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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0524

July 27, 2005

Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi and BRAC Commissioners:

As a follow up to the Regional Hearing held in Los Angeles on July 14, 2005, I am submitting the enclosed paper to be included as part of the official record.

Retired Admiral George Strohsahl authored this white paper. He has a tremendous amount of insight because he was heavily involved in the consolidation of Point Mugu and China Lake in the early 1990's as its commanding officer.

The paper serves as an historical account of the synergy and cost savings that was put in place over ten years ago and points out that there is much to be gained in the collaboration that could, should and does currently exist between China Lake and Naval Base Ventura County.

Thank you for your consideration of this information as you continue your deliberations.

Sincerely,



ELTON GALLEGLY
Member of Congress

Enclosure

COMMITTEES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
• CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
• EUROPE
JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEES:
• IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS
• COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RESOURCES
SUBCOMMITTEE:
• NATIONAL PARKS, RECREATION, AND PUBLIC
LANDS
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
• TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
• INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
• TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

BRAC Commission

JUL 29 2005

Received

A Workable Alternative

How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Background

The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) stood up as a command within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) claimancy on 1 January 1992. Its planning and legal basis stem from the Navy preparation for BRAC 91 and the subsequent BRAC implementation established by law. While initially encompassing several separate and independent NAVAIR field activities and the prior Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, then a field activity of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), it quickly evolved to a two-site technical organization at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. At the time of its formation, two other centers under NAVAIR were created, the NAWC Aircraft Division headquartered at Patuxent River, MD, and the Training Systems Division at Orlando, FL. A headquarters for the three centers was established as the NAWC in Washington, D.C. under NAVAIR. At the same time as the NAWC and its divisions were formed, companion centers were created in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and in SPAWAR.

The Intent

When planning started for BRAC 91, the leadership in the Navy was intent on consolidating the vast systems commands' RDT&E field activities into a much leaner structure. This was to be accomplished through realignments and closures affecting most of the field activities within the three systems commands organizations. NAVAIR leadership had had much earlier visions of a field activity structure with a flag officer in charge on each coast. The focus on the east coast would be airplanes and on the west coast, weapons, although the complexity of activity across all the supporting field structure was far greater than just those two commodities. Where activities were to continue to exist, the command function would vest in the NAWC division commander (a flag officer) and the supporting base function would be a subordinate command.

One very important aspect of this consolidation was the elimination of independent competing technical commands and functions around the country. Because weapons RDT&E functions were performed both at China Lake (more heavily R&D) and Pt. Mugu (more heavily T&E), a primary NAWCWD consolidation goal was to eliminate areas of overlap between the main sites. The new NAWCWD command structure significantly reduced middle management positions and located technical leadership at the site where it made the most sense. For example, Range, Targets, Test Wing, Logistics, Avionics and T&E Engineering leadership was located at Pt. Mugu, while System Engineering and Weapons leadership was located at China Lake. NAWCWD also adopted common systems for major supporting functions (e.g., financial, personnel,

information technology) depending on which site was judged most efficient. These consolidation efficiencies commenced in 1992 and were favorably noted during BRAC 95 site visits.

What followed in NAWCWD was a single command, headquartered first at Pt. Mugu and later at China Lake, commanding all the technical work at both places as an integrated organization, with subordinate Naval Air Weapons Station commands at each location to run the support functions of the bases themselves. Incredibly, there were really only two reasons for even identifying the two NAWCWD sites as separate entities. One involved the US Postal Service and the need to correctly address mail. The other had to do with detailed personnel management within the Department of the Navy and the need to have separate Unit Identification Codes (UIC) at each site.

NAVSEA used a different construct for their consolidated field activities and allowed each of the remaining activities renamed as Divisions, after closures occurred, to continue to exist as separate technical commands, coordinated in their work by a Washington, D.C. based Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) headquarters staff. NSWC Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) remains as one of those technical commands. The NSWC recently adopted a form of competency alignment under Product Area Directors and has significantly reduced redundancy and competition between the separately commanded Surface Warfare Center Divisions.

The Management Imperative

First within the NAWC, then quickly followed by all of NAVAIR, a Competency Aligned Organization (CAO) management paradigm was adopted. This structure of management aligns people by technical function or specialty to provide support for programs without regard to physical location. NAVAIR in many ways ceased being a headquarters organization, which it had to do because of very aggressive mandated downsizing, and adopted a process by which leadership at all management levels was placed where the "center of gravity" for specific functions really existed. In the case of Ranges, Target Systems, Weapons, Electronic Warfare and other technical areas, that meant that the NAWCWD was in charge of those areas for all of NAVAIR. Within NAWCWD, the technical leadership for Weapons R&D is clearly at China Lake with T&E work also being accomplished in that competency at Pt. Mugu and Patuxent River. Technical leadership for Open Air Ranges, of which there are four within NAVAIR, Targets (used at all the ranges), and Electronic Warfare reside at Pt. Mugu. Since, in terms of total workload and people employed, China Lake has always been the larger element of NAWCWD, it was decided that the headquarters (flag pole) for NAWCWD would remain at China Lake, instead of alternating between the two sites, as had been the original concept. However, it is extremely important to understand that the residence of the flag officer and his immediate staff does not create an organization centered at China Lake with a detachment at Pt. Mugu. The commander of NAWCWD maintains offices at Pt. Mugu. He and his staff spend a considerable amount of time there, as they are the only technical command function at both locations.

In contribution to the support of programs, both sites work together in a fully integrated manner and are literally an inseparable team. At every level, management has been flattened and the work fully distributed to the people best suited to perform it. In the flat management chain, it is very common to find workers at one site reporting to a manager at the other site. Modern electronic communications technology, including dedicated fiber optic and microwave links and a network of video teleconference nodes, combined with a regularly scheduled aircraft shuttle service, have been employed to tightly link technical work. For example some electronic warfare and weapons laboratories are connected by fiber optics and literally function as one across the two sites. The NAWC WD infrastructure is transformational in that it adopted these methods more than 10 years ago and has since refined them to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.

In 1998, as part of the Navy's shore establishment regionalization initiative, the Air Station at Pt. Mugu was moved from NAVAIR control to the fleet. Additionally, in 2000, the Naval Air Station at Pt. Mugu was merged with the Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme to create Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). The effect at NBVC was to eliminate duplicate base command and support functions at the two proximate bases. That consolidation effort continues to this day. It is important to note that NAWCWD Pt. Mugu and NSWC PHD exist today as technical tenant activities on NBVC. There are dozens of other tenant activities on NBVC. However, the only ones subject to BRAC 2005 realignment are NAWCWD and NSWC PHD.

The Proposed Technical Mega-Centers at China Lake in BRAC 2005

The proposed Weapons and Armament Center and the Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Center at China Lake will probably never exist in the final management structure, even if all the BRAC realignments are put into law. In keeping with the CAO management paradigm of NAVAIR those positions would be aligned into existing, or perhaps some new competencies within the overall NAVAIR structure. In a world of industrial funding for program work, management can ill afford to add additional management layers to accommodate BRAC realignment rationale. The resulting management structure will continue to employ people at multiple sites that do not close. In the case of the Pt. Mugu realignment, from a management perspective, literally nothing will be changed except the positions will physically relocate to China Lake under a new mailing address and UIC. Unfortunately, most of the technical experts in their specialties from NBVC will not move and fill those positions. The loss of intellectual capital will be devastating for several years. If the positions are not relocated, they will continue to support programs, through the CAO, and under the technical command of the same flag officer, as they are today joined "at the hip" with their counterparts at China Lake

In the case of the realignment of functions from NSWC PHD, there is a case for consolidating a small part of that work under different systems commands. The weapons management functions at PHD, which are not inextricable to their essential shipboard weapons system integration work, probably could be more efficiently managed within NAWCWD. However the people literally do not have to move to make that happen.

They can realign in place and remain at Port Hueneme as part of the NAWCWD on NBVC, or if NAWC management prefers, move over to the Pt. Mugu side of the base. There are a handful of C4ISR functions at NSWC PHD which more properly align under SPAWAR and should realign and relocate to Pt. Loma.

An Alternative Philosophical Rationale

Given the data provided by the Ventura County BRAC Task Force, it is obvious that the proposed NBVC realignment will trigger a large and painful loss of intellectual capital, perhaps in excess of 80%, will incur costs that are not reasonably recoverable, and have a serious impact on the program customers as well as the effectiveness of our war fighters. Yet the concept of establishing consolidated Weapons and Armament and Sensors, EW, and Electronics centers, if in name only, under one systems command has merit. Therefore the BRAC Commission need only honor the simple fact that the two-site NAWCWD exists as a totally integrated single technical command established by BRAC 91 and that those proposed centers really are to be established at NAWCWD, the command, not the singular location of China Lake. By so doing, (1) the realignment of all functions out of Pt. Mugu would be cancelled, (2) only the appropriate weapons functions at NSWC PHD would be realigned, in place, to NAWCWD and (3) a handful of C4ISR positions would actually move to Pt. Loma. The proposals for other bases to realign functions to the consolidated Weapons and Armament center would be judged on their individual merits under the BRAC process. If they were to be realigned, in keeping with this rationale, the gaining organization would be NAWCWD, and the most relevant site for the relocation would be selected based on the nature of the functions to be realigned.

Following this alternative recommendation would comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

A Workable Alternative

How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

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Given the data provided by the Ventura County BRAC Task Force, it is obvious that the proposed NBVC realignment will trigger a large and painful loss of intellectual capital, perhaps in excess of 80%, will incur costs that are not reasonably recoverable, and have a serious impact on the program customers as well as the effectiveness of our war fighters. Yet the concept of establishing consolidated Weapons and Armament and Sensors, EW, and Electronics centers, if in name only, under one systems command has merit. Therefore the BRAC Commission need only honor the simple fact that the two-site NAWCWD exists as a totally integrated single technical command established by BRAC 91 and that those proposed centers really are to be established at NAWCWD, the command, not the singular location of China Lake. By so doing, (1) the realignment of all functions out of Pt. Mugu would be cancelled, (2) only the appropriate weapons functions at NSWC PHD would be realigned, in place, to NAWCWD and (3) a handful of C4ISR positions would actually move to Pt. Loma. The proposals for other bases to realign functions to the consolidated Weapons and Armament center would be judged on their individual merits under the BRAC process. If they were to be realigned, in keeping with this rationale, the gaining organization would be NAWCWD, and the most relevant site for the relocation would be selected based on the nature of the functions to be realigned.

Following this alternative recommendation would comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

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How to use the existing construct of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division to comply with DoD's strategy of establishing centers of technical excellence, while significantly increasing military value, decreasing the cost of realignment and reducing the loss of intellectual capital.

Background

The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) stood up as a command within the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) claimancy on 1 January 1992. Its planning and legal basis stem from the Navy preparation for BRAC 91 and the subsequent BRAC implementation established by law. While initially encompassing several separate and independent NAVAIR field activities and the prior Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, then a field activity of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), it quickly evolved to a two-site technical organization at China Lake and Pt. Mugu. At the time of its formation, two other centers under NAVAIR were created, the NAWC Aircraft Division headquartered at Patuxent River, MD, and the Training Systems Division at Orlando, FL. A headquarters for the three centers was established as the NAWC in Washington, D.C. under NAVAIR. At the same time as the NAWC and its divisions were formed, companion centers were created in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and in SPAWAR.

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One very important aspect of this consolidation was the elimination of independent competing technical commands and functions around the country. Because weapons RDT&E functions were performed both at China Lake (more heavily R&D) and Pt. Mugu (more heavily T&E), a primary NAWCWD consolidation goal was to eliminate areas of overlap between the main sites. The new NAWCWD command structure significantly reduced middle management positions and located technical leadership at the site where it made the most sense. For example, Range, Targets, Test Wing, Logistics, Avionics and T&E Engineering leadership was located at Pt. Mugu, while System Engineering and Weapons leadership was located at China Lake. NAWCWD also adopted common systems for major supporting functions (e.g., financial, personnel,

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