilities.

(d) A capability is needed to rapidly measure and validate the performance of OAR simulators. This capability must also be capable of quick exploitation of actual threat systems.

(e) A capability is needed to collect realistic inflight test data to evaluate the effectiveness of infrared seekers and their countermeasures.

c. Threat Analysis: There is no direct threat to the Electronic Combat Test and Evaluation Capabilities. However, an indirect threat is posed by Hostile Intelligence Service (HIS) collection activity. HIS collection may reveal information about US weapon systems. It may also compromise foreign material exploitation programs or other sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

3. Nonmateriel Alternatives.

Changes in doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, and training cannot satisfy these needs. Organizational changes in the form of greater cooperation among the Services would reduce the number of threat simulation shortfalls, especially if electronic linking of facilities is pursued. In the cases where some capabilities exist but do not fully satisfy the needs, an alternative is to continue testing without improvements and modernization. This alternative, as a result of incomplete T&E and possible inadequate system performance, will increase technical risks and may substantially increase test schedule and associated life cycle costs.

4. Potential Materiel Alternatives.

a. Abandon EC Test Process. Concentrate improvements to a limited number of EC test facilities. This would reduce EC T&E infrastructure costs, but increase risk and program costs in those areas where improvements were not made.

b. Dual-Role Test Facilities. There are Air Force test facilities designed for other types of T&E that also have EC testing capabilities. They could be made "dual-role" by expanding their responsibilities to include EC testing. Corresponding EC facilities could be eliminated and their testing transferred to the dual-role facilities.

However, this would increase the workload for the dual- role facilities (probably hurting their primary mission programs) and decrease the funds available for improvements for their primary role.

c. Tri-Service Cooperation. Cooperation among the Services to modernize EC test facilities could be done by consolidating similar capabilities to maximize the DoD funds available.

d. Allied Cooperation. While safeguarding classified hardware and EC techniques, proprietary information, and restricted technology would make use of foreign test facilities difficult, this option should be studied. Foreign use of US test facilities should also be considered especially where combining resources would produce a better test facility.

e. Areas for potential study for possible solutions include:

(1) Networking existing US or Allied facilities.

(2) Upgrading existing US or Allied facilities.

(3) Consolidating existing US or Allied facilities.

(4) New US or Allied facilities.

5. Constraints.

a. System Under Test Transportation. A decision to maintaining test facilities at multiple locations must consider the added cost of transporting the system under test and its support equipment to each location.

b. Experienced Personnel. A decision to move test capabilities must account for the time and cost of replacing experienced personnel who chose not to move to a new location.

c. Environmental Protection. Environmental protection laws must be complied with in the construction or movement of facilities and flight testing.

d. Duplication. Duplication (or near-duplication) of capabilities, either within the Air Force or among the Services, must be avoided.

e. Security. The T&E infrastructure must be capable of testing EC system operational effectiveness without compromising equipment or information.

f. Availability. T&E capabilities must be able to handle the normal workload with minimal delays and have a wartime surge capacity.

g. Validation, Verification, & Accreditation. All threat simulations and simulators must be validated against approved intelligence data, verified for proper operation, and accredited by appropriate acquisition authorities.

6. Joint Potential Designator. Navy designates joint program. Army designates joint interest.

Page 247

Chair will penalize himself by staying. I'm distressed I e to do that.

REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: I understand, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: I hope you're sensitive to the problem of the Chair.

REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: And I see members of our delegation coming in, so perhaps I'll begin, then.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Fine. Representative Mike Doyle. Thank you, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by thanking the commissioners for holding this hearing and for offering to myself and others the opportunity to testify before you today.

I want to use this opportunity to speak about the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and why it should not be selected for closure and, in fact, should never have been considered for closure.

The Western Pennsylvania Coalition, after identifying multiple errors throughout the data supplied by the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, determined that a closer look at the grading of the criteria was necessary. After analyzing these individual errors, it became clear that

Page 248

the final rankings of the C-130 bases were affected by these mistakes.

The coalition then proceeded to evaluate the standings through the grading and weighing process as used by the Air Force. Criteria 4 and 5 were evaluated through use of the COBRA program, and the results of that analysis will be described in detail by my distinguished colleague, Congressman Mascara, in a few minutes.

I'm going to focus on criteria 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8, ich were evaluated using raw Air Force scores from their lysis and recommendations Volume 5. The results of our dy differed significantly from the Air Force's findings. Many of the identified errors negatively affected these raw scores. We have focused on three of these errors within this study, which I would like to submit for the record at this time.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Those will be admitted in the record. Thank you, sir. Will someone from staff get those, please?

REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE: First, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station received a low rating for the condition of its airfield pavement. This rating was based upon data that

Page 249

is 14 years old. A 1994 study, however, conducted by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency rates the pavement's ability as being capable of handling any aircraft and Air Force inventory.

The second error addressed was the future growth ability and the attainment status of our air quality. Our installation was graded red for its future growth ability and yellow for attainment status. The EPA has reviewed Allegheny County's air quality and reached the conclusion contained in the following quote: "The area attained the ozone standard at this time. Thus, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has no restrictions on its air quality."

The third error I wish to highlight pertains to the environmental impact of this facility. Despite the 911th Air Wing's answer to the BRAC questionnaire, it was graded red for wetlands. A 1994 study by GEONEX reports there are no wetlands apparent at your installation.

Underscoring the credibility of our points is the t that each of these studies was either in progress or e under contract prior to the Air Force BRAC questionnaire ocess which occurred during the spring of '94. Supporting data can be found in the appendices of the study that I have

Page 250

submitted for the record.

By eliminating these errors and using the same analysis, Pittsburgh qualifies for the top ranking for criteria 1, 2, and 8. As you can see, the net effect of these clarifications is quite substantial.

Furthermore, the coalition recognizes the importance of correct data and accurate assessment of that data for your deliberations. Thus, we have also taken the Air Force's grading system one step further in order to evaluate the criteria's rankings fairly and objectively.

Although there are many ways to accomplish this task, we chose the method that weighs each criteria equally and produces a numeric value based upon each of the rankings within each criteria. We believed that this weighted method would yield better results in general, and using the corrected data bodes well for Pittsburgh because of its consistent high rankings across the full range of criteria used by the BRAC.

Commissioners, as you already know and as this study and the corrected COBRA data clearly show, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should not have been on the Department of Defense Closure list and certainly should not

Page 251

be selected for closure.

I want to conclude my testimony by reiterating my thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today and by respectfully requesting that you closely examine the empirical data we have supplied.

Finally, I want to introduce my friend and colleague, Frank Mascara, who will detail the corrected COBRA data and its positive impact on the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Doyle.

And we're delighted to have Representative Frank Mascara. Congressman Mascara.

REPRESENTATIVE MASCARA: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the Commission who has presented me with an opportunity to address the Commission relative to two issues.

First is regarding the Kelly support facility in Oakdale, Pennsylvania; and second, the 911th Airlift Wing. Regarding the Kelly facility, the Army and the DOD were recommending a significant realignment. It is my understanding that because of the questions from the local community and from the Commission, the Army has reviewed its

Page 252

position and is seeking to modify its original recommendation.

Now, the Army is recommending a far less drastic realignment and is not recommending the closure of the exchange and the commissary. If the Army and the DOD have modified their recommendation in that fashion, then I would urge the Commission to approve it. I believe the Army review has proven the worth of the Kelly support facility. It is a great facility with great people. It does the essential work of logistics and maintenance, and it gets the job done.

Now, the 911th Airlift Wing. The COBRA cost data used to arrive at the decision to close the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station was, quite simply, incorrect. Substantial deviations existed on three counts -- incorrect cost data, partial year cost data, and totally missing cost data. Subsequent corrected COBRA runs by the Air Force and your own BRAC analysts have consistently demonstrated that Pittsburgh is the most cost-effective base among C-130 installations on civilian airfields.

The original COBRA analysis also failed to consider savings benefits from MILCON cost avoidance. Of the six installations at civilian airfields, Pittsburgh has the

Page 253

1 lowest projected MILCON over the COBRA analysis period. By
2 contrast, another considered base has projected MILCON 775
3 percent greater than Pittsburgh, money that would largely be
4 spent to needlessly duplicate capabilities already available
5 at Pittsburgh.
6 We believe that Air Force generated COBRA data
7 continues to seriously understate MILCON cost avoidance at
8 some bases. I am presenting corrected Western Pennsylvania
9 Coalition COBRA scenarios results which most accurately
10 reflect time comparison figures, data which, by the way, is
11 agreed with by the BRAC staff.
12 As you heard Congressman Klink -- if he has not
13 testified, you will hear so -- he has correctly explained
14 that the Air Force Reserve presently enjoys military benefits
15 and special facilities at the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station
16 that do not now exist and cannot be duplicated elsewhere
17 without enormous military construction costs.
18 Pittsburgh already has the assets needed to expand
19 its mission at no cost to the United States. These expansion
20 capabilities include additional existing concrete ramp space,
21 an acreage on installation, high capacity tarmac at the
22 adjacent, and a band-in passenger terminal. In all Air Force

Page 254

1 assessments of military value, Pittsburgh rates at or near
2 the top.
3 In summary, commissioners, when corrected COBRA
4 results, military value expansion, capability, recruiting,
5 environmental impact, and community support are considered,
6 Pittsburgh is, without question, the least favorable closure
7 candidate among C-130 bases. This was undoubtedly the
8 Commission's hypothesis at the add-on hearings.
9 Further discovery, investigation, and analysis
10 since then has convincingly validated that conclusion. Most
11 recently, the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall,
12 announced in a letter to Chairman Dixon that inactivation of
13 the Air Force Reserve 130 unit at O'Hare instead of the C-130
14 unit at Pittsburgh is a reasonable alternative.
15 Considering the facts in Pittsburgh's favor and the
16 change in the Air Force position regarding the closure of the
17 911th, the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station should remain open.
18 And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much for
20 that very fine contribution, Representative Frank Mascara.
21 And I understand that members of your delegation are arriving
22 even as I speak.

Page 255

1 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to leave the
2 State of Pennsylvania momentarily and accommodate the
3 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico. And then we're just
4 going to go on Murphy's rules for a little while around here
5 because of the vote in the House.
6 And the Chair is pleased to recognize the
7 distinguished delegate from Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero-
8 Barcello.
9 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we're delighted to have you,
11 Delegate Romero-Barcello.
12 DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you very much.
13 It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
14 the opportunity.
15 First of all, I would like to extend my
16 appreciation to the Commission for allowing me the
17 opportunity to express in person my serious concerns over the
18 proposed closure of Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
19 installation in the whole Caribbean region. And I say
20 "closure" in a deliberate way, because the term "realignment"
21 is a misnomer under the circumstances facing the fort.
22 Although the former Camp Buchanan was originally

Page 256

1 established as a training site for the 65th United States
2 Infantry Regiment in 1923, its role has changed dramatically
3 over the years. The main mission of Fort Buchanan at present
4 is to prepare and assume responsibility for the mobilization
5 of Reserve component forces in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
6 Virgin Islands.
7 The fort also provides administrative and
8 logistical support to active Reserve components of the U.S.
9 Armed Forces in Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, including
10 Puerto Rico Reserve Officers Training Corps, the ROTC. And
11 this includes recruiting services for the Army, the Navy, and
12 the Air Force, as well as providing mobilization support for
13 all Reserve components in case of war.
14 Fort Buchanan also provides support for the
15 planning, the coordination, and the execution of all Army-
16 related counter-terrorism actions on the island.
17 In recent military operations, such as the
18 Operation Desert Shield/Storm, an operation to uphold
19 democracy where Reserve forces and National Guard units have
20 been mobilized, Fort Buchanan as a lead mobilization station
21 has played a key role serving as a support hub to bring
22 together all elements of support, assuring the quick

Page 257

1 validation and the deployment of the mobilized units.
2 Also proven during these operations was the fact
3 that the total Army concept really works, thereby firmly
4 establishing the trend that Reserve component units will
5 continue to be mobilized along with the active component.
6 If Fort Buchanan is closed, where will the support
7 for future mobilizations in Puerto Rico come from? Fort
8 Buchanan is a mobilization station. While its parent
9 installation, Fort MacPherson in Georgia, is solely an
10 administrative support headquarters which has remained in
11 touch by BRAC, to close the Fort Buchanan garrison while
12 maintaining Fort MacPherson does not meet the test to
13 consolidate and economize on military spending.
14 Although the Department of Defense proposal asked
15 for a realignment of Fort Buchanan, this would constitute,
16 for all practical purposes, a closure. In effect, the fort
17 will cease operations as an active Army enclave. All active
18 Army personnel, military and civilian, will leave. All
19 active army functions will cease. All family housing must be
20 abandoned and all morale support activity stopped.
21 If this realignment were to take place, it would
22 result in a potential reduction of at least 500 jobs. The

Page 258

1 Commission is definitely being misled by the figures
2 presented in the Department of Defense Base Closure and
3 Realignment report stating that only 128 jobs would be lost.
4 At this time, Fort Buchanan services 2,486 active
5 duty and civilian personnel. It also serves five sizeable
6 groups, comprising some 73,170 persons who would also be
7 negatively impacted. These five groups include 175 active
8 Guard Reserve personnel and their families, 15,410 Reserve
9 component soldiers, 19,835 family members of Reserve
10 component soldiers, and 13,260 retirees and 34,890 family
11 members of retirees.
12 Fort Buchanan is a symbol of the Department of
13 Defense and the Army's interests in the Caribbean Basin, and
14 its presence brings stability to the region. To realign or
15 close this installation will not only negatively impact on
16 the critical support to the active and Reserve component
17 forces but would also added to the unemployment problem of
18 the island.
19 But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of
20 keeping Fort Buchanan on the active list is that the supposed
21 monetary savings to be achieved by closing the post are
22 highly questionable. The efficiency and combat readiness of

Page 259

Reserve component organizations will certainly suffer. A
bilization of these organizations will eventually take
e at a much higher cost to taxpayers than if Fort
hanan were to be maintained on the active list.
Is it worth risking part of our national security
to allegedly save a few dollars here and there? Will the
Army be able to rapidly and efficiently mobilize our Reserve
component units for a future conflict without Fort Buchanan?
In Puerto Rico, we have the Reserve units and the National
Guard, which are bilingual and very necessary and very
important in the use of any conflict or any military action
in the Caribbean or Central America or even South America.
I believe it is in our best national security
interest that the active Army facilities at Fort Buchanan
remain open, particularly now with the upcoming termination
of the U.S. military presence in Panama under the terms of
the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.
Puerto Rico has a proud and long tradition of
supporting national defense. This has been shown time and
time again as hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, in
spite of their obvious second-class citizenship, have
consistently and promptly answered the nation's call to arms

Page 260

without hesitation.
From the vital defenses of Panama during the First
World War and practically every theater of operations during
the Second World War to the frozen planes of Korea, the
hardships of Vietnam, the interventions in Grenada and Panama
and the sands of the Middle East, Puerto Ricans have been
there and have shed their blood.
Throughout all these operations, Fort Buchanan has
always stood ready to support us and has been a principal
e for mobilization and coordination, particularly for the
nada efforts, for the people who were going to the
eration Desert Shield in the Gulf Coast, for the trainees
that were organized in Puerto Rico. Today more than ever, we
in Puerto Rico stand ready to assume an even greater role in
the Army of the 21st century.
Closing Fort Buchanan, the only active Army
installation in Puerto Rico and the whole Caribbean region,
is certain to lead us in the wrong direction. I strongly
urge you to remove Fort Buchanan from any proposed base
closure list.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Delegate
Romero-Barcello. We appreciate it. Thank you.

Page 261

DELEGATE ROMERO-BARCELLO: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Senator Chaffee, I hate to have to
tell you, we're on Murphy's rules. A House vote interrupted
the Pennsylvania delegation. There are two members who have
returned, and I want to accommodate them, if you will give me
that courtesy. And I appreciate that usual courtesy from my
friend from the great State of Rhode Island.
And we're delighted to honor and recognize
Represent Ron Klink.
REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: I thank the members of the
Commission. I thank Senator Chaffee for also stepping aside
for a few moments. I know that you've heard from some of my
fellow Congressmen. I just wanted to come before you and
again ask for unanimous consent that my entire statement be
permitted into the record.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: And it will be reproduced in the
record in full, Congressman.
REPRESENTATIVE KLINK: Thank you very much. Again,
want to talk on behalf of the 911th Airlift Wing, like the
er members of the Pennsylvania delegation. The 911th, as
're probably aware by now, operates very economically on
about 115 acres of land. It's a tremendous facility that

Page 262

comprises the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.
This is the largest land mass airport in the Mid-
Atlantic and Northeastern part of the United States. And it
is the fourth largest in the entire country. The airport
contains more than 12,000 acres of land, and much of it is
still available for airport-related development.
The Pittsburgh Airport is USAIR's largest hub. It
will handle over 20 million passengers and 450,000 airlift
operations this year alone. Pittsburgh International
Airport, for example, has resources that are not available at
many smaller airfields across this country, three of the most
important services I think the Commission should be available
of because they're provided to the 911th direct benefits that
are offered at practically no cost -- runway construction and
maintenance, aircraft rescue, as well as firefighting.
In the case of field and runway maintenance,
Allegheny County each year allocates $6.5 million for runway
building and upkeep, which includes about 120 personnel on
approximately 30 pieces of snow clearance and removal
equipment valued at about $15 million. When the snow flies,
the operation goes on.
And, in fact, we will tell you that over the past

Page 263

12 years, not one minute has been lost in takeoffs and
landings at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport because
of snow and ice. The airport's all-weather capability, in my
view, is a very strong selling point, and these runways are
available to the 911th Airlift Wing.
This is something that is greatly in their favor.
Currently, the airlift wing operates on four runways at
Greater Pittsburgh. And this runway length runs from 8,100
feet to 11,500 feet. And even more significant is the fact
that the airport has the ability to build two additional
runways, a northern parallel one and a southern parallel one,
without the need to purchase a single additional acre of
land.
Currently, the ability exists to handle
simultaneous arrivals and departures on runways 28R and 28L
when the southern parallel is built. It is next slated
runway construction with environmental review underway with
proposed construction in 1998.
The airport will have the capability for
simultaneous triple arrivals and departures. Only
Dallas/Fort Worth and the new Denver International Airports
can perform this type of sequence. Such rapid deployment is

Page 264

not possible on a runway operation. If you blow a tire on
one runway airport, you're out of business. You shut down.
At Pittsburgh, if this happens, you move to runway 2. You
move then to runway 3 or 4 or the fifth runway.
The cost of constructing new runway space can be
15,000 to $20,000 per running foot of 24-inch thick concrete
or anywhere from 150 million to 250 million for an 8,500 foot
runway. This is a cost that neither the 911th nor the
federal government has to bear. It is being absorbed by the
locality.
All of the land and expansion capabilities that
have been mentioned are currently being leased from Allegheny
County for $1 per year. The 911th Air Wing has a compact and
efficient infrastructure. All the facilities and buildings
are well maintained. In February of 1994, the 911th Air Wing
signed a memorandum of agreement with Allegheny County to
utilize 21.7 acres of land.
Additionally, the county has offered 30 acres of
prime ready ramp space to the Air Force in 1994. And
recently, Allegheny County offered an additional 47 acres of
concrete ramp space adjacent to the existing ramp at no cost
to the Air Force. The Air Force is not required to possess

Page 265

1 nor maintain this valuable acreage. It will be held in
2 escrow for future Air Force utilization. And again, it will
3 be held at no cost.
4 This is a unique arrangement. It should not be
5 overlooked by the Commission when they're considering what to
6 do. This offer is the outcome of a $500,000 study that was
7 begun back in 1983 and in 1988 at the 911th Air Lift Wing
8 Base at their comprehensive plan. The exceptional capacity
9 and capability of the 911th to accommodate contingency
10 mobilization and future total requirements are demonstrated
11 in the comprehensive summary that was submitted to the
12 Commission.
13 I will try to wrap up by just saying that I would
14 like you to also if you haven't done so thus far to also
15 submit to the record the letter that was written by the
16 Secretary of the Air Force Widnall, that states unequivocally
17 that the deactivation of the C-130 Reserve unit at Chicago's
18 O'Hare Airport, rather than the 911th in Pittsburgh, is more
19 cost-effective. And I would ask that that be submitted for
20 the record. And I thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
22 Congressman Klink.

Page 266

1 And we now call upon your distinguished colleague,
2 Representative Kurt Weldon.
3 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
4 also ask unanimous consent to insert my system in the record.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And may I say to you, Congressman,
6 Weldon, that request is granted. Now, we do recognize that
7 two members of your delegation have been prevented from
8 speaking because of the roll call. They are welcome to come
9 tonight. I regret to say it will be after 7 o'clock,
10 Congressman.
11 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I'll pass the word to them.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're very kind. I hope you
13 understand the problem with the Chair.
14 REPRESENTATIVE WELDON: I do. Mr. Chairman, we
15 thank you for your leadership and the leadership of the
16 members of the Commission. I come today as a five-term
17 member of the National Security Committee, as an original
18 supporter of the BRAC process, and as chairman of the
19 Research and Development Subcommittee on the National
20 Security Committee in this Congress.
21 But I also come as a former teacher to give you a
22 report card, Mr. Chairman, in three areas. The three areas

Page 267

1 of interest that I have, I would give you an A, an
2 incomplete, and an F. The A, Mr. Chairman, is for the
3 recommendation of DOD and the Commission's acceptance of a
4 recommendation to consolidate machinery operations from
5 Annapolis to Philadelphia.
6 The former NAVSES operation, now Naval Surface
7 Warfare Center operation in Philadelphia, has become a crown
8 jewel of Navy surface ship engineering work. It makes sense,
9 it's logical, and it will save us a significant amount of
10 money.
11 For that, I give DOD and the Commission an A for
12 its foresight and would hope that you would follow through on
13 that recommendation. It's the direction that Congress is
14 going in in terms of consolidation. And as chairman of the
15 Research and Development Committee, I think it makes sense.
16 The second proposal I would like to talk about, I
17 give you an incomplete because you have not yet taken action,
18 even though it has been brought up by several of my
19 colleagues. And that is to continue Naval consolidation into
20 the NSWC at Philadelphia as it relates to machinery
21 operations. And this would consolidate NAVSEA's engineering
22 directorate for machinery systems, the 03 operation into

Page 268

1 Philadelphia, eliminating unnecessary duplication.
2 By fully integrating ship systems, life cycle
3 management, and in-service engineering into a cohesive
4 organization, the cost of designing and introducing new
5 systems into the fleet will be greatly reduced.
6 This proposal, Mr. Chairman, which has the support
7 of former Navy Secretaries John Lehman, as well as Shaun
8 O'Keefe, would save $165 million over 20 years, compared to
9 only $10 million in savings which would be realized if you
10 locate the 03 directorate at the Washington Navy Yard, as now
11 proposed. The Crystal City operation, in my opinion, should
12 be moved to Philadelphia. It will be logical, it will save
13 the Navy money, and I think would be more consistent in terms
14 of our future direction in regards to consolidations.
15 Let me give you my third area, Mr. Chairman. And
16 for that, I have to give you an F. Not you personally, but
17 the Commission. Because for the nine years that I've been in
18 Congress, I've been the only member coming before you trying
19 to close the facility. And each year, you've rejected me.
20 As a matter of fact, this year, the Commission did
21 not even consider my request, despite the support of the city
22 where the facility is housed, the county government that has

Page 269

1 gone on record, and all of the people in the area, we still
2 have an Army operation operating Naval tugs, Naval seagoing
3 tugs. To me, that's outrageous.
4 As a strong supporter of the military and a strong
5 supporter of defense, as a nine-year member of the committee
6 and as chairman of the R&D Committee, I think this Commission
7 is doing this country a disservice by not closing a facility
8 that's in my old hometown where I happen to be the mayor. We
9 have requested it. This year, you didn't look at it.
10 So while I give you an A for the one proposal, an
11 incomplete for the second, you fail in the third. That's a
12 shame, because your failure is a failure to the taxpayers.
13 It is unnecessary, it is an operation where the Reserve
14 officers there are protecting their own little operation and
15 little place along the Delaware River which is not necessary.
16 And I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, in your deliberations to
17 go back and look at this again.
18 Because I commit to you as a member of the National
19 Security Committee, I'm going to continue to pursue why the
20 Army has to have ocean-going tugs, when we have a fully
21 equipped Navy, which I'm a big supporter of, when we have the
22 necessary potential to meet any need that we have on the

Page 270

1 seas, and why we still have to have the Army operating ocean-
2 going tugs is beside me.
3 But the two consolidations at Philadelphia do make
4 sense. They are not in my Congressional district. They make
5 sense because they are right for the Navy.
6 As someone who voted for BRAC, in spite of knowing
7 that the Philadelphia Navy Yard was a possible candidate for
8 closure, these two consolidations make sense for the
9 taxpayers. They make sense for the Navy. They make sense
10 for the people of the region. They are right, they are
11 logical, and they will allow us to better utilize the
12 shrinking defense dollars that we're fighting on the floor to
13 keep in place at this very time working on the House National
14 Security legislation.
15 I thank you for your time. I thank you for your
16 indulgence in allowing me to come back. And I would hope
17 that when I come back the next time, that report card can be
18 switched to all As, and I can announce as a former teacher
19 that you've passed with flying colors. Thank you, Mr.
20 Chairman.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you, Congressman
22 Weldon. And I am properly chastised as Chair. But I'm going

Page 271

give you an A anyway, because you did your job within five minutes, and only three in your delegation did. You get an Congressman Weldon, a solid A.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, this isn't very funny work, I know, but maybe I've been sitting here too long. I'm going to turn the Chair over to my distinguished colleague, Commissioner Al Cornella, for the Rhode Island and Tennessee delegations.

And I've been asked to announce that my old friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island, Senator Pell, as Senator Chaffee knows, is attending a funeral for his friend and my own friend, former Secretary of Defense and our former colleague, Les Aspin, a memorial service for him, I should say. And we understand that, and we're going to hear Senator Clayburn Pell later in the day.

And it's my delight to recognize an old friend, Senator John Chaffee. I hope he'll understand that I have to excuse myself for a few minutes.

SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you very much, Senator Dixon and members of the Commission. First of all, I want to thank you for the service to our nation that you're giving in this very, very difficult task.

Page 272

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission today to present my testimony on the 1995 round of Defense Base Closures. I'll summarize my full statement and would like to have it placed in the record.

My testimony will be somewhat different from what you usually hear, because I give you good news. I support all the recommendations that affect us in Rhode Island, three in all, dealing with the Navy's presence in Newport. These recommendations, of course, came from the Defense Department. and as I mentioned, I supported each one of them.

First is the proposed consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Centers that are currently one in Newport, one in New London. The proposal is they be consolidated in Newport. I'm for that. I'm convinced the Newport laboratories constitute an irreplaceable, state-of-the-art facility.

Its upgrading in 1991 -- this is the facility in Newport -- to a super lab status enhanced its reputation which it had already earned as a center of excellence in submarine research and development. The center is well-prepared to increase its contribution to national security. In fact, a $12 million laboratory was just opened in January,

Page 273

and two more major labs, one costing 11.2 million, the other costing 21.7 million, are under construction and scheduled to open in 1996.

These last two facilities are being built specifically to accommodate the BRAC '91 and the BRAC '95 influx of personnel and their activities from New London over to Newport. Consolidation of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport will save DOD scarce resources by eliminating excess capacity and achieving efficiencies.

The 1991 action already appears well on its way to reducing costs, and the Navy estimates the 1995 transfer will result in further savings of $91.2 million over 20 years.

For the reasons cited above, I urge you to approve the Navy's proposal to consolidate the Naval Underwater Warfare Center's New London detachment into the Newport headquarters.

Second, the Navy has recommended the relocation of the Naval Research Laboratory Underwater Sound Reference Detachment currently in Orlando, Florida, moving to Newport. This proposal will achieve savings of 30.1 million over 20 years and will further strengthen the Navy's undersea research and development effort. I heartily endorse that.

Page 274

Third, I would like to address the Navy's recommendation to transfer the Naval Technical Training Center in Meridian, Mississippi, some to Athens, Georgia, and some to Newport's Naval Education Training Center. In advancing this proposal, the Navy seeks to streamline its operations and achieve savings by moving several administrative schools from Meridian to Newport.

The Naval Education and Training Center at Newport has long maintained a sterling reputation. It consists of institutions such as the Naval War College, the Surface Warfare Officers' School, and many others which have provided the fleet with the best educated, highest quality personnel. The learning environment of the Naval Education and Training Center in Newport is ideal for incorporation of the administrative schools at Meridian.

Its classrooms in Newport are modern, housing is plentiful, and the community will welcome students with open arms. The move of this center to Newport will achieve needed cost savings. Annual reoccurring savings after implementation of the Naval air station Meridian, a closing of the total facility at Meridian, is $26.9 million, with net savings over 20 years of 344 million. That isn't all the

Page 275

part that's going to Newport. That's the complete closure of the facility at Meridian.

For all these reasons, I urge the Commission to approve the Navy's proposed transfer of the Naval Technical Training Center in Meridian to Athens and to Newport. Again, I would like to thank the Commission for allowing me to appear today to give this testimony. Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA [Presiding]: Thank you, sir. We thank the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Senator John Chaffee.

SENATOR CHAFFEE: Thank you. And I came in under time.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: And we appreciate that. We'll move now to Representative Jack Reed.

REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address the Commission and for your work on behalf of the country and our defense.

I have a prepared statement which I would like to submit and summarize that statement for the benefit of the commissioners.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We would be glad to enter

Page 276

that into the record.

REPRESENTATIVE REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I rise in support along with my colleagues of the proposals the Department of the Defense and Department of the Navy to consolidate facilities in Newport, Rhode Island. This is a continuation of policies that have been in effect for several years.

It makes sense in terms of cost-effectiveness, it makes sense in terms of the availability of the intellectual capital we have built up in terms of scientists and researchers and technicians in Newport. It also makes sense in terms of the physical facilities at Newport, which will readily accommodate all of these proposed transfers.

This is the type of, I think, sensible program and programmatic changes that will strengthen our defense and also save the taxpayers valuable dollars. Newport has long been a center of research and Naval education. This proposal will enhance that center and that ability to educate our Navy and to provide the research we need as we face a technological revolution in warfare over the next several decades.

One other point I would like to add is that in

Page 277

1 terms of the human factors involved in some of these
2 consolidations, it's always very difficult because people
3 have attachments to localities, it's disruptive of the lives
4 of people to move. But particularly with respect to New
5 London and to Newport, my district sits squarely between the
6 two communities.
7 I have many people who live in my district and work
8 in New London or work in Newport and vice versa. And I think
9 this proposal not only will be sensible in terms of the
10 bottom line to the Navy and the mission of the Navy, but it
11 will be something that will accommodate in the easiest way
12 the lives and the futures of all the personnel that are
13 proposed to move.
14 So I would urge the Commission to support these
15 proposals, continue the consolidation of Naval underwater
16 research and testing and evaluation at Newport. It will be
17 in the best interest of the nation, and it will be in the
18 best interest of our taxpayers. And I thank the
19 commissioners for their efforts.
20 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Representative
21 Reed.
22 Representative Patrick Kennedy.

Page 278

1 REPRESENTATIVE KENNEDY: Mr. Chairman, members of
2 the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to testify along
3 with my colleagues from the Rhode Island delegation in
4 support of the Department of Defense Base Closure and
5 Realignment recommendations for the Naval Undersea Warfare
6 Center and the Naval Education Training Center, both located
7 in Newport, Rhode Island.
8 I realize that yesterday, the Commission heard a
9 day of testimony and today will continue to hear testimony
10 well into this evening, so I'll make my remarks brief. The
11 U.S. Navy has a long and rich history in Newport, Rhode
12 Island. Throughout that history, from the Revolutionary War
13 onward to this present day, the local community has actively
14 and vigorously supported a strong Naval presence in Rhode
15 Island.
16 Currently, the Navy is the largest single employer
17 in Newport County. And I am proud to say that the Navy
18 personnel, both military and civilian, play an integral role
19 in the community. It is in that vein and in that view that I
20 am pleased to represent the spirit of the Newport County
21 community and voice my support for the recommendations in the
22 BRAC '95.

Page 279

1 As you are well aware, DOD BRAC '95 recommendations
2 for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center built upon the previous
3 BRAC decisions. If the BRAC '95 recommendations are
4 implemented, they will complete the realignment of the Naval
5 underwater research and development and test and evaluation
6 functions in Newport.
7 The recommendations to consolidate undersea warfare
8 functions at Newport are consistent with the Navy's goals of
9 geographically consolidating compatible RDTE facilities,
10 interacting technical capabilities and resources, and
11 decreasing infrastructure and operating costs while at the
12 same time increasing the military value of those activities
13 not selected for closure.
14 Finally, I respectfully request that the Commission
15 support the incorporation of various Naval air training
16 activities at the Naval Education Training Center in Newport,
17 the Navy's premiere training site for officers, officer
18 candidates, senior enlisted personnel, and prospective
19 midshipmen. Such a realignment would result in a significant
20 return on investment in both the relatively short term, as
21 well as the long-term basis.
22 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe

Page 280

1 the DOD recommendations represent a win-win situation, as has
2 been said by my colleagues. They're cost-effective measures
3 and in the best interests of both the taxpayers, as well as
4 our military.
5 Having visited these facilities every weekend since
6 I've first been elected, I can tell you that the proximity of
7 the Naval Education Training Center with the Naval Undersea
8 Warfare Center next to the Naval War College is tremendous
9 and will only be enhanced by these BRAC recommendations.
10 There is compatibility and synergy because of their
11 collocation.
12 And, as I said before, Newport's proud of its
13 tradition of supporting the Navy. The whole community is
14 very actively anxious to facilitate in this process, and they
15 have the expertise to do so. I might add, the Chamber of
16 Commerce in Newport, as well as other retired military
17 personnel, are all active in preparing any of the movement
18 that needs to take place as a result of these
19 recommendations, so it's easy to make.
20 We have even got the superintendents of local
21 schools participating on this to show their interest in
22 making sure that the families have a quality of life that

Page 281

1 will be fitting for them in Newport. And, as you know,
2 quality of life is the number one issue, as recommended by
3 Defense Secretary Perry. And I think that in that spirit,
4 these recommendations should be implemented and would ask for
5 that consideration. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Kennedy.
8 And we thank the delegation from Rhode Island for
9 their testimony and also staying within the time limits. As
10 long as we're giving out grades here today, we'll give you an
11 A plus for that.
12 We'll now move on to the great State of Tennessee.
13 First to testify, the distinguished Senator, Bill Frist.
14 SENATOR FRIST: Mr. Chairman, commissioners, thank
15 you for this opportunity to testify in support of the defense
16 depot in Memphis, Tennessee.
17 Mr. Chairman, as I hope the testimony given today
18 by myself and my colleagues will demonstrate, the Memphis
19 depot is critical to the efficient and effective distribution
20 of material to our nation's armed forces, so critical, in
21 fact, that I believe the Defense Logistics Agency will not be
22 able to meet its distribution requirements in times of war or

Page 282

1 contingency operations if the current plan to disestablish
2 the Memphis depot is upheld.
3 Mr. Chairman, under the current plan, the DLA will
4 distribute and store military supplies through two primary
5 distribution sites, one on the Atlantic Coast and one on the
6 Pacific Coast. However, such a plan leaves a vast and
7 disturbing gap in coverage and in service for the Central
8 United States.
9 Moreover, as was dramatically demonstrated during
10 the Persian Gulf War, coastal PDS sites cannot support CONUS
11 facilities as efficiently as can a centrally located
12 distribution site. During both Operation Desert Shield and
13 Operation Desert Storm, goods shipped from the coast are
14 backed up almost to the point of gridlock, to use Admiral
15 Straw's word, while DDMT experienced no difficulty at all in
16 getting its goods shipped to military users.
17 In fact, not only was the Memphis depot ranked
18 number one in materiel support for our nation's fighting
19 forces in the Gulf, but it has subsequently participated in
20 every major military and humanitarian mission undertaken by
21 the Department of Defense. DDMT is the closest depot to the
22 largest concentration of our military forces, and 10 of the

Page 283

1 [illegible] 15 water ports in the United States are located on the
2 [illegible] of Mexico in close proximity to DDMT.
3 Not only does it have the ability to support the
4 [illegible]uthern hemisphere and the rest of the Western world, which
5 is more prone to multiple insurgencies, but it is a primary
6 distribution site and third partner to the coastal DLA depots
7 which service the European and Pacific Rim outport
8 requirements.
9 Mr. Chairman, by both quantitative and qualitative
10 measures, DDMT is superior and is more accessible than the
11 other depots. Thanks to its centralized location and depot
12 capabilities, DDMT provides truck services to 115 U.S.
13 installations of 100 persons or more. It has the ability to
14 outreach and service by truck 66 percent of active duty CONUS
15 military personnel within 48 hours. And 700,000 troops, or
16 42 percent of all CONUS based military personnel, can be
17 supported within a 24-hour period.
18 In terms of transportation infrastructure, the
19 Memphis depot is also unparalleled. This is demonstrated by
20 the fact that many major national and international
21 corporations have moved their distribution centers to Memphis
22 in recent years. Not only located on both East-West, as well

Page 284

1 as North-South interstates, it is home to over 200 trucking
2 companies.
3 It sits at the crossroads of 6 class I railroads --
4 6 railroads -- with 96 freight trains arriving and departing
5 daily. And it has unrivaled intermodal capability. It
6 boasts the world's second largest cargo airport, the second
7 largest in the world, with 9 airlines, 44 carriers. And
8 unlike Susquehanna, which was closed for 22 days last year
9 [illegible]cause of inclement weather, it has minimal constraints
10 [illegible]osed by weather conditions.
11 It also has two military air terminals. As
12 [illegible]merica's second largest inland port, with three harbors that
13 handle 11 million tons of cargo annually, Memphis is home to
14 six commercial barge lines and can accommodate ocean-going
15 ships 10 months of every year.
16 Mr. Chairman, the Defense Logistics Agency's
17 coastal PDS strategy has the advantage of simplicity. This
18 approach might even be adequate, were the DLA a commercial
19 entity that only has to meet the usual demands and deadlines
20 of commercial traffic. However, the DLA is not a commercial
21 entity, but rather the one agency responsible for supplying
22 America's fighting forces in times of peace, as well as times

Page 285

1 of war.
2 At such times, the movement of materiel both within
3 the U.S. and across the globe is critical. We must be
4 absolutely certain that the depot that is chosen can support
5 our military forces, and that is why I ask you to reconsider
6 the decision to disestablish the defense distribution depot
7 in Memphis, Tennessee.
8 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and yield
9 to my colleague, Senator Thompson.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator, thank you for your
11 testimony.
12 We now call Senator Thompson.
13 SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, members of the
14 Commission, obviously, we're dealing here with a subject much
15 more important than even impact to the community or to the
16 jobs that are involved. We're dealing with a matter of
17 national defense and national security. And that's why I
18 [illegible]plaud the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Base
19 [illegible]ure and Realignment Commission to streamline our nation's
20 [illegible]nse system.
21 I must point out that the closure of the defense
22 distribution depot in Memphis would hurt, not help, our

Page 286

1 country's defense structure. As my colleagues will tell you,
2 Memphis and DDMT have the things that are needed when it
3 comes to serving our troops in emergency operations in the
4 field and at home.
5 From World War II to Desert Storm, the Memphis
6 depot has a proven record of service and continues to provide
7 top support to our men and women in uniform. It has
8 accomplished this through DDMT's modern, highly automated and
9 integrated facility. Goods are delivered efficiently
10 because, as many national and international companies know,
11 Memphis's excellent transportation system and central
12 location have helped make it America's distribution center.
13 At a time when the private sector finds Memphis
14 such an appealing place to set its business, why is the
15 Defense Department recommending that one of its prime
16 logistics centers be closed in a city with such assets? Part
17 of DOD's recommendations entail lessening the amount of
18 capacity in its storage system. As its closure list stands,
19 there would be a 22 million cubit foot shortfall in storage
20 requirements.
21 The Defense Logistics Agency has stated that the
22 Air Force Logistics Centers, the ALCs, coupled with direct

Page 287

1 vendor delivery, would make up that shortfall. As you know,
2 the Air Force never addressed the need to close any of its
3 maintenance depots or ALCs, and the Commission is presently
4 examining their role in future military operations.
5 This calls into question DLA's reliance on this
6 space, especially if any of the air logistics centers are
7 closed. If any of the centers are closed, then DLA will need
8 more storage capacity. The closure of even the smallest ALC
9 will result in a 17.8 million cubit foot shortfall in the
10 Defense Department storage of the materiel handling capacity.
11 Only a depot like DDMT can fulfill the requirement
12 for storage space and materiel handling facilities that DOD
13 will need. The Memphis depot's transportation assets and
14 central location are exceptional in comparison with any other
15 DLA facility. Even though DLA claims that its movements
16 toward a direct vendor delivery system will help facilitate
17 many of its future capacity needs, this system has never been
18 proven in wartime.
19 In fact, most vendors are small- to medium-sized
20 businesses which do not have a wide range of transportation
21 capabilities. Most vendors also do not have the warehousing
22 abilities that the depot system provides. Distribution depot

Page 288

1 Memphis is a vital link between contractors and soldiers for
2 the vendors who cannot ship directly to the troops.
3 While direct vendor delivery is an option for
4 distributing goods to our military men and women, the
5 customers -- that is, our American troops -- could be placed
6 in jeopardy if a direct vendor system were fully in place.
7 DLA has observed that this could be a problem and that an
8 intermediary depot would be required to meet our military
9 needs.
10 In summary, I ask the Commission to reconsider
11 fully Air Force and DLA's base closure procedures. There
12 appear to be many shortcomings, and the timely delivery of
13 military supplies could be threatened. It must be made clear
14 that the Memphis depot is the only DLA depot that has a
15 wealth of modern automated facilities, central location, and
16 exceptional transportation assets to meet the needs of our
17 military and other emergency operations.
18 And I believe that points out the uniqueness of
19 this situation. We're very well aware of the appeals that
20 are made before this Commission and the exceptions that are
21 pointed out. But here, we do have a unique situation. We
22 ask that this not be lost in the shuffle. Whether you're

Page 289

1 looking at matters of transportation or location or
2 automation, this facility is a unique facility.
3 It was the Memphis depot and its 1,300 employees,
4 many of whom or some of whom are here today, that would be,
5 frankly, disproportionately affected as minority employees if
6 this closure goes through. These employees have helped ship
7 supplies to relieve workers in Oklahoma City the day of the
8 federal building bombing disaster.
9 During Operation Desert Storm, it was DDMT that was
10 the number one shipper of supplies to our troops in the
11 Persian Gulf. DDMT must be retained, because during war and
12 peace, it has a proven record of serving men and women in the
13 military and the people of this country, and closing it will
14 mean the loss of a valuable resource for this nation.
15 I thank you for the opportunity that we have to
16 present this case and ask you to consider these points ahead,
17 as I know you will, as the Commission formulates its final
18 list for the President. Thank you very much.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Senator Thompson, we thank
20 you for your excellent testimony.
21 And we now welcome Representative Harold Ford.
22 REPRESENTATIVE FORD: Thank you very much, Mr.

Page 290

1 Chairman and the members of the BRAC Commission. I
2 appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues from
3 Tennessee to make this case of the defense distribution depot
4 in Memphis.
5 I want to express my appreciation to the
6 commissioners and the staff. Everybody has been courteous
7 and certainly have been accommodating throughout this whole
8 process.
9 I particularly would like to thank Commissioner
10 Kling, who visited the site in Memphis, and would also like
11 to take the opportunity to thank Chairman Dixon and to
12 Commissioner Steele, Commissioner Cornella, along with
13 Commissioner Cox for taking time to meet with us and talk
14 about some of the problems that we see and the things that we
15 wanted to highlight in Memphis.
16 Our two Senators making compelling arguments who
17 have already testified before your Commission today about the
18 depot's strategic geographic location, unmatched
19 transportation infrastructure, and the importance of
20 maintaining the depot to fill the anticipated shortfalls in
21 storage capacity in the DOD distribution system, it is a
22 pleasure for us to testify, but it is very critical for us in

Page 291

1 the Tennessee area and those of us who live in the mid-South
2 area of Memphis.
3 Senators Thompson and Frist have explained in the
4 clearest terms the potential negative impact that closure of
5 the depot will have on the Department of Defense and its
6 distribution system.
7 I would like to cover another important area. That
8 is, the rationale behind the DLA's closure recommendation.
9 Before I do that, let me say that I am the Congressman from
10 the area that this defense base is located, and I am
11 extremely concerned about the economic impact that this
12 closure would have on the Memphis community. And I would
13 urge the Commission members to be sensitive to the adverse
14 impact of the closure in the workforce that we have in the
15 Memphis area.
16 The primary issue that I would like to address
17 today is the rationale behind the closure recommendation.
18 The Defense Logistics Agency has taken great pains to point
19 out that its decision to close DDMT was the result of an
20 evaluation of a continuation of factors called "BRAC
21 evaluation tools." And I believe a fresh look at DLA's own
22 BRAC evaluation tools will reveal that defense depot should

Page 292

1 remain open in Memphis, Tennessee.
2 These tools include military value, DOD force
3 structure plan, concept operations, joint service decisions,
4 and excess capacity. The first factor is military value. By
5 DLA's own analysis, Memphis was ranked third in military
6 value among stand-alone depots. However, DLA chose to
7 disregard DDMT's high military value ranking in favor of an
8 installation analysis which is of questionable merit.
9 DOD logistics strategic plan states that
10 transportation, not storage capacity, is critical military
11 value factor. And, as you have heard, DDMT is located in the
12 industry accepted transportation capital of the U.S. and
13 basically the world. Why, therefore, was DLA military
14 analysis structured to ensure that DDMT receive only 20 out
15 of 2,000 possible points for transportation resources?
16 The DLA's concept of operation requires that it
17 will be able to support two major regional conflicts by using
18 both coasts. Prior to BRAC '95, defense depot Memphis was
19 the primary war-fighting depot during the only major conflict
20 in Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm. Today, DLA has not
21 included a mobilization plan to determine how it would
22 provide without the capabilities provided by the DDMT in

Page 293

1 Memphis.
2 With respect to joint service decisions and excess
3 capacity, even though the DLA negotiated with the Air Force
4 and Navy for extra storage space, DLA has admitted there will
5 be a shortfall as a result of the closure of a maintenance
6 depot. And I believe that the shortfall requires DLA to
7 reassess its future capacity requirements in whether or not
8 it can afford the closure of a stand-alone depot like
9 Memphis, Tennessee.
10 In conclusion, members of the Commission, Mr.
11 Chairman, I ask that you and the Commission members go beyond
12 the mere cost considerations in your decisions on our defense
13 distribution system.
14 I ask that you consider the human and economic
15 consequences of displacing a community with
16 disproportionately high unemployment rates as important as
17 the Commission will make these decisions to make sure that
18 during wartime and peacetime, that the Department of Defense
19 and the Pentagon will have those logistics centers that can
20 meet the need and the building that will require the military
21 defense. Thank you.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman

Page 294

1 Ford.
2 And we welcome Representative Ed Bryant.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BRYANT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
4 and other members of the Commission. I appreciate very much
5 the opportunity along with the rest of the Tennessee
6 delegation to speak to this Commission.
7 My district does not include the Memphis depot.
8 However, as a former Army veteran and as a representative of
9 the area next to the depot, I am very much of one community
10 with Congressman Ford in urging this committee to relook at
11 their decision in closing the Memphis depot.
12 Memphis, in our opinion, is the most cost-effective
13 stand-alone depot in the nation and the Defense Department.
14 I am resolute in my belief that the important fact cannot and
15 must not be ignored by anyone through the remainder of the
16 process in the weeks ahead. Mr. Chairman, I believe our
17 performance in Memphis in carrying out our intricate mission
18 for our military is indicative of its importance for the
19 Defense Department and the security needs of America.
20 I think it would be accurate to say that Memphis
21 has strengthened our military effectiveness and readiness. I
22 would like to just pick up, if I could, and skip over a

Page 295

1 couple of comments. I know I've got a little bit shorter
2 [illegible]. But I wanted to follow up on Senator Thompson's
3 [illegible]ments about the idea of the concept of direct vendor
4 [illegible]em.
5 Mr. Chairman, I would question the efficiency and
6 the effectiveness of such a system envisioned to supposedly
7 supplant the already proven distribution process in Memphis.
8 In essence, the direct vendor system could very well be a
9 scatter shot approach for an operation which requires
10 organization, timeliness, and efficiency. And I have grave
11 concerns about this concept.
12 I also don't believe our military effectiveness
13 should be gambled -- our readiness should be gambled and our
14 security of our country in an effort to save money through
15 this type of concept. I would also like to point out the
16 fact that Memphis -- and follow up to what the Congressman
17 has said -- has gained an outstanding reputation as a
18 nationwide distribution center.
19 And I know this Commission has heard this before,
20 but I'll put aside my notes and just talk to you briefly
21 about this. Last week, I had the privilege of attending
22 another national corporation's grand opening in Memphis in

Page 296

1 Shelby County of a distribution center. And Memphis has
2 proven itself over the years through its railway system, its
3 highway system, its waterway system.
4 And now, with the addition of Federal Express, we
5 have that unique ability to place orders and get supplies out
6 by midnight the night before and delivered the next day,
7 which I don't think any other depot in this country has. And
8 because of our central location to either coast, we're able
9 to meet the needs of any contingent in any war anyplace in
10 [illegible] world, I think, better than any other department and
11 [illegible]ot in this nation.
12 And it begs the question, I think -- it's something
13 of concern I've always had, when I sit back as a Congressman
14 from this district and see America's best industries,
15 America's best companies coming to Memphis and recognizing it
16 as a distribution center and yet I see my very own government
17 moving away from Memphis. And I think that's an important
18 issue. I think that would be a good example for us to look
19 at as we make this decision.
20 I would urge this Commission, in summary, to look
21 at these issues of location, proven effectiveness, the
22 caliber of work that we have already done for this country,

Page 297

1 and I ask you to seriously reconsider your decision to close
2 the Memphis depot. And I would again thank you on behalf of
3 our delegation. Thank you.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you very much.
5 As long as we have most of the people here from
6 Texas, I would like to open with a comment that we will try
7 to hold all testimony to five minutes. We have over 200
8 members of Congress testifying before us.
9 And with that, I will begin with the senior Senator
10 from Texas, Senator Phil Gramm.
11 SENATOR GRAMM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
12 Chairman, let me repeat to you what I said in Fort Worth this
13 weekend. And that is, your work is critically important. I
14 congratulate each of you for your willingness to serve. And
15 I'm confident that you're going to do your best to try to
16 make a determination as to what is in the country's interest
17 and that you're going to be fair in each and every case that
18 you deal with.
19 I've got a short time. I want to touch on just a
20 [illegible] key points. First of all, in terms of Red River Army
21 [illegible]pot, I believe that credible evidence has been presented to
22 question whether or not one heavy depot can do all the

Page 298

1 peacetime work in the Army. I think there is a very serious
2 question as to whether one heavy depot can meet a wartime
3 surge and, as a result of that question, and even if you were
4 looking at only it alone, I think the Red River Army Depot
5 should not be closed.
6 I could outline the fact that it won the
7 President's Quality Award this year. The economic impact at
8 Red River Army Depot would be larger than any other proposed
9 closing on your list. I'm confident when you look at all
10 those things, it's going to stay open.
11 I support the single siding of the T-45 in Corpus
12 Christi. I support unifying the mine warfare helicopters.
13 And I also agree with those who say that there is room to
14 continue the T-44 training at Corpus Christi.
15 In terms of Reese Air Force Base, I think if you
16 look at the factors that are critical to pilot training in
17 the Air Force, that Reese stacks up well. Secondly, I want
18 to urge you to look not just at air space today, but the
19 relevant question is, what is air space going to look like 20
20 years from now. When you look at that, the argument for
21 Reese skyrockets.
22 Finally, Reese has a major university, a major

Page 299

1 city. The quality of life there, the access to education and
2 jobs for spouses is, I think, very strong.
3 In terms of Kelly Air Force Base, Kelly is the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest labor productivity, and in
5 terms of the quality of workmanship, the number one logistics
6 center in the Air Force. I mentioned in Fort Worth this
7 weekend that the commodity-based comparison makes absolutely
8 no sense economically, and I want to urge you to challenge it
9 and reject it. I am confident if you do, that you're going
10 to keep Kelly open.
11 Finally, the biggest surprise on the base closing
12 list to me was Brooks Air Force Base. Long ago, we should
13 have turned this into a scientific center. It has facilities
14 that are very specialized. It does all the drug testing for
15 the military. It is basically a science and research center.
16 It has brand-new facilities.
17 It seems to me that operating in Military City, USA
18 under a contonement plan where it is basically run out of
19 Kelly, that we can save tens of millions of dollars by
20 keeping this facility open, limiting its function to
21 research, having it supervised out of Kelly.
22 And I want to remind you that you're dealing with

Page 300

1 Ph.D.s, with scientists, who are not simply going to get up
2 and leave the research center in San Antonio. Many of them
3 are going to refuse to move. And I think if you look at this
4 decision on Kelly, you're going to conclude that it was the
5 poorest decision that was made in the whole base closing
6 recommendation.
7 A final point. Our love affair in Texas with our
8 military bases didn't happen the day that they went on the
9 Base Closing Commission list. Texans have always believed in
10 a strong defense. We have always been supportive of defense.
11 We want to continue to play a leadership role. We ask you to
12 look at the arguments that we have made to make a judgement
13 on the merits.
14 And we're confident that when that judgement is
15 made, that Kelly is going to be kept open, that Brooks is
16 going to be kept open, that Red River Army Depot is going to
17 be kept open.
18 And we believe that if you will look 20 years into
19 the future at air space, if you will look at quality of life,
20 which is not a major factor, but it's a significant factor,
21 and if you will compare Reese on those factors that are
22 important to the function Reese performs, pilot training in

Page 301

1 the Air Force, that Reese will also stay open.
2 I want to thank the committee for their
3 consideration and thank you for the good work you're doing.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator Gramm.
5 And now, we call Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson.
6 SENATOR HUTCHINSON: I certainly appreciate the
7 opportunity to be here with you again. Since I only saw you
8 three days ago, I'm tempted to say, we have got to stop
9 meeting like this. Since I'm your 167th witness in two days,
10 I know you would agree.
11 I want to talk briefly about our Texas bases. The
12 capacity and quality of Laughlin Air Force Base makes it the
13 Air Force's premiere undergraduate pilot training base. And
14 its location will make it remain forever so in the entire
15 United States.
16 Bergstrom Air Force Reserve Base has been a great
17 one and would continue to be. Carswell has the unique
18 mission of joint training that is a model for future
19 interservice cooperation in efficiencies, and it has been a
20 perfect model. The San Antonio community presented an
21 innovative plan to keep the function of Brooks Air Force Base
22 in San Antonio at reduced cost to the taxpayers and also

Page 302

1 providing the savings above the original Air Force proposal.
2 Brooks is not an Air Force base. It's a research
3 center. Its excellence would be compromised if the technical
4 staff didn't move, and the statistics show that they probably
5 won't. The Brooks contonement is the most innovative
6 proposal of the entire BRAC this time. I think it meets your
7 standard of substantial deviation, and I hope you will reward
8 innovation, excellence, and efficiency.
9 We in Texas support the consolidation of Navy
10 strike pilot training at Kingsville NAS. Also, Corpus
11 Christi NAS in South Texas provides the best air space and
12 training conditions for Navy pilot training. We are not
13 contesting the Navy's proposal, but T-44 training should stay
14 at Corpus.
15 Your Commission staff not only ranks Reese higher
16 in military value than its nearest competitor, but it also is
17 the clear choice of pilots and instructors. The Commission
18 heard sworn testimony from Brigadier General McFalls that he
19 chose Reese as the first Navy Air Force joint training base
20 because it was clearly the Air Force's best place to do it.
21 When you're looking at roughly equal facilities,
22 quality of life should be the tie breaker. Reese has job

Page 303

1 opportunities for spouses and a great university for
2 continued education of our military personnel and spouses.
3 Now, I want to talk about the two depots that are
4 on the list from Texas, and I want to talk about readiness.
5 We have a goal of winning two major regional conflicts that
6 are near simultaneous. We don't know what "near
7 simultaneous" means. We know that other potential aggressors
8 will have learned Saddam Hussein's lesson that you can't let
9 America have time to gear up, or you will pay a price.
10 Anyone who talks about readiness, anyone who talks
11 about the ability of our smaller armed services to meet the
12 test of two MRCs is talking first about lift capacity. As a
13 member of the Armed Services Committee, every service Chief
14 and every Secretary has come to us and said, "We must have
15 adequate air lift." Adequate air lift includes a dependence
16 to a great extent on the C-5.
17 There is only one hangar in America that can take a
18 C-5, and that is at Kelly. The competitors said last
19 Saturday that they could build a hangar to take Kelly for
20 about $52 million. Those numbers are not correct. It will
21 take $275 million to replicate the hangar at Kelly that can
22 take a C-5.

Page 304

1 We cannot afford to take this chance on readiness
2 by moving the expertise and moving away from the one hangar
3 that is there that can provide the C-5, which is going to be
4 a major part of our air lift capacity for the years to come.
5 Another major issue for readiness is maintenance of
6 equipment not being replaced. Red River Army Depot maintains
7 Bradleys, multiple launch rocket systems, and M-113 families
8 of vehicles. Not one of those is going to come online to be
9 bought new in the next year, probably not in the next two or
10 three years, which makes maintenance and the expertise even
11 more important.
12 The Army is suggesting that we put all of our
13 capabilities into one place, Anniston. Anniston's terrific.
14 Red River is terrific. Red River has proven in every
15 competition that it is the best. Red River maintains these
16 vehicles. We cannot afford by military strategy to put all
17 our eggs in one basket, and most certainly if we have a surge
18 need, we're not going to be able to fill it if we're at 100
19 percent capacity at Anniston.
20 Most certainly, if we had something terrible like a
21 natural disaster, having all our eggs in one basket does not
22 make sense. So I am just going to say that we have the case

Page 305

1 to be made on the merits for these very important readiness
2 issues for Texas. And I want to end by saying that our Texas
3 delegation comes to you, Republicans and Democrats. We
4 support the military. We have done it on the merits for
5 years and years and years.
6 We are not a delegation that comes to you voting
7 against the defense budgets, against the defense increases,
8 and then asks you to spend more by saving our bases. We are
9 supporting our military. We support it because it's right
10 for our national defense. And we thank you for all the
11 efforts you're putting forward. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Senator
13 Hutchinson.
14 Again, I will reiterate that we want to try to stay
15 within our five-minute time limit if we could, please, as
16 each speaker comes to the podium.
17 It was appropriate, I guess, to finish with Red
18 River. So we'll continue on with that. Representative Jim
19 Chapman.
20 REPRESENTATIVE CHAPMAN: Commissioners, thank you
21 very much. I see that I stand before a group all but one of
22 whom have been to Red River Army Depot. And we will cure

Page 306

1 that situation on Thursday. Commissioner Davis, we are
2 pleased and excited that you are coming along with
3 Commissioner Cox and look very much forward to your visit.
4 I want to echo what Senator Hutchinson has said.
5 First, I want to thank all of you. Knowing the terrific and
6 burdensome job that you have, I want to thank you for having
7 taken the time to come to Bowie County.
8 I want to remind you, though, at the same time
9 within the allotted time that I have that Red River Army
10 Depot is unique. It is the only depot in the Army that is a
11 combination of maintenance, supply, ammunition storage,
12 collocated with a large ammo plant, Lone Stone Army
13 Ammunition Plant.
14 It is the largest depot in the system. It is by
15 age of facilities the newest. Senator Hutchinson has already
16 said, we believe it is the best, not from the subjective
17 opinion of the hometown Congressmen, but from the objective
18 analysis and awards that have been won by this facility. It
19 was named as the President's quality leader award as one of
20 the finest facilities not in DOD but in the entire federal
21 government, one of four winners this year and the only winner
22 in the Department of Defense.

Page 307

1 The capacity is the issue in the depots. We know
2 Capacity, we believe, if you try to put all of the
3 k that could result from the work that would be necessary
4 he two theater scenario that Senator Hutchinson
5 mentioned. To pour all of that or attempt to pour all of
6 that into a single ground maintenance facility, we believe,
7 is a terrible mistake.
8 We believe that Anniston is a good facility. We
9 believe Red River is even better. And we believe it is a
10 mistake to put all of your eggs in one depot basket. Red
11 River Army Depot is unique. It is the only facility in the
12 world that maintains over 75 percent of the ground vehicles
13 that you find in an Army mechanized division. Nowhere else
14 in the world is that work done today.
15 The Army's workload numbers support the contention
16 that if we consolidate all of this into one facility,
17 Anniston will not have surge capacity, we will not be able to
18 respond, and we think it would be a mistake.
19 You all know -- and, Commissioner Davis, you'll
20 hear me later this week take issue -- substantial issue, in
21 many cases, with some of the Army's numbers. We have tried
22 to make a case individually and collectively that we believe

Page 308

1 the costs of closure are grossly understated when it comes to
2 Red River Army Depot and that the savings are overstated.
3 Last week or a few days ago, the Army redid its
4 COBRA numbers. And, while we still believe the case to be
5 that costs of closure are understated and savings overstated,
6 at least we now find that if it comes to the situation of
7 comparing Red River to its depot competition, its military
8 value is double that of Letterkenny, and the savings are
9 reater by realigning Letterkenny than closing Red River.
10 We believe the win-win scenario -- and that's what
11 have called it -- is to keep your two best depots,
12 niston and Red River. We believe you should downsize to
13 core. And we believe that by doing so and that partnering
14 with private industry, everybody wins, the taxpayers, the
15 Army, the military, national security, private industry. We
16 all win. We believe that is what we ought to do.
17 And finally, let me just say, as you all know too
18 well, of the BRAC recommendations this year, the economic
19 impact is most severe at Red River Army Depot. In fact, of
20 all of the recommended closures and realignments, of all of
21 the negative impact of this BRAC, 10 percent of the total
22 impact falls from the closure of Red River Army Depot.

Page 309

1 It is, according to the Army's numbers, going to
2 drive our unemployment rate to almost 22 percent. And those
3 of you who have been there and seen the statistics know, it
4 will likely stay there for many, many years.
5 I know the negative impact is going to be great in
6 every community that is adversely impacted by your decisions.
7 But I suggest to you that closing the best installation,
8 loading all of your eggs in one basket, and by doing so,
9 devastating and driving the unemployment rate in this
10 community this high for many, many years is the wrong thing
11 to do.
12 We trust your judgement. We hope that you will
13 view all of the facts and in your final analysis vote to
14 remove Red River from the list. And Commissioner Davis, we
15 look forward to seeing you on Thursday. Mr. Chairman, I
16 thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
18 Chapman.
19 Representative Joe Barton.
20 REPRESENTATIVE BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
21 n here to make a plea for the 301st Air Force Reserve Unit
22 at Naval Air Station Fort Worth which this Commission has

Page 310

1 asked to be looked at for deactivation or relocation.
2 The problem with the idea of moving the 301st is
3 that it will not close a base and actually might keep one
4 open. It won't save money. In fact, it will cost $16 and-a-
5 half million more. Deactivating the 301st would result in no
6 base closure, no base closure savings, and would cost the
7 American taxpayer millions of dollars each and every year as
8 far as the eye can see.
9 The fact is that base operations and overhead at
10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base must continue with or without
11 the 301st. In fact, other units at the Joint Reserve Base
12 must pick up support contributions that are now presently
13 borne by the 301st Air Force Reserve unit. Over $1.2 million
14 has been identified as a potential cost that the Navy must
15 pick up.
16 Deactivating the 301st is a force structure issue.
17 DOD analysis correctly shows that such an action would never
18 result in a payback.
19 On the contrary, closing Bergstrom Air Force Base
20 and moving the 10th Air Force headquarters to the Naval air
21 station joint Reserve base in Fort Worth results in complete
22 closure of a DOD installation. This action would have an

Page 311

1 immediate or one-year payback. Annual recurring savings
2 would continue in the amount of about $4 and-a-half million
3 annually. This 4.5 million is understated due to substantial
4 annual savings associated with joint training operations at
5 the joint Reserve base.
6 At the request of the BRAC, COBRA models were run
7 on May 5, 1995, and May 10, 1995, that compared deactivating
8 the 301st in Fort Worth and closing Bergstrom and moving the
9 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort Worth. This focus is
10 based on a comparison with Bergstrom, since Bergstrom is the
11 DOD recommendation for closure that has been presented to the
12 Commission.
13 This analysis shows closing Bergstrom to be clearly
14 the most cost-effective. The COBRA models confirm that
15 closing a base saves more money than not closing a base.
16 It's not even a close call.
17 The first item the COBRA model looked at was the
18 net one-time cost to deactivate the 301st in Fort Worth which
19 would be $2,946,000. The total one-time cost to close
20 Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force headquarters to Fort
21 Worth would be $4,362,000. So the net savings to close
22 Bergstrom versus deactivating the 301st would be that

Page 312

1 difference, or $16,584,000.
2 The second big area the COBRA models evaluated was
3 the annual recurring savings. The steady state savings to
4 close Bergstrom and move the 10th Air Force would be
5 $17,666,000. The steady state savings to deactivate the
6 301st at Naval Air Station at Fort Worth would be
7 $13,195,000. So the annual recurring savings to close
8 Bergstrom as a net difference of the two are $4,471,000.
9 Again, deactivating the 301st Naval Air Station
10 Fort Worth Joint Reserve unit results in no base closure, no
11 base closure savings, and never pays back. Instead, there
12 would be recurring costs to other DOD units at that remaining
13 base.
14 Another issue that I would like to address very
15 quickly concerns a supposed promise to Austin and reliance on
16 that promise. Austin Mayor Todd in the Austin delegation had
17 represented that somehow, the Air Force made a promise about
18 locating the Air Force Reserve unit at the Bergstrom site.
19 Congressman Geren and others have clearly shown that there
20 was no promise or commitment made, even given the benefit of
21 the doubt, beyond 1996.
22 During her site visit to Fort Worth last week,

Page 313

1 Commissioner Cox assured me that the promise was no longer an
2 issue for BRAC '95. Austin wants only one thing, the
3 economic advantages of the Bergstrom location for a civilian
4 airport. And they're to be commended for that.
5 I would like to submit for the record a news
6 article of June the 5th in the Austin American Statesman that
7 shows right now, there is a big controversy between the
8 airlines that want to use the new airport and the airport
9 authority about whether to build a second runway. They're
10 going to issue bonds in Austin this fall for about $600
11 million to build the second runway. And the airlines do not
12 want the second runway built.
13 If the second runway is not built, you can't have
14 the Air Force unit there, because it would only be one
15 runway. I don't have that article with me, but I will submit
16 it for the record.
17 In short, it doesn't make sense to deactivate the
18 301st. It doesn't make sense to move the 301st. It's a part
19 of a joint concept that's working very well with the Navy,
20 the Army, the Texas Air National Guard, the Marine Air Corps,
21 and the Air Force Reserve. Thank you very much.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.

Page 314

1 Congressman Lloyd Doggett.
2 REPRESENTATIVE DOGGETT: Thank you very much. And
3 I thank all of you members of the Commission. There is
4 clearly no way that we're going to achieve both economic
5 security with a balanced budget and military security unless
6 we achieve savings through base closure.
7 And I'm going to take a little different position
8 than perhaps some of your other Congressional witnesses,
9 because I want to emphasize that if the Air Force unit in the
10 10th Congressional district that I represent cannot pass
11 muster under your applicable criteria, I think you ought to
12 close it.
13 The taxpayers of America and the taxpayers of
14 Travis County are not going to benefit if we keep a unit that
15 is not efficient and is not economical. But I would say to
16 you, if the taxpayers in Travis County and throughout this
17 country are receiving a benefit as compared with other bases
18 and if you evaluate that benefit on a level playing field and
19 you compare it to the alternatives, then you have a
20 responsibility under the same standards to maximize the use
21 of that facility.
22 All that we are asking in the City of Austin is

Page 315

1 that you evaluate our base relative to others on a level
2 playing field. Let me just summarize a very few of the
3 special things about Bergstrom Air Force Base. During the
4 1991 BRAC process, as you know, Bergstrom was recommended for
5 closure.
6 After that, the citizens of Austin approved by a
7 vote the conversion of that base into a civilian airport.
8 And it's moving faster than luggage through the Denver
9 airport, I can assure you. The cargo operations are now
10 scheduled to begin in 1996. And there's no reason, newspaper
11 clipping aside, to assume they won't. And passenger
12 operations will begin in 1988.
13 The relative cost of keeping the 924th as a tenant
14 in the Austin Airport have to be evaluated not just on 1994
15 and 1995 before the new airport is ever opened, when costs
16 are at their peak. But I think you have to consider the fact
17 that the cost will drop when cargo gets there. And then,
18 they're going to drop dramatically when we have passenger
19 operations underway in 1998, which I have no reason to assume
20 will not occur.
21 Now, there is some disagreement. I think it's
22 sparked by an unfortunate disagreement not of my making and

Page 316

1 not of the making of any of my colleagues, but which you've
2 seen, I'm sure in other parts of the country between some
3 people in Austin and some people in the Fort Worth area over
4 the two relative bases.
5 I don't plan to participate in that disagreement,
6 except to this extent. As far as what Austin was promised by
7 the BRAC in the past or what it has not been promised, our
8 position has never been that the 1991 BRAC could or did say
9 that we would have a unit there for the rest of civilization.
10 Rather, it was our understanding that if we
11 proceeded as we have done with the conversion, with the
12 investment of local funds in a conversion to a domestic or
13 civilian airport, that the unit wouldn't be moved
14 immediately. And now, we're to a point where we're
15 fulfilling our obligations and feel that the Air Force in
16 proposing to move the unit is not fulfilling its.
17 Our frustration is, we met the 1996 deadline.
18 We're doing that. And we believe that the unit should not be
19 taken away on that basis. But I think the focus has got to
20 be not just on the promise but on the cost, because that's
21 what we're concerned about. And when you look at the
22 facility that will be there in terms of its size, in terms of

Page 317

1 its runways, in terms of its training areas, it has ample
2 capacity for inclusion of additional units with varied
3 missions.
4 It's uniquely located, the closest unit to Fort
5 Hood, which will soon hold 40 percent of the United States
6 Army's combat power. Bergstrom is the only Air Force Reserve
7 facility located in such close proximity to that
8 installation.
9 In addition to its logistical superiority, the
10 924th has itself proven in its winning members in the long
11 shot '95 competition at Nellis Air Force Base with the
12 missions that flew just in March over at Bosnia what a
13 winning unit it is, without a single sortie canceled due to
14 mechanical or equipment failure.
15 Finally, we have the support there in Austin with a
16 high tech economy, the most highly educated populace of any
17 county in the country, with a city of over 250,000, 65
18 percent of our manufacturing workforce in the technology
19 area. It's the kind of city that is compatible with having
20 the kind of Air Force Reserves that we need. And we're
21 backed up and are immensely proud of the veterans
22 organizations and the many veteran retirees that we have

Page 318

1 there in the Austin area.
2 In summary, we believe we're going to have a first-
3 class airport that works and that we can provide the Air
4 Force a first-class, well-placed, well-trained Reserve unit.
5 Thank you.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Doggett, for your testimony.
8 And we now recognize Representative Pete Geren.
9 REPRESENTATIVE GEREN: Thank you, members of the
10 Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
11 you today. And for those of you who were fortunate enough to
12 make the trip to Fort Worth last Saturday, I hope that you
13 enjoyed our hospitality. And we appreciated very much your
14 taking the day and spending it there.
15 I'm going to touch on a couple of points today. In
16 addition to the 301st in Fort Worth, I would also like to
17 note the AFUS facility in Fort Worth, as well. I'm going to
18 go back over some of the points I made on Saturday. For
19 those of you who were there, I apologize for that. But I
20 think the issue that I want to emphasize is so important in
21 the consideration of this, I wanted to go over it with you.
22 But first, regarding the AFUS facility in Fort

Page 319

1 Worth. It's recommended for closure and realignment to
2 wards Air Force Base. I have some questions and additional
3 mony I would like to submit regarding some of the data
4 sed. In any decision we make regarding AFUS that develops
5 and tests electronic warfare capability, it's a need
6 dramatically demonstrated by the shooting down of our F-16
7 pilot over Bosnia.
8 It's very important, and we believe that the
9 decision to move it out of Fort Worth is not cost-effective.
10 And we would like to provide additional information for the
11 record.
12 Regarding the JRB Fort Worth's military value, at
13 the hearing on Saturday, a couple of very important points
14 were emphasized. No less of an authority than the Chairman
15 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, sent a
16 letter that was introduced into the record on Saturday.
17 And let me quote from that record: "JRB Fort
18 Worth, which includes the 301st, it offers a prime
19 opportunity to demonstrate the viability of joint basing and
20 holds great promise for streamlining our infrastructure and
21 enhancing joint operational effectiveness."
22 Regarding Bergstrom, which unfortunately has become

Page 320

1 our competition in this initiative, General Shali also went
2 on to say that "The CINCs, chiefs of the services and I have
3 reviewed the proposal to close Bergstrom and determined that
4 it would not impair our ability to execute the national
5 military strategy."
6 Assistant Secretary of Defense Debbie Lee also sent
7 you a letter stating in part that it was imperative that the
8 301st remain part of JRB Fort Worth. The military value of a
9 int operations base, particularly as we ask the Reserves to
10 more with less, is we not only shrink our military but ask
11 p get better at the same time. It's critical that we
12 eed the recommendations of these military experts in this
13 regard.
14 It is a success. In fact, it's a BRAC success. We
15 all started JRB Fort Worth in 1993. The outstanding men and
16 women out there are making it a success, and we urge that
17 BRAC let the success go forward.
18 The commitment whether or not the BRAC '93 or BRAC
19 '91 made a commitment to Austin somehow supersedes all of
20 your other considerations has worked its way as a primary
21 concern of the Commission. And you have to be fair. Our
22 government has to be fair. We understand that. I think it's

Page 321

1 important, though, to look at some of the words of the people
2 in Austin that have supposedly relied on this commitment to
3 see what their understanding of it was.
4 The mayor of Austin sent a letter to the DOD in
5 which he said, and I quote from it -- and a copy of it's in
6 the packet -- he understood that the 924th would remain there
7 until at least September 30, '96. Congressman Pickle said in
8 a public statement, "The Pentagon is committed to keeping the
9 unit there until 1996." So they all understand that your
10 commitment, if there is one, extended no further than that.
11 The city council actually passed a resolution
12 authorizing the move to Bergstrom. August 1, 1991, they laid
13 out the conditions for the move. They did not mention
14 anything about the Reserves. They said, "If we get the land
15 from the government, if we get the FAA to approve the master
16 plan, and if it's affordable, we'll move." The very same
17 day, they had another resolution that says, "Please leave the
18 924th there." It wasn't a condition.
19 They emphasize a statement by -- I say "they" --
20 stin emphasizes a statement by Secretary Boatwright in
21 hich he talked about leaving the Reserves at Austin. He did
22 say, if you took one sentence out of context, that it was

Page 322

1 their plan to leave those Reserves at Austin. But he went on
2 to say -- and he made it very clear -- and we showed a tape
3 of the hearing to the Commission on Saturday -- he said, "But
4 I can't make any long-standing commitment."
5 Secretary Boatwright is a professional. He does
6 not get out on a limb and promise something he can't deliver.
7 He didn't have the authority to bind the BRAC. But even if
8 he had, he made sure that he didn't do that. He said, "I
9 cannot make a long-standing commitment." And you have a copy
10 of the transcript of Mr. Boatwright's so-called "promise" in
11 your text.
12 And in closing, let me just mention a couple of
13 things. There's the understanding, I think, by some that
14 this move out of inner city Austin to this new site was
15 something that came about as a part of BRAC. Austin has been
16 trying to move its airport for 20 years. They decided about
17 10 years ago to move to Maynard, a little town outside of
18 Boston, and build the Green Field Airport.
19 When they got put on the BRAC list in 1990 by
20 Secretary Cheney, Secretary Cheney's whole list was rejected.
21 But when they got put on the BRAC list, then, they decided to
22 move from Maynard to Bergstrom, because it saved them $108

Page 323

1 million. It had nothing to do with the commitments you made.
2 My time is out. I see the gavel going up. I
3 appreciate very much the opportunity to meet with you, and
4 again, I appreciate your making the time to come to Fort
5 Worth last Saturday. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
7 Geren.
8 Representative Larry Combest.
9 REPRESENTATIVE COMBEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I know how
11 seriously you take your role in this Commission. That's why
12 I know that you appreciate the serious impact of closing any
13 undergraduate pilot training base, because pilot training is
14 the very core of our military readiness.
15 Here, you're being asked to make a very close call.
16 Your inclination might be to follow the Air Force
17 recommendations. However, as your own BRAC staff have
18 confirmed, the Air Force data was flawed, the wrong
19 recommendation was made. Reese does not belong at the bottom
20 of the list.
21 Had the Air Force data been correct, then another
22 base would be on the bottom, and your decision might be made

Page 324

1 amid less murky circumstances. I recall very clearly that
2 Commissioner Davis expressed a concern at the May 10th
3 hearing that the Commission not cut back too far in the area
4 of pilot training.
5 Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is going to need all of
6 its pilot training capability and capacity to fulfill the
7 pilot training requirements of the Air Force into the 21st
8 century. If in the future, the Air Force needs to reopen a
9 base that you recommend for closure, reopening will cost
10 eight times more than the estimated savings that would be
11 presented.
12 The initial perception was that the Air Force had
13 excess capacity in pilot training, and one undergraduate
14 pilot training base could be closed. However, both the Navy
15 and the Air Force have begun to revise their future training
16 projections. Their pilot training requirements are going up.
17 One reason is the forecast demand for 51,000 pilots in
18 civilian aviation in just nine years, as massive numbers of
19 pilots begin to retire.
20 Also, retention rates in all the services are going
21 down. With a big hiring binge by the airlines, the Air Force
22 and the Navy will lose pilots by the hundreds. Additionally,

Page 325

1 the needs of the Air National Guard will increase demand on
2 Air Force training. There is no margin for error if Reese
3 Air Force Base is closed.
4 If pilot training requirements turn out to be
5 higher than were projected a year or more ago, then the Air
6 Force will be in the very dilemma that General Davis
7 described. I urge the Commission to press the Air Force on
8 this question and projected requirements. It is my
9 understanding that there may be much larger requirements for
10 pilots than originally projected.
11 There are five clear reasons that you should reject
12 the recommendation to close Reese. First, Reese has a higher
13 military value than any other UPT base which would be
14 retained or than other UPT bases which would be retained.
15 Your own staff revealed this fact in their analysis that
16 ranked Reese ahead of two other UPT bases. Their analysis
17 proved that there were substantial errors in the Air Force
18 DOD analysis.
19 Second, quality of life is the key to retaining
20 quality professional military personnel, and retention is one
21 of the keys to readiness.
22 Any successful business that prides itself on

Page 326

1 attracting and retaining quality people looks for a location
2 that provides a quality lifestyle, plentiful housing,
3 excellent medical facilities, jobs for spouses, easy access
4 with an international airport, and outstanding educational
5 opportunities. Reese Air Force Base had the highest rating
6 of any base in the Air Force in regards to quality of life.
7 Third, DOD tells Congress that housing is one of
8 the most important elements of quality of life. Their
9 military doctrine is, we enlist soldiers, but we reenlist
10 families. Retention is 15 percent higher at bases with good
11 housing. Reese has spent millions of dollars to ensure that
12 they have the finest housing of any UPT base. This is an
13 asset that cannot be ignored and cannot be matched without
14 considerable cost.
15 Fourth, it is a sad but indisputable fact proven
16 again just recently at Shepherd Air Force Base that flying in
17 training is a dangerous business. But it need not be a
18 hazard for innocent civilians if we pay special attention to
19 encroachment.
20 Both of the bases with less military value than
21 Reese have encroachment problems that place homes,
22 businesses, and public places in the direct path of daily

Page 327

1 training operations. By contrast, Reese does not have an
2 encroachment problem.
3 Fifth, Reese is the Air Force premiere
4 undergraduate pilot training base. It's the first to receive
5 the T-1 trainer, the first and only with joint Navy training,
6 the first to receive the new JPATS aircraft, and Reese is
7 also the number one base of preference of student and
8 instructor pilots in the air education and training command.
9 Our young men and women in the Air Force vote to
10 keep Reese every day by choosing to serve at Reese. Ladies
11 and gentlemen of the Commission, as I said, this is a close
12 call. Reese should not be closed. The data is flawed. The
13 planning assumption is clearly wrong, and I thank you very
14 much for your time.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
16 Combest.
17 Many members -- in fact, all members of Congress
18 have worked real hard in this process, but I would have to
19 say that we have probably seen more of Mr. Combest than
20 anyone. He has certainly represented his constituents well.
21 We're going to have a little change in our
22 schedule, and we're going to move up. Representative Martin

Page 328

1 Frost.
2 REPRESENTATIVE FROST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 I'm here on the same subject as the three witnesses you heard
4 right before Mr. Combest, and that's why I had asked to be
5 heard at this point. And I appreciate the opportunity to be
6 here today to express my opposition to the proposal to remove
7 the 301st Fighter Wing from the joint Reserve base in Fort
8 Worth.
9 And I will focus my remarks strictly on the issue
10 of jointness. I recognize that you have many difficult
11 decisions to make as part of the 1995 Base Closure and
12 Realignment process. However, this is not one of them.
13 Keeping the 301st Fighter Wing in Fort Worth is an easy
14 decision, a decision that is strongly and enthusiastically
15 supported by the North Texas Congressional Delegation, Fort
16 Worth city officials, and the community at large and by the
17 military.
18 You have already received detailed information
19 concerning the role and mission of JRB Fort Worth, so I won't
20 try to go over the same ground. However, I do believe it's
21 worthwhile to reemphasize a couple of points. It's critical
22 that we better utilize the defense assets we have as defense

Page 329

1 spending declines. In other words, to promote cost savings
2 and efficiencies, it would be necessary for the services to
3 eliminate duplicate efforts and find ways to work and train
4 together.
5 Admittedly, there are questions about whether such
6 joint ventures can be successful, yet you have in Fort Worth
7 proof that collaborative efforts are possible. Already, the
8 301st Fighter Wing and the Naval Reserve have developed an
9 operations plan which clearly reduces costs and promotes
10 efficiency through mutual support. No other base in the
11 United States offers this opportunity in the way it is
12 occurring at JRB Fort Worth.
13 Further proof that it is working can be seen in
14 support expressed for what's happening in Forth Worth by the
15 Department of Defense. As Congressman Geren just mentioned,
16 in a letter to this Commission, Assistant Secretary of
17 Defense Deborah Lee referred to JRB Fort Worth as "one of the
18 most successful products of BRAC '91 and BRAC '93."
19 In a memorandum provided to this Commission, Navy
20 Rear Admiral T.F. Hall stated that JRB Fort Worth "is on
21 track to be our nation's first master Guard Reserve base. As
22 such, it serves as a model for future consolidations."

Page 330

1 Admiral Hall concluded by saying that "Reversing the BRAC '93
2 decision establishing JRB Fort Worth would be a mistake and
3 that we should continue to pursue our present course of
4 action, which makes this joint Reserve base a model for the
5 future."
6 Let me note that some of the Reserve and Guard
7 units being reassigned to Fort Worth are coming from NAS
8 Dallas, which is in the area I represent and which was closed
9 as a part of BRAC '93 process. I was initially concerned
10 about the closure of NAS Dallas, but it's clear that
11 consolidation of these units with other Reserve and Guard
12 units at JRB Fort Worth makes sense.
13 So this experiment in joint service operations is
14 working. It is an experiment that we should not disturb by
15 removing a major part of the team. If we are to validate the
16 concept of joint preparation, training, and operations at one
17 facility by the services, it's essential that the 301st
18 Fighter Wing remain in place as originally planned. To do
19 otherwise would be disruptive and deny the services the
20 opportunity to demonstrate the efficiencies gained from joint
21 operations.
22 I urge the Commission to let this experiment

Page 331

ntinue, let the military have a chance to show how a joint ture between the services will not only be cost-effective will ultimately best serve the needs of our national curity by improving defense preparedness.

Again, I appreciate having this opportunity to be here today. I believe that the right decision is to permit the 301st Fighter Wing to remain a part of this joint Reserve base in Fort Worth. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Frost, thank you for your testimony.

Congressman Charles Stenholm.

REPRESENTATIVE STENHOLM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. I want to express my strong support for all of the excellent military facilities that we have in Texas. Also, I want to make you aware of the primary defense department facility in my own district, Dais Air Force Base, and the options it makes available to you as you go through the BRAC decision process.

But first, I want to also express my strong support for Goodfellow Air Force Base located in St. Angelo, which I represent together with Lamar Smith. Although Goodfellow is

Page 332

in Lamar's district, it is literally across the street from my district line. Therefore, I do represent many of the men and women who work and serve at Goodfellow, so I feel it is part of my district.

To call Goodfellow an "Air Force base" is a little misleading, because it has a proven track record as a joint service training facility. In fact, the latest in new state-of-the-art firefighting school facility is tops in the world. times, in fact, there may be more Army personnel at odfellow than Air Force.

I bring this to your attention because of my oncerns and efforts to find cost savings in the federal budget and my belief that joint missions whenever possible could be helpful in finding cost savings in the defense budget. In that regard, I would like to see more training missions go to Goodfellow. The City of St. Angelo is a good partner to the military, and I know they would welcome the growth at the base and would actively help accommodate any new needs caused by new missions at the base.

As a whole, the people of Texas have proven themselves to be very supportive of our bases and the men and women who serve there. While I am supportive of all the

Page 333

Texas facilities, there are two -- Reese Air Force Base, as you've just heard from Mr. Combest, and Naval Air Station; Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, formerly Carswell, currently being considered for closure, which I would like to speak to you about.

Although these bases are not in my district, again, I know that they are exceptional bases and encourage the Commission to reconsider the decision to close them. Secretary Widnall has stressed the importance to the Air Force of Air Force training and quality of life issues. The decision to close Reese, which was ranked the number one base by the Air Force for quality of life and which has an excellent training record, contradicts previously stated Air Force goals.

If Reese does close, I believe the Air Force will regret the decision, because it could result in a lack of well-trained pilots in the future. Moreover, it is my understanding that mistakes were made in the Air Force partment of Defense analysis of Reese, and I believe that eserves another look and should remain open.

JRB Fort Worth is another facility that does not warrant closure. The 301st Fighter Wing is not a base

Page 334

1 closure issue, and it will not result in long-term cost
2 savings. JRB Fort Worth is supported by the Pentagon and
3 should be taken off the closure list.
4 Turning to Dais Air Force Base, it is the training
5 base for the B-1 bomber, and it is also the home of two
6 squadrons of C-130s. Until last year, Dais also handled KC-
7 135 tankers. The Air Force has consistently rated Dais in
8 tier 1, one of the best bases. It has excellent
9 infrastructure, almost all of which is in virtually new
10 condition.
11 Dais has extra capacity available to handle
12 additional aircraft. It has near perfect flying conditions,
13 and its airfield has no encroachment problems. The base
14 presently has a primary aircraft inventory of 60 and could
15 handle another 40. I would also like to mention that Dais is
16 an attainment area under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly,
17 additional aircraft could be relocated there without raising
18 any air pollution concerns whatsoever.
19 I understand that the Commission is considering
20 several scenarios which would relocate KC-135 tankers or C-
21 130s. Dais could handle either plane with little or no
22 MILCON cost and would be an excellent location for both

Page 335

1 assets. I am aware that the proposal to move tankers to Dais
2 may not be consistent with they Air Force's stated one base,
3 one boss policy.
4 In fact, the Air Force moved 17 tankers out of Dais
5 in 1994 solely because of this policy, even though the base
6 has and is capable of handling KC-135 tankers. The
7 combination of B-1, C-130s, and KC-135s at Dais worked very
8 well there for over 10 years.
9 Mr. Chairman, commissioners, the need to save money
10 due to budgetary restraints requires much greater flexibility
11 in locating different types of aircraft such as bombers and
12 tankers at the same base. This one base, one boss policy
13 should not be the driving factor in matters resolving sound
14 fiscal decisions and operational logic.
15 In closing, ladies and gentlemen, take a hard look
16 at the Texas installations such as Dais and Goodfellow and
17 others. The one common thread is that the people of my state
18 are staunch supporters of defense and have prepared their
19 installations to perform the mission of defense in the United
20 States for the next century.
21 Texas has always trained our troops for conflict
22 such as World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. That

Page 336

1 was a conscientious decision made by our government due to
2 its citizens and location. We thank you very much.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
4 Stenholm.
5 The Chair now recognizes Representative Henry
6 Gonzalez.
7 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Thank you very much. I
8 sympathize very much. The Commission is confronted with a
9 task of staggering complexity and of monumental importance to
10 the safety and the well-being of our country. What you
11 decide will have a profound impact on the ability of our
12 country to protect itself and its interests around the world
13 and to do so with shrinking budgets.
14 The case for Kelly Air Force Base is this. First,
15 it's the most efficient, most effective of all of the air
16 logistic centers. Second, it has capabilities that are
17 unique, cannot be easily replaced, and cannot, economically,
18 be moved. If you were to take Kelly and its current workload
19 and try to do it at any other logistics center, it would cost
20 anywhere from $30 million to $60 million more per year, based
21 on today's labor and overhead costs.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Gonzalez, could you

Page 337

1 just pull the microphone down a bit, please.
2 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: Sure.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, sorry to
4 interrupt.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GONZALEZ: No, sir. And that
6 assumes that you could move the workload at no cost. There
7 are thousands of skilled, experienced workers at Kelly, and
8 they are efficient -- 99 percent of their work is defect-
9 free. And Kelly stands behind it. Kelly produced the first
10 organic product warranty in the Department of Defense. You
11 can't find a better workforce anywhere. Kelly has unique
12 capabilities.
13 Every outsized cargo carrier in the Air Force --
14 engines and airplanes alike -- is maintained there. It would
15 be impossible to move this operation without a severe adverse
16 effect on the airlift capability. And as you all well know,
17 the ability to move vast cargos over great distances in a
18 very short time is absolutely essential to our ability to
19 respond to the many different kinds of threats that exist
20 throughout the world today.
21 Kelly repairs and manages 60 percent of the engines
22 of our front line fighter aircraft, and 100 percent of the

Page 338

1 secondary power systems of this aircraft. Moving this
2 workload would disrupt fighter operations for a significant
3 period, and cost more than $1 billion, according to the Air
4 Force studies. While some may argue that all primary engine
5 work could be done in a single location, I would urge caution
6 on this.
7 Only a few years ago, the entire engine repair
8 facility at Tinker Air Force Base was shut down for many
9 months by a disastrous fire. Thus, we have practical, recent
10 experience that should caution everyone not to place all of
11 an essential workload at one place where an accident, hostile
12 action, or some other mishap could wreck readiness capability
13 overnight.
14 Anyone who has been to Kelly knows that this
15 installation is at the heart and soul of the Air Force
16 logistics. It has the best engine facility in the Department
17 of Defense. Its paint shops can handle any airplane. Its
18 hangers can house any airplane. It is a leader in cross
19 servicing. Its airlift capability is second to none. There
20 is no workforce anywhere that can match Kelly in skill, in
21 craftsmanship, pride, or cost. And there's no way that the
22 taxpayer will be well served by relocating its functions.

Page 339

1 Kelly has proved its worth to the nation time after
2 time. Kelly has earned its place, and keeping Kelly is the
3 only course of action that makes sense. Finally, I want to
4 urge the commission to consider carefully San Antonio's well
5 thought out, thoroughly cost effective plan to reconfigure
6 Brooks Air Force Base. This plan saves twice as much as the
7 proposed transfer of Brooks missions to other facilities
8 without disrupting ongoing operations or compromising
9 capability.
10 And I want to thank you, and express my gratitude
11 for this opportunity to appear before you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir, for your
13 excellent testimony. Representative Lamar Smith.
14 REPRESENTATIVE SMITH: Chairman, commissioners,
15 thank you for this opportunity to discuss the importance of
16 Brooks and Kelly Air Force Bases. These bases are not just
17 important to our hometown of San Antonio, they're also
18 important to the American taxpayer and to our nation's
19 defense. Everyone in this room is familiar with the
20 important contributions that the people of San Antonio have
21 made to our nation's defense.
22 The families of Military City have sent their sons

Page 340

1 and daughters into harm's way for their country in record
2 numbers. This record has fostered a patriotism and
3 commitment to the military that makes San Antonio truly
4 unique. It was apparent when most of you saw more than
5 35,000 San Antonians lining the entrance to Kelly Air Force
6 Base, displaying Kelly Proud; and on April 6th, when you saw
7 several thousand people displaying Brooks Proud, during your
8 visit to that base.
9 Those are not slogans invented for your visit.
10 They are a way of life, a way of working, that resonate
11 throughout the Department of Defense, and translate into top
12 quality, top efficiency, and top productivity. This
13 commitment to the military makes Kelly and Brooks as
14 important to the American taxpayer as they are to San
15 Antonio. San Antonio provides a one of a kind military
16 community that nourishes the critically important research
17 and aerospace medical training at Brooks.
18 In addition to the human system center, the
19 Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, the
20 Center for Environmental Excellence, and the human systems
21 program office are all at Brooks. The Air Force personnel
22 center, the repository for all Air Force personnel data, and

Page 341

1 the Lackland military training center, the home of the Air
2 Force basic training, also are in San Antonio.
3 San Antonio's outstanding and absolutely unique
4 biomedical community is the other part of this productive
5 partnership that exists in our hometown, and that cannot be
6 duplicated anywhere else. The University of Texas Health
7 Science Center, the University of Texas at San Antonio, the
8 Texas Research and Technology Foundation, Southwest Research
9 Institute, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research,
10 Wilford Hall Air Force Medical Center, and Brooks Army
11 Medical Center all contribute to the research synergies from
12 which the work at Brooks and the taxpayers who provide it and
13 the military missions that need it benefit.
14 When you combine these synergies with the very
15 small up front cost to the San Antonio cantonment proposal
16 that is before you, and with the long term savings from such
17 cantonment, that are twice as large as the DOD's proposals to
18 uproot the missions, then keeping the research work in San
19 Antonio makes sense and saves dollars.
20 Keeping the logistics depot at Kelly is an even
21 easier decision. That's because Kelly is the most cost
22 effective location in the Department of Defense to conduct

Page 342

1 aircraft depot maintenance. Kelly's labor costs are lower;
2 the quality of work higher; and the productivity greater than
3 at any other depot.
4 Your task is not easy, but it is clear that moving
5 the cost effective missions at Kelly or Brooks elsewhere
6 would not provide the taxpayers the value for their dollar
7 they are receiving now, nor would it assure continued top
8 quality support for our military personnel in missions around
9 the world. We live in a world where danger still lurks. It
10 lurks in the dreams of tyrants, like Saddam Hussein; in the
11 access of terrorist organizations to weapons of mass
12 destruction; and in instability and uncertainty on all
13 continents.
14 Danger of another kind lurks right here at home, in
15 out of control budget deficits that threaten the futures of
16 all of our children. This commission was charged with
17 combatting both dangers. And today I'm here to say that by
18 continuing the good work at Kelly and Brooks, driven by the
19 people of San Antonio in Military City, we can protect
20 against both such dangers.
21 Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank you
22 commissioners, as well.

Page 343

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Mr. Smith. We
2 nize Representative Henry Bonilla.
3 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: Thank you, Chairman. very
4 ch: it's nice to see you again.
5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
6 REPRESENTATIVE BONILLA: You can walk into almost
7 any room, after walking down any hallway in the city, on any
8 given day of the week in this city, the most powerful city on
9 Earth, and find a hearing going on. But this hearing that's
10 being conducted here today, there is none more important,
11 none more significant to the people of South Texas as the
12 decisions are being formulated the next several weeks, based
13 on the information that you're hearing today and that you've
14 gathered while out visiting the bases.
15 The last seven days have been profound for me, and
16 they have been a time that I'll remember for the rest of my
17 life -- watching 35,000 people line the streets of San
18 Antonio during your visit; then watching close to 20,000 in
19 Del Rio coming out to save Laughlin Air Force Base. And
20 frankly, I was delighted to see the looks on some of the
21 faces of the commissioners that visited that day -- looking
22 at the signs, reading what people had come out to tell you

Page 344

1 after their businesses had closed to allow them to come out
2 and show their support.
3 And hopefully, what has happened in the last seven
4 days has touched your life as well, and will be taken into
5 consideration as you make some very tough choices. Let me
6 take this opportunity to share with you my perspective, as a
7 member of the National Security Subcommittee of the House
8 Appropriations Committee. As a member of that committee, I'm
9 nstantly reminded of the very real constraints that we are
10 riencing in the defense budget.
11 We're having increasingly difficult times ensuring
12 that our military is provided with an adequate quality of
13 life and the tools and training to remain number one in terms
14 of our fighting force in this world. I personally welcome
15 your assistance in this effort to cut costs and make our
16 military more economically efficient. Laughlin and Kelly Air
17 Force Bases are the low cost providers for the United States
18 Air Force.
19 Closing either one of these bases will not be cost
20 effective, and will not serve the taxpayers' best interest.
21 We should not close facilities unless it saves money. A few
22 short days ago, a few of you were with us, as I mentioned in

Page 345

1 my opening remarks, and you visited Del Rio. You saw with
2 your own eyes the strong case for Laughlin. No other
3 undergraduate pilot training facility matches Laughlin. Its
4 weather and air space remain unsurpassed by any other
5 facility. And what this means is, dollars saved -- dollars
6 saved by fewer canceled missions; dollars saved by less time
7 traveling to useable air space; dollars saved by a low cost
8 and efficient workforce.
9 Laughlin trains the best pilots in the United
10 States Air Force. That is Laughlin's first contribution to
11 our national defense. Laughlin's cost effectiveness is its
12 second contribution to our national defense. These savings
13 free up additional dollars to be spent on quality of life, on
14 procurement, and training. These savings are vital for our
15 national defense. Without Laughlin, America would simply be
16 weaker.
17 I am proud to be Laughlin's representative, and the
18 people of Del Rio are very proud to be the home of the best
19 e base in the Air Force. And now for Kelly. I grew up
20 e shadows of Kelly Air Force Base. My father worked at
21 lly for roughly 30 years. I probably would not be here
22 today were it not for what Kelly Air Force Base provided for

Page 346

1 my family, and the opportunities it provided for many other
2 San Antonians as well.
3 Kelly is the lowest cost depot. Kelly has the
4 lowest labor cost, the highest quality, and this is nothing
5 that you've heard for the first time. This has been Kelly's
6 story for decades. As a member of the Appropriations
7 Committee, it would trouble me if we did not make cost
8 effective choices. I'm working hard to stretch federal
9 dollars. Assets like Kelly help me make my job much easier.
10 Our government must learn to deliver service as
11 well as for a lower cost. The BRAC can make that task easier
12 for all of us. I urge you to make cost efficiency a goal in
13 your decision-making process. We gain little and, in fact,
14 hurt ourselves, if closures cost money. Our goal must always
15 be saving money, not just closing bases. In simple terms, we
16 are closing bases to save money.
17 If it costs us money to close them, then we are
18 defeating the purpose of the base closure process. Kelly is
19 a tool we need in the battle to control government spending.
20 We should be looking at transferring workload to Kelly to
21 control costs. Low costs benefit the taxpayers, and make
22 dollars available for other vital Department of Defense

Page 347

1 missions. In fact, the issue of excess capacity is only
2 relevant in terms of its cost impact.
3 Now, to Brooks. San Antonio's cantonment proposal
4 maximizes the returns for taxpayers from closing Brooks Air
5 Force Base. This proposal results in considerable savings
6 with few closure costs. In addition, it keeps in tact the
7 workforce which has made Brooks a world-class facility. I
8 know you will give this proposal the serious consideration it
9 deserves. I don't have to tell you how strongly the people
10 of Del Rio and San Antonio support their military bases --
11 many of you have seen that firsthand.
12 You have personally witnessed this, and I sincerely
13 doubt that there are any communities in this great nation
14 with such strong and long standing support for our military.
15 That's why we are proudly known, in San Antonio, as Military
16 City, USA. Thank you for giving me a chance to testify
17 before your committee today. I appreciate your help with the
18 effort to save taxpayer dollars. Your jobs are very tough,
19 and I know you have some very difficult decisions ahead. And
20 we appreciate your commitment to this country.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. We
22 recognize Representative Frank Tejeda.

Page 348

1 REPRESENTATIVE TEJEDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
2 members of the commission. We are both here for the same
3 purpose, and that's to save taxpayers' dollars. As a
4 representative of the 28th congressional district, I have
5 been sent to Washington to be an effective steward of the
6 taxpayers' dollars. As created by Congress, the Defense Base
7 Closure and Realignment Commission is charged with making
8 decisions which must maximize military value and cost
9 savings.
10 The decisions this commission will make aren't
11 necessarily more difficult than the previous commissions.
12 I'm here to discuss two San Antonio bases, each of which have
13 served this nation for more than 75 years, First, Kelly Air
14 Force Base. Kelly is the most cost effective and productive
15 depot in the Defense Department today. Part of Kelly's
16 success is its low cost of labor, measured by the actual
17 overall labor and overhead rate.
18 According to figures published in DOD manuals, San
19 Antonio has maintained the lowest rates of all Air Force and
20 Navy depots from 1987 through 1993. Although its rates went
21 up in 1994, according to monthly DOD reports, San Antonio is
22 once again the lowest in 1995. In fact, San Antonio was the

Page 349

1 only ALC whose rates went down instead of up from 1994 to
2 1995. Closing Kelly would be an unacceptable financial
3 investment.
4 For example, the cost of military construction for
5 another ALC to absorb the C-5 workload would exceed $80
6 million. The 1994 headquarters Air Force material command's
7 AFMC-21 study estimated the MILCON costs at $52 million for
8 program maintenance of 13 aircraft. For the current
9 projected annual workload for 21 C-5s, that figure increases
10 to $82 million. However, this estimate does not include
11 transfer of equipment and personnel, training costs, or added
12 production costs, which would add another $147 million.
13 The resulting cost would provide only the minimal
14 maintenance facilities to do the job. The gaining depot
15 still would not have the same superb wide body aircraft
16 capability that Kelly already possesses. A complete
17 replication of these one of a kind facilities would raise the
18 costs to an astronomical level. On the other hand, San
19 Antonio can absorb a small aircraft workload in addition to
20 the C-5 workload, without building any new facilities.
21 That is military value, and that is cost
22 effectiveness. Two thoughts on Brooks Air Force Base.

Page 350

1 First, the enormous up front cost to move its missions
2 elsewhere is unacceptable, given the small return on such an
3 investment. In fact, such costs may rise above the original
4 estimate. In fact, attempting to relocate these missions
5 elsewhere, without most of the personnel, will seriously
6 disrupt the valuable work being performed.
7 Moving the work away from San Antonio will result
8 in the loss of many, if not most, of the scientists who would
9 not relocate. The missions at Brooks will not disappear.
10 Brooks is home to the only integrated human systems research
11 effort in the Defense Department. The Armstrong Lab is a
12 world leader in its mission area, with such unique facilities
13 as hyperbaric chambers, altitude chambers, one of three
14 spatial disorientation demonstrators in the world, directed
15 energy chambers, and a centrifuge.
16 The Armstrong Lab provides 30 percent of the
17 faculty of the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine. This
18 is the nation's leading aerospace medical training program.
19 In addition, the one of a kind configuration of biomedical
20 research and teaching activities in San Antonio provides an
21 invaluable resource for the Defense Department. Also at
22 Brooks, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence is

Page 351

1 essential to long term Air Force environmental programs in
2 the areas of compliance, hazardous waste clean up, and
3 environmental planning.
4 The permanent facility is currently under
5 construction, and will be completed in the very near future.
6 The San Antonio community has worked hard in support of an
7 alternative to the Air Force's recommendation. The
8 community's plan is innovative, and merits very serious
9 consideration. The pay off will avoid the high and somewhat
10 uncertain up front costs, save more than $100 million over 20
11 years, and avoid disruption to vital research and
12 environmental programs, without the loss of many scientists.
13 Mr. Chairman, that is military value, and that is
14 cost effectiveness. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman.
16 The Chair recognizes Representative Greg Laughlin.
17 REPRESENTATIVE LAUGHLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
18 and distinguished commissioners. I'm here today to speak on
19 behalf of the men and women of the 14th district who proudly
20 serve in the 924th Air Force Reserve unit. But before doing
21 so, I certainly would echo the words of my colleagues, Frank
22 Tejeda and Henry Bonilla, for I'm familiar with their bases,

Page 352

1 also having constituents that work and serve there.
2 Today I come before you to speak in behalf of a
3 commitment made by Secretary Boatright when, on behalf of the
4 BRAC, he told the citizens of Austin that if they were to
5 pass a bond election and the airport operational by 1996,
6 then they would be able to keep their reserve unit. No one
7 in his or her right mind would think that this commitment was
8 made for eternity. But certainly, as we talk about saving
9 dollars, the commitment of the federal government ought to be
10 worth a few dollars and cents.
11 And certainly the commitment ought to be honored
12 past the opening date of that facility. The 1986 Goldwater-
13 Nichols Act mandates combined commands and joint operations
14 between the various services of the government, military
15 services. With Fort Hood, our nation's largest military
16 facility, 50 nautical miles from Bergstrom, and with the
17 924th operating in approximately 25 percent of all joint
18 training exercises at Fort Hood, military preparedness and
19 military defense of our nation mandates that the 924th at
20 Bergstrom remain there.
21 That training can take place with minimal cost to
22 the taxpayer. Currently, only two Air Force reserve

Page 353

1 facilities are located in air quality attainment areas.
2 Bergstrom Air Force Base is one of those areas. And isn't it
3 ironic that at a time we talk about closing vital bases such
4 as Bergstrom, the American taxpayer is paying billions of
5 dollars to subsidize our allies' defense by keeping overseas
6 bases open.
7 Instead of closing Bergstrom, we should close bases
8 overseas, which were originally constructed and are still
9 kept open to counter a Soviet threat which no longer exists.
10 And finally, it seems to me incredible that so many Air Force
11 reserve bases and units have been added to the closure
12 consideration list, while not a single Air National Guard
13 unit has been mentioned.
14 I raise this question as an oddity of sober
15 deliberation, or is it rather the product of naked political
16 maneuvering? The question remains, as was asked by one of my
17 Republican colleagues on the National Security Committee last
18 month, why we have a separate Air National Guard from an Air
19 Force Reserve unit. And he asked the question because, as I
20 recall, he was from the state of Indiana, did the witness
21 have any information that the state of Illinois or Ohio have
22 a plan of attack or aggression.

Page 354

1 And so I ask you to simply consider, why is it that
2 no Air National Guards are on this list? And if it's a
3 matter of state pride for our governors, then we as a
4 responsible committee should ask them to pick up the
5 financial tab. Because as you well know, the federal
6 government pays in excess of 95 percent of the Guard's
7 expense and operation.
8 So I submit to you today that there is no reason to
9 close the 924th, when just a few weeks ago, men and women of
10 that unit were flying combat missions under the direction of
11 our Commander-in-Chief. So it's a question today of our
12 government keeping a commitment to a few American citizens.
13 I thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Congressman
15 Laughlin. Now a gentleman who's been waiting so patiently.
16 I believe he was the first member of the delegation to
17 arrive, Representative Kika de la Garza.
18 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you very much,
19 Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, and I don't mind
20 waiting. My district has been spared. I'm here to speak in
21 behalf of all of my colleagues, and the people of the state
22 of Texas. It's good to have this opportunity to appear

Page 355

1 before you today. And as is evident from the Texas presence
2 e this afternoon, we are very concerned about some of the
3 ommendations for the closure and realignment in our state.
4 In fact, I think that all of my Texas colleagues
5 will attest to the fact that some of the targets of the BRAC
6 95 unfairly impact us. Each member here has presented strong
7 and compelling details, and specific about their bases. Mr.
8 Chairman, I'll be very brief. There is no one that could
9 challenge the Texas strong and solid military tradition. My
10 family came in 1605, the original ones, as members of the
11 armed forces of the Kingdom of Spain. And we've been there
12 since.
13 And every generation has served, including myself
14 and the generation after me. I would like to make one
15 specific note, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and ask
16 that the commission reconsider the Navy's recommendation to
17 realign T-44 training to NAS Pensacola. Quite simply, with
18 the new pilot training rate requirements, there is not
19 sufficient capacity at NAS Pensacola to train multi-engine
20 pilots.
21 In addition, what would seem to me to be a very
22 practical consideration is the fact that South Texas has

Page 356

1 vast, unencumbered air space and good weather unmatched by
2 any area in this nation. The decisions that you will make in
3 the final weeks will, I know, be based on the information
4 presented here today. And I know that you will consider it
5 carefully and thoughtfully and with the seriousness that it
6 matters.
7 And I join all of my Texas colleagues in asking you
8 that your decisions be made on the facts presented here
9 today; and for that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. Before you
11 e. I'd like you to introduce the young gentleman you have
12 h you. I notice he's been waiting just as patiently.
13 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Well, he's been asking
14 how many more to go. This is grandson, Phil Ferias, from
15 Austin, Texas, that's helping me out for this week.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Welcome.
17 REPRESENTATIVE de la GARZA: Thank you, Mr.
18 Chairman.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: He must be your advisor,
20 right, sir? Before we move into Utah, I will relinquish the
21 chair. I'd like to thank the great and diverse state of
22 Texas for keeping us on time, and for the excellent

Page 357

1 presentations they've given us. With that, I'd like to turn
2 it over to my distinguished colleague, Commissioner Wendi
3 Steele.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: [Presiding.] Good afternoon.
5 I'd like to recognize Senator Orrin Hatch, please.
6 SENATOR HATCH: Madame Chairman, and distinguished
7 BRAC commissioners, let me try to be brief. Hill Air Force
8 Base is simply the best of the best. And I'm not saying that
9 just to be saying it. It is the best operational base, and
10 it is the best depot. Two rating groups have come to this
11 conclusion. Their findings have been twice verified by Air
12 Force Under Secretary Rudy de Leon.
13 First, in evaluating the five air logistics centers
14 for both operational and depot excellence, the Air Force Base
15 Closure Executive Group found that only Hill was rated as
16 tier one in both the operations and depot categories. Hill
17 received 33 out of a maximum 39 points. Tinker Air Force
18 Base was second, with 29 points. Second, the joint cross
19 vice group, in evaluating military value, gave Hill and
20 mer Robins the highest rating.
21 Now, what makes Hill the best of the best? It is
22 the pervasive winner mentality of its workforce. Let me give

Page 358

1 you just five examples, and I could give you many more.
2 First, Hill's two F-16 wings have won two of the last four
3 Gunsmoke competitions. Base wings are co-located on the Air
4 Force's best depot and on the Utah test and training range --
5 the best exercise facility in the world.
6 This combination has produced winners where it has
7 counted most of all, and that's in battle. Secondly, Hill is
8 the only maintenance site for the nation's ICBM fleet, with a
9 workforce cited by Vice President Al Gore as the heroes of
10 reinvention. And Hill is the single most important
11 inspection site of the START I treaty. Third, the commanders
12 of the units that fly into danger have cited Hill as the
13 leader in two level maintenance support.
14 Its successful programs for critical F-16 avionics
15 and radar equipment led to substantial savings for our Air
16 Force. And its avionics, such as the radar systems that
17 detect missiles targeted on our aircraft, of course, have
18 saved lives. Fourth, Hill won the cross service competition
19 to provide maintenance to the Navy's FA-18 tactical fighter.
20 The GAO recently confirmed that Hill's performance was
21 $11,000 per aircraft cheaper or less than the best competing
22 naval depot.

Page 359

1 And fifth, in the past two years, Hill has won five
2 environmental awards, culminating with its win of the
3 Secretary of Defense's environmental quality award as the
4 "best" in the DOD. Hill spills over with excellence, and its
5 vast capacity offers savings and successes with each
6 potential expansion of its base mission. Let me give you
7 just four reasons why our future air power will depend on
8 Hill.
9 First, Hill is now the logistics manager and depot
10 for the world's largest aircraft fleet, the F-16, used by 21
11 nations which share our regional and global security
12 objectives. Secondly, the cross service competition has
13 proven that Hill Air Force Base, perhaps more than any other
14 DOD installation, will become the Defense Department's most
15 cost efficient tactical fighter depot. Third, it is already
16 the world's largest overhaul facility for landing gear,
17 struts, wheels and brakes, accommodating 70 percent of DOD's
18 work; and with the capacity to do it all and to do it very
19 well.
20 And fourth, Madame Chairman and members of the
21 commission, Hill is clearly the logical source to consolidate
22 tactical missile work. It already does 92 percent of the Air

Page 360

1 Force mission, and 48 percent of DOD's, and can manage an
2 expanded mission with ease, efficiency, and economy. In
3 summary, Madame Chairman, Hill should be workloaded to its
4 fullest capacity.
5 We all know what the results are certain to be.
6 When everything is said and done, the one lingering
7 obligation that morally hangs over all of our heads is to
8 insist on a standard of excellence, even if that means the
9 loss of some of our installations. I thank the commission
10 for its consideration of my remarks, and for its visits to
11 Utah defense installations, including the defense depot
12 Ogden, which, in my opinion, is still the best in the DLA.
13 And I hope you'll consider that, as well. I
14 believe the commission will act in the best interest of our
15 national defense. I believe you're committed to do that, and
16 I urge you to do that. But we all need to remember this --
17 it is the young people in our military services, like my
18 brother who was killed in the Second World War, like CPT
19 Scott O'Grady, who risk their lives for our nation, and who
20 ought to expect the very best equipment and maintenance of
21 that equipment that our nation can provide.
22 And Hill Air Force Base is doing just exactly that.

Page 361

1 Let me just say that I believe in you, and I believe you'll
2 do what is best for our country, and I urge you to do so, and
3 not let any politics enter into it at all. Do what's right.
4 And in the end, I think most people will accept that. Thanks
5 so much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator Hatch.
7 And now, your colleague, Senator Bennett.
8 SENATOR BENNETT: Thank you very much, Madame
9 Chairman. I'm here as a senator, but I can't shake my past,
10 which is primarily in the business world. I have sympathy
11 for what you're doing, because I've had to do it myself --
12 downsize a corporation. It's always painful; it means people
13 get laid off; it means people get exciting plans postponed,
14 if not killed; and it's never fun.
15 However, there are some particular guiding
16 principles that apply, I think, in business or government.
17 And if I may be so presumptuous, I will try to suggest some
18 of them to you. One, of course, is that after you've visited
19 the facility and you've gotten the feel of things and you've
20 got a sense of smell about it, you go back and look at the
21 numbers. And if the numbers are properly compiled, they
22 don't lie to you, and they usually confirm the sense of smell

Page 362

1 that you have.
2 The numbers on Hill, Senator Hatch has given you
3 some. I won't belabor them. It is rated number one in
4 military value, the top rated base. But look at the
5 financial numbers. The return on your investment if you
6 close Hill is 29 years. And anybody who's tried to make a
7 return on investment calculation knows that 29 years is long
8 enough that it's going to slip.
9 In other words, there is a very good possibility,
10 from the numbers that you're being given, that in fact,
11 you'll get no return, ever, on your investment on closing
12 Hill, if it's that far out in the future. Of the ALCs you're
13 looking at, the one time cost of closing Hill is the highest.
14 If you decide we have to close one ALC, the most expensive
15 one you can close is Hill, at $1.418 billion.
16 Those are what the numbers say. I could give you a
17 great deal more. You've heard it all; you've examined it
18 all. I highlight those, and assume that since I'm so
19 brilliant and have convinced you that Hill must stay open, I
20 want to take the advantage of asking you to give Hill more
21 work, rather than less. And in your procedures, it's good
22 business sense to consolidate tactical missile workload to

Page 363

1 Hill.
2 Once again, let's look at the numbers. The depot
3 maintenance operation indicator report, the cost at Hill is
4 $69, compared to $101 at Letterkenny. Based on the cost
5 comparability handbooks the Army report, depot hourly rates
6 Hill at $49, compared to $65 at Letterkenny. There will be a
7 $15 million per year cost of savings if you bring that work
8 to Hill.
9 So convinced you in the first instance to keep
10 Hill, and now as a salesman still wearing my business suit,
11 tell you, send Hill more work. One other comment. Reference
12 has been made to DDOU. And several of you were at DDOU and
13 saw that. I understand, looking at the numbers, DDOU didn't
14 come out so well. So am I going to change my tune now and
15 say, no, don't look at the numbers this time; look at
16 something else?
17 No, I say look at the numbers because we understand
18 that the calculation made on the cost to close DDOU was made
19 on the assumption that DEPMEDS -- and those of you that were
20 there remember those as the medical things that go in boxes
21 and all the rest of this -- were included. In fact, through
22 some kind of error, DEPMEDS was left out of the statistical

Page 364

1 analysis, which means that the numbers you have, without
2 keeping the DEPMEDS program going, are wrong.
3 And I ask you to go back to DLA and recalculate the
4 DDOU circumstance, saying, oops, we left DEPMEDS out of the
5 calculation before; we need to put it in. And having said
6 that, I think then I can go back to my original pitch and say
7 you can trust the numbers. So I conclude by giving you my
8 best wishes for the challenge that you have; my conviction
9 that you will do it right and intelligently; and my certainty
10 that if you do, Hill will stay open, Hill will receive more
11 work, and DDOU will get a second look. Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Senator, thank you for your
13 testimony, and for your kind note that you sent the other
14 day, as well. And now, Congressman Hansen, who so faithfully
15 traveled about the state with us, as we looked at your
16 installations.
17 REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN: Well, thank you. It's good
18 to see you again. I appreciate the work you folks do. I
19 can't think of a harder job than the one you folks have. And
20 thank you for all you've done, in coming to Utah as many
21 times as you do. Let me take a moment and address a few of
22 the specific issues facing us in Utah. First is the Army's

Page 365

1 recommendation to significantly realign Dougway Proving
2 Grounds by closing the English Village housing area and
3 realigning over 250 vital support positions, including fire
4 fighters and medical personnel.
5 The current proposal also reallocates between six
6 and eight vital command and control positions. To this date,
7 I cannot find anyone -- except for General Shane of the BRAC
8 office -- that supports this recommendation. Even prior to
9 the release of the original BRAC list, the Pentagon chief
10 scientists, Mr. Philip Coyle and Mr. John Burke, called this
11 decision a major show-stopper, and actually recommended the
12 Department of Defense develop recommendations to relocate and
13 consolidate all chemi-bio testing and research activities to
14 Dougway.
15 Let me remind everybody what we're talking about.
16 Dougway Proving Ground is the size of Rhode Island. It is
17 the only place in the country where we can do the critical
18 chemical and biological test missions currently done at
19 Dougway. I do not have to tell you how important the work
20 is, protecting our military forces and civilian population in
21 an increasing dangerous world.
22 Commissioner Kling and Steele can tell you, have

Page 366

1 both been there. Dougway is very isolated. If the dedicated
2 professionals at Dougway Proving Ground are to be doing this
3 important and dangerous work safely and with the decent
4 quality of life, they must live at Dougway. There is simply
5 no housing outside the gate. In fact, there is no housing
6 for over 60 miles, over a high mountain pass which is covered
7 with snow as late as last week.
8 I feel so strongly about this issue that I've told
9 the Army if they cannot see the tremendous military value of
10 keeping English Village open to provide the necessary support
11 for Dougway Proving Grounds, then I'll just as soon fight to
12 close the whole thing. I'll do like I did once before, and
13 put in a bill to close that base. I really can see no reason
14 to do it any other way.
15 You simply cannot have Dougway Proving Ground
16 without the support of English Village. I hope you will move
17 to resolve this issue with the Army at tomorrow's hearing.
18 On another subject, I must repeat my disappointment with the
19 decision not to add any Defense Logistic Agency distribution
20 depots for further analysis. Studying these facilities
21 arbitrarily left out the original DLA analysis is the only
22 way to guarantee a full and fair hearing based on real

Page 367

1 numbers for the Defense Depot at Ogden, Utah.
2 The one thing the Peat Marwick study does tell us
3 at DLA has no idea who is their most cost efficient and
4 productive depot. I would continue to argue that the depot
5 that continually returns money to the department, the one
6 that makes a profit is the most efficient, and ought to be
7 kept. I strongly believe that DLA is closing their best
8 depot and the best deal for the American taxpayer.
9 I ask you to reconsider the DLA recommendation to
10 close DDOU. I believe a re-look at this decision is
11 particularly imperative, as you consider closing even more
12 DLA warehouse facilities associated with the closure of any
13 more air logistics centers. I also want to point out that if
14 DDOU is recommended for closure, there are a number of
15 important and independent missions performed at the depot,
16 including the DEPMEDS, the computer design center and the
17 Defense Reutilization and Marketing, that would be
18 dramatically affected by relocation, with no military
19 economic benefit.
20 I would also note here that I find it interesting
21 that the cost to move the DEPMEDS mission was not included in
22 the DLA's COBRA analysis of the cost to close DDOU. And I

Page 368

1 think that's an important point. They would have represented
2 one of the single largest costs. The fact is that all these
3 important missions should be left at Ogden. The Ogden
4 community is more than willing to come up with a creative
5 solution that meets everyone's needs.
6 I believe the lease back arrangement your staff has
7 been briefed on presents a win-win possibility. I hope you
8 have a chance to discuss these issues with DLA tomorrow in
9 their hearing. Lastly, I would be remiss not to repeat what
10 my other colleagues have already said, as has the senior
11 leadership of the Air Force, regarding Hill Air Force Base
12 and Ogden Air Logistics Center.
13 Hill is simply the best depot and the best
14 operational base from among the other depots. To my mind, it
15 makes both military and economic sense to fully workload your
16 best facility and reduce your excess capacity by closing one
17 or two depots. I believe, and I think the Air Force will
18 testify tomorrow, if questioned, that Hill Air Force Base is
19 the future for fighter aircraft maintenance and testing.
20 Hill's combination of maintenance facilities,
21 operational wings and the Utah Test and Training Range is
22 just simply unmatched. But you don't have to take my word

Page 369

1 for it. I know you have all seen the letter from the
2 assistant secretary, Rudy de Leon, which placed Hill Air
3 Force Base in the top tier. Now let me tell you some things
4 you probably don't know.
5 This week I will be attending an Air Force ceremony
6 at the Pentagon, honoring Hill Air Force Base and the 388th
7 fighter wing for maintenance excellence. I've also just
8 received a draft report in which GAO confirms, which we have
9 always known, that the Ogden Air Logistics was a less
10 expensive option for the maintenance of the Navy's FA-18s.
11 At the risk of sounding like a broken record, Ogden is the
12 best, and should be fully workloaded to give the American
13 people and the American soldiers their best value.
14 I also believe that Hill should be the Air Force's
15 center of excellence for airborne tactical and missile
16 maintenance, and should also be considered for single site
17 consolidation, if the decision reached in BRAC 93 is to be
18 reversed. Again, I thank you for your hard work, and the
19 honest deliberations you've given us, and for coming out to
20 Utah. It's been great to be with you, and I thank you so
21 much for what you're doing. I hope you take these
22 things into consideration.

Page 370

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
2 thank you for your testimony. Now, Congresswoman Enid
3 Waldholz.
4 REPRESENTATIVE WALDHOLZ: Thank you, Madame
5 Chairman, commissioners. I want to thank you for the
6 opportunity to speak on behalf of the people of Utah,
7 particularly the second district, which I represent, in
8 detailing for you just a few of the reasons why Hill Air
9 Force Base, together with the Ogden Air Logistics Center is
10 so vital not only to our state and its citizens, but to the
11 overall military capability of the United States.
12 Hill Air Force Base, together with the towns and
13 cities that surround it, make up a thriving American
14 community, anchored by the jobs of more than 21,000 men and
15 women who work round the clock to do their part to keep
16 America and its allies free. Utahans have long been
17 emotionally attached to Hill Air Force Base. They've shed
18 tears at the passing of its pilots and crews. They've shared
19 great pride at the news of successful missions of Hill's
20 fighter wings in conflicts around the world.
21 And they've shared the success of Utah's team when
22 Hill's active and reserve fighter wings have taken top prize

Page 371

1 at the Air Force Gunsmoke competitions. And from a purely
2 economic point of view, Utahans, particularly those that live
3 along the Wasatch Front, have benefitted both directly and
4 indirectly from the powerful economic presence of Hill Air
5 Force Base.
6 If Hill were to close, the negative economic impact
7 would be nearly double that of any other state with an air
8 logistics center. Current Department of Defense
9 recommendations are going to reduce jobs in Utah by 20
10 percent, and that's in addition to the 53 percent overall
11 defense cuts Utah has already taken in the last seven years.
12 If Hill were to close, that figure will rise up to an
13 incredible 90 percent cut of defense spending in Utah in the
14 last nine years.
15 Utahans have always answered the call of their
16 country to aid in its defense, and they fully expect to
17 continue to do their part as the nation starts to tighten its
18 belt. But it's clear from these figures that Utah has
19 already taken more than its share of cuts. Whether you look
20 at the state by state figures or the overall national
21 figures, you can clearly see that Utah has been the recipient
22 of very severe cuts over the past several years.

Page 372

1 Looking at the economics from a different angle, I
2 hope you'll consider that, as a percentage of personal
3 income, Utah is fourth in civilian defense salary, behind
4 only Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Hawaii, with a total
5 annual impact in excess of $2 billion. With the military
6 history that's been fully representative of our nation's
7 fighting forces spanning many, many decades, and fully
8 utilizing Utah's unique landscape and geographical assets,
9 Utah has become economically dependent on the defense
10 establishment for the simple reason that the defense
11 establishment has been equally dependent on Utah.
12 While every state that comes before you can and
13 will talk about its economic ties to the military, not every
14 state has been subjected to fallout from nuclear tests or
15 stores volatile chemical weapons for the nation's arsenal.
16 But Hill Air Force Base doesn't just deserve to stay open for
17 the sake of the Utah economy or for other reasons of
18 fairness.
19 Let me remind you briefly what America is getting
20 for the dollars it is spending in Utah. Utah has long been
21 known in all business and manufacturing circles as having one
22 of the highest skilled, best trained, and most highly

Page 373

1 motivated workforces in the nation. Hill Air Force Base is
2 home to more than 21,000 of these industrious, hardworking
3 and dedicated individuals. And our country's military is the
4 beneficiary.
5 Accordingly, it can't be said enough, Hill Air
6 Force Base is the highest rated ALC for military value in the
7 Air Force. There simply is no other way to state Hill's
8 importance to our country's military fighting forces. And
9 there is no other factor that should be more significant in
10 determining which ALCs should remain in service. Our
11 military is built on a bedrock of fairness, honor and
12 excellence. And simply put, on objective criteria, Hill is
13 the best.
14 For our nation's sake, it should remain open. In
15 closing, let me express my gratitude to the commissioners for
16 their careful and their dedicated consideration of Hill Air
17 Force Base. You've taken the time to visit Hill, to listen
18 to those of us who advocate its value to America as well as
19 to the people of Utah. Please support the continued
20 effectiveness and excellence of one of the brightest stars in
21 America's defense team, and vote to keep Hill Air Force Base
22 and the Ogden ALC open.

Page 374

1 Thank you again for your time and consideration.
2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congresswoman, and
3 you made it under your five minutes, so you get a bonus or
4 something here. In closing out the Utah delegation, we have
5 Representative Bill Orton.
6 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Thank you, commissioners.
7 And if we would get a bonus sufficient to keep the bases
8 open, I would yield back the balance of my time.
9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Actually, one of your
10 colleagues used extra time, so it's probably a wash, if you
11 must know.
12 REPRESENTATIVE ORTON: Okay. Well, it is a
13 pleasure for me to come and join with you to express my
14 support and views on the status of Hill Air Force Base, DDO
15 Utah, as well as Dougway Proving Ground. As the only
16 Democrat in the Utah delegation, I can tell you this is not a
17 partisan or a political issue. We are a united delegation
18 who have worked together tirelessly.
19 And I would like to commend the other members of
20 the delegation for their work and their testimony here today.
21 As a member of Congress and a member of the Budget Committee,
22 I come to you as one, who, from the very beginning of time,

Page 375

1 when I was elected, have supported downsizing of military
2 bases; have supported consolidation; have supported the very
3 reductions which are what you're striving to accomplish.
4 I understand your difficult job, and support what
5 you're doing in it. Even though I do not represent the
6 district in which these bases are located, I grew up there.
7 I know the workforce. I know that, in fact, the people
8 employed at these bases are the best workforce anywhere in
9 the country. In fact, I began my career as a civilian
10 employee at Defense Depot Ogden.
11 My father retired after 30 years of service as a
12 civilian employee at the fire department at Hill Air Force
13 Base. My brother-in-law and uncle currently work there.
14 It's no accident that people are wanting to move to Utah and
15 Ogden in order to live and raise their family. We have a
16 tremendous work ethic in Utah. The quality of our workforce
17 is outstanding -- well-educated, loyal, and growing.
18 The availability there of a growing, or of a well-
19 educated workforce is a tremendous asset to the federal
20 government. Now, for the most part, you're not going to be
21 hearing any new information here. But let me just refer the
22 commission to a study which did occur recently, which you

Page 376

1 have just received information on -- a COBRA study that has
2 been mentioned by a couple of other members of our
3 delegation.
4 The DLA, in analyzing the cost to close Defense
5 Depot Ogden did not include the cost of moving the DEPMEDS.
6 These DEPMEDS -- deployable medical centers -- the only place
7 in the country they are deployed from is Defense Depot Ogden.
8 The COBRA study will indicate to you that it will cost
9 upwards of $380 million to move that segment of what occurs
10 at DDO. So you thought it was $110 million, add $380
11 million, you're up almost to $500 million to close that
12 facility and move it. So it does deserve a second look.
13 I believe -- and in fact, what I want you to do is
14 what is best for the Defense Department. You're going to
15 hear from everybody here today, all the members, saying don't
16 close the base in my backyard. I'm asking the commission to
17 do the best thing for the Department of Defense, the best
18 thing for the people of this nation; and that is, look at the
19 facts, look at the resources, look at the cost efficiencies,
20 analyze the human resource asset, analyze the unique missions
21 and the irreplaceable missions, analyze the efficiency on
22 these bases.

Page 377

1 I'm confident if you do that, you will reach the
2 same conclusion that I and the other members of our
3 delegation have reached. So in closing, I would ask you to
4 keep in mind the following points. Defense Depot Ogden, in
5 direct comparison with other depots, ranks at or near the top
6 in overall efficiency of operations. The '94 study done by
7 Peat Marwick found Defense Depot Ogden the most cost
8 efficient of the five depots studied.
9 Hill Air Force Base, in any comparison with other
10 bases or air logistic centers, emerges as a superb facility,
11 if not number one, with critical missions and significant
12 capacity for expansion. The support that this gives the Utah
13 Test and Training Range is a great variety of unique
14 capabilities which cannot be replaced. In order for the
15 Department of Defense to continue to operate in the most cost
16 effective manner, while maintaining operational capabilities
17 which include surge ability and adequate infrastructure to
18 meet worldwide commitments, it must retain its best
19 facilities.
20 Defense Depot Ogden, Hill Air Force Base, and
21 Dougway are top notch facilities which qualify among the very
22 best, and need to be retained. So in closing, I am mindful

Page 378

1 of the very tough choices you're facing. I recognize
2 everyone coming here is going to be asking you not to close
3 their bases. And all I ask is that you consider the
4 facilities in Ogden from a fair and objective analysis.
5 I'm confident, in doing so, that you will come to
6 the same conclusion, that these bases cannot be spared. So
7 thank you very much for your consideration.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Congressman, and
9 thank you for the testimony on behalf of your whole
10 delegation. We appreciate it. Now we're moving along to the
11 state of Virginia. And I notice, in spite of back to back
12 votes, Senator Robb has shown up. Would you like to lead
13 off?
14 SENATOR ROBB: Madame Chair, thank you, and I do
15 appreciate it. We do have two back to back votes on, and I'm
16 sneaking over between the votes, if I may. I thank you again
17 for the opportunity to present the legislative perspective on
18 this last round of base closings. Yours is certainly not an
19 easy task, and we appreciate the fair and open manner in
20 which the BRAC hearings have proceeded. And I would say
21 simply that our differences with the DOD recommendations are
22 few, but they are important.

Page 379

1 Let me begin by joining Virginia's senior senator
2 who, if he has not already testified, will testify; and I
3 in his testimony in strongly urging you to reverse the
4 DOD recommendation to withdraw support for Fort Pickett.
5 Clearly, the Army did not take into account the utilization
6 of this key facility by other services, or the impact on East
7 Coast armor training readiness if this facility is closed.
8 Transferring control of Fort Pickett to the
9 National Guard under a so-called enclave may decrease the
10 Army's budget very slightly, but the cost to the taxpayer
11 will remain unchanged. The need for this strategically
12 located training facility has not been challenged. We
13 believe the Army should share the cost of operating it with
14 the other services who are presently using those ranges.
15 Secondly, and critically important, Madame
16 Chairman, the Navy's planning process surrounding the
17 proposal to move SPAWAR to San Diego was seriously flawed,
18 and the decision ought to be reversed. In 1993, the BRAC
19 directed that SPAWAR relocate in government owned space
20 "within the national capital region."
21 Undersecretary Danzig reinforced this policy by
22 issuing a policy imperative in April 1994 that "The

Page 380

1 Department of the Navy must co-locate the acquisition
2 workforce with the service acquisition executive, the
3 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RD&A, to ensure
4 efficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness of the acquisition
5 workforce."
6 As you know, Madame Chairman, the service
7 acquisition executive is located in the Pentagon, not in San
8 Diego. SPAWAR is the major acquisition command for hardware
9 and software for electronic systems in the world. In this
10 capacity, it works with commands and activities of the
11 national capital region and on the East Coast. Over the
12 years, they have been extraordinarily successful in carrying
13 out this role.
14 As the nation watched events unfold in Bosnia last
15 week, it struck me that the electronics aboard the ships
16 which guided the successful mission to rescue CPT O'Grady was
17 due, in large part, to SPAWAR's ability to work closely with
18 both the contractors and their ultimate fleet customers. It
19 makes no sense at all to move this critical command, with its
20 unique workforce, over 3,000 miles away from the assistant
21 secretary and their primary customers.
22 In doing the BRAC analysis for the move to San

Page 381

1 Diego, the Navy conducted COBRA models for a move to Fort
2 Monmouth and Hanscom Air Force Base. But despite the obvious
3 practical reasons to stay within the NCR, inexplicably, the
4 Navy did not even conduct COBRA runs on alternatives within
5 the national capital region.
6 In addition, the Navy did not calculate, in its
7 analysis for the San Diego move, any construction costs
8 associated with the transcontinental move, despite the fact
9 that four years ago, it spent over $10 million to relocate
10 just two blocks to its present location. And independent
11 analysis, which did conduct COBRA runs for alternatives in
12 the NCR, shows savings values in the NCR to be three to four
13 times greater than the amount projected for savings from a
14 move to San Diego.
15 This data has been made available to the staff for
16 their review. It has also come to our attention recently,
17 Madame Chairman, that the Navy is now preparing plans to
18 consolidate the systems commands. The object is to merge
19 redundant staffs and restructure the planning, budgeting and
20 acquisition roles of the system commands. We applaud this
21 change, which has been recommended by cross service groups for
22 years; most recently by the White House Commission on Roles

Page 382

1 and Missions in the Armed Forces.
2 But we would argue, Madame Chairman, that it simply
3 does not make sense to be scattering key elements of these
4 commands all across the country, even while we work to
5 rationally and efficiently consolidate our efforts. Finally,
6 Madame Chairman, nearly 40 percent of the personnel in SPAWAR
7 are in support or overhead positions, not in the line
8 positions, performing the critical functions of this command.
9 Elimination of this overhead, and combining
10 redundant functions with the other systems commands could
11 achieve the hoped for savings, without a major move, and
12 would enable this command to continue its service to its
13 primary customers, which are co-located with them in this
14 part of the country.
15 To quickly summarize my point, Madame Chairman, I
16 believe the DOD recommendation to move SPAWAR to San Diego
17 should be overturned for the following reasons. One, the
18 COBRA analysis and cost estimates were seriously flawed in
19 that they understate realistic construction costs and fail to
20 consider the more practical and efficient alternative sites
21 in NCR. Two, moving this command at this time complicates
22 efforts to consolidate the Navy systems commands.

Page 383

1 The force structure of SPAWAR suggests that the
2 planned savings can be associated by staying in their present
3 location and reducing unnecessary and redundant functions.
4 And three, keeping SPAWAR in the NCR keeps them co-located
5 with their customers and with the ASN RD&A, as required by
6 Navy policy imperatives. Madame Chairman, the Navy's own
7 data calls specified that, and I quote, "if SPAWAR were
8 relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be performed
9 slower with greater technical risk and greater expense."
10 Decreasing the efficiency of our critical commands
11 and increasing their costs, Madame Chairman, was not the
12 intent of the BRAC process. Our mission is to increase our
13 efficiency and reduce our costs. For SPAWAR, this can only
14 be done by keeping it in the national capital region. With
15 that, Madame Chairman, I thank you. I went a couple seconds
16 over. I appreciate your allowing me to not only testify
17 quickly, but to leave very briefly, because another vote is
18 in progress.
19 And Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to see you as well
20 as other members of the commission, and I thank you.
21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator. I think
22 you win for the speaking speed award. And you may take off

Page 384

1 for your vote. Thank you, sir. I believe Senator Warner is
2 voting, if I'm not mistaken, so the delegation has asked that
3 Congressman Pickett testify next.
4 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you, Madame Chairman
5 and members of the commission. I welcome this opportunity to
6 speak on behalf of the city of Virginia Beach and its sister
7 communities in greater Hampton Roads. We speak as one, in
8 support of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to
9 realign all Navy F-14 squadrons and to redirect the bulk of
10 the Atlantic fleet FA-18 Hornet assets to Naval Station
11 Oceana.
12 As you're well aware, BRAC 93 recommended Cherry
13 Point as a primary receiving site for Cecil Field F-18s. My
14 distinguished colleagues in North Carolina questioned the 95
15 directive, and asked, what has changed to justify this
16 modification? The obvious answer is force structure. BRAC
17 93 did not anticipate the immediate retirement of the entire
18 A-6 community, nor did it take into account the 50 percent
19 reduction in the number of F-14 squadrons that has occurred.
20 This leaves ample capacity at Oceana to accommodate
21 both the single-siting of all F-14s and the Cecil Field FA-18
22 squadrons. The Navy and DOD wisely chose to capitalize on

Page 385

1 Oceana's available capacity, and avoid the high cost of
2 constructing entirely new facilities at Cherry Point. The
3 military construction money saved by this decision is equal
4 to the cost of constructing an entirely new air station.
5 While there may not be agreement on exact dollar
6 values, it should be obvious to anyone that it is cheaper to
7 bear down these squadrons that are half-empty master jet
8 base, than at an air station already loaded and operating at
9 or near its maximum capacity. The cost issue and other
10 matters raised by North Carolina at the Baltimore public
11 hearing are dealt with more fully in this written rebuttal,
12 prepared by our Oceana community support group.
13 With your kind permission, I submit this document
14 for the record, and will restrict my remaining comments to a
15 few key points.
16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We'd be delighted to insert
17 that in the record.
18 REPRESENTATIVE PICKETT: Thank you. The 1995
19 recommendations clearly provide the most cost effective
20 basing plan for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. But they
21 also provide significant operational advantages. Tomcat and
22 Hornet squadrons fly into combat together from Navy carrier

Page 386

1 decks. Now they will train together from a common base
2 located only a few miles from their aircraft carrier home
3 port, within a major concentration of Navy schools and
4 training facilities, and the primary Navy and joint
5 headquarters for the Atlantic theater.
6 It is little wonder Oceana ranks first in military
7 value among the 20 Navy and Marine Corps operational air
8 stations. Oceana has a long and proud history as a master
9 jet base for carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft. This
10 excellent base offers a well-deigned airfield, capable of
11 high intensity operations; direct Navy controlled access to
12 extensive off shore training areas; comprehensive support
13 facilities; a modern infrastructure; and all necessary
14 amenities to enhance the quality of life of our military
15 personnel and their families.
16 Land encroachment at Oceana imposes no significant
17 operational limitations on aircraft landing, approaches, or
18 departures. Unlike Cherry Point, the standard left-hand
19 pattern, required by carrier pilots, is available on all
20 runways. To protect Oceana's future, the city of Virginia
21 Beach has enacted a new comprehensive airport zoning
22 ordinance, and recently required the land and budgeted $25

Page 387

1 million to relocate two 40-year-old elementary schools that
2 now marginally infringe a runway approach.
3 Oceana's unencroached outlying field at Fentriss
4 provides intensive day and night carrier landing practice on
5 a full length 8,000-foot runway, fully equipped to handle
6 emergency landings. Water supply and water quality at Oceana
7 is an absolute non-issue. Along with all other Navy bases in
8 South Hampton Roads, NAS Oceana gets its water supply
9 directly from the city of Norfolk, under a blanket contract,
10 dating back to 1947.
11 Norfolk and the Navy enjoy a longstanding
12 partnership and responsible water supply management,
13 including a 1981 joint venture for deep wells at Driver,
14 Virginia, to guarantee the Navy's water supply in an
15 emergency. In response to the air quality conformity
16 statement requirement noted in DOD's recommendation for
17 Oceana, the appropriate Virginia authorities have already
18 completed their analysis of the proposed base loading, and
19 issued documentation attesting to no impact on conformity
20 determinations for the Hampton Roads area.
21 Let me clearly and forcefully stress the fact that
22 after implementation of the 95 recommendations, Oceana will

Page 388

1 still have fewer aircraft and fewer military personnel than
2 its successfully hosted and supported during the late 1980s.
3 As mayor Obendorf of Virginia Beach told you in Baltimore,
4 the citizens of Virginia Beach are ready to roll out the red
5 carpet and welcome the Navy's best and brightest to NAS
6 Oceana, the Navy's Fightertown East.
7 Thank you very much.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much. And I
9 notice Senator Warner has arrived, and we'd be delighted to
10 hear your testimony at this time.
11 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you, Madame Chairman, and I
12 shall not take all my time. As the commission knows, we're
13 engaged in votes at this present time. Seeing my former
14 colleague and good friend, the senator from Illinois, Mr.
15 Dixon, I have to share with you an experience several of us
16 had not more than an hour ago at a beautiful service, a
17 memorium for Congressman Les Aspin.
18 And during the course of remarks from several
19 persons, including Congressman Spratt, Spratt noted the
20 following about the history of the BRAC process, and at one
21 time, Secretary Cheney took it upon himself -- and you
22 remember that, Senator, because you and I were tasked, in the

Page 389

1 Armed Services Committee, to draw up the legislation.
2 Secretary Cheney decided it wasn't needed, a BRAC commission
3 And this is what Spratt recounted in a hearing
4 public for the Armed Services Committee, whereupon Chairman
5 Aspin leaned down and said to Secretary Cheney, you remind me
6 of Claude Raines' immortal line in Casablanca, when he said,
7 I am shocked that politics would ever enter this issue; i.e.,
8 base closing. That's a direct quote.
9 Madame Chairman, and other members of the
10 commission, forgive me, I thought maybe a little moment of
11 levity --
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: It was greatly appreciated,
13 actually.
14 SENATOR WARNER: Particularly as it related to one
15 who was so knowledgeable and so influential, and provided
16 such warm friendship to those of us who are now before you
17 today. We miss him very much, and we did work with him on
18 this process. My colleagues have covered a number of items
19 here, and of course we are very appreciative of the various
20 decisions relating to Oceana, the Washington Navy Yard.
21 And on that, I would have to say that we fought the
22 battle to retain it in Virginia. I still think that's the

Page 390

1 best option. But if it's to go to the Navy Yard, that will
2 enable much of the industrial base and, indeed, many of the
3 employees to retain their offices in their homes, minimizing
4 a lot of serious dislocation; and preserving, in Crystal
5 City, a part of the economic base associated with the
6 facilities that are to be moved to the Yard.
7 It's a sound decision in terms of efficiency, and
8 therefore, we support that. I'm going to ask that my
9 statement be included, because we have another vote here
10 momentarily.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We will include it in its
12 entirety.
13 SENATOR WARNER: Thank you. While I agree with the
14 Navy regarding Naval Air Station Oceana and the NAVSEA, I
15 cannot see how their recommendation to move the Space and
16 Naval Warfare Systems Command from Arlington to San Diego,
17 California, would enhance readiness in any way. In fact, the
18 move to San Diego would adversely affect how that entity
19 accomplishes its mission.
20 Most of the business is conducted with other
21 government and civilian agencies in and around Washington,
22 putting the efficient accomplishment of this entity in

Page 391

1 considerable doubt. Now I turn to the Army installations.
Army's recommendations to realign Fort Lee's Kenner Army
munity Hospital to a clinic would indeed degrade readiness
key power projection and personnel training site.
5 And I'm sure my colleagues are going to very
6 carefully cover that, because they have been far more
7 intimately connected with that decision than others. Among
8 other things Fort Lee is an important training installation
9 that supports, on the average, nearly 4,000 military students
10 each day. For purposes of efficiency and morale, sick and
11 injured trainees who require in-patient care should be
12 hospitalized in a facility which is as close as possible to
13 their unit.
14 Perhaps the Army's medical infrastructure needs to
15 be reduced, but those reductions should not be made at
16 facilities with a high density of military students who often
17 engage in the risky training. If you could underline the
18 risky training, I think that's the key part of that decision.
19 And therefore, I join with my colleagues in urging you to
20 maintain the Army community hospital there as a full-service
21 facility.
22 Finally, I want to address the Army's proposed

Page 392

1 closure at Fort Pickett, one of the most cost effective bases
2 in America. And I had the opportunity, once again in the
3 past few days, to, on a one on one basis, discuss that issue
4 with the Army chief of staff, General Sullivan, who will soon
5 be concluding his most distinguished career. And I judged
6 from our exchange that he agrees with me on that. On May
7 4th, this commission heard me express my strong belief that
8 the true facts about Fort Pickett seriously deviate from what
9 the Army has reported to you.
You also heard former commandant of the Marine
ps, General Al Gray testify to the significant military
ue of Fort Pickett. Additionally, this Friday,
13 Commissioner Cornella will have the opportunity to view
14 firsthand Fort Pickett's many attributes, and receive a
15 briefing on and among other things, the importance of the
16 Fort to the Army and Marine Corps tank gunnery on the East
17 Coast.
18 Therefore, I want to emphasize to you again today
19 that the Army's plan is not to close Fort Pickett, but rather
20 to keep its ranges and maneuver areas open, while drastically
21 cutting jobs through the use of an enclave concept. In
22 addition to being a detriment to readiness, which I will

Page 393

1 explain momentarily, this enclave concept would negate
2 community reuse of Fort Pickett, and make it nearly
3 impossible to create jobs to offset those eliminated by the
4 closure.
5 That fact alone makes it an unfair, and I underline
6 unfair, recommendation. In other words, everybody loses;
7 everybody loses with this type of decision. And therefore,
8 we encourage you to consider leaving the fort as it is, and
9 continuing to serve both the Army and the Marine Corps and,
10 indeed, other services. The Army says the enclave will save
11 the government the money. But careful analysis shows that
12 the savings they have announced are greatly exaggerated.
13 By all indication, the Army's plan to keep Fort
14 Pickett running by licensing necessary ranges and maneuver
15 areas to the National Guard. It's interesting, in another
16 hearing before the Armed Services Committee this morning, we
17 had the nominee, Mr. White, up, who was to be the number two
18 man in the Department of Defense. And the Base Closure
19 mmission addressed perhaps the changing of a lot of the
onal Guard units.
And therefore, that seems to me to be in conflict
22 with any decision on this area. In their COBRA runs,

Page 394

1 however, the Army has not factored in the resulting cost to
2 the federal government caused by the licensing. According to
3 National Guard bureau estimates, these costs would be over
4 $7.5 million a year -- an amount that is nearly half of the
5 present annual operating budget of Fort Pickett.
6 Therefore, the Army's actual study states savings
7 from closing Fort Pickett would be significantly less than
8 what they have projected. Most significantly, in addition to
9 being unfair and uneconomical, the enclave concept represents
10 a half-hearted and potentially dangerous approach to
11 readiness. The enclave and licensing action combined would
12 still leave Fort Pickett seriously undermanned.
13 As a result, there would be poorly planned, poorly
14 supported and unsafe training. Readiness would ultimately
15 suffer. Fort Pickett is crucial to the continued readiness
16 of our armed forces. The Army agrees that it should remain
17 open, and that's essentially what General Sullivan told me.
18 But their proposed means to do so -- the enclave -- is flawed
19 from both the readiness and fiscal standpoints.
20 I strongly urge the commission to overturn the
21 recommendation to close Fort Pickett. In closing, I thank
22 all of you for your attention this afternoon, and for your

Page 395

1 service to the nation in this critical work that you're
2 doing. And I thank you for your patience while I was able to
3 deliver this statement.
4 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Senator, very
5 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Sisisky,
6 who's been waiting very patiently in the wings.
7 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: Thank you very much,
8 members of the commission; and I thank you, Madame Chairman,
9 for not using that gavel on my very senior senator.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I took the time off yours.
11 REPRESENTATIVE SISISKY: -- who happens to be three
12 months older than I am, so I can call him my senior senator.
13 My colleagues here will go into depth on Fort Pickett and
14 Kenner Army Hospital -- both of them are in my district. And
15 although the staff will probably tell you the Kenner decision
16 does not involve substantial deviation from the criteria,
17 that doesn't mean that it's very smart.
18 Fort Lee needs the ability to provide in-patient
19 services and isolate soldiers from the barracks. Of course,
20 there's sufficient private capacity to do that; but at what
21 cost? Past BRAC decisions increased Fort Lee's training
22 load, and Kenner serves 30,000 beneficiaries that are not

Page 396

1 reflected in the data because they're outside any catchment
2 areas.
3 Since these people weren't counted, the cost of the
4 decisions are likely to escalate beyond anyone's rejections.
5 That's why Tri-Care has questions about whether it was the
6 right decision. Yet the Army and joint group never consulted
7 Tri-Care. And as of last week, neither had your staff. The
8 easy way, obviously, out is to simply wash your hands of the
9 whole thing, and accept the recommendation. But I ask you
10 sincerely to apply your good sense.
11 Please do not do anything to degrade the quality of
12 life for our young warriors -- men and women who train at
13 this post. Now, the recommendation to close Fort Pickett
14 involves substantial deviation from all four military value
15 criteria. Criteria one evaluates current and future mission
16 requirements, and the impact on DOD's total force. Army
17 reserve data calls contain major areas -- not just little
18 areas, but major areas -- that they confess to, such as rail
19 that they said was not available, and C-141 capable airport.
20 And the Army issued no data calls to anyone,
21 anyone, regarding other uses of Fort Pickett. Air Force,
22 Navy, Marine and Special Ops use of Fort Pickett were

Page 397

1 completely ignored. Criteria two is the availability of land
2 facilities and air space at both existing and receiving
3 locations. The Army said annual training conducted at
4 Pickett could easily be conducted at Fort Bragg, AP Hill, and
5 Camp Dawson.
6 Yet on March 17th, the Army testified that Fort
7 Bragg needs $15 million to buy 15,000 acres to make up a
8 100,000 acre shortfall in training land. What's laughable is
9 that they want to buy outpost woodpecker habitat to credit
10 against the onpost woodpecker habitat that led to current
11 training restrictions. They spend $1 million a year to
12 protect woodpeckers, and now they want to go out and buy
13 more.
14 But let me tell you a little secret. We already
15 own 47,000 acres -- woodpecker-free acres at Fort Pickett.
16 With the exception of the national combat training centers at
17 Fort Irwin and Polk, Pickett's air space exceeds that
18 available anywhere else in the United States. And how can
19 Camp Dawson, which is in West Virginia, absorb some of the
20 training load? Camp Dawson is smaller than Rock Creek Park,
21 believe it or not. We've measured the acreage there.
22 Criteria three is the ability to accommodate total

Page 398

1 force requirements at existing and receiving locations. This
2 criteria was also ignored by the Army. For example, they
3 recommended moving Pickett's petroleum training facility to
4 Fort Dix. Yet on April 21st, representatives of Fort Dix
5 told your staff that the Army plan did not assign sufficient
6 personnel to Fort Dix to support these requirements.
7 This is the problem discussed in the memo, where
8 the new Army chief of staff asks, "think we need to rework
9 the figures." Now, criteria four involves cost and manpower
10 implications. If the Army had really wanted to save money at
11 Pickett, they should have done a manpower survey and
12 developed a more efficient staffing pattern. Instead, they
13 propose to enclave 93 percent of the post and transfer it to
14 the Guard.
15 But an enclave can't be operated by 16 people
16 identified by the COBRA model. DOD's recommendation, I
17 think, is a shell game designed to let the Army have their
18 cake and eat it, too. They get to keep using Fort Pickett
19 while someone else pays the bill. If I could leave you with
20 one thought now, and I know my time is fleeting, it is to
21 remember what General Al Gray said up in Baltimore.
22 The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General

Page 399

1 Gray came to you on his own time, on his own time, because he
2 loves his country. He believes that the decision to close
3 Fort Pickett is a terrible, horrible mistake. After he
4 finished his presentation, and I think you were there, people
5 said it was almost like having a religious experience.
6 General Gray said that after the 2nd Marines smashed into
7 Kuwait City, they said it was easy; it was just like at Fort
8 Pickett.
9 Fort Pickett is too valuable a resource, and I beg
10 you not to give it up. Let me, at this time, thank you very
11 much, and I sincerely mean it, for your service. I know how
12 difficult it can be. I've already talked to Chairman Dixon
13 on that. And I think the whole country appreciates whatever
14 you do. Thank you so much.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Well, thank you, sir, very
16 much, for your testimony. And now, Congressman Payne.
17 REPRESENTATIVE PAYNE: Madame Commissioner and
18 members of the commission, thank you for giving me this
19 opportunity to testify. I want to follow up on some of the
20 comments that have just been made about Fort Pickett.
21 Congressman Sisisky has outlined how the recommendation
22 involves substantial deviation from the military value

Page 400

1 criteria.
2 And I want to first call your attention to criteria
3 six, which is the economic impact on communities. I believe
4 the Army understated the adverse impact, by using Dinwiddie
5 County as a basis for their calculations, although much of
6 the post lies in Dinwiddie County, very few Fort Pickett
7 employees actually reside there. Most come from Nottoway
8 County and Lunenberry County, which is in my district, which
9 have unemployment rates of 6.3 percent and 10.4 percent,
10 respectively.
11 The total impact of this recommendation would
12 amount to nearly 7.5 percent of the current workforce in
13 those counties. This would be one of the most serious
14 impacts on a locality anywhere in the nation. Having served
15 in the Army both on active duty and in the Reserves, I also
16 want to comment on two of the military issues. Out of
17 loyalty to my service, I must confess that I wish the Army
18 had done a better job on this one.
19 The colonel who directs the Army basing study has
20 written, and I quote, "We believe the Marine Corps schedules
21 training at Fort Pickett as an alternative training area for
22 Camp LeJeune, on occasions where ranges and training areas

Page 401

1 are not available on Camp LeJeune." As most of you are
2 aware, nothing could be farther from the truth.
3 The Marines do not train at Fort Pickett simply
4 because of scheduling problems at Camp LeJeune. They train
5 at Fort Pickett because it offers a unique training
6 environment that is not duplicated at LeJeune or anywhere
7 else. They can put young Marines in an unfamiliar
8 environment, and teach them how to work together. The best
9 description of this is in a letter the commission has already
10 received from General O.K. Steele, former commander of the
11 2nd Marine Division.
12 I'm told he'll be in the commission offices on this
13 coming Thursday, and would be most happy to visit with any of
14 you who want to take advantage of this opportunity to speak
15 with him about Fort Pickett. General Steele said, and I
16 quote, "The training value and improvements in operational
17 readiness a unit commander can accrue at Fort Pickett, and
18 have always exceeded the relative low cost of the
19 investment."
20 One of the specific issues that the use of tank
21 ranges at Camp LeJeune is restricted only to stationary
22 firing. And even that can only happen during the suspension

Page 402

1 of boat traffic on the Intercoastal Waterway. Pickett, on
2 the other hand, offers tank training for both the Army and
3 Marines. In the Eastern United States, only Fort Knox,
4 Benning, Drum, and Camp LeJeune, with its restrictions, have
5 more ranges than Fort Pickett, capable of firing tank tables
6 I-VIII.
7 During the winter at Fort Drum, you learn more
8 about how to operate your tank heaters than you do about how
9 to fire tank tables. And that's why the 10th Mountain
10 Division, headquartered in Fort Drum, trains at Fort Pickett
11 during the winter. Those of you who attended the Baltimore
12 hearing remember that former Marine commandant Al Gray had a
13 number of things to say about Fort Pickett.
14 General Gray said Fort Pickett is the only place
15 east of the Mississippi where you can conduct the kind of
16 combined arms warfare that teaches the thought process that
17 goes beyond the art of war. He said, "If you didn't have a
18 Fort Pickett, you'd have to invent one." General Gray also
19 explained why Pickett's training figures over the last two
20 years do not accurately reflect their mission.
21 It's because people who normally train there were
22 around the world in places like Somalia, Haiti, and off the

Page 403

1 coast of Bosnia. Just last week, they were in position to
2 rescue Air Force pilot Scott O'Grady. General Gray
concluded, and again I quote, "In my military judgment, based
[illegible]l years of being a Marine and four years as a joint
[illegible]ef, closing Pickett is ludicrous; it's absolutely
6 ridiculous."
7 And I hope that the commission will come to the
8 same conclusion, and turn this decision around. Thank you
9 very much, and thank you for the good service that you are
10 providing this nation.
11 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
12 Congressman. Representative Scott will be next.
13 REPRESENTATIVE SCOTT: Thank you, Madame Chairman,
14 Mr. Chairman, and other commissioners. Thank you for the
15 opportunity to be with you today. I'm here to oppose the
16 recommendation to realign Kenner Memorial Hospital at Fort
17 Lee in Virginia. Currently, Kenner provides a full range of
18 in-patient and out-patient services to beneficiaries in its
19 catchment area.
20 Its catchment area is large because the nearest
21 military facility is over an hour and 20 minutes away. We
22 must remember that in any case, whatever we do in this

Page 404

1 recommendation, the same number of people will be sick or
2 injured and need the same medical service. So the question
3 is how we can best provide those services. The options
4 before you are to reject the recommendation and maintain
5 Kenner as it is now; or realign Kenner and depend on the
6 private in-patient and out-patient services totally; or
7 establish medical services on base, ranging from simple out-
8 patient services or an infirmary or a super clinic, providing
9 99 percent of the services now provided at Kenner.
10 The proposed recommendation before you is just to
[illegible]ign Kenner. But that's as specific as the proposal gets.
[illegible] to provide for the services that will be needed and the
[illegible]st and the convenience of those services is still under
14 review by the joint medical working group. There are several
15 critical problems with the proposal to realign Kenner.
16 First, it's not clear that there is sufficient medical
17 services on a private basis to meet the needs of Kenner
18 beneficiaries.
19 And in any case, those who use those services will
20 have significant travel requirements, which means that the
21 active duty personnel will have to spend more time getting
22 there. And others will have the inconvenience and additional

Page 405

1 expense of co-pays, deductibles, and exclusions associated
2 with Champus and Medicare. Second, there will not be an
3 emergency room on the base, because if you don't have an in-
4 patient facility, you can't have an emergency room.
5 Third, according to evidence I've seen, an
6 uncontradicted analysis, that there will be an increase -- as
7 much as $20 million -- to provide the same services that
8 people will need and are getting at Kenner, as they get now.
9 And the point of BRAC is to reduce expenses for the federal
10 government. I would hope we would not shift $20 million to
11 another budget, just to save the Defense Department a little
12 money.
13 Because we cannot make an intelligent decision
14 without the necessary information, I'm asking the commission
15 not to make a decision about Kenner Army Hospital until the
16 joint medical working group has finished its work and fully
17 understands the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.
18 Time is not important at this point. When the joint medical
19 working group completes its work, the Secretary of Defense
[illegible], by extension, the government will still have an
[illegible]ortunity to make informed decisions and right-size the
[illegible]ense medical establishment.

Page 406

1 It is not necessary to make a decision about Kenner
2 during the BRAC process because the size of the number of
3 employees involved is under the BRAC threshold of 200. Let
4 me conclude by reiterating what's at issue and what's at
5 stake with the options before you. First of all, the same
6 number of people will be sick or injured and need the same
7 level of services. And the issue is how we can best provide
8 those needs.
9 Further, there will be additional expense and
10 inconvenience to the beneficiaries, if they have to go
11 elsewhere. There are problems of what to do about
12 emergencies, infectious diseases such as chicken pox, because
13 they cannot be admitted an in-patient in private hospitals.
14 They have to be put somewhere. And furthermore, by
15 realigning Kenner, there's a potential $20 million additional
16 expense to the federal government.
17 Until these matters are fully evaluated, we cannot
18 make an intelligent decision. There's no necessity to make
19 the decision now. And for those reasons, I urge you to
20 reject the recommendation to realign Kenner at this time, to
21 allow us to make an informed decision based on the
22 appropriate information. Otherwise, we run the risk of

Page 407

1 putting form before substance and ending up with greater
2 costs and inconvenience to all concerned.
3 Madame Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be
4 with you and Mr. Chairman and other members of the
5 commissions. Thank you very much.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much for your
7 testimony, Congressman. Representative Jim Moran.
8 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: Good afternoon, Mrs. Steele
9 and Chairman Dixon, Mr. Clinger.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome.
11 REPRESENTATIVE MORAN: I'm going to talk to you
12 about SPAWARS. It's a technical command; it's what they call
13 a C4I command, primarily intelligence gathering. It's
14 currently located in Crystal City. There's four reasons why
15 we don't think that it should be moved. The first is stated
16 by the Navy in the BRAC data call 31. They say if SPAWARS
17 were relocated outside the Washington area, their mission
18 would be performed slower, with greater technical risk and
19 greater expense, due to a different, less experienced work
20 force.
21 That's the best argument -- the one that the Navy
22 used in the data call -- for not moving SPAWARS. The second

Page 408

1 is that SPAWARS provides a great deal of support for our
2 international allies. There's a current memorandum of
3 understanding that we have to comply with that requires
4 coordination and development of all the C4I projects, to take
5 place within the Washington metropolitan area.
6 SPAWARS works with our allies that need the ready
7 and secure access to their embassies in order to facilitate
8 information exchanges. And as I say, the C4I
9 interoperability -- you move them to the West Coast, and they
10 clearly couldn't perform that function, which is necessitated
11 by the current memorandum of understanding. The third point
12 is the contractors that work primarily with SPAWARS.
13 They also work with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, the Defense
14 Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, OPA, the
15 National Science Foundation. They work for virtually all of
16 these various naval systems commands. There's about 4,000
17 experts that SPAWARS needs. They're going to find it very
18 difficult to move out to San Diego. It will break up that
19 network of expertise, and as a result, SPAWARS needs will not
20 be as well met.
21 The last reason is that the personnel savings were
22 overstated and the construction costs were understated. The

Page 409

1 personnel savings, we feel, could well be achieved simply by
2 consolidation. Some of the management reforms that have been
3 discussed for a long time -- you could consolidate the common
4 support functions across the technical commands. There's
5 been several suggestions for consolidating some of the
6 commands themselves. That's up to the Navy.
7 But the reality is that the personnel savings that
8 are supposed to be achieved by moving SPAWARS could even more
9 readily achieved by leaving it where it is. Because where it
10 is gives you the opportunity to consolidate functions,
11 particularly the overhead support functions that they share
12 with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and all of the other commands. They're
13 all co-located here.
14 That makes a lot of sense. It gives us an
15 opportunity to achieve personnel savings, many of which have
16 been recommended for a long time. You move it out to San
17 Diego, and you're going to have to create new overhead costs,
18 and those additional people are going to cost more money than
19 if you were to share many of the functions. Construction
20 costs -- they are not addressed in this recommendation. It's
21 hard to assume that if you move 11,060 personnel and all the
22 associated equipment, that it's not going to require a build-

Page 410

1 out of the work spaces, the installation of computer
2 equipment.
3 You're going to have to pay for improvements to the
4 secure compartmented information facility, SCIF is the
5 acronym. Three years ago, SPAWARS moved just a short
6 distance within Crystal City; and it cost $10 million to
7 build a new SCIF, the secure compartmented information
8 facility. They had to install a new local area network and
9 construct a new communications lab. Well, you're going to
10 have to at least do that if you move out to San Diego.
11 And construction costs were not figured into this
12 analysis. So we urge the commission to reconsider the
13 SPAWARS move; to look at the loss of the corporate memory
14 that you have and the contractors that serve all the
15 commands; to weigh the impact that this is going to have on
16 current memoranda of understanding that we have to comply
17 with, and we couldn't if we moved to San Diego; and to review
18 the unstated personnel and construction costs that are not
19 included in this cost analysis.
20 We think those are compelling arguments for leaving
21 SPAWARS where it is. And finally, let me just say, I heard
22 something that is hard to believe, but that is that NAVSEA

Page 411

1 could still move to White Oak, which I would hope would not
2 be considered, for all the reasons that were given to the
3 previous base closure commission. It was not intended for an
4 office building.
5 It doesn't have the capacity for office building,
6 unless you're willing to spend more than it would cost to
7 build a new office building. They can't even accommodate the
8 commercial offices that would be needed for the contractors.
9 And they don't have the public transportation which is
10 required in the national capital region.
11 They would be in violation of the agreements that
12 the federal government has made with national capital
13 planning commission; that you have every facility beyond a
14 public transit have public transit access, which White Oak
15 doesn't.
16 So with that, I'm sure my time is expired. I
17 appreciate your indulgence, by not gavelling me to order.
18 And thanks for all the work you're putting into this. Thank
19 you.
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much,
21 Congressman, for your testimony. And lastly, but not least,
22 from the Virginia delegation, is Congressman Tom Davis.

Page 412

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
2 commissioners. The Army has proposed moving the Information
3 Systems Software Development Center, ISSC, from leased space
4 in Fairfax County to government space at Fort Meade,
5 Maryland. Now, this move from leased space to government
6 owned space may look good, and it could save the government
7 money, but none of the 400 military and civilian personnel
8 would be laid off, and the move is from Virginia to just
9 across town in Maryland.
10 But I think it's a bad decision for the Army and
11 the government, and I want to urge yo to have the Army
12 reconsider this move, and let me tell you why. The Army ISSC
13 has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. A couple of
14 years ago, when the Army looked to move the facility from
15 outdated facilities in Fairfax, Virginia, the Army asked the
16 GSA to find space for ISSC in Northern Virginia. They even
17 specified the boundaries.
18 The Army sought a location close to Fort Belvoir
19 and the Pentagon customers, and close to where most of its
20 employees had settled during the past 20 years. This was the
21 Crown Ridge building located at the junction of I-66 and
22 Route 50. GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease

Page 413

1 with Crown Ridge Associates for six years, at a cost of $3
2 million a year. That lease started a little over a year ago,
3 and it runs through May 28, 2000; and that's important.
4 Also, a total of $7.2 million was spent by Crown
5 Ridge, GSA, and the Army, to upgrade the buildings to meet
6 the unique requirements of the Army ISSC. The agreement with
7 GSA allows the Army to move out of the current space without
8 penalty, if appropriate notice is given. But the GSA is
9 still stuck with the lease until May 28, 2000. Now, after
10 spending all this money, the Army is proposing moving the
11 ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland.
12 The Army claims that it will save $8 million over
13 20 years. Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer,
14 GSA is still obligated for the six-year term of the lease.
15 If the Army moves out, GSA is stuck with an empty building.
16 This will not be easy space to fill, considering it was built
17 to suit ISSC and is not in reasonable proximity to mass
18 transit.
19 To quote GSA, regarding the Army's plan to move out
20 of this building, "The building was leased specifically for
21 the Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs.
22 Other federal agencies have not expressed interest in the

Page 414

1 location, and the building might be difficult to market."
2 Now, the office vacancy rate out in this area is about 12
3 percent today, and I think they will have a hard time
4 marketing it or subletting the facility, given the
5 particularities of particularly building needs used today.
6 In addition, the Army is going to have to convert
7 or build facilities at Fort Meade. The COBRA model figures
8 used by the Army indicate that it will have to spend roughly
9 $5 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and move ISSC. So
10 at a minimum, the government spends $11 million in renovation
11 and moving costs, and ISSC has to go through two moves in
12 three years. But the government will also be stuck with the
13 $3 million per year lease for a building which may sit empty
14 for three years -- another $9 million.
15 This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process
16 to work. The objective is to reduce costs for the
17 government, not just the military services. All this move
18 would accomplish is a cost shift from the Army to GSA -- a
19 tactic Congress has discouraged BRAC from endorsing. But
20 more importantly, while this is listed as an in-area move,
21 one only has to look at Washington rush hour commute from
22 Western Fairfax to Fort Meade, Maryland, to know that it will

Page 415

1 quire people to move or spend hours commuting.
2 ISSC civilian personnel, roughly two-thirds of the
3 mand's personnel, have built their lives in Fairfax County
4 er the past 20 years. With the signing of a new six-year
5 lease last year, personnel felt comfortable making plans to
6 stay in this area. Now the command will be moved again, and
7 literally to the other side of the Washington metropolitan
8 area.
9 Those working at ISSC are software experts with
10 very specialized and valuable skills. Certainly some will
11 move to Maryland and some will take the long commute from
12 Northern Virginia. But it's also likely that a significant
13 number will choose to find other jobs. The Army will lose
14 talented people, and there will be a real operational impact
15 on ISSC.
16 I think that if you look at the big picture, this
17 decision has never made sense for the government. It may
18 save the Army some money, if you don't count the disruption
19 and operations caused by another move and the potential loss
20 of skilled people. But ultimately, however, this move will
21 cost the government millions in moving and renovation costs,
22 and leave the GSA with a $3 million annual lease obligation

Page 416

1 on a building without tenants.
2 If you want to move it, wait until the end of the
3 lease, in the year 2000. Then, I think the savings could be
4 there. In closing, I repeat, with this move, we are shifting
5 the cost of the operation from the Army to GSA, we're not
6 saving any money. This is not what Congress intended when
7 the base closure process was set up. Thank you very much.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank
9 Congressman Davis for finishing within the time limit. And
10 you assume the chair, Mr. Chairman, may I make this
11 servation one more time. The great state of Virginia, with
12 ight people making a presentation, succeeded in having half
13 honor the request that their remarks be made within the five
14 minute period.
15 I congratulate Congressman Davis. I would have
16 been reluctant to make these remarks had he not finished
17 within the period. I would say again, it's five minutes.
18 There are 25 witnesses still to go today. Green is talk;
19 yellow is slow down; red is stop. Red is not talk another
20 minute; red is not talk another two minutes; red is not now
21 I'm all set to conclude, no, no, no, no. Red is stop. We
22 thank you very much, Congressman.

Page 417

1 REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Thank you, Senator.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you.
3 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Dixon.
4 And our final clean-up scheduled state delegation is the
5 great state of Wisconsin, and leading off will be Senator
6 Kohl.
7 SENATOR KOHL: Mr. Chairman and members of the
8 Commission, it is an opportunity that I appreciate very much
9 to testify before you today on behalf of the 440th Airlift
10 Wing, an Air Reserve unit based at General Mitchell
11 International Air Reserve Station Milwaukee.
12 I have a statement with me from Congressman Kleczka
13 which I would like to insert for the record.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It will be admitted.
15 SENATOR KOHL: When you close an Air Reserve
16 station, you are not just closing an installation, you are
17 making a decision to dismantle a unit, and in the case of the
18 440th Airlift Wing, the Air Force would be losing some of the
19 t highly trained C-130 pilots and maintenance crews.
20 From D-Day to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Desert
21 ield and Desert Storm to Haiti the 440th has demonstrated
22 its importance to our nation. Even now, as we consider the

Page 418

1 future of this historic unit, the 440th is ready as the lead
2 wing in the event of an evacuation of United Nations Forces
3 from Bosnia.
4 In 1993, the 440th accomplished what no other C-130
5 airlift wing has ever accomplished, and that includes active
6 duty Air National Guard and Reserve units.
7 An unprecedented performance in the Air Mobility
8 Command's Rodeo known as the olympics of airlifters, the
9 440th won the competition for the best C-130 air drop crew,
10 the best C-130 air drop wing, the best C-130 wing and the
11 best U.S. Air Force Mobility Wing.
12 As General Fogleman so aptly stated about the
13 440th, and I quote, "They are the best of the best." The
14 excellence of this unit is a reflection of the high quality
15 of the training provided at General Mitchell Air Reserve
16 Station and at other training venues in Wisconsin.
17 There are no traffic delays in Milwaukee. While
18 other airports experience significant air traffic delays
19 keeping Air Reserve pilots on the ground waiting to take off,
20 Milwaukee's pilots have minimum waiting time and maximum time
21 in the air flying.
22 Wisconsin Fort McCoy, an Army Reserve base, and

Page 419

1 Bulk Field, an Air National Guard installation offer unique
2 opportunities for joint training and provide local facilities
3 for flying air drops and training on dirt runways, which are
4 essential for combat training.
5 More important, the flying time from General
6 Mitchell to Fort McCoy or Bulk Field is 40 minutes. The C-
7 130 training mission requires that pilots fly for at least 30
8 minutes at low levels before they perform air drops, which
9 makes the location of the 440th in relation to Fort McCoy
10 ideal for efficient training.
11 Mr. Chairman, during Commissioner Steele's site
12 visit and again at the regional hearing in Chicago, pilots
13 from the 440th who fly commercially out of airports around
14 the country testified about how they like to fly out of
15 Milwaukee because of the unrestricted and unencroached
16 airspace and the lack of air track control delays.
17 The fact that Mitchell International Airport is not
18 a hub for a major international airline means that pilots do
19 not have to plan their flying time around jumbo jets. Again,
20 all of these conditions translate into for flying time for
21 pilots.
22 In addition to the obvious military value, the

Page 420

1 440th provides there are some unique and innovative cost
2 savings that make the installation extremely cost-effective.
3 The 440th owns its own facilities, and thus it has
4 no lease costs. The 440th has reduced landing fees at the
5 airport in exchange for providing crucial fire support.
6 And the training efficiencies in using of drop
7 zones at Fort McCoy and other training facilities around
8 Wisconsin translate into real savings for the Air Force.
9 So Mr. Chairman, I'm committed to finding ways for
10 the federal government to reduce the deficit, and I am
11 supportive of the base closing process. We should make the
12 hard decisions to eliminate bases we no longer need.
13 In the case of General Mitchell Air Reserve
14 Station, however, it would be contrary to the goals of
15 deficit construction. The 440th represents value for the
16 taxpayer dollar. It has the unique combination of
17 characteristics that has produced a top C-130 unit in an
18 extremely cost-effective manner.
19 America and Wisconsin cannot afford to lose this
20 unit which truly is the best of the best. I thank you for
21 your attention.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Kohl.

Page 421

1 Senator Feingold.
2 SENATOR FEINGOLD: Chairman Dixon and
3 Commissioners, thank you for giving me also this opportunity
4 to speak to you today about the 440th Air Reserve Unit at
5 Mitchell Airport.
6 I've always been a strong supporter of the base
7 closure process. Since 1993, I've actually worked to close
8 Wisconsin only naval installation in the state, Project Ill
9 Health, the extremely low frequency communications system,
10 and I've introduced legislation and wrote to you advocating
11 that it be placed on the list for consideration for closure.
12 In my view, it exemplifies an installation whose
13 mission is of little, if any, military strategic value, and
14 it therefore should be closed.
15 The 440th Airlift Wing, on the other hand, has time
16 and time again demonstrated its strategic value as a part of
17 our nation's overall defense forces. During the Persian Gulf
18 War, Haiti, Somalia or recent and future missions in Bosnia,
19 the men and women of the 440th have consistently served our
20 nation with honor, distinction and excellence.
21 You've already heard from Senator Kohl about the
22 unprecedented number of military honors the 440th has

Page 422

1 received in recognition of its training levels and
2 preparedness.
3 I believe that a primary reason has met with such
4 incredible success is the quality of the reservists who serve
5 there. I want to review very briefly for the Commission some
6 of the notable achievements of the 440th recruiting
7 operation.
8 First, the 440th is the recognized leader for
9 excellence in Air Force Reserve recruiting. As you all know,
10 it is important that reserve units be staffed at over 100
11 percent to ensure that they can be relied upon to do their
12 job, which is to back up the active duty in any case.
13 Few bases have been able to do that consistently,
14 but the staffing levels of the 440th have been over 100
15 percent nine out of the last ten years. For the Reserves,
16 this is not excess staffing. It is assurance that the 440th
17 has the personnel strength to activate for any mission
18 anywhere at any time.
19 Second, as Wisconsin's federal Air Force
20 installation, the 440th draws reservists from every one of
21 the nine congressional districts in the state, ensuring full
22 support of its mission.

Page 423

1 Third, with the regional hubs of both of the United
2 Parcel Service and Federal Express located at Mitchell Field,
3 the 440th has a large pool of trained pilots, loadmasters and
4 mechanics from which they can successfully recruit.
5 Recruiting is a critical element to the readiness
6 of any reserve unit. The 440th has demonstrated that their
7 recruit efforts far outdistance those of any other C-130
8 reserve unit.
9 I know some of you have heard this fact repeatedly
10 during the state visit to the 440th and at the regional
11 hearing that was recently held in Chicago. The 440th Airlift
12 Wing also provides the essential support for other federal
13 agencies in the Midwest.
14 As you consider its future, I'd like to point out
15 the concurrent negative impact that closing the 440th would
16 have on other government agencies.
17 First, the 440th is the headquarters of the
18 regional personnel office that currently services a seven-
19 state region, including Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana,
20 Minnesota, Ohio, Colorado and Oregon.
21 If the 440th closed, this function and the related
22 personnel would have to be duplicated at another site so that

Page 424

1 there would not be a net savings coming from the closure.
2 Second, the 440th is a regional federal
3 communications center and is the only authorized provider of
4 satellite and classified messages to other military and law
5 enforcement agencies, including DOD, FBI, DOT, DOE, Secret
6 Service and FEMA. It would be problematic for those agencies
7 were the 440th's communication center to be terminated.
8 Third, the 440th is a regional national disaster medical
9 system's site tasked with providing emergency airlift
10 services, casualty triage processing and as a medical
11 disaster communications hub in times of national crisis.
12 It is clear that our nation cannot afford to lose
13 the many functions that the 440th now provides for our
14 national security. There could be no doubt that this unit
15 plays a serious, strategic role in our nation's defense.
16 The Air Force has time and time again recognized
17 the military value of the 440th. For these reasons, the Air
18 Force has indicated that it does not want to close the 440th.
19 Further, as you all know, the Department of Defense
20 did not even recommend this unit for consideration for
21 closure. The State of Wisconsin is proud of the
22 accomplishment of the members of the 440th Airlift Wing and

Page 425

1 remains wholly committed to keeping this unit in Milwaukee.
2 It has demonstrated quality, superiority and
3 strategic value that should not be lost. I hope the
4 Commission will concur, and I thank you for your time.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Feingold.
6 Representative Barrett.
7 REPRESENTATIVE BARRETT: Thank you. I'd like to
8 thank Chairman Dixon and the members of the Commission for
9 giving us the opportunity to speak on behalf of the 440th
10 Airlift Wing in Milwaukee.
11 And I'd also like to thank Commissioner Steele
12 again for her visit to Milwaukee. We appreciated the
13 opportunity to show off the best of the best. I'm also
14 pleased to be the last speaker from the last state, and I'm
15 sure that you are, too, at least prior to the filler-ins that
16 come after me.
17 I join Congressman Kleczka, Senator Kohl and
18 Senator Feingold in my strong support for the 440th, and I
19 would like to conclude our testimony by highlighting some of
20 the arguments against closing the base.
21 In the most recent COBRA provided for the
22 Commission, the Air Force overstated by $1.85 million the

Page 426

1 potential savings to be achieved by closing the 440th. Also,
2 the costs associated with closing the base were understated
3 by $9.4 million in one-time costs and $2.6 million in
4 recurring costs.
5 These inaccuracies can be traced to several
6 factors. The regional civilian personnel office at the 440th
7 serves seven states and will have to be relocated if the Air
8 Force moves out of Wisconsin. The salaries of the 41 people
9 assigned to the 440th CPO therefore cannot be counted as
10 savings.
11 The Air Force Reserve has invested $7.7 million in
12 the 440th digital fiber optic communication system, the only
13 working system as required by the PY 2001 POM decision.
14 Although all bases will eventually receive such a
15 system, the Air Force Reserve will need to assemble a new
16 system at another base immediately if the 440th is closed,
17 substantially increasing the cost to close the 440th.
18 Another factor contributing to the increased cost
19 of closing the 440th is the need to maintain the support
20 functions such as drop zone operations at nearby Fort McCoy
21 that must continue even if the 440th closes.
22 The locate of the 440th at Mitchell International

Page 427

1 Airport provides unrestricted unencroached airspace and
2 minimal ground traffic delays for more efficient flight
3 operations than any other C-130 base.
4 The airport can annual any aircraft in the Defense
5 Department inventory in all weather and has been designated a
6 weather testing site for the C-17. In addition, enough space
7 exists to accommodate four additional C-130 aircraft
8 immediately.
9 Lastly, I would like the emphasize the strong and
10 constructive relationship that exists between the 440th and
11 the community. When members of the 440th flew to Bosnia,
12 Panama and Haiti, the community stepped in to help the
13 families they left behind.
14 When future emergencies call the reservists of the
15 440th to duty, the people of Wisconsin will be there again.
16 I hope you will all agree that the 440th makes an important
17 contribution to the Milwaukee area and to the State of
18 Wisconsin as a whole.
19 If the 440th is closed, the Air Force will no
20 longer have any presence in the State of Wisconsin. Our
21 national defense and our local community will surely suffer.
22 Thank you, and I would also, in closing, like to

Page 428

1 point out Chairman Dixon complimented Virginia. All our
2 speakers finished in time, and we did so to show the
3 efficiency that we work with the 440th. Thank you very much.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
5 Barrett. In fact, all three of you came under the time, and
6 I commend you for your performance.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman, I was just in the
8 back room making some certificates, some gold certificates
9 for the three of you from Wisconsin, which I'm going to
10 present personally.
11 CONGRESSMAN BARRETT: And it's just an example of
12 how well the 440th works. We couldn't have done it without
13 the 440th. Thank you very much.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will now hear from a
15 number of members of Congress who, for scheduling reasons,
16 were not able to appear with their delegations. We'll start
17 with Senator Shelby from Alabama.
18 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, members of the
19 Commission, I regret that I was not able to be with you
20 yesterday. I would first ask that my full written statement
21 be made part of the record, and we have some exhibits that
22 Chairman Dixon taught me years ago could be made part of it.

Page 429

1 too.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Without objection, your full
3 statement and the exhibits will be entered.
4 SENATOR SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
5 and other members of the Commission for giving me here today
6 the opportunity to speak before you briefly, and I'll try to
7 be brief.
8 The major focus of my comments this afternoon is
9 the ill-advised Army proposal to close Fort McClellan and
10 move the chemical and military police schools to Fort Leonard
11 Wood.
12 In addition, I will also highlight in my remarks
13 the proposed relocation of the aviation mission of the
14 Aviation Troop Command to Red Stone Arsenal and the movement
15 of the Army depot maintenance and defense distribution
16 functions from Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots to
17 Anniston Army Depot.
18 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I believe
19 that the rush to grab Fort McClellan's training missions has
20 resulted in a shoddy, very shoddy permitting process that has
21 completely disregarded our nation's military readiness for
22 the sake of short-term gains in jobs, yes, and prestige.

Page 430

1 Let me be clear that this is the final round for
2 the foreseeable future for BRAC. You know it and I know it.
3 The decisions you make in the coming days are irrevocable.
4 If you choose to the Army chemical training
5 functions to Fort Leonard Wood, this nation I believe will be
6 taking an enormous risk. The current permits, as
7 corroborated by expert commentary, are completely inadequate
8 for duplicating our current chemical training activities at
9 Fort McClellan.
10 This morning, this very day you heard from the
11 distinguished representative from the congressional district
12 in which Fort Leonard Wood is located. He made two
13 statements to you which require correction.
14 First, he told you that there would be an increase
15 in readiness because rear area protection in river crossings
16 would have the chemical school and MP school together with
17 the engineering school.
18 Second, he told you here that the Army sent a
19 letter stating that it can properly perform its mission under
20 the existing environmental permits.
21 As far as the first statement, I ask that you
22 consider whether at this point in history we should place a

Page 431

1 higher priority on river crossings than on the emergent
2 reaction to the use of chemical and biological agents,
3 particularly in urban areas, which provides lucrative targets
4 for weapons of mass destruction.
5 Secondly, I too have a letter dated yesterday from
6 the Chief of Staff of the Army Training and Doctoring Command
7 which states unequivocally that the smoke training permit
8 does not allow the chemical school to train as it currently
9 does at Fort McClellan. It also has other things in it, and
10 I'm sure you have that.
11 The letter then indicates that the Army will have
12 to modify its operations if the relocation is executed.
13 Because of the shortcutting of the permit process, the
14 lengthy litigation has already begun and I predict will
15 continue in Missouri.
16 As a result, any decision, yes, any decision to
17 move chemical training to Fort Leonard Wood bears substantial
18 risk to our nation's military readiness.
19 In contrast, Fort McClellan is a functional
20 facility with the proper permitting, the facilities and
21 experience for chemical warfare training. You know that.
22 In regard to the smoke permit, it's my

Page 432

1 understanding that a Memorandum for the Record was prepared
2 dated June 9, 1995, by Colonel Koflin, Director of Training
3 at the Army Chemical School.
4 This memorandum was approved by Colonel Mashburn,
5 Assistant Commandant of the Chemical School, also approved by
6 General Wooten, Commandant at the Army Chemical School and
7 transmitted to the assistant to the Chief of Staff for
8 Operations at TRADOP.
9 I respectfully this afternoon request that the
10 Commission obtain the Koflin memorandum to obtain a true
11 picture of the smoke permit. The Alabama delegation has
12 requested the document but have been refused by TRADOP. I do
13 not believe they will refuse you, Mr. Chairman.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We will do that, Mr. Senator.
15 SENATOR SHELBY: I will now turn to the movement of
16 the aviation component at ATCOM to Red Stone Arsenal forming
17 the Aviation and Missile Command, which is proposed.
18 The Army will achieve significant savings through
19 this realignment with little economic impact to the effected
20 community from which it's moved. This movement will allow
21 the Army aviation function to be located at a major Army
22 installation that has, yes, has an existing research

Page 433

1 development and engineering center.
2 This is an excellent fit because MICOM, the missile
3 command, and ATCOM have closely related commodity missions
4 and expertise, a synergism that is not found between the Army
5 chemical, military police and engineering schools, leading to
6 a very much more efficient AMC organization.
7 Why is this move cost-effective, we might ask?
8 It's cost-effective, Mr. Chairman, because the return on the
9 investment is only 2.3 years. I believe that answers itself.
10 In regard to the Anniston Army Depot, the depot maintenance
11 and defense supply movements will improve, yes, improve
12 readiness by consolidating all track vehicle maintenance in
13 one depot and will result in the need for only one depot to
14 support on-site operations such as Operation Desert Storm, as
15 opposed to the current situation where three depots are
16 necessary.
17 I know that the Commission has taken a close look
18 at the issue of capacity, and you should, questioning the
19 ability of Anniston Army Depot to perform the maintenance and
20 supply functions that would be transferred from Red River and
21 Letterkenny Army Depots.
22 The Army and Anniston Army Depot have analyzed the

Page 434

1 out-year workload levels and have concluded, Mr. Chairman,
2 that Anniston can perform all the maintenance and supply
3 functions with one eight-hour shift during a five-day
4 workload.
5 They also analyzed workload levels under other
6 conditions such as wartime conditions and have concluded that
7 all functions can be performed with just one extra shift, not
8 three.
9 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I ask you
10 that you validate the decisions of your predecessors in this
11 Commission and keep the current chemical training programs at
12 Fort McClellan and move the aviation function of ATCOM to Red
13 Stone Arsenal and move Army depot maintenance and supply
14 functions to Anniston Army Depot. I appreciate your
15 consideration this afternoon.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator. Next
17 will be representative Bud Cramer also from Alabama.
18 REPRESENTATIVE CRAMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
19 and members of the Commission. I thought perhaps I might be
20 the very last of just a few members of Congress that would
21 testify before you for these two days, but it looks like my
22 colleague from California will, in fact, follow me over a

Page 435

1 different issue.
2 I'm sure you've heard a lot of different arguments
3 from a lot of different members of Congress. This is my
4 third time to testify before this Commission. So I want to
5 thank you again for your attention.
6 What I'm going to attempt to do is summarize some
7 of the past points that I and other representatives of my
8 community have I think effectively made in the Birmingham
9 regional hearing and the Atlanta hearing this past Friday as
10 well.
11 I follow Senator Shelby. I come from north
12 Alabama, the Fifth Congressional District, so our Alabama
13 concern there really runs along a parallel of issues over Red
14 Stone Arsenal, one of the Army's finest military bases, one
15 of the most recognized and honored military bases in this
16 country.
17 We are speaking on behalf of the Army's
18 recommendation, the Army's recommendation to close the
19 Aviation and Troop Command in St. Louis and create, as
20 Senator Shelby said, the Army Aviation and Missile Command at
21 Red Stone Arsenal.
22 Now again, in Atlanta, we gave you examples of

Page 436

1 during the Gulf War how those two commands had to communicate
2 with one another from the separate sites there, and that was
3 done effectively but how much more effectively that could be
4 done if this move or recommendation is in fact followed.
5 We want to stress what we think, obviously, you
6 know the BRAC process is all about, and that is that if we're
7 to maintain military readiness and modernize our forces, then
8 what the BRAC process was intended to do was that of saving
9 money and that of forcing us to face tough decisions and
10 forcing us to close facilities that are recommended to be
11 closed.
12 We do that, again, to save money, but we want to do
13 it fairly. The Army and other services went through a
14 detailed and involved process to determine the installations
15 that they will need to carry out their current missions.
16 The Army then applied the selection criteria
17 established by law and made its base closure recommendations,
18 and the Army recommends that the Aviation and Troop Command
19 in St. Louis be closed. They would be consolidated there at
20 Red Stone Arsenal.
21 Now, the savings to be realized are enormous, and
22 they're quickly realized. There will be $46 million in

Page 437

1 savings every year with a 20-year savings total of $453
2 million.
3 The one-time cost of this consolidation will be
4 returned in less than three years, in fact in 2.3 years. The
5 Army obviously saves money and achieves what Chairman Dixon
6 has referred to in the past as the purposes of the BRAC
7 process in fact transferring ATCOM there to Red Stone.
8 The ATCOM closure is the largest Army commodity
9 command restructuring in the history of the base closing
10 process. The savings from this one closure represents 3
11 percent of the total DOD base closure savings this year.
12 The recommendation, if followed, will reduce the
13 Army commodity commands by more than 15 percent, and again
14 this meets the DOD recommendation.
15 Now, we've had a confusing issue, in my opinion,
16 that has been added over ATCOM. It has been suggested that
17 as an alternative to ATCOM moving to Red Stone that the Army
18 move the Space and Strategic Defense Command, which is in
19 Huntsville, in Research Park in rented facilities, that it
20 move that command to Red Stone Arsenal instead of closing
21 ATCOM.
22 Now, let me again point out that SSDC and ATCOM are

Page 438

1 totally separate commands, but I think the suggestion is a
2 smoke screen, and the suggestion seems to give the impression
3 that if SSDC is moved to Red Stone, then we wouldn't have
4 room for ATCOM there; we wouldn't need ATCOM to be there.
5 That is not true. There are no savings, none
6 whatsoever that would result from the move of SSDC to Red
7 Stone, and I think analysis is being run and has been run
8 that would show that.
9 So the return on the investment of the
10 recommendation of SSDC to Red Stone is never in fact
11 achieved. So I hope that issue doesn't confuse the members
12 of this Commission.
13 And let me, in conclusion, point out that again the
14 BRAC process was established to reduce our military
15 infrastructure by closing bases and consolidating activities.
16 This, of course, saves money.
17 The savings achieved with these closures are
18 crucial, again, to maintain military readiness and continuing
19 military modernization. Right now on the floor of the House
20 we're debating the House Armed Services Authorization Bill.
21 This is a tough atmosphere here, and we're debating the very
22 issues of military readiness in the field.

Page 439

So I think again, in today's atmosphere, we've got face these tough decisions. So we ask you to move ATCOM Red Stone Arsenal, and don't be fooled by the smoke screen r SSDC.

If you in fact choose to close SSDC and move it onto Red Stone Arsenal, we can, in fact, accommodate both of those commands. So I want to offer that as a final alternative as well.

Again, I want to thank the Commission, I want to congratulate the Commission for its patience, for this practically thankless job and for hearing me now three times. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much, Representative Cramer. Next we'll hear from Maxine Waters from the state of California.

REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission. I've very appreciative for the opportunity to testify today. As you may have guessed, I will focus my remarks on your report's proposed closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

I am well acquainted with the military value and the enormous economic impact the shipyard has not just in

Page 440

Long Beach but throughout Southern California. The rationale for closing Long Beach is based on the assumption that the private San Diego port facility currently in operation can be upgraded to meet the needs now served by Long Beach.

For several reasons, I would urge the Commission to carefully reconsider this finding. First, there are significant questions about the cost estimates made by the Commission associated with transforming the San Diego facility.

Many familiar with the operations of both Long ach and San Diego's capabilities believe the overhaul uired by San Diego could cost up to five times the Navy's iginal estimate.

At the same time, government savings from closure of Long Beach would be far less than the 2 billion over 20 years the Navy has projected. There have also been serious environmental issues raised which might render the restructuring of San Diego's port unsafe.

These concerns about closing Long Beach are not just my own. I site an enclosure to this Commission's report of two years ago. With a majority of the Pacific Fleet home ported in San Diego, there are distinct advantages to be

Page 441

gained by continuing to use Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the Navy's ship repair program.

At the time that statement was written, 1993, 30 percent of the Pacific Fleet home ported in San Diego. That percentage has increased to 70 percent today.

If anything, the value of the Long Beach Shipyard and its ability to service the Pacific Fleet is greater today than it was in 1993.

Second, in addition to the cost question, I believe there is a real chance that San Diego's port cannot reasonably be altered to absorb the capacity of the Long Beach Shipyard. Again, quoting from a letter by the last Commission's Base Structure Evaluation Committee Chair, "The commitment of the private sector to maintain the skills and facilities necessary to accomplish complex Navy workloads without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and maintenance workload is unknown.

Principal dependency on the private sector to accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned emergent urgent repair puts fleet readiness at risk and outside vy control.

Finally, I'd like to comment on one of the

Page 442

Commission's professed goals; that is, the maintenance of a balanced work force racially, ethnically and in terms of gender.

The Long Beach Naval Shipyard is the most diverse military base in the country. I've tried to put together some figures that will be in my written testimony about the makeup of that work force.

And while its ethnic diversity is not in and of itself a reason to keep it open, I believe this factor helps us meet the Navy's expressed goal of diversity.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. I'm sorry. We've got people coming in and out of here. We're trying to keep track of the inventory who is in here, who is not in here.

REPRESENTATIVE WATERS: I know. This factor along with the other reasons cited earlier in my testimony makes a strong case for maintaining the Long Beach facility.

In conclusion, Long Beach has twice been judged essential by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy. That conclusion was affirmed by an independent assessment done by the General Accounting Office.

For these reasons, I implore you to rethink your preliminary decision to close Long Beach for the good of its

Page 443

employees, for the good of the entire Southern California region, for the economy of the state of California and most importantly for the good of our military I'd like to please ask you to keep the Long Beach Shipyard operational. And I thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative Waters. Next we'll hear from Senator Pell from the State of Rhode Island.

SENATOR PELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and I admire your patience and strength. You must be pretty enured to what we say, so I'll be extra brief and within the limit.

This marks the third time I've testified before this mandated Commission. My testimony today represents a continuation of what I've previously stated and also more importantly reflects the continuity of the consecutive actions which were taken by your predecessor commissions.

Two years ago, the Commission determined to relocate surface ships from Newport and other coastal states. The move represented the departure of naval vessels that have graced Narragansett Bay for more than two centuries.

At the same time, however, they continued the

Page 444

consolidation of functions at both -- in Newark and at NETC, thus solidifying Newport's unique role as the Navy's preeminent center for indoctrination, classroom instruction, laboratory research.

At that time I concluded that with the Commission's decision Newport has trained sailors and traded sailors for science. Quite frankly, I believe that the previous actions by the predecessor commissions worked out well for the Navy, for Rhode Island and more important for the taxpayer.

Given my brief time, I'd like to leave you with just two thoughts. I would ask that a copy of the full text of these remarks be made a part of the Commission's record.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: They will be made a part of the record.

SENATOR PELL: I thank you. First, I strongly support DOD's recommendation to relocate Newark headquarters in Newport, the central functions from both Naval Undersea Warfare Center Detachment to New London and the Naval Research Underwater Lab in Fort Orlando, Florida.

The BRAC recommendations are consistent with the Navy's stated desire to geographically consolidate full spectrum laboratories and training facilities in a manner

Page 445

1 that simultaneously increases military value, decreases the
2 infrastructure and reduces the operating cost.
3 Based on information gathered from top Navy staff
4 when I last visited Newport less than two weeks ago, I'm
5 convinced of the accuracy of the official data provided by
6 the Navy and the analysis who ranked the Newport site in
7 Newark third out of 64 of all the Navy technical centers in
8 terms of military value. Without any hesitation, I would
9 urge you to sustain the recommendation.
10 Secondly, I strongly support the recommendation to
11 relocate training functions from the Naval Training Center in
12 Meridian, Mississippi, to Naval Education and Training Center
13 in Newport.
14 As you know, NATC Newport is recognized as the
15 crown jewel of excellence in naval education, training and
16 indoctrination. After the removal of the North Atlantic
17 Fleet from Newport in the 1970s, NATC was formed as a large
18 campus noted for its excellent schools.
19 The various commands currently at Newport include
20 the Naval War College, which dates back to 1884 and is the
21 oldest of its kind in America. I thank you for your
22 consideration and, as I say, admire your ability to hear so

Page 446

1 many. Thank you.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Senator Pell.
3 Next we'll hear from Representative Sam Gejdenson from
4 Connecticut.
5 REPRESENTATIVE GEJDENSON: Thank you very much.
6 I'll be very brief. I'm impressed by your sitting ability
7 and by your kidneys to hang out as long as you have.
8 I just want to say a couple of quick things. We're
9 all coming in here arguing for our districts. Go back, look
10 at the numbers. I think that the BRAC decisions, and I have
11 great admiration for Senator Pell, frankly from the first day
12 were based on faulty numbers.
13 When you look at where we are today, we see there
14 are two new buildings that the Navy is talking about adding
15 to the Newport facility at a time when we have all these
16 empty buildings in New London.
17 About a decade ago a friend of mine, Charlie Rose,
18 a gentleman I met in New York who is a builder said this to
19 me. He says, "I used to build buildings in New York City,
20 and those buildings would have every fifth floor for
21 computers.
22 And we had all our secretarial staff, and we had

Page 447

1 everybody in New York City, the most expensive real estate in
2 the world." He says, "Today there are no more floors for
3 computers. The management's in New York City, but the staff
4 is in Nebraska because it's cheaper to have it out there than
5 in New York City."
6 The logic in an era of computers and
7 telecommunications to take an isolated function that exists
8 today in New London and move it 45 minutes to an hour and a
9 half up to Rhode Island makes no sense when you look at the
10 cost of the program, to build new buildings when there are
11 perfectly good buildings providing these functions in New
12 London.
13 In an area where it is the individuals who make up
14 the expertise, to uproot those people or lose them will be
15 far more damaging to the government and costly. So I will
16 ask you to think of what the private sector does.
17 The private sector does not move all of its people
18 into one facility, building new buildings and cramming them
19 in together just so they can say they're on one physical
20 site. With computers, telecommunications and modern means of
21 communication, you can have the staff in Nebraska, and you
22 can have the bosses in Rhode Island.

Page 448

1 You can certainly have the management in Rhode
2 Island and this function that exists in New London kept in
3 New London. I will ask you to look at that photo that we are
4 bringing up to you now.
5 In New London, we build the submarines. We have
6 the submarine base with all of the submarine schools destined
7 to be there, and if this Commission agrees with last year's
8 Commission, including the Nuclear Power School, and we have
9 Newark.
10 Now, what sense it makes to take that function and
11 expend maybe 20- maybe $40 million more to put in Rhode
12 Island, with all deference to Senator Pell doesn't make sense
13 to me.
14 It doesn't make sense for the people who work there
15 to either make them travel further or sell their homes, up
16 root their families. There is no benefit to the government.
17 If anything, it's clear to me there is a cost to the
18 government.
19 And it seems clear that this Commission wants to do
20 the right thing for the government, as I think all of them
21 have wanted to do. If you look at the facts, make a decision
22 that makes sense, not just one that, you know, follows the

Page 449

1 flow. It will help government, and you'll help the people of
2 the country.
3 Let me now go to the debate about the Nuclear Power
4 School. I understand that others have come here and argued
5 about that photograph. I think your staff has been down
6 there.
7 There is nothing in Charleston except for trees,
8 what appears to be a dirt road, and the only debate exists as
9 to whether there is real swamp in the background. Now, there
10 is no infrastructure. There is no sewers. There's no
11 telephone lines. There are no buildings.
12 This is the building in Connecticut, less than nine
13 years old. It is perfectly suited for the Nuclear Power
14 School, and think of flying people back up to Connecticut to
15 do part of their work, down to Charleston to do some of their
16 work.
17 You can put virtually all the training in
18 Connecticut where the previous BRAC said it made sense to do
19 it. We have the space. We have physical assets in place,
20 and we have spent $11 million of the taxpayer monies to
21 redesign these buildings to the standard that the Navy
22 wanted.

Page 450

1 To now midstream turn around and go into that --
2 you know, it's not as pretty as Connecticut countryside, but
3 it's fairly decent for the scrub they have down there, and
4 flatten it, hope you get through the environmental problems
5 and then proceed to put in all the infrastructure you need,
6 buildings, doesn't make sense.
7 I ask you to look at the facts. I know you've got
8 a lot before you. Each of us comes and says save our people.
9 I'm saying only do it if it makes sense for the country. I
10 think we've made that case, and I thank you gentlemen for
11 your time.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. Thank you
13 Representative Gejdenson. Next we'll hear from
14 Representative Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.
15 REPRESENTATIVE ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much,
16 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. As you know, in
17 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission decided
18 that a portion of Homestead Air Force Base would to function
19 as the Homestead Air Reserve Base and would be the home of
20 two mutually supportive reserve units, the 482nd Fighter Wing
21 and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron.
22 Working closing with the BRAC and other federal

Page 451

agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Dade County worked out a dual use plan for the base based on the military and civilian use of that facility.

The cornerstone of that redevelopment plan was the presence of both the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron. Secretary Perry described this existing plan as an exemplary model of military-civilian partnership for future base closures and realignments.

Undoing this careful plan not only undermines the viability of this project in our home base of Dade County but will also serve to undermine other procedures to mitigate the impact of the BRAC's decisions on affected communities by undercutting the reliability of your decisions.

It is therefore unconscionable that even the presence of the 482nd Fighter Wing has been called into question through the actions of a community whose joint use airport operation lacks efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Allow me to briefly review the compelling reasons that led to the current plan and how these reasons retaken their force today.

As in real estate, the value of a base lies in its location, and Homestead's location allows it to support a

Page 452

number of crucial missions. South Florida rests at the crossroads of South America and the Caribbean.

Neither the location nor the importance of these areas has changed since the original BRAC plan. This fact was demonstrated during the Haitian operation when Homestead was used in the movement of troops and supplies.

Thus, Homestead remains a critical forward base for these important areas. The geo political importance of South Florida has been collaborated by the Defense Department's decision to locate the United States Southern Command here.

When the announcement was made, DOD officials expressed that this area was simply the only logical choice. The arrival of SOUTHCOM also reenforces the utility of this base as a possibility support facility.

The mission of the 301st Air Rescue Squadron is to locate and recover Air Force personnel and other defense personnel involved with the U.S. defense activities as well as provide rescue and recovery support for man flight operations.

Thus, the decision to relocate the rescue squadron to Homestead, home of the 482nd Fighter Wing fulfills a compelling operational and maintenance justification as the

Page 453

squadron would be in a position to support a combat-ready war fighting unit.

Moreover, the 301st has traditionally provided air rescue around the tip of Florida, thus its location at Homestead will allow it to respond quickly and effectively. Reality dictates that the decision of BRAC should be affirmed.

This Commission heard the arguments to relocate the squadron to Homestead and after careful deliberation reached the correct decision. Failure for this Commission to stick to its decision would invite endless attempts to undo the Commission's work and would threaten the entire mechanism for rationale reallocation of resources.

To move the 301st Air Rescue Squadron should not be reconsidered, and beyond the obvious issues of military efficiency, the reversal of the BRAC decision would put in serious peril the future of South Dade and the reconstruction efforts of this community.

The South Dade community has worked tirelessly to rebuild our community after Hurricane Andrew, and the center of these efforts lie in the base. Stopping the move of the 301st to Homestead would severely put into question the

Page 454

future viability of this plan.

Moreover, the rebuilding plans which count on the move of the 301st would be dealt a serious setback and could have great negative implications for the economic future of our community.

In 1993, the Commission recognized the importance of our base to this nation's defense. That reality has been reaffirmed by subsequent events, and this base remains an essential part of U.S. military readiness.

In conclusion, I strongly urge you and the other Commissioners to keep Homestead Air Reserve Base open by retaining the 482nd Fighter Wing at Homestead and reaffirming the decision to return the 301st to Homestead in 1995-'96.

These are the right decisions for the military, for our community and indeed for our nation. I thank you very much for your patience.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative Ros-Lehtinen. Next we'll hear from Representative Kasich from Ohio.

REPRESENTATIVE KASICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I come before the Commission sometimes to recommend closing things, sometimes to dispute facts. I'm not here to keep

Page 455

something open. It just depends what the facts are.

I'm here today to talk to you about the Newark Air Force Base for one reason. The Government Accounting Office and come out with, I'm told, the only report that has criticized the BRAC findings since this situation started.

And it says that contrary to the fact that we would save $3.8 million a year after the first eight years, they say in the report that it might take somewhere between 17 and 100 years to get any savings.

I don't know if they're right. I think we need to look at it. I don't want you to do the wrong thing. I'm not asking you to do the wrong thing. I'm asking you to take a look at whether these numbers are right.

The GAO, as Chairman Dixon will tell you, sometimes they do great work. Sometimes their work is less than great. Sometimes their work is flat out wrong. I don't know what it is in this case, although the people at the base obviously have done a lot of work themselves.

When Newark was first recommended for closing, I didn't do anything other than to argue we've got to make sure that the numbers are right. This GAO report calls to mind the fact that we've just got to take a look at it.

Page 456

If in fact the Base Closing Commission, which I strongly support -- I wrote part of the bill that created it -- if they determine that the savings will be there and it needs to be done, I will support you.

But if you find out that the numbers aren't right, then I think you got to come back and take a look at it. I've been before the Commission two other times. One was to argue the closing of BCSC in the last year where our numbers proved to be correct when we did receive some consolidation.

The first round of base closing was to close the base in Columbus, Ohio, and I came before the Commission and said I was prepared to support that.

So I'm here today not as an advocate other than an advocate of anything other than the process. I just think that when a report comes out that shows these kind of distinctions -- and it's my understanding the Commission is already aware of this.

So take a look at it. If it turns out to be smart to keep the operation open, then I'd urge you to do that, if it's going to save the taxpayers money.

If, in your judgment, the GAO is wrong, then you got to close it, going to privatize it there, and that's what

Page 457

1 we're going to have to live with, but I felt an obligation to
2 come here and say that with this kind of a report raising
3 these kind of questions it's necessary to bring it to your
4 attention, and I think many people would like to have the
5 questions answered. So Commissioner, thank you.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you very much,
7 Representative Kasich. I'll guarantee you have looked at it,
8 and we'll continue to take a good, hard look at that
9 particular report you cited and the whole issue of Newark.
10 Thank you. Next we'll hear from Representative DeLauro from
11 Connecticut.
12 REPRESENTATIVE DeLAURO: Mr. Chairman and
13 distinguished members of the Commission, I appreciate the
14 opportunity to testify today about the proposed closure of
15 the Stratford Army Engine Plant.
16 Between the visits to Stratford by Commissioners
17 Cornella and Kling and our presentation at the New York
18 regional hearing, I know that the Commission is familiar by
19 now with the issues surrounding the Stratford plant.
20 Rather than repeat all of the details, I want to
21 highlight several key points that I urge you to keep in mind
22 during your final deliberations.

Page 458

1 Our argument for keeping the Stratford plant open
2 is a simple one. We believe the Army has substantially
3 understated the military value of the Stratford plant, and it
4 has substantially unit estimated the cost of closing the
5 facility and reconstituting its capabilities elsewhere.
6 Let me first address the military value question.
7 As you know from previous testimony, the AGD 1500 engine will
8 be in use in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years, and the
9 Army has no other tank engine in development, no other tank
10 engine in development.
11 Historically, the Army procured two spare engines
12 for every tank produced. With the Abrams, the Army procured
13 only one spare engine per three tanks. So not only must
14 tanks equipped with the AGD 1500 last for 30 more years, they
15 must also make due with fewer spares.
16 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place
17 in the country where we build the AGD 1500 and critical spare
18 parts such as the recuperator. In my view, it is a
19 tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and
20 to lose its unique capabilities given the continuing
21 dependency of our tank fleet on the AGD 1500.
22 We need the Stratford plant to extend the life of

Page 459

1 the engines that are now in use, to build critical spares, to
2 provide field expertise to resolve the unique problems of the
3 battlefield and to quickly build new engines should that be
4 required by a military emergency.
5 The second point I want to leave you with is that
6 reconstituting the capabilities of the Stratford plant
7 elsewhere simply is not feasible. Stratford is not just an
8 Army engine plant. It is a dual use military and civilian
9 facility that manufactures a wide range of products.
10 These range from the exclusively military AGD 1500
11 tank engine to the exclusively commercial jet engine. In
12 between there is a continuum of helicopter and hover craft
13 engines with both military and commercial applications.
14 The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to
15 Corpus Christi and the tank work to Anniston. This is much
16 simpler said than done. The same equipment and the same work
17 force teams at the plant produce military and commercial
18 products for both aviation and for ground use.
19 All but two of 11 manufacturing cells are dual use,
20 as is the vast majority of the machinery. As those who work
21 at the plant like to say, splitting this capability is like a
22 very bad divorce in which one spouse takes the dining room

Page 460

1 table and the other gets the chairs. It will be very
2 expensive to get a complete set again.
3 The third point that I would like to leave you with
4 is that the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of
5 closing the plant. The greatest cost is for environmental
6 cleanup. The Army's calculations did not include any
7 environmental costs, but a November 1994 study conducted by
8 the Army Corps of Engineers estimated a minimum cost of $17.5
9 million just for environmental stabilization of the plant.
10 The study estimated that cleanup sufficient for
11 plant reuse could cost as much as $422 million. This is but
12 one of several costs that were understated by the Army. The
13 plant's operating contractor, Allied Signal Aerospace,
14 believes the Army also has understated closing costs,
15 recurring costs to secure the facility, relocation costs and
16 personnel costs as well.
17 Altogether, the contractor estimates that closing
18 the plant the cost $100 million over the next 20 years rather
19 than save $80 million as the Army has concluded. The much
20 better option for the Stratford Army Engine Plant is to
21 continue the work underway to downsize the facility, complete
22 its conversion into a dual use manufacturing plant.

Page 461

1 The Army is committed to investing $47.5 million in
2 this program. The employees of the plant, the union members
3 and the management have joined together to make the plan
4 work. They are cutting costs, improving productivity and
5 diversifying the product line into the commercial
6 marketplace.
7 This dual use approach maintains the vital military
8 value of the Stratford Army Engine Plant while reducing costs
9 to the Army by expanding commercial use of the plant.
10 This is the best option for national security and
11 the best option for the taxpayers. That is our case, Mr.
12 Chairman. We hope that the Commission will support us, and
13 we thank you and sincerely thank you for all of the time and
14 consideration that you have given to us. Thank you very,
15 very much for letting me come by today.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Representative
17 DeLauro. Next we'll hear --
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Chairman, I understand that a
19 member of the conference has a conference with you, and I'd
20 be glad to take the next two witnesses while you undertake
21 your obligation.
22 We're delighted to have Representative Charles

Page 462

1 Canady of Florida. Congressman Canady, we're pleased you
2 could come.
3 REPRESENTATIVE CANADY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4 Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I want to begin
5 by thanking for the opportunity to testify today.
6 My purpose in offering a statement today is to urge
7 your support for the redirect of MacDill Air Force Base in
8 Tampa, Florida, as recommended by the Department of Defense.
9 The continued health and well-being of MacDill is
10 very important to my many constituents who are employed at
11 the base. Throughout its long and distinguished history,
12 MacDill has contributed much to our national security. The
13 facilities there have accommodated many diverse missions over
14 the years, from a home base for a fighter wing to massive
15 airlifts of personnel and equipment during Operations Desert
16 Shield and Desert Storm.
17 It boasts easy access to a first-class training
18 facility and bombing range at Avon Park in Central Florida.
19 Generations of fighter pilots have honed their skills there
20 and in other training areas over the Gulf of Mexico.
21 In my view, the decision by DOD to redirect the
22 1993 Base Closure Commission's recommendation with regard to

Page 463

MacDill make strategic and operational sense. Recent massive lift operations such as last year's deployment of personnel and equipment to the Persian Gulf have demonstrated the clear need for a fully operational military run runway at MacDill.

MacDill is a unique asset among military facilities. It is the only installation which is home to two joint unified commands from which national command authority missions are directed. U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command are both headquartered at the base.

The contributions of these commands to our country's security in recent years is well known. An integral part of their success has been the first-class facilities at MacDill.

Earlier in this process, you heard testimony from General Wayne Downing of Special Operations Command and Lieutenant General Butch Neal of U.S. Central Command. Both have indicated that airfield support at MacDill is critical to their missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both validated the command's requirements. The Air Force, for its part, has performed

Page 464

internal studies which have determined that the best facility to support these requirement is the MacDill airfield.

I am confident you will reach the same conclusion and support the Department of Defense's recommendation that you will return the MacDill Airfield to MacDill Air Force Base.

Another action you have before you is the 43rd Air Refueling Group's transferring to MacDill. As you know, the force structure review found a shortage of air refueling assets in the Southeastern United States.

27 percent of the demand for tankers is found in this area, and only 9 percent of the supply is located there. These figures, along with the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to support the unified command's needs at MacDill created the opportunity to relocate a tanker unit from the asset-rich northern area to the south.

The location, the infrastructure and the physical plant at MacDill make it ideal for the relocation of tanker aircraft. Having met with the principals and toured the base, I am confident MacDill can accommodate the 43rd Air Refueling Group and other aircraft units in need of relocation.

Page 465

I want to close, Mr. Chairman, by stressing the commitment of the Tampa Bay area community to our Air Force base. The citizens and leaders in our part of Florida know that a fully operational MacDill Air Force Base will make an important contribution to our success as a community.

We appreciate the affirmative steps taken by the military to maximize the use of its assets at MacDill. We urge you to support the recommendations of the Department of Defense with regard to the MacDill redirect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Canady, and we are always indebted to a distinguished member of the Congress who does it inside five minutes. We appreciate it.

CONGRESSMAN CANADY: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Andy Jacobs of Indiana. We're delighted to have your here, Representative Jacobs. Thank you for coming.

REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: Thank you, Senator. I note the paper that the Hello Dolly is joining a renaissance, and so I would like to say to you it's not to see you back where you belong.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you.

Page 466

REPRESENTATIVE JACOBS: I incorporate my reference, which you already know, about Mayor Goldsmith's proposal not to obstruct or object to the closing of the Naval Warfare Center in Indianapolis but to close it in a way that is best for the Navy, best for the country and indeed best for the community.

As I understand it, an issue here is whether the Commission has the authority to use this innovative proposal, rather like the traditional question of whether you can get there from here.

I have written to each of you, but just to mention again the former Base Closure Commission came to Indianapolis with a recommendation that Fort Benjamin Harrison be closed and no recommendation that the Army Finance Center located at Building One, the second largest building in the United States Government's inventory anywhere be torn down or be discontinued.

One of the Commissioners took a tour of that building, came back to the Commission meeting and insisted that the Commission recommend that that enormous building be razed, and that was not recommended by the Army.

As a matter of fact, the Army had asked for an

Page 467

appropriation to refurbish it. If that isn't precedent enough, I really don't know what would be.

I'll just add this simple thing, two simple things about whether it's practical, whether you can do what is best, whether you can accomplish a sensible goal.

Bill Malden, in one of his World War II cartoons, shows four GIs on a jeep in a clearing, And Germany small arms rounds are coming in puffing up all around, and the driver, obviously, is refusing to move the jeep into the woods.

And the caption is, "I hate like hell to run on a flat." And I might add, too, that a few years ago they finished the downtown inner loop in Indianapolis, and they had what they called Dead Man's Curb, because it went under several bridges, overpasses, and it just kept turning and kept turning, and truck drivers were being killed, about one every 30 days on that turn.

I wrote to Governor Bowen, then Governor Bowen of Indiana, and suggested that they use the ramp chevrons which indicate to you that you keep turning and don't speed up where you logically would think you might.

He turned it over to his highway department, and

Page 468

after 50 days of due consideration he wrote back and told me they reported that those -- according to regulation could only be used on ramps to highways.

That very day I received that letter one more man was killed on that curve, and I picked up the phone and called the Governor and said, "Are you ready to employ a little common sense?" He said, "Quite."

And they put the chevrons up. There has not been an accident, let alone a fatality since, and that's several years ago.

So I implore the Commission do the practical thing here. Help the Navy. Help the country, which includes Indianapolis. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Thank you very much, Congressman. We appreciate Representative Jacobs' contribution. We're delighted to have Representative Tim Hutchinson of the great state of Arkansas.

REPRESENTATIVE HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all thank you, as chairman, for your leadership on this important issue and the job that you're doing.

During the few minutes that I have, I would like to

Page 469

1 point out the adverse economic impact that the closure of
2 Fort Chaffee Arkansas would have not on the local communities
3 but rather on the training of our armed forces.
4 As you all know, as enunciated in the policy
5 guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense for the 1995 BRAC
6 round, it was directed that when reviewing the potential
7 action to be taken at a certain installation priority
8 consideration be given to the fundamental military criteria,
9 which includes the current and current mission requirements
10 and impact on operational readiness of the Department of
11 Defense total force, the availability and condition of land,
12 facilities and associated airspace at the potential receiving
13 locations and the cost and manpower applications.
14 There could be no doubt that if the annual training
15 which is currently conducted at Fort Chaffee is forced to be
16 relocated to another major training area that there will be
17 extensive additional costs involved.
18 In addition to the monetary increase, our reserve
19 component units would be faced with a loss of training time
20 due to additional travel coupled with the limited
21 availability of maneuver training areas at alternate sites.
22 It is also my understanding that these moves will

Page 470

1 violate the travel requirements in United States Army Forces
2 Command National Guard Regulation 351.
3 It has been estimated that traveling to alternate
4 annual training sites will involve a minimum of two
5 additional training days per soldier per year. Obviously,
6 additional funds would be required to pay for these added
7 days.
8 And let us also not forget since these troops are
9 Reserve or National Guard units they're still held
10 accountable for the extra training days by their full-time
11 private sector employers.
12 Currently, the National Guard can operate Fort
13 Chaffee at a cost of $6.9 million a year. This includes real
14 property and operations maintenance costs for 1 million
15 square feet, an environmental and training area management of
16 62,000 acres.
17 If the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve units
18 are forced to relocate to Fort Sill, the total funding
19 increase for annual individual training will be between $6.75
20 million and $11 million.
21 Relocation to Fort Riley, a distance which would,
22 in fact, preclude inactive duty training, annual costs could

Page 471

1 exceed an additional expenditure by the Army of $3.5 million
2 per year.
3 A third option that has been mentioned is Fort
4 Polk, and it does not even have the facilities to train any
5 additional units from Fort Chaffee until the year 2001.
6 I'll tell you that these figures which I have used
7 were obtained from Army officials. Obviously, training and
8 readiness will be greatly degraded for those units that
9 normally drill at Fort Chaffee.
10 Also, the 188th Tactical Fighter Group, which is
11 based at the Fort Smith Airport, would have to have their
12 training areas reassigned with projected cost increases of
13 over $900,000 annually to utilize the nearest alternate
14 aerial bombing or strafing site.
15 This figure does not reflect additional cost of
16 other aerial component units training at alternate sites.
17 The need for sufficient training areas for the reserve
18 components was recognized by the Director of the U.S. Army
19 National Guard, Major General John Derouge, and the Director
20 of Management for the Office of the Army Chief of Staff,
21 Brigadier General James Shane during a meeting on June 8th
22 with staff members of your Commission.

Page 472

1 At that meeting Major General Derouge contended
2 that he, "Needs ranges, maneuver training areas and impact
3 areas for individual and unit training on weekends." These
4 Army officials stated that in fact their recommendation to
5 the Department of Defense did not include the words "training
6 areas" as part of the enclave because they were inadvertently
7 edited out.
8 In addition, the Army representative stated that
9 the Department has identified $20 million to pay for enclave
10 expenses at several major training areas to include Fort
11 Chaffee. Brigadier General Shane stated at the completion of
12 the meeting that, "The Army as an obligation to ensure that
13 the National Guard and the Reserve can train." I strongly
14 concur with General Shane's observation.
15 In conclusion, let me say that clearly the
16 statements by these officials demonstrate that Fort Chaffee
17 can continue to provide the necessary facilities to allow for
18 the proper training of our armed forces.
19 Being that the Army has already determined how to
20 allocate the funding for keeping this post operating, our
21 nation will be the loser of our armed services are denied the
22 opportunity to use the unique training areas provided by the

Page 473

1 post.
2 I believe that a rigorous cost benefit analysis
3 will reveal that the long-term cost of a shutdown of Fort
4 Chaffee will far exceed any apparent short-term savings.
5 Therefore, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I
6 strongly urge you to keep this valuable training installation
7 available to our citizen soldiers, and I thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Hutchinson, we're
9 indebted to you for that very fine contribution on behalf of
10 the great state of Arkansas. And we're pleased to have with
11 us the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of
12 California, Congressman Steve Horn.
13 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: Nice to see you again, Mr.
14 Chairman, and Commissioners and all visitors to Long Beach.
15 We're going to get the Chairman there yet.
16 I represent the 38th Congressional District of
17 California that includes the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which
18 is the closest public shipyard to the largest fleet
19 concentration in the world with over 70 percent of the
20 Pacific Fleet home ported just 81 nautical miles away.
21 I'm concerned that the Navy and the Department of
22 Defense substantively deviated from the future force

Page 474

1 structure plan and the preestablished final selection
2 criteria when they made the recommendation to close Long
3 Beach.
4 First, the Navy uses a new force structure plan as
5 the justification for no longer needing Dry Dock No. 1. In
6 1991 and 1993, the Navy stated that Dry Dock No. 1 was
7 essential as the primary West Coast aircraft carrier emergent
8 dry dock and that the Navy could not fulfill its Pacific
9 Fleet mission requirement without Dry Dock No. 1.
10 What has changed? Frankly, nothing. There are
11 still six carriers in the Pacific Fleet. The percentage of
12 large deck ships in the new force structure is increasing.
13 Dry Dock No. 1 is one of only two dry docks on the entire
14 West Coast capable of docking every ship in the Navy.
15 Without Long Beach a carrier would have to travel
16 1,100 nautical miles to Puget Sound from San Diego or 2,600
17 nautical miles to Pearl Harbor for repair, and they can't
18 handle the work they already have on time.
19 It is essential that the Long Beach Shipyard Dry
20 Dock No. 1 be kept open. History shows that mothballing or a
21 government-owned, contractor-operated approach for preserving
22 dry docks simply doesn't work.

Page 475

1 Economic vitalization is denied a community which
2 s already lost thousands of jobs with the closure of the
3 al station, the naval hospital and the economy generally,
4 the Navy is unable to maintain the dry dock in a way that
5 would be of any value in a time of need. Once this asset is
6 lost, it's lost forever.
7 Second, the Navy justifies its recommendation to
8 close Long Beach and not Portsmouth Naval Shipyard by stating
9 that the future uncertainties of the force structure prevent
10 the closure of Portsmouth.
11 I'm not here to denigrate Portsmouth, but Public
12 Law 101.510, which is your charter, clearly states that the
13 force structure plan for Fiscal Years 1995 through 2001 are
14 not some mythical formulation, but that period is what counts
15 in the decision-making, and that's to be the basis for making
16 recommendations.
17 Third, the base structure analysis team developed
18 data call scenarios, military value criteria and then
19 evaluation criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and
20 caused Long Beach's initial value scores to be lower by over
21 10 points in 1995.
22 The Department of Defense did not establish new

Page 476

1 selection criteria between 1993 and 1995, yet only Long
2 Beach's military value scores substantially changed from its
3 consistent position as a strong third in military value
4 behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. What has changed?
5 Nothing.
6 Fourth, the Navy badly underestimated the cost of
7 closure at only $74.5 million with an immediate break-even
8 point and a 20-year return on investment of at least $1.9
9 billion. Internal Navy documents reveal something else, a
10 dget request of 433 million or six times the amount now
11 imed by the Navy to this Commission.
12 Neither the Navy's fictional figure given to you
13 and the rest of us nor its partially realistic internal
14 figure includes over 500 million of additional workers's
15 compensation. Neither their fictional one or the real one in
16 their files from the shipyard doesn't say a thing about the
17 half billion dollars in worker's comp costs over 20 years.
18 Ask Charleston, ask Mare Island what those figures
19 meant and what they are now when they were closed. Using the
20 realistic cost of closure numbers, a break-even point is
21 about 40 years out rather than the Navy's claim of an
22 immediate return on investment.

Page 477

1 Finally, the Navy recommended the closure of Long
2 Beach and not Portsmouth despite the fact that the Navy
3 consistently in 1991, 1993, now 1995 ranked Long Beach higher
4 in military value than Portsmouth.
5 The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted
6 heavily toward military value, as they should be. The Navy
7 contends that nuclear issues significantly outweigh the
8 established selection criteria. Therefore, Portsmouth should
9 not be closed.
10 Since this is a substantial deviation from the
11 established selection criteria, if Portsmouth remains open,
12 then Long Beach should also remain open. Is the Commission
13 ready to close the one public shipyard that complied with the
14 Department of Defense guidance to install more efficient
15 management and reduce overhead, the only public shipyard to
16 return money to the taxpayers six years in a row?
17 Long Beach is the only public shipyard operating in
18 the black. If closed, what kind of a message does that send
19 to the taxpayers of the United States and those in charge of
20 er federal facilities that are attempting to become more
21 cient?
22 And it's the only yard within 1,100 miles of the

Page 478

1 largest ship concentration in the Pacific that can dry dock
2 the carriers and amphibious ships that are the heart of our
3 force projection capability in the Pacific.
4 On the merits, based on the military criteria, Long
5 Beach deserves to stay open. It's an irreplaceable asset
6 that we cannot afford to lose, and I thank you very much for
7 the opportunity.
8 Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a letter to the
9 Commissioners for the record with a few attachments,
10 including the law that guides the Commission with which I'm
11 sure you're familiar, but I think you will find the
12 attachments that spell out the substantial deviation most
13 helpful, and I believe staff has it here.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have the letter. Thank you,
15 Representative Horn.
16 REPRESENTATIVE HORN: You have it. Very good. I
17 thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know and I'm confident
18 in this group you're going to do the right thing. Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman Horn. And
20 we're delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from
21 the great state of Connecticut, Representative Chris Shays.
22 REPRESENTATIVE SHAYS: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman

Page 479

1 and members of the Committee. I appreciate you for all your
2 hard work and the tough decisions you'll be making. And let
3 me say to you that whatever your decision on the issue that
4 I'm most concerned with, and that's Allied Signal, I intend
5 to support the process and know that we've all been given a
6 fair hearing and hope you agree with my conclusions. But
7 whatever they are, I intend to support the Base Closing Bill.
8 Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission, I
9 appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today
10 regarding the recommendation to close the Stratford Army
11 Engine Plant. This is an extremely important issue not only
12 to the state of Connecticut but to our country, and that's
13 the reason for which I'm here.
14 As I'm sure you are aware, Connecticut as a
15 distinguished history of contributing to our national
16 defense. From aircraft to tanks and submarines, Connecticut
17 plays an integral role in maintaining our national security.
18 At a time of scarce resources and absolute
19 necessity for the implementation of a plan to balance the
20 budget, we must explore every option to help in achieving
21 this goal. Your efforts and suggestions will play,
22 obviously, a major role in this effort.

Page 480

1 I've repeatedly opposed increases in national
2 defense spending and feel Congress has an historic
3 opportunity to make meaningful reductions in the amount of
4 money we spend on defense, hence my support for the concept
5 and your efforts.
6 And there is little doubt military spending will
7 decrease in real terms over the coming years, I think also in
8 absolute terms, obviously.
9 Make no mistake, I support a strong national
10 defense and believe our forces should be prepared to deal
11 with whatever threats they may face, but the Cold War is over
12 and America has won.
13 The fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the
14 Warsaw Pact, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the spread
15 of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics are
16 harbingers of a new era.
17 Now we can and should reduce defense spending and
18 determine the best way in which we can save money. However,
19 it must be done in a fashion which preserves our national
20 security interests and realigns military objectives to meet
21 the threats of the post Cold War era.
22 The Stratford Army Engine Plant is a perfect

Page 481

1 example of how we can achieve both. As you are aware from
2 the May 5th presentation in New York Stratford is just more
3 than just a tank engine plant.
4 Not only are products manufactured exclusively for
5 the military, such as the AGT 1500 engine used in the Abrams
6 Tank M-1 produced at the plant, engines like the LF-507 Turbo
7 Fan which powers the Averroe regional jet aircraft are also
8 built at this site.
9 Through a dual use program, Allied Signal, which
10 conducts operations in the facility, has the ability to
11 produce engines for both the military and commercial sector,
12 and by next year they expect to have a production rate of at
13 least 70 percent commercial and 30 percent military. We
14 think it may actually go up to 80 percent commercial.
15 As you also know from the New York presentation,
16 Stratford has taken steps to downsize while maintaining its
17 ability to produce these necessary products. This plan will
18 reduce military production capacity from 200 to 10 engines
19 per month, cut the occupied area from 1.8 million to 1
20 million square feet and decrease the number of machines owned
21 by both Allied Signal and the Army by nearly 50 percent.
22 As a result, the costs are expected to be cut in

Page 482

1 half. Aside from making an effort to diversify Stratford,
2 it's extremely important that we remember -- and this is the
3 key point, I think -- the value this plant has to the
4 military.
5 It is the only plant that produces vital parts such
6 as the recuperative plates for the AGT 1500 and is the source
7 of repair parts for the engine, which is expected to be in
8 service for at least 30 more years.
9 While the Army may suggest it has the capability to
10 repair engines elsewhere, I believe this point proves that
11 theory incorrect. While I was not at the hearing in New York
12 last month, I'm aware of Commissioner Cornella's questions
13 regarding the amount of time an overhauled engine can last.
14 I believe the response of between 1,200 and 1,300
15 hours if done in Stratford compared to 400 hours in completed
16 at the Alabama depot again illustrates the value of this
17 facility.
18 As you may know, many of the machines needed to
19 produce the engines, such as the AGT 1500 and aviation
20 products, are owned by Allied Signal and that most are used
21 for the production of both. They use the machine to produce
22 both. Therefore, the Army would be unable to separate this

Page 483

1 manufacturing capability and, obviously, the cost savings as
2 well.
3 With all the concerns associated with closing the
4 plant, including its military value and the cost of closing
5 it -- excuse me. With all the concerns associated with
6 closing the plant, including its military value and the cost
7 of closing it and reconstituting its capabilities to other
8 areas, I don't believe it would be in our best interests, our
9 country's best interests.
10 I don't see the logic behind the Army's suggestion
11 that they close the plant. Simply stated, I believe the Army
12 has miscalculated the true costs and benefits of closing this
13 facility and request that you reject its proposal to do so,
14 and I thank you both, all three.
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,
16 Congressman Shays, for that important contribution on behalf
17 of the great state of Connecticut. And we're now delighted
18 to hear from the Distinguished Senior Senator from the state
19 of Alaska.
20 And as he moves towards the podium, I want to say I
21 thank him for the book on the 1,000 Mile War. That war began
22 53 years and 10 days ago on June 3, 1942, when the Japanese

Page 484

1 bombed Alaska and killed 25 Americans in a barracks, and also
2 the second largest number of people on both sides in the
3 Pacific Theater next to Iwo Jima was lost in the great state
4 of Alaska. I read the book from cover to cover. Excellent
5 book. I thank my friend from Alaska.
6 SENATOR MURKOWSKI: It was a good book. That
7 gentleman went on to be a good novelist. Thank you very
8 much.
9 Let me commend you and your staff for the fine work
10 you've done to try and make this a fair process. Since the
11 regional hearing in San Francisco, I've worked with the Delta
12 Junction Community members on serious concerns over the
13 realignment of Fort Greely.
14 Congressman Don Young testified before you
15 yesterday. I'll try not to duplicate his comments. My point
16 is this is not just a realignment. It really is the closing
17 of a small community in a remote part of the United States
18 that is economically dependent upon the Department of
19 Defense.
20 Fort Greely provides the Army with a training and
21 testing base that is roughly half the size of the state of
22 New Jersey, a post in which varied terrain and arctic

Page 485

1 conditions provide a real ability to train our troops for
2 winter warfare.
3 It permits rigorous testing of advanced weapons and
4 supports systems in an arctic weather environment which
5 cannot be replicated in a test chamber. The proposal before
6 you has been called a safari concept. It attempts to operate
7 the missions currently performed at Fort Greely, particularly
8 training and testing, from Fort Wainwright.
9 Common sense dictates that this is an inefficient
10 system and destroys the training proficiency of the
11 operation. There is also one overriding significant obstacle
12 to the Fort Greely scenario, because the bulk of the safari
13 concept will take place during our long, dark Alaska winter.
14 It is night all along, all night up there. It's dark all
15 night up there during the period of this time.
16 Transiting 120 miles to and from the Greely
17 training area in subzero temperatures in nighttime
18 conditions, coping with ice, fog and snowy conditions is like
19 traveling the distance between the snowy shores of Lake
20 Michigan in Chicago and the place I was born in Indianapolis
21 You now how far away that is.
22 Now, they would do that on a steady basis. More

Page 486

1 importantly, from a human perspective, the safari concept
2 adds further risk to our men and women who are required to
3 shift their operations back and forth between these two
4 bases.
5 You've also heard about the devastating impact of
6 this proposed realignment on the community from Don Young, as
7 I said, the significant loss of jobs and economic viability,
8 but the overall economic impact on this community is a
9 staggering 70 percent.
10 I don't think there is any other base realignment
11 or closure concept before the Commission that hits that
12 level. 70 percent of the economy of this area will be
13 eliminated. As you know, that is a real difficult
14 proposition.
15 If it were a true realignment, the community would
16 not face extinction. I ask you to examine, really, this
17 catastrophic impact on this community and see if something
18 can't be done.
19 I think there are alternatives to realignment,
20 retaining portions of the mission at Fort Greely. I think it
21 could be largely a governmental-civilian operation retaining
22 the core functions currently performed at Fort Greely and

Page 487

keep them there without the costs that have been indicated be necessary at Fort Wainwright.

We became aware recently of significant military construction requirements that the Army in Alaska say are necessary if this realignment takes place. That raise serious concerns over the true cost of the program.

I've asked that that memo be made available to you and your staff, and I've asked the General Accounting Office to review the discrepancy in the information that has been provided to us from the various portions of the Army. But the specific details of the Army's plan need, I think, review by the Commission, and I would urge you to do so.

In closing, if you find it absolutely essential to realign this community, at a minimum, I implore you to look at the realignment time line as proposed by the Army.

The Army now plans to abandon the facilities at Fort Greely during the next Alaskan winter. Hundreds of millions of dollars in investments made over the years in this base infrastructure will be destroyed in a matter of months.

This effectively eliminates any real chance for the community of Delta Junction to develop a reuse plan for those

Page 488

facilities. To abandon them in the middle of an Arctic winter is just wrong. I think that you could adopt some fair form of the Army's realignment but direct that it take place solely so that the place can be kept in good operating condition and the plans can be made in the following summer.

Again, I appreciate your courtesy in allowing me to be here. It's a tough job that you have, and I commend you for doing it. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I thank my friend, the Distinguished Senior Center from the great state of Alaska for his great presentation today, for the book and for his friendship. Thank you very much, Senator.

We're delighted to have -- I'm going to ask that my colleagues indulge me. Congressman Solomon Ortiz has been waiting here a while. We're going to call him. Congressman Solomon Ortiz. I want to give my colleague from Illinois a moment to catch his breath. Congressman Ortiz.

REPRESENTATIVE ORTIZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I will focus on those facilities that have been impacted by the Department of Navy's base closure recommendations, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and Naval

Page 489

Air Station Kingsville.

Naval Air Station Kingsville with its outlying field and its neighbor, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, can meet the single-sited T-45 strike training needs of the Navy, offers best weather, uncongested airspace, plenty of runways, good outlying fields, protected from infringement, access to over-water training areas, strong community support and its highest naval air training rating make this statement possible, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.

I am aware that criticism for the Navy plan has surfaced regarding the ability of the South Texas complex to meet this single-sited T-45 strike requirement. Using the most conservative capacity estimate of the most expensive training requirements with generous surge included, South Texas remains the most cost-effective alternative for advance strike training for the Navy.

Careful analysis the demonstrate that Naval Air Station Kingsville and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi have sufficient capacity to meet the strike training needs of the Navy. Should the Commission have concern about this ability, I would suggest that the OLF, a current Navy asset could be used for surge capability.

Page 490

Naval Air Station Kingsville is the Navy's finest pilot training facility with tremendous capacity and growth potential. NAS Corpus Christi has consistently demonstrated superior military value and versatile utility for our nation's military.

It is home to the three aviator training essentials, uncongested airspace, good weather and plenty of concrete for runways and outlying fields. It is a federal complex housing 47 tenant commands, including Customs, the Coast Guard, a major joint DOD research center and the Corpus Christi Army Depot, the world's largest helicopter repair facility.

In addition to its current mission as an Undergraduate Pilot Training base for Navy, Marine and Air Force pilots, NAS Corpus Christi serves as the home to the Navy Mine Warfare Command. It is a key component in the ongoing Navy plan to establish a center of excellence for mine warfare in South Texas that combines all elements of mine warfare training and operations in a central location.

The Navy has recommended the transfer of its West Coast mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi in support of the mine warfare center of excellence. I strongly

Page 491

endorse this proposal which serves to advance the Navy's plan to co-locate its mine warfare assets to secure maximized training opportunities and operational advantages.

This is a small redirect action that is noncontroversial and reaps enormous economic benefits for the taxpayer.

I strongly support the retention of the T-44, move the engine training at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Joint multi-engine maritime training with the Air Force has already begun at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi.

In those studies of maritime training conducted by the Department of Defense, NAS Corpus Christi has the highest military value. The T-44 used for multi-engine training is already single-sited at NAS Corpus Christi in compliance with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Navy policies that functional pilot training be consolidated.

Transfer of this undergraduate training function could only result in disruption to pilot training pipelines, duplication of facilities and expenses and the unnecessary incurring of a significant military construction cost.

The increased NFO PTR requirements and ongoing activities at NAS Pensacola make the transfer of the T-44

Page 492

mission to Pensacola quite complex, most unsafe and impossible from a capacity standpoint.

The Navy's substantially deviates from the base closure criteria in recommending the transfer of the T-44, and I urge you to reject this portion of the Navy's proposal. The South Texas community has reluctantly decided not to oppose the transfer of primary pilot training from NAS Corpus Christi to NAS Whiting Field in order to accommodate the single-siting of primary air training.

I support the analysis that asserts that both strike training and primary training may be consolidated based on the 1994 PTR rates with a reasonable surge. However, it must be noted that the single-siting of primary air training results in a much tighter management of aviation assets that the single-siting of advanced strike training since a much greater access capacity currently exists in the training facility.

I want to briefly discuss, and I'll finish in a few seconds, the Navy recommendation to realign NAS Corpus Christi to a naval air facility in support of NAS Kingsville. This seems like an internal Navy decision on the operational status of this facility.

Page 493

1 However, let me suggest that this may, in fact,
2 hinder the future operation of the base and the well-being of
3 numerous tenants. The recommendation to realign Naval Air
4 Station Corpus Christi to a naval air facility is based on
5 its proposed status as an outlying field.
6 However, I do not believe that this proposal takes
7 into full consideration the complexity of the base as a
8 federal facility. I appreciate the Commission listening to
9 me today, Mr. Senator, Mr. Commissioner.
10 Good to see some of my friends on the Commission,
11 and I know and I have all the faith that you will do what is
12 best or our country, and I just wanted to relay some of our
13 concerns of my constituents back in South Texas.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman
15 Ortiz. We're delighted to have you. We're pleased to
16 welcome the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of
17 Illinois, Congressman Dick Durbin.
18 REPRESENTATIVE DURBIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19 Let me at the outset thank both you, Mr. Kling, whom I know,
20 and the other members of the Commission for your service to
21 your country in this regard. It is a momentous task, and we
22 are most appreciative of the public service which you are

Page 494

1 rendering.
2 I might say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, this last
3 Sunday in a paper you're familiar with, the St. Louis Post
4 Dispatch, there was an excellent article printed about the
5 two facilities that I'm discussing by Mr. Harry Levins,
6 including a very nice picture of the Chairman, and I would
7 recommend it to you, and I'll leave it if you would like to
8 look at it informally or as part of the record, because I
9 think it sets out in detail the importance of the two
10 facilities I'll discuss today.
11 These facilities are the Aviation Troop Command,
12 better known as ATCOM, in St. Louis, and the Charles Melvin
13 Price Support Center in Granite City. I am from the Illinois
14 side of the river, but we have a regional approach to these
15 issues as we did with Metrolink and many others, and we are
16 hoping that your Commission will view this as a regional
17 asset in both instances.
18 The Army's recommendation to close ATCOM and
19 realign the Price Center does not fairly and accurately
20 represent the military value of these facilities and
21 exaggerates the resulting return on investment.
22 To follow an admonition I have given so many

Page 495

1 witnesses, I will, in fact, condense my remarks which are
2 made part of this record and just say to you that I believe
3 that at the outset the Army's recommendation to close ATCOM
4 exaggerates the savings in annual overhead cost.
5 The original estimate of 17.6 million has now been
6 re-estimated to 3.5 million. In addition, the close of ATCOM
7 is premature and would cost more than $100 million in moving
8 and relocation costs, and it would place the Army's aviation
9 mission in turmoil at this moment when, in fact, this
10 decision should be deferred until after the Department of
11 Defense has decided on a site for department-wide aviation
12 acquisition organization.
13 On the Price Support Center named after a mutual
14 friend of ours who gave a life of public service in support
15 of the armed services, I would say that I hope you'll
16 consider that the estimated cost of realigning the Price
17 Center would result in savings of 8.6 million a year, and, in
18 fact, the Army has over estimated these savings by about 6
19 million.
20 First, the Army estimated savings of 1.8 million
21 for closing the military family housing. Local data has
22 assigned the figure of 1 million instead of 1.8.

Page 496

1 Second, the Army failed to take into account the
2 cost of relocating the Price Support Center families which
3 would be about $1.45 million.
4 Third, the Army did not include the reimbursable
5 amount they now receive from tenants, which is almost $1
6 million a year. In fact, the Army has admitted to the
7 Commission is miscalculated the savings of realigning the
8 Price Center over the implementation period by $10 million
9 from an original estimate of 35 million to a revised estimate
10 of 25 million.
11 In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
12 the best alternative for the Army is not to close ATCOM or
13 the Price Support Center. The best alternative is to
14 establish an aviation command in St. Louis and retain the
15 Price Support Center.
16 I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you. I
17 urge the Commission to reject the Army's recommendations, and
18 I ask that my written remarks be entered in the record of
19 this hearing.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you so much, Congressman
21 Dick Durbin, the Congressman from the great state of
22 Illinois, and his remarks will be reproduced in the record in

Page 497

1 full. Will staff please obtain the remarks from the
2 Distinguished Congressman. Thank you very much, Congressman
3 Durbin.
4 And we're delighted to have Congressman Norm Mineta
5 from the great state of California.
6 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman, if I might
7 approach the desk to give you a report, sir?
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Norm.
9 REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: Mr. Chairman and members of
10 the Commission, it really does give me an honor and a
11 privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you
12 today.
13 Mr. Chairman, I am here this evening to bring to
14 your attention information which seriously calls to question
15 the credibility of the Air Force and unless acted upon would
16 challenge the credibility of the BRAC process.
17 The Department of Defense's recommendation that the
18 750th Space Group "realigned" to Falcon Air Station should be
19 described as what it is, a base closure. There are three
20 principal occupants at Onizuka Air Force Base, and the DOD
21 recommendation calls for two to move and one to eventually
22 disappear.

Page 498

1 Specifically, under the DOD recommendation, the
2 750th is being realigned to Falcon. The research group or
3 Detachment 2, will move to another facility in a "non-BRAC
4 action." And the remaining top secret tenants will remain at
5 Onizuka until no longer needed and then just go away.
6 Under any definition that I can imagine, the
7 absence of all units from a facility is a closure, and that
8 is exactly what is going on here.
9 Mr. Chairman, let me explain why the Air Force has
10 gone to such lengths to define its request as a realignment
11 and not as a closure. Just last year the Air Force studied
12 the cost of closing Onizuka. It studied five options for
13 relocating the three units at that facility.
14 This very Air Force study, which I have before me
15 right now and have now handed to the Chair of the Commission,
16 shows that the one-time costs of closing Onizuka is $699
17 million.
18 Mr. Chairman, the reason the DOD recommendation
19 with regard to Onizuka Air Station is being called a
20 realignment is the Air Force knows how much it would cost to
21 close the base and to deal with each of its occupants, and it
22 is doing everything it can do define away those costs from

Page 499

1 the start.
2 It is the responsibility of this Commission to
3 estly consider the impact of a DOD recommendation on the
4 payers both financially and from a national security
5 perspective.
6 The study I have before me shows that the Air Force
7 knows exactly how much its request would cost and is
8 attempting to redefine the effort in such a way to hide its
9 worst problems.
10 The numbers in this study must be seriously
11 examined, and we must recognize that what is being requested
12 is really a stealth closure and not a realignment. Mr.
13 Chairman, in my chairman, if it looks like a duck, quacks
14 like a duck and walks like a duck it is probably a closure.
15 We strongly urge the Commission to consider how the
16 DOD recommendation actually differs from a base closure and
17 to then use the Air Force's own numbers to examine what the
18 true costs of a closure really are.
19 Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity
20 to appear before this very distinguished Commission to
21 testify this evening, and I really want to thank all of the
22 members of the Commission for the very, very hard work and

Page 500

1 the time and the effort that you have put the last several
2 months in the issues that are facing this Commission and wish
3 to thank all of you for your very fine and hard work, and
4 thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, thank you very much,
6 Congressman Norm Mineta, a Distinguished Member of the House
7 from the great state of California, and we welcome his
8 colleague and friend Representative Anna Eshoo from the great
9 state of California as well. We've heard her before. We
10 ok forward to hearing her again.
11 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
12 al warm welcome and to the members of the Commission. It's
13 wonderful to hear about the great states that we come from
14 and the great members of Congress that you think we are.
15 Let's hope that you find our testimony to be great and
16 important.
17 It's a privilege to appear before you once again,
18 and I'd like to follow-up on some of the points my colleague,
19 Congressman Mineta, did make. I want to express to you how
20 troubled I am by the actions of the Defense Department,
21 specifically the Air Force, with respect to Onizuka Air Force
22 Base and the implications it has for our nation's

Page 501

1 intelligence gathering capabilities.
2 I think that we had a very fine discussion on this
3 very issue when you were in California, and I think very
4 important groundwork was laid on this very point.
5 Throughout this process, the Air Force has provided
6 us with a set of costs that show the saves our government
7 could make by closing Onizuka. In March, my staff directly
8 asked the Air Force for any other studies that were done by
9 them, and we told there were none.
10 Again in April, Senator Fienstein's staff asked the
11 Air Force in writing whether there were any studies done on
12 the costs of closing Onizuka. Both times the Air Force said
13 there were none, yet last week Mr. Mineta and I received an
14 Air Force report -- and not from the Air Force, obviously --
15 which demonstrates that just last year the Air Force did a
16 study on closing Onizuka, and the costs were astronomically
17 higher than the figures we had been given.
18 Not only does it show there are no savings in
19 sing or even realigning Onizuka, it shows that unless
20 re is some magic bullet developed our intelligence
21 thering capabilities would be more costly and less
22 efficient.

Page 502

1 Essentially, the Air Force says not to worry, and
2 although we didn't tell you about this report, which
3 contradicts our own numbers, it doesn't matter because we
4 will have a classified capability that makes the report you
5 found out about insignificant.
6 I ask can the Air Force guarantee this capability
7 by the time the President must decide to proceed with an
8 Onizuka mothballing? Evidently, the answer is no.
9 Mr. Chairman and Commission members, as recently as
10 two months ago the GAO criticized the Air Force for its
11 credibility regarding figures it has provided in the BRAC
12 process. Now again there is another case of the Air Force
13 essentially boiling the books.
14 In the process, a United States Senator and at
15 least a few members of Congress were misled, and upon further
16 inquiry regarding the conflicting cost figures that the Air
17 Force has given us they are relying on unfounded assumptions
18 that it will be capable of providing an architecture that
19 would reduce costs, an architecture which intelligence
20 sources raise serious questions as to estimates of
21 operational capability with respect to the so-called savings
22 that would be realized under the Onizuka closure.

Page 503

1 Mr. Chairman, I know that the Commission works
2 under a strong mandate to reduce defense costs while ensuring
3 a strong national defense. I support your mission, and my
4 support must include the Commission closing redundant and
5 unnecessary facilities throughout this country, including my
6 district.
7 But in fact the operations at Onizuka Air Force
8 Base are very different, but in the name of savings for its
9 own line item, the Air Force has provided an incomplete
10 picture and faulty numbers to Congress and to the Commission
11 itself.
12 Its answer to substantive questions about real
13 costs is to assert it will have an R&D answer by the time we
14 need it. I urge the Commission to reject this approach and
15 require the DOD to provide a more convincing fiscal case
16 before indeed our intelligence gathering capabilities are
17 reduced.
18 The Air Force has made its choice how it wants to
19 proceed in this manner. I believe that BRAC must insist on
20 more. Thank you once again for the opportunity to provide
21 testimony to you and for the work that you are engaged in. I
22 know that it is difficult, but I trust that your judgment

Page 504

1 will be a sound one. Thank you.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we appreciate very much your
3 valuable contribution, Representative Eshoo and you and your
4 colleagues who have so ably contributed to our efforts on
5 behalf of the great state of California. Thank you very
6 much.
7 REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO: Thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Congressman Dan Burton of the
9 great state of Indiana.
10 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Great state of Indiana,
11 Senator.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good to see you, Dan.
13 Representative Burton.
14 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you, Senator. I want
15 to thank you and the committee for permitting me to testify
16 before you this evening. I appreciate the opportunity to
17 support a very innovative and unique privatization proposal
18 for the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis.
19 This proposal was developed by an Indianapolis task
20 force which included Mayor Goldsmith and has received
21 positive reaction from the highest levels of the Pentagon and
22 I believe from BRAC Commissioner Lee Kling, who I see here

Page 505

1 today and had an opportunity to meet with when he was out in
2 Indianapolis.
3 In fact, I have in front of me a letter from
4 Richard Dansig, the Undersecretary of the Navy, that he has
5 forwarded to you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Dixon, which
6 expresses the Navy's interest in working with the City of
7 Indianapolis on this plan.
8 As some of you may know, I have been a fiscally
9 conservative member of Congress, and I consistently look for
10 ways to eliminate the wasteful use of taxpayers' dollars.
11 The partnership plan for the Naval Air Warfare Center I
12 believe does exactly that.
13 It actually saves more money, it saves more money
14 than the DOD's recommendation to completely close the
15 facility. The actual cost for closing the Naval Air Warfare
16 Center in Indianapolis is $226 million or almost three times
17 what the DOD estimate in its most costly COBRA analysis.
18 We are not talking about small change here. We're
19 talking about an unnecessary, and I want to emphasize
20 unnecessary, expenditure of 184 million taxpayers' dollars if
21 the DOD plan is used.
22 On the other hand, by complementing the partnership

Page 506

1 plan, the costs of closure are reduced by that $184 million.
2 Under the partnership plan, the implementation time is also
3 much shorter. It is hard to understand implementing a plan
4 which will cost taxpayers an unnecessary $150 million when
5 there is an alternative plan which will save $184 million.
6 I have two requests for you, the members of the
7 BRAC Commission, today. First, I request that the Commission
8 alter the present DOD recommendation by inserting the
9 partnership plan in its place. At the very least, the
10 Commission must make it clear that the partnership proposal
11 is the preferred closure option.
12 The Commission has nothing to lose by doing this.
13 The plan saves taxpayers' dollars. Technically, a closure
14 has been achieved, and the plan will protect and preserve a
15 very vital part of our national security and, I might add,
16 the jobs of nearly 2,500 of my constituents.
17 And second, I request the Commission establish a
18 time frame in which the negotiations between the city and the
19 Navy must occur, perhaps maybe a year. This would set a time
20 period within which the Navy and the city would be required
21 to structure the agreement upon which the partnership must be
22 based.

Page 507

1 These are two significant requests but are both
2 within the scope and jurisdiction of your Commission. I hope
3 you agree this alternative makes good sense and that you will
4 look with favor on this proposal. And with that,
5 Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to try to answer any questions
6 you might have.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions,
8 Representative Burton. We are very much aware of the plan,
9 and we appreciate your valuable contribution. It's under
10 serious consideration.
11 REPRESENTATIVE BURTON: Thank you very much.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very kindly. We're
13 delighted to have my old friend the great Congressman from
14 the great state of Florida, Representative Sam Gibbons. Good
15 to see you, Sam.
16 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Mr. Chairman and
17 Commissioner Kling, I first of all want to thank you for the
18 job you're doing for our country. It's very important, and
19 we know you'll do a good job. Secondly -- I've found
20 somebody's glasses here. I don't know whose they are.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: As the sign of an honest
22 politician, he found some glasses, and he's going to return

Page 508

1 them to the proper source. This will be in your credit, Sam.
2 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Thank you. I
3 represent MacDill Air Force Base. I am from Tampa, Florida,
4 and obviously I am here to talk about MacDill. And all I ask
5 you to do about MacDill is to follow the request of the
6 Defense Department and of the Air Force.
7 The Air Force wants to keep MacDill open to provide
8 the services that they must provide for the two joint
9 commands that are headquartered at MacDill, Special
10 Operations Command and Central Command.
11 We're honored to have those two very important
12 installations there. They need an airport to accomplish
13 their mission. The cheapest and best way is to allow the Air
14 Force to continue, as has been recommended to you, to operate
15 that airfield and of course to allow the Commerce Department
16 to have their NOAA operations there, their air wing there.
17 There is plenty of room at MacDill. I helped build
18 it in 1939, opened it way back then. As a college student, I
19 laid concrete for those runways. I'm very familiar with it.
20 I became a second lieutenant on active duty there in 1941,
21 and I have had it as my charge ever since.
22 Plenty of room. If you want to put some more

Page 509

1 tanker wings down there, we can take care of all of them that
2 you got, and as you know, the United States is short of
3 tanker wings in the southern part of the country, and the
4 northern part of the country is over tanker-winged according
5 to the DOD estimates.
6 So put as many tankers there as you want. We'll be
7 glad to take them all or anybody else that you got that you
8 need a home for and just do what the Department of Defense
9 has asked you to do as far as keeping MacDill open and
10 operated so Central Command and Special Operations Command
11 can both carry out their missions. Thank you very much. Any
12 questions, I'll be glad to answer them. It's nice to see you
13 back.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: We have no questions. We've been
15 down to your fine base and had a look at it. We thank you,
16 Representative Sam Gibbons, for your great contribution on
17 behalf --
18 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: And I assume that my
19 formal statement will be a part of the record.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Your formal statement will be
21 reproduced in the record in full. Do we have it?
22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes. If you don't, I will

Page 510

1 hand you one right now.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, you're going to give it to
3 the director right there. You're giving it to the top dog.
4 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: All right. Good. Thank
5 you very much and have a nice day.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: God bless you. Good to see you,
7 Sam. Representative Gibbons?
8 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I just wanted to ask do you still
10 get any of that Schlitz around?
11 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: I've got cases of Schlitz
12 now, you know that?
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I read that article. It's getting
14 kind of hard to get Schlitz. I was just wondering.
15 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Well, you know, I didn't
16 know they made Schlitz any more, Mr. Chairman. I was down at
17 the White House before the 50th anniversary of D-day. We
18 were supposedly briefing the President on what it was like,
19 and after the dinner the waiter came in with a silver tray,
20 and on the tray were two cans of Schlitz beer.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I love it.
22 REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: So I took them back to

Page 511

Normandy and drank them with my family at the same spot on road to where I had consumed the first ones 50 years ago.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: My god, you done the right thing, [illegible]m.

REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: This time I didn't leave the empties, though.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Bless your bones.

REPRESENTATIVE GIBBONS: Good to see you.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Thank you, Sam. We're delighted to have the Distinguished Congressman from the great state of California, Congressman Rob Portman, here, and we're pleased to hear from him.

REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Thank you, Senator. I'd like to claim California as my own, but I'm actually from Ohio.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, let the record show that that's the first mistake the Chairman has made in about 46 years, and I want the record to be eminently clear now that I charge my Commission to understand that this Distinguished Congressman, Rob Portman, is from the great state of Ohio.

REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. There you go.

Page 512

CHAIRMAN DIXON: My apology to you, Congressman.

REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: Not at all, Senator. I'm just from the great Midwest like you, and I'm proud of it.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I can tell by the cut of your jib.

REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: There you go. I'm very pleased to be here. Thank you for having me. I'm here to talk about Brooks Air Force Base at San Antonio and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

I don't represent Dayton Ohio. I do represent [illegible]uthwestern Ohio and have some interests in being sure that [illegible]right-Patterson continues to be a viable Air Force base and continues to be given the responsibilities I think that it deserves based on its rating.

And you've got a lot of tough decisions to be made here. I served in the White House back in the Bush Administration when the Base Closure Commission was first getting going, and I understand I think as well as anybody the need to keep it bipartisan, nonpartisan and apolitical, and I think you should make the decisions on the merits and, you know, there is a good reason to appoint an independent commission, and I support entirely.

Page 513

I applaud the Commission, in fact, for its role. I think you've been a very constructive force, and you've made a lot of difficult decisions in terms of downsizing while maintaining our readiness and modernization.

So I'm here today not to support a parochial view, although I tend to think consolidation works better than another but instead simply to urge you to act on the merits in this situation, and that's what the Commission is all about as I see it, and that's what you've done so well.

In accordance with BRAC, the Air Force has determined that it's necessary to reduce its laboratory research facilities around the country to carry out its mission in the most thorough and cost-effective way, and I'm sure you're very aware of that.

And to do this the Secretary of Defense has recommended consolidating Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio with Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, in Dayton, Ohio.

This decision I think is consistent with both the [illegible]g-term force structure plan as well as the selection [illegible]teria under the Base Closure and Realignment Act. Indeed, the Air Force has rated Wright-Pat as a Tier 1 base, and

Page 514

Brooks was rated as a Tier 3 base.

Furthermore, the Air Force has indicated that Wright-Patterson and the surrounding area have sufficient level of qualified personnel, expertise, support, technical facilities to incorporate the activities from Brooks at Wright-Pat efficiently and effectively.

The one-time costs of closure and consolidation should be more than offset by the long-term savings that the study indicates that would be associated with reducing personnel and reducing infrastructure.

The Air Force has also determined that consolidation will eliminate almost twice as many positions as the cantonment policy suggested by supporters of Brooks, almost twice as many positions.

This fact in addition to the reduction in overhead and other costs, is expected to result in an annual savings of about $32 million compared with only $10.5 million in annual savings associated with the other approach.

All of these are Air Force data, mind you, and they aren't fine. It comes straight from DOD. The services, including the Air Force, I think you've correctly been given the discretion to determine how best to restructure forces in

Page 515

a more efficient organization while preserving the ability to protect our great nation, and in this case they've decided that consolidation will result in the best military value for the Air Force.

So I urge you to consider the merits of the cost-effectiveness of the measure as you review the Air Force recommendation in accordance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act.

Sound decisions are based on sound policy -- I don't have to tell you all that -- divorced from politics, and I know that you will carry out your responsibilities, but I hope that in this case those sound decisions will help make your recommendations and the work of this Commission all the more credible and all the more persuasive to the American people as we're going through this tough downsizing.

I thank you very much for allowing me to say a few words here today, Senator.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Congressman Portman, thank you very much. I'm sorry that I hadn't had the pleasure to meet you during my service here, sir. You've made a very fine presentation on your behalf and the State of Ohio. I'm pleased to advise you you are the 200th member of the

Page 516

Congress to come before this panel in a little over 20 hours so far, and you've discharged your obligation very well, and we thank you for it.

REPRESENTATIVE PORTMAN: I think you are very patient with us, and I appreciate you're getting the input.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Congressman Portman. Ladies and gentlemen who have had the stamina to stay -- I hope you guys are getting overtime over there at that table. God bless you.

Now, we have two more coming, one member of the House and one in the Senate, and they're on their way. And should they show up in apt time, which I'm sure they will, we're going to accommodate them.

Now, earlier in the day the great state of Pennsylvania encountered difficulties because a substantial number of members from the House were here and had to return for a vote, and one of them demonstrating his devotion to his district and his state, having sped back to the House, having cast his vote, having served his constituency all day coming back here tonight, and we're delighted to see Congressman Phil English from the great state of Pennsylvania.

REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Page 517

1 I'm grateful for the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate
2 the fact that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission has
3 to make some decisions that would challenge the wisdom of
4 Solomon. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf
5 of the Youngstown-Warren Air Reserve Station that currently
6 serves the Pennsylvania Chenango Valley.
7 I believe that this facility is a significant
8 resource for our national defense, and I believe my
9 colleague, Mr. Traficant, is going to be offering or has
10 offered testimony to the Commission to that effect.
11 What I wanted to do in support his comments, since
12 I cannot claim to be an expert on all aspects of military
13 preparedness, is to relay to the Commission the significance
14 of the Air Reserve base to the Mercer County Pennsylvania
15 community.
16 Over 400 reservists as well as nearly 150 civilian
17 employees from Pennsylvania work at or otherwise utilize the
18 910th. The Youngstown Air Reserve Station has become one of
19 the area's largest single employers, and its loss would have
20 serious consequences upon the local community and on the
21 regional economy.
22 I believe that one could compare the beneficial

Page 518

1 effects of such a base on the local economy to that of a
2 significant company. This is particularly significant in
3 view of the fact that this region of Pennsylvania has
4 experienced a very substantial downturn in recent years and
5 hasn't fully recovered from the recession of the early 1980s.
6 I am here to emphasize the support and initiative
7 of the 910 personnel that they have given to their Air
8 Reserve station. They have an exceptional operational record
9 recognized regularly by the Department of Defense.
10 My view is that after reviewing the Youngstown Air
11 Reserve Station's military value, its capabilities and its
12 strong community support this Commission will see the merits
13 of its continued service.
14 Currently, the 910th Airlift Wing consists of two
15 tactical units, the 757th Airlift Squadron, the 773rd Airlift
16 Squadron as well as the Aerial Spray Branch and its
17 supporting units covering all facets of Air Force
18 requirements.
19 It is under the command of the 10th Air Force at
20 the Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas and the Air Force
21 Reserve Headquarters at the Robins Air Force Base in Georgia.
22 To briefly give you a sense of its size, the

Page 519

1 Youngstown Air Reserve Station employs nearly 500 people, is
2 utilized by 1,100 reservists, sits on 230 acres on the north
3 side of the Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport while using a
4 total of 1,300 acres when counting all of the facilities
5 used.
6 The mission of the 910 is two-fold. In wartime, it
7 deploys the C-130H in the combat operations of tactical
8 airlift. These operations include low-level infiltration
9 into combat environments where the aircraft can deliver
10 personnel and materials by airdrop and air-land techniques.
11 In peacetime, the Wing's mission is to direct the
12 organizing, equipping and training of Air Force Reserve air
13 crews in the tactical airlift tactics and techniques, and as
14 required, the unit will also be available to provide
15 nonmilitary humanitarian assistance.
16 In this capacity, since February of 1993, the 910
17 Air Wing has provided airlift and personnel for humanitarian
18 flights to Bosnia. Having offered this general testimony,
19 and I welcome you to review the balance of it in a
20 submission, I would love to field any questions you might
21 have and appreciate the opportunity to participate.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you very much,

Page 520

1 Congressman English, for your fine contribution. We thank
2 you for the statement you're placing in the record, and we
3 appreciate your efforts on behalf of your district and your
4 state. Thank you very much.
5 REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
6 and again I appreciate all of the efforts of this Commission
7 and wish you well.
8 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Congressman. Now, let
9 me say that the man who will be last is a man from a family
10 that has always been first. What a great way to end two days
11 of hearings by having an old friend who is always first come
12 in here as our 202nd witness.
13 He is last but not least the great Senior Senator
14 from the great state of Massachusetts, Ted Kennedy.
15 SENATOR KENNEDY: What an introduction. We missed
16 you out in your home state yesterday, Mr. Chairman.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That's in your credit, Mr.
18 Senator, in your credit.
19 SENATOR KENNEDY: That's indiscreet for me to
20 mention that at this time I know I'm the last thing between
21 you and a wonderful dinner somewhere.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're quite right, Senator, and a

Page 521

1 cold drink. Let your conscious be your guide.
2 SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, with that I will sit down,
3 I think. I'll just really take just a moment or two. First
4 of all, to thank all of you for the wonderful attention that
5 you've given in performing an extraordinarily national
6 service.
7 I think, Senator Dixon, and Lee Kling and General
8 Robles and General Davis have all had distinguished and
9 wonderful careers, and the fact that you've been willing to
10 run through this whole process and procedure you deserve the
11 highest commendations and the medals of our country for
12 service to our nation, and I say it very sincerely.
13 I thank you, and I want to thank Mr. Kling and
14 Generally Robles for coming up through Massachusetts, General
15 Davis as well. Every one in those communities are enormously
16 grateful, and they feel that you've given attention. You've
17 listened to their case.
18 I am a great believer in the case that has been
19 made and a great believer in the credibility of the case that
20 has been made, but I want to tell you that part of this whole
21 process was getting out and listening and asking people
22 questions and asking their participation. This really has

Page 522

1 served the process well.
2 To you, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for presiding
3 over this. From the decks of the Intrepid to the halls here
4 in Congress, your service has been exemplary as always.
5 Let me just finally mention this. There was a
6 procedure that was established by the Defense Department that
7 believed it was in the best interest of the security of this
8 nation and that is that they were going to treat the reserve
9 bases and the active duty bases as two different kind of
10 entities, and they did so with the exception of the South
11 Weymouth.
12 As you well know and as the record as we've gone
13 over reflects, the Brunswick Station was to be closed, South
14 Weymouth to remain open, and then, on the basis of
15 interventions and, quite frankly, the CINCLAN Fleet's
16 opinions ought to be listened to.
17 But at other times when his advice was sought, it
18 had reached a different conclusion, and all we're saying is
19 that the record has been made or not made with regards to
20 that intervention we do not believe that this Commission
21 giving the consideration of all these other factors should
22 deviate from what has been a tested, tried, evaluated process

Page 523

1 which says consider the active duty operation bases and
2 nsider the reserve bases in a different scale.
3 Now, I'm not here to review where South Weymouth
4 omes out in the reserve bases other than to say it is a
5 superb base, and with regards to the manning issue, though
6 are men and women who are ready to serve the reserve
7 function.
8 There is no real competition between what is
9 available at South Weymouth and at other reserve bases. I
10 respect the demographic issue as it relates to other bases,
11 but with regards to the different criteria which were used in
12 terms of the reserve, that South Weymouth makes that and
13 makes it in a strong way.
14 What we are saying is that -- and I think General
15 Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis when they were out there and
16 listened to the details and went through the various
17 presentations that were made to them in terms of the assets
18 of that base, and not to denigrate others, but the fact of
19 the matter is when you look at all the other reserve bases we
20 ought to be one that is maintained.
21 That was the initial recommendation. That is the
22 one that ought to be followed. If at some other time there

Page 524

1 is going to be a different criteria in terms of bringing the
2 reserve in operation and bringing a different kind of
3 criteria, then so be it.
4 But to single this out as the only situation in the
5 whole BRAC procedure that deviates from the clear, specific
6 requirements which were established, and when the clear,
7 specific requirements were established they reached a certain
8 result, and when they circumvented those procedures, they
9 reached a certain result in the termination or the closing
10 'll south Weymouth.
11 And we believe that we have a base with men and
12 omen that will perform that function, the reserves, with
13 great distinction. I thank you very much. We have responded
14 to all of the various sort of questions. I thank the members
15 of the community, Representative Haley, the others that are
16 here.
17 I think Generally Robles, Mr. Kling, General Davis
18 would feel that in that time of that presentation really
19 important information and analysis was made available by
20 these really outstanding citizens.
21 As you know, Representative Haley flies planes as a
22 part of the military service, takes great pride, as all our

Page 525

1 reservists do, but is someone who probably has assets in
2 terms of understanding these relationships with an insight
3 which is really very special and very unique.
4 And I want to thank him and to thank our whole
5 group very much for being here and yield whatever time
6 remains back to our Chair. I thank you very much. You're
7 wonderful to permit to me and the other members of the
8 Committee to testify, and we know whatever the results we've
9 been treated fairly and with respect, and we're very, very
10 grateful to you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, Senator, you continue to
12 give your complete devotion to your state. It honors us all
13 that you do that, and we thank you for coming here with your
14 friends on behalf of your great state of Massachusetts.
15 The great Senior Senator from Massachusetts,
16 Senator Ted Kennedy, leads me to say that this meeting is
17 adjourned.
18 (Whereupon, at 7:30 p.m., the meeting of the Base
19 'osure and Realignment Committee was adjourned.)
20 * * * * *

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

8:30 a.m.

1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Alan Dixon
Alton W. Cornella
Rebecca G. Cox
J.B. Davis
S. Lee Kling
Benjamin Montoya
Wendi Louise Steele
Josue Robles

C O N T E N T S

PRESENTATION OF:	PAGE
Secretary Togo D. West, Jr.	7
General Gordon R. Sullivan	18
Assistant Secretary Mike Walker	22
Brigadier General James Shane	22
Major General John R. D'Araujo	78
Secretary Sheila E. Widnall	96
General Ronald R. Fogleman	105
Major General Jay D. Blume	134
James Boatright	137
Secretary John H. Dalton	191
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.	205
Admiral J.M. Boorda	211
Assistant Secretary Robert B. Pirie	218
Secretary Joshua Gotbaum	260
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert E. Bayer	277

P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to this hearing of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is Alan J. Dixon, and I am chairman of the Commission, which is charged with recommending to the President which domestic military installations should close or be realigned.

With us today are my fellow commissioners, Al Cornella, Rebecca Cox, J.B. Davis, S. Lee Kling, Benjamin Montoya, Joe Robles, and Wendi Steele.

We are in the final weeks of our assignment. Final deliberations will begin June 22 here in this room. In the 15 weeks since we received Secretary Perry's list of 146 proposed closures and realignments, the Commission has conducted 12 investigative hearings in Washington -- 13 including today.

We have also taken some 85 hours of testimony at 16 regional hearings held all around the country, including Guam and Alaska. At those hearings, we heard presentations from communities from 35 states plus Guam and Puerto Rico. Yesterday and the day before, we heard testimony from more than 200 members of Congress whose states and districts are

affected by the list.

In addition to conducting 29 hearings, the commissioners have among them made almost 200 visits to some 75 bases on the closure list, and Commission staff has made another 75 base visits to gather additional information.

As everyone in this room probably knows, on May 10, the Commission voted to add 35 bases to the list for consideration for closure or further realignment. In the months since then, we have visited all those installations and conducted regional hearings at which the affected communities were heard.

Today, we have asked Department of Defense officials to come here, in part, to state their positions regarding the bases we added to the Secretary's list. However, we will be glad to hear from the Department regarding any base on the list, and we will ask some questions ourselves about some of the installations on the March 1 list based on what we have learned at our base visits and regional hearings.

We will hear from the three military departments in three separate panels and then conclude with a panel of witnesses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We

will begin with the Army from now until 10:00 a.m. We will hear from the Air Force from 10:15 to 11:45 a.m. and then break for lunch until 1:00 p.m.

From 1:00 to 2:30, we will hear from the Navy and then from 2:30 to 3:30, we will hear from the representatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency. We are fortunate to have with us a distinguished group of witnesses from the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., will be with us today. We also have Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan; the Honorable Mike Walker, Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics and Environment; Brigadier General James Shane, Director of Management in the Office of the Chief of Staff; and Major General John D'Araujo, Jr., Director, Army National Guard.

As always, I must remind you that the Base Closure Law requires me to swear in witnesses before they testify before the Commission. If the Army representatives will please stand and raise their right hands, I will now administer the oath.

(Witnesses sworn.)

CHAIRMAN DIXON: General Sullivan, I understand

Page 7

that you'll retire from the Army in just six days. On behalf of the Commission and the country, I want to thank you for spending time with us during your last week on active duty. We congratulate you, sir, and we honor you for your outstanding career service to the nation and the Army over the past 36 years. Thank you, sir.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Secretary West, we are delighted and honored to welcome you back.

SECRETARY WEST: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: And you may proceed at your leisure.

SECRETARY WEST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. This is a great day to be part of the Department of the Army. This is the Army's 220th birthday.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Happy birthday.

SECRETARY WEST: And so if I might, I would like to join you in your tribute to General Sullivan as the representative of the men and women in uniform of the Army, all of those who have participated in the security of this nation over its history.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Amen, my friend. Amen.

Page 8

SECRETARY WEST: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, we appreciate this second opportunity to discuss with you your alternatives for closure to our recommendations. We hope our comments will be helpful to you in your deliberations.

Obviously, these have been painstakingly developed us, as has the analysis of yourself and your staffs. Our isions were not arrived at easily, nor were they made in ste. They build upon the work of three previous Commissions and leave us with the infrastructure needed to keep our Army trained and ready into the 21st century.

We recognize, of course, your duty to review these painstakingly and to consider changes to the list. We hope that we can offer you information that will assist you in that way.

If I may turn to the proposed additions that affect the Army to your list. Other than Fort Halibard, Maryland, the Army does not offer a support to you for adding any other installations to the original list. After the DIS does depart from Fort Halibard, we have no further use for the property.

With respect to the other alternatives recommended,

Page 9

we have some views. Oakland Army Base. We studied the feasibility of closing the ports at both Bear and Oakland. We concluded that the loss of Oakland represents for the Army an operational risk that we would rather not have to accept. We need this critical port facility to support the rapid deployment of equipment during peace and war.

We need it for the deployment of our CONUS-based forces to respond to any national security threats that could emerge in the Pacific region. In our view, its closure would leave us without a port facility on the West Coast, and the financial savings simply do not justify that risk.

With respect to Tobyhanna, the Army has made the hard choices to divest itself of excess depot capacity, maintenance capacity, and consolidate workload from five to three depots, ground, air, and communications electronics. DOD's recommendations, which are ours, as well, on terkenny and Red River provide the optimum savings while porting our corps wartime requirements.

They have earned the support of the SEC DEF's cross-service group. Tobyhanna's our center of excellence for communications and electronics. Closing it, we believe, would directly contradict the Army's own military value which

Page 10

assesses Tobyhanna as the number one Army depot.

With respect to Letterkenny, DOD's proposal to realign Letterkenny preserves DOD's missile consolidation effort, achieves substantial savings for a reasonable investment, and reduces the overcapacity in ground equipment maintenance in the depot system.

Alternatives to move tactical missile maintenance to Hill Air Force Base, in the Army's view, would incur costs anywhere from four to nine times greater and produce significantly less in the way of savings. Extensive facility upgrades would be necessary to support tactical missile maintenance at Hill Air Force Base. For that reason, we do not recommend this as a more feasible or desirable alternative to the recommendation you have from DOD and the Army.

With respect to the space and strategic defense command, the Army has made a concerted effort to move out of leased space when it is cost-effective to do so. Our analysis shows that moving space and strategic defense command to a nearby installation would have significant costs and take over 30 years to pay off.

It would disrupt preexisting plans to move SSDC

Page 11

along with the program executive office missile defense onto Red Stone Arsenal at a later date. A decision, then, to relocate space and strategic defense command from leased spaced would be a poor substitute for terminating the lease and disestablishing and redistributing the assets of the aviation and troop sport command.

If we are not able to execute this plan as recommended, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, the Army will forfeit substantial savings from reductions in both management and facility overhead. And we would, of course, forego the operational advantages of aligning those functions that are related in research and development centers at other locations.

Making these changes, in summary, the above four changes, to the original list proposed by DOD on behalf of the Army would cost approximately $200 million more, would save up to $45 million less than had been recommended in our original list and, of course, would provide a greater operational risk to the Army.

Investing in alternative BRAC recommendations that produce fewer savings would be at the expense of Army readiness and of Army plans for force modernization. On this

Page 12

score, then, on these proposed additions, we urge you to weigh this assessment carefully, the assessment that the Army has offered you.

We would hope, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, you will agree with us that these changes ought not be pursued.

One word about our original recommendations. You've made extensive visits, you and your staffs, to our installations over the past few months to observe their operations and listen to the sincere voices of communities and elected representatives. We in the Army have been listening, too.

Their convictions, their fervent opposition have our admiration. It is moving to witness the pride our friends have and our neighbors in the Army and the installations that serve them. Even so, Mr. Chairman, with little exception, we are unaware of compelling arguments that would cause us to change our initial military judgements.

We have in some occasions in some instances learned new information that makes one realignment and two closures no longer viable in our view. We have provided our recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Page 13

1 and we mention them now.
2 Dugway Proving Ground. The crux of our
3 recommendation to close Dugway centered on the relocation of
4 the chemical biological testing elements to Aberdeen Proving
5 Ground and smoke obscurance testing elements to Yuma Proving
6 Ground permit restrictions, preclude conducting testing at
7 these two sites, thereby obviating the relocation of those
8 testing elements.
9 Efforts to transfer the English Village, the
10 housing area, to the Utah National Guard had been underway
11 prior to the development of our BRAC list and would,
12 therefore, require no action by the Commission to effect that
13 disposal.
14 Craven Point, New Jersey, U.S. Army Reserve Center.
15 The Army has recommended closing and relocating this facility
16 to Fort Hamilton, New York. While we were planning for this
17 implementation, we discovered that new construction,
18 approximately $10.5 million worth, is required to execute the
19 move.
20 The minor savings, Mr. Chairman and members of the
21 Commission, about $137,000 annually, simply does not justify
22 this expense. Moreover, the new facility would require a

Page 14

1 larger area than is available for construction at Fort
2 Hamilton.
3 Valley Grove, West Virginia, area maintenance
4 support activity. The Army recommended closing and
5 relocating this facility to Kelly Support Center in
6 Pennsylvania. We have since learned that Congress added a
7 construction project, about $6.8 million in value, to build a
8 new maintenance shop at the Wheeling, Ohio, County Airport.
9 This project is now underway and thus obviates the need for
10 us to move to a new facility at Kelly Support Center.
11 A word about additional information that would
12 adjust in a minor way other of our recommendations. At
13 Fitzsimons, we recommended closing this facility, Fitzsimons
14 Medical Center in Colorado, and relocating its optical school
15 and associated laboratory to Fort Sam Houston. We have
16 learned in the Army that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
17 Health Affairs is evaluating more cost-effective alternatives
18 to relocate that school, the optical school, elsewhere.
19 We would suggest that modifying the language of the
20 recommendation so it does not specify a precise location for
21 the optical school might help us as the Assistant Secretary
22 goes about his work.

Page 15

1 The Sierra Army Depot in California. The Army has
2 recommended realigning the facility, eliminating the
3 conventional ammunition mission, and retaining an enclave for
4 operational project stocks. We have learned that we simply
5 cannot get the demilitarization done of all the ammunition by
6 2001. And this necessitates the retention of some storage at
7 that location.
8 With respect to the Bayonne Military Ocean
9 Terminal, the Army has recommended closing this facility,
10 relocating the Eastern Area Command Headquarters and 1301st
11 Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth and retaining and enclave
12 for Navy tenants.
13 The Army Military Traffic Management Command is
14 considering an internal reorganization which could result in
15 the merger of their commands at another Eastern installation
16 beside Fort Monmouth. And the Navy has indicated a
17 preference for moving its activities. Therefore, if the
18 Commission were to modify the language of our recommendation
19 so it does not specify the particular gaining location or
20 retention of an enclave, then that would be helpful.
21 We know you have some questions, lots of questions,
22 for the Army in a number of areas of our recommendation and

Page 16

1 that they include probably the following issues that I will
2 just touch briefly: Leased facilities. The Army has
3 performed a military value analysis on leased facilities and
4 has concluded, essentially, that by and large, they have had
5 low military value in the instances in which we made
6 recommendations.
7 We have provided a detailed description of our
8 assessment regarding the leased facility that houses aviation
9 and troop support command in a letter to you and the
10 Commission on April 14, 1995. Our conclusion, then, that
11 this lease facility had low military value, coupled with the
12 resulting financial savings and operational advantages,
13 formed the basis for our original recommendation.
14 Depots. The Army's recommendation to close Red
15 River Depot and realign Letterkenny eliminates excess
16 capacity and achieves significant savings. A single ground
17 combat depot, Anniston, will support our peacetime
18 requirements. It will meet our surge requirements in the
19 event there are two major regional contingencies.
20 Family housing. Divestiture of family housing
21 quarters reduces burdensome maintenance and repair costs
22 where we have made those decisions and is a major part of the

Page 17

1 Army's overall housing strategy. The Army is closing housing
2 areas that support small garrisons and small headquarters
3 units and is keeping those that support major troop
4 concentrations.
5 It is a business judgement and an effort to do this
6 in a businesslike way. And thus, for us in the Army, the
7 challenge is to balance overall quality of life for our
8 soldiers against readiness and modernization of the U.S.
9 Army, hopefully achieving the maximum in all three of those
10 areas.
11 At Fort McClellan, we have furnished the
12 environmental permits for Fort Leonard Wood in support of the
13 training missions transferring from Fort McClellan. We are
14 now confident that we can make the change, that we can
15 accomplish the smoke training mission while at the same time
16 exercising good environmental stewardship.
17 Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, you've
18 been patient with me as I've gone through these. I wanted at
19 the outset, if I could, to try to put on the table as many of
20 what we think are the issues as possible as you prepare to
21 question us. Thank you for your patience, thank you for your
22 time, and it's good to be back before you again.

Page 18

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we thank you. Your
2 statement is very useful and very specific, and that's very
3 helpful to the Commission.
4 General Sullivan, I regret that this is the last
5 time I'll have the pleasure of listening to you testify. But
6 again, I thank you for your great service to this nation.
7 General Sullivan.
8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I
9 appreciate very much your remarks, and it's good to be back
10 here again.
11 As the Secretary noted, today's the Army's 220th
12 birthday. And needless to say, I am very proud to be the
13 Chief of Staff of the United States Army. I have been, and I
14 am particularly proud today to represent the men and women of
15 America's Army, active Guard and Reserve.
16 I would note that I completely agree with the
17 Secretary of the Army's remarks, and I would just like to add
18 some comments of my own. First of all, we are counting on
19 the savings from the original recommendations that we made.
20 We are, as you all know -- certainly everybody in the room
21 knows -- we're spending a historically low amount on the
22 Army, and I must get every bit of leverage I can out of the

Page 19

1 dollars we are given to keep the Army trained and ready.
2 As the Secretary pointed out, readiness, force
3 structure, quality of life for our soldiers, and, of course,
4 modernization. Since 1989, we have lost about 40 cents on
5 every dollar that we had programmed to keep this organization
6 trained and ready and modernized. Missions have gone up 300
7 percent. So this has been a very challenging period for us.
8 And this BRAC submission is very important to us.
9 I don't see much value in alternative options,
10 although as the Secretary pointed out, there are some minor
11 adjustments which should be made. But frankly, some of the
12 alternatives would cost the Army more and save us less. And
13 in this kind of an environment, I can't afford that.
14 I would reinforce what Secretary West said about
15 Oakland Army Terminal. Oakland Army Terminal is important
16 for us on the West Coast. It provides us a port facility to
17 project power into the Pacific. Tobyhanna is the number one
18 depot in terms of military value. It is important to the
19 United States Army, and I want to reinforce that.
20 Now, I realize that there are very difficult and
21 important decisions involving maintenance depots. What we
22 are trying to do is rely on a single ground combat vehicle

Page 20

1 depot. And I think we can do what we have to do with one
2 depot. We go from three to one.
3 Closing Red River and realigning Letterkenny to
4 Tobyhanna and Anniston, as we recommended, account for about
5 a third of the savings that we're counting on. So that is an
6 important adjustment for us.
7 If we had to do some of the alternatives, frankly,
8 would keep me from realizing -- keep us, the Department of
9 the Army, from realizing annual savings, which are very
10 significant and very important. And, as the Secretary
11 pointed out, shifting missile work from Letterkenny in
12 Pennsylvania to Hill Air Force Base is going to cost a
13 considerable amount of money, at least -- at least -- three
14 times more than our recommendation. And, frankly, I can't
15 afford it.
16 We have made some tough choices here, and we are,
17 in fact, taking what I feel is justified risk. And we have
18 to manage risk during periods like this. Losing 40 cents on
19 every dollar and seeing your missions go up 300 percent is
20 pretty significant. And this submission is very important to
21 us.
22 Let me just close by saying, number one, I

Page 21

1 appreciate what it is that you all have been through. As the
2 Secretary said, we appreciate the fact that you have traveled
3 around and looked at us. I think you will see merit in our
4 submission to you. And since this is the last BRAC, as least
5 as far as I can see, I really ask for your support in our
6 submission.
7 The object of the exercise was to save money, get a
8 good return on investment. I think what you have is a good
9 business program here, a good business approach to the
10 future. There is some risk in it, but I think the risk is
11 manageable, and I think it's acceptable.
12 And it's a risk which I believe is prudent that we
13 must take to keep the United States Army trained and ready so
14 that we can do what it is you ask us to do, fight and win
15 your wars and serve the United States of America, which we
16 have done proudly for 220 years, and I have every reason to
17 expect we'll do for as long as there is a Republic. Thanks.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you for that very excellent
19 presentation, General Sullivan. We are indebted to you.
20 We're delighted to have Robert Walker, the
21 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics,
22 and Environment.

Page 22

1 SECRETARY WALKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Secretary, it's good to see
3 you.
4 SECRETARY WALKER: Thank you. Good to see you.
5 Mr. Chairman, I have nothing to add. I join General Sullivan
6 in endorsing Secretary West's remarks. And I want to join
7 them, also, in thanking you for your service to the nation.
8 You've taken on a tremendous job, and we thank you for doing
9 that. Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, Secretary Walker.
11 Brigadier General James E. Shane, Jr., director of
12 management, Office of the Chief of Staff. General Shane, do
13 you have anything to say at this time?
14 GENERAL SHANE: Mr. Chairman, I have one thing to
15 say. I would like on behalf of my staff to tell you your
16 staff has accepted the challenge. They have put it through
17 rigorous changes. And we appreciate that, working with them.
18 And we think the end product will be the best for our
19 country. And it has been a pleasure serving the country in
20 this capacity and the Army.
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, general. And
22 if you are all willing, we will now begin a questioning

Page 23

1 period, with the distinguished commissioner to my left,
2 Commissioner Steele.
3 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: Good morning. Thank
4 you for addressing so many of these issues up front. As you
5 can imagine, we still have a pile of questions for you. But
6 I appreciate you at least getting out some of the answers
7 right at the beginning here.
8 And also, thank you and the service in general for
9 your help along our journeys. I've visited many of your
10 installations, and everybody truly has gone out of their way
11 to address our many questions and to be extremely helpful.
12 So thank you for that.
13 Let's just start with Red River, one depot. In
14 your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you
15 feel the Army is retaining core wartime requirements.
16 However, in your forecasts, there will be a 46 percent
17 shortfall in wartime requirements if you do all the work in
18 Anniston.
19 Our staff says that would require Anniston to
20 operate two eight-hour shifts seven days a week to support
21 those requirements.
22 I would like you to address both how you feel you

Page 24

1 can meet that and accept that risk and also just the fact
2 that there could be a natural disaster or a man-made disaster
3 and how the Army or the Department really could afford to put
4 all its eggs in one basket in this case, even if it is --
5 what did you say, a third of your savings? I'm very
6 concerned about that.
7 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner Steele, you raise
8 what is always for us a tough point, and that is the question
9 of when we decide to reduce, perhaps even to eliminate, what
10 may be duplicative or maybe even triplicative capabilities,
11 whether we are reducing to the point where we leave ourselves
12 open and vulnerable to surge requirements that we can't do
13 with what we have left.
14 And I think that's what we have tried to address.
15 Red River, Anniston, Letterkenny, all with a ground vehicle
16 maintenance capacity, leave us with more than we need to do
17 right now. And the question is, how when we shift around
18 these activities we can ensure both that we are as low as we
19 need to be to be efficient but still as robust as we need to
20 be to meet the surge.
21 The first answer, incidentally, about this is, we
22 simply can't afford to keep going on as we do. We simply

Page 25

1 cannot fund these. We believe that we can meet the surge
2 requirement as needed. Those are the reasons we do these
3 COBRA analyses, the reason we make these military value
4 assessments.
5 If you need a specific answer to the suggestion
6 that in order to meet a surge, we would have to work -- as
7 you said, I'm going to defer to General Shane in just a
8 second. But I need to assure you that we don't take these
9 decisions to go down from, say, three that are doing
10 relatively similar functions, although different kinds of
11 vehicles, to one lightly.
12 Do you want to add anything to that, General
13 Sullivan?
14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Just in general, I think the
15 Secretary has made the point. We can surge at Anniston or up
16 in Pennsylvania. We have capability to surge there, if
17 necessary, natural disaster or going to war and two MRCs.
18 And their alignment tank facility also could do some.
19 I think it's an acceptable risk. We don't have the
20 dollars to keep it open. That's an insurance policy that I
21 don't think we need to pay.
22 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm glad to hear both

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1 of you are at a level of comfort. I must admit, I'm not
2 there yet. I'll let my colleagues follow up on that, because
3 I've been to some installations that they haven't, so I would
4 like to dig into some of their --
5 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I'm sure there are other
6 views on it. We're taking a risk, and I understand that.
7 And my name is on the line on it. And I don't say it
8 lightly. This is sworn testimony. And I just told you that
9 I think we can take a risk.
10 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, general. A
11 lighter subject, Sierra Army Depot. It's the only
12 installation at which START Treaty mandated destruction of
13 rocket motors may be carried out. You did address Sierra in
14 the sense of changing our recommendation to allow for
15 storage. But how would the Department meet those treaty
16 obligations if the realignment with that change is accepted?
17 GENERAL SHANE: Let me refer to my staff just for
18 one second on that issue. My staff has informed me, number
19 one, which I knew, was the treaty had not been ratified. But
20 more importantly, there are other locations at which that
21 work can be done if we needed to do it. So there is a
22 spillover capability, Commissioner Steele.

Page 27

1 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: All right. Sierra's
2 demil capability is 22 percent of all of the ammunition demil
3 capability and 43 percent of the open demil capability. I
4 also understand that there's a pending 10-year permit for
5 doing all that open detonation in California.
6 Given the increasing volume of ammunition that will
7 need to be demilled, if we're already changing the
8 recommendation on Sierra, would it not make sense to keep the
9 installation open to allow the Department the flexibility to
10 use those open pits, which I might add, I thoroughly enjoyed
11 with your folks out there blowing up things in all 14 of them
12 the day I was visiting.
13 SECRETARY WEST: I don't think we need them. Our
14 problem with places like Sierra is that we can make an
15 argument for keeping almost everything we have on our list.
16 We haven't offered up almost anything as to which there is a
17 universal opinion it should go. We are making hard decisions
18 here, commissioner.
19 And I would say to you, yes, it probably wouldn't
20 hurt. But the fact is, we don't need them. And what we do
21 need is the savings we can get from these closures to fund
22 the things we absolutely do need.

Page 28

1 So I won't deny that it wouldn't be harmful to have
2 that capability that you mentioned, but if you ask the
3 professional judgement of my staff officers who have worked
4 the COBRA analysis, who have worked the back process, the
5 answer is, no, we don't need that.
6 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm not sure we have
7 done this, and I would like to know if you have, the costs
8 and benefits of saving additional outdoor storage for that
9 which you can't demil versus keeping Sierra and getting rid
10 of it. Have you addressed that at the Army?
11 SECRETARY WEST: I think we have addressed the cost
12 implications. If you want more numbers from us, I'm sure we
13 can provide them for you. But my sense is that having looked
14 at it, we have concluded -- and let's don't misunderstand it.
15 We will come to you for permission to retain only the bare
16 minimum.
17 And what you're saying is, wouldn't we really
18 rather keep more? Yes, I think we have addressed the cost
19 implications. I don't have the number answers right here for
20 you, but we can provide them to you.
21 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: If we could do that,
22 only because I remember during that visit, the COBRA was off

Page 29

1 by half on the amount of personnel that would need to stay.
2 So the savings had already dramatically decreased. And we
3 were talking about a very limited number of personnel to be
4 able to retain that capability for the Department.
5 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I could add,
6 our original savings was 29 million. Our current savings is
7 28 million annually. So we have revised them, and that's the
8 latest estimate that we have.
9 MADAME COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you.
10 Mr. Chairman, I defer the rest of my time.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank the distinguished
12 commissioner for her line of questioning. I would want to
13 observe before I recognize the next commissioner that I think
14 we're all here with a complete understanding of why we're
15 here. We would all like to have more.
16 I was chairman of Readiness in the Senate Armed
17 Services Committee, and you know my record when I was in that
18 place. And they have reduced the appropriations and
19 authorized amounts 40 percent; in the force level, 30
20 percent. And if we did everything on this list, we would
21 reduce your excess capacity by 21 percent.
22 And they did the budget resolution week before

Page 30

1 last. And our friends, Senator Thurmond and Nunn, speaking
2 for, I think, the two most powerful positions in either party
3 in the United States Senate, gave the Senate an opportunity
4 to increase the authorized and appropriated amounts, and the
5 Senate rejected it 60 to 40. I think the message is pretty
6 clear. It isn't there. And that's why we're here.
7 Commissioner Robles.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm
9 going to follow up on the depot question, because it is
10 clearly the most pervasive issue we're dealing with in this
11 particular round, in my personal judgement.
12 And just to set the record straight, we're not
13 challenging your assertions. All we're telling you is,
14 there's inconsistency between the services, and we're trying
15 to figure out what the right level is.
16 So having said that as a backdrop -- and I
17 understand risks, General Sullivan. I work in my civilian
18 job in the risk business. I'm in the business of financial
19 risk and operational risk, also. And I do the risk
20 assessments. And so I'll ask the question in this way.
21 As you know, we have put Letterkenny down as a
22 possible closure. Just assume that Letterkenny was closed.

Page 31

So now, you are down to one ground depot, one air depot, and one communications and electronic depot. And I just have to say that in the civilian world, you don't put all your computing power or all your capacity power at one location. You try to find what they call a contingency offset.

And I know there are some analogs, but in the ground combat vehicle world, there are not many analogs in the civilian world. There are in the communication and electronic world, there are in the aviation and maintenance world, but they're not allowed in the combat vehicle world. And so I worry about natural disasters, explosions, other things that could occur.

And I understand you lost 40 cents on the dollar. I know that as well as anybody, and that you think the risk is acceptable. But I'm not sure that we think the risk is acceptable. So have you really run some scenarios what would happen if you were down to just those three depots with no other depot as a backup and had to do a natural disaster excursion or an explosion excursion and what that would do to your future readiness?

SECRETARY WEST: Do you mean an explosion that took out one of our depots? Is that what you mean?

Page 32

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Yes. You had a tornado, a hurricane. You had an explosion, a fire. That is not unheard of. Tinker had a fire not too long ago. And if that did it to one of your depots and you had no backup -- let's say Letterkenny was gone -- do you still feel as comfortable as you said before on your risk?

SECRETARY WEST: Well, I hesitate to answer too quickly here, commissioner, because quite frankly, one of the first things that occurs to me is, there are just some risks that we can keep on trying to guard against, and we will just run out of money to guard against them.

You're right that there's less risk that there will be three explosions to take out three ground depots than that there is one that will take out one. But it strikes me that trying to do that particular analysis, the "what if," may not really help us in what we're trying to provide for you.

I understand your point is that it will help in what you're trying to do, and I'll see what my colleagues say about that. But for me, at the outset, the risk that by going from three at this point clearly redundant ground depots to one, essentially, will leave us somehow unable to do what we need to do in an emergency is one that my

Page 33

professional officers tell me they are prepared to undergo.

Having said that, let me now turn to them.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: Commissioner Robles, I think it's a manageable risk. You've got LIMA -- I've got LIMA where I could turn. I could turn to the civilian sector to do some of it. I believe the United States Marine Corps has some capability in that area.

Of all of the problems we have got in the sustainment of the force -- the sustainment of the force, now -- this is probably the one that's the most manageable. And I think that the insurance bill to keep depots which are -- or the bill, not the insurance bill. That's your business, not mine. The bill to keep depots which are significantly under capacity is too high, given the amount of dollars, to the chairman's point.

You know, we have got an organization to hold together here. And that's where I am. I think Jimmy has got me --

GENERAL SHANE: Well, I just wanted -- Mr. Chairman, General Shane -- to add to that. We did look at that. We thoroughly understand the risk associated with this. But nevertheless, as we look at the excess capacity,

Page 34

as the Chief Staff of the Army has pointed out, we just had almost 50 percent excess capacity, two depots' worth.

And, as you tackle that and you present these scenarios -- and you presented one as a natural disaster. So now, you've got a situation which impacts on the national security of this country.

So naturally, Department of Defense is going to rally to that and the Marine Corps and LIMA facilities. And our private sector would rally to it. And I think the resource is out there to accommodate that unpredictable risk that you pose to us.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Good. I just want to make sure we're on the record here, because this will give us the baseline for other service discussions about this particular issue, which is, very candidly, not uniform across the services.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: You know that in the last big war, we did a lot of that maintenance in Japan. We did a lot of maintenance of some of those vehicles, track vehicles in Japan, as you know.

SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, may I just add, at the early stage of development of the proposal, we were

Page 35

asking the same kinds of questions that you are asking. We went to our war fighters. We went to the deputy Chief of Staff for operations.

And we said, "What is your view on this?" And his view -- the people who have ultimate responsibility for providing Army equipment for the war fight said it was an acceptable risk. And that was the basis of our recommendation.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I just want to make sure we're all on the same sheet of music as we go through this very tough issue with the rest of the services.

SECRETARY WEST: I would like to add one more word.
13164x1662Y And I know you want to move on. I think, frankly, that our analysis tells us that the Department of Defense is bleeding depot money. We are just spending money on capacity that we simply do not need now.

If we have to make our contribution from the Department of the Army point of view, it is clear what it is we need to retain. And that is, perhaps, the most important thing to us, the way in which we have retained the ones -- Tobyhanna to do its mission, consolidating our ground vehicle maintenance at one depot.

Page 36

We know what we need, and that is the key thing. But we simply cannot continue to keep open capacity that we are not presently using. And yes, we do have to do some thinking about what do we do in a crisis. And we think we have done that.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I would like to switch to an equally noncontroversial subject. It has to do with the movement of the chemical facility from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. I was at Anniston last Friday and got a briefing from the McClellan folks. And their issues are two, and I would just like you to address those two issues.

Issue number one, they're concerned about the permits. Understanding that the State of Missouri said they're going to issue the permits and there are all the permits they need and that everything is good to go, but there is some concern that maybe all the permits were not issued and they were issued too hastily and not a proper analysis was done.

In some cases, they whited-out the permit from three or four years ago and inserted them. And there's going to be a legal challenge. And the environmental groups are starting to get up in arms, et cetera. So that was one

Page 25

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2 requirement as needed. Those are the reasons we do these
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22 And they did the budget resolution week before

Page 30

1 last. And our friends, Senator Thurmond and Nunn, speaking
2 for, I think, the two most powerful positions in either party
3 in the United States Senate, gave the Senate an opportunity
4 to increase the authorized and appropriated amounts, and the
5 Senate rejected it 60 to 40. I think the message is pretty
6 clear. It isn't there. And that's why we're here.
7 Commissioner Robles.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm
9 going to follow up on the depot question, because it is
10 clearly the most pervasive issue we're dealing with in this
11 particular round, in my personal judgement.
12 And just to set the record straight, we're not
13 challenging your assertions. All we're telling you is,
14 there's inconsistency between the services, and we're trying
15 to figure out what the right level is.
16 So having said that as a backdrop -- and I
17 understand risks, General Sullivan. I work in my civilian
18 job in the risk business. I'm in the business of financial
19 risk and operational risk, also. And I do the risk
20 assessments. And so I'll ask the question in this way.
21 As you know, we have put Letterkenny down as a
22 possible closure. Just assume that Letterkenny was closed.

Page 31

So now, you are down to one ground depot, one air depot, and one communications and electronic depot. And I just have to say that in the civilian world, you don't put all your computing power or all your capacity power at one location. You try to find what they call a contingency offset.

And I know there are some analogs, but in the ground combat vehicle world, there are not many analogs in the civilian world. There are in the communication and electronic world, there are in the aviation and maintenance world, but they're not allowed in the combat vehicle world. And so I worry about natural disasters, explosions, other things that could occur.

And I understand you lost 40 cents on the dollar. I know that as well as anybody, and that you think the risk is acceptable. But I'm not sure that we think the risk is acceptable. So have you really run some scenarios what would happen if you were down to just those three depots with no other depot as a backup and had to do a natural disaster excursion or an explosion excursion and what that would do to your future readiness?

SECRETARY WEST: Do you mean an explosion that took out one of our depots? Is that what you mean?

Page 32

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Yes. You had a tornado, a hurricane. You had an explosion, a fire. That is not unheard of. Tinker had a fire not too long ago. And if that did it to one of your depots and you had no backup -- let's say Letterkenny was gone -- do you still feel as comfortable as you said before on your risk?

SECRETARY WEST: Well, I hesitate to answer too quickly here, commissioner, because quite frankly, one of the first things that occurs to me is, there are just some risks that we can keep on trying to guard against, and we will just run out of money to guard against them.

You're right that there's less risk that there will be three explosions to take out three ground depots than that there is one that will take out one. But it strikes me that trying to do that particular analysis, the "what if," may not really help us in what we're trying to provide for you.

I understand your point is that it will help in what you're trying to do, and I'll see what my colleagues say about that. But for me, at the outset, the risk that by going from three at this point clearly redundant ground depots to one, essentially, will leave us somehow unable to do what we need to do in an emergency is one that my

Page 33

professional officers tell me they are prepared to undergo.

Having said that, let me now turn to them.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: Commissioner Robles, I think it's a manageable risk. You've got LIMA -- I've got LIMA where I could turn. I could turn to the civilian sector to do some of it. I believe the United States Marine Corps has some capability in that area.

Of all of the problems we have got in the sustainment of the force -- the sustainment of the force, now -- this is probably the one that's the most manageable. And I think that the insurance bill to keep depots which are -- or the bill, not the insurance bill. That's your business, not mine. The bill to keep depots which are significantly under capacity is too high, given the amount of dollars, to the chairman's point.

You know, we have got an organization to hold together here. And that's where I am. I think Jimmy has got some --

GENERAL SHANE: Well, I just wanted -- Mr. Chairman, General Shane -- to add to that. We did look at that. We thoroughly understand the risk associated with this. But nevertheless, as we look at the excess capacity,

Page 34

as the Chief Staff of the Army has pointed out, we just had almost 50 percent excess capacity, two depots' worth.

And, as you tackle that and you present these scenarios -- and you presented one as a natural disaster. So now, you've got a situation which impacts on the national security of this country.

So naturally, Department of Defense is going to rally to that and the Marine Corps and LIMA facilities. And our private sector would rally to it. And I think the resource is out there to accommodate that unpredictable risk that you pose to us.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Good. I just want to make sure we're on the record here, because this will give us the baseline for other service discussions about this particular issue, which is, very candidly, not uniform across the services.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: You know that in the last big war, we did a lot of that maintenance in Japan. We did a lot of maintenance of some of those vehicles, track vehicles in Japan, as you know.

SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, may I just add, at the early stage of development of the proposal, we were

Page 35

asking the same kinds of questions that you are asking. We went to our war fighters. We went to the deputy Chief of Staff for operations.

And we said, "What is your view on this?" And his view -- the people who have ultimate responsibility for providing Army equipment for the war fight said it was an acceptable risk. And that was the basis of our recommendation.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I just want to make sure we're all on the same sheet of music as we go through this very tough issue with the rest of the services.

SECRETARY WEST: I would like to add one more word.
13164x1662Y And I know you want to move on. I think, frankly, that our analysis tells us that the Department of Defense is bleeding depot money. We are just spending money on capacity that we simply do not need now.

If we have to make our contribution from the Department of the Army point of view, it is clear what it is we need to retain. And that is, perhaps, the most important thing to us, the way in which we have retained the ones -- Tobyhanna to do its mission, consolidating our ground vehicle maintenance at one depot.

Page 36

We know what we need, and that is the key thing. But we simply cannot continue to keep open capacity that we are not presently using. And yes, we do have to do some thinking about what do we do in a crisis. And we think we have done that.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. I would like to switch to an equally noncontroversial subject. It has to do with the movement of the chemical facility from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood. I was at Anniston last Friday and got a briefing from the McClellan folks. And their issues are two, and I would just like you to address those two issues.

Issue number one, they're concerned about the permits. Understanding that the State of Missouri said they're going to issue the permits and there are all the permits they need and that everything is good to go, but there is some concern that maybe all the permits were not issued and they were issued too hastily and not a proper analysis was done.

In some cases, they whited-out the permit from three or four years ago and inserted them. And there's going to be a legal challenge. And the environmental groups are starting to get up in arms, et cetera. So that was one

Page 37

1 issue.
2 The second issue is that there will be a
3 degradation of the smoke training mission, mobile spoke
4 specifically, because the permits they have don't let you do
5 use fog oil to do some of the smoke training that's required.
6 And the third issue and probably the one that got
7 my attention the most is that there is a belief by the
8 Military Police Corps and the Chemical Corps that they're
9 going to become second-class citizens when they move to Fort
10 Leonard Wood, that they have spent 20 years building up the
11 infrastructure and getting the facilities required to have a
12 quality MP force, which are always the first to deploy, as
13 all of us know, and the Chemical Corps that sort of bounced
14 around for several years looking for a home -- and now, we're
15 going to move them to Fort Leonard Wood, and they will become
16 second-class citizens and take a step down and that mission
17 will be subsumed.
18 Those are the three issues, as candidly and as
19 clearly as I understand them. So would you please address
20 them?
21 SECRETARY WEST: Let me start there, since I was so
22 directly involved in those decisions. Let's take the last

Page 38

1 one first, second-class citizenship. I think that there is
2 no one more grateful, first of all, to the communities that
3 have housed the Army over time, certainly to the community
4 that has housed these schools. Our soldiers have been
5 treated well, and they have been made to feel good there.
6 And yes, it is always more comfortable to remain in
7 the place where you were assigned and where you have over
8 time built up your stature both on the post -- and I think
9 your question referred more to on the post -- but also in the
10 community.
11 Even so, in our Army, particularly when we're
12 talking about branches of the services or the schools, it is
13 the commanders themselves of those institutions, the cadre,
14 who when they move to their new location will determine what
15 their status is on their new post. I hold them as
16 accountable for whether or not they're second-class citizens
17 in their new location as I do anybody else.
18 But even so, of course, the answer you would expect
19 from me is that we will make sure that at the new location,
20 they have the status, they have the -- and I think the other
21 thing they're concerned about is access to support that they
22 want. I would say that that's not a real worry on our part,

Page 39

1 but I understand why you raised it.
2 The other two are more recent issues. Let me take
3 the first of those two, which is permits generally, whether
4 we're getting them and whether we're going to get what we
5 need. Our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense -- and
6 it was one that the Chief of Staff and I specifically placed
7 our emphasis on as it worked its way up to us -- was that we
8 would not move -- there will be no moving unless we get the
9 permits we need to operate in the new location.
10 That was the basis on which we recommended that the
11 Secretary send the list to you. And I think that is the way
12 that recommendation comes to you. That pledge on the part of
13 the Chief of Staff and on the Secretary of the Army remains
14 in effect. Our recommendation to you is that we not move,
15 that we don't move unless we get the permits.
16 But the second part of that is, from all I
17 understand from those who I trust and the Chief trusts to
18 follow this information for us, we now have those permits,
19 every one of them, and to the extent we need them to do our
20 job.
21 Is that right?
22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, it is. And let me

Page 40

1 reinforce that, and then I'll get to the other one. To the
2 best of my knowledge, we have the permits that we need.
3 I understand that because Missouri is a regulated
4 state regarding some of the environmental aspects of smoke,
5 that their permit is a little bit less open than Alabama, but
6 I believe we can get to the level of training we need with
7 the permits as I understand them, now. You know, as I have
8 seen them to this date. Now, certainly --
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Could I interrupt at that point,
10 general? You have legal counsel that advises you about these
11 matters, I take it?
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. Yes. Now, regarding
13 the second aspect of your question, I'm committed to
14 maintaining the essence of America's Army. And it troubles
15 me, obviously, when someone says that they think a move such
16 as this will put them into second-class citizenship in the
17 Army.
18 We're certainly not going to let that happen, and
19 I'm sure General Reimer, if he were here, would say the same
20 thing. I mean, we have seen a lot of change here in the last
21 four years, an enormous amount of change. And we have kept
22 the vibrancy and the credibility of this organization.

Page 41

1 And moving the chemical school and the MP school to
2 Fort Leonard Wood, in my view, will not be detrimental to
3 that in the long-term readiness of the United States Army.
4 And we will work -- and I know General Reimer will; I'm sure
5 I'm speaking for him -- to ensure that that just doesn't
6 happen. But it's important for me to hear. It's feedback.
7 And obviously, I'll take a look at it.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My
9 time has expired.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Commissioner Montoya.
11 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Let me stay on the same
12 topic for a moment, general, but come at it from another
13 issue that has come to our attention, the issue of permits.
14 There's a real trap there, in that there in the world of
15 environmental issues, you get permits to construct things
16 which are fairly easy to obtain compared to permission to
17 operate things.
18 It's those operating permits that generally don't
19 come till after you finish construction or nearly the time
20 construction is done that really tie your hands. And so I
21 don't seek to tell you that you aren't getting good advice,
22 but I just mention that it's a long process and a very

Page 42

1 unpredictable process.
2 And in that regard, I've seen correspondence where
3 the moving of the chemical school could, in fact, jeopardize
4 a remaining mission that you have in mind for Anniston, which
5 is the disposal of chemical stockpile.
6 The State of Alabama, I think, has written that
7 part of the conditions that they had contemplated in writing
8 permits or awarding permits for construction in later
9 operation was the assurances that there would be adequate
10 cleanup or reaction forces associated with the chemical
11 school if there were an accident or if there were a spill,
12 what have you.
13 And so they would reconsider issuing construction
14 and operating permits for your disposal activity at the
15 existing site. Can you address that for me?
16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I don't believe there's a
17 direct link between the two, although I understand that I'm
18 sure there is someone somewhere who is trying to draw that
19 link. But I don't believe there's a link between McClellan
20 and Anniston in that regard.
21 Now, to your other point, I'm not the lawyer here.
22 There's a lot of attorneys here in this room, and there's a

Page 43

1 lot of attorneys that can handle the other aspects of it.
2 I'm aware of the pitfalls involved in a move such as this
3 with permits to construct and permits to operate. And there
4 will be views on all of that.
5 I think what the Secretary said is important. We
6 have proposed to move these two schools from Alabama to
7 Missouri because we feel that is the most efficient way to
8 operate three schools and the most efficient way to be
9 operating the Army.
10 We are not going to do it if it will jeopardize our
11 mission. And that -- we'll just have to play this out. I
12 believe we have what we need to do that now. Look, we're
13 walking a fine line here. I've got to get the money to run
14 this organization. And I think the way to do it is to get
15 out of McClellan.
16 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And general, I accept that
17 on its face. I'm not going to quarrel with that. What I'm
18 suggesting is, there are people in state government, and
19 there are environmental folks that could care less about your
20 money, your mission.
21 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And they will stop you. As

Page 44

1 sure as I'm sitting here, they will stop you. And I'm not
2 convinced that today, that your path is so clear that you
3 have the assurance that you can execute. That's this
4 commissioner's concern at this point in the process. I
5 haven't seen the evidence that you can execute,
6 notwithstanding your correctness.
7 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner, if I might have a
8 chance to address that. I'm not the lawyer here, either, but
9 I am a lawyer. And the Chief and I have a number of lawyers
10 who have been addressing that very issue. That's one of the
11 reasons we wrote that condition into our approval. And I am
12 familiar with the very point you make. And we are very
13 careful about it.
14 That is why I've emphasized that. But I also don't
15 want to mislead you. It is true that we believe right now
16 that we have the permits we will need, and we also believe
17 that we will be able to carry through in the place that we
18 will move to. We were very careful about analyzing that.
19 And we realized that working through the permitting process
20 is a series of landmines.
21 It is why when we did the review, the Chief and I
22 asked the basic question which I suspect occurs to you as

Page 45

1 well underneath all of this, which is, "Why would you leave a
2 place where you've got all your permits where you are able to
3 operate without legal impediment to go to a place where
4 you've got to go through the process that not only regulators
5 but those who come in to influence regulators, the public,
6 might somehow derail that effort?"
7 And the answer is, the logic of the move, the
8 savings, the intelligence in the way we can operate our force
9 dictate it. That being the case, we have walked as carefully
10 as we know how through the permits. And at this moment, we
11 are encouraged. We believe we are there in terms of what we
12 need now, and we believe we will continue to have the
13 cooperation of the receiving states' authorities, even though
14 there will from time to time be issues that arise.
15 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner Montoya, if I might
16 add one thing on the chemical demilitarization issue. The
17 Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for the
18 Secretary of Defense to build eight such chemical
19 demilitarization plants throughout the United States. And
20 the Army is committed in each one of those cases to provide
21 exactly the amount and the level of support that's needed for
22 the safe operation of those chemical demilitarization plants.

Page 46

1 In none of the other locations is there a military
2 base such as Fort McClellan. So we believe that it is not
3 required for the safe operation of the plants that we will
4 provide exactly the level of support that is required.
5 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And I accept that, too. The
6 issue is, will Alabama accept that. And they're on record
7 saying they won't. And we have 50 independent states like
8 you have 8 independent commissioners, and they don't always
9 work in concert.
10 One question to the depots, and it's a substantive
11 question. Again, looking at a total cost as we look at these
12 issues, we have some data that indicates that the cost of
13 unemployment compensation in the Army number is less than a
14 million dollars; the community's estimating costs that could
15 be in excess of $50 million. And that presumes that none of
16 the people or very few of the people will move from one place
17 to the other.
18 That has two implications -- that great cost
19 disparity implication; the other one is, there is clearly
20 workload at Red River. Having been there, there is a lot of
21 work there and more work contemplated. Two questions: Can
22 you absorb the workload at Anniston that is there today?

Page 47

1 And secondly, does your analysis indicate that
2 large numbers of people are going to move, or are you going
3 to be able to replace the skills -- if they don't move,
4 you're going to lose a tremendous resource. I was really
5 impressed with the people, by the way, at Red River, their
6 attitude, their management skills and approach.
7 You're going to lose a great resource, not only in
8 plant, but in people if they don't move. And have you
9 analyzed how you're going to make that up to handle that
10 workload? What is your view of those people?
11 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I was going to say,
12 commissioner, we share your view. That's one of our top
13 depots. They won an award. They are a fine representation
14 of employees and people who work for the United States doing
15 the United States' business and doing it well, and we're
16 proud of them.
17 We do not make this plan lightly. We make it in
18 view of the fact that if we are going to combine the depot
19 maintenance, we are driven to combine it at the facility that
20 has the heavy maintenance capability. And I think that's
21 sort of where we had to go on that.
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And you can do the work, you

Page 48

1 think, with the people you've got at Anniston, or do you see
2 some growth in personnel?
3 SECRETARY WEST: Yes. Your question about
4 migration, for example, I don't know what our personnel
5 expectations are.
6 GENERAL SHANE: There's no question that we can do
7 the work, Commissioner Montoya. We looked at that. We
8 coordinated that with the Army Materiel Command. The
9 headquarters does that. Everything seems to be in place.
10 Your concern with regards to the 10 million and $50
11 million difference that you brought up with regards to
12 working compensation, let me comment about that. Our numbers
13 -- and this is a point I think we need to keep in mind, that
14 the Army's numbers have been audited by the Army Audit Agency
15 and GAO at almost every step in the process.
16 So I feel fairly comfortable with the numbers. It
17 doesn't mean that we haven't collectively made a minor
18 mistake. But I think that those numbers are good for the
19 Army, 10 million is a good number. But regards to the work,
20 no question. Anniston can assume that workload.
21 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner

Page 49

1 Montoya.
2 Commissioner Kling.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: One quick question back to
4 the chemical. Will a general officer be heading up the
5 Chemical Corps if it moves to Fort Leonard Wood?
6 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
7 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, it will be?
8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes. Each of the schools will
11 be separate and distinct, I'm sure. Now, that doesn't mean
12 that there wouldn't -- you know, I think there will be some
13 management efficiencies which could take place, obviously,
14 since there would be overlap in some of the --
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: We had just heard that there
16 wouldn't be a general officer in that.
17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: You did?
18 COMMISSIONER KLING: That there would not be, and
19 that's really why I'm asking you. Let me turn to the matter
20 of the leases, if I could, a second. We have had a lot of
21 back and forth information, and I'm referring to ATCOM, which
22 you just, Mr. Secretary, briefly touched on the military

Page 50

1 value of leases.
2 But the Missouri delegation and the community have
3 expressed their concern that the Army has not complied with
4 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of '90. Can you
5 just explain why you believe that the Army's recommendation
6 concerning leases are consistent with the force structure and
7 the final selection criteria giving priority to military
8 value?
9 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir. And there are several
10 points to be made here, and then I think I will also defer to
11 General Sullivan, as well. First of all, the question is,
12 the military value of what? Are we talking about the
13 military value of the lease itself and the facility, as we
14 often do when we talk about the military value, say, of an
15 Army installation, the military value of Fort Bragg and all
16 those ranges and the like?
17 Because if we're talking about that, then the
18 military value of the leases in a building in essentially an
19 office setting is simply not that significant. No, I
20 overstated. It's not significant. So the only other
21 question, then, is the appropriateness of the economic
22 decision made there, the business decision, on the one hand

Page 51

1 and of the implications of how we are organizing ourselves to
2 do the defense business.
3 That is, should ATCOM remain together for the
4 synergy of its many component parts; or if, as we're planning
5 to spin some things off, will that somehow lessen their
6 ability to do their job? And I think maybe you want me to
7 really get to that latter point.
8 So first of all, on the leases, as a business
9 matter, I would like to see the Army out of as many leases as
10 we could get out of. Now, that's simply not possible to do.
11 There are too many instances in which when you look at the
12 contrasting alternatives, it makes much better business sense
13 to be in that lease there.
14 That is not the case with ATCOM in St. Louis. It
15 does not make better business sense for us to be in those
16 high-cost leases. It makes better business sense if we have
17 a way consistent with the Chief of Staff's force structure
18 needs, to be somewhere in space that is on a post or that the
19 Army owns and where there can be some synergy with other like
20 activities.
21 And on the second part, a decision which
22 essentially moves components of ATCOM to do like things with

Page 52

1 like components seems to us, again, to make sense in terms of
2 the needs of the Army at that time. And on those alignments,
3 I think I'm prepared to pass along to the Chief.
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I think leases, while important,
5 I think we need to just consolidate all of them as much as
6 possible.
7 GENERAL SHANE: If I could?
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, sir, General Shane.
9 GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Kling, let me make a
10 comment on this. First, with regards to Missouri delegation,
11 as you recall, I provided I think it was a 14-page letter
12 which laid out the Army's position on that in detail. And
13 what I think the bottom line of that was is not a question of
14 criterias.
15 It's really a question of process and how you go
16 about assessing and going through the rigorous analysis of
17 coming up with the term "military value." With normal
18 installations, what we did, we use what we call the
19 "installation assessment plan." And we used a computer model
20 called Decision Pad to come up with a list of ratings based
21 on some attributes that were established.
22 The difference is the fact that we looked at each

Page 53

1 individual list, but we did not necessarily use the Decision
2 Pad model or the installation assessment plan to do that. So
3 when I read through what the delegation was saying to me, I
4 think there may be a little bit of information here that was
5 kind of left out.
6 And that was the fact that they may just did not
7 understand clearly with regards to what military value was
8 and confused it with the issue of the installation assessment
9 of leases. So once again, I would ask that for testimony
10 today, that we provide for you or make a matter of record the
11 memorandum I provided to the Commission's staff.
12 COMMISSIONER KLING: That would be fine, sir.
13 SECRETARY WEST: Commissioner, there was one point
14 left untouched, and I should just make a note. The other
15 point, the utility of actually separating those units out,
16 separating aviation from troop support, which is what ATCOM
17 is right now. It's basically a combination of two different
18 functions.
19 What our proposal will do as part of the process
20 is, we'll return those to like locations. Aviation will be
21 with like activity. Troop support will be, I think, with the
22 solider support at Fort Nadick. And that makes sense to us

Page 54

1 in terms of the synergy of those operations.
2 SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I might add
3 just one point on what the Secretary just said. In addition
4 to that, it results in a substantial cost savings. The
5 annual savings from the recommendation is $56 million
6 annually once it's executed. That's 9 percent of the entire
7 savings of the entire package before the Commission. That is
8 a substantial savings in this one instance.
9 COMMISSIONER KLING: That's a good lead-in, Mr.
10 Secretary, to the second question. And this really is
11 getting down more to it. The Army estimates, as I understand
12 -- we have a slide here that we'll put up, but the Army
13 estimates that 786 civilian positions could be eliminated by
14 combining the aviation troop command and the missile command.
15 However, the community believes that the personnel
16 savings are significantly overstated, and from the 786, only
17 48 positions would be eliminated as shown on this slide in
18 which we may not be able to see, but I believe you all have
19 it in front of you.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Do you have the slide?
21 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
22 COMMISSIONER KLING: I wonder if you might just

Page 55

comment on each of these categories as we go down it, Secretary Walker or whoever.
SECRETARY WEST: We'll let General Shane.
COMMISSIONER KLING: General Shane?
GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Kling, let me discuss that. First of all, let me state that the Army stands by its number 786. And let me explain why. First of all, at every juncture -- and I'll discuss each one of these points in just a minute.
But at every juncture, once again, the Army Auditing Agency and GAO checked our numbers. So they have been validated by some analysts and reviewed. So we feel pretty comfortable with regards to that. Let me give you just a take.
First of all, we start with additional force structure reductions. I would like to point out a couple of things. They use in here the October '94 program budget guidance, which talks to man years and dollars and not authorizations. And they talk -- plus the February command plan changes, which has not been confirmed by the Army.
So what we used was what we were directed to by DOD, and that was the November '94 ASIP. And once again, we

Page 56

stand by those numbers. The 205 you see here are not just Army numbers. Those consist of Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy, and other DOD people. So the 205 number, we simply do not support that number.
The area support positions, the bottom line there is the fact that once again, we do not support it because the workload is being absorbed elsewhere. And we get down to the last two areas which talk about 90 and 387 as base OPS personnel.
What they're saying is the fact that you do not recognize any savings when associated with streamlining, downgrading, reengineering a headquarters, which was in our proposal.
And we simply have discussed this in detail with the major command, and they agree that these numbers here are overstated. So the bottom line is, the 48 number which they say which constitutes no savings for the Army is not correct.
COMMISSIONER KLING: The biggest numbers are the 90 and the 387. And what you're saying to me, I believe, if I would understand from a business life, is that you absolutely are going to be instructing when the move takes place that these positions are not to be filled, period?

Page 57

GENERAL SHANE: That's correct. That's correct.
COMMISSIONER KLING: So you stand by the fact that these -- we will not be replacing these numbers of people when this move is done?
GENERAL SHANE: That's correct. And I have personally gone down and talked to the commander of MICOM, Major General Link, and discussed this issue with him in talking about this in conceptual terms. And we feel comfortable with our number -- 786 is the right number.
SECRETARY WALKER: Commissioner, if I might add one thing. After this list was submitted to the Commission, the staff continued to work on looking at the estimates to make sure that they were correct. This has been revised downward. The original estimate was for 1,022 personnel savings. And we have looked at it again, and the current estimate is 786. So we have taken into account those concerns in the recommendations.
COMMISSIONER KLING: I guess the other point is the savings.
SECRETARY WALKER: Yes. And as a result of that, we still found that the savings not only held up but increased. The original recommendation indicated that annual

Page 58

savings would be 46 million. We now calculate those savings to be 56 million annually after completion.
SECRETARY WEST: So the bottom line, commissioner, is every time we review this, it looks better to us.
COMMISSIONER KLING: I've been told my time has expired, so Mr. Chairman, I turn it back to you. And by the way, gentlemen, I certainly thank the Army. In all the visits we had, the people were splendid. The Corps is wonderful. It has been a great experience.
GENERAL SHANE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner Kling.
General Sullivan, you made an interesting remark in your presentation about the fact that this is the last BRAC. And, of course, you and I know that under law, it is the last BRAC. Have I shocked you? You did make that --
GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, I did.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, let me make this observation. It clearly is the last BRAC provided by law. There isn't any question that we have got a 40 percent reduction in authorized and appropriated amounts. There isn't any question we have got a 30 percent force level reduction.
There isn't any question we haven't come up to the

Page 59

mark in this BRAC round even if we exceeded the recommendations of the Department of Defense to take care of the excess capacity. I believe all that's a given. But you interrupt me if I'm wrong. I'm shocked to see staff show me figures that show we're back down to about the 1950 level. I think that's regrettable, if it's factual.
But I think the trend does not look very good. Were it up to me, I would advise differently, but I'm satisfied that Congress is doing nothing more but reflecting the views of their constituency and, for the time being, we have to live with that.
In any event, it brings me to this point. Obviously, no one would tolerate another BRAC in a couple of years. I think everybody has a belly full of this for right now, and I can understand why. Certainly, the Chair has a belly full of it. But it occurs that there's a lot of excess capacity out there still to be looked at again.
There has been some discussion about the possibility of maybe after a couple of Presidential elections intervene and the dust settles and everybody has had an opportunity to review their own house again -- maybe I'm throwing out a figure of something like 2001, there's an

Page 60

election in '96, and there's an election in 2000.
And by that time -- and that's the end, incidentally -- I believe I'm correct -- that's the end of the reach of these BRACs, 2001. So it strikes me that out there six years away where nobody needs to lie awake nights right now, maybe we could look at this again. And I only ask you -- you're leaving in six days. You don't have a dog in this fight. What do you think of that?
GENERAL SULLIVAN: I think the way you're going is probably the right line of reasoning. Certainly, nobody knows what the dollars are going to do. But if they continue to go down, the only way to do it is to have a BRAC Commission, in my view.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I don't want to have one sitting around for six years.
GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, no. I mean, if you were to ask me, "Okay, what would you recommend?" I would recommend that after this all runs its course, then consider resurrecting the Commission.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Let me ask you another thing. We have seen here -- I don't mean this as any reflection on you -- a lot of changes in the evolution of the

Page 61

1 BRAC process. You know, you take off things, you put them
2 back on, you realign, you realign again, you subtract, you
3 add to. I'm not finding fault with that.
4 Now, there may be some of that after this, and the
5 question has occurred to us, without reaching out beyond what
6 you've done, we are thinking we need to address how you make
7 changes in BRAC over the next six years. If you want to come
8 to us, say, "We have kind of looked at this again, and this
9 needs a little bit more tuning up."
10 So do you think that's something we -- the reason I
11 ask all these things, Senator Thurmond has asked us to come
12 in about the middle of July when the dust has at least
13 partially settled if we can get back into town, and we'll
14 wear bulletproof vests and come in in the dead of night like
15 Abraham Lincoln did after the election that time over 100
16 years ago. But if we do that, is that a thing we should be
17 looking at?
18 GENERAL SULLIVAN: In my opinion, it is. I think
19 the leaders of these organizations need the flexibility to
20 manage their assets so that they can hold these organizations
21 together. And I can't predict -- I don't think anybody can
22 predict what's going to happen here. And I think there has

Page 62

1 to be some mechanism so we can move things around.
2 I think Commissioner Montoya's question is
3 certainly -- look, we're paying attention to that. Now, we
4 don't want to slavishly hold to preconceived plans or
5 preconceived notions if it doesn't seem correct. And locking
6 us in, fencing us in, will be dysfunctional. Could be.
7 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And Secretary, you're nodding
8 "yes." If you have anything you want to --
9 SECRETARY WEST: No. On a different matter, your
10 comment about the Chief not having a dog in this fight, of
11 course, we know how he feels about the Army. He always will
12 have a dog in this fight.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Oh, I understand that. Well, we
14 respect and love him for it. Now, I'm going to ask two more
15 questions. They're highly repetitious. But, you know, by
16 now, let's all be adults about this. We know what the hot
17 spots are around here. And everybody knows that some things
18 are not going to be a lot of trouble, and other things are
19 highly controversial. Let's face that.
20 Now, the fight between Alabama and Missouri has
21 gotten into the national magazines and everything else. And
22 it's a pretty good fight, and I respect both sides for going

Page 63

1 at it and making their best cases. Now, challenges are
2 taking place before the commissions right now at the
3 administrative level. I have no doubt this is going into
4 courts and so forth. I'm a lawyer. That's how I make my
5 living in my other life.
6 But you fellows are here saying that you stake your
7 reputations on the fact that what you have now, the permits
8 you have now satisfy the Army regarding this matter.
9 SECRETARY WEST: To the extent we know and with the
10 advice we have, which yes, as you pointed out, does include
11 our counsel.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I want to tell you
13 something. We're going to start voting next Thursday, the
14 22nd day of June. And I ask you both, General Sullivan and
15 Secretary West -- let's see; you're going to leave here six
16 days from now -- but I would ask you all to let us know if
17 there's any changes in this. Because as far as the Chair's
18 concerned, I indicate not at all how we'll vote. There may
19 even be divisions here.
20 But the point is, I act on the assumption you're
21 saying you're satisfied about the permits on whatever this
22 chairman finally will do.

Page 64

1 SECRETARY WEST: And that's a correct assumption,
2 sir.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, finally, I want to make this
4 clear in my own mind. There's a lot of discussion here. All
5 my colleagues have asked these questions. These questions
6 are in our mind. You have five depots out there, and we all
7 know we're looking at good stuff now. I've said from the
8 beginning, "Hey, you have an '88 round; you have a '91 round;
9 you have a '93 round."
10 I played baseball and sports when I was a kid --
11 not so good -- but I remember, you had a bunch of cuts. By
12 the time you got the cuts finished, you had what you thought
13 was your team left. And this is the fourth cut. All this
14 stuff's good. Most of these places have had awards of
15 excellence and all kinds of tributes to the fine work they
16 do, right?
17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now, you've got five depots out
19 there, and you're telling us with the excess capacity you've
20 got, you can live with cutting out two and having three left.
21 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: And you are saying to us that

Page 65

1 that's better than downsizing, so far as the Army is
2 concerned, without any judgement of what some other service
3 may do?
4 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir. That is exactly what
5 we're saying.
6 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You say you save money by closing
7 and not downsizing.
8 SECRETARY WEST: Yes, sir.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You've looked at downsizing?
10 SECRETARY WEST: By "downsizing," you mean simply
11 shrinking the particular five to a smaller size?
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Get them smaller and in place.
13 SECRETARY WEST: We have, and we have concluded
14 that that is not the way to go and that those who may be
15 going that way are not making as good judgements as we are.
16 (Laughter.)
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, that's a stronger response
18 -- I'm a luckier lawyer than I thought I would be on that
19 one.
20 (Laughter.)
21 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair recognizes Commissioner
22 Davis.

Page 66

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: From the United States Air
2 Force.
3 (Laughter.)
4 SECRETARY WEST: Who are, incidentally, making fine
5 judgements.
6 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Formerly of the Air Force.
7 First, I would like to join my colleagues up here in wishing
8 General Sullivan well. And we hope that he doesn't go away,
9 that he provides his advice and counsel for years to come.
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thanks.
11 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Secretary, I'm going to
12 have to beg your indulgence. You know, it's a wonderful
13 thing when -- the commissioners are really worried that
14 either agreeing with you or not agreeing with you would do
15 severe damage to your capability. And I recognize the job
16 General Sullivan and you have done in trying to map this
17 strategy out.
18 I also recognize that your budget flex is not very
19 high and that if you don't get the savings, you probably
20 jeopardize your readiness and your modernization accounts,
21 which is really very critical. By the same token, as you can
22 see, we're not up here to challenge the U.S. Army on their

Page 67

1 depot choices.
2 We're just worried that we leave you with the
3 proper capability when we're finished. And natural disaster
4 has already been covered rather well. And that's something
5 we should worry about.
6 Let me ask you another question in sort of a
7 counter-natural disaster question. Given that you -- if Red
8 River is closed and Anniston will be almost completely at
9 capacity by shifting the workload, have you considered using
10 Letterkenny as a backup to increase their workload with some
11 other vehicles -- the Palladin runs out in, I think, '97 --
12 if you just do the active Reserves, you do the Guard and
13 Reserve, then you've got a continuing Palladin, so we're told
14 by Letterkenny -- and increase it with something like some
15 other vehicle like the Bradley fighting vehicle or something
16 like that?
17 SECRETARY WEST: We have looked at a lot of
18 different options, commissioner. That is one we specifically
19 have not chosen. As you know, we are realigning Letterkenny,
20 or at least we are proposing to. The Palladin, incidently,
21 is, in our view, not jeopardized by this. It will be done by
22 the time these occur.

Page 68

1 And so my answer is, no, using Letterkenny in that
2 capacity is not our plan. I think, however, your reference
3 to natural disasters and the like, again, maybe you want to
4 hear a little bit more from us on that point. And I'm going
5 to let the Chief respond.
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, we're all concerned
about your surge capacity. You know, if you close a depot,
whether it be Red River or some other one, your surge
capacity has been properly protected.
10 SECRETARY WEST: Surge capacity is one of the
11 things we spend the most time thinking about.
12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, we worry about that. I
13 think a million men and women in the United States Army, 10
14 divisions, is the -- I don't need to go through that litany
15 with you, because you know it. And I'm down here -- we are
16 right at the edge of taking more force structure and getting
17 into some big-time cuts here.
18 And I think, frankly, that this is the best
19 approach. And it wasn't easy to take eight divisions out of
20 the United States Army and 600,000 people. And we have got
21 to have this kind of money. And, as the chairman pointed
22 out, nobody knows where these dollars will go in the future.

Page 69

1 And that's really what we're after.
2 And when surge -- we'll have to take care of surge
3 and figure it out. I think we can figure it out, when push
4 comes to shove. I'm sure American industry -- corporate
5 America has always been with us, and we're gong to be able to
6 handle it in corporate America.
7 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As a follow-on, General
8 Sullivan, then, the latest study indicates that we ought to
9 do more privatization. Would that be part of your scheme?
10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: In that case, in the surge case.
11 You know, some natural disaster, which you're hypothesizing,
12 I would figure something out. And then I'm sure somebody
13 would step up and say, "Chief, we can handle that; give it to
14 us."
15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, I hope you take comfort
16 from the fact that we're worrying about this almost as much
you are.
GENERAL SULLIVAN: I do, and I appreciate your
concerns. And as you know, J.B., I'm trying to balance all
20 of this to do what I have to do in the larger sense, which is
21 to provide an Army which is capable of doing what the country
22 wants it to do and not work on the margin in the total sense.

Page 70

1 These are big dollars. They're not marginal
2 dollars. But they start cutting into readiness. I
3 understand readiness when you get into war, but some of these
4 things, natural disasters, I think I can overcome.
5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, sir. Now that I've got
6 the big question off our minds, some lesser ones. Does the
7 recent sarin incident trouble you in the movement of the
8 chemical training facility?
9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No. The recent sarin incident
10 troubles me, but moving the chemical -- I've moved divisions
11 all over the place. I've moved hundreds of thousands of
12 troops. We're not going to lose our capability vis a vis
13 that issue by moving from Alabama to Missouri or moving from
14 Alabama to anyplace. I'll keep the capabilities I need, and
15 we know how to do this kind of stuff.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, sir. The Michigan
17 delegation yesterday talked about the Army pulling its
18 garrison out of Selfridge, and they were worried about who
19 was going to pick up the process. And, of course, I think
20 the Army's the only one that has any active duty people at
21 the Selfridge station. Is that, in fact, true, and where
22 should we go on that one?

Page 71

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Jimmy, you may want to talk to
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You may want to provide it for
4 the record, Jim.
5 GENERAL SHANE: This is General Shane. I would
6 prefer to comment on the record in writing, if I may.
7 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Sure. And my last question
8 is, according to the Army data, the Sierra Army Depot's the
9 only Army installation out of which START Treaty mandated
10 destruction of rocket motors can be carried out. How is the
11 Department of Defense -- Mr. Secretary, if you close Sierra
12 Army Depot, how is the Department of Defense going to -- are
13 they going to recertify another depot?
14 SECRETARY WEST: I would think so. I think we have
15 an alternative to it. I just don't know what it is right off
16 the top of my head, commissioner.
17 Do you know, Jimmy?
18 GENERAL SHANE: I really don't know the answer to
19 that. But I think it's not being closed, and I think we need
20 to specify for the record it's being realigned. So there's a
21 big difference.
22 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: But the capability there --

Page 72

1 GENERAL SHANE: But the capability there with
2 regards to that --
3 GENERAL SULLIVAN: We'll give you an answer.
4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, sir. And, Mr.
5 Secretary, one final question. I'm sorry. I had to leave
6 the dais for a second. But you do not plan to close English
7 Village under the current plan?
8 SECRETARY WEST: We had been negotiating with the
9 National Guard about English Village before we made our
10 recommendation on Dugway. And, quite frankly, commissioner,
11 we believe that what we announced on Dugway probably had some
12 impact on how that was going forward.
13 It is our desire to keep English Village available.
14 The question is, who will keep it available. It is our hope
15 that that will be transferred to the Guard.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So it's the intent for the
17 U.S. Army to keep it open, but who funds it is at question?
18 SECRETARY WEST: The intent is to pass it over to
19 the Guard.
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you very much, sir.
21 Mr. Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much,

Page 73

1 Commissioner Davis.
2 Commissioner Cox?
3 MADAME COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. Mr.
4 Secretary, both you and the chairman have eloquently pointed
5 out that we have to make do with less. And one of the things
6 that we seem to be doing successfully DOD-wide is taking
7 advantage of our Reserve components.
8 And we have seen that in several facilities, both
9 facilities and in several incidents over the last couple of
10 years how important the Reserve and Guard are to our efforts.
11 And for that reason, I want to ask you some questions about
12 some of the training ground recommendations that you've made
13 because, as we continue to rely even more on the Reserve
14 components, it's obviously important that they be well ready
15 and trained.
16 You all have proposed not closing exactly but
17 realigning, I take it, and enclaving Fort Pickett, Fort
18 Chaffee, and Indiantown Gap. My understanding in talking to
19 folks who train there today is that your proposal is not that
20 we close them but that they enclave those training areas and
21 facilities which are needed so that we will have those
22 training grounds but that it be funded and run by our

Page 74

1 Reserves and the National Guard.
2 In each case, in Indiantown Gap, my understanding
3 is they're looking at almost 100 percent of the facilities
4 and land being enclaved; at Fort Pickett, somewhere between
5 85 and 95 percent; and I'm not as clear at Fort Chaffee what
6 kind we're looking at. So we're essentially looking at
7 keeping the whole thing but running it differently, for which
8 we sow an enormous amount of savings.
9 I wonder if you might comment on, I guess, just
10 sort of an overall concern that if we're not closing them and
11 we're going to be running 85 or 100 percent of them, where do
12 we really get the savings in having the Guard run it versus
13 the Army?
14 SECRETARY WEST: Well, I'm not sure about the 100
15 percent versus 85 percent looking at the numbers. But the
16 question for us is always the same one, commissioner. It is
17 whether we are operating the particular facility or
18 installation in a way that reflects present-day realities,
19 both in terms of our use of our personnel and of our funding.
20 And the fact is that in each case, yes, we do show savings,
21 because the savings occur because we take away some
22 housekeeping and post-oversight authority and those kind of

Page 75

1 support facilities and turn it into solely the operation for
2 which it's going to be used.
3 That's what the enclaves say. The enclaves say
4 there is a lesser mission, there is a portion of it that's
5 less than the whole that can be isolated. If isolated, we
6 can better cost it out, better trace where the funding needs
7 to be, and also take away the incidentals that are no longer
8 necessary there.
9 Your point, I think, is are we somehow pushing this
10 off into a budget item under different colors.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Yes. If you're enclaving 85 to
12 100 percent of it, and, for example, at Fort Indiantown Gap
13 you don't have a number of the things that you might consider
14 quality of life, so there aren't sort of post things that
15 could go away, you do wonder.
16 From our perspective, and I understand you're
17 looking at it from an Army perspective, we're looking at it
18 as an overall government-wide expenditure on important
19 training. Just moving it to somewhere else doesn't help us.
20 MR. WEST: Well, it does. It makes the people who
21 use it, and who are therefore funding it, a little bit more
22 careful about how much funding they wish to lavish on it.

Page 76

1 Basically, the way I think, now you've got me on a broader
2 philosophy, a philosophical point, and I think I better get
3 off it pretty quickly, but basically I think the way we
4 protect the integrity of the federal budget is by making
5 individuals, individual organizations, entities of the
6 Executive Branch responsible not only for being the
7 proponents but the explainers of how they spend their funds.
8 In this instance, sure, we may be moving
9 responsibility over to someone, but it is the very someone
10 who should be responsible for looking at how that is going to
11 be used. At the same time, we are going to realize savings.
12 I think what you would like to know is whether the number, in
13 terms of savings to the Federal Government or the Department
14 of Defense, is exactly the same as the savings we show to the
15 active Army and whether there is maybe a smaller increment
16 there, because I am convinced that there is an increment, and
17 it is significant enough for us to propose this change to
18 you.
19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: It's about 50 -- you take all
20 three of them. If we could do what we wanted to with all
21 three, it's about 50 million a year.
22 COMMISSIONER COX: To the Army?

Page 77

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: With the National Guard, as I
3 understand it, and --
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I've got some MPA and O&M costs.
5 I've got some MPA, military personnel, in there. So I would
6 say that their costs, they're there anyway in most cases, so
7 their costs are already accounted for.
8 COMMISSIONER COX: My understanding, and maybe we
9 could ask the general of the National Guard, as I see is
10 here, is that they're looking at costs of about $29 million
11 or so for running these three facilities. Maybe that's a few
12 other facilities too?
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: Commissioner Cox,
14 Brigadier General Shane. Let me touch on that.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Surely.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: In our analysis, we need
17 to point out that in the COBRA runs, we put aside $20 million
18 to run those three installations. I think if you talk to the
19 National Guard, General D'Araujo is here, he'll tell you his
20 requirement is about $21.6 million for those three
21 installations. So it's in the ballpark.
22 This is not done in a vacuum with regards to the

Page 78

1 requirement for training. We've coordinated and I've talked
2 direct with the National Guard. The bottom line is there are
3 some missions here that we need to divest ourselves of, that
4 he doesn't want to do. We don't to do them and we don't want
5 to pay for them. That's the thrust of our recommendation
6 here.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: And when you say, and maybe we
8 should ask D'Araujo here as well -- in fact, could I ask you
9 if you feel comfortable? Brigadier General Shane has just
10 indicated that the funding is at about $20 million for the
11 National Guard. That is for this year or is that over a
12 period of time? How does that work?
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's to establish the
14 enclaves and to operate the enclaves.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: To establish the enclaves.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's programmed in the
17 operating costs for that.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: And, General, do you feel
19 comfortable that you can continue to run the training areas
20 that you need and that others who train there need, and that
21 you'll be able to get that money?
22 MAJOR GENERAL D'ARAUJO: Yes. The figures that you

Page 79

1 just heard about, $21 million, is our estimate for the
2 operating costs for the three installations you referred to
3 based on the minimum essential enclave we feel we need to
4 support, our weekend and annual training requirement.
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I interrupt? For the record,
6 that's MG John R. D'Araujo, Director of the Army National
7 Guard. Does the reporter have all that? Could the reporter
8 hear the distinguished general's remarks?
9 MG D'ARAUJO: I think so, sir.
10 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, we don't want to think so.
11 I respect that.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: Actually, I'm having a hard time
13 hearing the general's remarks.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: It's my responsibility to reserve
15 the integrity of the record here. State your name. Have you
16 been sworn?
17 MG D'ARAUJO: Yes, I have. Let me restate what I
18 just said.
19 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
20 MG D'ARAUJO: General Shane's comments are correct.
21 What we've identified are the enclaves we require for our
22 IDTR weekend and annual training requirements to support the

Page 80

1 Guard forestructure as we see it unfolding through the years.
2 Our estimates for those enclaves that we've defined working
3 with the Army runs about $21 million for those three
4 installations you referred to.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: For those three installations?
6 MG D'ARAUJO: That is correct.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: And are you comfortable that
those annual costs of $21 million, presumably saving the Army
something more than $21 million, will be forthcoming?
MG D'ARAUJO: I expect that they will be, yes.
COMMISSIONER COX: GEN Sullivan, you will be gone,
12 but some of the rest of you all -- will you be supporting
13 that request?
14 MR. WEST: Well, let me just say, as the Secretary
15 of the Army, I'm responsible for all three components and
16 their budgets. So either General D'Araujo is speaking with
17 my authority or I'm speaking in support of him.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: And you do support him?
19 MR. WEST: I support him. Secretary Walker, let me
20 add that we've been working very closely with the Director of
21 the National Guard as well as with the state tags. The $20
22 million will be forthcoming, I can assure you, in the future

Page 81

1 budget programs.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: But that's a one-time cost.
3 MR. WALKER: No. That's an annual cost of
4 operation, I believe; is that correct?
5 COMMISSIONER COX: I'm sorry. The COBRA was -- the
6 $20 million, what was that that General Shane referred to?
7 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: That's the programmed
8 operating cost to operate the enclaves we're leaving behind.
9 MR. WEST: That's correct.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: And you all feel comfortable
11 that that money -- you all will support each other in asking
12 the Congress for that money; is that correct?
13 MR. WALKER: The continuation of this training is
14 important in those locations. There's no question.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: As I understand it, there are a
16 number of other services training there as well, not just the
17 Army Guard. The Navy has got some training at some of these
18 facilities.
GENERAL SULLIVAN: The Marines.
COMMISSIONER COX: The Marines have some training
at some of these facilities. Have you been coordinating with
22 them, and are you comfortable that that training will

Page 82

1 continue to be accomplished at a reasonable cost?
2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That's at Pickett, yes. That's
3 where they do most of -- the Marines do a lot of training at
4 Pickett. We're working that action.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: And are those costs including --
6 your $21 million is the National Guard cost?
7 MG D'ARAUJO: That is correct.
8 COMMISSIONER COX: Are the costs for the Marine
9 training, I think the Navy Seals training at Fort Pickett,
10 are those also included in that $21 million that's in the
11 COBRA? That's in addition?
12 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: What you're talking about
13 are reimbursable expenses, but you're not including the COBRA
14 model.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Right.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: So we would expect the
17 Navy, the Marines to reimburse the National Guard for
18 training opportunities.
19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Whatever they do there, they
20 would reimburse them. That's in their budget line.
21 COMMISSIONER COX: And the National Guard, when
22 you're looking at enclaving and picking up the $21 million

Page 83

1 cost, I assume if you're not enclaving 100 percent of it, you
2 are enclaving enough that it would also cover the training by
3 the Marines and the Seals.
4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Sure.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: So, virtually all training that
6 is going on today at Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee will
7 continue at Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee?
8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't know. I wouldn't want
9 to sign up for that, but I would sign up for if whatever the
10 MEF is on the East Coast, if CG of the Marine forces on the
11 East Coast wanted to do training at Fort Pickett, he would
12 come up and negotiate with the commander of Fort Pickett
13 United States Army National Guard and he would, in fact,
14 reimburse him or her for whatever training he did as
15 appropriate out of his training funds, as would the regular
16 Army.
17 If the active Army wanted to go in and jump, as the
18 82nd does or 18th Airborne Corps, they would pay the Virginia
19 National Guard so much to do whatever they do. It would be a
20 business operation, but it would not be in this -- I urge you
21 not to try to relate $20 million to 50 because there's no
22 correlation.

Page 84

1 COMMISSIONER COX: That's part of what I'm
2 concerned about, unfortunately.
3 MR. WEST: I think we can certainly agree with you
4 on two points. One, yes, we've made our best good faith
5 effort to enclave sufficiently so that the training that
6 needs to be done by the Guard Bureau and those can be done.
7 Secondly, you are right, I think, that there may indeed be
8 other costs to the United States Government that don't get
9 caught up in what we've said here. But it is our belief that
10 the savings exist nonetheless and that we can isolate those
11 costs, try to get them together so that you'd see it.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: That would be helpful.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Now let me say this, if the Chair
14 may interrupt. We only have 12 minutes left and I'm going to
15 honor the right of my last commissioner to ask questions.
16 But two commissioners have now indicated they would like to
17 send you some questions in writing.
18 It occurs to me, if my colleague would accommodate
19 me, that Commissioner Cox could pursue this assiduously
20 working with staff to get to the finite results of what she
21 wants in writing with you folks. I know Commissioner Kling
22 has questions in writing. So there may be others.

Page 85

1 I'm sure you're all willing between now and the
2 22nd day of this month to answer those questions because her
3 line of questioning is certainly important to us. Thank you
4 very much, Commissioner Cox.
5 Commissioner Cornella.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. I want to move
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8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: When you say you didn't
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10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I can use Sunny Point. I can
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17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Now is there a problem,
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COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I believe that there is a necessity sometimes to pay for readiness. Can you tell me how many ships went out of Oakland and how many went out of Bayonne in 1994? How many ships were sent out of those two ports?

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COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I can tell you. I've got it right here. You can check my figures for me. Out of Bayonne 88 ships were deployed, and out of Oakland 16 ships. Are the savings greater for closing Bayonne or for closing Oakland and closure costs? GEN Shane, do you have that at your fingertips?

BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: I don't have that. I can

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COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I think we're rapidly running out of time, fortunately for some. Nothing was meant by that. Don't misunderstand that, please. Talking about Pickett, Indiantown Gap and Chaffee, 85 to 95 percent of the reduction is going to be -- I should say 85 to 95 percent of the infrastructure will be enclaved, condoned.

Isn't it true that the bulk of the savings will come from personnel reduction not infrastructure reduction? I know that's the desire of the Army to get out from underneath that overhead. I mean, I think we've covered that. Why weren't you able just to go through a manpower reduction because you're under threshold, and address that?

BRIGADIER GENERAL SHANE: I'm not familiar with the numbers of 85 to 90 percent retention of infrastructure with regards to these installations. I think the agreement that we had with the National Guard is we're going to reduce those to the bare minimums that they need to perform the training requirements. We're working to define, number one, the training requirements and, number two, trying to decide exactly what the divestiture level is going to be for those installations.

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COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: But that would be the mass on the installation, right, okay. Is there any intention, if the Army moves to Missouri with Fort McClelland, is there any intention to move from live agents to simulated agents? I know that's been discussed. Are you considering that?

MR. WEST: I don't know the answer to that.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Does that mean you have not discussed it if you don't know the answer?

GENERAL SULLIVAN: I have not discussed it with anyone.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: That doesn't mean that somebody hasn't discussed it, but I haven't.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would just like to make one last statement. In regard to the request that we have only limited funds, you have to close these bases because of that, I would say, this commissioner thinks, that if that installation should not be closed, I'm sorry that the Army is going to have to find some way to keep that thing open and to pay for it.

That's not going to be our concern because I don't necessarily feel that we were given the options to -- if we

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had another installation that we wanted to remove, that we could take some off. We did not have those options in regard to, for example, a maneuver base. If you had to make these recommendations today, would there be any change on consideration of one of the large active duty maneuver bases?

GENERAL SULLIVAN: No.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. Thank you very much for your time.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much, Commissioner Cornella. I apologize to the Army for running over a little, although we're going to accommodate the Air Force precisely on time. We thank you for being very forthright in all of your remarks. Good luck to you, GEN Sullivan.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'll have the Air Force. God bless you, General.

[Panel excused.]

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manner. Please discontinue visitation and clear the room in a quiet and orderly manner, ladies and gentlemen, so that we can accommodate, in a timely way, the distinguished Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the Air Force and others. Please clear the room.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will now hear from the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila E. Widnall. With Secretary Widnall is Chief of Staff of the Air Force, GEN Ronald R. Fogleman. We also have MG J.D. Blume, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base Realignment and Transition, and James Boatright, Consultant to the Secretary.

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SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of this Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again to discuss the 1995 Air Force BRAC recommendations. Since I was last here, I know that you and your staff have been very busy with your review.

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This morning I would like to focus on some of the issues that have been raised by communities and your staff regarding our recommendations. Because the Commission added all five Air Force depot installations for consideration for closure or further realignment, and because of the very significant potential impact of that action, I will spend the

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8 capacity, ensures future efficiencies and savings and, at the
9 same time, avoids the very significant one-time costs
10 associated with the closures of such large and complex
11 installations.
12 Additionally, it postures the Air Force well for
13 future privatization opportunities. Some have suggested that
14 the downsizing proposal achieves neither capacity nor
15 infrastructure reduction, but would simply result in empty
16 unused buildings on our logistic centers. That clearly is
17 not true.
18 Early in the process, the Air Force analysis
19 concluded that there is approximately one depot equivalent of
20 excess capacity and approximately one-and-a-half depot
21 equivalence of excess infrastructure measured by square
22 footage.

Page 98

1 Our site surveys have identified over a depots
2 worth of excess capacity that would be eliminated through our
3 recommendation. Infrastructure equivalent to one-and-a-half
4 depots has been specifically identified by building number
5 for elimination or potential reuse by other agencies.
6 As a result of the consolidation and downsizing
7 initiative, both capacity and square footage will be reduced
8 dramatically. The refined costs and savings estimates
9 provided to your staff, including some improved
10 consolidations, indicate a one-time cost of $233.5 million,
11 annual savings of over $92 million and a 20-year net present
12 value savings of $973.3 million.
13 The consolidation recommendation also achieves
14 maximum commodity-specific efficiencies. By permitting us to
15 focus on individual commodity workloads and to consider their
16 best distribution throughout the Air Force, we have been able
17 to isolate and take advantage of efficiencies not available
18 with a total closure scenario. For example, McClellan has
19 the most modern state-of-the-art facility specifically
20 designed for repair of hydraulic components.
21 Under our recommendation, we will move hydraulic
22 work from two other depots into this facility and gain the

Page 99

1 benefits of consolidation into this most efficient facility.
2 If McClellan AFB is closed, the entire hydraulics workload
3 will be moved to another depot without existing facilities
4 designed for this function, necessarily increasing the number
5 of people required for this specific work. We cannot achieve
6 this spectrum of Air Force-wide, commodity-specific
7 efficiencies if we close a depot and move every workload at
8 that depot to a new location.
9 The Commission staff has suggested the possibility
10 of substantially increased savings from depot closures if
11 greater manpower reductions and faster closure schedules are
12 assumed. They have suggested that the Air Force eliminates
13 only seven percent of depot positions in its closure
14 scenarios. That figure is incorrect.
15 When measured properly against depot-related
16 manpower authorizations, Air Force closure scenarios
17 eliminated between 12 and 15 percent of the total ALC
18 positions, including 20 percent of the overhead and over half
19 of the base-operating support positions dedicated to running
20 the installations.
21 More importantly, however, I want to stress that
22 greater manpower savings cannot be achieved and therefore

Page 100

1 should not be assumed with the closure of an Air Force depot
2 because of the unique characteristics of those installations
3 and our workload.
4 First, depot-related positions typically account
5 for less than a third of the total population at an Air Force
6 depot installation. Operational missions, DOD and non-DOD
7 tenants and other Air Logistics Center functions account for
8 a large segment of our depot base population. The closure of
9 a depot activity by itself would not reduce the manpower
10 required for these other missions.
11 Second, we do not believe the wholesale relocation
12 of a depot workload would result in significant reductions of
13 even depot-specific manpower. Due to past workload
14 consolidation efforts at our depot, there is little redundant
15 execution of workload at the different depots.
16 As a result, most depot-related manpower positions
17 and equipment at the closed facility would have to be
18 transferred to a receiving depot. There would be manpower
19 savings related to overhead and management functions, but
20 they are already properly reflected in the Air Force
21 analysis.
22 Although the suggested use of higher assumed

Page 101

1 manpower savings may be appropriate for small, single use
2 depot maintenance facilities, this approach is most
3 inappropriate for the very large multifaceted missions
4 supported on Air Force logistic center installations.
5 Assumptions regarding manpower savings do not, in any event,
6 touch the fundamental concern we face in contemplating depot
7 installations closures, that is, the cost to close.
8 As I have previously discussed, the one-time cost
9 associated with the closure of the depot, even for the
10 various scenarios provided by your staff, are very
11 significant. Indeed, the least expensive scenario is priced
12 at over $560 million. To understand the full impact of these
13 costs, it is important also to consider their distribution by
14 year.
15 The nature of BRAC actions requires that expenses
16 related to relocating missions and workload, such as military
17 construction, be incurred early to accommodate the necessary
18 mission relocation before a closure can take place. Our
19 current estimates of cost across fiscal years 1996 to 2001
20 compared to available budget resources indicates considerable
21 budget shortfalls in some years if the Commission approves
22 all of our original recommendations except the Kirtland

Page 102

1 realignment.
2 Although we have sufficient funds to cover the
3 one-time costs associated with these closures and realignment
4 actions across the entire period, we have a shortfall in
5 fiscal years 1996 and 1997 ranging from $50 million to almost
6 $250 million each year. We will likely deal with these
7 short-term problems by delaying closure dates on certain
8 actions and thus moving expenses into later years where funds
9 remain.
10 We will not be able to do this if we have to close
11 a depot. If a depot base is closed, we will have a shortfall
12 across the entire period in excess of $317 million. There
13 will be no reserve in the later years to solve the large
14 shortfalls in the early years. This problem would be further
15 exacerbated if your staff suggestion of accelerated closures
16 were followed, since more costs would be required in those
17 early years.
18 The closure of a depot would have dramatic adverse
19 impacts on our budget and necessarily draw essential funds
20 from top priority readiness, modernization and quality of
21 life initiatives that are so critical to our future Air
22 Force. Quite simply, the methods suggested to increase

Page 103

avings and make a closure more attractive do not resolve our difficulties and do not make closure a fiscally viable or operationally attractive alternative.

I continue to believe that a dispassionate review of the proposed reductions in capacity, square footage and personnel, potential efficiencies and the necessary constraints imposed by operational and fiscal realities will lead you to the conclusion that the Air Force recommendation is the most prudent and cost effective alternative. I strongly support it, and I urge you to do the same.

I would like to turn briefly to the closure of Rome Laboratory. The refined costs presented to you as a result of our site surveys are the best estimates for implementing this recommendation and include appropriate calibration and installation costs. This action is cost effective and operationally sound with a reasonable payback of the investment within six years. The closure of Rome Lab is also an important step towards the broader goal of implementing cross service consolidation of laboratory assets.

The recommendation to close Brooks AFB is likewise sound and should be approved. The contonement option proposed by the San Antonio community, from our perspective, is not a

Page 104

viable option. That proposal would retain a substantial installation without its own support establishment requiring cumbersome scheduling and travel for routine maintenance, personnel services and other normal day-to-day requirements.

The large number of personnel who would remain at Brooks would not receive adequate support. The recommendation to close Brooks AFB with the majority of its activities relocating to Wright-Paterson will achieve the long-term reduction in laboratory capacity and infrastructure we need for a reasonable investment.

As you know, the Air Force is proceeding to implement the 1993 BRAC recommendation to close Newark AFB and is pursuing an option of privatizing the workload. We have been advising your staff of the status of our efforts. We will continue to do so and expect to provide additional information within the next week or so.

I understand there may be some confusion as to the Air Force position concerning the 1995 Secretary of Defense recommendation regarding Letter Kenny Army Depot. Let me make clear the Air Force is not seeking to have a share of the workload at Letter Kenny moved to the Ogden Air Logistics Center. The Air Force fully supports the DOD recommendation

Page 105

and the enhanced cross servicing that it achieves.

As the Secretary of Defense has communicated to you, the recommendation to realign Kirtland AFB no longer represents a cost effective measure. With this one exception, I strongly urge the Commission to approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close or realign Air Force installation.

I would like now to turn to GEN Fogleman to provide additional comments on various operational considerations related to the recommendations.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: And we thank you, Secretary Widnall.

We're delighted to have GEN Fogleman, Ron Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, with us today.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting us here this morning.

The United States Air Force realizes that there's a need to reduce excess infrastructure if we're going to meet our security needs in the future, but we also think and believe very strongly that this action must be taken in a fiscally responsible manner.

I've spent a lot of years of my life in the Air

Page 106

Force programming business. I think I understand out-year programs and I would tell you that, during the period of FY '96 to 2002, all the services are in a critical period in terms of limited procurement funds, overall DOD funding, but any additional funding that get laid in as a result of not considering the fiscal outcomes of base closure actions, I think, will have a tremendous impact on our program.

I think the Air Force has been at the forefront of DOD closure and realignment efforts. I've said before, since the 1988 Base Closure Commission, we've saved $18 billion. That's 71 percent of all the DOD savings to date. We have a proven track record. I think we know how to do this.

Having said that, I would like to acknowledge, as the Secretary has, that the Air Force has worked with both DOD and the Commission to modify the SECDEF's original recommendations as a result of site surveys and further information. Particularly, the Secretary has mentioned Kirtland Air Force Base.

The other one that we have continued to look at is an outgrowth of the FY '93 BRAC, and that is the potential for realignment of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Unit at O'Hare Field, in light of Air National Guard

Page 107

and Air Force Reserve recommendations, as part of this program.

My purpose in being here today, Mr. Chairman, is I want to express operational concerns over the expanded list of potential Air Force installations for realignment and closure. To one degree or another, I may be off-base here, but I think that --

CHAIRMAN DIXON: You're never off-base, General. Tell it as it is.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, I tell you, Mr. Chairman, I don't think that the operational considerations were fully voiced strongly enough before the '93 Commission, and I think there was a mistake made as a result of that. It was a mistake that we chose to live with. It was the law of the land, and we have supported that. But I did not want to have anybody misunderstand where the operational Air Force was coming from on the issues that are here, and so that's why I am here today.

First and foremost, I'm deeply concerned over the addition of Grand Forks Air Force Base. Two of our unified commanders, CINCTRANS and CINCSTRAT, have indicated the loss of this base would seriously impair their war-fighting

Page 108

capabilities. I think we owe it to them to give them their full support.

I'd like to provide you some background on this issue. I hope that it's not one of those "invented here" syndromes. But two years ago we began a rebasing effort, or a KC-135 fleet, to form core air refueling wings at Grand Forks, Fairchild and McConnell Air Force Bases.

We did that because the world has changed. The manner in which we have organized our forces has changed and the days of penny-packet KC-135 outfits being co-located with bomber outfits, that's Cold War stuff. We're in a new environment. We restructure.

We carefully organized and located these larger wings to realize economies of scale in operations, logistics, organization in wartime as well as peacetime missions requirements. I think the actual operations at Grand Forks over the past year-and-a-half have confirmed these advantages.

Moreover, the base possesses unique attributes that enhance its value as a core tanker wing. It offers some of the best infrastructure in the Air Force for large tanker fleets, including a very modern hydrant refueling system, a

Page 109

1 large ramp, and a recently resurfaced runway.
2 Its north central location readily supports our
3 nuclear deterrent posture and our global crisis response
4 capability, plus it offers the ability to economically
5 service northern air refueling tracks in essentially
6 uncluttered air space.
7 Closing Grand Forks would eliminate these benefits
8 and it would add turmoil to our tanker force, which has
9 suffered in the closing and realigning of 12 tanker bases
10 since the initial BRAC in 1988. Last summer I had 67 percent
11 of the Air Refueling Force in PCS status as a result of that
12 realignment.
13 We have now come to closure on these core bases,
14 and so a decision to blow up one of these core bases and
15 start to move those assets around will not only have a
16 negative impact, operationally, but it will also impact
17 adversely on our people, who have been drawn through a
18 knothole in this business.
19 My second concern is that of looking at Guard and
20 Reserve activities in base realignment and closure. Again, I
21 think the Air Force track record in total force utilization
22 of Reserve and Guard forces is unequalled. We've spent a lot

Page 110

1 of time and effort making this work.
2 In all deference to one of your commissioners, he
3 played a role. Commissioner Davis had me assigned to the Air
4 Reserve Personnel Center as a youth, and I had the
5 opportunity, as a young major, to learn a little bit about
6 Air Reserve Personnel activities.
7 I learned the importance of knowing the
8 demographics and the connectivity to communities and, as I
9 have grown up in our Air Force, I have come to appreciate
10 that one of the reasons that these Guard and Reserve units
11 can contribute so much to active duty Air Force day-to-day
12 operations is because of their ties back to those
13 communities.
14 The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard
15 are experts on demographics, basing, and recruiting, and so I
16 think we should pay attention to them when they speak on
17 these issues. I think they have come forth, and we've played
18 in a forthright manner during this operation.
19 So I would strongly urge that we support GEN
20 McIntosh's recommendation that we close no more than one F-16
21 and one C-130 Reserve outfit.
22 Now, the opportunity to inactivate a Reserve unit

Page 111

1 at O'hare International represents a good solution, perhaps,
2 to the C-130 portion of this equation. We had originally
3 recommended looking at Pittsburgh as the closure but, as we
4 moved forward in our negotiations with the City of Chicago,
5 it now appears as though there may be a solution on the
6 horizon where closing the C-130 unit at O'Hare and moving the
7 KC-135 Air National Guard unit down to Scott Field would work
8 out to everyone's benefit and allow us to go back and clean
9 up some FY '93 or '93 Commission activities.
10 On the other hand, I disagree with any action that
11 would result in the inactivation of the Reserve F-16 unit at
12 Carswell Field. Co-location of the Navy and Air Force Reserve
13 operations at this location, as per the '93 BRAC Commission
14 recommendation, I think has paid off very, very well.
15 For the Air Force Reserve, this represents a very
16 cost-effective tenant operation in a location that has both
17 great recruiting and retention activities. The unit's
18 location on a military installation will result, I think, in
19 few savings to DOD from its inactivation.
20 Remaining Reserve unit are really necessary to
21 flesh out our Air Force force structure required to sustain
22 the growing Reserve contribution to the Air Force contingency

Page 112

1 operations around the globe, and so that's why I would
2 strongly urge you to impact no more than one F-16 and one C-
3 130 Reserve out there.
4 I would tell you that I share Secretary Widnall's
5 fear that attempting to fix our excess capacity with depot
6 closures would be extremely costly. I think it would
7 adversely impact Air Force readiness and modernization
8 efforts, particularly if we tried to accelerate such an
9 effort.
10 In particular, we have come to rely increasingly on
11 rapid depot-level repair and return capabilities under our
12 so-called lean logistics program, which is a model program
13 for DOD. It has allowed us to significantly reduce the size
14 of our installation intermediate-level repair shops and
15 enhance the deployability of our combat units.
16 Consequently, I will tell you that the entire Air
17 Force senior leadership supports Air Force depot downsizing
18 as the best recommendation of this action. I bring this up
19 intentionally, because there's apparently some word out there
20 in the street somehow that there is a division between the
21 senior Air Force leadership, that the blue-suiters may not be
22 supporting this. In fact, a couple of my four-stars have

Page 113

1 been named by name as recommending to the Commission some
2 other activity.
3 I will tell you, unless you know something I don't
4 know, I spoke to both of those gentlemen -- one within the
5 last 24 hours, the other within the last 30 minutes -- and,
6 as we confirmed last week when we got together at the Four-
7 Star Corona, the Air Force senior leadership supports our
8 approach to this depot downsizing.
9 The last issue I'd like to talk about is, I would
10 like to reconfirm our recommendation for closure of no more
11 than a single undergraduate pilot training installation.
12 That is, Reese Air Force Base.
13 Air Education and Training Command is determined
14 that we have excess capacity of one undergraduate pilot
15 training base in the near term and, based on our assessment,
16 if the Air Force must close a UPT base, we think Reese is the
17 right installation to close.
18 I understand this recommendation has been supported
19 by every analysis performed by your staff, the air staff, the
20 Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training.
21 We should be able to meet our anticipated pilot production
22 requirements during the FYDEP with one less UPT installation

Page 114

1 as our joint pilot initiatives begin to mature.
2 The United States Air Force is going to increase
3 its pilot production 52 percent between 1996 and the year
4 2002, and we have looked closely at this, because we have had
5 some concerns about the rate at which JPAT aircraft would
6 come on, some of the other assumptions that might be made
7 but, at this point, we think that this is a reasonable risk,
8 if you will, to continue with our recommendation and, if we
9 are to close a UPT base, we support our original analysis.
10 As I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I tell you, I think
11 it's important again that I remind the commissioners that I
12 recused myself from considering both small aircraft bases and
13 laboratories, based on a ruling by our general counsel. So,
14 with this overview, sir, I am prepared to answer your
15 questions.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, GEN Fogleman
17 and Secretary Widnall.
18 The Chair has to answer several phone calls out
19 here. I'm going to ask my colleague and friend, GEN J.B.
20 Davis, to chair in my absence.
21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS (presiding): A terrible
22 responsibility, to be the first questioner and the Chair, at

Page 115

the same time.

I very much appreciate the statements of the Secretary and the Chief, and I think your positions are very clear in that process. I will deal probably with just two subjects, making sure that I don't hog all the time on Air Force issues.

Madam Secretary, your position on the depots has been very consistent and very clear, and I would hope maybe you would indulge me a little fantasy here, or what-if, because the questions keep coming, and we're certainly responsible not only to our own conscience, but to the congressional delegations and the communities.

If we were to close one depot -- it doesn't make any difference, the cheapest one to close -- let's just take that for an example. It doesn't make any different which one it is. What would that do to your out-year budgeting? You stated that there would be some shortfalls, but what impacts would that have and what kind of things would you have to do to your budget to manage that process?

SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I think, as I stated in my testimony, even excluding the whole issue of environmental costs, which is a complexity, we're talking about shortfalls

Page 116

on the order of $320 million.

As we move into this, I would say, very uncertain budget climate that we see before us, I think our goal is to keep our significant modernization programs on target, while providing today's readiness and quality of life. Even in the best of circumstances, we think this is going to be a tough challenge. To be faced with a shortfall on the order of $320 million over this is simply going to make this much more difficult.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And specifically, what accounts would you at least take a look at?

SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I'm not prepared to kind of reprogram here on the spot. Actually, the Chief has had a lot more experience with that. I don't know if you want to try to respond to that question. We would need to look at it; that's clear.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I would only say this, that, in near term, the kinds of dollars we end up talking about are O&M funds, and O&M funds are directly related to readiness. So, if you start looking for $300 million in the O&M account in the near term, you could come up with all kinds of examples of how many flying hours does that equate to, how

Page 117

much RPMA is that for bases that will not get to go in and repair facilities, et cetera.

Then, if we're responsible, if we're forced into this, what we will have to do is, rather than sit here every year and have this cascade of unfunded O&M fall on us, and try to fix it in the execution year, we sit down and we'll program that out. And the way you end up doing it is, you end up looking at all your programs and, in all likelihood, procurement is going to end up being impacted by this.

$300 million is about the kind of money that you spend on, totally on JPATs in one year; it's the kind of money that we spend on our precision munitions programs; it's about the magnitude of the money that we'll be spending on the conventional munitions upgrade program for the B-1 bomber.

So it's hard to say, "Yes, I'm going to trade this off or that off." What you end up doing is, you go in there and, in an era in which we're supposed to be recapitalizing force, you just end up pushing that further out to the right and the people end up operating either in less than optimum facilities or with less than modern equipment. That's the kind of impact.

Page 118

SECRETARY WIDNALL: And, of course, for us the bottom line is that we view this as a totally unnecessary expenditure that does not provide any real value for the Air Force.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, ma'am. So you would probably characterize it as at least painful, if not very painful?

SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, I would say very painful.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Then, there is kind of a folklore out that the Air Force could, in fact, close two depots and still --

(Laughter.)

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: How would you characterize that?

SECRETARY WIDNALL: It's ridiculous.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY WIDNALL: Maybe we should talk a little bit about how we actually measure capacity. There is the statement that we have an "excess capacity of one-and-a-half depots." What that means is square footage and work stations.

I want to make it very clear that we do not have

Page 119

extra people. One of the reason why our direct labor shows so small a savings when we talk about realigning depots is that we have already taken the people. We have downsized the workforce at our depots 28 percent since, say, 1986, if that's a reasonable base year.

So, when you start looking for "personnel savings" as a result of capacity reductions, those people aren't there. When we talk about capacity reductions, we're talking about work stations and buildings which, under our proposal, we fully intend to get rid of and downsize.

I guess I also want to emphasize that we believe this proposal sets us up for future realignment under the new leadership that is coming into AFMC and also for some privatization initiatives. We intend to continue to be creative at reducing Air Force infrastructure and we think this depot proposal sets us up to be able to do that over the coming years.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, could I comment just on the depot thing?

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yes, sir.

GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I very much appreciate the time that the commissioners have spent out there looking at our

Page 120

installations. Anybody who has been to one of our air logistics centers and characterizes it as a depot hasn't been looking around, and I don't think that's the case with the commissioners. I think there's a lot of people that characterize it that way because they've never been there.

Our air logistics centers are megabases. You know that. In fact, they are the kind of installations that this Commission is trying to get us to build. They are trying to get us to put more than one activity, maximize the use of ramp space, et cetera.

We have done that in the past and, as I tried to say before the Commission in the past, this isn't a case of the arsenal by Fort whatever, at Window Rock. This is a megabase that has been built over time as a result of past base closure activities. We've consolidated on there. That's why we have so many tenants that need to be moved. That's why we have operational missions on these bases.

And, as you know, when you start getting down to the depot part of that, it becomes a very small part of these installations. I just hope that, as a result of the commissioners' visits out there, that that's come through loud and clear.

Page 121

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I very much appreciate you
2 giving me the latitude to play some what-ifs because,
3 clearly, we need to hear the views of the Secretary and the
4 Chief on that subject, because it's been a very difficult
5 subject.
6 The last subject area I'm going to deal with is
7 UPT. GEN Fogleman and I, in a previous life, spent a lot of
8 time in UPT and working the models to sort of describe what
9 our out-year UPT requirements are and, as GEN Fogleman knows,
10 especially as the commander of AMC, the vagaries of those
11 figures sometimes depend on a lot of things such as the pilot
12 retention rates, increased airline hiring, the requirements
13 for the Air Force Reserve, because they account for certain
14 folks coming out.
15 And every time I get ready to say that we ought to
16 close a UPT base, my palms start to sweat, simply because I
17 was in that UPT buildup when we went from non-Vietnam to
18 Vietnam and found out that in the first year it cost us more
19 pilots to increase our capacity, because we had to open up
20 capabilities that we did not have.
21 You state in your statement that, in fact, Air
22 Training Command has -- and you've looked at, it and I know

Page 122

1 it's not just AETC, but it happens to be XLO, when some other
2 folks have looked at it.
3 How confident are you that, if we close a UPT base,
4 that we will have sufficient capacity -- You stated that we
5 will increase significantly in the out years -- if a surge
6 would be required, and if we did not continue on, if we had
7 some halt in the jointness of our UPT? Can you give us your
8 views on that, Chief, please?
9 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, again, I tried to very
10 carefully craft my words there, that I think, within the
11 FYDEP, we will probably have the capacity, but it's based
12 upon some assumptions about doing business differently than
13 we do today.
14 It assumes, for instance, that the pilot bonus
15 program continues, as it is today, and it's a program that we
16 have to come fight for and revalidate every year. If that
17 program goes away, then our retention rates are going to go
18 down.
19 It assumes that there is no great increase in
20 airline hiring, that we sort of stay with what we've been
21 through here recently in steady state. There are those who
22 will tell you that the airline business is about to reach a

Page 123

1 drop-off point in their senior captain ranks, but it's a
2 little bit like the mythical shortfall in pilots -- it's
3 always another year out.
4 One of the very concrete things, though, that does
5 give me concern, and it falls slightly outside the FYDEP, is
6 the fact that, in order to sustain our Air National Guard and
7 our Air Force Reserve units, today roughly 50 percent of all
8 of our aviators that leave active duty sign up with the Air
9 National Guard and the Air Force Reserve; so that keeps their
10 requirement for initial pilot training lower.
11 They are starting to see some drop-off in those
12 numbers and have, in fact, within the FYDEP, come in and
13 asked for additional pilot training slots. We have been able
14 to accommodate those within the FYDEP.
15 But, in the year 2003 and beyond, because we have
16 been producing so few pilots in the early 1990s, if the Air
17 Reserve and the Guard were able to capture 100 percent of all
18 pilots leaving active duty, they would not be able to fill
19 their cockpits, and they will have to come for more pilot
20 training.
21 Now, I've probably just confused the picture more,
22 but it's within those assumptions that we say, "Okay, we

Page 124

1 think we can do it within the FYDEP and meet the build up
2 that we have planned." And it is required, as a result of
3 how much we throttle back. You know the dynamics.
4 Beyond that, it gets very soft, out beyond 2002,
5 looking at what our requirements are across the force, but we
6 do know, specifically, Guard and Reserve requirements are
7 going to go up.
8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I have one other question on
9 UPT, and I'll submit that for a formal answer. I'm drunk
10 with power with this Chair. I've exceeded my time and so
11 I'll have to pass.
12 I'm going to deviate slightly and go to
13 Commissioner Kling, because he has an appointment at 11:15,
14 and then I'll come back to my right.
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. You know, I've
16 still got a problem with this depot issue, and I'm sure you
17 realize that a lot of us do, and I'm not trying to be
18 obnoxious with it or anything you want to say.
19 But, Secretary Widnall, you testified that the
20 biggest factor in closing an air logistics center is the
21 initial up front cost and the involvement there.
22 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.

Page 125

1 COMMISSIONER KLING: And yet, Secretary Perry
2 recently, in his decision to withdraw the recommendation to
3 realign Kirtland, that really freed up about $270 million --
4 278, I think, to be exact -- in closing costs, up front, and
5 adding this amount to the 127 million currently projected as
6 the cost of closing an Air Force depot, really would provide
7 $405 million of up front costs available right now, or 70, 80
8 percent of what you have.
9 Wouldn't this have some bearing on how you look at
10 closing a depot, in light of your statement about the up
11 front costs?
12 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I believe the number that I had
13 in my testimony is that we would still be short roughly $300
14 million. But I guess one of the ways I look at it is there
15 are actually a lot of similarities between the reason why
16 Kirtland was too expensive to close and why a depot is too
17 expensive to close.
18 It has to do with the big MILCON bill for moving
19 tenants and moving activities. The earlier Air Force
20 successes in BRAC -- which, as the Chief mentioned, we are,
21 to date, responsible for 70 percent of the DOD savings in
22 BRAC -- a lot of that had to do with the fact that we were

Page 126

1 closing force structure bases at the same time we were
2 drawing down force structure, so we did not have a big MILCON
3 bill to transfer force structure to another base.
4 As we looked at the Kirtland realignment, a lot of
5 the expenses -- really, the majority of the expenses -- had
6 to do with building new facilities for tenants on that base
7 who were perfectly well-housed where they were, and that's
8 true at a depot as well.
9 As the Chief mentioned, I think, there are three
10 types of personnel who are on a typical air logistics
11 organization:
12 There are the people who do the actual depot work.
13 There are the people who do the air logistics work, which is
14 the inventory, the parts, and all of that. Those two
15 together represent, say typically, 50 percent of the base
16 personnel.
17 And then there are the tenants, and these tenants
18 are just an incredible variety of units. They have
19 facilities requirements. They use big simulators. They have
20 good facilities. So one of the fundamental bills you have to
21 pay is the big MILCON bill for moving these tenants, as well
22 as for moving the specialized equipment that each individual

Page 127

1 depot has for doing the kind of work that they do.v0B
2 Our conclusion is that that simply does not make
3 sense, that there are other ways to use those resources --
4 the downsizing in place, the sort of ridding oneself of
5 excess buildings, setting it up for future downsizing, which
6 we intend to pursue aggressively over the years ahead, and
7 also gives us a base to explore the use of excess facilities
8 by the surrounding civilian community.
9 Much of the work that we do in our depots is
10 obviously aviation related. There's a big aviation community
11 out there in the civilian world. There may be some
12 opportunities at some of these installations to do public-
13 private partnerships that would allow us to get some of our
14 work done by the private sector, in new relationships, as the
15 Roles and Missions Commission has recommended, and also to
16 provide facilities for those private sector partners to do
17 work for the civilian world.
18 So we see a lot of opportunities. What doesn't
19 make sense to me is simply replicating really good facilities
20 at other installations.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: I understand the up front
22 costs are the big thing, of course, and we do have some

Page 128

1 figures, though, that we're working up that show that the
2 savings are really quite, quite substantial and very, very
3 material, on closing the base.
4 And, you know, I've visited, I think, every one of
the depots, and every time I went to some, I saw a plating
operation, I saw a painting operation, I saw a machine shop,
and I recognized and I also saw a specialized hydraulic unit
at one place, and so forth.
9 But common sense kind of tells you that we don't
10 need all those plating and machine shops in some of those
11 operations. That's where I come from.
12 SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's right.
13 COMMISSIONER KLING: I also know of an instance
14 recently of a company that has a fulfillment center and a
15 depot operation -- a service company. They bought another
16 company that had the same types of operation, that was losing
17 a lot of money, but they bought it knowing that they would be
18 able to close that one down and move it into this one, taking
19 a loss of millions to making a profit of millions. And
20 that's really kind of what we're looking at.
21 I know we can argue that, but that's where I come
22 from.

Page 129

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me just respond that your
2 example, in fact, characterized the essence of our proposal.
3 We do intend to combine like facilities.
4 Our consolidation is oriented to avoiding
5 duplication, consolidating like workloads at single
6 facilities -- the one that it makes the most sense. That's
7 not without cost. We estimate an investment of over $200
8 million to accomplish that, but a net present value in
9 savings of close to $1 billion.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: The overhead costs, by closing
11 entirely, there's an awful lot saved. You know, we can argue
12 that, I'm sure, different ways, and I appreciate your
13 comment, but let me just ask you another question.
14 If we were going to suggest the closing of a depot,
do you stand by the Air Force's tiering evaluation? If we
re going to recommend that a depot close, would you stand
the tiering evaluation, presently?
SECRETARY WIDNALL: I suppose it depends a little
19 bit on how you view the purpose of the tiering.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: May I interrupt, Madam Secretary?
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
22 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Could we put that graph up on the

Page 130

1 screen?
2 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
3 CHAIRMAN DIXON: The chart that has the tiering
4 evaluation -- do we have that here? Apparently we do not
5 have that one.
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I think I sort of know this by
7 heart. Let me just make a few points about the tiering.
8 First of all, it's important to remember that the
9 tiering basically is a good, better, best sort of tiering,
10 that there is no bottom, in the sense that they're
11 alphabetically listed. I believe we had two air logistics
12 centers in the bottom tier.
13 I would say that the tiering, to me, represents
14 what I would say is the platform for judgment, that you take
15 the tiering and then you begin to apply some judgment. We
16 never just cut through and simply checked off things in the
17 lower tier and said "That's our list." We always applied
18 judgment -- operational considerations, environmental
19 concerns, and the specifics of what was actually going on in
20 an installation.
21 So I guess the answer to your question is, of
22 course I support the results of the Air Force analysis that

Page 131

1 allowed us to identify bases that were in the bottom tier,
2 but it is only the beginning of our process, it's not the end
3 of it.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. Just a last -- can
5 I have one fast question?
6 If you turn to Brooks Air Force Base, and we were
7 looking at that there's a one-time cost to close Brooks of
8 $211 million and a savings of $32 million.
9 And, if you would consider even the cantonment
10 suggestion of the community, the cost to close goes down to
11 $11 million and the annual savings goes down from 32 to 17
12 but, if you took that money and applied that large up front
13 money again to closing a depot, and applying it there, you
14 would well have covered your cost of closing one depot from
15 the budget standpoint and you would still have materially,
16 materially higher savings; and I guess that's where we're
17 coming from.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me make a remark about
19 that. I'm not sure --
20 COMMISSIONER KLING: Excuse me. The only reason I
21 say that is Brooks is certainly a fine operation there, and
22 it's something we can all be proud of, I'm suer.

Page 132

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Right. And, of course, our
2 depots are also fine operations.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: You better believe it.
4 SECRETARY WIDNALL: And I guess, in the case of
5 Brooks, we see some real synergism within the scientific
6 communities at Wright-Patterson and Brooks that will be
7 gained if we move those researchers to a single place.
8 We also see some quite substantial problems
9 associated with the cantonment, which I indicated in my
10 opening statement. So that is a proposal we do not support.
11 MR. BOATRIGHT: If I could just add one additional
12 comment there, with the cantonment, we don't close anything.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
14 Kling. Have you concluded?
15 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, I think so.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Commissioner Cox.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much. GEN
18 Fogleman, I really didn't mean to get into UPT bases, but if
19 I could just follow up and ask for some information for the
20 record, I'm concerned that your comment that one of the
21 assumptions that you're using in believing that you have
22 enough capacity in UPT bases even if you closed one is based

Page 133

1 on the last, I think you said, couple of years' retention
2 rate as to commercial airline hiring.
3 As you undoubtedly know, the airline industry has
4 lost $13 billion in the last five years. We didn't do too
5 well in the year or two before that. We have virtually hired
6 no one in the last five years and very few in the couple
7 years before that.
8 I'm concerned that if your retention rate is based
9 on us only hiring the amount of pilots we've hired in the
10 last five, seven, even ten years, that it nay not be
11 realistic. The FAA, as you know, predicts an enormous
12 increase in pilot hiring, in every year for the foreseeable
13 future. I don't know if that's true or not, but that's their
14 prediction.
15 So I would be interested if you would provide for
16 the record what those retention rates are that you're using,
17 how much, what would be the impact on capacity if the FAA
18 projections for airline hiring are, in fact, true and if we
19 use sort of pre-1989 commercial airline hiring from the DOD.
20 I was at the Department of Transportation for many
21 years when the DOD was terribly concerned that the commercial
22 airlines were benefitting from your training of pilots, and I

Page 134

1 think the commercial airlines appreciated that then and may
2 well in the future.
3 So if you wouldn't mind providing that for the
4 record, that would be helpful.
5 GEN Blume, I would like to ask you some questions
6 about Onizuka. I understand that you all have proposed
7 realigning Onizuka at this moment, and are not proposing
8 closing it, for a variety of reasons.
9 One of those reasons is that you agree that we
10 should have dual-node capacity and you're leaving the
11 facilities there for a period of time while you develop a
12 dual-node capacity that could be used at Falcon, and that
13 that dual-node capacity includes networking dual-node
14 capacity as well.
15 When would you believe that you would have the
16 dual-node, single-site capacity available at Falcon, or in
17 some other form?
18 GENERAL BLUME: First, let's say that we feel
19 strongly that a dual-node control satellite node has been,
20 during the Cold War, a reality and a necessity, but it will
21 not be required in the future.
22 As you recall, in the briefing that you and I both

Page 135

1 sat in, the communications function of that capability will
2 be retained at Onizuka as long as required to support the
3 tenants that are there. The dual-node capability will not be
4 required at the closure of, or, excuse me, the realignment of
5 Onizuka.
6 Therefore, this architecture, the communications
7 network architecture that you're referring to will come on-
8 line about 2002, 2004, and it will be in effect at that time;
9 and that will negate the requirement for even the
10 communications portion of the dual capacity.
11 Now, there will be a single node at Falcon Air
12 Station.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: But we will have the ability for
14 a redundant system, I guess you're saying, by the year 2001,
15 2002?
16 GENERAL BLUME: That's right. It wouldn't be dual,
17 it will be multi-faceted, yes.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. And let me just ask you
19 a question, because my understanding had been that you were
20 working toward that and that, in fact, those costs were, to
21 a great extent, already accounted for and, therefore, were
22 not in our COBRA costs, obviously.

Page 136

1 GENERAL BLUME: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: I am concerned, because I have
3 an R&D budget item justification sheet for the satellite
4 control network, and it was in a 1994 study which I
5 understand, in some ways, is overtaken by events.
6 However, what it shows is that basically, between
7 1994 and the year 2001 and continuing after that --
8 indicating that the R&D will not be complete even in the year
9 2001 -- roughly $1 billion being spent on this system.
10 I'm not sure that that's not inconsistent with the
11 "We already know where we're going and we'll have completed
12 it in the year 2001." I just want to ask you to comment on
13 that. Maybe this is a different program. Why don't I just
14 give you a copy of that?
15 GENERAL BLUME: I can't comment on that specific
16 thing, but I would like to have it, and will look at for the
17 record.
18 COMMISSIONER COX: I'll be happy to send that to
19 you for the record.
20 Then moving on, just to also point out that the
21 decreasing cost savings that COBRA changes from you all on
22 Onizuka, as I understand it now, get the annual savings down

Page 137

1 from 30 million to about 16.1. Is that the COBRA numbers are
2 those just our numbers?
3 GENERAL BLUME: That's right. The recurring
4 savings is 16.1.
5 COMMISSIONER COX: Great. Thank you very much.
6 Other savings numbers that have changed -- and, Mr.
7 Boatright, maybe this is your area -- the most recent Air
8 Force estimate for the one-time cost to close the Rome lab
9 has increased from $52.8 million to $79.8 million. Our own
10 Commission estimates estimate that cost at about 118.6
11 million.
12 Assuming we're right, the Commission estimates
13 versus your latest estimates, which have come up as well, we
14 also reduced the annual savings from about $13 million to
15 $5.9 million, and that increases the return on investment
16 period from 6 to 31 years.
17 Presuming we're right for a minute -- and I
18 understand that you don't necessarily presume that we're
19 right -- would you want to close, based on a 31-year return
20 on investment? Would you still recommend that?
21 MR. BOATRIGHT: I would tell you that a 31-year
22 return on investment is not a good return on investment. I

Page 138

1 would tell you that we strongly disagree with the cost
2 numbers and the savings numbers you're using.
3 We have gone through these numbers very, very
4 carefully. We've done site survey up there. We're very
5 comfortable that we, in fact, can carry out this closure
6 action with the costs, and we'll realize the savings that we
7 have projected.
8 We believe that it's still a very cost-effective
9 proposal. From an operational standpoint, it is one of the
10 few actions that's being taken that is truly consistent with
11 the cross-servicing that we're trying to achieve within the
12 Department. We think that's a very important consideration
13 here.
14 COMMISSIONER COX: And we appreciate the work that
15 you all have done with us to go through these numbers and the
16 fact that you have changed them where you believed there were
17 changes necessary and, obviously, that process will continue
18 right up through June 22nd.
19 MR. BOATRIGHT: One other correction, if I could.
20 You gave us a number that indicated that our cost of closure
21 was 79.8.
22 COMMISSIONER COX: That's the number I have.

Page 139

1 MR. BOATRIGHT: I think it's 79.9 is the number
2 that I have.
3 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. I'll check, on that.
4 Two other just real quick questions, to follow upon
5 some information that we've seen.
6 Secretary Widnall, if the Commission does reject --
7 which is purely hypothetical at the moment -- the
8 recommendation to close Reese Air Force Base, for whatever
9 reason, do you believe that we should close another Air Force
10 Base or would you recommend that we simply not close one?
11 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I would recommend that you not
12 close one.
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Not close one at all? Thank
14 you. And then, in sort of the same vein, GEN Fogleman, if we
15 do not close Bergstrom Air Force Base as recommended, or
16 Reserve Base, as recommended by the Air Force, would you
17 recommend that we close an alternative or that we not close
18 any?
19 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, the problem that the
20 Reserve is they have a force structure in the fighter
21 business that's coming down. They have to close a fighter
22 unit.

Page 140

1 COMMISSIONER COX: And if we didn't close
2 Bergstrom, how would you accomplish that? Would you want us
3 to close something else?
4 My understanding, for example, is that MG McIntosh
5 has said that if Bergstrom is not closed, the Air Force will
se its own conversion actions to meet the F-16 program and
esumably would prefer that they do it that way, rather than
close Dallas-Forth Worth, Carswell, or Homestead. Would
ou concur with that?
10 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes, I would.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you very much.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
13 Cox. Commissioner Cornella.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15 General Fogleman, I know we've had some discussion
16 on UPT. I'd like to continue along those lines, if we could.
17 You mentioned the JPATS, and I'm not sure we mentioned the
18 JPATS in regard to the Navy's training requirement, but I've
19 been told that, if a turbo jet aircraft is chosen for the
20 JPATS aircraft candidate, instead of a turbo prop, that the
21 Navy's primary training capacity would be reduced.
22 Would you be prepared to absorb additional primary

Page 141

1 training for the Navy if Reese Air Force Base was closed?
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We would have a limited
3 capability to do that, I guess again, as I looked at the
4 assumptions that I've said there, because what we have said
5 is, with the assumptions, within the FYDEP, if we close one
6 base, we can meet our requirements and we have a very slim
7 surge capability that could, in theory, be used to absorb
8 more Navy training, if we had to.
9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I'm getting the impression,
10 from an earlier comment, too -- you said something along
11 these lines, and I think I have one word correct, and that's
12 the "must." It says: "If the Commission must close a UPT
13 base" -- now, has the recommendation of the Air Force
14 changed?
15 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: What I was trying to put in
16 ontext there is, back to the Secretary's point, if you're
ng to close a UPT base, we think the analysis says Reese
he base to close. That's really what I was trying to get
20 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You evidently have concerns
21 about closing even one UPT base; is that correct?
22 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I'm sorry?

Page 142

1 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You even have concerns,
2 though, about closing one UPT base?
3 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I have signed up to, and the Air
4 Force and the ATC has signed up to, closing one UPT base,
5 because we think we can meet the requirements within the
6 FYDEP, as I've said for our people, with the assumptions,
7 again, that I have agreed to provide to Commissioner Cox.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We've all heard arguments
9 that downsizing saves more money than closing, and I will
10 add, in some instances, have you ever considered that for UPT
11 bases?
12 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I think there's a different util
13 involved in UPT bases.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Widnall, in your
15 opening statement I believe you mentioned that the 7 percent
16 that was figured was across all tenants, not just the ALC
17 personnel or the depot personnel.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Right.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Can you tell us what the
20 percentage is of depot personnel?
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: If you count ALC personnel,
22 which is both the ALC part and the depot part, it's a number

Page 143

1 in the range of 12 to 15 percent, so it is certainly in the
2 ballpark of other large depot closures by the other services.
3 Again, I remind you that the workload reductions,
4 the people have already been reduced. So, in either
5 realigning or closing, we're not looking for major direct
6 labor drawdowns, because we have already been there, done
7 that.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, then, I want to
9 follow up with a question right along the lines of why we
10 might need the amount of labor that we have.
11 As we visited each base containing an air logistics
12 center, they presented data they are operating at
13 approximately one-half of their 1987-89 capacity. For
14 example, both Tinker and Kelly are maintaining engines at
15 approximately 2 million hours each versus 5 million hours of
16 capacity that they have.
17 How can this be cost-effective, to downsize when
18 both require significant overhead?
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I guess, in order to do that, I
20 might ask Mr. Boatright or GEN Blume, because it's the whole
21 question of how did we make the choices on the different
22 commodities and whether or not it is prudent to retain

Page 144

1 capacity to do engines at two different places. That's sort
2 of a readiness issue, as well as an efficiency issue.
3 I don't know, Mr. Boatright, if you want to respond
4 to that. It's a real detail of our planning.
5 GENERAL BLUME: Let me comment, just for a second.
6 And that is the fact that, you know, the realignment and the
7 Air Force option was to realign, to consolidate all that
8 workload, but to retain those two particular elements, one at
9 Tinker and one at Kelly.
10 But there's a lot more there, at either Tinker or
11 Kelly, than just the engine workload, so you can take one
12 piece of it, but that is a consolidation, and there would be
13 many, many other consolidations, as you know, at the other
14 depots.
15 MR. BOATRIGHT: I think that our whole proposal to
16 realign and consolidate is, we have taken and looked at,
17 across the Air Force depot structure, looked for those
18 activities that have the greatest potential for manpower
19 savings through consolidation, and what we've done is, we've
20 put that package together to create a very cost-effective
21 proposal.
22 Now, if you take and close a depot, what happens to

Page 145

1 you is that you can no longer pick and choose; you have to
2 take everything out of that depot and you have to relocate it
3 somewhere else and, in doing that, we create some
4 inefficiencies in addition to some efficiencies, and our
5 belief is, based on our analysis, that the realignment that
6 we've proposed is far superior to a closure action.
7 And it's really no more complicated than that.
8 That's basically what we've done, and we believe that that's
9 the right way to go about doing this. These are very, very
10 complex installations that have an awful lot on them and, to
11 consider closing one, in our opinion, is not the way to go.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: The current Brooks facilities
13 are very modern and built for their current use. In our
14 staff visit to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the buildings
15 proposed for the Brooks move are widespread and significantly
16 inferior to those at Brooks. Do you believe this could cause
17 serious degradation of the Brooks mission if the Commission
18 accepts that recommendation?
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: No, I really don't believe that
20 because, while Wright-Patterson may be widespread, they will
21 be co-located with the Aeronautical Systems Center, so we
22 actually believe there will be a lot of synergism between

Page 146

1 members of the scientific community. We might find people
2 sort of shifting fields and contributing to other projects
3 that are in the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-
4 Patterson. So I think, in fact, it would have a synergistic
5 effect.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: As we've visited many of
7 those types of installations over the past few months, we've
8 learned that not many of the highly technical people really
9 want to make a move.
10 Now, can you tell me the percentage that you've
11 projected of personnel from Brooks that would actually move,
12 other than military people that would actually be assigned to
13 move?
14 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I don't have that number. Do
15 we have an estimate for that? We'll have to provide that for
16 the record.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. Then I'd like to
18 finish off with GEN Fogleman.
19 In the last four years, the Air Force basing
20 decisions have been strongly influenced by a one base, one
21 wing/one boss concept. With a vast amount of excess
22 infrastructure, or some excess infrastructure, and declining

Page 147

1 budgets, why does it make sense for the Air Force to continue
2 to adhere to this concept?
3 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: In fact, we're not continuing to
4 adhere to it, and I think, if we were going to attack the one
5 base/one boss philosophy, we're doing it at the wrong time
6 because the one base/one boss philosophy cost was the up
7 front cost to get people moved around.
8 I understood this question may come up, so I went
9 back and I tried to look at our infrastructure to see where
10 one base/one boss forced us into excess infrastructure and I
11 must tell you, when I go to the large aircraft base
12 facilities, for instance, I find three core tanker bases that
13 are choc-a-block. You can't get any more airplanes onto
14 Fairchild, onto Grand Forks, or onto McConnell Air Force
15 Base.
16 I see two bomber bases that you might walk the ramp
17 and say "These are under-utilized," but you start getting
18 into other things like trying to combine the nuclear bombers
19 from Minot with non-nuclear bombers at, say, Ellsworth. You
20 go to a place like Barksdale. You know, it's a pretty full
21 base with what we're doing with the B-52 operation and what
22 we're doing with some Reserve conversions.

Page 148

1 So I must tell you, Mr. Commissioner, I would need
2 some help on identifying my excess infrastructure being
3 driven by one base/one boss. If somebody can show me where
4 that's really forcing us to be inefficient, then I will go to
5 work on this, but I think, in the main, where the so-called
6 inefficiencies had occurred, they were things associated with
7 the initial stand-up, not so much with sustained operation
8 and, as a result of our previous BRACs, we've kind of got
9 ourselves pretty well skinnied down.
10 I look at Charleston Air Force Base. You might be
11 able to shoehorn some more airplanes into Charleston and, if
12 we get C-17s, trust me, we'll do that. McGuire is pretty
13 well maxed out with everything that we're doing. The same
14 thing is true of our West Coast Air Mobility Wing at Travis.
15 So, as I look around, there may be pockets where
16 there would be some excess capacity, but I don't think it's
17 driven necessarily by one base/one boss. For instance, at
18 McChord Air Force Base, we have some excess capacity as a
19 result of fighter force structure coming down.
20 So there was a case where that fighter force
21 structure coming down wasn't driven by one base/one boss. It
22 was the fact we were told to go to 20 TAC fighter wings, and

Page 149

1 it's very difficult and expensive to put any other kind of
2 force structure in there.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: So I would take your answer
4 to be that philosophy has changed and, if you had a base that
5 had some excess capacity and you could put another mission in
6 there, you would; is that correct, sir?
7 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: If it made sense from all the
8 other operational considerations. This is one of those
9 things that I tried to look at the Commission's request for
10 "How would you relocate assets, say, if you closed Grand
11 Forks?" And the next thing I saw was we were looking at
12 penny packet stuff -- stuffing a squadron into Seymour
13 Johnson or two squadrons there or two squadrons here, and it
14 completely undercuts our operational concept and the way
15 we're doing things.
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. I yield
17 back to the Chairman.
18 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank Commissioner Cornella.
19 Commission Steele.
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Welcome. We're doing a lot
21 of UPT base talking, and I tell you, the Reese community,
22 someone along the parade line had a pretty interesting

Page 150

1 proposal that said, "Save Reese, close the Pentagon."
2 (Laughter.)
3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And the steady-state savings
4 if you ran a COBRA run might really be something you want to
5 look at.
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: They've got my vote.
7 (Laughter.)
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: We'll note that. It was
9 under oath.
10 Looking at the UPT issue across the Navy the Air
11 Force, if I could, a UFT, if -- and this is an if -- we're
12 down to three Air Force UPT base -- and you talked about
13 increasing the workload or the throughput by about 52 percent
14 through 2002.
15 On the one hand, I believe Commissioner Cornella
16 asked a question, "Would you have room at, say, Columbus to
17 absorb some of the Navy strike training if they had a
18 shortfall?" And I don't expect you to address the Navy
19 training, but they're maxing out Kingsville and there's a
20 question of if they would have the capacity they need in the
21 out years.
22 I guess I'd like to look at the issue both on

Page 151

1 Columbus, specifically ability to absorb strike training, or
2 the reverse of that, if you feel you're really maxing out in
3 the Air Force, your ability to achieve the throughout you
4 need for pilot training, could the Air Force benefit by the
5 retention of Meridian for capacity's sake?
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Well, as I've said, within the
7 FYDEP, we can close one UPT base and still have the capacity
8 to have some small amount of surge or absorb some training
9 from somewhere else.
10 We look at that as a system, though. We don't look
11 at it by base, for a lot of different reasons. So what we
12 will end up doing as we build a PFT for the year, then we
13 kind of get base-specific. But we kind of look at it in the
14 aggregate, because, in any given year, attrition will vary by
15 base, these kinds of things.
16 So I'm not prepared to try and address a question
17 that says, "If we have some excess capacity, is that excess
18 capacity all at Columbus?" The answer is no, it's not going
19 to be at Columbus. It's going to be spread across the force.
20 I mean, that's the way you're going to spread it.
21 And then -- I'm not prepared to answer the
22 question, but we might be able to go back and model it --

Page 152

1 "Given that you had excess capacity of 100 slots, how many of
2 them would you think would be at Columbus," then I think we
3 could go back and give you an answer to that. But I can't
4 answer that here.
5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I said Columbus specifically
6 because of their capability to also train for strike, should
7 we need to do that.
8 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: But all our bases, under our
9 UPT scheme that we're going to go to as we continue to look
10 at how we bed this down -- I mean, Columbus will have that
11 capability; we'll have that capability at other places, also.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. If it's all right, I
13 may follow up with a question in writing --
14 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Okay. That would be useful.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- to try to bring the Navy's
16 comments last week and your thoughts on this together. It
17 would be very helpful.
18 Returning to Brooks for a second, if I might, and
19 this is a tad redundant with Commissioner Cox's question, but
20 given that the one-time cost in the Air Force proposal is
21 $211 million to close with annual savings of 32.2, San
22 Antonio community's cantonment proposal, the costs are only

Page 153

1 11 and the annual savings are half of the Air Force savings.
2 I'll give you that, in the long haul, under your
3 proposal, just looking at this, and if you don't count loss
4 of personnel or the question of perhaps the infrastructure
5 not being on par at Wright-Patt with what they currently have
6 in San Antonio, you would have more savings under your
7 proposal in the long, long haul.
8 But if, going to the ALC issue, if up front costs
9 are your issue, this would provide you an additional $200
10 million that could go toward a closure of a single ALC. And
11 we all know that the steady state savings on an ALC are
12 significant versus looking at the 32 million versus 17.6
13 million.
14 Looking at that as an entire picture, could that
15 $200 million be much better spent in the long term for the
16 Air Force to go toward a complete closure of one ALC?
17 SECRETARY WIDNALL: No, I don't believe so. I view
18 proposal that we submitted as really the optimum proposal
19 in the best interests of the Air Force. Again, I think with
20 respect to Brooks, I think the cantonment makes very little
21 sense. I think it would be very hard on the people. They'd
22 have to go driving over to one of the other San Antonio

Page 154

1 installations for every little personnel matter, everything
2 they needed to do to get Air Force support.
3 I think we would be missing an opportunity to
4 locate the scientific communities together to get the kind of
5 synergism that we need if we're going to move forward in the
6 future and sort of integrate human factors into aeronautical
7 systems.
8 So I think, from the technical point of view, it
9 just makes more sense to relocate Brooks to Wright-Patterson.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you, Madam Secretary.
11 Switching to the Northern Tier, GEN Fogleman, the
12 Secretary has notified us that there will be no determination
13 by the Secretary that would require retention of the missile
14 group at Grand Forks. If the 321st Missile Group is
15 inactivated, will it be necessary to demolish or relocate
16 Grand Forks' ABM facilities, and do you know what the
17 associated costs would be of demolishing?
18 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We have looked into this, and
19 the answer is no. We have been told there will be no
20 requirement to demolish or relocate that ABM facility.
21 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Under the treaty, the State
22 Department checks off on that also, that we don't have a

Page 155

1 treaty obligation to demolish?
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: This was a position that was
3 provided to us by the deputy secretary of defense after
4 inter-agency consultation, so if there's somebody out there
5 that has some additional information, they haven't been up in
6 the net.
7 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Switching gears for a
8 moment, we've heard about a tanker shortfall in the
9 Southeast. Could you address specifically what that
10 shortfall might be and the number of squadrons?
11 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: What I would kind of prefer to
12 do is talk to it in terms of we have some numbers I'll share
13 with you, if I could.
14 We look at it in terms of peacetime demand, and
15 that is an important dimension. This is peacetime, peacetime
16 demand versus basing. And the issue is how many air-
17 refueling-capable airplanes do you have in a certain part of
18 the country versus your tankers?
19 What we have in the Southeast is 27 percent of the
20 demand is in the Southeast. Without any rebasing, 7 percent
21 of our capability is in the Southeast.
22 In the Northern Tier, we have 5 percent of the

Page 156

1 demand and 15 percent of our tankers based there but what the
2 Northern Tier gives us is optimum location for the support of
3 the bombers in the wartime scenario. And so we have been
4 trying to work a way to help redress this imbalance in the
5 South. This has been this way for years.
6 And, of course, that's at the heart of our
7 Malmstrom recommendation, to move those tankers to MacDill.
8 That helps some. It doesn't help a lot. It's 12 tankers.
9 But it helps some, and it helps us work the problem of we are
10 currently obligated to run an air field at MacDill Air Force
11 Base and we have no force structure on it.
12 By the same token, we are obligated to run an air
13 field at Air Force Base in a place where we have excess force
14 structure, a relatively small unit that we think would have
15 minimum impact on the people and the unit to transfer it to
16 the Southeast. And so that's really what we're trying to
17 address.
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Switching back to Northern
19 Tier a little bit, if the Commission decides not to try to
20 find a home for the tankers at Grand Forks, looking only at
21 the two missile fields, if we go just back to Minor and Grand
22 Forks.

Page 157

1 Having visited Grand Forks a week-and-a-half ago,
2 two weeks ago -- time is becoming a bit of a blur here -- I
3 was told pretty much by everyone that day that those missile
4 fields are largely interchangeable, which is why the original
5 recommendation, though it said closure of Grand Forks was
6 preferred, the Secretary was willing to close Minot should
7 that letter not be able to come forward to us during this
8 process.
9 My question is -- given I know it's an A system and
10 a B system and there had been issues that react with the B
11 system, but they've cleared those, et cetera, and the Air
12 Force's testimony that there is not a water problem at Grand
13 Forks -- would it perhaps make sense for the Air Force, in
14 the long haul, to have the Commission close Minot's missile
15 field, under the scenario we're touching the tankers at Grand
16 Forks, to provide you the opportunity in a future BRAC in,
17 say, 2001 or whatever, to have the chance to move the bombers
18 from Minot to close a base, to then save you that operating
19 cost, if Grand Forks is going to stay a place you want to
20 operate from, from now till whenever?
21 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: First of all, I was not aware
22 that the Air Force says there's not a water problem at Grand

Page 158

1 Forks, because I can tell you the numbers they show me
2 consistently is that we're spending considerably more money
3 to operate those silos at Grand Forks than we are at Minot or
4 anywhere else and, if they're not spending it on the water
5 issue, I don't know what they're spending it on.
6 But we break it out by base, sort of cost per silo,
7 and everything I have ever seen says that it is more costly
8 to operate silos at Grand Forks than it is at the other
9 locations and it has always been attributed to the water
10 problem. So you may have some new information that I don't
11 have. I don't know who testified to that.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Actually, General, I had
13 always heard that, as well, but it was said pretty
14 consistently and some of the senior command had come in also
15 during my visit and also addressed that issue and said that
16 it was no longer a problem.
17 Say it still is a problem. How would the cost
18 compare with fixing a water problem on a silo every X amount
19 of years versus maintaining the operations of the base in the
20 long haul? And my time is expired.
21 MR. BOATRIGHT: If I could comment on this, in
22 regard to our analysis, the Air Force did a rather detailed

Page 159

1 analysis comparing each of the missile bases, one to another,
2 to determine which base was the best base, which was the next
3 best base, and right down the line.
4 We did that analysis, considering a number of
5 factors. One, water table level, because that affects the
6 hardness of the site, and that has something to do with the
7 survivability of the site. When we did that, Grand Forks
8 clearly comes out as the one that would be closed. That is,
9 it doesn't do as well in that comparative analysis as the
10 other sites.
11 Now, the next one up the ladder is Minot. That's
12 the reason why the Air Force focused on Grand Forks, because
13 retaining the other three gives us the best possible missile
14 field structure that the Department of Defense can maintain.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you. Staff slipped me
16 a note that says that Grand Forks is the third -- how do I
17 say this -- the second cheapest, third most costly, expensive
18 to run, missile field. I know there's a lot of issues
19 involved in this and I don't want to take any more time from
20 my colleagues on this issue.
21 GENERAL BLUME: As the chief said, it is the most
22 costly, also.

Page 160

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thank you very much.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Commissioner
3 Steele. Commissioner Robles.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 Madam Secretary, as you said in your opening remarks, the Air
6 Logistics Center issue is the centerpiece of your discussion.
7 It is clearly the centerpiece of our mind. So I'm going to
8 talk a little more about it, and I'm going to try to
9 crystallize a couple of thoughts that I think we heard today,
10 just to make sure that you understand the difficulty we have.
11 The reason I'm saying that is because we have
12 between now and the 22nd to gather all the facts. Then,
13 we're going to go into a voting mode and we want to make sure
14 we have all the evidence, all the numbers we need to make a
15 clear, fair, objective decision.
16 The second thing I will say is, as you know, I've
17 spent most of my adult life in the analysis and numbers
18 business, so I have a particular interest in the numbers that
19 support your decision. I asked the staff -- all of us have,
20 but I particularly have been asking them -- that I'm not
21 saying the numbers are wrong, the numbers are perfectly
22 right.

Page 161

1 It's the assumptions that I quibble with; it is the
2 parameters that I quibble with; it is things like the number
3 of years to close, the year you start the closure, the 15-
4 percent productivity you get when you downsize and zero
5 percent productivity when you consolidate -- on and on and on
6 and on -- the PCS costs, the workmen's comp cost, the whole
7 string of numbers that are the underpinning for this
8 analysis.
9 When you do all that, the staff will show us next
10 week a rather detailed analysis that shows that there is
11 significant deviation in the numbers. So let's just agree to
12 disagree for right now. We have a different set of numbers
13 than you do and we will be briefed on what those numbers are.
14 So, if that is the case, I guess what I'm asking
15 you is, we have to take a good, serious look at whether we
16 close one or two depots, and we're going to look at that.
17 I'm not saying we're going to vote to do that, but we're
18 going to take a good, hard look at that. I think you
19 certainly got that, from the tone of our discussion.
20 My question to you is, given your BCEG rankings and
21 given all your analysis, one more time, should we stick with
22 your rankings as we come to grips with this issue of closing

Page 162

1 one or two of these depots?
2 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I think I responded to
3 that question that certainly I stand behind the Air Force
4 tiering, and just to remark that our tiering is alphabetical
5 by tier so that, you know, if Kelly and McClellan end up in
6 the bottom tier, then K comes before M, and so that's all you
7 can attribute to the relative listing of those two bases.
8 But I do view the results of the tiering as the
9 beginning of a process and not the end of a process, and that
10 is the very process that the Air Force went through in trying
11 to make its recommendation.
12 So I don't know how else to respond to your
13 question, except to say that it is certainly my fervent hope
14 that you make the right decision, because I truly believe
15 that you have the future of the Air Force in your hands, at
16 least for the near term, and the recommendations that this
17 Commission will make, I believe will determine the health of
18 the Air Force over the next ten years.
19 So I fervently hope you make the right decision,
20 because, for us, it is a big risk.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: We understand that, and we
22 asked the Army who was before you, about risk management.

Page 163

1 And, see, we have two different analyses here. We
2 have a risk-averse solution, which is basically your
3 maximizing the aversion to risk so you can have capability
4 for the out-years, and you have the Army who says, "We're
5 going to be risk takers and we're going to go down to three
6 depots, one of each, and that's it." And so we're wrestling
7 with that.
8 Do we have to have a cookie-cutter approach?
9 Absolutely not. But the fact of the matter is, they also
10 have readiness at stake, just like you do, and so we have to
11 see what is the right answer. And I understand there are
12 different depot structures and there are different cost
13 involved.
14 But, to the extent that your costs and your savings
15 -- your up front costs and your savings -- are not what is in
16 this analysis -- and we believe that -- then that makes this
17 risk strategy a lot clearer for us to make a decision on
18 because, then, maybe there isn't as much risk.
19 Now, capacity, we'll put up a chart, the capacity
20 chart. See, this is what we're wrestling with.
21 SECRETARY WIDNALL: You may be wrestling with it,
22 but I can't see it.

Page 164

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Well, this is a chart of your
2 data going to the BCEG. Turn the other side around.
3 SECRETARY WIDNALL: It's not getting any better.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Maybe it's clearer on that
5 chart.
GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Our problem is, we have an angle
not at it.
SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's fine.
COMMISSIONER ROBLES: That chart was prepared on --
10 no, I need the capacity chart, is the one that I'd like to
11 see. They understand their own ranking system. This chart
12 right there, that chart. Do you have a copy of that chart?
13 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. I have it.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: This one?
15 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Well, I don't have that one,
16 but I have this one.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: If you would look at this
18 chart, please, this is your data that you sent to the Joint
19 Cross-Service Group, and there are two charts. The first one
20 is the Air Force depot maximum potential capacity, and it was
21 normalized according to your input; so we didn't create this
22 number, these are numbers you gave us.

Page 165

1 It clearly shows that there is at least 50 percent
2 excess capacity in the Air Force structure by the year 1999.
3 So there it is, and that's what we're using, your number.
4 Then the second chart is just how that's broken
5 down by depot, and it shows, if you take that capacity and
6 spread it around the depots, so there's clearly no
7 misunderstanding in our mind that there's excess capacity.
8 So, given that there's excess capacity, we are now
9 trying to come to grips with -- and you said that up front --
10 is it one or two? And you say downsizing is your preferred
11 alternative. We say maybe that's your view, and we
12 appreciate it, and that's your professional judgment. But we
13 need to take a look at all the parameters and all the
14 financial support data.
15 GENERAL BLUME: I think we said one-and-a-half, or
about one-and-a-half and, if you went to two, there would be
me severe disruption, some out-sourcing, some things that
would have to do with other services and things of this sort,
that there was not that much excess capacity.
20 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Which are good, right? I
21 mean, we are looking to --
22 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: We're looking at that, Mr.

Page 166

1 Commissioner, but the one thing we would ask this Commission
2 to keep in mind is, that looks at this, is the United States
3 Air Force has not been out on the street crying about
4 readiness. We understand readiness. We have a system we've
5 built to keep us a ready force. We understand getting rid of
6 excess capacity.
7 You all will, I hope, as you do this analysis, not
8 try and reinvent how the Air Force does business, because I
9 think that's beyond your charter. You will fold your tent
10 and go away this summer, and we will get to live with this --
11 I will get to live with it -- for several more years, as the
12 Secretary will.
13 So if, as a part of your analysis, you're
14 fundamentally changing the way we do business, then I would
15 ask that we be able to sit down and talk about this.
16 On the other hand, I think that the position we
17 have taken, relative to downsizing in place gives, us the
18 flexibility to do things such as respond to the Roles and
19 Mission Commission of doing more out-sourcing, privatization
20 in pace, et cetera, with far less impact on the work force
21 and the readiness of our Air Force.
22 You start closing these depots, and I will tell

Page 167

1 you, there is no way that you're not going to impact our
2 combat readiness for a couple years, when you start moving
3 these things around.
4 Now, is it worth having it impacted, to get the
5 long-term savings? I mean, those are the kinds of value
6 judgments that have to be made. And, as we look at it, and
7 we look at the savings and the flexibility this gives us, we
8 say we've got a complete package.
9 Now, that's kind of where we're coming from on
10 that.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I understand. I understand
12 your bottom line and, just so there's no misunderstanding,
13 we're every bit as attuned to the readiness issue as you are,
14 and we have made a commitment that we're not going to tell
15 anybody, prescribe how to do things. There's going to be
16 plenty of broad flexibility, as you should have, as you're
17 required to have, as the leadership of the Air Force, to do
18 whatever has to be done.
19 But all I wanted to make sure of, was to underscore
20 the point that we're going to come to grips with this issue
21 here over the next four or five days, and this is not an easy
22 issue, and there is a difference in opinion on the total up

Page 168

1 front costs and the total savings; and that is going to be a
2 major impact on this equation.
3 So if you have any final adjustments, there is some
4 time sensitivity here, so enough on that.
5 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Let me just remind you -- and
6 I've said it in my opening statement -- that, when you look
7 at one of these bases, Air Force bases, that we call depots,
8 I would say that certainly less than 50 percent of the people
9 who are on that base are actually involved in the depot, and
10 50 percent of them are involved in some other activity with
11 facilities and equipment.
12 A lot of the major cost has to do with moving those
13 tenants who are needed, they're in our plans, they're part of
14 what we do, and they cannot be downsized.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I understand. The second
16 question is a question that you also alluded to in your
17 opening remarks, which has to do with tactical missile
18 workload. And you appropriately said that you weren't
19 looking for work. We're the ones who added the list.
20 We are the ones who said we ought to take a look at
21 it, based on the last BRAC Commission's recommendation about
22 more jointness and the fact that we just want to know if we

Page 169

1 could, in fact, look at an option that moves tactical missile
2 workload from an Army depot to an Air Force depot.
3 We've heard both sides of the argument, as you
4 would expect.
5 On the one side, we hear that "It would require
6 much more construction, primarily for additional igloos at
7 Hill Air Force Base, that there are some very large costs to
8 do that and, oh, by the way, Hill doesn't have the expertise
9 or would have difficulty building up the expertise to do this
10 missile work."
11 On the other side, on the ground at Hill, when I
12 was there, they told me "It would not require additional
13 igloos, we do have the capability to do this kind of work,
14 we've done it in the past, we're doing some of it now, and we
15 could do more in the future."
16 So could you please just give us your thoughts and
17 your analysis on this whole issue?
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: As i say, I think we would feel
19 rather relaxed with your ultimate decision on this matter.
20 You're obviously in a position, both by virtue of your recent
21 activities and your background, to make this decision. So I
22 think we feel comfortable with however it comes out.

Page 170

1 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I would really like to know
2 if you know of any construction requirements, because it
3 appeared to be a service-unique standard for storage of
4 missiles that caused that additional construction. I'd just
5 like to get a little insight on that issue.
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: I guess we'd be glad to work
7 with the staff.
8 GENERAL BLUME: That is the way we understood that
9 the analysis was performed, also, and that the requirement
10 was that, if you had to store all the missiles there, that
11 there would be a significant cost increase. Is that an
12 absolute requirement?
13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And the answer is?
14 GENERAL BLUME: And the answer is no.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: So you would not have to
16 build those additional igloos to meet the same separation
17 distance and storage requirements that the Army requires of
18 its storage?
19 GENERAL BLUME: That's maybe a little bit different
20 question. I'm not sure what we would have to do. We'd have
21 to go in and look at it. But it depends upon the concept
22 that you work under. As I understand it, they're going to

Page 171

1 take the missiles apart, was what you had asked them to do
2 anyway, or what the Army's proposal, that is, was to do, and
3 going to farm out part of the workload.
4 So I guess what I would say is that it depends
5 upon, there were two different options. One was the air-to-
6 air, the IR missiles, and that sort of thing, what's being
7 done there now, and the other one was, I think, all the
8 missile activity was there.
9 But, if you don't store all the missiles there, if
10 you store the missiles at some other thing, my understanding
11 was that the capacity was there.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. Well, if you could
13 give us some feedback on that, the option is very simply not
14 splitting the two like the Army's proposal, but taking the
15 missiles, moving them in their entirety, all the missile
16 inventory, to Hill Air Force Base, doing the required
17 maintenance there.
18 And then we were told at Hill you don't have to
19 store them there; it's not an operationally sound concept to
20 store all the missiles at that base. You would put them out
21 in storage facilities that are geographically separated and
22 then you would ship them from there to wherever the theater

Page 172

1 of operations is. That's the way I used to do it when I was
2 in the war-fighting business.
3 So would you just kind of tell us, could you do
4 that and would there be large additional expenditures for
5 construction if you did it under that concept or that scheme?
6 GENERAL BLUME: We'll look into that for you.
7 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I
8 yield back my time.
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you very much,
10 Commissioner Robles. Commissioner Montoya.
11 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: My comments are going to be
12 more in that nature than asking a question, because this is a
13 final opportunity under oath to make sure that I understand
14 the Air Force position because, to the extent that I
15 understand it and support it, I have trouble with the Army's,
16 and vice versa.
17 The Secretary of Defense has given us the dilemma,
18 because we have some inconsistent positions in looking at
19 similar activities, and I'm going to try -- the engineer side
20 of me says -- I'm going to try to factor through all that and
21 deliver a consistent vote that SECDEF will have to live with,
22 whoever that SECDEF is.

Page 173

1 So I'm going to try to say in my own words what I
2 think your position is and have you concur or not concur, or
3 fix it, because I want to leave this session with that
4 understanding, not to suggest that I agree with it or not,
5 but I do want to understand it.
6 Before I do that, I've got to respond to a comment
7 the general made. It's the second time it's been made in
8 about two weeks. And senior people in government, to infer
9 that we should make the right choice because we'll be gone 1
10 July and, therefore, leave you with a problem, really offends
11 me in this sense.
12 When you take off that uniform, you will live the
13 rest of your life with the decisions that you've made, good
14 or bad and, when I take off this Commission uniform, I'll
15 feel the same way. So we are working very hard to come up
16 with the right answer, General, because we do appreciate what
17 it is we're doing, what's in our hands.
18 I assure you I won't be going home 1 July and
19 forgetting about it. I'll live with this the rest of my
20 life, also.
21 Now, this is what I think the Air Force is saying.
22 And I want to distinguish between capacity and idle

Page 174

1 industrial capability.
2 I think what the Air Force is saying -- and it's a
3 cash flow analysis that you're presenting to us, really --
4 you're saying that, given the workload that you have in the
5 Air Force today, or anticipate, that, through your managerial
6 approaches -- and they are wide-ranging, and I won't
7 categorize them all -- you are trying to size and keep sizing
8 your capacity to meet that workload. Whatever percent excess
9 you need, you'll figure that out, but you're optimizing your
10 capacity, which includes people, machines, and facilities.
11 You admit that, beyond that, minus the people,
12 you've got some industrial capability that is idle. That's
13 facilities and machines.
14 And you're also saying that you are more willing to
15 carry the cost, or you are willing to carry the cost of that
16 idle industrial capability as part of your everyday
17 budgeting, that that is cheaper than closing an Air Force
18 depot and having to move practically all the positions, not
19 the overhead, but practically all the positions that you are
20 working in an ALC, because you have sized it to proper
21 capacity and, therefore, that's an incremental workload that
22 you've got to move in total someplace else.

Page 175

1 That cost is greater than owning the capacity, plus
2 the idle capability, at one place. That's what you're
3 saying, I think.
4 From a business perspective, there are some numbers
5 that you leave out, and maybe that's okay in government.
6 From a business perspective, we would have to cost that idle
7 industrial capability. We would have to put a cost for the
8 investment we made and the carrying costs, plus the
9 depreciation costs, plus the operations and maintenance cost.
10 That is not necessarily entirely a cash-flow
11 analysis and, therefore, for you, it's a sum cost and you can
12 live with that under your economic model much better than I
13 could in the world that I live in.
14 I think that's what you are essentially saying to
15 us, is that it's cheaper for you to live with how you've
16 reorganized and how you've squeezed. You can pay for that
17 stuff that isn't being used. That's a better answer than
18 trying to close everything at one place and moving it in real
19 dollars that you have to spend this year, next year, and the
20 following year.
21 That's what I'm hearing, and I want to see if I'm
22 hearing that correctly.

Page 176

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Okay. I think I can supplement
2 that, because I think that you have laid it out, but let me
3 make some additions.
4 First of all, it is not our intent to carry the
idle capability. We have identified buildings for
molition, and this really does happen. When I visit an Air
orce Base, I'm always overjoyed to see a building in the
lages of demolishing, because if we do not need buildings,
9 the best thing, after some point, is to simply tear them
10 down.
11 So the fact of the matter is that we want to get
12 rid of idle capability and, as I often remarked when we were
13 in the BCEG, what I'd like to see us do is to turn this into
14 grass. That's got a number of advantages, not the least of
15 which is that it is another form of long-term environmental
16 remediation, to let the land return to its natural state.
17 There is also, of course, the possibility that we
18 can free up some of either part of the base or some of those
19 buildings for use by the civilian community in a public-
20 private partnership and, certainly, in some of our more
21 modern facilities, we would want to look at that. That, of
22 course, is part of our planning that we think will take place

Page 177

1 over the next few years, with our new leadership at AFMC.
2 I guess the only other part I would really want to
3 emphasize is the large number of productively employed
4 tenants on our bases. These are healthy organizations with
5 major facilities, and to simply take them and move them has
6 always seemed to me to be a big unnecessary expense.
7 So those are the two additions I would want to
8 make.
9 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I think your first comment
10 fits the model I laid out, in that you will make a subset
11 tradeoff, whether it is cheaper to keep a building in place
12 for future use and maintaining it, as opposed to tearing it
13 down. That will be an economic subset.
14 And the other will be to further reduce those
rrying costs of maintenance, by having somebody else occupy
use it. So I don't think that's inconsistent with the
rsimplification I made.
I think I'm finally understanding what it is you're
19 saying, after self-searching and writing myself notes from
20 places I've been. And so, to the extent that we can come to
21 agreement that we understand each other, I'll leave it at
22 that.

Page 178

1 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Perhaps, Mr. Commissioner, I
2 could add one thing. While we are not required, as you say,
3 to follow the same business accounting rules that you are,
4 it's interesting that, within the logistics business, because
5 of our defense business operating fund activities, more so
6 than in some of the operational parts of the Air Force, we
7 are sort of required to account for this overhead and
8 infrastructure and all that.
9 And I would ask that, as a data point, perhaps the
10 Commission go look at the services and how they have done in
11 DFOB and DBOF funding over the last several years, and I
12 think you will find that the Air Force, through its model,
13 has generated excesses to this fund or, at least, we have
14 been in the contributing versus the withdrawal mode.
15 I think it may be an indication of precisely what
16 you said in terms of, as we drew down our workforce to kind
17 of match up with what our requirements were, while
18 infrastructure stayed there, our real capacity came down; and
19 that's sort of reflected.
20 But it's a measure of merit that, anytime you start
21 talking about DBOF, you get on icy --
22 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I lived in that DBOF world

Page 179

1 for a number of years.
2 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: -- icy treads, as you well
3 remember.
4 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Yes. NIF world, we used to
5 call it.
6 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes.
7 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Yes, sir.
8 GENERAL BLUME: And let me assure you that those
9 costs for that mothballing, as you might say, or destruction,
10 or whatever, those were captured, as far as the analysis was
11 concerned.
12 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: And that's what I heard at
13 Kelly, particularly, that even with those costs included, I
14 heard a labor rate number that was better than any of these
15 by some considerable amount. So I'm going to ask the Navy,
16 why is the Air Force so much better than you all? That's for
17 another day, though.
18 SECRETARY WIDNALL: We've been asking that for
19 years.
20 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: One last comment, Mr.
21 Chairman. I am really impressed with your facilities
22 management, General, in the Air Force. It is a real pleasure

Page 180

1 to visit Air Force bases. Treatment, facilities, appearance
2 -- I would have to say that they're equal to one of our
3 nuclear submarines in quality of life.
4 (Laughter.)
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Commissioner Montoya.
6 Madam Secretary, I'll have only about four
7 questions, and we'll be able to break for lunch.
8 Now, in your earlier comments back in March, the
9 Air Force, your argument to us then, in connection with this
10 novel idea of downsizing instead of closing any of your
11 depots, was that you could not afford to close a depot with
12 the funding you have available. That was our understanding,
13 and we've examined that record, and we're satisfied that was
14 the argument then.
15 Our staff -- I want to be candid with you -- now
16 believes they've showed that it is affordable and that it
17 does make economic sense, and they are now concerned that
18 you're raising instead operational concerns, really, for the
19 first time now, that it was entirely an argument of the
20 funding earlier and that you have reconfigured your position
21 somewhat in connection with our second meeting.
22 Is an unfair characterization by our staff?

Page 181

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. Well, I guess maybe I
2 might characterize our earlier statement as sort of an
3 enthusiasm for the proposal, based on the obvious point that
4 the DOD had some very serious budget problems in the year
5 ahead. But, really, from an operational and management point
6 of view, I've always believed that the real attractiveness
7 had to do with the consolidation of the individual
8 commodities.
9 But, clearly, at that sort of top-level testimony
10 that we gave at that point, we certainly didn't spend our
11 time talking about hydraulics consolidating at this base, and
12 the instrumentation consolidating at this base. We didn't go
13 into that level of detail.
14 And we certainly didn't talk, at that point, about
15 the obvious fact, as I've tried to emphasize here, that the
16 presence of so many tenant units on our installations makes
17 the cost to consider moving very, very large. I think these
18 were clearly things we realized at the time.
19 But you recall Secretary Perry's presentation and
20 Mr. Deutch's presentation really, I think all of us were
21 flushed with the enthusiasm of the net present value for this
22 approach, and that's, I'm sure, the emphasis we gave. But I

Page 182

1 believe we've always seen it as a complete package.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Did you want to say
3 something, General?
4 GENERAL BLUME: Madam Secretary, could I just tag
5 on?
6 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Mm-hmm.
7 GENERAL BLUME: Even the Joint Cross-Service Group
8 had significant operational concerns with the closure of one
9 or two of the air logistics centers, and we certainly have
10 always had that concern. Our voice is being heard, maybe, a
11 little bit more now, but certainly the affordability, as the
12 Secretary said, is very important.
13 The less disruption that we can have is certainly
14 an important fact, and the operational concerns, as far as
15 the Chief made, as far as readiness, are extremely important
16 also.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I hear all that. Now, let me
18 review the bidding, because these figures are the figures we
19 have to work with. There's been a 40 percent reduction in
20 authorized and appropriated amounts since the high point in
21 the Reagan Administration when I served in the United States
22 Senate. There's been a 40 percent reduction.

Page 183

1 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, in the budget, right.
2 CHAIRMAN DIXON: There's been a 30 percent force
3 reduction. If we honor every request of the Department of
4 Defense -- every one of them -- and don't do anything else,
5 we will only achieve a 21 percent reduction in the capacity
6 out there. I think that's factual.
7 The next thing is -- and I regret this -- you know
8 my record when I was in the United States Senate, so I don't
9 advocate what has occurred. But the downsizing has actually
10 resulted in a downsizing, unbelievably, to about the 1950
11 level, which I find, quite candidly, quite shocking.
12 I take it, it is only the Congress reflecting the
13 constituency views. I can only accept that as the reason why
14 because, from a national security standpoint, no one could
15 defend it. But that's factual.
16 Now, continuing the bidding, in the BRACs, through
17 '93, the Navy has closed one-half of their aircraft depots --
18 three of six. If we only do what the Navy requests this
19 time, if we only support that, the Navy will have closed half
20 their shipyards. The Army will have closed, if we only do
21 what they say -- assuming we do what they say -- six of the
22 nine depots.

Page 184

1 So I wonder at what point the force reductions in
2 the authorized and appropriated amounts get to the level
3 where one says, "Hey, what are we going to do with all this
4 capacity?" You know, one has to say, in honesty, General,
5 that if you've been there and you've seen them and eye-balled
6 them, which we've done, there is humongous space. Humongous
7 is the only fair way to describe it.
8 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, could I --
9 CHAIRMAN DIXON: General, I love you; I'd be
10 delighted to hear your defense.
11 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: I won't try to defend. What I
12 will try to do, though, is hopefully amplify.
13 I have before me a list of those depots, Army,
14 Navy, that you have described. I can go down through three
15 Army depots, three Naval aviation depots, and add up their
16 total base population, and they do not equal the base
17 population of Kelly Air Force Base. I mean, we're talking in
18 terms of scale.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I wouldn't argue that with you.
20 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: But, if the Air Force were
21 structured so that we had these little depots our here, then
22 I think we could compare. We would have apples to apples,

Page 185

1 oranges to oranges.
2 We have taken the position based on past actions.
3 I mean, we have consolidated activities into these megabases.
4 You have to go back into the past to see the same kinds of
5 drawdowns that we've had to get us into this position.
6 Again, I think Commissioner Montoya has put his
7 finger on what we're trying to do with what we have left. So
8 I think people who will put forward this comparison of
9 numbers versus looking at the complexion of these
10 installations, you know, it's not quite apples to apples.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Let me ask you a couple
12 more quick questions. You are saying to us that the
13 reevaluation indicates that Kirtland should not be closed,
14 are you not?
15 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes, that's right. That's
16 right.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: So that we don't have any
18 difference of opinion about that.
19 SECRETARY WIDNALL: That's right.
20 CHAIRMAN DIXON: All right. Now finally -- and
21 this is procedural -- this is the last BRAC. There isn't any
22 question, when we conclude this BRAC, we are leaving a lot of

Page 186

1 excess capacity out there that everybody has to deal with,
2 that gives you problems when you want to do procurement,
3 gives you problems on force levels, a lot of other things.
4 Also, I don't think it's subject to debate that
5 there's no stomach in the Congress and probably not in the
6 country for another round in a couple of years, and it's also
7 fairly clear that Presidential politics can get involved in
8 this, to some extent. And I don't mean that critically.
9 Thank God for a country where those things are part of the
10 great debate.
11 There's some thinking that, when the dust is
12 cleared and everybody has dusted themselves off and relaxed
13 and reviewed it more carefully, that after a couple of
14 Presidential elections, maybe we ought to have an opportunity
15 to look at it again, having in mind the statutory inability,
16 really, to do anything without a BRAC.
17 There's some talk about 2001. That would let two
18 Presidential elections intervene. It also has the nice
19 result that all BRAC stuff will be finished by then.
20 I ask you -- all of you and particularly Mr.
21 Boatright and MAJ Blume, who are the guys who have to figure
22 these things out -- whether you think that makes some sense.

Page 187

1 MR. BOATRIGHT: Yes, sir. I think your analysis
2 makes sense to me. I think that definitely we can't predict
3 with any great accuracy what's going to happen over the next
4 six years in regard to force structure, in regard to budgets.
5 I would tell you that today, while we may not have
6 every base or installation that we could have closed or
7 realigned out of the Air Force structure, we're down to a
8 position, assuming that we get a reasonable closure in this
9 round, to a level that I think will serve the Air Force very
10 well over the next six years and, at that point in time, if
11 there is a need for one, for some additional realignment and
12 closure actions, I think that would be the time that we ought
13 to be considering such a thing.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Is that an appropriate reflection
15 of the views of all of you?
16 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Yes. Yes.
17 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Perhaps, If I could, one
18 comment, Mr. Chairman.
19 That is, it would be very useful for us if somehow
20 the Commission could, in its report, stipulate that the
21 actions that have been directed, you know, from all the
22 previous BRACs and, in fact, the actions from this, that

Page 188

1 there's some sunset clause on prohibitions to move force
2 structure around because, quite frankly, we really do reach
3 the point where our hands are tied by BRAC legislation, and
4 it prevents us from doing some things that emerge as
5 opportunities to --
CHAIRMAN DIXON: We'd like to have your suggestions
n that, because my final question was this one that we find
hat there are changes in the succeeding BRACs, and you want
to re-evaluate, and that makes good sense and it's
10 understood.
11 And we think there ought to be some authority for
12 you to continue to be able to do that with existing BRAC
13 things, not an authority for you to act on a base,
14 independently existing statues, or anything, but to let you
15 review what you've done with all these BRACs.
16 GENERAL FOGLEMAN: Yes, sir.
17 CHAIRMAN DIXON: That would be good? And if you
18 could give us -- we asked the same thing of the Army, we'll
19 ask the same thing of the Navy -- your ideas about all those
20 things, we would find that useful.
21 Incidentally, we don't want to create some extra
22 bureaucracy out there, particularly, to do that kind of

Page 189

1 stuff.
2 We want to find some way to do that that the
3 Congress, in its wisdom, will see makes good sense, because
4 Senator Thurmond has asked us to come over there in the
5 middle of July and make these recommendations and defend what
6 we've done and, as I said to the Army, if we can get our
7 bulletproof vests and come in, in the dark of night, we'll
8 probably come back then to answer the questions.
9 We sure thank you all.
10 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank you.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Madam
12 Secretary.
13 SECRETARY WIDNALL: Thank all of you.
14 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much. We're in
15 recess until 1 O'clock..
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a luncheon recess was
en.)

Page 190

1 AFTERNOON SESSION
2 (1:00 p.m.)
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: [Presiding.] Good
4 afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Our morning session ran a
5 little bit over time, so the rest of our commissioners will
6 be joining us shortly. This afternoon, we will begin with
7 the representatives of the Navy, who will be with us until
8 2:30 p.m. They are the Honorable John Dalton, the Secretary
9 of the Navy; ADM J.M. Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations;
10 General Carl Mundy, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
11 the Honorable Robin Pirie, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
12 for Installations and Environment.
13 At 2:30 p.m., we will welcome Joshua Gotbaum, the
14 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security; Robert
15 E. Bayer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations;
16 GEN George T. Babbitt, Jr., Principal Deputy Director of the
17 Defense Logistics Agency; and Marge McMananay, BRAC Team
18 Chief for the Defense Logistics Agency.
19 If the panelists will please rise and raise their
20 right hands, I will administer the oath.
21 [Witnesses sworn.]
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Dalton, you may

Page 191

1 begin.
2 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
3 have a complete statement I'd like to submit for the record,
4 but would like to give an abbreviated version of that, if I
5 could, at this time.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will do that, sir.
7 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you very much. Mr.
8 Chairman, members of the commission, it's once again an honor
9 to be before you today. Today I will present our position on
10 the installations which the commission added to the list for
11 consideration on May 10, 1995. In approaching this
12 assignment, I must reiterate our objective in this round of
13 base closure -- to achieve a more streamlined, efficiently
14 located and responsive base line of support, capable of
15 meeting the needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
16 We in the Department of the Navy continue to have
17 confidence in our previous recommendations. When taken
18 together with the decisions made in prior rounds, we believe
19 these recommendations are the right recommendations for the
20 department. Recommendations that result in an infrastructure
21 able to support the four deployed Navy and Marine Corps
22 expeditionary force that projects this nation's resolve

Page 192

1 around the world.
2 In my testimony before you on March 6th, I reviewed
3 our recommendations in detail, and explained the basis for
4 them. While I will not repeat that description of our
5 analysis, we'll be happy to respond to your questions on our
6 recommendations and process. My purpose today, Mr. Chairman,
7 is to speak specifically about that portion of the
8 commission's expanded list of Department of Defense
9 recommendations which relate to the Navy and Marine Corps.
10 I recognize and applaud the care and diligence that
11 you and your staff have brought to the process. There are
12 five basic areas of additions that i believe warrant your
13 careful reflection. I will address them starting with our
14 valuable assets on the Atlantic, and then move to the Pacific
15 area. Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, the
16 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is an integral component of our
17 nuclear powered, fast attack submarine program and mission.
18 It is extremely important for the support of our
19 SSNs and the Department of the Navy's depot infrastructure.
20 Following are the four ship maintenance depot closures that
21 have already been approved in the base closure process, and
22 one closure conducted outside of the process, our

Page 193

1 recommendation to close the Long Beach Naval Shipyard and the
2 ship repair facility in Guam reduced the remaining excess
3 capacity by about half.
4 To reduce this excess further, our recommendation
5 transfers additional depot workload to the remaining
6 shipyards from other department activities, predominantly
7 technical centers. Including our present recommendations, we
8 will have left only five of the original 12 ship depot
9 activities, resulting in two per fleet and one overseas in
10 the Western Pacific.
11 Each of the remaining four shipyards is nuclear
12 capable, thus providing robust support and the required
13 flexibility for all aspects of fleet operational readiness.
14 The commission's proposal to close Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
15 would bring the excess capacity in our shipyards down to
16 about 1 percent, creating an unacceptable risk as we strive
17 to support ever-increasing global initiatives with dwindling
18 numbers.
19 The retention of some excess shipyard capacity was
20 not an oversight, Mr. Chairman. It was a military judgment
21 decision by senior department of the Navy and military and
22 civilian leadership. This conscious decision was made to

Page 194

1 provide necessary flexibility to meet future uncertainties in
2 nuclear shipyard requirements. Let me speak for a moment
3 about he uncertainty of future requirements.
4 Mr. Chairman, the ultimate size and nature of the
5 nuclear submarine fleet is in the throes of dramatic and
6 fluid changes. The SSN force level is projected to decline
7 by nearly 50 percent. There is a debate concerning
8 introduction of new classes of submarines. These factors, as
9 well as world events, affect decisions on whether to refuel
10 or defuel our Los Angeles class fast attack submarines.
11 These boats are the backbone of our submarine
12 force. Decisions to refuel, defuel, or inactivate nuclear
13 powered submarines have a significant impact on nuclear depot
14 workload to be assigned to Portsmouth. Our recommendation,
15 which retains Portsmouth, protects nuclear capacity for
16 greater flexibility. Whatever the future holds, it is clear
17 that the SSN 688 attack submarine will be the mainstay of our
18 submarine fleet into the next millennium.
19 In that context, it is important to remember that
20 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard currently is the center of
21 excellence for our SSN 688 class submarine depot maintenance.
22 It is the only planning yard within the Navy where

Page 195

1 engineering modifications and maintenance procedures are
2 designed for this class of submarine. As the regional
3 maintenance hub of the Northeast region, it is within 170
4 miles of the major submarine concentration at New London,
5 Connecticut.
6 Twenty-two of 57 SSN 688 class major depot
7 availabilities are planned to be performed at Portsmouth
8 Naval Shipyard through Fiscal Year 2005. That's 39 percent
9 of the availabilities for major submarine depot maintenance.
10 The anticipated nuclear workload for Fiscal Years 2001
11 through 2005 requires four nuclear shipyards. And there is
12 no room for any slippage.
13 Delays of any kind could result in the removal of
14 ships from the operating fleet. When an SSN 688 submarine
15 reaches the end of its 120-month operating cycle, it is
16 restricted from submerging, and is lost as a fleet
17 operational asset. Without Portsmouth, our remaining dry
18 docks and facilities would have to be scheduled hell to toe.
19 There would be no time allowed for required maintenance on
20 the dry docks themselves, and considerable schedule
21 adjustments would have to be made for non SSN ships.
22 If any significant accident occurs, or emergent

Page 196

1 repair is required, or if any ship maintenance availability
2 is altered for any reason, we will have fast attack
3 submarines surfaced and tied up at the dock, waiting for
4 maintenance. In our opinion, Mr. Chairman, we would be
5 operating on and perhaps over the edge, and be in jeopardy of
6 not meeting our global commitments.
7 The question might be asked, what about private
8 shipyards? Mr. Chairman, no SSN refueling workload is
9 available or manned in the private sector. The Department
10 estimates it would take about three years to stand up and man
11 such a facility, at a cost between $45 million to $100
12 million. Skeptics point to Electric Boat Company in Gratin,
13 Connecticut, as a potential refueling source.
14 But Gratin has not refueled any type of submarine
15 for over 20 years, and does not currently have the necessary
16 facilities to do so. While Newport News Shipbuilding Company
17 has previously refueled fleet ballistic missile submarines,
18 it does not currently have the facilities for Los Angeles
19 class fast attach submarines. If you seriously contemplate a
20 private shipyard, consideration must be given to the
21 requirement to extensively train and maintain a dedicated
22 private workforce, in place, under contract.

Page 197

1 You can't begin such an effort when the problem
2 emerges; it just takes too long. Therefore, we believe that
3 assignment to the private sector is not a prudent choice.
4 The cost of closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and then
5 replicating it in the private sector just doesn't make sense.
6 Mr. Chairman, the right answer, the essential answer, is to
7 retain Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
8 Maintaining a modest nuclear excess capacity
9 provides the flexibility and a critical edge against future
10 uncertainties. This retention is absolutely necessary to
11 meet the requirements of the future force structure, given
12 both maintenance and operational constraints. Turning now to
13 Naval Air Station Atlanta. Mr. Chairman, we believe NAS
14 Atlanta is a future cornerstone of the future Navy and Marine
15 Corps reserve force.
16 When we evaluated closing the naval reserve air
17 station in Atlanta, a number of factors became evident. For
18 example, NAS Atlanta has low overhead because of its adjacent
19 location to Dobbins Reserve Air Force Base. The synergies
20 created by Dobbins maintaining the runway, and NAS Atlanta
21 operating the medical facilities are examples of how six
22 reserve components at this joint facility have woven an

Page 198

1 operating network that reduces cost for all.
2 NAS Atlanta is our least expensive reserve naval
3 air station to operate by over $4.5 million a year. Most
4 importantly, the demographics of Atlanta show a very positive
5 trend for purposes of reserve recruiting. The fact that the
6 more mature Air Force Reserve units on the base complex at
7 Dobbins are manned at excess of 100 percent shows the richest
8 of the demographic base in Atlanta.
9 Additionally, the Atlanta area is the regional
10 Marine Corps Reserve base for the Southeastern United States.
11 Like the facility created in BRAC 93 at Fort Worth, if NAS
12 Atlanta is left open, it will be a model for the future of
13 the joint reserve force. Mr. Chairman, your objective and
14 ours is to reduce excess capacity. Closing NAS Atlanta would
15 require the department to incur significant costs to create
16 additional capacity at other air stations, which certainly
17 does not meet our common objective.
18 Since NAS Atlanta can accommodate and man the three
19 additional squadrons proposed to be stationed there with no
20 military construction expenditures, we believe NAS Atlanta
21 should remain open as an important part of our Navy-Marine
22 Corps-Air Reserve structure and our future Navy and Marine

Page 199

Corps total force. We have recommended the closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth, and the transfer of P-3 and C-130 squadrons from South Weymouth to the active air station at Brunswick.

This recommendation not only reduces air station excess capacity, but also furthers the integration of active and reserve force structure. With this closure, all remaining reserve air stations will be joint facilities.

With regard to the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at Point Mugu in California, this activity is a critical national asset for research, development, training and engineering for the Navy.

Point Mugu has been studied extensively in BRAC 91, 93 and 95. BRAC 91 resulted in a major consolidation of the China Lake and Point Mugu sites, which focused on eliminating duplication and intertwining organizations. BRAC 91 and subsequent management actions have resulted in China Lake and Point Mugu rating number one and two in military value among all Navy technical activities, and have already reduced staffing at these two activities by 2,000 employees.

We now have an efficient, irreplaceable set of land and sea ranges, co-located with and integral to research and

Page 200

development laboratories that are critical to the Department of Defense. Point Mugu also provides a broad range of support for Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and active forces, including the training and embarkation of weapons qualification facilities for Pacific fleet SeaBees.

Mr. Chairman and commissioners, the current integrated mix of facilities and capabilities at the China Lake and Point Mugu sites represent five years of consolidation and realignment efforts. Redundant organizational structures and functions have been eliminated, and the remaining functions are critical. The Navy has already accomplished significant infrastructure reductions with the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in the smartest and most economical manner.

Spreading the Point Mugu functions to several other locations would undermine the unique synergy created through the previous BRAC rounds. Next, Mr. Chairman, I want to clarify what I believe is a significant point concerning the public works center at Guam. This facility was not recommended to me for closure, but was thoroughly considered by the base structure evaluation committee.

With retention of the telecommunications center,

Page 201

the naval magazine, naval hospital and other government facilities for a total of more than 3,300 personnel, plus approximately 2,600 personnel assigned by the Air Force, there is more than a sufficient customer base to warrant retention of a public works center. Obviously, the size of a public works center is going to be dependent on the number of operations it supports.

Given the current size of the activities being supported, we believe the appropriate course of action is as we recommended -- the retention of the public works center, Guam. As in the case of Guam, other communities are coming forward with initiatives to privatize certain facilities recommended for closure by the Department of the Navy.

We support privatization initiatives such as have been suggested by the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville, so long as they entail private sector facilities and employees competing under applicable statutes, policies and regulations. Flexibility in language is essential to providing the ability to consider all of these options, since the Department of the Navy will, of course, be bound by any final commission recommendation language with regard to these

Page 202

facilities or others.

As in any business transaction, however, the best interest of the Department of the Navy and the nation must prevail. Mr. Chairman, as a result of further analysis by your staff, and in discussions they have had with affected communities and with our base closure staff, it has been suggested that I address certain issues related to the Department of the Navy's recommendations.

In my complete written statement for the record, I have specifically addressed the major concerns. But I would like to reemphasize now the obvious fact that our budgetary top line has come down dramatically. Finally, and frankly, we can no longer afford to keep bases for which we have no mission requirement, as in the case of NAS Adak.

Additionally, our force and reserve resource levels have gone down to the point that we do not need certain things any longer to get the job done, like Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Finally, wherever we can consolidate activities and do the work in one facility that is now being done at two, with little or no loss of efficiency, that is what we think we should do.

Examples of such consolidations are demonstrated in

Page 203

the recommendations for the Naval Surface Warfare Center detachment at Annapolis, and for the movement of SPAWAR to San Diego. We have, in each case, kept the activity that provides us the greater benefit, and we have consolidated like operations to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale.

I would like to conclude by saying, once again, that we take no joy in our recommendations. This is a painful process, which I'm sure you fully recognize, as a result of your extensive and ambitious schedule of base visits throughout the nation. In each location, concerned citizens have gathered hearings, hopeful that somehow, someone would turn back the tide and stop the closure of their facilities.

Your task of ensuring the recommendations presented to the President are the right recommendations for the Department of Defense and the nation is both difficult and critical. We are heartened, however, by the growing number of communities that are recognizing the opportunities that can come from the re-use of these facilities. We have opened dialogues with several of these groups, and are hopeful that the outcomes will be beneficial to all parties.

Page 204

As I have said before, these communities will forever be a part of the extended Navy family. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I, along with my colleagues, will be happy to respond to your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Secretary Dalton. ADM Boorda, did you wish to make any statement?

ADM BOORDA: No, I agree, obviously, with my Secretary's statement, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.

GENERAL MOODY: I have no statement, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Secretary Pirie?

SECRETARY PIRIE: No, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would ask the timekeeper to extend 10 minutes to each commissioner, and we'll begin with Retired ADM Ben Montoya.

COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: GEN Mundy, you got a free ride last time. We're going to start with you today.

GENERAL MUNDY: Just because I was pouring the drinks.

COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I have a couple of questions. The first one is BRAC related, to a previous BRAC action. We've been advised,and maybe you're aware of the

Page 205

1 fact that the community in Glenview, Illinois, has been
2 speaking with the Marine Corps about the possibility of being
3 able to, after they become owners, going through the
4 statutory process of Glenview, to lease back facilities, or
5 the facility, to keep the Marine Corps there
6 We've looked at that very carefully, and it
7 requires a statute, I think, to overcome some statutory
8 procedures. And my question is, is the Marine Corps
9 interested in that? And would you want this commission to
10 consider that proposal and write some appropriate language to
11 facilitate that?
12 GENERAL MUNDY: Commissioner, as you've accurately
13 portrayed, on the heels of the previous BRAC actions, the
14 decision was made to close the naval air station at Glenview.
15 And that's a good Marine community, always has been. We have
16 a great deal of affection for the community. But it was to
17 achieve economies for all the right reasons. Now, the new
18 factor that has come in is the proposal, as you suggest.
19 As we have looked at that, there are legal
20 complications with that, if not restrictions, prohibitions
21 that would be not currently within the latitude of the
22 Secretary, or any of us, for that matter, I think, to go

Page 206

1 around. There are -- if the circumstances evolved, as has
2 been at least portrayed by the city of Glenview there, it
3 certainly is an interesting offer.
4 And I would think that right now, we have fairly
5 specific language that directs us to move that Marine air
6 control group down to Dandalk, Virginia. If the commission
7 saw fit to relax that language to give some flexibility to
8 the department to look at the most economical and the most
9 effective, from the standpoint of demographic recruiting and
10 that sort of thing, that would certainly not be harmful in
11 the next couple of years, as that proposal could be
12 considered.
13 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: One of the thoughts, if we
14 were to redirect, and write some language, it would be in an
15 either or category. If there's a statutory fixed, you'd be
16 permitted to stay; if there isn't by a certain date, you'd
17 move. The 93 recommendation, in rewriting a finding as of
18 this BRAC, the clock will start again. It is our counsel's
19 judgment, you'd have another six-year term.
20 You may not want that. But I think that's
21 something that if you're interested in, we'd be more than
22 pleased to work with your staff and work some language that

Page 207

1 might give you that flexibility.
2 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, I think as the Secretary used
3 the term here, the flexibility in the options, or flexibility
4 in the language, would certainly be, in my view, in the best
5 interest.
6 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: The other question is as
7 much an observation. I understand that there has been
8 continual dialogue in trying to have the Marines reconsider
9 the helicopter portion of their move to Miramar, and take it
10 to March Air Force Base. The community has been very active
11 in lobbying for that. It's our understanding that that
12 Department of the Navy decision, based upon operational and
13 funding reasons, is committed to the Miramar move.
14 And my observation is this. I lived for a number
15 of years in the San Diego area in my Navy life. And one of
16 the biggest issues in San Diego, and I think it remains there
17 is the helicopter noise down on the Silver Strand.
18 Helicopters seem to be more of an intrusion because of their
19 flight patterns and flight characteristics than jet aircraft.
20 And Miramar has been a base that is not quite like El Toro,
21 but it's sort of in that category from an encroachment
22 perspective.

Page 208

1 And I just wonder if you feel comfortable that
2 you'll be able to, for the long haul, move there and be able
3 to execute operationally, given the characteristics of
4 helicopters in the community.
5 GENERAL MUNDY: Commissioner, I feel comfortable
6 that we'd be able to do that. There's no question that the
7 relocation to Miramar puts a good number of aircraft that
8 would be on, at any given time, I think, about 150 to 200
9 flying machines of one sort or another -- jet or helicopter
10 or even C-130s -- operating out of there. For Marines, we do
11 that at a lot of other places. We do it out at Yuma, only
12 few miles to the east.
13 We do it up at 29 Palms. We do it off the decks of
14 amphibious ships. So we are accustomed to operating
15 helicopters and fixed wings together. Yes, the noise pattern
16 for the heavy lift helicopters is certainly a consideration.
17 There's a long track here, and I think you must be aware of
18 it. When the decision was made in BRAC 91 to close Tustin,
19 that in effect forced the issue. We had nowhere to put the
20 largest aircraft group in the Marine Corps, which was the
21 helicopter group at Tustin.
22 The BRAC proposed at that time, and I think the

Page 209

1 Defense Department endorsed the movement of the group up to
2 29 Palms, building what would have turned out to be about a
3 $650 million base there. That became impractical, and that
4 was turned around in BRAC 93, and we were told to go in the
5 direction that we're going. So we really are without a lot
6 of viable options, other than to proceed as we're going. And
7 I think we can do that effectively.
8 As far as March Air Force Base, it is a good base.
9 We have been out there over the years. It's one of our -- it
10 is in fact our principal area port of departure when we ship
11 Marines out of the West Coast, out to crisis response. But
12 the fact is that, as I understand it, the Air Force, of
13 course, has closed that as an active base. It will be a
14 Reserve and an Air National Guard base.
15 The policy and the capacity of the Reserve and
16 Guard is not to be able to operate that as a base with us as
17 a tenant. Under those circumstances, we can certainly
18 consider relocating there. But we cannot operate the base we
19 have -- neither the structure, the people, or the resources
20 within the department. And it would be the creation of an
21 additional base at a time when we are trying to draw down the
22 numbers of bases.

Page 210

1 So my recommendation to you, much as the March
2 option might be, is that we continue with no change to the
3 BRAC 91 and 93 decisions, or recommendations.
4 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you, General. ADM
5 Boorda, this question may require an answer for the record,
6 but in the course of looking at all these bases of all the
7 services, it's become apparent in hearings and also visiting
8 that you all are right -- one must be very careful if you
9 dispose of ranges, industrial capacity or waterfront.
10 Because once gone, it's gone. And so that has been a
11 constant thought in our minds as a result of hearing from the
12 leaders in our military services.
13 And so one of the issues for me, in looking at the
14 Long Beach Naval Shipyard, has been the issue of home-
15 porting aircraft carriers. You can't avoid that; it keeps
16 coming up. It comes up in the Alameda context, in the
17 Edwards context, and now we're talking about San Diego. In
18 looking into that further, I have seen some of the San Diego
19 plans for home-porting. And there is considerable dredging
20 and filling that I think is part of that contemplated
21 construction involved.
22 And the concern I have there is, notwithstanding

Page 211

our good intentions and notwithstanding our great plans, if I were disposed to want to stop the Navy from coming, that to me -- I'd like to be the attorney on the side of the environmentalists who would say, no dredging, no filling and so forth. So I'd like to know where we are in the environmental process regarding creating a mega home port in San Diego, given those characteristics; and the Navy's assessment of its probability of success, community involvement to date and so forth.

Because Long Beach is a wonderful waterfront facility, I think we would agree to that. And I hesitate to vote to close something without some assurance that we really can go somewhere else on the West Coast. Do you have any current information regarding that?

ADM BOORDA: The issue for me, with regard to San Diego is one where I think we're not writing on a blank page anymore. We've really gone quite a ways down the road toward creating two major carrier locations on the West Coast of the United States -- one in San Diego, and one in the Pacific Northwest.

There is a history of that, as you said, and there is a lot of work now with the community, with the port

Page 212

authority in San Diego, that controls the entire port complex, including the airports there. I think the best thing for us would be to give you, for the record, a chronology of all the things we've done -- which are basically a list of successes at this point -- and a prospective look at what we're going to do.

And of course we think we're going to be ccessful. The idea of closing Long Beach was not an easy c And one of the things we looked at was San Diego versus ing Beach for home-porting. In previous BRACs, we closed the naval station and moved those ships to other ports. So we had already started that process. But I'd be glad to provide you -- there's a lot of environmental details here, for the record.

COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: I have a feeling there is. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I'm completed.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner Montoya. Commissioner Lee Kling.

COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, let me begin by saying thanks to you and all the officers in personnel, as we visited, for their indulgence. They probably put a lot of people out, but we really appreciate

Page 213

all the support and help that we got. I also would like to say I personally appreciate your comments concerning privatization, particularly dealing with Indianapolis and Louisville, because I do know that they're moving along.

And your support of that and your statement of that was very positive. And they're concerned, probably, about whether we, say, make some kind of recommendation to you, which is a question of how much authority we have. But if we make the suggestion that we would like to see it encouraged -- privatization -- I think they'll be a lot more comfortable now by your statement. So I thank you very much for that, and I think it's a wonderful direction to go.

Let me just hop around with a few different questions, if I can. We talked about the naval reserve, and certain of questions have been raised, and I'd just like to ask about the -- the Navy believes that we can move the reserve from Boston to New Brunswick, and that's about 150 es away, I believe. Is there any concern about moving y from a population center and being able to continue to ntain that reserve situation?

SECRETARY DALTON: Yes, sir, it is, Mr. Kling. We looked at that situation with respect to how it affects

Page 214

reserves. And we found that as far as the recommendation to move to Naval Air Station Brunswick, that 60 percent of the reservists live within 150 miles of that facility. And we expect that for -- the air aspect and the service aspect will be done in Quincy, so overall, the reserves in the Northeast are adequately considered and taken care of with respect to our recommendation with that.

COMMISSIONER KLING: So you're comfortable with it?

SECRETARY DALTON: I am comfortable with it.

COMMISSIONER KLING: Turning to South Weymouth, and of course, there's concern there about closing. Rightly so, every community should. But the community there has stated that the Navy has violated their analysis procedures by considering a closure scenario that closes a reserve air station and moves its units into an active air station. Could you maybe touch on that, and why you believe your recommendation was developed with the Navy procedure? And maybe ADM Boorda could -- or whoever.

SECRETARY DALTON: I'll be happy to, and I'll be happy for the CNO and Mr. Pirie to comment as well, with respect to that. We feel like we did comply with the proper analysis procedures. The Navy and the naval reserve have

Page 215

always tried to maximize operational capabilities together as part of the total force. And closing NAS South Weymouth reduced excess capacity at both active and reserve air stations; provided substantial savings; and maintained the most capable air station in the Northeast United States, vice two underutilized air stations.

And we do feel like that we complied with the spirit and the letter of the regulations. But would you like to add to that?

ADM BOORDA: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. There's a synergism here which is even better than many of the others we get. In maritime patrol air, about half the flight hours that reservists fly are flown in active missions, contributing with the active force -- not just training, but actually out doing it. In the case of logistics -- and when some of the airplanes move up, there will be logistics aircraft, 130s -- our entire logistics lift, other than what is on the aircraft carriers themselves is in the reserves. So this is a good move, putting reserves and active together in aviation.

COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, ADM Boorda. Could I ask a question, further, Admiral? Concerning the

Page 216

undergraduate pilot training, and your letter of May 25th, to Congressman Montgomery on this subject, could you please elaborate on your concern, your comments? Specifically the risks associated in conducting all intermediate advanced strike training at a single base.

In your words, you stated that this would be a difficult task and reduce the capacity for surge operations, and that could be unacceptable, considering the increased pilot training requirements I think we all know are there. Do you still support this recommendation to close Meridian? And do you have any concerns about it?

ADM BOORDA: Well, let me be very clear that what I'm going to say is my own personal opinion. The Department's opinion --

COMMISSIONER KLING: Good enough for me.

ADM BOORDA: Okay. The Department's opinion is as stated in the submission. This was a tough call, Meridian. Looking at the BCEG's figures, there's about an 18 percent -- and Mr. Pirie may want to be more specific than that in a moment -- about an 18 percent excess capacity if you do it all, all the strike training, at Kingsville-Corpus complex. That should be enough. As we watch, and for affordability

Page 217

1 reasons, properly at that time, in my opinion, Meridian ended
2 up on the list.
3 As we look at this year's budget work that we're
4 doing, we see that we're a little bit light on fixed wing
5 aviation, and particularly in the strike community. And
6 there's already been a decision made that we will pick up the
7 Air Force's AF-111 mission, which is going to keep about four
8 squadrons of EA6Bs for us. And they train in the strike
9 pipeline.
10 None of this is a whole lot more training. It's
11 small numbers. Could we do all that at Kingsville-Corpus
12 complex? The answer is yes. We could, if everything
13 happened the way I said in that letter, eat up almost all
14 that excess and have no surge capability.
15 Again, speaking only personally, I would more
16 comfortable if I had a little surge capacity if we didn't
17 guess right on what we're doing. It is an affordability
18 issues though. And as I said in that letter, the real issue
19 is risk versus cost.
20 I would hope, and in our initial hearing I believe
21 I said something very similar to this, that we could do a
22 better job of figuring out how to work better with the Air

Page 218

1 Force and the base just to the north of there. This was good
2 air space. There's a bombing range right there. We can do
3 lots of good things together. There are reserves on the base
4 and National Guard.
5 So I would hope that in your deliberations, you
6 could find a way to keep something at Meridian, to keep that
7 base alive providing the surge capability without large
8 expense to us. And that we could be smart enough to get the
9 benefits at Kingsville. That would require a lot of work,
10 and I have to tell you that is my own personal opinion and
11 not shared by the department.
12 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you, Admiral. Maybe I
13 could see if there's any other personal opinions on this
14 subject that might help, by the way.
15 SECRETARY PIRIE: Yeah, my personal opinion
16 coincides with the opinion of the department in this case.
17 And it is as ADM Boorda states. We can, in fact, do the
18 stick training at Kingsville-Corpus. It will, in fact, be
19 tight. Particularly if we bring on the extra squadrons that
20 may be contemplated; if we can afford them and do that.
21 And it is a cost benefit analysis. It's $30
22 million a year. And that's a considerable benefit to the

Page 219

1 department if we can realize those savings. Having said that
2 -- that's the view from the technical side.
3 COMMISSIONER KLING: I understand. I just wonder,
4 Secretary Dalton, do you have any different feeling on that?
5 I don't want to stay with this subject, I know we've got
6 others now.
7 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Kling, as the CNO and Mr.
8 Pirie have said, this was a thorough analysis. It was a
9 difficult recommendation because it's a relatively new
10 facility and it's certainly well supported by the community.
11 It really came down to an affordability issue and the
12 savings. And the savings being approximately $350 million
13 over the twenty-year period that caused the recommendation
14 that it be closed. But it was a tough decision. It's a fine
15 facility with fine people, but that's the reason we came to
16 the conclusion that we did.
17 COMMISSIONER KLING: Just a last question on that
18 subject and I'll relinquish my time. In all the figures that
19 you have put together, those figures, you still feel are
20 correct and adequate on this.
21 SECRETARY DALTON: Yes, sir, our projection in this
22 case, I think it's $345 million over a twenty-year period, is

Page 220

1 what we anticipate the savings to be.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner.
4 Commissioner Wendi Steele.
5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: One moment, I didn't think he
6 was going to jump my way. Give me a second here. I'll start
7 off with something that's not big on scope or substance, but
8 it's kind of a principle issue and I'd just like to bounce it
9 off you and see what your thoughts are, Mr. Secretary.
10 The Oakland FISC, as you're well aware, there was
11 special legislation passed to circumvent the BRAC process, to
12 allow the FISC to return to the city for a dollar a year for
13 fifty years versus going through the BRAC process and
14 closing. My personal concerns with that is, take a look at
15 Chicago, they're willing to pay to move tenants out of the
16 base. They want that land for city expansion.
17 But in this case, now we have a city that gets it
18 for a buck instead of some sort of market value or cost to
19 move. My questions for the Navy on this are twofold. One,
20 the Navy is, as I understand, is still going to have to pay
21 to move the remaining tenants. I know there are not a lot of
22 them; that's something you're going to have to pick up in

Page 221

1 your budget. With not getting any money from the property,
2 it wouldn't revert to the city.
3 And secondly, a legal question. Would the Navy,
4 under the lease, be liable for any environmental damage that
5 might happen while this becomes a megaport in the next fifty
6 years?
7 SECRETARY PIRIE: I think we're going to have to
8 give you a detailed answer for the record, Commissioner. The
9 question about whether FISC Oakland should be closed or not,
10 is that the department recommends that it should be closed.
11 But the secretary, in his discretion, removed it from the
12 list.
13 So our recommendation is to remain in status quo at
14 Oakland. Liability for environmental restoration remains
15 with the department regardless of whatever the disposal of
16 the property happens to be. We're well under way in working
17 that.
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I'm sorry. The liability
19 part I meant was from now, in the future. I understand the
20 department is liable up until now, but if the properties went
21 through a normal BRAC processing and got returned to the
22 city, then the city becomes, or whoever buys the property --

Page 222

1 My, I'm not a lawyer, one of few in the room, my
2 layman's understanding would be, whoever owns the property
3 would be liable. But in this case, the Navy would retain
4 ownership for the next fifty years for a whopping proceed of
5 fifty dollars. But would have to have, my guess would be the
6 liability for any damage to that property, to whoever they
7 lease it to.
8 SECRETARY PIRIE: The liability for the past
9 environmental restoration is inescapable and stays with us
10 regardless of the disposal. For future environmental damage,
11 I'm not really clear what the terms of the lease would be,
12 but it seems to me that we would write the lease in a
13 protective way so that we would be covered for whatever is
14 done in the future, by whoever is the tenant.
15 COMMISSIONER STEELE: And Secretary Dalton, I
16 wondered if you would comment on if you think we ought to
17 have the FISC go through the BRAC process or allow the
18 special legislation to proceed?
19 SECRETARY DALTON: Madam Commissioner, I'd like to
20 elaborate further for the record, if I could, on that. I
21 don't have anything to add from what Mr. Pirie has answered.
22 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, thank you very much.

Page 223

1 witching to Guam. Secretary Pirie, in your letter to
2 Representative Underwood, you stated that through long term
3 leases, outright transferrals, or any other mutually
4 agreeable arrangement, as much of the land and facilities as
5 possible on Guam, you'd work out such agreements.
6 Do you feel that it's most beneficial for you if
7 the Commission just lays hands off and allows you to proceed
8 as you would; or would it help, given the past history of
9 negotiations between the department and Guam, if we had
10 language to help the revitalization move forward quicker
11 MR. PIRIE: Well, as you know, we're advocates of
12 flexible language wherever it can be supplied to us. We've
13 had a number of discussions with Representative Underwood and
14 Governor Guiterez of Guam, and others about the disposition
15 of the property. And I think we can come to an amicable
16 understanding in this case.
17 In particular, the location of the MSC ships and
18 the helicopter squadron seem to me that rather than directive
19 language for the relocation of those, language that allows
20 the fleet commander the flexibility to put those squadrons
21 where it best suits his operational needs would be very
22 helpful. And that would permit him to locate them in Guam

Page 224

1 for part or all of the future as may be best for them.
2 Back to the disposition of the property. I think
3 that we are on a good track with the government of Guam. I
4 think we can do it without a great deal of help. The more
5 flexible the language, the better for us.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Somebody can help
7 remind me -- the recommendation that we received, were the
8 MSC ships to go to Hawaii?
9 MR. PIRIE: Yes.
10 COMMISSIONER STEELE: So you'd like to open that up
11 ther and not designate Hawaii, specifically, in our
12 eport.
13 MR. PIRIE: Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. The fuel farm on
15 Guam -- just kind of finish Guam off here -- bad choice of
16 words, excuse me, delegate -- finish the issue of Guam --
17 working out the operational chain of command on our visit we
18 were told that you had actually -- the department as a whole
19 would like to retain the fuel farm, that it was an oversight
20 to have it on the list. Would you all concur with that?
21 MR. PIRIE: We would like access to the fuel farm.
22 We would like to be able to use the fuel farm. Whether we

Page 225

1 own it or not is I think a matter of relative indifference to
2 us.
3 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Well, we'll follow
4 through with that one in writing just to make sure that we
5 have the language that would be most flexible.
6 Only because I was caught off guard -- this is very
7 rare -- I'm going to yield the balance of my time.
8 COMMISSIONER CORNELL: Thank you, commissioner.
9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you, Ms. Sector. I'm
10 sorry, because of inefficient management on my part I was
11 unable to be here for your stirring opening statement. But
12 I've read it very quickly and I do appreciate it, and I'm
13 sorry that I missed it.
14 My questions are I guess pretty much along the same
15 line I had before. Again, I appreciate Admiral Boorda's very
16 thoughtful remarks about the pilot training. As you know, I
17 was very concerned about the search capability and he's been
18 very forthright in that process.
19 I do have another, I guess, pilot training question
20 will try to get through it reasonably quick. In
21 ng at the pilot training and talking to the Air Force
22 that kind of meshing that you are doing with the Air

Page 226

1 Force, I think that will work out very well. And then the
2 prospect of moving -- no, I'm sorry -- setting up the pilot
3 training and the way you've got it set up -- right now, just
4 in Corpus Christi. It's my understanding you move all the T-
5 44s to Pensacola. And with the increased NFO and WSO or
6 basic NAV training, navigator training, do you have room to
7 do all that down at Pensacola?
8 ADMIRAL BOORDA: It fits, J.B. I don't want to
9 give anybody the impression that we can't fit it the way we
10 have it, it's a surge issue. Are we going to do more
11 consolidation in the Air Force? I think we'd like to, and I
12 think the Air Force would like to and we're going to keep
13 working the problem. But right now, no, things fit where we
14 got them.
15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And this morning with the Air
16 Force, Admiral Boorda, it came up that if the JPATS goes to
17 be a turbo jet versus a turbo prop, that may cause the Navy
18 some problems. Do you want to comment on that?
19 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Well, as you well know, we're
20 going to have air space issues, depending on what JPATS looks
21 like. And without knowing what JPATS looks like it's a
22 little hard to anticipate that. I think that whatever

Page 227

1 happens, if JPATS is an airplane that requires bigger AQs,
2 different kind of issues, you're going to see us have to
3 consolidate more. That's the way we would deal with it. But
4 that's really speculative until we know what the airplane
5 looks like.
6 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As you all can suspect, we've
7 had a lot of help with some of things we're doing. And we
8 even gave you a little help with the sight out at Corona, in
9 that we've added it -- put it on to take a look at it. And
10 as I pull on that string I find there are several maybe down
11 sides to that process, that you've got all that consolidated,
12 it's a fairly independent organization sitting there. And by
13 moving it does that you cause you some distress, even though
14 you deferred it because of the economic impact?
15 ADMIRAL BOORDA: I think -- if it's all right, I'd
16 ask Mr. Pirie to answer it, because the real issues were not
17 whether we could consolidate or move the functions at the
18 tech facility but, rather, what was the employment in that
19 area and what had happened in that area.
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Basically, what we're getting
21 from the communities is that it is a independent unit, it
22 needs to stay as an independent unit because of the service

Page 228

1 it provides to both the second and third fleets. I just
2 really need some of your guidance.
3 ADMIRAL BOORDA: We are technically more capable
4 than we were four or five years ago, GPS, a lot of recording
5 systems, a lot more 3-D radars, a lot more ability to know
6 what happened and evaluate it makes that not as good a case
7 as it might have been in the past. But the issues there are
8 really employment issues.
9 Do you want to --
10 MR. PIRIE: No, I mean, I agree with your answer.
11 Technically, the DSEC looked at moving part of that activity
12 to the Naval PG School where it would be co-located with the
13 operations research faculty. And that looked to us to be a
14 real kind of winning alignment. The other parts of it, some
15 of it goes to China Lake, some to other Naval air research
16 facilities. We did not see that we would lose anything that
17 couldn't be -- wasn't really redundant elsewhere.
18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And I think my last question
19 is that -- of course, $64,000 question -- which I thought
20 that you answered rather eloquently, Admiral Boorda. I
21 haven't read the papers yet, but I don't know how the Sea
22 Wolf fared in the mark-up, but is there anything that's

Page 229

1 happened, since you were at Portsmouth, to change your mind
2 on the kind of risks that we'd be taking if we close
3 Portsmouth.
4 ADMIRAL BOORDA: In the House mark-up Sea Wolf did
5 not make it. We still have to see what's going to happen in
6 the Senate. We're hopeful. I think I'd like to echo what
7 the Secretary has said before, and that is that this is an
8 uncertain business, that the 688s are going to be with us for
9 a long time, depending on how construction plans and funding
10 go; and I hope we'll be totally successful, but depending on
11 how they go, the 688 could become even more important for
12 even longer. And it's a pretty risky business shutting down
13 the center of excellence that takes care of that submarine.
14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Lastly, Mr. Secretary, I'd
15 like to thank you personally for every place I've been on a
16 naval base, they did not chastise me for my secondary
17 education.
18 (Laughter.)
19 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And they were very kind to us
20 and they were very forthright in their answers. It was a
21 pleasure to be back on a naval base.
22 SECRETARY DALTON: Thank you very much,

Page 230

1 Commissioner. We appreciate having you, and want to
2 compliment you and all the commissioners for the exhaustive
3 schedule that you've had since we last met, all the places
4 you've been and the schedule that you've been on to get
5 around to hear from everyone. And we certainly welcomed you
6 aboard our naval facilities and appreciate having you and
7 commend you for all that you've done.
8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you very much. Mr.
9 Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner
11 Davis. Commissioner Rebecca Cox.
12 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. I want to start by
13 just following up on a couple of questions that have been
14 asked by other commissioners, to make sure I understand.
15 General Mundy, if I could start with you on the
16 March Air Force Base issue. You indicated that certainly the
17 Marines are working with fixed and rotary aircraft in many
18 places, and that that's a doable situation. If we do
19 everything that the DOD has recommended, you'll have over 100
20 fixed wing, I think, and over 100 helicopters at Miramar.
21 Are you operating with that kind of volume and that kind of
22 air space with a mixed group?

Page 231

1 GENERAL MUNDY: Rarely. Probably in an exercise
2 or, you know, certainly operationally; but not on a routine
3 day-to-day basis.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: Not on a day-to-day basis?
5 GENERAL MUNDY: No.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: So that at least the volume
7 itself is different.
8 GENERAL MUNDY: The volume is considerable. There
9 are a lot of -- as I think you well know -- El Toro has four
10 runways, Miramar has one. So there are some complications.
11 You have the Marine layer that comes in from the sea that
12 complicates air traffic control, IFR versus VFR, from time to
13 time, seasonally.
14 So there will be more difficulty in operating there
15 than there would be if they were separated. But, again, my
16 fundamental belief is it's possible to do it.
17 COMMISSIONER COX: You could do it. It would be
18 safer to do it at March, were that an option? I mean, you
19 wouldn't disagree -- or El Toro or somewhere outside, if that
20 were an option.
21 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, I'd prefer not to say safer,
22 although that's debatable. I would prefer to say it would be

Page 232

1 less complicated maybe to do it, but we would hope to be safe
2 at both locations.
3 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. And then finally on that,
4 let me ask you a question because we asked some of your folks
5 out in -- Drax Williams, specifically, in Marine West Coast
6 Aviation, who is in charge of it -- for some numbers to look
7 at the March option, and he provided us with some numbers.
8 And I will say we worked with him in '93, too, and frankly he
9 was closer on the numbers than the DOD was, as it well turned
10 out.
11 Those numbers that he provided the Base Closure
12 Commission -- us, personally and our staff, at our request --
13 are vastly different than the numbers that we have gotten
14 from the Navy on the cost of the March option. I realize
15 you're not an expert on numbers, but my experience with Mr.
16 Williams is that his numbers have been very good.
17 I wonder if you just might comment -- these are not
18 even close, as you know, we're tens of millions of dollars
19 apart in a year. Could you give us, at least, some comment
20 on whether you think it might be somewhere in between, or
21 perhaps your folks didn't get to look at the whole picture or
22 -- how do you explain that enormous difference?

Page 233

1 GENERAL MUNDY: Well, let me say first and then I'm
2 going to turn here -- we have a convenient system here of
3 passing off to the guy on the end of the table.
4 COMMISSIONER COX: I see. I was hoping to get you
5 to answer to that one.
6 (Laughter.)
7 GENERAL MUNDY: You make a good point, and I would
8 say that in support of Major General Williams and his crew
9 out there that, indeed, the amount of money that it has cost
10 us to move from El Toro down to Miramar is I think as you
11 know already beyond what -- we've already been given more
12 money than was initially estimated.
13 So they have been, they're on scene and they look
14 at a lot of different things. Some of that relates, I think,
15 to the facilities that are available and to the perception of
16 the replacement versus the acceptance of a facility. For
17 example, we know we're closing a lot of housing, some 2,700
18 units up around El Toro, as we move south. They, on the West
19 Coast, understandably -- and I would, too, if we had the
20 money to do it -- would like to go down and rebuild a
21 quantity of housing in another area.
22 So some of that has been as a result of the

Page 234

1 difference in those --
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. Although the numbers, as
3 I understand, that they've given us on housing do not assume
4 we're going to build more, but do assume because San Diego
5 cost of living is higher that our costs are going to go up
6 moving to San Diego, which I assume even the Navy doesn't
7 disagree with.
8 GENERAL MUNDY: Yeah. As far as the other cost
9 factors, again, can I pass off to you on that, Robert?
10 MR. PIRIE: Well, if the issue is does the actual
11 estimated cost of the move from El Toro to Miramar exceed the
12 estimations in the COBRA model, I think that's not a
13 surprise; because the COBRA model, for one thing, excludes
14 environmental restoration costs.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: That's really not the issue. in
16 fact, the COBRA model was wrong, it now appears, by a three-
17 fold factor -- of actual spent dollars, not projected costs,
18 from El Toro to Miramar.
19 But that's not the issue. My only point was at the
20 time Mr. Williams and the very same BRAC staff told us that
21 the costs would be about where they're going to come out,
22 which is three times more than the Navy projected at that

Page 235

time. My only point is that's a done deal, it's over, those issues are -- nobody is looking at reopening El Toro. My only point was that his track record on numbers, at least in that area and involving those assets, has been a whole lot better than the Navy's.

And I was wondering if, perhaps, you all might be willing to give that a closer look given his track record.

MR. PIRIE: Well, I'm always interested in new ideas. And not having the numbers before me and not having - -

COMMISSIONER COX: We'd be happy to do it for the record.

MR. PIRIE: -- had an opportunity to do a detailed analysis of them, I can't tell you whether I believe them or not.

COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. Maybe you'd just take a look at both sets. That would be helpful.

GENERAL MUNDY: But let me reinforce, Commissioner, if I may, again -- I'd like to say your thesis is not without some degree of accuracy and that, yes, the projections out there were pretty close because it looks like where we're going.

Page 236

That notwithstanding, the prospect of moving to March is more a function of just people and resources that we don't have to be able to run that base.

COMMISSIONER COX: Sure.

GENERAL MUNDY: Were the base available could we go there as a tenant?

COMMISSIONER COX: You'd love to.

GENERAL MUNDY: We would opt for it just like that. But that's not possible.

COMMISSIONER COX: I understand. And I didn't mean to follow-up that closely. Secretary Dalton also to follow-up on the Corona issue and, frankly, you know I wish in a sense you hadn't looked at it on a political basis because there are a lot of military arguments for Corona and I wonder if you might take a look at that.

I'm in the airline business, we have the National Transportation Safety Board. It's an independent group, it oversees everything from our training to accidents to whether the FAA is doing the right thing. There are a lot of people who -- I'm sure Boeing would like to have the NTSB working out of Boeing's offices. The FAA itself wouldn't mind having the NTSB under it.

Page 237

But we've all decided, as an airline industry, that it's important to have that independent outside look where they don't have any other role -- they're not involved in planning or procurement or promotion of GPS or anything else. They can look at it independently.

I see Corona coming out of the airline business very much in that same category, they're an independent group. And you all are proposing to move them to the -- you aren't, Secretary Dalton -- Secretary Perry and the Navy are proposing to move them to the equivalent of the FAA or Boeing. And I worry about that on an independent assessment basis. I wonder if you wouldn't mind, Secretary Dalton, I know you took them off the list on a political basis and maybe, therefore, didn't have an opportunity to look at the military independent assessment issue -- if you wouldn't mind commenting on that.

SECRETARY DALTON: Well, Commissioner, as I indicated, I don't really have anything much to add beyond what I told you at our previous meeting. It was the decision I made with respect to looking at the total impact of what had been done in BRAC '93, BRAC 91, and looking at BRAC '95, the recommendations we were making to the states of

Page 238

Florida and South Carolina and California, had all been hit significantly --

COMMISSIONER COX: No, I understand that you --

SECRETARY DALTON: -- and those are the reasons that we made the decision. And after the recommendation that we made on Long Beach, which was painful but we thought was necessary, we made the decision that we did with respect to those other facilities.

COMMISSIONER COX: I guess what I'm saying is it might be helpful if you would look at it not an economic impact basis, but on a military value added basis because I think we would be interested in your thoughts on that, too.

And, Admiral Boorda, you look like you wanted to say something on that?

ADMIRAL BOORDA: No. Only that, in fact, we've done that. And that's why it would have been on the list had it not been for economic issues. The independent look that you talk about -- and I'm not suggesting you put it on the list, I mean, it's not on the list now, you added it for consideration --

COMMISSIONER COX: We added it, right.

ADMIRAL BOORDA: But the independent look you talk

Page 239

about could be done easily from another place, and that's the postgraduate school. They also are not fleet operators. They do assessments for us in a lot of areas.

COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. And I have just two other quick questions, and they're really sort of "what if." You all proposed that we reverse a '93 decision to move NAVSEA to White Oak and instead move it to the Navy Yard.

Also in '93 we indicated that SPAWAR ought to stay in the area, although I don't think we specifically said -- if we did not take your redirect on NAVSEA to White Oak, the SPAWAR people have indicated that they believe that there are more synergies with what they do here than what they do in San Diego and prefer to stay in the area.

If we did not would you be supportive -- not move White Oak, if we left White Oak open and moved NAVSEA to White Oak would you be interested in leaving SPAWAR at the Navy Yard?

SECRETARY DALTON: That's pretty convoluted. Our plan is -- we think that what we're recommending to you makes the most sense and we recommend that you take it. But the hypothetical, I'll ask Robert to --

MR. PIRIE: Yes. That is a hypothetical question I

Page 240

would dearly love to leave severely alone.

(Laughter.)

MR. PIRIE: We're recommending moving SPAWAR to San Diego because it allows us to achieve a considerable consolidation of staff and support for SPAWAR and considerable savings over the years. And that savings is not allowable with other options, such as Navy Yard, such as Hanscom Air Force Base.

COMMISSIONER COX: So unrelated to the fact that if we move NAVSEA to the Navy Yard, you would not have room for SPAWAR -- you would still recommend that we move SPAWAR to San Diego?

MR. PIRIE: Yes. Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you. And then, lastly, Secretary Dalton, we recently received a letter from the Secretary of Transportation expressing concern about the Coast Guard at Adak. I wonder if operations of the Coast Guard were given consideration on the Adak proposal.

SECRETARY DALTON: I haven't seen that correspondence, Commissioner. I'll be happy to take a look at it. With respect to the Coast Guard at Adak --

MR. PIRIE: I've seen it -- and it came in very

Page 241

1 late, as a matter of fact. And we believe that the Coast
2 Guard has other options in the Aleutian Chain and elsewhere
3 in Alaska to support their operations. However, if they wish
4 to take over NAS Adak and pay $25 million a year to operate
5 it, I'm sure that we can come to some kind of an agreement.
6 COMMISSIONER COX: You're willing to work with
7 them, to work out their operation problems.
8 MR. PIRIE: I'm willing to work with the Coast
9 Guard any time.
10 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner.
12 It's my distinct privilege at this time to introduce our
13 chairman, the distinguished chairman of the 1995 Defense Base
14 Closure and Realignment Commission, former senator from the
15 great state of Illinois, Alan Dixon.
16 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
17 Gentlemen, may I first say to you I apologize for being gone
18 during some of your testimony. As men of your importance, I
19 hope you understand there are some housekeeping duties by now
20 with the vote starting next Thursday. I'm only going to ask
21 three questions.
22 One is one I would rather not ask. And I say in

Page 242

1 advance of the question, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Boorda,
2 that I know and respect you both for everything you do; and
3 even when I don't agree with you, I understand pretty clearly
4 what your position is.
5 Now, I'm compelled to make this statement and ask
6 this question. I hope you understand it. I'm not trying to
7 put you on the spot, but eight of us have to vote.
8 You recently revised the projected pilot training
9 rate -- now, it's been discussed a little but we haven't
10 gotten specific -- to reflect increases in pilot training
11 requirements, including the introduction of additional FA-
12 18s, EAG-P squadrons. I have seen, and it is in our packet,
13 Admiral Boorda, the letter you sent to the distinguished
14 congressman from that district who all of us have great
15 affection for.
16 Now, you conclude -- I won't bore the audience with
17 the whole question by saying this -- the combination of
18 increased strike PTR in a single-strike training base makes
19 successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and
20 reduces our capacity for surge operations, and that could be
21 unacceptable. I understand that.
22 But the trade-off remains the degree of difficulty

Page 243

1 or risks versus costs to operate two strike training bases.
2 And I understand that. Now, this morning one of my
3 distinguished colleagues asked General Sullivan, and
4 Secretary Togo said, "Now, here, you're closing two depos" --
5 and then they went through kind of a hypothetical case. And
6 I said, "Isn't there a lot of risk in this?" He said, "Yeah.
7 There's a lot of risk in that, but we considered it as an
8 acceptable risk; in view of the cost, we recommend doing it."
9 And, you know, I'm going to be honest with you now.
10 This is one of them that we're going to have a tough time
11 with around here, so I'm compelled to ask both of you in a
12 specific way about Meridian. Now, what are you telling us
13 here? We know you're getting it down to one, you're going to
14 save a lot of money, but is it an unacceptable risk? Now, is
15 it acceptable or isn't it acceptable? I guess that's what I
16 have to ask you.
17 ADMIRAL BOORDA: As I was -- Mr. Secretary, do you
18 want to go first?
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I almost hesitate to use your own
20 words to ask the question, but --
21 ADMIRAL BOORDA: No, I'm glad you did. Inasmuch as
22 they were mine, let me answer your question. I think we

Page 244

1 talked about it a minute ago.
2 It's my personal opinion -- it's not the
3 Department's opinion -- that we're right on the margin of
4 surge capability. I agree with the numbers that the BCEG has
5 done. And that would give us about 18 percent excess
6 capacity training at Kingsville, using the Kingsville-Corpus
7 complex. That requires everything to go just right.
8 I would like -- personally, not the Department's
9 position -- to be able to find a way to work better with the
10 Air Force to keep some residual capability there for surge;
11 to keep that place open, not totally closed, and still try to
12 get the flexibility to get the savings from combining things
13 at Kingsville. That would require you to give us more
14 flexibility than we have asked for. And that's why I say
15 it's my personal opinion.
16 If everything goes exactly as planned, we'll be
17 okay and we will close a very good and very new base that was
18 hard for us to put on the list.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I hear you, but let me tell
20 you my problem with -- I respect the answer. Let me tell you
21 my problem, now. I was here in the Reagan years. I voted
22 for the build-up. If I was here I'd still be voting against

Page 245

1 the reductions. All right? But that's Alan Dixon, and
2 that's not the country, and that's not the Congress right
3 now. And I accept that. There's a change.
4 Now, all of us wish there was more. And we're
5 going to have to make some tough choices here. Now, there's
6 a 40 percent reduction in authorized and appropriated
7 amounts, and a 30 percent reduction in force level. And if
8 we give you everything that all of you have asked for --
9 nothing more than that, let's assume that, it's not the way
10 it's going to happen, exactly, but let's just assume that for
11 the purposes of our discussion -- if we give the DOD
12 everything they ask for, it's 21 percent. So there's excess
13 capacity out there.
14 Now, I know there's a lot of risk and a lot of
15 stuff we're doing, but I have to say that, unfortunately,
16 you, the guys that are going to have to make these judgmental
17 decisions in many cases -- now, I don't say we can't change
18 these things, some of them we're arguing about, we might have
19 some different ideas, in fact, and all the services might
20 have some different ideas, some at the margin, some at the
21 heart, maybe. But it's on numbers where there's an arguable
22 difference.

Page 246

1 But it's hard for those of us, I will say in due
2 respect we have three distinguished men that had the
3 experiences you had up here that I'm privileged to serve with
4 here -- but it's hard for us to make that kind of a judgement
5 about this doggone thing. I just want to level with you
6 about that. I don't feel comfortable with it. I don't want
7 to take an unnecessary risk. So I hate to pursue it beyond
8 that.
9 I don't know, Mr. Secretary, do you have anything
10 further you want to say?
11 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, as the CNO has
12 indicated, this was a tough recommendation for us because of
13 the points that he has outlined. We do feel like that the
14 Kingsville-Corpus Christi complex has sufficient capacity to
15 single side all our Department of the Navy strike training.
16 Even if we do add the 10 flight squadrons and relocate the
17 E2-C2 train to Kingsville.
18 He's made the point with respect to what would
19 happen. We don't plan on bringing on 10 additional squadrons
20 at this time. As a matter of fact, we're talking with
21 discussions between three and six. But if we did, we could
22 make it. So we have the ability to do it. It still makes it

Page 247

painful recommendation that it be closed, but that is our recommendation.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, here's what I'm going to ask you to do. We're going to vote starting next Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m. I'd like my colleagues and friends here on this panel here to have one day of rest of prayer. Sometime by the end of the day Tuesday we'd like to hear further from you on this close call that will resolve in your mind your judgement as our leaders in that field about the risk versus cost thing that you ultimately make your decision on it.

Because if you leave it this way -- I'm willing to have you leave it that way, and then we'll hassle with it. But we do see what you're saying to us. We understand it. It's just kind of hard for us to make a call. We've got it on the list. It takes five to take it off -- I would remind you -- we'll all eight be here. And I think it's one we need to know more about. All right? Sorry to put it back in your lap --

SECRETARY DALTON: Sure. That's fine.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Okay. Two more. I put this, Mr. Secretary, to the other services and I put it to you and your

Page 248

colleagues, that what we are seeing here in this unpleasant duty that we're undertaking to the best of our individual abilities is doing this job and recognizing you are going to leave some excess capacity out there. We all see that, everybody tells us that in these public meetings and in private. And probably ought to look again sometime.

Now, everybody knows nobody wants to look in two years. I don't see any congressmen come up to me and say, "I'd like to have another round two years from now."

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Ain't too much demand for it. And I don't really think there's much stomach for it in the country, to be truthful with you. But I think it is true we ought to look again sometime.

And recognizing presidential politics and all, there's beginning to be a kind of a consensus that maybe about 2001 -- which lets two presidential elections intervene, and also has the nice number there because it's a culmination of all the BRACs out there. And we're thinking that we might take a look at the possibility or recommending one more to take another look after the dust has settled, and wondered whether you have a positive or negative view -- any

Page 249

of the four of you as experts in the field -- about that.

SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, I think that the process is a good process. It is one that has worked well. It's difficult -- and it's a difficult job that you have -- but it is one that I think was properly devised and one that does offer the opportunity to close excess capacity and get rid of things that we don't need.

As we all know, as our budgets have come down, we had too much infrastructure and this process has done a great deal to eliminate what we don't need. I would think that that sort of time frame would allow the consolidation to, in fact, occur, that has happened in BRAC '88, '91, '93, '95. And most of '95 would have been complete by then, in terms of the six years.

So that is a time frame that I think would give each service the opportunity to see how it is operating with the new structure, see if indeed the excess capacity at the margin or if it really is more than is necessary. And if that were the case, I think that another round at that time would indeed make sense, and it seems to me that would be an appropriate consideration for discussion.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you for that. Now, the

Page 250

last and final thing related to that is that we take note of the fact that throughout these rounds there have been alterations, realignments and changes and so forth, in the BRACs. And we suspect that there's a probability some of you may want to revisit some of those things in the future. I'm not talking about any other bases haven't been touched.

But I'm talking within the BRAC process. And we'd like to hear from you, we've asked the other services -- we don't want to set up some bureaucracy out there that's going to cost the taxpayers a lot of money -- but we'd like to have your suggestions about how the idea of reviewing these BRACs, so you're comfortable with everything you have done, would be -- in other words, Senator Strom Thurmond is asking us to come before the Armed Service Committee in the Senate in a couple weeks, and we'd like to be able to say, "Here's what we think about BRAC in the future. Here's what we think about reuse. We've got people working on it. Here's what we think about realignments or reviews of this BRAC stuff in the next several years."

SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, we'd be happy to provide that, our opinions to you on that subject.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you. Well, I just want to

Page 251

say that, General Mundy, we all understand you're retiring at the end of the month. And we just want to say we appreciate you spending part of your last few weeks with us. We honor and congratulate you, sir, for your distinguished career of service to the nation and the Marine Corps, we're proud of you. Thank you, sir.

ADMIRAL BOORDA: I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And you have just spoiled my rapport with the CNO because he has sworn that if he comes up here and has to listen to anymore compliments about me he's not going to invite me over for dinner or something.

(Laughter.)

ADMIRAL BOORDA: So I told him if he'd wait three years, it will be his turn.

SECRETARY DALTON: I thought we were going to get through a whole hearing without that, for once, but we didn't.

(Laughter.)

ADMIRAL BOORDA: Thank you, sir, it's a pleasure to serve.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Chairman Dixon. Commissioner Joe Robles.

Page 252

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I just have one question. I know you've had a long afternoon. It relates to an issue that we've been, sort of, wrestling with which private sector versus in-service work across a whole gamut of activities.

And my question directly relates to the Portsmouth visit. You're using the private sector to do some nuclear refuelings for your carriers. With the closure of Long Beach, you're going to have to rely more on the private sector to do some of that work.

What about the submarine force? Have you considered or is there some overriding operational -- we saw the intricacies of nuclear work and the intricacies of submarine work, the closed bases, the very highly specialized facilities, but you seriously looked at moving some of that workload into the private sector?

ADMIRAL BOORDA: Long Beach has -- I know you know this, but just so the record will be right, Long Beach has nothing to do with any of that nuclear work.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES: No. I understand, non-nuclear work.

ADMIRAL BOORDA: With respect to submarine nuclear work, we have a lot of work in the private sector. Right now

Page 253

1 most of that work is construction. The construction of a
2 submarine and the putting together of the nuclear power plant
3 and fueling it is a much different operation than refueling
4 or defueling.
5 Oddly -- probably not oddly enough, I think you'd
6 probably understand refueling and defueling is a much more
7 complex operation because you're work a hot reactor, and
8 you're working with radioactive materials from the very
9 beginning in a confined space. We had not planned on moving
10 that work to the private sector.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: So there is really no plan,
12 long term-plan even to consider doing that function or piece
13 of that function?
14 ADMIRAL BOORDA: As long as we have to do
15 refueling, defueling and overhaul work for the -- focus on
16 the 688 Class for a minute -- for the 688 Class, and in
17 everything goes exactly like it's supposed to -- the last 688
18 doesn't go away until 2026 -- then it would make sense for us
19 to do that work in public yards rather than in the private
20 sector.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Commissioner

Page 254

1 Robles. I would like to finish up with a few questions that
2 I have. Going back to the consideration of Guam, not to be
3 redundant but to be a little more precise on some of the
4 testimony we received, in regarding to the MSC ships and HC-
5 5, we understand that the senior leadership in the Navy has
6 had discussions with Governor Goodarest and Congressman
7 Underwood from Guam concerning the MSC ships and their
8 helicopter squadron HC-5.
9 We also heard that you and a delegation from Guam
10 are in essential agreement as to a change in the
11 recommendation that will be a win-win position for both
12 parties.
13 It appears to us that the decision to relocate or
14 locate the MSC ships and HC-5 at a particular location is not
15 a decision that depends on whether a particular base is
16 closed or not and whether either unit has more than 300
17 civilian personnel.
18 Consequently, would it be acceptable to you if the
19 Commission made no decision as to the final location of MSC
20 ships and HC-5 and recommended any such decision be made by
21 the Navy at some time in the future when the leadership of
22 the Navy found it necessary?

Page 255

1 SECRETARY DALTON: Mr. Chairman, that would
2 certainly be acceptable. We did have a meeting. I had a
3 short meeting with Mr. Perry, met with the Governor and the
4 delegate at length.
5 SECRETARY PIRIE: As did Admiral Boorda.
6 SECRETARY DALTON: And I defer to him.
7 ADMIRAL BOORDA: Because you don't have to make
8 that decision and we can, it will give us some added
9 flexibility. It will help Guam, and particularly in the case
10 of those MSC ships, they're not often in their own port
11 anyway. They're out working wherever we want them to work.
12 That's why they're in the MSC.
13 So I think it makes good sense. The Governor,
14 Secretary, Assistant Secretary and I all agreed that the
15 flexibility would be useful, and then we can make that
16 decides when the time is right.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. In addition,
18 some comments about what's called the Glut '94 Lands. We're
19 interested in helping ease the process of transferring excess
20 federal land in Guam to the Government of Guam.
21 And we understand that there are some 4,000 acres
22 of Navy land included in a report known as Glut '94 that the

Page 256

1 Navy has declared to be excess to their needs.
2 Also, we understand that there is no disagreement
3 within the Navy as to the recommendations of this report.
4 Would the Navy have any objection if this Commission included
5 in its report recommendations to transfer those Navy lands in
6 the Glut '94 report to the Government of Guam under the
7 procedures of the Base Closure Act?
8 SECRETARY DALTON: That would be fine, Mr.
9 Chairman. We would have no objection.
10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
11 A question or two on Lakehurst. That is something we haven't
12 talked about today. Lakehurst, as you gentlemen know,
13 handles all the launch and recovery, research and
14 prototyping, procurement, testing.
15 It appears that little would be moved from there
16 other than some of the heavy machinery and the
17 remanufacturing of some of the equipment, the manufacturing
18 of single-point items, items that if they failed would cause
19 a ship to go over the deck.
20 What would remain would be, basically, in my
21 understands now, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but the
22 engineering buildings would remain. Three buildings would

Page 257

1 remain.
2 The testing facilities would remain, the launch
3 testing facilities, the test tracks, the airport. Most of
4 those types of facilities would remain.
5 It's my understanding that in determining the cost
6 of the closure that the cost of moving that equipment was not
7 figured -- there are about 300 pieces of equipment there --
8 and that when it was determined they were not included, the
9 local command was asked to arrive at the number of pieces of
10 equipment they needed to move in order to do the job, and
11 they came up with a number somewhere, as I remember, around
12 124.
13 They were told that that number really did not fit
14 into the model, and that 74 was the right number. I have two
15 questions, I guess. One would be your feelings on that
16 comment, if you feel they are accurate in regard to that move
17 and whether or not you feel it makes sense to overhaul those
18 large launch valves, the steam launch valves in Jacksonville
19 and then ship them to Lakehurst for testing. If you could
20 answer those two questions for me, please?
21 SECRETARY PIRIE: With respect to the first issue,
22 what is the proper amount of equipment to be shipped, that

Page 258

1 was a discussion between the chain of command of Lakehurst
2 and the commanding officer, and it is perfectly consistent
3 with our system for the chain of command to decide what's the
4 appropriate amount of stuff to move when a base is closed.
5 The normal dialogue that takes place when a base is
6 nominated for closure is that the command immediately says,
7 "Well, you can close me, but you have to replicate my entire
8 base at a piece of real estate of my choosing brand new."
9 And discussion goes on from there about, "No.
10 That's not what we had in mind. That's excess capacity we're
11 talking about. We want you to close the base entirely."
12 That discussion goes on, and that is provided for in our
13 system.
14 So what you have seen in all that is the product of
15 that. Certainly, the command doesn't like being told, "No,
16 only 74 pieces, not 124," but that's the prerogative of the
17 system's commander to decide that.
18 Now, with respect to overhauling the valves in
19 Jacksonville, I think that's an entirely reasonable position.
20 It's a fine industrial facility, and there is no reason for
21 us to replicate industrial facilities all along the East
22 Coast.

Page 259

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You know I understand that explanation, and I could believe it if we could take and close that facility. So you tell me what kind of advantages are to be gained other than back-filling Jacksonville by moving that equipment out at Lakehurst.

SECRETARY PIRIE: The real problem was that the expense of moving the test facilities which are in place was -- we really couldn't come to closure on that. It would have been better, if the expense had been right, to relocate all of that stuff at Patuxent River.

But in the end, we really -- it was a very hard decision, and we really decided that was the engineering and the test facilities that we had to leave. It would have been better to close the whole place, yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir. And I thank all of you gentlemen, and I'm going to make Admiral Boorda sit through this one more time because I, too, was going to thank General Mundy for his many years of stellar service and leading the young men of this country in the Marine Corps. We appreciate your service to our country, sir. Thank you.

GENERAL MUNDY: Thank you very much, Commissioner.

Page 260

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: And we would also like to submit written questions for the record. We will be getting those over to you. Thank you.

(A brief recess was taken.)

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will continue. I'd like to introduce the next panel, Ms. Marge McManamay -- I'm going to get it right this time -- Lieutenant General Babbitt, Secretary Josh Gotbaum and Mr. Bob Bayer. Welcome. Secretary Gotbaum.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission --

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Excuse me one moment. We need to swear you in. If you would please rise and raise your right hand. We almost made it through the first day without making that mistake, but we'll get it done here.

(Panel sworn.)

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Secretary Gotbaum.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I'm sorry to hear that we're the first group you've heard today that you were sufficiently worried you had to swear them in.

After all of the hundreds of hours of hearings that

Page 261

you all have done, frankly, on behalf of the Secretary and the Department the first thing I want to say is we're very thankful for the opportunity you're giving us to get a last word in, since there is, obviously, a lot that has happened.

Before I get to specifics, if I may, I'd like to make a couple of points, not necessarily because you will not have heard them before but because we think they are sufficiently important that we make them.

The first one is that an aggressive program of base closure remains absolutely necessary. Without it we simply are not going to have the funds we need to maintain the forces we have to have for readiness in the next generation.

There has been a lot of rhetoric recently about the end of the decline of the defense budget, and there is even a prospect that our budget at the Department of Defense may be increased some this year.

But whether it is or is not, the fact of the matter that the Defense budget is still going to be down versus mid-'80s by about 40 percent. Our force structure is going to be down about 40 percent, and our infrastructure is down about 20 percent.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Is that correct, Mr. Gotbaum?

Page 262

I've been seeing 30 percent on force structure, and I want to know if I am corrected on that.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I will tell you, sir, that when I first said that we don't have very good measures of infrastructure, we have even fewer -- or rather, we have even more measures of force structure.

So when I say generally a third to 40 percent, what I'm really doing is giving you a melange between number of fighter wings, number of active duty troops, number of ships, et cetera. It's somewhere between 30 and 40 percent. I promise you we can gen up a statistic that will confirm your view.

But the critical point is by whatever measure our force structure is down considerably more than our infrastructure, which is down about 20 percent.

The recommendations the Secretary of Defense placed before you would reduce our infrastructure by about another 5 or 6 percent.

It would result in savings to the Department or the taxpayers over a couple of decades net by something on the order of $18 billion. That's money we need. That's really my first point. It's our most important point by far.

Page 263

Second point, our process is not perfect, but it is considerably more objective than some of the stuff that we have heard that has been presented to you all.

Like you, and in some cases with you over the last three -- we have, over the last three months, gone over our recommendations and alternatives that have been suggested in light of the sustained analysis and criticism from communities, their consultants, et cetera.

And with very few exceptions, some but very few, we still feel that the recommendations we made to you are sound. They're still right. Both the recommendations for closure and the ones that ought to endure.

This does not mean that the results are perfect or without error. We already last week sent a letter to the Commission admitting that our analysis of Kirtland was not right and therefore withdrawing our recommendation that it be realigned.

And I would like to deliver today and insert for record a similar review of some work in the Army, particularly at Dugway in which we conclude that for a variety of reasons more operational than cost-driven we don't think that recommendation makes sense in light of the

Page 264

continued analysis that has gone on.

So not perfect, not that there are no mistakes, but the law has required and we've tried to be very objective and do so. That's not always the case with everything you've heard before you, and I know you know it, but I think it's important for us to remind you.

You've spent a lot of time now going through this stuff. You've heard talk from communities, from their consultants, many expert consultants, including some very distinguished flag officers and in each case urging you to do a little less, do a little different, keep a piece on this base, move some workload here, et cetera, leave just a few active operations, whatever.

You have also, I suspect strongly, have heard from within DOD from officers who would like to keep or add to their existing infrastructure but without the responsibility for paying those costs.

As you weigh this, and you obviously must, and we know you will competently, all we ask is that you remember that these folks do not have an obligation to protect the national defense within a fixed budget, and we do, and we would assert you do.

Page 265

1 As part of that, we would ask as you continue your
2 review that like my other court of review, which this
3 Commission obviously is, that you recognize the professional
4 operational and military judgment that has gone into these
5 recommendations and give it appropriate deference.
6 As you know, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
7 Staff has testified, and as you've seen before you a lot of
8 very senior military as well as civilian time went into these
9 because this is not just a matter of counting beans.
10 This is not just a matter of dollars. It's a
11 matter of operations, and there are some recommendations
12 which are, obviously, controversial but which we made based
13 on strong military advice.
14 I'll give you one example that I know is before the
15 Commission is Grand Forks. In our view, the issue is not
16 whether you could save money or not but closing all of Grand
17 Forks.
18 But it is the considered judgment of the Chief of
19 Staff of the Air Force, of the rest of the military
20 leadership, in fact of each of the operational commanders
21 that that is a facility which we want to keep on an operating
22 basis. So as you review, as you take this into account, we

Page 266

1 hope you would give appropriate deference.
2 My last general point before I get down to
3 individual cases and open up to questions is very simple.
4 Regardless of what we do here, regardless of what you do
5 here, we are going to need future base closure authority.
6 If you take all the BRACs that have gone thus far
7 and you take the most robust estimate of the most aggressive
8 closure scenario that you are doing, I suspect that you will
9 not get an infrastructure reduction that comes close to our
10 force structure reduction or our budget reduction.
11 One of the things that this Commission has done
12 that is enormously heartening is, in fact, raise the question
13 of future base closure authority. We hope you will consider
14 the matter carefully, and we hope you will consider the
15 matter strongly in the affirmative.
16 If I may now, I'd like to get to some specific
17 cases, and I'm not going to spend a lot of time on each of
18 them. There are many, as you know, and you've already heard
19 from the service Secretaries and Chief, but I'd like to
20 discuss a couple of them and then just open it up for
21 questions.
22 In most cases, because they make a broader point,

Page 267

1 let me start, if I may, with the proposal made by the folks
2 in Utah to close all of Letterkenny and move that work to
3 Hill.
4 Let's be clear what we're not saying. Hill has
5 excess capacity. That's undeniable, but we don't think the
6 way to fill that excess capacity is to tear down a joint
7 operation just when the investments have been made and it has
8 begun to work.
9 We have, as a result of a recommendation of the
10 Commission in '93, consolidated on an interservice basis
11 missile maintenance at Letterkenny. We have proposed, after
12 considering the matter, to resize and restructure and
13 downsize a lot of Letterkenny but to keep most of that effort
14 and to ally it with the electronics capability that is
15 already availability at Tobyhanna.
16 We've already spent a lot of money, over $20
17 million, to develop that capability. We've moved people
18 there. We've moved workload there. In fact, we've moved
19 about 70 percent of that workload there already.
20 Is it theoretically possible to do that work at
21 Hill? Yes, it is. It would clearly require some MILCON or
22 recognizing that you'd need to store things in multiple

Page 268

1 facilities not necessarily at Hill.
2 But in our view, it simply makes no sense to do a
3 180 now because we are engaging here in joint maintenance,
4 and we're doing it on a basis that we think is cost-
5 effective. So that's one issue on tactical missiles and the
6 question of how we resolve excess capacity.
7 Let me talk, if I may, a minute about labs and how
8 we reduce lab capacity. You know almost as well as we,
9 probably as well as we that the local community is concerned
10 about the closure of Rome Labs, that Rome is an excellent
11 facility whose closure would affect the entire central New
12 York region.
13 We recognize that. We just don't think that there
14 is an alternative. We have excess lab capacity throughout
15 the Department of Defense. We believe, and we have looked at
16 the issue again and we have not changed our view, we believe
17 that consolidating those efforts at two other very good labs,
18 at Hanscom and Monmouth, will achieve simultaneously a
19 reduction in costs, an encouraging of interservicing and a
20 maintaining of quality.
21 And that is precisely the kind of activity that the
22 Joint Cross Service Group, which Joint Cross Service Group we

Page 269

1 set up at the urging of the Commission suggested. We're
2 doing it. We think it will save costs. We think it will
3 save money, et cetera.
4 Not that Rome isn't a good facility. It's a
5 terrific facility, but unfortunately, we have more excellent
6 facilities than we can handle. Brooks is -- and I know that
7 the Commission has been concerned with Brooks as well -- is a
8 similar story.
9 We are proposing to close it and consolidate those
10 activities at Wright-Patt not because Brooks isn't a good
11 facility -- it is a very good facility -- but because we have
12 more capacity than we need, and leaving that capacity open
13 means that we're not reducing lab capacity.
14 I want to talk about a couple of other issues
15 because they're general, and they come on my plate at OSD.
16 One is housing. This Commission has made the point in
17 several of its hearing, in my view entirely appropriately,
18 that the Department of Defense should not shut a base down
19 and then waste perfectly good housing.
20 And you have asked us whether or not we need
21 authority or direction or whatever to use housing on closing
22 bases, and I want to be very clear this is an issue that we

Page 270

1 send a lot of time and a great deal thinking about and
2 worrying about, but the truth is we already have that
3 authority.
4 We already have the ability at closing bases to
5 transfer housing to another service or for another use, and
6 we use it. As it happens, I'm the person in DOD that signs
7 off on this, so I can tell you personally that the Air Force
8 took over Navy housing at Moffett.
9 The Navy took over Army housing at Fort Sheridan,
10 and in each case at a closing base we review it. We see
11 whether it makes sense because some of the housing at closing
12 bases, like our housing at the bases we retain, is not up to
13 snuff and see whether it makes sense to keep it and use it.
14 So we think we've got the authority. What we ask
15 the Commission not to do is to require us to keep housing in
16 cases where it won't make sense.
17 This gets me to a similar case, which is
18 privatization. We have the authority right now to contract
19 for work with the Department of Defense. We are encouraging
20 efforts at Louisville and at Indianapolis to develop private
21 alternatives to the facilities that are being -- that we have
22 recommended to be closed there.

Page 271

I personally have spoken to the mayor of Indianapolis a lot of times. We think we have the authority to do that right now. What we ask from the Commission is that you not force us to do something that doesn't make sense, because it's one thing to permit privatization. It's one thing to permit a facility to be used to bid on the Department's business.

It's quite another thing to say to the Department of Defense you must keep working this place, and you've got to keep excess capacity open, because that, then, keeps us from doing the mission which is, in fact, to reduce capacity.

Those are the sorts of issues that we thought we ought to raise specifically. I guess before opening up to questions I would like to remake the point that I made the first time I came here.

This is a miserable process. We don't like it. It is an absolutely necessary process. We are enormously grateful and we appreciate the Commission's role because you are the court of review. You are the assurance to the Congress and to the public that what we do, in fact, is consistent with the force structure and, in fact, is consistent with the criteria.

Page 272

So we appreciate that. We appreciate all the work you've done. We look forward to keep on answering the two or three questions that might be left outstanding, and we look forward with only a modest amount of nervousness to your conclusions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Secretary Gotbaum. General Babbitt, do you have an opening statement, sir?

GENERAL BABBITT: Very briefly, I just wanted to point out that the original testimony given to the Commission on behalf of DLA was given by General Larry Farrell. He has since departed DLA and moved to a job in the Air Force.

Upon his departure, I took over his duties with regard to BRAC. I have really nothing to add to his original testimony, but you have added some things as potential closures in the interim period, and I'm here to answer any questions that you may have.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Ms. McManamay, do you have --

COMMISSIONER KLING: Just one question about General Farrell. I just have to advise you that I think we named him the shadow because I think General Farrell was at

Page 273

every location we have been to. He probably knows everything as well as we know.

GENERAL BABBITT: If he was only here.

COMMISSIONER STEELE: He probably is.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Mr. Bayer.

SECRETARY BAYER: I have nothing to add, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: What I'd ask is that the timekeeper extend each Commissioner seven minutes, and we'll open the questioning with Chairman Dixon.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Mr. Secretary, to you and your colleagues at that table I thank you for your full and complete cooperation. You've been very helpful to us. We are indebted to you, sir, and my questions will be very brief.

First of all, I appreciate your remarks concerning the need of a future BRAC, and we've talked to the various services about that today. Now, candidly, my recollection of the earlier remarks by both you and your distinguished colleague, our new head of the CIA, John Deutsche, the two of you I believe suggested about three years or so from now having another BRAC.

I'm candid in saying to you that the sense I get in

Page 274

talking to people here in the Commission, around the country and in the Congress and other places is that we'd better leave it alone a little while.

I think that everybody is kind of full of BRAC right now, and our thought is in view of the Presidential elections and other things that do have a way of impacting these things to some extent that we might think about 2001.

I know that's a ways off, but 2001 is at the end of the BRAC process. It permits two Presidentials to intervene, and it gives us some time to catch our breath and gives everybody a time to review everything.

That may not be as much as you would have wanted, but I ask you whether you think that it's a solution we could live with in view of the fact we have to report to the Armed Services Committee in a couple of weeks.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, let me be very direct on this point because I think it's important. My view is real simple. We have found and we have proved that without a BRAC process we can't close our infrastructure.

And notwithstanding that we hope you will endorse our recommendations and help us a lot in this thing, there is clearly a lot left over. My suspicion is that in the

Page 275

fullness of time we will discover sometime before 2001 that this problem is a real problem.

But this is the world of the possible, and any BRAC is better than no BRAC authority at all, and therefore we think it is most important that the Commission be strong that there be some.

As to when that would be, I'll tell you, sir, the Secretary of Defense's view was three to four years. There were others even within the building who said five, six years. I don't think we should be dogmatic about time as much as about the importance that there be a process.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I appreciate the answer. The numbers are really compelling, I will say, but I just sense that, you know, there is some -- I even find in the public sector less of an enchantment with this idea than there was in the beginning.

And it's like any unsavory thing that you encounter after a while. You aren't so interested in continuing the process, and I think we'll just take a look at it. We'll be talking to you, and we'd appreciate you talking to staff. We're going to try to work out what's best.

The other part of that that's awfully important is

Page 276

that you see and we see this fact that there are changes in what is done in the BRAC process over the years. We see places that were losers becoming winners and vice-versa.

So it's all part of the evolutionary process, and we are very interested in hearing from you and particularly Mr. Bayer, who has had a lot of experience in this field about your suggestions how best we can do that without setting up some big bureaucracy, which we do not want to do, to permit the BRAC accommodations that need to be made between now and 2001.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Very important point. Actually, may I make one further point?

CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yes. Please do, Josh.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: I promise you that even though it is absolutely the case that you and your staff and the communities are tired and would like a breather there is a small office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that would like a breather just as much.

CHAIRMAN DIXON: I believe it.

SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Let me, if I may, defer directly to Bob Bayer on the question of what interim authorities we need.

Page 277

1 SECRETARY BAYER: I think there are two or three
2 points, Mr. Chairman. One of them is, obviously, the longer
3 the interval is between this BRAC round and the next one the
4 more compelling is the reason to have some sort of a
5 practical interim authority either to make changes that we
6 see from the recommendations that you and the President and
7 the Congress ultimately agree to in this round and also
8 closure or realignment actions that become compelling, time
9 compelling, during that interim period of time.
10 So the authority that we would have to fall back on
11 right now would be 10 USC 2687, which has clearly been
12 impractical and in fact as been made moot by this process.
13 The only other two points I'd like to make on this
14 issue are one of the key factors that made this whole process
15 work was the waiving of the National Environmental Policy Act
16 with regards to the specific closure and realignment
17 decisions, not the decisions to reuse the property. I think
18 that clearly has to be in any interim authority.
19 And the other point I would make with regards to
20 any interim authority that it be done in such a way that it
21 be expedited enough that communities won't be hung out
22 inordinately.

Page 278

1 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yeah. I think that's all very
2 good.
3 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, may I add one
4 further one? Part of my job which I don't discuss very
5 often, although this Commission was nice enough to ask about
6 it at one point, is the reuse area.
7 The Congress has been enormously gracious in
8 providing legislative authority that permits much speedier
9 property disposal at closing bases, and I would say it's
10 equally important that we find a way to maintain those
11 streamlined procedures for property disposal on a going-
12 forward basis even in the interim.
13 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Thank you very much.
14 Incidentally, I misspoke before. I didn't mean to say
15 unsavory. I think unpleasant would do it.
16 I wonder if I could bother General Klugh for just a
17 minute. Was he sworn?
18 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes, sir.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: General, would you come up next to
20 my friend Bob Bayer by the mike so we get it in the record?
21 I just want to ask you a question. I hope I'm not putting
22 you on the spot, but you chaired the Cross Service Working

Page 279

1 Group so I guess you are on the spot.
2 Now, your alternatives offered closures when you
3 chaired the Cross Service Working Group, but in no instances
4 did you recommend downsizing. We also take note that in the
5 past certain services that now recommend only downsizing were
6 intrigued before with closures.
7 Now, all of this is very interesting, I guess I
8 ask will you please tell this Commission why you recommended
9 closures but did not recommend any downsizing?
10 GENERAL KLUGH: Well, Chairman Dixon, I would tell
11 you that we were focused in the Joint Cross Service Group on
12 the amount of excess capacity that we had with an objective
13 of downsizing the depots to meet core logistics requirements.
14 And we did not have any way of managing or determining
15 downsizing of multiple locations to get to that excess
16 capacity.
17 There are two ways of getting at the excess
18 capacity, particularly in the Air Force, and that is
19 downsizing or closure of a depot, closure of two depots,
20 closure of one depot and shrinking the rest of them to get to
21 the excess capacity and shrinking all depots in place to get
22 to the excess -- get down the excess capacity.

Page 280

1 We chose in the Joint Cross Service Group two
2 alternatives. We offered the Air Force two alternatives.
3 One is close one and shrink in place to get rid of the excess
4 capacity; that is, through interservicing send work out to
5 the private sector.
6 Second, to close two depots. The Air Force chose
7 the third alternative of shrinking or downsizing five depots
8 in place. I would say to the extent that the Air Force could
9 rid itself of the excess capacity, that is a good
10 alternative.
11 The objective we had in the Joint Cross Service
12 Group was and still is to rid ourselves with the excess
13 capacity.
14 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: Mr. Chairman, can I make one
15 additional point to my colleague?
16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: That's quite all right.
17 SECRETARY GOTBAUM: The Joint Cross Service Group
18 process, as you know, was rough. What was done in the depot
19 Joint Cross Service Group is we developed a linear
20 programming model and said to it, in effect, go out in a
21 relatively mechanistic way, close things until you got down
22 to a particular capacity.

Page 281

1 Now, we know that there's a considerable amount of
2 controversy and question and examination which you're going
3 to undertake on the question of downsizing versus whole
4 closures.
5 But the fact that we didn't have a computer model
6 that was sophisticated enough to close 20 percent at 5
7 places, versus making a 0/1, close-it/don't-close-it decision
8 at depots, I don't think should be -- should be the basis on
9 which you make the judgment. We really were trying to get
10 some rough measure of capacity reduction, using a, frankly,
11 rough computer model.
12 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Well, I respect that, and I don't
13 need a computer model if I got eyeballs, though, Mr.
14 Secretary. There's an awful lot of excess capacity out there
15 that I saw with my eyeballs. General Klugh, you had the Navy
16 on your staff when you did the cross servicing of the depots?
17 The working group?
18 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes, I did. Yes, sir.
19 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I'll ask you, sir, whether it was
20 your opinion that there was substantial excess capacity, even
21 in excess of two of the five depots on the basis of what you
22 and your group saw, that led you to believe that you could

Page 282

1 recommend closing one, and downsizing in place for the
2 balance, or closing two.
3 GENERAL KLUGH: If I understand your question,
4 would that be excess capacity, the remaining after?
5 CHAIRMAN DIXON: Was there adequate capacity
6 remaining if you -- in the judgment of you and your cross
7 service group, you close two?
8 GENERAL KLUGH: Yes. If we close two -- the FO's
9 depot, as I remember specifically, appeared to be about a
10 depot and three quarters, in terms of depot equivalence
11 excess. And, therefore, by closing two depots and shifting
12 workload to other existing bases that must remain open for
13 various reasons using that capacity better, then that
14 certainly could take place.
15 Getting into privatization, as a matter of fact,
16 some of that work load -- in other words, having one and
17 three quarters depot excess, certainly privatization of some
18 of that remaining workload could, in fact, give us room for
19 closing two depots. We felt that it was certainly,
20 economically, driven to get that excess capacity to the best
21 utilization that we possibly could.
22 So I guess in some I would say that -- three ways

Page 283

1 of getting to that excess capacity. One was to close one
2 depot, and downsize everything else, but still taking the
3 excess capacity out. And second was to close two depots and
4 sending whatever little workload left that was excess to
5 capacity to other services in an interservice matter or
6 privatization. And then third, shrink all the depots in
7 place, which is a challenge.
8 But then, what do you do with that excess capacity
9 of those facilities that you declare excess? So, the answer
10 is -- I guess, the best I could.
11 CHAIRMAN DIXON: I thank you, General Klugh, for
12 that response, which is helpful for the record.
13 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Chairman Dixon.
14 Commissioner Cox.
15 COMMISSIONER COX: Well, I'm honored to be right
16 after the Chairman. Secretary Gotbaum, in previous testimony
17 to the Commission, you had stated that the COBRA analysis
18 provides an estimate of closure costs, as we all know.
19 However, the Navy has excluded certain base closure costs
20 related from its COBRA analysis, where those costs are DOD --
21 apparently, civilian labor costs.
22 And it says the effect of making one time costs

Page 284

1 shown on the COBRA for at least the Navy analysis understate
2 the true costs of implementing the recommendations. In some
3 cases, this is somewhat significant. For example, including
4 the cost for disassembly, reassembly, and calibration of lab
5 equipment for the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Annapolis,
ould raise the one-time cost for this recommendation from
out $25 million to $50 million.
Has somehow the DOD taken to this -- into account
9 in your evaluation of the DOD numbers?
10 MR. GOTBAUM: No.
11 COMMISSIONER COX: No.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: I guess, if I may --
13 COMMISSIONER COX: Of course.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: The direct answer to your question is
15 no, pending contradictions by my colleague.
16 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. But?
17 MR. GOTBAUM: But -- and this is a very but -- as
18 you know, this is a process in which we try -- we are
19 required by law, and we try to be as objective, as
20 comprehensive, as auditable, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, as
21 possible. And, we have in a couple of instances, been faced
22 with the question: Why don't you add more costs to the mix?

Page 285

1 And, in most cases, it turns out that, either
2 because we couldn't get those costs in a bases that was
3 sufficiently secret that wouldn't raise cain, just to -- you
4 to you asked the question -- or, because they turned out to
5 be relatively small, and we've declined to do so. Now there
6 are some exceptions to that, okay? One of them is Kirkland.
7 Okay? That was --
8 COMMISSIONER COX: And we, I might say I thought it
9 was a very gracious letter on Kirkland, and we very much
10 appreciated everything you all did to get to the bottom of
11 those costs, and, you know, it was well done.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: I'm not sure if -- I'm lousy at
13 quoting people verbatim, but I will tell you what the
14 Secretary of Defense said is something almost as direct as,
15 if we made a mistake, let's say so. Period. Okay. What I
d, however, is that most of the time, when we incorporate
corporated costs, or when we refine analysis in an
ective fashion, it still turns out we've got a lot of
19 excess capacity, and the rank ordering still looks an awful
20 lot alike.
21 And so, my caveat earlier on in my opening
22 statement about -- where -- we are required to be -- we are

Page 286

1 required to be objective. The folks who are basically trying
2 to ding the recommendations are not -- is the only addition I
3 would make. What I will do, if I could, is go back, and with
4 your permission, come back for the record with a guesstimate
5 of what are the implications of this failure to include DOD
6 civilian -- would that be all right?
7 COMMISSIONER COX: Okay. That would be helpful,
8 and you're right. In some cases, it may not make a big
9 difference, and at least the numbers we have on that one --
10 it's twice the one time costs. It still may not make a
11 difference.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: Well, let's be clear what the process
13 is, okay? Because I've been -- I've been a neutral analyst,
14 and I have been an advocate, okay? It's what -- one of the
15 side effects of being an investment banker. When I am a
16 neutral analyst, it's my job to say this is our guess. The
17 odds of being wrong up need to be about the same as the odds
18 down. When I am an advocate, I can get enormously creative
19 at adding costs that these obviously competent people at DOD
20 fail to include.
21 And, I can be also enormously creative at
22 forgetting to include costs, as well.

Page 287

1 COMMISSIONER COX: Right. And I understand that,
2 and I understand that this is not a science, and we are not
3 going to get every dollar right. There is not question about
4 that. However, we would like to save money for the Defense
5 Department.
6 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, ma'am.
7 COMMISSIONER COX: If we know, for a fact, that
8 there are additional costs, I don't think we should stick our
9 head in the sand, and pretend like we're saving a whole lot
10 more money than we are. And so, you know -- once we get past
11 the sort of generalities, where there are specifics and we do
12 know them, I would like to consider them, even though the
13 COBRA model itself may not be capable of doing that.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Can I give you the counter argument,
15 just to give you a for instance?
16 COMMISSIONER COX: Sure.
17 MR. GOTBAUM: One of the things I have observed as
18 I look at the BRAC process is that, of course, none of us
19 knows exactly what a closure cost is, right? But, it turns
20 out there are three stages in the life of a cost estimate.
21 Estimate number one is when the recommendation has made the
22 initial COBRA cost, and that closure cost is $10.

Page 288

1 Estimate number two is when the base commander at
2 the closing base realizes that his base is on the list, and
3 the base commander at the receiving base realizes that he's
4 about to get an opportunity for initial MILCON, and that cost
5 goes to $12, or $20. Okay? Estimate number three is when
6 the controller's office in the relevant service, the
7 controller's office in the -- we're talking about the
8 Secretary of Defense -- and the budgeteers get at it.
9 And generally, what we find is, when we actually go
10 and spend the money, it ends up being a little less than the
11 $10 we started out with. So --
12 COMMISSIONER COX: No, I understand that -- anyway.
13 Let me go on. We, as you all can probably tell from my
14 fellow commissioners today, in the Air Force, there is at
15 least some concern about the Air Force downsizing. And I
16 don't know where that time -- where that's going to go. But,
17 assuming, for a moment that it is the decision to close one
18 or more Air Force depots, would it be your view that we
19 should encourage interservicing, by making that part of the
20 recommendation?
21 Or do you see that as your job, and we should
22 simply say send it where you may?

Page 289

1 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me start with what's desirable,
2 and what's possible. We're in favor of interservicing, and
3 we are doing it, and we are -- and any place where it is
4 encouraged, should be encouraged. What we have found though,
5 is that the BRAC process by itself happens not to be a very
6 good way to encourage interservicing, because the BRAC
7 process is precisely the time at which every single commander
8 knows that his or her capacity is on the line.
9 And so, what we discovered in our joint cross
10 service groups is that we are most effective at getting
11 interservicing before or after the decision, rather than
12 during the decision. Now, that doesn't mean that the
13 commission could not, and should not in its recommendation,
14 whatever it decides, say DOD interservicing makes sense,
15 would save money, and you ought to do more of it.
16 But, I guess what we would hope is that you would
17 recognize that the actual process for deciding where workload
18 ought to go is sufficiently complicated, sufficiently subtle,
19 that I think it really ought to be a management judgment.
20 Maybe one done on an interservice basis by, for example, the
21 Depot Maintenance Council, that General Klugh runs. But
22 that, essentially, it ought to be a judgment made after, not

Page 290

1 as part of the closure decision.
2 COMMISSIONER COX: Thank you.
3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner J.B. Davis.
4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Secretary, as you noted,
5 we've been getting a lot of help on some of this stuff, and -
6 - from various sides. But in each case, there are some that
7 ring a truth in the process. And I'd like to go back to
8 General Klugh's discussion -- you know, it's still the DS --
9 OSD position that -- the Air Force position, i.e., downsizing
10 the depots, is the preferred option.
11 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, sir. And let's be clear why.
12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: As General Klugh said, we're
13 looking for reductions of capacity on a cost effective basis.
14 That's what the name of the game is. And we had a computer
15 model, which helped us guess what you ought to do, but that's
16 what it was. It was a computer model to help us guess what
17 you ought to do. The first mission is to reduce capacity.
18 The Air Force made the case, and backed it up with
19 some analysis that they could reduce a lot of the capacity at
20 lower cost, by chomping pieces out of five air logistic
21 centers, and by closing a whole air logistic center, large --
22 because depots turn out to be only parts of the ALC, in the

Page 291

1 case of, for example, Kelly.
2 The depot is half of the ALC, and the ALC is about
3 two thirds of the total base. So that -- they made their
4 case. They backed it up with numbers that, in effect, they
5 could reduce capacity, and they could do so on a cost
6 effective basis by downsizing. To us, we looked at it. I'll
7 tell you Bob and his staff looked at it, and it seemed to us
8 that was fulfilling the requirement on a cost effective
9 basis.
10 We are very well aware and we are perfectly happy
11 that the Commission is looking at this issue, because we know
12 that it is controversial, and we know that you will be
13 objective about it. But the reason we support, and supported
14 was because we are trying to do just that -- reduce capacity
15 on a cost effective basis.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I hate to beat a dead horse,
17 but I asked the Secretary of the Air Force that if we closed
18 one, would the Air Force be able to sustain its readiness and
19 modernization accounts, and the out years with the costs
20 involved with closing the cheapest one, whatever that one
21 was. Whether OSD will be able to handle that, from a -- from
22 the budgeting process --

Page 292

1 MR. GOTBAUM: I have learned, sir, in my one year
2 at the Department of Defense, never to make promises about
3 what OSD can pay for, especially in the current environment.
4
5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Given that's a maybe answer --
6 what about two?
7 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me say this. We have not, at
8 least, not recently, looked at what the up front closure
9 costs are, or would be, for closing a whole depot. The -- we
10 did look when the Air Force came forward and said our
11 estimate of closure costs is -X-, and they did, in fact, seem
12 to us to be plausible at the time. And that was, as I
13 recall, a very substantial sum approaching a billion dollars.
14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: It's a little more than that
15 now, isn't it?
16 MR. GOTBAUM: And, there is no denying that up
17 front costs do matter, and up front costs do constrain us.
18 And, there is no denying that even something as important as
19 base closure has to be measured against modernization, and so
20 I don't want to leave you with the impression that we are
21 confident or comfortable that we could take a depot closing,
22 and pay for it with the budgets that we have allocated for

Page 293

1 BRAC. I can't give you that assurance, sir.
2 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: That's two maybe's, sir, we'll
3 accredit you for. I'd like to follow up on something
4 Commissioner Cox said. You know, we're always looking for
5 interservicing. And one of the things the community came
6 forward on was moving the Marines, because the congestion of
7 the area down in San Diego at Miramar -- moving the Marines
8 to March Air Field -- or March Air Force Base, depending on
9 how old you are -- and, the answer we basically got from the
10 Commandant today was, yes, he'd like to do that.
11 But, he'd like somebody else to pay the bill. We
12 asked each one of the services -- would they step up to that
13 process, and each one of them respectfully declined. Now I -
14 - would OSD be willing to step up to that process? I mean,
15 what is the OSD position on it?
16 MR. GOTBAUM: I'll tell you, sir. This is easy.
17 We -- if we had our druthers, we wouldn't do any of this. It
18 is because we have to pay the bill that we're doing this. I
19 am very well -- very familiar with the proposal that we put
20 this capacity in March, rather than where we have slotted it
21 in the various places we've slotted it. The issue is that it
22 would cost money. It would cost money, you should pardon the

Page 294

1 expression, up front.
2 And we are clearly budgeted concerning that in the
3 interim. And it would -- furthermore, it would, in effect,
4 add an active duty component, and add the infrastructure for
5 an active duty component at a base which is now strictly a
6 reserve base. So, it would cost a fair amount of money. So
7 I'm not surprised that the Commandant said sure, as long as
8 you'd pay for it, I'd take it.
9 Okay. But, the issue is, from the perspective of
10 the taxpayers and the Department of Defense as a whole,
11 because we do have to pay for it, we think there are better
12 ways to do it.
13 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, could I have one
14 more short question?
15 CHAIRMAN DIXON: You certainly may.
16 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Being an aviator, I am very
17 concerned about wind tunnels, and things like that. And, and
18 then NSWC at White Oak -- that Hypersonic Wind Tunnel? And
19 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to this
20 facility as a national treasure -- unique national
21 capability. National treasure is my word. Have you looked
22 at your requirements from an OSD perspective of wind tunnels?

Page 295

1 I mean, you've got one in Tennessee, you have one
2 in White Oak. Is that excess to your requirements, even
3 though it has a unique capability?
4 MR. GOTBAUM: Unfortunately, sir, the answer to
5 that, unfortunately, for those who would like for us to keep
6 that facility is open, the answer is yes. It is excess to
7 our requirements. Let me give you -- this is a case in which
8 -- to go back to the Commandant's example about, if I don't
9 have to pay for it, I'd like to use it? Okay.
10 The folks who operate that wind tunnel at White
11 Oak, with whom I have personally spoken, I'll tell you, tell
12 me that they have for a number of years been trying to get
13 other components of DOD to pay the operating costs. It
14 costs, if I recall correctly -- and if I'm off by half a
15 million dollars, I apologize -- about $3.5 million a year to
16 operate that facility.
17 And they are having trouble getting a half a
18 million dollars of other support from other DOD components.
19 What that says to me is that, yes, if it's free, this is
20 something we like. But right now, it's not free. And
21 therefore, with respect, we think it's better that in fact,
22 we concentrate our capacity elsewhere.

Page 296

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, thank you Mr. Secretary,
2 and Mr. Chairman, if I had another time, I'd ask what about
3 private industry, but I think I'll pass on the wind tunnel.
4 Thank you.
A PARTICIPANT: Oh. It's one of my other
estions.
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Lee Kling.
COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you. I noticed that you
9 made some statements about the labs, and wanting to do that.
10 And I don't want to get into that, but I would just like to
11 make a comment that leads me almost to my next one, is that
12 is -- I think we ought to be careful when we tear apart the
13 labs in our high tech areas, and so forth, and split them up
14 and send them to the winds.
15 And I recognize that you think that, but I happen
16 to think that our future is the high tech, and is the labs,
17 and is those things, as opposed to storage. So -- which
18 makes me then ask the question of you that, on March -- and I
19 want to read you a little bit -- on March 1st, the DOD
20 submitted 146 realignment or closure actions to the
21 Commission.
22 And to date, the services have revised 63 of these

Page 297

1 146 recommendations, resulting in an increase in the one-time
2 cost of $170 million, and a decrease in the annual savings of
3 $130 million. And that's shown on the chart that we have, or
4 hopefully -- I hope we're passing to you something you can
5 see a little bit better than that, Mr. Secretary.
6 MR. GOTBAUM: I will admit to being blind, sir, but
7 that one's tough.
8 COMMISSIONER KLING: You have one. I guess -- this
9 is what you originally showed us, in essence. This is where
10 we are today. And my first question is, do you agree --
11 I'll wait for a minute -- the question is, do you agree with
12 these revised estimates of the cost and savings that we now
13 have in front of us, in essence.
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Commissioner, I would -- having spent
15 most of my life working with numbers and estimates, and
cially when I'm under oath, I am not going to be so naive
o cavalier as to tell you that yes, I subscribe to these
mbers exactly. I think what we can say on this, just
19 having seen this piece of paper, is that the following things
20 are true.
21 One is, we are re-estimating, partly as the result
22 of your request, partly as the result of suggestions on the

Page 298

1 part of community, and partly because we want to make sure
2 that we're doing this right. We are re-estimating from the
3 moment we make a recommendation.
4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Again, I -- excuse me.
5 MR. GOTBAUM: That, always in the first round,
6 raises the costs. Lowers the savings. I personally take
7 some comfort in the fact that what you're telling me is that
8 after that process has gone through, we're still talking
9 about something which would save the taxpayers -- I said
10 eighteen, you're saying nineteen billion dollars -- so that
11 overall, in fact, the savings are substantially on the same
12 order of magnitude as they are.
13 Does that mean there aren't changes? Yes, sir,
14 there are -- I would characterize them, though, as -- in
15 percentage terms -- relatively small. And I would also want
16 to point out and make a very important part of the record, is
17 that I am absolutely confident -- as confident as I was that
18 the numbers would change between March 1 and today, I am
19 equally confident they will change again once you make your
20 decision.
21 COMMISSIONER KLING: And I agree and we all know
22 that that is what happens to these numbers but when you look

Page 299

1 and say from where we started that we're now down $130
2 million on an annual in saving and we have to add to that now
3 -- in the cost of -- we have to add to that Kirkland now
4 because Kirkland is not going to provide the savings that was
5 originally provided into these number.
6 And I guess really the question I'm trying to ask
7 you is that you have certain items budgeted going forward in
8 the process and you counted on certain of these savings and
9 these costs there and my only simple question is if we're
10 falling off of these savings that we encounter, wouldn't you
11 encourage us to look for alternate ways to beef these back up
12 to find things such as -- such as -- and I'm back because all
13 of us are on the depot business but such as looking at
14 something like that that maybe could take us back up into the
15 savings level if it was sound.
16 I'm not trying to get to a specific dollar number.
17 MR. GOTBAUM: No, no, you raise a serious point and
18 I think it deserves a serious answer. The answer is it is
19 clearly the case that we're looking for the Commission to
20 help us lower infrastructure costs and as we said when we
21 first testified, we would hope that in any case you decide
22 that we have made a mistake, if you can, that you find a

Page 300

1 substitute that you discuss it with us because there are
2 always military and operational implications for all these
3 changes.
4 Having said that, one of the things that I hope the
5 Commission is cognizant of is this issue of up-front costs is
6 a real issue and it is helpful long term but maybe not
7 feasible short term to help us by adding hundreds of millions
8 of dollars to the BRAC budget in '97 if that's the way we
9 achieve the 2001 savings.
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: But if we found that the cost
11 of closing was that we could get a payback in three to four
12 years, then you would support that?
13 MR. GOTBAUM: Let me be clear. There are lots of
14 issues that are not on this table that have paybacks in
15 three, four, five, six years, okay, and they are not there
16 because they would require substantial chunks of money up
17 front. It is partly for that reason, frankly, that most of
18 the flag officers with whom I'm spoken -- and I can't say
19 everyone but a lot have said I do want another round of BRAC
20 and usually the answer is longer than three or four years but
21 that period of time but remember that three or four year
22 payback ignores the question of how much you pay up front and

Page 301

1 how much you pay up front is really what we are budgeting to.
2 COMMISSIONER KLING: My time is up but just
3 specifically, if we found -- and I don't have this as a
4 fact -- if we found at a depot the cost to close was $450
5 million and the annual savings was $150 million, how would
6 you feel about that?
7 MR. GOTBAUM: And that this was -- and the
8 Department had made a recommendation which would have saved
9 less money in a way that was less military --
10 COMMISSIONER KLING: I'm just saying in theory, if
11 a cost to close of a depot was at $450-500 million 400 and we
12 could save and that the savings figure would end up to be
13 $150 million a year, how would you just feel about that?
14 MR. GOTBAUM: I would think it would be something
15 which when we can afford it, we would like to do and the
16 issue is can we afford it. I'm really not trying to dodge
17 your point but I think it is genuinely important to
18 understand that there is a budge constraint under which we
19 operate.
20 Now, I will tell you that I meant what I said about
21 the rhetoric of more money for defense has colored people's
22 views because a lot of folks within the building, even, have

Page 302

1 said "Whoa, well, now we're going to have more money and
2 therefore, we don't need to close as much." But what they
3 don't see and what the controller of the Department of
4 Defense reminded me as recently as yesterday is for every
5 additional dollar that the Congress is promising us, there
6 are $5 of claimants and so my suspicion is when we "get a
7 little more money", we're not going to have a little more
8 money; we're going to have a little less money and as you do
9 your deliberations, we hope you will take quite seriously
10 into account sir.
11 COMMISSIONER KLING: Thank you.
12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Montoya.
13 MR. MONTOYA: I guess the day is approaching when
14 our second guessing you all is going to end and it's going to
15 turn the other way and I'm beginning to feel that heat and
16 therefore, though I find your answers today, as last time,
17 very interesting and you're a very interesting witness but at
18 the same time, your glibness gives me some discomfort because
19 I sense that we're all over the line on so many things and I
20 sense it not so much from you, Mr. Gotbaum, but the result of
21 SECDEF whatever guidance you gave or did not give the
22 services because we've got a number of theories of how you

Page 303

1 deal with excess capacity and the Air Force has one, the Army
2 has another and the Navy has something in between those two.
3
4 I'll give you an example of your own words. You
5 talked about Brooks Air Force Base and closing the base down
6 and moving things to another place and you're getting rid of
7 lab capacity. I would argue that using the Air Force
8 definition of ALCs, you aren't getting rid of any capacity
9 because what you're doing is you're taking a right-side
10 laboratory supposedly, fully worked and you're going to move
11 it someplace else and what you're really doing is trying to
12 reduce infrastructure support by closing the entire base.
13 You're going to take advantage of another base's overhead by
14 moving this lab capacity that you have to another location.
15 The Air Force's argument with us is really saying,
16 Commission, we have right-sized our capacity to meet our work
17 load in a different way than closing things. You're going to
18 cost us more money by forcing us to move our capacity around.
19 Then we have that other stuff we've accounted for, the empty
20 spaces and the idle machines, that's all been factored into
21 our cost structure and so we don't have excess capacity. We
22 have right-sized.

Page 304

1 As we look at things where the Navy closes a
2 shipyard, now, that's closing excess capacity and that's
3 getting rid of excess capacity because something has gone a
4 way. Closing a wind tunnel, your other example, that's
5 getting rid of excess capacity. It's gone.
6 And so to the extent a service closes something, no
7 longer needing it, I think you'd give them great deference to
8 that decision but when they're not closing something like
9 Kirkland, just moving it around, then it becomes a matter of
10 cost. I think your hurdle is higher to overcome our
11 questioning when you're closing nothing but you're merely
12 moving things about and I think that's where Kirkland failed.
13 So, let me try to pin your down on Long Beach,
14 having used that as a backdrop. We really need to know
15 specifically what it costs to close a shipyard because we're
16 entering a very difficult decision phase and I have seen the
17 official Navy numbers to close Long Beach is something on the
18 order of -- I think it's less than $100 million, the cost to
19 do that.
20 I'm also aware of an internal NAVSEA memorandum
21 from the shipyard commander to his hierarchy that he's
22 talking about closure costs in excess of $400 million. Now,

Page 305

1 that is a huge variation and I would ask you to find out -- I
2 didn't ask the Navy specifically because I wanted OSD to take
3 a role in this. I'd like to know what are the facts of
4 closing Long Beach Naval shipyard and secondly, I think in
5 the case of shipyards, we have the further benefit of other
6 closures. There seems to be some history that estimates for
7 closing shipyards have been far lower than actual experience
8 and so we have some empirical evidence to better calculate
9 the closing of the Long Beach Naval shipyard.
10 So, for the record and before the 22nd, I would
11 really like to get from you what that answer is because it is
12 so important and I think I understand Air Force's -- and one
13 of your definitions of excess capacity. You might have two
14 or three more but I think I understand one.
15 MR. GOTBAUM: I will not be glib. I will give you
16 a one-word answer; yes.
17 MR. MONTOYA: Thank you.
18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Robles.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Just a couple of quick
20 questions and you can well imagine the depo issue is going to
21 hit you right between the eyes one more time with feeling and
22 I just have the first question, kind of an interesting

Page 306

1 question and you understand this has been a very interesting
2 day. We started off the day with one service telling us that
3 they want to take all their capacity, wring it out, get down
4 to the very most optimum, leanest structure they can, take
5 risks, admitted risks because they think it's manageable risk
6 because of -- there's actually other things.
7 Then we're followed up by another service that says
8 oh, by the way, we're very risk averse and so we're not going
9 to close anything. We want to just downsize it, lay it away
10 and get ready for the big one. And then right in the middle
11 of it, the Navy says we're kind of halfway there. So we're
12 trying to wrestle with this issue.
13 And then I was also interested in hearing that the
14 United State Air Force just told us that 71 percent of all
15 DOD closure savings have been achieved by the Air Force.
16 Now, Mr. Gotbaum, does it make sense that the United States
17 Air Force has to date, achieved 71 percent of all BRAC
18 savings? Is that a true number? A number you can certify
19 to?
20 MR. GOTBAUM: Can I deal with the easy ones first?
21 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I mean, this was in testimony
22 today, we were told that they had been a leader in closures

Page 307

1 in the United States Air Force, that they, in fact, have
2 saved some $18 billion, that is 71 percent of all the savings
3 achieved by the Department of Defense in this base closure
4 process and I thought that was a very interesting number.
5 MR. GOTBAUM: And Commissioner, since I cannot,
6 right now, from memory, let me absolutely circle back on that
7 one.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Could you please get back to
9 us on that and validate the voracity. There are some
10 assumptions there we're not understanding and that didn't go
11 along with that number.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: Right,, if I can deal with your first
13 question, which is why is it that my father's house has many
14 restructuring plans. That, I'll tell you sir, is not to me -
15 - and I spent a lot of time in the private sector doing
16 restructuring -- that, by itself, is not a surprise.
17 Let's go back and take the previous commissioner's
18 point about the wind tunnel, okay, in which we're "closing
19 one facility and actually shrinking our use of land but we're
20 actually using the land next door." And this is genuinely a
21 case in which there is no one-size-fits-all approach.
22 As you know, much better than I, the Department is

Page 308

1 big place, it has a range of activities. I'm trying to worry
2 about -- and so frankly, I would not be surprised that there
3 were circumstances in which we saved money by closing an
4 installation entirely and also that there were times when we
5 saved more money by cutting out pieces. That frankly does
6 not surprise me at all. The issue for us and the issue for
7 the Commission and I'm not going to be glib about it; I'm
8 going to be blunt about it, is which is the one that saves
9 money most cost effectively and maintains the military
10 mission. That's the question and we know it's a question on
11 the Commission's plate. We're glad that it's on your plate
12 and we're going to deal with that.
13 My staff, proving that they are as competent as I
14 like to claim in public, reminds me that it is probably true
15 that the Air Force statement, as made, is true because in the
16 early rounds -- the way you get savings in this business, as
17 you know, is you spend a lot of money up front and then -- so
18 the first three years, you don't save anything; you spend and
19 then you start getting savings. And in the earliest rounds
20 of BRAC, '88 and '91, the Air Force closed a lot of
21 facilities, okay.
22 So, I suspect that it is true that if you looked as

Page 309

1 savings achieved to date, not of costs, that the Air Force is
2 responsible for a lot of them. One thing I can tell you
3 though, is that we, as part of our analysis, when the
4 Secretary's recommendations came to the Department of
5 Defense, Bob and I looked at all three services' estimated
6 savings from the three rounds that we've had and the rounds
7 that we're recommending and I will tell you, sir -- and
8 frankly, I was surprised -- they were very close to the same
9 for each service.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And that's what I thought.
11 I'd just like for you to make that available to us.
12 MR. GOTBAUM: And we will send you those numbers.
13 So, over the fullness of time, the three rounds plus the ones
14 there, truth is they look like every service was making a
15 very serious effort.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And I didn't want to add on
17 to but the numbers because your one-size-fits-all A to Z
18 approach would be okay if the numbers were all consistent but
19 when they're also major differences in assumptions about what
20 gets saved, what doesn't get saved, what's a cost, what's a
21 savings, it really causes us perplexing problems and this is
22 what we're dealing with right now.

Page 310

1 The second question has to do with the depo joint
2 cross service groups and I know they went through a lot of
3 deliberation but we heard today for the first time -- at
4 least I heard it for the first time, I won't speak for the
5 other commissioners -- that readiness was an issue. Never
6 before had I heard that when you all did the deliberations,
7 there was a readiness impact but today, it was testified that
8 now we're raising the readiness specter and saying oh, by the
9 way, we can't close because if we do that, there will be a
10 readiness impact and I just had never heard that and I
11 wondered if you had heard that in the joint cross service
12 groups or any other time?
13 MR. GOTBAUM: Not having the benefit of the
14 testimony this morning, it is very clear and that part of the
15 reason General Klugh -- and I should probably let him answer
16 this -- we're in a process, not as difficult or as miserable
17 as this process, but pretty difficult last year with the
18 services trying to define core. Why were they trying to
19 define core? Because they were trying to define that level
20 of work load which, in order to maintain our ability to fight
21 wars, which is how we define readiness, okay, ought to be in-
22 house.

Page 311

1 So with respect I think that the job that General
2 Klugh was trying to do was precisely one of saying how much
3 capacity can I reduce before I threaten readiness. And
4 although we do not run around very often in the Department of
5 Defense saying tick, tick, tick, tick, oh, killed readiness
6 etc. We try to make judgments about what capacity we can
7 afford and what level of risks and that's what the level of
8 debate is.
9 But if nobody has said that if we eliminated all
10 depo capacity, we would not be ready, then that's clearly
11 true. The issue here is what levels do we need.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: And that's a good
13 clarification. I just wondered if any other service, the
14 Army, the Air Force, the Navy brought up the readiness issue
15 as saying if we got rid of the proposed over capacity, we
16 would run into a readiness problem. What you're telling me
17 is that would not -- your recommendations were consistent
18 with maintaining readiness and yet, being able to downsize
19 the infrastructure and getting rid of excess capacity.
20 MR. GOTBAUM: Keep in mind, sir, that what we, in
21 effect, did is ask the service, both military and civilian
22 what is your judgment, keeping military value first, as to

Page 312

1 the kinds of reductions you can recommend consistent with
2 readiness. And so in every service there were depot
3 facilities in which the service said I want this one, I need
4 this one and therefore, we're not going to touch it, in every
5 service.
6 With your permission, sir, I'd like to let General
7 Klugh, who is responsible for this in the --
8 GENERAL KLUGH: Briefly, Commissioner Robles, I
9 will just say that the readiness issue was addressed, as Josh
10 was saying, through sizing the depots to core. And that we
11 were protecting the capability to support all of the key
12 weapons systems that might be involved in a JCS scenario.
13 None of the alternatives that we sent forward to
14 the services violated that. All of those alternatives, both
15 in DM1 and DM2, took the core under consideration and,
16 therefore, readiness under consideration.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, sir. So what I'm
18 hearing you say, then, is if you right-size the depots to be
19 able to meet that core capacity that you identified in your
20 group, you should not have a readiness problem.
21 GENERAL KLUGH: That is correct.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you, sir.

Page 313

1 MR. BAYER: Commissioner Robles, I'd like to add
2 one further point, in terms of readiness. And that is that
3 the Joint Cross Service group was looking at readiness from
4 the logistics point of view, i.e., sizing to core. But when
5 the services then looked at their bases, particularly in the
6 Air Force where there were multi-service or multi-mission
7 bases, their readiness construct for that base was broader
8 than simply logistics. So that might be another reason why
9 you received that input.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Thank you. I understand.
11 Because they have air fields there and they do other
12 ancillary missions there that may have a readiness impact.
13 But again, we're not talking about reducing those.
14 The argument has always been about taking the depot
15 maintenance function within an air logistics center, for
16 example, and downsizing it to do core capacity work. And so
17 that ought not have a readiness impact unless you have to
18 degrade the base support structure sufficiently such that it
19 may affect other missions. I thought I understood the
20 equation. I was just making sure.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, commissioner.
22 Commissioner Steele.

Page 314

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Good afternoon. Am I correct
2 in that the Secretary's guidelines for the Department for
3 BRAC '95 instructed the services not to include or consider
4 environmental cleanup costs in putting forth their
5 recommendations. Is my memory of that memo right?
6 MR. GOTBAUM: From day one -- and I mean day one
7 like 1988 or certainly the 1991 round -- it has been the
8 policy of the Department of Defense -- in other words, it is
9 not just this Secretary of Defense, but it's been all of
10 them -- essentially that environmental cleanup -- we know
11 that we have to clean up our land whether it is active or
12 not. And we therefore did not want to bias ourselves, in
13 effect, against doing cleanup where we ought, by putting that
14 on the table since we have to pay the freight whether it's
15 open or closed.
16 And so yes, it is true in this round, and it was
17 true in previous rounds, that they estimate operating costs,
18 they estimate compliance costs, but they don't estimate
19 cleanup costs, and they leave those off to the side. Now, it
20 is of course absolutely true that once we make a closure
21 decision we in fact -- if we want to do reuse, we have to do
22 that cleanup, and that's why that cost gets factored into our

Page 315

1 BRAC recommendations. Is that clear?
2 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Sure. My follow-up question
3 then would be, the Secretary of the Air Force this morning
4 specifically said that we should not consider an ALC due to
5 environmental costs. There were some other issues mentioned,
6 but that was mentioned specifically. Given the Secretary of
7 Defense's guidance to the Department and the testimony we
8 heard this morning, how would you counsel the Commission on
9 whether or not we consider environmental cleanup costs as we
10 proceed into this final week?
11 MR. GOTBAUM: Again, I don't have the benefit of
12 the Secretary of the Air Force's testimony but, having
13 discussed this issue with her in the past, I think the issue,
14 as I tried to say it before, which is we try to keep
15 environmental cleanup costs off the decision of which base
16 you close.
17 In other words, if we have two bases, one that has
18 a lot of environmental cleanup and another that doesn't,
19 okay, we don't think environmental cleanup ought to get into
20 that factor because if we did, every base commander in the
21 world would understand that what he ought to do is drop a lot
22 of oil drums in sensitive places. We don't want to do that,

Page 316

1 okay. That would be a mistake.
2 So we try to be try to be neutral in this and make
3 the decision. But we are under a budget constraint and, as a
4 result -- and it is true not just in the Air Force; the Army
5 and the Navy, too -- they keep a running tab of how much
6 money they think they have for base closure. And as a
7 result, in effect, what we do -- and this gets to a point
8 that the other commissioner made -- some things don't come on
9 this list because they simply add a lot of upfront cost, even
10 though they are nominally high payoff.
11 And that is, I believe, the context in which the
12 Air Force said, Is there a payoff for closing a depot?
13 Answer: Yes, there is. Is there an upfront cost? Answer:
14 Yes, there is. Is it large? Yes, and therefore if we can do
15 it more cheaply we will.
16 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. And to follow up
17 there, and this is sort of a continuation of a couple of my
18 colleagues' questions. If you could put on your investment
19 banker hat for me, please, for a moment, and you have a
20 choice here, looking at ALCs. We've got the $276 million
21 that was budgeted for the closure of Kirtland.
22 MR. GOTBAUM: Seventy-eight.

Page 317

1 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I think I have that number
2 right, or close. If you look at Brooks Air Force Base and
3 the community's contonement plan, true, the steady-state
4 savings are half the department's recommendation, but we're
5 talking numbers of 17.6 versus 32.2. But the upfront cost
6 for Brooks, if we do the Department's recommendation, it's
7 211 million; the community's is only 32.
8 I can give you, Mr. Investment Banker, 200 million
9 upfront for Brooks, two hundred and whatever I said --
10 seventy-six million -- for Kirtland, and give you a steady-
11 state savings a heck of a lot bigger than the difference
12 between 11 and 17, is this a proposal you would interested
13 in?
14 MR. GOTBAUM: Having spent a lot of time on both
15 sides of the table, buying and selling, I think it's very
16 important to ask the question of, Am I buying or selling? If
17 I'm selling --
18 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Short answer, please.
19 MR. GOTBAUM: Okay. I think the issue is what the
20 numbers really are. We -- let's be very direct. Whenever a
21 community comes to us and says, "We can save you money as
22 long as you leave capacity lying around," I cover my wallet.

Page 318

1 And that is what in many, many, many cases communities have
2 done.
3 We don't like this process, okay. It is miserable.
4 But that is all too often exactly what people are saying.
5 That's what's going on at Brooks. It's what going on at
6 Rome. And as a result, can we "save" money? Sure, we can
7 save money by leaving excess capacity.
8 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I can save you a lot more
9 money in the long haul by providing to the Department the
10 upfront costs that were testified a couple months ago that,
11 had they been there, the Air Force would have gone a
12 different course. So, all right, one more last question
13 here.
14 I really do commend all of you on the work of the
15 Joint Cross Service groups. I think they really did do a
16 good job. My frustration in this chair is they had the
17 responsibility, but they didn't have the authority to make it
18 happen. Getting back to Commissioner Davis' comment about
19 interservicing, I would like to provide the Department the
20 greatest flexibility with the recommendations -- they're not
21 recommendations -- with the report that we send forth.
22 However, given the track record on

Page 319

1 interservicing -- you mentioned depot maintenance council as
2 a suggestion on should we close a depot or two, where that
3 workload could be best directed. Does the depot maintenance
4 council have the authority to make it happen?
5 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes.
6 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Interservice? Okay. I just
7 want to be sure.
8 MR. GOTBAUM: Yes, it does.
9 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay. Lastly, General
10 Babbitt, the Ogden community has forwarded a concept paper
11 which basically allows DOD to divest ownership of the DDO
12 property but allow DLA to lease it back to meet its short-
13 term capacity needs for storage, which I guess are stated at
14 21 million if we accept the Department's recommendation. I
15 guess that number has since maybe become a little bit iffy.
16 Given the shortfall in storage capacity and the
17 potential additional shortfall should the Commission proceed
18 to do a different approach to the ALC issue, have you had an
19 opportunity to look at the Ogden community's proposal? And
20 could you comment on that?
21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Yes, we have. The
22 risk of a shortfall -- the 21 that was originally stated,

Page 320

1 what we now feel is closer to 10 million, if there are no
2 other changes made -- is truly a risk. And we would there is
3 some reasonable probability it would never be required. To
4 now enter into an agreement with Ogden to lease space that we
5 never need didn't seem prudent to us. And therefore we
6 reject that offer now.
7 If in fact it should come to pass that some of that
8 capacity is required, certainly it is available to us, that
9 we would enter into agreement either Ogden or communities
10 that have facilities -- other facilities that might be
11 affected by closure to cover a short-term shortfall. And we
12 would propose that was one of our risk management approaches.
13 COMMISSIONER STEELE: To my surprise, I haven't
14 been handed a note that says my time is expired, so I'm going
15 to follow up and ask you what happened to this 21 million
16 shortage. I mean, back at the beginning, when we heard that
17 was out there --
18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Why did it go from 21
19 to --
20 COMMISSIONER STEELE: -- and that was one of the
21 reasons where the ALCs said, "Oh, well, look, we'll have
22 room, another good reason to downsize." Do you not need that

Page 321

1 room -- oops, I got my note.
2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Does that mean I don't
3 have to answer? We had proposed $21 million as a prudent
4 risk long before there was any offer made by the Air Force
5 for excess capacity at the five ALCs if none were closed.
6 And we still feel that's a prudent rise, and we still feel
7 that that's a lean forward approach that DLA should make.
8 There is the possibility that inventory
9 requirements will go down even further than we've been able
10 to estimate now. And therefore we would still feel there's a
11 possibility we will never require that additional space.
12 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Okay, thank you. And I wish
13 you look in your new post as you replace our shadow.
14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Thank you.
15 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We do have to have a little
16 nor once in a while.
17 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Very little.
18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Even in this process. I
19 just have two quick questions and then we'll be finished.
20 Mr. Gotbaum, you had said in answer to Commissioner Kling's
21 question about -- he gave you -- about the scenario involving
22 400, 500 million dollars to close and 150 annual savings, you

Page 322

1 had said if you could find that kind of money to close a
2 depot, you would do that. Is that correct? Did I hear your
3 answer correctly?
4 MR. GOTBAUM: What I said is, we're looking for the
5 payoffs that we can afford. And that is precisely what we
6 are doing throughout this process.
7 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: If I took the 278 million
8 that would be saved now that we're not going to Kirtland, and
9 I take the 127 million that would be saved on the down-sizing
10 of a depot, that would give us 405 million. Wouldn't that go
11 a long ways towards the closure of a depot, assuming it was
12 in the 400 to 600 million dollar range.
13 MR. GOTBAUM: At the risk of being contentious, are
14 we also including in the ledger the increase costs that we've
15 discovered in all the other places that the Commission still
16 agrees should be close.
17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, if we want to do
18 that, we can start including in a lot of other costs, too,
19 and savings. Like if we have savings of $50 million dollars
20 a year by not upgrading equipment that is on that site -- you
21 know, there has been a figure out that infrastructure costs
22 and improvements over a 30-year period, I believe, but I'd

Page 323

1 have to go back and get those numbers. But anyway, it
2 amounts to $50 million a year to keep upgrading the equipment
3 and repairing it and replacing it and the infrastructure and
4 everything that exists in the depots.
5 So I mean, we can play a lot of numbers games here.
6 But my question is, Couldn't that money be used for closure
7 then?
8 MR. GOTBAUM: The answer is, yes, sir. And I don't
9 want to play numbers games, but I want to be very direct.
10 The congress does not give us infinite year money. The
11 congress gives us money year by year. And therefore there
12 are a lot things, dozens of things, that this Department
13 would love to do that would save billions of dollars that
14 require upfront costs of only tens of millions or hundreds of
15 millions, that we do not do.
16 And all I ask is, as you consider our
17 recommendations, and as you form your own, keep in mind both
18 parts of the equation. That's all.
19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We will do that, sir. And
20 I thank you. I have one last question for General Babbitt.
21 If the closure of one or more ALCs would happen, would
22 that -- how would that affect your previous recommendations

Page 324

1 in regard to DLA activities. Would some of those
2 recommendations have to be changed? Or would there be
3 sufficient capacity to pick up whatever would come out of
4 those ALCs?
5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: First of all, Mr.
6 Commissioner, it depends on other recommendations in part,
7 that the commission may recommend. And say, for example, you
8 had considered the alternatives of Letterkenny and Tobyhanna
9 Army Depots and also Red River Army Depot in your discussions
10 so far. And whatever decisions you might recommend there
11 would also affect our capacity and requirement for storage.
12 But, because I don't know the answer to that, I'll
13 qualify my answer and say if you assume that only the four
14 depots that DLA originally recommended for closure are going
15 to be closed, then we proposed a 21 million cubic foot
16 shortfall as a risk. And we honestly felt that it was a good
17 possibility that that shortfall would disappear by 2001 and
18 therefore would never have to be replaced.
19 We still feel that we can manage that risk, and we
20 have tried to be reasonable about that by saying how would we
21 manage that, and we have a list of a number of alternatives,
22 which exceed by quite a bit the 21 million cubic feet, that

Page 325

1 we would use to manage the risk if the need came about.
2 That shortfall represented about 5 percent of our
3 expected capacity in 2001, and we thought it was prudent.
4 That 21 million shortfall has now changed to 10 because of
5 some fact-of-life changes, which I could itemize for you. We
6 have already presented those to the Commission in written
7 form. But I'd say those are fact-of-life changes,
8 information that has changed since we submitted our report.
9 If the Commission were to recommend no closures of
10 AlCs, we would certainly have more than enough capacity at
11 the ALCs, the five ALCs, excess to handle any shortfall that
12 might eventually happen. If you closed one ALC, it's our
13 assessment that we would still have sufficient risk
14 management capability to not change our recommendation at
15 all.
16 If, on the other hand, you close two ALCs, we would
17 still propose to manage 15 to 20 million cubic feet of risk.
18 And that would leave probably somewhere in the neighborhood
19 of 18 to 20 million cubic feet that should probably be
20 considered reestablishment through some other means.
21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: So if an ALC was closed,
22 the depot at that site would also be closed, the DLA depot?

Page 326

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: Our position on what
2 we have called collocated depots is, there purpose for being
3 there is to support the maintenance depot. And therefore, if
4 the maintenance depot were to close, we would also close the
5 associated distribution depot.
6 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Before we close, I would
7 just like to return to Mr. Gotbaum, because I think he has
8 one more thing he wants to say.
9 MR. GOTBAUM: Actually, sir, it's a request. This
10 Commission and this staff has been absolutely terrific in
11 making clear what the Commission's concerns are and asking
12 the Department for information. And I hope we have been as
13 forthcoming in providing it.
14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You have.
15 MR. GOTBAUM: It's clear from your questions and
16 clear from your concerns that you're considering a lot of
17 mixing and matching. And I would offer and ask that, as you
18 consider the alternatives, we would obviously like to, both
19 because we know something about this and because there is
20 military judgment and other things involved, help in that
21 process, participate in the process anytime. I can assert
22 with absolute confidence that we have a 24-hour-a-day

Page 327

1 operation.
2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I appreciate your patience
3 with this chairman, as I've asked you the questions today. I
4 know it's been a long and arduous process for us. I know
5 we've had -- we just went nonstop for the last few months.
6 So if there was any shortness, I apologize for that.
7 MR. GOTBAUM: Sir, all I can promise you is that,
8 if I could substitute you for any of several committee
9 chairmen in Congress who I am not dumb enough to name, I'd do
10 it in a second. Thank you, sir.
11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Before we read the closing
12 statement, I would turn to Commissioner Montoya for just a
13 comment.
14 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: General, I failed to mention
15 one thing. As a courtesy to two flag officers, a retired
16 flag officer, a supply corps friend of mine has written me a
17 rather contentious letter with lots of supply corps language.
18 I don't understand the letter yet. And I also got a very
19 fine, eloquent rebuttal from another supply corps flag
20 officer, which I also don't understand. But would you please
21 tell Admiral Straw that I have is response, and I will do my
22 homework, and I will understand it before this is over.

Page 328

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BABBITT: I'll be happy to do
2 that.
3 COMMISSIONER MONTOYA: Thank you very much.
4 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: We have now concluded the
5 29th and final public hearing of the 1995 base closure
6 commission. And I want to say, and I want you to carry this
7 back to all the branches of service, to other members of the
8 Department of Defense, any installation commanders you may
9 come across, that we thank you for your hospitality, your
10 cooperation, your openness through this process, and your
11 patience with us, as we struggle to find the truth and to
12 arrive at a decision.
13 I want to thank all the witnesses that have
14 appeared before us today. The information you've brought us
15 has been extremely valuable, and I mean that, Mr. Gotbaum.
16 And we will take your remarks into very serious
17 consideration.
18 We will next meet in this room on Thursday, June
19 22, to begin our final deliberations. This hearing has
20 ended.
21 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was
22 concluded.)

DRAFT CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY - AFEWES

THE AIR FORCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE EVALUATION SIMULATOR (AFEWES) IS A HIGHLY-CLASSIFIED, GOVERNMENT TEST FACILITY IN FORT WORTH, TX WHOSE MISSION IS TO IMPROVE THE SURVIVABILITY OF U.S. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT WHEN ENGAGED BY ENEMY WEAPON SYSTEMS IN TIME OF WAR. THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK PERFORMED IN AFEWES WAS FORCEFULLY BROUGHT TO MIND LAST WEEK, BY THE TRAGIC LOSS OF CAPT. SCOTT O'GRADY'S F-16 TO A BOSNIAN SA-6 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) SYSTEM.

SINCE ITS BEGINNING IN 1958, AFEWES TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E) OF ELECTRONIC COMBAT (EC) SYSTEMS HAS SAVED COUNTLESS LIVES IN CONFLICTS FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THROUGH THE VIETNAM WAR AND OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON (LIBYAN CONFLICT), TO OPERATION DESERT STORM. CONTINUED REGIONAL INSTABILITIES, WORLDWIDE, MAKE THIS ONE-OF-A-KIND FACILITY AS CRITICALLY-NEEDED AS EVER BEFORE. DESPITE ITS ESTABLISHED IMPORTANCE TO THE WARFIGHTER, THE AIR FORCE HAS OPTED TO RECOMMEND "DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELOCATION" OF THIS VALUED NATIONAL ASSET. THE "OFFICIAL" RATIONALE JUSTIFYING THIS ACTION IS BADLY FLAWED!

THE AIR FORCE WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE THAT AFEWES WILL BE REESTABLISHED INTACT ON THE WEST COAST AND CLAIMS "MOVING AFEWES WILL NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF NEEDED T&E CAPABILITY." THE AIR FORCE'S "PROGRAMMING PLAN 94-04" HOWEVER, CONFIRMS, THAT THE MAJORITY OF AFEWES SIMULATIONS OF BOSNIAN THREATS (AND OTHER HOT SPOTS AROUND THE WORLD) WILL BE DISCARDED! THIS SERIOUS OVERSITE TYPIFIES THE FALLACY OF THE AIR FORCE ARGUMENT TO MOVE AFEWES.

THE AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF $7M TO MOVE AFEWES CONSIDERS ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF OVERALL CAPABILITY AND DOES NOT INCLUDE DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING OF THE REPLACEMENT WORKFORCE. ACTUAL COSTS OF MOVING THE COMPLETE CAPABILITY, WITH SUITABLE DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING, WILL COST $60-70M AND GREATLY INCREASE THE TIME REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI). THIS RESULT IS INTOLERABLE IN TODAY'S BUDGET ENVIRONMENT!

AN OFFICIAL AIR FORCE DOCUMENT STATES "MOST AFEWES TESTING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ELSEWHERE"; ALTHOUGH THE "ELSEWHERE" IS NEVER IDENTIFIED. IN REALITY, AFEWES HAS TRULY UNIQUE CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL BE PERMANENTLY LOST IF THE FACILITY IS DISTURBED BY BRAC.

AIR FORCE ANALYSIS SHOWS AFEWES UTILIZATION IN FY 2001 WILL APPROACH THE UTILIZATION OF ALL MAJOR DoD OPEN AIR RANGES COMBINED! THIS SAME ANALYSIS CLAIMS AFEWES IS UNDERUTILIZED BUT FAILS TO SHOW HOW UTILIZATION WILL BE INCREASED IF AFEWES IS MOVED.

MODERN ELECTRONIC COMBAT TESTING REQUIRES RADIO FREQUENCY (RF) & INFRARED (IR) SIMULATIONS IN THE SAME LOCATION. THIS CRITICAL REQUIREMENT IS MET AT AIR FORCE PLANT 4 TODAY. THE AIR FORCE BRAC PLAN, AMAZINGLY, WILL DESTROY THIS UNIQUE CAPABILITY AND SPLIT AFEWES IR & RF RESOURCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST COASTS!

THE ISSUE OF AFEWES RELOCATION HAS LESS TO DO WITH DOLLARS AND TECHNICAL JARGON THAN IT DOES WITH THE VERY SURVIVAL OF OUR AMERICAN SONS AND DAUGHTERS IN COMBAT. THEY DESERVE THE VERY BEST TEST CAPABILITY WE CAN PROVIDE! THE NATION'S BEST INTEREST IS CLEARLY SERVED IF AFEWES REMAINS IN FORT WORTH, TX AND CONTINUES TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES FOR OUR MILITARY FORCES. I'D BET CAPT SCOTT O'GRADY WOULD AGREE!

AFEWES/BRAC QUESTIONS FOR THE USAF

Question 1. Why are the majority of AFEWES systems, which represent Bosnian Threats to NATO aircraft not identified for relocation in the Air Force PPlan 94-02, Revision 2? Since many of these threats also exist in other regional "hot spots" as well, how can the apparent salvage of their AFEWES counterparts be justified?

Question 2. How can the USAF justify its BRAC recommendation without first satisfying Congressional direction and electronic networking study recomendations within its own Mission Needs Statement?

Question 3. Which validated Government T&E facilities have the current capability to duplicate the following AFEWES test categories at comparable technical fidelity and cost?

- Fully-dynamic, Infrared Alert/Response testing with actual FME seekers at correct IR wavelengths?
- Real-time, Real-frequency evaluations of RF power-managed EC systems in Theatre-specific laydowns at operationally realistic signal density/fidelity?
- Correlated multi-spectral (RF & IR) test capability at actual frequency/ wavelength in a single location as required by modern EC systems?
- RF Semi Active Missile ECM testing, over a broad Field of View, at actual frequency, with real-time, threat-specific kinematics?
- Combined countermeasure (pilot maneuver + active/expendable EC) Test Capability in the missile end-game with validated threats and manned reactive high-fidelity cockpits?

Question 4. Why does the Air Force $7M estimate for AFEWES relocation fail to account for "the time and cost of replacing experienced personnel who choose not to move to a new location" as required Air Force Mission Need Statement, AFMC 003-93? How will the loss of 1500 man years of AFEWES expertise provided by the current O&M contractor be replaced? What are the costs of Planned Reverse Engineering and the development of necessary documentation for the new O&M workforce?

Question 5. Explain in detail, the value-added, technical benefit to be derived from AFEWES relocation to AFFTC. Specifically, what additional enhanced test and evaluation capabilities will be achieved above and beyond those currently provided by AFEWES at the Air Force Plant 4 location?

ANSWERS TO AFEWES/BRAC QUESTIONS

Answer 1. The Air Force position in this area is particularly shortsighted in that it apparently considers the only threat simulations worth relocating to be the most advanced systems developed in the former Soviet Union. Older systems such as the SA-2 and SA-3 SAMS which were operational in the Vietnam War era remain viable threats to allied aircraft in many Third World regions to this day.

The unique fidelity, cost, and Quick Reaction Test Capabilities which AFEWES offers for these older threats cannot be provided in any other form of simulation.

Answer 2. Air Force Mission Needs Statement, AFMC 003-93, identifies "Networking existing US or Allied facilities" as an area of potential study to meet its own T&E needs. The 1995 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY 95 Senate Appropriations Committee Report impose restrictions on DoD initiatives to realign the EC Test and Evaluation Infrastructure. These Congressional Directives, respectively, require DoD to develop and submit to the Congress, 1) an EC Master Plan and 2) a Hardware-in-the-Loop Data Linking Report.

To date, the US Air Force has complied with neither of these Congressional directives or Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) guidance contained in its very own Mission Needs Statement for Electronic Combat (EC) Test and Evaluational (T&E) Capabilities.

A test funded by the USAF and recently completed within the AFEWES has proved, conclusively, that with the inclusion of state predictor algorithms, AFEWES Terminal Threat Systems can be electronically networked with manned cockpit simulators anywhere worldwide without appreciable degradation in the accuracy/fidelity of test results.

An Air Force technical study, which was specifically focused on Hardware-in-the-Loop (HITL) simulation has recently been completed and briefed to USAF officials. This study clearly identifies electronic linking, not facility relocation, as the most cost effective approach to meet USAF T&E technical and fiscal requirements.

Answer 3. None of the Test Categories identified in Question 3 can be accomplished at comparable technical fidelity and cost at any Government test facility other than AFEWES.

The expected Government response will probably make references to a highly classified Open Air Range, which, despite its merits, is physically unable to perform the tests identified in Question 3 and is substantially more expensive to utilize than AFEWES.

Answer 4. There is no rational explanation the Government can offer to explain how the 1500 man years of experience provided by the current AFEWES contractor can be replaced.

The $7M Government estimate was composed primarily of $5.77M physical relocation cost (estimated by the pound) and $2.1M estimate for required Military Construction (MILCON).

The Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) PPlan 94-04 provides an itemized list of the AFEWES Resources the Air Force actually intends to relocate. The current AFEWES O&M Contractor has prepared detailed estimates of the total costs involved to include development of necessary documentation and training of the replacement workforce. Using these detailed contractor estimates, the total cost of reestablishing the AFEWES assets identified in the AFMC PPlan at another government location is $29.6M.

Answer 5. There is <u>no significant technical benefit</u> associated with collocation of AFEWES with an Installed System Test Facility (Anechoic Chamber). To attempt to perform close-loop effectiveness testing with an EC system installed in the aircraft would require injection of AFEWES signals, to and from the aircraft, thus eliminating the need for the Anechoic Chamber. This signal injection requirement would require technical modifications to each AFEWES simulator, which has not been priced by the Air Force. Any minimal benefit claimed by the Air Force for this approach would be totally offset by the absence of experienced AFEWES personnel with working knowledge of the equipment involved.

This approach applied to an aircraft physically adjacent to AFEWES at Air Force Plant 4, would accomplish the same result without the unnecessary expense and lost capability of physically relocating the facility.

COMMITTEES:
NATIONAL SECURITY
SCIENCE

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June 1 1995

Colonel Tommy Dyches
Group Operations Commander
AFRES 301st Fighter Wing
NAS Fort Worth JRB
Fort Worth, Texas 76107

Dear Tommy:

As part of our community response to Austin's submission to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission on April 19 and May 10 1995, some input from the 301st FW is required.

Therefore, I would appreciate your assistance in providing a response to certain data that I will submit to the commission as part of this response.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren
Member of Congress

PG:pr

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
301 FIGHTER WING (AFRES)
NAVAL AIR STATION, JOINT RESERVE BASE
FT. WORTH TEXAS 76127 6200

MEMORANDUM FOR: Congressman Pete Geren 5 June 95

FROM: 301 OG/CC

SUBJ: Request for Information

1. Our response to your 1 June 1995 letter is at attachment 1.

2. In order to insure a complete understanding of our responses, the following format was used to address each statement in which a response was warranted:

a. the original Austin-Bergstrom Support Group (ABSG) statement, as submitted to the DBCRC at the Dallas Regional Hearing on 19 April 1995

b. the official response to the ABSG 19 April paper from HQ USAF/RT

c. the "Austin Update" of May 10 1995 which addressed the HQ USAF/RT response

d. the 301 FW response

3. If we can be of any other service to you or your staff, please feel free to call on us.

Thomas A. Dyches

Thomas A. Dyches, Colonel, USAFR
Commander, 301 Operations Group

1 Atch: 301 FW Response
cc: 301 FW/CC

History and Previous BRACC Decisions

Bergstrom Air Force Base was established in 1942 as the Del Valle Army Air Base on land purchased for that purpose by the City of Austin. For the next 50 years, the Base served our nation as the home of Continental Air Command C-47's, Strategic Air Command B-52's and KC-135's and Tactical Air Command P-82's, F-101's and RF-4's, among other aircraft. In addition to its flying operations, the base served as the home of the 12th Air Force, the TAC Senior NCO Academy, West and the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF).

The 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended and the President and Congress concurred that Bergstrom AFB be closed as an active duty Air Base. In addition, the law stated that *"The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be distributed."*

In a City Council work session on February 21, 1992, James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Military Installations, USAF, told the citizens of Austin that the 1991 BRAC law gave them until June 1993 to decide whether or not they were going to build a municipal airport at Bergstrom and that the Air Force would abide by that time line with regard to any decision about the Reserve unit. Secretary Boatright also stated, *"Our plan is still, and will remain, and our planning efforts will be toward operating that unit at Bergstrom assuming that there is going to be an airport."* and again, *"Certainly we would like to see an airport there because then we could leave the unit right where it is. But that's your decision, the community's decision, however you decide it we'll make it work for the Department of the Air Force."*

On **May 1, 1993,** the citizens of Austin by a vote of 63% to 37% overwhelmingly approved a $400 million referendum to move the airport to the Bergstrom site. Subsequent to that vote, planning was begun on the airport master plan, to include the Reserve cantonment area. That plan includes a schedule which will move the cargo operations to the new site by 1996 and the passenger operations by 1998. The vote preceded the law's June 1993 deadline and this schedule meets the timetable of making Bergstrom *"an economically viable entity by the end of 1996"*.

The 1991 law also said that, *"The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to opeate it there."* This facility strips and paints fighter aircraft in the most environmentally advanced airplane painting facility in the Air Force. At the same time, the RCCF saves the Air Force between $1.5 and $2.0 million a year over the cost of painting those 100 aircraft at a depot.

Even so, in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended to the BRAC and the '93 Brac agreed to *"Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority assumes the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date"*. Subsequently, the DOD ruled that the City must contract with an independent contractor, who would then bid on the Air Force's work. The city and DOD continue to work on this issue. Currently, the city, at its expense, has provided temporary electrical service and is rerouting utilities to the RCCF to insure its continued operation.

Also in 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended, *"The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed unless...."* At that time, the Base had not officially closed and the airport master planning was in its early stages.

The citizens BRAC task force questioned whether the Air Force had considered all services, MILCON funds in its justification. The task force showed that the DOD (Navy) could save approximately $57 million in MILCON funds at NAS Ft. Worth by collocating the 301st FW at Bergstrom and having the Navy utilize the buildings currently used by the 301st FW and those which would be used if the 704th FS moved there. This was substantially more than the $6.7 million in MILCON funds which the Secretary of Defense stated would be saved with the Bergstrom move.

They also questioned whether a base which was located in airspace with the second highest trafficked airport in the nation could effectively meet its training and unit readiness obligations. In 1991, Carswell AFB was closed in part due to, *"....the worst ground and regional air space encroachment in its category. The regional air space will continue to be stressed by aggressive aviation growth in the area."* Moving more aircraft onto the "closed" base than were there when it was an active duty base did not seem reasonable.

Although the BRAC did not recommend moving the 301st FW to Austin, *"The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to consider the recruiting problems that*

may exist by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area." and *"The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has ground-encroachment problems and is in a high density aircraft traffic pattern."* The '93 BRAC law did reaffirm the '91 BRAC law by providing that the *"Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996."*

In September of 1993, Bergstrom Air Force Base was closed as an active duty base. The 67th Reconnaissance Wing was deactivated and the 12th Air Force Headquarters and ancillary units moved to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. With the closure, Austin lost 3,870 military and 1,256 civilian jobs in addition to 6,628 military dependents. Austin's economy lost approximately $330 million a year due to the base closing.

Since September of 1993, the City of Austin has worked with the Air Force to identify a cantonment area(s) which minimizes the cost of any new construction for AFRES. They have designed the airport site plan based upon the location and configuration of that cantonment area. Designs are nearing completion and demolition and construction have begun with a projected opening of passenger service scheduled for October 1998.

Because of the Air Forces repeated promises, the '91 and '93 BRAC laws and Austin's commitment to the Reserves remaining, the city has committed to incurring additional costs in the design and construction of the new airport. These costs and/or design considerations include:

1. Location of the terminal and access to the north side of the site instead of south side. (location of the cantonment area)

   a. North location would have required less demolition of existing leasable buildings and ramp space.

   b. An additional access road would not have been required. ($3,250,000 contract)

2. 6,200' spacing between runways required due to cantonment area and RCCF. Also, additional cross taxiway is required due to runway spacing. (FAA requires minimum 4,300' spacing for concurrent ILS approaches)

3. Secondary runway design to be 9,000' for Reserves use, instead of 7,500' airlines wanted.

4. Relocation of cargo operations from existing airport two years prior to passenger operations, to meet '91 BRAC law. (approx. $1,000,000 expense per year)

5. City's commitment of $6000,000 to the Reserves for the cantonment area.

6. City's commitment to reroute existing utilities to site. ($464,897 already spent)

In recognition of the Bergstrom AFB history and the Bergstrom Air Reserve Station, the City Council voted in 1994 to name the new airport the ***Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (A-BIA)***.

In addition to sharing the cost of operations with a civilian airport beginning in 1996, other DOD units have committed or expressed an interest in sharing the 430 ac. cantonment area. These units include: the Army National Guard Aviation Brigade (committed), the Naval Reserve Center (currently sharing some facilities) and NASA (base U-2 airplanes). This led Sherri W. Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) in June of 1994 to say, *"Bergstrom is the perfect example of base reuse this administration is looking for."*

"The Air Force in the 21st Century is going to be lean, is going to be agile, and is going to be higher-tech than the one we know today." The Air Force of tomorrow, which Gen. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, USAF, was referring in February 1995, will be required to be highly educated and technically competent. Austin, Texas provides just such a recruitment base. This community is the most highly educated among cities with a population of over 250,000. 83%, 25 yrs. or older, are high school graduates, 32% have bachelor's degrees and 11% have graduate or professional degrees. There are seven colleges and universities with over 100,000 students, including the third largest state University in the US. The University of Texas, located in the Austin area. Texas A&M, with 43,000 students is only 90 miles away. Austin is known as the "best read city in the nation" with more bookstores per capita than any other city in the US.

Austin is also recognized as one of three high tech centers in the United States, "Silicon Hills". Of 800 manufacturers, 300 are high-tech, employing 33,600 people, or 65% of the manufacturing workforce. Austin is also the home of "Pickle Research Center," a major defense research lab and numerous defense contractors. These include: Tracor, Lockheed, Motorola, Radian, Texas Instruments, and others.

Supporting the Air Force's recruiting efforts is a city with over 14,000 military retirees and their dependents and over 115 different military organizations with 103,000 members.

Austin is a military town with all the branches of the Armed Services represented here, including the Headquarters, Texas Army and Air National Guard. In addition, there are four AFROTC and 14 AFJROTC programs in the area.

"Quality personnel are the most critical part of any organization." When Secretary Widnall said that in February 1995, instead of the Air Force as a whole, she could have been talking about the men and women of Bergstrom Air Reserve Station and Austin, Texas. For that is what Austin provides the Air Force, a quality reservist, a quality facility, a quality civilian employer and a quality environment in which to live, work and rear a family.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Forward **(Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995):

Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

Appendix 7, Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations ("AF Analysis") shows the overall evaluation for several AFRES installations for each of the eight Criteria used by the Air Force in their evaluation. Criteria I.1.A and I.1.B are excluded and appear to apply only to Active Duty installations. As shown below, according to the objective criteria specified in the AF Analysis, Bergstrom ARS is an outstanding location for any Air Force Reserve Mission.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requirements	**Yellow -**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1**

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Airfield Capabilities	**Yellow -**	**Green**	**Yellow -**
Base Operating Support	**Yellow**	**Green -**	**Yellow**
Training Effectiveness	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**
Overall Mission Requirements	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	**Red +**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	**Red +**	**Green -**	**Red +**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	**Yellow**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -	Red +
Air Quality	Green -	Green	Green -
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities and Infrastructure	**Yellow**	**Green -**	**Yellow**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I and II

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I and II**

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Mission (Flying) Requirements	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**
Facilities and Infrastructure	**Yellow**	**Green -**	**Yellow**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C

Airfield Capabilities

Appendix 7 of the AF Analysis is further broken down into subelements. Criteria I.1.C. "Airfield Capabilities," lists Bergstrom as a Yellow Minus, but in actuality is Green. The "Airfield Capabilities" category is further broken down into subelements: runways, taxiways, and aprons to determine the rating.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1.

Runway/Taxiway for Fighter mission, shows Bergstrom as Green which is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.C.1**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.2.

Runway/Taxiway for Bomber mission, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 200 ft wide and at least 10000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 278400 sq. ft.
Pavement strength supports bomber mission.
Red = Anything else.
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
(b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. wide total.
(c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 2.85 times requirement.
(d) Pavement - will support bomber mission.
(e) Source -
- 924 SPTG/BCE
- Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.C.2**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for bomber missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.1.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 278,400 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.2

When the Reserve Ramp or "D" Ramp was constructed in the early 1960s, it was designed

to accommodate KC-135As. Using this as a baseline for comparison, this and the next two criteria shows that a ramp of 278,400 square yards is capable of handling 42 KC-135s. (Methodology: 278,400 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds per aircraft (AF requirements) equals 42 KC-135s. 88,125 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 14 KC-135s on D ramp.)

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.2

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Bomber Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 278,400 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria..

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.3

Runway/Taxiway for Tanker mission, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft. wide and at least 8000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 283 sq. ft.
Pavement strength support bomber mission.
Red = Anything else
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
(b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. wide total.
(c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 2.8 times requirement.
(d) Pavement - will support tanker mission.
(e) Source -
- 924 SPTG/BCE
- Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.C.3:**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for tanker missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.1.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 283,200 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.3

Using the above data and the same methodology, a ramp of 283,200 square yards can accommodate 43 KC-135s. (283,200 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 43 KC-135s)

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.3

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Tanker Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 278,400 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria..

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C.4

Runway/Taxiway for Airlift mission, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria: Green = Runway at least 150 ft. wide and at least 8000 ft. long.
Taxiway at least 75 ft. wide.
Apron at least 433104 sq. ft.
Pavement strength supports airlift mission.
Red = Anything else
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Runway - 300 ft. wide and 12250 ft. long.
(b) Taxiway - 75 ft. wide stressed/150 ft. long.
(c) Apron - 88125 sq. yds/793125 sq. ft. or 1.83 times requirement.
(d) Pavement - will support airlift mission.
(e) Source -
- 924 SPTG/BCE
- Flight Information Publication (Terminal)
- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: **Criteria I. 1.C.4**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - The grade of Red for Runway/Taxiway for airlift missions is correct. The actual goal posts used to evaluate this area were approved by the Base Closure Executive Group (attached). A typographical error in the Air Force Report incorrectly stated the apron requirements in square feet, rather than square yards. The actual value used to compute Bergstrom's Apron Grade was 104,553 square yards (II.I.B.1.c), which was significantly less than the required 433,104 square yards required for a Green grade.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.4

Using the above data and the same methodology, a ramp of 433,104 square yards can accommodate 66 KC-135s. (433,104 sq yds divided by 6532 sq yds/KC-135 equals 66 KC-135s).

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C.4

The data cited in the ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995) claims 88,125 square yards available for the Airlift Mission. The corrected BCEG criteria states that 433,104 square yards are required for a GREEN rating. The BCEG credited Bergstrom ARS as having 104,553 square yards available (16,428 square yards more than cited by Bergstrom in the initial report). Nonetheless, whichever total is used, Bergstrom ARS falls well short of the required area for a GREEN rating.

TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the RED rating, assigned Bergstrom ARS, utilizing the current grading criteria..

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.C

Overall: Airfield Capabilities

Airfield Capability	**DOD Analysis**	**Correct Conclusion**
Fighter Mission	Green	Green
Bomber Mission	Red	Green
Tanker Mission	Red	Green
Airlift Mission	Red	Green
Overall	**Yellow -**	**Green**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.C

Overall: Airfield Capabilities

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Fighter Mission	Green	Green	Green
Bomber Mission	Red	Green	Red
Tanker Mission	Red	Green	Red
Airlift Mission	Red	Green	Red
Overall	**Yellow -**	**Green**	**Yellow -**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D

Operational Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D, ARC Operational Effectiveness, shows Bergstrom as Yellow minus. Operational Effectiveness is further broken down (AF Analysis pages 7-12) into subelements "Base Operating Support Integration" and "ARC Training Effectiveness" to determine the rating.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Base Operating Support Integration, lists Bergstrom as overall Yellow. The rational for the subelements is unclear and refers to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements (IX.16). Based on the subelements and the criteria listed in the document, it appears that the overall rating of Yellow is currently correct, but probably incorrect after construction of the Austin/Bergstrom Airport. For example, the criteria asks, "Are there other Government aviation units collocated on the airfield?" Based on the fact that the Texas National Guard Aviation Department will be basing their helicopters, now located at Mueller Airport, here in 1998, it seems only prudent to include them in any future plans or data.

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1

The community states that the rationale for subelements of Base Operating Support are unclear. The interactive computerized base questionnaire, question IX. 16, asked if there were any other government agencies on the base. If the response was no, as is Bergstrom's case, then all services are provided by the host. For installations where the answer was yes, detailed questions followed for each support component.

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Operational Effectiveness:

The USAF response to the four Criteria listed (I.1.D.1; I.1.D.1.a; I.1.D.1.d; and I.1.D.1.e) are all based on data used in the summer of 1994 without any consideration for changes in the future. This very much skews the true picture and the figures used to obtain that picture. If one of the major Criteria is Net Present Value Savings over 20 years, it stands to reason that any factors that would affect that value should be looked at. It appears the Air Force used only the statistics that supported their particular view or point. The actions we listed in this section are all programmed and will occur prior to 1998. In addition, it appears there are additional units that are interested in occupying portions of the cantonment area and thereby sharing in the costs which in turn reduces the cost to operate the 924 FW. To not consider these factors results in a picture that is less than complete and does not offer the BRAC all the options available.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1 **(Community responds)** The ABSG appears to be accusing the BCEG of "cooking the data" here; a serious charge requiring substantiation. There is no factual evidence offered to that effect.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.a

Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Yellow
(2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
(3) Criteria:

Green	Joint or Civil
Yellow	Tenant or Host
Red	Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data

(a) Based on current conditions Yellow is correct but that will probably change when the National Guard (NG) relocates here in 1998. Since they use the same fuel (JP-8), it makes sense for them to utilize the AFRES fuel farm.

(b) Source -

- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- 924 SPTG/CC

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.a

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Current Status Yellow, Future Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.a

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.a **(Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.b

Security, shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.b**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.b

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.b**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.c

Base Supply shows Bergstrom as Yellow which is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.c**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.c

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.c**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.d

Tower/Air Traffic Control, shows:

(1) AF Analysis Status - Yellow
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:

Green	Joint or Civil
Yellow	Tenant or Host
Red	Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Bergstrom currently manages the ATCALS contact with a civilian contractor for the airfield at a cost of $31,000 per month. This will continue until the end of FY 96 when the Aviation Department, City of Austin will assume the operation of the airfield and the ATCALS contract.

(b) Source - 924 OSS/OSA

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.d**

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994. The projected airfield operation change to management of the airfield and the ATCALS contract by the City of Austin in FY 96 was not considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.d

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.d (Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.e

Base Civil Engineering, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Yellow
(2) Correct Status - Yellow (Current)/Green (Future)
(3) Criteria:

Green	Joint or Civil
Yellow	Tenant or Host
Red	Separate

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Based on discussions that have already been held with the National Guard (NG) and the City of Austin, it appears that the 924 FW will be providing the NG Aviation Department with fire fighting protection from the 924 SPTG/BCE fire department. This is to comply with DoD fire protection directives.

(b) Source - 924 SPTG/BCE

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.1.e**

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Current Status Yellow, Future Green

Air Force Response - All Air Force questionnaire responses were based on current information at the time of questionnaire completion, which in the case of this BRAC round, was the Summer of 1994, Projected force structure changes such as the move of the Texas National Guard Aviation Department in 1998 were not, and should not have been considered for the purposes of this round.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1.e

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1.e **(Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.1

Overall: Base Operating Support Integration:

Base Operating Support Integration	**DOD Analysis**	**Correct Conclusion**
Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Yellow	Green
Security	Yellow	Yellow
Base Supply	Yellow	Yellow
Tower/Air Traffic Control	Yellow	Green
Civil Engineering	Yellow	Green
Overall	**Yellow**	**Green**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.1

Overall: Base Operating Support Integration:

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Security	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Base Supply	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Tower/Air Traffic Control	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Civil Engineering	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Overall	**Yellow**	**Green**	**Yellow**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2
Training Effectiveness

Criteria I.1.D.2, ARC Training Effectiveness, is further broken down into Fighter Training, Tanker Training, and Airlift Taining. All data in this section was provided by HQ USAF/RT (formerly HQ USAF/SOOR). No rational is given as to the size requirements for the MOAs. Although Bombers were addressed under Criteria I.1.C Airfield Capabilities, they are conspicuously absent under this criteria. Criteria I.1.D.2.b, Tanker Training and Criteria I.1.D.2.c, Airlift Training apperar to be correct as stated in the AF Analysis. The AF Analysis contains a number of errors in its analysis of Fighter Training.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

Supersonic Air Combat MOAs, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red +
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:
- Green <= 150NM
- Yellow 150 NM and <=200NM
- Red > 200 NM
- Size Minimum of 4200 sq. NM (nominal 75 X 56 NM)

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) W-228 is located 140 NM to the southeast of Bergstrom.

(b) Source - Jet Navigational Chart (JNC) 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

USAF Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

Air Force Analysis - Red +
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Distances to the areas were measured from the base to the centroid of the area in question, not the nearest edge, for standardization/use purposes. In this particular case, the distance to the center of the area is 209 NM, instead of 140 NM as provided by the community.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

In theory the idea of using the centroid of the area to standardize the data used is good; however, in practice it penalizes you if you have a large area and will result in an erroneous rating as in the case of W-228. It is a very large area and as you can see the change in rating from Red + to Green by simply changing the measurement criteria from centroid to closest edge.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

The ABSG has refuted AF findings. The ABSG believes it would be an accurate yardstick to measure the distance from the airfield to the "closest edge" of the MOA in question. The ABSG claims the W-228 area to be 140 NM (closest edge) from Bergstrom ARS.

It is entirely unrealistic to measure the usefulness of a MOA by evaluating the distance from the airfield to the "closest edge" of the airspace. No useful training can be accomplished at a pinpoint location. It appears that ABSG has made a futile attempt to alter the grading criteria in order to attain a more desirable rating. The AF grading criteria has been universal in nature and has been applied to all military installations being evaluated. The ABSG claims that W-228 is such a large area, that selecting the center point unfairly penalizes Bergstrom ARS. With this in mind, TEAM FORT WORTH has selected a nominal center point for W-228 training.

Nominal Center Point	Distance From Bergstrom ARS
N 2700.00 W 9600.00	211 NM[1]

This center point is within two nautical miles of the AF grading criteria. Positioning opposing forces northand south of this point provides suitable distances between players. Orienting a fight around this nominal center point is feasible only if W-228B and W-228C are simultaneously scheduled. If W-228B is unavailable for simultaneous use, the center point would have to be relocated further south.

To validate the AF analysis and rating scale, an analysis was performed on the ability for an F-16C (PW-220E engine equipped) to takeoff from Bergstrom, fly to W-228, perform a training mission, and return to Bergstrom ARS[2].

App 002 Route Name	Aircraft Cnfg	Area Fuel Flow	BSM Wx	Area Delay	Land Fuel	ASD
BSM1A	2x370	5600 lb/hr	VFR	01+02+00	1002	02+08+06
BSM1B	2x370	5600 lb/hr	IFR	00+50+00	2084	01+56+06
BSM2A	1x300	5000 lb/hr	VFR	00+43+00	1042	01+48+58
BSM2B	1x300	5000 lb/hr	IFR	00+30+00	2094	01+35+59
BSM3A	Clean	4800 lb/hr	VFR	00+23+00	1035	01+28+59
BSM3B	Clean	4800 lb/hr	IFR	00+10+00	2038	01+15+58
BSM4A	ECM	5100 lb/hr	VFR	00+19+00	1027	01+25+00
BSM4B	ECM	5100 lb/hr	IFR	00+07+00	2019	01+13+00

[1] Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship (From JNC 44).
[2] Appendix (002): FPLAN V9.3 Flight profile computations.

The "App Route Name" is highlighted on each of the appropriate flight profiles found in Appendix (XX). The "Aircraft Cnfg" column shows the number of external gas tanks carried and the gallons of gas in those tanks. ECM indicates an external jamming pod. The "Area Fuel Flow" shows the fuel consumption rate in pounds per hour. Reference Assumption 4 below as to how this rate was attained. "BSM Wx" indicates the weather status at Bergstrom ARS. When the weather is VFR, a desired land fuel quantity was 1000 lbs. When inclement weather is present, a larger fuel reserve is required to be able to divert to a suitable weather alternate. The "IFR" reflects a required fuel reserve of 2000#[3] upon landing at Bergstrom ARS. The "Area Delay" column indicates how long a mission could remain in the area for training purposes given the fuel consumption rates and Bergstrom area weather. The "Land Fuel" shows the exact fuel state at landing following the "Area Delay". "ASD" is Average Sortie Duration. This is nothing more than the amount of time the aircraft are airborne.

Assumptions:

1. 1500 lbs STTO for 2x370 gallon cnfg. 1200 lbs for all others.
2. Takeoff from BSM and cruise to W-228 at 28,000' / 300C.
3. No winds either to or from the area.
4. Loiter in W-228 at 5,000' at 450C (NO AFTERBURNER USE ALLOWED!)
5. RTB at 33,000' / 300C.
6. Straight line vectors to and from the area.

The configuration of air-to-air sorties is desired to be that of what a fighter pilot would expect in a combat engagement. The desired load for the F-16 would be 2 sidewinders and 2 AMRAAMs plus an ECM pod. This is the most realistic configuration, as F-16's can jettison fuel tanks and bombs when the decision is made to engage in the air-to-air arena. The ECM pod on the centerline is a non-jettisonable store.

The "Area Time" shows total playtime available. Any fighter pilot will attest that a fight takes approximately 3-5 minutes to setup. Between fights approximately 5-8 minutes is required to reposition and gather forces. Therefore, there is approximately 8-13 minutes of administrative time required to have one fight and be ready for another. What does all this mean? W-228 is all but unusable to any configuration which provides the approximate aircraft characteristics (routes BSM2A through BSM4B) to be expected in a real world scenario. At best, the any F-16 operating from Bergstrom ARS would have enough gas for one engagement to mature or two abbreviated engagements (route BSM2A). At worst, Bergstrom ARS assets would have enough gas to reach the area, setup an egagement, begin the "fight", and have to terminate 2-4 minutes later (route BSM4B).

[3] The 2000 lb figure is a nominal fuel value which would allow an IFR divert to the San Antonio area (San Antonio weather IFR) or the DFW area (DFW weather VFR).

One final concern is that of ASD. On average, BSM could expect ASD to be 1.7 to 1.8 to utilize the W-228 MOA (no AAR). In the days of limited flying hours, this high air-to-air ASD is absolutely unrealistic. Suddenly, W-228 doesn't seem all that attractive.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2

- Perhaps these reasons were the primary factor for the 924 FW / 704 FS utilizied the W-228 area only six times beginning in March 1994 to present[4]. In fact, no Letter of Agreement is currently maintained between the 924 FW / 704 FS and the W-228 scheduling authority.

W-228 is another MOA (similar to the Kingsville and Randolph MOAs - addressed shortly) heavily dominated by pilot training requirements. NAS Corpus Christi, TRAWING 2&4, is the primary user of this warning area.

ABSG claims to qualify W-228 as GREEN airspace is inaccurate. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the AF rating of RED for Bergstrom ARS.

[4] Source: W-228 Scheduling Authority. Chief Stevens. Radar Section. DSN 861-2503. Comm 512-939-2503.

(ALTERNATIVE TEAM FORT WORTH RESPONSE)

If the criteria is changed to allow distances to be measured to the "nearest edge", then all bases must be measured against that standard. Bergstrom's *relative* standing compared to other bases would remain the same. As a matter of fact, for the criteria to remain a viable filter, it too would need readjustment. For example, Bergstrom argues that W-228 is 140 NM from the base when measured to nearest edge, as opposed to the 209 NM distance when measured to the centroid. This results in a distance reduction of 33%. In contrast, Carswell is 99 NM from the centroid of it's nearest Air Combat Area (Brownwood MOA); it is 62 NM to the nearest edge. This results in a comparable distance reduction of 37%. The point is that when the "new" criteria is used, similar reductions are realized at all other bases. A 35% reduction in the analysis criteria is shown below. It reveals that Bergstrom would *still* be rated RED+ accepting their measurement of 140 NM to the nearest edge.

"Adjusted" Criteria (35% reduction):

- RED: (>130 NM)
- GREEN (≤ 97.5 NM)

It makes more *practical* sense to measure distances from the base in question to the center of the working area, which might not be the area's centroid. For example, A-4s would require significantly less airspace to conduct Air Combat Tactics (ACT) training than would F-16s, due to differences in tactical airspeeds, radar/missile capabilities, etc.

Given that air-to-air engagements begin with adversaries starting at opposite ends of the area, most of the fighting occurs around its midpoint. Therefore, a reasonable measurement to the W-228 area mentioned in ABSG's rebuttal would be approximately 211 NM, arrived at as follows:

(a) According to the W-228 scheduling authority , W-228A is a **sub-sonic** area which is reserved Monday through Friday for near exclusive use by the naval training wing at NAS Corpus Christi. The fact that it is not certified for supersonic flight precludes it from this discussion.

(b) The combining of W-228B and W-228C provides an area size of 60 x 25 NM. While not optimum by AF standards (75 x 56 NM), this area is suitable for F-16 and other fighter operations. As a matter of fact, this combination of the B and C sections of W-228 is how they are ordinarily scheduled.

(c) The geometric center of W-228B/C is shown at attachment 1. The distance to the center of this area is 211 NM. This is the point where most of the training will occur and where the fighters will be returning to base from when the engagements are concluded.

Assuming that Bergstrom jets are configured with external tank(s) sufficient to permit 30 minutes of "playtime" in the area, it would require 28 minutes to fly there, 28 minutes to return to base, and 10 minutes to allow for terminal delays. This adds up to an average mission length of 96 minutes, of which **only 31%** devoted to actual ACT training.

The efficacy of the AF criteria and their justification of a rating of RED+ for Bergstrom becomes clear when illustrated in real-world terms. Is there any wonder why, in light of Bergstrom's overstated significance of the W-228 area to their ACT requirements, that they utilized this area a grand total of only six times during the last year and a half.

Bottom line: W-228 is no more useful to Bergstrom's everyday ACT requirements than it is to Carswell's. Bergstrom's RED+ rating is valid and fully justified.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

Other Air Combat MOAs, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:
- Green <= 100NM
- Yellow 100NM and <=150NM
- Red > 150 NM
- Size Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and 20,000 feet altitude block above 5000 feet AGL.

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
- Brownwood Area 96 nm north
- Chase Area 70 nm south
- Randolph Areas 70 nm northwest
- Brady Area 50 nm northwest *

(a) Source -
- Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) H-23B
- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

(5) * Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25), the 924 FW is able to fulfill approximately 75 % of its air-to-air training requirements, 75 % of its MAVERICK training requirements, and 10% of its air-to-ground training requirements in this MOA located 80 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2**

Air Force Analysis - Red +
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Areas predominantly used for pilot training were not considered useable for air combat training. The Brady area, while useable, does not meet the basic criteria of an Air Combat MOA, i.e. supporting air-to-air requirements.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

The MOA used in this example is Brownwood MOA. It is not a pilot training MOA since it belongs to units as NAS Dallas and is predominately used by reserve and guard units. In the original document, we stated that Brady does not meet the criteria but that the unit is able to accomplish approximately 75% of its air-to-air training requirements, 75% of its

MAVERICK training requirements, and 10% of its air-to-ground training requirements in this MOA.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.2

The current BCEG criteria requires a MOA to possess a 20,000 foot altitude block. This criteria does not recognize additional blocks of Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAA's). In the case of Brownwod, the MOA provides an altitude block of 7,000 feet to 17,999 feet MSL. While this is not a realistic evaluation of quality airspace, all other bases being graded were held to this standard. ABSG claims the Brownwood MOA to be 96 NM north of Bergstrom ARS. Once again, the BCEG criteria was altered to arrive at these results. The Brownwood MOA is subdivided into three smaller MOAs, Hornet, Tomcat and Loon. Recent Brownwood usage reflects that the 457 FS has been regularly training against VMFA-112 (USMCR F-18's) utilizing the Hornet and Tomcat MOAs concurrently[5]. The size of the Hornet & Tomcat MOA is 2205 square nm[6]. Picking a nominal center point for the Hornet and Tomcat areas yields the following results[7]:

Nominal Center Point	Distance From Bergstrom ARS
N 3147.00 W 9858.00	116 NM

NAS FW, JRB is the scheduling authority for the Brownwood MOA. As the airspace schedulers, units assigned to NAS FW are afforded higher priority than off-station units. The units receiving first priority for the Brownwood MOA are the 301 FW / 457 FS, VMFA-112, and VF-201. Off station users such as those assigned to Bergstrom ARS receive a lower priority and may have difficulty retaining desired Brownwood airspace[8]. While dissimilar assets may be available for day-to-day training operations in the Brownwood MOA, face-to-face briefs and de-briefs would be cost prohibitive for fighter assets stationed at Bergstrom ARS. This would drastically detract from the quality of training received. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Brownwood MOA to be second hand accessible to fighter assets located at Bergstrom ARS.

The Chase MOA is subdivided into three separate MOAs, Chase 1, 2, and 3. These MOAs have been recently redesignated Kingsville 4,5, and 3 respectively. While Kingsville 1 and 2 are within a reasonable distance from Bergstrom ARS, several limitations result in these MOAs being untenable for fighter aircraft use. The vertical boundaries (including ATCAA's) of Kingsville 4 are 11,000' MSL through FL230. Kingsville 5 is bounded from 9,000' MSL up to FL230. At best, Kingsville MOAs 4 and

[5] Source: Brownwood MOA Coordinator AC1 Wagner. DSN 739-7689. Comm 817-782-7689.
[6] Appendix (003): Hornet & Tomcat Airspace Measurement.
[7] Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship (From JNC 44).
[8] Source: Brownwood MOA Coordinator AC1 Wagner. DSN 739-7689. Comm 817-782-7689.

5 allow a vertical gaming area of 14,000'. Kingsville 3 is bounded from 8,000' MSL to FL230[9]. There are no dissimilar assets readily available for day-to-day training operations in the Kingsville MOAs. Finally, the Kingsville MOAs are used primarily by NAS Kingsville. Their mission is very similar to AF AETC training bases. Their usage dramatically reduces the availability for other units to utilize the Kingsville MOAs. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Kingsville MOAs to be of little or no value to a fighter unit located at Bergstrom ARS.

The Randolph MOA, located south of Bergstrom ARS, is under the authority of Randolph AFB. The AETC wing at Randolph AFB heavily uses this MOA Monday through Friday[10]. A fighter unit would have very limited availability during the week. The 924 FW / 704 FS utilized the Randolph MOAs only four times int the last two years[11]. There are no dissimilar assets readily available for day-to-day training operations in the Randolph MOAs. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Randolph MOA to be of little or no value to a fighter unit located at Bergstrom ARS.

ABSG claims the Brady MOA to be 50 NM NW of Bergstrom ARS. The actual distance is 95 NM to the center point of the Brady MOA[12]. Brady MOA is acknowledged to be to small to qualify as a suitable MOA for training. ABSG claims the Brady MOA to be 1125 square miles. In actuality, the Brady MOA is only 980 square nautical miles[13]. The vertical limits of the Brady MOA are 500' AGL through FL230. However, when MOAs are used for Air Combat Training (ACT), a 5000' AGL floor is imposed[14]. This floor reduces the vertical limits of the Brady MOA to 7000' through FL 230, a mere 16,000'. Other boundary limitations include that the western edge of the MOA is only 10 NM wide[15]. The horizontal and vertical boundaries of the Brady MOA render it untenable for modern day Air Combat Training. While dissimilar assets may be available for day-to-day training operations in the Brady MOA, face-to-face briefs and de-briefs would be cost prohibitive for fighter assets stationed at Bergstrom ARS. This would drastically detract from the quality of training received. As stated in the ABSG Inital Report (19 April 1995), the 924 FW / 704 FS fulfills 75% of their air-to-air training in the Brady MOA. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the training value received from Brady MOA is sub-standard and inadequate. Subjecting an additional USAF fighter organization to the severe limitations found in the Brady MOA are not in the best interests of that unit or the United States military readiness.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Other Air Combat MOAs.

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[9] Source: Kingsville MOA Coordinator AC1 Hummel. DSN 861-6187. Comm 512-595-6187.
[10] Source: Randolph MOA Coordinator. Captain Alan Schaefer. DSN 487-5580. Comm 210-652-5580.
[11] Source: Randolph MOA Coordinator. Captain Alan Schaefer. DSN 487-5580. Comm 210-652-5580.
[12] Appendix (001): Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship.
[13] Appendix (004): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensative Areas.
[14] AFI 11-214 Section 5.2.8.1.3.
[15] Appendix (001): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensative Areas.

TEAM FORT WORTH finds that all of the "Southern Texas" MOAs cited in the ABSG report are under the scheduling authority of either USAF or USN training wings. These MOAs are under the constant use of these training wings, and offer little availability to off-station fighter assets. TEAM FORT WORTH acknowledges and understands the BCEG rating of RED for fighter assets located at Bergstrom ARS.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

Low altitude MOAs, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:
- Green <= 100NM
- Yellow 100NM and <=150NM
- Red > 150 NM
- Size Minimum of 2100 sq. NM (nominal 47 X 45 NM) and from surface up to at least 2500feet AGL.

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) W-228 is located 140 NM southeast of Bergstrom.
Brady Area 60 nm northwest *
(b) Source -
JNC 44
1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire

(5) * Note: Although Brady MOA does not meet the stated criteria (size is 1125 sq. NM, nominal 45 X 25), the 924 FW is able to fulfill all of its low altitude training requirements in this MOA. Brady MOA is located 60 NM northeast of Bergstrom.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3**

No Response Presented.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

No Rebuttal Offered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3**

ABSG once again has made invalid claims not in compliance with the universal grading criteria.

1. W-228 is falsely stated as being 140 NM from Bergstrom ARS. As previously discussed, even when shifting the true center point to the north, a fighter aircraft must fly 211 NM from Bergstrom ARS to W-228. The available "Area Delay" times would be further reduced due to increased fuel consumption in the low altitude environment. TEAM FORT WORTH finds W-228 to be unusable for Low Altitude Training to fighter aircraft operating out of Bergstrom ARS.

2. ABSG continues to list the Brady MOA as suitable airspace to complete required training squares. Brady MOA Low (500' AGL up to 6000' MSL) has six noise sensitive measles which further complicate fighter aircraft operating in the small geographical confines of the Brady MOA[16]. TEAM FORT WORTH finds the Brady MOA to be of limited value for LOWAT training.

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3

TEAM FORT WORTH finds ABSG quest to obtain a re-evaluation of GREEN to be unsubstantiated and invalid. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the AF rating of RED for Bergstrom ARS.

[16] Appendix (001): Brady MOA Airspace Measurement / Noise Sensative Areas.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4

Scoreable Range complexes, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Scoreable Range -
Green Criteria - 1< 100 nm and 4 < 250 nm
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Shoal Creek Range is 70 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A.
(b) Yankee Range is 122 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R-6312.
(c) Dixie Range is 128 NM southeast of Bergstrom inside R-6312.
(d) Peason Ridge is 225 NM east of Bergstrom inside R-3803A.
(e) Ft. Polk is 225 NM east of Bergstrom.
(5) Source -
TPC H-23B
AFR 50-46
(6) Note: The 924 FW is able to accomplish 100% of its required air-to-ground weapons delivery requirements on the first three ranges listed.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Distances to the areas were measured from the specific Air Force base to the centroid of the area in question, not the nearest edge for standardization/use purposes. In this particular case, Shoal Creek range lacks conventional target and strafe capabilities, and the distance to the center of the other areas is 209 NM, instead of 140 NM as provided by the community.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4

It appears the Air Force combined responses to Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3 and Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4 in their answer.

(i) Criteria I.1.D.2.a.3 deals with low altitude MOAs and the Air Force showed W-228 as the closest low altitude MOA. As in 4.A above, the unit shows W-228 as being 140 NM away. The unit report also states that although Brady MOA does not meet the stated requirement for size, the unit is able to fulfill all of its low altitude requirements in this

MOA.

(ii) Criteria I.1.D.2.a.4 deals with scoreable range complexes. The 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire criteria for scoreable range complexes/target arrays (I.2.C.4, page 1.03) states "capable of or having tactical targets, conventional targets, and strafe." Based on this criteria, Shoal Creek meets this criteria since it currently has conventional targets, tactical targets, and high angle strafe can be accomplished on the range. The range currently does not have low angle strafe pits but they could be added if absolutely necessary. Currently, they are not necessary since all the users of Shoal Creek range can accomplish their low angle strafe at other ranges.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response:

ABSG listed five separate ranges to justify their refutation of DOD findings.

1. Shoal Creek Range, located inside the Fort Hood complex (R-6302A), is a USAFR operated range, maintained by the 301 FW[17]. Shoal Creek does not possess a range tower, a flank tower, or any means of accurately scoring bombs which are delivered on the complex[18]. Furthermore, ordnance is restricted to BDU-33 or MK-106 only. Strafe of any type is *not* authorized on the Shoal Creek facility[19]. Live bombs or inert heavyweights are not authorized for use on the Shoal Creek complex.

2. Yankee Range qualifies by AF criteria as a "scoreable range". However, this range has a very small impact area of only 0.429 sq. miles[20]. Additional range restrictions include no live or heavyweight delveries and no use of self-protection aids such as chaff and/or flares[21].

3. Dixie Range is identical in size and capability as Yankee range[22]. In fact, both of these "scoreable ranges" are encompassed on one range complex, McMullen Range. If the intent of the BCEG criteria is to have geographically separated ranges to allow flexibility to weather and a variety of target complex to enhance training, then the Yankee / Dixie facilities should only be counted as one range.

4. Peason Ridge Range was closed in August of 1992. There is no expected plan to reopen this range to high performance aircraft[23]. Units stationed at Bergstrom ARS would *not* have the use of this range.

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[17] AFR 50-46/301 FW AFRES, Introduction
[18] AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Page A-2.
[19] AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Chapter 3, Page 3-1 Section 3-4.
[20] AFR 50-46,149 FG Supp-1 (149TFGRegulation 50-46), para 2-3a.
[21] Ibid, para 3-5.
[22] 924 FGR 55-46, Atch-4.
[23] Telecon with Mr. Cal Hodnett. Peason Ridge Range training analyst BDM. DSN 863-9508. Comm 318-531-9508.

5. Fort Polk is an impact area only. No capability exists to accurately score bombs in this area. In comparison to other ranges, no scoreable conventional or tactical targets exist in the impact area[24].

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary:

Of the five ranges listed by ABSG, only McMullen Range qualifies as a "scoreable range". Although Yankee / Dixie qualifies as "scoreable range(s)", these two complexes are highly incumbered with strict limitations and unrealistically small geographical boundaries. TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the BCEG assigned RED rating.

[24] Source: Telecon with Mr. Jerry Hilton. Fort Polk Range Operations. DSN 863-5819. Comm 318-531-5819.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Electronic Combat Range within 250 NM, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria: Green <= 250 NM
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Ft Hood is 65 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A
(b) The U.S. Army has a threat array located on the east side of the impact area that simulate numerous real world threats. They also have personnel assigned to maintain, deploy, and operate the threat system. The capability exists to operate against the threats and to employ ECM pods.
(c) Source - TPC H-23B
U.S. Army

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training were obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Fort Hood is not a recognized Air Force Electronic Combat Range, and is not listed in the U.S. Army data base as an EC Range for AF use.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

The Air Force listed Claiborne Range as the closest EC range to Bergstrom at 255 NM. Claiborne Range is owned and operated by the 917 FW (AFRES) at Barksdale AFB, LA. The range currently has only one Sentry Dawg, which is a limited threat transmitter only. These same capabilities exist on Yankee Range, 122 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Yankee Range currently has one Sentry Dawg and a Smokey Sam system. Fort Hood, on the other hand, has several actual threat transmitters and the capability to track the target, something Sentry Dawg cannot do. Fort Hood also possesses the capability to detect and evaluate the effectiveness of jamming pods carried on fighter aircraft. The fact that Fort Hood does not show up on someone's list of EC ranges does not alter the fact that this capability exists within 65 NM of Bergstrom and therefore, can justify a Green rating in this area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Yankee range currently does have a Sentry Dawg system as well as a Smokey Sam system[25]. The 149 FG, located at Kelly AFB, is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Air National Guard facilities located at the Yankee Target Site[26].

(WE NEED TO FIND OUT FROM LTC BENNET WHAT THE AF USES TO QUALIFY A RANGE AS AN EC RANGE. BSMs ARGUEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE SOME FOUNDING. FURTHER RESEARCH PENDING.)

The Fort Hood facility which ABSG refers to, lost funding (US Army) in July of 1994[27]. There are no U.S. Army personnel assigned to maintain, deploy or operate this system. These facilities were absorbed by Lockheed Corp., a civilian contractor. There are currently no provisions for, or any history of, any AF unit utilizing the system maintained by Lockheed Corp[28].

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[25] AFR 50-46,149 FG Supp-1 (149TFGRegulation 50-46), Para 2-4.
[26] Ibid, Para 1-1.b.
[27] Telecon with Major Lingsh. DSN 737-5512.
[28] Telecon with Mr. Harley Wills. Comm XXX-287-3079.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.6

Ground Forces/Tactical Aircraft Employment, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5**

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.5**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Ranges, shows Bergstrom as Red and that is correct. The closest ACMI range is W-453, 460 NM east of Bergstrom.

(1) Note: Although a lot of emphasis is placed on ACMI ranges, they are extremely costly to build, operate, maintain and technology has made them obsolete.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7**

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.7**

The world's most highly advanced tactical training range is located in Nevada. The Nellis range complex has been a user of ACMI technology since the mid-1970s. The Red Flag Monitoring Debrief System (RFMDS) is an advanced ACMI range which allows a ground station to track and display a large number of aircraft in near real time. While earlier versions of ACMI are limited to tracking fewer aircraft, the value added to training missions is recognized throughout the Tactical Air Forces[29]. ABSG claims that ACMI is obsolete is factually incorrect.

[29] **Telecon with Major Jeff Wish, Nellis AFB Range Control (RFMDS) DSN (682-1110).**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

Full Scale Weapons Drop Ranges, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:

Green	<=200 NM
Yellow	>200NM and<=250NM
Red	> 250 NM

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) Ft Hood is 60 NM north of Bergstrom inside R-6302A and is a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range.
(b) Source - TPC H-23B

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - All Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training was obtained from an Air Staff certified data base. Fort Hood is not a recognized Air Force Full Scale Weapons Drop Range.

Overall Comment: In order to effectively evaluate all bases equally, the Air Staff developed and certified a data base to capture all Military Operating Areas, Warning Areas, Ranges, and Restricted Airspace used for training. To qualify for the data base, the training area had to meet the minimum criteria established for the specific training item. In some cases, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units are able to use areas not specifically designed for the type training required. While this should be considered positive, the BRAC process was designed to identify those bases which best were able to support future force structure, to include those which were in close proximity to training areas meeting Air Force requirements. Again, Fort Hood was not listed in the Army data base as being available for Air Force use.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

Since we have not been provided the Air Force definition of a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range, it is difficult to respond to this criteria. However, it appears that the only ranges used in this category were ranges completely controlled by the Air Force. This makes no allowance for the use of Joint facilities nor acknowledges the fact that other agencies can and do provide facilities used by Air Force units. The Air Force used Claiborne Range, 255 NM east of Bergstrom as the closest range that fits this category. Claiborne Range is essentially a postage stamp range that only has the capability to handle a limited number of

inert munitions and no live munitions at all. Fort Hood can handle any size of inert munition and live MK-82/83/84 weapons. Once again, the fact that Fort Hood does not show up on someone's list of weapons ranges does not alter the fact that this capability exists within 65 NM of Bergstrom and therefore, can justify a Green rating in this area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

The Fort Hood area consists of the Fort Hood MOA and R-6302[30]. Inside R-6302 is the Shoal Creek Range and an impact area. As stated earlier, Shoal Creek range is restricted to all but training ordnance only (BDU-33 and MK-106)[31]. The Fort Hood impact area is primarily used by the US Army for ordnance expenditures. This impact area is not readily available to AF fighter units. This impact area is normally restricted to two high performance aircraft[32]. Scheduling of AF assets to expend heavyweight ordnance (live or inert) are at the discretion of the US Army. Currently, any use of the impact area must be done in conjunction with US Army exercises[33].

TEAM FORT WORTH Summary: Criteria I.1.D.2.a.8

The AF assessment to not qualify the Fort Hood impact area as a Full Scale Weapons Drop Range, and subsequent rating of RED is accurate and fair.

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[30] Enclosure 6 to Tab F to App 9 Annex C to 12 AF OPORD 1-88.
[31] AFR 50-46/301 FW Sup 2, Annex A, Chapter 3, Page 3-1 Section 3-4.
[32] Enclosure 6 to Tab F to App 9 Annex C to 12 AF OPORD 1-88.
[33] Telecon with LTC Bright. D.O. 3rd ASOG. DSN 737-1909.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

Visual Routes/Instrument Routes (VIR/IR), shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9**

None Required.

ABSG Rebuttal (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.D.2.a.9**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2.a

Overall: ARC Fighter Training Areas

Criteria	DOD Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Supersonic Area	Red	Green
Other Air Combat MOAs	Red	Green
Low Altitude Areas	Red	Green
Scoreable Ranges	Red	Green
Electronic Combat	Red	Green
Ground/Tactical Area	Green	Green
ACMI Ranges	Red	Red
Weapons Drop Areas	Red	Green
Low level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Training Areas	**Red +**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2.a

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Supersonic Area	RED	GREEN	RED
Other Air Combat MOAs	RED	GREEN	YELLOW
Low Altitude Areas	RED	GREEN	RED
Scoreable Ranges	RED	GREEN	RED
Electronic Combat	RED	GREEN	RED
Grond/Tactical Area	GREEN	GREEN	GREEN
ACMI Ranges	RED	RED	RED
Weapons Drop Areas	RED	GREEN	RED
Low Level Routes	GREEN	GREEN	GREEN
Overall Training Areas	**RED +**	**GREEN -**	**RED +**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1.D.2

Overall: ARC Effectiveness

Mission	**DOD Analysis**	**Correct Conclusion**
Fighter Training	Red +	Green -
Tanker Training	Green -	Green -
Airlift Training	Green	Green
Overall Training Effectiveness	**Yellow -**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1.D.2

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Fighter Training	Red +	Green -	Red +
Tanker Training	Green -	Green -	Green -
Airlift Training	Green	Green	Green
Overall Training Effectiveness	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Critieria II.1

Mission Support Facilities

Criteria II.1, Mission Support Facilities, shows Bergstrom as overall Yellow -. Any further information needed on this criterai must come from AFRes.

USAF Response: **Criteria I.1.C.1**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria I.1.C.1

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I.1.C.1**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A

Associated Airspace

Criteria II.3.A, Existing Assosciated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, and Low Level Routes. There are no specific corrsponding questions in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire. The analysis here appears to be a complitation of all the airspace, range, and low level data originally contained in the unit response to the Questionnaire and appears to be somewhat subjective.

Criteria II.3.A.1, MOAs and Restriced Airspace, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:
Green - Civil and commercial aviation development generally compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace.
Yellow - Civil and commercial aviation development impacts access to some (limited) MOAs.
Red - Civil and comercial aviation dominates the development of and access to MOAs or Restriced Airspace.
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) The two MOAs used the majority of the time by the 924 FW, Brady and Brownwood, are impacted very little by civil and commercial aviation. The only impact is when the Brownwood MOAs are capped because of weather problems around Dallas/Ft Worth Airport and they are seldom capped below FL 230 which allows the 924 FW to complete its mission. The Brady MOA is almost never impacted by civil aviation. The other MOA's often used - Chase, Randolph, Crystal - are seldom effected by civil aviation because of their location in south Texas, a sparsely populated region.
(b) Source -
- 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
- 924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.A.1**

Air Fome Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Applicable MOAs and Restricted Airspace were evaluated by the Air Force Reserve Functional Expert, using criteria developed in conjunction with the Base Closure Working Group member from Combat Forces. Professional judgment and reference to the following questions in the questionnaire were used to determine Direct Input grades: 1.2.3.B. 1, I.2.3.B.2, 1.2.3.B.3, I.2.3.B.4, I.2.3.B.5, 1.2.3.B.6, I.2.3.B.7, I.2.3.B.8, and 1.2.3.B.9.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.1

In order to adequately answer this question it is necessary to utilize day-to-day operations and unit expertise. The unit has a very highly experienced and knowledgeable air space manager with previous experience as an FAA Air Traffic Controller. He works very closely with Houston Center and the Southwest Region out of Ft Worth. Using his expertise and daily experiences within the unit, we do not see civil and commercial aviation dominating the development of and access to MOAs or Restricted Airspace. The 704 FS does not experience problems on a daily basis and has an excellent working relationship with both Houston and Ft Worth Centers. The response does not track with data the unit furnished in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire. The closest questions in the Questionnaire are under I.2.E, Airspace Used by Base; they do not reveal any civil or commercial aviation domination or encroachment into MOAs or Restricted airspace used by the base.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A.1

The 301 FW also has a very highly experienced and knowledgeable air space manager with previous experience as an FAA Air Traffic Controller. He also works very closely with Houston Center and the Southwest Region out of Ft Worth. His expertise and daily experiences within the unit tend to validate the professional judgement of the Air Force Reserve Functional expert. An AOPA survey highlighted that general aviation pilots may be frustrated about not being able to determine if an area is active. The Air Transport Association (ATA) wants air carrier aircraft to be able to fly point-to-point. In January, the FAA began to allow point-to-point operations for aircraft at and above FL390 between selected city pairs. The ceiling will gradually decrease to FL290. This will have a significant impact on high altitude ATCAAs used by the Bergstrom unit.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A.2

Bombing Ranges, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - **Green**
(3) Criteria:

Green - Regional development generally compatible with Air to-Ground ranges.

Yellow - Regional development incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to-Ground ranges

Red - Regional development severely incompatible in may areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) There is no data to support a Red rating. The three ranges predominately used by the 924 FW have NO regional development that impacts on them.

(b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
924 OSS/OSK Interview

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.A.2**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Applicable MOAs and Restricted Airspace were evaluated by the Air Force Reserve Functional Expert, using criteria developed in conjunction with the Base Closure Working Group member from Combat Forces. Professional judgment and reference to the following questions in the questionnaire were used to determine Direct Input grades: 1.2.3.B.1, I.2.3.B.2, 1.2.3.B.3, I.2.3.B.4, 1.2,3.B.5, I.2.3.B.6, 1.2.3.B,7, I.2.3.B.8, and 1.2.3.B.9.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.2

The response is the same as the previous question. There is no change from the original rebuttal submitted to Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations (Volume V) on 27 March 1995. The Air Force response here does not change any of the factors.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A.2

A recent ANG-contracted study of real-time airspace documented well the need to improve the overall military and civilian utilization of special use airspace, and suggested areas to explore potential solutions.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A.3

Criteria II.3.A.3, Low Level Routes, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.A.3**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.A.3

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.3.A.3**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.A

Overall: Existing Associated Airspace:

Existing Associated Airspace	**AF Analysis**	**Correct Conclusion**
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green
Low Level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	**Red +**	**Green**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.A

Overall: Existing Associated Airspace:

CRITERIA REVIEW	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green	Red
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green	Red
Low Level Routes	Green	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	**Red +**	**Green**	**Red +**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B

Criteria II.3.B, Future Associated Airspace, is further broken down into MOAs and Restricted Airspace, Bombing Ranges, andLow Level Routes. The same commnets listed above for existing airspace also apply here.

MOAs and Restricted Airspace, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - **Green**
(3) Criteria:

Green- Future civil and commercial aviation development generally expected to remain compatible with existing Military Operating Areas and Restricted Airspace.

Yellow - Future civil and commercial aviation development may impact access to some (limited) MOAs. Future development of MOAs and Restricted Airspace may be limited.

Red - Future civil and comercial aviation may dominate the area and access MOAs may become severely limited. Future development Restricted Airspace incompatible.

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) No data is presented to substantiate this rating of Red. The FAA, Ft Worth Region and Houston Center over the last several years have publicized their Airspace 2000 plans and thier future plans for the Austin Bergstrom International Airport.

These plans indicate the 924 FW should have little conflict in meeting its future airspace needs and requirements. Houston Center at one time proposed a new MOA for the 924 FW due west of the base off the Junction TACAN that would be from surface to FL450 and have the capacity to support 100% of the unit's air-to-air requirements for airspace. Any changes to the Brownwood MOAs would have minimal impact on the 924 FW since they have other quality airspace available in south Texas, a low air traffic region.

(b) Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire,
924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: Criteria II.3.B

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - This was a direct input grade resulting from analysis of potential expansion of a base's associated airspace. For a base to be rated green, the functional expert required a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval. Past experience with airspace growth attempts indicates that even in sparse activity areas, airspace growth is difficult.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.B.1

Nowhere in the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire criteria does it state that a current proposal for airspace expansion is a requirement. This question was adequately answered in the original rebuttal under this Criteria. In the Questionnaire, Bergstrom and Carswell are listed as Red, Homestead is listed as Yellow, and all other AFRES bases (11) are listed as Green under this Criteria. Based on the stated requirement for a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval in order to get a green rating, it would appear that all the airlift and tanker bases in AFRES must have such proposals pending. This is doubtful since they do not have the same requirement for MOAs and restricted airspace that fighter units do. Grissom for example utilizes the MOAs owned by the Ft Wayne, IN ANG fighter unit.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.B.1

A: The Air Force's "RANGES 2005" data collection effort has grown to incorporate a study of all airspace.----use projections,extensive list of data elements, and status of environmental documentation.

Source: Southwest Region Airspace Committee Meeting Minutes Memorandum for Record, dated April 10, 1995.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B.2

Criteria II.3.B.2, Bombing Ranges, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Red
(2) Correct Status - Green
(3) Criteria:

Green - Future regional development generally expected to remain compatible with AIr-to-Ground ranges.

Yellow - Futre regional development may become incompatible in some (limited) areas, creating restrictions on Air-to-Ground ranges.

Red - Future refional development may become severely incompatible in may areas, causing major restrictions to Air-to-Ground ranges.

(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:

(a) Once again there are no data availble to substantiate this rating and it appears to be subjective. There are no known FAA plans, including their Airspace 2000 plan, that will adversely impact 924 FW bombing ranges. Again, south Texas is a low civil air traiffic region.

(b)Sources - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire
924 OSS/OSAM

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.B.2**

Air Force Analysis - Red
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - Again, this was a direct input grade resulting from analysis of potential expansion of a base's associated airspace. For a base to be rated green, the functional expert required a current proposal for airspace expansion that had a high likelihood of approval. Past experience with airspace growth attempts indicates that even in sparse activity areas, airspace growth is difficult.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.B.2

The rebuttal to this is the same as in the previous Criteria. Once again, it is hard to believe that six tanker/airlift bases have current airspace proposals pending.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3.B.2

LTC Arseneau(AF REP Southwest Regeion FAA) states that within the region there are 30 Military OperationsAreas, 7 Restricted Areas,54 IR,57 Vr and 76 SR military training routes, and 37 air refueling tracks. The region is fortunate to have a military-friendly population. Current issues in the region include the requirement for expanded airspace to meet the needs of new weapons, tactics and refueling missions.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B.3

Criteria II.3.B.3, Low Level Routes, shows Bergstrom ARS as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.B.3**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.B.3

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.3.B.3**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.B

Overall: Future Associated Airspace.

Future Associated Airspace	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green
Low Level Routes	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	**Red +**	**Green**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.3.B**

Overall: Future Associated Airspace.

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW

MOAS and Restricted Airspace	Red	Green	Red
Bombing Ranges	Red	Green	Red
Low Level Routes	Green	Green	Green
Overall Existing Airspace	**Red +**	**Green**	**Red +**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.C

Existing Local/ Regional Airspace Enchroachment.

Criteria II.3.C, Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

USAF Response:

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995):

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response:

Not Applcable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3.D

Future Airspace Encroachment.

Criteria II.3.D, Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachement, shows Bergstrom as Yellow and that is correct. This is also based on Houston Intercontinental Airport located 120 NM southeast of Bergstrom. Austin is a low air traffic density area.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.3.D**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.3.D

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.3.D**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.A

Air Quality.

Criteria II.4.A, Air Quality, is further broken down into Attainment Status, Restrictions, and Future Growth. The data for this is from the 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire, Elements VIII.1 and VIII.16.

Criteria II.4.A, Attainment Status, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.4.A**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.A

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.4.A**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.B

Criteria II.4.B, Restrictions, shows:

(1) AF Analysis - Yellow
(2) Correct Status - **Green**
(3) Criteria:
Green - Not Yellow and not Red
Yellow - 1 block >= 40 or 2 blocks >= 30 or 3 blocks >= 20
Red - 1 block >= 50 or 2 blocks >= 40 or 3 blocks >= 30
(4) Bergstrom ARS Data:
(a) No mention is made in the 195 Air Force Base Questionaire of what constitutes a block. It is not possible with the data that we have to determine how a rating of Yellow was derived. On reviewing the Questionnaire Element data, there are only two areas mentioned, VIII.E.8 Monitoring and VIII.E.9 BACT/LAER, and neither of them indicate that Bergstrom is not in complete compliance with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commision (TNRCC) rules and regulations. The City of Austin environmental compliance officer has called Bergstrom "pristine" when compared with most airports or military bases.
(b) Source - 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire.
Interview with City of Austin environmental compliance officer.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.4.B**

Air Force Analysis - Yellow
Community Analysis - Green

Air Force Response - This question refers to a data call briefed to and approved by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group to better quantify Air Quality Restrictions. The data call was sent to each base with instructions to complete each block in order to examine specific air quality restrictions. Weighting was assigned to each block depending on its importance. Once the data call was completed, the points in each block were totaled to determine the type and severity of each specific restriction. Bergstrom specifically exceeded the applicable goalposts for open burning, and regulations prohibiting open burning/open detonation. In addition, they answered yes when questioned whether they have continuous emissions monitoring requirements for sources at the base which exceed the Federal New Source Performance Standards requirements, and whether Bergstrom has BACT/LAER emissions thresholds (excluding lead) that exceed the Federal Clean Air Act requirements.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.B

This area is very difficult to determine exactly what is being asked and how it is being weighted. The environmental personnel assigned to the 924 FW do not fully understand how the ratings were arrived at nor exactly what they mean. Without full and complete access to the data used to determine this rating it is impossible to adequately comment on it. It does appear that under Criteria for Monitoring and BACT/LAER, the unit is being penalized because the State of Texas has regulations that are stricter than the Federal Clean Air Act requirement.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.4.B**

Without realizing it, the ABSG has hit the nail squarely on the head. In fact, their rating of red is due precisely to the fact that the state of Texas has more stringent regulations than the federal government requires in the area of air quality, making the government's point. Of course the unit is being penalized for it, because it is clearly paying more to deal with those issues. Example: Many states allow open air burning, but the state of Texas does not. Instead, in Texas, a contractor is typically needed to resolve the problem at additional expense to the American taxpayer.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4.C

Criteria II.4.C, Future Growth, shows Bergstrom as Green and that is correct.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.4.C**

None Required.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.4.C

Not Applicable.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.4.C**

Not Applicable.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.4

Overall: Air Quality:

Air Quality	**AF Analysis**	**Correct Conclusion**
Attainment Status	Green	Green
Restrictions	Yellow	Green
Future Growth	Green	Green
Overall	**Green**	**Green**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.4

Overall: Air Quality.

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Attainment Status	Green	Green	Green
Restrictions	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Future Growth	Green	Green	Green
Overall	**Green**	**Green**	**Green**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.6

Billeting Requirements.

Billeting Requirements is broken down into Installation Billeting and Commercial Billeting. This area relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements IX.3.A and IX.3.B. Bergstrom ARS has 1191 AF reservists assigned as of 23 March 1995. Of these a maximum of 385 require billeting during drill weekends. The 924 FW provides 155 on-base billets and 230 off-base billets during drill weekends. This equates to 32% of reservists requiring billeting, 13% on-base and 19% off-base, with the off-base billeting providing 60% of the total. This does not change the AF Analysis of Yellow but is lower than the figures shown in the Questionnaire.

USAF Response: **Criteria II.6**

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria II.6

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria II.6**

The 301 FW has approximately 1200 drilling Reservists assigned, 142 of whom require billeting. This represents less than half the billeting cost absorbed by the 924 FW.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VI

Economic Impact.

Criteria VI, Economic Impact, shows the Percent Job Loss (All BRACs) for Bergstrom as 0.3%, Carswell as <0.1%, and Homestead as 0.1%.

USAF Response: **Criteria VI**

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VI

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria VI (Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VII

Community.

Criteria VII, Community, really refers to recruiting data for each community. All the AFRES bases listed are Green - This is because of Criteria VII. 11, Other Local Guard/Reserve Unit, and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Element IX. 12. All AFRES units are shown as Yellow under this Criteria because they have > 2 units and <= 10 units in their community. It is not understood how the Carswell AFRES location can recruit effectively when competing for almost 12,000 military and reservists in the Ft. Worth area.

USAF Response: **Criteria VII**

Air Force Response - Recruiting figures were obtained from each unit as part of the Air Reserve Component data call and certified as accurate by Air Force Reserve Headquarters.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VII

We do not know why this is listed since we did not disagree with the rating shown in the report.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria VII (Community responds)**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria VIII

Environmental Impact.

Criteria VIII, Environmental Impact, shows Bergstrom as overall Green with only one area rated Yellow. That area is Criteria VIII. 5, Installation Restoration Program (IRP). It is shown as Yellow and relates to 1995 Air Force Base Questionnaire Elements VIII. 13 A - VIII. 13 F. It is interesting to note that Carswell is the only AFRES base that is shown as Green under Criteria VIII.5. Bergstrom is the only AFRES base shown as Green under Criteria VIII.2, Asbestos.

USAF Response: **Criteria VIII**

No Response Offered.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Criteria VIII

No Update Submitted.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria VIII**

No rebuttal is necessary. ABSG makes no point.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying) Requirements

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -
Overall Mission Requireme	**Yellow -**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria I.1

Overall: Mission (Flying Requirements.

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Airfield Capabilities	Yellow -	Green	Yellow -
Base Operating Support	Yellow	Green -	Yellow
Training Effectiveness	Yellow -	Green -	Yellow
Overall Mission Requireme	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	**Red +**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II.3

Overall: Airspace Encroachment.

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Existing Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Future Airspace Encroach	Red +	Green	Red +
Existing Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Future Local/Regional Airspace Encroachment	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Airspace Encroach	**Red +**	**Green -**	**Red +**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure.

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -
Air Quality	Green -	Green
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities	**Yellow**	**Green -**

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Criteria II

Overall: Facilities and Infrastructure.

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Mission Support Facilities	Yellow -	Yellow -	Yellow -
Airspace Encroachment	Red +	Green -	Red +
Air Quality	Green -	Green	Green -
Billeting Requirements	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Overall Facilities	**Yellow**	**Green -**	**Yellow**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Criteria I and II

Criteria	AF Analysis	Correct Conclusion
Mission (Flying) Requirements	Yellow -	Green -
Facilities and Infrastructure	Yellow	Green -

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Criteria I and II**

CRITERIA	DOD ANALYSIS	ABSG REBUTTAL	TEAM FW REVIEW
Mission (Flying) Requirements	**Yellow -**	**Green -**	**Yellow -**
Facilities and Infrastructure	**Yellow**	**Green -**	**Yellow**

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Cost Comparison

1. The Air Force cost analysis appears inconsistent and inaccurate.

A. Inputs to the financial model suspect.

The Air Force uses the 'COBRA' computer model to simulate the effects of a proposed realignment or base closure. While the model may work when provided valid data, none of the inputs or assumptions are apparent from the COBRA model. There are however, several areas for concern.

1. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that they only considered Air Force monies. That is, BRACC monies, other service monies, other federal agency monies are not considered. For example, the BRACC monies saved byclosing Homestead or the Navy monies saved by moving the 301 FW from Ft. Worth were not considered.

2. When questioned, the Air Force office in the Pentagon (AFRT) stated that military force structure is not considered in the COBRA model. However, the Bergstrom model clearly shows the job elimination or realignment of the civilian (ASRT) force for Bergstrom. The civilian ART force is a large part of the "military" presence in the Reserve - in contrast with the normal active duty civilian force.

3. A review shows that the assumptions for Bergstrom are in error or the model is indecipherable. For example, the model submitted to the BRACC shows all costs for Bergstrom doubling after 1997. In fact, the overhead costs will substantially reduce as the City of Austin assumes more control of the base.

4. The Air Force submission to the BRACC shows a model for converting Bergstrom to KC-135's, closing Bergstrom, and moving the unit to MacDill. This move contemplates construction costs at MacDill about the same as Bergstrom - such a move would be a net cost to the government.

B. Personnel costs associated with Force Structure should not be considered

The Austin BRACC Study Group believes it is unreasonable to consider military personnel costs associated with force structure to be considered in determining locations for realignment or closure. The AF Reserve civilian ART force is largely part of the force structure. When comparing AFRES units with similar missions, it is reasonable to assume that military personnel costs are approximately equal. That is, the military personnel costs associated with closing the Bergstrom F-16 unit would be about the same as the unit at Miami or New Orleans, etc.

The Austin BRACC Study Group therefore made a cost comparison between AFRES fighter locations based on two factors. First, an estimate of the overhead associated with the six F-16 fighter locations was made. This estimate was based on the Base Operating Support (BOS) budgets of each unit. Several of the units are based at an Air Force active duty location and their overhead is less than a unit located at a joint use field and substantially lower than an AFRES operated base. However, the Air Force assumes a variable cost associated with its AFRES unit, and this variable overhead needs to be considered.

Second, the Austin BRACC Study Group collected the current construction costs for the services at the six AFRES fighter locations. In our analysis "opportunity cost" is taken as the construction cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer if the listed AFRES location were to close. For example, at Homestead $88 million in new construction projects are planned and $15 million has been spent. At Austin/Bergstrom, $13 million in new construction is authorized and $2 million has been spent. At Phoenix (Luke AFB), although the value of the AFRES facilities are close to $50 million, only $20 million of new construction is planned in the next 2 years.

II. Summary of Cost Savings

	1996 Opportunity Cost	Annual Overhead Value*	Net Present
Miami	-73,000,000	5,000,000	($118,642,728)
Fort Worth	-59,000,000	2,500,000	(81,821,364)
Austin	**-11,000,000**	**3,500,000**	**(42,949,910)**
Phoenix	-20,000,000	2,500,000	(42,821.364)
New Orleans	0	3,000,000	(27,385,637)
Salt Lake City	0	2,500,000	(22,821,364)

*Using a discount rate of 9% and a 20 year cost recovery period.

Cost to closure has not been considered, but would make the Austin location look substantially more favorable. The Air Force in their COBRA analysis estimated the cost to close Austin/Bergstrom at $34 million and the cost to close Miami/Homestead at only $7.9 million. Obviously, the cost to close Fort Worth, Phoenix, New Orleans, or Salt Lake City would be substantially less than Austin or Miami because they would remain as operating DOD facilities.

It should be noted that if the Air Force's estimate of $34 million to close Austin/Bergstrom is current, then the savings by closing Bergstrom is about $9 million over 20 years (again, excluding military force structure).

In its final report to the BRACC the Austin BRACC Study Group intends to compare other AFRES locations to the above listed F-16 locations. It is certainly true, however, based on the above analysis, that Austin/Bergstrom is NOT the most expensive AFRES location and in fact it compares favorably.

USAF Response: Cost Comparison

Air Force Response - It appears that the Bergstrom community has a misunderstanding of the COBRA model and the process of estimating criteria IV/V values.

The COBRA model is directed by OSD for all services to use on BRAC decisions. The model uses two types of data: standard factors, which are used for all AF bases; and base unique data, which is certified for accuracy by the appropriate major command. All three services, the GAO, and the AF Audit Agency have reviewed and validated the model and the process. While there is a certain degree of inaccuracy in the model, it is consistent and thus fairly compares costs and savings among alternatives.

The model includes all major factors which either drive costs or savings. One of the most important input areas is personnel. The cost of eliminating, moving, or other personnel actions is a large part of the costs and personnel elimination is the key factor in determining savings.

The summary of cost savings provided by the community is significantly flawed in two areas. First, COBRA includes all cost and savings elements, not just opportunity costs, when calculating NPV. Second, OSD guidance directs the use of a 2.75 discount rate.

Finally, the community called into question the $34 million cost to close stated in the Air Force report. Specifically, the $34 million cost to close noted in the report resulted from the Air Force Reserve's initial level playing field COBRA. In the focused COBRA, these figures reflected a onetime cost as reported to the Commission for Bergstrom of $13.4 million with a one-time savings due to military construction avoidance of $13 million. This results in an exceptionally low one-time net cost to close the base of $345,000.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Cost Comparison

Once again, without complete access to all the data used to define the parameters in the DoD COBRA model, it is impossible to comment on the figures used. They definitely warrant further investigation since they will be a significant factor in any decision to close or keep open a base.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Cost Comparison

1. Summary of Cost Savings:

Fort Worth is shown to have an opportunity cost savings of $59 million. This figure is based on cancellation of MILCON to accommodate the move of the Texas Air National Guard from NAS Dallas to Ft. Worth. this move was directed by BRAC 93 and the chart does not show all data considered in BRAC 93 that made the one-time expenditure of funds viable by eliminating recurring costs and consolidating the TANG BOS under the new Joint Reserve Base. Obviously, no real MILCON cost savings was available through the Austin proposal to move the 301 FW, so a bogus figure was divined from a separate BRAC action. The $59 million figure for TANG MILCON is inaccurate. The Navy shows total MILCON of $27 million for TANG. There are no certified estimates of what it would take to modify 301 FW facilities to accommodate TANG, but could exceed $27 million. Additionally, the only MILCON scheduled for the 301 FW was an $18 million figure that was directed as a result of BRAC 91. This was intended to relocate facilities to accommodate a Reserve Cantonment Area. Only approximately $1 million was spent and that construction is complete. The rest was eliminated as part of the cost savings associated with the consolidation under Fort Worth JRB. The Air Force Reserve at Fort Worth has no MILCON planned, scheduled, or funded.

b. The same paragraph shows an annual overhead of $2,500,000 for Ft. Worth and run it out 9 years to get a figure of $22,500.000. This figure is added to the Texas Air National guard MILCON figure to arrive at a total purported savings of $81,821,364. Note also that the overhead figure at Austin is $3,500,000 and that translates into 9 million more than Ft. Worth for the same period. This figure does not include the actual costs of overhead at Austin following takeover by the city. At present, the Air Force Reserve has no figures for these additional airport fees. A mandate to remain at Austin without a cost estimate and agreement, amounts to writing a blank check to the City of Austin for whatever support they choose to provide the Air Force Reserve.

2. The notes at the bottom of the same page state that the cost of closure has not been considered and go on to state that closing Bergstrom would cost $34 million while it only costs $7.9 million to close Homestead. It does not state what it costs to close the Reserve unit at Ft. Worth. It must be noted that the Reserve unit at Ft. Worth is a part of the NAS Ft. Worth JRB and whatever the costs associated with moving this unit might be, it could not be considered a savings since the host base remains open. That is, you incur the cost of a move without benefit of getting a closure.

3. The last paragraph on the page in question states that based on the analysis on that page, Bergstrom is NOT the most expensive AFRES location and in fact, compares favorably. In truth, the figures are wrong and make just the opposite case. HQ AF Reserve is on record that stand-alone units (i.e., not hosted by active duty) are more expensive to operate. BOS costs at 301 FW (Ft. Worth) and 924 FW (Austin) were $15.1 million and

$15.2 million respectively in 1994 when both were stand-alone units. Costs were $12.2 million and $16.7 million respectively when 301 FW became a tenant and 924 FW remained a host in 1995. Austin's position ignores the simple economic reality that it is far more cost effective to operate one base rather than two. It also ignores the fact that the BRAC process is designed to close and realign bases, while preserving the capacity needed to fight and win America's wars, not to keep them open when far more efficient options are available.

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995): Alternative Proposal

The Air Force has proposed closing Bergstrom ARS for two stated reasons: eliminate one F-16 unit; and save money. To follow is one suggestion for accomplishing these two goals. There are, of course, many alternatives - this is but one alternative for the BRACC to consider.

1. Move the AFRES flying squadron from NAS Ft. Worth to Bergstrom.

   In 1993 the Air Force proposed closing Bergstrom and consolidating 2 F-16 squadrons at Ft Worth (i.e. Carswell). The Air Force estimated that such a consolidation would cost around $6 million, but save $20 million per year. Consolidation at Ft. Worth does not make sense for many reasons. For example, the Navy, Air Guard, and Army are moving a large number of aircraft into Ft Worth, creating congested ground and airspace. Carswell was closed as an active duty installation for, inter alia, this ground and airspace congestion and encroachment.

   Consolidating at Austin/Bergstrom does make sense both for military value and cost savings. As outlined below, Bergstrom is an ideal location for consolidation and would be cost effective.

2. Close Homestead Air Reserve Base.

   In 1993 the BRACC decided to consolidate Air Force Reserve units at Homestead, with the understanding that Dade County would make the Base a joint use facility (but not a commercial air carrier facility). This decision is expensive for the United States - **$88 million** in new construction required. Dade County argued that a Homestead consolidation made sense because, inter alia: the 301st Rescue Squadron and 302 Fighter Wing would both make use of Homestead; and with MacDill AFB closed, there was no Air Force presence in south central Florida.

   1995 has brought substantial changes from the Air Force. The Air Force now proposes leaving the 301st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida. Little justification can be made for spending $88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

3. Section I below explains how such a proposal would not have a negative effect on military value - specifically Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements. Section II below explains how this proposal would save the U.S. taxpayer almost $200 million in overhead and an additional $400 million in personnel savings, while eliminating only one F-16 squadron.

I. Operational Readiness and Mission Requirements

A. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from Ft. Worth NAS's single runway in a high aircraft traffic area degrades operational readiness, increases operating costs, and unnecessarily increases risks.

1. It will be difficult to launch and recover from a single runway on a normal basis the 150 - 200 aircraft proposed for Ft. Worth NAS in a high aircraft traffic area, degrading operational readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

Exhibit IV-A shows the normal operational tempo for Carswell/Ft. Worth. As can be seen from Exhibit IV-A, in normal operation approximately 100 sorties, and 250 takeoffs, approaches, and landings per day can be anticipated. Allocating a takeoff and landing window of three minutes to each aircraft results in a 12 1/2 hour flying day and approximately a 14 hour duty day.

Even with such mitigation practices as staggering duty days of the various squadrons, diverting the 25 rotary sorties, and combining fighters into flights, Carswell/Ft. Worth's single runway is faced with about a 10 hour stream of takeoffs and landings with aircraft assigned several minute windows for takeoffs and recoveries. Scheduling would be dictated by takeoff and recovery allocations instead of mission requirements. Maintenance delays would result in canceled sorties and loss of training; control delays in aircraft in-flight emergencies would have a ripple effect resulting in canceling dozens of sorties. Instrument weather in the Carswell/Ft.Worth area would force cancellation of many additional sorties and the attendant unnecessary loss of training.[1]

While Exhibit IV-A illustrates normal operational tempo, an important test of war time training is the ability to surge and exercise under war time conditions. Under the proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth, any exercise could only be undertaken if other flying units were willing to stand down during the exercise period. Further, a desirable characteristic of a military base is its capacity to expand and surge in times of potential hostilities - Carswell/Ft. Worth would have no excess capacity.

The proposal for Carswell/Ft. Worth would result in one of the most active single runway operations during daylight hours in the world. Truly a remarkable task for a base previously closed because it had "the worst ground and regional airport encroachment in its category."[2]

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[1] The instrument weather could be mild, say 1500 foot ceilings, and yet force instrument approaches. Requiring instrument approaches would force cancellation of many sorties even though the training area weather is adequate.

[2] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President 1991, p.53

BERGSTROM

In contract, the Bergstrom/Austin airport is a two runway operation.[3] As an operating Air Force Base, Bergstrom sustained 100 takeoffs, approaches, and landings for four squadrons during a normal duty day. With the addition of commercial traffic and another suitable runway, two F-16 squadrons could easily be accommodated without any operational impediment.

2. Operating 150 - 200 aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a high traffic area incurs a substantial hidden operational cost.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

DFW is one of the highest traffic areas in the United States.[4] As can be seen from Exhibit IV-B, Carswell/Ft. Worth is one of 25 airports in the Dallas-Fort Worth terminal control area. It is readily apparent from Exhibit IV-B that any departure other than to the West is difficult from Carswell/Ft Worth.

The current plan for Carswell/Ft Worth launch and recovery in good weather (VMC) is to depart all aircraft to the West below 4,000 ft. for 30 miles prior to permitting turns to the North or South or further climbs to altitude.[5] Good weather recoveries are similarly restrictive with approach corridors from the Northwest and Southwest to Carswell/Ft. Worth. In most cases, the routing and altitudes are indirect, adding time and cost to operational training.

While the FAA and the military are working to minimize aircraft delays, because of the indirect routing and altitude restrictions, as well as the heavy volume of traffic at Carswell/Ft Worth and in the DFW area, several minutes of additional flight time per sortie (in good weather) will occur because of cumulative delays.[6]

Departure and approach delays into Carswell/Ft. Worth in inclement weather or at night (IMC) would impose even worse delays compared to good weather (VMC) approaches and recoveries. IMC departures for flights of fighters cannot use the VMC plan of remaining below 4000 feet for 30 miles. Many sorties will be canceled during IMC

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[3] Bergstrom currently has 1 large and 1 small runway. In 1998 the small runway will be eliminated and another parallel runway will be operational.

[4] Chicago O'Hare is the first.

[5] Contact Richard Baugh, Fort Worth Center Airspace Manager, for more details.

[6] Flights to the West under good conditions would experience little ground clearance or air traffic control delay, although the altitude and routing corridors will result in route delay. Departures to the East wouldencounter significant handling delays and the routing delay is staggering.

operations, reducing operational training, and the sorties that successfully launch will have significantly increased operational expense.

While estimates of increased operational costs at Carswell/Ft. Worth because of these cumulative delays are difficult to determine, approximate numbers will illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

- An F-16 squadron, such as the 301st FW at Ft. Worth, flies over 3,000 local sorties per year.
- Approximately 75% of the sorties are VMC and 25% of the sorties are IMC/night.
- A conservative estimate of these cumulative delays at Ft. Worth are 3-5 minutes (VMC) and 6-8 minutes (IMC).
- An F-16 costs over $3000 per hour to operate.
- The added cost of Ft. Worth basing of an F-16 squadron approaches $1,000,000 annually in operational expense when compared to a Bergstrom consolidation. The AFRES F-16's further add congestion and cost to the other aircraft at Ft. Worth NAS[7] and civilian aircraft traffic in the DFW Metroplex.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, Austin, Texas has low commercial aviation traffic and Bergstrom/Austin's two runways can handle easily two squadrons with no delay. The routings are direct to all military operating areas without added cost to other users.

3. Operating large numbers of fighter aircraft from the single runway at Carswell/Ft. Worth in a populated area increases risks and diminishes operational training and readiness.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

In the fighter business, operational requirements dictate that the fighters takeoff on time, arrive at their destinations on time, and fighters typically use their available fuel for training (ground attack or air combat) to the maximum extent possible. It is quite common for fighters to return to base with 10 minutes or less of fuel remaining in order to meet their training and operational objectives.[8]

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[7] The operational savings to the Navy by moving the F-16's to Bergstrom is also difficult to estimate with precision, but should approach $2 million annually. (8000 local sorties, 2-3 minute takeoff, approach, or landing delays eliminated; $4000-5000 per hour operation cost).

[8] Because fuel is always limited, 10-15 minutes of fuel reserved for Carswell/Ft. Worth traffic delays typically means 10-15 minutes less training time. Because the tactical portion of a sortie is on the order of 30 minutes, half

Further, it is not uncommon for a fighter aircraft with an emergency to close a runway for a half hour or more, resulting in the diversion of all airborne aircraft to other air fields. Because Carswell/Ft. Worth will be the only military air field in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, military aircraft will be forced to recover at Alliance, Meacham, DFW, or Love in many cases.

Arriving at a single runway over a populated area presents a risk that should, if possible, be avoided. To offset the risk of running out of fuel or forced diversion into a civilian field, pilots will be forced to increase their fuel reserve - significantly reducing their effective training and operational readiness.

BERGSTROM

In contrast, the Bergstrom/Austin airport has two usable runways, practically eliminating the risk of diversion or the necessity to increase fuel reserve. Additionally, Bergstrom/Austin is fortunate to have other military air fields in the immediate area -- Gray Army Air Field 54 miles to the North and Randolph AFB 50 miles to the Southwest. Finally, the approaches to Bergstrom are predominately over unpopulated areas.

II. Carswell/Ft. Worth's training air space is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed.

1. The bombing ranges reachable from Carswell/Ft. Worth are Army controlled, permit only limited tactics, and are often unavailable.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The primary range used by Carswell/Ft. Worth for bombing practice is the Falcon range on the Ft. Sill Army complex. Because the range is small, only limited tactical maneuvers are permitted, limiting the type of training available. The Air Training Command unit from Sheppard AFB unit also uses Falcon. An increasing problem is obtaining range time for Falcon. Because Falcon Range is part of an Army live fire complex, the Army often preempts all other use and sometimes even cancels other users on short notice.

Limited bombing practice can be achieved at Ft. Hood. Ft. Hood is controlled by the Army which is sometimes unable to yield time for Air Force training.

BERGSTROM

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the operational training may be lost because of the need to guard against delays in the Carswell/Ft. Worth approach.

As can be seen from Exhibit IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom has available to it a greater variety of bombing ranges. Most improtant are the McMullen ranges - actually two ranges. Yankee and Dixie. Yankee is controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, while the Bergstrom Air Force Reserve controls Dixie. Neither range is in an Army complex, meaning access is unlimited and tactical entries can be made from the multiple low level routes leading to the ranges. Further, because Dixie is controlled by the Air Force Reserve, bombing practice is not preempted by any other user or authority.

Bergstrom has excellent access to Ft. Hood and is 60 miles (10 minutes) closer than Carswell/Ft. Worth.

Access to the Peason Tactical range at Ft. Polk is possible from Bergstrom. Bergstrom is 70 miles closer to Peason than Carswell/Ft. Worth, which means 12 minutes more time available in support of Army exercises. Because of the traffic flow at DFW, Ft. Polk is difficult to reach from Carswell/Ft. Worth.

2. The number of air combat ranges available from Carswell/Ft. Worth is inadequate to support the number of fighter squadrons proposed for Carswell/Ft. Worth.

CARSWELL/FT. WORTH

The Brownwood MOA has quality training airspace and is easily accessible from Carswell/Ft Worth. Currently, however, the Navy schedules Brownwood in excess of six hours per day for its own use. With the addition of at least another Navy squadron using Brownwood and increasing traffic into DFW, use becomes difficult for Air Force use during normal duty hours. The result is that Air Force fighter squadrons based t Carswell/Ft Worth will be forced to use Rivers MOA and Brady MOA a large percentage of the time. The Rivers and Brady MOA's are long distances from Carswell/Ft Worth, substantially reducing the operational training and increasing operational costs for air combat training.[9]

BERGSTROM

Turning to Exh. IV-C and IV-D, Bergstrom/Austin has a number of MOA's readily available to it for air combat training. The Brady MOA is owned by the Air Force Reserve and is only a short distance away. Equally close to Bergstrom/Austin, are the Randolph and Chase MOA's. With Navy Chase closed, the Chase MOA's are readily available. Even the Brownwood MOA can be easily used from Bergstrom/Austin for joint training with the Navy.

[9] The 45-50 minute enroute time to the Rivers MOA is 45-50 minutes of valuable air combat training time lost.

II. COST SAVINGS

A. Move the 457th Flying Squadron to Bergstrom

As discussed above, the Air Force in 1993 estimated that consolidating the 704 FS from Bergstrom with the 457 FS at Carswell/Ft. Worth would cost $6 million and save $20 million per year. While these estimates may not be correct, they are useful for comparison.

The effects of moving the 457FS from Ft. Worth to Bergstrom would be to eliminate the $2.5 million per year in overhead incurred by the 301FW in Ft. Worth. Additionally, the $2.7 cost for military construction to move 10th Air Force to Ft. Worth would be saved, along with the $300,000 in moving expense.

A significant savings would result from closing the 301 FW at Ft. Worth. First, the Navy would save approximately $39 million in construction costs and complete their move to Ft. Worth earlier saving additional monies. This $39 million is based on the estimated value of the 301 FW facilities using Air Force pricing guide and square footage of the facilities. Additionally, the 301 FW was allocated $18 million in new construction (it is unknown how much of this allocation has been spent).

To accommodate the 457 FS at Bergstrom under $4.5 million would be spent. This estimate is from the Air Force Reserve and assumes a new operations building would be built and a fuel storage hangar. This estimate is not dependent on the type of airplane used by the 457 FS. The Bergstrom ramp area of 283,000 sq ft is of sufficient size to accommodate 36 F-16's and 8 KC-135's for example. There would be a moving cost estimated as $1.2 million for moving the 457 FS to Bergstrom.

In Summary, the savings:

- Move the 457 FS Flying Squadron to Austin
  - $2.5 M Overhead saved per year
  - Opportunity Cost $59 M
  - Mil Con at Austin Required - ($4.5M)

- Cost to move single squadron - ($1.2M)

- Savings from 10th Air Force remaining at Bergstrom
  - $2.7 Milcon
  - $.3 moving expense

- Present Value of Overhead and Construction Savings - $81.5 million

- Personnel Savings additional $182 million
  (Based on Air Force 1993 estimate of $20 million per year in annual savings.)

Additional considerations:

- Ft Worth is currently scheduled for
  11,500 Reservists
  140 Aircraft + transients and Lockheed
- 30 T/O, approach, or landing per hour from a single runway in the DFW traffic area (as shown in Exhibit IV-A)
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to recruit.
- With so many reservists it will be difficult to drill.
- Closure of the 301 FW at Ft. Worth will not only save the Navy substantial military construction monies, but also save perhaps 2 years in their move completion timing.

B. Close Homestead

Homestead ARB has excellent flying airspace. The only negative from an operational training view is that there is no Army units located close enough for joint training.

As previously mentioned, reopening Homestead ARB is expensive for the United States. $88 million in new construction is required. However, the Air Force now proposes leaving the 301st Rescue Squadron at its temporary home of Patrick AFB in Florida. Additionally, the Air Force proposes reopening MacDill AFB in Florida and establishing an Air Force Reserve unit. Little justification can be made for spending $88 million to reopen Homestead as an Air Reserve Base to support one unit.

In Summary, the savings from Homestead closure:

1. Construction Savings - $73 million. This represents $88 million allocated and the almost $15 million already spent. See Exhibit IV-D.
2. Overhead Savings - $5 M/year. As previously indicated, the overhead estimates are based on good faith estimates from a unit's Base Operating support budget, taking into consideration the relative cost of running a unit, savings from joint use, and active duty associated costs.
3. Present Value of Savings - $118 M
4. Cost to Close - $7.9 M
This estimate may be low, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force in their COBRA studies.
5. Additional Personnel Savings, same as Bergstrom (--$220 M). This is the estimated manpower savings resulting from closure. This estimate is believed to be high, but is the estimate provided by the Air Force for Bergstrom. Homestead manpower costs are at least as great as Bergstrom.

C. Summary of Cost Saving.

- Move Carswell to Austin - $81.5 million.
- Close Homestead - $110 million.

Present Value of Total Overhead Savings for same combat capability - $191.5 million.

Additional Personnel Savings -- $400 million.

USAF Response: **Alternative Proposal**

Air Force Response - The decision to close Bergstrom Air Reserve Station was the culmination of extensive analysis by the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. Carswell NAS ranked higher than Bergstrom in Criterion I , Mission (Flying) Requirements, and Criterion II, Facilities. Specifically, Carswell ranked higher than Bergstrom in both Airfield Capabilities, and Air Reserve Component (ARC) Operational Effectiveness. In addition, Carswell is considered by the AFRES to be much better demographically for recruiting purposes, and ranks better than Bergstrom in Joint Training Opportunities, Training Opportunities (Airspace), and in the cost of bedding down an F-16 squadron.

In its attempt to downsize, the Air Force Reserve found it to be more beneficial from a fiscal standpoint to close Bergstrom. AFRES plans to draw down to four F-16 squadrons and consolidate and reduce its infrastructure and BOS costs. In the case of Bergstrom, the AFRES is totally responsible for the airfield and its operation, versus Carswell, where the costs can be shared jointly with the Navy and the Air National Guard. While the community's proposal did warrant consideration, it is the Air Force Reserve's opinion that closing Bergstrom, and maintaining an AFRES F-16 unit at Carswell is clearly the best option.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Alternative Proposal

1. The USAF position is a restatement of what is contained in the Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendation (Volume V) and the rhetoric used by AFRES as stated by Brig. Gen. Bradley in his testimony before the BRACC to justify their decision to place Bergstrom on the Air Force list.

2. The statement that Carswell is considered by AFRES to be much better

demographically for recruiting purposes does not apparently take into consideration that the Austin MSA supports a much smaller guard/reserve population than does the Dallas/Ft Worth MSA. NAS Ft Worth is scheduled to have 11,500 reservists assigned. Considering the fact that the 924 FW is currently manned at 101% and could be manned at a much higher level, it does not appear the unit has any problems attracting reservists. Bergstrom has traditionally run 8-10 points higher than Carswell (FY 92 BSM-106.4%/FWH-95.6%; FY 93 BSM-98.8%/FWH-91.0%; FY 94 BSM-103.4%/FWH-92.6%). Another point is that the 924 FW is the only AFRES unit located between San Antonio and Ft Worth. Without this unit, there are a lot of people that would not be able to participate in the reserve program without traveling extremely long distances. Another factor is that the 301 FW has a policy that all members of that unit must live within 50 miles of the base. The 924 FW has no such policy and as a result allows participation from a much larger percentage of the population.

3. In response to the statement about Carswell ranking better in Joint Training Opportunities and Training Opportunities (Airspace), that has been shown to be incorrect. The 924 FW has at least as good and in many cases better training airspace and opportunities than does the 301 FW.

4. The statement that AFRES plans to draw down to four F-16 squadrons has already been addressed. The original plan from AFRES was to close the 926 FW at NAS New Orleans and convert the 301 FW to tankers. This left AFRES with four F-16 squadrons. The 926 FW is currently not funded nor programmed for existence beyond FY 96/4.

5. The statement that AFRES is totally responsible for the airfield and its operation shows a basic lack of information. The 924 FW is only responsible for the cantonment area and will operate the runway, tower, and navaids only until the city takes over in 1996. Once again future changes that impact on our operating costs were not considered.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: Alternative Proposal

4. Page IV-6, paragraph IIA is full of errors. First, they stated that in 1993, Air Force estimated that consolidating the Austin unit to Ft. Worth would cost $6 million and save $20 million per year. Later, it is stated that moving the Ft. Worth flying unit to Austin would cost $4.5 million. In fact, HQ AFRES has identified a $10 million MILCON cost to relocate the Ft. Worth unit to Austin. Also, note that this paragraph uses the unsubstantiated figure of $2.5 million per year overhead at Ft. Worth to suggest a savings if the Ft. Worth unit was moved. It fails to mention that on page III of this document, they show an overhead at Austin of $3.5 million per year.

- 5. Page IV-7. The fifth point states that personnel savings of $182 million are available based on the Air Force 1993 estimate of $20 million per year in annual savings. Again, the reference is so vague that it is not possible to refer to a source document; however assuming that the $20 million dollar savings refers to the elimination of the support personnel at Bergstrom during the study of cost savings in moving the Austin unit to Ft. Worth, the number is not valid if the direction of unit moves is reversed. Actually, there are 312 support personnel at Austin and 208 at the Air Force Reserve unit in Ft. Worth. Obviously, the $20 million figure referred to the elimination of the larger personnel package and less savings are accrued if the smaller Ft. Worth package is eliminated.
- Point six is also in error. The latest figures for total reservists is 7800 at Ft. Worth vice 11,500 and 105 aircraft versus 140 plus.(Source?)
- Austin Exhibit IV-A purporting to show 30 T/O, approach, or landing per hour from NAS Fort Worth JRB, is factually incorrect.(Source?)
- Austin's statement that it will be difficult to recruit is factually incorrect. It has been the policy of two 301 Fighter Wing Commanders to intentionally recruit far fewer than our recruiting base would allow, in order to preserve positions for members at other units that were scheduled to deactivate. The policy has given many highly trained and deserving Reservists an opportunity to continue their military careers, while avoiding training costs attendant to recruiting off the street.
- The ABSG assertion that "with so many reservists it will be difficult to drill" is factually incorrect. Drill schedules have and will continue to be deconflicted when appropriate, and co-scheduled when mutually beneficial. There are many advantages to a Joint Reserve Base, not the least of which are Joint Training opportunities not available in Austin.

Austin's assertion that "closure of the 301 FW at Ft. Worth will not only save the Navy substantial military construction monies, but also save perhaps 2 years in their move completion timing is not only factually incorrect, exactly the opposite is true. The Navy was able to construct a very cost effective timetable because of the 301 FW and the capabilities it already has in place. The timetable was planned with that in mind. To take away what the 301 FW brings to the Joint Reserve Base concept would both delay the existing timetable significantly and increase the cost. The obvious reason is that the Navy

would have to tear apart an existing Joint infrastructure and replace it.

7. This paper is not a point by point rebuttal of all inconsistent data found in the subject document. Much of the data presented in the document had no source reference; only glaring errors were identified.

8. Most notably, figures on costs at Bergstrom reimbursable to the city following establishment of the International Airport were missing, probably because they don't exist. The net effect of the Air Force Reserve accepting such an arrangement would be the same as signing a blank check over to the city of Austin with nothing guaranteed in return.

NAS FT. WORTH PROJECTED DAILY OPERATIONAL TEMPO

	LAUNCH AND RECOVERY	ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE APPROACHES/ LANDINGS	TOTAL EVENTS
TACTICAL[1]	118	60	~~178~~ 178
MULTI-ENGINE	10	10	20
ROTARY	25	5	~~3~~ 30
TRANSIENT	10	2	12
LOCKHEERD	6	2	8
TOTALS	169	79	248

[1] The Tactical projections are based on a survey of the fighter units involved. The F-16 squadron flies 16 sorties per day on a normal basis. The other projections are Navy estimates contained in its Defense Recommendation for Carswell white paper. Almost 90% of the tactical sorties are daylight sorties, i.e. on 9 out of 10 days these 168+ tactical events will be attempted during normal flying hours 0830-1630, or 21 tactical events per hour. The remaining 70 events would be more evenly spread over the airport hours, or about 6 events per hour. 30 events per hour from a single runway are obviously not possible on a normal basis.

TEAM FT WORTH RESPONSE

NAS FT. WORTH PROJECTED DAILY OPERATIONAL TEMPO[1]

	LAUNCH AND RECOVERY		ADD'L MULTIPLE APPROACHES/ LANDINGS		TOTAL EVENTS	
	ABSG	Team FtWorth	ABSG	Team FtWorth	ABSG	Team FtWorth
TACTICAL[2]	118	76	60	52	178	128
MULTI-ENGINE	10	10	10	10	20	20
ROTARY	25	24	5	12	30	36
TRANSIENT[3]	10	4	2	2	12	6
LOCKHEED	6	8	2	0	8	8
TOTALS	169	122	79	76	248	198

[1] All projections are based on actual contacts with units involved. Reduced numbers are the result of innaccurate ABSG information as to the number of units relocating, possessed aircraft of each unit, and actual ops tempo data. Ref telecons, 25 May 1995, with: VMFA-112 and VMFA-124 (DSN 874-6306), VMFA-201 (874-6195), TANG C-130s (874-6560), Army Reserve (874-6550), TANG CH-47/UH-60s (874-6560), Lockheed (Comm 763-3619), and NAS FW JRB Transient Alert (739-5719)

[2] Using 90% daylight sortie figure of ABSG, 0830-1630 flying window, yields 14 tactical events per hour (198 x .9)/8. Since two-ship is the average size takeoff movement, this number can be reduced by one third, since ATC treats two-ship takeoff as single event for traffic purposes. This yields 10 events/hr.

[3] Monthly average is 198, of which 75% occur during weekend, yielding 1.65 aircraft per week day (rounded up L&R = 4)

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE[34]

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. ***TEAM FORT WORTH Review***

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
McMullen Range	Actually two ranges - Yankee (north) and Dixie (south). The Navy owns the land, but their use has diminished. The Kelly Guard controls Yankee, while the Bergstrom Reserve controls Dixie. The ranges are good conventional ranges and have a number of tactical targets.	125 NM	Both ranges are fully manned and under-utilized. Could easily support more squadrons. The active duty Air Force at Randolph also used Dixie in cooperation with Bergstrom.
McMullen Range	**Two complexes on one range. Yankee and Dixie are extremely small and suffer critical restrictions which impede quality tactical training.**	**126 nm**	**Both complexes are readily available for units wishing the limited training opportunities present.**
Chase MOA	As the Navy leaves Chase, the entire air space becomes more available. Navy Corpus and Kingsville use the Chase MOA's to a limited extent.	70 nm	Largely available. One Chase MOA is close to Bergstrom, while another Chase MOA overlies McMullen Range.
Kingsville MOA (Formerly Chase)	**Limited vertical blocks render this MOA untenable for modern air combat training.**	**Kingsville 4&5: 94 nm** **Kingsville 3: 134 nm**	**Continued use of this MOA by USN training wings stationed at Kingsville NAS will restrict availability for off-station users.**

[34] ABSG distances to closest edge. **TEAM FORT WORTH distances to area centroid.**

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. ***TEAM FORT WORTH Review***

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Peason Range	Good tactical range in western Lousiana. The new Army Medium conflict exercise are. Ft. Polk.	225 nm	Will become major support area for exercises.
Peason Ridge Range	Range closed in August 1992.	241 nm	Range closed in August 1992. No plan to reopen to high performance aircraft.
Ft. Hood	North Ft. Hood has a dedicated AF range - Shoal Creek. South Ft. Hood has a live bombing area. The Army sometimes limits access.	70 nm	Used increasingly to support the Army at Ft. Hood.
Ft. Hood	Shoal Creek, has no ability to score bombs, and is restricted to training ordnance only (no strafe). The impact area in Ft. Hood is useable for heavyweight inerts or live bombs.	65 nm	The US Army owns the Fort Hood MOA. Shoal Creek time must be approved by the army. The impact area is available for joint training opportunities.

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. *TEAM FORT WORTH Review*

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Brownwood MOA	Brownwood includes separate air compat areas that can be used individually. Used together, the area can accommodate a big fight.	96 nm	Navy Dallas owns and uses a lot. Also, Carswell and Dyess B1's are users. Additionally, the FAA preempts military use for holding DFW traffic. Little available time left.
Brownwood MOA	MOA vertical limits of 7,000' through 17,999'. ATCAA allows operation up to FL 340. Geographical boundaries well exceed requirements of modern day air combat tactics training.	Center of Hornet & Tomcat 116 nm	Navy Fort Worth owns the Brownwood MOA. Scheduling priority given to units based at the Navy Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base.
Brady MOA	Brady is low (23,000 ft. and below) which is advantageous for Low altitude training, but not as useful for unlimited training.	60 nm	Bergstrom owns and controls. It is close and easy to use.
Brady MOA	Brady MOA is untenable for modern day air combat tactics training. It is useful for LOWAT, although impeded with several noise measles.	95 nm	Readily available for use, as most units utilize more productive airspace.

SUMMARY OF BERGSTROM TACTICAL AIRSPACE

ABSG Initial Report (19 April 1995 vs. *TEAM FORT WORTH Review*

AREA	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	AVAILABILITY
Randolph MOA	The Randolph 2A MOA is large with a good altitude block for unlimited air combat training.	70 nm	Other Randolph MOA's are closer, but normally unavailable because of heavy use by Randolph.
Randolph MOA	The Randolph 2A MOA is limited from 9,000' MSL to FL 210. This extremely limited vertical block is untenable for modern day air combat training.	Randolph 1A: 64 nm Randolph 1B/C: 74 nm Randolpgh 2A: 96 nm	All Randolph MOAs are heavily utilized by AETC assets located at Randolph AFB. Off-station users would have limited availability to these MOAs.
Crystal MOA	The Crystal MOA is large, with the biggest altitude block of any MOA in Texas.	130 nm	Crystal is used and controlled by the Kelly Air National Guard, and accordingly is normally available. However, its distance from Bergstrom makes it a second choice.
Crystal MOA	The Crystal MOA is an adequate MOA, with a veritcal block from 6,000' MSL to FL 450.	160 nm	TEAM FORT WORTH concurs with the ABSG statement regarding Crystal availability.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ABSG

"Austin Update May 10, 1995"

Point / Counterpoint

ABSG Update (10 May 1995: General Statement

The City of Austin has provided the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) with detailed information over the last month to support its firmly held position that the Bergstrom Air Reserve Station (BARS) cantonment area should not be shut down. In fact, the City's position is that the BARS should be expanded to further enhance the Department of Defense's financial Return on Investment while providing strong Military Value per the DBCRC's criteria. The following outlines our current evaluation with regard to that criteria:

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: General Statement **(Community responds)**

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): The Law and the Promise.

A. The Law and the Promise.

1. The 1991 BRAC Law: *"The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be distributed."*

   a. Citizens of Austin voted May 1, 1993, 63% to .37% to move the municipal airport to Bergstrom site.

   b. Plans call for City's Aviation Department to move all cargo operations to Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (A-BIA) in October 1996 and to assume majority of operating expenses.

   c. All air operations will move to A-BIA by end of 1998 and Aviation Department and FAA will assume **all** operating expenses.

2. The Air Force's 1992 Promise: In a special meeting of the City Council on February 21, 1992, James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Military Installations, USAF, told the citizens of Austin that, *"Our plan is still, and will remain, and our planning efforts will be toward operating that unit at Bergstrom assuming that there is going to be an airport."* and again, *"Certainly, we would like to see an airport there because then we could leave the unit right where it is. But that's your decision, the community's decision, however you decide it we'll make it work for the Department of the Air Force."*

3. The 1993 BRAC Law: *"Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996.*

   a. At April 6, 1995 BRAC visit, Commissioner Cox pointed out that the 1993 law reaffirmed the 1991 law that the unit would remain if Austin met the stated conditions.

4. Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCIF)

   a. 1991 BRAC law: *"The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there."*

      1. Most environmentally advanced airplane stripping and painting facility in the Air Force.

      2. Saves Air Force between $1.5 and $2.0 million a year over cost of 100 aircraft at depot.

5. In 1993, Commissioner McPherson referred to "*an inherent ninth criteria, which is that the United States doesn't break its word or this Commission ought not to break its word or to cooperate in the breaking of the word.*"

   a. Citizens of Austin have upheld every aspect of the requirements for keeping the Reserves at Bergstrom Air Reserve Station (BARS).

   b. The master plan and costs for A-BIA have been greatly affected by the 430 ac. cantonment area and other needs of the Air Force Reserves.

   c. Construction has begun on south access road for the cantonment area ($3.7 mil) and utilities rerouting ($464,897, thus far).

   d. City has committed $600,000 directly to the Reserves for the cantonment area (over and above utilities rerouting and other costs).

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **The Law and the Promise.**

A. **The Law and the Promise.**

1.

   a.

   b.

   c.

2.

3.

   a.

4.

   a.

      1.

      2.

5.

   a.

b.

c.

d.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' Military Value to Nation.

B. BARS' Military Value to Nation.

1. AFRES's F-16's primary mission of close air support for ground troops is supported by BARS 3 to 4 times more than any other unit because of it's close proximity to the "largest army fort in the free world", Ft. Hood. (The only AFRES unit located in such close proximity to an Army fort.)

2. 924th FW accomplishes mission.

   a. 704th FS part of team which won **first place** in "Long Shot '95" competition just completed at Nellis AFB, Nev. This competition included units from the AF and AFRES.
   b. 924th FW flew over Bosnia as part of "Deny Flight" for six weeks in March of 1995 without a single sortie canceled due to mechanical or equipment failure.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **BARS' Military Value to Nation.**

B. BARS' Military Value to Nation.

1. BARS does *not* support close air support missions 3 to 4 times more than any other unit. The 457 FS supported 65% *more* close air support missions to Ft. Hood than the 704 FS for the time period July 1994 through March 16, 1995[35].

There were over 200 total missions scheduled for the Ft. Hood Tactical Range in the time period stated above. The 704 FS flew 20 scheduled close air support missions to Ft. Hood during this time. The 457FS flew 33 scheduled close air support missions to Ft. Hood during this time.

The 457 FS also flew 38 missions to Fort Sill from September 1994 through May 1995[36] (a five month period). The 704 FS / 924 FW did not support any CAS missions to Fort Sill. The centralized location of NAS FW, JRB uniquely positions assets so as to acheive maximum on-station and off-station joint training opportunities with Army units at *both* Fort Sill and Fort Hood.

BARS is not the only other unit located in such close proximity to an Army fort. The 704 FS is located approximately 65 miles from Ft. Hood. The 457 FS is 85 miles from Ft Hood. If flown direct at fighter speeds, it would take an extra 2.5 minutes to arrive from Ft. Worth than it would from Austin. Additionally, to get maximum training on

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[35] Appendix (005): 3 ASOG Close Air Support Summary. Excluding August and September due to lack of data from 3 ASOG.

[36] Fort Sill Scheduler (MSgt Taylor) DSN 639-2300.

close air support missions, low level routes are usually flown to tactical ground ranges. There are no military training routes (MTR's) which lead directly from Austin to Ft. Hood[37]. If the 704 FS were to use an MTR it would drastically increase their distance both going to and departing Ft. Hood range. The 457 FS uses two MTR's which run almost directly to Ft. Hood making 85 miles a realistic number. The 457 FS is the originator of these low levels, specifically designed for use with the Fort Hood MOA. Fighter units stationed at Bergstrom ARS have no advantage for Fort Hood composite training than units positioned at Navy FW, JRB.

2. "924th FW accomplishes mission...."

a. It is an accurate statement that the "704th FS was part of team which won **first place** in Long Shot '95". However, Part II, Section J (Austin Update May 10, 1995), has greivous and misleading statements concerning the 924 FW / 704 FS. This item will be appropriately addressed.

b. Many other Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces, including the 301 FW / 457 FS, have also contributed to real world contingencies, with equal success rates. TEAM FORT WORTH congratulates all ARC forces for the dedication and sacrifice they have made.

[37] Appendix (006): DOD AP/1B Chart, MTR's - Central US

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS', an economical locale for Air Force Reserves.

C. BARS', an economical locale for Air Force Reserves.

1. Cost to operate declining due to collocation on civilian airport.

2. Collocation of addition units, both AFRES and other DOD, possible on existing cantonment area and in existing facilities.

3. Savings of significant MILCON funds and other DOD costs with collocation of additional AFRES units to BARS.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **BARS', an economical locale...**

C. **BARS'. an economic locale for Air Force Reserves.**

1.

2.

3.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): Economic Impact on Austin.

D. Economic Impact on Austin

1. Significant cost associated with design of A-BIA around cantonment area. (Austin will see no return on investment if Reserves leave.)

2. '91 Base Realignment and Closure already cost Austin: 3,870 military and 1,256 civilian jobs, directly, 6,628 military dependents; and approximately $330,000,000 per year.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **Economic Impact on Austin.**

D. **Economic Impact on Austin.**

1.

2.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' can support **any** mission.

E. BARS' can support **any** mission

1. Bergstrom Air Force Base was built as a SAC base and the current Reserve "wet" ramp and hangers (3) located in the BARS were built for KC-135's to support the B-52s.

2. Local ranges and MOAs provide first class training areas for all type aircraft.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **BARS' can support any mission.**

E. **BARS' can support any mission.**

1.

2.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995): BARS' Environmental Statement.

F. Bergstrom Air Reserve Station is one of only two locations in all of AFRES which is in an environmental **attainment** area.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **BARS' Environmental Statement. (Community responds)**

F.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995) Section II, Paragraph J: An Accurate Assessment...

An accurate assessment of the facilities and training areas available is reflected in the 924 FW first place finish in Long Shot '95. Long Shot is a composite force employment competition between teams of the general purpose Numbered Air Forces. Long Shot is conducted as a low cost/short notice, come as you are war, involving *minimal training preparation for execution.* The objective of Long Shot is bombs on-target-on-time with no losses. The missions involve high speed, low level ingress to a scoreable target for full scale weapons delivery while countering a myriad of surface to air threats utilizing electronic threat emitters and engaging adversary air fighters (LOWAT). After successfully striking the target the participants must egress their way through the threats, thus exercising the skills required in a combat scenario. Based on the 924 FW first place finish the community's assessment of training areas appears accurate.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response: **An Accurate Assessment...**

The statement above is typical of the half truths and distortion of operational factors presented throughout ABSG findings. The description of the Long Shot competition is complete and accurate. The competition was an excellent indicator of combat mission readiness in that it was a "come as you are war". However, the phrase "...924 FW first place finish in Long Shot '95" would lead most readers to believe the 924FW won first place in the Long Shot '95 competition. However...

The 924 FW were *members* of the first place team and contributed to that team's success. The 924 FW, along with other reserve and active duty units comprised the winning team. Although not mentioned in the ABSG statement, the winning team also included the 301FW.

The Long Shot judges individually evaluated units on each team and assigned points based on "bombs on target on time". The total points for each team was the cumulative of each units point total. The 457 FS tallied 800 points out of a possible 800 points, for a 100% combat effectiveness[38]. The 704 FS tallied 475 points out of 800 points available for a 59% combat effectiveness[39]. The 704 FS finished 11th out of 27 competing units. The 457 FS scored higher than all USAF reserve, and guard contestants! These results placed the 457 FS among

[38] **Appendix (007): 12 AF Long Shot '95 Summary.**
[39] **Ibid.**

four units with a 100% success rate (other aircraft were two F-117 and one B-1B). The 457 FS unit was the *only* F-16 unit to achieve a 100% success rate.

In ABSG style, an accurate assessment of Long Shot '95 results shows the 924 FW facilities and training areas available to be 59% effective when compared to the 301 FW facilities and training.

The ABSG owes the 301 FW / 457 FS and 924 FW / 704 FS Long Shot competitors an apology for their portrayal of the Long Shot '95 results.

ABSG Update (10 May 1995) Section III: Return on Investment.

A. City of Austin Costs

1. $600,000 Invested to Date

2. Changes to Accommodate Cantonment Area

   a. Different terminal location

   b. More demolition required

   c. Utilities rerouted to cantonment are - $465,000

   d. Greater distance between runways

   e. Second runway 9,000'vice 7,000'

   f. New cross taxiway

   g. South access road for Reserves (under construction)-$3.25M

   h. Joint fire fighting facility (under construction)-$2.3M

   i. Moving cargo in 1996. Prior to 1998 full airport opening will cost $1M per year.

   j. Sunk cost at former proposed Manor site-$ 10M

B. Costs at Austin-Bergstrom

1. Air Force Analysis

When the Base Closure Commission closed Bergstrom AFB in 1991, the Air Force offered the City of Austin the option of moving its commercial airport to Bergstrom. As previously discussed, Mr. Boatright, Deputy Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, told the City of Austin that the Air Force Reserve unit would remain at Bergstrom if the City of Austin elected to use Bergstrom as its

commercial airport. The 1991 and 1993 BRACC reports and related statutes define the City of Austin and Air Force obligations.

It is reasonable to expect that between the time of closure of Bergstrom in 1993 as an active duty Air Force Base and 1996, when the City of Austin assumes operation, that the costs of running Bergstrom as an Air Reserve Base would be relatively high. It is also reasonable to expect that the cost of maintaining an Air Force Reserve unit as a tenant at Austin-Bergstrom after 1996 would be substantially reduced. The heightened costs associated with the period 1993-1996 are expected costs of defense conversion. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that 1994 and 1995 represent the peak costs of the Air Force Reserve at Austin.

Notwithstanding common sense, the Air Force in its cost analysis of Bergstrom has used 1994 as its benchmark year. Extrapolating 1994 costs over 20 years is not only inappropriate, but potentially misleading.

In its response of April 29, the Air Force implies that the Austin Citizens group is challenging the operation of the financial computer program DOD uses in its BRACC deliberations - the "COBRA" model. However, the quarrel is not with the operation of COBRA, but rather the implementation by Air Force. It is difficult - and unnecessary - to criticize the Air Force implementation, because the Air Force failed to state or provide its assumptions and inputs into the COBRA model.

The analysis below, while simplistic, should be accurate for comparison of alternative locations. Further, the assumptions and inputs are stated so that they can be objectively and critically analyzed.

2. 1994 Costs

The costs associated with the Air Force Reserve can be categorized as: (1) fixed overhead costs, (2) personnel overhead costs; and (3) costs of military operation. The costs associated with military operation, category (3), are not to be considered in BRACC analysis. Category (1) was reviewed in detail in past presentations to the BRACC by Austin Citizens group. Categories (1) and (2) comprise the "overhead" or "Base Operating Support" Costs (BOS) in Air Force jargon.

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

The current fixed overhead costs provided to the Austin Citizens Group was approximately $3.8 million for 1995. In 1996, these costs are reduced by about $400,000 when the City of Austin assumes the cost of operating the navigational aids and air traffic control (ATCALS). Further, as the Air Force Reserve cantonment area shrinks from 3500 acres as an active duty base to 300 acres, many of its fixed

costs are reduced. For example, the utility costs are a dominant cost in fixed costs and utility costs are expected to reduce over $200,000 in 1995 alone compared to 1994. Fixed overhead costs while close to $4 million in 1994, should be reduced to about $3 million by 1998 when full commercial operations begin at Austin-Bergstrom.

b Personnel Overhead Costs.

The total civilians, employed in 1994 in nonmilitary positions at Austin-Bergstrom was about 290. Of this amount, about 55 were employed as security police 55 for fire protection, and 100 were part of civil engineering. Between 1993, when the Active Duty Air Force left and 1996, the start of commercial cargo activities at Austin-Bergstrom, a large number of civilians were required. For example, the AF Reserve must provide around the clock fire protection for not only flying activities, but also structural fires for the over 3000 acres and buildings of the former Air Force Base. Similarly, a large number of civil engineers and planners are required to vacate Air Force buildings, assist the City of Austin with construction plans, and oversee construction in the 300 acre Reserve cantonment area.

3. 1998-Joint Use Plan

a. City of Austin Responsibilities

In 1996 the City of Austin begins commercial cargo operations at the Austin-Bergstrom airport. In 1998, full commercial operation at Austin-Bergstrom will begin with the closing, with Austin's current airport Robert Mueller.

Collocation at a joint use facility is a significant financial benefit to the Air Force, although it is difficult to quantify. Examples include the following.

1. Assumption of the cost to operate air traffic control and navigational aids. Currently, the Air Force spends about $400,000 per year and this number will be reduced to about $10,000 per, year by 1998.
2. The cost of maintaining a 12,000 foot runway is substantial. By 1998 the City of Austin will not only assume maintenance responsibility, but will have added a 9000 foot parallel runway.
3. The cost of noise abatement and community relations is a substantial cost to the Air Force at its operating locations. The City of Austin will assume responsibility after 1996.
4. Utility provision is expensive infrastructure. The City of Austin is undertaking extensive capital improvements to provide water, waste, electricity, and gas to the Military cantonment area at Austin-Bergstrom.
5. The City of Austin has undertaken the responsibility of providing access roads construction and maintenance into the Military cantonment area.

b. Tenant Units

Currently, there are many tenant U.S. government units either located at Austin-Bergstrom, or with pending written requests to relocate to Austin-Bergstrom. If the Air Force Reserve were to abandon Austin-Bergstrom as the host unit, these tenant units would have to make alternative costly arrangements. For example, the Air Force has proposed moving Tenth Air Force to NAS Ft. Worth at a military construction cost of $2.5 million and a relocation cost of $4.4 million, for a total of $7.1 million. As presented to the BRACC on its site visit to Austin on April 6, the RCCF is a state of the art aircraft strip and paint facility that by Air Combat Command's own estimate save the Air Force about $2 million per year.

Without the support of the Air Force Reserve for security, fire, administration, ground equipment, etc. the viability of the RCCF would be in doubt.

Tenant	Mission	Military Manning
Headquarters Tenth Air Force, AF Reserve	Command over assigned Reserve Units	140
Army National Guard	Helicopter Unit, located at current Austin airport	450
US Navy NR Seal Delivery Vehicle Teams 1 & 2	Currently in place at Austin-Bergstrom	300
G5 M-Force Up Navy	Request pending *	182
Ground Combat Readiness Center, AF Reserve	Ground combat training and drug interdiction	103
Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF)	ACC state of the art aircraft strip and paint facility	13 (+100 Civ)
NASA	NASA operate 3 ER-2 aircraft for will operate about 170 days per year	41
Texas Headquarters Civil Air Patrol	Assist Air Force and FAA in search and rescue	40
DOD Investigative Services	Security Investigations, Industrial Security, etc.	7
ROTC	Univ. of Texas	6

4. Year 2000 Estimated Costs

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

As previously discussed, the fixed overhead for the Air Force Reserve is estimated to reduce to approximately $3.2 million per year by 1998. This is primarily due to the assumption of air traffic control, navigational aid, runway maintenance and

other infrastructure expenses and a reduction in utility expenses as the Air Force turns buildings over to the City of Austin and shrinks into its 300 acre cantonment area.

b. Personnel Overhead Costs

Personnel costs are difficult to estimate. The 1994 number of non-military civilians is about 290. This number will reduce gradually over the next five years for several reasons.

- First, the City of Austin will assume responsibility for structural fires. This relieves the Air Force from 24 hour per day fire protection services. Instead the Air Force will provide an augmentation fire protection service during Air Force flying operations.
- Second, Air Force currently maintains a large civil engineering staff to support the transfer of land and facilities to the City of Austin and the construction of the Reserve cantonment area and the approximately $13 million in military construction.
- Third, the Air Force Reserve currently incurs the total cost for security of the cantonment area. With the addition of tenant units, memorandums of understanding are currently in negotiation for contributions from tenant units for the cost of security. This may be in the form of manpower or direct expense, but will in any event reduce the effective cost of security of the Air Force Reserve.

For these reasons, the effective overhead personnel costs are conservatively estimated at about 225 by the year 2000. Because the Air Force has not provided any of its assumptions or inputs into its COBRA financial model, it is difficult to estimate the approximate costs associated with overhead personnel or the reduction savings. However, in 1993 the Air Force did provide its inputs for its COBRA financial model and used a cost
factor of about $42,000 per head inclusive of salary, benefits, and burden.

	1998 Fixed Overhead	1994 Personnel Overhead	1998 Personnel Overhead	Total 1998+ Overhead Costs
Air Force Estimate	$8 m	$12+M	$12+M	$21 M
Connect Estimate	$3.2 M	$12+M	$9.4-M	$12.5 M

*BOS or fixed overhead budgets were obtained from the 924 FW as about $3.9 M in 1994 with the reductions discussed above for a 1998 estimate of $3.2 M. The Air Force estimate of $8 M is difficult to understand because no assumptions or inputs are provided by the Air Force, but appears to include about $2.5 M in active duty man days for military reservists.

C. Cost Comparison

1. Cost Factors for Reserve Unit

a. Fixed Overhead Costs

Fixed overhead cost appear to be fairly consistent among reserve units. As expected, stand-alone units such as Homestead, Grissom, March, and Willow Grove are the highest, but not significantly. A unit collocated at a Joint use field, such as Bergstrom, are slightly higher then a unit located at an active duty base, such as Luke or Hill.

b. Personnel Overhead Costs

Here again, stand-alone units such as Homestead, Grissom, March, and Willow Grove are the highest, while a unit located at an active duty base, such as Luke or Hill are the lowest. A unit collocated at a Joint use field, such as Bergstrom, are mid-range.

The numbers used in the analysis below are (1) actual numbers from stand alone units; and (2) estimates from units located at active duty bases. The estimates for overhead personnel for a unit at an active duty base are only rough approximations. For example, the Air Force Reserve unit at Luke AFB has only about 30 personnel on its payroll in the "fixed overhead" or BOS category. However, the Air Force uses a planning number of about 8% of total military for overhead personnel planning, plus special categories. For a 1200 military reserve unit, therefore, about 100 overhead personnel are estimated for additional support - e.g. supply, fire protection, security, administration, recreation, billeting, etc. For stand-alone units we estimate about 100 personnel in the overhead category.

c. Construction/Opportunity Costs

The Austin BRACC Study Group collected the current construction costs for the services at the various AFRES locations. In our analysis "opportunity cost" is taken as the construction cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer if the listed AFRES location were to close. For example, at Homestead $88 million in new construction projects are planned and $15 million has been spent. At Austin/Bergstrom, $13 million in new construction is authorized and $2 million has been spent. At Ft. Worth (Carswell), the Navy saves $39 million in construction costs and the Air Force saves about $20 million if the Air Force Reserve at Ft. Worth were to close or relocate. At Phoenix (Luke AFB), although the value of the AFRES facilities are close to $50 million, only $20 million of new construction is planned in the next 2 years.

2. Alternative Location Cost Comparison

	Fixed Overhead ($ millions)	1994 Personnel Overhead	2000 Personnel Overhead	Opportunity Costs
Grissom ARB	$4	360	360	0

March ARB	$4	400	450	0
Willow Grove	$3	300	300	0
Carswell ARB	$2.8	325	100	60 M
Homestead ARB	$4.0	300	300	73 M
Bergstrom ARB	$3.2	290	225	11 M
Luke AR	$2.8	100	100	20 M
Hill AR	$2.8	100	160	0

3. Timing of Potential Savings (Criteria 5)

The BRACC procedure correctly recognizes that near term savings are more favorable and less speculative than long term savings. A five year present value analysis on the above comparison reveals that Austin-Bergstrom is a cost effective location.

5 Year Net Present Value

	Annual Overhead	Opportunity Costs	Present Value
Grissom ARB	19,120,000	0	83,936,000
March ARB	20,800,000	0	91,311,000
Willow Grove	15,600,000	0	68,483,000
Carswell ARB	9,300,000	59,000,000	99,826,000
Homestead ARB	16,600,000	73,000,000	145,873,000
Bergstrom ARS	**12,650,000**	**11,000,000**	**66,533,000**
Luke AR	7,200,000	20,000,000	51,607,000
Hill AR	7,200,000	0	31,607,000

*Using a discount rate of 4.5%, as currently set by OSD, and a 5 year cost recovery period. 4.5% discount rate is below the cost of funds of the U.S. government - using a realistic discount rate would be more favorable to Bergstrom.

Cost to closure has not been considered, but would make the Austin location look substantially more favorable. The Air Force in their COBRA analysis estimated the cost to close Austin/Bergstrom at $13 million and the cost to close Miami/Homestead at $7.9 million. Obviously, the cost to close Fort Worth, Phoenix, New Orleans, or Salt Lake City would be substantially less than Austin or Miami because they would remain as operating DOD facilities.

4. 20 Year Savings (Criteria 4)

20 Year New Present Value

	Annual Overhead	Opportunity Costs	Present Value
Grissom ARB	19,120,000	0	248,000,000
March ARB	20,800,000	0	270,000,000
Willow Grove	15,600,000	0	203,000,000
Carswell ARB	7,200,000	59,000,000	152,000,000
Homestead ARB	16,600,000	73,000,000	289,000,000
Bergstrom ARS	**12,650,000**	**11,000,000**	**175,000,000**
Luke AR	7,200,000	20,000,000	114,000,000
Hill AR	7,200,000	0	94,000,000

*Using a discount rate of 4.5%, as currently set by OSD, and a 20 year cost recovery period.

Even using a 20 year analysis period, Austin-Bergstrom is a cost effective location.

TEAM FORT WORTH Response Section III: **Return on Investment.**



Appendix (001)
Bergstrom ARS / Airspace Relationship

(JNC 44)



FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM1A form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

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CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T

temp: -40C wind:

FF: 2950

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FREQUENCIES

****

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	2+08+06	10708

****

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1500
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		10210
	L/O @ 28000		N 2932.78	147	30	300C	+03+51		576
			W09750.22	147	30	452G	00:03:51		9634
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	181	300C	+24+02		1181
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:53		8453
003	4Y		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	1+13+30		6061
	B		W09600.00	149	211	480G	01:41:23		2392
	L/O @ 31000		N 2731.64	330	21	300C	+02+38		364
			W09544.33	330	232	474G	01:44:01		2028
004		35	N 3011.85	330	190	300C	+24+05		1026
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	02:08:06		1002

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)

2 Chaff/flares

2 370 gallon tank with pylon (3/7 empty or with missiles)

2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

Delay 01+02+00

5000' / 450C → FF: 5600 lb/HR

APPENDIX (002) FPLAN DATA

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM1B form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

CLEARANCE	TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA
	Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
	temp: -40C wind:
	FF: 2950

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA	TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
	423	1+56+06	9626

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1500
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		10210
	L/O @ 28000		N 2932.78	147	30	300C	+03+51		576
			W09750.22	147	30	452G	00:03:51		9634
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	181	300C	+24+02		1181
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:53		8453
003	AY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	1+01+30		4944
	8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	01:29:23		3509
	L/O @ 31000		N 2732.49	330	23	300C	+02+50		389
			W09544.93	330	234	474G	01:32:13		3120
004		35	N 3011.85	330	189	300C	+23+53		1037
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:56:06		2084

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)
2 Chaff/flares
2 370 gallon tank with pylon (3/7 empty or with missiles)
2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

DELAY 00+50+00

5000' / 450c → FF: 5600 lb/HR

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM2A form: FM70STD
Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

CLEARANCE	TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA
	Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
	temp: -40C wind:
	FF: 2544

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA	TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
	423	1+48+58	7808

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		7650
	L/O @ 28000		N 2937.82	147	24	300C	+02+57		437
			W09753.97	147	24	452G	00:02:57		7213
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	187	300C	+24+51		1054
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:48		6159
003	AY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+54+30		3867
	28		W09600.00	149	211	480G	01:22:18		2292
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.10	330	19	300C	+02+16		307
			W09542.53	330	230	474G	01:24:34		1985
004		35	N 3011.85	330	193	300C	+24+24		942
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:48:58		1042

Starting Configuration:
1 Gun (full)
2 Chaff/flares
2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
1 300 gallon tank with pylon (4/6 empty)

Delay 00+43+00
5000' / 450C → FF: 5000 lb/hr

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM2B form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

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CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T

temp: -40C wind:

FF: 2544

****

FREQUENCIES

****

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+35+59	6756

****

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		7650
	L/O @ 28000		N 2937.82	147	24	300C	+02+57		437
			W09753.97	147	24	452G	00:02:57		7213
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	187	300C	+24+51		1054
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:48		6159
00?	\Y		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+41+30		2785
	.8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	01:09:18		3374
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.95	330	20	300C	+02+26		326
			W09543.13	330	231	474G	01:11:44		3048
004		35	N 3011.85	330	192	300C	+24+15		954
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:35:59		2094

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)
2 Chaff/flares
2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
1 300 gallon tank with pylon (4/6 empty)

DELAY 00+30+00

5000' / 450C → FF: 5000 lb/HR

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM3A form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

****

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T

temp: -40C wind:

FF: 2344

****

FREQUENCIES

****

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+28+59	5865

****

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2940.34	147	21	300C	+02+32		375
			W09755.84	147	21	452G	00:02:32		5325
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	190	300C	+25+17		988
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:49		4337
003	AY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+34+30		2110
	.8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	01:02:19		2227
	L/O @ 31000		N 2728.25	330	17	300C	+02+07		284
			W09541.93	330	229	474G	01:04:26		1943
004		35	N 3011.85	330	194	300C	+24+33		908
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:28:59		1035

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)

2 Chaff/flares

2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

DELAY 00+23+00

5000' / 450c + FF: 4800 #/HR

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM3B form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

****

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T

temp: -40C wind:

FF: 2344

****

FREQUENCIES

****

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+15+58	4862

****

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2940.34	147	21	300C	+02+32		375
			W09755.84	147	21	452G	00:02:32		5325
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	190	300C	+25+17		988
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:49		4337
003	AY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+21+30		1080
	.8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	00:49:19		3257
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.10	330	19	300C	+02+15		301
			W09542.53	330	230	474G	00:51:34		2957
004		35	N 3011.85	330	193	300C	+24+24		919
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:15:58		2038

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)

2 Chaff/flares

2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)

DELAY 00 + 10 + 00

5000' / 450C → FF: 4800 lb/HR

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM4A form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

CLEARANCE	TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA
	Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T
	temp: -40C wind:
	FF: 2525

FREQUENCIES

DEP FIELD DATA	TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
	423	1+25+00	5873

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2938.66	147	23	300C	+02+48		422
			W09754.59	147	23	452G	00:02:48		5278
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	188	300C	+25+01		1053
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:49		4225
003	[illegible]AY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+30+30		1906
	8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	00:58:19		2319
	L/O @ 31000		N 2729.95	330	20	300C	+02+24		326
			W09543.13	330	231	474G	01:00:43		1993
004		35	N 3011.85	330	192	300C	+24+17		966
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:25:00		1027

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)
2 Chaff/flares
2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
1 Centerline pylon
1 AN/ALQ-184

DELAY 00+19+00

5000' / 450c → FF: 5100 lb/HR

FPLAN version 9.3: FLIGHT PLAN and LOG route: BSM4B form: FM70STD

Ref: 1F-16C-1 F100-PW-220 engine, Mil Climb, Subsonic Cruise

****

CLEARANCE

TAKE-OFF, CLIMB, CRUISE DATA

Climb: 28000 Cruise: 452T

temp: -40C wind:

FF: 2525

****

FREQUENCIES

****

DEP FIELD DATA

TOT DIST	TOT ETE	TOT FUEL
423	1+13+00	4881

****

TP	ROUTE FIX	FREQ	LAT LON	MH MC	DIST	CAS GS	ETE ETA	ATA	FUEL
001	STTO	35	N 3011.85				+00+00		1200
	KBSM		W09740.98				00:00:00		5700
	L/O @ 28000		N 2938.66	147	23	300C	+02+48		422
			W09754.59	147	23	452G	00:02:48		5278
002	S/D:		N 2700.00	147	188	300C	+25+01		1053
	W-228		W09600.00	147	211	452G	00:27:49		4225
003	DELAY		N 2700.00	149	0	450C	+18+30		884
	8		W09600.00	149	211	480G	00:46:19		3342
	L/O @ 31000		N 2730.80	330	21	300C	+02+34		346
			W09543.73	330	232	474G	00:48:53		2996
004		35	N 3011.85	330	191	300C	+24+07		977
	KBSM		W09740.98	330	423	474G	01:13:00		2019

Starting Configuration:

1 Gun (full)
2 Chaff/flares
2 AIM-9L, M (1,9)
1 Centerline pylon
1 AN/ALQ-184

DELAY 00+07+00

5000'/450 c → FF: 5100 lb/HR

APPENDIX (003) HORNET & TOMCAT AREAS MEASUREMENT





SECTION	AREA (Formula/Result)		
A	1/2 (14.0 x 27.5)	=	192.5
B	35 x 13	=	455.0
C	1/2 (38.5 x 14.5)	=	279.125
D	3.5 x 10	=	35
E	1/2 (6 x 2)	=	6
F	1/2 (2.5 x 10)	=	12.5
			980.125 Sq Miles

APPENDIX (004) BRADY MOA AIRSPACE
MEASUREMENT 7 AIRSPACE RELATIONSHIP

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS OFF	MAN-DAYS EML
2P0701N	5	011500Z	1600Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0702N	5	051500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0703N	5	051530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0704N	5	051900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0705N	5	051930Z	2000Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0706N	5	061500Z	1530Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0707N	5	061530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0708N	5	061900Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0709N	5	061930Z	2000Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0710N	5	071500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0711N	5	071530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0712N	5	071900Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	NO		X	HHQ CNX		
2P0713N	5	071930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0714N	5	081500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0715N	5	111500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0716N	5	111530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0717N	5	111900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0718N	5	111930Z	2000Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0719N	5	121500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0720N	5	121530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	712 ASOS	YES	X				
2P0721N	5	121900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0722N	5	121930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX		
2P0723N	5	131500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0724N	5	131530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0725N	5	131900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0726N	5	131930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0727N	5	141500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0728N	5	141530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0729N	5	141900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0730N	5	141930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0731NA	5	161500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	704FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0731NB	5	181500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0732N	5	181530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								

33

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OCT-12-1994 14:09 712 ASOG 738+5251 P.14

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS OFF	MAN-DAYS ENL
2P0733N	5	181900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0734N	5	181930Z	2000Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0735N	5	191500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0736N	5	191530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0737N	5	191900Z	1930Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0738N	5	191930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	6CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0739N	5	201500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0740N	5	201530Z	1600Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0741N	5	201900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0742N	5	201930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	457FS	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0743N	5	211500Z	1530Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	NO		X	NO AIRSPACE		
2P0744N	5	211530Z	1600Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0745N	5	211900Z	1930Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	47FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0746N	5	211930Z	2000Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	182FS	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0747N	5	221500Z	1530Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	6CAV/3ASOG	NO		X	OPS CNX		
2P0748N	5	251430Z	1515Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0749N	5	251515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0750N	5	251830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0751N	5	251930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0752N	5	261430Z	1515Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X	X	ONE SHIP		
2P0753N	5	261515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0754N	5	261830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0755N	5	261930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0756N	5	271430Z	1515Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	6CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0757N	5	271515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0758N	5	271830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	2AD/11ASOS	YES	X				
2P0759N	5	271930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	6CAV/3ASOG	YES	X				
2P0760N	5	281430Z	1515Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0761N	5	281515Z	1630Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0762N	5	281830Z	1930Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0763N	5	281930Z	2030Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	VMFA142	1CAV/9ASOS	YES	X				
2P0764N	5	291500Z	1530Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS								
2P0765N	1	052230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10								

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A-005-2

3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS OFF	MAN-DAYS EKL
2P0766N	1	062230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10								
2P0767N	1	072230Z	2330Z	2		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10								
2P0768N	1	082230Z	2330Z	2 6		LIVE	JAAT/CALFEX/2 A-10								
2P0769N	5	251400Z	1030	2 2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/3ASG								
2K0701N	5	122000Z	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2K0702N	5	122030Z	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2K0703N	5	192000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2K0704N	5	192030Z	2100Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2K0705D	5	272030Z	2100Z	4		LIVE	JAAT/FT RILEY								
ADD ON MISSIONS															
2K9795D	5	271900Z	1930Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	114FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2K0701X	5	061500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	FTR CNX		
2K0702X	5	121500Z	1540Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	FTR CNX		
2K0703X	5	191500Z	1540Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	FTR CNX		
2K0704X	5	201500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	WX CNX		
2K0705X	5	271500Z	1520Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY	185FG	1ID/10ASOS	NO		X	NOTE 1		
2M0701N	5	051600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0702N	5	052000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0703N	5	061600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX		
2M0704N	5	062000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0705N	5	071600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0706N	5	072000Z	2000Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0707N	5	121600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0708N	5	122000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0709N	5	131600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0710N	5	132000Z	2030Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0711N	5	191600Z	1630Z	2		BDU	DAY CAS								
2M0712N	5	192000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0713N	5	201600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0714N	5	202000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				

MAY-12-1995 14:11 712 A906 738+5251 P.16

A-005-3

Disk: FY94 CAS
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3 ASOG CAS DATA FOR JULY 1994

as of: 10/19/94 5:04 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	MAN-DAYS OFF	MAN-DAYS ENL
2M0715N	5	211600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	NO		X	OPS CNX		
2M0716N	5	212000Z	2000Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0717N	5	221600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0718N	5	222000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	BDU	DAY CAS	140FW	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0719N	5	251300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0720N	5	251600Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0721N	5	252000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0722N	5	261300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0723N	5	261600Z	1630Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0724N	5	262000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX		
2M0725N	5	271300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0726N	5	271600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0727N	5	272000Z	2030Z	2	F-16	DRY	DAY CAS	188FG	4ID/13ASOS	YES	X				
2M0728N	5	281300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0729N	5	281600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0730N	5	282000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0731N	5	291300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0732N	5	291600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0733N	5	292000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0734N	5	301300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0735N	5	301600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0736N	5	302000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0737N	5	311300Z	1330Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0738N	5	311600Z	1630Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								
2M0739N	5	312000Z	2030Z	2		DRY	DAY CAS								

NOTE 1: UNABLE TO GET DATA FROM FT RILEY/10ASOS

A-005-4

Disk: FY94 CAS
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File: JULCASDA.XLS

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2P1001N	5	031500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1002N	5	031530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1003N	5	031900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1004N	5	031930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1005N	5	041500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1006N	5	041530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1007N	5	041900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1008N	5	041930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1009N	5	051500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1010N	5	051530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1011N	5	051900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1012N	5	051930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1013N	5	061500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1014N	5	061530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1015N	5	061900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1016N	5	061930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1017N	5	071500	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1018N	5	101500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1019N	5	101530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1020N	5	101900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1021N	5	101930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1022N	5	111500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1023N	5	111530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1024N	5	111900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1025N	5	111930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1026N	5	121500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1027N	5	121530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1028N	5	121900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1029N	5	121930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1030N	5	131500	1530	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1031N	5	131530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1032N	5	131900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1033N	5	131930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						

A-005-5

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File: OCTCASDA.XLS

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2P1034N	5	141500	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1035N	5	171500	1630	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1036N	5	171530	1600	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1037N	5	171900	1930	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1038N	5	171930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1039N	5	181500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1040N	5	181530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1041N	5	181900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1042N	5	181930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1043N	5	191500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1044N	5	191530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1045N	5	191900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1046N	5	191930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1047N	5	201500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1048N	5	201530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1049N	5	201900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	712 ASOS	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1050N	5	201930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1051N1	5	211500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	3 ASOG	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1051N2	5	211530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	3 ASOG	NO		X	MAINT CNX (A/C)
2P1052N	5	241500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	3 ASOG	YES	X		
2P1053N	5	241530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	YES	X		
2P1054N	5	241900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1055N	5	241930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1056N	5	251500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1057N	5	251530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1058N	5	251900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	WX CNX
2P1059N	5	251930	2000	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1060N	5	261500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1061N	5	261530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1062N	5	261900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1063N	5	261930	2000	2	F-18	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1064N	5	271500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1065N	5	271530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1066N	5	271900	1930	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1067N	5	271930	2000	2	F-18	DRY	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	YES	X		

A-005-6

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2P1068N1	5	281500	1530	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1068N2	5	281530	1600	2	F-18	MK76	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	VFMA	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	MECH PROBLEM(A/C)
2P1069N	1	281900	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1070N	1	291900	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1071N	1	302000	2100	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD						
2P1072N	5	311600	1630	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1073N	5	311630	1700	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS						
2P1074N	1	312000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/2AD	704FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 3 ASOG													
2P1075N	5	041600	1630	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1076N	5	041630	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1077N	5	041930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1078N	5	042000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1079N	5	051500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1080N	5	051530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1081N	5	051930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1082N	5	052000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1083N	5	111500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1084N	5	111530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1085N	5	111930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1086N	5	112000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1087N	5	121500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1088N	5	121530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1089N	5	121930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1090N	5	122000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P1091N	5	181500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1092N	5	181530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1093N	5	181930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1094N	5	182000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1095N	5	191500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1096N	5	191530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1097N	5	191930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P1098N	5	192000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	9 ASOS/1CAV	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)

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A-005-7

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2P1099N	5	251500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10100N	5	251530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10101N	5	251930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10102N	5	252000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10103N	5	261500	1530	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10104N	5	261530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10105N	5	261930	2000	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10106N	5	262000	2030	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/SCB	457FS	11 ASOS/2AD	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2P10107N	5	141530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	11 ASOS/2AD	YES	X		
2P10108N	5	171530	1600	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS	184FS	712 ASOS	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1001N	1	042000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1002N	1	042030	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1003N	5	252000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1004N	5	252030	2300	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1005N	1	182000	2030	2		DRY	FT RILEY CAS						
2K1006N	1	182030	2100	2		DRY	FT RILEY CAS						
2K1007N	1	252030	2100	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1008N	1	252000	2030	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	YES	X		
2K1010D	1	311830	1900	4		BDU	FT RILEY/JAAT						
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 10 ASOS													
2K1001X	5	171920	1940	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	132FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1002X	5	191940	2000	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	WX CNX
2K1003X	5	261920	1940	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	132FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2K1004X	5	261940	2000	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS	114FG	10 ASOS/1ID	NO		X	UNIT CNX (A/C)
2L1001V	5	051400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1002V	5	061400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1003V	5	121400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1004V	5	131400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1005V	5	191400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						

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A-005-8

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2L1006V	5	201400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1007V	5	261400	1500	2		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2L1008V	5	271400	1500	4		BDU	FT BLISS/CAS						
2M1001N	1	011630	1830	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1002N	5	041600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1003N	5	042000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1004N	1	051600	1700	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1005N	1	052000	2100	2		HOT	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1006N	5	061600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1007N	5	062000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1008N	5	071600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1009N	5	111600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1010N	5	112000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1011N	5	121600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1012N	5	122000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1013N	5	131600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1014N	5	132000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1015N	5	141600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1016N	5	181600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1017N	5	182000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1018N	5	191600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1019N	5	192000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		
2M1020N	5	201600	1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		
2M1021N	5	202000	2100	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1022N	5	211600	1700	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		
2M1023N	5	251600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1024N	5	252000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		
2M1025N	5	261600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1026N	5	262000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		
2M1027N	5	271600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
2M1028N	5	272000	2100	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/CAS		13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1994

as of: 11/4/94 6:32 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT	TFT	NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL UNIT	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2M1029N	5	281600	1700	2		BDU	FT CARSON/CAS						
ADD ON MISSIONS FOR 13 ASOS													
2M1001X	5	070000	2400	4	A-10	DRY	FT CARSON/CAS	REMKS	13 ASOS/4ID	YES	X		WHITEMAN ANG
(A/C): IN REFERENCE TO AIRCRAFT'S UNIT													

A-005-10

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

as of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM

	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
1N	5	011600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	011630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
3N	5	012000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-18	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
4N	5	012030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-18	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
5N	5	021600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	021630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	022000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
8N	5	022030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-18	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
9N	5	031600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
0N	5	031630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	032000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2N	5	032030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-18	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C MAINT CNX
3N	5	041600	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	1	042100	Z	2300	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/6 CAV JAAT						
5N	1	060030	Z	230	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/6 CAV JAAT						
6N	1	070030	Z	230	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CAS/6 CAV JAAT						
7N	5	071600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	071630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
9N	5	072000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	47FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
0N	5	072030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	081600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	081630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
3N	5	082000	Z	2030	Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	47FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
4N	5	082030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
5N	5	091600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	091630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	3 ASOG	NO			WX CNX
7N	5	092000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	092030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
9N	5	101600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
0N	5	101630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	102000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	102030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	141600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	5	141630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
5N	5	142000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	142030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	151600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
8N	5	151630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
9N	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
0N	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	161600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						

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A-005-11

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

as of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM

).	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
2N	5	161630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	162000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
4N	5	162030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
5N	5	171600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
6N	5	171630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
7N	5	172000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
8N	5	172030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
9N	5	181600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
0N	5	211600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	211630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
2N	5	212000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	212030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	5	221600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
5N	5	221630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	222000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
7N	5	222030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
8N	5	231600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	712 ASOS	YES	X		
9N	5	231630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
0N	5	232000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
1N	5	232030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	11 ASOS	YES	X		
2N	5	281600	Z	1630	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
3N	5	281630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
4N	5	282000	Z	2030	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
5N	5	282030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
6N	5	291600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
7N	5	291630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
8N	5	292000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
9N	5	292030	Z	2100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
0N	5	301600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
1N	5	301630	Z	1700	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2N	5	302000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	184FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
3N	5	302030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
N MISSIONS															
4N	5	71630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
5N	5	72030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
6N	5	81600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
7N	5	82000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
8N	5	91600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
9N	5	92030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
0N	5	101600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
1N	5	102000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	DIXIE RANGE TACP TRN	704FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		

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A-005-12

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 94

as of: 12/8/94 12:58 PM

I.	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
01N	5	081800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
02N	5	082000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
03N	5	091800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
04N	5	092000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
05N	5	101800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
06N	5	102000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
07N	5	151800	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
08N	5	152000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/JAAT	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		ARMY FTX
09N	5	161800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
10N	5	162000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
11N	5	171800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
12N	5	172000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
13N	5	281800	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
14N	5	292000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON/JAAT	120FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		ARMY FTX
15N	5	301800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
16N	5	302000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN						
1N	5	182100	Z	2130	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	303FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
2N	5	182130	Z	2200	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	303FS	10 ASOS	YES		X	A/C MAINT. ABORT
3D	1	251930	Z	2000	Z	2		DRY	FT RILEY CAS/JAAT						
N MISSIONS FOR THE 10 ASOS															
3X	5	161930	Z	2000	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	138FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
4X	5	162020	Z	2040	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	132FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
5X	5	162040	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	141FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
6X	5	302120	Z	2140	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY CAS TACP TRN	138FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
N MISSIONS FOR 12 ASOS															
1X	5	071530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
2X	5	071900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
3X	5	081530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
4X	5	081900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
5X	5	091530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
6X	5	091900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
7X	5	101530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
8X	5	101900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	LIVE	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
9X	5	151530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
0X	5	151900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	DRY	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
1X	5	161530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
2X	5	161900	Z	2100	Z	4	A-10	DRY	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL
3X	5	171530	Z	1730	Z	4	A-10	DRY	FT BLISS/JAAT	RMKS	12 ASOS	YES	X		AF WEAPONS SCHOOL

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER 94

as of: 1/11/95 2:39 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2P1230N	5	122030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
2P1231N	5	131600	Z	1620	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1232N	5	131620	Z	1640	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
2P1249N	5	131640	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
2P1233N	5	132000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
2P1234N	5	132030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
2P1250N	5	141530	Z	1550	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	9 ASOS	YES	X		
2P1251N	5	141550	Z	1610	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1235N	5	141600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1236N	5	141630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1237N	5	142000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1238N	5	142030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457FS	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1239N	5	151600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF201	11 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1240N	5	151630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	3 ASOG	NO			WX CNX
2P1241N	5	152000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
2P1242N	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF201	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1243N	5	161600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149FS	3 ASOG	YES	X		
2P1244N	5	161630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	3 ASOG	NO			WX CNX
ADD ON MISSIONS:															
2P1201X	5	091530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1202X	5	091700	Z	1730	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1203X	5	131530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2P1204X	5	131700	Z	1730	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1205X	5	191530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	712 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1206X	5	191930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1207X	5	201530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	712 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1208X	5	201930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1209X	5	211530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1210X	5	211930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	9 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1211X	5	221530	Z	1600	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2P1212X	5	221930	Z	2000	Z	4	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VFMA112	11 ASOS	NO			A/C UNIT CNX
2K1201A	2	051430	Z	1500	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	303 FS	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER 94

as of: 1/11/95 2:39 PM

EQ NO.	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
K1202A	2	051500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1203A	2	051830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1204A	2	051900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1205A	2	061430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1206A	2	061500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1207A	2	061830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1208A	2	061900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1209A	2	081430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1210A	2	081500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1211A	2	081830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1212A	2	081900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1213A	2	091430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1214A	2	091500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1215A	2	091830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1216A	2	091900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1217A	2	121430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1218A	2	121500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1219A	2	121830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1220A	2	121900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1221A	2	131430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1222A	2	131500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1223A	2	131830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1224A	2	131900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1225A	2	151430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1226A	2	151500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1227A	2	151830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1228A	2	151900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1229A	2	161430	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1230A	2	161500	Z	1530	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1231A	2	161830	Z	1900	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
K1232A	2	161900	Z	1930	Z	2		BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN						
ADD ON MISIONS:															
K1201X	2	61500	Z	1530	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	188FS	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
K1202X	2	81500	Z	1530	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	188FS	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX

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FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER 94

as of: 1/11/95 2:39 PM

REQ NO.	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED FLYING	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2K1203X	2	131745	Z	1815	Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	303FS	10 ASOS	YES	X		
2K1204X	2	131815	Z	1845	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	185FS	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2K1205X	2	132000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	114FG	10 ASOS	YES	X		
2K1206X	2	141815	Z	1845	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	185FS	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2K1207X	2	142000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT RILEY ARTEP TRN	114FG	10 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2L1201V	5	61400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
2L1202V	5	71400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
2L1203V	5	81400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
2L1204V	5	131400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
2L1205V	5	141400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
2L1206V	5	151400	Z	1430	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.						
ADD ON MISSIONS:															
2L2001X	5	201400	Z	1600	Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
2L2002X	5	201400	5	1600	Z	1	OA-10	BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
2L2003X	5	201800	Z	2000	Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
2L2004X	5	201800	Z	2000	Z	1	OA-10	BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
2L2005X	5	211400	Z	1600	Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT BLISS TACP TRN.	354 FS	12 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1217N	5	11600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						
2M1218N	5	12000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						
2M1219N	5	61600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2M1220N	5	62000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	NO			WX CNX
2M1221N	5	71600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1222N	5	72000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1223N	5	81600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						
2M1224N	5	82000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						
2M1225N	5	131600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1226N	5	132000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1227N	5	141600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1228N	5	142000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	118 FS	13 ASOS	YES	X		
2M1229N	5	161600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						
2M1230N	5	162000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.						

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95

REQ NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
0101N	712 ASOS	5	031600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0102N	712 ASOS	5	031630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0103N	712 ASOS	5	032000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
0104N	712 ASOS	5	032030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
0105N	712 ASOS	5	041600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
0106N	712 ASOS	5	041630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
0107N	712 ASOS	5	042000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0108N	712 ASOS	5	042030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0109N	712 ASOS	5	042200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0110N	712 ASOS	5	042230	Z	2300	Z	2	F-16	LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	CANX 8 AF / 457 FS
0111N	712 ASOS	5	051600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	712 ASOS			X	LATE NOTICE TO FS
0112N	712 ASOS	5	051630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0113N	712 ASOS	5	052000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX
0114N	712 ASOS	5	052030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
0115N	712 ASOS	5	052200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0116N	712 ASOS	5	052230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0117N	712 ASOS	5	061600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
0118N	712 ASOS	5	061630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0119N	712 ASOS	5	091600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0120N	712 ASOS	5	091630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184FS	11 ASOS			X	MAINT CANX
0121N	712 ASOS	5	092000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
0122N	712 ASOS	5	092030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0123N	712 ASOS	5	101600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0124N	712 ASOS	5	101630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0125N	712 ASOS	5	102000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	3 ASOG	X	X		
0126N	712 ASOS	5	102030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
0127N	712 ASOS	5	111600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0128N	712 ASOS	5	111630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0129N	712 ASOS	5	112000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0130N	712 ASOS	5	112030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	149 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
0131N	712 ASOS	5	112200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0132N	712 ASOS	5	112230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0133N	712 ASOS	5	121600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF 201	3 ASOG			X	WX CANX
0134N	712 ASOS	5	121630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
0135N	712 ASOS	5	122000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
0136N	712 ASOS	5	122030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF 201	9 ASOS			X	WX/ MAINT CANX

MAY-12-1995 13:45 712 ASOS 738+5251 P.06
A-005-17

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95

EQ NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS
P0137N	712 ASOS	5	122200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0138N	712 ASOS	5	122230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0139N	712 ASOS	5	171600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0140N	712 ASOS	5	171630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
P0141N	712 ASOS	5	172000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
P0142N	712 ASOS	5	172030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0143N	712 ASOS	5	181600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0144N	712 ASOS	5	181630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0145N	712 ASOS	5	182000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX BY A/C
P0146N	712 ASOS	5	182030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX
P0147N	712 ASOS	5	182200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0148N	712 ASOS	5	182230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0149N	712 ASOS	5	191600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-14	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF 201	3 ASOG	X	X		
P0150N	712 ASOS	5	191630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0151N	712 ASOS	5	192000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
P0152N	712 ASOS	5	192030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	11 ASOS	X	X		
P0153N	712 ASOS	5	192200	Z	2230	Z	2	F-14	LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	VF 201	11 ASOS	X	X		
P0154N	712 ASOS	5	192230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0155N	712 ASOS	5	201600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0156N	712 ASOS	5	201630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0157N	712 ASOS	5	231600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0158N	712 ASOS	5	231630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	11 ASOS			X	MAINT CANX
P0159N	712 ASOS	5	232000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0160N	712 ASOS	5	232030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0161N	712 ASOS	5	241600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0162N	712 ASOS	5	241630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/1 CAV JAAT	184 FS	9 ASOS	X	X		
P0163N	712 ASOS	5	242000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0164N	712 ASOS	5	242030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0165N	712 ASOS	1	251600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/1CAV JAAT						
P0166N	712 ASOS	1	251630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD CAS/1CAV JAAT	184 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX
P0167N	712 ASOS	5	252000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0168N	712 ASOS	5	252030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0169N	712 ASOS	5	252200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0170N	712 ASOS	5	252230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.						
P0171N	712 ASOS	1	261600	Z	1630	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/1CAV JAAT						
P0172N	712 ASOS	1	261630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/1CAV JAAT	184 FS	9 ASOS			X	WX CANX

MAY-12-1995 13:46 712 ASOS 738+5251 P.07

A-005-18

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF JANUARY 95

	SPT'D						NO.	AIR-	REQ.		TASKED	CONTROL	SORT				
D NO.	UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		SORT.	CRAFT	ORD.	TYPE MISSION	UNIT	PARTY	FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REMARKS	REMARKS
0173N	712 ASOS	1	262000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0174N	712 ASOS	5	262030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0175N	712 ASOS	5	262200	Z	2230	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0176N	712 ASOS	5	262230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0177N	712 ASOS	1	271600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0178N	712 ASOS	1	271630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0179N	712 ASOS	1	272000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0180N	712 ASOS	1	281600	Z	1630	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0181N	712 ASOS	1	281630	Z	1700	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD CAS/ICAV JAAT							
0182N	712 ASOS	5	301600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0183N	712 ASOS	5	301630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0184N	712 ASOS	5	302000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0185N	712 ASOS	5	302030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0186N	712 ASOS	5	311600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0187N	712 ASOS	5	311630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	184 FS	11 ASOS			X	BASE WX CANX	
0188N	712 ASOS	5	312000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
0189N	712 ASOS	5	312030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN.							
D ON MISSIONS																	
0188Y	712 ASOS	5	311600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN.	704 FS	11 ASOS	X		X	RNG AIR ACTIVATION	
0101N	13 ASOS	5	041600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X		X	ATO MISPLACED	
0102N	13 ASOS	5	042000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			
0103N	13 ASOS	5	051600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			
0104N	13 ASOS	5	052000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			
0105N	13 ASOS	5	081600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0106N	13 ASOS	5	101600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0107N	13 ASOS	5	102000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0108N	13 ASOS	5	111600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0109N	13 ASOS	5	112000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0110N	13 ASOS	5	121600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0111N	13 ASOS	5	122000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0112N	13 ASOS	5	171600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0113N	13 ASOS	5	172000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.							
0114N	13 ASOS	5	181600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			
0115N	13 ASOS	5	182000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			
0116N	13 ASOS	5	191600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN.	140 FW	13 ASOS	X	X			

A-005-19

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY 95

as of: 9/3/95 2:52 PM

REQ NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO SORT	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	REMARKS/CONTACTS	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2P0201N	712 ASOS	1	082030	Z	2130	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CATB JAAT							
2P0202N	712 ASOS	1	090030	Z	0100	Z	2		DRY	FT HOOD CATB JAAT			NIGHT CAS				
2P0203N	712 ASOS	1	100030	Z	0100	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD CATB JAAT			NIGHT CAS				REASON UNSUCCESS
2P0204N	712 ASOS	1	110030	Z	0100	Z	2		LIVE	FT HOOD CATB JAAT			NIGHT CAS				WRONG MUNITION
2P0205N	712 ASOS	5	011600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0206N	712 ASOS	5	011630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	194 FS	3 ASG		X	X		
2P0207N	712 ASOS	5	012000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0208N	712 ASOS	5	012030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0209N	712 ASOS	5	012230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				
2P0210N	712 ASOS	5	012300	Z	2330	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				
2P0211N	712 ASOS	5	021600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							WX CANX
2P0212N	712 ASOS	5	021630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	194 FS	9 ASOS		X	X		WX CANX
2P0213N	712 ASOS	5	022000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							WX CANX
2P0214N	712 ASOS	5	022030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							WX CANX
2P0215N	712 ASOS	5	022230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				WX CANX
2P0216N	712 ASOS	5	022300	Z	2330	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				WX CANX
2P0217N	712 ASOS	5	031600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							WX CANX
2P0218N	712 ASOS	5	031630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	194 FS	9 ASOS		X	X		WX CANX
2P0219N	712 ASOS	5	061600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0220N	712 ASOS	5	061630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0221N	712 ASOS	5	062000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0222N	712 ASOS	5	062030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							WRONG MUNITION
2P0223N	712 ASOS	5	071600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0223A	712 ASOS	5	071620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0224N	712 ASOS	5	071640	Z	1700	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0225N	712 ASOS	5	072000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	9 ASOS		X	X		WRONG MUNITION
2P0226N	712 ASOS	5	072030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	9 ASOS		X	X		WRONG MUNITION
2P0227N	712 ASOS	5	081600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	712 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0227A	712 ASOS	5	081620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	712 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0227Y	712 ASOS	5	081630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	704 FS	712 ASOS		X	X		
2P0228N	712 ASOS	5	081640	Z	1700	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	712 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0229N	712 ASOS	5	082000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	9 ASOS				X	A/C FUEL PROBLEM
2P0230N	712 ASOS	5	082030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	JAAT DIVERT	457 FS	8 CAV/3ASG	MK-87	X	X		AIRFIELD REPAIR
2P0231N	712 ASOS	5	082230	Z	2250	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87	X	X		AIRFIELD REPAIR
2P0231A	712 ASOS	5	082250	Z	2310	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87	X	X		AIRFIELD REPAIR
2P0232N	712 ASOS	5	082310	Z	2330	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87				AIRFIELD REPAIR
2P0233N	712 ASOS	5	091600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0233A	712 ASOS	5	091620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0234N	712 ASOS	5	091640	Z	1700	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0235N	712 ASOS	5	092000	Z	2020	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0235A	712 ASOS	5	092020	Z	2040	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0236N	712 ASOS	5	092040	Z	2100	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0237N	712 ASOS	5	092230	Z	2300	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				
2P0238N	712 ASOS	5	092300	Z	2330	Z	2		LIVE*	FT HOOD TACP TRN			*MRK-82,GUNS				
2P0239N	712 ASOS	5	101600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION
2P0239A	712 ASOS	5	101620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	9 ASOS	MK-87			X	WRONG MUNITION

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A-005-20

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY 95

as of: 3/3/95 2:52 PM

REQ NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	REMARKS/CONTACTS	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2P0273N	712 ASOS	5	232000	Z	2030	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0274N	712 ASOS	5	232030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0275N	712 ASOS	5	232230	Z	2250	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0275A	712 ASOS	5	232250	Z	2310	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0276N	712 ASOS	5	232310	Z	2330	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0277N	712 ASOS	5	241600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0277A	712 ASOS	5	241620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	241640	Z	1700	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0278N	712 ASOS	5	271600	Z	1620	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0278A	712 ASOS	5	271620	Z	1640	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0280N	712 ASOS	5	271640	Z	1700	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0281N	712 ASOS	5	272000	Z	2010	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0281A	712 ASOS	5	272010	Z	2020	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0281B	712 ASOS	5	272020	Z	2030	Z	2	F/A-18	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	MAG 41	11 ASOS	MK-87			X	A/C FLIGHT HOURS MAXED
2P0282N	712 ASOS	5	272030	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0283N	712 ASOS	5	281600	Z	1630	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0284N	712 ASOS	5	281630	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU or DRY	FT HOOD TACP TRN							
2P0285N	712 ASOS	5	282000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0286N	712 ASOS	5	282030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0287Y	712 ASOS	5	160415	Z	0420	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0288Y	712 ASOS	5	160420	Z	0425	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0289Y	712 ASOS	5	160425	Z	0430	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0290Y	712 ASOS	5	160430	Z	0435	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0291Y	712 ASOS	5	160435	Z	0440	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0292Y	712 ASOS	5	160440	Z	0445	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0293Y	712 ASOS	5	160445	Z	0450	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0294Y	712 ASOS	5	160415	Z	0420	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0295Y	712 ASOS	5	160420	Z	0425	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0296Y	712 ASOS	5	160425	Z	0430	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0297Y	712 ASOS	5	160430	Z	0435	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0298Y	712 ASOS	5	160435	Z	0440	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P0299Y	712 ASOS	5	160440	Z	0445	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02100Y	712 ASOS	5	160445	Z	0450	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02101Y	712 ASOS	5	170415	Z	0420	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02102Y	712 ASOS	5	170420	Z	0425	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02103Y	712 ASOS	5	170425	Z	0430	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02104Y	712 ASOS	5	170430	Z	0435	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02105Y	712 ASOS	5	170435	Z	0440	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02106Y	712 ASOS	5	170440	Z	0445	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2P02107Y	712 ASOS	5	170445	Z	0450	Z	1	F-117	LGB MK-50	FT HOOD TACP TRN	8 FS	9/712 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2M0201N	13 ASOS	5	011800	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0202N	13 ASOS	5	012000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0203N	13 ASOS	5	021600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0204N	13 ASOS	5	022000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2M0205N	13 ASOS	5	031600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		

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A-005-21

3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY 95

as of: 3/3/95 2:52 PM

REQ NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TDT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	REMARKS/CONTACTS	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2M0206N	13 ASOS	5	071600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0207N	13 ASOS	5	072000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0208N	13 ASOS	5	081600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0209N	13 ASOS	5	082000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0210N	13 ASOS	5	091600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0211N	13 ASOS	5	092000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0212N	13 ASOS	5	101600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0213N	13 ASOS	5	141600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0214N	13 ASOS	5	142000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0215N	13 ASOS	5	151600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0216N	13 ASOS	5	152000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0217N	13 ASOS	5	161600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0218N	13 ASOS	5	162000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0219N	13 ASOS	5	211600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0220N	13 ASOS	5	212000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0221N	13 ASOS	5	221600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0222N	13 ASOS	5	222000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0223N	13 ASOS	5	231600	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0224N	13 ASOS	5	232000	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	120 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0225N	13 ASOS	5	242000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0226N	13 ASOS	5	281600	Z	1700	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0227N	13 ASOS	5	282000	Z	2100	Z	2		BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN							
2M0228Y	13 ASOS	5	271800	Z	1900	Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0229Y	13 ASOS	5	272200	Z	2300	Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS		X	X		
2M0230Y	13 ASOS	5	281800	Z	1900	Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS				X	WX. CANX.
2M0231Y	13 ASOS	5	282200	Z	2300	Z	4	F-16	BDU	FT CARSON TACP TRN	4 FS	13 ASOS				X	WX. CANX.
2L0201V	12 ASOS	1	011400	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0202V	12 ASOS	1	021400	Z	1500	Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0203V	12 ASOS	1	081400	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0204V	12 ASOS	1	091400	Z	1500	Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0205V	12 ASOS	1	151400	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0206V	12 ASOS	1	161400	Z	1500	Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0207V	12 ASOS	1	221400	Z	1500	Z	2		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2L0208V	12 ASOS	1	231400	Z	1500	Z	4		BDU	FT BLISS JAAT							
2K0201N	10 ASOS	5	072130	Z	2200	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TACP TRN	138 FS	10 ASOS		X	X		
2K0202N	10 ASOS	5	072030	Z	2100	Z	2	A-10	DRY	FT RILEY TACP TRN	303 FS	10 ASOS		X	X		
2K0203N	10 ASOS	5	282130	Z	2200	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TACP TRN	188 FS	10 ASOS				X	WX CANX
2K0204N	10 ASOS	5	282130	Z	2200	Z	2		DRY	FT RILEY TACP TRN		10 ASOS					
2K0205D	10 ASOS	1	221900	Z	1900	Z	2	A-10	BDU	FT RILEY JAAT	303 FS	10 ASOS		X	X		
2K0201Y	10 ASOS	5	012120	Z	2140	Z	2	F-16	DRY	FT RILEY TACP TRN	138 FS	10 ASOS		X	X		
	TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES						347										

A-005-22

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3 ASOG CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SUMMARY
FOR MONTH OF MARCH 95

as of: 4/5/95 2:28 PM

REQ	NO.	SPT'D UNIT	PRI	TOT		TFT		NO. SORT.	AIR-CRAFT	REQ. ORD.	TYPE MISSION	TASKED UNIT	CONTROL PARTY	SORT FLOWN	SUCC	UNSUCC	REASON UNSUCCESS
2P03	01N	712 ASOS	5	011600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	02N	712 ASOS	5	011630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	03N	712 ASOS	5	012000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	04N	712 ASOS	5	012030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	05N	712 ASOS	5	021600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	06N	712 ASOS	5	021630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	07N	712 ASOS	5	022000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	08N	712 ASOS	5	022030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	09N	712 ASOS	5	031600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	10N	712 ASOS	5	031630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	11 ASOS			X	WX CANX
2P03	11N	712 ASOS	5	061600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	12N	712 ASOS	5	061630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	13N	712 ASOS	5	062000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	14N	712 ASOS	5	062030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	15N	712 ASOS	5	071600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	3 ASOG	X	X		
2P03	16N	712 ASOS	5	071630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	17N	712 ASOS	5	072000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	18N	712 ASOS	5	072030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	19N	712 ASOS	5	081600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
2P03	20N	712 ASOS	5	081630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	21N	712 ASOS	5	082000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	22N	712 ASOS	5	082030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	23N	712 ASOS	5	091600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
2P03	24N	712 ASOS	5	091630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	25N	712 ASOS	5	092000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	26N	712 ASOS	5	092030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	27N	712 ASOS	5	101600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN	457 FS	712 ASOS	X	X		
2P03	28N	712 ASOS	5	101630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	29N	712 ASOS	5	131600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	30N	712 ASOS	5	131630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	31N	712 ASOS	5	132000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	32N	712 ASOS	5	132030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	33N	712 ASOS	5	141600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	34N	712 ASOS	5	141630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	35N	712 ASOS	5	142000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	36N	712 ASOS	5	142030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	37N	712 ASOS	5	151600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	38N	712 ASOS	5	151630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	39N	712 ASOS	5	152000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	40N	712 ASOS	5	152030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	41N	712 ASOS	5	161600	Z	1630	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	42N	712 ASOS	5	161630	Z	1700	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	43N	712 ASOS	5	162000	Z	2030	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						
2P03	44N	712 ASOS	5	162030	Z	2100	Z	2	F-16	BDU	FT HOOD TACP TRN						

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

APPENDIX (006) DOD AP/1B Chart, MTRs-
Central US

LONG SHOT 1995
RESULTS OF
"DUEL IN THE DESERT"

TOP TEAM WINNER

	POINT TOTALS	POSSIBLE POINTS	
* 8AF TEAM #2	2200	3200	68.750%
9AF TEAM #1	2175	3400	63.971%
9AF TEAM #2	1825	3200	57.031%
8AF TEAM #1	1725	3400	50.735%
12AF TEAM #2	1600	3200	50.000%
12AF TEAM #1	1575	3400	46.324%

TOP NAF WINNER

	POINT TOTALS	POSSIBLE POINTS	
9AF TEAM #1	2175	3400	63.971%
9AF TEAM #2	1825	3200	57.031%
	4000	6600	60.606%
8AF TEAM #1	1725	3400	50.735%
8AF TEAM #2	2200	3200	68.750%
	3925	6600	59.470%
12AF TEAM #1	1575	3400	46.324%
12AF TEAM #2	1600	3200	50.000%
	3175	6600	48.106%

PERIOD : 5

VUL PERIOD: 2000 - 2100Z

MISSION CMDR: CAPT PURDY

8AF TEAM #1:

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET

BASE	WING	SQDN	CALL SIGN	#'s	WEST OF 115W PUSH POINTS (+50)	RED AIR KILL POINTS (+25 / PER)	REDAIR OR SAM MORT POINTS (-50)	TARGET HIT (LGB - 30) (FTR - 140) (BMR - 300) TOSS SCORE FEET	TARGET HIT POINTS (+100)	SPLASH W/IN 2MIN TOT POINTS (+50)	FRAG 26SEC MIN DECONF POINTS (-50)	INVALID A/A KILL POINTS (-75)	HVA LOSS POINTS (-50)	VTR FILM NOT ASSESS POINTS (0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL POINTS AWARDED	POINTS AVAILABLE	
8AF TEAM #1:	AIR TO AIR																
NAS NEW ORLEANS LA	159FG	122 FS	F-15A														
CAPT MEYER			JAZZ	11	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT HOURIN			JAZZ	12	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT RYAN			JAZZ	13	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	
CAPT MAGUIRE			JAZZ	14	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	
					200	50	-100			0	0	0	0	0	150	200	75.000%
	AIR TO GROUND																
BARKSDALE AFB LA	917WG	47 FS	A-10A					6xMK82AIR	75-43-08								
1LT BARTLEY			SWINE	21	50	0	0	58	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ FOY			SWINE	22	50	0	0	38	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT MILLER			SWINE	23	50	0	0	84	0	0	-50	0	0	-25	-25	200	
1LT BENSON			SWINE	24	50	0	0	23	100	50	-50	0	0	0	150	200	
					200	0	0		300	150	-100	0	0	-25	525	800	65.625%
FT SMITH MUNI APRT AR	188FG	184 FS	F-16A					6xMK82AIR	75-43-08								
MAJ HASLETT			HAWG	31	50	25	0	144	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	200	
1LT VON GROTE			HAWG	32	50	0	0	16	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT BRYAN			HAWG	33	50	0	-50	202	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
MAJ CUNNINGHAM			HAWG	34	50	0	-50	50	0	0	0	0	0	-25	-25	200	
					200	25	-100		100	50	0	0	0	-25	250	800	31.250%
CANNON AFB NM	27FW	428 FS	F-111E					2xMK84AIR	76-14-83								
CAPT HICKEY			GEMINI	41	50	0	-50	227	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT FITZ			GEMINI	42	50	0	0	602	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT LESS			GEMINI	43	50	0	0	99	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT RICHARD			GEMINI	44	50	0	0	582	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					200	0	-50		100	50	0	0	0	0	300	800	37.500%
BARKSDALE AFB LA	28W	20 BS	B-52H					6xMK82AIR	76-07-22								
CAPT JAMESON / CAPT PURDY			JAMBO	51	50	0	0	225	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT CONTE			JAMBO	52	50	0	0	291	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT HERREN			JAMBO	53	50	0	0	422	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					150	0	0		200	100	0	0	0	0	450	600	75.000%
HOLLOMAN AFB NM	49FW	8 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT KOHNTOPP			STELTH	61	50	0	0	63	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					50	0	0		200	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	25.000%
														GRAND TOTALS:	1725	3400	50.735%

PERIOD : 4
VUL PERIOD: 1900 - 2000Z
MISSION CMDR: CAPT MCMANUS
8AF TEAM #2:

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET

BASE	WING	SQDN	CALL SIGN	#'s	WEST OF 115W PUSH POINTS (+50)	RED AIR KILL POINTS (+25 / PER)	REDAIR OR SAM MORT POINTS (-50)	TARGET HIT (LGB - 30) (FTR - 140) (BMR - 300) TOSS SCORE FEET	TARGET HIT POINTS (+100)	SPLASH W / IN 2MIN TOT POINTS (+50)	FRAG 26SEC MIN DECONF POINTS (-50)	INVALID A/A KILL POINTS (-75)	HVA LOSS POINTS (-50)	VTR FILM NOT ASSESS POINTS (0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL POINTS AWARDED	POINTS AVAILABLE	
8AF TEAM #2:	AIR TO AIR																
TYNDALL AFB FL	325FW	2 FS	F-15C														
CAPT HAMLETT			CAP	11	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
CAPT EASTER			CAP	12	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	
CAPT STAPLETON			CAP	13	50	50	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	50	
CAPT MARSHALL			CAP	14	50	50	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	50	
					200	100	-50		0	0	0	0	0	0	250	200	125.000%
(CARSWELL)	AIR TO GROUND																
FORT WORTH NAS TX	301FW	457 FS	F-16C					6xMK82AIR	75-43-08								
MAJ GOURLEY			SPAD	21	50	0	0	54	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
1LT GARTH			SPAD	22	50	0	0	43	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT MURRAY			SPAD	23	50	0	0	121	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT MORTENSON			SPAD	24	50	0	0	26	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		400	200	0	0	0	0	800	800	100.000%
BERGSTROM ARB TX	924FG	704 FS	F-16C					2xMK84AIR	76-14-83								
MAJ THOMPSON			OUTLAW	31	50	0	0	38	0	0	0	0	0	-25	25	200	
1LT DUGAN			OUTLAW	32	50	0	0	48	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ TEMPLIN			OUTLAW	33	50	0	0	159	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT HIGGINS			OUTLAW	34	50	0	0	120	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		200	100	0	0	0	-26	475	800	59.375%
LUKE AFB AZ	56FW	62 FS	F-16C					2xMK84AIR	76-14-83								
CAPT ORR			SPIKE	41	50	0	0	11	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT GUTIERREZ			SPIKE	42	50	0	0	205	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT HECHT			SPIKE	43	50	25	0	171	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	200	
CAPT NEWTON			SPIKE	44	50	0	0	101	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	25	0		200	100	0	0	0	0	525	800	65.625%
DYESS AFB TX	7WG	9 BS	B-1B					6xMK82AIR	76-07-22								
CAPT MCMANUS			DARK	51	50	0	0	378	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT CARVER			DARK	52	50	0	0	673	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					100	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	100	400	25.000%
HOLLOMAN AFB NM	49FW	9 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT MCKEON			STELTH	62	50	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					50	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	25.000%
														GRAND TOTALS:	2200	3200	68.750%

A-007-3

PERIOD : 1

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET

VUL PERIOD: 1600 - 1700Z

MISSION CMDR: MAJ SPRATT

9AF TEAM #1:

BASE	WING	SQDN	CALL SIGN	#'s	WEST OF 115W PUSH POINTS (+50)	RED AIR KILL POINTS (+25 / PER)	REDAIR OR SAM MORT POINTS (-50)	TARGET HIT (LGB - 30) (FTR - 140) (BMR - 300) TOSS SCORE FEET	TARGET HIT POINTS (+100)	SPLASH W / IN 2MIN TOT POINTS (+50)	FRAG 26SEC MIN DECONF POINTS (-50)	INVALID A/A KILL POINTS (-75)	HVA LOSS POINTS (-50)	VTR FILM NOT ASSESS POINTS (0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL POINTS AWARDED	POINTS AVAILABLE	
9AF TEAM #1:	AIR TO AIR																
LANGLEY AFB VA	1FW	27 FS	F-15C														
CAPT WISNIEWSKI			FIRST	11	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT PENN			FIRST	12	50	0	-50	N/A	0	0	0	-75	0	0	-75	50	
CAPT YOUNG			FIRST	13	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT KAULS			FIRST	14	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	-75	0	0	-25	50	
					200	50	-50		0	0	0	-150	0	0	50	200	25.000%
	AIR TO GROUND																
MCENTIRE ANGB SC	169FG	157 FS	F-16C					6xMK82AIR	75-43-06								
MAJ SPRATT			MACE	21	50	0	0	84	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT DODSON			MACE	22	50	0	0	185	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
MAJ MONJEAU			MACE	23	50	0	0	18	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT FLESHMAN			MACE	24	50	0	0	110	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		300	150	0	0	0	0	650	800	81.250%
SHAW AFB SC	20FW	79FS	F-16C					6xMK82AIR	75-43-06								
CAPT MIDDLEBROOKS			DOGMAN	31	50	0	0	72	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT WEST			DOGMAN	32	50	0	0	82	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT MEYERS			DOGMAN	33	50	0	0	112	100	0	0	0	0	0	150	200	
CAPT SHREWSBURY			DOGMAN	34	50	0	0	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					200	0	0		300	100	0	0	0	0	600	800	75.000%
SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB SC	4WG	335 FS	F-15E					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT RHELAN			CHIEF	41	50	0	-50	132	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT MUELENTHALER			CHIEF	42	50	0	0	28	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT WISER			CHIEF	43	50	0	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT WELLS			CHIEF	44	50	25	0	28	100	50	0	0	0	0	225	200	
					200	25	-50		200	100	0	0	0	0	475	800	59.375%
MINOT AFB ND	5BW	23 BS	B-52H					6xMK82AIR	76-07-22								
CAPT ANDESON			ACME	51	50	0	-50	418	0	0	0	0	-50	0	-50	200	
CAPT SCHERR			ACME	52	50	0	0	421	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT MCCREARY			ACME	53	50	0	0	96	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					150	0	-50		100	50	0	0	-50	0	200	600	33.333%
HOLLOMAN AFB NM	49FW	8 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT BERG			STELTH	63	50	0	0	9	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					50	0	0		200	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	100.000%
														GRAND TOTALS:	2175	3400	63.971%

PERIOD : 2
VUL PERIOD: 1700 - 1800Z
MISSION CMDR: MAJ TAYLOR
9AF TEAM #2:

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET

BASE	WING	SQDN	CALL SIGN	#'s	WEST OF 115W PUSH POINTS (+50)	RED AIR KILL POINTS (+25 / PER)	REDAIR OR SAM MORT POINTS (-50)	TARGET HIT (LGB - 30) (FTR - 140) (BMR - 300) TOSS SCORE FEET	TARGET HIT POINTS (+100)	SPLASH W / IN 2MIN TOT POINTS (+50)	FRAG 26SEC MIN DECONF POINTS (-50)	INVALID A/A KILL POINTS (-75)	HVA LOSS POINTS (-50)	VTR FILM NOT ASSESS POINTS (0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL POINTS AWARDED	POINTS AVAILABLE	
9AF TEAM #2:	AIR TO AIR																
EGLIN AFB FL	33FW	58 FS	F-15C														
CAPT MANLEY			KONG	11	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT VACCARO			KONG	12	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
CAPT MCDONALD			KONG	13	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT WISE			KONG	14	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
					200	75	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	275	200	137.500%
	AIR TO GROUND																
SPRINGFIELD ANGB OH	178FG	162 FS	F-16C					6xMK82AIR	75-43-08								
MAJ WILLIAMS			BUCKI	21	50	0	0	75	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT SOUDER			BUCKI	22	50	0	0	176	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
MAJ JOHNSON			BUCKI	23	50	0	0	197	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
MAJ COGLIN			BUCKI	24	50	0	0	152	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					200	0	0		100	50	0	0	0	0	350	800	43.750%
TOLEDO EXPRESS APRT OH	180FG	112 FS	F-16C					2xMK84AIR	76-14-83								
MAJ TRETAR			LOMA	31	50	0	0	187	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT NEWELL			LOMA	32	50	0	0	82	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT RINKE			LOMA	33	50	0	0	88	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ DIEHL			LOMA	34	50	0	0	98	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		300	150	0	0	0	0	850	800	81.250%
MOODY AFB GA	347WG	68 FS	F-16C					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
MAJ TAYLOR			LANCR	41	50	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT LAFOND			LANCR	42	50	0	0	114	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT DIXON			LANCR	43	50	0	-50	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT FORN			LANCR	44	50	0	-50	1668	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
					200	0	-100		0	0	0	0	0	0	100	800	12.500%
ELLSWORTH AFB SD	28BW	37 BS	B-1B					6xMK82AIR	76-07-22								
CAPT MIKESELL			TIGER	51	50	0	0	169	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT VANDENBOSSCHE			TIGER	52	50	0	0	95	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					100	0	0		200	100	0	0	0	0	400	400	100.000%
HOLLOMAN AFB NM	49FW	9 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT DAVIDSON	49FW	9 FS	STELTH	64	50	0	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					50	0	0		200	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	25.000%
														GRAND TOTALS:	1825	3200	57.031%

PERIOD : 3

VUL PERIOD: 1800 - 1900Z

MISSION CMDR: CAPT D BROWN

12AF TEAM #1

LONG SHOT 95 TEAM SCORE SHEET

BASE	WING	SQDN	CALL SIGN	#'s	WEST OF 115W PUSH POINTS (+50)	RED AIR KILL POINTS (+25 / PER)	REDAIR OR SAM MORT POINTS (-50)	TARGET HIT (LGB - 30) (FTR - 140) (BMR - 300) TOSS SCORE FEET	TARGET HIT POINTS (+100)	SPLASH W / IN 2MIN TOT POINTS (+50)	FRAG 26SEC MIN DECONF POINTS (-50)	INVALID A/A KILL POINTS (-75)	HVA LOSS POINTS (-50)	NO ASSESS VTR FILM POINTS (0 HIT / -25)	TOTAL POINTS AWARDED	POINTS AVAILABLE	
12AF TEAM #1		AIR TO AIR															
DOBBINS AFB GA	116FW	128 FS	F-15A														
CAPT O'CONNOR			KAOS	11	50	25	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	50	
CAPT EAVES			KAOS	12	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
CAPT DUERR			KAOS	13	50	75	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	125	50	
MAJ FEARNEYHOUGH			KAOS	14	50	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	
					200	100	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	150.000%
		AIR TO GROUND															
DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	355WG	357 FS	A-10A					6xMK82AIR	75-43-06								
CAPT O'DAY					50	0	0	78	100	0	0	0	0	0	150	200	
MAJ WEAVER			CHILI	22	50	0	0	259	0	0	0	0	0	-25	25	200	
CAPT SANDERS			CHILI	23	50	0	0	57	0	0	0	0	0	-25	25	200	
CAPT NACHTMAN			CHILI	24	50	0	0	56	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					200	0	0		200	50	0	0	0	-50	400	800	50.000%
HILL AFB UT	388FW	421 FS	F-16C					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT WARREN			SPIDR	31	50	0	-50	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT ALVORD			SPIDR	32	50	0	-50	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT ROOSA			SPIDR	33	50	25	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	200	
CAPT KEATON			SPIDR	34	50	0	-50	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
					200	25	-150		0	0	0	0	0	0	75	800	9.375%
HILL AFB UT	388FW	34 FS	F-16C					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT BROWN			RACE	41	50	0	0	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT FORD			RACE	42	50	0	0	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT CLAPP			RACE	43	50	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
CAPT FERGUSON			RACE	44	50	0	0	29	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
MAJ CLAYFISH					200	0	0		100	50	0	0	0	0	350	800	43.750%
BARKSDALE AFB LA	917WG	93 BS	B-52H					6xMK82AIR	76-07-22								
CAPT CASTELLANI			SCALP	51	50	0	-50	977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	
CAPT KIRKPATRICK			SCALP	52	50	0	0	261	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
CAPT CAIXEIRO			SCALP	53	50	0	0	462	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	200	
					150	0	-50		100	50	0	0	0	0	250	600	41.667%
HOLLOMAN AFB NM	49FW	8 FS	F-117					1xGBU12	76-14-02								
CAPT ENGMAN	49FW	8 FS	STELTH	65	50	0	0	17	100	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	
					50	0	0		200	50	0	0	0	0	200	200	100.000%
														GRAND TOTALS:	1575	3400	46.324%

A-00726