DCN 5058
Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission

JUL 21 2005

Received

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi: Tom:

Below is information provided to me by U.S. Fleet Forces Command, regarding its opposition to the scenarios to close Naval Submarine Base New London. ***The scenario to close SUBASE New London was the only closure recommendation opposed by Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) that was ultimately recommended by the Department of Defense.***

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In 2005, two consecutive CFFCs -- Admiral William J. Fallon and Admiral John B. Nathman -- opposed all Navy scenarios to close SUBASE New London during deliberations. As you know, DOD ultimately recommended DON-0033. This scenario would transfer SUBASE New London's homeported fast attack submarines to Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, and would distribute its component activities to Navy and Army installations in Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, Florida and Texas.

In an official telephone discussion on June 29, Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, Deputy and Chief of Staff, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, told me that CFFC opposed DON-0033 because closing SUBASE New London would 1) limit the overall flexibility of the U.S. fast attack submarine force; 2) pose significant readiness, training and operational risks; 3) negatively impact day-to-day operations that accompany regular SSN maintenance; 4) present SSN integration problems at SUBASE Kings Bay; and 5) abandon substantial sunk costs in the existing Naval Submarine School at SUBASE New London and require significant military construction investments at SUBASE Kings Bay.

VADM Cosgriff confirmed that moving two more SSN squadrons to NAVSTA Norfolk would exacerbate the existing "waterfront congestion" there. The recommended scenario to close SUBASE New London would require at NAVSTA Norfolk extensive nesting with increased loading operations -- operational and readiness risks. VADM Cosgriff also noted that introducing fast attack submarines to SUBASE Kings Bay would raise significant challenges since it currently has no SSN facilities.

I respectfully ask you to give these expert opinions your full consideration as you prepare your final decision on Naval Submarine Base New London.

All the best,

Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

BRAC Commission
JUL 21 2005
Received

July 19, 2005

The Honorable James Bilbray
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Bilbray: Jim:

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All the best,

Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission

JUL 21 2005

Received

The Honorable Philip Coyle
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Coyle:

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All the best,

Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission

JUL 21 2005

Received

Brigadier General Sue. E. Turner, USAF (Ret)
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Turner:

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All the best,

Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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DCN 5058
Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret)
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

BRAC Commission
JUL 21 2005
Received

Dear Commissioner Newton: Fig:

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Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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DCN 5058
Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission

JUL 21 2005

Received

The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Skinner:

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Rep. Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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DCN 5058
Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret)
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

BRAC Commission
JUL 21 2005
Received

Dear Commissioner Gehman:

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Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission

JUL 21 2005

Received

General James T. Hill, USA (Ret)
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Hill:

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Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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Executive Correspondence

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 2005

BRAC Commission
JUL 2 : 2005
Received

The Honorable James V. Hansen
BRAC Commission
Polk Building , Suites 600 and 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Hansen: Jim:

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Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut

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