


Basing of Navy Surface Ships Post BRAC '05



Naval Air Station Corpus Christi Joint Service and Federal Complex

Joint Aviation Training
Navy – Marine – Air Force – Coast Guard



JPATS Trainer Due In
South Texas by Mid-00s

Corpus Christi Army Depot Facility Profile

Multi-Service ♦ Multi-National



- Designated as the Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for rotary wing aircraft (8-21-01)
- CCAD is a "Purple" depot serving Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines & allied nations rotary wing aircraft, engines and components
- Full service includes overhaul, retrofit, modernization, and hands-on training for military personnel
- Depot teams dispatched worldwide for on-site maintenance, crash damage analysis and support
- 2.2 million square feet of industrial space
- Ideal weather for aircraft testing
- Has overhauled 14,000 aircraft since 1961




NAS Kingsville Facility Profile



- More than **18,000** square miles of unencumbered South Texas airspace controlled by the Navy (twice the size of Maryland)
- Surrounded by more than **3 million** acres of ranch land under Military Operations Areas (MOAs)
- **Six 8,000-foot** runways (2 at Orange Grove OLF)
- **McMullen Target Ranges** with two separate targets: Yankee (day) and Dixie (day/night)
- **T-45 Integrated Training System** in place
- **Ample ramp & maintenance facilities** to support T-45
- **Outstanding weather** with **25% fewer "down"** days than other Navy strike base
- **Well situated** to support Border Patrol operations in South Texas region
- **City committed** to protecting airfield and AICUZ from encroachment

Mines: Joint Warfighting Access Threat

Since 1950 mines damaged more U.S. Navy ships than all other enemy actions combined (14 by mines, 5 by other). Mines are a formidable, low-cost, low-tech threat.



USS PRINCETON
(Gulf War)

14

- USS PRINCETON CG-59
- USS TRIPOLI LPH-10
- USS S.B. ROBERTS FFG-58
- USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY LST-1167
- USS BARTON DD-772
- USS MANSFIELD DD-728
- USS WALKE DD-723
- USS E.G. SMALL DDR-838
- USS BRUSH DD-745
- USS SARSI ATF-111
- USS PARTRIDGE AMS-31
- USS PLEDGE AM-277
- USS PIRATE AM-275
- USS MAGPIE AMS-25



USS TRIPOLI
(Gulf War)

1

1

1

2

USS COLE DDG-67

USS STARK FFG-31

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5

USS HIGBEE DD-806

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5

TERRORISTS


MISSILE

TORPEDO

AERIAL ATTACK

MINES


USS Samuel B. Roberts: Mine Impact - April 14, 1988



67 Injured Personnel
\$30 Million Damage
22-Foot Hole Port Side
2000 Tons of Water Onboard

Threats to Today's Fleet

- 36 Countries Produce Mines
 - 26 of these export mines
- 58 Countries Use/Have Mines in Inventory
 - 34 Countries Buy Mines
- More than 400 Recognized Mine Designators
- Over 350,000 Threat Mines Worldwide



Moored Contact

- Inexpensive
- Relatively Simple

Bottom Influence

- Tough MCM Problem




Moored Influence


- Advantages of both
- More complex to build / operate

Special

- Rocket Propelled
- Mobile
- VSW



What's Wrong With BRAC Recommendations? They Separate Key Mine Warfare Assets



What's Wrong With BRAC Recommendations?

Ends Key Warfighting Advantage of An Integrated Mine Warfare Center of Excellence




Gen. Michael W. Hagee
33rd Commandant of
the Marine Corps


The key question about our mine warfare capability was put to Admiral Ryan in July 2003 by General Hagee while touring the South Texas military complex:

Hagee: "How were the mines cleared going into Um Qasr in a week? When we were briefed on the war plan we were told that it could take as much as a month."

Ryan: "If we had done it the old way, it probably would have taken a month. Because of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at NSI, with surface, aviation and EOD assets training together, we were able to get it done in a week."



Rear Admiral Paul J. Ryan
Commander
Mine Warfare Command



Navy Plan Ignores the Lessons of History That Launched the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence

- ◆ **Disestablishing the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence as a stand-alone entity will profoundly impair mine warfare training and readiness.**
- ◆ **“Consolidating” Mine Warfare Command with the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Command in Point Loma, California marginalizes both missions.**
 - **Fleet ASW Command, established in April 2004, has been struggling to carry out its training and readiness mission and establish its own identity.**
 - **Anti-Submarine Warfare and Mine Warfare have very little in common with respect to equipment, tactics, techniques, procedures, operations and training. This forced merger will hinder, rather than help, each of the separate missions.**



Selection Criteria Does Not "Value" Small Bases or Specialized Missions


BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA - P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

- ◆ The selection criteria for determining military value was applied unfairly and inaccurately to Naval Station Ingleside.
- ◆ Recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 1.



Navy Military Value Criteria Biased Against Small or Special Purpose Bases

- ◆ **SEA-3: NSI can berth a carrier but not provide power for cold iron startup without modification**
 - No credit although power could be provided
- ◆ **SEA-4 changed from “relative condition of the piers” to “combined total linear feet in 3 categories.”**
 - Biased against small bases and reinforces SEA-1, CG equivalents. All NSI piers were built since 1990
- ◆ **SEA-9: Distance to nearest nuclear capable shipyard**
 - Not required for minesweepers
- ◆ **SEA-10 and SEA-11: No credit given for Electromagnetic Roll Facility, the NSI equivalent of degaussing/deperming facility**
- ◆ **SEA-13: Does the activity have nuclear weapons security, nuclear weapons handling, nuclear weapons and radiological accident response**
 - Capability could be provided.
- ◆ **SEA-21, 27, 29: Distance to nearest submarine training facility, submarine operating area, submarine training range**
 - Capability could be developed in the Gulf.
- ◆ **SEA-35: Distance to nearest weapons station**
 - Minesweepers’ ordnance can be handled locally



NSI is Very Good at What It Does

Navy Plan Puts Too Much Reliance on Unproven Mine Warfare Systems

BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA - P. Law 108-375:

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3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

- ◆ **The recommendation to close Ingleside, break up the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, and shift mine warfare assets to fleet concentration areas, represents too heavy a reliance on unproven mine warfare systems.**
- ◆ **This amounts to undue risk to the operational readiness of the total force.**
- ◆ **Recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 1.**

There is Too Much Risk in the Navy Plan

BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA - P. Law 108-375:

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Military Value


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3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

◆ **Conclusion:**

- **The recommendation to close Ingleside, break up the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, and shift mine warfare assets to fleet concentration areas, represents too heavy a reliance on unproven mine warfare systems.**
- **This amounts to undue risk to the operational readiness of the total force.**

- ◆ **Recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 1.**

Irreplaceable Asset: Established Mine Warfare Training Ranges in Texas Owned Waters 9 Miles (3 Leagues) Into Gulf




Recommendation Results in the Loss of Dedicated Mine Warfare Training Areas


- ◆ There are no dedicated MCM or AMCM training ranges in Norfolk or San Diego with permanently installed mine shapes.
- ◆ Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, has mine test and evaluation areas. Areas will be of no use to MCM ships if Naval Station Ingleside is closed and the ships are moved to San Diego.
- ◆ The expansion of these training areas, placement of permanent mine shapes and exercise mines, and utilization of explosive mine neutralization charges will require the submission of detailed and time consuming environmental impact statements.
- ◆ East Coast Shallow Water Test Range is 8 years into the EIS process.

- ◆ **Conclusion:**
 - Dedicated training areas are essential for effective joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
 - Recommendation results in the loss of dedicated mine warfare training areas and the movement of mine warfare assets to areas where replacement ranges are not available within the implementation period.
- ◆ Recommendation thus deviates substantially from Criterion 2.

Strategic Importance: Ingleside Provides Homeland Defense For Southern Coast



Naval Assets & Strategic Targets Post BRAC '05



June 2005 "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support" calls for a "layered maritime defense" and protection of the geographic approaches to the U.S.


No Credit for Expansion Potential to Support Surge and Future Force Requirements

BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA - P. Law 108-375:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

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3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.



- ◆ Inadequate scoring of Naval Station Ingleside for its ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements to support operations and training.
- ◆ Recommendation thus substantially deviates from Criterion 3.

NSI's Ability to Support Other Missions Not Considered



BRAC FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA - P. Law 108-375:


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Military Value


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3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

- ◆ DoD scoring failed to consider contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.
- ◆ No consideration to homeport ships affected by potential BRAC of Pascagoula.
- ◆ The recommendation represents a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Army Reserve Storage Facility Not Considered



Failure to Consider Layberthing of Military Sealift Command Ships



•NSI Meets All the Technical Requirements Set By the MSC for basing of any class of MSC ship:

- ✓ Pier
- ✓ Water depth
- ✓ Port characteristics

MSC currently pays to layberth ships at civilian docks



- ◆ Conclusion: DoD failed to consider contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.
- ◆ The recommendation is a substantial deviation from Criterion 3.

Navy Data Errors

- ◆ Pre-BRAC savings for MHC decommissioning was limited to ship crew only
 - No calculation given for reduction in maintenance requirement or base operations
 - Initial Navy response: 50% ship reduction = 0% manpower reduction
 - 22 June Navy response: 50% ship reduction = ~3.5% manpower reduction (48 billets)
 - Navy has agreed the data is inconsistent and needs further analysis including re-run of COBRA
- ◆ 1 July 05 GAO report states Navy has already taken MPN savings for 21k personnel reduction over the FYDP (pg 104)
 - Actual recurring savings from NSI BRAC < \$27 million/yr versus DOD's \$75.63 million/yr estimate

- ◆ Conclusion:
 - Errors in COBRA data overestimate recurring savings.
 - GAO questions Navy MPN savings.
- ◆ The recommendation results in substantial deviation from Criterion 4.

7,000 tankers offload in Texas annually. Closing NSI saves less than the value of one load of oil!

Potential LCS Support



- ◆ **Ideal training site for Mine Warfare mission modules**
 - Centrally located for LCS ships and crews from both coasts
 - Rights to local sea and air MCM training ranges granted by State of Texas (and NOT considered in BRAC analysis)
 - Mine Warfare Training Center exists and can be expanded for LCS
 - New COMINEWARCOM headquarters under construction
- ◆ **Ideal MCM mission module storage and refurbishment site**
 - Large laydown areas
 - Convenient truck, rail and air access (NAS Corpus Christi or Corpus Christi International Airport)
 - Regional Support Group Ingleside available for refurbishment work
- ◆ **High speed LCS reduces transit time to/from other fleet operating areas**
- ◆ **Co-locating mine warfare mission modules with the dedicated mine warfare assets at NSI optimizes the transition to organic warfare.**

Ideal LCS Homeport for Homeland Defense Purposes

New Training Opportunities: Gulf Beach Amphibious Landing Site



March 17, 2004
Letter to Adm. William Fallon
The State of Texas will make five miles of state-owned beachfront available to DOD for amphibious training from Oct. 1 to March 31 of each year. This area will be available to DOD free of charge.
Jerry Patterson, Commissioner
Texas General Land Office



What's Wrong With BRAC Recommendations?

Reduced Quality of Life for Naval Personnel



Homes Purchased In 2005 by NSI Military Personnel

	NATIONAL	INGLESIDE - CORPUS CHRISTI	SAN DIEGO	NORFOLK
Overall Cost of Living	100	83.1	136.4	96.6
Median Home Value	\$134,000	\$64,100	\$201,800	\$99,400
Housing Cost	100	61.6	179.4	88.4
Food & Groceries	100	90.8	123.1	97.5




Additional Savings by Merging Regional Headquarters in Corpus Christi

BRAC Recommendation

Regional Headquarters at Great Lakes, Illinois

Outlay

\$1.7M Relocation
\$0.31M MILCON
\$0.16M **recurring**
annual locality pay
differential




**Cost
Impact
\$2.2M***

Our Recommendation

Regional Headquarters at Corpus Christi, Texas

Savings

\$1.7M Relocation
\$0.31M MILCON
\$0.16M **recurring**
annual locality pay
differential



**Cost
Impact
\$0**


CNRS – CNRMW Program Totals

PROGRAM	TOTAL COST (K)	
	CNRS	CNRMW
	O&MN & O&MNR	O&MN & O&MNR
*Air Operations	36,231.31	0.00
Command & Staff	32,716.89	13,598.54
Environmental	9,247.63	5,113.15
Facility Support	62,842.35	64,306.46
Housing	5,153.98	13,616.87
Operations Support	16,247.62	8,321.48
Personnel Support	26,168.60	66,409.69
*Port Operations	5,942.00	0.00
Public Safety	82,397.22	39,263.65
TOTAL	276,947.60	210,629.84

Strategic Importance of South Texas



- South Texas Has a Joint Military & Federal Complex
- Mines: Joint Warfighting Access Threat
- The Navy's Solution After Gulf War: Establish a Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at NSI
- Dedicated Support Assets for a Dedicated Mine Warfare Center
- There is Too Much Risk in the Navy Plan
- Irreplaceable Asset: Established Mine Warfare Training Ranges in Texas-Owned Waters 9 Miles Into Gulf
- Closing NSI Causes the Nation to Lose a Strategic Staging Area for Homeland Defense
- Gulf Shipping Choke Points Need Protection
- NSI Expansion Potential to Support Joint Operations Not Considered in Analysis
- COBRA Data Overestimated Savings
- DOD Estimated Annual Savings from BRAC Recommendations is \$5.5 Billion. NSI is less than 1% of DOD Estimated Savings.
- The Navy Region South Recommendation Makes No Sense



Backup Documents

- ◆ **Biographies of Presenters**
 - **Loyd Neal, Chairman STMFTF**
 - **Adm. Paul J. Ryan, USN (Ret.)**
 - **Adm. Al Konetzni, Jr., USN (Ret.)**
 - **Capt. F. W. Montesano, USN (Ret.)**
- ◆ **Summary**
- ◆ **Army Reserve Equipment Storage**
 - **Army Reserve Brief**
 - **2001 Overview of CHP System**
 - **Emails Explaining Selection of NSI**
- ◆ **Coast Guard Decision**
 - **Approval Letter from Coast Guard (8/4/04)**
 - **Navy Letter Delaying Decision (2/15/05)**



Paul J. Ryan
Rear Admiral, US Navy (retired)

Summary of Relevant Experience:

Retired Navy admiral, last active duty assignment was Commander, Mine Warfare Command in Corpus Christi, TX, 2002-2003. More than 10 years experience in command and executive leadership positions, including command of a nuclear attack submarine, a submarine tender, and a major shore command.

Education:

B.S. US Naval Academy, 1973

M.A. Naval Postgraduate School, 1979

Naval War College, 1990

Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Program for Senior Officials in National Security, 1995

MIT Seminar XXI, 2000

Navy Executive Business Course, 2003

History of Navy Assignments:

Commander, Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, TX. 2002-2003. Prepared and deployed forces to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Director, Warfare Programs and Readiness (N8) on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Deputy Director of the Navy Quadrennial Defense Review Office. Coordinated and developed detailed justification for Navy force structure and infrastructure in support of detailed presentations to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Commanding Officer, USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) and Commanding Officer, USS L.Y. Spear (AS-36). Over 15 years' operational sea duty on 5 submarines and one submarine support ship.

Operational Experience. Over 30 years of active duty, including 10 years in Washington, DC.



**Vice Admiral Albert H.
Konetzni, Jr.**

**Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, Jr.
United States Navy (retired)**

Vice Admiral Al Konetzni, United States Navy retired, is a native of Pleasantville, New York. Attending the United States Naval Academy, Admiral Konetzni graduated and was commissioned an Ensign in June of 1966.

A career Nuclear Submariner, Admiral Konetzni has successfully commanded at all levels and has extensive experience in strategic planning, financial and personnel management, engineering, innovation, foreign affairs, leadership, and lecturing.

During his time as Commander of all United States Submarines in the Pacific from 1998 until 2001, Admiral Konetzni engineered and executed an innovative plan to solve the Navy's high attrition of young Sailors. In 1998 the Navy was losing one of out every three young Sailors from their first commands, after just completing costly initial training. This tragic loss of talented manpower was not acceptable to the Admiral, and he made it his personal goal to solve that problem. The driving force behind a revolutionary program, in just over two years he reduced personnel attrition in the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force from 25% to 7%. Based on these astounding results, the Navy immediately incorporated his program as a model, and today enjoys higher retention and lower attrition than ever in its history. The Wall Street Journal published a front-page article featuring Admiral Konetzni and his attrition achievements (July 2000).

During this same time period, Admiral Konetzni challenged Defense Department and Congressional bureaucracy to save a squadron of submarines from scheduled early decommissioning and destruction. In addition he initiated the study, planning, and execution to return submarines to Guam, Marianas Islands. These actions not only saved billions of taxpayer dollars, but also ensured that proper maritime defense would be in place for the U.S.

From May 2001 thru July 2004 as Deputy Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Konetzni was responsible for the readiness and performance of 160 ships, nearly 1,200 aircraft and 50 bases and facilities manned by more than 133,000 personnel. During this unusually critical three-year period in Naval History, the Navy was called on repeatedly to deploy in defense of the nation. The terrible events in New York and at the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001, tested the readiness of the Atlantic Fleet, and it was Admiral

Konetzni who personally ensured the readiness of those Fleet assets.

Use of the Navy's principal training range on the island of Vieques came to an abrupt end in April 2003. In its place, Admiral Konetzni helped design and implement the Training Resource Strategy that allows the Navy to maintain combat superiority by better utilizing existing training ranges on the East and Gulf Coasts.

In 2003, when the majority of the Atlantic Fleet surged to fight in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Admiral Konetzni helped the Chief of Naval Operations reevaluate how the Navy deployed and could maintain presence globally. He was the principal engineer of the revolutionary Fleet Response Plan (FRP).

FRP has transformed Navy planning and has been heralded as a possible training and maintenance model for adoption by all service branches. Simply stated, the plan calls for the Navy to have six surge-ready Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), and an additional two CSGs ready to follow shortly thereafter. This plan has enabled the Navy to re-think how it mans, maintains, equips, trains and ultimately, fights its ships.

Admiral Konetzni presently serves as Chairman Emeritus of the Board of the United States Naval Institute, Board Member for the Larry King Cardiac Foundation, Tompkins Builders, Inc., EYP Mission Critical Facilities, Inc., and on the Board of Governors of the We Are Family Foundation. He holds a Masters Degree in Industrial Personnel Administration from George Washington University and has co-authored the book Command at Sea.

For his Naval Service, Admiral Konetzni has received two Distinguished Service Medals, six awards of the Legion of Merit, and three awards of the Meritorious Service Medal. In addition, for his efforts regarding Homeland Security, he received the U.S. Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal.

Admiral Konetzni retired from active duty on 1 September 2004.

Contact Information:

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Woodbine, GA 31569

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(Cell) 757-613-3492

Email: konetzni@myway.com
konetzni@vzw.blackberry.net

Naval Station Ingleside

Background: after the poor performance of US mine forces in Operations Earnest Will (tanker escorts) and Desert Storm, CNO Admiral Kelso placed renewed emphasis on mine warfare, including the establishment of a Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Ingleside. Since that time there has been strong Congressional and OSD support for mine warfare. The success of US mine countermeasure ships, helicopters, and EOD personnel in Operation Iraqi Freedom is a reflection on the progress the Navy has made, due in large part to the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence and the integrated (helicopter, ship and EOD) training that takes place in the Corpus Christi operating area. Mines continue to be a major threat to Joint warfighting operations in the littorals.

The Navy proposes to close Naval Station Ingleside and relocate the MCM ships to San Diego, move Mine Warfare Command to Point Loma and co-locate with Fleet ASW command to establish an Undersea Warfare Center of Excellence, and relocate HM-15 helicopters to Norfolk.

The Navy plan impacts the operational effectiveness of the Navy mine countermeasure force and therefore violates BRAC Criterion 1:

- The recommendation neuters the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence.
- The recommendation eliminates the possibility of integrated surface and airborne MCM training, thus reducing the operational effectiveness of MCM forces
- The recommendation violates the military standard of "we train as we fight."

The selection criteria for determining military value were applied unfairly and inaccurately to Naval Station Ingleside and substantially deviate from BRAC Criterion 1:

- No credit for having a unique and specialized mission (Evaluation criteria SEA 14 and 15 would have given unique credit for the mine warfare mission, but were deleted)
- Navy military value criteria were biased against small, special purpose bases. All Navy bases were rated in their ability to support nuclear carriers, nuclear weapons, nuclear repair work, proximity to submarine operation areas, submarine training facilities, etc., none of which apply to NSI. NSI is exceptionally good at what it has been funded to do!)
- SEA 28 gave NSI no special credit for having 6 dedicated off-shore mine warfare training ranges. 9 other bases received the same credit for ability to conduct mine warfare training even though they don't have dedicated mine warfare training ranges.

The recommendation to close NSI, break up the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, and shift mine warfare assets to fleet concentration areas represents too heavy a reliance on unproven future mine warfare systems and thus poses a significant risk to the operational readiness of the total force, substantially deviating from Criterion 1:

- The BRAC action assumes Congress will approve the inactivation of all 12 MHC class ships.
- The Navy proposal assumes future mine warfare capability will be provided by the new Littoral Combat Ship program and mine warfare systems that have not yet demonstrated operational capability. The Navy shipbuilding plan is recognized as unaffordable and there is technical and schedule risk in the new mine warfare systems.

Errors in COBRA data have overestimated the recurring savings from closing Naval Station Ingleside.

- Pre-BRAC savings for inactivation of the 12 MHC ships only accounted for their crews, not for their portion of the maintenance and support burden on Naval Station Ingleside.
- Initial Navy response was that despite a 50% reduction in ships, there was no reduction in maintenance and support personnel.
- 22 June Navy response was that there would be a 3.5% reduction in manpower (48 billets). When challenged, Navy reps agreed that their data was inconsistent, required more research and analysis, and a rerun of COBRA model.

Naval Station Ingleside is ideally positioned to support 21st century naval requirements:

- Homeland Defense of the Gulf Coast
- Mine Warfare Center of Excellence
- Littoral Combat Ship mine warfare training, module storage and refurbishment, and possible LCS basing as part of our maritime homeland defense posture.
- Expanded Coast Guard presence
- Military Sealift Command ship berthing
- Army Reserve warehousing
- Expeditionary warfare training

VISION

To establish up to seven strategic equipment storage sites throughout the continental United States that combine the cost-effective benefits of Controlled Humidity Storage with enhanced readiness and the ability to deploy equipment rapidly throughout the world to meet the needs of a power-projection Army.

The Army Reserve selected the Mississippi Gulf Coast as the first prototype equipment storage operation site for the following reasons:

- Superior air, sea, and ground transportation infrastructure
- Existing military facilities.
- Strategic location that facilitates world-wide deployment

and . . .



WHY CONTROLLED HUMIDITY STORAGE?

➤ **ENHANCES ARMY RESERVE CAPABILITIES THROUGH:**

- Improved Readiness
- Improved Deployability

➤ **PROVIDES BETTER UTILIZATION OF LIMITED RESOURCES**

CONCLUSIONS

- Economic analysis indicates CHS would reduce current systemic maintenance costs for the Army Reserve.
- Controlled Humidity Storage in Corpus Christi, Texas can effectively support the Army Reserve's strategic readiness and deployment requirements.
- The Army Reserve CHS initiative fully supports the Army Chief of Staff's vision of rapid force projection and reduced logistics costs.



3. Facts:

- a. The USAR has only two CHP systems currently in use: one at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin and one at Fort Dix, New Jersey. These systems use a metal shelter that can be relocated, are approximately 20,000 square feet in size, and cost less than \$500,000.
- b. The Army Reserve has a CHP system requirement for 6.6 million square feet of Long Term Preservation at Strategic Storage Sites and for Modified Long Term Preservation at 21 Equipment Concentration Sites. The configuration of the shelters will be determined by the operational requirements of the selected locations. Ventura County, California; Jacksonville, Florida; Gulfport, Mississippi; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Wilmington, North Carolina; Johnstown, Pennsylvania; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Fort Pickett, Virginia are currently under consideration for Strategic Storage Sites. The total program costs in excess of \$500 million, and it is expected to require a mix of Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve and Military Construction, Army Reserve funds to fully implement the ARLOG XXI recommendations.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
4001
Ser N4/5U890223
15 Feb 05

The Honorable Gene Stewart
Mayor of Ingleside
P.O. Drawer 400
Ingleside, TX 78362

Dear Mayor Stewart:

Thank you for your offer of improvements to both Building 313 and 400 feet of the west face of the 'small boat pier' to allow the US Coast Guard to homeport three 87 foot Coastal Patrol Boats at the US Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas. We are currently in discussions with the US Coast Guard regarding their requirements.

Offers to convey or improve real property or improvements require approvals by the Secretary of the Navy or Chief of Naval Operations depending on the value of the property or improvements. In accordance with established procedures and policy, your offer has been forwarded to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), South for an evaluation of cost and technical issues attendant to all required improvements to support the proposed ship platforms. Once completed, this information is forwarded and used to determine feasibility and acceptability of improvements as well as the appropriate approval authority, before the gift can be accepted.

We will notify you of the disposition of the offer upon completion of our review. Thank you again for your offer, and for your continued support of our Navy. If I can be of further assistance, please contact CDR John D'Angelo of my staff at (202) 433-4711, or email at John.L.D'Angelo@navy.mil.

Sincerely,

J. D. McCARTHY
Vice Admiral, Supply Corps
United States Navy
Director, Material Readiness
and Logistics

Copy to:
CNI