

JUL 29 2005



JULY 27, 2005

DAVE, Received

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO VISIT OUR GREAT STATE OF NEVADA. IT WAS GREAT TO MEET YOU. I HOPE THE TRIP WAS ENJOYABLE AND INFORMATIVE. PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL ME IF YOU NEED ANYTHING. TAKE CARE, STAY IN TOUCH.

ROBERT T. HERBERT, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR
UNITED STATES SENATOR HARRY REID
DEMOCRATIC LEADER

Bob



JUL 29 2005

JULY 27, 2005

JENNIFER,

Received

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO
VISIT OUR GREAT STATE OF NEVADA. IT
WAS GREAT TO SEE YOU AGAIN. I HOPE
THAT THE TRIP WAS ENJOYABLE AND INFORMATIVE.
I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DINNER/DRINKS IN
NOVEMBER. TAKE CARE, STAY IN TOUCH.

ROBERT T. HERBERT, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR
UNITED STATES SENATOR HARRY REID
DEMOCRATIC LEADER



Executive Correspondence
DCN 5842

BRAC Commission

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

JUL 29 2005

FRANK PALLONE, JR.
6TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
NEW JERSEY

Received

July 22, 2005

Dear Jim:

I hope this letter finds you well. I just wanted to send you a recent article posted on MSNBC regarding Fort Monmouth. This article encapsulates an argument against the closure of Fort Monmouth. Also attached is a short summary that clearly states the reasons that this closure is wrong. Thanks for all your help.

Sincerely,
Frank



Fighting the insurgency at the Jersey Shore

Fort Monmouth struggles to jam IEDs, track mortar rounds and stay alive

By Michael Moran
Senior correspondent
MSNBC

Updated: 10:25 a.m. ET July 18, 2005

FORT MONMOUTH, N.J. -

In an aging office park not far from the Ferris wheels and boardwalks of the New Jersey shore, the Army's fight against Iraq's insurgents and Afghanistan's Taliban is in high gear. Here, where among other things the aircraft altimeter was invented (1933), the first "walkie-talkie" was developed (1936), and where the Army trained courier pigeons until 1957, engineers and researchers are working on ways to counter two of the most deadly and effective weapons in the arsenal of America's enemies: mortar attacks and IEDs -- or "improvised explosive devices." Collectively, these two weapons have taken more than 500 American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past three years.

"A very significant portion of Army casualties comes from mortars and IEDs," says Larry Smith, deputy chief of staff for operations and planning at the base. "We have people working on things that save American lives, and we've been working full out ever since Sept. 12, 2001."

At the start of next month, Fort Monmouth will begin shipping to eager units in Southwest Asia the fruits of its research -- an important software update to a portable radar array its engineers developed several years ago.

The array is known as "Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar" and it was designed to provide protection for special operations forces routinely forced to set up camp behind enemy lines, where attack can come from any direction.

Deployed by U.S. Army Rangers for the first time in early 2004, it allows American troops to quickly identify the exact spot that a mortar round originated and, if all goes well, destroy the weapon before it can get off another round or move to a new position. In June, after just six months of seeing the LCMR in action, the Army named it one of the inventions of the year, and commanders have credited Fort Monmouth and the LCMR's contractor, Syracuse Research Corp., with saving dozens of lives.

Larry Bovino, the senior engineer who oversaw development of the radar, says the updating coming this month is much in demand: a software rewrite that will allow the very same radar system not only to direct "counter battery fire" but also to give off a warning signal before even the first round hits.

"Over the past year or so, with the LCMR in action in Iraq and Afghanistan, people came to us and said that the early warning piece would really be nice," he said. "The update will go out in a CD. It should be as easy as putting a new game on your computer."

'Not very sexy stuff'

Work like that done at Fort Monmouth and the two dozen other major military laboratories in the United States often gets obscured by the more compelling news from the front lines. "Sometimes, it's just not very sexy stuff," says Smith, who has risen to the upper levels of management at Fort Monmouth since arriving in 1976 as an intern. "But we also have a lot of sensitive stuff that can't be discussed freely for security reasons."

Among the more recent "home runs" hit by the Fort's various labs: new "Joint Network Node" radios that allow even small units to bounce vital communications off of satellites rather than relying on unreliable "line-of-sight" radio signals; the phraselator – a handheld device that "speaks" up to 30,000 pre-programmed phrases in dozens of languages, and "Blue Force Tracking" systems that are credited with reducing "fratricide" or friendly fire deaths to virtually zero, an amazing and underreported aspect of the war given the high friendly fire casualty rates of previous conflicts.

Right now, the Holy Grail is something called Crew 2 — a product of the Information Warfare unit at the fort that commanders hope will help prevent the Iraq insurgents and other groups from using cell phones to detonate IEDS.

Like the counter-mortar radar, Crew 2 is built on the back of an existing system — a countermeasures device known as Warlock which proved ineffective in the end because it could not block the frequency of a radio detonator unless it intercepted it, which is very difficult. Crew 2 is said to work differently, but just how is being kept very quiet.

"We don't talk much about Crew 2, and we certainly don't describe its capabilities in any specific way or even describe the device it counters," says Tim Rider, an Army spokesman. "There's a chess game going on between us and the insurgents, and we're not giving away our moves."

Race against time

What is public record, however, is a \$550 million contract awarded two weeks ago to Syracuse Research Corp., the same company that produces the counter-mortar radar, in early July. The five-year contract includes money for development, training, production and maintenance — a typical "full life-cycle" project that will be administered by Ft. Monmouth.

Meanwhile, other military labs run by the Navy and the Air Force are working on similar

devices, each racing against time as the insurgency adapts from cell phones to garage door openers to television remote controls to set off its mines.

Even as its scientists and engineers drill down on these problems, another challenge that could prove as disruptive as any IED has arisen: Fort Monmouth has been listed for on this year's Pentagon base closings list.

But Fort Monmouth is fighting an uphill battle against its own age, a uniformed military that wants to consolidate facilities to put more money into weapons, and parochial factions in Congress bent on taking jobs to their states. The current base closing template announced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in May would move much of Fort Monmouth's work to Virginia's Ft. Belvoir and the Aberdeen Proving Ground, a weapons testing depot in rural Maryland.

Smith, a professorial-looking man nearing the end of his long Army career, is not at liberty to discuss his views of the proposed move. He concedes, however, that a move like that would pose some challenges. "If the recommendations are implemented, we'll be expected to complete our mission and relocate at the same time. It will be challenging."

Besides extensive labs working on communications, radar, electronic countermeasures and information warfare, Fort Monmouth's offices contain hundreds of white-collar workers who manage large defense contracts. There is also a support center that operates 24 hours a day providing what amounts to customer service to soldiers all around the world who are having trouble with the Army's increasingly complex array of systems and software programs.

Indeed, except for the guard and signs at the front gate, the average person could probably drive through a facility like Fort Monmouth without ever realizing they were on a military base. Its 219 acres employs about 8,000 people – only 467 of them uniformed military. The vast majority of the fort consists of civilian federal government employees, some 5,085 people, who drive to work in skirts or shirts and ties, then drive back out again to homes in affluent Monmouth County, New Jersey.

"Often people come here and say, 'Where are all the soldiers'," Smith says. "We're definitely lopsided toward the civilian side. But we know what our troops need and we're here to provide it. That's our mission."

SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE FORT MONMOUTH

Overview

Fort Monmouth is the Army's major C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] installation. Fort Monmouth's work in C4ISR is critical both to the success of our current warfighting operations and our future transformational objectives. Considerable quick reaction capabilities have been provided and are being supported in the field today by Fort Monmouth employees and their supporting contractors. Fort Monmouth is central to Army and Joint C4ISR for Iraq, critical to resetting units going to or returning from Iraq, crucial to equipping the modular Divisions and Brigades with the latest C4ISR products, and essential to the future force by providing critical technologies.

The BRAC 2005 recommendation to close Fort Monmouth would result in significant short and long-term risks to C4ISR capabilities. Most importantly, it would result in the loss of a generation of crucial intellectual capital and would disrupt vital programs for many years. Additionally, it would achieve only minimal cost savings, at best. Based upon recently re-calculated/corrected data and using the BRAC-mandated "net present value" payback period formula, the payback period for re-locating Fort Monmouth is **33 years**. Furthermore, the payback period is extended to **44 years** when the costs of re-constituting and training the workforce are included.

The recommendation to close Fort Monmouth is deeply flawed in many respects and substantially deviates from the BRAC selection criteria by not considering: impact on current or future mission capabilities; impact on Joint warfighting and removing access to a nearby Joint Base; cost to relocate; manpower implications; inaccurate estimates of costs and annual savings; and the inability of the receiving base to support the mission.

Section 1 – Military Value

By law, military value is required to be the primary consideration for BRAC recommendations. The BRAC 2005 process minimized the extent to which Fort Monmouth's superior military value in C4ISR capabilities was considered. According to the DOD's own rankings, Fort Monmouth was:

- First in Information Systems Technology – Research
- First in Information Systems Technology – Development and Acquisition
- First in Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare – Development and Acquisition
- Third in Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare – Research

Yet, the proposed recommendation would seriously diminish military value by moving these Fort Monmouth functions to an installation rated lower in each category, incurring a devastating loss of intellectual capital in the process. This move is totally inconsistent with the intent of the BRAC process.

Section 2 – Intellectual Capital

The core military value of a Research, Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation [RDAT&E] installation is its workforce. Moving the Fort Monmouth RDAT&E functions would mean the loss of most of these technical experts. During the 1995 BRAC process, studies found that, on average, fewer than 20% of scientists and engineers moved to follow missions. In a directly analogous move, when the Army re-located the Electronic Technology and Devices Laboratory from Fort Monmouth to Adelphi, MD, in conjunction with a prior BRAC action, 350 positions were identified for re-location; of those, only 36 employees chose to move. An independent Harris survey found that implementation of the Fort Monmouth recommendation would result in similar losses of more than 80% of the workforce. Most would choose to retire and/or seek jobs elsewhere in the Federal Government or in New Jersey's technology corridor.

The R&D portion of Fort Monmouth features 2,055 highly skilled scientists and engineers (S&Es) doing C4ISR work. In addition, about 20% of the more than 2,500 individuals involved in the acquisition and

support of fielded C4ISR systems are also scientists and engineers. The remainder of the workforce is well-educated, acquisition certified, and experienced in C4ISR. All told, the Fort Monmouth workforce is highly trained and experienced. Their average age is 48, with 18 years of experience. All have security clearances and more than 82 % have advanced degrees. They are deeply involved in critical C4ISR programs and represent the institutional expertise of the Army, providing technical expertise for both the current and future force and are the technical foundation for the PEO and PM programs.

The proposed re-location would essentially destroy the Army's premier C4ISR organization. In the best case, it will require at least 10 years to reconstitute that level of capability and expertise.

- Recruiting, screening, and hiring even a small number of these scientists and engineers would take at least two years (a conservative estimate). Bringing the complement of 2055 back to full strength would take many more than ten years.
- Highest security clearances take an average of 12-18 months per DoD figures.
- The average C4ISR expert requires 2-3 years of initial formal training.
- An additional 4-6 years of continued learning is needed before scientists and engineers have systems level expertise in Defense-specific domains, such as information warfare.
- Over the course of a career, it takes roughly 10-15 years for an engineer/scientist to progress to a mid-level manager and 20 years to progress to senior manager. In the interim, existing and planning programs would suffer as new employees gain C4ISR experience.
- Many Fort Monmouth employees are also certified acquisition officials. Certification requires formal education, training and experience according to formal DOD standards.

This loss of human capital would not only diminish RDAT&E capacity and productivity during a time of war, but also disrupt, perhaps irreparably, major Army C4ISR programs.

Section 3 – Program Disruption

Fort Monmouth scientists and engineers provide more than half of the advanced technology necessary to make the Future Combat Systems (FCS) a reality. Fort Monmouth provides 19 critical C4ISR technologies for FCS. FCS is built on net-centricity; net-centricity is wholly achieved through C4ISR; without C4ISR there is no FCS.

Over the five year defense program cycle, Fort Monmouth has \$35B worth of programs under development. Some of these programs include:

- Distributed Common Ground System—the Army's system to integrate multiple ground processing systems into one integrated program. It is the major program for intelligence transformation and will provide the architecture for all future intelligence processing.
- Warfighter Information Network—Tactical, which is the single integration Future Force communications network.

Such programs, along with FCS and other major programs, are facing important developmental milestones during the BRAC implementation period. These programs would be delayed significantly by the loss of highly skilled senior scientists and engineers with crucial expertise and security clearances. This impact was never considered in the military value and cost analyses relating to this recommendation.

Section 4 – Analysis of RDA and T&E Integration

The concept of an integrated Land Warfare C4ISR Center of Excellence is used to justify this recommendation. In fact, this Center of Excellence already exists at Fort Monmouth, which is the home of Army C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition. This would be very difficult to re-create at the proposed receiver site, Aberdeen Proving Ground, which has less than one hundred personnel working on any C4ISR function. Their presence certainly does not justify relocating thousands of Fort Monmouth Government and contractor professionals.

The Army has attempted to justify this massive move by describing the potential use of test and evaluation capabilities at Aberdeen. Initially, the Technical Joint Cross Service Group never considered the integration of Army C4ISR RDA with T&E; this was added at the last minute by the Army in order to

make the recommendation appear to have a logical basis. [TJCSG only considered integration with T&E for “platforms.”] DOD IS 42

In fact, formal testing of C4ISR systems occurs all over the country, with much of that testing occurring at the Electronic Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona (the designated site for all C4I testing). These ranges are *never* going to be replicated at Aberdeen for financial, military personnel and feasibility reasons. Further, while formal T&E is not and never will be conducted in C4ISR at Aberdeen, informal testing in the form of demonstrations, concept feasibility, and experimentation (especially the Joint versions of these) are currently conducted at Fort Monmouth facilities on the Dix-Lakehurst- McGuire Joint Base just 23 miles from Fort Monmouth. Such capabilities with instrumented ranges, appropriate airspace, and access to troops and their equipment do not exist at Aberdeen.

Section 5 – Cost Credibility

DoD failed to consider a variety of financial and programmatic costs associated with the Fort Monmouth recommendation. First, DoD failed to include accurate costs for military construction related to the Fort Monmouth recommendation. No study has determined whether Aberdeen would be suitable to sustain the many facilities that would have to be replicated. Our extensive detailed analysis shows that re-creating Fort Monmouth’s highly specialized laboratories, testing facilities, and workspace would require massive investment in MILCON and other accounts that adds up to *\$1B more* than DoD’s estimates. DoD also overstated the extent of recurring savings from the recommendation by \$69M. As a result, even if the costs of reconstituting and training the workforce and the program disruption costs are not included, **the return on investment period would actually be 33 years.**

Second, DoD failed to consider programmatic costs. Critical C4ISR programs currently underway will experience disruption as described in Section 3. Critical, multi-million dollar Army and Joint programs with major milestones to be completed in the 6-10 year range (i.e., after implementation of the BRAC recommendations but before reconstitution of the scientific and engineering workforce) will be delayed, resulting in programmatic and productivity costs and the inability to provide critical, life-saving capabilities to warfighters.

Finally as outlined in Section 2, the DoD assumption that 75% of the skilled and experienced for Monmouth workforce will move is false. In fact, the opposite will be the case: less than 20% will transfer. In addition to disruption costs, the tangible costs of workforce reconstitution are recruiting and training new employees. Drawing on the considerable body of knowledge available on employee turnover costs, i.e., detailed case studies and models, costs can be estimated for recruitment using a percentage of annual salary and for training (considered as), non-productive time as a percentage of annual salary. The steps of that process, briefly described are:

- a. Parse the workforce by skill category and level.
- b. Select reasonable high and low bounds for recruiting & training time percentages.
- c. Select representative burdened salaries.
- d. Apply the percentages to burdened salaries by the parsed workforce skill and level sets.

The recruiting percentages ranged from 150 to 30 percent and training from three months/yr for three years (75%) to one month/yr for three years (8%). The resulting cost bounds were \$400M and \$200M. **A conservative estimate of these costs (e.g., by applying the midpoint of the cost range in the COBRA model) increase the 33 year payback period to 44 years.**

Section 6 – Jointness

The Fort Monmouth recommendation would result in the loss of current and future jointness opportunities. First, a substantial investment has already been made to create a networked capability at Fort Monmouth with high bandwidth. This infrastructure supports current and future joint activities, including those connecting Army Battlelabs, the other Services, the Joint Forces Command, the Boeing FCS facility, and other facilities. The opportunities resulting from this capability were never considered.

In addition, Fort Monmouth is located near the Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire (DLM) Joint Base ~~DCN 5842~~ mentioned in Section 4, this new joint base has outstanding facilities relevant to Fort Monmouth missions that have been and are currently being used by Fort Monmouth elements *every day*, and which offer additional jointness possibilities in the area of DoD C4ISR. A move to Aberdeen will sever this relationship. DOD did not consider the current and historic connection to the Joint Base.

Section 7 – Maneuver and Airspace

The BRAC recommendation failed to consider area maneuver and airspace, especially that which is located at the DLM Joint Base. This location represents the only place in the country with three contiguous bases from the three Services. Fort Dix has 31,065 acres of land, including 13,765 acres of range and impact areas and 14,000 acres of contiguous maneuver area. Much of this land is already instrumented for C4ISR events. Lakehurst has an unrestricted airfield capable of 24/7 operations with VFR/IFR capabilities. It is designed for fixed wing, rotary wing, lighter than air and UAV operations. McGuire AFB adds additional airfield capabilities. Within 45 miles of DLM is a military operating area (W-107) which allows for air operations through supersonic speeds and naval operations.

Section 8 – Other Concerns

Several other factors were not considered in the BRAC process. The most important of these is the crucial role of Fort Monmouth in developing and supporting technologies for homeland defense and homeland security. Fort Monmouth is actively involved in working with several agencies with responsibilities for the most populous area of the country – an area that has been the target of multiple domestic terrorism attacks. To take one example, Fort Monmouth was designated to provide Continuity of Operations facilities for FEMA Region II, a mission which has been activated numerous times. Other projects include the Port Authority of NY/NJ, the New York City Department of Transportation, and the State of New Jersey. The DOD also did not fully consider the cost to the nation to disrupt other agency tenant missions on Fort Monmouth, such as the new VA Health Services Center and the FBI, as required by Section 2913(e) of the BRAC statute.

Conclusion

The recommendation to close Fort Monmouth substantially deviates from the BRAC selection criteria by not considering impact on current or future mission capabilities; impact on Joint warfighting and removing access to a nearby Joint Base; cost to relocate; manpower implications; inaccurate estimates of costs and annual savings; and the inability of the receiving base to support the mission. Moving Fort Monmouth's C4ISR mission to Aberdeen Proving Ground would lead to severe loss of critical intellectual capital; disrupt major programs in the short and long-terms; and pose unacceptable risk to capabilities that are critical to the warfighter, Joint C4ISR, and the future transformation of the Armed Forces. This risk is justified by neither cost analysis nor improved functionality, as current jointness would be destroyed. .

A More Strategic Approach

- 1) Maintain and enhance C4ISR capacity by keeping the workforce at Fort Monmouth.
 - a. Highly expert workforce is not disrupted, keeping current operations in tact and preventing disruption of longer-term programs and research.
 - b. Permit non-DoD activities present on the installation (e.g., the VA, FEMA, FBI, etc.) to continue operating with little or no impact.
- 2) Formally make Fort Monmouth a sub-installation (“enclave”) of the Joint Base at Lakehurst-Dix-McGuire.
 - a. Institutionizes opportunity for greater joint participation in Joint C4ISR programs.
 - b. Permits establishment of a Joint C4ISR Command.
 - c. All responsibility for garrison management and operation is transferred to the Joint Base Headquarters, which will review Fort Monmouth for excess land.
 - d. The “down-sized” Monmouth installation has a greatly diminished need for base operations support, and can shed duplicative infrastructure.
- 3) Cede excess portions of the installation from Federal jurisdiction, realizing considerable savings.