THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

DCN 726

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950428-7

FROM: SARBANES, PAUL S.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (MD)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL	✓			CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF WITNESS LIST FOR MARYLAND BASES AT THE BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950428	Date Originated: 950427	Mail Date:

PAUL S. SARBANES
MARYLAND

308 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
202-224-4524

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2002

April 27, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Closure and realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950425-7

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As requested in your letter of March 24th, I am writing to submit names of witnesses for your regional hearing on Maryland facilities included in the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. The Maryland presentation will consist of five individual community presentations. In addition to the schedule and order for these presentations, I am also providing the name and title of each witness and approximate time allocations, as requested.

These witnesses are being recommended by myself, Senator Mikulski, and the appropriate Member of the House of Representatives.

Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee (30 minutes):

- Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier (29 minutes)
  retired employee, Ft. Ritchie

- Mr. Herb Meininger (1 minute)
  retired Garrison Commander, Ft. Ritchie

Advocates for Naval Surface Weapons Center, Annapolis (25 minutes):

- Mr. Jim Corder (20 minutes)
  retired Assistant Head of Propulsion and Auxiliary Systems Directorate

- Mr. Larry Argiro (5 minutes)
  retired Head of the Machinery R&D Directorate, NSWC - Annapolis

Naval Surface Weapons Center, White Oak (25 minutes):

- Mr. John Tino (10 minutes)
  retired employee, NSWC White Oak

- Mr. Mike Subin (15 minutes)
  Chair, White Oak Task Force

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Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore (15 minutes):

o Ms. Cathy Kropp (14 minutes)
Computer Assistant, USAPDC

o Mr. Bill Weiman (1 minute)
Forklift Operator and Local Union 1409 Vice President, USAPDC

Fort Meade Advocacy Committee (10 minutes):

o Colonel Kent Menser (10 minutes)
retired Garrison Commander, Ft. Meade

In addition to these witnesses, I will introduce Governor Glendening at the outset as well as any Delegation member who is not able to stay. Those members who are able to stay will have an opportunity to speak following the community presentations. A maximum of two minutes will be allotted to each member.

Thank you for your assistance. If I can provide you with any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me or have your staff contact my staff at (202)224-4524.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Paul S. Sarbanes
United States Senator

PSS/rjl

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950427-15

FROM: WARNER, JOHN	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (VA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		JB
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL	✓			CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUBMITTING STATE OF VA'S AGENDA FOR THE BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950427	Date Originated: 950427	Mail Date:

I look forward to seeing you in Baltimore.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

John Warner

JW:pcs

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950419-19

FROM: SHORR, DAVID A.	TO: CREEDON
TITLE: DIRECTOR	TITLE: GENERAL COUNSEL
ORGANIZATION: MO. DEPT. OF NAT. RESOURCES	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		Bro
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONSE TO CREEDON LETTER DATED ECTS 950330-14; ATTACHMENT INCLUDED.

Due Date: 950426	Routing Date: 950419	Date Originated: 950418	Mail Date:

STATE OF MISSOURI
Mel Carnahan, Governor • David A. Shorr, Director
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176 (314)751-4422
FAX (314)751-7627

FEDEX #4003777072

Please refer to this number
950419-19

April 18, 1995

Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon
General Counsel
The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

RE: 950330-14

Dear Ms. Creedon:

This is in response to your letter of March 31, 1995. I will restate your request and the appropriate response which follows.

Question: What environmental permits are required for construction and full operation of a Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) similar to that at Fort McClellan, using live-agent training, and at what point in construction, testing, or operation will each be required?

> **Response:** One permit is required for the CDTF for using live-agent training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. That permit has been issued. The permit is to construct an air source. No further permits are required. There are some requirements regarding testing included in the current permit. A copy of this permit is attached as Exhibit A.

Question: What environmental permits are required to institute open air smoke training at Fort Leonard Wood and at what point will each be required?

> **Response:** A preliminary determination to issue a permit for obscurant training at Fort Leonard Wood has been made. A 30-day public comment period began April 12, 1995. Anticipated final issuance date is the week of May 15, 1995. The permit requires specific monitoring and meteorological activities take place at Fort Leonard Wood and places certain restrictions regarding time of operation. In addition, provisions regarding monitoring of storm water from Fort Leonard

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in their NPDES permit issued April 11, 1995. Copies of these permits are attached as Exhibits B and C respectively.

Question: As of today, has the Army applied for any of these permits? When were these applications received?

Response: The agency was in the process of reviewing Water Pollution Control permit activities at Fort Leonard Wood at the time of the Department of Defense announcements and included monitoring requirements from four obscurant training locations in said review. Applications for air installations including CDTF and smoke school were received March 1, 1995 and deemed accepted on that date.

Question: Have any significant concerns or obstacles to issuance of any permit so far been identified? If so, what are they?

Response: Two permits have been issued and a third placed on public notice.

Question: If it is possible to estimate issuance dates, please do so.

Response: The air permit to construct for the CDTF was issued April 11, 1995. A NPDES permit for Fort Leonard Wood was issued April 11, 1995. A preliminary decision to issue a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit for smoke school related activities was announced April 11, 1995. It is estimated that that permit will come to conclusion the week of May 15, 1995.

Question: Is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit necessary for the Army to perform any function proposed for transfer to Fort Leonard Wood? If so, please identify the listed or characteristic wastes that would require permitting for storage or disposal.

Response: No Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit is necessary for the proposed mission transfer. An evaluation of waste streams is attached as Exhibit D. Pollution prevention activities regarding mask filters have eliminated the principal hazardous constituents. Current masks will be phased out prior to operations in Missouri (see Exhibit E).

Question: Has the Department received any correspondence from the public regarding the proposed CDTF at Fort Leonard Wood? If so, please indicate the nature of such comments.

> **Response:** As of March 31, 1995 two letters have been received regarding the CDTF. One included a copy of an article regarding the Army's Utah incinerator and the second requested additional information. Comment letters on the NPDES permit were received from the Missouri Sierra Club and were incorporated into the permit.

Question: On May 19, 1993, you wrote to Commission Chairman Jim Courter, responding to questions raised then about a similar DoD proposal. A copy of the letter is attached. Is that letter still accurate?

> **Response:** A principal change in our letter of May 19, 1993 relates to our presumption that a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit would be required for the CDTF. Due to pollution prevention activities on the part of the Department of Defense relating to air canisters, this is no longer necessary. Other presumptions are still intact.

I appreciated the chance to meet with you in Chicago. If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me at 314-751-4732.

Very truly yours,

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

David A. Shorr
Director

DAS/mjb

p:\wp51\david\creedon

STATE OF MISSOURI

EXHIBIT A

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION

PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT

Under the authority of RSMo 643 and the Federal Clean Air Act the applicant is authorized to construct the facility described below, in accordance with the laws, rules, and conditions as set forth herein.

Permit Number: 0495-013 Facility I.D. Number: 3860-0004-026

Owner: U.S. Army Engineering Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Owner's Address: ATZT-DPW-EE, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Facility Name: U.S. Army Engineering Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Facility Address: ATZT-DPW-EE, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Legal Description: Pulaski County, S21, T35N, R8W

Application for Authority to Construct was made for:

**** a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility and Thermal Treatment Unit. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (5), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." ****

☐ Special Conditions are not applicable to this permit.

☒ Special Conditions do apply to this permit and are listed as attachments starting on page 2.

April 10, 1995
EFFECTIVE DATE

John A. Young
DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

PERMIT NUMBER
0495-013

FACILITY I D NUMBER
3860-0004-026

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

The permittee is authorized to construct and operate subject to the following special conditions:

Materials Which May Not Be Charged to the Incinerator

a. No hazardous wastes may be charged to this incinerator. A waste is considered to be hazardous if, in order that it be charged to an incinerator, a permit from the Missouri Hazardous Waste Program would first be required in order that such a waste be charged to an incinerator.

b. Certain gas mask filters may not be charged to the incinerator because these filters contain levels of chromium sufficient to characterize the filters as a hazardous waste. Specifically, C2 filter masks, stock number 4240-01-119-2315 may not be charged to the incinerator.

Emission Limits:

a. Particulate matter (as PM_{10}) - 30 milligrams per dry standard cubic meter (0.013 grains per dry standard cubic foot).

b. Carbon monoxide - 50 parts per million by volume.

c. Dioxins/furans - 1.9 nanograms per dry standard cubic meter, toxic equivalency (1989 toxic equivalency factors).

d. Hydrogen chloride - 42 parts per million by volume or 97% reduction (9-hour average), whichever is more stringent.

e. Mercury - 0.47 milligrams per dry standard cubic meter (0.22 grains per million dry standard cubic feet) or 85% reduction, whichever is more stringent.

f. Nerve Agents - no detectable quantity of either GB (sarin) or VX. For purposes of determining a detectable level of either nerve agent, it shall be sufficient to use equipment which is at least as sensitive to GB (sarin) and VX as the gas chromatographs used in the automatic continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS) units located adjacent to the "hot areas" in the training building.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

The permittee is authorized to construct and operate subject to the following special conditions:

Performance Testing Conditions

a. Within 90 days of reaching full operation, but in no case later than 180 days after initial startup, an emission test shall be conducted in order to quantify air pollutant emissions. The stack test shall determine the emission rates of particulate matter (as PM_{10}), carbon monoxide, dioxins/furans, hydrogen chloride, mercury, and the nerve agents GB (sarin) and VX. A completed Proposed Test Plan Form (copy enclosed) will serve the purpose of notification and must be approved by the Air Pollution Control Program staff director prior to conducting emission testing.

b. The date on which performance tests are conducted must be pre-arranged with the Air Pollution Control Program (APCP) a minimum of 30 days prior to the proposed test date so that this Program may arrange a pretest meeting, if necessary, and assure that the test date is acceptable for an observer to be present. A completed Proposed Test Plan form enclosed may serve the purpose of notification and must be approved by the APCP prior to conducting the required emission testing.

c. Two copies of a written report of the performance test results shall be submitted to the Director of the Air Pollution Control Program within 30 days of completion of any required testing. The report must include legible copies of the raw data sheets, analytical instrument laboratory data, and complete sample calculations from the required EPA Test Methods for at least one sample run.

d. The test report is to fully account for all operational and emission parameters addressed both in the permit conditions as well as in any other applicable state or federal rules or regulations.

e. Performance testing shall be conducted under the condition of maximum process/production rate, or within ten per cent (10%) of this rated capacity. The process/production rate at which performance testing is conducted shall become the maximum process/production rate at which the incinerator is permitted to operate, under the authority granted by this permit.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

The permittee is authorized to construct and operate subject to the following special conditions:

f. Actual conditions under which performance testing is conducted shall be recorded every fifteen (15) minutes throughout each of the test runs. These conditions are to include all relevant process/production parameters as well as all parameters relating to the status of emission controls: this data is to be included in the emissions test report. No maintenance or upgrade of emission control efficiency shall be undertaken during emission testing.

g. Testing shall be conducted during periods of representative conditions at the maximum process/production rates, not to include periods of startup, shutdown, or malfunction.

h. Emission testing results, in "mass of pollutant/volume of air," shall be reported for the pollution source airstream, free from any extraneous source of dilution air. Potential dilution airstreams shall either be sealed off prior to testing or else be measured by appropriate EPA test Methods and subtracted from the total airflow at the sampling location. Failure to account for dilution air can lead to cancellation of testing and/or a violation notice for "circumvention."

i. The owner or operator shall provide, or cause to be provided, performance testing facilities as follows:

   i. Safe sampling platform(s).
   ii. Safe access to sampling platform(s).
   iii. Utilities for sampling and testing equipment.
   iv. Sampling ports adequate for test methods applicable to this facility. This includes:
      (1) Constructing the air pollution control system such that volumetric flow rates and pollutant emission rates can be accurately determined by applicable test methods and procedures;
      (2) Providing a stack or duct free of cyclonic flow during performance tests, and;
      (3) Removal of the port caps 24 hours prior to testing to verify both their removability as well as full-diameter clearance to the stack; caps may be retained hand tight.

PERMIT NUMBER

0495-013

FACILITY I D NUMBER

3860-0004-026

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

The permittee is authorized to construct and operate subject to the following special conditions:

j. Performance tests shall be conducted, and data reduced, in accordance with specified EPA Test Methods unless an equivalent or alternative test method is otherwise approved by the Director.

k. Unless otherwise specified, each performance test shall consist of three separate runs using the applicable test method. Each run shall be conducted for the time and under the conditions specified in the applicable standard.

l. For the purpose of determining compliance with applicable standards, the arithmetic mean of results of the three runs shall apply. Only, under rare circumstances and upon approval by the Director, may compliance be determined by the arithmetic mean of two runs.

PROPOSED TEST PLAN

Submitted to: MO Dept. of Natural Resources,
Air Pollution Control Program
P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102

Date Submitted: _____

Attention: _____

Proposed Test Date: _____

1.) FACILITY INFORMATION:		
Name:		
Address:		
City	State:	Zip:
Name & title of Contact Person:		
Phone No. of Contact Person:	Fax No.:	

2.) AIR POLLUTION SOURCE TO BE TESTED:				
Type of Source:				
Reason for Test:		Condition of Permit		Consent Agreement
		Administrative Order		
		Other (specify)		
Permit No. of Source to Be Tested:				
Address of Source:				
Directions to Source (or map attached):				
Initial Start-up Date:				

3.) TESTING FIRM INFORMATION:		
Name of Firm:		
Address:		
City	State:	Zip:
Name & title of Contact Person:		
Phone No. of Contact Person:	Fax No.:	
Number of employees of firm:		
No. of employees actually engaged in air pollution source testing:		
Organizational chart with names & title of personnel: (please attach)		

3.) TESTING FIRM INFORMATION: (cont.)	
Location & description of laboratory facilities:	
Subcontractor(s) utilized by firm for source testing activities:	
Number of air pollution sources previously tested by firm:	
Sources tested by firm in Missouri in past 3 years (source, test, date):	

4.) PERFORMANCE TEST INFORMATION:					
	Pollutant	No. of Sampling Points	Total Time per Test Run	No. of Test Runs	Test Method to be Used
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					

5.) GENERAL

A. Sampling Equipment Information:

The manufacturer and model of the sampling equipment to be used by the tester for the performance tests, along with a description of any equipment which may differ from that required by the specified method(s).

_____

_____

B. Test Procedures:

A description of any test procedures to be used in the conduct of the performance tests which may differ from the specified method(s).

_____

_____

NOTE: Deviations from EPA test methods observed during test procedures will not necessarily be corrected by agency observer and could result in agency rejection of test results.

C. Analytical Procedures:

A description of any analytical procedures which differ from the specified method(s).

_____

_____

D. Data Sheets:

A sample of all field data sheets which do not provide the data shown on the example sheets in 40 CFR 60 for the specified method(s).

E. Air Pollution Control Equipment:

Types and manufacturers of all control equipment:

_____

_____

Design or guarantee efficiency: _____

Design gas volume at full load (acfm): _____

Design pressure drop: _____

Maintenance schedule and method of recordkeeping: _____

6.) SPECIFIC: for Incinerators			
Provide a full description of the source operation, including as a minimum the following:			
A. Manufacturer and type of incinerator:			
B. Type of feed (batch, intermittent, continuous) and frequency:			
C. Design feed rate (lbs/hr, lbs/batch):			
D. Expected normal feed rate:			
E. Type of scales			
F. 24 hour operational flow scheme (ash removal, preheat, burn cycle, postheat, etc.):			
G. Type of fuel:			
H. Secondary chamber volume _____ (cubic feet) & sketch of chamber with inside dimensions:			
I. Type of secondary chamber temperature continuous chart recorder:			
J. Type(s) of waste and relative percentages:			
K. Hospital:	YES	NO	Licensed No. of Beds:
Average bed occupancy:			

7.) CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM
A description of continuous monitoring system(s) including the following:
A. Manufacturer of each monitor:
B. Model number and serial number of each monitor:
C. Description of interface system (for extractive monitors):
D. Description of data acquisition and handling system:
E. Number of copies of operator's manual supplied with each monitor:
F. Name of testing firm that will perform the reference method tests for sulfur dioxide and/or nitrogen oxides during the continuous monitoring system performance evaluations:
G. Name of organization that will perform the continuous monitoring system performance evaluations (Source operator, monitoring system manufacturer or representative, or testing firm):
H. Anticipated starting date of the conditioning period for the monitoring systems:
I. Drawing of the monitoring system location(s) showing stack or duct dimensions, air pollution control equipment, fans, and location(s) of disturbances which affect monitor location(s) determination (May be shown on drawing required on Preliminary Test Method Page or attach to this document).

SOURCE TESTING REPORT FORMAT

COVER
- Plant name and location
- Source sampled
- Testing company or agency, name, and address

CERTIFICATION
- Certification by team leader
- Certification by reviewer (e.g.: Professional Engineer)

INTRODUCTION
- Test purpose
- Test location, type of process
- Test dates
- Pollutants tested
- Observers' names (industry and agency)
- Any other important background information

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
- Emission results
- Process data, as related to determination of compliance
- Allowable emissions
- Description of collected samples
- Visible emissions summary
- Discussion of errors, both real and apparent

SOURCE OPERATION
- Description of process and control device
- Process and control equipment flow diagram
- Process data and results, with example calculations
- Representatives of raw materials and products
- Any specially required operation demonstrated

SAMPLING and ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
- Sampling port location and dimensioned cross section
- Sampling port description, including labeling system
- Sampling train description
- Brief description of sampling procedures, with discussion of deviations from standard methods
- Brief description of analytical procedures, with discussion of deviations from standard methods

APPENDIX
- Complete results with example calculations
- Raw field data (original, not computer printouts)
- Laboratory report, with chain of custody
- Test log
- Calibration procedures and results
- Project participants and titles
- Related correspondence

REVIEW OF APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE
SECTION (5) REVIEW
Project/Facility No: 3860-0004-026
Permit No:

U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Leonard Wood
ATZT-DPW-EE
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Complete: March 1, 1995
Reviewed: March 28, 1995

Pulaski County, S21, T35N, R8W

REVIEW SUMMARY

- This is a de minimis addition to an existing major source, and is reviewed in accordance with Section (5), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, *Construction Permits Required.*
- No adverse ambient air quality impact is expected to occur as a result of the operation of the proposed training facility.
- Hazardous air pollutants will be emitted from the incinerator, though in minute amounts. No nerve agents will be emitted from this training facility, as the training exercises themselves, in association with the incinerator, insure that these agents are neutralized.
- There are no New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) or National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant (NESHAP) standards which will apply to this training facility.
- Approval of this permit application is recommended.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The U.S. Army Engineering Center and Fort Leonard Wood has applied for authority to install a Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) at its facility in Pulaski County. The CDTF will include a hot training area, an incinerator for disposing of training wastes, a standby package boiler, and a 600 kW standby electrical generator. The facility will be used to train army personnel on the identification, handling and decontamination of vehicles and other equipment tainted with nerve agents. As part of the training, instructors will contaminate various pieces of equipment with drops of nerve agents, which will be applied with a syringe. The soldiers will then identify and decontaminate the equipment using decontamination agents and water. The debris from the training, which can include nerve agents, wastewater, uniforms and cleaning materials,

will be burned in the incinerator. The nerve agents involved are binary agents, requiring the mixing of two separate compounds to produce the nerve agents. The binary agents themselves are kept in separate, guarded, locked areas.

The nerve agents which will be used in the training are GB (sarin) and VX. Sarin is a colorless liquid with a vapor pressure of 2.9 mm Hg @ 25°C, a vapor density of 4.86, and a volatility of 22,000 mg/m3 @ 25°C. VX is an odorless amber colored liquid similar in appearance to motor oil. It has a vapor pressure of 0.0007 mm Hg @ 25°C, a vapor density of 9.2, and a volatility of 10.5 mg/m3 @ 25°C. Both of these agents volatilize readily, and being heavier than air, stay low to the ground. Both agents are highly toxic. Both agents degrade readily and rapidly in the presence of caustic agents.

The building in which the training is conducted is constructed as a "building within a building." The training building is functionally divided into a hot area and a cold area. The hot area is where the nerve agents are used, while the cold area is kept uncontaminated. The hot training area is divided into eight functionally separate areas, with each area kept under negative pressure and vented through filter trains made up of prefilters, activated carbon absorption systems and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. All hot areas are assumed to have air contaminated with nerve agents and chemical decontaminants. The hot area ventilating system is designed to maintain a negative pressure in the hot areas with respect to the cold areas of the building. The pressure in the hot areas varies with expected contamination levels, being least negative in areas adjacent to the cold areas, and becoming increasingly negative from front to rear of the hot area to force any air infiltration to flow from cold areas to hot areas. The air in each zone is exhausted through two sets of HEPA and activated carbon filters for redundancy in each filter train. Each of the filter trains is independent, and has a cross-sectional area sized for its design air flow. Seven automatic continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS) units will be located adjacent to hot areas in the training building. Each ACAMS unit consists of an air pump (1 liter/minute) and two gas chromatographs, one monitoring for sarin and the other monitoring for VX. Nerve agent concentrations are continuously recorded on a strip chart. If either nerve agent is detected at levels equal to or greater then occupationally safe levels established by the Surgeon General, then alarms are triggered on the monitor itself, and in the building control room. The alarm levels are 0.01 ng/l (nanogram/liter) for VX and 0.1 ng/l for sarin. All ACAMS units are backed up by the M43/M43A2 Chemical Agent Detector connected to a M8 Chemical Agent Alarm. This system has a sensitivity of 400 ng/l for VX and 200 ng/l for sarin. The detectors are based on electrochemical (M43 detectors) or ion mobility (M43A2 detectors) technology. In addition to the ACAMS, a Depot Air Monitoring System (DAMS) will be used to monitor for nerve agent air concentrations. The DAMS consist of an air pump (1 liter/minute) and a porous polymer filled tube. Air monitoring will be conducted by pumping air (40 liters total) through the DAMS tube followed by CDTF laboratory analysis of the sorbent. The DAMS monitors are twice as sensitive as the ACAMS units. This system insures that there is no chance that nerve agents will escape the building.

The incinerator is a Midland Ross Pyrobatch model forced draft, batch type, dual chamber unit. It has a rated design capacity of 125 pounds per hour of solid waste; the maximum design heat

release rate is 4,610 BTU/lb. The emissions from the incinerator are ducted through a rich fume reactor, a venturi scrubber, and a packed tower scrubber. A package boiler with a rated heat input capacity of 31.25 MMBTU/hr, fired with No. 2 fuel oil, is associated with the incinerator. The steam from this package boiler is used for space heat and process heat. The standby package boiler is fired with No. 2 distillate fuel, and has a rated heat input capacity of 6.25 MMBTU/hr. The 600kW standby generator uses a reciprocating engine, and is also fired with No. 2 fuel oil.

Fort Leonard Wood has stated in the application that the incinerator will (1) have an operable door lockout mechanism, (2) will be equipped with a continuous chart recorder which will monitor and record the temperature in the secondary chamber (to an accuracy of ±2%), (3) will keep complete paper records of operators on duty, emission tests performed, incinerator maintenance, combustion chamber temperatures and the quantity, type, and suppliers of any off-site waste which is incinerated, (4) will provide training to all incinerator operators, said training to include basic combustion theory, operating procedures, monitoring of combustion control parameters of the incinerator, and all emergency procedures to be followed if the incinerator should malfunction or exceed operating parameters, and (5) will stack test the incinerator within 90 days of reaching full operation in order to determine combustion efficiency and particulate emission rate. In view of the nature of materials incinerated at this facility, additional testing will be required to demonstrate that the incinerator will operate safely.

EMISSIONS/CONTROLS EVALUATION

Emissions are calculated using emissions factors from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency document AP-42, *Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors,* and from information supplied by the applicant. Emissions calculations are detailed in an appendix to this report. Potential emissions from the operation of this facility are listed in the following table. Potential emissions are calculated based on the operation of the facility for 8,760 hours per year, with all controls in place and operational. Potential emissions from this facility are below the deminimis emissions levels for all pollutants.

CDTF Decontamination Facility		
Pollutant	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
PM_{10}	0.28	1.12
Sulfur Dioxide	1.59	7.00
Nitrogen Oxides	7.72	33.71
Carbon Monoxide	3.24	14.36
Volatile Organic Compounds	0.34	1.48
Lead	0.004600	0.020000
Hydrochloric Acid	0.032000	0.142000
Total PCB	0.000001	0.000002

CDTF Decontamination Facility		
Pollutant	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
Antimony	0.000800	0.003500
Arsenic	0.000015	0.000070
Beryllium	0.000001	0.000002
Cadmium	0.000300	0.001500
Chromium	0.000048	0.000212
Manganese	0.000035	0.000160
Mercury	0.006690	0.029290
Nickel	0.000037	0.000162
Hydrogen Fluoride	0.001443	0.006322
Chlorine	0.001017	0.004500
TCDD	0.00000006	0.00000027
HxCDD	0.0000000001	0.0000000005
HpCDD	0.0000000003	0.0000000014
OCDD	0.0000000014	0.0000000100
Total CDD	0.00000133	0.00000583
TCDF	0.00000045	0.00000197
PcCDF	0.0000000002	0.0000000010
HxCDF	0.0000000011	0.0000000050
HpCDF	0.0000000013	0.0000000100
OCDF	0.0000000046	0.0000000200
Total CDF	0.00000447	0.00001957

PERMIT RULE APPLICABILITY

This permit review was conducted in accordance with Section (5), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, *Construction Permits Required.*

APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS

I. Installation Level: U.S. Army Engineering Center, Fort Leonard Wood

A. General

1. Applicable Requirements: Submission of Emission Data, Emission Fees and Process Information
   a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.110
   b. Payment of Fees: $25.70 per ton of pollutant as of 1994
   c. Recordkeeping Requirement: Emissions Inventory Questionnaire (EIQ)
   d. Reporting Requirement: April 1 for previous year's emissions (EIQ)

2. Applicable Requirements: Operating Permits
   a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.065
   b. Emission Limitation: none
   c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
   d. Monitoring Requirement: none
   e. Reporting Requirement: none

B. Visible Emissions

1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emission of Visible Air Contaminants
   a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.080
   b. Emission Limitation: Emissions may not exceed an opacity of 20%
   c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
   d. Monitoring Requirement: Visual Inspection, EPA Method 9
   e. Reporting Requirement: none

C. Odors

1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emission of Odors
   a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.090
   b. Emission Limitation: Odorous matter may not be emitted in concentrations and frequencies or for durations where odor can be perceived when one volume of odorous air is diluted with seven volumes of odor-free air
   c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
   d. Monitoring Requirement: Measurements made with a scentometer as manufactured by the Barneby-Cheney Company, or similar technique that will give equivalent results
   e. Reporting Requirement: none

II. Emission Point Level: CDTF Decontamination Incinerator

A. Particulate Matter

1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emissions of Particulate Matter from Industrial Processes
   a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.050

b. Emission Limitation: 5.78 pounds per hour. The incinerator emissions are expected to be approximately 0.73 pounds per hour, which will be in compliance with this rule.
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
d. Monitoring Requirement: none
e. Reporting Requirement: none

B. Sulfur Dioxide
1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emission of Sulfur Compounds
a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.100
b. Emission Limitation: Gases emitted from the incinerator shall not contain sulfur compounds in concentrations in excess of 500 parts per million by volume (ppmv). The incinerator exhaust gas is expected to have a sulfur concentration of 14.8 ppmv, which will be in compliance with this rule.
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
d. Monitoring Requirement: none
e. Reporting Requirement: none

III. Emission Point Level: Standby Package Boiler
A. Particulate Matter
1. Applicable Requirements: Maximum Allowable Emissions of Particulate Matter From Fuel Burning Equipment Used for Indirect Heating
a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.060
b. Emission Limitation: 3.75 pounds per hour. The boiler emissions are expected to be approximately 0.3 pounds per hour, which will be in compliance with this rule.
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
d. Monitoring Requirement: none
e. Reporting Requirement: none

B. Sulfur Dioxide
1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emissions of Sulfur Compounds From Indirect Heating Sources
a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.150
b. Emission Limitation: 8 lbs/MMBTU, equivalent to 250 pounds per hour of sulfur dioxide. The boiler emissions are expected to be 0.3 pounds per hour, which will be in compliance with this rule.
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
d. Monitoring Requirement: none
e. Reporting Requirement: none

IV. Emission Point Level: 600 kW Standby Generator
A. Sulfur Dioxide
1. Applicable Requirements: Restriction of Emission of Sulfur Compounds

a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-3.100
b. Emission Limitation: Gases emitted from the generator shall not contain sulfur compounds in concentrations in excess of 500 parts per million by volume (ppmv). The generator exhaust gas is expected to have a sulfur concentration of 18 ppmv, which will be in compliance with this rule.
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: none
d. Monitoring Requirement: none
e. Reporting Requirement: none

AMBIENT AIR QUALITY IMPACT ANALYSIS

Because of the nature of the mission of this facility, ambient air quality modeling was performed. The model chosen is a highly conservative model, meaning that it tends to overestimate actual ambient impacts. Ambient impacts are given as 1-hour averages. Modeling results are detailed in the following table.

CDTF Decontamination Facility				
Pollutant	Ambient Impact ($\mu g/m^3$)		Ambient Standard ($\mu g/m^3$)	
PM_{10}	0.58	24-hr	150.00	24-hr
Sulfur Dioxide	8.82	1-hr	1300.00	3-hr
Nitrogen Oxides	17.36	24-hr	100.00	annual
Carbon Monoxide	18.13	1-hr	40000.00	1-hr
Volatile Organic Compounds	1.88	1-hr	235.00	1-hr
Lead	0.0100	1-hr	1.50	quarterly

CDTF Decontamination Facility				
Pollutant	Ambient Impact ($\mu g/m^3$)		Acceptable Ambient Level ($\mu g/m^3$)	
Antimony	0.0046	1-hr	6.67	8-hr
Arsenic	0.0001	1-hr	0.03	8-hr
Beryllium	0.000004	1-hr	30.00	8-hr
Cadmium	0.0020	1-hr	50.00	8-hr
Chromium	0.0003	1-hr	1.36	24-hr
Manganese	0.0002	1-hr	0.89	8-hr
Mercury	0.0027	8-hr	0.01	8-hr
Nickel	0.0002	8-hr	1.33	8-hr
Hydrogen Fluoride	0.0033	24-hr	0.68	24-hr

CDTF Decontamination Facility				
Pollutant	Ambient Impact ($\mu g/m^3$)		Acceptable Ambient Level ($\mu g/m^3$)	
Chlorine	0.0024	1-hr	3.95	24-hr
TCDD	0.00000040	1-hr	no standard	
HxCDD	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
HpCDD	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
OCDD	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
Total CDD	0.00003700	1-hr	no standard	
TCDF	0.00000260	1-hr	no standard	
PcCDF	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
HxCDF	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
HpCDF	0.00000001	1-hr	no standard	
OCDF	0.00000003	1-hr	no standard	
Total CDF	0.00002600	1-hr	no standard	

The modeled values in the table above are taken at the point of highest impact, just under 300 meters downwind of the facility. All ambient impacts are below the applicable impact standards; where the table states "no standard," this simply means that acceptable ambient levels have not been determined by this program - it does not mean that these compounds are non-hazardous.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

On the basis of this review conducted in accordance with Section (5), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, *Construction Permits Required*, approval of this permit, with conditions, is recommended.

Michael J. Stansfield, P.E.
Environmental Engineer

31 March 95
Date

Daniel D. Carney
Environmental Engineer

31 March 95
Date

ATTACHMENTS

EMISSIONS CALCULATIONS

600kW Standby Generator

This generator is designed to keep the hot area ventilation system and the incinerator system in operation in the event of a power failure. Emission factors for calculating the emissions from this standby generator are from Section 3.4 of AP-42, *Large Stationary Diesel and All Stationary Dual Fuel Engines.* This section covers those engines larger than 600hp. The Source Classification Code (SCC) used is 20200401 for large bore internal combustion diesel engines. Emissions are estimated to be:

600kW Standby Generator			
Pollutant	Emission Factor (lb/MMBTU)	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
PM_{10}	0.0496	0.1	0.4
Sulfur Dioxide	0.51	1	4.3
Nitrogen Oxides	3.1	6	26.2
Carbon Monoxide	0.81	1.6	6.9
Volatile Organic Compounds	0.1	0.2	0.9

Standby Package Boiler

Emissions factors for calculating the emissions from this standby package boiler are from Section 1.3 of AP-42, *Fuel Oil Combustion.* The maximum design heat input rate for this boiler is 6.25 MMBTU/hr. Emissions are estimated to be:

Standby Package Boiler			
Pollutant	Emission Factor ($lb/10^3$ gallon)	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
PM_{10}	2	0.1	0.4
Sulfur Dioxide	7.1	0.3	1.4
Nitrogen Oxides	20	0.9	3.9
Carbon Monoxide	5	0.2	1
Volatile Organic Compounds	0.34	0.02	0.1

Decontamination Incinerator

The incinerator is a Pyrobatch System two chamber design, and will burn Type 0 (solid) and Type 5 (liquid) wastes. It is a batch type incinerator, using a forced, induced draft. The primary chamber volume is 378 cubic feet, and is fitted with a 2.594 MMBTU/hr burner. The secondary chamber volume is 1010 cubic feet, and is fitted with a 25.778 MMBTU/hr burner. The army

estimates that approximately 250,000 pounds per year of Type 0 waste, and 6,225,000 pounds of Type 5 waste will be incinerated annually. A typical daily load to the incinerator, from army records at the Fort McClellan site, will include:

Typical Daily Incinerator Loading			
Description	# of bags	Weight (lbs)	Volume (ft^3)
Wet sludge in plastic lined fiber drums	1	180	3.5
Chemistry Lab Trash	1	25	5
Training Bay Trash	4	100	20
Medical Lab Trash	1	15	5
Laundry Trash	1	15	5
Office & Classroom Trash	4	60	20
Grounds Trash	1	25	5
Carbon Filters in PVC bags	2	448.4	18
Extra PVC bags	5	20	5
Hoods, Boots & Gloves	1	6	1
Overgarments (Hoods, Boots & Gloves)	1	8	1
Overgarments	6	80	30
Gas Mask Filters	1	18	1
Totals	29	1000.4	122.5

A further description of each of the above categories is given below:

Garbage Composition	Details
Wet Sludge	95% water, 2% solids, 3% drumpaper + PVC bag
Chemistry Lab Trash	20% glass, 10% metal, 20% rags, 50% paper + PVC bags
Training Bay Trash	10% glass, 10% metal, 40% rags, 40% paper + PVC bags
Medical Lab Trash	40% plastic, 30% paper, 30% rags + PVC bags
Laundry Trash	50% cloth, 50% paper + PVC bags
Office & Classroom Trash	100% paper + PVC bags
Grounds Trash	30% paper, 30% plastic, 20% glass, 20% metal + PVC bags
Carbon Filters in PVC bags	28% water, 35% metal, 39% carbon + PVC bags
PVC bags	100% PVC
Hoods, Boots & Gloves	100% rubberized material + PVC bags
Hoods, Boots & Gloves from Overgarments	100% rubberized material + PVC bags
Overgarments	100% rubberized material + PVC bags

Gas Mask Filters	inerts 30%, 30% carbon, 20% metal, 20% plastic + PVC bags

The gas mask filters canisters which may be charged to the incinerator do not include the old C2 filter canister, stock number 4240-01-119-2315, which is no longer in production; the Army estimates that its existing stocks of this item will be exhausted by October 1995. This gas mask filter canister has been replaced by the C2A1 filter canister, stock number 4240-01-361-1319. While the C2A1 filter canister is currently in the supply system, it will not be issued until the residual supply of C2 canisters is exhausted from the supply system.

Solid wastes are introduced into the primary chamber at a maximum rate of 125 pounds per hour. Liquid wastes are introduced into the secondary chamber, identified on process flow diagram as a rich fume reactor, at a maximum rate of 3,130 pounds per hour. The emissions from the incinerator are ducted through a venturi scrubber and packed tower scrubber connected in series. Control efficiencies claimed in the application are 94.95% for TSP and lead, 90.96% for PM_{10}, and 84.5% for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide. The incinerator is expected to operate 8 hours per day, 250 days year. The incinerator has associated with it an external combustion boiler with a rated heat input of 34.6 MMBTU/hr, and fired with distillate oil at the rate of 247 gallons per hour. Acid gas concentrations of hydrogen chloride (HCl) and sulfur dioxide (SO_2) in the exhaust gas stream are directly related to the chlorine and sulfur content of the waste. Most of the chlorine will be converted to HCl. The packed tower is categorized as a medium-energy scrubber, and relies on impingement to facilitate removal of either particulate matter or acid gases. The venturi scrubber is categorized as a high-energy system, and is used primarily for control of particulate matter. The design outlet concentration for particulate matter is 0.09 grains/ascf. Parameters monitors by instrumentation affixed to the incinerator will include carbon monoxide, primary and secondary chamber temperatures, pH and flow of scrubbing brine, liquid waste feed rate, combustion gas velocity, and exhaust gas CO concentration in ppm.

The emissions factors chosen are from Sections 1.3 and 2.6 of AP-42, *Fuel Oil Combustion* and *Medical Waste Incineration.* Section 2.6 was chosen as being most representative of the types of wastes to be disposed of in the incinerator. While it is recognized that there will be little or no pathological wastes disposed of through the incinerator, the wastes which will be processed will be high in chlorine content, and will contain quantities of wastewater and cleaning materials including masks, gloves, suits, and boots, which are also present in medical wastes. For purposes of estimating emissions from the incinerator, only the weight of solid wastes are considered, since the wastewater is almost exclusively water contaminated with bleach and the nerve agents. While the nerve agents are toxic, they also decompose very rapidly at the temperatures encountered in the incinerator.

CDTF Thermal Treatment Waste Heat Boiler			
Pollutant	Emission Factor ($lb/10^3$ gallon)	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
PM_{10}	2	0.05	0.2
Sulfur Dioxide	7.1	0.27	1.2
Nitrogen Oxides	20	0.77	3.4
Carbon Monoxide	5	1.2	5.4
Volatile Organic Compounds	0.34	0.1	0.4

CDTF Incinerator			
Pollutant	Emission Factor (lb/ton)	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
PM_{10}	4.67	0.03	0.12
Sulfur Dioxide	2.17	0.02	0.09
Nitrogen Oxides	4.95	0.05	0.21
Carbon Monoxide	3.86	0.24	1.06
Volatile Organic Compounds	0.299	0.02	0.08
Lead	0.073	0.004563	0.019984
Hydrochloric Acid	3.35	0.032453	0.142145
Total PCB	0.0000465	0.000000	0.000002
Antimony	0.0128	0.000800	0.003504
Arsenic	0.000242	0.000015	0.000066
Beryllium	0.00000625	0.000000	0.000002
Cadmium	0.00548	0.000343	0.001500
Chromium	0.000775	0.000048	0.000212
Manganese	0.000567	0.000035	0.000155
Mercury	0.107	0.006688	0.029291
Nickel	0.00059	0.000037	0.000162
Hydrogen Fluoride	0.149	0.001443	0.006322
Chlorine	0.105	0.001017	0.004455
TCDD	0.000001	0.00000006	0.00000027

CDTF Incinerator			
Pollutant	Emission Factor (lb/ton)	Hourly Emissions (lbs/hr)	Annual Emission (tons/yr)
HxCDD	0.000000002	0.0000000001	0.0000000005
HpCDD	0.000000005	0.0000000003	0.0000000014
OCDD	0.000000022	0.0000000014	0.0000000060
Total CDD	0.0000213	0.00000133	0.00000583
TCDF	0.00000721	0.00000045	0.00000197
PcCDF	0.000000003	0.0000000002	0.0000000008
HxCDF	0.000000017	0.0000000011	0.0000000047
HpCDF	0.00000002	0.0000000013	0.0000000055
OCDF	0.000000074	0.0000000046	0.0000000203
Total CDF	0.0000715	0.00000447	0.00001957

EXHIBIT B

3860-0004-015

U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

Department of Defense

U. S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood

ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N, R10, 11, 12W

**** Permission to construct a static and mobile fog oil smoke training facility. This review was conducted in accordance with Section (8), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required." ****

Proposed Draft Air Permit
Ft. Leonard Wood Smoke Training
April 11, 1995

Emissions Limitations

1. *Annual Throughput*. Fort Leonard Wood (the "Permittee") shall process no more than 65,000 gallons of SGF-2 fog oil during any 12-month period. This total shall include the fog oil used in the mobile (valley) operations and the static (introductory) operations.

2. *Daily Throughput*. The Permittee shall process no more than 3700 pounds of SGF-2 fog oil during any 24-hour period. This total shall include the fog oil used in the mobile (valley) operations and the static (introductory) operations.

3. *Emissions Limitation*. The Permittee shall not emit PM_{10} at a rate in excess of 2600 pounds per hour. This rate corresponds to processing fog oil at 3700 pounds per hour with a particulate conversion factor of 70%.

4. *Recordkeeping*. The Permittee shall record the amount of fog oil processed by the smoke generators during the previous month and the previous twelve months. During any month in which smoke training occurs, the Permittee shall record daily and hourly consumption of fog oil. The Permittee shall maintain said records and provide them to APCP personnel on request.

5. *Reporting of Violations*. The Permittee shall report to the Enforcement Section, Air Pollution Control Program (APCP), no later than ten days after the end of each month during which the preceding 12-month cumulative total of fog oil processed exceeds 65,000 gallons of fog oil (Condition Number 1).

6. *Reporting of Violations*. The Permittee shall report to the Enforcement Section, APCP, no later than ten days after an

exceedance of the 3700 pound daily limit of fog oil (Condition 2).

Ambient Air Monitoring

7. *Quality Assurance Project Plan*. The Permittee shall file two copies of a Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) within 90 days of issuance of this permit for approval by the Staff Director, APCP. The QAPP shall describe the method and manner for collecting air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone required by this permit.

8. *Pre-Startup Monitoring*. The Permittee shall collect at least one year of continuous air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone at locations to be determined by the APCP beginning as soon as possible after this permit is issued. Collection of monitoring data shall begin no later than eighteen months immediately prior to the beginning of smoke training. Ozone monitoring is only required from April 1 through October 31.

9. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall submit to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the air quality monitoring data collected pursuant to Condition 8.

10. *Post-Startup Monitoring*. The Permittee shall collect at least two years of continuous air quality monitoring data for PM_{10} and ozone at locations to be determined by the APCP beginning after smoke training begins. Ozone monitoring is only required from April 1 through October 31.

11. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall submit to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the air quality monitoring data collected pursuant to Condition 10.

Meteorological Monitoring

12. *Observers*. At all times during the operation of the smoke generators, a network of observers shall be stationed at locations from which they can observe whether smoke crosses the Fort Leonard Wood property boundary. The observers shall maintain continuous electronic or visual communications with the smoke generator operators.

13. *Meteorological Monitoring*. For the entire period beginning no less than one hour prior to generating smoke and ending no less than one hour after ceasing generating smoke, the Permittee shall measure and record no less frequently than hourly (including the beginning and ending conditions) on-site meteorological data including ambient air temperature, atmospheric pressure, relative humidity, atmospheric stability, mixing height, and wind speed and direction.

14. *Limitations on Operations*. Smoke training shall only be conducted at the locations and under the meteorological conditions as outlined in Attachment A.

15. *Forecasting Acceptable Conditions*. Smoke training may take place only if the Permittee forecasts no earlier than two hours prior to commencement of smoke training that the meteorological conditions of Attachment A will exist during smoke.

16. *Prohibitions*. Generation of smoke shall cease if:

    a) Meteorological conditions are not within the conditions approved for smoke training as described in Attachment A, or

    b) Visible smoke drifts beyond the Fort Leonard Wood

property boundary, or

c) Under other conditions as may be determined by the Director.

Soil and Vegetation Sampling

17. *Soil and Vegetation Sampling Plan (SVSP)*. Within 180 days of the issuance of this permit, the Permittee shall submit two copies of a SVSP to the APCP for review and approval. The SVSP shall describe the method and manner of collecting and analyzing soil and vegetation samples and of monitoring the impact of smoke training activities on soils and vegetation.

18. *Pre-Startup Sampling*. For no less than one year prior to the commencement of smoke training, the Permittee shall collect and analyze soil and vegetation samples no less frequently than quarterly at each location described in Attachment A. The Permittee shall comply with the sampling and monitoring conditions of Missouri State Operating Permit No. MO-0117251 granted by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Missouri Clean Water Commission.

19. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall report the results of the sampling and analysis required by Condition 18 to the APCP within 60 days of the date the samples are collected.

20. *Post-Startup Sampling*. Upon commencement of smoke training, the Permittee shall collect and analyze soil and vegetation samples no less frequently than monthly at each location described in Attachment A. After two years of sampling, the Permittee may petition the Director, APCP, for modification of the sampling schedule and frequency.

21. *Reporting*. The Permittee shall report to the APCP no less frequently than quarterly the soil and vegetation sampling data collected pursuant to Condition 20.

Other Special Conditions

22. *Record Retention*. All records required by this permit shall be maintained and available for inspection by MDNR personnel for no less than five years from the date the record is created.

23. *Public Information*. The Permittee shall cooperate with the APCP in presenting the air quality monitoring data of Condition 8 to the public at an informational meeting to be convened by the APCP. If the data does not substantially conform with the assumptions and conclusions of air quality modelling or if the smoke training is shown to cause or contribute to a violation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), the Director may require the Permittee to take corrective action or may revoke the permit.

24. *Corrective Action*. If in the opinion of the Director, APCP, the presence of PM_{10} in the ambient air exists in quantities and durations that directly or proximately cause or contribute to injury to human, plant, or animal life or health, or to property, or that unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of life or the use of property, the Director, APCP, may require the Permittee to submit a corrective action plan adequate to timely and significantly mitigate the emission of PM_{10}. The Permittee shall implement any such plan immediately upon its approval by the Director, APCP. Failure to either submit or implement such a plan shall be a violation of the permit.

Attachment A
Wind Directions during Smoke Training+

Site	A Stability	B Stability	C Stability	D Stability	E* Stability
Musgrave	130 - 220	I50 - 220	160 - 215	170-215(1)	150 - 225
Ballard	340 - 35	340 - 35	340 - 35	350 - 35	340 - 35
Mush Paddle	195 - 275	195 - 275	195 - 270	195 - 240(2)	195 - 270
Bailey	All direction except 120 deg.	340 - 40 175 - 325	340 - 40 175 - 325	None	230 -240

(1) 45 minute limit for wind directions 190 - 210 degrees
(2) 45 minute limit for wind directions 220 - 240 degrees
\+ A 3 minute exclusion is requested
* A-D stabilities are not restricted based on wind speed, however, E stability is limited to wind speeds of 4 m/s and greater.

PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION
April 11, 1995

REVIEW OF APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE
SECTION (8) REVIEW
Project/Facility No: 3860-0004-015
Permit No:

U. S. Army Engineer Center
Fort Leonard Wood
ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Complete: March 31, 1995
Reviewed: April 10, 1995

Parent Company:
U. S. Army Engineer Center
Fort Leonard Wood
ATTN: ATZT-DPW-EE
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Pulaski County, All or parts of T33, 34, 35N,
R10, 11, 12W

REVIEW SUMMARY

- This review is conducted in accordance with Section (8) of Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Permits Required"
- Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations apply to this facility
- Emissions of particulate matter less than ten microns (PM_{10}) at the facility will be greater than 15 tons per year; therefore, this is a major modification at a major facility.
- No Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPS) are emitted in this process
- No federal New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) or National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) apply to this operation
- Special conditions are imposed by this permit

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Fort Leonard Wood (the "Applicant") is an existing major source and has applied for permission to operate an obscurant (smoke) training school. The smoke training school will use M3A3 smoke generators (or equivalent) to train soldiers in the operation of

the smoke generators and in the tactical use of obscurants during simulated battlefield operations.

To generate the smoke, SGF-2 fog oil (a hydrotreated heavy naphthenic petroleum distillate mineral oil) is vaporized, recondensed, and dispersed into the air. The fog oil is emitted as liquid droplets with diameters of 0.5 to 1.0 micron. This diameter size is close to the wavelength of visible light, making this oil the choice for smoke training.

The M3A3 smoke generators are driven by gasoline-powered pulse jet engines. Each generator consumes 4 gallons of unleaded gasoline per hour and processes 40 gallons of fog oil per hour.

There will typically be about 12 generators operating each time the training is conducted. However, there will be no limitations on the number of generators; rather, limits are imposed on the amount of fog oil which may be processed. The smoke training will occur at several sites at Fort Leonard Wood. Smoke training can not be used at some sites during certain meteorological conditions because such conditions could cause an exceedance of the PM_{10} ambient air quality standards (10 CSR 10-6.010, "Ambient Air Quality Standards") or the ambient air increment (10 CSR 10-6.060(11)(A), "Table 1 — Ambient Air Increment Table").

The air quality impact due to the smoke training is evaluated by considering the fog oil as a VOC (volatile organic compound) and as PM_{10}. There is no ambient air quality standard for VOCs. In lieu of preapplication air quality analysis, pre- and post-operation ambient air monitoring for ozone will be required.

The air ambient quality impact of the emission of PM_{10} is evaluated using the ambient air quality model ISC2 (Industrial Source Complex), draft version dated December 6, 1994. This version of ISC2 is recommended by the EPA for use in this study to estimate the effect on the ambient air quality of the operation of equipment which emits air contaminants. This permit has conditions that prohibit smoke training operations at those locations when meteorological conditions exist that could cause an exceedance of the PM_{10} National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or the PM_{10} increment. The constraints have been developed based on wind direction, atmospheric stability, and distance from the site to the property line. Attachment A describes the acceptable sites under various meteorological conditions. Fort Leonard Wood agrees to maintain a minimum of 3 kilometers visibility at property boundary as related to the

smoke training school.

The total amount of fog oil processed by the smoke generators is limited to 65,000 gallons during any 12-month period. Since this construction triggers the federal PSD regulations, a BACT (Best Available Control Technology) analysis must be performed. Adding a PM_{10} control device to the smoke generators would defeat the purpose of the mission. Other smoke generation systems were evaluated, and the proposed method is the most feasible.

EMISSIONS/CONTROLS EVALUATION

Most of the fog oil will disperse as PM_{10}, but some will evaporate as VOC. According to information provided by the applicant, 30% of the fog oil will evaporate before reaching the property boundary.

Additional emissions are expected from the combustion of gasoline in the pulse-jet engines. Emission rates for the combustion of gasoline from the smoke generators are calculated using emission factors from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency document AP-42, "Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors: Volume II: Mobile Sources," and from Material Safety Data Sheets supplied by Ft. Leonard Wood.

Table 1 below lists the annual emissions expected when Fort Leonard Wood vaporizes 65,000 gallons of fog oil, including the combustion of unleaded gasoline in the pulse-jet engine.

Table 1: Pollutants Emissions in Tons per Year

	VOC	PM_{10}	SO_2	NO_x	CO
Fog Oil	250	175	0.0	0.0	0.0
Combustion	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	11.3
Totals	251	175	0.0	0.2	11.3

PERMIT RULE APPLICABILITY

This PSD review is conducted under Section (8) of Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Permits Required." Compliance with this section of the rule means that the proposed source will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of ambient air

quality standards, will not cause or contribute to ambient air concentrations in excess of any applicable maximum allowable increase as listed in 10 CSR 10-6.060 Subsection (11)(A) Table 1, will not violate any applicable emission control regulations or the Air Conservation Law, and will not cause an adverse impact on visibility in any Class 1 area.

APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS

I. Installation Level: Fort Leonard Wood
   A. General
      1. Applicable Requirements: Submission of Emission Data, Emission Fees and Process Information
         a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.110
         b. Emission Limitation: $25.70 per ton of pollutant
         c. Recordkeeping Requirement: Emissions Inventory Questionnaire (EIQ)
         d. Reporting Requirement: April 1 for previous year's emissions (EIQ)
      2. Applicable Requirements: Operating Permits
         a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.065
         b. Emission Limitation: None
         c. Recordkeeping Requirement: None
         d. Monitoring Requirement: None
         e. Reporting Requirement: Submission of Future Operating Permit Application

I. Emission Point Level: Smoke Training Sites
   A. PM_{10} Emissions
      1. Applicable Requirements: Construction Permits Required
         a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.060
         b. Emission Limitations: 65,000 gallons of SGF-2 fog oil per 12-month period; 3700 pounds of SGF-2 fog oil per day; 2600 pounds/hour of PM_{10}
         c. Recordkeeping Requirement: Annual and daily throughput; emissions rate
         d. Monitoring Requirements: Pre-startup and post-startup ambient air quality monitoring data; meteorological data; soil and vegetation sampling;
         e. Reporting Requirement: Violations of emission limitations; monitoring data
   B. VOC Emissions
      1. Applicable Requirements: Construction Permits

Required
a. Regulatory Authority: 10 CSR 10-6.060
b. Emission Limitation: 65,000 gallons of SGF-2 fog oil per 12-month period
c. Recordkeeping Requirement: Annual and daily throughput
d. Monitoring Requirements: Pre-startup and post-startup ambient air quality monitoring data
e. Reporting Requirement: Violations of emissions limitations

BACT ANALYSIS

A "top-down" BACT analysis is required to be submitted with this application. BACT is defined as an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction for each pollutant which would be emitted from any proposed installation or major modification which the Director, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental and economic impacts, and other costs, determines is achievable for such an installation or major modification. BACT may be achieved through application of production processes, or available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of the pollutant.

For this process, applying any control device defeats the purpose of the generating smoke for smoke training. Therefore, the only BACT option is to examine the other methods available to produce smoke. According to the U. S. Army Medical Research and Development Laboratory's publication, "Smokes and Obscurants: A Guidebook of Environmental Assessment, Volume 1. Method of Assessment and Appended Data," there are several methods to produce smoke.

Phosphorous Smokes and Hexachloroethane Smokes are both delivered in a pyrotechnic setting. In other words, they involve the use of cannons, mortars, smoke grenades, tank guns, rockets, and bombs.

Diesel Fuels and Fog Oils are delivered by Smoke Pots, Vehicle Engine Exhaust Smoke Systems, M3A3 Generators, and Jet-Turbine Helicopters.

Infrared Smokes are delivered by grenades. They contain powdered

brass, which is an alloy of copper and zinc.

The purpose of smoke training is to train soldiers on the use of the M3A3 fog oil smoke generator and to allow them to observe the behavior of fog oil smoke under field conditions. The other methods of generating smoke produce HAPS (Hazardous Air Pollutants) or are delivered in a more dangerous manner than the M3A3 generator.

Because the use of the M3A3 smoke generators and SGF-2 fog oil does not result in the emission of hazardous air pollutants, nor the use of pyrotechnics, it is considered both the best and safest option. Therefore, this option is chosen as BACT.

MODELING AND MONITORING

Fort Leonard Wood, in compliance with Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060(8)(C), has conducted ambient air quality modeling. The review of the modeling is included as a memo from the Technical Support Section of APCP (Appendix A). The modelling showed significant impact areas for PM_{10}. The modeled maximum concentrations exceeded the de minimis level for PM_{10}. Therefore, Fort Leonard Wood will be required to conduct post-construction monitoring For PM_{10}.

Existing monitoring data was used to demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS. However, to check this data, Fort Leonard Wood is required to conduct one year of preconstruction monitoring prior to the beginning of smoke training.

The monitoring will be continued for two years after smoke training begins. Because of concerns about the air quality in the area, Fort Leonard Wood will present the air monitoring data at a public hearing to be convened by the Air Pollution Control Program.

CLASS I AREA IMPACT ANALYSIS

The federal PSD regulations as adopted in 10 CSR 10-6.060 require an ambient air quality impact analysis to be done on all Class I areas within 100 kilometers in order to assure that no adverse ambient air quality impact will occur within the Class I area. There are no Class I areas within 100 kilometers of the proposed

plant. Therefore, no Class I impact analysis is required.

ANALYSIS OF IMPACT ON VISIBILITY, LOCAL SOILS, ANIMALS AND VEGETATION

The Applicant analyzed the projected impairment to visibility, soils, animals and vegetation.

The EPA's "Workbook for Plume Visual Impact Screening and Analysis," was used to determine the visual quality of the area and assess the visual impact of the proposed facility. The model indicates that the visibility in the area would not be adversely affected. Appendix B contains the result of the visibility analysis.

The procedures listed in the EPA document, "A Screening Procedure for the Impacts of Air Pollution Sources on Plants, Soils, and Animals," were examined. Since there is no simple procedure for estimating the impact of ozone from a single source, and since PM_{10} is not one of the regulated pollutants for which screening is done in the EPA screening guidance, no further analysis of the impact of smoke training on visibility, local soils, animals and vegetation is required. This permit requires constant soil and vegetation sampling. The Water Pollution Control Program has also required water sampling to be conducted and the results submitted quarterly.

GROWTH IMPACTS

The Applicant analyzed the air quality impact projected for the area as a result of general commercial, residential, industrial growth, as well as growth associated with this installation. The installation is expected to increase by 7900 persons. This includes civilian/permanent party military increase of 1600 and a trainee increase of 6300. All of the permanent party and military trainees will be served by the facility on-post. Increased fuel use for space heating and air conditioning could result in some increased emissions. However, the expected increase in personnel would merely bring Fort Leonard Wood back to the same level of personnel as served in 1990. Therefore, no additional growth-related air pollution impacts are anticipated.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

On the basis of this review conducted in accordance with Section (8), Missouri State Rule 10 CSR 10-6.060, "Construction Permits Required," the undersigned recommend this permit be granted with conditions.

Sharon Turpin
Environmental Engineer

4/11/95
Date

Glenn A. Carlson, P.E.
Acting Chief,
Construction Permits Unit

4/11/95
Date

ATTACHMENTS

Appendix A

STATE OF MISSOURI
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 10, 1994

TO: Glenn Carlson, Acting Unit Chief
Permit Section

FROM: Calvin Ku, Section Chief TCK
Technical Support Section

Chris Smith, Meteorologist CS
Technical Support Section

SUBJECT: Fort Leonard Wood Smoke Training PSD Modeling

I. Introduction

Fort Leonard Wood is proposing to conduct smoke training at several locations within their property. Due to the emission rates of the smoke generators to be used in the training, this project is subject to PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) permit review including modeling requirements.

A modeling report entitled 'Predicted Air Quality Impacts for Fort Leonard Wood Smoke Training School' was submitted by Burns & McDonnell on April 9,1995(attached). This report includes two separate analyses, the PSD increment analysis and the NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standard) analysis. These analyses indicate that the smoke training can be conducted no more than one hour a day during specific meteorological conditions in order to meet the necessary standards. The following report summarizes the modeling review and the resulting recommendations for permit requirements.

II. Modeling Procedures

The modeling procedures used in this study follow PSD and air quality modeling guidelines. The selected model for this application is the draft version of the new ISC2 (Industrial Source Complex) model dated Dec. 6, 1994. This version of the

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ISC2 includes simple and complex terrain algorithms and incorporates EPA's intermediate terrain policy. Additionally, the new version includes new area source and deposition algorithms. This model was recommended by EPA for use in this study.

The source information differs in the PSD increment modeling and the NAAQS modeling. For the PSD increment model, only the smoke generator sources are included. These generators will be placed on vehicles and may be moved during their operation. The vehicles will be spaced by at least 20 meters and will be oriented in a line or a 'v'. For modeling purposes, worst case is assumed to be a line of volume sources with an interval of 20 meters. The smoke generators will not operate more than one hour per day and therefore are evaluated on a one-hour basis. The smoke sources are modeled at all possible locations of operation within the fort. The NAAQS modeling includes all major sources within 50 kilometers of Fort Leonard Wood. A major source list was generated from the state's emission inventory databases and additional quality assurance was conducted prior to modeling to verify emission rates and source locations. These sources are modeled as continuous operations for worst case impacts.

The meteorological data sets are also different in the PSD increment and NAAQS runs. Because the smoke generators will be allowed to operate only during specific meteorological conditions, user-generated meteorological data sets are used for the PSD increment modeling. Varying meteorological conditions based on wind speed, stability, mixing height, and temperature are used in the model. Wind direction is considered by placing all receptors in a straight line at the proper downwind distance. Using this method, it is possible to model direct path wind directions to all fence line receptors in one model run. The NAAQS runs use five years of actual meteorological data from Springfield and Monett, Missouri.

III. PSD Increment Results

Because the baseline has not been established in this area, the entire PSD increments are available. These values are 30 ug/m^3 and 17 ug/m^3 for the 24-hour and annual average, respectively. The one-hour averages produced by the model are divided by 24 to obtain a representative 24-hour average. These results are then compared to the 24-hour increment of 30 ug/m^3 to identify receptors along the property boundary that will not exceed the increment. Corresponding wind directions are identified as acceptable conditions for operation. This procedure is duplicated for each possible training location. From these runs, a list of acceptable meteorological conditions is derived for each smoke training site (see Table II of the modeling report).

Because the smoke training will not be conducted more than 135 days per year, the annual increment does not require an evaluation. Even if a 30 ug/m^3 maximum 24-hour concentration occurs at the same receptor all 135 days, the annual concentration will only be 11 ug/m^3, well below the annual increment.

IV. NAAQS Results

PSD guidelines require that a NAAQS demonstration be conducted for the area that will be significantly impacted by the new source. For this study, a 50 kilometer radius is used. The model predicts several violations of the NAAQS due to sources beyond the Fort Leonard Wood property boundary. These locations are listed in Table III of the attached modeling report. Due to these potential exceedances of the NAAQS, the smoke training will not be allowed to occur under meteorological conditions which will result in a significant contribution. Several of the sites will not impact any of these potential exceedances already. However, under certain meteorological conditions stipulated in the PSD increment review as being acceptable, there is a significant contribution. Therefore, the fort is further restricted in their operation of the smoke generators. The resulting meteorological conditions which are acceptable for the PSD increment and the NAAQS are given in Table II of the modeling report.

V. Recommendations

Basis on the modeling analysis, we recommend the following conditions that should be required with the issuance of the smoke training permit:

1) The smoke generators shall be operated no more than one hour per day and no more than 135 days per year.

2) The total emissions of PM10 from the smoke generators shall be limited at a rate of 2600 pounds per hour. This emission rate is based on the use of 3700 pounds per hour of fog oil and assumes a 70% conversion rate to particulate matter.

3) The smoke training emissions are found to be acceptable for the PSD increment and the NAAQS for the wind directions, stabilities, and durations listed in Table II of the smoke training modeling report provided by Fort Leonard Wood.

4) In addition to the wind direction and stability requirements, the model indicates that a wind speed of at least 1 m/s is necessary for stabilities A-D and at least 4 m/s for

stability E. Also, a mixing height of 200 meters is necessary for stabilities A-C and a mixing height of 320 meters is required for stabilities D-E.

5) Under no circumstance should the smoke training be conducted during F stability.

6) No smoke training should occur at any locations other than those specified in Table II of the modeling report.

7) The model predicts concentrations during very specific meteorological conditions. Special attention should be given to the measurement and monitoring of these parameters before, during, and after the smoke training occurs. This requires not only appropriate instrumentation, but qualified personnel as well. Fort Leonard Wood should be required to secure these instruments and trained personnel.

VI. Conclusion

Based on the modeling analysis, the proposed smoke training at Fort Leonard Wood, if operated under the requirements listed in Section V, will not cause or contribute to a violation of the PSD increment or NAAQS for PM10.

APPENDIX B

*** Level-1 Screening ***

Input Emissions for

Particulates	6500.00	LB /HR
NOx (as NO2)	.00	LB /HR
Primary NO2	.00	LB /HR
Soot	.00	LB /HR
Primary SO4	.00	LB /HR

**** Default Particle Characteristics Assumed

Transport Scenario Specifications:

Background Ozone:	.04 ppm
Background Visual Range:	25.00 km
Source-Observer Distance:	120.00 km
Min. Source-Class I Distance:	120.00 km
Max. Source-Class I Distance:	140.00 km
Plume-Source-Observer Angle:	11.25 degrees
Stability:	6
Wind Speed:	1.00 m/s

R E S U L T S

Asterisks (*) indicate plume impacts that exceed screening criteria

Maximum Visual Impacts INSIDE Class I Area
Screening Criteria ARE NOT Exceeded

					Delta E		Contrast	
Backgrnd	Theta	Azi	Distance	Alpha	Crit	Plume	Crit	Plume
SKY	10.	84.	120.0	84.	2.00	1.455	.05	.015
SKY	140.	84.	120.0	84.	2.00	.149	.05	-.006
TERRAIN	10.	84.	120.0	84.	2.00	.060	.05	.000
TERRAIN	140.	84.	120.0	84.	2.00	.017	.05	.000

Maximum Visual Impacts OUTSIDE Class I Area
Screening Criteria ARE NOT Exceeded

					Delta E		Contrast	
Backgrnd	Theta	Azi	Distance	Alpha	Crit	Plume	Crit	Plume
SKY	10.	75.	116.2	94.	2.00	1.493	.05	.016
SKY	140.	75.	116.2	94.	2.00	.153	.05	-.006
TERRAIN	10.	65.	112.0	104.	2.00	.084	.05	.001
TERRAIN	140.	65.	112.0	104.	2.00	.024	.05	.001

Attachment A Wind Directions during Smoke Training+					
Site	A Stability	B Stability	C Stability	D Stability	E* Stability
Musgrave	130 - 220	150 - 220	160 - 215	170-215(1)	150 - 225
Ballard	340 - 35	340 - 35	340 - 35	350 - 35	340 - 35
Mush Paddle	195 - 275	195 - 275	195 - 270	195 - 240(2)	195 - 270
Bailey	All direction except 120 deg.	340 - 40 175 - 325	340 - 40 175 - 325	None	230 -240

(1) 45 minute limit for wind directions 190 - 210 degrees
(2) 45 minute limit for wind directions 220 - 240 degrees
+ A 3 minute exclusion is requested
* A-D stabilities are not restricted based on wind speed, however, E stability is limited to wind speeds of 4 m/s and greater.

USA, Ft. Leonard Wood
MO-0117251, Pulaski Co.

EXHIBIT C

STATE OF MISSOURI
Mel Carnahan, Governor • David A. Shorr, Director
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176

APR 11 1995

U.S. Army (USA)
Bldg. 2200 A
Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Dear Permittee:

Pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control act, under the authority granted to the state of Missouri and in compliance with the Missouri Clean Water Law, we have issued and are enclosing your State Operating Permit to Discharge from USA, Ft. Leonard Wood.

Please read your permit and attached Standard Conditions. They contain important information on monitoring requirements, effluent limitations, sampling frequencies and reporting requirements.

Monitoring reports required by the special conditions must be submitted on a periodic basis. Copies of the necessary report forms are enclosed and should be mailed to the regional office listed below. Please contact that office for additional forms.

This permit is both your Federal Discharge Permit and your new State Operating Permit and replaces all previous state operating permits for this facility. In all future correspondence regarding this facility, please refer to your State Operating Permit number and facility name as shown on page one of the permit.

If you have any questions concerning this permit, please do not hesitate to call this office or our Jefferson City Regional Office at 1908 Bubba Lane, P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102, (314) 751-2729.

Sincerely,

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM

Daniel R. Schuette
Chief of Permit Section

DRS:rb

Enclosure

c: EPA - Billing Branch

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STATE OF MISSOURI

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MISSOURI CLEAN WATER COMMISSION

MISSOURI STATE OPERATING PERMIT

In compliance with the Missouri Clean Water Law, (Chapter 644 R.S. Mo. as amended, hereinafter, the Law), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Public Law 92-500, 92nd Congress) as amended,

Permit No. MO-0117251

Owner: U. S. Army (USA)

Owner's Address: Bldg. 2200 A, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Operating Authority: N/A

Operating Authority's Address: N/A

Facility Name: USA, Ft. Leonard Wood

Facility Address: Bldg. 2200 A, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

Legal Description: All or parts of: T33, 34, 35N, R10, 11, 12W, Pulaski County

Receiving Stream & Basin: Roubidoux Creek (Gasconade Basin) (10290203-35-02) (C)
Big Piney (Big Piney Basin) (10290202-01-00) (P)

is authorized to discharge from the facility described herein, in accordance with the effluent limitations and monitoring requirements as set forth herein:

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

Outfall #001 - #008 - - SIC #9711

Continued on Next Page

This permit authorizes only wastewater discharges under the Missouri Clean Water Law and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; it does not apply to other regulated areas. This permit may be appealed in accordance with Section 644.051.6 of the Law.

February 17, 1995-April 4, 1995 (revised)
Effective Date

John A. Young
John A. Young
Director, Division of Environmental Quality

February 16, 2000
Expiration Date

Director of Staff, Clean Water Commission

MO 780-0041 (10-93)

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Facility Descriptions (continued)

Outfall #001 - Smith Branch
Components:
Explosives detonation area FLW-4, 5, 6: SW, Sec. 31, T35N, R11W
Forney army airfield FLW-12: NW, Sec. 27, T35N, R11W
Forney army airfield FLW-13: SE, Sec. 28, T35N, R11W
Normandy training area FLW-15: Sec. 29 & 32, T35N, R11W
Smoke training
Outfall is SW ¼, Sec. 29, T35N, R11W
Smith Branch (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #002
Components:
Area 007A 800-880 motorpool: NW, Sec. 22, T35N, R11W
Area 007B 900-900 motorpool: SW, Sec. 22, T35N, R11W
Area 007E 600-671 motorpool: SE, Sec. 15, T35N, R11W
Area 007F 700-771 motorpool: NW, Sec. 22, T35N, R11W
Smoke training
Outfall is Center Sec. 8, T35N, R11W
Pond Hollow, Ballard Hollow (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #003
Components:
Transfer station FLW-16: SE, Sec. 15, T35N, R11W
Outfall is SE ¼, Sec. 11, T35N, R11W
Dry Creek (Big Piney River Basin) (10290202-01-00)

Outfall #004 - Unnamed Branch of Big Piney River
Components:
Defense reutilization and marketing office FLW-1: NW, Sec. 13, T35N< R11W
Bulk fuel storage FLW-2: NW, Sec. 13, T35N, R11W
Bulk fuel storage FLW-3: NW, Sec. 13, T35N, R11W
Outfall is SW ¼, Sec. 18, T35N, R11W
Unnamed branch #1 (Big Piney River Basin) (1029202-01-00)

Outfall #005 - Unnamed Branch of Big Piney River
Components:
102 ARCOM maintenance area FLW-7D: SE, Sec. 23, T35N, R11W
Smoke training
Outfall is NW ¼, Sec. 25, T35N, R11W
Unnamed branch #2 (Big Piney River Basin) (10290202-02-00)

(continued on next page)

C. Facility Description (continued)

Outfall #006
Components:
Asphalt training facility FLW-14: NE, Sec. 36, T35N, R11W
Smoke training
Outfall is at end of oil water separator discharge pipe. NW ¼, Sec. 31, T35N, R10W
Big Piney River (Big Piney River Basin) (10290202-01-00)

Outfall #007
Components:
Rock quarry FLW-17: N ½, Sec. 31, T35N, R10W
Outfall is at sediment pond outfall NW ¼, Sec. 31, T35N, R10W
Big Piney River (Big Piney River Basin) (10290203-01-00)

Outfall #008
Components:
Sanitary landfill FLW-8, 9, 10: NW, Sec. 5, T34N, R11W
Outfall is SE ¼, Sec. 32, T35N, R11W
Smith Branch (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #009 - Musgrove and Turnbull Hollows
Outfall is SE ¼, Sec. 19, T34N, R11W
Musgrove Hollow (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #010 - Mush Paddle Hollow
Outfall is SW ¼, Sec. 23, T34N, R11W
Mush Paddle Hollow (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #011 - Sapper Hollow
Outfall is NW ¼, Sec. 23, T34N, R11W
Sapper Hollow (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfall #012 - Bailey - McCann Hollow
Outfall is SW ¼, Sec. 1, T34N, R11W, near McCann Cemetery
Hurd Hollow (Gasconade River Basin) (10290203-35-02)

Outfalls #009, #010, #011, #012
Activities related to obscurant training, also called "smoke training". This involves the use of finely dispersed oil to created foglike conditions.

A. EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

The permittee is authorized to discharge from outfall(s) with serial number(s) as specified in the application for this permit. The final effluent limitations shall become effective upon issuance and remain in effect until expiration of the permit. Such discharges shall be controlled, limited, and monitored by the permittee as specified below:

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #001 Smith Branch						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
Settleable Solids	mL/L/hr	2.5		1.5	once/year	grab
Oil & Grease	mg/L	15		10	once/year	grab
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons	mg/L	20		15	once/year	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
Nitrate	mg/L	10		10	once/year	grab
Ammonia and N	mg/L	5		5	once/year	grab
Lead, Total Recoverable	mg/L	0.020		0.020	once/year	grab
Iron, Total Recoverable	mg/L	1.0		1.0	once/year	grab
Zinc, Total Recoverable	mg/L	0.345		0.345	once/year	grab
Copper, Total Recoverable	mg/L	0.029		0.029	once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY, THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY, THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						

MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED as outlined above ; THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE as outlined above
THERE SHALL BE NO DISCHARGE OF FLOATING SOLIDS OR VISIBLE FOAM IN OTHER THAN TRACE AMOUNTS.

B. STANDARD CONDITIONS

IN ADDITION TO SPECIFIED CONDITIONS STATED HEREIN, THIS PERMIT IS SUBJECT TO THE ATTACHED Part I STANDARD CONDITIONS DATED October 1, 19 80 , AND HEREBY INCORPORATED AS THOUGH FULLY SET FORTH HEREIN.

A. EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND MONITORING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #002 Pond Hollow, Ballard Hollow						
Outfall #004 Unnamed branch of Big Piney						
Outfall #005 Unnamed branch of Big Piney						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
Settleable Solids	mL/L/hr	2.5		1.5	once/year	grab
Oil & Grease	mg/L	15		10	once/year	grab
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons	mg/L	20		15	once/year	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
Outfall #003						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #006 Asphalt plant at oil water separator discharge pipe						
Sampling Requirements - Discharge of storm water only.						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
Oil & Grease	mg/L	15		10	once/year	grab
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons	mg/L	20		15	once/year	grab
Settleable Solids	mL/L/hr	1.5		1.0	once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						
Discharges during dry weather (no storm water runoff is occurring) where the discharge may contain pollutants form the putting, placing, disposal, or dumping of residual concrete and washdown waters.						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
Total Suspended Solids	mg/L	70			once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #007 Rock Quarry Dry weather flows						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
Total Suspended Solids	mg/L	30		15	once/year	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						
Storm Water Flows						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/year	24 hr. estimate
Settleable Solids	mL/L/hr	1.0		0.5	once/year	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/year	grab
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY, THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995						
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual
MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995						

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #008 Sanitary landfill (FLW-8, 9, & 10)						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/quarter***	instantane estimate
Rainfall	inches	*		*	daily measurement	grab
BETX	mg/L	0.75		0.75	once/quarter***	grab
Biochemical Oxygen Demand$_5$	mg/L	60		45	once/quarter***	grab
Chemical Oxygen Demand	mg/L	120		90	once/quarter***	grab
Total Suspended Solids	mg/L	80		60	once/quarter***	grab
Settleable Solids	mL/L/hr	1.5		1.0	once/quarter***	grab
Total Dissolved Solids	mg/L	*		*	once/quarter***	grab
Conductivity (Specific Conductance)	umhos/cm	*		*	once/quarter***	grab
Chloride Plus Sulfates	mg/L	1000		1000	once/quarter***	grab
Iron, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/quarter***	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/quarter***	grab
Color****		*		*	once/quarter***	visual

MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #008 Sanitary landfill (continued)						
Calcium	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Fluoride	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Total Hardness	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Barium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Boron, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Cadmium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Chromium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Cobalt, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Copper, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Sodium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Ammonia as N	mg/L	5.0		5.0	once/year	grab
Nitrate and Nitrite as N	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Phosphorus, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Mercury, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Arsenic, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Lead, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Selenium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab

(continued on next page)

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #008 Sanitary landfill (continued)						
Silver, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Manganese, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Magnesium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Zinc, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Antimony, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Beryllium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Nickel, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Sulfate	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Thallium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Total Organic Carbon	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Vanadium, Total Recoverable	mg/L	*		*	once/year	grab
Oil and Grease	mg/L	15		10	once/year	grab
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons	mg/L	20		15	once/year	grab

MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY, THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE October 28, 1995

OUTFALL NUMBER AND EFFLUENT PARAMETER(S)	UNITS	FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS			MONITORING REQUIREMENTS	
		DAILY MAXIMUM	WEEKLY AVERAGE	MONTHLY AVERAGE	MEASUREMENT FREQUENCY	SAMPLE TYPE
Outfall #009 - Musgrove and Turnbull Hollows Area						
Outfall #010 - Mush Paddle Hollow Area						
Outfall #011 - Sapper Hollow Area						
Outfall #012 - Bailey McCann Hollow Area						
Flow	MGD	*		*	once/quarter***	24 hr. estimate
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons	mg/L	20		15	once/quarter***	grab
Oil and Grease	mg/L	15		10	once/quarter***	grab
pH - Units	SU	**		**	once/quarter***	grab
Color****		*		*	once/quarter**	visual

MONITORING REPORTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED QUARTERLY. THE FIRST REPORT IS DUE July 28, 1995

* Monitoring requirement only.

** pH is measured in pH units and is not to be averaged. The pH is limited to the range of 6.0-9.0 pH units.

*** Once quarter in the months of March, June, September, and December.

**** Permittee shall observe outfall for presence of oil sheen or other unnatural colors. This requirement exists whether it has rained or not.

C. SPECIAL CONDITIONS

1. Report as no-discharge when a discharge does not occur during the report period.

2. Outfall #008 only. All design and operating specifications and all Waste Management Program approval conditions pertaining to water quality are hereby made a part of this permit and shall apply throughout the life of this permit without regard to other conditions, permits, occurrences, etc.

3. This permit may be modified, or alternatively revoked and reissued, to comply with any applicable effluent standard or limitation issued or approved under Sections 301(b)(2) (C), and (D), 304(b)(2) and 307(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act, if the effluent standard or limitation so issued or approved:

   a. Contains different conditions or is otherwise more stringent than any effluent limitation in the permit: or

   b. Controls any pollutant not limited in the permit.

   The permit as modified or reissued under this paragraph shall also contain any other requirements of the Act then applicable.

4. This permit may be reopened and modified or alternatively revoked and reissued, to incorporate new or modified effluent limitations or other conditions, if the result of a waste load allocation study, toxicity test, or other information indicates changes are necessary to assure compliance with Missouri's Water Quality Standards.

5. This permit does not allow the discharge of storm water that has contacted the open face of the landfill. This permit does not allow the discharge of untreated leachate. All leachate shall be handled in accordance with the Solid Waste Disposal Area Operating Permit, Report of Approval of Plans and Specifications (with conditions).

6. Changes in Discharges of Toxic Substances:

   The permittee shall notify the Director as soon as it knows or has reason to believe:

   a. That any activity has occurred or will occur which would result in the discharge of any toxic pollutant which is not limited in the permit, if that discharge will exceed the highest of the following "notification levels:"

      (1) One hundred micrograms per liter (100 ug/l);

      (2) Two hundred micrograms per liter (200 ug/l) for acrolein and acrylonitrile; five hundred micrograms per liter (500 ug/l) for 2,4 dinitrophenol and for 2-methyl-4, 6-dinitrophenol; and one milligram per liter (1 mg/l) for antimony;

      (3) Five (5) times the maximum concentration value reported for the pollutant in the permit application;

      (4) The level established in Part A of the permit by the Director.

   b. That they have begun or expect to begin to use or manufacture as an intermediate or final product or by-product any toxic pollutant which was not reported in the permit application.

C. SPECIAL CONDITIONS (continued)

7. All discharges shall comply with the Missouri Water Quality Standards, 10 CSR 20-7.031, Section (3)(C), which states (Waters shall be free from substance in sufficient amounts to cause unsightly color or turbidity...", and Section (4)(G), which states "Water contaminants shall not cause or contribute to turbidity or color that will cause substantial visible contact with the natural appearance of the stream...".

8. Outfall #008 only. All activities performed to control erosion on the landfill site (seeding, mulching, terracing, etc.) shall be described and submitted along with the second quarter and fourth quarter Discharge Monitoring Reports. If no erosion controls are undertaken, indicate so on the reports.

9. U.S. Army, Ft. Leonard Wood will protect the asphalt plant from the 100 year flood event by appropriate methods.

10. Outfall sampling and observation points must be clearly marked in the field.

11. This condition is in addition to regular monitoring. When smoke training actually begins, permittee shall sample monthly each outfall located in the vicinity of where the training has occurred. Sample shall be taken within 24 hours after 1.0 inch of rainfall has fallen. If a 1.0 rainfall does not occur in a given month, report " no 1.0 inch rainfall event." This sampling shall continue until permittee is notified by Department of Natural Resources Water Pollution Control Program that this monitoring can be discontinued. Sampling analyses shall be the same as for outfalls #009, #010, #011, and #012, with the addition of Lead and Zinc. Results should be submitted with regular quarterly monitoring reports.

    A rain gauge located at a place of the permittees choosing, shall be used to determine whether 1.0 inch of rain has fallen.

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

NPDES MONITORING REPORT FOR NON-MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER DISCHARGES

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Mail to the appropriate DNR regional office as noted in your permit.
2. Report must be signed by owner and by analyst. Report should be typed or neatly printed.
3. Part A of the permit specifies the parameters to be monitored, frequency of monitoring and frequency of reporting results. If quarterly reports are required, they are due on April 28, July 28, October 28, and January 28, each report covering the preceding 3-month period not including the reporting month. See the permit for reporting dates if other than quarterly.
4. Report results of all analyses, even if performed more frequently than required by Part A of the permit.
5. File a report even if discharge is intermittent and no discharge occurred during the monitoring period. Complete the identification section, write "ND" in the appropriate columns for the dates the facility was checked, and sign the report. NOTE: If a discharge occurs any time during the monitoring period, it must be reported.
6. Under "Sample Type" indicate whether sample analyzed was: (a) grab sample; (b) 24-hour composite sample; or (c) modified composite sample. NOTE: See permit for type of sample required for each parameter.
7. Under "Sample Type" for Flow indicate whether figures shown are based on (a) instantaneous measurements or (b) actual 24-hour measured flow. Figure recorded is to represent the total 24-hour flow for the date shown or a reasonable estimate.
8. Indicate whether samples were collected by owner or by personnel of the lab performing the analyses.

NOTE: This reporting form is a universal reporting form for non-municipal sewage treatment plants, industries, and other point-source discharges.

Industries and individuals who have their own report forms designed for their specific needs are encouraged to substitute their forms. A suitable substitute must meet the following specifications.

(a) Form must be 8½" x 11".

(b) Report must show all of the information indicated on this standard form.

FACILITY NAME	PERMIT NUMBER	COUNTY	OWNER	TYPE OF FACILITY

REQUIRED FREQUENCY OF MONITORING

THIS REPORT COVERS PERIOD _____, 19 ____ THROUGH _____, 19 ____

DATES SAMPLED																	
TIME OF DAY SAMPLED																	
SAMPLES COLLECTED BY																	
DATES OF ANALYSES																	
PARAMETERS	PERMITTED FINAL LIMITS	RECORD ACTUAL RESULTS OF ANALYSIS — DO NOT AVERAGE														SAMPLE TYPE (SEE NOTES 6 AND 7)	ANALYTICAL METHOD (BE SPECIFIC)	(RECORD, AS APPROPRIATE, SUCH INFORMATION AS METHOD OF PRESERVATION, METHODS OF SAMPLE COLLECTION, ABNORMAL AGE OF SAMPLE, EXPLANATION OF UNUSUAL RESULTS, ETC.) REMARKS AND COMMENTS
FLOW GPD																		
BOD mg/l																		
SUS. SOLIDS mg/l																		
pH UNITS																		
FECAL COLI. /100 ml.																		

ANALYSES PERFORMED BY	SIGNATURE OF ANALYST
REPORT APPROVED BY OWNER	DATE

MO 780-1307 (10-91)

WQP 109 Rev. 10/91

STANDARD CONDITIONS FOR NPDES PERMITS
ISSUED BY
THE MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
MISSOURI CLEAN WATER COMMISSION
Revised
October 1, 1980

PART I — GENERAL CONDITIONS
SECTION A — MONITORING AND REPORTING

1. **Representative Sampling**
   A. Samples and measurements taken as required herein shall be representative of the nature and volume, respectively, of the monitored discharge. All samples shall be taken at the outfall(s), and unless specified, before the effluent joins or is diluted by any other body of water or substance.
   B. Monitoring results shall be recorded and reported on forms provided by the Department, postmarked no later than the 28th day of the month following the completed reporting period. Signed copies of these, and all other reports required herein, shall be submitted to the respective Department Regional Office, the Regional Office address is indicated in the cover letter transmitting the permit.

2. **Schedule of Compliance**
   No later than fourteen (14) calendar days following each date identified in the "Schedule of Compliance", the permittee shall submit to the respective Department Regional Office as required therein, either a report of progress or, in the case of specific actions being required by identified dates, a written notice of compliance or noncompliance. In the latter case, the notice shall include the cause of noncompliance, any remedial actions taken, and the probability of meeting the next scheduled requirements, or if there are no more scheduled requirements, when such noncompliance will be corrected. The Regional Office address is indicated in the cover letter transmitting the permit.

3. **Definitions**
   Definitions as set forth in the Missouri Clean Water Law and Missouri Clean Water Commission Definition Regulation 10 CSR 20-2.010 shall apply to terms used herein.

4. **Test Procedures**
   Test procedures for the analysis of pollutants shall be in accordance with the Missouri Clean Water Commission Effluent Regulation 10 CSR 20-7.015.

5. **Recording of Results**
   A. For each measurement or sample taken pursuant to the requirements of this permit, the permittee shall record the following information:
      (i) The date, exact place, and time of sampling or measurements;
      (ii) The individual(s) who performed the sampling or measurements;
      (iii) The date(s) analyses were performed;
      (iv) The individual(s) who performed the analyses;
      (v) The analytical techniques or methods used; and
      (vi) The results of such analyses.
   B. The Federal Clean Water Act provides that any person who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be maintained under this permit shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 per violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months per violation, or by both.
   C. Calculations for all limitations which require averaging of measurements shall utilize an arithmetic mean unless otherwise specified by the Director in the permit.

6. **Additional Monitoring by Permittee**
   If the permittee monitors any pollutant at the location(s) designated herein more frequently than required by this permit, using approved analytical methods as specified above, the results of such monitoring shall be included in the calculation and reporting of the values required in the Monitoring Report Form. Such increased frequency shall also be indicated.

7. **Records Retention**
   The permittee shall retain records of all monitoring information, including all calibration and maintenance records and all original strip chart recordings for continuous monitoring instrumentation, copies of all reports required by this permit, and records of all data used to complete the application for this permit, for a period of at least 3 years from the date of the sample, measurement, report or application. This period may be extended by request of the Department at any time.

SECTION B — MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS

1. **Change in Discharge**
   A. All discharges authorized herein shall be consistent with the terms and conditions of this permit. The discharge of any pollutant not authorized by this permit or of any pollutant identified in this permit more frequently than or at a level in excess of that authorized shall constitute a violation of the permit.
   B. Any facility expansions, production increases, or process modifications which will result in new, different, or increased discharges of pollutants shall be reported by submission of a new NPDES application at least sixty (60) days before such changes, or, if they will not violate the effluent limitations specified in this permit, by notice to the Department at least thirty (30) days before such changes.

2. **Noncompliance Notification**
   A. If, for any reason, the permittee does not comply with or will be unable to comply with any daily maximum effluent limitation specified in this permit, the permitee shall provide the Department with the following information, in writing within five (5) days of becoming aware of such condition:
      (i) A description of the discharge and cause of noncompliance, and
      (ii) The period of noncompliance, including exact dates and times or, if not corrected, the anticipated time the noncompliance is expected to continue, and steps being taken to reduce, eliminate and prevent recurrence of the noncomplying discharge.
   B. Twenty-four hour reporting. The permittee shall report any noncompliance which may endanger health or the environment. Any information shall be provided orally within 24 hours from the time the permittee becomes aware of the circumstances. A written submission shall also be provided within 5 days of the time the permittee becomes aware of the circumstances. The Department may waive the written report on a case-by-case basis if the oral report has been received within 24 hours.

3. **Facilities Operation**
   Permittees shall operate and maintain facilities to comply with the Missouri Clean Water Law and applicable permit conditions. Operators or supervisors of operations at publicly owned or publicly regulated wastewater treatment facilities shall be certified in accordance with 10 CSR 20-9.020(2) and any other applicable state law or regulation. Operators of other wastewater treatment facilities, water contaminant source or point sources, shall, upon request by the department, demonstrate that wastewater treatment equipment and facilities are effectively operated and maintained by competent personnel.

4. **Adverse Impact**
   The permittee shall take all necessary steps to minimize any adverse impact to waters of the state resulting from noncompliance with any effluent limitations specified in this permit or set forth in the Missouri Clean Water Law and Regulations (hereinafter the Law and Regulations), including such accelerated or additional monitoring as necessary to determine the nature and impact of the noncomplying discharge.

EXHIBIT D

STATE OF MISSOURI

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 7, 1995

TO: US Army Training Center, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, TSD File

FROM: Ed Sadler, Director
Hazardous Waste Program

SUBJECT: Regulatory Determination

Re: 1. Facsimile dated March 15, 1995, Ms. Emily Brown/US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood to Mr. David Walker/Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Re: Analyses of New Canisters

2. Letter dated March 7, 1995, Major General Joe N. Ballard/US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood to Mr. David Shorr/Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Re: Filters Used in Training

3. Facsimile dated February 23, 1995, Mr. Bob Morrison/US Army Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center to Mr. Kim Miko/US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood
Re: Analyses of Chemical Filter Elements

4. Facsimile dated July 29, 1994, Mr. Scott Murrell/US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood to Mr. David Walker/Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Re: Analyses of Chemical Filters

5. Chemical Decontamination Training Facility, Thermal Treatment Unit, Part B Permit Application submitted by US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, dated April 6, 1995

6. Memorandum dated June 4, 1984, Mr. Matthew Straus/US Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Identification Branch to Mr. Jon P. Yeagley, US Environmental Protection Agency, State Programs Section
Re: Assessment of Chemical Agents

7. Departments of the Army and the Air Force. Military Chemistry and Chemical Compounds. FM 3-9/AFR 335-7.

RECYCLED PAPER

C. DEQ

EXHIBIT E

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY ENGINEER CENTER AND FORT LEONARD WOOD
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

March 7, 1995

Office of the Commanding General

MAR 14 1995

Mr. David Shorr
Director, Missouri Department of Natural Resources
Post Office Box 176
Jefferson City, Missouri, 65102-0176

RE: Filters used in Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Training. (See Enclosed Memorandum)

Dear Mr. Shorr:

Fort Leonard Wood has received the enclosed information from the U.S. Army Material Command indicating the C2 filter canister used with chemical protective masks is being replaced with a new C2A1 filter. The new C2A1 filter is manufactured from non toxic components to eliminate the need to treat it as a hazardous waste upon disposal.

The old C2 filter canister is no longer in production and the Army's existing stocks of this item will be exhausted by October 1995. All filter canisters used after that date will be the new C2A1. We presently send discarded C2 canisters to a licensed Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility in accordance with state and federal regulations and will continue to do so until they are out of our inventory.

All new filters issued on Fort Leonard Wood after October 1995 will be the new C2A1. This will include the filters used in the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF), should it be constructed at Fort Leonard Wood in the future. No C2 filters will be treated in the CDTF incinerator. We regard this as an important part of the Army waste minimization program and further evidence of our ability to conduct training at Fort Leonard Wood in a safe and responsible manner.

Sincerely,

Joe N. Ballard
Major General, U.S. Army

Enclosure

FILE w/ FORT McCLELLAN

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP						
ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 20 APR		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER		✓				HG 20APR
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER						
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	

COMMENTS:

Let's discuss after you review. Make sure Deidre reviews. Also get Madelyn's reaction.

Document Separator

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: June 6, 1995

TIME: 11 a.m.

MEETING WITH: Allies in Defense of Cherry Point (N.C.)

SUBJECT: MCAS Cherry Point

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Col. Dave Jones (Ret.); Allies in Defense of Cherry Point
Al Bell
Maj. Gen. Hugh Overholt (Ret.)
Troy Smith
Bob Keltie, Consultant

Commission Staff:

Madelyn Creedon, General Counsel
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director, Review & Analysis
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook; Interagency Team Leader
Jim Owsley, Cross-Service Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Jim Brubaker; Navy DoD Analyst
Ed Flippen; Interagency FAA Analyst

MEETING PURPOSE: (mm-mcas.doc)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

MEETING REQUEST

Now that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has been provided with the recommended list of closures and realignments by the Secretary of Defense, the Commission is analyzing the data used by the Secretary in making his decisions. In order to ensure that your meeting with Commission members and/or staff is as productive as possible in the limited time available, please respond to the following items and return to your Commission contact by fax as soon as possible. Also, prior to the meeting, please provide the Commission with the data and other facts you intend to use in presenting your case to the meeting participants. This will allow the Commission member and/or staff to be prepared to address the specific points you plan to make and answer your questions as fully as possible during the meeting.

- **ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED:**

Discussion of a 9 May Nemfakos letter to Sen. Faircloth re: P-80 standards. Discussion of a 19 May letter from Nemfakos to Dixon.re: Oceana air conformity general discussion

- **COMMUNITY SPOKESPERSON:** Allies in Defense of Cherry Point

Col. Dave Jones (Ret.), Al Bell, MG Hugh Overholt (Ret.)
Troy Smith, J.R. Reskovac

- **PROPOSED AGENDA:**

- **OTHER ITEMS**

Meeting to be held June 6 at 11:00 a.m. with Alex Yellin.

Please return by fax to (703) 696-0550:

Attention:
Cece Carman, Director of Intergovernmental Affairs ____
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison ____
Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison ____
Sylvia Davis-Thompson, Manger, Re-use issues ____

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: May 25, 1995

TIME: 4:00 PM

MEETING WITH: Rep. Susan Molinari

SUBJECT: Ft. Hamilton

PARTICIPANTS:
Name/Title/Phone Number:

Rep. Susan Molinari (R-NY)
Kevin Tyne, Office of Rep. Molinari
Steve Karalekas, consultant
Jim Noone, consultant

***Commission Staff*:**

Ed Brown; Army Team Leader
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison

MEETING PURPOSE: Congresswoman Molinari emphasized the financial burden the Army's recommendation would have on service members assigned to the New York City area who would no longer be able to occupy housing at Fort Hamilton. She encouraged the Commission to allow Secretary Perry's recent initiative to privatize family housing work its way through the legislative process. Jim Noone provided the attached sheets that challenged the Army's original COBRA; however, the revised COBRA received on 24 May rendered his analysis moot. He was encouraged to review the new COBRA and provide input to the Commission staff.

(mm-ftham.doc)

DISCREPANCIES IN HOUSING COSTS FOR FORT HAMILTON

1. COBRA "Family Housing Ops" (Attachment 1)

1998	1999	2000	2001	Beyond
2,018	4,035	4,035	5,904	7,772

2. Army Stationing & Installation Plan Report (ASIP) as of 3/31/95, as referenced in memo of 4/25/95 from Fort Dix Base Transition Office to FORSCOM (Attachment 2)

* Fort Hamilton FY93 Army Family Housing Budget	$3,694,000
* Number of housing units	442
* Cost per unit	8,358
* Cost of housing: Fts. Hamilton and Totten (FY93)	4,774,000

3. FY95 Army Family Housing Budget (approx.) 3,500,000
Fts. Hamilton and Totten

Data As Of 13:50 09/15/1994, Report Created 15:07 02/17/1995

Department : ARMY
Option Package : CA6-6
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\CA6-6.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 2001
ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015($K): -74,015
1-Time Cost($K): 2,110

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	-355	-827	-827	-1,347	-3,356	-1,977
Overhd	184	138	2,580	-385	-405	-2,687	-574	-5,240
Moving	0	0	405	0	0	230	636	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	80	0	0	51	132	0
TOTAL	184	138	2,711	-1,212	-1,232	-3,752	-3,162	-7,217

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	18	0	0	25	43
TOT	0	0	18	0	0	25	43
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
TOT	0	0	12	0	0	0	12

Summary:

REALIGN FORT HAMILTON. DISPOSE OF ALL FAMILY HOUSING. RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LAND AND FACILITIES FOR EXISTING ARMY UNITS AND ACTIVITIES. RELOCATE ALL ARMY RESERVE UNITS FROM CAVEN POINT, NEW JERSEY, TO FORT HAMILTON.

Attachment 1

Department : ARMY
Option Package : CA6-6
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\CA6-6.CBR
Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFP

ONE-TIME NET -----($K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	48	0	0	48	96
Civ Moving	0	0	405	0	0	230	636
Other	184	138	466	78	58	321	1,246
MIL PERSONNEL							
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	55	0	0	51	107
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	25	0	0	0	25
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	184	138	1,000	78	58	651	2,110

RECURRING NET -----($K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	-2,018	-4,035	-4,035	-5,904	-15,992	-7,772
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-446	-903	-903	-1,268	-3,520	-1,639
BOS	0	0	-161	-273	-273	-579	-1,286	-579
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-414	-828	-828	-1,403	-3,473	-1,978
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	1
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	4,749	4,749	4,749	4,749	18,996	4,749
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	1,711	-1,290	-1,290	-4,403	-5,272	-7,217
TOTAL NET COST	184	138	2,711	-1,212	-1,232	-3,752	-3,162	-7,217

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FORT DIX
FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY

AFZT-CSX(5-10b) 25 April 95

MEMORANDUM FOR Headquarters, Forces Command, ATTN: AFPI-BC, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-6000

SUBJECT: 18 April 95, BRAC 95 Commission Site Visit to the New York Area Command (NYAC)

1. The following information is submitted as requested by Mr. Rick Brown, BRAC Commission Program Analyst and LTC Sam McNabb, the Army Basing Study (TABS).

a. Validated Army Stationing & Installation Plan (ASIP) report as of 31 Mar 1995, enc 1.

b. Ft. Hamilton FY93 AFH Direct Operating Budget $3,694,000.00
# of housing units 442
cost per unit 8,358.00

Ft. Totten FY93 AFH Direct Operating Budget 1,080,000.00
# of housing units 187
cost per unit 5,775.00

FY95 Army Family Housing (AFH) costs attached as enc 2.

c. AFH occupancy broken out to show enl/wo/off/civ by category i.e. Navy, Army, Civilian etc. enc 3.

d. Commercial Activities (CA) Contract cost, enc 4.

2. I have reviewed the information above for completeness and accuracy in coordination with the DRM, Fort Dix, New York Area Command (NYAC) staff, and the Commander NYAC.

Encls

TONI ALEXANDER
Director, Base Transition Office

Attachment 2

MISCELLANEOUS RECURRING COSTS FOR HOUSING

1. In calculating net recurring savings, COBRA offsets savings from family housing ops with additional costs from increased BAQ/ VHA. This cost: $4,749,000.

2. However, Army calculated increased BAQ/VHA cost using only Army personnel (261). Excludes 53 personnel from other services utilizing Fort Hamilton housing. See Attachments 1 and 2 from The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Documentation Set, Alternative No. CA 6-6.

3. Assuming all 53 additional personnel are enlisted, this adds $431,271 to BAQ/VHA cost. Thus, recurring savings are lowered by same amount.

ROM 1.

AFPI-BC (5-10c) 9 Dec 94

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Fort Hamilton

1. Following information was discussed with LTC McNabb on 6 Dec.

a. If the reserves and MEPS are going to stay at Hamilton, it would seem to make sense to consider allowing some other small tenants to also remain there since this would not be a reserve enclave. Examples of this would be the CIDC, Vet, medical type activities. These would be small activities needing minimal office space which would allow us to probably avoid renovation costs at gaining sites or recurring leases.

b. Since family housing is not being retained, costs for VHA and BAQ must be included in the COBRA model. 261 of the 442 housing units were occupied by Army personnel at the end of FY 94. A conservative number of personnel to compute the VHA and BAQ costs would be the 261 Army personnel.

C. There is a contract for Household Goods shipments operated from Hamilton for the New York area. Contract amount is $2,448M and this needs to be carried as a recurring costs and not taken as savings.

d. Personnel

ASIP start point	W4LK-A	77 CIV
	W4LK01	38 CIV
	TOTAL	115 CIV

(1) RETAIN

AREA SUPPORT	9 CIV
CARETAKER	25 CIV
NYAC	17 CIV
TOTAL	51 CIV

(2) ELIMINATE 115 - 51 = 64 CIV; but only if Totten is reduced to a reserve enclave. otherwise there would be no personnel eliminations since these spaces would have to go to the operation of totten which currently takes place from Hamilton.

Neta R. Adams
for NETA R. ADAMS
Chief, BRAC 91 Branch

Attachment 1

out 21 persons against
13 persons Hamilton

FAMILY HOUSING DATA AS OF 09/30/94

INSTL	TOTAL INVENTOR	ARMY	NAVY	USCG	AIRFORC	MARINE	UNACC'D OCC'D	UNACC'D CIV	TOTAL OCC'D	TOTAL VACANT	TOTAL INACT
HAMILTOI	442	261	13	8	13	19	4	35	353	89	5
TOTTEN	188	109	4	0	3	9	1	1	127	61	22
	630	370	17	8	16	28	5	36	480	150	27

NOTE: INACTIVE UNITS ARE INCLUDED IN "TOTAL VACANT" CATEGORY

NITA says allow housing = 18% of total parts

17,500/yr

72 units at Manhattan Beach by DEC 31
USGG concurrent jurisdiction since 1990.
maybe 40 are usable

about 440 + barracks @ Wadsworth. USN no longer letting anyone in. DOI had planned to take over but has reneged. USCG plans to use about 276. USGG must modify. USN has requested to stay in about 60 unit. USCG currently using 83. There may be on about 25 units left.

may cost about $1.1M to bring up to specs. COE lower price to $ just to take it. USCG said no. COE is angry.

Manhattan units cost $160K/yr for up to 45 units

In 1972 USA gave up ownership in 1972. USN units 3/4 bdr was built 3-4 yrs ago. After USN gave up SIHP, DOI would take over

Brooklyn Air Station is going away since no longer need for Manhattan Housing.

Attachment 2

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: April 24, 1995

TIME: 11 a.m.

MEETING WITH: Letterkenny Army Depot representatives

SUBJECT: Letterkenny Army Depot (COBRA issues)

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Mike Joyce, Office of Rep. Bud Shuster (R-PA)
John Redding, Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) Coalition
Hallie Bunk, LEAD Coalition
Bob Jameson, Consultant
John Metz, LEAD Coalition
Dave Leonards, LEAD Coalition

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director, Review & Analysis
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader
Jim Owsley, Cross-Service Team Leader
Glenn Knoepfle; Cross-Service Team
Ty Trippet; Interagency Associate Analyst
Bob Bivins; Interagency Issues Team, Cobra Specialist
Bob Miller; Army DoD Analyst
Mike Kennedy; Army Team

MEETING PURPOSE: **(mm-lead3.doc)**

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

OK for

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

For Bar Review

DATE: April 6, 1995

TIME: 10:00

MEETING WITH: Univ of Colorado representatives

SUBJECT: Fitzsimons Army Medical Center

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Paige Reffe, Uof Colorado, DC representative
Mark Greenberg; The Jefferson Group (representing the city of Aurora, CO)

***Commission Staff*:**

Ed Brown; Army Team Leader
Dave Lewis; Army Team
Madeline Creedon; Counsel
Jim Schufrieder; Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren; Manager, State and Local Liaison

MEETING PURPOSE:

The Colorado representatives asked for a meeting to discuss the potential for the Commission to change the recommendation on Fitzsimons AMC from a closure to conversion to a "government owned/contractor operated" (GOCO) facility to be run by the University. Ms. Creedon explained that reuse issues do not fall under the purview of the Commission and suggested that they contact the Army and OSD officials responsible for implementing Commission decisions.

mm-fitz1.doc David Lewis/Army Team/4/8/95

Document Separator

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: April 20, 1995

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

MEETING WITH: Staff of Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA)

SUBJECT: Ft. Hunter Liggett, California

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Dave Borden, Office of Rep. Sam Farr
Edith Johnsen, Monterey County Supervisor
Veronica Ferguson, Monterey County Intergovernmental Affairs
Dr. Marion Bryson, former Director of Test & Experimentation Command
Red Walkley, Community Advisor
Peter Kozumplik, Consultant
J. R. Reskovac, Consultant

Commission Staff:

Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Steve Bailey, Army DoD Analyst

MEETING PURPOSE: Provided representatives of the community around Fort Hunter Liggett the opportunity to present information challenging the Army's recommendation to move the Test and Experimentation Center to Fort Bliss, Texas. Commission Staff was given reasons for keeping those missions and functions at Fort Hunter Liggett based primarily on operational and fiscal grounds as described in a four-page outline (Enclosure). A brief historical overview of the Test and Experimentation Center's mission and cumulative economic impact on the area were discussed, with representatives requesting that the Army be asked to analyze the installation as a test center as well as a training area.

Encl

MONTEREY COUNTY

THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

COUNTY OF MONTEREY / FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

INFORMATION MEETING WITH

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Thursday, 20 April 1995

ENCL

ARMY RECOMMENDATION IS A "SHOW STOPPER"

I. FLAWED ANALYSIS

A. Army recommendation evaluated Ft. Hunter Liggett **exclusively as a training area.**

B. Proper evaluation should also have considered FHL **as a proving ground.**

C. Critical questions regarding testing mission requirements were **omitted** in the Army's review and analysis process.

II. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS -- MILITARY VALUE

A. TEC as a system cannot be moved!

TEC is an *integrated* test and experimentation "system" consisting of people, instrumentation, and terrain. Some of the people can be moved, all of the instrumentation can be moved, but the terrain cannot be moved. Any attempt to move TEC will break it by destroying system integration. TEC cannot be reconstructed at Fort Bliss.

B. Frequency interference at Fort Bliss

TEC's instrumentation is set at 918 mhz. At Fort Bliss, the contiguous White Sands Proving Ground uses an overlapping frequency (915 mhz) for safety and drone control. It is not economically feasible to reprogram TEC instrumentation for an alternative frequency.

C. FHL can be closed for experimentation

FHL's configuration permits the required testing and experimentation of dangerous weapons or classified systems. As an isolated installation, it can be completely closed to all civilian traffic. Fort Bliss has a major highway running through it. This highway also requires heavy tracks to moved via transporter rather than under their own power.

D. FHL's terrain has been accurately digitized

Operational areas at FHL -- and much of the terrain surrounding the installation -- have been digitized to within one meter accuracy. Essential for some critical testing, this has not been done at Fort Bliss.

E. FHL has a variety of terrain

FHL contains a uniquely-wide variety of terrain essential for comprehensive experimentation. It has mountains, wooded hills, flat open valleys, lakes, rivers, and desert. Fort Bliss contains arid high western desert.

F. FHL has a laser-safe test area

FHL is **the sole** Army installation with "laser-safe bowl" for non-eye-safe laser testing.

G. FHL has space for simultaneous training and testing

FHL is sufficiently large to accommodate simultaneous testing and most divisional-level training exercises without interference.

H. FHL has unrestricted airspace

The Army owns all airspace above FHL to 24,000 feet. This airspace allows for complete freedom of maneuver during experiments. Airspace at Fort Bliss is constricted by an international border and commercial air traffic.

I. Low artificial light levels at FHL

Because of its isolation, artificial light contamination at FHL is virtually nonexistent -- enabling the tester to create whatever light level he desires to accommodate testing requirements. This is not the case at Fort Bliss.

III. COST CONSIDERATIONS -- RETURN ON INVESTMENT

A. Army analysis ignores operational costs

None of the operational costs -- in terms of replacing TEC instrumentation or changing its frequencies (the former is cheaper) -- were included in the Army COBRA analysis. Similarly, costs associated with test disruptions or moving tracks by transporters were not included.

B. TEC strength greatly overstated

The Army COBRA analysis uses a personnel strength of 456 (50 officers, 326 enlisted, 80 civilians) for TEC. However, force structure reductions already programmed will reduce the total strength to only 206 prior to the planned move. The Army analysis incorrectly includes a force structure saving as a BRAC saving. Furthermore, the planned force reduction will reduce BOS and RPMA costs at FHL -- thereby reducing that savings that would accrue from the proposed move.

C. RPMA/BOS costs are overstated for FHL and understated for Fort Bliss

RPMA and BOS costs associated with FHL are inflated while no RPMA or BOS costs are associated with Fort Bliss. However, the Reserve Component training garrison is to remain in place at FHL -- requiring RPMA and BOS costs very similar to those after the planned force reduction. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how an addition of 206 (or 456) personnel can be accommodated at Fort Bliss with *no* increase in these costs! These combine to render the anticipated savings illusory.

D. FHL has sufficient housing; Fort Bliss does not

FHL currently has 87 units of family housing, coupled with sufficient barracks and BOQ space to accommodate **ALL** personnel once the planned force reduction takes place. On the other hand, Fort Bliss lacks sufficient on-base housing for its current population. However, the increased personnel costs -- BAQ and VHA -- are not entered into the COBRA analysis.

E. Cost of moving TEC contracts was not considered

TEC is supported by a variety of contract personnel. The Army COBRA analysis avoids the costs associated with moving these personnel, terminating their contracts, or hiring new contractors (if such expertise can be found) at Fort Bliss.

F. Cost of moving TEC instrumentation was not considered

The summary statement in the Army COBRA analysis specifically notes that the cost of moving TEC instrumentation was not considered.

G. Cost of housing TEC instrumentation was not considered

The Army analysis does not consider any military construction requirements associated with moving TEC to Fort Bliss. However, necessary facilities to house the instrumentation must be built or modified to meet mission-peculiar requirements and there is a cost associated with this MILCON.

IV. CONCLUSION

As currently stated, the Army recommendation simply fails the common sense test on both operational and fiscal grounds. As the DoD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated in his 10 February 1995 memorandum, it is a **major** "show stopper" to the DoD OTE program.

V. RECOMMENDATION

Careful and complete **expert** analysis of the operational and fiscal implications of the Army recommendation to realign FHL.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: December 1, 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Campbell

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

See attached list

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Charlie Smith, Executive Director and Special Assistant to the Chairman
Madelyn Creedon, General Counsel
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional & Intergovernmental Liaison
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the standard community briefing. Discussions focused on the community's role in the Commission process. The staff told the representatives that communities should emphasize the military value of their installation in any presentation to the Commission at a regional hearing relegating economic impact to a secondary position since all communities are adversely impacted by the closure or realignment of an installation. The representatives left a booklet, *"Citizens for Fort Campbell – America's Premier Power Projection Platform – A Vital Defense Facility for the 21st Century in the Heartland of America,"* that has been placed in the Commission's library.

MANN & SMITH
Ensuring Your Tomorrow

Dwight Dickson
Bill Good, Jr.
Lee B. Hudson
Kevin Jwaish
Bill Knight
Walton N. Smith, Jr.
Freddy Wyatt

November 29, 1994

TO: Ce Ce Carman
BRAC Committee

Persons who will attend the BRAC briefing Thursday, December 1, 1994 at 2:00 PM in your office building

Kentucky:

Wally Bryan	Mayor, Hopkinsville, KY
Steve Tribble	County Executive, Christian Co.
John Mahre	Chamber Chairman, Hopkinsville
Arlivia Gamble	Chamber Chairman Elect, Hopkinsville
Darrell Gustafson	Vice Chairman Chamber Military Affairs, Hopkinsville
Kelly Walker	Chamber Director Military Affairs, Hopkinsville
Bobby Mace	Mayor, Oak Grove, KY
David Shore	Pennyrile ADD Executive Director, Cadiz, KY
Anne Carol Guffey	President Local AUSA Chapter, Hopkinsville
Austin Carroll	Past President AUSA, Hopkinsville

Tennessee:

Bob Thompson	County Executive, Montgomery Co., Clarksville
Billy Atkins	Chamber President, Clarksville
BG Wendell Gilbert (Ret.)	V.P. Development APSU University, Clarksville
Don Jenkins	Chamber Chairman Military Affairs, Clarksville
Walton Smith, Jr.	President Elect Chamber, Clarksville
Gene Washer	Publisher Clarksville Leaf Chronicle
Curtis Johnson	President Elect AUSA, Nashville
Dick Webber	State of TN Dept. Economic Development
Sandra Denny	Chamber Director Military Affairs, Clarksville
DeAnn Campbell	Vice Chairman Chamber Military Affairs, Clarksville

(615) 552-0921 [illegible] 100
FAX (615) 552-[illegible] [illegible] Bank

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 941108-2

FROM: Walton Smith	TO: Ben Borden
TITLE: —	TITLE: Dir R&A
ORGANIZATION: Mann & Smith	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
SENATOR DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A		✓	
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				ISSUES TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL							
				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

Confirming meeting w/ Ed Brown on 12/1/94

Due Date: 11-22-94	Routing Date: 11-8-94	Date Received: 11-8-94	Mail Date:

MANN&SMITH
Ensuring Your Tomorrow

November 4, 1994

Please refer to this number when responding 941108.2

Dwight Dickson

Bill Good, Jr.

Lee B. Hudson

Kevin Judish

Bill Knight

Walton N. Smith, Jr.

Freddy Wyatt

Mr. Ben Borden
Chairman of Research & Analysis
BRAC Committee
1700 N. More Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Borden:

I appreciate your cooperation in scheduling a meeting with a few of us from Clarksville, Tennessee and Hopkinsville, Kentucky.

It is my understanding we will meet with Ed Brown and he will give us an overview of the BRAC process and how it will effect our family member, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Approximately, eight members of our group will meet with Mr. Brown at your office on December 1, 1994 at 2:00 PM.

Again, thanks for your cooperation

Sincerely,

Walton

Walton N. Smith, Jr.

cc: Billy Atkins
Anna Carol Guffey
Kelly Walker
Sandra Denny

(615) 552-0924
FAX (615) 552-0949

126 Main Street, Suite 100
Lower Level, First American Bank
Clarksville, TN 37040

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 941125-2

FROM: Wendell Ford, et.al	TO: David S. Lyles, et.al
TITLE: U.S. Senator	TITLE: Staff Director
ORGANIZATION: U.S. Congress	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: Fort Campbell	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
SENATOR DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				ISSUES TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL							
				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
✓	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

Invitation to meeting on Dec 1, '94 re: Fort Campbell. Same invite addressed to. Charles Smith.

Due Date:	Routing Date:	Date Received:	Mail Date:
11-28-94	11-25-94	11-21-94	

MITCH McCONNELL
KENTUCKY

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE
APPROPRIATIONS
RULES
ETHICS (VICE CHAIRMAN)

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1702
(202) 224-2541

Please refer to this number when responding 941125.2

November 15, 1994

Mr. David Lyles
Staff Director
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear David:

On behalf of the Kentucky and Tennessee Congressional delegation we would like to invite you to attend a breakfast meeting on Thursday, December 1 at 8:30 a.m. in room S 151 of the Capitol. Joining us at this meeting will be the Citizens for Fort Campbell a group made up of Kentucky and Tennessee AUSA members as well as members of the Hopkinsville - Christian County Chamber and the Clarksville - Montgomery County Chamber.

We think that you will benefit from a presentation given by the Citizens for Fort Campbell outlining their ongoing commitment to Fort Campbell. As you know, Ft. Campbell has enjoyed its status as one of the premiere military installations in the U.S. in part because of the universal support it has received from both the surrounding community as well as the Congress and Army.

We sincerely hope that you will be able to join us for these important discussions. Please contact Billy Piper at 224-2541 to let us know if you can attend.

Sincerely,

Mitch McConnell
MITCH McCONNELL
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Wendell Ford
WENDELL FORD
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Jim Sasser
JIM SASSER
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Harlan Matthews
HARLAN MATTHEWS
UNITED STATES SENATOR

FEDERAL BUILDING
241 MAIN STREET
ROOM 102
BOWLING GREEN, KY 42101
(502) 781-1673

FEDERAL BUILDING
ROOM 307
COVINGTON, KY 41011
(606) 261-6304

155 EAST MAIN STREET
SUITE 210
LEXINGTON, KY 40507
(606) 252-1781

1501 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE N
LONDON, KY 40741
(606) 864-2026

600 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. PLACE
ROOM 451
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202
(502) 582-6304

IRVIN COBB BUILDING
608 BROADWAY
PADUCAH, KY 42001
(502) 442-4554

TENNESSEE-KENTUCKY
CHAPTER
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
P.O. Box 7, Fort Campbell, KY 42223

December 15, 1994

Mr. Ed Brown
Base Closure & Realignment Commission
2700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with the "Citizens for Fort Campbell" and for your invaluable insight into the 1995 BRAC process.

It was a pleasure to meet you and have the opportunity to share with you our sincere concern for the defense of our nation and for the welfare of the officers, soldiers, and family members at Fort Campbell who are an integral part of our community.

The 8,000 members of the TN-KY Chapter are proud to be the "Voice of the Army" for Fort Campbell, the Army's Premier Power Projection Platform, and to represent the greatest fighting forces in the world, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (Airborne)!

We thank you for your service to our country and look forward to working with you for the continued best interest of the Army.

Sincerely,

Anna Caryl Guffey
Chapter President

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: October 17, 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Leonard Wood, MO

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

See attached sheet

Commission Staff:

Tom Houston, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Mary Woodward, Congressional & Governmental Affairs
Cece Carman, Congressional & Governmental Affairs
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Tom welcomed the delegation and explained the importance of communities interfacing with the Commission staff prior to the Secretary of Defense sending his recommendations to the Commission on March 1, 1995. Ed gave the standard Commission briefing. As shown in the attached agenda, various members of the delegation presented information concerning the quality of life at Fort Leonard Wood and the importance of the installation to the local economy. The Commission staff emphasized that the closure or realignment of any installation will likely have an adverse impact on the local economy; therefore, if Fort Leonard Wood is recommended for closure or realignment, any community presentation to the Commission should focus on the military value of the installation in comparison with other installations in its category. The community also gave the Commission a public relations notebook about Fort Leonard Wood.

F.C.F.
F.L.W.F.
Friends Concerned For Fort Leonard Wood's Future
P.O. Box 877SRB • 314-336-5121 • Fax 314-336-5472
Waynesville/St. Robert, Mo. 65583

MISSOURI DELEGATION TO
B.R.A.C. STAFF - OCTOBER 17, 1994

JOHN B. MAHAFFEY CHAIRMAN OF FRIENDS OF FLW; CASA MO. (WEST)	SPRINGFIELD, MO	(417-883-9180)
ROGER WILSON LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, STATE OF MISSOURI		
CHARLIE BROWN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, FRIENDS OF FLW	LEBANON, MO	(417-532-6157)
JERRY CLARK EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, (VOLUNTEER) FRIENDS OF FLW	SPRINGFIELD, MO	(417-881-5655)
DR. WALT GAJDA (GYDA) VICE CHANCELLOR OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA	ROLLA, MO	(314-341-4138)
TOM MURRAY ACTIVE ARMY VOLUNTEER	RICHLAND, MO	(314-765-3221)
CHRIS MORRISEY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT	(314-336-5121)
COL. ED OWSLEY RETIRED CHIEF OF STAFF FLW PRESIDENT STATE OF MISSOURI AUSA, MAYOR PRO-TEM OF ROLLA, MO	ROLLA, MO	(314-364-6595)
KEITH PRITCHARD CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF 50	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT, MO	(314-774-6417)
BILL RANSDALL MAYOR OF WAYNESVILLE, MO; FORMER PRESIDENT 5TH REGION AUSA	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT, MO	(314-341-3838)
BILL SELLERS FORMER PRESIDENT FORT WOOD-MID MO CHAPTER AUSA	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT, MO	(314-338-2000)
LARRY SEXTON PRESIDENT, FORT WOOD-MID MO CHAPTER AUSA	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT, MO	(314-336-2000)
REV. JUDI TILLET COMMUNITY LEADER	WAYNESVILLE-ST. ROBERT, MO	(314-774-5389)
FRED VOSS AREA VICE PRESIDENT, FORT WOOD-MID MO CHAPTER AUSA	ROLLA, MO	(314-364-3676)
GORDON WARREN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, FRIENDS OF FLW; FORMER MAYOR, RICHLAND, MO	RICHLAND, MO	(314-765-3230)

F.C.F.
F.L.W.F.
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Waynesville/St. Robert, Mo. 65583

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Lynn Sharp

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BG Arvid E. West, Jr. (USA Ret.)

Lake of the Ozarks, Mo.
MG Jack Waggener (USA Ret.)

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Neal Ethridge
Sam Hamra
John B. Mahaffey
John E. Moore, Jr.

St. Louis, Mo.
Stephen F. Brauer
Stuart Symington, Jr.
George "Bert" Walker

PRESENTATION AGENDA

OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTION OF MISSOURI GROUP	John Mahaffey
QUALITY OF LIFE	Rev. Judi Tillett
EDUCATION	Dr. Walt Gajda
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES	Keith Prichard
INTRO VIDEO	Keith Prichard
SPECIAL INTRODUCTION OF LT. GOVERNOR	John Mahaffey
STATEMENT FROM STATE OF MISSOURI	Lt. Governor Roger Wilson
CLOSING REMARKS	John Mahaffey

Distribute Resource Material

Questions from Staff

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 941101-5

FROM: KEITH W. PRITCHARD	TO: BROWN
TITLE:	TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER
ORGANIZATION: F.C.F. F.L.W.F.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO.	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
CHAIRMAN COURTER	✓			COMMISSIONER BOWMAN			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER BYRON			
SPECIAL ASSISTANT				COMMISSIONER COX			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER JOHNSON			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER LEVITT			
				COMMISSIONER MCPHERSON			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STUART			
PRESS SECRETARY				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A			
DIR./EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF R & A			
				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				ISSUES TEAM LEADER			
SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR				COBRA MODEL ANALYST			
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION				DATABASE ANALYST (GIS)			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

⇒ TYL FOR RECENT MEETING w/ DBCRC.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 11/1/94	Date Received: 11/1/94	Mail Date:

F.C.F.
F.L.W.F.
Friends Concerned For Fort Leonard Wood's Future
P.O. Box 877SRB • 314-336-5121 • Fax 314-336-5472
Waynesville/St. Robert, Mo. 65583

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Neal Ethridge
Sam Hamra
John B. Mahaffey
John E. Moore, Jr.

St. Louis, Mo.
Stephen F. Brauer
Stuart Symington, Jr.
George "Bert" Walker

October 24, 1994

Please refer to this number when responding 941101-5

Edward A. Brown II
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Mr. Brown,

Let me take this opportunity to thank you and the BRAC Staff for allowing the Friends of Ft Leonard Wood to meet and discuss the relationship of Ft Leonard Wood and our country's defense.

We found the meeting informative, direct and very beneficial. We encourage further evaluation of Fort Leonard Wood by the DA, DOD, and BRAC teams. Further review will demonstrate Fort Leonard Wood's ability to accomplish DOD goals at an efficient cost. Fort Leonard Wood is very flexible and can support various missions from all branches of service.

Our 63,000 acre compound adjoins 150,000 acres of National Forest which provides a year round realistic training environment with four distinct seasons. Fort Leonard Wood enjoys full support from local and state agencies that in no way restrict base training or operations.

Fort Leonard Wood remains a major TRADOC command base and was recently awarded the Installation of Excellence by TRADOC. While we support our major

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missions; U S Army Engineer Center, U S Army Basic Training, International Officer Training, Joint Interservice Training. We also support other DOD contingency missions such as: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Haiti, Panama, Bosnia, Somilia, the Iraq conflict and

It is clear that Fort Leonard Wood is a major Army base that contributes dramatically to the DOD missions. Fort Leonard Wood has military value that cannot be overlooked or understated.

Please feel free to contact me at anytime if I can provide assistance in your agency's evaluation of Fort Leonard Wood.

Sincerely,

Keith W. Pritchard

Keith W. Pritchard

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: February 17, 1995

TIME: 11:00 AM

MEETING WITH: Newport News Delegation

SUBJECT: Fort Eustis

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Joe S. Franks, Councilman, City of Newport News, 2400 Washington Avenue, Newport News, VA 23607 (804) 873-2131
Dan Shellabarger, Executive Assistant to the President, Warwick Group Limited, The Warwick Building, 10858 Warwick Blvd., PO Box 1039, Newport News, VA 23601 (804) 599-9470 FAX (804) 873-4887
Dave O'Brien, Consultant
Wayne Arney, Consultant
Jack Blume, Consultant

Commission Staff:

Cece Carman, Director of Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
* Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Rick Brown, Senior Analyst, Army Team
Steve Bailey, DoD Analyst, Army Team
Bob Miller, DoD Analyst, Army Team
David Lewis, GAO Analyst, Army Team
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Eric Lindenbaum, DoD Analyst, Navy Team

MEETING NOTES: Because of the familiarity of the attendees, no Commission process briefing was given. Councilman Frank provided information that detailed the military value of Fort Eustis. In addition, he stated that the Army's data call did not permit Fort Eustis to address adequately its unique capabilities and the mission of the 7th Transportation Group. The community representatives left copies of a pamphlet entitled *Fort Eustis and Fort Story, Virginia – Lifeline to the Frontline* and a series of information papers on the "value added" by Fort Eustis as a major training site and power projection platform. Copies of both are in the library,

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: February 16, 1995

TIME: 2 :00 PM

MEETING WITH: Governor Mel Carnahan of Missouri and Missouri Congressional Delegation Representatives

SUBJECT: Fort Leonard Wood and Aviation and Troop Support Command

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

The Honorable Mel Carnahan, Governor of Missouri
Mr. Eric Jaffe, Office of the Governor of Missouri, DC Office
Ms. Jill Friedman, Office of the Governor of Missouri
Mr. David Shorr, Director of Natural Resources, State of Missouri
Mr. Larry Sexton, President, Fort Leonard Wood Chapter, AUSA
COL (Ret) Phil Hoge, St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association
Mr. Jack Pollard, Office of Representative Ike Skelton
Mr. Lindsay Neas, Office of Representative Jim Talent
Mr. Jeff Kuhnreich, Office of Senator Kit Bond
Mr. Mike Boxerman, Office of Representative Richard Gephardt
Mr. Tim McAnarney, Consultant

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Britta Brackney, Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Wade Nelson, Director of Communications
Ralph Kaiser, Office of the General Counsel
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
* Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
J. J. Gertler, Senior Analyst, Army Team
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Because of the familiarity of the attendees, no Commission process briefing was given. Governor Carnahan made a presentation outlining the military value of both Fort Leonard Wood and Aviation and Troop Support Command. A copy of a handout with his comments is attached. Discussions centered on the permits required if the Army recommends relocation of the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) and smoke training to Fort Leonard Wood. Mr. Shorr stated that the necessary permits for the CDTF could be issued by mid-May if the Army submits the proper and complete documentation to replicate the facility that currently exists at Fort McClellan immediately. Mr. Shorr also stated that smoke training was permittable based on the smoke test that was done in May 1993.

Please refer to this number when responding 950216-3

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

STATE OF MISSOURI
JEFFERSON CITY
(314) 751-3222

MEL CARNAHAN
GOVERNOR

ROOM 216
STATE CAPITOL
65101

Governor Mel Carnahan
Comments to the Base Realignment and Closing Commission
2/16/95

Thank you for granting us the time to address the future of United States Army installations in Missouri.

Specifically, I would like to talk to you about Ft. Leonard Wood and the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis. It should be clear that Missouri is united in the effort to keep these two facilities -- and to ensure that they remain a viable part of the country's (overall) military mission.

All six elected officials in Missouri, both Republicans and Democrats from all regions of the state, have come together to sign a letter in support of this effort. Congressman Ike Skelton has done an excellent job in representing the interests of his district in Washington, and Senators Bond and Ashcroft are also fully committed to this effort.

FT. LEONARD WOOD

Ft. Leonard Wood has been, and continues to be a vital part of the United State's military mission.

MILITARY MISSION

The centerpiece of Ft. Leonard Wood is the United States Army Engineer Center. It is recognized as a state-of-the art facility -- that sets the standard for training engineers not only for the Army, but for the Department of Defense.

This facility serves a critical role in developing engineers who will be prepared for the battlefield of the next century. Furthermore, this facility is the only installation in the U.S. Army that provides engineer training for:

- officers,
- non-commissioned officers, and

- enlisted personnel at the same location.

In addition, Ft. Leonard Wood is one of only four sites in the country for basic training. And of these four, Ft. Leonard Wood is the leader in gender-integrated training, (a pilot project where men and women are trained together).

As for general operations:

- An estimated 5,600 soldiers were trained at Ft. Leonard Wood for deployment during Operation Desert Storm.
- About 17,000 troops use the installation for weekend and annual training;
- 187 National Guard and Reserve units also use the base for training; and
- Ft. Leonard Wood provides Air National Guard units with the only bombing and strafing range in the region.
- In fact, the range is used by 4,000 aircraft -- 250 days a year.

LAND USAGE

Ft. Leonard Wood covers 63,000 acres, comprised of woods, hills, rivers, lakes and streams. This makes the base ideal for:

- basic training,
- training engineers in bridge building,
- training combat engineers in land mine warfare and demolition, and
- it provides realistic training conditions for operators of armored personnel carriers.
- In addition to those benefits -- Forney Army Airfield, has a 6,000 foot runway that is capable of handling U.S. Air Force C-130 transports, as well as civilian 757 aircraft.

EXPANDABILITY

Ft. Leonard Wood has the facilities, the resources, and the support to handle additional missions.

In fact, the base, the people in the surrounding communities and the local and state government are ready, willing and able to take on additional missions. And as their representatives we aggressively seek other missions for Ft. Leonard Wood.

Ft. Leonard Wood is located near the population center of the United States, but is in a sparsely-populated area: the population density is a mere 40 residents per square mile.

Considering the size, location and versatility, Ft. Leonard Wood is well-suited, (for example), as a site for the Army's chemical decontamination training facility. In fact -- All of the biological, and chemical training could be conducted at Ft. Leonard Wood. We are already reviewing any and all environmental concerns, and are prepared to expedite the review process in order to issue a permit for such a facility by mid-May.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

There are 11,800 military personnel at the installation in addition to nearly 5,000 civilian employees. Nearly half of those work for contractors. The operating budget of the installation is $100 million.

Ft. Leonard Wood is the state's largest employer outside the two metro areas. One in every 8 dollars in income received in the area is earned by military personnel -- and in the 9- county area around Ft. Leonard Wood -- military personnel hold 1 out of every 10 jobs.

Closing this base would simply devastate the nearby communities that were built, (by and large) in support of the base. Not only would the impact hit the towns of Waynesville and St. Roberts, but the repercussions would be felt throughout the entire state.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Although Ft. Leonard Wood is located in a rural area -- the region offers many of the amenities of a more populous area.

The University of Missouri-Rolla, (located only 30 miles away), is recognized internationally for its engineering education. UMR is one of only two institutions in the country offering professional training in all of the energy and minerals engineering disciplines. And currently, it offers courses at Ft. Leonard Wood. In fact, military personnel can earn a master's degree in as little as 36 weeks.

And when it comes to public service, Ft. Leonard Wood is outstanding. For example, the base hosts the Missouri Special Olympics Summer Games, which is recognized as one of the top five Special Olympics events in the world.

There are also great recreational opportunities throughout central Missouri -- just two hours from the base is Branson, the new capital of country music. Even closer still is the lake of the Ozarks, and not more than two-hours away to the Northeast is St. Louis (with all the big city amenities including the arts and professional sports) -- and now it is also home of the new St. Louis Rams football team.

AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND (ATCOM)

Speaking of St. Louis, it goes without saying that ATCOM personnel have the opportunity to experience the many fascinating attributes that St. Louis has to offer -- from the St. Louis Symphony, and the new science center, to the world famous St. Louis Zoo, just to mention a few. Furthermore, St. Louis has the lowest cost of living of any of the nation's top metropolitan areas.

MILITARY MISSION-ATCOM

The ATCOM mission is vital to the Army, and if it is not performed here, it must be performed elsewhere.

Essentially, ATCOM is the lead Army commodity command for life cycle management of all Army aviation systems and soldier support equipment. This management includes research, maintenance, overhaul and eventual disposal. The command provides logistics and ensures aviation system and soldier support equipment readiness for the Army worldwide.

The ATCOM mission is fully integrated into the war fighting system of our nation. It is vital to the efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness of the Army.

LAND USAGE-ATCOM

The command is located in General Services Administration facilities called the Federal Center in North St. Louis. It is adjacent to Interstate 70, and only six miles from Lambert Airport. The facility is well served by mass transit, and in addition to highways and air -- ATCOM materials are readily shipped on the inland waterway and railroad.

Construction at the Federal Center has totaled $100 million since 1981, with $13 million in construction currently under way. ATCOM rents this facility from GSA for $8 to $9 a square foot, compared to $16 for the average Class A office space in the St. Louis region...

ECONOMIC IMPACT-ATCOM

Of the 3,600 ATCOM employees, 96% are civilians.

By being located in a major urban area, ATCOM offers many people job opportunities they might not have otherwise. In fact, of the 3600 employees -- approximately 30% are minorities.

For ATCOM employees, this mission represents good jobs, with excellent career training and advancement opportunities unmatched elsewhere in the urban area.

CONCLUSION

The Armed Forces, during a previous BRAC review, concluded that the Army Aviation and troop support functions are essential and must continue to be performed. The review also revealed that some cost savings were achieved by combining the two functions -- which is now ATCOM.

In fact, less than two years ago, a BRAC follow-up review concluded...and I quote: *"The high relocation costs make realignment and closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."*

Well, today the same is true as it was then. The cost, (not only in dollars) but in force readiness, sustainability, and general social upheaval of a community makes the cost of closing or relocating ATCOM cost prohibitive -- and ultimately not in the best interest of the nation.

Similarly, once you have considered all the facts, we believe you will conclude:

1. Ft. Leonard Wood provides state-of-the-art training to engineers that would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere;
2. Ft. Leonard Wood provides modern training facilities, as evidenced by its successful gender-integrated program;
3. Ft. Leonard Wood has excellent growth potential and a community that supports future expansion;
4. Ft. Leonard Wood offers exceptional educational opportunities and an up scale quality of life.

The entire state of Missouri and (in particular) the nine surrounding rural counties and the city of St. Louis, strongly support the missions of Ft. Leonard Wood -- and ATCOM -- and want to see them both continue to thrive.

Missouri is proud of its long and distinguished association with the United States Army. And we look forward to seeing that continue. Thank you.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: January 26, 1995

TIME: 9:00

MEETING WITH: City of Huntsville, AL delegation

SUBJECT: Redstone Arsenal

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number: 703-548-6300 or 205-265-9195

The Honorable Steve Hettinger; Mayor of Huntsville
Larry Capps; Co-Chair BRAC Community Task Force and General Manager.-Huntsville Operations-Raytheon
Joe Ritch; Co-Chair BRAC Community Task Force and Attorney, Serrote and Permutt
Larry Waller; President, Huntsville Chamber of Commerce
Douglass Sileo; Director, BRAC Community Task Force

***Commission Staff*:**

David Lyles, Staff Director
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison
* Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Mike Kennedy, Army Team
Dick Helmer, Cross-Service Team
Bob Bivins, Interagency Issues Team, Cobra Specialist
Tony Forkin, Executive Secretariat

MEETING PURPOSE: Ed gave the DBCRC process briefing. The community representatives emphasized the unique facilities that existed at Redstone Arsenal, the technological capabilities of the installation, the ability of the installation to accept additional missions, and the importance of the installation to the local economy. In addition, they provided a video about the installation and a booklet that profiles Redstone Arsenal and Huntsville/Madison County.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: January 25, 1995

TIME: 2:00

MEETING WITH: Yuma, AZ delegation

SUBJECT: Yuma Proving Ground and Yuma Marine Corps Air Station

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

The Honorable Marilyn Young; Mayor of Yuma
Gene Fisher; Rep. Ed Pastor's Office
Don Soldwedel; Chairman, Yuma Task Force
Barry Rhoads; Consultant

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Charles Smith, Executive Director/Special Assistant
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison
Chris Goode, Director of Administration
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
James Landrith, Navy Team
Jim Owsley, Cross-Service Team Leader
Ann Reese, Cross-Service Team

MEETING PURPOSE: Ed gave the DBCRC process briefing. The community representatives emphasized the lack of restrictions in using the ranges associated with MCAS Yuma and Yuma Proving Ground and of encroachment around both installations. In addition, the community representatives stated that there are no environmental problems in the Yuma area similar to those in other areas of Arizona.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: January 4, 1995

TIME: 10:00 AM

MEETING WITH: Concerned Responsible Individuals in Support of Picatinny (CRISP)

SUBJECT: Picatinny Arsenal

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Martin Chase
John Amerspek
Garrett Roosma
Bill Manning; Consultant

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Charles Smith, Executive Director/Special Assistant
Wade Nelson, Director of Communications
Chuck Pizer, Deputy Director of Communications
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Jim Owsley, Cross Service Team Leader

MEETING PURPOSE: Because the attendees were familiar with the Commission process, Ed gave an abbreviated version of the standard briefing highlighting changes in the law since the 1993 round. Mr. Chase presented a briefing that explained CRISP and emphasized their recommendation that the Army establish the Armaments Command, a research, development, and engineering command, at Picatinny Arsenal. In addition, the CRISP representatives provided a white paper entitled *Why Picatinny* and copies of letters sent to Department of the Army officials.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: January 13, 1995

TIME: 2:00

MEETING WITH: Sen. Bennett's office

SUBJECT: Military installations in Utah

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Greg Whisenant; BRAC Project Legislative Aide, Sen. Bennet Office
Corrine Larson; Military Legisllative Assistant, Sen. Bennett Office

Commission Staff:

Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
***Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader**
Jim Owsley, Cross-Service Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader

MEETING PURPOSE: Frank gave process briefing to staff. Staffers relayed their primary concern was Hill AFB and asked about best methods for community interaction. We discussed in length , suggesting that Hill AFB had a goood effort that goes through Mike Pavich. Staffers also commented about recent articles implying that past closures had not gone as planned nor fast enough, engendering much discussion. We also discussed implications of environmental clean-up as well as environmental compliance costs. fc

December 15, 1994

Mr. Ed Brown
Base Closure & Realignment Commission
2700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Brown,

We appreciate the briefing on BRAC and the process for accomplishing your upcoming mission.

The individuals in our Citizens for Fort Campbell delegation are citizens interested in the welfare of our communities. We are proud of the men and women of the 101st Airborne ASSLT, 5th Special Forces and the 160th SOAR. They are excellent soldiers and fine individuals who contribute to the cultural richness of our communities and we appreciate the contribution they are making to our national defense.

Thank you and you staff for your presentation and for providing us a better understanding of the Commission.

Sincerely,

John Mahre, AIA
Chairman
Hopkinsville Chamber of Commerce

Billy P. Atkins
Chairman
Clarksville Chamber of Commerce

Hopkinsville Christian County Chamber of Commerce

The Chamber
HOPKINSVILLE
CHRISTIAN COUNTY

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: December 12, 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Lewis and McChord AFB, WA

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Tom Swarner; Publisher, Military News Publishers
Mike Worthy; Area President, First Interstate Bank of Washington, N.A., 1201 Pacific Avenue, P.O. Box 1997, Tacoma, WA 98401, (206) 593-5217
David Graybill; President & CEO, Tacoma–Pierce County Chamber of Commerce, 950 Pacific Avenue, Suite 300, P.O. Box 1933, Tacoma, WA 98401, (206) 627-2175

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional & Intergovernmental Liaison
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the Commission process briefing. The staff told the community representatives that the Commission would not have the Services' responses to data calls until after March 1. The staff also outlined the procedures used by the 1993 Commission in its conduct of regional hearings. The community representatives toured the library and left a public relations video on Tacoma.

First Interstate Bank
Northwest Region

First Interstate Bank
of Washington, N.A.
Southwest Washington
1201 Pacific Avenue
P. O. Box 1997
Tacoma, WA 98401
206 593-5217 FAX 593-5611

Michael C. Worthy
Area President

December 28, 1994

Edward A. Brown, III
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure's Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Ed,

Our thanks to you for the briefing on the BRAC process and an introduction to the library. We had some knowledge of the process, but you confirmed our understanding and clarified some important issues for us.

You'll understand if we hope for little contact with you in the future. Rest assured that if we do, we know it will be professional and forthright.

Thanks again for your attention to our community's concerns.

Best Regards,

MCW/db

Member FDIC

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: October 3, 1994

SUBJECT: Yuma Proving Ground and Marine Corps Air Station Yuma

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Don Sodwedel, Chairman of the Board, Western Newspapers, Inc., (602) 783-3311
Sam Pepper, Publisher, The Yuma Daily Sun, (602) 783-3333

Commission Staff:

Tom Houston, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Cece Carman, Congressional Liaison
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the standard DBCRC briefing. Discussions centered on the joint cross-service groups, particularly test & evaluation; the environmental impact on gaining installations of relocating missions; the role of economic impact; the importance of military value; and the need for consultants in representing communities and states.

WESTERN NEWSPAPERS, INC.
290 S. 1st Ave., Suite 4, Yuma, Arizona 85364
General Offices: (602) 783-3311
Financial Center: (602) 782-9555

DATE: October 10, 1994

FROM: DON SOLDWEDEL

TO: Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader
BRACC
Arlington, VA

Dear Ed:

After listening to you last week during your excellent briefing to Mr. Pepper and me I came away feeling I knew you well!.

You really handled everything well. . spelling each step very clearly for us.

The next day we had a very interesting meeting, which was as encouraging as it can be at this point in the process, with the AMC at Alexandria.

Again our thanks to you for the amount of time you gave us and thanks for the help.

Sincerely,

Don

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: September 1, 1994

SUBJECT: Defense Presence in Maryland

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Wiley Pearson, Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Barbara Mikulski, (202) 224-4654

Commission Staff:

Tom Houston, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Cece Carman, Congressional Liaison
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed presented the short DBCRC process briefing . Wiley's questions dealt with the Commission's consideration of installations that are below threshold, particularly those of the Reserve Components; the conduct of regional hearings; and the potential impact of the joint Cross-Service groups. Ed gave him copies of the 1991 and 1993 Commission reports, the 1995 milestones, PL 101-510, and the closure history for installations in Maryland.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 23 Aug 94

SUBJECT: Fort Hood

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

GEN (Ret) Robert M. Shoemaker, County Commissioner, Bell County, Texas, (817) 933-5102

Commission Staff:

*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader
Cece Carman, Congressional Liaison

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the Commission overview briefing. GEN Shoemaker's questions dealt with the Army's decision-making process, the conduct of regional hearings, and Army force structure decisions and their potential impact on CONUS installations. Copies of relevant portions of the Army's 1993 submission to the Commission, Public Law 101-510, 10 USC 2687, the Commission milestones, and recent stories from the *Army* Times pertaining to Fort Hood were given to GEN Shoemaker. Gen Shoemaker provided the attached copies of documents from the Howdy Task Force.

HOWDY TASK FORCE
P. O. BOX 548
KILLEEN, TEXAS 76540

AUGUST 8, 1994

STAY THE COURSE AT FORT HOOD

A 1991 army objective assessment of division posts measured 35 discrete attributes under the five major categories of mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiencies, expandibility and quality of life. This quantitative study identified Fort Hood as the army's best "Fighting Installation". When qualitative comparisons are added, the superiority of Fort Hood as the army's premier station is even more striking. Fort Hood stands alone in the quality and capacity of its maneuver terrain and automated multi-purpose ranges which are just minutes away from garrison motor parks.

Outstanding support of soldiers and their families is a proud tradition of the civilian communities surrounding Fort Hood. Within weeks of the July, 1991 announcement that the division from Fort Polk would move to Fort Hood, subject to successful environmental studies, seven cities in the Hood commuting area had formed the "Howdy Task Force" which was charged with coordinating community preparations for the integration of the incoming soldiers and families in Central Texas.

In the last three years over 4,500 new housing units have been constructed in the post commuting area. With these new units the historical factor of 95% of the off-post families living in the tri-cities within 10 miles of the main gate has been maintained. Recently three new multi-family housing projects have been announced which will add about five hundred more close-in rental units. For the past year new single family homes have been completed in the tri-cities at a rate of more than four a day, and building permits continue to be issued at boom rates.

Since December 1991 over 40,000 soldiers have saved $10,600,000 because of deposit waiver programs of fifteen utility companies and city water departments. During the same period, rental deposit waivers and local housing set-aside programs have benefitted 2,564 soldiers with savings of $1,800,000. In August 1994 the Howdy Housing Chairman was notified by Congressman Edward's office that the Farm and Home Administration had agreed to the local request for regulatory changes which would extend eligibility for FMHA "No to Low" interest home mortgages to service personnel. A preliminary survey shows that over 8,000 Fort Hood soldiers would meet the eligibility requirements for these very favorable loans. This initiative by the Howdy Housing Committee will benefit service people throughout the United States.

The Fort Hood Housing Office surveyed 500 rental units in December 1992 and again in September 1993, and compared rates from 1989 to the survey

date. On average, rental increase over a four year period was 13% (5% each in 92 and 93). During the same four year period the military basic allowance for quarters increased 16.8%, while Killeen property taxes increased 34% and property insurance increased even more.

When current school construction projects are completed in the summer of 1995, about 600 classrooms and labs will have been added since 1990 to the two school districts which serve Fort Hood children. Local voters have passed $36 million in bond issues for school construction in the last two years. In September 1994 Copperas Cove citizens will vote on an additional $12 million to add more capacity including a new junior high school.

Major construction of retail outlets both on and off post will make family living even better. A second commissary with 24 checkout lines opened in May 1994, and a major PX will soon be started. A new Holiday Inn Motel and several national restaurant chains (Red Lobster, etc.) have opened. Projects underway include a new shopping complex which will include Toys R Us and Target Stores, one of the first five Walmart "Super Stores" in Texas, and three chain supermarkets.

The Texas Department of Transportation agreed two years ago to expedite the development of highways serving the Fort Hood area. A south loop around Killeen now under construction will connect across west Fort Hood with a loop to be constructed around Copperas Cove.

Practically all of the developments outlined above have occurred in response to the final decision just two years ago that the Army would increase the military strength of Fort Hood to nearly 45,000. Certainly there have been growing pains during the buildup of Fort Hood. But the process is over the hump. Everyday the close-in housing market will improve. Excellent school systems will get even better.

During the BRAC 95 process someone may suggest that the strength of Fort Hood be reduced. This would exchange minor, temporary problems which will be solved months before BRAC 95 decisions are made for serious long term trouble. A reduction of troops at Fort Hood would provide the smallest incremental savings in base operations of any reduction the Army could make. The ratio of base operations costs to mission costs would be increased. The Army's best home station maneuver grounds and firing ranges would be underutilized. Local taxpayers and businesses would be punished for investing in additional capacity of schools and stores by the whipsaw effect of a reduction of students and customers just months after the build up to 44,500 has been completed. But the group hardest hit would be the 5,000 active army officers and NCO home owners as the local housing markets turn soft. The Army does not want key officers and NCO's bad mouthing assignment to its best post because "You can't sell your house there."

In these challenging times the Army must wring every bit of readiness from each dollar available and from every soldier on the rolls. Now is the time for the Army to stay the course and reap the full benefit of its best and most efficient post.

HOWDY TASK FORCE
P. O. BOX 548
KILLEEN, TEXAS 76540

AUGUST 8, 1994

THE CASE FOR CONTINUED FULL UTILIZATION OF FORT HOOD

Military Value: During the BRAC 91 process an army objective assessment named Fort Hood the Army's top Ranked Fighting installation and added units at Fort Hood to bring troop strength to nearly 45,000. Since then the facilities of Fort Hood and its supporting cities have been further improved and modernized.

Just minutes away from the garrison motor parks, Hood units can train on the best brigade sized maneuver terrain in CONUS with rolling interspersed woods and open area simulating terrain in the worlds temperate areas. Additional densely wooded areas simulate jungle conditions. Water crossings up to one quarter mile can be practiced. There are two villages for training in urban warfare. The terrain is ideal for helicopter training on and off post. Hood parachute drop zones can handle brigade size drops. The moderate climate permits year round learning.

Nine automated, multi-purpose (tank, Bradley, helicopter) ranges can handle six maneuver battalions simultaneously. Six automated small arms ranges and 46 other ranges make up the best range complex in the army. All army weapons except Patriot and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) routinely fire at Hood. Air Force weapons up to B-52 with 500 pound bombs use Hood ranges.

A mobilization and equipment site for the Texas Army National Guard at North Fort Hood stores 29 battalion equipment sets, including 49th Armored Division units. Over 20,000 reserve component troops conduct annual training at Fort Hood.

More than one hundred off-post sites under no cost usage permits are available in a 10,000 square mile box in central-west Texas for aviation training and headquarters sites for real distance CPX's. Restricted air space over Fort Hood, and low density civil air traffic in the vicinity enhance joint training with the USAF.

Fort Hood has the army's largest computer driven battle simulation center, which can exercise battalion to corps level staffs. III Corps can wargame with up to 5 divisions.

In addition to the qualitative edge in terrain and facilities there is the added advantage of the face-to-face building of the full corps support team working with 2 local divisions.

Efficient deployment facilities include: The Port of Beaumont, four hours away by state designated priority highways; rail loading docks which link with the main line of the Santa Fe Railway which runs through post; deployment airfield (RGAAF), 10,000 ft runway, ramp space for 9 C-5 or 747 or 14 C-141's.

Systematic construction and renovation programs over the past 20 years have build modern barracks, administrative facilities, motor parks, post exchanges, large commissaries, and recreational facilities ideal for the 45,000 military population. The new $60 million maintenance shops permit efficient component rebuild and equipment repair at great savings over off-post alternatives.

There are 5556 family quarters on post with 227 more under construction. 95% of the 21,500 soldiers who live off-post reside in Killeen, Copperas Cove, and Harker Heights within 10 miles of the main gate. Since the 1990 census 4596 new dwellings have been constructed in the commuting area, 3769 of these were built within 10 miles of the flagpole. Counting construction underway over 600 classrooms have been added to the Killeen and Copperas Cove School Districts since 1990. Local communities have consistently shown outstanding support for soldiers and families.

Summary: Fighting units can train better, and at less cost at Fort Hood than at any other station. The incremental base support cost of stationing a second division at Fort Hood is about one third the base support cost of a one division post. Conversely, moving a division from Fort Hood would gain only one third of the base support savings of closing a one division post.

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ
27TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

2136 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4327
202-225-7742

DISTRICT OFFICES:
3649 LEOPARD SUITE 510
CORPUS CHRISTI, TX 78408
512-883-5868

3505 BOCA CHICA BOULEVARD, SUITE 200
BROWNSVILLE, TX 78521
210-541-1242

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4327

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES
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CHAIRMAN, MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION PANEL
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
CHAIRMAN, OCEANOGRAPHY, GULF OF MEXICO AND OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

July 20, 1994

Mr. Ed Brown
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

Thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet with my constituents representing the South Texas Military Facilities Task Force. The DOD bases in cur area -- Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi Naval Air Station, Kingsville Naval Air Station, and Naval Station Ingleside -- have a good story to tell. We believe they are among the best military facilities available to our Armed Forces today.

Once again, thanks for your time and attention. The people of South Texas truly appreciate your effort and desire to listen to our concerns. If there is ever anything I can do for you, please do not hesitate to contact me.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Solomon P. Ortiz
Member of Congress

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 12 Jul 94

SUBJECT: Fort Riley

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

BG (Ret) Bill Roche - (703) 522-6790
COL (Ret) Fred Hepler - Executive Director, Governor's Task Force in Support of Fort Riley; (913) 762-1976
Mr. Harland Priddle - Director of Commerce and Economic Development, Junction City/Geary County Development Agency; (913) 762-1976

Commission Staff:

Tom Houston, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Cece Carman, Congressional and Community Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the attendees a short briefing to update them on the 1995 BRAC process. Specific questions dealt the Army's force-structure plan, the conduct of base visits and the community involvement, and the need for consultants to represent the community.

Governor's Task Force in Support of Fort Riley
P.O. Box 1876, Junction City, Kansas 66441
(913) 762-1976 Fax (913) 762-3353

JOHN F. "FRED" HEPLER
Executive Director

July 13, 1994

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Ed:

A short note to thank you for your briefing and orientation of the BRAC Commission. Your information was very helpful and you forthrightness and willingness to introduce me to the other staff members was very much appreciated.

I look forward to working closely with the Commission as the process unfolds. Again, thank you very much for your time and efforts in making my visit productive.

Sincerely,

Fred Hepler
Executive Director

JFH:lle

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 9 May 94

SUBJECT: Fort Riley

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Dean Campbell; President, Campbell Distributors, Inc; (913) 776-2337
Chris Curtin
Jim McCullough
John Montgomery
Harland Priddle; Director of Commerce and Economic Development, Junction City/Geary County Development Agency; (913) 762-1976
Merrill Werts
BG (Ret) Bill Roche
Dan Stanley; Administrative Assistant to Senator Dole; (202) 224-6521

Commission Staff:

Matt Behrmann, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Mary Woodward, Director of Congressional Liaison
Tom Houston, Press Secretary
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the attendees a short briefing to update them on the 1995 BRAC process. Specific questions dealt with appointment of Commissioners, the details to be included in the force-structure plan, the importance of criteria dealing with economic and environmental impact, the need for consultants to represent the community, and the best methods for a community to present its position to the Commission.

WILLIAM H. ROCHE

2001 NORTH NELSON STREET
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22207
TELEPHONE 703-522-6790

MAY 18, 1994

Dear Ed:

Thanks for your help with the Ft Riley citizen's Group - and for the excellent presentation. I had told the people that you were the right person for your job - and you convinced them that I was right! They all went home with a much better feeling about the fairness of the process and the professionalism of the staff.

It is great to see you looking so well and doing such a sensitive job. I look forward to working with you in the months ahead.

Best to Rena.

Sincerely,

Bill

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: May 5, 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Gordon

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Al Hodge; President, Metro Augusta Chamber of Commerce; (706) 821-1300
Bob Reich; Director of Economic Development, Columbia County Chamber of Commerce; (706) 863-8771
J. J. Langston

Commission Staff:

Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Mary Woodward, Director of Congressional Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the attendees a short briefing to update them on the 1995 BRAC process. Specific questions centered on consideration of economic impact on communities, the potential impact of DoD's Joint Cross-Service Groups, and community interface with the Commission. Extracts from the Army's input to the 1993 Commission pertaining to Fort Gordon were provided.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 3 May 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Carson

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Clark Atwood; President, Atwood Homes
Kent Brosh; Crissey Fowler Lumber Company
Steven Coffin; V.P., Government and Public Affairs, Colorado Gas Company
MGen Larry Fortner (USAF) (Ret); TRW Space & Defense
John Fowler; President, Chamber of Commerce
Mark Greenberg; The Jefferson Group
Ryer Hitchcock; V.P., Smith Barney Shearson
Shirley Hurtado; Dulce's Sweets and Treats
Thomas James; Partner, Holme Roberts and Own, LLC
Harold Littrall; President, Air Academy National Bank
Edward Lohman; Source One Realty
James Lucas; V.P./Gen. Manager, KKTV
James Moore; V.P., Marketing & Training, Bank One
James Munger; Deputy City Manager, Colorado Springs
Harlan Ochs; Ochs Petroleum
David Palenchar; Senior Program Officer, El Pomar Foundation
Jim Palmer; Sr. V.P., Govt. Affairs, Colorado Springs Chamber of Commerce
David Pringle; Colorado National Bank Exchange
Col Michael Quinlan (USAF) (Ret); Regional V.P., USAA
Steve Sharkey; CEO & President, Fidelity Real Estate & Development
RADM Clinton Taylor (USN) (Ret) TROA President
LTG Calvin Waller; (USA) (Ret)
Edwin Warrell; V.P., A.F. Programs, OAO Corporation
Rick Wilson; State Director, Defense Conversion Retention
Joseph Woodford; President, Woodford Industries, Inc.

Commission Staff:

Mary Woodward, Director of Congressional Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Ed gave the attendees, who were representatives of the Colorado Springs Chamber of Commerce, a short briefing to update them on the 1995 BRAC process. Specific questions centered on the nominations of Commissioners, the potential impact of 10 USC 2687 thresholds on force structure decisions, the conduct of regional hearings, and how the community can best participate in the process.

FIDELITY
REAL ESTATE

May 13, 1994

Mr. Ed Brown
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Re-Alignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

RE: Colorado Springs Chamber of Commerce Contingent

Dear Ed:

As a member of the Colorado Springs Commerce Contingent to Washington, I want to thank you for your very lucid and useful explanation of the BRAC process as it effects the Army. I have heard numerous comments to the effect that your briefing in the Capital Building on May 3rd was perhaps the most helpful of all those which we received during our stay in Colorado Springs. We appreciated the candor of your comments together with your objective communication of the process. If it becomes appropriate as a part of our effort, I know that many us would look forward to meeting with you again.

Again, thanks for meeting with us.

Sincerely,

FIDELITY REAL ESTATE

Stephen L. Sharkey
President

SLS/nal

411 South Tejon, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903-2142, (719) 634-0500 Fax (719) 634-3086

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: April 12, 1994

SUBJECT: Newport News/Hampton Roads Area Military Installations

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Councilman Joe Frank, Chairman of Hampton Roads BRAC 95 Committee, (804) 873-2131
Walter Segaloff, Chairman of Newport News BRAC 95 Committee
MG (Ret) Hank Small, Defense Consultant, (804) 868-0594
Mark Greenberg
Dave Sullivan

Commission Staff:

Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: Alex gave the community representatives a short briefing to update them on the 1995 BRAC process. It was understood that they were interested in Navy issues; however, specific questions centered on Fort Eustis and to a lesser degree on Fort Monroe. In addition, the Commission staff responded to the attached questions.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION 1995 QUESTIONS

1. What is the true nature of the military cuts that should be expected by this next BRAC round? News reports and rumors state the this could be the "worst BRAC Yet". Is this true? Can the nature/depth of these cuts be quantified? What percentage of the military do you plan to cut next year?

2. During the 1995 BRAC process, what is the proper role of community groups from localities which are home to military installations? For example, is it proper for them to mount an organized effort to save the base and can that effort be coordinated with local base officials or must it be a purely independent activity?

3 What is the proper role of the local Congressional delegation during the BRAC process? Are Congressmen allowed any special contact with BRAC Commissioners and is their input given any greater weight than input from other non-Pentagon sources?

4. What are the basic criteria to be used to determine retention or closure of a base or installation?

5. What criteria are being established to assist the Pentagon and BRAC commissioners in determining which bases should be closed and which functions should be realigned? Once this specific information is finalized, will it be available to the general public and local base support groups? If so, how do we go about receiving such information? Also, when will the criteria be published?

6. In the past, Data Calls for information have been made by the Pentagon to military bases. Will this same process be used in 1995 or does the Pentagon already have the information it requires in it decision making process? If Data Calls are going to be part of the 1995 process, will the collected information be available to the public? If so, how do we go about receiving the information?

7. Is a community economic impact statement required prior to a closure decision?

8. During the previous rounds of decision making by the BRAC Commission, what types of arguments and activities, regardless of their origination, were particularly successful in swaying the opinion of commissioners? What types of activities and arguments proved to be ineffective?

9. Is anything at all accomplished by marshalling direct and large-scale public support for a particular local military installation?

10. Is there anything a local community can do, either alone or in conjunction with its military base(s) that is particularly helpful or detrimental to the future of the base and the way it is perceived by the Pentagon and/or the BRAC commissioners?

11. What role do local base commanders play in the BRAC decision making process and are they allowed to form support partnerships with their local communities in an effort to save an installation?

12. If there are perceived weaknesses in the position of any installations, is there anything which the local community can do, in a timely way, to offset or correct those weaknesses?

13. Many military installations have a variety of agreements for services between themselves and their surroundings communities. These can cover such areas as education, solid waste disposal, transportation, community facilities, etc. Often these agreements take the form of legal contracts. Do such contractual partnerships receive consideration during the BRAC review process and, if so, how much?

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 11 Mar 94

SUBJECT: Fort Riley

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

BG (Ret) Phillip J. Zeller, Jr., (913) 762-2629

Commission Staff:

Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: BG Zeller lives in Junction City, KS, one of the cities near Fort Riley, and is assisting Junction City and Manhattan in their dealings with the Commission. He was given copies of the analysis section pertaining to maneuver installations from the Army's 1993 submission to the Commission, the military value attribute definitions for maneuver installations from the Army's 1993 back-up information, and the Army's installation assessment narrative and environmental baseline data pertaining to Fort Riley. He will be working with BG (Ret) Roche to arrange a meeting between community leaders and the Commission staff in May 1994.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 8 Mar 94

SUBJECT: Fort Riley

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

BG (Ret) Bill Roche, (703) 522-6790

Commission Staff:

Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

MEETING NOTES: BG Roche is a point-of-contact in Washington for the communities surrounding Fort Riley. He was briefed on the Commission process and timelines. In addition, he was given the military value analysis section pertaining to maneuver installations from the Army's 1993 submission to the Commission. He will be scheduling a meeting with the Commission staff for community leaders sometime in May 1994.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: 3 Mar 94

SUBJECT: Georgia Military Installations

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Frank Allen, Director, Georgia Defense Initiative/Military Affairs Coordinating Committee, (404) 223-2261
Cece Carman, Legislative Assistant to Senator Nunn, (202) 224-3521

Commission Staff:

Matt Behrmann, Staff Director
Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
*Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader
Bob Cook, Interagency Issues Team Leader

MEETING NOTES:

Cece Carman requested the meeting to introduce Frank Allen to the Commission staff and to have the staff familiarize him with the Commission process. Frank explained that his organization was established by the Governor of Georgia to provide a comprehensive approach for the state in addressing potential closures and realignments for the 1995 round. In addition, the organization is responsible for looking at current and emerging technologies for application at local communities for improving the quality of life for service members at installations in Georgia. GEN (Ret) Edwin H. Burba, Jr., former commander of Forces Command at Fort McPherson, serves as the Chairman of the organization on a pro-bono basis. Specific discussions centered on the potential impact of interservicing on installations in Georgia and the importance of installations and surrounding communities preparing for the 1995 round.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: October 12, 1993

SUBJECT: Presidio of Monterey Annex

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Lance McClair, Mayor, Seaside
Don Jordan, Mayor Pro-Tem, Seaside, (408) 899-6200
Sam Head, Interim City Manager, Seaside, (408) 899-6220
Dennis Potter, Planning Services Manager, Seaside, (408) 899-6223
George Schlossberg, Attorney, Cotten and Selfon, (202) 659-3173
John Lynch, Consultant, Planning Adjustment Associates, (703) 922-7015

Commission Staff:

Ben Borden, Director of Review & Analysis
Mary Ann Hook, General Counsel
Jamie Gallagher, Director of Congressional Liaison
Ed Brown, Army Team Leader
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader

MEETING NOTES:

- Subsequent to 1993 Base Closure Commission recommendation, City of Seaside offered to lease, with option to buy, golf courses at Presidio of Monterey Annex
- DEPSECDEF was quoted by city representatives as stating that golf courses would be "made available" and city could "review new POM Annex footprint" to be available by end of October
- City representatives met with Paul Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing), on 12 October and were told that Army is willing to let city operate golf courses under contract to city
- Current Army planning is based on legal opinion issued by Office of Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) that states that "...SECDEF is legally required to implement only that portion of the 1993 Commission's recommendation that directs the retention of the Presidio of Monterey"
- City position is that legal opinion is active intent of Army to disrupt base closure process and could have far-reaching impact on all recommendations if Army is permitted to proceed
- City believes it would not be in its best interest to take legal action
- City recommended Chairman send a letter to SECDEF asking if OTJAG opinion represents DoD position

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950337 -1

FROM: FERGUSON, CHARLES H.	TO: KENNEDY, MICHAEL
TITLE: ACTING DIRECTOR	TITLE: ARMY GAO ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: SIMA, ST LOUIS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		b31
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF BRIEFING HE WILL PRESENT ON APRIL 1.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950331	Date Originated: 950330	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. AMC SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
1222 SPRUCE STREET
ST. LOUIS, MO 63103-2834

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

March 30, 1995

Office of the Director

please refer to this number
when responding 950331-1

Mr. Michael Kennedy
Senior Analyst
Defense BRAC Commission

Dear Mr. Kennedy,

Following is a copy of the briefing I will present Saturday, April 1, 1995. I'm also providing a copy of the narrative.

Please give me a call should you have questions. I can be reached at (314) 331-4055.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Ferguson

Charles H. Ferguson
Acting Director, SIMA-St. Louis

Enclosure


SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY

SYSTEMS INTEGRATION & MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY

SIMA - ST. LOUIS

PRESENTATION TO THE BRAC COMMISSION

Briefer: Charles H. Ferguson
Acting Director
SIMA - St. Louis

April 1, 1995

OUTLINE

- WHO WE ARE
- ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS
- WHAT WE DO
- MAJOR SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY
- WHERE WE FIT
- THINGS TO CONSIDER
- SUMMARY

WHO WE ARE

SIMA

SIMA - ST. LOUIS IS THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND'S CENTRAL DESIGN ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION SERVICES TO SUPPORT ARMY WHOLESALE LOGISTICS





ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS

MARCH 1995

CIVILIANS 348

MILITARY 5

14 DIFFERENT SKILL TYPES

AVG AGE:	47
AVG YRS AT SIMA	17
AVG YRS/SVC	21
EDUCATION LEVEL:	
BACHELORS DEGREE	129
MASTERS DEGREE	35
AVG GRADE	GS-11



FY 95 BUDGET

SALARY/BENEFITS	$20,306
AWARDS	247
OVERTIME	150
TDY	125
TRAINING	150
SUPPLIES	200
EQUIPMENT PURCHASE	100
ISA'S	2,332
BUILDING LEASE	2,600
OTHER	700
TOTAL	$26,910

WHAT WE DO

SIMA

ATCOM



TACOM



MICOM

- SYSTEM DESIGN
- DEVELOPMENT
- TESTING
- FIELDING
- MAINTENANCE
- INTEGRATION
- CUSTOMER SUPPORT
- CONSULTING SERVICES



USASAC



JLSC

ARL

TECOM

DLA

CECOM

MAJOR SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY

COMMODITY COMMAND STANDARD SYSTEM (CCSS)

A network of standard software and hardware used by the AMC Commodity Commands in support of Army Logistics functions.

FUNCTIONALITY



BUSINESS PROCESS

TYPES OF ITEMS

SYSTEM SIZE

APPLICATIONS	581
PROGRAMS/MODULES	5,265
LINES OF CODE	9,300,000

EXTERNAL INTERFACES



BUSINESS SUPPORTED

PROCUREMENT ACTIONS	260,000
PROCUREMENT VALUE	$14.9 BILLION
ITEMS MANAGED	171,000
REQUISITIONS PROCESSED	2.9 MILLION

WHERE WE FIT


OPERATIONAL CONTROL - JANUARY 1995
OFFICIAL REALIGNMENT - OCTOBER 1995
DOD/ARMY
AMC
MICOM
SIMA
MICOM
ATCOM
CECOM
TACOM
USASAC

THINGS TO CONSIDER

LOSS OF CRITICAL ARMY AUTOMATION SKILLS THROUGH REGULAR AND EARLY RETIREMENT

SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS

- SYSTEM IMPACTS OF BRAC e.g. ATCOM DISESTABLISHMENT
- DOD Corporate Information Management
- MAJOR ARMY INITIATIVES

IMPACT ON MILITARY READINESS

BOTTOM LINE: PROPER TIMING OF BRAC REALIGNMENT ACTIONS IS CRITICAL TO OVERALL MISSION SUPPORT

SUMMARY

THE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY:

- SUPPORTS THE ARMY/DOD LOGISTICS MISSION
- POSSESSES A HIGHLY SKILLED, EXPERIENCED AND EDUCATED WORKFORCE
- SUPPORTS THE NEED FOR BRAC
- BELIEVES THE TIMING OF BRAC ACTIONS IS CRITICAL TO CONTINUED MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

TITLE

SENATOR DIXON, MR. KLING, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS-----I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO PRESENT A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ARMY'S SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS SIMA.

OUTLINE

HERE ARE THE TOPICS I WILL COVER.

I'LL PROVIDE A DESCRIPTION OF WHO WE ARE AND SHARE SOME ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS.

I WILL THEN TALK ABOUT WHAT WE DO AND DISCUSS THE MAJOR DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY WE HAVE.

I'LL SHOW YOU ORGANIZATIONALLY WHERE WE FIT IN THE ARMY LOGISTICS STRUCTURE.

I'LL PROVIDE SOME THINGS I BELIEVE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE TIMING OF ANY BRAC REALIGNMENT.

I'LL CLOSE WITH A VERY BRIEF SUMMARY.

WHO WE ARE

WE ARE THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND'S CENTRAL DESIGN ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF THE WHOLESALE INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS, OF WHICH ATCOM IS ONE. INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS ARE ALSO REFERRED TO AS COMMODITY COMMANDS.

JUST TO ENSURE THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING, WE ARE NOT PART OF ATCOM. IN FACT, IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, WE CAME UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ARMY MISSILE COMMAND. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL RELOCATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTION.

WE ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN THE ROBERT A. YOUNG FEDERAL BUILDING AT 1222 SPRUCE STREET IN DOWNTOWN ST. LOUIS.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS

WITH RESPECT TO ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS, WE CURRENTLY HAVE 348 CIVILIANS AND 5 MILITARY EMPLOYEES. WE ALSO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 120 CONTRACTOR, COMPUTER OPERATIONS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL CO-LOCATED WITH US IN THE RAY BUILDING. OUR WORKFORCE IS COMPRISED OF 14 DIFFERENT SKILL TYPES RANGING FROM LABORERS TO PEOPLE WITH VARIOUS COMPUTER SKILLS TO PEOPLE WITH BUSINESS AREA KNOWLEDGE IN ALL LOGISTICS AREAS INCLUDING PROVISIONING, CATALOGING, REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION, PROCUREMENT, MAINTENANCE PLANNING, STOCK CONTROL, FINANCE AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE. FIFTY-SEVEN (57) PERCENT OF OUR WORKFORCE HAS PROFESSIONAL DATA PROCESSING SKILLS COVERING SUCH AREAS AS PROGRAMMING AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS.

THE AVERAGE AGE OF OUR WORKFORCE IS 47 YEARS OLD. OUR PEOPLE HAVE WORKED AT SIMA AN AVERAGE OF 17 YEARS AND HAVE AN OVERALL AVERAGE OF 21 YEARS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE. THIRTY-SEVEN (37) PERCENT OF OUR WORK FORCE HAS BACHELOR'S DEGREES, WHILE 10% HAS MASTER'S DEGREES.

WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE DOD DOWNSIZING THAT HAS OCCURRED SINCE 1989. FROM THIS CHART YOU CAN SEE THAT OUR ON-BOARD STRENGTH HAS DECREASED FROM 570 IN 1989 TO A PROJECTED ON BOARD STRENGTH OF 345 AT THE END OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. THAT'S A REDUCTION IN ON-BOARD STRENGTH OF 40%. OUR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH HAS DECLINED BY AN EVEN HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF 43%.

OUR FY95 BUDGET IS SHOWN AT THE LOWER RIGHT. A COUPLE OF POINTS SHOULD BE MADE. THE INTERSERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT, OR ISA LINE, INCLUDES SUCH THINGS AS THE COST OF COMPUTER OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, AND HEALTH AND FITNESS SERVICES.

THE BUILDING LEASE COST OF $2.6 MILLION IS FOR OUR SPACE IN THE RAY BUILDING. IN THE PAST YEAR, WE TURNED BACK SOME 35,000 SQUARE FEET OF SPACE TO GSA DUE TO DOWNSIZING OF OUR WORKFORCE. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING ADDITIONAL SPACE THAT WILL BE TURNED BACK. THIS SPACE REDUCTION IS WARRANTED SINCE WE HAVE LOST SOME 55 PEOPLE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, WE HAVE ALSO HAD

CONTRACTORS CO-LOCATED IN THE BUILDING WORKING WITH US ON DOD AUTOMATED SYSTEM INITIATIVES. THOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE DECLINING AND THEREFORE ADDITIONAL SPACE CAN BE TURNED BACK TO GSA. MY GOAL IS TO REDUCE OUR SPACE REQUIREMENTS BY ANOTHER 20% OVER THE NEXT YEAR.

WHAT WE DO

AS TO "WHAT WE DO", WE SUPPORT THE ENTIRE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE.

WE WORK WITH THE SYSTEM USER COMMUNITY TO DEFINE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. WE DESIGN AND DEVELOP AUTOMATED SYSTEMS. WE PERFORM INTERNAL TESTING TO VERIFY THAT IN OUR VIEW, THE SYSTEM PERFORMS APPROPRIATELY. WE ALSO PARTICIPATE IN TESTS WITH THE USER COMMUNITY TO VERIFY THAT THE SYSTEM MEETS THEIR NEEDS.

AS PART OF THE FIELDING PROCESS, THE SYSTEM IS PROTOTYPED AT ONE OF THE INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS, SUCH AS THE MISSILE COMMAND, THE TANK-AUTOMOTIVE & ARMAMENTS COMMAND, OR ATCOM. DURING THAT TIME, WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PROTOTYPE SITE TO ENSURE THAT PROBLEMS ARE CORRECTED BEFORE THE SYSTEM IS INSTALLED AT THE REMAINING SITES.

ONCE THE SYSTEM IS FIELDED, WE PROVIDE "ROUND THE CLOCK" TELEPHONIC SUPPORT TO CORRECT PROBLEMS OCCURRING DURING PRODUCTION. WE OFTEN TAKE CARE OF PROBLEMS JUST BY ANSWERING QUESTIONS POSED BY CALLERS. IF THE SITUATION

DEMANDS IT, PEOPLE ARE CALLED IN TO CORRECT PROBLEMS.

IN ADDITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING OF SYSTEM CHANGES, WE ALSO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SYSTEM INTEGRATION. OUR SYSTEM INTEGRATES ALL WHOLESALE LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS. COMPARING OUR SYSTEM WITH A MAJOR RETAIL CHAIN, FOR EXAMPLE, WE CATALOG THE INVENTORY OF ITEMS, WE PROCESS CUSTOMER ORDERS, WE HANDLE BACKORDERS, WE COMPUTE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITEMS AND ORDER REPLENISHMENT STOCKS, WE DETERMINE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCKS, AND WE HANDLE THE ACCOUNTING PROCESSES. OUR SYSTEM DOES IT ALL FROM A WHOLESALE DEFENSE LOGISTICS PERSPECTIVE. AS A RESULT, WE MUST ENSURE THAT CHANGES IN ONE AREA ARE REVIEWED CLOSELY TO MAKE SURE THAT IMPACTS IN OTHER AREAS ARE ALSO ADDRESSED.

I MENTIONED EARLIER THAT WE PROVIDE "ROUND THE CLOCK" CUSTOMER SUPPORT. WE OPERATE A HELP DESK WHICH IS ACCESSIBLE TO THE USER COMMUNITY 24 HOURS A DAY.

IN ADDITION, WE PROVIDE A BROAD RANGE OF CONSULTING SERVICES TO INCLUDE PLANNING COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, ANALYZING

COMPUTER HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, AND PROVIDING ADVICE ON THE USE OF NEW COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY FOR SPECIFIC BUSINESS PROBLEMS.

MAJOR SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY

OUR MAJOR SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY IS THE COMMODITY COMMAND STANDARD SYSTEM OTHERWISE KNOWN AS CCSS. IT IS HIGHLY INTEGRATED AND CONTAINS EXTENSIVE FUNCTIONALITY IN THE BUSINESS PROCESS AREAS SHOWN AT THE UPPER LEFT. IN ADDITION, IT SUPPORTS MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ITEMS, SPARE AND REPAIR PARTS, AND AMMUNITION ITEMS.

CCSS IS A VERY LARGE SYSTEM COMPRISED OF APPROXIMATELY 9.3 MILLION LINES OF CODE. IT HAS MANY EXTERNAL INTERFACES AS DEPICTED AT THE LOWER LEFT.

YOU CAN SEE AT THE LOWER RIGHT THAT CCSS SUPPORTS A SIZABLE PORTION OF DOD BUSINESS. OUR SYSTEM GENERATES APPROXIMATELY $15 BILLION IN ANNUAL PROCUREMENTS AT INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS SUCH AS ATCOM, THE MISSILE COMMAND, AND THE TANK-AUTOMOTIVE & ARMAMENTS COMMAND.

THE SYSTEM PROCESSES ALMOST 3 MILLION SOLDIER-GENERATED REQUISITIONS ANNUALLY AND IS USED BY ITEM MANAGERS AT THE INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS TO MANAGE OVER 170,000 ITEMS OF SUPPLY.

NO DOUBT, THE SIZE OF THE BUSINESS SUPPORTED BY CCSS WOULD COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH THE LARGER FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES. IT IS BIG BUSINESS!!!!

WHERE WE FIT

THE UPPER LEFT PORTION OF THE CHART PORTRAYS WHERE WE FIT ORGANIZATIONALLY WHILE THE SHADED SECTION DEPICTS THAT OUR PRIMARY CUSTOMER BASE IS THE ARMY INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS. ULTIMATELY, OUR SYSTEM SUPPORTS THE SOLDIER IN THE FIELD.

BACK TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR A MOMENT. UNTIL JANUARY 1995, WE WERE CONSIDERED A SEPARATE REPORTING ACTIVITY OF HEADQUARTERS AMC. AS STATED EARLIER, ACTION WAS TAKEN BY AMC TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SIMA-ST. LOUIS TO MICOM IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. WE WILL BE FORMALLY ALIGNED UNDER MICOM ON 1 OCTOBER 1995. NO PHYSICAL RELOCATION WAS PLANNED UNDER THIS PARTICULAR REALIGNMENT ACTION.

THINGS TO CONSIDER

WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT. THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DOWNSIZING THAT CONTINUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT "THINGS TO CONSIDER" BEFORE DETERMINING THE TIMING OF BRAC ACTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO SIMA-ST. LOUIS.

OUR WORK FORCE HAS SUFFICIENT YEARS OF SERVICE SUCH THAT 50% COULD OPT FOR REGULAR OR EARLY RETIREMENT BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF FY96. THAT PERCENTAGE INCREASES TO 62% BY THE END OF FY98. BASED ON THESE FIGURES, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT SIMA WOULD LOSE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ITS SKILL BASE IN A RELOCATION.

IN MY OPINION, AUTOMATION IS ONE OF THE KEY ENABLERS DURING PERIODS OF DOWNSIZING. IT SERVES TO OFFSET THE LOSS OF EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL AS A PART OF DOWNSIZING. THE TIMING OF ANY BRAC REALIGNMENT AS PERTAINS TO SIMA SHOULD SEEK TO MINIMIZE THE ASSOCIATED LOSS OF AUTOMATION SKILLS.

THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM SUPPORT IMPLICATIONS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED. AS AN EXAMPLE, ATCOM PRESENTLY IS TARGETED FOR DISESTABLISHMENT WITH PIECES GOING TO THE MISSILE COMMAND, THE SOLDIER SYSTEMS COMMAND, THE TANK-AUTOMOTIVE AND ARMAMENTS COMMAND IN DETROIT, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND IN FT. MONMOUTH, NJ. SHOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OCCUR, EACH OF THESE ACTIONS WILL REQUIRE SUPPORT FROM THE SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE.

IN THE CASE OF THE SOLDIER SYSTEMS COMMAND, THEY HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OR EXPERIENCE WITH CCSS. THEREFORE SIMA WILL HAVE TO ESTABLISH THE APPROPRIATE SYSTEMS INFRASTRUCTURE AT THAT SITE. THIS IS NO TRIVIAL TASK. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE FINAL STAGES OF IMPLEMENTING CCSS AT A NEW LOCATION. THE COST OF THAT EFFORT WILL TOTAL APPROXIMATELY $3.5 MILLION.

IN THE CASE OF THOSE PORTIONS OF ATCOM THAT WOULD TRANSFER TO THE MISSILE COMMAND, THE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND, AND THE TANK-AUTOMOTIVE & ARMAMENTS COMMAND, WE HAVE FAIRLY RECENT EXPERIENCE FROM BRAC 93 WHICH COVERED THE TRANSFER OF THE

ARMAMENTS COMMAND INVENTORY CONTROL POINT FUNCTIONS FROM ROCK ISLAND, IL TO THE TANK-AUTOMOTIVE COMMAND IN DETROIT, MI. THIS WAS AT A SIMA SYSTEMS COST OF APPROXIMATELY $800K OVER 14 MONTHS.

THE BOTTOM LINE WITH RESPECT TO THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF ATCOM IS THAT IF THE MAJOR SYSTEM CHANGES ARE NOT COMPLETED ON TIME, THE ORGANIZATIONS PICKING UP THE ATCOM FUNCTIONS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM THEIR NEW MISSION, POTENTIALLY IMPACTING ARMY READINESS. SIMA WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE, FROM A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE, IN ANY BRAC ACTION INVOLVING ATCOM. THEREFORE, THE TIMING OF ANY PHYSICAL REALIGNMENT INVOLVING SIMA MUST TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION.

IN ADDITION, OUR SYSTEM WAS VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM. SHOULD ANOTHER CONTINGENCY OF THIS NATURE ARISE, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT.

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOD STANDARD LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AS PART OF THE JOINT LOGISTICS SYSTEMS CENTER CORPORATE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES. SUPPORT TO THIS EFFORT WOULD SUFFER IF

THE TIMING OF BRAC REALIGNMENT ACTIONS IS NOT CONSIDERED. WHEN DOD SYSTEMS BEGIN TO BE DELIVERED TO THE SERVICES, SIMA WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN INTEGRATING THEM INTO EXISTING ARMY SYSTEMS SUCH AS CCSS. THE DOD SYSTEM WILL NOT REPLACE CCSS IN TOTAL, NOR WILL THE DOD SYSTEMS BE DELIVERED ALL AT ONE TIME. THEREFORE, WE WILL BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF INSERTING PIECES OF DOD SYSTEMS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.

WE ARE ALSO WORKING TO SUPPORT MAJOR ARMY INITIATIVES. ONE SUCH INITIATIVE IS WAR RESERVES MANAGEMENT, WHERE SIMA IS MAKING SIGNIFICANT SOFTWARE CHANGES TO SUPPORT THE ARMY'S GOAL OF INCREASED ASSET MOBILITY CONCURRENT WITH AN OVERALL REDUCTION OF ON-HAND ASSETS. THE SUCCESS OF THIS AND OTHER ARMY INITIATIVES COULD ALSO BE IMPACTED IN A NEGATIVE MANNER BASED ON THE TIMING OF BRAC REALIGNMENT ACTIONS.

ANOTHER MAJOR WORKLOAD FACING THE AUTOMATION WORLD IS THE UPCOMING CENTURY DATE CHANGE. SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM CHANGES WILL BE REQUIRED TO KEEP AUTOMATED SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL DURING TRANSITION TO THE NEW CENTURY. THE NEED FOR CHANGES HAS ALREADY BEGUN AS MANY

PROGRAMS MAKE PROJECTIONS SEVERAL YEARS IN THE FUTURE. THE NEXT 2 TO 3 YEARS WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT WORK TO MAKE SURE SYSTEMS SUCH AS CCSS DO NOT FAIL AS WE NEAR THE YEAR 2000.

THE MAJOR POINTS I WANT TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THIS CHART ARE:

--THERE ARE SYSTEM IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH ANY BRAC REALIGNMENT OF ATCOM. SIMA WOULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN ADDRESSING THESE SYSTEM IMPACTS.

--THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DOD AND ARMY LOGISTICS INITIATIVES REQUIRING SIMA INVOLVEMENT.

--BASED ON THE RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY OF THE SIMA WORKFORCE, IT IS LIKELY THAT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE WOULD RELOCATE AS PART OF A BRAC REALIGNMENT.

THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT ALL OF THESE FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE TIMING OF ANY BRAC REALIGNMENT INVOLVING SIMA. IF THEY ARE NOT, ARMY LOGISTICS READINESS WILL BE IMPACTED.

SUMMARY

IN SUMMARY, SIMA-ST. LOUIS PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AND DOD LOGISTICS MISSION. OUR SYSTEM PROVIDES CRITICAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO THE SOLDIER IN THE FIELD. OUR WORK FORCE IS HIGHLY SKILLED, EXPERIENCED, AND EDUCATED.

WE UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR BRAC ACTIONS AS A MEANS FOR DOD TO CONTINUE ITS DOWNSIZING EFFORTS.

SHOULD THE DECISION ULTIMATELY BE MADE TO REALIGN SIMA AS PART OF BRAC, THE TIMING OF THE ACTUAL REALIGNMENT MUST BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED; OTHERWISE, READINESS AND THE OVERALL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DOD LOGISTICS MISSION WILL SUFFER.

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 6 Apr		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER						
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER	✓					
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	

COMMENTS:

Bob: Would like you to assume responsibility for this. We need to send the letter to the Army (Chairman to SECARMY) for comment. I believe we have some "stuff" in the 93 files plus the deliberation hearing book. We need the Army's report that responded to the FY 94 Authorization Act.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950403-15

FROM: WELDON, CURT	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (PA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: MARCUS HOOK ARMY RESERVE FACILITY	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	JG
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:
REQUESTING COMMISSION CLOSE MARCUS HOOK ARMY RESERVE FACILITY.

Due Date: 950405	Routing Date: 950403	Date Originated: 950315	Mail Date:

CURT WELDON
7TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

2452 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3807
(202) 225-2011

1554 GARRETT ROAD
UPPER DARBY, PA 19082
(610) 259-0700

30 SOUTH VALLEY ROAD, SUITE 212
PAOLI, PA 19301
(610) 640-9064

MIGRATORY BIRD
CONSERVATION COMMISSION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3807

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
READINESS
MILITARY ACQUISITION
NATO PANEL, VICE-CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES
OCEANOGRAPHY, VICE-CHAIRMAN
THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES

CO-CHAIRMAN:
CONGRESSIONAL FIRE SERVICES CAUCUS
US-FSU ENERGY CAUCUS
CONGRESSIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE
ON RECYCLING
THE EMPOWERMENT CAUCUS

March 15, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950403-1

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to urge that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission consider adding to the base closure list the Army Reserve facility in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. I am one of the few Members who has been actively seeking a closure in my district, but thus far have received no assistance from the Department of Army or Department of Defense.

Since I served as Mayor of Marcus Hook in 1980, I have been supporting local community efforts to close the underutilized Army Reserve facility in Marcus Hook and secure it for completion of a waterfront park. The Army has opposed every effort to accomplish this goal, insisting that Marcus Hook is a "unique" facility.

The key unit operating at Marcus Hook is Detachment 1, 949th Transportation Company (Floating Craft). The unit consists of 36 reservists, two tug boats and two barges, and has never been activated since its establishment in the 1960s. The unit is supported by the Ground and Marine Army Maintenance Support Activity, consisting of four civilian personnel. Detachment 1 supports its parent operation in Curtis Bay, Maryland, and both units support an active unit at Fort Eustis in Virginia. The 949th supports Coast Guard, DOT and tug and barge support in harbors, inland waterways and oceans.

Given the Army's steadfast refusal to assist on this matter, I had language included in the base closure legislation directing that the Department give priority consideration to closure of the facilities for which the local community supported closure. I requested that Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission consider the facility for closure in 1991 and 1993. The site was not considered by DOD or BRAC in 1991, but was added to the base closure list for consideration on May 21, 1993.

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

Not only was the 1993 Commission reluctant to question the mission requirement, but it only had a month to come up with an alternative site in lieu of outright mission elimination. By the 1993 Commision's admission, the Army continued its stonewalling on this issue. The 1993 BRAC did not approve closure of Marcus Hook.

The Total Army Analysis which justifies this mission was constructed in the Bush Administration, and should be reconsidered in light of current security plans and reduction in Army divisions. The facility is grossly underutilized, and it could easily be relocated or consolidated into its parent company or the active unit without harming the Army's transportation needs. I think it is time that the community's request be seriously considered, and that alternative sites be located if indeed the mission is still required.

The FY94 Defense Authorization directed the Army to report on alternative sites within a one hundred mile radius of the Marcus Hook facility. That report, which I recieved, was wholly inadequate. It overinflated costs of renovations necessary in some cases, and drastically limited its options at certain sites.

It is clear that the Army, thus the Department of Defense, will not offer a recommendation to close this facility. For that reason, I ask that you add Marcus Hook to your recommendation list of bases for closure and provide the necessary analysis of alternative sites and consideration of this community request. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

CURT WELDON
Member of Congress

CW:nl

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950405-8

FROM: EVERETT, TERRY	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (AL)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: Ft RUCKER	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INF[illegible] ERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepa[illegible]ply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COMMISSION VOTE TO CONSOLIDATE UNDERGRADUATE HELICOPTER TRAINING WITH THE ARMY.

Due Date: 950407	Routing Date: 950405	Date Originated: 950403	Mail Date:

TERRY EVERETT
2D DISTRICT, ALABAMA

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN,
COMPENSATION, PENSION, INSURANCE
AND MEMORIAL AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
RISK MANAGEMENT AND SPECIALTY CROPS

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
PROCUREMENT
READINESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0102

208 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2901

3500 EASTERN BOULEVARD #250
MONTGOMERY, AL 36116
(334) 277-9113

100 W. TROY ST. #101
DOTHAN, AL 36303
(334) 794-9680

108 N. MAIN STREET
OPP, AL 36467
(334) 493-9253

April 3, 1995

950405-8

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you consider the Department of Defense recommendations to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to reduce our military infrastructure, I ask that you carefully review the Joint Cross-Service Groups proposal on undergraduate pilot training. Secretary Perry supported the consolidation of undergraduate fixed-wing pilot training, but chose not to consolidate undergraduate rotary wing pilot training in his recommendations to you.

The Joint Cross-Service Group proposed several alternatives to consolidate undergraduate pilot training to eliminate costly and unnecessary redundancies. In each of the three alternatives presented, the Group recommended that all undergraduate helicopter pilot training be consolidated with the Army. This integration makes sense from a number of budgetary and efficiency points, but even more importantly, would promote the standardization of military operations and jointness.

The Army is recognized world-wide as the leader in rotary wing aviation. The Army owns 79 percent of all DOD helicopters, performs 85 percent of all DOD helicopter acquisitions, and trains the lion's share of all DOD helicopter pilots. The Army's vast training facility at Ft. Rucker currently has the infrastructure and air and ground space necessary to safely train all DOD helicopter pilots. By consolidating introductory pilot training with the Army, DOD would be able to standardize many operations that would enhance interoperability among the services.

The Navy has for years maintained that they must train helicopter pilots differently because they fly in more demanding environments than their Army counterparts. The Army has demonstrated that their pilots are equally capable of operating in sea-based conditions. During the Persian Gulf tanker "reflagging" operation in the late 1980's, Army OH-58D helicopters and pilots were requested to fly from the decks of naval surface combatants in support of this mission. As a matter of fact, the Army still has a number of these helicopters on loan to the Navy in the Persian Gulf region. More recently, Army aviation supported the initial Haiti invasion from the deck of the USS Eisenhower. Army UH-60 Blackhawks and AH-1 Cobras worked in tandem to ferry troops from the sea to the Haitian mainland in a classic example of military jointness that worked well and made sense.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that you intend to hold a hearing on the Joint Cross-Service Group findings later this month, and I commend you for pursuing and possibly

PRINTED ON RECYCLED FIBERS

expanding DOD's intent to consolidate certain roles and missions. I would encourage you and the other commissioners to press DOD and the Navy on the validity of the basis for rejecting the Group's findings to consolidate undergraduate helicopter training. I sense that the rationale is based more on age-old tradition than solid facts.

As you are keenly aware, numerous unplanned contingencies and declining defense budgets have caused a continuous drain on our military operations and maintenance accounts. The result is the beginning of a deep-seeded erosion in the readiness of our forces. In testimony before the House National Security Committee, each of the service chiefs made it very clear that we are treading dangerously close to an unacceptable state of readiness under the current defense budget strategy. As a nation, we should not tolerate the atrophy of the world's finest military, so it is incumbent upon Congress and the Administration to look for more efficient ways to train and operate our forces. This consolidation proposal is certainly a step in the right direction.

Sincerely yours,

Terry

TERRY EVERETT

TE/whh
cc: BRCC Commissioners

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950407-8

FROM: KENNEDY, MIKE	TO: CASON, PAULINE P.
TITLE: ARMY GAO ANALYST	TITLE: DIRECTOR, COMMAND ANAL DIR.
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: REDSTONE ARSENAL
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: REDSTONE ARSENAL	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		b7
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR ASSISTANCE DURING VISIT TO REDSTONE ARSENAL.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950407	Date Originated: 950407	Mail Date: 950407

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 7, 1995

DR Pauline P. Cason
Director
Command Analysis Directorate
Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, AL 35802

Please refer to this number when responding 950407-8

Dear Dr. Cason:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Redstone Arsenal. The briefings and tour provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the facilities at the Arsenal. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the Sam Fields, Carol Meekins and Dave Harris for their assistance. I would also like to thank Jenice Fuqua for her efforts in coordinating the base visit.

Sincerely,

Michael Kennedy

Michael Kennedy
Senior Analyst

MIBTF

Richard G. Palaschak
Director of Operations

Munitions Industrial Base Task Force
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 905
Arlington, VA 22202

Phone: (703) 418-2492 Fax: (703) 418-2491

THE MUNITIONS BASE TASK

AEROJET
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS
ARMTEC
BEI
BULOVA
CMS
DAY & ZIMMERMANN
HERCULES
HOLSTON
MARTIN MARIETTA
MASON & HANGER
NATIONAL MANUFACTURING CO
NORRIS INDUSTRIES
OLIN
TALLEY INDUSTRIES
TEXTRON DEFENSE SYSTEMS
THIOKOL
VALENTEC

Ade
pe
f
dev
pa

MIBTF

SHRINKING INDUSTRIAL BASE

	1978	Current	1995	
Government-Owned	32	24	19	-41%
Contractor-Owned	286	86	52	-82%

Source: U.S. Army SARDA, 1/94

FUNDING TRENDS ARE SQUEEZING WAR RESERVES MODERNIZATION

MIBTF

Army Ammunition Procurement Funding



*Source: Army Materiel Command, 1993

12/1/93

REPLENISHMENT?
SIGNIFICANT MUNITIONS SHORTFALLS

MIBTF

Ammunition Industry Replenishment Shortfalls - Peacetime Capacity after 180-day Desert Storm-type conflict and Korean Peninsula conflict



FEMA calculations based on Global '92 Wargame at NWC
Source: Strategic Assessment Center, SAIC

12/1/93

OUR GROWING RELIANCE ON STOCKPILE RAISES QUESTIONS

MIBTF

- How relevant are the munitions stored to real combat requirements?

- Do procurement trends support improvement in the ratio of modern to obsolete war reserves?

12/1/93

HOW RELEVANT ARE THE STORED MUNITIONS?

MIBTF



- APPLICABLE GO TO WAR
- DISCRETIONARY
- APPLICABLE TRNG
- WAR RESERVE STOCKS-ALLIES
- EXCESS

Thousands of Short-Tons

12/1/93

WIN TWO MRCs?-ONE MRC (LET ALONE TWO) ALREADY SHOWS RED LIGHTS FOR MUNITIONS

MIBTF

Colors indicate months needed to reach requirement:

Green = Less than 6
Yellow = 6-12
Red = More than 12

Ammo Type	Desert Storm Performance	AMC Rating 1992	Impact of FY94 Budget*
Small Cal.			
20 mm			
25 mm			
50 cal			
30 mm			
40 mm			
Fuzes			
Mortars			
Tank			
Artillery			
Explosives			
Propellant			
Demo/Detonators			
Bombs			
CM W/H			
Mines			
Ship Ammo			
Rockets			

*Assumes no change in stockpile status
Source: Strategic Assessment Center, SAIC

12/1/93

CAN THE MUNITIONS BASE SUPPORT THESE OBJECTIVES?

MIBTF



12/1/93

INDUSTRY CAN NO LONGER SUBSIDIZE ITS FAILING MUNITIONS BUSINESSES

MIBTF

Financial Indicators for Munitions Companies (1991)



Data from D&B and SEC On-Line
Source: Strategic Assessment Center, SAIC

12/1/93

ARMY VIEW OF MUNITIONS INDUSTRIAL BASE "CRITICAL AND GETTING WORSE"*

MIBTF

AMC Assessment as of June 1993

Industrial Sector	Industry Baseline Assessment			Trend
	Weak	Acceptable	Strong	
Satellites				—
Wheeled Vehicles				↑
Communication Equip				—
Small Caliber Weapons				↓
Electro-Optics				—
Sensors				—
Large Missiles				—
Large Caliber Weapons				—
Small Missiles				↓
Track Vehicles				↕
Aviation				↕
Chemical-Biological				↕
Ammunition				↕

* According to the Army's Production Base Managers, AMC HQS

12/1/93

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950309-7

FROM: DIXON	TO: WEST, TOGO D. JR.
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: SEC OF THE ARMY
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE ARMY
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN — DATE: 13 MAR

	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER						
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER						
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	

COMMENTS:

Due Date:	Routing Date:	Date Originated: 950309	Mail Date: 950309

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
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March 9, 1995

The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0101

Dear Secretary West:

I would like to thank you for your recent testimony before the Commission concerning the Department of the Army's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations. I would also like to express our appreciation to General Gordon Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Army Robert Walker, and Brigadier General James Shane for their testimony.

As I mentioned at the conclusion of your testimony, attached are a number of questions that I would like answered for the record. I would appreciate your response to these questions by March 24, 1995 in order that the Commission can consider them early in our deliberative process.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD/jjg
encl.

JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS/ARMY

1. The 1993 Commission recommended that DoD look at cross-service issues in greater detail.

   How did the Army consider/incorporate recommendations from the Joint Cross-Service working groups? How was this coordinated with other services?

2. Did anyone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense require the Army to include any of the alternatives of the Joint Cross-Service Groups in its recommendations? Please specify.

3. The 1993 Commission rejected the Department's recommendations to close Letterkenny Army Depot and directed that the tactical missile maintenance workload previously conducted at 9 different DoD depots be consolidated at Letterkenny.

   What workload has already been transferred?

   What is the schedule for transferring the remaining workload?

   How much has already been obligated in support of the missile maintenance consolidation plan at Letterkenny?

   Has the Army re-evaluated the cost/benefit ratio of the missile maintenance consolidation plan at Letterkenny? If so, please comment on the results of the updated analysis.

4. The Joint Cross Service Group on Depot Maintenance suggested that air launched missile maintenance be consolidated at Hill Air Force Base; ground launched missile maintenance work be consolidated at Anniston Army Depot and the Marine Corps Hawk missile workload be accomplished at Barstow.

   Why did the Army reject the cross-service team proposal and instead consolidate all missile work at Tobyhanna Army Depot?

GENERAL ARMY ISSUES

1. From Cold War levels to the end of Fiscal Year 1996, the Army will have reduced its force structure by approximately 37% worldwide.

   How much has the Army reduced its installation infrastructure?

   If there is significant difference, please explain your rationale.

2. Reuse of facilities that DoD disposes of is critically important to the community. It is an Army responsibility to ensure that the facility is reusable and to coordinate with or assist agencies or groups that desire to assume control of disposed facilities.

   Did the Army consider reuse in development of its recommendations to the Commission?

   Were any bases removed from consideration because of projected reuse problems?

MANEUVER

1. The Army's report to the Commission states that maneuver installations must have the capacity to station 19 mechanized brigades and 13 light brigades. Current capacity is 15 mechanized brigades and 14 light brigades.

   Since current capacity for light brigades is greater than required, why didn't the Army recommend the closure of an installation such as Fort Richardson which has the capacity for one light brigade and no capability to accommodate additional brigades even with construction?

2. Forts Riley, Drum, Richardson, and Wainwright scored lowest on the Army's military value assessment among maneuver installations. None of them was recommended for closure.

   Does the Army's requirement to be able to accommodate the 10-division Army within the continental U.S. effectively prohibit ever closing a maneuver installation?

3. The Army announced significant restructuring late last year, which affected Forts Bliss, Lewis, Riley and Carson, among others.

   Was the desire to maintain the existing maneuver base structure a factor in that restructuring?

   Was OSD consulted in advance regarding possible effects of the restructuring on the BRAC process?

   What guidance did OSD give the Army regarding the effect of the realignment effect on maneuver bases?

4. Why is the Army moving the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment from Fort Bliss to Fort Carson and retaining one brigade there instead of keeping the 3rd at Fort Bliss, moving the brigade elsewhere, and closing Fort Carson?

5. With the removal of one brigade from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, will there be any partial closure of Schofield Barracks?

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. Why is Fort Dix being significantly realigned when it is third in military value?

2. In the Army's recommendation on Fort Chaffee, it states that it "...intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard".

   What does that mean? All of the 72,000 acres? Which of the more than 1,200 buildings?

3. Fort Indiantown Gap is centrally located to the largest concentration of Reserve Component forces in the northeastern United States, and supporters contend this proximity has significantly contributed to saving taxpayer dollars due to less travel time to and from its training facilities.

   Did your staff study how these cost savings might offset any savings from closing the post?

4. What is the impact on Army and Air National Guard flight training if the active duty personnel who operate and schedule the air to ground range at Fort Indiantown Gap depart?

5. Which of the ten Major Training Areas in the Continental United States were seriously considered for being relinquished to the Army Reserve or National Guard for operation and administration?

FORT McCLELLAN

1. In testimony before this Commission, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch said that environmental permitting "is a process that the Army has got to go through before we would be ...willing to close Fort McClellan."

   How long can the Army wait for those permits and still accomplish the closure of Fort McClellan within the time constraints on closures established in law?

   By whatever measure you choose to use. at what point would the difficulty of obtaining permits and moving the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense Training Facility outweigh leaving them in place?

2. The state of Alabama has said that permitting of the chemical demilitarization facility at Anniston Army Depot depends on the presence of Fort McClellan.

   Does the Army believe that it will need to seek new permits for the Anniston chemical demilitarization facility if its recommendation on Fort McClellan is approved?

   Has that process begun?

COMMAND, CONTROL & ADMINISTRATION

1. The recommendations pertaining to Fort Hamilton, Fort Totten, and the Selfridge Army Garrison result primarily in the closure of family housing.

   Why are savings realized if the Army must now pay basic allowance for quarters and variable housing allowances to soldiers who were occupying those family housing units?

2. The DoD recommends the movement of a Defense Investigative Service unit from Fort Holabird, Maryland. This is the last tenant at Fort Holabird.

   Do you have a plan or recommendation regarding the disposal of the Fort Holabird property?

   Will Fort Holabird be disposed of under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 or through the regular disposal process?

MEDICAL

1. The Army is recommending the closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Aurora, Colorado.

   What will happen to Fitzsimons Army Medical Center's role as a lead agent and referral center for a 13-state region?

   How is the cost of expanding the capacity of one or more other DOD hospitals to assume this role reflected in the cost/benefit evaluation of closing Fitzsimons?

2. The Army indicates that some of the Fitzsimons workload will be moved to Evans Army Community Hospital at Fort Carson and to the Air Force Academy hospital, both about 75 miles away in Colorado Springs.

   Are those two hospitals able to absorb the increased workload?

3. In recommending the closure of Fitzsimons and the realignments of the hospitals on Forts Meade and Lee, did the Army consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel and their family members remaining in the area of the hospital to be closed?

   What about retirees, survivors, and their family members?

   Do you have any estimate of the additional out of pocket costs to beneficiaries in those areas following the closure and realignment of those hospitals?

4. Even though not specifically stated, it is assumed that the Army is recommending the closure of Noble Army Hospital at Fort McClellan along with the closure of that base. However, the Army presence at the nearby Anniston Army Depot is slated to grow, and that facility does not have a hospital.

   Did the Army consider the potential benefits of keeping some medical capacity at Fort McClellan to meet the needs of the remaining military presence in the area?

5. Does the closure of Noble Army Hospital impact on the capability of Anniston Army Depot to perform its chemical demilitarization mission?

6. In 1993 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) recommended the realignment of Patterson Army Hospital at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to a clinic. This list does not mention Patterson Army Hospital.

   Did the Army consider the closure of Patterson Army Hospital?

   How is the situation different this year than it was in 1993?

7. What are the opportunities to further downsize hospital infrastructure beyond the recommended closings of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center and Noble Army Hospital at Fort McClellan and the downsizing of the hospitals at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Fort Meade, Maryland?

DEPOTS

1. Your analysis of military value for the four Army depots ranked Tobyhanna first, Anniston second, Red River third, and Letterkenny fourth. In your recommendations to the Commission, you recommend closure of Red River and realignment of Letterkenny.

   Did you consider closing all four depots? If not, which depots did you exclude? For what reasons did you exclude them?

   Did you consider moving production lines from Anniston to Red River? If not, why?

2. What military attributes about Tobyhanna and Anniston Army Depots were so compelling that they were removed from consideration?

3. The Navy has recommended realignment of Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Corpus Christi Army Depot is a tenant there, and relies on the Navy airfield for helicopter flight operations.

   Does the realignment of Naval Air Station Corpus Christi to a Naval Air Facility impact on Army plans for Corpus Christi Army Depot? If yes, how?

4. In the Army's report to this Commission, comments on the alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance pertain only to alternatives that result in losses to Army depots.

   Are there any gains from other Services at Army depots as a result of the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations?

   If yes, do these impact on your depot analyses or recommendations?

5. If your recommendations are fully implemented, will the Army depot structure retain excess capacity which could be used for workload from other services?

PROVING GROUNDS

1. Will the capability to conduct chemical or biological testing remain at Dugway after realignment?

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. You recommend realigning the Sierra Army Depot by removing its conventional ammunition storage and destruction missions.

   Where will these missions be performed?

PORTS

1. Sunny Point was retained because it is the sole ammunition terminal in the Army inventory. U.S. Navy port facilities accommodate USN and USMC bulk ammunition requirements.

   Please explain why a single Service could not accommodate Army, Navy, and Marine Corps bulk ammunition shipping requirements.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

1. OSD policy guidance directed that "...environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations." The policy further states that "...unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse."

   Were any installations not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems?

2. Funding in support of environmental clean-up of BRAC 88 installations expires at the end of Fiscal Year 1995.

   Is expiration of funding a potential problem?

   What is the estimated cost of uncompleted BRAC 88 environmental clean-up actions?

   How do you intend to continue to fund required clean-up activities?

3. As the Army made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

   For example, did environmental limitations on a base's expansion potential play a major role in the analysis?

   Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

LEASES

1. The Army studied the offices of the Military Traffic Management Command in Virginia under the lease category. The Army report stated that "analysis was discontinued because realignment was not financially advantageous."

   What alternatives did the Army find to be not financially advantageous?

2. We have received copies of two letters from the Army to the other Services requesting retention of facilities on bases recommended for closure in the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to this Commission. In one, the Army requests portions of the Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, Kansas; in the other Army requests portions of Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

   Were these two issues discussed during the DOD joint review process? If not, why not?

3. Actions like these two letters are exactly what the Business Executives for National Security highlighted in their study concerning implementation of previous BRAC recommendations.

   Do you think that the Commission should change the Brooks Air Force Base and Naval Reserve Training Center recommendations to reflect establishment of reserve component enclaves?

COSTS AND SAVINGS

1. Many installations studied for closure were ultimately deferred "because it was not found to be financially advantageous."

   What were your minimum financial criteria for considering a base for closure?

2. Is the Army changing any of its execution procedures to accelerate realization of, or increase, savings from base closings?

3. During testimony on 7 March 1995, Brigadier General Shane stated the Army changed some installation assessment attributes based on a General Accounting Office report. Please identify the report and which attributes were changed based on the report.

4. Despite Congressional & GAO recommendations, costs of closures to other affected federal agencies is excluded from installation cost considerations on the rationale of high cost-vs.-low benefit of gathering and quantifying data.

   Can you suggest a cost-effective alternative that addresses Congressional concern?

COMMODITY

1. The Air Force has proposed moving functions from the Rome Labs in New York to the Army's Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

   Is there sufficient capacity at Fort Monmouth to accommodate the proposed move?

   Did you incorporate the effects of this Air Force move when ranking Fort Monmouth against other commodity installations?

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JAMES V. HANSEN, UTAH

1. Secretary West: Are you aware that during the previous two rounds of base closures, the then Secretaries of the Army removed Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, from any further consideration under the BRAC process because of its unique military value and characterized Dugway as an irreplaceable national security asset? What has changed in the last three years to precipitate your recommendation to this commission?

2. The Army is proposing to move Dugway's Smoke and Obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground. Are you aware that Yuma does not possess the environmental permits from the State of Arizona required to permit open-air testing of this magnitude? If these permits cannot be obtained what are your plans for this important testing?

3. Are you also aware that Dugway already possesses these permits as well as all permits required for the open-air release of live chemical agent as required in other realignment proposals?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS

The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, "except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave." The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

1. Has the Army identified which of Fort Chaffee's 70,000 acres and 1,000 buildings would be licensed to the National Guard, and which would be returned to the public for development?

2. As a result of the 1991 Base Closure process, Fort Chaffee has been dedicated primarily to the training of Reserve Component units and individuals. Was the Reserve Component involved in the decision to close Fort Chaffee?

3. How much will it cost the Army National Guard to operate the licensed portions of Fort Chaffee? Does the Army intend to provide the National Guard with the required funds?

4. The Army says that the annual recurring savings of closing Fort Chaffee will be $13 million. How can that be, since the base's total FY 1995 operating budget is only $9.7 million?

5. Does the Army's $13 million projected annual savings consider the costs of continuing to operate the Fort Chaffee "enclave" and the extra travel costs involved for reserve component units that will now have to travel longer distances to places such as Fort Polk or Fort Sill?

6. In BRAC 93, Fort Chaffee ranked #5 among 10 Major Training Areas. In BRAC 95, Chaffee was ranked last among those same 10 Major Training Areas. What factors caused Chaffee's ranking to drop so much in just two years?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. ROSCOE BARTLETT, MARYLAND

1. What are the exact costs (and savings) associated with the proposed relocating of the Information Systems Engineering Command (CONUS) from Fort Ritchie to Fort Huachuca, Arizona? At the present time, figures show that 73 percent of the important telecommunications responsibilities fulfilled by ISEC is performed on the east coast. I am deeply troubled by a proposed change of station for this high-tech unit and the increased expenditures ties to meeting its mission from the west. Tell me -- specifically -- upon what basis this particular move is justified and what savings will be realized as a result.

2. The Army's recommendations state that the National Military Command Center (referred to as Alternate Joint Communications Site R) will be able to maintain its operational support even with the removal of those units from Fort Ritchie which currently have the task of supporting Site R. Given the unique and unpredictable geographic/weather/logistical demands of the region in which Site R and Fort Ritchie are located, how can a significant change in locations for crucial support units be justified and still maintain the operations readiness of Site R in both peacetime and crisis?

3. In my estimation, the missions of both the garrison (Fort Ritchie) and its tenants have become more demanding and exacting as a result of earlier BRAC action and increasing global tension and threats to our national security. The ability of the military to respond swiftly and adequately to crisis is clearly in jeopardy as a result of the recommendations in the Army's report. Please tell me how our total force requirements will be met with the relocations and closures (involving Fort Ritchie) contained in the Army's report to the Commission. I am unconvinced that the military value will be enhanced as a result of the changes suggested.

4. It is a fact that designated potential receiving locations are not prepared to house and accommodate incoming units. Of primary concern to the Army in its criteria for site selection is the ability of existing and receiving locations to mobilize units, manpower and operations to meet any contingency. Fort Ritchie has historically proven that its mission is unique and that it can meet the Army's requirements at minimal cost. What benefits can you cite which justify relocating units from Fort Ritchie to sites which are not prepared to accept them?

5. The U.S. Army has recently invested nearly $2 million in construction of an armory at Fort Ritchie. In addition, $2.6 million has been invested in the construction of a new post exchange at Fort Ritchie. Construction of a newly-dedicated commissary at the post will total $4.6 million. The post fire station will cost $1.6 million and the restoration of the Fort's lake, dam, and spillway will cost taxpayers $3.7 million. The Army's efforts to economically justify closing Fort Ritchie do not measure up to the reality of the investments made to keep the base in operation. The investments made in the facility make Fort Ritchie more likely to meet the Army's goals, not less. I assume that the Army's expenditures of millions of dollars of public funds for capital improvements at Fort Ritchie were made to keep the post open in operation. Please assure me that such is the case and intent.

6. In accordance with the jointness criteria, Fort Ritchie now hosts a joint organization (DISA). Was that important factor considered as part of the Army's evaluation?

7. Did the Army ever consider the conversion of 1111th Signal Battalion and the MPs to civilian space to avoid excessive construction costs for support facilities (ie., housing, dining) at Fort Detrick?

8. Was any consideration given to contracting out or having civilian security systems replace Fort Ritchie MPs? This would save transportation costs from Fort Detrick to Site R.

9. Was consideration given to realigning the organizations based at Fort Ritchie to other locations closer to Fort Ritchie -- such as ISEC to Letterkenny Army Depot or TAO (sic) to Site R, or moving the 1108th Signal Brigade to Site R? Such a realignment could meet both the Army's goals, utilize Fort Ritchie's assets and save expenses.

10. What consideration has been given to realigning Fort Ritchie (ie, the garrison) to become a subpost of Fort Meade?

11. What consideration was given to using Fort Ritchie to support DISA Headquarters, thereby meeting DISA goals, consolidating resources and getting personnel out of leased facilities? This action would be consistent with future total force requirements.

12. What consideration has been given to Fort Ritchie being assigned to GSA and the property subsequently being leased back to the current tenants?

13. Did the Army coordinate -- to any degree whatsoever -- with DISA to determine the cost of moving the Network Management Center?

14. With regard to environmental concerns: was consideration given to significant impact of additional personnel on Fort Huachuca's water supply system (which is critically short)?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. GLEN BROWDER, ALABAMA

With respect to the relocation of the live chemical agent training facility from Fort McClellan, would you advise as follows:

1. What contacts has the Army or OSD had with the Governor of Missouri or his staff concerning environmental permits for this facility?

2. Have you applied for any permits?

3. If so, what permits have you applied for? When?

4. What office or organization in the Army is responsible for obtaining these permits?

5. Are the applications public and if so, how can the public obtain them?

6. Have you requested or do you expect to request or obtain any waivers with respect to these permits?

7. Since you are requesting permits before we have taken action on your recommendation, when do you plan to undertake the environmental review required by the National Environmental Policy Act?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JIM CHAPMAN, TEXAS

1. Was the combined military value and cost of closure of the co-located facilities of Red River Army Depot, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Defense Logistics Agency distribution depot (DDRT), and their tenants considered in the overall evaluation as requested of the Army, Defense Logistics Agency, and Department of Defense by the community?

2. In developing workload realignment options, did the Army modify the receiving depots capacity to account for the impact of changes in production mix on depot capacity and will the Army have sufficient depot maintenance capacity with only one tracked vehicle depot to meet its core maintenance workload requirements and hence its readiness requirements?

3. The Army, unlike the Air Force, has claimed savings for the workload reductions due to downsizing. Does this not falsely represent and overstate the BRAC savings and distort the analysis?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

1. Secretary West, in making the decision to close Fort Pickett, Virginia, did the Army consult with the leadership of the other services and federal agencies who currently train at Fort Pickett, for input concerning the value to them of the installation?

2. Secretary West, when the Army ran its COBRA analysis for Fort Pickett, did you factor in the additional costs to the Army associated with Reserve Component units, who are quartered relatively near to and have regularly trained at Fort Pickett in the past, having to travel further to accomplish annual training periods and, in some cases, weekend training densities?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JERRY F. COSTELLO, ILLINOIS

1. Given the active force down-sizing and greater reliance on the Reserve components, wouldn't it make sense to use the Price Support Center, which is so ideally located, as a major reserve force support base?

2. The Army has said they must close the military family housing at Price because of the ATCOM move, yet only 17% of that housing is occupied by ATCOM personnel and there is a waiting list of over one year. Why do the soldiers in the commands at St. Louis not deserve equal housing consideration?

3. The Army has said that Price will close "except for a small reserve enclave and storage area." What consideration was given to the activities of the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency? Why aren't the costs of relocating those activities included in the cost data supplied by the Army?

4. The Army does not mention the DLA Strategic Stockpile material at the Price Support Center in their narrative. What disposition will be made of the more than 700,000 tons of material there, and at what cost? Why isn't that cost reflected in the Army's analysis?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SPENCER ABRAHAM, MICHIGAN

1. Mr. Secretary, your report states there is no job loss associated with closing the Detroit Army Tank Plant. However, General Dynamics currently manufactures M1 tank gun mounts in the Tank Plant. I understand the Army's reasoning was since the General Dynamics contract expires in 1997, and the Army has six years to complete the facility disposal, the job loss would come from an end to the contract, and not from the closing of the Tank Plant. Is the baseline reason to close the Tank Plant: to cease gun mount production by General Dynamics?

2. — **If yes:** I further understand Rock Island Depot in Illinois is the only other manufacturer of M1 tank gun mounts. Why are you ending a contract with a civilian contractor when the only other source of production is a government arsenal? Given that this does not fall within the traditional arsenal production area of barrels, why are you ceasing private production for government owned facilities?

3. — **If no:** Are you then anticipating renewing the production contract with General Dynamics?

4. — **If no again:** Why are you ceasing gun mount production with the private firm of General Dynamics when the only other organization producing these parts is in the Army arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois? Isn't current DoD policy to utilize private contractors over public producers whenever possible? What savings are derived from closing the Tank Plant that warrant abrogating this major policy directive?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. RICHARD GEPHARDT, MISSOURI

Regarding ATCOM:

1. The Army's analysis of commodity oriented installations indicates that it performed exhaustive analyses based on the selection criteria and force structure plan as dictated by the BRAC law. Did the Army perform similar analyses of leased facilities? If so, please provide these analyses.

2. In 1993, the Army determined that "the high relocation costs make realignment or closure (of ATCOM) impractical and prohibitively expensive." Has there been a change in circumstance in the last two years that makes relocation more affordable? Please provide details.

3. A 1991 Defense Management Report found that merging the Aviation Command and the Troop Support Command into ATCOM would result in management and cost efficiencies. What change has led to the conclusion that, rather than consolidation, breaking ATCOM into four new entities is more efficient? If so, please provide these analyses.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS PAUL S. SARBANES AND BARBARA A. MIKULSKI AND REPS. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT AND ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR., MARYLAND

1. How were the cross-service capabilities of the Defense Information Systems Agency's Command assessed as part of the Army's evaluation and final decision to recommend Ft. Ritchie for closure?

2. Did the Army coordinate directly with DISA to determine the cost of moving the Network Management Center?

3. Did the DOD take into account Fort Huachuca's critical water shortage as part of its recommendation to send a significant number of additional personnel there?

4. How were the additional costs of having the Information Systems Engineering Command (CONUS) service East Coast clients factored into the long-term cost of the proposal to move these functions to Fort Huachuca?

5. Has any consideration been given to assigning Fort Ritchie to GSA so the property could be subsequently be leased back to current tenants or to an expanded DISA presence?

6. What consideration was given to the Defense Information Systems Agency's current use of Ft. Ritchie, cost of relocating, and to their potential for locating their Western Hemisphere headquarters at this site?

Regarding US Army Publications Distribution Center, Middle River, MD:

1. What is the justification for the following statement in the DOD's submission to BRAC: "The consolidation eliminates a manual operation in Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process?" Please specify criteria and methodology for determining a manual vs. automated operation, and the "efficiencies" that are expected.

2. How is "efficiency" calculated when comparing the Baltimore and St. Louis facilities? Did comparative figures for the two facilities include average weight shipped per month per employee or throughput times for loose issue, resupply or initial distribution?

3. In evaluating where to consolidate, did the Army examine the effect of Desert Shield/Desert Storm on order processing times?

4. Was the potential reduced lease cost at Baltimore included in the cost analysis?

5. In repeated studies and comments, the Army has cited the automation technology and capabilities of the PDC, Middle River. On what basis did the Army label this site a " manual operation" in its submission to BRAC?

6. Did the Army include increased shipping costs from St. Louis to the East Coast and to foreign destinations when calculating cost savings?

7. Did the Army examine savings potentials that could be achieved by returning initial distribution of stock to the Centers which is currently being performed by contracted printers?

8. Was the entire US Army Publications and Printing Command, including headquarters, considered for consolidation?

9. Was there any examination of consolidating other service distribution centers with the Army's?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. GEORGE W. GEKAS, PENNSYLVANIA

1. Considering the unique training facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap, including the artillery range, the Tank Table VIII qualification range, Muir Army Airfield with the largest Reserve Component helicopter training facility in the United States, the 44,000 square feet aircraft maintenance hangar with aviation fuel storage capacity of 100,000 gallons, and the air-to-ground bombing and gunnery range (one of only 15 in the United States), how did the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army arrive at the conclusion that "Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations", especially considering that Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum do not have these same unique facilities and are not geographically located near the largest concentration of Reserve Component units in the northeastern United States, as is Fort Indiantown Gap?

2. The Army's report states that "Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill, and Fort Drum." Has any study been done to make sure that these other facilities actually have the training facilities equal to the facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap, or sufficient for the needs of these units, such as Tank Table VIII qualification ranges? And, do these other facilities have training time available in their schedules to accommodate the needs of our training units? Additionally, has the DoD investigated the costs of transport and equipment associated with using other training sites?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

1. Why didn't the Army study the costs of alternatives to the Detroit Tank Plant as part of the BRAC process?

2. Does the Army have plans for completing elsewhere the work now done at the Detroit Plant? If not, why not?

3. Did the Army consider the cost to move any machining equipment from the Detroit Plant, where would it go and how much would the move cost?

4. Who will provide the engineering support for the gun mounts production now provided by General Dynamics at the Tank Plant, and what will be the cost?

5. Why was the consideration of such potential costs put off until after the Army made the closure recommendation, instead of being examined as part of the Total Army Basing Study, and factored into the COBRA analysis?

6. When it is clear that real people will lose their jobs if the closure is implemented, how can the Army say the recommendation "will not affect any jobs"?

7. The recommendation to close the Detroit Tank Plant postulates a closing cost of about $1 million. What is the basis of this estimate, and what component costs were included?

8. The recommendation to close the Detroit Tank Plant postulates a net savings during the implementation period (FY 96-2001) of about $8 million. What is the basis for this savings estimate?

9. Are the costs associated with moving the work from Detroit Army Tank Plant to other locations included in the estimated closing costs and net savings, and if not, why not?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS CHRISTOPHER DODD AND JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN AND REPRESENTATIVES ROSA DELAURO AND CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTICUT

1. Congressional language in Fiscal Year 1994 directed the Department of the Army to convene a Blue Ribbon Panel to examine the tank engine industrial base. In response to that request, the Defense Science Board's Tank Engine Industrial Base Task Force recommended keeping open the Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) in order to maintain a "critical mass" of support engineering and logistics capability at SAEP for an extended period.

2. On February 14, 1995, Secretary Decker, in a response to Senators Dodd and Lieberman, stated that the Army planned on spending $47.5 million as part of a three-year tank engine industrial base program. This program would retain engineering expertise, essential recuperator parts production, and a minimal capacity for new engine assembly and testing at SAEP.

   Why, less than a two weeks after this letter was written, did the Army recommend closing this facility?

   How does this decision affect the *directed* preservation of the tank engine industrial base?

3. What are the implications for implementation of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report without SAEP?

4. What *specific* alternatives has the Department of the Army outlined to meet all requirements of the Panel's recommendation given the closure of SAEP?

5. Why were the more than 1,500 workers at SAEP not considered in this evaluation? Closing SAEP will result in sizable job loss and significant economic impact on the region.

6. If workforce impact was not a consideration, are not Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) facilities automatically placed at a distinct disadvantage during the Army BRACC process?

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950307-20

FROM: DIXON	TO: PERRY, WILLIAM
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: SEC OF DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF DEFENSE
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS							

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

DATE: 7 MAR

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
		✓				VPF 7/10
RICK BROWN		✓				8 MAR
J. J. GERTLER		✓				8 Mar
STEVE BAILEY		✓				
BOB MILLER		✓				NK 8 Mar
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				8 Mar
DAVE LEWIS		✓			✓	
CLIFF WOOTEN						

COMMENTS:

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number
when responding 950307-20

March 3, 1995

The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1000

Dear Secretary Perry:

I would like to thank you for your recent testimony before the Commission concerning the Department of Defense's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations.

As I mentioned at the conclusion of your testimony, attached are a number of additional questions that I would like answered for the record. I would appreciate your response to these questions by March 15, 1995 in order that the Commission can consider them during its deliberative process.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

fac:sma
Encl.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Secretary Perry, your report to us uses the results of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses to project the anticipated costs and savings that would result from implementing your recommendations.

Recognizing that the figures used in the COBRA analyses are not budget quality, how accurate do you believe the projections are?

How closely have the figures in the COBRA analyses prepared in 1991 and 1993 compared to the actual costs for closures?

2. Secretary Perry, how many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

How long are such caretaker costs accounted for under base closure funding?

3. Secretary Perry, in the 1993 round, one community pointed out that the cost of cleaning up an installation directed to close could be three to ten times as great as the cost of cleaning up an active installation. This difference is due to expected technological advances in environmental restoration.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe the difference between routine and closure related cleanup costs, if factual, should be considered in cost of closure calculations?

4. Secretary Perry, could you describe any efforts by DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency to establish variable levels of environmental cleanup, tied to specific plans for reuse?

5. Secretary Perry, in making closure decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

For example, a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions. Did this issue play a major role in the analysis?

Were bases in Clean Air Act non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

6. Secretary Perry, in 1993 the Commission made specific recommendations to the Department regarding improvements in health care operations and increased cost effectiveness.

Mr. Secretary, did you direct your Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to examine the consolidation of resources across military departments?

What was the outcome of that examination?

How is that examination reflected in the Department's new list of recommended closures and realignments?

7. Secretary Perry, in developing the current list, did you direct the Services to consider closing military hospitals that are not cost effective, given their patient load and the cost and availability of medical care in their communities?

8. Secretary Perry, did you direct the Services to move medical assets, including moving them across Service lines, in order to increase the capability and usage of military medical facilities?

9. Secretary Perry, during the development of the current list, did you direct the Services to review their policy of closing military hospitals when bases served by those hospitals are closed?

What was the result of that review?

Have you ensured that the most cost effective means of delivering care to all beneficiaries are maintained, irrespective of other base closure actions?

10. Secretary Perry, in October 1994 Business Executives for National Security (BENS) issued a report ,"Uncovering the Shell Game," which criticized the Department's record in actually closing military facilities. "60 Minutes" featured the report later in the year. The essence of the report and the "60 Minutes" characterization was that "of the 67 bases the President, Congress and the Pentagon have agreed to shut down thus far, over one-third never closed or have quietly reopened under a new name or function." As you know, Mr. Secretary, we plan on offering recommendations to the President concerning reuse and future closure actions. Reports such as the BENS report detract from general support for the closure process.

Mr. Secretary, please give us your comments on the BENS report.

(Note: During the March 1, 1995 hearing, Secretary Deutch agreed to provide a copy of DoD's written response to BENS.)

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

1. Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

2. Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment will have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

3. Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

1. Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

From Senator Pryor (Arkansas):

1. Secretary Perry, the Army was asked to consider the cost of moving the Defense Logistics Agency activity at the Red River Army Depot in its analysis of the total closure costs. The community has estimated the cost for such a move to be in excess of $300 million. Is this estimate consistent with the cost calculated by DoD?

2. Secretary Perry, it is my understanding that the Red River Army Depot was recently awarded the President's Prototype Award in support of the Administration's National Performance Review initiatives. Were such awards for quality and efficiency considered by DoD in its base closure process?

3. Secretary Perry, could you detail the reasoning behind the Army's recommendation to completely close out one of its primary depots and realign another when the other Services appear to have chosen realignment initiatives through "downsizing in place" at their maintenance facilities?

From Senator Shelby and Representative Browder (Alabama):

1. Secretary Perry, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan from the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits and certification for the construction of facilities at a new location prior to the 1995 base closure round if DoD wanted to put the installation on the list again. It appears that DoD did not follow this direction.

Have all the necessary permits been obtained by the Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP						
ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 10 MAR		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER						10 MAR
STEVE BAILEY						10 Mar
BOB MILLER						10 MAR
MIKE KENNEDY						10 MAR
DAVE LEWIS		✓				10 MAR
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	
COMMENTS:						

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950309-6

FROM: KIDD, SYLVIA E.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: PRESIDENT	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: NAT. MILITARY FAMILY ASSOC.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING PERMISSION TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON HEALTH BENEFITS FOR MILITARY RETIREES

Due Date: 950316	Routing Date: 950309	Date Originated: 950303	Mail Date:

The National Military Family Association
6000 Stevenson Avenue, Suite 304, Alexandria, Virginia 22304-3526
(703) 823-NMFA FAX (703) 751-4857

Please refer to this number when responding 950309-6

BOARD OF ADVISORS

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Chairman and Founder

Mrs. Creighton W. Abrams
Dr. Lawrence J. Korb
Vice Chairmen

Mrs. Norman R. Augustine
MCPON Duane Bushey, USN (Ret)
The Honorable Beverly Byron
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Mrs. Richard Cheney
Mrs. William J. Crowe, Jr.
GEN Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret)
Mrs. Michael S. Davison
BG Peter Dawkins, USA (Ret)
Mrs. Peter Dawkins
Mr. Frank DiBello
Senator Robert Dole
President Gerald R. Ford
Mrs. Gerald R. Ford
Senator John H. Glenn, Jr.
ADM James Gracey, USCG (Ret)
Mrs. James Gracey
GEN Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret)
Mrs. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
CSM Joseph M. Himelick, USA (Ret)
Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Mr. Irving Kaufman
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
VADM William P. Lawrence, USN (Ret)
Mrs. William P. Lawrence
GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret)
Mrs. Edward C. Meyer
ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret)
Mrs. Thomas H. Moorer
Dr. Dennis K. Orthner
CMSAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)
MG George S. Patton, USA (Ret)
Mrs. George S. Patton
Mrs. Colin L. Powell
MCPO Larry Rhea, USN (Ret)
Representative Patricia Schroeder
Mrs. John M. Shalikashvili
MCPO-CG Allen W. Thiele, USCG (Ret)
Senator Strom Thurmond
GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA (Ret)
Mrs. John W. Vessey, Jr.
LTG La Vern E. Weber, NGUS (Ret)
Mrs. La Vern E. Weber
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Mrs. Caspar W. Weinberger
Mrs. Alfred J. Whittle

March 3, 1995

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

The National Military Family Association requests permission to testify before the Commission on the subject of health care benefits for military retirees affected by base closures and realignments.

Point of contact concerning this matter is Dorsey D. Chescavage.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Sylvia E. J. Kidd

Sylvia E. J. Kidd
President

mwk

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP						
ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 9 MAR		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				[illegible]
J. J. GERTLER		✓				[illegible] 10 MAR
STEVE BAILEY		✓				[illegible] 9 Mar
BOB MILLER		✓				[illegible]
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				[illegible]
DAVE LEWIS		✓				[illegible] 10 Mar
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	
COMMENTS:						

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950306-2

FROM: KLING, LEE	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: COMMISSIONER	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		b9
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

QUESTIONS FOR ASST SEC GOTBAUM FOR MARCH 1, HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950306	Date Originated:	Mail Date:

Lee Klang

Please refer to this number when responding 950306-2

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Mr. Gotbaum Your report states that an independent review of the DoD cumulative economic impact analysis was performed by six experts from government, academia and the private sector. They concluded that the Department "estimates tend to overstate economic impact and that the Department should stress this in its presentations to the Commission, the Congress, and the public."

Do you believe you have gone overboard in the analysis of economic impact and if so, how and where?

Does this unnecessarily excite the communities affected?

Are you aware if the Navy determined a numerical measure or thresh;hold to conclude that the cumulative economic impact should cause them to decide against further consideration of installations they would otherwise close?

from Wendi Steele

Mr. Gotbaum In the Cross Service areas of depots, test and evaluations and laboratories, I understand the need to retain a core capability within the Department of Defense but not within each service.

With fewer dollars available for new weapons systems, how can the Department justify retaining these duplicate core capabilities?

Did the Cross Service Groups calculate the cost of these duplications?

Mr. Gotbaum Some of the same interservicing areas have been studied and costed for the last 20 years. In most cases recomendations were rejected by the Services and the Department chose not to direct.

Do you feel that this Commission is the only way to get rid of the excess infrastructure costs?

from Lee Elix

MEDICAL

Mr. Gotbaum The country is going through a major realignment in the delivery of health care. Hospitals across the country are merging within cities and regions .

What do your recommendations do to merge medical facilities across service lines within areas and regions?

What are the specific recommendations by area and region, and was each analyzed?

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 9 MAR		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				RE 3/10
J. J. GERTLER		✓				JG 10 MAR
STEVE BAILEY		✓				SAB 9 Mar
BOB MILLER		✓				R 10 Mar
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				MK [illegible]
DAVE LEWIS		✓				[illegible]
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	[illegible]

COMMENTS:

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950308-2

FROM: LYLES	TO: BAYER, ROBERT E.
TITLE: STAFF DIRECTOR	TITLE: DEP ASST SECDEF
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: OFFICE OF SECDEF
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TESTIMONY; QUESTIONS FOR GOTBAUM AND PERRY ATTACHED.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950308	Date Originated: 950308	Mail Date: 950308

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 950308-2

March 3, 1995

Mr. Robert E. Bayer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations)
3300 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E813
Washington, DC, 20301-3300

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your recent testimony before the Commission and your ongoing assistance in the base closure and realignment process.

Attached please find a copy of our follow-up questions submitted to Secretary Perry and to Secretary Gotbaum from our recent March 1, 1995 Investigative Hearing. As indicated in our letters to Secretary Perry and Secretary Gotbaum, we would appreciate the responses by March 15, 1995.

Thank you for your assistance and please call me with any questions.

Sincerely,

David

David S. Lyles
Staff Director

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Secretary Perry, your report to us uses the results of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses to project the anticipated costs and savings that would result from implementing your recommendations.

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1. Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

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Have all the necessary permits been obtained by the Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FOR MR. GOTBAUM FROM 1 MARCH INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS

Mr. Gotbaum, you indicated during your testimony that you would respond for the record to the following questions:

1. What is the annual cost of the excess infrastructure in the Joint Cross-Service areas remaining after the 1995 round?

2. The Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995 through 1999. According to a senior DoD official, these cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction in these personnel by the turn of the century.

   How much of a reduction in DoD laboratory infrastructure is contained in your recommendations?

   How and when is DoD going to eliminate the excess infrastructure?

3. The Joint Cross-Service Review Team provided two options, both resulting in the closure of 8 depots. These options would eliminate between 30 million to 35 million excess hours from a total excess capacity of about 40 million hours.

   The final DoD recommendation would close 3 depots and realign 7 others. How many hours of excess capacity will be eliminated if these recommendations are approved?

4. What are the bases that were not recommended for closure by the Navy to the Secretary of Defense for economic reasons?

   Which, if any installations, were substituted for these omitted closures?

5. What do your recommendations do to merge medical facilities across the Services in each region?

   What possibilities were analyzed (cover by region)?

6. How did DoD view the benefits of regional (medical) complexes?

7. AS Meridian received two looks -- one at the service level and the second look at the joint level. If the joint ranking was higher, why didn't DoD take action based on the joint ranking, rather than accepting the Service recommendations?

8. If implemented, will the Department's recommendations to the Commission reduce a major portion of the excess capacity in any or all of the five cross-service functional areas? Please discuss those areas in detail where large amounts of excess capacity remain.

9. In May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "Core is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements...Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the ***minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary*** to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence." (emphasis added)

   If DoD's recommendations are implemented, will any of the Services retain capacity above their core level?

   If so, what are the reasons for retaining this capacity?

   Will the DoD's base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

If not, what means will the Department use to implement the Deputy Secretary's direction?

10. In 1993, the Defense Base Closure Commission realigned part of the Defense Information Services Agency (DISA) into 16 information processing megacenters. At that time, all officials concluded there would be excess capacity even within these megacenters. Some have suggested that DISA actually requires only 5 megacenters. To realign, DISA would have to come to the Commission to change the 1993 recommendation.

    Given that there is excess capacity within DISA, why are there not recommendations for further consolidation?

Document Separator

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN

DATE: 3 MAR

	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				
J. J. GERTLER		✓				
STEVE BAILEY		✓				
BOB MILLER		✓				
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				
DAVE LEWIS		✓				
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	

COMMENTS:

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950303-2

FROM: HANSEN, JAMES	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (UT)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		b3
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUBMITTING QUESTIONS FOR THE SEC OF THE ARMY AND SEC OF THE AIR FORCE.

Due Date 950305	Routing Date 950303	Date Originated 950302	Mail Date:

JAMES V. HANSEN
1ST DISTRICT, UTAH

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
NATURAL RESOURCES
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON OFFICE
ROOM 2466
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4401
(202) 225-0453

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4401

DISTRICT OFFICES
1017 FEDERAL BUILDING
324 25TH STREET
OGDEN, UT 84401
(801) 393-8362
(801) 625-5677
(801) 451-5822

435 EAST TABERNACLE
SUITE 301
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770
(801) 628-1071

Please refer to this number when responding 950303-2

March 2, 1995

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon,

I appreciated your comments during the opening hearings concerning your willingness to ask any question brought before you by any Member of Congress or other interested entity. I share your belief that the BRAC process must remain completely open, unquestionably honest and clear of all political considerations.

I respectfully request your consent to ask the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Army the following questions.

For the Secretary of the Air Force

(1) Secretary Widnall: Did you, or anyone on your staff, receive any communication or guidance from the White House, or anyone associated with the White House, directing you to remove McClellan AFB in California from consideration for closure or recommending that you devise a plan for Air Logistic Centers that would keep McClellan open?

For the Secretary of the Army

(2) Secretary West: Are you aware that during the previous two rounds of base closures, the then Secretaries of the Army removed Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, from any further consideration under the BRAC process because of its unique military value and characterized Dugway as an irreplaceable national security asset? What has changed in the last three years to precipitate your recommendation to this commission?

(3) The Army is proposing to move Dugway's Smoke and Obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground. Are you aware that Yuma does not possess the environmental permits from the State of Arizona required to permit open-air testing of this magnitude? If these permits cannot be obtained what are your plans for this important testing?

(4) Are you also aware that Dugway already possesses these permits as well as all permits required for the open-air release of live chemical agent as required in other realignment proposals?

Mr. Chairman your consent to these questions and more importantly your diligent efforts throughout this process are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

James V. Hansen
Member of Congress

P.S. I also find the allegations expressed in the attached article from Newsweek of March 6, 1995 to be very disturbing.

Document Separator

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN | DATE: 7 MAR

	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				CB 3/8
J. J. GERTLER						
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER						
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	

COMMENTS:

Source for Community Concerns/Issues

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950307-3

FROM: MIKULSKI, BARBARA	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: SENATOR (MD)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: OBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: FORT RITCHIE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

QUESTIONS FOR SEC WEST AND QUESTION THAT NEED WRITTEN RESPONSES.

Due Date: 950309	Routing Date: 950307	Date Originated: 950306	Mail Date:

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

Please refer to this number when responding 950307-3

March 6, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are seriously concerned that the Department of Defense has recommended closing Fort Ritchie, Maryland and the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center in Middle River, Maryland without a full and impartial examination. We have attached a question about each post that we would appreciate your asking Secretary West to respond to orally during the Commission's hearing tomorrow, and a series of questions for which we would like to have detailed written responses.

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

Paul S. Sarbanes
United States Senator

Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Member of Congress

Roscoe G. Bartlett
Member of Congress

Questions for The Hon. Togo West, Secretary of the Army, submitted by Senators Sarbanes and Mikulski and Representatives Bartlett and Ehrlich for the hearing before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, March 7, 1995.

RE: Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Q. What consideration was given to the Defense Information System Agency's current use of Ft. Ritchie, cost of relocating, and to their potential for locating their Western Hemisphere headquarters at this site?

RE: US Army Publications Distribution Center, Middle River, MD

Q. In repeated studies and comments, the Army has cited the automation technology and capabilities of the PDC, Middle River. On what basis did the Army label this site a "manual operation" in its submission to BRAC?

Questions submitted for the record by Senators Sarbanes and Mikulski and Representatives Bartlett and Ehrlich.

RE: Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Q. How were the cross-service capabilities of the Defense Information Systems Agency's Command assessed as part of the Army's evaluation and final decision to recommend Ft. Ritchie for closure?

Q. Did the Army coordinate directly with DISA to determine the cost of moving the Network Management Center?

Q. Did the DOD take into account Fort Huachuca's critical water shortage as part of its recommnedation to send a significant number of additional personnel there?

Q. How were the additional costs of having the Information Systems Engineering Command (CONUS) service East Coast clients factored into the long-term cost of the proposal to move these functions to Fort Huachuca?

Q. Has any consideration been given to assigning Fort Ritchie to GSA so that the property could subsequently be leased back to current tenants or to an expanded DISA presence?

RE: US Army Publications Distribution Center, Middle River, MD

Q. What is the justification for the following statement in the DOD's submission to BRAC: "The consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process?" Please specify criteria and methodology for determining a manual vs. automated operation, and the "efficiencies" that are expected.

Q. How is "efficiency" calculated when comparing the Baltimore & St. Louis facilities? Did comparative figures for the two facilities include average weight shipped per month per employee or throughput times for loose issue, resupply or initial distribution?

Q. In evaluating where to consolidate, did the Army examine the effect of Desert Shield/Desert Storm on order processing times?

Q. Was the potential reduced lease cost at Baltimore included in the cost analysis?

Q. Did the Army include increased shipping costs from St. Louis to the East Coast and to foreign destinations when calculating cost savings?

Q. Did the Army examine savings potentials that could be achieved by returning initial distribution of stock to the Centers which is currently being performed by contracted printers?

Q. Was the entire US Army Publications and Printing Command, including headquarters, considered for consolidation?

Q. Was there any examination of consolidating other service distribution centers with the Army's?

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP						
ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 3 MAR		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN	✓					CRB 3/7
J. J. GERTLER						JJG 8 MAR
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER						
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN						✓

COMMENTS:

Rick: I would like you to coordinate with appropriate analysts in Navy and Air Force teams concerning attached. If the words are not in the Commission's final report, it is more difficult for the Reserves to acquire the property. You should also check with LTC Sam McNabb, TMBS, to see why the Navy and Air Force did not include in their recommendations. Cliff should file these cpnts.

MFR: Issues (USN & USAF) submitted to Sue as question for record 3/7/95 - CRB

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950302-6

FROM: Walker, Mike	TO: OFFICE OF
TITLE: ASST SEC OF ARMY	TITLE: DEP. ASST SEC OF THE NAVY
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF ARMY	ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE NAVY
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: (NARC) OLATHE, KS	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		JS
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:
TRANSFER OF LAND AND BUILDINGS FROM [redacted] NAVY TO ARMY; (NARC) OLATHE, KS.

Due Date	Routing Date: 950302	Date Originated: 950215	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110

February 15, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950302-6

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

SUBJECT: Transfer of Land and Buildings to Department of the Army - Naval Air Reserve Center (NARC), Olathe, KS

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Command has an interest in the subject property should it become excess to the Navy requirements. It would satisfy facilities requirements for USAR units in the Community.

Transfer of excess Navy property would allow the Army Reserve to eliminate a costly lease, reduce the need for new programmed construction, and provide facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. The Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost savings of $181,300 and an FY 99 MILCON project with an estimated cost savings of $5,401,000.

The attached site plan of NARC property has been annotated to indicate the land and buildings to be considered for transfer to include seven buildings; 154, 300, 301, 302, 304, 20, 23, and approximately 15 acres. These buildings satisfy Army Reserve space requirements of approximately 44,000 square feet.

Printed on Recycled Paper

If transfer of the property is supported, we will direct preparation and execution of the DD Form 1354 to effect the conveyance.

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing)
OASA (I,L&E)

Attachment

CF: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Economic Security, ATTN: ASD(ES)
Director of the Army Staff,
ATTN: DAS-TAB (Col Jones)
Chief, Army Reserve
ATTN: DAAR-EN (Mr. Porter)
Commander, Army Reserve Command
ATTN: AFRC-DCS-EN (LTC Ard),
AFRC-COE (Mr. Smith)



NARC OLATHE EXISTING OCCUPANCY

PLATE 3

SUBJECT: Transfer of Land and Buildings to Department of the Army - Naval Air Reserve Center (NARC), Olathe, KS

The following language is recommended in the Navy/DoD submittal to the Base Realignment and Closure Committee for BRAC 95;

> "The Navy shall transfer the land and buildings to be vacated by the Navy Reserve at the Naval Air Reserve Center, Johnson County Airport, Olathe, Kansas, to the Army to establish an Army Reserve Enclave."

See the attached memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&H) with related site plan for justification.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950302-7

FROM: WALKER, MIKE	TO: BOATRIGHT, JAMES
TITLE: ASST SEC OF ARMY	TITLE: DEP ASST SEC OF AIR FORCE
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE ARMY	ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		b3
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

TRANSFER OF LAND AND BUILDINGS FROM DEPT OF AIR FORCE TO ARMY; BROOKS AFB, TEXAS.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950302	Date Originated: 950215	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110

February 15, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950302-7

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (INSTALLATIONS)

SUBJECT: Transfer of Land and Buildings to Department of the Army - Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Command has an interest in a portion of the subject property should it become excess to the Air Force requirements. It would satisfy facilities requirements for USAR units in the San Antonio area.

Transfer of Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to eliminate a costly lease, reduce the need for new programmed construction, and provide facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. The Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost savings of $218,655 and an FY 99 MILCON project with an estimated cost savings of $11,400,000.

The attached site plan of Brooks AFB has been annotated to indicate the land and buildings to be considered for transfer, including thirteen permanent buildings of 211,300 square feet and approximately 57 acres. These buildings satisfy Army Reserve space requirements of approximately 200,000 square feet.

Printed on Recycled Paper

If transfer of the property is supported, we will direct preparation and execution of the Form DD 1354 to effect the conveyance.

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing)
OASA(I,L&E)

Attachment

CF: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Economic Security, ATTN: ASD(ES)
Director of the Army Staff,
ATTN: DAS-TAB (Col Jones)
Chief, Army Reserve,
ATTN: DAAR-EN (Mr. Porter)
Commander, Army Reserve Command
ATTN: AFRC-DCS-EN (LTC Ard),
AFRC-COE (Mr. Smith)

PARTIAL SITE PLAN, FORT SAM
SAN ANTONIO, TX
NOT. TO. SCALE



02-14-1995 09:45AM FROM TO 17036965371 P.02

SUBJECT: Transfer of Land and Buildings to Department of the Army - Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

The following language is recommended in the Air Force/DoD submittal to the Base Realignment and Closure Committee for BRAC 95;

> "The Air Force shall transfer the land and buildings to be vacated at Brooks AFB, San Antonio, Texas, to the Army for an Army Reserve Enclave."

See the attached memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&H) with related site plan for justification.

Document Separator

BROOKS AFB

Secretary Widnall, you recommendation to close Brooks AFB, Texas, involved closing all activities and facilities, including family housing. We understand that there is a huge waiting list for family housing at nearby Lackland AFB.

1. Secretary Widnall, why did your recommendation not include the retention of family housing at Brooks AFB to help satisfy Air Force family housing requirements in the San Antonio metropolitan area?

Secretary Widnall, we recently received a copy of a memorandum dated February 15, 1995, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing) to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) expressing interest in the U.S. Army Reserve Command acquiring approximately 57 acres and 13 permanent buildings at Brooks AFB--should it become available from the Air Force. Transfer of this Air Force property would allow the Army Reserve to (1) eliminate a costly lease, (2) reduce the need for newly programmed military construction, and (3) provide facilities necessary to enhance unit readiness at a significant savings to the Department of Defense. According to Army officials, the Army Reserve would be able to cancel a lease with an annual cost saving of $218,655 and a fiscal year 1999 military construction project with an estimated cost saving of $11.4 million.

1. Secretary Widnall, was this request discussed and resolved during deliberations by either the BRAC 95 Steering Group or BRAC 95 Review Group, which were established to consider such inter-service needs? If not, why not?

MEMORY STORAGE REPORT (MAR 03 '95 11:59PM)

(AUTO)

FILE	FILE TYPE	OPTION	TEL NO.	PAGE
082	MEMORY TX		96965371	05

617-0476

REMAINING CALL CAPACITY 299

THE ARMY
IEF OF STAFF

NG STUDY

S-TABS
GON, ROOM 2A684
ON, DC 20310-0200

M MCNABB

EPHONE:
5COM (703) 697-1765/6
ELEPHONE:
22/DSN 223-9322

DATE-TIME-GROUP
030910MAR95

NUMBER OF PAGES
Cover
+
4

Document Separator

17TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright 1995 The Denver Post Corporation
The Denver Post

February 11, 1995 Saturday 1ST EDITION

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A-16

LENGTH: 359 words

HEADLINE: Springs breathes a sigh of relief

BYLINE: Dennis Huspeni, Special to The Denver Post

BODY:

COLORADO SPRINGS - News that Fort Carson was left off the "hit list" for base closures had business and city leaders cautiously optimistic yesterday.

The list of bases to be closed went to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry this week. Fort Carson wasn't on the list.

The list is subject to revision, however. Perry will review and possibly change the list before forwarding it to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC, in March. The commission is to make a decision by mid-May.

"It's like the Broncos being up by two touchdowns at the end of the third quarter," said Rocky Scott, president of Colorado Springs Economic Development Corp. "It's encouraging in the sense it appears it's highly likely that the Department of Defense is not considering (closing) Carson. But the end of the story doesn't come until BRAC has made its final decision."

The closure commission can add bases to the list, and that leaves Fort Carson's future uncertain, Scott noted.

Maj. Timothy Edinger, a spokesman for Fort Carson, said the post hasn't been notified officially of its status.

But Edinger noted three things that he thinks secures Carson's future:

The relocation of the 10th Special Forces to Fort Carson. The move is about two-thirds finished, and work continues on the 10th's $ 46 million headquarters at the fort.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry, now stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, is scheduled to move to Fort Carson.

Fort Carson will keep the 3rd Brigade, part of the 4th Infantry Division.

"We're confident Carson will be judged on its merits and treated fairly," Edinger said.

Colorado Springs Mayor Bob Isaac said yesterday that the news could be good, but he'd rather comment when the official "hit list" is published.

"If it's true, we're extremely happy," said Lisa Koran, project officer of the Keep Carson Military Retention Initiative. But, she agreed, there won't be

dancing in the streets until the official list comes out.

The Keep Carson Initiative has raised more than $ 460,000 from local businesses and individuals and has spent the money lobbying Pentagon officials and touting Fort Carson's strengths.

LOAD-DATE-MDC: February 13, 1995

12TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright 1995 Boston Herald Inc.
The Boston Herald

February 11, 1995 Saturday FIRST EDITION

AC CS
DC AF
CCS
BS
CC

SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. 014

LENGTH: 376 words

HEADLINE: Editorial; Hanscom, Natick needed

BODY:

The Boston Navy Yard, Fort Devens, Watertown Arsenal - Massachusetts has contributed plenty to the downsizing of the nation's defense establishment.

Now Hanscom Air Force Base in Bedford, home of the Electronic System Center for the Air Force, and the Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center are being studied for possible inclusion in the Pentagon's fourth round of base closings and consolidation.

The United States has long had too many military bases, kept alive only to placate local politicians. Some still active forts in the West have had no military function since the defeat of Geronimo; Virginia's Fort Monroe was built to keep the British fleet out of the James River and hasn't had any military usefulness since Grant took Richmond.

Placating some politicians meant other politicians could get stiffed. When Richard Nixon was commander-in-chief, guess which state was likely to find its federal installations of all kinds surplus to requirements? If you guessed the only state he didn't carry for re-election you'd go to the head of the class. Those political games left a legacy of suspicion that's hard to overcome.

Yet the new process of Pentagon recommendations to an independent commission, whose decisions must be accepted or rejected by Congress as a package, has worked well in the earlier closure rounds. No state has to worry about political punishment or favoritism toward a competitor any more.

Hanscom and the Natick lab employ almost 12,000 people directly, and there's a good reason for that. They have unique talents, capabilities and assets that aren't duplicated anywhere else in the armed forces, and one of the best locations in the country for research because of the density of talent in neighboring firms and universities. Hanscom developed the devastating J-Stars ground targeting system used in the Persian Gulf War. Natick, which would cost $ 240 million to duplicate elsewhere, has room to absorb tasks from other bases, and supporters are making that point vigorously.

Taking work from these two installations would be a major blunder, and indeed reports from Washington say the Army has decided to keep Natick. We're confident any good assessment of defense needs will keep both.

LOAD-DATE-MDC: February 13, 1995

3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright 1995 The Morning Call, Inc.
The Morning Call (Allentown)

February 7, 1995, Tuesday, FOURTH EDITION

SECTION: BETHLEHEM, Pg. B3

LENGTH: 598 words

DL
CCS
CC
BB

HEADLINE: SPECTER TOURS TOBYHANNA;
SENATOR CONFIDENT THE ARMY DEPOT WILL BE KEPT OPEN

BYLINE: MIKE FRASSINELLI; The Morning Call

BODY:

The author of the "single bullet" Kennedy assassination theory and griller of Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings took on a far less controversial issue yesterday in the Poconos.

Arlen Specter, the U.S. senator and presidential hopeful, spoke about the importance of eeping Tobyhanna Army Depot open during a tour yesterday of northeastern Pennsylvania's largest employer.

With the depot employing 3,600 workers and pumping an estimated $ 420 million into the area's economy each year, few locals would argue with Specter's assessment.

In the Lehigh Valey, the depot has an estimated $ 3 million impact on vendors who provide services to the depot.

Still, there is a chanc hemlitr ailty will be shut down during the next wave of closings this year by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

"I am confident that Tobyhanna will stay open," said Specter, R-Pennsylvania. "But I don't want to take any chances with the Base Closing Commission holding hearings during the course of the next several months."

Specter and Sen. Rick Santorum last month sent Defense Secretary William Perry a letter asking that Pennsylvania bases be left alone. In the 1991 and 1993 closings, Pennsylvania was the one of the hardest hit states, losing the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

"That loss," Specter said, "permeates all the way into northeastern Pennsylvania."

Specter, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said he worries about the Clinton Administration's military budget cuts.

"We are really, I think, cut beyond the bone now," he said. "And when we have operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, we are stretched very thin. Tobyhanna is very, very important for national defense."

When it opened in 1953 as the Tobyhanna Signal Depot, the military base employed about 500 and mostly supplied and stored equipment. Today it repairs

equipment and employs seven times as many workers.

"It is more than just a military installation in the Poconos," said Col. Michael Lindquist, who led Specter on a tour of computer system and maintenance area. "It is in fact a community in northeastern Pennsylvania."

Meanwhile, 150 billboards with the slogan, "Keep the Best," have begun going up along roadways in the Pocono and Scranton region in an effort to rally support for the Tobyhanna depot.

"We have been very fortunate. The community has come behind Tobyhanna Army Depot in an unprecedented way," said Carmen Minora, who has helped develop the billboard sign project.

The plea to keep Tobyhanna Army Depot open crosses political party lines.

Monroe County Commissioner James E. Cadue, a Democrat, has personal feelings for the Coolbaugh Township-based depot. Cadue grew up in Coolbaugh.

"When my dad was involved with the construction crews that built this place back in the 1950s, I used to ride through all these buildings as a kid in a jeep every Saturday to check for breaks in the pipeline and this and that and the other thing," said Cadue, 46.

"So I am very familiar with this operation and what it means to this community, and as an elected official here in Monroe County I am deeply concerned about any possibility that this facility may be closed.

"We'd lose 500 to 600 jobs at the county level here and another 3,000 jobs in the region, a $ 420 million impact on the region in terms of the economy and $ 160 million payroll here. I mean, these statistics are awesome."

See also "Specter taking time to judge surgeon general nominee"

LOAD-DATE-MDC: February 8, 1995

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HEADLINE: SENATORS FIGHT TO SAVE N.J. BASES

BYLINE: TINA TRASTER POLAK, Staff Writer

BODY:

U.S. Sens. Bill Bradley and Frank R. Lautenberg are waging a public relations battle to save New Jersey's military installations from federal cutbacks, saying they are vital to the state's economy and the nation's safety.

The New Jersey senators, both Democrats, and a delegation of military and local officials toured the state's seven installations Monday in an effort to drum up support to protect the bases from realignment or closure.

On March 1, the Department of Defense will forward the names of the bases it is recommending for closure to the U.S. Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The commission must then accept or modify the Pentagon's recommendations by July 1 before forwarding the list to President Clinton. Clinton must then approve or reject the list before sending it to Congress by July 15.

"Compared to many states, New Jersey doesn't have a huge military presence, and it doesn't make sense to target our bases for cutbacks," Lautenberg said in a written statement.

The senators tour follows a visit by Governor Whitman last week to Picatinny Arsenal in Rockaway Township. The governor also hopes to save the state's military powerhouse. More than 90 percent of the Army's lethal high-tech weaponry and munitions are designed at the base.

Although the arsenal's $ 1.2 billion payroll is an economic boon to the region, the Pentagon is scrutinizing it for waste and downsizing.

One plan would move some of its mission to the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.

The Whitman administration has hired a $ 300,000 lobbying firmto keep Picatinny and seven other bases off the Pentagon's hit list.

Bradley last year helped wage a campaign to protect McGuire Air Force Base and Fort Monmouth from realignment.

The senators seven-stop tour began at Picatinny, where such high-profile weapons as the Patriot missile are developed.

LANGUAGE: English

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February 11, 1995; SATURDAY; ALL EDITIONS

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LENGTH: 574 words

HEADLINE: PICATINNY ARSENAL BACKERS RALLY TO KEEP THE BASE OPEN

BYLINE: JOHN CICHOWSKI, Staff Writer

BODY:

Stung by an unexpected adverse report, supporters of Picatinny Arsenal are gearing for battle this morning to save North Jersey's biggest military base and more than 4,000 civilian jobs.

Politicians, businessmen, lobbyists, and former base employees were called to an emergency strategy session in Rockaway Township after the Scripps Howard News Service reported that the Army had placed the 6,500-acre site on a list of 40 bases planned for cutbacks or closure.

"I view these media accounts as rumors, but I am proceeding under the assumption that we plan for the worst and hope for the best," said U.S. Rep. Rodney Frelinhuysen, R-Morris, who arranged the 10 a.m. meeting in Town Hall.

A senior Army official declined to specify which 40 sites were chosen for closure or realignment, but said the Scripps Howard report, including its Picatinny reference, was "very accurate." However, a second senior official said the base is not on the list.

The news service said the list was submitted Thursday by the Army to a deputy of Defense Secretary William Perry. By March 1, Perry must submit his list to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which will make recommendations to President Clinton by July 1. Congress makes a final decision by July 15.

"We have plenty of time to fight, and this kind of report is good in a way because it helps us focus the community," said Barry Rhoads, whose Washington law firm was hired by Governor Whitman's administration to beat back any attempt to close the base.

If the report is true, Rhoads and his partner, Matt Behrmann, said they will develop information showing the financial advantages of keeping Picatinny open compared with other bases.

"Our arguments will become all about dollars and cents," said Behrmann.

Picatinny, Morris County's second-largest employer after AT&T, is run with an annual budget of $ 1.2 billion. Its payroll exceeds $ 160 million and contracts to 134 New Jersey firms amount to $ 62 million.

Including these firms, an estimated 27,000 jobs are linked to the base, which started as a pre-Revolutionary War forge.

The Whitman administration hired Rhoads firm, Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson, and Hand , under a $ 300,000 contract when the Pentagon began preparing for a third, and last, round of post-Cold War base closings. Picatinny survived the first two cutbacks, but its location in the Northeast is considered a detriment in the third round because bases in other parts of the country can be run more inexpensively.

Picatinny supporters note that base engineers and scientists have developed high-tech armaments, such as the Patriot missile, which were used in the Persian Gulf war, and the great majority of its civilian personnel and contractors would not move to another location if the base were closed.

Members of New Jersey's congressional delegation, Picatinny employees, and representatives of a group called Concerned Responsible Individuals Supporting Picatinny (CRISP) questioned the accuracy of the Scripps Howard report.

"This doesn't make sense," said John Amerspeck, CRISP's president.

"The Army just spent $ 23 million building the most advanced small-arms testing facility in the world at Picatinny. Why throw away state-of-the-art facilities?"

This article contains material from The Associated Press.

LANGUAGE: English

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Document Separator

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

March 9, 1995

The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0101

Dear Secretary West:

I would like to thank you for your recent testimony before the Commission concerning the Department of the Army's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations. I would also like to express our appreciation to General Gordon Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of the Army Robert Walker, and Brigadier General James Shane for their testimony.

As I mentioned at the conclusion of your testimony, attached are a number of questions that I would like answered for the record. I would appreciate your response to these questions by March 24, 1995 in order that the Commission can consider them early in our deliberative process.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD/jjg
encl.

JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUPS/ARMY

1. The 1993 Commission recommended that DoD look at cross-service issues in greater detail.

   How did the Army consider/incorporate recommendations from the Joint Cross-Service working groups? How was this coordinated with other services?

2. Did anyone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense require the Army to include any of the alternatives of the Joint Cross-Service Groups in its recommendations? Please specify.

3. The 1993 Commission rejected the Department's recommendations to close Letterkenny Army Depot and directed that the tactical missile maintenance workload previously conducted at 9 different DoD depots be consolidated at Letterkenny.

   What workload has already been transferred?

   What is the schedule for transferring the remaining workload?

   How much has already been obligated in support of the missile maintenance consolidation plan at Letterkenny?

   Has the Army re-evaluated the cost/benefit ratio of the missile maintenance consolidation plan at Letterkenny? If so, please comment on the results of the updated analysis.

4. The Joint Cross Service Group on Depot Maintenance suggested that air launched missile maintenance be consolidated at Hill Air Force Base; ground launched missile maintenance work be consolidated at Anniston Army Depot and the Marine Corps Hawk missile workload be accomplished at Barstow.

   Why did the Army reject the cross-service team proposal and instead consolidate all missile work at Tobyhanna Army Depot?

GENERAL ARMY ISSUES

1. From Cold War levels to the end of Fiscal Year 1996, the Army will have reduced its force structure by approximately 37% worldwide.

   How much has the Army reduced its installation infrastructure?

   If there is significant difference, please explain your rationale.

2. Reuse of facilities that DoD disposes of is critically important to the community. It is an Army responsibility to ensure that the facility is reusable and to coordinate with or assist agencies or groups that desire to assume control of disposed facilities.

   Did the Army consider reuse in development of its recommendations to the Commission?

   Were any bases removed from consideration because of projected reuse problems?

MANEUVER

1. The Army's report to the Commission states that maneuver installations must have the capacity to station 19 mechanized brigades and 13 light brigades. Current capacity is 15 mechanized brigades and 14 light brigades.

   Since current capacity for light brigades is greater than required, why didn't the Army recommend the closure of an installation such as Fort Richardson which has the capacity for one light brigade and no capability to accommodate additional brigades even with construction?

2. Forts Riley, Drum, Richardson, and Wainwright scored lowest on the Army's military value assessment among maneuver installations. None of them was recommended for closure.

   Does the Army's requirement to be able to accommodate the 10-division Army within the continental U.S. effectively prohibit ever closing a maneuver installation?

3. The Army announced significant restructuring late last year, which affected Forts Bliss, Lewis, Riley and Carson, among others.

   Was the desire to maintain the existing maneuver base structure a factor in that restructuring?

   Was OSD consulted in advance regarding possible effects of the restructuring on the BRAC process?

   What guidance did OSD give the Army regarding the effect of the realignment effect on maneuver bases?

4. Why is the Army moving the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment from Fort Bliss to Fort Carson and retaining one brigade there instead of keeping the 3rd at Fort Bliss, moving the brigade elsewhere, and closing Fort Carson?

5. With the removal of one brigade from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, will there be any partial closure of Schofield Barracks?

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. Why is Fort Dix being significantly realigned when it is third in military value?

2. In the Army's recommendation on Fort Chaffee, it states that it "...intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard".

   What does that mean? All of the 72,000 acres? Which of the more than 1,200 buildings?

3. Fort Indiantown Gap is centrally located to the largest concentration of Reserve Component forces in the northeastern United States, and supporters contend this proximity has significantly contributed to saving taxpayer dollars due to less travel time to and from its training facilities.

   Did your staff study how these cost savings might offset any savings from closing the post?

4. What is the impact on Army and Air National Guard flight training if the active duty personnel who operate and schedule the air to ground range at Fort Indiantown Gap depart?

5. Which of the ten Major Training Areas in the Continental United States were seriously considered for being relinquished to the Army Reserve or National Guard for operation and administration?

FORT McCLELLAN

1. In testimony before this Commission, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch said that environmental permitting "is a process that the Army has got to go through before we would be ...willing to close Fort McClellan."

   How long can the Army wait for those permits and still accomplish the closure of Fort McClellan within the time constraints on closures established in law?

   By whatever measure you choose to use, at what point would the difficulty of obtaining permits and moving the Chemical School and the Chemical Defense Training Facility outweigh leaving them in place?

2. The state of Alabama has said that permitting of the chemical demilitarization facility at Anniston Army Depot depends on the presence of Fort McClellan.

   Does the Army believe that it will need to seek new permits for the Anniston chemical demilitarization facility if its recommendation on Fort McClellan is approved?

   Has that process begun?

COMMAND, CONTROL & ADMINISTRATION

1. The recommendations pertaining to Fort Hamilton, Fort Totten, and the Selfridge Army Garrison result primarily in the closure of family housing.

   Why are savings realized if the Army must now pay basic allowance for quarters and variable housing allowances to soldiers who were occupying those family housing units?

2. The DoD recommends the movement of a Defense Investigative Service unit from Fort Holabird, Maryland. This is the last tenant at Fort Holabird.

   Do you have a plan or recommendation regarding the disposal of the Fort Holabird property?

   Will Fort Holabird be disposed of under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 or through the regular disposal process?

MEDICAL

1. The Army is recommending the closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Aurora, Colorado.

   What will happen to Fitzsimons Army Medical Center's role as a lead agent and referral center for a 13-state region?

   How is the cost of expanding the capacity of one or more other DOD hospitals to assume this role reflected in the cost/benefit evaluation of closing Fitzsimons?

2. The Army indicates that some of the Fitzsimons workload will be moved to Evans Army Community Hospital at Fort Carson and to the Air Force Academy hospital, both about 75 miles away in Colorado Springs.

   Are those two hospitals able to absorb the increased workload?

3. In recommending the closure of Fitzsimons and the realignments of the hospitals on Forts Meade and Lee, did the Army consider the medical needs of the active duty personnel and their family members remaining in the area of the hospital to be closed?

   What about retirees, survivors, and their family members?

   Do you have any estimate of the additional out of pocket costs to beneficiaries in those areas following the closure and realignment of those hospitals?

4. Even though not specifically stated, it is assumed that the Army is recommending the closure of Noble Army Hospital at Fort McClellan along with the closure of that base. However, the Army presence at the nearby Anniston Army Depot is slated to grow, and that facility does not have a hospital.

   Did the Army consider the potential benefits of keeping some medical capacity at Fort McClellan to meet the needs of the remaining military presence in the area?

5. Does the closure of Noble Army Hospital impact on the capability of Anniston Army Depot to perform its chemical demilitarization mission?

6. In 1993 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) recommended the realignment of Patterson Army Hospital at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to a clinic. This list does not mention Patterson Army Hospital.

   Did the Army consider the closure of Patterson Army Hospital?

   How is the situation different this year than it was in 1993?

7. What are the opportunities to further downsize hospital infrastructure beyond the recommended closings of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center and Noble Army Hospital at Fort McClellan and the downsizing of the hospitals at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Fort Meade, Maryland?

DEPOTS

1. Your analysis of military value for the four Army depots ranked Tobyhanna first, Anniston second, Red River third, and Letterkenny fourth. In your recommendations to the Commission, you recommend closure of Red River and realignment of Letterkenny.

   Did you consider closing all four depots? If not, which depots did you exclude? For what reasons did you exclude them?

   Did you consider moving production lines from Anniston to Red River? If not, why?

2. What military attributes about Tobyhanna and Anniston Army Depots were so compelling that they were removed from consideration?

3. The Navy has recommended realignment of Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Corpus Christi Army Depot is a tenant there, and relies on the Navy airfield for helicopter flight operations.

   Does the realignment of Naval Air Station Corpus Christi to a Naval Air Facility impact on Army plans for Corpus Christi Army Depot? If yes, how?

4. In the Army's report to this Commission, comments on the alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance pertain only to alternatives that result in losses to Army depots.

   Are there any gains from other Services at Army depots as a result of the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations?

   If yes, do these impact on your depot analyses or recommendations?

5. If your recommendations are fully implemented, will the Army depot structure retain excess capacity which could be used for workload from other services?

PROVING GROUNDS

1. Will the capability to conduct chemical or biological testing remain at Dugway after realignment?

AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. You recommend realigning the Sierra Army Depot by removing its conventional ammunition storage and destruction missions.

   Where will these missions be performed?

PORTS

1. Sunny Point was retained because it is the sole ammunition terminal in the Army inventory. U.S. Navy port facilities accommodate USN and USMC bulk ammunition requirements.

   Please explain why a single Service could not accommodate Army, Navy, and Marine Corps bulk ammunition shipping requirements.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

1. OSD policy guidance directed that "...environmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations." The policy further states that "...unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse."

   Were any installations not recommended for closure or realignment due to unique contamination problems?

2. Funding in support of environmental clean-up of BRAC 88 installations expires at the end of Fiscal Year 1995.

   Is expiration of funding a potential problem?

   What is the estimated cost of uncompleted BRAC 88 environmental clean-up actions?

   How do you intend to continue to fund required clean-up activities?

3. As the Army made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in your analysis?

   For example, did environmental limitations on a base's expansion potential play a major role in the analysis?

   - Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

LEASES

1. The Army studied the offices of the Military Traffic Management Command in Virginia under the lease category. The Army report stated that "analysis was discontinued because realignment was not financially advantageous."

   What alternatives did the Army find to be not financially advantageous?

2. We have received copies of two letters from the Army to the other Services requesting retention of facilities on bases recommended for closure in the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to this Commission. In one, the Army requests portions of the Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, Kansas; in the other Army requests portions of Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

   Were these two issues discussed during the DOD joint review process? If not, why not?

3. Actions like these two letters are exactly what the Business Executives for National Security highlighted in their study concerning implementation of previous BRAC recommendations.

   Do you think that the Commission should change the Brooks Air Force Base and Naval Reserve Training Center recommendations to reflect establishment of reserve component enclaves?

COSTS AND SAVINGS

1. Many installations studied for closure were ultimately deferred "because it was not found to be financially advantageous."

   What were your minimum financial criteria for considering a base for closure?

2. Is the Army changing any of its execution procedures to accelerate realization of, or increase, savings from base closings?

3. During testimony on 7 March 1995, Brigadier General Shane stated the Army changed some installation assessment attributes based on a General Accounting Office report. Please identify the report and which attributes were changed based on the report.

4. Despite Congressional & GAO recommendations, costs of closures to other affected federal agencies is excluded from installation cost considerations on the rationale of high cost-vs.-low benefit of gathering and quantifying data.

   Can you suggest a cost-effective alternative that addresses Congressional concern?

COMMODITY

1. The Air Force has proposed moving functions from the Rome Labs in New York to the Army's Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

   Is there sufficient capacity at Fort Monmouth to accommodate the proposed move?

   Did you incorporate the effects of this Air Force move when ranking Fort Monmouth against other commodity installations?

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JAMES V. HANSEN, UTAH

1. Secretary West: Are you aware that during the previous two rounds of base closures, the then Secretaries of the Army removed Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, from any further consideration under the BRAC process because of its unique military value and characterized Dugway as an irreplaceable national security asset? What has changed in the last three years to precipitate your recommendation to this commission?

2. The Army is proposing to move Dugway's Smoke and Obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground. Are you aware that Yuma does not possess the environmental permits from the State of Arizona required to permit open-air testing of this magnitude? If these permits cannot be obtained what are your plans for this important testing?

3. Are you also aware that Dugway already possesses these permits as well as all permits required for the open-air release of live chemical agent as required in other realignment proposals?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS

The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, "except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave." The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

1. Has the Army identified which of Fort Chaffee's 70,000 acres and 1,000 buildings would be licensed to the National Guard, and which would be returned to the public for development?

2. As a result of the 1991 Base Closure process, Fort Chaffee has been dedicated primarily to the training of Reserve Component units and individuals. Was the Reserve Component involved in the decision to close Fort Chaffee?

3. How much will it cost the Army National Guard to operate the licensed portions of Fort Chaffee? Does the Army intend to provide the National Guard with the required funds?

4. The Army says that the annual recurring savings of closing Fort Chaffee will be $13 million. How can that be, since the base's total FY 1995 operating budget is only $9.7 million?

5. Does the Army's $13 million projected annual savings consider the costs of continuing to operate the Fort Chaffee "enclave" and the extra travel costs involved for reserve component units that will now have to travel longer distances to places such as Fort Polk or Fort Sill?

6. In BRAC 93, Fort Chaffee ranked #5 among 10 Major Training Areas. In BRAC 95, Chaffee was ranked last among those same 10 Major Training Areas. What factors caused Chaffee's ranking to drop so much in just two years?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. ROSCOE BARTLETT, MARYLAND

1. What are the exact costs (and savings) associated with the proposed relocating of the Information Systems Engineering Command (CONUS) from Fort Ritchie to Fort Huachuca, Arizona? At the present time, figures show that 73 percent of the important telecommunications responsibilities fulfilled by ISEC is performed on the east coast. I am deeply troubled by a proposed change of station for this high-tech unit and the increased expenditures ties to meeting its mission from the west. Tell me -- specifically -- upon what basis this particular move is justified and what savings will be realized as a result.

2. The Army's recommendations state that the National Military Command Center (referred to as Alternate Joint Communications Site R) will be able to maintain its operational support even with the removal of those units from Fort Ritchie which currently have the task of supporting Site R. Given the unique and unpredictable geographic/weather/logistical demands of the region in which Site R and Fort Ritchie are located, how can a significant change in locations for crucial support units be justified and still maintain the operations readiness of Site R in both peacetime and crisis?

3. In my estimation, the missions of both the garrison (Fort Ritchie) and its tenants have become more demanding and exacting as a result of earlier BRAC action and increasing global tension and threats to our national security. The ability of the military to respond swiftly and adequately to crisis is clearly in jeopardy as a result of the recommendations in the Army's report. Please tell me how our total force requirements will be met with the relocations and closures (involving Fort Ritchie) contained in the Army's report to the Commission. I am unconvinced that the military value will be enhanced as a result of the changes suggested.

4. It is a fact that designated potential receiving locations are not prepared to house and accommodate incoming units. Of primary concern to the Army in its criteria for site selection is the ability of existing and receiving locations to mobilize units, manpower and operations to meet any contingency. Fort Ritchie has historically proven that its mission is unique and that it can meet the Army's requirements at minimal cost. What benefits can you cite which justify relocating units from Fort Ritchie to sites which are not prepared to accept them?

5. The U.S. Army has recently invested nearly $2 million in construction of an armory at Fort Ritchie. In addition, $2.6 million has been invested in the construction of a new post exchange at Fort Ritchie. Construction of a newly-dedicated commissary at the post will total $4.6 million. The post fire station will cost $1.6 million and the restoration of the Fort's lake, dam, and spillway will cost taxpayers $3.7 million. The Army's efforts to economically justify closing Fort Ritchie do not measure up to the reality of the investments made to keep the base in operation. The investments made in the facility make Fort Ritchie more likely to meet the Army's goals, not less. I assume that the Army's expenditures of millions of dollars of public funds for capital improvements at Fort Ritchie were made to keep the post open in operation. Please assure me that such is the case and intent.

6. In accordance with the jointness criteria, Fort Ritchie now hosts a joint organization (DISA). Was that important factor considered as part of the Army's evaluation?

7. Did the Army ever consider the conversion of 1111th Signal Battalion and the MPs to civilian space to avoid excessive construction costs for support facilities (ie., housing, dining) at Fort Detrick?

8. Was any consideration given to contracting out or having civilian security systems replace Fort Ritchie MPs? This would save transportation costs from Fort Detrick to Site R.

9. Was consideration given to realigning the organizations based at Fort Ritchie to other locations closer to Fort Ritchie -- such as ISEC to Letterkenny Army Depot or TAO (sic) to Site R, or moving the 1108th Signal Brigade to Site R? Such a realignment could meet both the Army's goals, utilize Fort Ritchie's assets and save expenses.

10. What consideration has been given to realigning Fort Ritchie (ie, the garrison) to become a subpost of Fort Meade?

11. What consideration was given to using Fort Ritchie to support DISA Headquarters, thereby meeting DISA goals, consolidating resources and getting personnel out of leased facilities? This action would be consistent with future total force requirements.

12. What consideration has been given to Fort Ritchie being assigned to GSA and the property subsequently being leased back to the current tenants?

13. Did the Army coordinate -- to any degree whatsoever -- with DISA to determine the cost of moving the Network Management Center?

14. With regard to environmental concerns: was consideration given to significant impact of additional personnel on Fort Huachuca's water supply system (which is critically short)?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. GLEN BROWDER, ALABAMA

With respect to the relocation of the live chemical agent training facility from Fort McClellan, would you advise as follows:

1. What contacts has the Army or OSD had with the Governor of Missouri or his staff concerning environmental permits for this facility?

2. Have you applied for any permits?

3. If so, what permits have you applied for? When?

4. What office or organization in the Army is responsible for obtaining these permits?

5. Are the applications public and if so, how can the public obtain them?

6. Have you requested or do you expect to request or obtain any waivers with respect to these permits?

7. Since you are requesting permits before we have taken action on your recommendation, when do you plan to undertake the environmental review required by the National Environmental Policy Act?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JIM CHAPMAN, TEXAS

1. Was the combined military value and cost of closure of the co-located facilities of Red River Army Depot, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Defense Logistics Agency distribution depot (DDRT), and their tenants considered in the overall evaluation as requested of the Army, Defense Logistics Agency, and Department of Defense by the community?

2. In developing workload realignment options, did the Army modify the receiving depots capacity to account for the impact of changes in production mix on depot capacity and will the Army have sufficient depot maintenance capacity with only one tracked vehicle depot to meet its core maintenance workload requirements and hence its readiness requirements?

3. The Army, unlike the Air Force, has claimed savings for the workload reductions due to downsizing. Does this not falsely represent and overstate the BRAC savings and distort the analysis?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

1. Secretary West, in making the decision to close Fort Pickett, Virginia, did the Army consult with the leadership of the other services and federal agencies who currently train at Fort Pickett, for input concerning the value to them of the installation?

2. Secretary West, when the Army ran its COBRA analysis for Fort Pickett, did you factor in the additional costs to the Army associated with Reserve Component units, who are quartered relatively near to and have regularly trained at Fort Pickett in the past, having to travel further to accomplish annual training periods and, in some cases, weekend training densities?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. JERRY F. COSTELLO, ILLINOIS

1. Given the active force down-sizing and greater reliance on the Reserve components, wouldn't it make sense to use the Price Support Center, which is so ideally located, as a major reserve force support base?

2. The Army has said they must close the military family housing at Price because of the ATCOM move, yet only 17% of that housing is occupied by ATCOM personnel and there is a waiting list of over one year. Why do the soldiers in the commands at St. Louis not deserve equal housing consideration?

3. The Army has said that Price will close "except for a small reserve enclave and storage area." What consideration was given to the activities of the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency? Why aren't the costs of relocating those activities included in the cost data supplied by the Army?

4. The Army does not mention the DLA Strategic Stockpile material at the Price Support Center in their narrative. What disposition will be made of the more than 700,000 tons of material there, and at what cost? Why isn't that cost reflected in the Army's analysis?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SPENCER ABRAHAM, MICHIGAN

1. Mr. Secretary, your report states there is no job loss associated with closing the Detroit Army Tank Plant. However, General Dynamics currently manufactures M1 tank gun mounts in the Tank Plant. I understand the Army's reasoning was since the General Dynamics contract expires in 1997, and the Army has six years to complete the facility disposal, the job loss would come from an end to the contract, and not from the closing of the Tank Plant. Is the baseline reason to close the Tank Plant: to cease gun mount production by General Dynamics?

2. — **If yes:** I further understand Rock Island Depot in Illinois is the only other manufacturer of M1 tank gun mounts. Why are you ending a contract with a civilian contractor when the only other source of production is a government arsenal? Given that this does not fall within the traditional arsenal production area of barrels, why are you ceasing private production for government owned facilities?

3. — **If no:** Are you then anticipating renewing the production contract with General Dynamics?

4. — **If no again:** Why are you ceasing gun mount production with the private firm of General Dynamics when the only other organization producing these parts is in the Army arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois? Isn't current DoD policy to utilize private contractors over public producers whenever possible? What savings are derived from closing the Tank Plant that warrant abrogating this major policy directive?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. RICHARD GEPHARDT, MISSOURI

Regarding ATCOM:

1. The Army's analysis of commodity oriented installations indicates that it performed exhaustive analyses based on the selection criteria and force structure plan as dictated by the BRAC law. Did the Army perform similar analyses of leased facilities? If so, please provide these analyses.

2. In 1993, the Army determined that "the high relocation costs make realignment or closure (of ATCOM) impractical and prohibitively expensive." Has there been a change in circumstance in the last two years that makes relocation more affordable? Please provide details.

3. A 1991 Defense Management Report found that merging the Aviation Command and the Troop Support Command into ATCOM would result in management and cost efficiencies. What change has led to the conclusion that, rather than consolidation, breaking ATCOM into four new entities is more efficient? If so, please provide these analyses.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS PAUL S. SARBANES AND BARBARA A. MIKULSKI AND REPS. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT AND ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR., MARYLAND

1. How were the cross-service capabilities of the Defense Information Systems Agency's Command assessed as part of the Army's evaluation and final decision to recommend Ft. Ritchie for closure?

2. Did the Army coordinate directly with DISA to determine the cost of moving the Network Management Center?

3. Did the DOD take into account Fort Huachuca's critical water shortage as part of its recommendation to send a significant number of additional personnel there?

4. How were the additional costs of having the Information Systems Engineering Command (CONUS) service East Coast clients factored into the long-term cost of the proposal to move these functions to Fort Huachuca?

5. Has any consideration been given to assigning Fort Ritchie to GSA so the property could be subsequently be leased back to current tenants or to an expanded DISA presence?

6. What consideration was given to the Defense Information Systems Agency's current use of Ft. Ritchie, cost of relocating, and to their potential for locating their Western Hemisphere headquarters at this site?

Regarding US Army Publications Distribution Center, Middle River, MD:

1. What is the justification for the following statement in the DOD's submission to BRAC: "The consolidation eliminates a manual operation in Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process?" Please specify criteria and methodology for determining a manual vs. automated operation, and the "efficiencies" that are expected.

2. How is "efficiency" calculated when comparing the Baltimore and St. Louis facilities? Did comparative figures for the two facilities include average weight shipped per month per employee or throughput times for loose issue, resupply or initial distribution?

3. In evaluating where to consolidate, did the Army examine the effect of Desert Shield/Desert Storm on order processing times?

4. Was the potential reduced lease cost at Baltimore included in the cost analysis?

5. In repeated studies and comments, the Army has cited the automation technology and capabilities of the PDC, Middle River. On what basis did the Army label this site a " manual operation" in its submission to BRAC?

6. Did the Army include increased shipping costs from St. Louis to the East Coast and to foreign destinations when calculating cost savings?

7. Did the Army examine savings potentials that could be achieved by returning initial distribution of stock to the Centers which is currently being performed by contracted printers?

8. Was the entire US Army Publications and Printing Command, including headquarters, considered for consolidation?

9. Was there any examination of consolidating other service distribution centers with the Army's?

QUESTIONS FROM REP. GEORGE W. GEKAS, PENNSYLVANIA

1. Considering the unique training facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap, including the artillery range, the Tank Table VIII qualification range, Muir Army Airfield with the largest Reserve Component helicopter training facility in the United States, the 44,000 square feet aircraft maintenance hangar with aviation fuel storage capacity of 100,000 gallons, and the air-to-ground bombing and gunnery range (one of only 15 in the United States), how did the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army arrive at the conclusion that "Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations", especially considering that Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum do not have these same unique facilities and are not geographically located near the largest concentration of Reserve Component units in the northeastern United States, as is Fort Indiantown Gap?

2. The Army's report states that "Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill, and Fort Drum." Has any study been done to make sure that these other facilities actually have the training facilities equal to the facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap, or sufficient for the needs of these units, such as Tank Table VIII qualification ranges? And, do these other facilities have training time available in their schedules to accommodate the needs of our training units? Additionally, has the DoD investigated the costs of transport and equipment associated with using other training sites?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

1. Why didn't the Army study the costs of alternatives to the Detroit Tank Plant as part of the BRAC process?

2. Does the Army have plans for completing elsewhere the work now done at the Detroit Plant? If not, why not?

3. Did the Army consider the cost to move any machining equipment from the Detroit Plant, where would it go and how much would the move cost?

4. Who will provide the engineering support for the gun mounts production now provided by General Dynamics at the Tank Plant, and what will be the cost?

5. Why was the consideration of such potential costs put off until after the Army made the closure recommendation, instead of being examined as part of the Total Army Basing Study, and factored into the COBRA analysis?

6. When it is clear that real people will lose their jobs if the closure is implemented, how can the Army say the recommendation "will not affect any jobs"?

7. The recommendation to close the Detroit Tank Plant postulates a closing cost of about $1 million. What is the basis of this estimate, and what component costs were included?

8. The recommendation to close the Detroit Tank Plant postulates a net savings during the implementation period (FY 96-2001) of about $8 million. What is the basis for this savings estimate?

9. Are the costs associated with moving the work from Detroit Army Tank Plant to other locations included in the estimated closing costs and net savings, and if not, why not?

QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS CHRISTOPHER DODD AND JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN AND REPRESENTATIVES ROSA DELAURO AND CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTICUT

1. Congressional language in Fiscal Year 1994 directed the Department of the Army to convene a Blue Ribbon Panel to examine the tank engine industrial base. In response to that request, the Defense Science Board's Tank Engine Industrial Base Task Force recommended keeping open the Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP) in order to maintain a "critical mass" of support engineering and logistics capability at SAEP for an extended period.

2. On February 14, 1995, Secretary Decker, in a response to Senators Dodd and Lieberman, stated that the Army planned on spending $47.5 million as part of a three-year tank engine industrial base program. This program would retain engineering expertise, essential recuperator parts production, and a minimal capacity for new engine assembly and testing at SAEP.

   Why, less than a two weeks after this letter was written, did the Army recommend closing this facility?

   How does this decision affect the *directed* preservation of the tank engine industrial base?

3. What are the implications for implementation of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report without SAEP?

4. What *specific* alternatives has the Department of the Army outlined to meet all requirements of the Panel's recommendation given the closure of SAEP?

5. Why were the more than 1,500 workers at SAEP not considered in this evaluation? Closing SAEP will result in sizable job loss and significant economic impact on the region.

6. If workforce impact was not a consideration, are not Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) facilities automatically placed at a distinct disadvantage during the Army BRACC process?

Document Separator

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN				DATE: 23 Feb		
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				RB 2/27
J. J. GERTLER		✓				JJG 27Feb
STEVE BAILEY		✓				SEB 24Feb
BOB MILLER		✓				24Feb
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				MK Feb 24
DAVE LEWIS		✓				DL 24Feb
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	

COMMENTS:

Statement of the Honorable
Joel Hefley
of Colorado

Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities
February 23, 1995

Hearing on Base Closure and Realignment Issues

This afternoon, the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities will conduct its first hearing of the 104th Congress. At the outset, I want to express my appreciation to my colleagues on the subcommittee, especially the ranking member, Mr. Ortiz, for their cooperation and useful suggestions as we organized the subcommittee for this Congress. I look forward to to working closely with each of you as we move toward consideration of the FY1996 Defense Authorization Bill.

The subject of today's hearing, an overview of where we currently stand in the base closure process, is critical to the long-term readiness and preparedness of the armed forces. BRAC, of course, is also a matter of intense speculation and concern to members and the communities they represent throughout the Nation. Next week, the Department of Defense will make public its infrastructure recommendations to the Commission on Base Closure and Realignment. That will be the first step in a process that will take several months.

This hearing was called prior to the announcement of the Department's recommendations to provide the subcommittee with an opportunity to address a number of key questions before having to deal with the 1995 list. Foremost among these questions are the costs and savings that have been realized —— or have not been realized —— from the first three rounds of base closures; the adequacy of the FY1996 budget request to meet BRAC demands; the process for base reuse and disposal; the unexpected costs associated with environmental cleanup at BRAC sites; and how the Department plans to deal with lingering BRAC issues once current law expires when this last round in 1995 is finished.

I voted for the legislation which established the Commission process. I believed then, and I believe now, that unneeded infrastructure must be disposed. However, I also voted in favor of the amendment offered last year by my good friend from Utah, Mr. Hansen, that sought to defer the 1995 round until 1997. I did so because I shared the concern of many members that the budget resources were not adequate to meet BRAC demands. I am not sure that it is wise to have, as we will this year, four phases of BRAC action running at the same time. I was also concerned when I cast that vote that infrastructure reductions may be, in fact, happening too fast and cutting too deep. I am concerned about the inadequacy of the force structure contemplated by the Bottom Up Review and the ability of the remaining infrastructure to handle an "upsizing" of the force if that should be necessary —— and, based on history, it probably will be —— in

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BY THE COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

JOSHUA GOTBAUM

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIES

OF THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

FEBRUARY 23, 1995

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I am Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security.

This is my first appearance before your subcommittee. I am especially pleased to be asked to testify on the crucial issues of base closure and reuse. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organizations and individuals responsible for these important efforts report to me:

- The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations works with the Services in deciding what installations will be recommended for closure or realignment.
- The Base Transition Coordinators are the Department's on-site ombudsmen at closing bases; and
- The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) helps communities plan for the reuse of the facilities.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS

Obviously, I cannot comment on the recommendations that the Secretary of Defense will make next week. I am happy to summarize the process and its importance to Defense.

As you all know, the size of our military force and our budget both have been shrinking. Unless we downsize our infrastructure as well, we run the risk that funds will be spent on infrastructure that ought to go to readiness and modernization -- in effect, that the "tail" would swallow the "teeth".

Congress recognized that any base closing process must unquestionably be fair. The BRAC process was designed to be as objective, as public, as auditable as any process in government. The law requires that every BRAC recommendation must be made in accordance with the force posture. It must be made in accordance with a specific set of published criteria. Furthermore, all the data used must be signed, certified, and made available to the public and every interested party. The entire process is audited and overseen by the General Accounting Office.

Within the Department, the Services have historically taken the lead responsibility for developing and analyzing possible closures. They have done so not only because they are best acquainted with their real estate and missions, but also because they have the staff to handle the massive data analysis and provide the necessary audits. They then make their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Historically, the Secretary has accorded great deference to the Services' recommendations.

Recommended closures are selected on the basis of eight criteria (attached). These criteria relate to military value, savings and return on investment, and the economic and environmental impacts of closure. These same basic criteria were used in all previous BRAC rounds. We believe they serve us well. They provide the basis for recommendations that are consistent.

The final protection of the BRAC process is, of course, the BRAC Commission. This independent body receives information and testimony from every party and reviews each DoD recommendation, to ensure consistency with the force structure and the criteria.

For BRAC 95, the Department made a number of changes based upon the nature of the excess capacity we faced.

One change in this round is that, for the first time, the Department has developed procedures to consider areas in which the different Services perform similar or identical functions. Five "joint cross-service groups" (JCSGs) were established in functional areas with significant cross-service potential. These areas are: depot maintenance, test and evaluation, laboratories, medical treatment facilities, and undergraduate pilot training. Each JCSG has representation from OSD and from each Military Department. Each was tasked to analyze the capacity and requirements for each function across all services, from the perspective of DoD's overall work load. After doing so, the joint groups then suggested possible configurations to the Military Departments, which considered them as part of their overall BRAC deliberations.

Another enhancement we made for BRAC 95 was to develop a more consistent method for applying criterion six, "economic impact on communities." Although economic impact had always been a criterion, there was no consistency in the data gathered to assess it or on the method for doing so. So this year we established an economic impact joint cross-service group. The Economic Impact Joint Cross-Service Group established guidelines for the DoD Components to measure the economic impact of base closure and realignment alternatives, including cumulative economic impact from past BRAC actions.

The Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering the service recommendations. Next Tuesday, the Secretary will announce his recommendations and forward them to the BRAC Commission.

Most observers consider the BRAC process an unparalleled success. It has already resulted in hundreds of closures and realignments within the United States, 70 of which are identified as "major" closures. By comparison, in the 10 years prior to BRAC 88, the Department was able to close only 4 major facilities.

Does BRAC Really Save Money?

Some have questioned whether -- given that closing a base initially requires rather than saves money -- the taxpayers actually save as a result. The answer to that question is a resounding "Yes". Initially, of course, there are upfront costs, mostly to construct facilities and accommodate moves to receiving bases. But these initial costs are fully offset by savings within the six year closure period that the law allows. The first three rounds of BRAC will, we believe save some $4 billion *per year* when fully implemented. Even after the programmed environmental costs are taken into account on a present value basis, we expect the first three rounds to save the taxpayers and the Department over $30 billion. (We do not include the cost of environmental cleanup in making BRAC decisions since the Department must comply with the law whether a base is open or closed. Nonetheless, cleanup costs are substantial.)

BRAC Savings in $Billions

Round	*Net Savings Within Six Years*[1]	*Ongoing Savings / Per Year*[2]	*Total Savings*[3]
BRAC 88	$0.5	$0.6	$6.8
91	$3.0	$1.5	$15.8
93	$1.6	$2.0	$15.7
Total	**$5.1**	**$4.1**	**$38.3**

Excludes environmental cleanup costs.

[1] Then-year dollars.

[2] FY96 constant dollars.

[3] 20 year net present value (NPV) in FY96 constant dollars with 4.2% discount rate.

Some have noted, accurately, that the original projections of large proceeds from the sale of base real estate have not been realized in practice. Nonetheless, by far the majority of the benefits of BRAC are the result of *avoiding* infrastructure costs we otherwise would pay.

Others have questioned whether BRAC provides full savings to the taxpayer, because the Department or other agencies sometimes choose to keep and use parts of a closing base. However, this mistakes the real purpose of the BRAC process, which is to permit both closure *and* realignment. Many times it makes sense to keep and use one part of a base (for example, housing or reserve facilities) while closing the rest.

BASE REUSE PROCESS

The Federal Role in Reuse & Redevelopment Today

The Administration, the Department, and I personally have placed great emphasis on improving the process by which base closure properties are disposed and redeveloped into productive civilian uses. Rapid reuse is not only important to the communities and workers impacted by the base closure, it is also essential in our efforts to cut costs.

The Federal Government currently affects reuse in two separate ways:

1. Property disposal policies and procedures; and

2. Assistance in local economic development.

Property Disposal Policies and Procedures

Under the Base Realignment and Closure Act, authority to dispose of military facilities was delegated by the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Secretary of Defense and subsequently redelegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Since DoD is operating under delegated authority, it must adhere to the statutory authorities and regulations promulgated by GSA. Often times, this has not worked well with large-scale property disposals.

Currently, base property disposal is governed by no fewer than five statutes, ranging from the most recent amendments of the Base Closure Act to the Federal Property Act of 1949. After a closing decision is made, DoD must first offer the property to other DoD components, then to other Federal agencies, then to state and local governments, and finally to local communities, developers and providers to the homeless.

Federal law provides for transfer of surplus property for any of several purposes at no costs: education, parks, airports, and to homeless providers. And, as I will discuss, the Congress has given us authority to make transfers for job creation as well. But the standards and procedures for doing so differ, case by case.

Assistance in Local Economic Development

For any large scale real estate development effort, there are three distinct, sequential phases: organization, planning, and implementation. DoD directly assists local communities in the organization and planning phases. We offer technical advice on what type of organizations have worked in the past and provide planning grants to underwrite part of the organization's costs. The amount we provide over a three to four year period has ranged from $45,000 to more than $3 million.

We also help indirectly in the implementation phase, by working with the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) and the Department of Labor (DoL). We involve other Federal Agencies early in the process so that the transition from planning to implementation can occur smoothly.

Reinventing Base Reuse

In 1993, after reviewing the historical base property disposal process, the President himself concluded that it did not work very well. It was clear from the 1988 and 1991 closures that the Federal property disposal process was not designed to promote quick economic redevelopment in base closure communities. Confounding rapid reuse were:

- Federal and State laws and regulations that never contemplated land reuse transactions as massive as those resulting from base closures.
- Environmental cleanup processes that can take years, even decades, to complete.
- Traditional property disposal rules that focus on getting cash up front, with little consideration given to long term development and job creation in the community.

The President resolved to change it. He announced a new Federal policy to support faster redevelopment at base closure communities. And, I am pleased to say, today we have the legal authority and have begun to implement each of the President's proposals:

Property disposal that puts local economic redevelopment first. Thanks to the Congress, we now have legislative authority to convey property for job creation purposes. Interim leases for facilities have been encouraged and approval for leasing has been delegated to lower organizational levels. Federal screening for reuse of facilities and equipment has been expedited. Finally, DoD now consults with local communities before removing personal property from a closing base. These changes allow communities to begin their reuse planning without delay. We have learned from bitter experience that without an active community and community consensus, redevelopment simply cannot occur.

"Fast track" environmental cleanup, to remove needless delays. A Base Cleanup Team (BCT), comprised of experts from DoD, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and State representatives, has been established at all closing or realigning installations where property is available for transfer. Our goal is for the BCT's to be able to make many decisions on the spot, to speed up clean up. Achieving that goal will require changes in many of the individual agencies, but we have been making some progress.

Transition coordinators. For every major base slated for closure, we now have a base transition coordinator. These on site ombudsmen and women make sure that communities and other interested parties have the information they need, when they need it. BTC's have access to all parts of DoD, to the base commander, and to other Federal and State Agencies. At every closing base I visit, I ask the mayor and local officials who their BTC is. They always know.

More effective economic development assistance. The Department's economic adjustment support through our Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) has long been recognized as highly professional and helpful. As the BRAC process continues, our workload has increased. The average "major" base closure community receives technical assistance and a planning grant of on the order of $300,000 per year for 3 to 5 years. We have also accelerated the time it takes to award grants. For most communities, the grant approval time is now within a matter of weeks, not months.

Commerce's Economic Development Administration and the Department of Labor have also been charged to play an active role in economic development and worker retraining. Both departments were given significantly more funding. Labor now sends a team to each base closure community, to describe their job training programs and to help set up local job referral services. These Departments, too, have reduced their grant processing time.

Another major improvement, about which we are very pleased, is the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994. It exempts base closure properties from the requirements of McKinney Act Title V, which gives automatic priority use of any surplus Federal property to homeless assistance providers. The new law requires communities to integrate the needs of the homeless into their broader redevelopment procedures. As a result, arguments about priorities have become agreements that lead to economic development. Nearly 50 communities have elected to use the new process.

Accomplishments

I am pleased to say that we are beginning to see the effects of these changes.

First, we've learned to act more quickly. As a result, the average base in BRAC 93 will be closed in half the time it took in the first BRAC round only five years earlier.

Second, local communities and local developers are moving faster as well. In BRAC 88, the average community took nearly two and a half years to create a reuse plan; in the last round that time dropped to only a year.

Faster reuse benefits the Department as well as base closure communities, because only when a community begins to take responsibility for base property can DoD cease its security and maintenance expenses. Protection & maintenance costs for a closed base can easily run $2-3 million per year; for large industrial facilities, such as shipyards, the annual charge can be more than $10 million. The faster local communities develop reuse plans and the property is transferred, the sooner DoD is released from millions of dollars in annual holding costs. In this context, our technical advice and planning grants -- if they speed up the process by even a few months -- begin to look like a very good investment.

Already, the redevelopment of closed bases has created nearly 8,000 new jobs and over 200 tenant businesses. The types of reuse are as diverse as the communities themselves. England Air Force Base in Alexandria, Louisiana and Chanute Air Force Base in Rantoul, Illinois have become the engines of their communities' economic growth by creating over 1,500 jobs on base in less than two years after closure. Today on those two former bases, there are more civilians working than before the bases were closed.

Not every story is so encouraging, but there are plenty of others: At the former Lowry Air Force Base, tenants include a community college and a museum. At Wurtsmith Air Force Base in rural Michigan, 425 new jobs have been created by aviation, educational, industrial, and office-related activities.

And today, on the site of the former Sacramento Army Depot, Packard Bell is producing computers -- on an interim lease, even before the final transfer is completed. Ultimately the company expects to employ 3,000 people. Follow-on employment by Packard Bell's suppliers could mean thousands more.

Sometimes reuse means other public services: airports, schools, parks, prisons, even other government offices. Such activities can reduce government costs, while at the same time provide stability for development. Their presence at the installation early in the reuse process helps attract other tenants and jobs.

We have also begun to use our new jobs-centered property disposal authority to approve conveyances to local communities. In many of these conveyances we will receive fair-market value back to the taxpayers, but we will do so with flexible payment terms, over time as that value is realized by economic recovery.

This process is not easy. It is not quick, and it is certainly not smooth. Some communities have a tough time attracting new businesses, and sometimes doing so takes considerable time, but it does happen. For example, the Department has tracked nearly 100 pre-BRAC closures, from 1961 through 1993. Almost 90,000 civilian jobs were eliminated from these closures. How many new jobs have been created to replace them? *Over 170,000 jobs -- almost twice as many.*

And we are helping. All these changes -- to the law, to regulations, in policies, programs and communication -- should make new job creation easier and faster.

Next Steps

But there is much more to be done:

Better Communication

First, better communication. Within the next month, long before BRAC 95 becomes final, we will publish a guide to help community leaders understand closure and reuse. This summer and fall, we will hold conferences throughout the country, explaining what tools are available and introducing communities to EDA, DoL and other sources of support. We've always known that the most successful reuse comes when community leaders act early and knowledgeably. And we intend to help them do so.

Clearer Guidance & Priorities

Our next step is to make clear what we can and cannot do. This spring, we will follow-up on the community handbook with a detailed manual geared to the Military Departments and Federal Agencies who will carry out the new laws, regulations, and policies. And we will accompany it with a new set of rules, developed by all parts of the Department after receiving nearly 1,000 comments from 126 communities and organizations.

Further Streamlining

Last, but certainly not least, we hope you will agree to further legislative reform. Base reuse is still at the mercy of an incredibly complex maze of laws. Many of those, we believe, were drafted in a simpler time, for simpler transactions. They were not created to deal with the challenges of property transfer on this grand scale.

For some months now, we have been reviewing ways to streamline the process and make it work better for DoD and the communities. We are looking at ways to work Federal, state, and local issues in parallel, rather than going down to the "slowest common denominator". There are also proposals to permit near-term job creation, by allowing leasing on still-operating bases.

Sometime this spring, I hope we can discuss just these steps with the Congress, and that you will give them the same high priority that we do.

Closing

In closing, let me reiterate three points:

1. First, we strongly support the BRAC process, and believe it will ultimately save the taxpayers and the Department billions of dollars.

2. Second, we are proud of the achievements we have made to reform the reuse/property disposal process. Mayors and Governors from around the country have told us that our efforts to make the process more "user friendly" are on the right track.

3. But, third, there is much more to do. With your help, we will continue looking for ways to streamline our laws and procedures, to permit faster disposal and more effective job creation. Because, after all, that is part of what economic security is about.

I appreciate the opportunity this committee has provided, and would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Department of Defense

Final Selection Criteria

1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

Attachment

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:30 p.m. EST,
Thursday,
February 23, 1995

MILITARY BASES

Challenges in Identifying and Implementing Closure Recommendations

Frank C. Conahan, Senior Advisor to the Comptroller General for Defense and International Affairs Programs

GAO/T-NSIAD-95-107

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to provide you with an overview of our work involving the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. This includes our legislatively mandated role in assessing DOD's recommendations and process of selecting closure candidates and our subsequent work examining the implementation of BRAC decisions.

Today, I will (1) provide a brief historical account of the BRAC process, including our role in that process; (2) summarize some of the conclusions we have drawn in assessing DOD's decision-making process in prior BRAC rounds and identify improvements that DOD and its components have made to the process; (3) share with you the results of our work on previous base closures--including planned reuse and environmental cleanup of these facilities; and (4) make some preliminary observations about BRAC issues that may extend beyond the life of the current BRAC legislation.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BRAC

As DOD budgets, force structure, and personnel began to be reduced in the mid-to-late 1980s, it became increasingly important to ensure that scarce DOD resources be devoted to the most pressing

operational and investment needs rather than maintaining unneeded property, facilities, and overhead. Historically, however, closing unneeded military facilities had not been an easy task, in part, due to public concerns about the effects on communities and their economies and concerns about the impartiality of the decision-making process. Additionally, legislative provisions enacted in the 1970s requiring congressional notification of proposed closures and preparation of economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports severely hampered base closure efforts.

Legislation enacted in 1988 (P.L. 100-526)--which was used only for that year--facilitated a successful round of base closure decision-making. It outlined a special process for considering closing actions, authorized a special commission to propose closures and realignments, and provided relief from certain statutory provisions that were seen as hindering the base closing process.

Efforts by the Secretary of Defense in January 1990 to initiate additional base closure actions--without special enabling legislation--encountered difficulty and were not completed. Concerned about the Secretary's January 1990 proposals, the Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX, P.L. 101-510) halting any major closures except those following the new act's requirements. The act created the independent BRAC commission and outlined procedures, roles, and

time lines for the President, the Congress, DOD, GAO, and the Commission to follow.

The 1990 legislation required that all bases be compared equally against selection criteria and DOD's current force structure plan, provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The legislation mandated rounds of BRAC reviews in 1991, 1993, and 1995. For each BRAC round under the 1990 legislation, the services and DOD agencies submitted their candidates for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense for his review. After reviewing their candidates, the Secretary submitted his recommendations to the BRAC Commission for its review. The BRAC Commission, which could add, delete, or modify the Secretary's recommendations, then submitted its recommendations to the President for his consideration. The President could either accept or reject the Commission's recommendations in their entirety; if he rejected them, the Commission could give the President a revised list of recommendations. If the President accepted the Commission's recommendations, he forwarded the list to the Congress, which became final unless the Congress enacted a joint resolution disapproving it in its entirety.[1]

Base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993 produced decisions to fully or partially close 70 major domestic bases and to close,

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[1]See enclosure 1 for an overview of BRAC 1995 outlining DOD's selection criteria, key steps taken by DOD components in identifying BRAC candidates, and key milestone dates.

realign, or otherwise downsize scores of other bases, installations, and activities.[2] I need to emphasize that the number of bases recommended for closure in a given BRAC round is often difficult to tabulate precisely because closure actions are not necessarily complete closures, and closures may involve activities and functions rather than bases.

The term "base closure" often conjures up the image of a larger facility being closed than may actually be the case. Military installations are diversified and can include a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility, or leased facility. Further, more than one mission or function may be housed on a given installation. Individual base closure and realignment recommendations may actually affect a variety of activities and functions without fully closing an installation. For example, in 1993, the Navy recommended closure of its Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) in Norfolk, Virginia, which is an aircraft maintenance facility. The Norfolk NADEP is located on the Norfolk Naval Base, which includes among other activities the Norfolk Naval Station and Naval Air Station, which were not closed by BRAC 1993.

Complete closures, to the extent they occur, may involve relatively small facilities, rather than the stereotypical large military base. Thus, the term "base closing" used in conjunction with BRAC

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[2]See enclosure 2 for definitions pertaining to DOD base realignment and closure actions.

should be viewed generically as referring to facilities, installations, and activities of varying sizes. Closings and realignments, whatever their size, however, are designed to reduce unneeded infrastructure and achieve operational savings--that is the bottom line in terms of what the base closure process is all about.

DOD is still completing base closures and realignments approved in prior years. DOD must currently initiate closure and realignment actions no later than 2 years after the President submits his list to the Congress and must complete implementing actions within 6 years. DOD data indicates that as of January 1995, 51 percent of the 70 major closing actions of the prior three rounds had been completed. Implementing actions on BRAC 1995 recommendations must be completed by 2001.

The 1990 legislation mandated that GAO analyze the Secretary's selection process and recommendations for each BRAC round and submit a report to the Congress and the BRAC Commission.[3] For BRAC 1995, this report must be submitted within 45 days after the Secretary makes public his list of proposed realignments and closures. Our next report must be submitted by April 15, 1995.

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[3]See Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-224, May 15, 1991) and Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

ADEQUACY OF DOD'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Several statutory or policy requirements of the BRAC process are designed to enhance its fairness and integrity and have been strengthened over time. They include the following:

-- All DOD components must use specific models for assessing (1) the costs and savings associated with BRAC actions and (2) the potential economic impact on communities affected by those actions. We have identified shortcomings in these models and their use in prior BRAC rounds and have seen model improvements made each round to improve their effectiveness.

-- Information used in DOD BRAC decision-making must be certified. That is, certification that the information is accurate and complete to the best of the submitting person's knowledge and belief. This requirement resulted from a 1991 amendment to the Base Closure and Realignment Act, and it was designed to overcome concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in the process.

-- DOD components must develop and implement internal control plans to foster accurate data collection and analyses and documentation of decisions. A component of the internal control plans is extensive involvement by service audit agencies and DOD Inspector General personnel to better ensure the accuracy of data used in decision-making and to enhance the integrity of the process. These audit groups have performed admirably, under tight time constraints, to conduct real-time assessments of data used in the decisions. They have pointed out errors and tracked corrections to help ensure the most accurate data possible was being used.

Our reports on prior BRAC rounds have pointed out problems with documentation of decisions and some recommendations by DOD components, but overall we found their decision-making processes were generally sound, and most decisions adequately supported. In the most recently completed BRAC round, 1993, we found that (1) the

Navy generally completed return-on-investment analyses primarily to test the feasibility of an alternative, not to determine which, of competing alternatives, produced the greatest savings; (2) the Army chose not to recommend a base for closure, in part, because of environmental cleanup costs--a factor that is not supposed to be considered in calculating closure costs; (3) the Air Force's documentation of some of its final recommendations made it difficult to understand its justification, although subsequent oral explanations seemed to justify the recommendations; and (4) the Defense Logistics Agency overstated estimated savings of some realignments.

Our 1993 report also stated that OSD did not exercise strong leadership in overseeing the military services and DOD agencies during the process. Consequently, some technical problems occurred, and the opportunity to consider consolidation of maintenance facilities on a DOD-wide basis was lost. DOD responded to these problems by attempting to strengthen the process for BRAC 1995 and sought to encourage its components to explore opportunities for cross-service use of common support assets. It did this by organizing cross-service review groups to propose alternatives for the components to consider in five functional areas: (1) maintenance depots, (2) laboratories, (3) test and evaluation facilities, (4) undergraduate pilot training, and (5) medical treatment facilities.

Our assessment of the 1995 BRAC process is underway and will not be completed until we issue our report in April. Our staff will be undertaking a short, but intensive, scrutiny of the Secretary's recommendations once they are final and made public on March 1, 1995. Operating under tight time constraints, we will track selected recommendations back through the components' decision-making processes to test their logic, consistency, and reasonableness. We will report any concerns to the BRAC Commission and the Congress.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS BASE CLOSURES

Let me now discuss the status of previous closure decisions. While the implementation of BRAC 1993 is still in its early stages, DOD and local communities have had more time to develop and implement reuse plans for the two earlier rounds. We reported earlier on the results of our review on 37 base closures from the 1988 and 1991 rounds.[4] While the findings remain unchanged, we have updated the figures for you today (see enclosure 3).

Federal property that is no longer needed is not automatically sold. Rather, DOD is required to first screen excess property for possible use by other DOD organizations and then by other federal agencies. If no federal agency has a need for the excess property,

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[4] Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991 (GAO/NSIAD-95-3, Nov. 1, 1994).

it is declared surplus to the federal government and generally is made available to qualifying nonprofit organizations and state and local governments. Any property that remains is available for sale to the general public. DOD is required to comply with environmental laws for disposing of real property. These laws call for all relevant parties to agree on the extent of cleanup required before property can be transferred within the federal government and that property be cleaned up before it can be transferred to nonfederal users.

Originally, DOD estimated that $4.1 billion would be received from the sale of property from BRAC 1988 and 1991 rounds to help pay for the costs of realignments and closures. DOD property sales currently total about $63 million. The primary reason for the low property sales is that about 88 percent of the property we reviewed at these 37 installations was being retained by DOD or transferred at no cost to other federal agencies or state and local jurisdictions. Of the remaining 12 percent, 3 percent is planned for sale and 9 percent is undecided. Closure costs not paid from property sales revenue will have to be paid from congressional appropriations.

In addition to requesting property at no cost, communities are also asking the federal government to provide cash grants, income producing properties, and building and infrastructure improvements to assist with the conversion of military properties to civilian

uses. Communities have received nearly $300 million in cash grants from various federal agencies to assist with the planning and implementation of base reuse plans. DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment has provided $33 million; the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration has provided $83 million; the Department of Labor has provided $46 million; and the Federal Aviation Administration has provided $130 million.

Communities are also seeking the public benefit conveyances of readily marketable properties, such as military golf courses and family housing, to support reuse activities. Communities are asking for these revenue generating properties to help fund the operating expenses while they implement their reuse plans for activities such as airports or educational institutions.

Finally, communities are asking DOD to renovate buildings, upgrade utility systems, construct roads, and improve other infrastructure. Some requests have been for converting buildings from their former military use to classroom facilities and to bring buildings up to current state and federal standards. Other requests have been for infrastructure system upgrades to gas, water, and sewage systems and the construction of access roads. Communities are asking DOD to perform this work, provide the funds to do the work, or deduct the funds from property sales revenue.

Our work also shows that reuse planning and disposal of property are being delayed for several reasons. These include (1) disagreements over reuse alternatives, (2) changing laws and regulations, and (3) environmental cleanup of contaminated properties.

Disagreements over reuse arise when competing federal agencies, local jurisdictions, or other members of the community cannot agree on reuse alternatives. We have seen disagreements between cities, counties and cities, federal agencies and cities, Indian groups and local communities, and homeless assistance organizations and local communities. When conflicts arise, DOD base closure officials have urged all parties to reach an accommodation; however, DOD has the discretion to determine the final use of the property.

Changing laws and regulations delay reuse planning. When new legislation is passed, communities that are in the midst of reuse planning often choose to delay decisions until implementing regulations are finalized. For example, the Congress passed legislation in 1993 to expedite the base conversion process and support economic development in communities facing base closure. DOD issued interim rules in April 1994 and amended them in October 1994. Final rules are expected to be published in mid-March of this year.

With respect to environmental cleanup of contaminated properties, we have just released our report on the environmental impact at closing military installations.[5] This report addresses the significant environmental cleanup challenges that face the Congress, DOD, the state, and local communities before the property can be reused.

The Congress, DOD, and the Environmental Protection Agency have taken a number of actions over the past several years to resolve environmental cleanup issues at bases that are being closed and realigned. However, problems still remain. For example, our report shows that DOD's cost estimate for cleaning up 123 closing and realigning activities/installations increased to $4 billion in its fiscal year 1995 budget request.[6] However, later, more comprehensive estimates developed by 84 installations for their April 1994 cleanup plans totaled about $5.4 billion. We found that even these estimates were understated.

Our report also shows DOD has made all closing and realigning installations eligible for high priority cleanup funding. This high priority accelerates DOD's cleanup funding needs. However,

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[5]Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

[6]The 123 activities/installations are those that are identified in DOD's fiscal year 1995 base realignment and closure budget justification documents. This number differs from other summary figures for base closures because of the way DOD aggregated these numbers for budget purposes.

63 percent of the $5.4 billion estimate is for installations that would not have been given a high priority for cleanup funding if they were not closing or realigning. Also, most of the property will remain as federal lands and may not have to be cleaned up before reuse. In addition, in 1994 DOD received authority to use long-term leases so property can be placed into nonfederal reuse before cleanup is completed. To date, only a few leases have been signed.

Finally, our report shows that DOD's cleanup progress has been limited. Most sites at closing and realigning installations are in the earliest stages of investigation and study and may be 10 years or more away from cleanup. DOD has made limited cleanup progress for several reasons. First, the study and evaluation process is lengthy. Second, some of the contaminated sites are just too large or prohibitively expensive to clean up and some of the cleanup methods are unsure. Decontaminating groundwater is costly, difficult, and sometimes impossible. Third, new technology is frequently not a ready option because it may involve unacceptable risks or contractors may prefer other technology based on their past experiences.

To accelerate the environmental cleanup at closing installations, DOD established the Fast Track Cleanup program in July 1993. While certain elements in the program have achieved desired results, others have not, and opportunities for improvement remain.

For example, one initiative focused on quickly identifying and transferring uncontaminated property. However, although the services identified about 121,000 of about 250,000 acres at 1988 and 1991 closing installations as uncontaminated, the regulators only concurred on about 34,000 acres. Moreover, most of the uncontaminated property that has been identified is usually undeveloped, remotely located, and often not desirable for reuse.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

BRAC 1995 represents the last round of base closing reviews authorized under the 1990 legislation. Questions exist about whether sufficient infrastructure reductions will be made in the current round or whether additional rounds will be needed. Further, the BRAC round in 1993 was used to obtain BRAC Commission approval for changes to BRAC decisions made in 1991; the same is expected to occur in BRAC 1995 relating to prior BRAC decisions. Since DOD cannot unilaterally change a BRAC Commission decision, questions exist as to how any adjustments to 1995 BRAC decisions will be made in the future once the 1995 BRAC Commission has completed its work.

The question of whether the 1995 and earlier BRAC rounds will have eliminated sufficient excess infrastructure cannot be fully answered yet. However, recent statements by the Secretary suggest that excess infrastructure may remain after the 1995 BRAC round.

DOD's goal for the 1995 round was to reduce the overall DOD domestic base structure by at least 15 percent of DOD-wide plant replacement value--an amount at least equal to the three prior BRAC rounds. Recently, the Secretary said that he expects that the 1995 round reduction will be smaller than the 1993 round. This suggests that the current round may not meet DOD's stated goal. Our review of the 1995 round will address DOD's reasoning for the degree to which excess infrastructure was retained.

If further BRAC rounds are needed, the recent history of base closures suggests that some form of authorizing legislation may be needed to overcome problems which inhibited base closures in the past. However, I am not suggesting such legislation at this point, because we have not completed our review of the current BRAC round. In addition, we plan to complete a more detailed assessment of lessons learned from these rounds to determine what worked, what did not work as well, and what might be done differently to facilitate any additional reductions.

Regarding changes to prior BRAC decisions, the history of recent BRAC rounds suggests that some mechanism will be needed to authorize changes to 1995 BRAC decisions. I am not recommending a specific approach at this time. However, we would be glad to provide some alternatives for your consideration at a later date.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions from you or Members of the Subcommittee.

OVERVIEW OF BRAC 1995

The following is an overview of BRAC 1995 outlining DOD's selection criteria, key steps in DOD components' decision-making, and key dates pertaining to the BRAC process.

DOD SELECTION CRITERIA

Military Value (receives priority consideration)

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of DOD's Total Force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated air space at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return On Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential cost and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Community Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

KEY STEPS TAKEN BY DOD COMPONENTS IN IDENTIFYING BRAC CANDIDATES

-- Categorizing activities.

-- Collecting data needed to identify excess capacity and establish military values at individual locations.

-- Identifying realignment and closure candidates and analyzing alternatives/scenarios.

-- Performing analyses to gauge potential costs and savings from realignment and closure alternatives/scenarios.

-- Determining economic, community, and environmental impacts.

-- Recommending candidates for realignment and closure.

KEY DATES

The 1995 BRAC process is governed by certain key dates. No later than:

-- March 1, 1995: The Secretary of Defense reports his recommendations for realignments and closures to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This point marks the first public release of proposed realignments and closures and public availability of DOD BRAC documents.

-- **April 15, 1995**: GAO provides Congress and the Base Closure Commission with "a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process."

-- July 1, 1995: The Base Closure Commission reports to the President on its recommendations for realignments and closures.

-- July 15, 1995: The President transmits to the Commission and Congress a report containing his approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

-- August 15, 1995: Should the President disapprove any of the Commission's recommendations, the Commission must transmit a revised list to the President.

-- September, 1995: Congress has 45 days in which to enact a joint resolution should it desire to disapprove the entire package of realignment and closure recommendations.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE DEFINITIONS

The following definitions were provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the Department of Defense (DOD) components for use in the 1995 base closure and realignment process. The definitions remain unchanged from the 1993 process.

CLOSE

All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal which are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

CLOSE, EXCEPT

The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the military, civilian, and contractor personnel will either be eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally, active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count against the "small portion retained."

REALIGN

Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of the base. Only a portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being realigned if it will experience a net reduction of DOD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

RELOCATE

The term used to describe the movement of missions, units, or activities from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they relocate.

Enclosure 2

RECEIVING BASE

A base that receives missions, units or activities relocating from a closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net increase of DOD civilian personnel.

MOTHBALL, LAYAWAY

Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency needs of DOD. Bases or portions of bases "mothballed" will not be excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim economic uses.

INACTIVATE, DISESTABLISH

Terms used to describe planned actions that directly affect missions, units, or activities. Fighter wings are inactivated, bases are closed.

Enclosure 3

Enclosure 3

December 1994

PLANNED PROPERTY DISPOSALS AT SELECTED BASES CLOSED IN THE 1988 AND 1991 ROUNDS

Base	Federal			Public benefit transfers					Econ dev transfer	Market sales	Undetermined	Total acres
	DOD	FWS/BLM	Other federal	Homeless	Airports	Park/recreation	Education	Other				
Army MTL, MA						7					30	37
Bergstrom AFB, TX	356				2,860							3,216
Cameron Station, VA				8		64				93		165
Castle AFB, CA			660	8	1,581	18	132	13		365		2,777
Chanute AFB, IL	13				1,181	147	62			729		2,132
Chase NAS, TX								262	3,399	96		3,757
Davisville NCBC, RI	380		10			219			512		159	1,280
Eaker AFB, AR					1,690	484	300			3	809	3,286
England AFB, LA					2,282							2,282
Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN	244			4		1,550			548	150	5	2,501
Ft. Devens, MA	5,598	800	260	20					2,633			9,311
Ft. Ord, CA	1,190	15,009		133	846	2,605	338		2,681		4,923	27,725
Ft. Sheridan, IL	310			46		103	4				249	712
Ft. Wingate AD, NM	13,000	8,812										21,812
George AFB, CA			900	34	2,300		63		1,443	328		5,068
Grissom AFB, IN	1,398								1,324			2,722
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN		47,500							2,764		5,000	55,264
Lexington AD, KY	4					210			566			780
Long Beach NS/NH, CA	592		17	26			62		178		57	932
Loring AFB, ME	1,223	6,600	35				18				1,611	9,487
Lowry AFB, CO	115			47		175	220	22	711	576		1,866
Mather AFB, CA	57			28	2,883	1,462	95			1,169	22	5,716
Moffett NAS, CA	130		1,440							7		1,577
Myrtle Beach AFB,SC					1,244		15			1,559	926	3,744
Norton AFB, CA	112		33	4	1,267	24	10	39	641			2,130
Pease AFB, NH	230	1,095			2,305			27	600			4,257
Philadelphia NS/NH/NSY, PA	550		1			30		6		13	902	1,502
Presidio of San Francisco, CA			1,480									1,480
Puget Sound NS, WA		4	10	18		82	21	16				151
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO	214				202					12		428
Rickenbacker AGB, OH	300				1,635						80	2,015
Sacramento AD, CA	79			29			4		373			485
Tustin MCAS, CA	10			54		103	219			875	359	1,620
Warminster NAWC, PA	100										740	840
Williams AFB, AZ					3,262		642			138		4,042
Woodbridge ARF, VA		580										580
Wurtsmith AFB, MI			2	7	1,600	15	10	5		489	1,413	3,541
Total acreage	26,205	80,400	4,848	466	27,138	7,298	2,215	390	18,373	6,602	17,285	191,220
Percent of total	13.70	42.05	2.54	0.24	14.19	3.82	1.16	0.20	9.61	3.45	9.04	100.00

Legend

FWS/BLM — Fish and Wildlife Service/Bureau of Land Management
Econ dev transfer — Economic development transfer

Document Separator

"Value Added" by Fort Eustis, Virginia



A series of Information Papers on the "value added" by Fort Eustis, Virginia, as a major training site and power projection platform for the defense of our nation.

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INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: Fort Eustis Support of Worldwide Deployments

PURPOSE: To provide information on the role of Fort Eustis in Worldwide Deployment/Mobilization operations.

FACTS:

1. Fort Eustis serves as a power projection platform for all deployments from the East Coast of the United States. Fort Eustis actively provided support for deployment and/or mobilization of military forces for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE, as well as support for Rwanda. It is currently supporting OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

2. Arrival Departure Airfield Control Group (ADACG) is a round-the-clock operation when deployment/redeployment aircraft missions are in progress. During OPERATION DESERT STORM, Fort Eustis ADACG personnel were billeted in a hangar at Langley AFB for 60 continuous days and supported load planning, staging and loading/unloading of all aircraft missions. Fort Eustis also provides Port Support Activity (PSA) teams to local ports to assist in loading and unloading military cargo from ocean going vessels. The strength of the PSA is determined by type of cargo, size vessels, and time required to load/unload the ships or vessels. The Fort Eustis Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operates round-the-clock during deployment and redeployment operations. During OPERATION DESERT STORM, the EOC was continuously operational for up to 90 days at a time.

3. With the collocated resources of the 7th Transportation Group (Composite) and the Joint Strategic Deployment Training Center (JSDTC), Fort Eustis provides the Department of Defense with a formidable strategic deployment capability. Upon alert notification, 7th Group and JSDTC combine resources to simultaneously support sea and air deployment of the U.S. Forces from the east coast. Additionally, Fort Eustis transportation personnel deploy themselves to receive personnel and equipment in the theater of operations.

4. The 7th Transportation Group's outload support includes providing ADACG and PSA to expedite the outload of personnel and cargo. The ADACG assists the Air Force in loading/unloading troops and cargo from both military and civilian aircraft. The PSAs are stationed at local ports to assist loading/unloading

SUBJECT: Fort Eustis Support of Worldwide Deployments

9. Fort Eustis deployed 1,600 soldiers and 21 Army watercraft from Fort Eustis and 175 soldiers from Fort Lee to participate in OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The Third Port was used for deploying soldiers and equipment from units of the 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC, and soldiers and equipment of the 240th Quartermaster Group, Fort Lee, VA, aboard the Army's 7th Group watercraft located at Fort Eustis. In addition, installation support was provided to U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) military and civilian personnel and 25 helicopters from the 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division located at Fort Drum. Also provided installation support to elements of the 101st Airmobile Division. Supported ADACG operations at Langley AFB during deployment, and manifested and loaded 15 aircraft. The 7th Group supported loading Port Support Activity operations at Newport News Marine Terminal for manifesting and loading one vessel, CORNHUSKER STATE. Fort Eustis also provided 135 personnel to load the SEABEE Vessel, CAPE MOHICAN at Norfolk International Marine Terminal.

10. Fort Eustis currently operates a Soldier Readiness Processing Support Center for personnel rotating into and out of Guantanamo Bay, Panama, and Surinam. The mission, "Peace Plus" requires receiving, billeting, and soldier readiness processing, and arranging transportation on channel flights from Norfolk Naval Air Station for all initial and replacement personnel deploying/redeploying to this area of operations.

11. Fort Eustis also provides ongoing support to 7th Group soldiers deploying to Southwest Asia in support of OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR. Fort Eustis supported ADACG at Langley AFB with personnel to load more than 700 personnel and equipment of the 7th Group which deployed to Southwest Asia on 20 aircraft.

INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: The Synergistic Training Value of Fort Eustis, Virginia, and its Sub-installation Fort Story

PURPOSE: To provide information on the unique training attributes of Fort Eustis.

FACTS:

1. Fort Eustis, located on the Warwick River in Hampton Roads, Virginia, enjoys a unique location admirably suited to its exceptional mission. Fort Eustis is the home of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps, the U.S. Army Transportation Center, and the U.S. Army Transportation School. The Transportation Corps is responsible for the deployment of all Army units and the movement of their fuel, ammunition and supplies to combat or contingency operations areas. The Transportation Center and School are responsible for training civilian and military Transporters in a myriad of Transportation related skills and specialties from Advanced Individual Training to Deployment Training at the Joint Strategic Deployment Training Center.

2. Also at Fort Eustis is the 7th Transportation Group (Composite), the only composite transportation group in the Army. It is responsible for the receipt and forward movement of all supplies entering an Army area of operation. As such, the Group has participated in every contingency operation since OPERATION DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD and is the most frequently deployed unit in the Army.

3. Third Port, undoubtedly the most unique facility in the Department of the Army, is a deep water port with access to the James River, Chesapeake Bay and Atlantic Ocean. It provides a self-deployment site for the Army's Logistics Support Vessels and 7th Group's watercraft, and an excellent training facility for watercraft operations and cargo transfer training for the Transportation Center and School. The beaches of Fort Story are the Army's only training area for logistics-over-the-shore and amphibious operations and training.

4. Fort Eustis is the location of a number of one-of-a-kind training facilities. Third Port contains a landship which allows training for shipboard cargo operations without the expense of operating an actual vessel or the danger to the environment that a fuel carrying vessel poses. Third port also has Department of

INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: The Unique Aviation Training Value of Fort Eustis

PURPOSE: To provide information on the value of the aviation training attributes of Fort Eustis.

FACTS:

1. Fort Eustis plays a significant role in Army Aviation. Its unique location makes it a desirable and cost effective facility for utilization by Navy and Air Force helicopters as well. It is also a site for joint Army and Air Force aviation maintenance training.

2. The primary aviation activity at Fort Eustis is the U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School (USAALS), which has the mission of enhancing the warfighting capability of the Army. It provides subject matter expertise in the development of aviation logistics operations and sustainment support concepts, organization designs, and materiel and training requirements. It produces qualified aviation logistics personnel and provides for their sustainment and enhancement training. It also contributes to the development of warfighting concepts and doctrine, and coordinates research and development programs as an integral part of the Army's Aviation Branch.

3. Since 1983, over 5,000 Army, Air Force, and international students from over 20 nations have been trained annually. The daily schedule has approximately 135 classes supported by a staff and faculty of over 700 soldiers and civilians. Currently, USAALS has an increasingly diverse mission. The numbers of allied students has steadily increased and USAALS is being considered for other Department of Defense (DOD) helicopter maintenance training missions. In FY 94, the Air Force consolidated utility aircraft maintenance training and collocated their larger aircraft (H-53) training with USAALS. Ongoing DOD Interservice Training Review Organization studies are now looking to collocate and/or consolidate all aviation maintenance training for DOD.

4. The second largest aviation related activity, is the Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD), which is a section of the Aviation Research, Development and Engineering Center (AVRDEC), itself a part of the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM), St. Louis, Missouri. ATCOM is a major command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), Alexandria, Virginia. The mission of AATD is to improve Army aviation's preeminent warfighting capability. By understanding both present and future needs of

INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: Value of Fort Eustis as a Multi-Functional Installation

PURPOSE: To provide information on the activities that reside on Fort Eustis.

FACTS:

1. Fort Eustis, the home of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps and Transportation Training Center, is also the location of many other activities with a wide range of functions and responsibilities.

2. The primary tenant is Forces Command's 7th Transportation Group (Composite). The 7th Group is a one-of-a-kind unit providing worldwide transportation support to deploying, deployed and redeploying units on a continuous basis. Over 4,000 soldiers strong, 7th Group has been a major player in every United States operation in recent history.

3. Fort Eustis possesses many one-of-a-kind operational and training facilities. Third Port, with access to the James River, the Chesapeake Bay and Atlantic Ocean is the Army's only deep water port. It has been used for the self deployment of 7th Group's Logistic Support Vessels and Army watercraft in every operation of the past two decades. Third Port is also a superb training facility for the Transportation School and other services' personnel. For its training mission it has a rail head, a landship for realistically training stevedores without the cost of a real vessel or the potential danger that fuel spills would have on the environment. Third Port has the only ground mounted Haaglund Crane, a state-of-the-art crane, found only on ships. The ground mounted crane can be used for training in weather that would be unsafe on a vessel.

4. Fort Eustis possesses the only Department of Defense rail training and maintenance facility on a military installation. The rail facility includes an organic rail network, maintenance and training facilities, and rail equipment. Fort Eustis has a stand-alone rail operations support capability. Also located at Fort Eustis is Felker Army Airfield (FAAF), home to several operational units, both active and reserve. FAAF daily supports Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force rotary wing aircraft training and operational support missions. FAAF is also the location of the U.S. Army Aviation Logistics schools Apache

10. The U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration's James River Reserve Fleet support activity is also located at Fort Eustis. This activity provides administrative and maintenance support to 151 ships/vessels that are in the Reserve fleet.

11. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Contracting Activity (TCA) located at Fort Eustis manages the centralized contracting and Federal Information Processing (FIP) contracting for TRADOC to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. It provides advice and assistance to TRADOC staff elements in all mission and FIP contracting areas relating to combat developments, training developments, as well as test and evaluation. TCA supports contracting requirements for the TRADOC's National Training Center as well as training worldwide.

12. Department of Defense agencies and activities at Fort Eustis include a Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) fiscal station which provides military pay, civilian pay, finance and accounting support to Forts Monroe, Story, Eustis, and other Army elements in the Hampton Roads area. The regional Defense Printing Services (DPS) facility operated by the U.S. Navy, provides regional printing support to all defense activities in the area.

13. Quality of life and well being of our soldiers and their families is an important consideration at Fort Eustis. McDonald Army Community Hospital (MACH), is a full service Tri-Care Facility responsible for providing care to over 47,950 beneficiaries both active and retired. Collocated with MACH is the U.S. Army Dental Activity's Tignor Dental Clinic which provides high quality comprehensive dental care in a newly renovated full service dental clinic. In addition to serving Fort Eustis, MACH and the Dental Activity serve Fort Monroe and Fort Story as well as the retired community of the Virginia Peninsula. The Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) is represented at Fort Eustis by a modern state of the art commissary providing service to all members of the Department of Defense both active and retired. The Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES), open to all members of the Department of Defense, consists of nine retail stores, nine personal service activities, a Burger King, and a Food Court. Fort Eustis is also the home to a full service NationsBank facility and the award winning Fort Eustis Federal Credit Union.

INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: The Synergistic Value of Fort Eustis

PURPOSE: To provide information on the synergistic effect achieved by Fort Eustis being located in the Hampton Roads area.

FACTS:

1. The Virginia Peninsula is home to military installations which provide a significant contribution to national defense. Combined with the installations of South Hampton Roads, they represent an inter-service complex unequaled in the United States.

2. The synergy of this interrelationship is highly significant. It enhances the nation's capability to rapidly respond to emergencies and contingency deployments. It reduces cost through mutual support, by eliminating duplication of effort. The area has one of the finest natural harbors in the world, two major airfields capable of handling any type aircraft, and an efficient road and rail network. There is also a support structure in place to provide all essential services for both peace and war.

3. Armed Forces activities range from major headquarters to basic training facilities. The collocation of these activities enhances the development of joint doctrine, the testing of new concepts, joint use and sharing of training facilities, and the mutual support essential for the successful projection of a combat force. Sound command relationships make all this possible.

4. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), located at Fort Monroe, is a major headquarters responsible for training soldiers and developing the doctrine with which the Army will fight in the future. TRADOC's proximity to the Air Combat Command and the Atlantic Command is essential to the development of joint doctrine. Fort Monroe is also home to the Joint Warfighting Center, which develops doctrine for joint operations. In addition, Fort Monroe houses numerous small activities that are essential for joint operations.

5. Langley Air Force Base is home to Air Combat Command (ACC) and the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, making the base both a policy and an operational activity. ACC develops Air Force combat doctrine and as TRADOC's counterpart is ideally located for joint service coordination. The 1st Tactical Fighter Wing is a combat ready

In addition, EODTEU TWO provides readiness improvement training for permanent shore detachments, and Shipboard EOD detachments, Mine Counter Measures (MCM) and Mobile detachments, as well as other specialized EOD training. Another organization which takes advantage of the unique location and terrain of Fort Story is the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic, Amphibious Reconnaissance Section, which trains United States and Allied Armed Forces in basic and advanced reconnaissance skills required in support of amphibious operations.

9. The Yorktown Naval Weapons Station ammunition facility provides support to the Navy as well as explosive ordnance disposable and calibration services throughout the area. Its proximity to the fleet and its huge capacity make it an essential element of the Peninsula Complex.

10. The Navy Supply operation at Cheatham Annex, deals with refrigerated and dry storage. It is the main supplier of the Atlantic fleet. This installation is also home to the Navy's Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion's units that train extensively with the Army's stevedores and utilize the unique training facilities and equipment at Fort Eustis. Cheatham Annex also houses the Defense Logistics Agency's reutilization and marketing office.

11. The Yorktown Coast Guard Reserve Training Center is the Coast Guard's largest training activity. Over 15,000 students attend its courses annually. All services provide students for classes ranging from small boat operations to handling of hazardous cargo. The Coast Guard shares its training facilities with other services, and in turn, uses Army training facilities at Fort Eustis. A Navy fuel supply operation is also located at the training center.

12. Camp Peary is a training installation that provides facilities and support for Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies. It also uses the facilities and support of other Peninsula bases.

13. Located at Newport News Shipbuilding is the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding which is responsible for overseeing the work on all Navy vessels in the yard and for the administrative support of all crew members and their families. This organization works with Peninsula installations to ensure a high quality of life for the service members under its control. It also utilizes essential training facilities at Fort Eustis and other area military installations to maintain crew readiness.

FORT EUSTIS SUPPORT TO OTHER INSTALLATIONS/ACTIVITIES IN THE TIDEWATER AREA

1 NOVEMBER 1994

RECEIVERS:	FORT EUSTIS PRINCIPLE SUPPORT CATEGORIES																			FORT EUSTIS TENANT SUPPORT CATEGORIES						
	1. TRAINING *	2. TNG FACILITIES	3. RANGES	4. EDUCATION SVCS	5. JOINT DOCTRINE	6. DEPLOYMENT MOB	7. AVIATION SPT	8. VISUAL INFO SPT	9. ACQUISITION SPT	10. INFORMATION MGT	11. COMMUNITY SVCS	12. FAMILY HOUSING	13. UPH	14. FIRE PROTECTION	15. WTRCRAFT/PORT	16. MAINTENANCE	17. TRANSPORTATION	18. SUPPLY/SVCS	19. RAIL	20. TRADE CALIB	21. PRINTING	22. FINANCE	23. AOAP LAB	24. AMC-LAO SPT	25. DECA/AAFES	26. HEALTH SVCS
ARMY:																										
FORT STORY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FORT MONROE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FORT LEE	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X				X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FORT AP HILL	X	X				X	X	X			X				X		X			X			X	X		
FORT PICKETT	X	X					X	X			X				X		X			X			X	X	X	
CAMP PEARY	X	X	X				X				X			X	X			X							X	X
ROTC/JR ROTC	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X
RESERVE COMPONENTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
TRANSCOM	X	X	X		X	X	X				X				X										X	X
MTMCTEA	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	X
CORPS OF ENGINEERS	X	X					X				X				X		X	X					X		X	X
NAVY/COAST GUARD/MARINES:																										
NAS OCEANA	X	X	X				X				X	X	X	X	X	X		X						X	X	X
DAM NECK	X	X	X	X							X			X	X	X		X						X	X	X
NAB LITTLE CREEK	X	X	X		X			X			X			X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X
NOB NORFOLK	X	X	X		X		X	X			X				X		X	X		X				X	X	X
CHEATHAM ANNEX	X	X	X		X		X		X		X			X	X	X					X	X		X	X	X
COAST GUARD RESERVE TNG CTR	X	X	X		X			X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X						X	X	X
NAVAL WEAPONS STATION	X	X	X				X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X			X			X	X	X
NAVAL RESERVE	X	X	X								X		X	X	X			X						X	X	X
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE	X	X			X		X	X			X				X							X			X	X
SUPSHIP NEWPORT NEWS		X	X			X					X		X	X	X	X	X	X						X	X	X
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND	X	X			X	X		X			X				X										X	X
MARINE CORPS RESERVE	X	X	X					X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
CAMP ELMORE	X	X	X								X				X	X		X		X					X	X
AIR FORCE:																										
LANGLEY/SHEPPARD AFB	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
AIR FORCE RESERVE	X	X	X								X			X	X			X						X	X	X
OTHER AGENCIES:																										
DEPT OF COMMERCE, NOAA	X	X					X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, JRRF	X	X	X		X		X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X						X	X	X
DEPT OF JUSTICE, UNICOR		X									X			X		X	X			X						
JAMES CITY COUNTY			X	X			X							X	X				X							
YORK COUNTY			X	X			X							X	X				X							
CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS	X	X	X	X			X	X						X	X				X							
FORT EUSTIS ON-POST TENANTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

* See reverse for the type of training provided.

INFORMATION PAPER

1 November 1994

SUBJECT: Economic Value of Fort Eustis and Fort Story

PURPOSE: To provide an overview of the economic impact of Forts Eustis and Story on the surrounding communities.

FACTS:

1. IMPACT - Forts Eustis and Story with a military and civilian workforce of nearly 18,000 and is one of the largest employers on the Peninsula. It has a significant impact on local economies, as a 1989 Virginia Peninsula Chamber of Commerce study clearly indicates. For every two military/ federal civil service employees, one civilian "service sector secondary" job is created, which suggests another 9,000 jobs directly attributable to Forts Eustis and Story.

2. TOTAL POPULATION - The total population of Fort Eustis is 18,181. The civilian workforce consists of 1,468 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) employees, 1,067 tenant employees, 419 NAF employees, and approximately 747 contract employees. There are 2,131 TRADOC soldiers and 3,961 Forces Command (FORSCOM) and 547 other personnel (tenants/MEDDAC), 3,176 U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard military personnel stationed at Fort Eustis. The student population averages 160 civilians and 3,378 military per year. Fort Eustis and Fort Story serve over 23,000 retirees and family members.

3. PAYROLL - Department of Defense (DOD) payroll is $345M, annually. The military personnel payroll is $228M, and the civilian payroll is $117M.

4. CONTRACTS - Annual contracts, with local vendors amount to over $34M per year. Construction contracts totaled approximately $3.2M as of 30 Sep 94.

5. CAPITAL INVESTMENT - As of October 1994, capital investment at Fort Eustis is $58.8M for FY 94 through FY 96. Capital investment categories are: Army Family Housing, $2.0M; Environmental Programs, $14.4M; and Operations and Maintenance totaling $42.4M. Fort Eustis new construction/capital investment for NAF and Appropriated Funds will total $22.1M.

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950216-3

FROM: CARNAHAN, MEL	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: GOVERNOR	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: STATE OF MISSOURI	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		B17
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

HANDOUT FROM FEB 16 MEETING WITH DBCRC; COPY PLACED IN LIBRARY.

Due Date:	Routing Date 950216	Date Originated: 950216	Mail Date:

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE OF MISSOURI
JEFFERSON CITY
(314) 751-3222

MEL CARNAHAN
GOVERNOR

ROOM 216
STATE CAPITOL
65101

Please refer to this number when responding 950216-3

Governor Mel Carnahan
Comments to the Base Realignment and Closing Commission
2/16/95

Thank you for granting us the time to address the future of United States Army installations in Missouri.

Specifically, I would like to talk to you about Ft. Leonard Wood and the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis. It should be clear that Missouri is united in the effort to keep these two facilities -- and to ensure that they remain a viable part of the country's (overall) military mission.

All six elected officials in Missouri, both Republicans and Democrats from all regions of the state, have come together to sign a letter in support of this effort. Congressman Ike Skelton has done an excellent job in representing the interests of his district in Washington, and Senators Bond and Ashcroft are also fully committed to this effort.

FT. LEONARD WOOD

Ft. Leonard Wood has been, and continues to be a vital part of the United State's military mission.

MILITARY MISSION

The centerpiece of Ft. Leonard Wood is the United States Army Engineer Center. It is recognized as a state-of-the art facility -- that sets the standard for training engineers not only for the Army, but for the Department of Defense.

This facility serves a critical role in developing engineers who will be prepared for the battlefield of the next century. Furthermore, this facility is the only installation in the U.S. Army that provides engineer training for:

- officers,
- non-commissioned officers, and

- enlisted personnel at the same location.

In addition, Ft. Leonard Wood is one of only four sites in the country for basic training. And of these four, Ft. Leonard Wood is the leader in gender-integrated training, (a pilot project where men and women are trained together).

As for general operations:

- An estimated 5,600 soldiers were trained at Ft. Leonard Wood for deployment during Operation Desert Storm.
- About 17,000 troops use the installation for weekend and annual training;
- 187 National Guard and Reserve units also use the base for training; and
- Ft. Leonard Wood provides Air National Guard units with the only bombing and strafing range in the region.
- In fact, the range is used by 4,000 aircraft -- 250 days a year.

LAND USAGE

Ft. Leonard Wood covers 63,000 acres, comprised of woods, hills, rivers, lakes and streams. This makes the base ideal for:

- basic training,
- training engineers in bridge building,
- training combat engineers in land mine warfare and demolition, and
- it provides realistic training conditions for operators of armored personnel carriers.
- In addition to those benefits -- Forney Army Airfield, has a 6,000 foot runway that is capable of handling U.S. Air Force C-130 transports, as well as civilian 757 aircraft.

EXPANDABILITY

Ft. Leonard Wood has the facilities, the resources, and the support to handle additional missions.

In fact, the base, the people in the surrounding communities and the local and state government are ready, willing and able to take on additional missions. And as their representatives we aggressively seek other missions for Ft. Leonard Wood.

Ft. Leonard Wood is located near the population center of the United States, but is in a sparsely-populated area: the population density is a mere 40 residents per square mile.

Considering the size, location and versatility, Ft. Leonard Wood is well-suited, (for example), as a site for the Army's chemical decontamination training facility. In fact -- All of the biological, and chemical training could be conducted at Ft. Leonard Wood. We are already reviewing any and all environmental concerns, and are prepared to expedite the review process in order to issue a permit for such a facility by mid-May.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

There are 11,800 military personnel at the installation in addition to nearly 5,000 civilian employees. Nearly half of those work for contractors. The operating budget of the installation is $100 million.

Ft. Leonard Wood is the state's largest employer outside the two metro areas. One in every 8 dollars in income received in the area is earned by military personnel -- and in the 9- county area around Ft. Leonard Wood -- military personnel hold 1 out of every 10 jobs.

Closing this base would simply devastate the nearby communities that were built, (by and large) in support of the base. Not only would the impact hit the towns of Waynesville and St. Roberts, but the repercussions would be felt throughout the entire state.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Although Ft. Leonard Wood is located in a rural area -- the region offers many of the amenities of a more populous area.

The University of Missouri-Rolla, (located only 30 miles away), is recognized internationally for its engineering education. UMR is one of only two institutions in the country offering professional training in all of the energy and minerals engineering disciplines. And currently, it offers courses at Ft. Leonard Wood. In fact, military personnel can earn a master's degree in as little as 36 weeks.

And when it comes to public service, Ft. Leonard Wood is outstanding. For example, the base hosts the Missouri Special Olympics Summer Games, which is recognized as one of the top five Special Olympics events in the world.

There are also great recreational opportunities throughout central Missouri -- just two hours from the base is Branson, the new capital of country music. Even closer still is the lake of the Ozarks, and not more than two-hours away to the Northeast is St. Louis (with all the big city amenities including the arts and professional sports) -- and now it is also home of the new St. Louis Rams football team.

AVIATION AND TROOP COMMAND (ATCOM)

Speaking of St. Louis, it goes without saying that ATCOM personnel have the opportunity to experience the many fascinating attributes that St. Louis has to offer -- from the St. Louis Symphony, and the new science center, to the world famous St. Louis Zoo, just to mention a few. Furthermore, St. Louis has the lowest cost of living of any of the nation's top metropolitan areas.

MILITARY MISSION-ATCOM

The ATCOM mission is vital to the Army, and if it is not performed here, it must be performed elsewhere.

Essentially, ATCOM is the lead Army commodity command for life cycle management of all Army aviation systems and soldier support equipment. This management includes research, maintenance, overhaul and eventual disposal. The command provides logistics and ensures aviation system and soldier support equipment readiness for the Army worldwide.

The ATCOM mission is fully integrated into the war fighting system of our nation. It is vital to the efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness of the Army.

LAND USAGE-ATCOM

The command is located in General Services Administration facilities called the Federal Center in North St. Louis. It is adjacent to Interstate 70, and only six miles from Lambert Airport. The facility is well served by mass transit, and in addition to highways and air -- ATCOM materials are readily shipped on the inland waterway and railroad.

Construction at the Federal Center has totaled $100 million since 1981, with $13 million in construction currently under way. ATCOM rents this facility from GSA for $8 to $9 a square foot, compared to $16 for the average Class A office space in the St. Louis region...

ECONOMIC IMPACT-ATCOM

Of the 3,600 ATCOM employees, 96% are civilians.

By being located in a major urban area, ATCOM offers many people job opportunities they might not have otherwise. In fact, of the 3600 employees -- approximately 30% are minorities.

For ATCOM employees, this mission represents good jobs, with excellent career training and advancement opportunities unmatched elsewhere in the urban area.

CONCLUSION

The Armed Forces, during a previous BRAC review, concluded that the Army Aviation and troop support functions are essential and must continue to be performed. The review also revealed that some cost savings were achieved by combining the two functions -- which is now ATCOM.

In fact, less than two years ago, a BRAC follow-up review concluded...and I quote: *"The high relocation costs make realignment and closure impractical and prohibitively expensive."*

Well, today the same is true as it was then. The cost, (not only in dollars) but in force readiness, sustainability, and general social upheaval of a community makes the cost of closing or relocating ATCOM cost prohibitive -- and ultimately not in the best interest of the nation.

Similarly, once you have considered all the facts, we believe you will conclude:

1. Ft. Leonard Wood provides state-of-the-art training to engineers that would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere;
2. Ft. Leonard Wood provides modern training facilities, as evidenced by its successful gender-integrated program;
3. Ft. Leonard Wood has excellent growth potential and a community that supports future expansion;
4. Ft. Leonard Wood offers exceptional educational opportunities and an up scale quality of life.

The entire state of Missouri and (in particular) the nine surrounding rural counties and the city of St. Louis, strongly support the missions of Ft. Leonard Wood -- and ATCOM -- and want to see them both continue to thrive.

Missouri is proud of its long and distinguished association with the United States Army. And we look forward to seeing that continue. Thank you.

N E W S R E L E A S E

GOVERNOR MEL CARNAHAN

CAPITOL BUILDING ROOM 216 JEFFERSON CITY MO 65101 PHONE: (314) 751-3222 FAX: (314) 751-4458

Please refer to this number when responding 950216-3

For Immediate Release
Feb. 16, 1995

For more information,
call Chris Sifford
at 314-751-3222

Carnahan Discusses Base Closure With BRAC

Gov. Mel Carnahan today met with BRAC officials and expressed his concerns regarding the possible closure of military bases in Missouri.

Carnahan met with officials at the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC). The primary topic was Army installations, and specifically Fort Leonard Wood and Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis.

The governor stressed the economic importance of Department of Defense installations to their respective communities, as well as their vital role in the country's overall military mission.

"Missouri has a long and distinguished history of serving our country in its time of need," Carnahan said. "We intend to vigorously pursue an active role in seeing that this history continues."

Logistically, Carnahan said, Missouri maintains a position as the crossroads of the nation with ready access to rail, barge and air transportation facilities. This makes the state an ideal location for military installations.

In addition, he said that the host communities for military installations have a vested economic interest in those facilities, and any closure would have dire consequences.

"These communities have invested a great deal, both economically and socially, in these installations. It would be tragic to disrupt the very economic foundation of these communities, especially when it is not in the nation's best interest," Carnahan said.

Total military spending in Missouri for Fiscal Year 1993 totaled more than $7.1 billion. Spending for Army installations, alone, totaled more than $1.46 billion.

- more -

At $433.8 million in total expenditures, Ft. Leonard Wood made up the largest single chunk of any military installation. St. Louis is the state's biggest beneficiary of defense spending, with $4.44 billion in total expenditures.

Other impact items of Department of Defense operations include:

* nearly 76,000 Missourians, representing an annual payroll of $1.5 billion, are employed at DOD facilities;

* Ft. Leonard Wood has the largest payroll of any DOD operation in the State, with 11,281 civilian and military employees and a payroll of more than $345 million;

* Army prime contracts contribute nearly $729 million to the Missouri economy, with $87 million coming from Ft. Wood;

* civilian payroll totals $534.3 million statewide, with more than half of that amount coming from Army operations;

* ATCOM has 3,600 employees -- 96% of those are civilians.

A preliminary list of bases slated for closure will be issued March 1, with additions to that list possible through May 17. BRAC's recommendations will be submitted to President Clinton on July 1.

Document Separator

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP						
ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN					DATE: 23 FEB	
	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER						
STEVE BAILEY						
BOB MILLER		✓				
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	
COMMENTS:						



BG JOHN F. MICHITSCH
COMMANDER

Simulation, TRaining and Instrumentation COMmand

PROJECT MANAGER TRAINING DEVICES

MISSION

- DEVELOP AND FIELD ASSIGNED ARMY TRAINING DEVICES AND SIMULATORS (SYSTEM AND NON-SYSTEM)
- DEVELOP AND FIELD ARMY SYNTHETIC FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEMS
- SERVE AS AMC EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR COMBAT TRAINING CENTER INSTRUMENTATION AND SYSTEM ACQUISITION
- ACQUIRE ASSIGNED ARMY TRAINING DEVICES AND SIMULATORS FOR ALLIES ... FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

VISION

THE ARMY'S VISION

AMERICA'S ARMY TRAINED AND READY, A STRATEGIC FORCE, SERVING THE NATION, AT HOME AND ABROAD, CAPABLE OF DECISIVE VICTORY INTO THE 21st CENTURY

THE AMC VISION

THE LEADER IN EQUIPPING AND SUSTAINING AMERICA'S ARMY THROUGH SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGY AND RESPONSIVE SUPPORT ASSURING WORLD WIDE POWER PROJECTION AND DECISIVE VICTORY

THE STRICOM VISION

TO BE RECOGNIZED & SOUGHT OUT AS THE WORLD LEADER IN SIMULATION, TRAINING AND TEST TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS, INSTRUMENTATION AND SYNTHETIC ENVIRONMENTS AND CONSISTENTLY EXCEL AT ADAPTING TO OUR (EXTERNAL & INTERNAL) CUSTOMERS' NEEDS AND EXCEEDING THEIR EXPECTATIONS IN A COMPETITIVE AND COST EFFECTIVE MANNER.

MISSION



- DoD FOCAL POINT FOR DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION (DIS) ENVIRONMENT & AGGREGATE LEVEL SIMULATION PROTOCOL (ALSP)

- OPERATE AERIAL AND GROUND TARGETS FOR TEST AND TRAINING

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

STRICOM

Center of Excellence

STRICOM

ARMY
- Tech Base
- PMs
- World Class Leader in Simulation

UCF

$6.8M
MYs - 68

- Professional Development
- Institute for Simulation & Training

OTHER AGENCIES

- Air Force Armstrong Lab
- Marine Corps Liaison
- Air Force Liaison

140 COMPANIES

- Industry R & D

$180M
MYs - 1200

FLORIDA

- Trng Sim Tech Cons (TSTC)
- Enterprise Florida

$2.5M
over 2 yrs

OTHER ARMY AGENCIES

- ARI
- ARL
- HRED

- Product Oriented
- Matrix Approach
  - Includes Navy
- Leveraged

NAVY

- Base Ops
- Project Engr
- Contracts

$8M
MYs - 128

For Simulation & Training

RESOURCES

PEOPLE	AUTH
MILITARY	49
CIVILIAN	442
TOTAL	491
MANYEARS	
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER-TSD	119
OGA/SUPPORT SERVICES	407
GRAND TOTAL	1017

RESOURCES


($M)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
551
659
760
724
726
714
746
FMS
OMA
PROC
RDTE
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99

PM TRADE PROJECT ACTIVITY

- 105 Projects In Progress
  - Close Combat (ABRAMS, BRADLEY, AGS, JAVELIN...)
  - Combat Support (CTC Inst., FSCATT, MILES 2000, DSCS...)
  - Air Combat (SOACMS, APACHE CMS, AGES II, STINGER...)

- FY93 Project Results
  - Over 41 Significant Contract Actions
    - √ Value Over $237 Million
  - Delivered 741 Training Devices
    - √ Value Over $185 Million

PM DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION (DIS)

MISSION

- DoD Lead for DIS
- Integrate the DIS Synthetic Environment in Support of the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM), Battle Labs and Research, Development & Engineering Centers (RDECs)
- Manage the Combined Arms Assessment Network
- Develop and Maintain the Army's DIS Modernization Plan & Management Decision Package (MDEP)
- Develop & Maintain DIS Standards & Architecture for DoD
- Coordinate the Exploitation of Emerging DIS Technologies from Industry, ARPA, Academia, and Other Research Activities

COMBINED ARMS ASSESSMENT NETWORK



STRICOM FOREIGN MILITARY SALES



42 Active Cases

$411 Million

PRIMARY PRODUCTS
- M1A2 Trainers
- LAV Trainers
- APACHE Trainer
- BLACKHAWK Trainers

NAWC

Training Systems Division

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER


NAWC
Square Footage
de Florez Bldg 237,533
Annex 29,313
Mechanical Bldg 4,000
Total 270,846
Facilities
Galley/cafeteria 5,100 sq. ft
Wellness Center
Parking
1,000 spaces
Security
Closed circuit TV
Instrusion detection system
Lynx security access control system
Symplex fire protection system
de Florez Complex
40.5 Total acres
2.0 Buildable acres

NAWCTSD HISTORY

TEAM

1941 Established as Special Devices Desk-Bureau of Aeronautics

1946 Moved to Port Washington, N.Y.

1950 U.S. Army Participation Group established

1965 Moved to Orlando

1970 Marine Corps representation established

1975 Air Force representation established

1985 State of Florida Center of Excellence established

1988 Relocated to Central Florida Research Park

1993 Naval Air Warfare Center
Training Systems Division

NAWCTSD

MISSION

To be the principal Navy center for research, development, test and evaluation, acquisition and product support of training systems, to provide interservice coordination and training systems support for the Army and Air Force, and to perform such other functions and tasks as directed by higher authority.



VISION

The world class leader in training, simulation and modeling systems, and provider of choice for quality products and services to our customers' total satisfaction.

WORKFORCE

NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS TEAM

√ FORMAL EDUCATION
37 PHD; 246 MASTERS; 441 BACHELORS

√ EXPERTISE

- ENGINEERS
  ELECTRONIC, COMPUTER, AEROSPACE, PHYSICS, ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL, AND CIVIL
- COMPUTER SCIENTISTS
- INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DESIGNERS/DEVELOPERS
- PSYCHOLOGISTS/PHYSIOLOGISTS
- LOGISTICIANS
- PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
- ECONOMISTS
- ATTORNEYS
- CONTRACTING OFFICIALS
- BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL
- OPERATIONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCE


NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER TRAINING SYSTEMS DIVISION
MARINE CORPS LIAISON
USAF OPERATING LOCATION
TRAINING SYSTEM PRODUCT GROUP
JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEMS (JSIMS) PROGRAM OFFICE
SIMULATION, TRAINING AND INSTRUMENTATION COMMAND (STRICOM)
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR SIMULATION AND TRAINING TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY
- APPROXIMATELY 140 FIRMS REPRESENTED ENGAGED IN SIMULATION, TRAINING AND TRAINING TECHNOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA - INSTITUTE FOR SIMULATION AND TRAINING
ARMY HUMAN ENGINEERING LABORATORY
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AIR FORCE ARMSTRONG LABORATORY (PROPOSED RELOCATION)
NAVAL RESERVE UNITS
ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FIELD ACTIVITY
GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, ACADEMIA COMMITTED TO COOPERATIVE RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE AFFIRMED BY STATE OF FLORIDA RESOLUTION 16 APR 85

CUSTOMER DIVERSITY

- DOD
  - DEFENSE MODELING & SIMULATION OFFICE
  - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  - MARINE CORPS
  - ARMY
  - AIR FORCE
- NAVY
  - AVIATION
  - SURFACE
  - UNDERSEA
  - CNET
  - RESEARCH
  - BUMED
  - RESERVES
- OTHER
  - FAA
  - NASA
  - COASTGUARD
  - FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
  - ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
  - NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

Training Material Cases (51) Value $280M
Prospective Cases [28] Value $160M

NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS TEAM



- REDUCES COST & RISK; LEVERAGES PMA/PMS/NAWCTSD PROGRAMS
- PROMOTES INTEROPERABILITY & COOPERATION WITH ALLIED SERVICES
- CREATES FUTURE SALES OPPORTUNITIES

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

TEAM

TRAINING & SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY CONSORTIUM



CRADA's (8)



INDUSTRY



NAWCTSD

GAMESHELL
HELMET MOUNTED DISPLAY
DIS

NASA



ACADEMIA





- √ SCHOOL YEAR 2000
- √ SCHOOL PARTNERSHIPS
- √ VETT LAB AT MIT

NAWCTSD's Three Largest Sponsors

(Amounts Include All Types of Funding Provided)



As of 30 Sep 94

(Beginning with 30 Sep 94, FY 94 also based on gross obligations)

NAWCTSD
TENANT ACTIVITIES

NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS TEAM

- *BASEKEEPING, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND/OR TECHNICAL SUPPORT ARE PROVIDED TO THE FOLLOWING TENANTS OF NAVAIRWARCENTRASYSDIV...*

- U.S. ARMY SIMULATION, TRAINING AND INSTRUMENTATION COMMAND (STRICOM)
- ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ARI) FIELD OFFICE
- ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY, HUMAN RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING DIRECTOR FIELD OFFICE
- MARINE CORPS LIAISON
- AIR FORCE LIAISON
- NAVAL AIR RESERVE UNIT, NAS JACKSONVILLE
- NAVAL AIR RESERVE UNIT, NAS ATLANTA
- NAVY DATA AUTOMATION FACILITY

NAWCTSD
TENANT ACTIVITIES (Cont)

NAVAL AVIATION SYSTEMS TEAM

- NAVY EXCHANGE SERVICE CENTER
- NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
- DEFENSE PRINTING SERVICE DETACHMENT OFFICE
- PERSONNEL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
- SCHEDULED AIRLINE TICKET OFFICE
- OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 1108
- DEFENSE INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING RESOURCE ANALYSIS
- DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
- ARMSTRONG LABORATORY AIR CREW TRAINING RESEARCH DIVISION (DETACHMENT)
- SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

ORLANDO, FLORIDA

A GROWING CENTER OF EXCELLENCE IN SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY



- STRICOM
- ARI FIELD UNIT
- HRED LIAISON OFFICE

- NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, TRAINING SYSTEMS DIVISION
- USAF & USMC LIAISON OFFICE
- INSTITUTE FOR SIMULATION AND TRAINING (UCF)
- ENTERPRISE FLORIDA
- MORE THAN 140 SEPARATE COMPANIES HAVE OFFICES IN AREA

- JOINT TECHNICAL COORDINATION GROUP
  - TRAINING SYSTEM DEVICES
- TRAINING & SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY CONSORTIUM

THE IMPACT OF THE SIMULATION TRAINING INDUSTRY ON FLORIDA ECONOMY

- Total impact on Florida state economy in 1986 was $1 Billion in gross state product
  - $335 Million in wages
  - 27,000 jobs
  - $11.1 Million in state taxes
  - $18.3 Million in local taxes
- Each job in the state's Simulation and Training Industry was multiplied into 2.02 jobs
- Each $1 of Output produced by the industry itself required an additional $0.65 in supporting production from other parts of the state's economy
- Each $1 in wages paid by the industry generated an additional $0.65 in wages in other parts of Florida's economy

DOD/COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP

- COLLOCATION OF MILITARY
- UCF PARTNERSHIP
- COMMUNITY SUPPORT PARTNERSHIPS IN EDUCATION, CFC, TEACH INS BLOOD DRIVES, ADOPT NEEDY FAMILIES, MISCELLANEOUS VOLUNTEER SUPPORT

CENTRAL FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT

EMPLOYMENT

	FY93 (ACTUAL)		FY94 (PROJECTED)	
	ARMY PROGRAMS	NAVY PROGRAMS	ARMY PROGRAMS	NAVY PROGRAMS
GOVERNMENT				
EMPLOYEES	456	945	541	929
SALARY	$22M	$40.4M	$26M	$40.2M
CONTRACTOR				
EMPLOYEES	1050	450	1200	453
SALARY	$38.1M	$16.3M	$43.5M	$16.4M

CENTRAL FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT

($ MILLIONS)

	FY93 (ACTUAL)		FY94 (PROJECTED)	
CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY
LOCAL	$125	$25	$147	$25.2
TOTAL	$572	$304	$674	$305.8
ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET				
BASE OPERATIONS	$6	$7.6	$7	$5.3
LOCAL IMPACT				
$ EXPENDITURES	$153	$73	$180	$70.6

VISITORS TO CENTRAL FLORIDA

- STRICOM/NAWCTSD 60,000/YEAR
- Contractor Personnel 4,500/year

NOTE: Average Business Traveler to Central Florida spends $172.00 per day

IMPACT: OVER $10 Million yearly

SOURCE: STRICOM Information Base Survey of 25 companies under contract with STRICOM Orange County Economic Initiative Executive Summary Report

Document Separator

ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN

DATE: 24 FEB

	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
RICK BROWN		✓				CRB 2/24
J. J. GERTLER		✓				24 FEB
STEVE BAILEY		✓				24 Feb
BOB MILLER		✓				
MIKE KENNEDY		✓				mk
DAVE LEWIS		✓				24 Feb
CLIFF WOOTEN		✓			✓	

COMMENTS:

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950223-5

FROM: LYLES, DAVID	TO: BAYER, ROBERT
TITLE: STAFF DIRECTOR	TITLE: DEPUTY ASST SECDEF
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: OFFICE OF SECDEF
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		BZA
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER REQUESTING DOD PROVIDE ALL BACKGROUND INFO FOR COBRA ANALYSES SUPPORTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEC OF DEFENSE.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950223	Date Originated: 950223	Mail Date:

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 950223-5

February 21, 1995

Mr. Robert E. Bayer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Economic Reinvestment and BRAC
Room 3E-813
3300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-3300

Dear Bob:

The Commission's review of the Secretary of Defense's recommended base closures and realignments includes analysis of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) computer runs. Much of the COBRA analysis is derived from installation specific data calls which serve as detailed installation fact sheets. Other COBRA analysis requires information not found on the installation data calls. During previous rounds, some base recommendations were difficult to substantiate because there was insufficient supporting data for a complete COBRA analysis. This shortcoming resulted in numerous requests for additional information from the services.

To prevent this problem in the 1995 round, I request that you provide to the Commission all background information for the COBRA analyses supporting the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. This is especially true for data relating to mission costs/savings calculations. I also request any rationale for civilian and military positions eliminated or moved as a result of a closure or realignment action. As a guide, I suggest any cost or savings which are greater that $100,000 and not calculated in the model from standard factors and easily verified data, be substantiated with supporting detail.

My point of contact for this request is Mr. Bob Cook, Review and Analysis Interagency Team Chief. I appreciate your assistance in this matter and look forward to working with you during the upcoming months.

Sincerely,

David

David S. Lyles
Staff Director

Document Separator

CLEARED
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

APR 0 6 1994

DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY REVIEW (OASD-PA)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BRAC: A PROJECTION

TIDEWATER ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE CONTRACTORS

APRIL 13, 1994

Introduction

Greetings and recognition of VIPs, sponsor, etc.

I wish to thank the Tidewater Association of Service Contractors for the invitation to be here today to talk about the 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) process

BRAC Responsibility

The Logistics responsibilities for BRAC include 30 Distribution Depots employing about 19,000, 18 Inventory Control Points (ICPs) employing about 32,000, and 33 maintenance activities employing over 110,000. One of the maintenance activities, the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and one of the distribution depots are located here in Norfolk area.

Materiel Management and Distribution Management

Materiel management and distribution management--DoD's supply functions--have not been the subject of as much BRAC attention as our maintenance depots. Still, there has been significant realignment and closure in these logistics areas, particularly in the supply distribution depots. One of these distribution depots--I'm glad to say one that has not been affected by BRAC--is located here in Norfolk. Formerly known as the Norfolk Navy Supply Center, it is now called Defense Depot, Norfolk. This name change came about in 1992 when the Defense Logistics Agency took over the management of all CONUS distribution depots.

Prior to BRAC 88, DoD had 35 CONUS distribution depots. Today, there are 30 supply depots, employing about 19,000 people. Of these remaining supply depots, 5 are scheduled for closure--Sacramento from BRAC 91 and Charleston, Oakland, Pensacola, and Tooele from BRAC 93. These BRAC actions were in conjunction with depot maintenance activities closures at the same locations. And, it is likely that future closures of depot maintenance activities will result in closures of collocated supply depots because

94-S-1320

their primary mission is to support the maintenance function. We anticipate a very aggressive look at supply depots in BRAC 95 because we estimate that something in the ballpark of 100 million attainable cubic feet of storage space is excess to the Department's needs.

Downsizing of the DoD's ICP structure (these are our activities which manage the 5 million lines of supply in the DoD logistics system) through BRAC actions has, to this point, not been extremely successful. Prior to BRAC 88, DoD had 20 inventory control points. Today, we have 18 ICPs employing about 32,000 people. Twelve are Service ICPs--four, Army; five, Air Force; two, Navy; and one, Marine Corps. And, six are DLA ICPs.

Of the 12 Service ICPs, two are by-products of recent BRAC and DoD management decisions. As recently as 1991, the Army had 6 ICPs, but in 1991, the Army Aviation System Command and the Army Troop Support Command--collocated in St. Louis, MO--were merged into the Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM). This was an Army management action, outside the BRAC process. However, in BRAC 93, the Army's Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) was realigned with the Army's Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) to become the Armament, Chemical and Acquisition Logistics Activity (ACALA). This new command is already provisionally established and will become official in October 1994.

91 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

BRAC 93 also resulted in the consolidation of two of DLA's six ICPs. The Defense Electronics Supply Center, located in Dayton, Ohio, will be realigned with the Defense Construction Supply Center, located in Columbus, Ohio. When this change is effected, DoD will have only 17 ICPs.

The BRAC process for materiel management and distribution management will follow similar procedures to those followed in BRAC 91 and BRAC 93. That is, the head of the Military Component--either the Secretary of the Military Department or the Director of DLA will make closure/realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. However, the Procedures for maintenance activities will be different this year. Later, I describe these procedures.

Maintenance Activities

When it comes to BRAC, the maintenance depots receive the most attention. Currently the Department of Defense has 24 remaining major depot maintenance activities that will be subject to realignment or closure analyses during the BRAC 95 process. The current total employment for maintenance

depots including those on previous BRAC lists is over 110,000 people. These maintenance activities are among the largest employers in the states in which they are located. Therefore, potential realignment or closure can have dramatic impacts on their local community and even the states in which they are located.

Sizing the Department's depot infrastructure, while ensuring a high degree of readiness and sustainment of our forces, is a top Defense priority. However, downsizing of our depot infrastructure will not be an easy nor pleasant task.

The rest of my presentation will focus on these maintenance activities because that is the area of major focus for logistics during the upcoming BRAC 95 process.

BRAC 95 Process

Initiating the Process

The 1995 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC 95) is the last round of closures authorized under Public Law 101-510. In recognizing that it is critical to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure, the Deputy Secretary of Defense determined that the BRAC process should begin early. Consequently, he issued a memorandum on January 7, 1994, providing guidance for selecting bases for realignment and closure. He noted that the Defense Guidance for BRAC 95 had a goal of an overall 15 percent reduction in plant replacement value. He then pointed out that significant reductions in infrastructure and overhead costs could only be achieved through careful studies that address not only structural changes to the base structure, but also operational and organizational changes, with a strong emphasis on cross-service utilization of common support assets.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense indicated that the BRAC 95 process must enhance opportunities for consideration of cross-service tradeoffs and multi-service use of the remaining infrastructure. Accordingly, he established a new organizational structure to take advantage of cross-service asset sharing opportunities.

He established a BRAC 95 Review Group to review BRAC 95 analyses, establish closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for Components, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense including cross-service tradeoff recommendations.

The Deputy Secretary also established a BRAC 95 Steering Group to assist the BRAC 95 Review Group in exercising its authorities and to review DoD Component supplementary BRAC 95 guidance.

Cross-Service Groups

To enhance opportunities for consideration of cross-service tradeoff and multi-service use of the remaining infrastructure, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created six Joint Cross-Service Groups. The six BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Groups are:

- Test and Evaluation
- Laboratories
- Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education
- Undergraduate Pilot Training
- Economic Impact
- and Depot Maintenance which I chair.

These groups must work with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies in the areas which are considered to have the most significant potential for cross-service impacts in BRAC 95.

The purpose of the Economic Impact Cross-Service Group is: to establish the guidelines for measuring economic impact and, if practicable, cumulative economic impact; to analyze DoD Component recommendations under those guidelines; and to develop a process for analyzing alternative closures or realignments necessitated by cumulative economic impact considerations, if necessary.

The purpose of the other five functional area joint cross-service groups is:

- To determine the common support functions and bases to be addressed by each cross-service group
- To establish the guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements and milestone schedules for DoD Component conduct of cross-service analyses of common support functions
- To oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses of these common support functions
- To identify necessary outsourcing policies and make recommendations regarding those policies
- To review excess capacity analyses

- To develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets for consideration in such analyses, and
- To analyze cross-service tradeoffs.

Policy Guidance

Base realignment, closure or consolidation studies that could result in a recommendation to the 1995 Commission of a base closure or realignment must meet the following requirements:

- The studies must have as their basis the approved Force Structure Plan;
- The studies must be based on the final selection criteria for choosing bases for closure and realignment and
- The studies must be based on analyses of the base structure by like categories of bases using: objective measures for the selection criteria, where possible; the force structure plan; programmed workload over the FYDP; and military judgment in selecting bases for closure and realignment.
- The studies must consider all military installations inside the United States (as defined in the law) on an equal footing, including bases recommended for partial closure, realignment, or designated to receive units or functions by the 1988, 1991, or 1993 Commissions.

Data Certification

In an effort to ensure the data used for analysis is accurate, complete, and can be audited, Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 1995 Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation is accurate and complete. This procedure is applicable at all levels through the chain of command.

DoD components shall establish procedures and designate appropriate personnel to certify that data and information collected for use in BRAC 95 analyses are accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief. DoD Components' certification procedures should be incorporated within a required internal control plan. This process is subject to audit by the General Accounting Office.

Finally, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies, and heads of other DoD Components must certify to the Secretary of Defense that data and information used in making BRAC 95 recommendations to the Secretary are accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Release of Information

Data and analyses used by the DoD components to evaluate military installations for closure and realignment will not be released until the Secretary's recommendations have been forwarded to the 1995 Commission on March 1, 1995. As in the past BRAC efforts, the 1995 Commission must hold public hearing on the recommendations.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has a special role in assisting the Commission in its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and must also prepare a report detailing the Department of Defense's selection process. As such, the GAO will be provided, upon request, with as much information as possible without compromising the deliberative process.

Infrastructure Background

Past Practices

You may ask; How did we get to where we are today? or Why do we have so much excess infrastructure?

From the late 1940s until the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States war planning scenarios called for large-scale response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and emphasized full industrial mobilization. Within that context, a principle justification for public sector depot maintenance infrastructure was the need for ready capacity to meet the surging needs of the operational forces while the private sector production base was gearing up for wartime demands. This large scale, full-mobilization scenario drove the policy guidance that established our current large organic logistics capacity and infrastructure.

By the end of the 1980s, the existing capabilities and capacity were the products of 40 years of incremental changes, typically to support new weapon systems as they came on board, and tempered by periodic contractions.

Post Cold War

The collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the subsequent easing of geopolitical tensions have increased the anticipated warning time for war, allowing for reductions in force structure and operating tempo, and have lessened depot maintenance needs for peacetime and for wartime planning. Also, the recent changes in planning from preparation for a large scale conflict to preparation for shorter duration contingency scenarios have reduced the requirement for depot maintenance infrastructure. While the focus during the cold war was readiness and sustainability for a massive, and protracted war, that focus now includes readiness for smaller conflicts, sustainability for shorter duration conflicts, followed by reconstitution. This revised planning has reduced both the requirements for force structure and operating tempo of the forces planned for the conflicts. For depot maintenance, the net effect of force structure, and scenario-driven changes have been to significantly reduce depot maintenance requirements and, has in the process, generated significant excess depot capacity.

The Need for OEM Technology

One of the guiding principles of the recently completed Bottom Up Review stated, "We must also maintain the technological superiority of our weapons and equipment. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that we produce the best weapons and military equipment in the world. This technological edge helps us to achieve victory more swiftly and with fewer casualties. We must design a balanced modernization program that will safe guard this edge and the necessary supporting industrial base without buying more weapons than we need or can afford."

What Has Been Done:

The Bottom Up Review

The Bottom Up Review determined that the United States must field forces sufficient to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The Review identified the required force structure and the enhancements deemed necessary to accomplish those warfighting requirements.

Core Capability

The Department must preserve sufficient core maintenance capability to ensure sufficient support for the Bottom Up Review scenarios. This core capability concept sounds simple, but has many different interpretations. Section 2464, Title 10 United States Code states "... it is essential for the national defense that the Department of Defense activities maintain a logistics capability (including personnel, equipment, and facilities) to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements." The challenge is to determine how much core depot maintenance capability is sufficient. The Services recently used a newly developed methodogy for quantifying core depot maintenance requirements based on Joint Staff approved scenarios and resultant force structure.

Organic Depot Maintenance Capacity

As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be universal agreement that there is too much organic depot maintenance capacity. One of the major challenges in the coming years will be to reduce that excess capacity.

For instance, at present, there are 33 major maintenance depots. Two of those, Sacramento Army Depot and the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard are in the process of closing. Of the remaining 31 depots, 7 were included in the President's BRAC 93 recommendation to Congress. There will still be much excess capacity after these close, and the excess capacity will be further increased by additional force structure reductions.

The Services have come to the realization that in this era of declining resources, they must reduce infrastructure commensurate with force structure. The BRAC 95 process may be our last chance to shed much unnecessary infrastructure.

The Future of Maintenance Depots

In addition to the two depots in the process of closing from BRAC 91 and the seven from BRAC 93, the Services have taken other steps, within their level of authority, to reduce the size of their depot maintenance infrastructure. For example, actions are underway that will result in Fiscal

Year 1994 depot personnel end strength levels that are reduced by 30 percent from Fiscal Year 1987.

The maintenance depot infrastructure must continue to shrink commensurate with force level reductions. The workload will simply not be there to support the current infrastructure. As I have indicated, there will be less workload due to reduced force structure, increased reliance on the modern equipment, and the upgrading of existing weapon systems.

We will define core capability to ensure that our downsizing efforts are not accomplished in a precipitous fashion. I anticipate this will be more of a collaborative effort in the future because the Services have come to the realization that there is a trade-off between infrastructure and the force structure we can afford.

Aging Weapon Systems

The average age of weapon systems will increase with relatively few new systems being introduced due to declining purchases of new systems. The average age for many of the front line systems, for which no replacement is programmed, have already reached the point where overhauls are becoming more frequent and expensive. For instance, the Air Force's B-52 fleet has an average age of 31.4 years. This aging of systems will be offset to some extent by retiring some older systems, such as the Navy's Belknap Class Cruisers. Our challenge is to properly size the depot infrastructure to support long-term peacetime maintenance and contingency requirements for a smaller inventory.

New Weapon Systems

In the future, there will of course be new weapon systems and modernizations introduced into the inventory. However, the number of new systems under development has been sharply reduced, and those systems that are produced will be procured in substantially smaller numbers. Preserving our technological edge will be increasingly more dependent on upgrades and modifications than in the past.

Given the historical dominant role of the private sector in developing and designing upgrades and modernizations, it is prudent to review the role of the developers in applying those modifications and upgrades. At the same time we must consider the organic depot capabilities. Managed correctly this strategy can be invaluable in monitoring critical technology capabilities in the private sector and in sizing organic depots to focus on core workload requirements.

The Services must identify and eliminate redundancy among the organic depots. This will mean an increased reliance on cross-servicing for all of the Services. There have been many recent success stories cross-servicing. These include the M1A tanks at Anniston Army Depot, the Air Force's J-79 engine being maintained at the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, the Navy's TF-30 and F110 engine workload at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center. Presently, less than 3 percent of the total DoD depot maintenance workload is cross serviced. There needs to be a dramatic increase in that amount.

Budget Reductions

The Department of Defense has entered a period of rapid contraction. In terms of FY 1993 constant dollars, and excluding the costs of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Departments' budget authority has declined from $370.9 billion in FY 1985 to $267 billion in FY 1993, a reduction of $103.9 billion, or 28 percent. Procurement funds have declined by 57 percent since 1985. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funds have been reduced by 5 percent, and Operation and Maintenance funding has shrunk by 12 percent.

For illustrative purposes, in terms of constant FY 1993 dollars, in FY 1987 we had a depot maintenance budget of $16 billion, over 156,000 depot personnel and 35 depots. By Fiscal Year 1993 we had a depot maintenance budget of $13 billion, an end strength of approximately 117,000 and the number of depots to remain open has dropped from 35 to 24.

The reductions in Defense spending have had a similar effect in the private sector. Business Week recently projected that during 1994 alone, Defense industries may cut 100,000 more jobs over the 600,000 previously eliminated.

Spurred by the 57 percent reduction in procurement dollars since 1986, industry, especially the original equipment manufacturers, have recently shown an increased interest in depot maintenance. With the rapidly diminishing number of new weapon systems being developed and procured, depot maintenance repair and modification programs are now viewed by industry as a potential source of new business and possibly a means for supporting the industrial base military capability.

On the other hand, Congress, out of a concern to preserve the maintenance depots skilled workforce has mandated a

number of constraints that limit management flexibility. They include an overall 40 percent ceiling by Military Department or Defense Agency on the performance of depot-level maintenance workload by non-Federal Government employees. There is also a legal requirement to use competitive procedures prior to awarding contracts for depot maintenance for any workload previously performed by DoD depots and valued at $3 million or more. In addition, Congress annually provides further guidance in the Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts.

Sizing the Depot Maintenance Infrastructure

Our major challenge centers around maintaining the capability to support and sustain the revised force structure with absolutely no degradation in readiness during peace, or war.

The second challenge is to properly size the infrastructure to support the needs of that force identified in the Bottom Up Review. To do this we must properly utilize the existing organic depot capacity through cross-servicing and utilizing existing Centers of Technical Excellence. This will be a real challenge, with no easy answers.

The Bottom Up Review decisions and resultant budget reductions have also impacted the private sector. Excess depot maintenance capacity also exists in the private sector. In rightsizing, it is important to maintain those capabilities required by both short and long-term defense requirements. We believe that both, private sector and organic depots are essential elements of the nation's industrial base. The public and private sectors must be balanced and sized appropriately to meet the needs of the force structure without any degradation in readiness.

Centers of Technical Excellence that have already been established in our public depots must be properly utilized to sustain readiness and to capitalize on investments already made.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we must prove to Congress that we can do the job in a responsible and efficient manner and then convince them to let us do that job without artificial management constraints. A comprehensive view of maintenance management is required.

We are working hard to ensure depot maintenance is highly responsive to readiness and warfighting requirements. We also are conducting the requisite studies and analysis to rightsize the organic depots based on the Bottom Up Review, core workload requirements, and determining the best balance for public and private sectors and ensuring that we maintain the engineering and technology bases in the private sector required to sustain the technological superiority of weapons for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.

The job ahead is enormous, but one that is vital to the security and well being of our nation. We must ensure the men and women who serve under the American Flag will be the best trained, best equipped, and best prepared fighting force in the world.

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DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and Private Sectors

Statement of Donna M. Heivilin, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss several defense depot maintenance issues. DOD annually spends about $15 billion for depot maintenance, modifications and upgrades to support aircraft, combat vehicles, wheeled vehicles, ships, and other equipment. For a variety of reasons, DOD is downsizing and must consider how to cost effectively acquire needed depot maintenance activities while supporting industrial base needs in both the public and private sectors. Recognizing that excesses exist, there are differing views on how the workload should be allocated. At the heart of the current debate are questions regarding how much workload should be retained in the public depots as "core" capability, whether a service should be allowed to have its own core capability, and how the remaining non-core workload should be allocated among the public and private sectors.

As you requested, my testimony today will address the following issues:

-- the share of DOD's depot maintenance program spent in the public and private sectors;

-- the use of public-private competition as a tool for allocating depot maintenance workload;

-- observations on the Defense Science Board Depot Maintenance Task Force findings and recommendations; and

-- DOD's transfer of employees, workload, equipment, and facilities at closing maintenance depots.

Before I discuss specifics, let me provide a summary of our views on these issues.

First, the amount of funding going to the private sector is much higher than reported. In recent years, statistics reported by DOD indicate that the mix of funding between the public and private sectors was 65 percent and 35 percent, respectively. However, all data has not been collected and reported uniformly by the services. While a precise estimate is not possible, it appears at least half of the depot maintenance funding currently goes to the private sector.

Second, while we have concerns about implementation of public-private competition, and while the amount of savings are difficult to quantify, we believe the program can reduce depot maintenance costs. Similarly, while industry representatives believe the program is inherently unfair and want it to be terminated, DOD has made progress in making the competitions fair. We do not at this time see sufficient evidence for terminating the public-private

competition program. We believe it should continue to be an option for allocating work when it is likely to result in reduced costs.

Third, while we support many of the task force findings and recommendations, there are areas where we differ. In particular, we agree there is a need to identify a rational maintenance core policy, but we believe, as DOD does, that this should be done on a DOD-wide basis rather than a service-specific basis. Additionally, we believe the allocation of non-core workload should be based on cost effectiveness--unless there are overriding circumstances, such as industrial base considerations.

Lastly, at this time none of the maintenance depots identified for closure have closed. DOD appears to have an effective program in place to assist employees in finding alternative employment, although some workers may not be able to get a job with comparable pay. There are some concerns about other aspects of closing the depots.

BACKGROUND

Depot maintenance activities require extensive shop facilities, specialized equipment, and highly skilled technical and engineering personnel to perform major overhaul of parts, completely rebuild parts and end items, modify systems and equipment by applying new or improved components, manufacture parts unavailable from the

private sector that are needed for performing depot maintenance activities, and provide technical assistance by field teams at operational units. At the beginning of the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process, DOD was performing depot maintenance operations at 35 of its own major depots[1] and thousands of contractor facilities. With full implementation of currently approved BRAC decisions, the number of DOD depots will be reduced to 24. Reductions are also taking place in the private sector. However, even after planned closures, there will still be excess capacity in both sectors that must be addressed.

Due to threat changes, new war-fighting plans, budget reductions, and decisions to close excess facilities, DOD has been faced with the critical issue of how to determine the appropriate size of its industrial base in the post cold war era. At the heart of this issue is the controversy over what is the proper workload mix between public depots and private contractors. Attempts to "rightsize" the industrial base have been made through legislation that established percentage workload goals and through programs for competing maintenance workloads between the public and private sectors. Because of the interest and, at times, opposing views on how DOD should handle the industrial base issue, Congress directed DOD to establish a defense and industry task force to "assess the overall performance and management of depot-level activities of the

[1]A major DOD maintenance depot is defined as a facility employing more than 400 personnel in depot maintenance.

Department of Defense." Section 341 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994[2] required a report by April 1, 1994. The ensuing Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management included a large group of senior representatives from both industry and government. The Deputy Secretary of Defense submitted the task force report to Congress on April 7, 1994.

REPORTED PRIVATE SECTOR SHARE OF DEPOT MAINTENANCE FUNDS IS UNDERSTATED

Statutory and regulatory provisions have been used to address the mix of maintenance workload between the public and private sectors. For example, 1974 legislation established a specific dollar value mix for the alteration, overhaul, and repair of naval vessels. Since then, workload allocation decisions have been influenced by percentage goals found in DOD guidance and legislative mandates. DOD Directive 4151.1, "Use of Contractor and DOD Resources for Maintenance of Materiel," directed the services to plan for not more than 70 percent of their depot maintenance to be conducted in service depots in order to maintain a private sector industrial base. A 1992 amendment to 10 U.S.C. 2466 prohibited the military departments and defense agencies from contracting out more than 40 percent of their depot maintenance work to the private sector.

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[2]P.L. 103-160, Sec. 341, 107 Stat. 1547, 1622 (1993).

For fiscal years 1985 through 1992, DOD reported that depot maintenance expenditures were split between the public and private sectors about 65 percent and 35 percent, respectively. However, our work shows that the private sector more likely receives over 50 percent of the DOD depot maintenance budget. We found that a portion of the monies expended on the maintenance workload assigned to the public sector ultimately is contracted out to the private sector for parts and material, maintenance and engineering services, and other goods and services. However, as currently reported, these monies are included in calculating the public sector's share of depot maintenance expenditures. Additionally, some types of depot maintenance activities, such as interim contractor support, are not included in previously reported statistics. We also noted inconsistencies in how the services collect and aggregate data to develop DOD's report to Congress on the public and private mix for depot-level maintenance.

While a lack of uniform and complete data prevented us from precisely quantifying the public-private sector mix, we found several indications that at least 50 percent of the funds ultimately go to the private sector. For example, Army Materiel Command data indicates that about $437 million of the $1.2 billion expended by Army depots in fiscal year 1993--about 31 percent--went to the private sector. About 21 percent of the dollars expended by the Army depots went to buy parts and material and about 10 percent for other goods and services. If these expenditures are added to

the amount of depot maintenance funds spent directly in the private sector, we estimate that about 58 percent of the Army's depot maintenance budget is spent in the private sector.

We also found that about 43 percent of the Air Force Materiel Command's $4.3 billion depot maintenance dollars in fiscal year 1993 went to public depots (excluding parts and other goods and services acquired from the private sector), while about 57 percent went to the private sector. Although we tried to obtain data from all Navy shipyards on fiscal year 1993 expenditures in the private sector, we received data from only one shipyard. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard reported that $81 million of its $399 million expenses for that year went for material and various other goods and services contracted with the private sector. Thus, the private sector received about 20 percent of that shipyard's operating expenses for fiscal year 1993.

The task force report found that the public-private ratio becomes nearly 50-50 when dollars spent at public depots for parts and components--but purchased from the private sector--are included as part of the private sector's share. If included, other goods and services procured from the private sector would increase the private sector's share above 50 percent.

If Congress continues to be interested in quantifying the expenditure of depot maintenance funding in the public and private

sectors, it may wish to consider requiring DOD to revise the manner in which it collects, aggregates, and reports the data.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION AS A TOOL FOR ALLOCATING DEPOT MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD

There is disagreement about using public-private competition as a tool for allocating depot maintenance workload. This program is quite new, except for its use in competing ship repair.

DOD's public-private competition program, which began in 1985 when Congress authorized the Navy to compete shipyard workloads between the public and private sectors, is carried out under various legislative authorities. The 1985 DOD Appropriations Act[3] directed the Navy to test the feasibility of using competition between public and private shipyards as the basis for awarding a portion of the ship overhaul and repair workload. Although the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services initially opposed expanding the competition program to the other services and Navy aviation activities, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 provided for a pilot competition program. Section 314 (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993[4] authorized a new pilot program through fiscal year 1993. The pilot program limited the amount that could be competed to four percent of the total depot maintenance program. Arguing that DOD

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[3]P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1904, 1907 (1984).

[4]P.L. 102-190, Sec. 314, 105 Stat. 1290, 1336 (1991).

could achieve significant savings by expanding the public-private competition program, DOD officials requested that limitations on the pilot program be removed. Section 354 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993[5] repealed the requirement for the pilot program--clearing the way for DOD to expand its competition program.[6]

Table 1 provides summary information on workloads awarded to the private and public sectors for the 302 competitions that were awarded as of December 31, 1993.[7] Of these, 202 competitions were for the repair of Navy surface ships and submarines. Of the remaining 100 competitions, the Air Force conducted 34; the Army 35; the Navy 24; and the Marine Corps 7.

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[5]P.L. 102-484, Sec. 354, 106 Stat. 2315, 2379 (1992).

[6]A more detailed history of the public-private competition program was provided in correspondence to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept. 30, 1993).

[7]Navy ship awards are included through March 31, 1994.

Table 1: Summary Information on Workloads Awarded to the Private and Public Sectors in the Public-Private Competition Program

Dollars in millions

Service	Number of Workloads Awarded				Value of Workload			
	Private Sector		Public Sector		Private Sector		Public Sector	
	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total	Value	Percent of Total	Value	Percent of Total
Air Force	13	38	21	62	$ 64.3	22	$ 232.0	78
Army	15	43	20	57	54.0	49 54	55.3	51 56
Navy Aircraft/ Components	10	42	14	58	88.5	23	288.6	77
Marine Corps	1	14	6	86	.4	3	13.9	97
Non-Ship Total	39	39	61	61	207.2	26	589.8	74
Navy Ships	133	66	69	34	1,174.4	50	1,171.6	50
Total	172	57	130	43	$1,381.6	44	$1,761.4	56

While private companies believe the program is inherently unfair and want it terminated, DOD has made progress in making the competitions fair. Our analysis showed that overall, the private sector won 57 percent of the competitions, which represent about 44 percent of the dollar value. Private shipyards won 91 percent of the 117 surface ship competitions and 32 percent of the 85 submarine competitions. Moreover, private shipyards won all of the more recent competitions. Public shipyards complain that their ability to reduce their overhead is inhibited by the requirement that they maintain industrial base capability to repair items that are being phased out of the inventory or are unusual and not common on most ships.

Public shipyards also contend that they are no longer competitive because they are now required to bid full costs, whereas private shipyards are not so restricted. During the first few years of the competition program (fiscal years 1985 to 1987), public shipyards were not required to bid full costs. That is, if overhead costs were covered by noncompeted work, public shipyards could bid the variable costs of the proposed additional work. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989[8] required that public shipyard proposals in public-private competitions include full costs to the government.

We have been asked to look in more detail at the ship and submarine competitions. As a part of our ongoing work, we compared the historical costs of competed submarine repairs in both the public and private sectors. We found that the average cost of performing a competed submarine workload in public shipyards during fiscal years 1988 through 1993 was less than the average cost for competed workloads over the same period, even though private yards had bid lower.

The private sector won only one of the seven Marine Corps competitions. Forty-three percent of the 35 Army competitions went to the private sector--but the dollar value was split about in half. The private sector won 42 percent of the Naval aircraft and

[8]P.L. 100-456, 102 Stat. 2054 (1988).

component repair competitions--representing 23 percent of the dollar value of naval aviation competitions.

The Air Force is a strong advocate of public-private competition and its depots have been very successful in winning competitive awards. Air Force depots have won 21 of the 34 Air Force competitions--representing workload valued at $232 million, or 78 percent of the total value of Air Force competition programs awarded as of December 31, 1993. The Air Force reported that awarding these workloads to the next lowest bidder would have increased costs by $108 million. An Air Force depot also won a $61 million Navy depot maintenance competition for the F/A-18 aircraft. The Air Force wants to expand its public-private competition program. Because of questions over whether the Air Force competitions are fair, I am focusing many of my comments today on our analysis of this program.

To gain further insights into the Air Force's competition program, we examined the 28 competitions in which the Air Force bid on a workload. We analyzed 134 bid proposals submitted for these competitions. The difference between the winning bid and the highest losing bid exceeded 300 percent in several competitions. Losing bids ranged from 9 percent less to 496 percent more than the winning bid. In competitions won by the public sector, private offerors' final bids averaged 150 percent greater than the winning depots' bids.

Noting the large percentages by which Air Force depots were winning many of their competitions, private sector companies--particularly original equipment manufacturers that have higher overhead costs and are more heavily facilitized than service-oriented companies--believe this is because the Air Force depots are not including all their costs. When we questioned Air Force officials about the reasons for these variances, they noted that industrial improvements to Air Force depots during recent years have contributed significantly to efficiency and productivity. For example, one Air Force depot we visited had reduced the number of hours required to accomplish programmed depot maintenance tasks by applying state-of-the-art equipment, tooling, and processes. These included robotic media blast technology to remove paint from aircraft surfaces and a more efficient industrial production line.

We noted in comparing proposals for several competitions that bidders appeared to interpret differently the tasks required to accomplish the work. Air Force officials acknowledged the difficulty in writing a precise statement of work for maintenance competitions and conceded that, as a result, bidders often had widely varying interpretations as to the tasks required and the time needed to perform them. Air Force depots that have maintained the equipment previously may better understand what is actually required. Contracting officers said that the difficulty in writing a precise statement of work also adversely affects repair

competitions restricted to the private sector--frequently leading to contract revisions and cost overruns.

In two competitions, the Air Force bid the lowest cost, but cost comparability adjustments[9] to its bids increased the evaluated prices, resulting in the awards going to private sector bidders. We observed that, over time, the relative significance of cost comparability adjustments has increased. For the first half of the competitions, Air Force depots' bids were adjusted upwards for comparability an average of 3.5 percent of the amount bid. In contrast, adjustments for the second half averaged 7.6 percent. As additional comparability factors were added, their share of the bid prices increased.

In the 60 proposals we reviewed where data on labor hours were provided, the most significant cause for the difference between the winning and losing bids was the number of direct labor hours proposed. Winning offerors bid an average 77 percent fewer labor hours than the losing offerors. On average, the closest competitor bid 32 percent more hours than did the winner. We reviewed Defense Contracting Audit Agency reports on some of these competitions as

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[9]To level the playing field between public and private sector bidders, DOD uses comparability factors to reflect cost elements not included or fully included in the proposed bid prices. For public sector bids, comparability factors are used to account for elements not included in the end-item cost that is charged the customer but are paid for by other appropriation accounts. These factors include such items as unfunded civilian retirement liability, unemployment compensation, and military support costs.

well as the cost-realism analyses performed by the procuring activities. The Air Force depots' estimates for labor hours were reviewed and the final estimates accepted as reasonable. Nonetheless, it is not possible to determine if the performing depots will accomplish the work for the labor hours bid until actual performance data is available and evaluated. This analysis should be facilitated by the Air Force's implementation of a Depot Maintenance Performance Tracking System. However, post award contract administration performed by the Defense Contract Management Command and independent post award audits would also be helpful in evaluating the results of these competitions.

OBSERVATIONS ON DEPOT MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE REPORT

You asked that we comment on the findings and recommendations of the task force report provided to Congress on April 7, 1994. We have not reviewed the report in depth, and are focusing our comments on the task force recommendations that (1) core be implemented as service-specific; (2) selected non-core workload be allocated to certain capabilities in the private sector, and the remaining non-core workload competed in the private sector; and (3) public-private competition be eliminated.

In transmitting the report to Congress, the Deputy Secretary of Defense generally agreed with the task force recommendations, except for the recommendation that core should be service specific.

The Deputy Secretary noted that core will be DOD-wide, thus providing greater flexibility in eliminating duplicate resources, increasing interservicing, and implementing efficiency measures.

Service versus DOD Core

DOD established a methodology for determining the capabilities needed to maintain mission essential weapon systems--referred to as core workload--to be used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency scenarios.[10] Core capabilities and requisite workloads, by definition, are generally to be maintained in DOD depots, although some core capability could logically exist outside of DOD depots--in the private sector.

The task force found that readiness responsibilities contained in law require service depots to provide service core responsibilities--rather than relying on another service's depot for this support. Task force members found that current DOD policy was not definitive on the issue of whether core requirements should be service specific or consolidated as DOD core. The majority of the task force held the position that core should be service specific, and commented in the report that "such an approach is essential to support military service title 10 readiness

[10]At the direction of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each service used the approved methodology to compute its core depot maintenance requirements. OSD is now reviewing the results, but has not yet approved the core workloads.

responsibilities."[11] Conceptually, under a service core concept, each service would be allowed to retain its own core workload. Non-core workload would then be transferred to the private sector, either allocated or competed. The Air Force did not agree with the majority opinion. Air Force officials noted that core should be established and maintained in the most cost-effective and efficient public depots; thus, it should be based on a DOD-wide rather than a service-specific basis.

The task force concluded that, in implementing the core policy, excess capacity in the depot system should be eliminated. However, the task force indicated that substantive challenges existed in transitioning the current DOD depot infrastructure to one based on the core concept and that conflicts with the current direction will arise. For instance, the task force suggested that ongoing efforts to consolidate the depot maintenance of tactical missiles at one depot may be inconsistent with industrial base issues-- including the core concept.

We support the task force's findings and recommendations for implementation of a rational core policy, but disagree that the core must be service specific. Assessing and maintaining the

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[11]DOD activities are required under title 10 to "maintain a logistics capability...to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements". 10 U.S.C. 2464(a).

health of the total DOD industrial base is a key issue facing the country as funds are decreasing for both weapons production and maintenance. Implementing a rational DOD policy on core is an essential step for developing an effective strategy for allocating depot maintenance workload between the public and private sectors.

We believe core requirements should be defined by each service. However, we find no persuasive argument that the performance of the core workload should be performed in a service-specific depot. Prior DOD directives defining core requirements have clearly noted that core workload could be assigned to any DOD component.

Defining core on a DOD basis encourages the potential benefits of increased consolidations and interservicing within the DOD depot maintenance system. Interservicing involves transferring work on comparable systems to the depot of another service to take advantage of economies of scale and to avoid the cost of maintaining unnecessary duplicative capabilities. Since as far back as 1958, the Congress, GAO, and internal DOD studies have repeatedly pointed out that (1) the military services accomplish much less interservicing than they can and should and (2) this condition exists primarily because of service parochialism.[12] In June 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense called for increasing

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[12]This point was well chronicled in our testimony, "Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support a Downsized Military", (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993). House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness.

the amount of interservicing to at least 10 percent by 1995. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, DOD increased the amount of interservicing from about $300 to about $460 million, despite significant reductions in the services' depot maintenance programs. This represents 3.5 percent of the depot maintenance work in fiscal year 1990 and over 6 percent in fiscal year 1992.

As indicated by the following examples, current workload planning suggests that the amount of depot maintenance work interserviced will continue to rise over the next few years. The Army estimates that it will interservice about $25 million annually with the Air Force as a result of public-to-public competitions. Likewise, the Navy plans to interservice about $61 million with the Air Force for repairs of some of its F/A-18 aircraft. In addition, DOD plans to consolidate tactical missile maintenance at the Letterkenny Army Depot. In 1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Depot Consolidation Study noted that there are many more opportunities to reduce DOD maintenance costs through increased interservicing. That same year, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations encouraged additional interservicing, noting that interservicing should be taken into consideration during the 1995 BRAC process.[13]

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[13] H. Rept. 254, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1993) S. Rept. 153, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1993) (Reports accompanying H.R. 3116, Dept. of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994).

Allocating Non-Core Workload to the Private Sector

The task force also recommended that DOD allocate selected non-core workload to private sector companies to help preserve needed private sector industrial base capabilities. The intent of this recommendation appears to be to target workload (most likely for applying modifications and upgrades) to manufacturing companies that, because of their overhead and production-oriented facilities, are not likely to be competitive with public depots or with other private sector companies that concentrated on repair and overhaul. Once direct allocations are made, the remaining non-core workload would be competed within the private sector. The task force did recognize that by exception, some non-core workload will invariably fall to the public depots because the private sector will not or cannot compete. The task force may have been overly optimistic in its views that most of the remaining non-core workload can be competed in the private sector. In view of the amount of sole-source contracting used by the services in acquiring depot maintenance services and the difficulties likely to be faced in contracting for workload that includes many individual items in few quantities, with infrequent and uncertain repair requirements, we believe that the amount of workload that can be successfully competed may be far more limited.

We generally agree with the task force's position that, as an industrial base issue, DOD may want to help preserve critical

capabilities in the private sector with direct allocations of maintenance workload. In those situations where a policy decision is made that research and development and procurement dollars are insufficient to maintain a defense contractor that is essential to the industrial base, other sources of funding must be made available for that purpose. However, like public-private competition, increased use of the private sector for maintenance support is a controversial issue because, as the DOD industrial base is downsizing, both sectors are seeking work traditionally done by the other, and as operations and maintenance dollars are shrinking, operational commanders are looking for the least costly source of obtaining required maintenance services.

Advocates for increased private sector involvement argue that "critical" production skills must be maintained and that a shift toward the private sector would help sustain the production base during a period of much reduced weapons procurement. They also argue that the private sector can provide depot maintenance at lower costs than the public sector. In contrast, opponents to increased private sector involvement contend that the private sector already designs and manufactures the kits used in system modifications and upgrades. They note that contracting with the private sector for the application of modifications is not likely to add significantly to maintaining design and production capability in the private sector. They also believe that applying modifications and upgrades in public depots at the same time other

depot maintenance work is being performed reduces the amount of time weapon systems are out of service, eliminates duplicative tasks, and decreases overall costs.

We believe the marginal amount of funding that would be available to the private sector is likely to have little impact given the overall industry size. Consequently, increasing the amount of maintenance work available to the private sector is likely to have little significant impact on maintaining research and development and production capability in the private sector unless the funding is targeted. For fiscal year 1993, DOD spent about $15 billion for depot maintenance operations, including modifications and upgrades. Based on our projections, 50 percent of these dollars may already go to the private sector. In reality, in an industry where prime defense contractor awards in 1993 were $131 billion dollars,[14] it is not likely that contracting some portion of the remaining $15 billion would make a significant impact unless targeted via direct allocation rather than being competed.

The task force did not address the determination of how selected non-core work should be directed to the private sector and in what amounts. These could be very volatile issues and, given the limited amount of funding that is likely to be available for this purpose, it will be essential to specifically identify those

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[14]Department of Defense Prime Contract Awards By State, Fiscal Year 1993. DOD, DIOR/PO9-93/02(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), p.2.

industrial capabilities in the private sector where depot maintenance workloads should be directed to support overall industrial base needs. Like the public sector, further reductions in excess capacity for production in the private sector will be necessary. Therefore, if certain capabilities need to be preserved in the private sector, rational policies and procedures are needed that will identify what maintenance workload allocations should be directed to specific companies for industrial base considerations, without regard to whether or not the work could be done more cheaply by a public depot or another commercial company.

Additionally, we are concerned that a policy of turning over the remaining non-core work to the private sector could conflict with the long-standing policy of awarding work to the most cost-effective provider. The latter policy is endorsed in 10 U.S.C., section 2462, and by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 which, in principle, provide that DOD should rely upon the private sector for supplies and services whenever the private sector is less costly than the public sector. A recommendation to offer all non-core workload to the private sector without a determination that the work can be done more cheaply in the private sector appears to conflict with this approach. In our opinion, DOD should generally analyze the non-core workload to determine cost-effective buys. Public-private competition is not the only vehicle for this analysis. Other mechanisms are available such as OMB Circular A-76 cost comparisons and the decision-tree logic found in

DOD Directive 4151.1, "Use of Contractor and DOD Resources For Maintenance of Materiel".

ELIMINATION OF DEPOT MAINTENANCE COMPETITION BETWEEN SECTORS

The task force envisioned that, with sizing to core requirements, the need for public depots to compete for maintenance work would be eliminated. The task force recognized that certain situations could occur where public-private competition would be necessary. The task force report provided little insight regarding how much of DOD's non-core workload can realistically be contracted out more cheaply than it can be done in-house given considerations such as the extensive amount of excess capacity currently available in the public sector, the large amounts of workload whose requirements are sporadic and in very limited quantities, and the inability to compete much of the workload because of considerations such as proprietary data and older technologies.

The task force identified several concerns with continuing the competition program. For example, efficiencies achieved would not be as likely in the future because the costs of conducting competitions were high and the payoffs would be progressively smaller as workloads were recompeted. Furthermore, DOD has other mechanisms for controlling costs and improving productivity. The task force also questioned whether results of prior competitions were meaningful, DOD's ability to create a level playing field, and

the divisive nature of pitting the services against commercial sources or each other. The Air Force dissented with the majority position. It believes if the source of repair is determined by competition, depot maintenance costs will be lower.

We agree with some of the task force's concerns about DOD continuing its public-private and public-public competition programs. A competition program alone should not be used to eliminate inefficiencies in the depot maintenance infrastructure. A "winner-take-all" program may not promote a healthy industrial base, particularly where DOD has created a unique business environment with the influences of government procurement regulations and a single buyer market structure.

On the other hand, while we recognize that improvements are needed in the implementation of the public-private competition program, we do not believe there is sufficient evidence to support eliminating the program. Although competition for depot workload often has been controversial, it has contributed to controlling depot costs. A public-private competition program should not be burdened with artificial goals. We believe that public-private competition should remain as an option for DOD activities to use when selecting source of repairs.

OBSERVATIONS ON DOD'S DEPOT MAINTENANCE CLOSURES

Since 1988, three BRAC Commissions have recommended realignments and closures of DOD's public depots. Table 2 shows the depots recommended for closure and the dates established for closing.

Table 2: Maintenance Depots Recommended For Closure

BRAC Year	Service	Depot Maintenance Activity	Planned date of closure
88	Army	Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot	09/94
91	Army	Sacramento Army Depot	10/95
	Navy	Philadelphia Naval Shipyard	09/96
93	Navy	Charleston Naval Shipyard	04/96
	Navy	Mare Island Naval Shipyard	04/96
	Navy	Alameda Naval Aviation Depot	09/96
	Navy	Norfolk Naval Aviation Depot	09/96
	Navy	Pensacola Naval Aviation Depot	09/95
	Army	Tooele Army Depot	09/96
	Air Force	Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, Newark Air Force Base	09/96

The first depot scheduled to close is the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, in September 1994. The remaining nine depots are scheduled to close over the next 2-1/2 years. Although seven of these depots were identified by the most recent BRAC and are less than a year into the implementation process, our work indicates several emerging issues.

First, DOD has programs to assist employees affected by depot closures to obtain other employment. For instance, under DOD's priority placement program, employees at closing depots can register for positions within DOD and receive priority in filling certain vacant DOD jobs. DOD officials are optimistic that most employees will find jobs, but many may have to move if selected for vacant DOD positions. Employees choosing to remain in their local community may have difficulty obtaining employment with pay comparable to that in the depot.

Second, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,[15] subtitle A of title XXIX of 107 Stat. 1909, "Base Closure Community Assistance"--referred to as the Pryor Amendment, authorized conveyance of real and personal property at closing depots to local redevelopment authorities. Shipyard officials believe that conveying real and personal property to local redevelopment authorities may not be completed by planned depot closure dates. Also, they anticipate that the costs of preserving and maintaining equipment and facilities until turned over to the local community may be high. Some depot officials also are confused as to the definition of what constitutes personal property under the Pryor Amendment. DOD implementing guidance, published on April 6, 1994, may help resolve some of these concerns.

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[15]P.L. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993).

Third, DOD may incur unnecessary costs by moving maintenance support capability associated with the repair and maintenance of obsolete items from closing depots to other sources of repair. This possibility highlights the need for DOD's inventory managers to evaluate and update inventory records to identify items that are obsolete and no longer require maintenance support. Maintenance support for these obsolete items should be eliminated and not transferred.

Fourth, some depots may not be receiving sufficient funding to accomplish the closures as scheduled. Depot officials said they received less funding in fiscal year 1994 than they required to develop and implement closure plans. They also expressed concern that funds for related closure actions would not be available as needed.

Fifth, the Air Force plans to convert its Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center from government to private ownership through privatizing the workload in place. Emerging problems include whether (1) the Air Force can compete workload when manufacturer proprietary rights are involved, (2) contractors will be interested in performing the work at the Center, and (3) adequate funds will be available to transfer the activity to private ownership. Also, industry representatives have pointed out that retaining the workload at the same facility will not reduce excess depot capacity.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD faces many challenges in effectively managing its depot maintenance program. These involve a complex set of interactive issues that include both cost and industrial base considerations. Critical decisions must yet be made regarding the appropriate size of the DOD industrial base including how workload will be allocated between the public and private sectors, how to eliminate excess depot capacity, whether to have a DOD or service core, whether to retain public-private competition, and how to most effectively use interservicing to consolidate similar workloads and reduce redundancy in maintenance capability. There may be certain cases where, because of industrial base or readiness considerations, DOD may choose a particular maintenance workload allocation that results in certain cost inefficiencies. We believe this may be appropriate, but the cost of these policies should be known. We look forward to continuing to support your committee as it deliberates these critical issues. I am prepared to respond to your questions at this time.

(709071)

Document Separator

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 941003-4

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ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
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TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
✓	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
	Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

⇒ FORWARDING SUGGESTIONS FROM CONSTITUENT REGARDING RESERVE UNITS AND BASE CLOSURES.

Due Date: 10-17-94	Routing Date: 10-3-94	Date Received: 9-28-94	Mail Date:

HENRY J. HYDE
6TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE

2110 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1306
(202) 225-4561

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1306

September 15, 1994

Please refer to this number
when responding 941003-4

Mr. Jim Coulter, Chairman
Base Closure Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Coulter:

I am enclosing a letter I have received from my good friend and Cook County Commissioner, Carl Hansen. This is a follow up to my inquiry dated June 10, 1994.

The Commissioner has some interesting observations and ideas concerning Armed Forces Reserve Units and base closures. To date, neither he nor I have received a reply to our inquiry.

While I understand the constraints placed on the Base Closure Commission, Commissioner Hansen has made some worthy suggestions that should be considered.

Your assistance in this regard is greatly appreciated and I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Henry Hyde
Member of Congress

HJH/byc
Cc. Honorable Carl Hansen

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OFFICE OF THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY
118 NORTH CLARK STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602

August 18, 1993

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
2104 Rayburn House
Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Henry:

The wave of proposed military base closings and unit consolidations appears to have left a number of questions unanswered, especially with regard to the most cost- effective way of housing units and activities to be continued. To be closed are Fort Sheridan (in part), Glenview Naval Air Station and (possibly) the Air Force facilities at O'Hare. To be continued are numerous reserve units and training activities, many of which take on increased importance as a result of active duty unit reductions. Finally, there is a smaller number of active duty units which due to a continuing need will remain in the Chicago area.

Some of these units could, of course, be housed at the to be expanded Great Lakes Naval Training Station. The practicality of this approach may be limited because of the already planned expansion of facilities at this base due to the closing of San Diego and Orlando.

It is desirable that the Chicago area not lose the numerous reserve units presently stationed in our area. The presence of such units has the dual positive effect of affording reserve participation to our citizens and providing access for defense purposes to the Chicago pool of available and trained personnel.

An alternative approach to relocating, rebuilding facilities and the consequent expenditure of many millions of defense dollars may be found in the conversion of some of the bases targeted for closing into multi-service or Department of Defense facilities. Admiral Charles Emerson, a friend of mine, and I discussed this possibility recently. The scenario would be, for example, to take the Glenview Naval Air Station and make it a Department of Defense facility available to Naval air units, Marine air units, Air Force units and Army air units. Similarly, reserve ground units from the various services could also be housed here for training purposes. Actually, this would also be a good use for the cantonment area at Fort Sheridan, especially given the already planned occupancy of its military housing by the Navy.

This approach could at once provide housing in the Chicago area for many of the units which otherwise might be required to relocate. It would also significantly reduce the need for construction of additional facilities elsewhere. It would also reduce the traumatic effects of massive relocations of personnel on our several reserve programs. Finally, especially insofar as Fort Sheridan is concerned, it would keep active one of the two historical installations which never should have been on any base closure list in the first instance, the other being the Presidio of San Francisco.

I realize I am treading water in a very deep pool. Nevertheless, with budget constraints being what they are, and the need to maintain an effective reserve program being indispensable to the national interest, you may find that these thoughts merit some consideration.

Sincerely,

Carl

Carl R. Hansen
County Commissioner

CRH/m
cc: Congressman Robert H. Michel
Congressman Philip M. Crane
Admiral Charles Emerson

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 940615-2R1

December 30, 1994

Please refer to this number when responding 941003-4R1

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Henry:

This is in reponse to your letters to former Chairman Jim Courter regarding Commissioner Charles Hansen's letters to you. Henry, I apologize for the delay in responding.

As you may know, the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission allowed the Navy to keep certain family housing units at Glenview Naval Air Station. Should the Navy require additional units at Glenview NAS, the Secretary of Defense must submit a new recommendation to the 1995 Commission. As to the Air Force facilities at O'Hare, the Air Force would also be required to make an additional recommendation to the Commission in 1995. Should the Navy or Air Force make such recommendations, I will certainly keep Commissioner Hansen's comments in mind. If you or your staff have any further questions, please do not hesitate to give me or David Lyles, my Staff Director, or Charles Smith, my Special Assistant and Executive Director, a call.

Henry, congratulations on your new chairmanship and I look forward to seeing you in the new year.

Kindest personal regards.

Your friend,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

October 12, 1994

Mr. Carl R. Hansen
County Commissioner
118 North Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60602

Dear Commissioner Hansen:

Thank you for your letter to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with suggestions regarding housing of reserve units.

I understand and appreciate your interest in the implementation of Commission actions; however, it is not the role or function of the Commission to participate in the execution of closures and realignments. Therefore, I have referred your comments to the Base Closure and Reutilization Office at the Department of Defense.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure process and I hope you will contact us again if we can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

TOM HOUSTON
Staff Director

TFH:mw
ECTS#: 941003-4

cc: Rep. Henry Hyde

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