

Analysis of DoD Recommendation to Close Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey

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Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Bases are closed only if:

- Excess capacity is reduced
- Base's key mission no longer required
- Inherent nature of existing facility imposes unacceptable constraints on missions
- Mission could be accomplished better somewhere else
- Opportunity for savings without significant risk

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

The Excess Capacity Argument

NOT VALID

- Ft Monmouth's main mission is Land C4ISR. There is no documentation of excess capacity in Land C4ISR.
- In fact, DoD is investing heavily in all forms of C4ISR capabilities. Spending patterns, previous statements, etc. all point to a *shortfall* in C4ISR, not an excess capacity.
- C4ISR is the heart of network centric warfare. By volume of workload, military requirements, and volume of spending, Land C4ISR is significantly more extensive than Air or Sea based C4ISR. So within the overall category of C4ISR, Land-based is more militarily vital, and in demand by the warfighters, than Sea or Air based systems.
- There is no transformation of the military without C4ISR improvements. There is no Joint warfighting without C4ISR. There is no way for the 20-year force structure (esp. given the refusal of DoD to increase end strengths) to properly meet future threats without gains in C4ISR and interoperability capabilities.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Mission is No Longer Needed

NOT VALID

- Land C4ISR is a mission that is unquestionably needed, both now and for the foreseeable future.
- Importance of Ft Monmouth's mission is growing, not decreasing.
- Land C4ISR is the essence of Transformation. Without it, you cannot do more with less.
- Land C4ISR is what allows troops to operate Jointly without killing themselves in friendly-fire incidents, allows interoperability, situational blue force/red force awareness, and opportunities for common software solutions and upgrades.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

NOT VALID

Ft. Monmouth not the right place for mission

- Not a single shred of evidence has been presented by DoD that existing facilities at Ft Monmouth interfere with, or are not capable of supporting, the Land C4ISR mission.
- Ft Monmouth is able to leverage significant Jointness benefits through prior and expanding relationship with nearby Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.
- Ft Dix has almost the same military value score as Aberdeen PG (#23 vs #18). If Ft Dix military value score were re-calculated to include acreage + facilities of McGuire AFB and Lakehurst NAES, the Joint Base military value score would surpass the military value score of APG.
- No encroachment, air space, environmental, workforce, or any other militarily significant limitations on Ft. Monmouth in present location.
- Ft Monmouth has significantly higher military value scores than both Adelphi and Soldier Systems Natick, yet these were not recommended for closure or realignment, despite having similar facility profiles as Ft Monmouth. **This is a substantial deviation from the selection criteria.**
- Other major C4ISR RDAT&E facilities are located at relatively small (<1000 acres) campuses where there are nearby clusters of universities, computer and technology businesses, large number of advanced degrees, etc. (Adelphi, Rome AFRL, Soldier Systems Natick, Hanscom AFB). None of these facilities are cited in BRAC for their 'smallness' posing future mission difficulties or limitations.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Mission Better Accomplished Elsewhere

NOT VALID

- There is no evidence presented that APG could conduct C4ISR RDAT&E better than Ft Monmouth.
- APG has no military units training at the base to test or evaluate Land C4ISR systems in a realistic environment. Ft Dix does, and Monmouth uses Dix instrumented ranges to do T&E.
- APG has no lab space or other Land C4ISR facilities in place. All would need to be built from scratch. Why waste scarce MILCON \$ for no gain in capability?
- APG has no experience or history in Land C4ISR systems. There is no proven ability to manage Joint C4ISR programs. But there is proven ability at Ft Monmouth.
- The higher military value scores of Aberdeen PG have nothing to do with Land C4ISR. The higher scores are mostly due to larger acreage. Yet acreage poses no limitation, nor any discernable effect, on the successful accomplishment of C4ISR RDAT&E.



Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Mission Better Accomplished Elsewhere (continued)

NOT VALID

- RDAT&E facilities are historically located in areas of the country from which they can draw upon a robust workforce of highly educated persons, and benefit from the proximity to universities, private labs, and high-tech firms. This is the case with Ft Monmouth, Hanscom AFB, and Soldier Systems Natick.
- Maryland's high-tech science workforce, academic centers, and firms are nowhere near APG. They are concentrated near Washington DC and Bethesda, well outside any established or valid commuting pattern to APG.
- The other concentration of well educated workers lives in Baltimore and along I-83. These workers are highly unlikely to brave a lengthy commute which takes them across the heavily congested 695 beltway, then up I-95 towards APG. Especially when government jobs generally pay less than private industry science and technology jobs.
- The 40 mile area near APG is rural, sparsely inhabited, and has one of the lowest concentrations of Bachelor's or higher academic degrees in Maryland.
- There is absolutely no evidence that APG would attract a better science and technology workforce than Ft Monmouth. It is doubtful that APG could attract the same or equivalent science & tech workforce that already exists in the Ocean-Monmouth region of New Jersey.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations



Comparison of higher academic degrees in the APG region versus Ft. Monmouth

(Persons aged 25 and above with Bachelor's degree or higher.) Source: US Census Bureau.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Conclusion:

- Based on all available data on the Maryland and New Jersey workforces, there is nothing that implies or supports the idea that reconstituting the Ft Monmouth, NJ workforce at APG, MD would improve the quality or quantity of scientific personnel conducting Land C4ISR RDAT&E.
- There is nothing in any of DoD's publicly available data which supports the contention that the Land C4ISR RDAT&E mission, if relocated from Ft. Monmouth, would improve in either quantity or quality at APG.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Savings Could be Achieved w/o Risk

NOT VALID

- DoD counts the savings of those who do not relocate from Ft. Monmouth to APG, but does not count the costs of retraining or recruiting the new workers.
- DoD is underestimating the number of workers who would move from Ft. Monmouth to APG. This would drive up the costs of reconstituting the work force.
- Some specialized facilities at Ft Monmouth cannot be easily or inexpensively moved or rebuilt. Examples: Satellite facility, anechoic chamber, others. These require lengthy permit applications and certifications. Could make it impossible to complete the move inside the mandated 6 year window.
- There are few facilities at APG suitable for the Ft Monmouth Land C4ISR mission. Almost everything would need to be built from scratch.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Savings Could be Achieved w/o Risk

NOT VALID

- There are serious and substantial risks of program disruption if Ft Monmouth's workforce is moved.
- Most senior technicians and scientists eligible for retirement would retire in NJ and seek other employment. They would no longer be available to help train the follow-on workforce.
- Workforce would become younger and less experienced (and less capable).
- Many Joint and transformational programs conducted at Ft Monmouth would face disruption and risk. Warfighters would unquestionably be affected negatively for the short term. The effects would be felt immediately for IED protection programs and several others. Effects could last beyond 6 years.
- Even the Army testified that there would be some irreducible level of risk in the Ft. Monmouth move. This risk can never be reduced to zero no matter what management initiatives are undertaken. The question becomes what is the likely risk and what are the likely benefits, and do the benefits of the move outweigh the risks?

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Military Value Criteria #1: substantial deviation.

“The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.”

- Land C4ISR capabilities would be reduced if Ft. Monmouth were closed, or at the minimum disrupted and placed at risk for no foreseeable gain. Overall ability to conduct Joint warfighting hinges on the successful execution of Land C4ISR RDAT&E programs.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Military Value Criteria #2: substantial deviation

- “The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.”
- No evidence of deficiencies or limitations in Ft. Monmouth's land, facilities, or airspace that impacts current or future missions.
 - Current and expanding collaboration with Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst provides better opportunities to execute Land C4ISR RDATE mission than at APG.
 - Realigning with enclave to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst would create a mega-facility with equal or higher military value than APG without any of the risks of disruption of moving to APG.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Military Value Criteria #3: substantial deviation.

“The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.”

- All surge and contingency requirements at Ft. Monmouth could be accommodated with realignment with enclave at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.
- Realignment with enclave at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst would provide better opportunities to support the future total force, since Dix regularly conducts training of large-scale units, while APG does not. Dix also has better mobilization capacity than APG.
- Lakehurst NAES component of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst has better UAV support capabilities than APG, which impacts future total force requirements.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Military Value Criteria #4: substantial deviation

“The cost of operations and the manpower implications.”

- New Jersey has a superior technical workforce in the 40 mile vicinity (within normal commuting patterns) of Ft. Monmouth than APG, Maryland. The manpower implications of closing Ft. Monmouth and relocating to APG would substantially place at risk the mission. And the quality and quantity of the manpower implications would be reduced at APG.
- Realignment with enclave to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst would provide opportunities for cost savings while still complying with the manpower implications in Military Value Criteria #4.

Assessing the Military Value of DoD's Ft. Monmouth Recommendations

Final Conclusions:

- Significant but inherently unknowable risks would be incurred if Ft. Monmouth were closed, for minimal or no benefits.
- No excess capacity would be reduced.
- The mission at Ft. Monmouth is important and growing.
- There are no limitations or problems carrying out these missions at Ft. Monmouth.
- There is no evidence the mission would be carried out better at Aberdeen Proving Ground.
- There is no evidence that the savings could be obtained without risk.
- The savings are dubious and overstated.