

Red River Defense Committee

**Community Briefing and Backup Data
Site Visit - June 8, 1995**

Table of Contents



TAB


A	Community Case Briefing
B	BRAC Impact
C	Military Complex Overview Briefing
D	Savings Overstated - Documentation
E	Cost of DLA Relocation
F	Construction Requirements At Anniston
G	DLA - BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates, 5 May 1995
H	Supply/Storage To Rubber Products
I	Tenant Support of Enclaved Operations
J	Non-Appropriated Fund Accounting
K	Missile Recertification Office Excluded in BRAC 93
L	Missile Recertification Office Cost to Relocate
M	Community Questions and Responses
N	Return on Investment (Detail)
O	COBRA Cost Analysis Revision
P	Transfer of Above Core Work to Anniston

Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence




Briefing: Community Case
Presented By: Congressman Jim Chapman



Synopsis of the Red River Case

1. DoD substantially deviated from Final Selection Criteria
 - Military Value (Criteria 1 and 4)
 - No combined assessment of military value of Red River and Defense Distribution Depot was developed
 - Army and DLA conducted separate and independent analyses
 - Recommendations overload Anniston, limit surge capacity, and jeopardize readiness
 - Return on Investment (Criteria 5)
 - Cost understated
 - \$28.9 million for Unemployment Compensation
 - \$319 million for DLA relocation
 - \$ 34 million for Anniston construction requirements
 - Army recurring savings overstated by \$116 million
 - DLA decision to disestablish Defense Distribution Depot was based on Army's recommendation to close Red River, not cost
 - Return on investment is 60 years, not immediate as claimed by Army
 - Army analysis was flawed by omission of significant mission requirements such as Missile Recertification
2. Community Proposal
 - Retain Red River and Anniston
 - Realign Letterkenny workload to Red River and Anniston
 - Downsize to core
 - Team with industry



Cost Comparison Should Consider Total Complex

Savings

Indirect Personnel

Base Operations Personnel

Facilities Maintenance

Utilities


Costs


Construction

Equipment Acquisition

Relocation of:

- **Equipment**
- **Personnel**
- **Tenants**
- **Vehicle/Repair Parts**
- **Other DLA Stocks**





Flaws in Army Methodology

- Savings are overstated
 - Non-BRAC savings are included \$116 million
- Costs not included
 - DLA relocation \$319 million
 - Construction requirements at Anniston \$ 34 million
- Costs understated on unemployment compensation \$ 28.9 million
- Requirements not considered
 - Supply/storage support for Rubber Products
 - Tenant support of enclaved and other operations
 - Non-appropriated Fund Accounting
 - Missile Recertification Office



DoD BRAC Policy Guidance

- **GAO Report to Congress and Chairman of BRAC, April 95**

"DoD's BRAC policy guidance stipulates that personnel reductions associated with force structure reductions should not be included in BRAC savings"




Army Violated DOD BRAC Policy Guidance

- Army's first response to related community question was nonresponsive and misleading:
 - "The Army did not base its base closure recommendations on savings realized from workload reductions as a result of downsizing. The savings included reductions as a result of installation closures, realignments of missions to other installations with like capabilities and excess capacities, and the elimination of personnel."
- Army's second response finally revealed the truth, the claimed savings were based on force structure reductions:
 - "...The number of personnel recommended for transfer to Anniston was determined based on the workloads at both Anniston and Red River, when there would be reductions of those workloads based on fiscal year projections, and the available workforce at Anniston.
...The workloads that were used to make the necessary calculations were those certified by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) for the FY95 and beyond timelines..."



True BRAC Savings Were Not Identified

- **The community asked for Army estimates of base operations and maintenance indirect personnel savings associated with the recommended closure. These are the only personnel savings that would be a result of BRAC actions.**
- **The Army's Response: "Base operations and maintenance indirect personnel are not specifically identified at that level of detail."**




Comments About Army Study

- Study is grossly inaccurate and violates DoD BRAC policy guidance
- Army provided incomplete and misleading answers to initial community questions
- Army's most recent responses to questions and COBRA Analysis substantiate every flaw identified by community
- True BRAC savings and costs were not determined
- Army conducted a misleading and indefensible study
 - Ignored workload and missions of tenants
 - Misrepresented the facts concerning the DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation
 - Left out consideration of DFAS Non-Appropriated (NAF) Accounting
 - Said they moved DFAS NAF Payroll to "Base X" when that activity is not even located at Red River!



Flaws in DLA Methodology

- **Evaluated as co-located depot. No credit was given for distribution mission to external customers.**
- **Decision based solely on Army recommendation to realign maintenance mission**
- **Decision not based on cost/savings**




Return on Investment

Community Estimate

	Army (\$M)	RRAD Complex (\$M)	Army Maint* (\$M)
Recurring Savings	\$129.0	\$13.1	\$9.2
Recurring Cost	<u>\$5.8</u>	<u>\$5.8</u>	<u>\$5.8</u>
Annual Net Savings	\$123.2	\$7.3	\$3.4
One Time Cost	\$59.6	\$441.5	\$165.2
Return on Investment	Immediate	60 years	48 years

*Assumes DLA remains at Red River



Army Revises COBRA Cost Analysis

- **Army's savings from closure**
 - **Reduced by \$379 million for Red River**
 - **Increased by \$310 million for Letterkenny**
 - **Current Letterkenny savings \$144 million greater than Red River**

**Bottom Line - Red River vs Letterkenny Closure
Letterkenny provides greater savings
Letterkenny ranks lower in military value**



Profitability


"I consider the planned annual net operating result (NOR) as the primary depot performance measure, therefore we should reward positive variances from the planned NOR."


**DENNIS L. BENCHOFF
Major General, USA
Commanding, 20 Jan 94**



Profitability


Cumulative FY90 -- FY94






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 - **Military Value (Criteria 1 and 4)**
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 - **Retain Red River and Anniston**
 - **Realign Letterkenny workload to Red River and Anniston**
 - **Downsize to core**
 - **Team with industry**




Insufficient Ground Combat Vehicle Capacity at Anniston

Peacetime (FY99)



Wartime




Source: Army TABS Office and BRAC Data Call



Where We Are


- **Army has three vehicle maintenance depots**
- **Army needs to retain two vehicle maintenance depots**
- **Distribution depots are required to sustain readiness**
 - **Approximately 50% of CONUS troops are stationed in the Central United States**
 - **80% of Red River distribution mission is in support of external customers**



What We Need To Do

- Follow concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management, April 1994
- Retain two most efficient vehicle depots
 - Red River
 - Anniston
- Downsize both to CORE workload
 - Maintain knowledge base
 - Maintain readiness level
- Realign Letterkenny vehicle and missile workload to Red River and Anniston
- Team with industry
 - Preserve industrial base
 - Increase capacity utilization
- Maintain the distribution mission at Red River

Current Process



Note: Red River Tracked Vehicle Maintenance Facility is the most modern vehicle maintenance facility in the Army Depot System.



Red River Downsizing Plan


- **Plan developed to reduce excess capacity, Feb 94**
- **Plan identified**
 - **Resources required for sustainment of core workload**
 - **Infrastructure available for divestiture**
- **Divestiture Plan**
 - **Divest facilities to industry**
 - **Layaway any excess facilities**
- **Net annual labor savings \$37 million**
- **Reduces maximum capacity by 41%**
- **Improves FY 99 capacity utilization to about 80%**



Red River

Teaming With Industry Plan

- **Red River/United Defense - Alliance Plan, Nov 94**
- **Worksplitted for Light Tracked Vehicles**
 - **Depot "Core" - Disassembly and Overhaul at Red River**
 - **Industry "Above Core" - Modification and Assembly at United Defense**



Red River Proposal

- **Combine Downsizing and Partnership With Industry Plans**
 - **Downsize Red River**
 - **Make facilities available for industry use**
 - **Accomplish depot and industry work at Red River**

Note: A similar plan for Anniston downsizing was prepared in February 1994. A teaming arrangement with General Dynamics is in place.

Community Proposal

Shared Facilities and Equipment




Government

Contractor



Advantages of Teaming At Red River

- **Preserves Both Contractor and Depot Skill Base**
- **Preserves Mobilization/Surge Capacity**
- **Increases Depot Capacity Utilization**
- **Reduces Duplication of Facilities/Equipment**
- **Eliminates Transportation Cost To/From Contractor**
- **Provides Most Cost Effective Approach to Meet Readiness/Sustainability Requirements**




Everybody Wins

- **Army**
- **Private Industry**
- **Taxpayer**



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Summary

- **Army needs to retain two combat vehicle depots**
- **Letterkenny ranks dead last on military value**
 - **Red River's score is more than double that of Letterkenny**
- **Red River is the most profitable depot**
 - **Letterkenny is the least profitable**
- **Army COBRA shows the largest net present value savings will result if Letterkenny is closed**
- **The BRAC 95 commission should recommend**
 - **Closure of Letterkenny**
 - **Retention of Red River and the DLA Distribution Depot**

Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Briefing: Community Impact
Presented By: Robert E. "Swede" Lee



Economic Impact of BRAC 95 on Northeast Texas

- **Largest loss of jobs of any one area in the nation**
- **10% of total job losses under BRAC 95 are a result of Red River closure**
- **Unemployment projected to reach over 20%**
- **No metropolitan area nearby for reemployment opportunities**
- **Unemployment benefits could exceed \$50M in first two years**
- **Based on past history (Lone Star Steel) area may never recover - Morris County unemployment is still in double digits ten years later**



Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Briefing: Military Complex Overview
Presented by: Dr. Phillip DuVall




Unique Industrial Complex

- **Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Distribution Depot Red River**
- **Red River Army Depot**
- **Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant**
- **Eight Tenants**





Red River Military Complex

- Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Distribution Depot
- Army Maintenance Depot
- Army Ammunition Depot
- Army Contractor, Lone Star Ammunition Plant
- Receipt, Storage, and Issue of Vehicles and Repair Parts
- Repair and Modification of Army Weapon Systems and Components
- Receipt, Storage, Maintenance, and Issue of Ammunition
- Manufacture of Ammunition




Red River Military Complex Synergy






Red River's Major Customers



Over 50% of all stateside military posts, camps, and stations are located in the Red River central distribution area




Distribution Destinations

<i>Ranking</i>	<i>Location</i>
1	Ft. Hood, TX
2	Europe
3	Ft. Riley, KS
4	Korea
5	Ft. Bliss, TX
6	Ft. Sill, OK
7	Ft. Polk, LA
8	Ft. Carson, CO
9	Ft. Campbell, KY
10	Ft. Rucker, AL



Profile of Assets in Storage



% LINES


As of 31 Jan 95



Vehicles in Storage

Category	Ready to Issue	Repairable	Non- Repairable	Weight (Tons)
Tactical	1,558	908	23	23,016
Combat	1,262	4,662	10	83,335
Repair & Return				
-- Natl Guard		66		693
-- FORSCOM		15		158
TOTAL	2,820	5,651	33	107,202


Note: As of 27 Mar 95



Depot Maintenance

for DoD's "CORE" Weapon Systems

- **Bradley Fighting Vehicle System**
- **Multiple Launch Rocket System**
- **M113 Family of Vehicles**
- **Fire Support Team Vehicle**
- **Heavy Equipment Transporter**
- **M9 Armored Combat Earthmover**
- **Palletized Load System**
- **Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units**



Army Mechanized Division Structure

• Bradleys	311
• Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	9
• M113 Family of Vehicles	706
• M1 Abrams	255
• M109 Howitzers	72
• M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers	64

***We support 77% of all tracked vehicles in a typical
mechanized division.***

Note: Items highlighted in red represent core systems supported by Red River Army Depot



Fleet Densities

10 Division Army


Bradleys	6,724
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Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	747
---------------------------------------	------------

M113 Family of Vehicles	17,353
--------------------------------	---------------

TOTAL	*24,824
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****Current Production Rates = 24 Year Cycle***



Unique Capability to Support Logistics Power Projection

- **Unserviceable Assets at RRAD**
 - **Bradleys - 732**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 2,553**
- **Power Projection Capability***
 - **Bradleys - 50/Month**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 200/Month**

****With current infrastructure, capability exists to equip
one division within six months***



Knowledge Base

- **Technical support to the field**
- **Mobilization support**
 - **Deploying units**
 - **In Theatre**
- **Force Reconstitution**

***Rapid response within 24 hours to any location -
World Wide***



Red River Army Depot

A National Quality Leader

- **Formally named Winner of 1995 Federal Quality Improvement Prototype Award by the Federal Quality Institute, 2 March 1995**
- **Federal sector award criteria synonymous with Malcolm Baldrige Award**
- **Importance of award lies with the accomplishments during pursuit**
- **Depot Recognized as a Quality Leader by:**
 - **Vice President Gore (National Quality Conference, July 1994)**
 - **National Partnership Council**
 - **Government Executive Magazine (July 1994)**
 - **Federal Times Newspaper (18 July 1994)**
 - **September 1994 Status Report of National Performance Review**



Red River Army Depot

A "Unique" Quality Team

- **Successful in spite of downsizing, major reorganization, and BRAC threats**
- **Most important asset is the summation of the members as one unique team**
- **Quality should be a part of the BRAC Criteria**
 - **Quality products**
 - **Performance efficiency**
 - **Responsiveness and readiness to customers**




Summary

- **Depot With Three Major Missions**
- **50% of Distribution Customers in Central United States**
- **Maintenance Support of 77% of Army Mechanized Division Tracked Vehicles**
- **Unique Body of Rapidly Deployable Knowledge**



Maintenance Mission Workload

Equivalent Personnel



Reduction	
QTY	%
ANAD	72%
RRAD	28%
Total	100%




Source: Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, FY95-99, dated 30 Jan 95

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT


TRUE SAVINGS

■ FY96 - 513 Base Personnel on TDA

- ▶ 20 - Base Operations Personnel supporting other Non-Army Tenants
- ▶ 143 - Base Operations Personnel to be transferred to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant
- ▶ 13 - BRAC Transition
- ▶ 337 - Base Operations Personnel supporting Army functions and DLA who will be separated - True BRAC Savings




RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT




X

337
PERSONNEL



\$38.9K AVG ANNUAL SALARY
(Includes 18% Fringe Benefits)

TRUE SAVINGS



13.1M

JAD
John
Dee

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT, TX

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$60 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$313 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$123 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$1,497 million.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) --Page 1/2
 Data As Of: 18:49 01/25/1995, Report Created 08:55 02/13/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE2&3-2R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DE2&3-2R.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1999
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015(\$K): -1,497,302
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 59,636

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	-39	-95	-18,266	-61,061	-85,687	-85,687	-250,834	-85,687
Overhd	4,452	7,294	-1,191	-29,971	-37,805	-37,805	-95,026	-37,805
Moving	0	843	21,793	8,266	0	0	30,902	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	31	1,090	755	0	0	1,876	0
TOTAL	4,413	8,074	3,426	-82,011	-123,492	-123,492	-313,081	-123,492

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	1	0	2	5	0	0	8
Enl	1	0	3	2	0	0	6
Civ	0	3	888	956	0	0	1,847
TOT	2	3	893	963	0	0	1,861

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	404	636	0	0	0	1,040
TOT	0	404	636	0	0	0	1,040

Summary:

REALIGN RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT (RRAD) BY TRANSFER OF LIGHT COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD TO ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT, TRANSFER AMMUNITION STORAGE MISSION, CIV TNG EDUC, AND INTERN SCHOOL TO LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT (LSAAP), TRANSFER TO BASE X THE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING/LOGISTICS, ENCLAVE THE RUBBER PRODUCTION FACILITY TO LSAAP, AND ELIMINATE THE REMAINING ACTIVITIES/POSITIONS.

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/15
 Data As Of 18:49 01/25/1995, Report Created 08:55 02/13/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE2&3-2R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DE2&3-2R.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	36	1,489	1,704	0	0	3,229
Civ Retire	0	16	575	397	0	0	989
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	82	846	0	0	0	928
POV Miles	0	6	45	0	0	0	51
Home Purch	0	253	3,369	0	0	0	3,622
HHG	0	171	2,363	0	0	0	2,534
Misc	0	17	245	0	0	0	262
House Hunt	0	68	660	0	0	0	728
PPS	0	29	7,689	8,266	0	0	15,984
RITA	0	119	1,446	0	0	0	1,565
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	97	122	0	0	0	220
Freight	0	1	6	0	0	0	7
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	6	260	297	0	0	564
OTHER							
Program Plan	4,462	3,347	2,510	1,882	0	0	12,202
Shutdown	7	1,350	5,073	3,195	0	0	9,625
New Hire	0	14	158	0	0	0	173
1-Time Move	0	0	5,000	0	0	0	5,000
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	10	0	25	39	0	0	75
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	31	1,090	755	0	0	1,876
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	4,479	5,645	32,975	16,536	0	0	59,636

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/15
 Data As Of 18:49 01/25/1995, Report Created 08:55 02/13/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE2&3-2R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\DE2&3-2R.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0
BOS	0	3,611	5,828	5,828	5,828	5,828	26,925	5,828
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-0	3,611	5,828	5,828	5,828	5,828	26,925	5,828
TOTAL COST	4,479	9,256	38,803	22,365	5,828	5,828	86,561	5,828
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	31	180	372	446	446	1,476	446
O&M								
RPMA	5	952	5,513	11,697	14,379	14,379	46,925	14,379
BOS	12	30	8,909	28,808	28,808	28,808	95,376	28,808
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	69	20,561	62,971	84,958	84,958	253,518	84,958
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	34	68	136	374	543	543	1,699	543
Enl Salary	15	31	77	154	185	185	648	185
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	66	1,182	35,377	104,376	129,320	129,320	399,643	129,320
TOTAL SAVINGS	66	1,182	35,377	104,376	129,320	129,320	399,643	129,320



DLA BRAC 95 Detailed Analysis

Analysis of alternatives

DLA's analysis of distribution depots was greatly influenced by military judgment. There are several tenets that were held constant throughout the deliberative process:

- When a Military Service determined that a Maintenance Depot was surplus to their needs, DLA would consider closing collocated distribution functions. The logic was twofold: first, the maintenance depot is by far the biggest customer and primary reason for DLA presence; and second, complete closure of that facility infrastructure generates the best economic return to DoD.
- In the case of Stand-Alone Depots, throughput capacity and storage space to support a two front contingency scenario is paramount. Containerization and consolidation points (CCP) and airlift capability to support mobilization are required. Activities that can provide this type of support, one on each coast, are strongly favored for retention.
- To maximize efficiencies and reduce overall costs, take advantage of storage space at depots collocated with another activity.

Analysis of staffing requirements to accommodate workload moving from a closed, disestablished, or realigned site considered POM reductions and other efficiencies gained from economies of scale. DLA has ongoing initiatives such as activity based costing, benchmarking, tailored logistics, Distribution Standard System, and discrete pricing. These initiatives, along with significant workload reductions, are projected to decrease DLA's distribution workforce prior to FY 01. Further, consolidation of workload at fewer sites is projected to improve productivity within direct labor by 25 percent. In addition, non-direct labor requirements are expected to reduce by 25 percent through elimination of duplicate effort. Taking these factors into consideration, it is projected that only 60 percent of the direct labor would be required to perform the workload transferred from a disestablished depot to a gaining depot; and, only 35 percent of the non-direct labor would be required at the gaining depot. All percentages first allowed for previously programmed POM changes. In the case of a realigned depot, which will be used primarily for slow moving and war reserve materiel, only 20 percent of the workforce (after POM changes) will be transferred to an active depot. A small contingent will remain to perform distribution duties at the realigned site.

DLA looked at numerous scenarios that provided support to the overall Concept of Operations. The scenario disestablishing DDRT and DDLP; closing DDMT and DDOU; and realigning DDCO yielded the best mix of sustaining workload capacity, utilizing storage



DLA BRAC 95 Detailed Analysis

capacity and maintaining sufficient Military Value across the Agency. It was the judgment of the DLA BRAC Executive Group that this combination provided the best future distribution operation for the Department of Defense.

The analysis considered downsizing to accommodate our future requirements. In consonance with our Concept of Operations, Military Value, and the SAILS model analyses, DLA recommends closure of the DDMT and DDOU Stand-Alone Depots, and follows the Army lead in disestablishing DDRT and DDLP. The realignment of DDCO is the result of requirements for inactive storage only, and the fact that active workload from DDCO can be accommodated most efficiently at the two primary East and West coast depots (DDSP and DDJC). Because of the large amount of conforming hazardous materiel storage space, new construction and mechanization, close proximity to customers, and collocation with another DLA activity, DDRV remains without change. Additionally, because of the large amounts of storage and throughput capacities, CCP capabilities, and location to transportation ports of embarkation for contingency support, both DDSP and DDJC remain open in an active status. DLA distribution depots collocated with a maintenance depot not selected for closure by their respective Service remain open.

Return on investment analysis

Starting in 1996 and ending in the year 2001, this scenario provided a one time cost of \$308.2M and a total net savings of \$16.2M. The net present value after 20 years was a savings of \$874.4M and a steady state savings of \$88M. This scenario efficiently utilized all available storage space in the system.

Impact assessment

Economic assessment

Economic impacts of the DLA BRAC recommendation for distribution depots and Region Headquarters ranges from a small positive impact to a fairly significant negative impact. Anticipated changes in staffing, how those changes influence community support employment, and impact on local employment are provided in the figure below.

CAAJ(BRAC) PAGE 2 CLOSE HOLD
SUBJECT: Summary of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Executive Group
(BRACEG) Meeting - 24 January 1995 (Morning Session)

keep open a stand-alone depot we were proposing to close. Since this decision was obtained a short time before the meeting, MMD will review associated issues and bring a recommendation to a BRACEG meeting to be scheduled later in the day.

D. Additional efforts to accommodate a storage capacity shortfall were briefed. Besides achieving an additional 5 million Attainable Cubic Feet (ACF) by racking out the operations area at the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus (DDCO) and using the 12 million ACF available at Rough and Ready Island, an additional 12 million ACF of storage capacity will be achieved by maximizing cube at the remaining depots. As a result the projected shortfall of 20 million ACF previously briefed is now estimated to be an 8 million ACF shortfall. The risks outlining the Storage Management Plan and possible impacts were again stressed.

E. The methodology used to determine distribution direct and non-direct labor requirements for the distribution workload in Fiscal Year 2001, considering potential BRAC realignments and closures, was reviewed. The parameters used in making this determination were noted. Goals were to increase productivity by 25 percent and decrease indirect costs by 25 percent. To achieve this reduction, 40 percent of the direct labor and 65 percent of the non-direct labor positions will be eliminated from those depots affected by closure or realignment. Although an exact requirement was determined for the number of direct labor personnel needed to perform the distribution workload in Fiscal Year 2001, a degree of risk was assumed by assigning a savings percentage to all affected depots, regardless of the number of sites affected by closure or realignment.

F. An ongoing issue amongst the Services and DLA is determining who will pay for the closure of tenants (such as our collocated distribution depots) and who will claim savings. If the Service is required to pay for the closure (as they did in BRAC 93) then some Services feel that they should claim the savings. In either case, the Services will pay for the cost of collocated depot closures because our unit cost will have to rise to accommodate this cost, if DLA pays for the closure. We hope to receive some OSD guidance soon.

IV. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

A. Modify the DoDIG chart to show the percent of errors and the amount corrected--DoDIG.

B. Review alternatives associated with the Army closing Letterkenny and present recommendations at the next BRACEG meeting--MMD.



COBRA COMPARISON
DLA/DDRT Model For DDRT

COBRA Summary:	DLA	DDRT
ROI	2002 (2 yrs)	2022 (22 yrs)
NPV in 2015 (\$K)	-186,147	67,930
1-Time Costs (\$K)	58,893	338,253

Scenarios: DLA: Close Red River. Move all workload associated with maintenance to DDAA. Move remaining workload as follows: active stock and associated personnel to DDJC, move remaining workload to Base X. No personnel transfers to Base X. Region personnel assigned to DDRW. Return to DDRW HQ in Stockton.

DDRT: Disestablish DDRT. Move all vehicles and associated stock to DDAA. Move all remaining stock to DDJC. Move 100% of stock. Personnel moves unchanged from DLA model.

1. Mileage Corrections:	DLA	DDRT
DDRT to DDSP	1188	1205
DDRT to DDJC	1188	1799
DDRWRT to DDRW	1188	1799
2. Mission Equipment:	9,881 Tons	19,384 Tons from BRAC Data
Supply Equipment	0 Tons	378 Tons
Military Light Veh	0	20
Heavy/Spec Veh	0	519

3. Personnel changes and costs/savings were not changed except mileage correction for DDRWRT to DDRW changed moving costs slightly.

4. 1-Time Unique and Moving Costs:	DLA	DDRT
Unique Costs	\$10,089,000	\$225,261,169
Unique Moving	\$ 8,390,000	\$ 37,952,181

Explanations: DLA figures are take directly from COBRA. No explanation of the source of these figures is given.

DDRT: (A more detailed analysis of the following figures is attached.)
13,740 vehicles to DDAA. Preparation to ship cost: \$33,614,882.
Transportation: \$19,905,270. Labor at DDAA to unload and store: \$9,552,325.

DDRT has 120,735 Tons of Mission Stock, excluding Vehicles;
7.4% is vehicle support stock (8,934 Tons to DDAA).
92.6% is other stock (111,801 Tons to DDJC).

Mission Stock to DDAA:	Prep for Ship	Transportation
Mission Stock to DDJC:	\$ 14,181,206	\$ 478,182
	\$177,465,081	\$ 17,568,729

NOTE: Above tonnage includes all DDRT stocks. Some materiel will be shipped to DRMO at Red River and will be excluded from tonnage. However, materiel is continuing to be received from DDTU and is expected to compensate for this reduction in tonnage. Vehicles and secondary items being received at DDRT from DDTU are included in number of vehicles and tons of materiel. These figures are based on actual to date numbers and projections for additional receipts in FY95.

5. Inflation: DLA model contains 3% inflation beginning in 1997. However, the model was run without inflation added. The DDRT model was also run without inflation for consistency. If inflation is included, the total figures are not changed significantly. Some detailed figures are increased. Ex. \$19,040,000 MILCON at DDAA becomes \$20,362,000 with inflation considered.

COBRA COMPARISON

DLA & DDRT Models

	DLA	DDRT
Summary		
NPV (2015) (\$K)	180,147	160,139
Time Costs (\$K)	58,893	329,688
Mileage (1)		
DDRT to DDSP	1,188	1,205
DDRT to DDJC	1,188	1,799
DDRWRT to DDRW	1,188	1,799
Mission Equipment (2) (\$)	9,881	19,384
Supply Equipment (\$)	0	378
Military Light Veh (\$)	0	20
Heavy/Spec Veh (\$)	0	519
1-Time Move (3) (\$)	8,390,000	37,417,468
1-Time Other (4) (\$)	10,089,000	248,669,298

DDRT - 129,464 tons

1. Mileage corrections effect 1-Time Moving and 1-Time Other costs.
2. DDRT Mission Equipment , Supply Equipment and Mil & Heavy/Spec Veh costs are taken from BRAC Data Call submissions.

3 & 4. 1-Time Moving & 1-Time Other
 1-Time Moving costs are "Transportation"
 1-Time Other are "Labor"
Vehicles - 13,740 total vehicles

Labor to load at 1911 - \$23,614,882
 Labor to load at DDAA - \$9,552,325

Secondary Items - 129,464 total tons
 Active - 72.92%
 Dormant - 23.5%
 War Reserve - 3.21%
 FMS - 0.38%

DDAA -
 7.4% to DDAA - 8,934 tons
 Cost of 42,000 lb truck - \$1,124 and 425 trucks

Labor to ship @ \$1,587.33 per ton - \$15,207,153

DDJC - Active + FMS - 87,880 tons
 Cost of 42,000 lb truck - \$3,300 and 4,185 trucks

Labor to ship @ \$1,587.33 per ton - \$169,494,519

DEPOTX - Dormant + War Reserve - 32,004 tons
 Cost of 42,000 lb truck - \$2,093 and 1,524 trucks

Labor to ship @ \$1,587.33 per ton - \$50,800,117


Mission Stock Relocation Costs

- Packing and Crating Cost:
 - Secondary Items = \$191,646,287
 - Major End Items = \$ 43,167,207
- Transportation Cost:
 - Secondary Items = \$18,046,911
 - Major End Items = \$19,905,270
- Total Packing/Crating/Transportation:
 - Secondary Items = \$209,693,198
 - Major End Items = \$ 63,072,477
- Grand Total = \$272,765,675

	DDRT LABOR	TRANS	DDAA LABOR
ALL VEH	33,614,882	19,905,270	9,552,325
CORE FY85 VEH	2,374,687	1,494,433	663,872
CORE FY96 VEH	2,335,526	1,123,708	604,736
FY95+FY96 CORE VEH	4,710,213	2,618,141	1,268,608
SPT STOCK (7.4%)	15,207,155	512,776	380,367
SPT+ISA (20%)	41,100,418	1,385,881	1,028,019
TOTAL CORE TO ANAD	24,697,260		
TOTAL CORE PLUS ISA TO ANAD	106,586,795		


Dormant Materiel

Defense Distribution Depot Red River



DDRT Projected Attrition Rate

As of 17 Mar 95



Based on FY94 Issue Data. Remaining lines had no activity in FY94



Construction Requirements at Anniston

- Realign Combat Vehicles \$15 million*
- Realign DLA Supply Support \$19 million**
- Total \$34 million


*Source: Joint Cross-Service Working Group

**Source: DLA Cobra



CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

Joint Cross-Service Working Group DEPOT



COSTS (\$M)

	.8	14.6	1.3	.2
Q&M				
MILCON	5.1	10.0	5.0	0
OTHER	.06	1.1	.1	.02
TOTAL	6.0	25.7	6.4	.2

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS)	60	11	45	0
BREAK EVEN (YEAR)	2056	2007	2041	1996
STEADY STATE SAVINGS (\$M)	.2	3	.3	.6
(YEAR)	2052	2008	2037	1997
5 YR NPV (\$M)	-208.0	17.8	-2.5	8.8

PERSONNEL:

ELIMINATIONS	0	0	0	11
REALIGNMENTS	36	708	66	0

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

THE ARMY BASING STUDY





DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
 DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST
 P.O. BOX 200001
 STOCKTON, CA 95200



IN REPLY
 REFER TO

DDRW-R

0 6 MAY 1995

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates

TO: MMDBP

1. Reference DLA BRAC 95 Implementation Guidance, 11 Apr 95, Annex G, para 2.a.

2. We have identified the following concerns and shortfalls with BRAC 95 funding requirements based on our comparison of preliminary BRAC cost estimates to the COBRA pricing model:

a. **Closure Dates.** For both DDOU and DDRT, the COBRA model identifies out-year costs which do not align with current planning dates communicated to us (30 Sep 96 for DDOU; 30 Sep 97 for DDRT). Dollars identified for the out-years will require reassignment to earlier fiscal years to accommodate those targets.

b. **Material Movement:**

(1) DDOU. Funding for the overall effort seems adequate to accomplish required movement/relocation of material, people and equipment.

(2) DDRT. Funding for the overall effort seems to be \$ 1.2M less than required. \$600K of the \$ 1.2M represents the increase in the percentage of redistribution from 40% to 70%, with a subsequent decrease in disposals/attrition from 60% to 30%. Our estimate is based on the assumption that closure will occur prior to the out-year identified in COBRA. An additional \$ 600K will be required to relocate National Stockpile Material (asbestos) from DDRT in conjunction with the projected closure.

c. **Environmental.** We understand that the environmental costs for closure (which are not covered in COBRA) you are considering in your FOM 97 submission were developed by CAAE. We do not have visibility of what those detailed estimates were and consequently cannot speak to their adequacy. We have recently identified an additional requirement of \$ 200K for environmental action related to unexploded ordnance at DDOU; \$ 300K for lab sampling/analysis contract; and \$ 2M for facility decontamination. This is beyond the estimates for BRAC-related regulated environmental compliance expenses at DDOU we provided to CAAE on 4 May 95.

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DDRW-R PAGE 2
SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates

d. **Radiation Close-out Costs.** We estimate the cost of radiation-related closure actions are \$ 3M for DDOU and \$ 2M for DDRT. This will cover historical data collection, surveys for contamination, radiation clean-up, and close out surveys to prove the areas are clear. It will also cover purchases of special survey instrumentation, contractor personnel to perform surveys and clean contaminated areas, and laboratory services. These requirements come from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and state/local health agencies. Based on our research and phonecalls to HQDLA, these costs are not addressed in COBRA, nor have they been considered in your current BRAC 95 POM estimating.

e. **Safety and Health Costs.** We estimate the cost of safety/health-related closure actions are \$ 750K for DDOU and \$ 250K for DDRT. This will cover the costs of surveys by safety and health personnel (safety specialists; industrial hygienists; occupational health nurse) to ensure that: personnel receive required medical surveillance at termination/transfer; appropriate surveys/inspections are maintained for personnel; close-out surveys/inspections are performed. It also includes the cost of contracts (such as medical and laboratory contracts) that will be needed to clear the depot for closure.

f. **MILCON.** MILCON estimates will be contained on the DD 1391 Front Pages which have been requested by MMDL.


3. Please refer your questions on this action to DDRW-ROA, Phyllis Smith (DSN 462-2331) or Laurie Beach (DSN 462-2373).


A. E. STEINMAN
Captain, SC, USN
Acting Commander



DDRT Support to Rubber Product Division

- Receive, store, and issue raw rubber
- Provide constant temperature cold storage
- Special preservation and packaging
- Receive, store and issue all track and roadwheels
 - Unserviceable
 - Rebuilt (Serviceable)
- 1,042,501 cubic feet of roadwheels/track stored



DDRT Support to Ammunition Operations

- Receive, store and inspect lumber
- Hazardous materials storage
- Hazardous waste disposal
- Fabricate cartons and boxes
- Acceptance inspection of installed systems/equipment

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office

- ◆ Serves as the collection point for government property identified as excess.
- ◆ Excess property is reissued to other government entities through a comprehensive reutilization program.
 - \$12.3M in property donated to local schools, cities, and qualifying civic organizations in FY93
- ◆ Property that can not be reutilized is offered to the general public for bid in public auctions.

6/8/95

1

District Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Center

- ◆ Provides calibration and maintenance of equipment at Red River and from the Little Rock Region of the Federal Aviation Agency.
- ◆ Two independent laboratories annually certify over 10,000 items.
 - Electronic Standards Laboratory
 - Physical Dimensions Laboratory
- ◆ Only Army facility west of the Mississippi certifying small arms and ammunition gages.
 - 1,728 small arms and ammunition gages certified annually

6/8/95

2

Consolidated Non-Appropriated Fund Accounting Office

- ◆ Provides financial accounting services to 88 installations CONUS and OCONUS.
 - Saudia Arabia
 - Puerto Rico
 - Alaska
 - 29 of the 48 contiguous states
- ◆ Current customers include the following.
 - Army Materiel Command
 - Military Traffic Management Command
 - Forces Command
 - Defense Logistics Agency
 - Health Services Command
 - Military District of Washington
 - The Judge Advocate General's School
 - Corps of Engineers
 - Army Reserve Personnel Center
 - Training and Doctrine Command
 - United States Army Pacific

6/8/95

3

U. S. Army Health Clinic

- ◆ Provides both Occupational Medicine and Primary Care to approximately 10,000 patients annually.
 - 6,000 active duty and retired personnel and their families
 - 4,100 employees of Red River Army Depot, Defense Distribution Depot Red River, and other tenants
- ◆ Referrals to local specialist and surgeons contributed over \$823,000.00 to the local medical community in 1993.
- ◆ Industrial hygiene laboratory supports Red River Army Depot, Defense Distribution Depot Red River, and other tenants.

6/8/95

4

Defense Printing Services

◆ Operates under the administration of the Navy and provides printing services for the following.

- Red River Army Depot
- Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant
- Defense Finance Accounting System
- Corpus Christi Army Depot
- Sacramento Army Depot
- Sierra Army Depot

◆ Prints

- Weekly and bi-weekly payroll
- Contracts
- Issue runs
- Competition bid packages
- General paper media

6/8/95

5

General Services Administration

◆ Serves as the fleet manager for all motor vehicles utilized by RRAD and tenants.

◆ Motor vehicles removed from service are offered to the general public for bid in public auctions.

6/8/95

6



Consolidated Non-Appropriated Fund Accounting Office

- ◆ Provides financial accounting services to 88 installations CONUS and OCONUS.
 - Saudia Arabia
 - Puerto Rico
 - Alaska
 - 29 of the 48 contiguous states

- ◆ Current customers include the following.
 - Army Materiel Command
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 - Defense Logistics Agency
 - Health Services Command
 - Military District of Washington
 - The Judge Advocate General's School
 - Corps of Engineers
 - Army Reserve Personnel Center
 - Training and Doctrine Command
 - United States Army Pacific

QUESTION: Provide the following information, showing costs and personnel estimates used in the Army COBRA analysis, for support provided for remaining operations.

Missile Recertification Office

The Army recommendation does not include this activity as "remaining" at Red River but includes it as part of the on-going DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation at Letterkenny.

Consolidated Non-Appropriated Fund Accounting Office

This activity was not included as a part of the cost analysis for the Army recommendation since its personnel (134) are non-appropriated fund employees. They will either be eliminated during the process or absorbed at other locations.

Ammunition Operations

The ammunition storage mission at Red River was transferred to the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Base operations support was included in the total (100) personnel included in the transfer. TMDE, DRMO, U.S. Army Health Clinic, and the Defense Printing Services were not included in the transfer and were addressed individually in the Army recommendation.

Rubber Operations

The rubber operations were enclaved at Red River (Lone Star) with command and control being Anniston Army Depot. Base operations support was included in the total (100) personnel included in the transfer. TMDE, DRMO, and U.S. Army Health Clinic were not included in the transfer and were addressed individually in the Army recommendation.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Non-Appropriated Payroll Activity

This activity was transferred to Base "X" and was not left at Red River.





**DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**1993
REPORT
TO THE**

Army Depots

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Category: Depots

Mission: Depot Maintenance

One-time Cost: \$ 23.1 million*

Savings: 1994-99: \$ 42.8 million*

Annual: \$ 13.1 million

Payback: 7 years

*These numbers reflect SIMA-E redirect savings

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot-maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows: instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Department of Defense conducted the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize LEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots, the future heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S., and the resulting savings.

SIMA-E, which performs computer systems design and data management functions for a variety of activities, is transferring to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 1993. Retention keeps this activity focused regionally upon the customer. SIMA-West is located in St. Louis and supports functions in the western portion of the U.S. DISA advised the Army there were no advantages or savings from a relocation to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Less than 25% of the work performed by SIMA-E is associated with the Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the consolidation of the Joint Missile Maintenance mission at Letterkenny Army Depot, as originally recommended by Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918, remains the most sensible and economical option available for the interservicing of missile workload. The community maintained realigning the missile-maintenance workload to other depots would not take advantage of the efficiencies gained by interservicing at a single site. Also, the community argued existing artillery workload should not be transferred to another Army depot as originally planned. The community cited various factors including a partnership arrangement with private industry

Additionally, the community believed Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) should not relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, but should remain in place at LEAD and form the Industrial Operations Command (IOC) from existing DESCOM assets thereby saving the cost of

was consolidated at the depot, retention of the current artillery workload could help alleviate the problem. Although not included with DOD's original consolidation plan, the transfer of Hawk ground control system maintenance from the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, could further reduce costs and improve Letterkenny facility utilization rates.

The Commission found the consolidation of tactical-missile maintenance at a single depot was a valid plan worthy of implementation in order to create efficiencies and reduce costs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, PA, and instead, adopts the following recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open. Consolidate tactical-missile maintenance at the depot as originally planned by the Department of Defense in the Tactical Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot, 31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992). Add tactical-missile maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, California, to the consolidation plan. Retain artillery workload at Letterkenny. Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Army Depot (change to the 1991 Commission recommendation) until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Category: Depots
Mission: Depot Maintenance
One-time Cost: \$ 73.7 million
Savings: 1994-99: \$ 107.2 million
Annual: \$ 51.0 million
Payback: Immediate

personnel relocations. The community agreed with the Army recommendation SIMA-E should remain in place at LEAD until DISA determined the best alternative for its future.


COMMISSION FINDINGS:

The Commission found the Army treated all its depots equally. The Commission also found the Army's process for isolating and eliminating excess capacity was a consistent and prudent approach toward decreasing the excess capacity that existed in the Army's depot system.


The Commission carefully considered interservicing of tactical-missile maintenance and found the eight defense depots identified by the Department of Defense as interservicing candidates in the Tactical Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot, 31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992) were performing similar work on tactical-missile guidance and control sections and in some instances related ground control systems. In addition to Letterkenny Army Depot, these eight included Ammunition Army Depot, AL; Red River Army Depot, TX; Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA; Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA; Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA; and Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, UT.

The Commission also found the workload originally planned for consolidation at Letterkenny had decreased. Some missile systems—the Shilleagh, Land Combat Support System, Chaparral, and the ANTSQ-73—were no longer considered viable candidates for transfer because they would soon be retired, and a substantial portion of the remaining work for potential transfer to Letterkenny was being performed by private contractors. Despite all of these interservicing efficiency-reducing factors, a recent study by the Army Audit Agency concluded the annual recurring savings to be realized from tactical-missile consolidation at Letterkenny would be under-utilized if the tactical-missile workload While the Letterkenny facilities might possibly be under-utilized if the tactical-missile workload currently assigned to the private sector, transitions to Letterkenny.

TACTICAL MISSILE MAINTENANCE CONSOLIDATION PLAN FOR LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT




SPARROW



SIDEWINDER



MAVERICK



HAWK

Prepared for: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PRODUCTION
AND LOGISTICS

31 JANUARY 1992
REVISED 30 APRIL 1992

j. Chaparral is an air defense system consisting of the missile, the launcher, and normally an M113 chassis that transports the launcher. LEAD will repair the missile, launcher platform, and missile subsystems. RRAD will continue to repair the M113 chassis transporter. The workload data is based upon this concept. Maintenance workload for the Chaparral may be further reduced in future years.

k. The Army Tactical Missile is being reassigned from ANAD to LEAD for all maintenance and stockpile reliability program efforts. This was a recommendation of the Tactical Missile Study. This action should be completed November 1992.

l. The HARM and the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will transition to LEAD over several years. The schedule is dependent upon the development of the TPS and the ATE. HARM will begin transitioning in 1993 for the Peculiar Support Equipment (P.S.E.), followed by the control sections, and finally the guidance sections in 1996. For planning purposes, it is assumed that both AMRAAM and HARM will activate depot maintenance at LEAD in 1995.

m. RRAD maintains a Theatre Readiness Monitoring Facility in support of the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) and Phased Array Tracking To Intercept Of Target (PATRIOT) missile programs. Marine Corps Logistics Base at Barstow, California is the Marine's depot maintenance point for the HAWK system. These operations will continue at their present location as recommended in the Tactical Missile Study, and this workload was not considered for consolidation at LEAD.

n. The Avenger is a mobile air defense system, using Stinger missiles and mounted on a High Mobility Motorized Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) truck, using a forward looking infrared sensor for target acquisition. It is a division and brigade-level component of the forward area air defense system and was originally called the pedestal mounted Stinger. The Air-To-Air Stinger (ATAS) is a defensive missile fired from a helicopter at enemy aircraft. Neither Avenger, nor the ATAS were included in the Tactical Missile Study. Both are tactical missile systems that will transition to LEAD. There are depot level maintenance (DLM) requirements for the Avenger beginning in FY93. Avenger DLM capability should be established at LEAD to meet FY93 requirements.

o. The PATRIOT system is produced by Raytheon Corporation, and LEAD is the current organic depot support for the system. This plan includes the consolidation of all depot maintenance for PATRIOT to LEAD. There is also approximately \$30 million in PATRIOT maintenance performed by NATO Maintenance Support Activity that was not included in the consolidation planning.

p. Many of the systems identified for transition may never be consolidated. The future reductions to DOD budgets may force the elimination of systems from the active inventory. In addition, not all systems should be assumed to transition from all contractors. There is an extremely high probability that 100 percent of contractor workload will not be

DEFENSE DEPOT
MAINTENANCE COUNCIL

OPTIONAL FORM 93 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages

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Fax #	Pager #
NSN 7540-01-317-7388 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	



CORPORATE BUSINESS PLAN
FY 91-95

JUNE, 1991

PRINTED BY USAISC-LKY

**Table 7-5
Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD)
DLH (000)**

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>
Workload	1749.0	1771.7	1901.9	2185.7	3284.3
Capacity Index	1643.0	1831.0	2373.0	2373.0	3351.3
Utilization Index	106%	97%	80%	92%	98%
Competition Risk	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

LEAD will serve as the DOD tactical missile (guidance and control) and missile support equipment depot level maintenance facility. All Army artillery workload currently at LEAD will be consolidated at RRAD, while the LEAD automotive workload will be consolidated at TEAD. The FY95 capacity reflects changes to accommodate these workload shifts.

**Table 7-6
Red River Army Depot (RRAD)
DLH (000)**

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>
Workload	2294.0	2431.8*	3184.7*	3285.8	2939.4
Capacity Index	2409.0	2702.0	3539.0	3880.0	3168.0
Utilization Index	95%	90%	90%	85%	93%
Competition Risk	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

All light combat vehicle depot maintenance for the Army, including repair of associated engines and secondary items, will be located at RRAD. Depot maintenance of appropriate tactical missile systems at RRAD will be transferred to LEAD. The theater readiness monitoring facility for the Hawk and Patriot missile systems will be retained at RRAD.

- * Bradley Fighting Vehicle SWA generations will increase workload.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-0001



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AMCSO


5 May 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MICHAEL G. JONES, DIRECTOR, TOTAL ARMY
BASING STUDY OFFICE, 200 ARMY PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0200

SUBJECT: Placement of the Red River Army Depot (RRAD) Missile Recertification Mission under
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95.

1. Reference: Memorandum, AMSMC-AEB, 4 May 95, SAB.
2. As indicated in the enclosed reference, missile recertification is a function of the ammunition storage mission at RRAD. Therefore, since the Army BRAC 95 recommendation concerning RRAD is for the ammunition storage mission to transfer to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (LSAAP), then the missile recertification mission will transfer as well. Additionally, detailed data included in the reference clearly indicates that because of significant transfer costs and other adverse impacts, relocation of the RRAD missile recertification mission would not be in the best interests of the Army, other services or foreign customers.
3. Since missile recertification is a function of the ammunition storage mission at RRAD, the current language of the BRAC 95 recommendation concerning RRAD should not require modification.
4. Should the BRAC 95 recommendation concerning RRAD become law, RRAD will close and command and control of the missile recertification office (MRO) will be placed under Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) or Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD).
5. The POC is Mr. Fred McLaren, AMCSO, DSN 284-0576, datafax DSN 284-3779.
4. AMC - America's Arsenal for the Brave.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


MICHAEL C. SANDUSKY
Chief
Special Analysis Office

1 Encl

CF:
Commander, HQDA, Attn: DAIM-BO, 600 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0600



POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Cost to Relocate Missile Recertification Office from RRAD

1. PURPOSE. To provide information on the relocation of Missile Recertification Office.

2. FACTS.

a. PATRIOT Equipment - Disassembly, package, transportation, installation, verification of test equipment, tools, fixtures, office equipment, and spares. \$3,400,000. BASED UPON MICOM PROJECTION.

b. HAWK Equipment - Same as above. Estimated cost \$2,000,000. Based on relocating a FMS Customer.

c. HAWK and PATRIOT Training - Train new workforce (90%). Training cost includes salaries - \$5,700,000. *Standard*

d. Missile Readiness - Processing cost over and above currently programmed cost. Work to be performed at OCONUS locations until new facilities and training are completed:

(1) PATRIOT:

Transportation	\$6,362,422	
Missile Processing	<u>5,703,130</u>	(NAMSA)
TOTAL	\$12,065,552	

(2) HAWK: \$6,000,000 Based on WAG.

e. New Construction - Worst case estimates, 70,000 square feet to meet recertification processing and inert storage requirements. Costs are based on estimates provided for Depot Tiering Concept - \$12,720,000.

f. Explosive Storage - 253 new standard igloos required to store HAWK and PATRIOT (253 x 400K = \$101,200).

g. Missile Movement - Cost to relocate storage of missiles from RRAD to LEAD.

HAWK	\$ 1.531M
PATRIOT	<u>964k</u>
TOTAL	\$2.495M

h. Total estimated cost to relocate MRO and become fully operational:

Relocate Equipment	\$ 5,400,000
Training	5,700,000
Msl Readiness	18,065,552
New Construction	12,720,000
Explosive Storage	101,000,000
Missile Movement	<u>2,495,000</u>
TOTAL	\$145,380,552

JESSIE C. WILLIAMS/3202





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110



March 24, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950327

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Senator Dixon:

Thank you for the recent opportunity to testify before the Commission regarding the Army's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations.

In response to your request to the Secretary of the Army, dated March 9, 1995, enclosed are answers to your questions for the record. The information is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The Army hopes to continue its good working relationship with the Commission in the months ahead. Please let me know if you need any further assistance.

Robert M. Walker
for Robert M. Walker
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics & Environment)

Enclosures

**RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT
QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE CHAPMAN**

1. Was the combined military value and costs of closure of the co-located facilities of Red River Army Depot, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Defense Logistics Agency distribution depot (DDRT), and their tenants considered in the overall evaluation as requested of the Army, Defense Logistics Agency, and Department of Defense by the community?

Although the Army initially considered the combined costs of the three installations/activities, only costs for Red River and Lone Star are included in the Army's recommendation. The Army considered an option that would retain the DLA Regional Distribution Center in an enclave supported by Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. However, DLA's analysis supported relocation of their facility. Accordingly, their closure costs are contained in a separate recommendation.

2. In developing workload realignment options, did Army modify the receiving depots capacity to account for the impact of changes in product mix on depot capacity and will Army have sufficient depot maintenance capacity with only one tracked vehicle depot to meet its core maintenance workload requirements and hence its readiness requirements?

The product mix (light combat vehicles, missile maintenance, wheeled vehicles, and ammunition storage) and depot capacities of gaining installations were evaluated to ensure that sufficient capacity and capability were available to transfer mission/workload from Red River Army Depot. The Army will have sufficient core capacity with a single ground combat vehicle maintenance depot to meet its sustaining requirements and maintain Army readiness. At the Army's remaining ground maintenance depot (Anniston Army Depot), the depot is workloaded at 100% of its current capacity for core workload. This workloading is based only on a 5 day, 8 hour schedule and considers no overtime/second shift work. Based on Anniston's maximum capacity, the core workload represents only 71% for core workload or 76% for total workload.

3. The Army, unlike the Air Force, has claimed savings for the workload reductions due to downsizing. Does this not falsely represent and overstate the BRAC savings and distort the analysis?

The Army did not base its base closure recommendations on savings realized from workload reductions as a result of downsizing. The savings include reductions as a result of installation closures, realignments of missions to other installations with like capabilities and excess capacities, and the elimination of personnel.

CONGRESSMAN JIM CHAPMAN OF TEXAS

1. Why does data reflected in the COBRA model drastically deviate from data submitted by the installation, specifically the costs associated with movement of wholesale/retail assets in storage at the Defense Distribution Depot Red River to the Defense Distribution depots at Anniston and San Joaquin and to depot "X"?

The DLA activity at Red River was not asked to determine costs to move inventory. They were asked to provide information pertaining to inventory movement in three areas in their data call submission. The first area was the total tonnage of inventory on hand during the data collection period. The second, was their local transportation rate per ton per mile for the movement of bulk freight. The third was an estimated cost per ton for preparing materiel for bulk quantity shipment. For both the depots at Red River and Letterkenny, they were asked to also submit the number and types of vehicles in inventory. In the BRAC office, estimates to move materiel were calculated considering both DLA and coordinated Service inventory reductions and accelerated attrition of materiel at closing sites. Materiel that is excessed by the applicable inventory manager is not considered for movement. Additionally, a closing location will discontinue receipt of new materiel and customer returns but be placed at the top of the list for issuing materiel. The result of these actions will be a much lower level of inventory that has to be moved to the receiving locations when the depot is closed. Once the quantities to be moved were determined, the cost to prepare the stock was calculated per ton by using standard costs for picking, packaging, packing and marking developed by the HQ Distribution Business Office. The costs were predicated on past issues and Defense Base Operating Fund (DBOF) issue costs. Movement costs for vehicles were based on DBOF rates for each particular type of vehicle. The costs for shipping were calculated using transportation rates submitted by the depot in their data call and multiplied by the number of miles from the depot to the projected final destination. This is basically the same methodology used in BRAC 93. Historically, our COBRA estimates have been either consistent with or slightly higher than actual expenditures. Therefore, we feel confident that our estimate for stock movement at Red River is reasonable and if anything, conservative.

CONGRESSMAN JIM CHAPMAN OF TEXAS

3. Was the combined military value and cost of closure of the collocated facilities of Red River Army Depot, Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, DLA Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT) and their tenants considered in the overall evaluation as requested of the Army, DLA, and Department of Defense by the community?

Defense Distribution Depot Red River is closing because the Army recommended closure of the Red River Army Depot. DLA has a commitment to the Services to provide rapid response distribution assistance by maintaining a distribution presence wherever they have a maintenance depot or major fleet support activity. The consideration of tenants is a host responsibility and DLA cannot comment on the Army's evaluation process.



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
308 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

May 2, 1995



Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

The attached response is being provided to request 950414-9, dated April 14, 1995, that addresses questions from Representative Jim Chapman on Red River Army Depot.

Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Ron Hammer, (703) 693-0077.


MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, TABS

Attachment

**RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT
QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN JIM CHAPMAN**

QUESTION: The Army has stated that it did not base its BRAC recommendations on savings realized from workload reductions resulting from downsizing. The Army's analysis shows the elimination of 1847 personnel at Red River and the realignment of only 375 personnel to Anniston, yielding a net savings of 1472 personnel. Provide a detailed analysis of how the Army could reduce 1472 personnel and include a description of the process improvements that will allow a savings of over 1000 direct labor positions, breakdown of the projected types of personnel included in the 375 proposed for realignment, the projected workload used to make the calculation, and the number of base operations personnel eliminated.

The Army recommendation is for the elimination of all 1847 personnel - not the 1472 addressed in the question. An additional 375 are being transferred to Anniston that are not part of the 1847. The number of personnel recommended for transfer to Anniston was determined based on the workloads at both Anniston and Red River, when there would be reductions of those workloads based on Fiscal Year projections, and the available workforce at Anniston. It was determined that it was more cost effective to retain a skill from the Anniston workforce, that is compatible/equal to the required skill, rather than eliminate that individual and hire the duplicate skill from the Red River workforce. The breakdown of the labor categories includes multiple skilled laborers in the maintenance fields (material identifiers, warehouse workers, computer operators, welders, welding inspectors, machinists, grinders, machine tool operators, painters, FME mechanics, sandblasters, assorted mechanics, test cell operators, etc). Although the vast majority are skilled laborers, there are several technical (engineers) specialties included in the evaluation. The workloads that were used to make the necessary calculations were those certified by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) for the FY 93 and beyond timelines. Base operations personnel retained at Red River (transferred to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant) totaled 100 employees. The Army analysis did not go beyond the specific authorizations listed in the total depot (W45JXX) population provided in the Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP). The transfer of 100 base operations personnel was determined based upon a recommendation from AMC with the remaining base operations personnel eliminated in the 1,847 depot staff.

QUESTION: The only apparent savings associated with the decision by the Army to close Red River relates to base operations and indirect maintenance personnel savings resulting from moving the depot maintenance mission to Anniston. What are the Army's estimated costs and personnel saved in the base operations and maintenance indirect areas. Provide the rationale used in obtaining the estimates. Explain specifically any personnel savings besides base operations and maintenance indirect personnel shown in the COBRA analysis and the rationale used in making the estimate.

The Army's projected savings are based upon the evaluation of all positions at Red River as identified in the Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP). Base operations and maintenance indirect personnel are not specifically identified at that level of detail. However, they are included in the overall personnel savings of \$254 million associated with the elimination of 1,847 personnel. When identifying specific positions, Army coordinated with the Army Materiel Command for depot reported staffing. Savings associated with all personnel are detailed in the COBRA analysis which has been provided in an earlier request.

QUESTION: Provide the following information, showing costs and personnel estimates used in the Army COBRA analysis, for support provided for remaining operations.

Missile Recertification Office

The Army recommendation does not include this activity as "remaining" at Red River but includes it as part of the on-going DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation at Letterkenny.

Consolidated Non-Appropriated Fund Accounting Office

This activity was not included as a part of the cost analysis for the Army recommendation since its personnel (134) are non-appropriated fund employees. They will either be eliminated during the process or absorbed at other locations.

Ammunition Operations

The ammunition storage mission at Red River was transferred to the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Base operations support was included in the total (100) personnel included in the transfer. TMDE, DRMO, U.S. Army Health Clinic, and the Defense Printing Services were not included in the transfer and were addressed individually in the Army recommendation.

Rubber Operations

The rubber operations were enclaved at Red River (Lone Star) with command and control being Anniston Army Depot. Base operations support was included in the total (100) personnel included in the transfer. TMDE, DRMO, and U.S. Army Health Clinic were not included in the transfer and were addressed individually in the Army recommendation.

Defense Finance and Accounting Services, Non-Appropriated Payroll Activity

This activity was transferred to Base "X" and was not left at Red River.

QUESTION: The Army, in answering a question related to consideration of combined costs of BRAD, DDRT and LSAAP, stated that it made allowances for DLA Regional Distribution Center to be part of the enclave supported by LSAAP. Specifically, what provisions were made for base operations support, medical support, DEMO Marketing Office support? What were the cost and personnel estimates for this support? Also, what costs were included for the movement of core tracked vehicles and associated repair parts from BRAD to ANAD? Were these estimates included in the COBRA analysis?

The responsibility for all analysis for the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Regional Distribution Center is with the DLA BRAC Office. The Army made no COBRA analysis that included any data associated with the mission, personnel or assets on-hand at the distribution center. Army had envisioned a possible scenario that would have included "enclaving" the DLA activity in place but took no additional actions in light of DLA's independent analysis and recommendation. All reported savings and costs associated with the DLA recommendation are in their submission and at no time were they included in any Army recommendation/analysis.

QUESTION: On January 5, 1995, the community specifically requested that the Army and DoD evaluate RRAD, DDRT, LSAAP, and tenants as a single military complex. Subsequently, the Army made its analysis independent of costs associated with the "disestablishment" of DDRT. DLA made its decision to close DDRT because of the Army's decision to move the depot maintenance mission to Anniston. Did the Secretary of Defense accept the two independent analyses and recommendations or was an analysis made at the DoD level? If such an analysis was made, provide it. If it was not done, why not?

The Secretary of Defense considered the Military Department and Defense Logistics Agency evaluations prior to making the Department's formal recommendations. DLA's decision to close DDRT is considered to be independent from the Army's recommendation. DLA decided separately that it was more advantageous to them to relocate rather than stay as part of the enclave supported by LSAAP. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance recommended the closure of Red River. The Army does not have any of the analysis conducted at DoD level.




Chart 5 - Return on Investment

As a result of the flaws I have just addressed, I take issue with the Army's calculation on return on investment. The Army says they will receive an immediate return on investment. This is simply not the case. Using DoD data we estimate that the return on investment will be 57 years, four years longer than this fine installation has been in existence. What a travesty if we let this happen. It simply does not make sense!

Let me give you a little more detail on the computations. When you take out the savings claimed by the Army that are the result of Force Structure changes not BRAC, the only real savings that would accrue are base operations or overhead personnel. This is 337 personnel or \$13.1 million per year. The Army falsely assumed that the direct labor manhours performing the mission could be eliminated but the manhours will be needed by Anniston. The community used the Army's estimate for recurring cost which includes the base operations personnel required to support the remaining operations enclaved to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. The annual net savings is \$7.3 million. We believe the one-time cost is understated by \$319 million for relocation of DLA stocks, associated personnel costs, and equipment relocation, and \$34 million of construction required at Anniston. When the one time cost is divided by the annual net savings, the results of return on investment is 57 years.

If you look at the column on the right, we have also computed the return on investment assuming the DLA mission remains at Red River and only the Army Maintenance mission is moved to Anniston. The recurring savings is based on elimination of 237 base operations or overhead personnel for \$9.2 million per year. Again, the direct labor manhours performing the mission at Red River will be needed at Anniston. The Army falsely assumed they would not be needed and claimed them as BRAC savings. The one-time cost is understated by \$34 million for additional construction required at Anniston and \$52.1 million for relocation of the core tracked vehicles and associated repair parts. This gives a return on investment of 43 years. In all cases, the Army failed to include the cost of transfer of the core tracked vehicles and associated repair parts.

Simply stated the economics do not support relocation of either the DLA distribution mission or the Army maintenance mission. We believe DoD substantially deviated from the Final Selection Criteria Number 5 - Return on Investment.



PAT DEVLIN
2417 RHOB



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Brown:

This package contains the updated COBRA cost analysis for all Army recommendations that have been refined since the original submission on 1 March 1995. Summary information on changes in Return on Investment, 1-Time Costs, Net Costs and Savings over the Implementation Period, and Net Present Value after 20 Years is shown in attached tables. Selected COBRA reports are provided at enclosure 1.

COBRA reports for the following recommendations have been updated:

Aviation-Troop Cmd	Fort Pickett
Bayonne Terminal	Fort Chaffee
Concepts Analysis Agency	Info Sys Software Cmd
Dugway Pvg Gd	Letterkenny Army Depot
East Fort Baker	Price Support Center
Fitzsimons AMC	Pubs Distr Ctr, Baltimore
Fort Hamilton	Red River Army Depot
Fort Indiantown Gap	Savanna Army Depot
Fort Dix	Seneca Army Depot
Fort Greely	Sierra Army Depot
Fort Hunter Liggett	Stratford Army Eng Plant
Fort Totten	US Army Garrison, Selfridge

The following COBRA analyses are being revised and will be forwarded when available:

Charles Kelly Support Center	Valley Grove AMSA
Fort Ritchie	Caven Point Reserve Center
Fort Buchanan	Fort McClellan

The following recommendations have no change to the COBRA analyses:

Bellmore Log Activity
Big Coppett Key
Branch USDB, Lompoc
Camp Kilmer
Camp Pedricktown
Camp Bonneville
Detroit Arsenal
Fort Missoula

Fort Detrick (Proj Reliance)
Fort Lee (Kenner Army Hospital)
Fort Meade (Kimborough Army
Hospital)
Hingham Cohasset
Rec Ctr # 2
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center
Sudbury Training Annex

This updated COBRA information has been considered and does not change the Army's recommendations. The point of contact for further information on this issue is MAJ Chuck Fletcher, (703) 697-6262.

Sincerely,



encl

sn MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

TABLE 1. RETURN ON INVESTMENT CHANGES:

RECOMMENDATION	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
EAST FORT BAKER (Increased MILCON costs)	5 YRS	11 YRS	+ 6 YEARS
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD (Increased rehab costs)	6 YRS	9 YRS	+ 3 YEARS
BAYONNE TERMINAL (Decreased personnel eliminations)	5 YRS	6 YRS	+ 1 YEAR
DUGWAY PVG GD	1 YRS	IMMED	- 1 YEAR
FORT TOTTEN	1 YEAR	IMMED	- 1 YEAR
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	2 YRS	IMMED	- 2 YEARS
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	3 YRS	3 YRS	NO CHANGE
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	5 YRS	5 YRS	NO CHANGE
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	2 YRS	2 YRS	NO CHANGE
FORT GREELY	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT CHAFFEE	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT DIX	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FITZSIMONS AMC	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
FORT PICKETT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
FORT HAMILTON	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
PRICE SPT CTR	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
US ARMY GARRISON, SELFRIDGE	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE

TABLE 3. CHANGES TO COSTS AND SAVINGS OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD:

PACKAGE	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	-313	-227	-86
FORT DIX	-112	-29	-83
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	-67	-25	-42
PRICE SPT CTR	-35	-25	-10
FORT CHAFFEE	-39	-30	-9
EAST FORT BAKER	1	8	-7
BAYONNE	8	14	-6
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	-34	-29	-5
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	-54	-50	-4
FORT GREELY	-43	-39	-4
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD	2	5	-3
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	12	13	-1
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	1	1	0
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	-24	-24	0
FORT HAMILTON	-3	-3	0
DUGWAY PVG GD	-61	-62	1
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	-11	-12	1
FORT TOTTEN	0	-2	2
FITZSIMONS AMC	-179	-183	4
FORT PICKETT	-41	-47	6
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	-9	-31	22
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	-3	-31	28
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	-207	-294	87
		TOTAL	
		CHANGE	-109 *

* This represents approximately 109 million dollars less in savings over the implementation period than initially projected.

** Numbers are rounded to the nearest million

TABLE 4. NET PRESENT VALUE - 20 CHANGES:

	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
RED RIVER AD	-1497	-1118	-379
FT DIX	-478	-145	-333
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-285	-89	-196
DUGWAY PVG GD	-307	-249	-58
FT HAMILTON	-74	-24	-50
PRICE SPT CTR	-116	-85	-31
SENECA AD	-242	-218	-24
BAYONNE	-90	-69	-21
FT GREELY	-225	-210	-15
SIERRA AD	-333	-322	-11
EAST FT BAKER	-15	-5	-10
SAVANNA AD	-112	-105	-7
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD	-8	-7	-1
FT CHAFFEE	-167	-166	-1
FT TOTTEN	-17	-17	0
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	-7	-7	0
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	-80	-81	1
FT HUNTER LIGGETT	-64	-68	4
FT PICKETT	-241	-256	15
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	-35	-111	76
FITZSIMONS AMC	-983	-1065	82
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	-453	-573	120
LETTERKENNY AD	-952	-1262	310
	TOTAL CHANGE		-529*

* This represents approximately 529 million dollars less in NPV 20 than initially projected.

** Numbers are rounded to the nearest million

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE263-2K
 Scenario File : C:\COMRA\FINAL95\DE263-2K.CMR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COMRA\SP7DMC.SPF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1999
 ROY Year : Immediate

MFV in 2015 (\$K) : -1,117,981
 1-Time Cost (\$K) : 51,433

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	-28	-47	-14,856	-49,435	-68,407	-68,407	-201,180	-68,407
Overhd	2,966	5,133	2,884	-17,940	-24,234	-24,442	-55,414	-24,442
Moving	0	713	20,214	6,365	0	0	28,002	0
Wingio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	27	995	581	0	0	1,603	0
TOTAL	2,938	5,623	10,147	-60,420	-92,622	-92,849	-226,998	-92,849

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	1	0	2	4	0	0	8
Enl	0	0	2	2	0	0	4
Civ	0	2	714	716	0	0	1,472
TOT	1	2	740	742	0	0	1,485
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	239	669	0	0	0	908
TOT	0	239	669	0	0	0	908

Summary:

 UPDATE TO THE ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION.
 UPDATED PERSONNEL NUMBERS USING THE NEW ASIP.

RRAD

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : 02262-1R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FINAL95\02262-1R.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.BFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
WILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	26	1,363	1,309	0	0	2,708
Civ Retire	0	12	522	366	0	0	840
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	72	908	0	0	0	977
POV Miles	0	5	49	0	0	0	55
Home Purch	0	221	3,534	0	0	0	3,755
HHG	0	150	2,473	0	0	0	2,623
Misc	0	18	255	0	0	0	273
House Rent	0	60	710	0	0	0	770
PPS	0	29	6,336	6,165	0	0	12,730
RITA	0	104	1,527	0	0	0	1,632
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	57	126	0	0	0	183
Freight	0	1	7	0	0	0	7
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	6	218	229	0	0	473
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,369	2,227	1,870	1,253	0	0	6,119
Shutdown	4	969	5,667	2,984	0	0	9,625
New Hire	0	12	178	0	0	0	191
1-Time Move	0	0	1,000	0	0	0	1,000
WIL PERSONNEL							
WIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	6	0	31	33	0	0	71
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	27	995	581	0	0	1,603
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,879	4,093	11,589	13,061	0	0	51,622

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE263-3R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FINAL95\DE263-3R.CBR
 Std Vctrs File : C:\COBRA\ST7DRG.SPP

RECURRING COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM								
RPMA	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0
BOE	0	2,451	5,033	5,033	5,033	5,033	22,582	5,033
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHARPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-0	2,451	5,033	5,033	5,033	5,032	22,582	5,032
TOTAL COST	2,979	4,454	16,622	18,093	5,033	5,032	74,215	5,032
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
WILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSM								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RECURRING SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	16	125	268	317	317	1,043	317
OSM								
RPMA	2	484	3,826	8,423	10,209	10,209	33,183	10,209
BOE	5	15	5,335	10,519	10,721	10,948	41,544	10,948
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	46	16,973	50,782	67,709	67,709	103,219	67,709
CHARPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	34	68	170	408	543	543	1,767	543
Enl Salary	0	0	46	123	154	154	478	154
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	41	629	26,475	78,523	97,655	97,881	301,205	97,881
TOTAL SAVINGS	41	629	26,475	78,523	97,655	97,881	301,205	97,881

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE263-2R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FINAL95\DE263-2R.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\877DEC.877

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
Nil/CON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Yan Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OWN								
Civ Retir/RIP	0	48	1,585	1,616	0	0	1,549	
Civ Moving	0	713	15,924	6,266	0	0	23,402	
Other	2,973	2,218	12,764	4,466	0	0	23,408	
NIL PERSONNEL								
Nil Moving	0	0	21	22	0	0	71	
OTHER								
MAP / RSE	0	27	998	501	0	0	1,602	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,973	4,003	21,589	12,861	0	0	51,632	
RECURRING NET								
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	Total	Beyond
PAN HOUSE OPS	-0	-16	-125	-268	-317	-317	-1,043	-317
OWN								
APMA	-2	-484	-3,826	-8,422	-10,209	-10,209	-33,153	-10,209
BOB	-5	2,417	-302	-13,407	-13,609	-13,916	-30,961	-13,916
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-46	-16,973	-50,782	-67,709	-67,709	-203,219	-67,709
CRAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NIL PERSONNEL								
Nil Salary	-36	-68	-216	-531	-698	-698	-2,245	-698
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Risc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-41	1,827	-21,442	-73,490	-92,622	-92,849	-278,622	-92,849
TOTAL NET COST	2,932	5,830	10,147	-60,630	-92,622	-92,849	-226,990	-92,849

Pat Dawlin



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO
ATTENTION (U)

May 30, 1995

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is in response to your request 950518-4, dated May 17, 1995, concerning questions the Commission addressed on the breakout of ground vehicle depot maintenance, wartime ground vehicle depot maintenance workload for Anniston, Letterkenny, and Red River, and a listing of core weapons systems.

The requested information has been provided directly to the Commission staff to meet briefing/presentation requirements. Attached is an additional copy for your files.

Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Ron Hamner, (703) 693-0077.


MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, TABS





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND
5001 EBENHOWER AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-5001



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AMCLG-MP

- 3 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL DENNIS L. BENCROFF, COMMANDER, U.S.
ARMY INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, (PROV),
ROCK ISLAND, IL 61299-6000

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Transfers of
Core and Above-Core Depot Maintenance Work

1. Reference meeting, Red River Army Depot- (RRAD), 20-21 Apr 95, chaired by RRAD BRAC office and attended by RRAD, Industrial Operations Command (IOC), AMC, and HQDA BRAC personnel.
2. This memorandum provides guidance on how to treat above-core depot maintenance work in BRAC 95 implementation plans. It responds to questions regarding above-core work raised at referenced meeting.
3. Plan to transfer above-core work from RRAD and Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) to an organic Army maintenance depot. If the commodity of the above-core work is addressed by the BRAC 95 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) recommendations, follow the recommendations. For example, plan to transfer above-core missile work from Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD). If the commodity is not mentioned in the BRAC 95 OSD recommendations, plan to transfer the work to the depot that could best accommodate it.
4. We will continue to plan for transition to a core-based methodology for determining source of repair. As we do this, we may in the future identify organic work for which contracting would be appropriate. However, given our commitment to implementing BRAC 95 quickly, it is not feasible to reevaluate in our implementation plans source-of-repair decisions for work already programmed.
5. Point of contact at HQ AMC is Mr. Mike Russell, AMCLG-MP, DSN 284-8249.
6. AMC -- America's Arsenal for the Brave.

VR
James B. Enchever
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Logistics and Operations

ANCLG-MP

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Transfers of
Core and Above-Core Depot Maintenance Work

CF:

HQDA, ATTN: DALO-SMM

COMMANDER

ATCOM, ATTN: AMSAT-G

CECOM, ATTN: AMSEL-CG

MICOM, ATTN: ANSMI-CG

TACOM, ATTN: AMSTA-CG

IOC, ATTN: AMSMC-AEE

RRAD, ATTN: SDSRR-B

CofS DESCOM, ATTN: AMSDS-MN

DIRECTOR, ACALE, ATTN: AMSTA-AC

**DEFENSE DEPOT
MAINTENANCE COUNCIL**



**BUSINESS PLAN
FISCAL YEARS 1995-1999**



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000



JAN 30 1995


MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, Fiscal Years 1995-1999

This Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan is approved for distribution and use. It is a compilation of initiatives and actions pursued by DoD Components to strengthen, streamline, and restructure the depot maintenance program.

The Plan recaps recently issued depot maintenance policies. Service strategies for implementing these policies include methodologies for calculating depot maintenance core and statistical information on various aspects of depot maintenance management. It should be recognized that all projections may be impacted by recommendations of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. We will update the Plan to keep pace with these changing requirements.

Please direct questions, comments, and suggestions for improving the Plan to our Maintenance Policy, Programs and Resources office, telephone (703) 697-7980.


James R. Klugh
Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics)



CHAPTER 6

CAPACITY AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION

6.1 CAPACITY AND UTILIZATION MEASUREMENT IMPROVEMENT

In FY90 a study was initiated by the Joint Policy Coordinating Group on Depot Maintenance (JPCG-DM) to review DOD capacity measurement and utilization policies. The results of that study and its recommended revisions to the then DOD 4151.15-H, Depot Maintenance Production Shop Capacity Measurement Handbook, 22 July 1976, were submitted to the then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) (ASD(P&L)) on 5 December 1990. ASD(P&L) approved the study report on 25 January 1991 and began a process of revising the capacity handbook, which when published, will be designated DOD 4151.18-H and entitled the Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook.

Capacity utilization is a broad heading under which various types of actions are grouped. The unifying theme of these actions is that they promote a more cost effective use of DOD organic maintenance facilities.

The primary means of increasing capacity utilization is consolidation, which decreases overhead costs by reducing the number of facilities necessary to complete depot workload requirements. Savings from military construction (MILCON) and capital equipment avoidance are also by-products of workload consolidations, since fewer new facilities, refurbishment and/or equipment are needed in performing depot maintenance.

Another major facet of capacity utilization is process efficiencies. Through the application of Total Quality Management (TQM) procedures, depots are able to improve efficiency in accomplishing current workloads, thereby reducing customer costs.

6.2 CAPACITY UTILIZATION SUMMARY

This section provides tables which depict, by depot, the impact of all planned workload, capacity, and depot capacity utilization changes over the period FY94-FY99. These figures reflect planned closures, interservicing, consolidations, divestitures, and facility and equipment layaways. The tables are comprised of three categories:

- Workload, which shows the amount of workload in direct labor hours that the depot anticipates in a given fiscal year;
- Capacity Index, which shows the amount of workload in direct labor hours that the depot can effectively produce annually on a single shift, 40-hour week basis;

Utilization Index, which is a computation of dividing workload by capacity index;

Capacity and utilization data were computed in accordance with the methodology outlined in the DDMC Capacity Measurement Study Improvement Report, 5 December 1990, for all depots activities except the NAVSEA shipyards. The shipyard capacity and utilization indexes were computed on a different basis, noted in section 6.3.3. Capacity data represents the total capacity at each depot, including reserve and excess capacity.

When appropriate, tables are followed by notes describing particular strategies for those depots. These notes also provide explanations of any unusual fluctuations shown by the data in a given table.

6.2.1 Army

**Table 6-1
Anniston Army Depot (ANAD)
(DLH 000)**

	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>
Workload	2,336	2,909	2,976	2,375	1,815	1,763
Capacity Index	3,200	3,200	3,200	3,200	3,200	3,200
Utilization Index	73%	91%	93%	74%	57%	55%

**Table 6-2
Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD)
(DLH 000)**

	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>
Workload	2,936	3,431	3,507	3,635	3,606	3,833
Capacity Index	4,394	4,307	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009
Utilization Index	67%	80%	87%	91%	90%	96%

There is a projected capacity decrease in FY96 (298,000 DLH) which is a result of force modernization systems, equating to a workload mix change and a redesign/re-layout of maintenance facilities. Airframes will be larger and work station size will increase, resulting in fewer work positions.

Table 6-3
Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD)
(DLH 000)

	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>
Workload	1,161	1,876	2,461	2,477	1,984	1,961
Capacity Index	1,869	1,995	2,197	2,312	2,355	2,485
Utilization Index	62%	94%	112%	107%	84%	79%

The gradual and steady increase in the LEAD Capacity Index from FY94 to FY99 reflects the incoming tactical missile workload.

Table 6-4
Red River Army Depot (RRAD)
(DLH 000)

	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>
Workload	1,565	1,749	1,964	2,154	1,580	1,493
Capacity Index	3,095	3,233	3,233	3,233	3,233	3,233
Utilization Index	51%	54%	61%	67%	49%	46%

There is a projected capacity increase in FY95 (138,000 DLH) which is due to several previously programmed minor MILCON projects. The overall decline in workload is due to DOD force structure reductions.

FY99 Depot Requirements

FY99 Workload Capacity
Manhours (000) Manhours (000)

Red River	1493	3233
Anniston	1763	3200
Letterkenny	1961	2485
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	5217	8918

$\frac{5217}{8918}$ X 3 Depots = 1.75

Benefits Resulting From



the
DoD Recommendation To
Consolidate
Ground Combat Vehicle Maintenance

BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE DOD RECOMMENDATION TO CONSOLIDATE GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

The information within this package addresses the benefits resulting from the DOD recommendation to consolidate depot maintenance of all ground combat vehicles at a single depot. The driving forces behind the recommendation include the following:

- a. The dollars saved by reducing infrastructure and improving operating efficiencies.
- b. The readiness improvements realized by supporting all ground combat vehicles from a single site.

The information presented in the "Briefing Chart" section of this package illustrate the stated savings/improvements. Charts presenting vehicle weapon systems and projected workload for ANAD, LEAD, and RRAD are also included. The information demonstrates ANAD has a fewer numbers of supported vehicle systems, but has greater projected vehicle workload levels. This relationship proves that supported system(s)' complexity is a more accurate assessment of a depot's capabilities than numbers of systems supported.


The "Reference Data" section of the package includes the charts' data sources. The alphabetic designation of each chart matches the tab containing the chart's reference/source data.

Excessive Capacity



Excessive Infrastructure

Excessive Costs!



Capacity & Workload Source: BRAC 95 Data Calls

Maximum Potential Capacity = Max. Cap. A Depot Can Achieve on a 1-8-5 Workshift with No Restrictions on Equipment or Personnel

PEACETIME

BRAC 95 Consolidated Combat Vehicle Workload vs Anniston Combat Vehicle Capacity (1-8-5)


<u>Commodity</u>	<u>FY 97</u>	<u>FY 98</u>	<u>FY 99</u>
LEAD			
SP Howitzers	1208	618	416
ANAD			
Engines & Comp	392	392	385
Combat Vehicles	1787	1146	1058
RRAD			
Engines & Comp	122	118	120
Combat Vehicles	1887	1261	1142
Construction Equip	25	17	17
Total Workload	5421	3552	3138
Total Transition Workload*	4213	3552	3138
ANAD Max Capacity	4042	4042	4042
ANAD Utilization(%)	104	88	78

* RRAD transition in FY 97 & LEAD transition in FY 98

CAPACITY BY	CBT VEHICLE	OTHER
Vehicle	3118	
Engines	924	
Missile		107 **
Ground Spt & Other		364
TOTAL	4042	471

** Transitioning to LEAD & TOAD as part of BRAC 93 & BRAC 95

Anniston Capacity/Utilization



Conclusions:

Anniston can accommodate the consolidated tracked vehicle workload.

Anniston's maximum peacetime capacity will increase with the transfer of equipment from RRAD and LEAD and the opening of laid away facilities.

Anniston's maximum peacetime Combat Vehicle capacity (4042 mhrs) is based on a 1-8-5 operation.


MOBILIZATION/WARTIME

Actual Impact Closing 2 Ground Depots

Using Multiple Shifts
ANAD Capacity
Meets/Exceeds
Mobilization/Wartime
Ground Depot Capacity
Requirements

Short Wartime
Requirement


No Problem
Funded
Workload



PEACETIME
CAPACITY
(1-8-5)

ANAD MAXIMUM
POTENTIAL
CAPACITY
(Multiple Shifts)

Annual Operating Cost Savings Resulting from Consolidation of Workload




Consolidation of Ground Combat Vehicle Workload from 3 to 1 Depots Produces Annual Savings by Reducing Overhead Costs!

TOTAL

Ground Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance Program Workload

DEPOT	TOTAL GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEMS SUPPORTED	WORKLOAD COMMODITIES	PROJECTED WORKLOAD IN M DLH		
			FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
ANAD	M1FOV	COMBAT VEH, TANKS	1.787	1.146	1.058
	M88				
	AVLB	ENGINES, TANKS	.392	.392	.385
	M728				
M551	TOTAL	2.179	1.538	1.443	
M60A3					
RRAD	BFVS	COMBAT VEH, TANKS	1.887	1.261	1.142
	MLRS				
	M113FOV	ENGINES, TANKS	.122	.118	.120
	PLS				
	HETS	CONST EQUIP.	.025	.017	.017
	M9ACE				
M577	TOTAL	2.034	1.396	1.279	
M981					
LEAD	M109	COMBAT VEH SELF PROPELLED	1.208	.618	.416
	M992FAASV				
	M578	TOTAL	1.208	.618	.416
M110					



CAPACITY

BRAC 95

1.3 Assuming (a) the current projected total workload remains as assigned; (b) that sufficient production demand is available to justify maximum hiring, with no significant investment in capital equipment; and (c) no major Military Construction additional to that already approved and funded: what is the maximum extent to which operations, by commodity group, could be expanded for depot maintenance work at your activity, based on the current and future planned workload mixes? Please provide your response in the absolute maximum number of direct labor hours (DLHs).

Table 1.3.a: Maximum Potential Capacity

COMMODITY GROUP	INDEX (DLHs)				
	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999
Special Interest Calibration	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Engines Tanks	923,618	923,618	923,618	923,618	923,618
Missiles Tactical	597,961	217,466	116,206	116,206	116,206
Combat Vehicles Tanks	2,635,787	3,016,282	3,117,542	3,117,542	3,117,542
Ground Gen Equipment Small Arms	329,864	329,864	329,864	329,864	329,864
Munitions	***	***	***	***	***
Other	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
*** TOTAL	4,512,230	4,512,230	4,512,230	4,512,230	4,512,230

COMBAT VEH TOTAL 4,041,560 4,041,560 4,041,560

Although only five commodity groups are used as a basis for displaying Anniston Army Depot Capacity Index, these are not the only commodity groups ANAD has the capability to support. See Table 1.1.b for additional information.

** As the tactical missile maintenance mission leaves in FY96, the associated capacities will be reutilized to support electronic/hydraulic components of Ground Combat Vehicles.

*** Since ammunition maintenance capacity is not captured in the Capability Engineering Data Reporting System (CEDRS) files, it is not included in the Maximum Potential Capacity Index total.

**** Per HQDESCOM instructions, includes turbine and internal combustion engines.

NOTE: DESCOM use a new CI which really is the CI in 1.1.a plus any new capacity that would be created by assuming that workstations are available to fill up all unused space plus personnel to man both current and new workstations given the commodity mix for which the facility was designed.

NOTE: Maximum potential capacity is identifying what the depot's capacity could expand to if there were no limits on equipment and workstations. This basically looks at capacity based on available floor space and how it could be maximized.

ANAD MAX. POT. CAP FOR COMBAT VEHICLES

3

(Pg 1 of 3) = 4.042 MDLH

ANAD/LEAD/RRAD MAX POT (MID) FOR COMB VEH

ANAD (Pg 1 of 3) = 4.042

LEAD (Pg 3 of 3) = 1.605

RRAD (Pg 2 of 3) = 3.360

TOTAL = 8.997

GRAPH DATA

19 OCT 94

RLA



CAPACITY

1. Capacity Utilization - 1.3 Continued

1.3 Assuming (a) that the current projected total workload remains as assigned; (b) that sufficient production demand is available to justify maximum hiring with no significant investment in capital equipment; and (c) that no major Military Construction additional to that already approved and funded; What is the maximum extent to which operations, by commodity group, could be expanded for depot maintenance work at your activity based on the current and future planned workload mixes? Please provide your response in the absolute maximum number of direct labor hours (DLHs).

Table 1.3.a: Maximum Potential Capacity

COMMODITY GROUP	INDEX (X DLHs)				
	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999
Aircraft Comp Ordnance	274	274	274	274	274
Ground Combat Vehicles Components	170	170	170	170	170
Missiles Tactical	380	380	380	380	380
Combat Vehicles Tanks	2768	2768	2768	2768	2768
Crane Equipment	160	160	160	160	160
Tactical Vehicles Vehicles	399	399	399	399	399
Components	133	133	133	133	133
Ground Gen Equip Other	360	360	360	360	360
Spec Interest Calibration	40	40	40	40	40
TOTAL	4,684	4,684	4,684	4,684	4,684

Legal for 3 to 6A
08b, 210574 or

Revised 20 June 1994

COMBAT VEH TOTAL

3,630 3,360 3,360

122
3/18
170
2768
399
133
360
40

y, Capacity Utilization, continued

Table 1.3.a: Maximum Potential Capacity



COMMODITY GROUP*	INDEX (DLHs)				
	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999
Missiles Tactical	1,156,825	1,414,580	1,529,650	1,572,606	1,572,606
Combat Veh Self Prop	1,316,387	1,316,387	1,316,387	1,316,387	1,446,797
Combat Veh Towed	158,030	158,030	158,030	158,030	158,030
Ground Gen Equip Munitions	42,959	42,959	42,959	42,959	42,959
Generators	42,959	42,959	42,959	42,959	42,959
Other	23,014	23,014	23,014	23,014	23,014
Ammo Maint (274)	420,385	420,385	420,385	420,385	420,385
GRAND TOTAL	3,160,559	3,418,314	3,533,384	3,576,340	3,706,750

for in category to how

COMBAT VEH TOTAL

1,474,417 1,474,417 1,604,827

* Capacity is computed based on a 1-8-5 work week and the physical restrictions of our current commodity mix. For example, the maximum capacity of our ammunition operations is constrained by Army (AMC) safety restrictions. Changes to our workload mix could substantially increase our capacity. PATRIOT and HAWK occupy dual-purpose space. This space can support missiles and/or ground support equipment.

GRAPH DATA

ANAD MAX POT CAP FOR COMBAT VEH.

(Pg 1 of 3) = 4.042 MDLH

ANAD/LEAD/READ MAX. POT. CAP FOR COMBAT VEH.

ANAD (Pg 1 of 3) = 4.042
 LEAD (Pg 3 of 3) = 1.605
 READ (Pg 2 of 3) = 3.360

TOTAL = 9.008

E3

WORKLOAD

J. Programmed Workload, continued

Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload

COMMODITY GROUP ANAD	DLIs In M				
	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Engines Tanks	.228	.397	.392	.392	.385
Missiles Tactical	.166	.107	.084	.072	.067
Combat Vehicles Tanks	2.284	2.360	1.787	1.346	1.058
Ground Gen Equip Small Arms	.186	.089	.089	.182	.232
Munitions	.009	.005	.005	.005	.007
Other	.015	.016	.016	.016	.012
Spec Interest Calibration	.001	.002	.002	.002	.002
TOTAL	2.909	2.976	2.375	1.815	1.763

TOTAL GROUND COMBAT VEH ^{2.179} ^{1.538} ^{1.443}
 NOTE: Use the latest data available. Identify reimbursable work separately.

CONSOLIDATED GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE WORKLOAD

	97	98	99
(pg 1 of 3) ANAD	2.179	1.538	1.443
(pg 2 of 3) LEAD	1.208	.618	.416
(pg 3 of 3) RRAD	2.034	1.396	1.279
<u>TOTAL</u>	5.421	3.552	3.138

Programmed Workload, continued

Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload

COMMODITY GROUP LEAD	DLHs in M (REIMB)				
	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Missiles Tactical	.758 (.221)	1.195 (.612)	1.234 (.642)	1.334 (.671)	1.502 (.642)
Combat Vehicles Self-Propelled	.999 (.293)	1.180 (.416)	1.208 (.438)	.618 (.189)	.416 (.111)
Towed	.030 (.009)	.033 (.011)	.035 (.011)	.032 (.011)	.042 (.011)
Ground Gen Equip Munitions	.038 (0)	0	0	0	0
Generators	.039 (0)	.047 (0)	0	0	0
Other	.012 (0)	.006 (0)	0	0	.001 (0)
TOTAL	1.876 (.523)	2.461 (1.039)	2.477 (1.091)	1.984 (.871)	1.962 (.764)

TOTAL GROUND COMBAT VEH 1.208 .618 .416
 NOTE: Use the latest data available. Identify reimbursable work separately.

216

216


3. Programmed Workload, continued

Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload


COMMODITY GROUP	DLHs in M (REIMB)					
	RRAD	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Aircraft Comp Ordnance		.026 (.002)	.029 (.002)	.029 (.002)	.036 (.002)	.037 (.002)
Engines Tanks		.070 (.006)	.097 (.007)	.122 (.007)	.118 (.007)	.120 (.007)
Missiles Tactical		.115 (.020)	.083 (.019)	.088 (.019)	.141 (.019)	.170 (.019)
Combat Vehicles Tanks		1.250 (.290)	1.697 (.762)	1.887 (.802)	1.261 (.361)	1.142 (.348)
Const Equipment		.028 (0)	.044 (.030)	.025 (.010)	.017 (0)	.017 (0)
Tactical Vehicles Vehicles		.193 (.026)	0	0	0	0
Components		.015 (.015)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)
Ground Gen Equip Other		.050 (0)	.011 (0)	0	.004 (0)	.004 (0)
Spec Interest Calibration		.002 (0)	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		1.749 (.359)	1.964 (.823)	2.154 (.843)	1.580 (.392)	1.493 (.579)

TOTAL COMMOD COMBAT VEH 2.034 1.396 1.274
 NOTE: Use the latest data available. (Identify nonreimbursable cost separately.)


F6




SEE TAB A



Anniston's Multi-Work Schedule Capacity





Cost Advantages of Consolidating Ground Combat Vehicle Maintenance

Total FY95 Overhead Cost = \$79,037,000

Assuming Same Overhead Costs in FY97 (\$79,037,000) and
Comparing the Effect Workload has on rates....


FY97

ANAD ONLY RATE CONSOLIDATE WORKLOAD RATE

Direct Hours	2,354,000 HRS	---	Direct Hours	5,660,000 HRS	---
Direct Labor	\$51,246,580 or \$21.77/hr		Direct Labor	\$123,218,200 or \$21.77/hr	
Overhead	\$79,037,000 or \$33.58/hr		Overhead	\$100,377,445 * or \$17.73/hr	
Total	\$55.35/hr		DIFFERENCE	Total	\$39.50/hr
				\$15.85/HR	

Annual Savings \$15.85 x 5,660,000 DLH = \$89,711,000

*INCLUDES increases in variable overhead costs (utilities, within shop OH) that would increase with additional Direct Labor. Fixed costs would remain the same.



3. Programmed Workload, continued

Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload

COMMODITY GROUP AMAD	DLMs in M				
	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Engines Tanks	.228	.397	.392	.392	.385
Missiles Tactical	.166	.107	.084	.072	.067
Combat Vehicles Tanks	2.284	2.360	1.787	1.146	1.058
Ground Gen Equip Small Arms	.186	.089	.089	.182	.232
Munitions	.009	.005	.005	.005	.007
Other	.015	.016	.016	.016	.012
Spec Interest Calibration	.001	.002	.002	.002	.002
TOTAL	2.909	2.976	2.375	1.815	1.763

NOTE: Use the latest data available. Identify reimbursable work separately.

2.179 1.538 1.443

Programmed Workload, continued

Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload

COMMODITY GROUP LEAD	DLHs in M (REIMB)				
	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Missiles Tactical	.758 (.221)	1.195 (.612)	1.234 (.642)	1.334 (.671)	1.502 (.642)
Combat Vehicles Self-Propelled	.999 (.293)	1.180 (.416)	1.208 (.438)	.618 (.189)	.416 (.111)
Towed	.030 (.009)	.033 (.011)	.035 (.011)	.032 (.011)	.042 (.011)
Ground Gen Equip Munitions	.038 (0)	0	0	0	0
Generators	.039 (0)	.047 (0)	0	0	0
Other	.012 (0)	.006 (0)	0	0	.001 (0)
TOTAL	1.876 (.523)	2.461 (1.039)	2.477 (1.091)	1.984 (.871)	1.961 (.764)

1.208 .618 .416

NOTE: Use the latest data available. Identify reimbursable work separately.

EG

5. Programmed Workload, continued


Table 3.1.b: Programmed Workload


COMMODITY GROUP	DLHs in M (REIMB)					
	RRAD	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999
Aircraft Comp Ordnance		.026 (.002)	.029 (.002)	.029 (.002)	.036 (.002)	.037 (.002)
Engines Tanks		.070 (.006)	.097 (.007)	.122 (.007)	.118 (.007)	.120 (.007)
Missiles Tactical		.115 (.020)	.083 (.019)	.088 (.019)	.141 (.019)	.170 (.019)
Combat Vehicles Tanks		1.250 (.290)	1.697 (.762)	1.887 (.802)	1.261 (.361)	1.142 (.348)
Const Equipment		.028 (0)	.044 (.030)	.025 (.010)	.017 (0)	.017 (0)
Tactical Vehicles Vehicles		.193 (.026)	0	0	0	0
Components		.015 (.015)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)
Ground Gen Equip Other		.050 (0)	.011 (0)	0	.004 (0)	.004 (0)
Spec Interest Calibration		.002 (0)	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		1.749 (.359)	1.964 (.823)	2.154 (.843)	1.580 (.392)	1.493 (.379)

2.034 1.396 1.279

NOTE: Use the latest data available. Identify reimbursable work separately.

F 6





Red River Defense Committee

BASE VISIT

June 1, 1995

CONTENTS

- DLAs Storage Capacity Shortfall Solution
- Additional Costs
- Occupancy, Excess and Shortfall Scenerios
- DMRD 902
- Readiness
- Army Costs To Disestablish DDRT
- Environmental Concerns



Red River Defense Committee

*DIAs Storage Capacity Shortfall
Solution*

STORAGE CAPACITY INCONSISTENCIES

MAJ GEN Lawrence P. Farrell: "Since the Agency (DLA) did not need the storage capacity, the Agency recommended the closure of the DLA Distribution Depots at Letterkenny and Red River.

FACT:


DLA BRAC 95 Detailed Analysis:

Agreements reached with Navy and Air Force to obtain storage space to offset anticipated 21M ACF shortfall.

MILCON proposed to build four (4) warehouses @ \$48M to help offset deficit.

Defense Distribution Depot Red River


Storage Capacity (ACF)



NOTES:

1. Current & Pending Lease From LSAAP @ \$0.069 per cu ft
2. Available space from LSAAP @ \$0.071 per cu ft.
3. Space available from RRAD if BRAC Commission votes to close RRAD. This would include space to store and stack vehicles in covered space.
4. Commercial Storage Space cost of \$0.44 per cu ft. (Source: 1993 Economic Analysis for DOC.)

OCCUPIED & EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY



Occupied & Excess capacities are given after applying an attrition rate of 30%.

W/LSAAP - Current DDRT Capacity Plus LSAAP Available Space with RRAD Remaining Open.

W/RRAD - Current DDRT Capacity Plus LSAAP Capacity Plus Capacity From RRAD if Closed.



Red River Defense Committee

Additional Costs



**ADDITIONAL COSTS IDENTIFIED BY DLA ABOVE COSTS
INCLUDED IN THE COBRA ANALYSIS**

NATIONAL STOCKPILE MATERIAL (ASBESTOS) REMOVAL	\$ 600,000
RADIATION CLOSEOUT COSTS	2,000,000
SAFETY/HEALTH RELATED CLOSURE ACTIONS	250,000
**REDISTRIBUTION OF STOCK	600,000
TOTAL	\$3,450,000

****Represents 30% increase in stock redistribution at 3% increase in total cost! Cost for redistribution should increase 75%.**

DDRW Letter dated 10 May, Subject: Pitstop 95 Topics for DDRW states, "Estimating Costs of Material Movement: Discrete pricing rates will not cover the actual cost of material movement." as an issue to be discussed during the DLA Closure Implementation visits (Pitstop 95).

REDISTRIBUTION COST DISPARITIES



NOTE: DLA proposed to redistribute 40% of DDRT stock at a cost of \$18,479,000. With the accelerated shutdown of 2 years, they have proposed to move an additional 30% for only \$600,000 more. The cost to move an additional 30% of materiel should be \$13,859,250, according to their original method of calculating costs.

PRELIMINARY COSTS IDENTIFIED BY ANAD/RRAD TO SUPPORT RUBBER PRODUCTS OPERATIONS AT RED RIVER

- PURCHASE/INSTALL GAS/OIL FIRED BOILER \$290,000
- PURCHASE/INSTALL INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT PLANT EQUIPMENT 250,000
- FENCING FOR ENCLAVED BUILDINGS ???
- RELOCATION OF CHILLER EQUIP AND INSULATION FOR PORTION OF BLDG 427 ???
- RELOCATION OF P&P PROCESS TO BLDG 493 ???
 - DIP TANKS
 - DRAINAGE SYSTEM TO INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT
 - SEALED CONCRETE FLOORS
 - VENTILATION
 - STEAM, WATER, AND CONDENSATE LINES
 - COMPRESSED AIR DROPS
- ISSA(s) WITH LSAAP AND AMMO FOR BASEOPS SUPPORT ???
 - FIRE PROTECTION
 - COMMUNICATIONS
 - HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL
 - SAFETY
 - DOIM SUPPORT
 - MEDICAL
 - REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE
 - PEST CONTROL
 - REFUSE COLLECTION/DISPOSAL
 - RECYCLING
 - PROCUREMENT
 - ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT
 - ADMINISTRATION
 - CUSTODIAL
 - VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
- UNRESOLVED
 - DLA SUPPORT
 - EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

DDRT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Actual Maximum vs DLA COBRA Costs

Force Structure Change	-174	
Orig -245 minus changes for 1998-2001		
Base Population Prior To BRAC Action		885
Realignment to DDAA	349	
Realignment to DDSP	87	
Scenario Position Change	-449	
Orig -378 plus 1998-2001 Force Structure Additions		
6% of 885 - Not Willing To Move	53	
10% of 885 - Early Retirement	88	
5% of 885 - Regular Retirement	42	
Scenario Position Change	449	
Minus Early Retirement	-88	
Minus Regular Retirement	-42	
Total Separated	319	
Maximum Unemployment Compensation		
319 x 26 weeks x \$259 per wk =		\$2,148,146
(90% of 319) x 26 addl weeks x \$259 per wk =		\$1,932,658

Total Possible Maximum =	\$4,080,804
Compared To DLA COBRA	\$ 153,468

PRIORITY PLACEMENT SERVICE

Community vs DLA COBRA Assumptions

Two factors in the COBRA "Standard Factors Screen One - Personnel" do not reflect the probable case at DDRT.

Priority Placement Service (60%)

PPS already has a very large number of registrants

More registrants will be added as a result of BRAC95

Fewer positions will be available because of BRAC95 and Federal Employee Reductions

Therefore, a more realistic figure would be 30%

PPS Actions Involving PCS (50%)

There are virtually no agencies and/or positions within 50 miles of DDRT

Therefore, a more realistic figure would be 100%

COBRA Changes - One-Time Costs

Civilian Moving - (50% to 100% PCS) - Add	\$2,724,907
-------------------------------------------	-------------

Civilian Moving - (60% to 30% PPS) - Reduce	\$ 28,800
---------------------------------------------	-----------

Civilian PPS - (50% to 100% PCS) - Add	\$3,254,400
----------------------------------------	-------------



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST
P.O. BOX 990001
STOCKTON, CA 95209



IN REPLY
REFER TO

DDRW-R

6 MAY 1995

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates

TO: MMDBP

1. Reference DLA BRAC 95 Implementation Guidance, 11 Apr 95, Annex G, para 2.a.

2. We have identified the following concerns and shortfalls with BRAC 95 funding requirements based on our comparison of preliminary BRAC cost estimates to the COBRA pricing model:

a. **Closure Dates.** For both DDOU and DDRT, the COBRA model identifies out-year costs which do not align with current planning dates communicated to us (30 Sep 98 for DDOU; 30 Sep 97 for DDRT). Dollars identified for the out-years will require restatement to earlier fiscal years to accommodate these targets.

b. **Material Movement:**

(1) DDOU. Funding for the overall effort seems adequate to accomplish required movement/relocation of material, people and equipment.

(2) DDRT. Funding for the overall effort seems to be \$ 1.2M less than required. \$600K of the \$ 1.2M represents the increase in the percentage of redistributions from 40% to 70%, with a subsequent decrease in disposals/attrition from 60% to 30%. Our estimate is based on the assumption that closure will occur prior to the out-year identified in COBRA. An additional \$ 600K will be required to relocate National Stockpile Material (asbestos) from DDRT in conjunction with the projected closure.

c. **Environmental.** We understand that the environmental costs for closure (which are not covered in COBRA) you are considering in your POM 97 submission were developed by CAAE. We do not have visibility of what those detailed estimates were and consequently cannot speak to their adequacy. We have recently identified an additional requirement of \$ 200K for environmental action related to unexploded ordnance at DDOU; \$ 300K for lab sampling/analysis contract; and \$ 2M for facility decontamination. This is beyond the estimate for BRAC-related unplanned environmental compliance expenses at DDOU we provided to CAAE on 4 May 95.


DDRW-R PAGE 2
SUBJECT: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates

d. **Radiation Close-out Costs.** We estimate the cost of radiation-related closure actions are \$ 3M for DDOU and \$ 2M for DDRT. This will cover historical data collection, surveys for contamination, radiation clean-up, and close out surveys to prove the areas are clear. It will also cover purchases of special survey instrumentation, contractor personnel to perform surveys and clean contaminated areas, and laboratory services. These requirements come from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and state/local health agencies. Based on our research and phonecalls to HQDLA, these costs are not addressed in COBRA, nor have they been considered in your current BRAC 95 POM estimating.

e. **Safety and Health Costs.** We estimate the cost of safety/health-related closure actions are \$ 750K for DDOU and \$ 250K for DDRT. This will cover the costs of surveys by safety and health personnel (safety specialists; industrial hygienists; occupational health nurse) to ensure that: personnel receive required medical surveillance at termination/transfer, appropriate surveys/inspections are maintained for personnel; close-out surveys/inspections are performed. It also includes the cost of contracts (such as medical and laboratory contracts) that will be needed to clear the depot for closure.

f. **MILCON.** MILCON estimates will be contained on the DD 1391 Front Pages which have been requested by MMDI.

3. Please refer your questions on this action to DDRW-ROA, Phyllis Smith (DSN 462-2331) or Laurie Beach (DSN 462-2373).


A. E. STEICHLMAN
Captain, SC, USN
Acting Commander

cc:
FO (Ms. Vandike)
DDOU-D
DDRT-D



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
 DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST
 P.O. BOX 960001
 STOCKTON, CA 95206



IN REPLY
 REFER TO

DDRW-R

SUBJECT: Pitstop 95 Topics for DDRW

TO: MMDBP

D
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 Legal
 Environment

1. Reference MMDB letter, 26 Apr 95, subject: Pitstop 95.
2. DDRW would like Pitstop 95 visits made to both DDOU and DDRT for BRAC 95 Implementation Planning. We propose the following:

DDOU 22-23 May 95

Because the scope of a potential stand-alone installation closure far exceeds the DDRW BRAC experience, we request that all major BRAC 95 implementation topics — as reflected by your guidance annexes, required implementation plan sections and MS Project reporting areas — be addressed. Our particular concerns are below; we would hope you do not plan to limit your dialogue to these topics, but raise significant issues you feel our action-level employees should be aware of. We will plan for the DDOU Pitstop 95 visit to last 2 full days, 0730-1600; we will include a tour of DDOU in our session.

- a. Workload Transfer
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Federal Supply Class Realignment between ICPs: Early completion is needed to permit timely relocation of material from closing installations.
 - DLA ICP Taskings: Maximizing Redistribution Orders (RDOs) will facilitate managing staffing, workload and Depot capabilities
- b. Personnel
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Personnel Entitlements/Programs
- c. Facilities
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues

cf: X

11 May 95 (MR)

- c. Facilities (cont'd)
 - MILCON Responsibilities:
 - Documentation Preparation (DD 1391)
 - Programming and Contract Award Issues (eg, planning dates)
 - Approval Process
 - Design Start Dates
- d. ADP/Telecommunications
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
- e. Finance
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - BRAC 95 Project Codes: Need to establish separate project codes for each closing installation.

~~Administrative Costs of Closure not funded by the Base Closure Account.~~

 - Administrative Costs of Closure not funded by the Base Closure Account.
- f. Environmental
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues (We may seek to either expand or contract environmental issues addressed during Pitstop 95, based on the number of concerns and questions we still have following the CAAE visit to DDOU on 11 May 95).
 - Army/DLA BRAC Implementation MOA. NEPA schedule impacts to reuse.
- g. Manpower
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Audit Trails
 - Savings Computations
- h. Logistics
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
- i. Personal Property
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Screening and Inventory Requirements
 - Responsibilities to Local Redevelopment Authority
- j. Quality of Life
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues

k. Other Considerations (Real Estate; Tenants; Public Affairs; Reserve Component Liaison; Misc)

- Real Estate
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Responsibility for property transfer (DLA v. Army)
 - Requirements to support Army and Definition of DLA role
 - Approval authority for short-term leases of excess facilities (AMC v. delegation to Installation Commander)
- Tenants
 - General Overview of Requirements and Planning Issues
 - Planning and programming responsibilities for relocation.
 - DLA responsibilities v. tenant (or their HHQ) responsibilities.
 - Survey Data
 - Interservice Support Agreement Issues
 - Tenant Personal Property Issues
- BTC Role: Relationship to Community, Installation Commander, BEC, HHQ
- MS Project: Systems Requirements; Reporting Concerns
- Base Transition Office Staffing

DDRT 25-26 May 95

We anticipate DDRT closure actions will more closely parallel BRAC implementation responsibilities we have faced previously. Although we request a general overview of BRAC 95 Implementation Planning issues, such as those listed above for DDOU, we would like the following issues given primary attention during your site visit to DDRT. We will plan for the DDRT Pitstop visit to last one and one-half days (0730-1600 25 May and 0700-1100 26 May); we will include a tour of DDRT with the session.

- a. Workload Transfer - SDS Change for Partial Shipments
- b. Asbestos/Bauxite NSP Transfer
- c. Reimbursables - Workload/Funding Transfer
- d. Enclaved Mission Support
- e. Administrative Requirements (critical v. noncritical work)
- f. Responsibilities of collocated depots for environmental cleanup prior to facility turn-over
- g. Participants in the joint Army/DLA facilities condition survey at DDRT

DDRW-R PAGE 4
SUBJECT: Pitstop 95 Topics for DDRW

3. Please notify us of the number and names of DLA representatives we may expect at these site visits, to facilitate administrative planning. Questions should be referred to DDRW-ROA, Phyllis Smith (DSN 462-2331) or Laurie Beach (DSN 462-2373).


A. E. STEIGELMAN
Captain, SC, USN
Acting Commander

cc:
DDOU-D
DDRT-D



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
HEADQUARTERS
CAMERON STATION
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-8100

7 h22 am
R —
ASCW-D base

NO REPLY
NEED TO

MMDB

05 MAY 1996

**SUBJECT: Closure/Realignment of Industrial Operations Command (IOC) Installations Under
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95**

**TO: Chief, Performance Evaluation Division
Department of the Army
Headquarters, U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000**

1. Reference your letter, 1 May 95, subject as above.

2. Thank you for your notification of the target date for completion of BRAC 95 actions at IOC installations. With concentrated efforts of the Army ICPs, DLA Supply Centers, and Defense Distribution Depot personnel, I believe it is possible to close Defense Distribution Depots Red River (DDRT) and Letchkenny (DDLK) in the same time frame. There are, however, significant concerns that need to be addressed:

a. **Budgeting.** As you know, in situations where a DLA activity is a tenant of a Service's installation which is undergoing closure or realignment, the cost of base closure is funded by the Military Service within their BRAC account. We must receive required funding from the Army for any necessary MILCONs, materiel movement, and for civilian personnel RIF, retirement and moving costs, etc.

b. **Disposition of Assets.** Maximum cooperation from Army ICPs is needed in providing us disposition on service-owned materiel and in effecting prompt disposal of materiel no longer needed. Specifically, at DDRT and DDLK, ask your ICPs to:

- (1) Divert procurement and returns to other depots.
- (2) Modify existing contracts to ship materiel to other depots.
- (3) Make issues, i.e., attrite assets out of DDRT and DDLK, ahead of other depots.
- (4) Treat DDRT and DDLK as priority disposal sites.


3. I would appreciate your support in honoring our funding requests and placing the emphasis on Army owners of stock to ensure requirements are reviewed and materiel is disposed and

MMDB

Page 2

SUBJECT: Closure/Realignment of Industrial Operations Command (IOC) Installations Under
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95

moved at the earliest. The established goal of 30 Sep 97 is ambitious, but achievable, and
requires a strong, joint effort. We are ready to do our part.



HAROLD E. BURCH
Brigadier General, USA
Executive Director
(Distribution)

OC
DAB-BO
AMCSO BRAC Ofc
DCRE
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
CAA(BRAC)
MMDO
FOX

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Red River Defense Committee

*Occupancy, Excess and Shortfall
Scenerios*

1. DDRT WILL HAVE EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY TO ACCEPT TRANSFER OF ALL MATERIEL FROM ANY OF THE PROPOSED CLOSURES OF DLA COLLOCATED DEPOTS
2. NONE OF THE COLLOCATED DEPOTS WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY TO ACCEPT TRANSFER OF ALL MATERIEL FROM DDRT.

	TOTAL ACF	EXCESS ACF	OCC	30% ATTRIT	FUTURE ACF OCC	FUTURE EXCESS
DDST	26,318	8,472	17,846	5,353	12,493	13,825
DDMC	12,791	4,023	8,768	2,630	6,138	6,653
DDOO	18,595	1,941	16,654	4,996	11,658	6,937
DDL P	25,150	6,396	18,754	5,626	13,128	12,022
DDTP	16,862	1,443	15,419	4,626	10,793	6,069
DDWG	18,358	4,432	13,926	4,178	9,748	8,610
DDRT	23,007	2,113	20,894	6,268	14,626	

FUTURE EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY AT DDRT:

CURRENT EXCESS	2,113
UNDER CONSTRUCTION	3,801
WAREHOUSE ENHANCEMENT	1,357
CONVERSION OF OPERATIONS BLDG TO STG	3,124
30% DISPOSAL THROUGH FY 97	6,268

TOTAL PROJECTED EXCESS STORAGE CAPACITY IN ACF 000's **16,663**

SOURCES:

DLA Military Value Base Specific Information for Collocated Distribution Depots
 DDRW-R Memo dated 8 May, Subject: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates
 BRAC 95 Data Call

CAPACITY ANALYSIS NOTES

- A DLA TOTAL AS REFLECTED IN DETAIL ANALYSIS OF BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS
- B STORAGE SPACE AVAILABLE AT DDRT BUT NOT INCLUDED BY DLA IN BRAC ANALYSIS
- C ABOVE SCENARIO
- D CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS INCLUDES OCCUPANCY RATE GOAL OF 85%

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDST, DDLP				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDST	26318		
	DDL P	25150		
		117286		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		117	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		225	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			412
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
	BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97	72.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
		65818		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		66	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		174	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			463
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
	BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		21.5	

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDWG				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDWG	18358		
		84176		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		84	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		192	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			445
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
	BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97	39.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDMC				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDMC	12791		
		78609		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		79	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		187	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			450
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		34.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT,DDOU,DDOO				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDOO	18595		
		84413		
CAPACITY FY 94-97			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		84	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		192	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			445
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		39.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDTP				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
	STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's			
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDTP	16862		
		82680		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		83	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		191	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			446
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		38.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDST				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDST	26318		
		92136		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		92	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		200	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			437
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		47.5		

SCENARIO: CLOSE DDMT, DDOU, DDHU				
DDRT 31290 (TO INCLUDE DOC, WHSE IMPROVEMENT, BLDG 595 CONVERSION)				
STG CAPACITY IN ACF IN 000's				
	DDMT	33980		
	DDOU	31838		
	DDHU	15625		
		81443		
CAPACITY FY 94-97				
			ACF	ACF
A	STG SPACE (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			618
	INCREASES THROUGH F7 97:			
B	ADDITIONAL STG CAPACITY AT DDRT		8	
	MAXIMUM UTILIZATION		11	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS TO VACATE		15	
	VACATE OUTSIDE BRAC		23	
	VACATE PREVIOUS BRAC		70	
C	VACATE BRAC 95		81	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		189	
	TOTAL AVAILABLE FY 97			448
REQUIREMENT FY 94-97				
			OCF	OCF
	COVERED STG RQMT (SEP 94 DD 805 DATA)			450
	INCREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	EUROPE RETURNS		1	
	OUT-TO-INSIDE		9	
	ASO PUBS		3	
	AMC RESIDUAL SPT DMRD 902		8.5	
D	PLUS 15% OPERATING LEVEL		67	
	SUBTOTAL (INCREASES)		88.5	
	DECREASES THROUGH FY 97:			
	DLA INVENTORY REDUCTION		35.5	
	SVS INVENTORY REDUCTION		18.5	
	SUBTOTAL (DECREASES)		54	
	COVERED STORAGE REQUIREMENT FY 97			484.5
BOTTOM LINE: SHORTFALL FOR FY 97		36.5		



Red River Defense Committee

DMRD 902

DMRD 902

DDRT and RRAD

- DMRD 902 Policy On Distribution
 - All Distribution Functions Within DLA
- HQ DLA Position
 - "There Will Be No DLA Presence At Red River"
- Distribution Functions To Support Enclaved Missions
- ARMY (AMC, IOC, ANAD) Distribution Support To RRAD

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT DECISION 902

DEFINITION OF DISTRIBUTION:

Distribution is defined as ALL actions involving the receipt of new procurement, redistributions and field returns; storage of materiel (includes care of materiel in storage/care of supplies in storage); issue materiel; consolidation and containerization of materiel; preservation, packaging, packing and marking; physical inventory; quality control; traffic management; other transportation services; unit materiel fielding and set assembly/disassembly; transshipment and minor repair.

Source: Defense Management Review Supply Depot Consolidation Study, p. 1

SUPPLY DEPOT CONSOLIDATION:

Approval is given to consolidation of materiel distribution functions at defense supply depots, to improve overall performance and assist in controlling costs under the Defense Logistics Agency.

Source: Memorandum, 12 Apr 90, Deputy Secretary of Defense

DDRT SUPPORT TO RUBBER PRODUCTS DIVISION

- RECEIVE, STORE & ISSUE RAW RUBBER
- PROVIDE CONSTANT TEMPERATURE COLD STORAGE
- SPECIAL PRESERVATION AND PACKAGING
- RECEIVE, STORE & ISSUE ALL TRACK & ROADWHEELS
 - UNSERVICABLE
 - REBUILT (SERVICABLE)
- 1,042,501 CUBIC FEET OF ROADWHEELS/TRACK
STORED

DDRT SUPPORT TO AMMUNITION OPERATIONS

- RECEIVE, STORE & INSPECT LUMBER
- HAZARDOUS MATERIELS STORAGE
- HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL
- FABRICATE CARTONS & BOXES
- ACCEPTANCE INSPECTION OF INST/
SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENT



Red River Defense Committee

Readiness


READINESS

- ◆ **41% Military Population located in central United States.**
- ◆ **Pre-deployment requirements for troops must be met from within country.**
- ◆ **Supply pipeline "clogged" with overseas shipments during Operation Desert Storm at Primary Distribution Centers.**
- ◆ **DDRT transportation network permits delivery within two (2) days for central U.S.**
- ◆ **Surge capabilities proven during recent conflicts: Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, and Kuwait.**

WHO WILL SUPPORT PRE-DEPLOYMENT TROOPS DURING A CONFLICT SITUATION?



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DEPOTS





Red River Defense Committee

Army Costs To Disestablish DDRT

CONTROL OF MATERIEL

Responsible for Procurement, Distribution and Disposal of Materiel.

Army NICP/DLA Center

OWNER

Material Release Order (MRO)

DLA Depot

CUSTODIAN

Responsible for Receipt, Storage and Shipment of Materiel


Shipment

Customer/Other
DLA Depot

DESTINATION

DLA Depots have no authority to ship or direct any materiel to a Customer of another Storage Site. Records maintained at the NICP/Center indicate the Storage Site for materiel they own. The owner chooses the Storage Site based on Procurement Location, Customer Density and Location, Second Destination Transportation Costs and other factors.

U.S. ARMY COSTS TO MOVE MATERIEL (Lines in Storage, Excluding Vehicles)



Costs are calculated at a rate of \$29.71 per line times 2 (for Issue and Receipt Costs).

As of 17 Mar 95

ARMY COSTS TO RELOCATE DDRT

Materiel & Additional

- Army Recommended Leaving DDRT In Place
- HQ DLA Decided Relocation Sites For Army Materiel
 - DDAA, DDJC, BASE X
 - Coordinated With Army???
 - Managers & Owners
 - Customer Locations & Densities
 - Program/Project Managers
 - Transportation Costs
- DLA MILCON
 - 44 Acre Hardstand @ \$19M
- Vehicles
 - All to DDAA?
 - Storage Only - No Maintenance
- Additional Costs - (ref DDRW Ltr dtd 8 May 95, Subj: BRAC 95 Preliminary Cost Estimates)
 - National Stockpile Asbestos - \$600,000
 - Radiation Closeout Costs - \$2,000,000
 - Safety/Health Related Closure - \$250,000

**BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURES
EXECUTIVE GROUP MEETING ATTENDEES**

**2 FEBRUARY 1995
0830-0930**

ATTENDEES:

DD	Maj Gen Farrell
CA	Mr. Thurber
GC	Mr. Baird
FO	CAPT McCarthy
AQ	Mr. Scott
CAI	Ms. Gallo
CAN	Mr. Burke
MM	Maj Gen Babbitt
MMD	BG Burch
<u>MMDD</u>	Mr. Roy
MMS	CAPT Orr
MMSD	CAPT Rountree
CAAG	Mr. Gelli
CAAV	CAPT Leeder
GAO Representative - Mr. Perkins	
DoDIG Representative - Mr. Padgett	

REVIEW OF SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS

- HIGHLIGHTS

- ARMY CLOSES RED RIVER- AMMO STORAGE & TRAINING CENTERS TO LONE STAR...LIGHT COMBAT VEHICLE MAINTENANCE TO ANNISTON..."DLA REGIONAL DEPOT AND RUBBER PRODUCTION FACILITY TO LONE STAR"
- ARMY REALIGNS LETTERKENNY...VEHICLE MISSION TO ANNISTON & MISSILE GUIDANCE WORKLOAD TO TOBYHANNA...RETAIN AMMO STORAGE ENCLAVE & DoD TACTICAL MISSILE CONSOLIDATION STORAGE
- ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY FROM BETHESDA TO NEW DLA FACILITY AT FORT BELVOIR
- NAVY CLOSES LONG BEACH SHIPYARD....ONLY NEEDED FAMILY HOUSING UNITS REMAIN
- NOTHING SIGNIFICANT IN AIR FORCE

Close Hold

13 JAN 95

DECISION MEETING

EXECUTIVE GROUP

BRAC 95



ALTERNATIVES

<u>SITE</u>	<u>PRO's</u>	<u>CON's</u>	<u>ACF</u>	<u>COST</u>
R&R ISLAND	Cheap	Poor facility Navy could close Retains a site	12.5M	0 (RPM needs)
NORFOLK HANGER		FISC wants a warehouse (3M ACF) in exchange Need to downsize DDNV	3M	\$6M
ASO WAREHOUSES		Poor Condition In wrong place Creates a new site	9M	
RETAIN DDLP AS A SITE Missile site only; Dead stock similiar to DDCCO realignment	Closes a depot	Poor condition Retains a site Located too close to DDSP for active stock	26M	Run in waiting (costs may rise b/c of smaller number of people at DDLP)
BUILD 4 WAREHOUSES	New In the right places	Costly	10M	\$92M
RETAIN DDRT AS A SITE Unserv end items; reimbursables; southern customer base	New warehouses Good condition Good customer base, Fits Army scenario No hardstand MILCON Closes a depot	Retains a site	26M	Contractor operated Unknown - Difference in close and realignment = +\$2M annually, likely to go higher. Saves 15.6 in MILCON hardstand. Takes advantage of \$32M sunk cost in MILCON (DOC)
COLUMBUS Conversion of OP's areas	Good investment		5M	\$1M

OPTIONS

	<u>ACF</u>	<u>COST</u>
■ If DDLP does <u>not</u> close: (Shortfall = 28-32M)		
A. Retain DDRT & Rackout DDCO	31M	\$1M
OR		
B. Rackout DDCO; Build 4 warehouses; utilize DDNV hanger; Stay at R&R	30.5M	\$99M
■ Use ASO warehouses as back-up if R&R closes and eat 1.5-5.5 shortfall.	26.5M	\$99M
■ If DDLP <u>closes</u> : (Shortfall = 54-58M)		
■ Do both A&B above but delete DDNV hanger	55.5-58.5M	\$93M

DLA - "SUPPLIER OF CHOICE"

- ◆ **DLA is striving to be the "SUPPLIER OF CHOICE" for the Department of Defense.**

- ◆ **Department of the Army has recommended consolidating its Vehicle Mission at an Army/DLA Depot.**

- ◆ **DLA has chosen to "disestablish" DDRT - the "Depot of Choice" for Department of Defense projects such as:**
 - ◆ **Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (S**
 - ◆ **ATCOM Mobile Laundry Units**
 - ◆ **Palletized Load System**
 - ◆ **Possible M1 Abrams FY96-97 Fielding Point (DDAA S Limitations)**



DLA BRAC 95 Detailed Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a combat support agency providing world-wide logistics support and related services throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) in the areas of contract management, supply management, and distribution management. The primary focus of the Agency is to support the warfighter both in time of war and peace. DLA also supports humanitarian relief efforts in times of national emergency. DLA's vision is to be the provider of choice, around the clock and around the world, by providing logistics readiness and enabling weapon systems acquisition at reduced cost.


The Agency's commitment to its customers is to provide high quality, responsive, affordable logistics services. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process provides the opportunity to examine the Agency's infrastructure and identify opportunities to effectively use excess space to consolidate or merge activities, achieve significant operating efficiencies, reduce costs, and leverage the synergy that exists among the Agency's logistics support functions.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended) and Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, established requirements and procedures for base realignments and closures within the DoD. The Act and related policy guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Cross Service Groups established the foundation for the BRAC analysis process which has been followed by DLA. DLA's analysis process incorporated applicable law, OSD guidance, including the DoD Selection Criteria, and DLA Decision Rules developed for the BRAC 95 process. The general steps in the DLA BRAC 95 Selection process are shown in the figure below:

Figure 1
DLA BRAC 95 Selection Process



Because of the breadth of DLA's customer support, our analysis considered projected DoD force structure impacts in terms of the types of support or services provided by DLA, i.e., contract management, supply management, and distribution management. To address these



Defense Logistics Agency

BRAC 95

DLA Installations

Military Value

Point Distribution Methodology

decided at 300 so as to be in synch with the BRAC law which applies at installations with at least 300 authorized civilian personnel. These large organizations have an impact on installation operations and a number of them on the same installation create a large governmental footprint that helps with costs, overhead, enhances space utilization, etc. In addition, since the host pays to move tenants if the host is relocated and the base closes, costs associated with a closure recommendation would be much higher.

2. DLA TENANTS (100 POINTS). Identifies the number of personnel assigned to DLA tenant organizations that are located on the installation. This reflects the magnitude of the DLA footprint at the installation and the associated DLA mission disruptions that would occur if the host were disestablished. Since the installation is managed by DLA, having DLA tenants is considered more important than having other tenants.

3. NON-DLA TENANTS (50 POINTS). Identifies the number of personnel assigned to non-DLA organizations located on the installation. The magnitude of the non-DLA tenants also impacts the operation of the installation; however, from a DLA perspective they are not

CAAJ(BRAC) PAGE 2 CLOSE HOLD
SUBJECT: Summary of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Executive Group
(BRACEG) Meeting - 24 January 1995 (Morning Session)

keep open a stand-alone depot we were proposing to close. Since this decision was obtained a short time before the meeting, MMD will review associated issues and bring a recommendation to a BRACEG meeting to be scheduled later in the day.

D. Additional efforts to accommodate a storage capacity shortfall were briefed. Besides achieving an additional 5 million Attainable Cubic Feet (ACF) by racking out the operations area at the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus (DDCO) and using the 12 million ACF available at Rough and Ready Island, an additional 12 million ACF of storage capacity will be achieved by maximizing cube at the remaining depots. As a result the projected shortfall of 20 million ACF previously briefed is now estimated to be an 8 million ACF shortfall. The risks outlining the Storage Management Plan and possible impacts were again stressed.


E. The methodology used to determine distribution direct and non-direct labor requirements for the distribution workload in Fiscal Year 2001, considering potential BRAC realignments and closures, was reviewed. The parameters used in making this determination were noted. Goals were to increase productivity by 25 percent and decrease indirect costs by 25 percent. To achieve this reduction, 40 percent of the direct labor and 65 percent of the non-direct labor positions will be eliminated from those depots affected by closure or realignment. Although an exact requirement was determined for the number of direct labor personnel needed to perform the distribution workload in Fiscal Year 2001, a degree of risk was assumed by assigning a savings percentage to all affected depots, regardless of the number of sites affected by closure or realignment.

F. An ongoing issue amongst the Services and DLA is determining who will pay for the closure of tenants (such as our collocated distribution depots) and who will claim savings. If the Service is required to pay for the closure (as they did in BRAC 93) then some Services feel that they should claim the savings. In either case, the Services will pay for the cost of collocated depot closures because our unit cost will have to rise to accommodate this cost, if DLA pays for the closure. We hope to receive some OSD guidance soon.

IV. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

A. Modify the DoDIG chart to show the percent of errors and the amount corrected--DoDIG.

B. Review alternatives associated with the Army closing Letterkenny and present recommendations at the next BRACEG meeting--MMD.





Red River Defense Committee

Environmental Concerns

ANAD NATIONAL PRIORITY LIST (NPL) 1989

- **SITE OF SEVEN HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL TRENCHES**
- **EXHUMATION AND REMOVAL OF 62,000 TONS OF CONTAMINATED EARTH**
- **RCRA CLOSURE IN 1983**
- **THREE SEPARATE TREATMENT FACILITIES FOR PREVENTION OF FUTURE CONTAMINATION**
- **AVERAGE 100,000 GAL/DAY WATER EXTRACTION**
- **\$77M PROGRAMMED FOR GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION CLEANUP**
- **ESTIMATED COMPLETION - YEAR 2030**

ARMY CANNOT AFFORD RISK OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION AT ANAD DUE TO HEAVY INDUSTRIAL WASTE ASSOCIATED WITH RRAD MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD



Accommodation of Consolidated Combat Vehicle Maintenance Mission




ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BRAC 95 WORKLOAD ANALYSIS


The following space available layouts (not all buildings shown) were developed to support future planning for ANAD's Directorate of Maintenance buildings, based on projected workload data from the OPS dated 6/19/94. As a result of the BRAC 95 recommendations, a follow-on analysis of the workload data from the OPS dated 3/21/95 was used to assess the capacity/capability of ANAD to accommodate the proposed BRAC consolidated workload. The analysis was based upon product similarities and our historical knowledge of the assets to be worked. This analysis resulted in the color scale layouts which depict how this overlay of workload would look in Directorate of Maintenance buildings in FY 97.

<u>BUILDING</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>TAB</u>
Bldg. 105	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94. BRAC 93 Missile workload transition would be completed leaving the building open for use.	A
Bldg. 106	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	B
Bldg. 113	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94. BRAC 93 Missile workload transition would be completed leaving the building available for use.	C
Bldgs. 128/161	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	D
Bldgs. 128/161	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	E
Bldg. 129	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	F
Bldg. 129	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	G

Bldg. 130	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	H
Bldg. 130	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	I
Bldg. 143	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	J
Bldg. 143	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	K
Bldg. 400	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	L
Bldg. 400	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	M
Bldg. 410	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	N
Bldg. 410	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	O
Bldg. 414	Depicts building area available in FY97 based on workload data taken from OPS dated 6/19/94.	P
Bldg. 414	Depicts reutilization of building as a result of BRAC 95 recommendations. Layout is based on workload shown in OPS dated 3/21/95 and includes specialized test equipment required to support production.	Q



CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



ELECTRONICS/ELECTRO-OPTICS FACILITY

 AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE


PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
OFFICE

MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 1015

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN SCALE: NTS
DATE: 24 MAR '95 SHEET: OF
DWG. NO.: ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE




ELECTRONICS/ELECTRO-OPTICS FACILITY

 AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING OFFICE			
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT			
BUILDING 113			
DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.	ESB-968
DATE: 24 MAR 95	SHEET OF		

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



PRODUCTION ENGINEERING

OFFICE

MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ARMISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 106 (SECOND LEVEL)

DRAWN BY: STAN WARDEN SCALE: NTS
DATE: 24 MAR 95 SHEET: OF DWG. NO. ESB-968

IVE TESTING FACILITY BUILDING 161


PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
OFFICE

MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 128/161


DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.
DATE: 24 MAR '95	SHEET OF	ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



MACHINING/TRANSMISSION TESTING/SMALL ARMS FACILITY



AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



PRODUCTION ENGINEERING

OFFICE
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
AMMUNITION ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 129

DRAWN BY: STAN WALKER SCALE: 1/4" = 1'-0" DWG. NO. ESB-968
DATE: 24 MAR 95 SHEET 1 OF 1


CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



HATCHED AREA IS PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION TO HOUSE THE TRANSMISSION TEST EQUIPMENT FROM RRAD AND LEAD

TRANSMISSION DYNAMOMETER CONTROL ROOM

TX 100/M9 ACE TRANSMISSION TEST STAND (CURRENTLY IN LAYAWAY)



HATCHED AREA SHOWS TRANSMISSION MACHINE SHOP (CURRENTLY IN LAYAWAY)

MACHINING/TRANSMISSION TESTING/SMALL ARMS FACILITY

GREEN = ANRAD
 RED = RRAD
 BLUE = LEAD


CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
OFFICE
 MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
 ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BRAC 95 FY97 WORKLOAD PROJECTIONS
BUILDING 129

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN | SCALE: 1/4" = 1'-0" DWG. NO.: ESB-968
 DATE: 24 MAR 95 | SHEET: 0F

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE/TRANSMISSION/FINAL DRIVE FACILITY

 AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING




OFFICE
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 130

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

DRAWN BY: STAN VALJARI	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.
DATE: 24 MAR 95	SHEET OF	ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



YOU ARE HERE




TURRET/MAIN GUN/RECOIL/MECHANICAL FIRE CONTROL/FINAL PAINT FACILITY

AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING OFFICE		
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT		
BUILDING 143		
DRAWN BY: STAN VALJORN	SCALE: 1/8" = 1'-0"	DWG. NO.
DATE: 28 MAR 95	SHEET OF	ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



GREEN = ANAD
 RED = RRAD
 BLUE = LEAD


CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
 OFFICE
 MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
 ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BRAC 95 FY97 WORKLOAD PROJECTIONS
BUILDING 143

DRAWN BY: STAN VALDICH | SCALE: 1/8" = 1'-0"
 DATE: 28 MAR 95 | SHEET: 05 | DWG. NO.: ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



VEHICLE DISASSEMBLY & ASSEMBLY/HULL & TURRET WELDING & MACHINING/NBC SYSTEM TESTING FACILITY

 AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE


PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
OFFICE
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 400

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.
DATE: 24 MAR 95	SHEET OF	ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

HIGH RISE AUTOMATED STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM DEDICATED TO COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAMS WORKED IN BUILDING 400 (4,314 PALLET LOCATIONS)



VEHICLE DISASSEMBLY & ASSEMBLY/HULL & TURRET WELDING & MACHINING/NBC SYSTEM TESTING FACILITY





GREEN = ANAD
RED = RRAD
BLUE = LEAD

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
OFFICE
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BRAC 95 FY97 WORKLOAD PROJECTIONS
BUILDING 400

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN SCALE 1/4"=1'-0" DWG. NO.
DATE: 28 MAR 95 SHEET OF ESB-968




ENGINE DYNAMOMETER TEST FACILITY

AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

YOU ARE HERE



CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE


PRODUCTION ENGINEERING

OFFICE
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BUILDING 410

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN | SCALE: NTS | DWG. NO.: ESB-968
DATE: 24 MAR 96 | SHEET: OF

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



VEHICLE FIRE CONTROL & AUTOMOTIVE FINAL REPAIR FACILITY

 AVAILABLE AREA (BASED ON FY96/97 WORKLOAD QUANTITIES FROM FY94 OPS DATED 6/19/94)

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING OFFICE		
MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT		
BUILDING 414		
DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.
DATE: 24 MAR '95	SHEET OF	ESB-968

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE



GREEN = ANAD
 RED = RRAD
 BLUE = LEAD

 EXCESS CAPACITY

CLOSE HOLD/SENSITIVE


PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
 OFFICE
 MAINTENANCE DIRECTORATE
 ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

BRAC 95 FY97 WORKLOAD PROJECTIONS
 BUILDING 414

DRAWN BY: STAN VAUGHN	SCALE: NTS	DWG. NO.
DATE: 24 MAR 95	SHEET: OF	ESB-968

Red River Defense Complex

DLA's Storage Capacity Shortfall Solution



DLA Storage Analysis

- **Situation**
 - **DoD recommendations result in DLA storage capacity shortfall**
 - **Closure of Air Logistics Centers adds to shortfall**
- **Approach**
 - **Attrite excess DLA stocks (30% reduction)**
 - **Determine impact of attrition on storage capacity**
 - **Evaluate impact of closure options**

DLA Storage Analysis (Cont.)

DDRT Excess	Million Attainable Cubic Feet
With LSAAP	22.9
With RRAD Closure	42.9
Occupied	
Ogden	23.9
Memphis	28.4
Kelly	12.5
McClellan	6.1
Tinker	11.7
Letterkenny	13.1
Tobyhanna	10.8
Warner Robins	9.7

DDRT can absorb the occupancy of one or more of the above

Proposal - Option Two


- **If Red River Army Depot closes, enclave DDRT to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant**
- **Expand DDRT capacity by using Lone Star and Red River excess storage capacity**
- **Consolidate DLA stocks in the DDRT for central distribution**

Advantages

- **Resolves DLA's storage capacity shortfall**
- **Eliminates negotiations with Navy and Air Force**
- **Allows for an orderly workload reduction design**
- **Prevents expensive commercial storage leasing**
- **Provides for a Central US Army Distribution and Deployment Service**
- **Eliminates Army costs to disestablish DDRT**
- **Avoids DRMD 902 conflict on distribution support**

Proposal - Option One

- **Defense Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT) and Red River Army Depot remain open**
- **Expand DDRT capacity by using Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant excess storage capacity**
- **Consolidate DLA stocks in the DDRT for central distribution**



Red River Defense Committee

**Community Briefing and Backup Data
Site Visit - June 15, 1995**

Table of Contents



TAB

A	Community Case Briefing
B	BRAC Impact
C	Military Complex Overview Briefing
D	Current Army Workload Data
E	Transfer of Above Core Work to Anniston
F	COBRA Cost Analysis Revision
G	Realignment of Missile Workload

Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Briefing: Community Case
Presented By: Congressman Jim Chapman




Synopsis of the Red River Case

1. DoD substantially deviated from Final Selection Criteria

- **Military Value (Criteria 1 and 4)**
 - **No combined assessment of military value of Red River and Defense Distribution Depot was developed**
 - **Army and DLA conducted separate and independent analyses**
 - **Recommendations overload Anniston, limit surge capacity, and jeopardize readiness**
- **Return on Investment (Criteria 5)**
 - **Cost understated**
 - **\$28.9 million for Unemployment Compensation**
 - **\$319 million for DLA relocation**
 - **\$ 34 million for Anniston construction requirements**
 - **Army recurring savings overstated by \$116 million**
 - **DLA decision to disestablish Defense Distribution Depot was based on Army's recommendation to close Red River, not cost**
 - **Return on investment is 60 years, not immediate as claimed by Army**
 - **Army analysis was flawed by omission of significant mission requirements such as Missile Recertification**

2. Community Proposal

- **Retain Red River and Anniston**
- **Realign Letterkenny workload to Red River and Anniston**
- **Downsize to core**
- **Team with industry**



Flaws in Army Methodology

- Savings are overstated
 - Non-BRAC savings are included \$116 million

- Costs not included
 - DLA relocation \$319 million
 - Construction requirements at Anniston \$ 34 million

- Costs understated on unemployment compensation \$ 28.9 million

- Requirements not considered
 - Supply/storage support for Rubber Products
 - Tenant support of enclaved and other operations
 - Non-appropriated Fund Accounting
 - Missile Recertification Office



Return on Investment

Community Estimate


	Army (\$M)	RRAD Complex (\$M)	Army Maint* (\$M)
Recurring Savings	\$129.0	\$13.1	\$9.2
Recurring Cost	<u>\$5.8</u>	<u>\$5.8</u>	<u>\$5.8</u>
Annual Net Savings	\$123.2	\$7.3	\$3.4
One Time Cost	\$59.6	\$441.5	\$165.2
Return on Investment	Immediate	60 years	48 years

*Assumes DLA remains at Red River




Maintenance Mission Workload

Equivalent Personnel




	Reduction	
	QTY	%
ANAD	733	72%
RRAD	285	28%
Total	1018	100%





Mobilization/Wartime


Actual Impact Closing 2 Ground Depots






Insufficient Ground Combat Vehicle Capacity at Anniston

Peacetime (FY99)



Wartime




Source: Army TABS Office and BRAC Data Call



Where We Are

- **Army has three vehicle maintenance depots**
- **Army needs to retain two vehicle maintenance depots**
- **Distribution depots are required to sustain readiness**
 - **Approximately 50% of CONUS troops are stationed in the Central United States**
 - **80% of Red River distribution mission is in support of external customers**




Red River Should Be Retained

- **Higher Military Value**
- **Higher Profitability**
- **Letterkenny Realignment/Closure
Saves More**



Military Value

Depot Rank/Score




Source: Army TABS Office



Profitability


"I consider the planned annual net operating result (NOR) as the primary depot performance measure, therefore we should reward positive variances from the planned NOR."


DENNIS L. BENCHOFF
Major General, USA
Commanding, 20 Jan 94



Profitability

Cumulative FY90 -- FY94





Army Revises COBRA Cost Analysis

- **Army's savings from closure**
 - **Reduced by \$379 million for Red River**
 - **Increased by \$310 million for Letterkenny**
 - **Current Letterkenny savings \$144 million greater than Red River**

**Bottom Line - Red River vs Letterkenny Closure
Letterkenny provides greater savings
Letterkenny ranks lower in military value**




Summary

- **Army needs to retain two combat vehicle depots**
- **Letterkenny ranks dead last on military value**
 - **Red River's score is more than double that of Letterkenny**
- **Red River is the most profitable depot**
 - **Letterkenny is the least profitable**
- **Army COBRA shows the largest net present value savings will result if Letterkenny is closed**
- **The BRAC 95 commission should recommend**
 - **Closure of Letterkenny**
 - **Retention of Red River and the DLA Distribution Depot**



What We Need To Do

- **Follow concepts recommended by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management, April 1994**
- **Retain two most efficient vehicle depots**
 - **Red River**
 - **Anniston**
- **Downsize both to CORE workload**
 - **Maintain knowledge base**
 - **Maintain readiness level**
- **Realign Letterkenny vehicle and Army missile workload to Red River and Anniston and Air to Air Missiles to Hill ALC**
- **Team with industry**
 - **Preserve industrial base**
 - **Increase capacity utilization**
- **Maintain the distribution mission at Red River**



Red River

Downsizing Plan


- **Plan developed to reduce excess capacity, Feb 94**
- **Plan identified**
 - **Resources required for sustainment of core workload**
 - **Infrastructure available for divestiture**
- **Divestiture Plan**
 - **Divest facilities to industry**
 - **Layaway any excess facilities**
- **Net annual labor savings \$37 million**
- **Reduces maximum capacity by 41%**
- **Improves FY 99 capacity utilization to about 80%**



Red River

Teaming With Industry Plan

- **Red River/United Defense - Alliance Plan, Nov 94**
- **Worksplitted for Light Tracked Vehicles**
 - **Depot "Core" - Disassembly and Overhaul at Red River**
 - **Industry "Above Core" - Modification and Assembly at United Defense**



Community Proposal

Shared Facilities and Equipment

- **Combine Downsizing and Partnership With Industry Plans**
 - **Downsize Red River**
 - **Make facilities available for industry use**
 - **Accomplish depot and industry work at Red River**

Note: A similar plan for Anniston downsizing was prepared in February 1994. A teaming arrangement with General Dynamics is in place.



Advantages of Community Proposal

- **Preserves Both Contractor and Depot Skill Base**
- **Preserves Mobilization/Surge Capacity**
- **Increases Depot Capacity Utilization**
- **Reduces Duplication of Facilities/Equipment**
- **Eliminates Transportation Cost To/From Contractor**
- **Provides Most Cost Effective Approach to Meet Readiness/Sustainability Requirements**
- **Maintains Employment Base in Northeast Texas**



Everybody Wins

- **Army**
- **Private Industry**
- **Taxpayer**



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


Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Briefing: Community Impact




Economic Impact of BRAC 95 on Northeast Texas

- **Largest loss of jobs of any one area in the nation**
- **10% of total job losses under BRAC 95 are a result of Red River closure**
- **Unemployment projected to reach over 20%**
- **No metropolitan area nearby for reemployment opportunities**
- **Unemployment benefits could exceed \$50M in first two years**
- **Based on past history (Lone Star Steel) area may never recover - Morris County unemployment is still in double digits ten years later**



Red River Defense Complex

People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Briefing: Military Complex Overview
Presented by: Dr. Phillip DuVall



Unique Industrial Complex

- **Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Distribution Depot Red River**
- **Red River Army Depot**
- **Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant**
- **Eight Tenants**



Red River Military Complex

- Defense Logistics Agency,
Defense Distribution Depot

Receipt, Storage, and Issue of
Vehicles and Repair Parts

- Army Maintenance Depot


Repair and Modification of
Army Weapon Systems and
Components

- Army Ammunition Depot


Receipt, Storage, Maintenance,
and Issue of Ammunition

- Army Contractor, Lone Star
Ammunition Plant

Manufacture of Ammunition




Red River Military Complex Synergy






Red River's Major Customers



Over 50% of all stateside military posts, camps, and stations are located in the Red River central distribution area




Distribution Destinations

<i>Ranking</i>	<i>Location</i>
1	Ft. Hood, TX
2	Europe
3	Ft. Riley, KS
4	Korea
5	Ft. Bliss, TX
6	Ft. Sill, OK
7	Ft. Polk, LA
8	Ft. Carson, CO
9	Ft. Campbell, KY
10	Ft. Rucker, AL



Profile of Assets in Storage



% LINES

As of 31 Jan 95



Vehicles in Storage


Category	Ready to Issue	Repairable	Non- Repairable	Weight (Tons)
Tactical	1,558	908	23	23,016
Combat	1,262	4,662	10	83,335
Repair & Return				
-- Natl Guard		66		693
-- FORSCOM		15		158
TOTAL	2,820	5,651	33	107,202

Note: As of 27 Mar 95



Depot Maintenance ***for DoD's "CORE" Weapon Systems***

- **Bradley Fighting Vehicle System**
- **Multiple Launch Rocket System**
- **M113 Family of Vehicles**
- **Fire Support Team Vehicle**
- **Heavy Equipment Transporter**
- **M9 Armored Combat Earthmover**
- **Palletized Load System**
- **Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units**




Army Mechanized Division Structure

• Bradleys	311
• Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	9
• M113 Family of Vehicles	706
• M1 Abrams	255
• M109 Howitzers	72
• M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers	64

We support 77% of all tracked vehicles in a typical mechanized division.

Note: Items highlighted in red represent core systems supported by Red River Army Depot



Fleet Densities

10 Division Army


Bradleys	6,724
-----------------	--------------

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	747
---------------------------------------	------------

M113 Family of Vehicles	17,353
--------------------------------	---------------

TOTAL	*24,824
--------------	----------------

****Current Production Rates = 24 Year Cycle***



Unique Capability to Support Logistics Power Projection

- **Unserviceable Assets at RRAD**
 - **Bradleys - 732**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 2,553**
- **Power Projection Capability***
 - **Bradleys - 50/Month**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 200/Month**

****With current infrastructure, capability exists to equip one division within six months***



Knowledge Base

- **Technical support to the field**
- **Mobilization support**
 - **Deploying units**
 - **In Theatre**
- **Force Reconstitution**


***Rapid response within 24 hours to any location -
World Wide***



Red River Army Depot

A National Quality Leader

- **Formally named Winner of 1995 Federal Quality Improvement Prototype Award by the Federal Quality Institute, 2 March 1995**
- **Federal sector award criteria synonymous with Malcolm Baldrige Award**
- **Importance of award lies with the accomplishments during pursuit**
- **Depot Recognized as a Quality Leader by:**
 - **Vice President Gore (National Quality Conference, July 1994)**
 - **National Partnership Council**
 - **Government Executive Magazine (July 1994)**
 - **Federal Times Newspaper (18 July 1994)**
 - **September 1994 Status Report of National Performance Review**



Red River Army Depot

A "Unique" Quality Team

- **Successful in spite of downsizing, major reorganization, and BRAC threats**
- **Most important asset is the summation of the members as one unique team**
- **Quality should be a part of the BRAC Criteria**
 - **Quality products**
 - **Performance efficiency**
 - **Responsiveness and readiness to customers**



Summary

- **Depot With Three Major Missions**
- **50% of Distribution Customers in Central United States**
- **Maintenance Support of 77% of Army Mechanized Division Tracked Vehicles**
- **Unique Body of Rapidly Deployable Knowledge**



24 May 95

1. Breakout of ground vehicle depot maintenance program workload by commodity for FY97, FY98, and FY99 at Anniston, Letterkenny, and Red River Army Depots.

a. Anniston

(1) FY97

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
3c Tank Gas Turbine Engines	392,000
6b Tanks	1,787,000

	2,179,000

(2) FY98

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
3c Tank Gas Turbine Engines	392,000
6b Tanks	1,146,000

	1,538,000

(3) FY99

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
3c Tank Gas Turbine Engines	385,000
6b Tanks	1,058,000

	1,443,000

b. Letterkenny Army Depot

(1) FY97

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6a Self-Propelled Artillery	1,208,000
6c Towed Artillery	35,000

	1,243,000

(2) FY98

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6a Self-Propelled Artillery	618,000
6c Towed Artillery	32,000

	650,000

(3) FY99

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6a Self-Propelled Artillery	416,000
6c Towed Artillery	42,000

	458,000

c. Red River

(1) FY97

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6b Combat Vehicles	1,887,000
6d Combat Vehicle Components	122,000
8 Automotive/Construction Equipment	25,000
9b Tactical Vehicle Components	3,000

	2,037,000

(1) FY98

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6b Combat Vehicles	1,261,000
6d Combat Vehicle Components	118,000
8 Automotive/Construction Equipment	17,000
9b Tactical Vehicle Components	3,000

	1,399,000

(1) FY99

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Direct Labor Hours</u>
6b Combat Vehicles	1,142,000
6d Combat Vehicle Components	120,000
8 Automotive/Construction Equipment	17,000
9b Tactical Vehicle Components	3,000

	1,282,000

2. Details on wartime ground vehicle depot maintenance workload for Anniston, Letterkenny, and Red River Army Depots.

a. The following is the projected total ground vehicle workload associated with the two-medium-regional conflict scenario. (This workload is larger than the computed core workload. Core workload is the peacetime minimum necessary to assure that capability and capacity exists so that, during wartime, depots can surge to meet the following wartime workload requirements).

(1) At ARAD:

3,122,347 direct labor hours

(2) At LEAD:

3,448,501 direct labor hours

(3) At RRAD:

6,259,782 direct labor hours

TOTAL 12,830,630

3. List of core weapon systems. See attached list.

Encl 2





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND
1001 ROSENTHAL AVENUE, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22304-0001



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AMCLG-MP

- 3 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL DENNIS L. BENCHOFF, COMMANDER, U.S.
ARMY INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, (PROV),
ROCK ISLAND, IL 61299-6000

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Transfers of
Core and Above-Core Depot Maintenance Work

1. Reference meeting, Red River Army Depot (RRAD), 20-21 Apr 95, chaired by RRAD BRAC office and attended by RRAD, Industrial Operations Command (IOC), AMC, and HQDA BRAC personnel.
2. This memorandum provides guidance on how to treat above-core depot maintenance work in BRAC 95 implementation plans. It responds to questions regarding above-core work raised at referenced meeting.
3. Plan to transfer above-core work from RRAD and Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) to an organic Army maintenance depot. If the commodity of the above-core work is addressed by the BRAC 95 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) recommendations, follow the recommendations. For example, plan to transfer above-core missile work from Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD). If the commodity is not mentioned in the BRAC 95 OSD recommendations, plan to transfer the work to the depot that could best accommodate it.
4. We will continue to plan for transition to a core-based methodology for determining source of repair. As we do this, we may in the future identify organic work for which contracting would be appropriate. However, given our commitment to implementing BRAC 95 quickly, it is not feasible to reevaluate in our implementation plans source-of-repair decisions for work already programmed.
5. Point of contact at HQ AMC is Mr. Mike Russell, AMCLG-MP, DSN 284-8249.
6. AMC -- America's Arsenal for the Brave.

VR
James B. Emahiser
JAMES B. EMAHISER
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Logistics and Operations

ANCLG-MP
SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Transfers of
Core and Above-Core Depot Maintenance Work

CF:
HQDA, ATTN: DALO-SMM

COMMANDER
ATCOM, ATTN: AMSAT-G
CECOM, ATTN: AMSEL-CG
MICOM, ATTN: ANSMI-CG
TACOM, ATTN: AMSTA-CG
IOC, ATTN: AMSMC-AEE
RRAD, ATTN: SDSRR-B

Cofs DESCOM, ATTN: AMSE-MN

DIRECTOR, ACAA, ATTN: AMSTA-AC



PAT DEVLIN
2417 RHOB



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO
ATTENTION CD

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1-125
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Brown:

This package contains the updated COBRA cost analysis for all Army recommendations that have been refined since the original submission on 1 March 1995. Summary information on changes in Return on Investment, 1-Time Costs, Net Costs and Savings over the Implementation Period, and Net Present Value after 20 Years is shown in attached tables. Selected COBRA reports are provided at enclosure 1.

COBRA reports for the following recommendations have been updated:

Aviation-Troop Cmd	Fort Pickett
Bayonne Terminal	Fort Chaffee
Concepts Analysis Agency	Info Sys Software Cmd
Dugway Pvg Gd	Letterkenny Army Depot
East Fort Baker	Price Support Center
Fitzsimons AMC	Pubs Distr Ctr, Baltimore
Fort Hamilton	Red River Army Depot
Fort Indiantown Gap	Savanna Army Depot
Fort Dix	Seneca Army Depot
Fort Greely	Sierra Army Depot
Fort Hunter Liggett	Stratford Army Eng Plant
Fort Totten	US Army Garrison, Selfridge

The following COBRA analyses are being revised and will be forwarded when available:

Charles Kelly Support Center	Valley Grove AMSA
Fort Ritchie	Caven Point Reserve Center
Fort Buchanan	Fort McClellan

The following recommendations have no change to the COBRA analyses:

Bellmore Log Activity	Fort Detrick (Proj Reliance)
Big Coppett Key	Fort Lee (Kenner Army Hospital)
Branch USDB, Lompoc	Fort Meade (Kimborough Army Hospital)
Camp Kilmer	Hingham Cohasset
Camp Pedriektown	Rec Ctr # 2
Camp Bonneville	Rio Vista Army Reserve Center
Detroit Arsenal	Sudbury Training Annex
Fort Missoula	

This updated COBRA information has been considered and does not change the Army's recommendations. The point of contact for further information on this issue is MAJ Chuck Fletcher, (703) 697-6262.

Sincerely,



encl

for MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, The Army Basing Study

TABLE 1. RETURN ON INVESTMENT CHANGES:

RECOMMENDATION	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
EAST FORT BAKER (Increased MILCON costs)	5 YRS	11 YRS	+ 6 YEARS
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD (Increased rehab costs)	6 YRS	9 YRS	+ 3 YEARS
BAYONNE TERMINAL (Decreased personnel eliminations)	5 YRS	6 YRS	+ 1 YEAR
DUGWAY PVG GD	1 YRS	IMMED	- 1 YEAR
FORT TOTTEN	1 YEAR	IMMED	- 1 YEAR
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	2 YRS	IMMED	- 2 YEARS
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	3 YRS	3 YRS	NO CHANGE
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	5 YRS	5 YRS	NO CHANGE
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	2 YRS	2 YRS	NO CHANGE
FORT GREELY	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT CHAFFEE	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT DIX	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	1 YEAR	1 YEAR	NO CHANGE
FITZSIMONS AMC	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
FORT PICKETT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
FORT HAMILTON	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
PRICE SPT CTR	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE
US ARMY GARRISON, SELFRIDGE	IMMED	IMMED	NO CHANGE

TABLE 2. 1 TIME COST CHANGES:

RECOMMENDATION	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
DUGWAY PVG GD	25	8	-17
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	60	51	-9
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	13	5	-8
FORT DLX	19	12	-7
FORT HAMILTON	2	0	-2
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	15	14	-1
FORT TOTTEN	4	3	-1
FORT CHAFFEE	10	10	0
FORT PICKETT	25	25	0
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	2	2	0
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	38	38	0
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	14	14	0
BAYONNE	44	44	0
PRICE SPT CTR	4	4	0
FORT GREELY	23	23	0
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	6	7	1
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	6	7	1
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD	8	9	1
FITZSIMONS AMC	103	105	2
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	50	53	3
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	4	7	3
EAST FORT BAKER	8	12	4
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	146	152	6
		TOTAL CHANGES	-24*

* This represents approximately 24 million dollars less in 1 - time costs than initially projected.

** Numbers are rounded to the nearest million

TABLE 3. CHANGES TO COSTS AND SAVINGS OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD:

PACKAGE	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	-313	-227	-86
FORT DIX	-112	-29	-83
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	-67	-25	-42
PRICE SPT CTR	-35	-25	-10
FORT CHAFFEE	-39	-30	-9
EAST FORT BAKER	1	8	-7
BAYONNE	8	14	-6
SENECA ARMY DEPOT	-34	-29	-5
SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	-54	-50	-4
FORT GREELY	-43	-39	-4
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD	2	5	-3
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT	12	13	-1
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	1	1	0
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	-24	-24	0
FORT HAMILTON	-3	-3	0
DUGWAY PVG GD	-61	-62	1
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	-11	-12	1
FORT TOTTEN	0	-2	2
FITZSIMONS AMC	-179	-183	4
FORT PICKETT	-41	-47	6
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	-9	-31	22
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	-3	-31	28
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	-207	-294	87
		TOTAL	
		CHANGE	-109 *

* This represents approximately 109 million dollars less in savings over the implementation period than initially projected.

** Numbers are rounded to the nearest million

TABLE 4. NET PRESENT VALUE - 20 CHANGES:

	INITIAL	REVISED	CHANGE
RED RIVER AD	-1497	-1118	-379
FT DIX	-478	-145	-333
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-285	-89	-196
DUGWAY PVG GD	-307	-249	-58
FT HAMILTON	-74	-24	-50
PRICE SPT CTR	-116	-85	-31
SENECA AD	-242	-218	-24
BAYONNE	-90	-69	-21
FT GREELY	-225	-210	-15
SIERRA AD	-333	-322	-11
EAST FT BAKER	-15	-5	-10
SAVANNA AD	-112	-105	-7
INFO SYS SOFTWARE CMD	-8	-7	-1
FT CHAFFEE	-167	-168	-1
FT TOTTEN	-17	-17	0
CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGY	-7	-7	0
STRATFORD ARMY ENG PLT	-80	-81	1
FT HUNTER LIGGETT	-64	-88	4
FT PICKETT	-241	-256	15
PUBS DISTR CTR, BALTIMORE	-35	-111	76
FITZSIMONS AMC	-983	-1065	82
AVIATION-TROOP CMD	-453	-573	120
LETTERKENNY AD	-952	-1262	310
	TOTAL		
	CHANGE		-529*

* This represents approximately 529 million dollars less in NPV 20 than initially projected.

** Numbers are rounded to the nearest million

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE263-3R
 Scenario File : C:\COMRA\FINALS\DE263-3R.CMR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COMRA\SPTRC.S77

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1999
 ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015 (\$K) : -1,117,901
 1-Time Cost (\$K) : 51,432

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	-28	-47	-14,856	-49,435	-68,407	-68,407	-201,180	-68,407
Overhd	2,966	5,133	2,886	-17,940	-24,335	-20,442	-55,414	-34,442
Moving	0	713	20,924	6,365	0	0	28,002	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	27	995	881	0	0	1,603	0
TOTAL	2,938	5,623	10,147	-60,430	-92,622	-92,849	-226,999	-92,849

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	1	0	2	4	0	0	7
Enl	0	0	2	2	0	0	4
Civ	0	2	714	735	0	0	1,472
TOT	1	2	740	742	0	0	1,485
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	239	569	0	0	0	808
TOT	0	239	569	0	0	0	808

Summary:

 UPDATE TO THE ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION.
 UPDATED PERSONNEL NUMBERS USING THE NEW ASIF.

RRAD

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE242-3R
 Scenario File : C:\COMRA\FINAL95\DE242-3R.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COMRA\877DEC.SFP

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
WILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feas Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSN							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	16	1,363	1,309	0	0	2,788
Civ Retire	0	12	522	366	0	0	900
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	72	908	0	0	0	977
POV Miles	0	5	49	0	0	0	54
Home Purch	0	221	2,534	0	0	0	2,755
MHO	0	150	2,473	0	0	0	2,623
Misc	0	18	265	0	0	0	270
House Rent	0	80	710	0	0	0	770
PPS	0	29	6,226	4,365	0	0	12,730
RITA	0	104	1,527	0	0	0	1,632
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	57	126	0	0	0	183
Freight	0	1	7	0	0	0	7
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	6	238	229	0	0	473
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,949	2,227	1,670	1,253	0	0	8,119
Shutdown	4	963	5,667	2,984	0	0	9,628
New Hire	0	12	178	0	0	0	191
1-Time Move	0	0	5,000	0	0	0	5,000
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MHO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	6	0	31	33	0	0	71
OTHER							
HAD / RSH	0	27	995	581	0	0	1,603
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,979	4,003	31,589	13,061	0	0	51,632

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA vs.08) - Page 2/3
 Date As Of 10:01 03/19/1995, Report Created 14:28 03/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE263-7R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FINAL95\DE263-7R.CBR
 Std Vetre File : C:\COBRA\SP7DRG.BPP

RECURRING COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
o&m								
RPMA	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0
BOE	0	2,451	5,033	5,033	5,033	5,032	12,582	5,032
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carstaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-0	2,451	5,033	5,033	5,033	5,032	22,582	5,032
TOTAL COST	2,373	4,454	16,622	18,093	5,033	5,032	74,215	5,032
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
o&m								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECURRING SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	16	125	268	317	317	1,043	317
o&m								
RPMA	2	484	3,826	8,423	10,209	10,309	33,153	10,209
BOE	5	15	5,335	18,519	18,721	18,948	61,544	18,948
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	46	16,973	50,782	67,707	67,707	203,215	67,707
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	14	68	170	408	543	543	1,767	543
Enl Salary	0	0	46	123	154	154	478	154
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	41	629	16,675	78,622	97,655	97,881	301,205	97,881
TOTAL SAVINGS	41	629	16,675	78,622	97,655	97,881	301,205	97,881

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : DE2&3-3R
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\FINAL95\DE2&3-3R.CBR
 Std Extra File : C:\COBRA\97DEC.97F

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OWN								
Civ Retir/RIP	0	46	1,885	1,515	0	0	1,549	
Civ Moving	0	713	15,924	6,365	0	0	13,002	
Other	-2,973	2,218	12,754	4,464	0	0	21,408	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Nil Moving	6	0	21	33	0	0	71	
OTHER								
M&P / R&M	0	27	998	501	0	0	1,602	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,979	4,003	21,549	12,851	0	0	51,832	
RECURRING NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	-0	-16	-125	-268	-317	-317	-1,043	-317
OWN								
RPMA	-2	-464	-3,826	-8,423	-10,209	-10,209	-33,153	-10,209
BOS	-5	2,437	-302	-13,487	-13,489	-13,916	-38,961	-13,916
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-46	-16,971	-50,782	-47,709	-47,709	-203,219	-47,709
CRANFIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Nil Salary	-34	-68	-216	-521	-698	-698	-2,245	-698
Reuse Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	-41	1,927	-21,442	-73,490	-92,622	-92,849	-278,622	-92,849
TOTAL NET COST	2,938	5,930	10,107	-60,639	-92,622	-92,849	-226,990	-92,849

Pat Dulin



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
200 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO
ATTENTION (U)

May 30, 1995

Mr. Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:


This is in response to your request 950518-4, dated May 17, 1995, concerning questions the Commission addressed on the breakout of ground vehicle depot maintenance, wartime ground vehicle depot maintenance workload for Anniston, Letterkenny, and Red River, and a listing of core weapons systems.

The requested information has been provided directly to the Commission staff to meet briefing/presentation requirements. Attached is an additional copy for your files.

Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Ron Hamner, (703) 693-0077.

[Signature]
for MICHAEL G. JONES
COL, GS
Director, TABS





Missile Support


<u>Item</u>	<u>Transfer Location</u>	<u>SQ FT Required</u>	<u>SQ FT Available</u>	<u>Building</u>
Sparrow	Red River Army Depot	5,000	5,000	957/1130/939
*Sidewinder	Red River Army Depot	12,900	12,900	957/939
*Stinger	Red River Army Depot	1,500	1,500	957
Army Tactical Missile	Anniston Army Depot	4,200		

*These items require 100,000 class clean room which is presently operational in Building 957



Ground Support


<u>Item</u>	<u>Transfer Location</u>	<u>SQ FT Required</u>	<u>SQ FT Available</u>	<u>Building</u>
Patriot (Major Item)	Red River Army Depot	9,000	9,000	421
Avenger	Red River Army Depot	5,720	5,720	421/406
MLRS	Red River Army Depot	8,100	8,100	406
HAWK (Major Item)	Barstow	17,000		



Cost to Transfer Missile Equipment From Letterkenny

<u>Item</u>	<u>Transfer Location</u>	<u>Equipment Transfer Cost</u>
Sparrow	Red River Army Depot	\$170,000
Sidewinder	Red River Army Depot	\$130,000
Stinger	Red River Army Depot	*N/A
Army Tactical Missile	Anniston Army Depot	\$415,000

*STINGER is still under contract and depot equipment and maintenance has not been established



LTC Bob Miller
Defense Base Closure
and
Realignment Commission

Red River Army Depot
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas
Texarkana, Texas
8 June 1995

President's Quality Award Criteria

Strategic
Quality
Planning

Human
Resource
Development
& Management

Quality &
Operational
Results

Information
& Analysis

Management
of
Process Quality

Leadership

Customer
Focus
&
Satisfaction

National
Performance
Review

- ✓ **Customer Response**
- ✓ **Union & Management Partnerships**
- ✓ **Reorganized for Quality**
- ✓ **"HEARTS" Change Process**
- ✓ **Self-Managed Work Teams**

- ✓ **Putting the Customer First**
- ✓ **Empowering Employees to Get Results**
- ✓ **Cutting Red Tape**
- ✓ **Getting Back to Basics**

1995 Quality Improvement Prototype Award "Winner"

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT

A COMPETITIVE
INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX

EXCELLING IN
QUALITY PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES

VISION

TAQ

QUALITY OF LIFE

TRAINING

LEADERSHIP

ENVIRONMENT

SAFETY

VALUES AND
ETHICS

COMMUNICATION

GOALS
&
OBJECTIVES

MEMBERS OF
RED RIVER

18 AUG 93







We
Support
The
Soldier

Red River Army Depot



People With A Vision Proudly Creating Excellence



Red River Army Depot



We
Support
The
Soldier

Three Major Missions

- **Maintenance**
 - **Performs Depot Level Maintenance on a Variety of Combat Vehicles, Weapon, and Support Systems.**
- **Ammunition**
 - **Performs Depot Level Maintenance, Storage, and Demilitarization on a Variety of Ammunition and Missiles.**
- **Missile Recertification**
 - **Sole-Source Support to United States Forces and Various Foreign Military Sales for Recertification of Patriot and Hawk Missiles.**

Power projection and sustainment through deployable and reinforceable knowledge and skill.



Unique Missions



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Conversion/Modification of Light Tracked Vehicles**
- **Rebuild of Roadwheel, Track, Bias and Radial Tires**
- **Design and Manufacture of Prototype Combat Vehicles**
 - **Large Area Mobile Protected Smoke System**
 - **M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (Stretched)**
 - **USAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal Vehicle**
 - **Joint Readiness Training Center Light Armored Vehicle Conversion**
 - **National Training Center Opposing Forces Surrogate Vehicles**
- **Special Fabrication Projects**
 - **Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) Installation Kits**
 - **Combat Identification Panels**



Interservice Support



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Marine Corps**
 - **Amphibious Armored Vehicle Roadwheels**
 - **Hawk Missiles**
 - **Negotiations Currently Ongoing for 500 High Mobility Multi Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)**

- **Navy - Armament Subsystems**

- **Air Force**
 - **Explosive Ordnance Disposal Vehicle**
 - **Maverick Missiles**



DoD's "CORE" Weapon Systems Supported



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS)**
- **Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)**
- **M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV)**
- **Fire Support Team Vehicle (FIST-V)**
- **Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET)**
- **M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE)**
- **Palletized Load System (PLS)**
- **Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU)**



Army Mechanized Division Structure



We
Support
The
Soldier

• <i>Bradleys</i>	311
• <i>Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)</i>	72
• <i>M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV)</i>	706
• <i>M1 Abrams</i>	255
• <i>M109's</i>	72
• <i>M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE)</i>	64

We support 77% of all tracked vehicles in a typical mechanized division.

• <i>High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle</i>	1700
• <i>Cargo Truck</i>	1500
• <i>Heavy Expanded Mobile Transport Truck (HEMTT)</i>	500
• <i>Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET)</i>	24
• <i>Light Equipment Transporters (LET)</i>	3
• <i>Palletized Load System (PLS)</i>	63

Note: Items highlighted in red/italics represent core systems supported by Red River Army Depot



We
Support
The
Soldier

Fleet Densities

Current USA Inventory

Bradleys	6,724
M113 FOV	25,600
MLRS	747
Total	33,071

10 Division Army

Bradleys	6,724
M113 FOV	17,353
MLRS	747
Total	*24,824

Non-USA/World

Bradleys	400+
M113 FOV	50,000
MLRS	86

**Current Production Rates = 24-Year Cycle*



Unique Capability to Support Logistics Power Projection



**We
Support
The
Soldier**

- **Unserviceable Assets at RRAD**
 - **Bradleys - 732**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 2,553**
 - **Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - 810**

- **Power Projection Capability**
 - **Bradleys - 50/Month**
 - **M113 Family of Vehicles - 200/Month**

- **Mobilization + 6 Months - RRAD Could Provide:**
 - **300 Bradleys**
 - **1200 M113 Family of Vehicles**




VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE **Support Provided in the Field** **Fiscal Years 1994 & 1995**



We
Support
The
Soldier

- 98 Site Visits
- 257 Members Deployed
- **Examples of Support:**
 - MLRS MWO Application - CONUS/OCONUS
 - MLRS VOLEP - CONUS/OCONUS
 - M113A3 Fielding - Ft. Stewart, Georgia
 - Bradley MWO Application - CONUS Locations
 - MLRS Retrofit - CONUS/OCONUS
 - Deprocessing - Kenya/Rwanda
 - Bradley Repair - Ft. Bliss, Texas
 - AR3 (Army Equipment Afloat) Handoff - Kuwait
 - MLRS Relay Box Mod - Germany
 - Combat Identification Panels - Korea
 - Bradley Radio Repair - Ft. Carson, CO



RAPID RESPONSE



RRAD Support Provided to DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM



We
Support
The
Soldier


- **Deployed 315 Members**
 - 257 to CONUS Destinations
 - 176 to OCONUS Destinations
- **Provided 30,304 Mandays of Support**
 - Painted 6,000 Items for 1st Cavalry
 - Provided Staff to USA Spt Gp in Saudi
 - Upgraded 300 BFVS in Saudi
 - Assisted USA Spt Gp in Modification of M1A1s
 - Fabricated 1,000 M9ACE Roadwheels
 - Accelerated Secondary Item Production
- **Force Reconstitution**

Increased Production By 1 Million Manhours





Unique Environment of Cultural Change



We Support
The Taxpayer

- **Partnerships with Customers**
- **Union & Management Partnerships - All Organizational Levels**
 - **80% Reduction in Number of Grievances (FY90-FY94)**
- **Reduction of Organizational Layers from Five to Three**
 - **Decreased the Number of Supervisors by 51% (FY94)**
 - **Increased Member to Supervisor Ratio - 15:1 (FY96 - 23:1)**
- **State-Of-The-Art Training**
 - **Increased Training Hours Per Member from 17 to 71**
 - **"HEARTS" Teambuilding (RRAD-4986; Other-1570)**
 - **Cost Avoidance of More Than \$3 Million**
- **Empowerment of Our Members**
 - **Decreased Injuries by More Than 11%**
 - **FY94 Suggestion Savings of \$1.2 Million**
 - **FY94 Value Engineering Savings of \$7.8 Million**
 - **Reduced Local Regulations by 53%**
 - **Increased Productivity at a Savings of \$14.8 Million**
- **88 Self-Managed Work Teams - 27% of Members**
- **129 Process Action Teams - 70% Cross-Functional**

UNITED WE CONTINUE OUR QUALITY JOURNEY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY!



Summary



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Depot With Three Major Missions**
- **One-of-a-Kind Capabilities**
- **75% of Heavy Division Tracked Vehicles**
- **Unique Body of Rapidly Deployable Knowledge**
- **National Leader Of Cultural Change and Increased Efficiency**

Background

The Old Way

Coercion

Confrontation

Co-Existence

Adversarial - "US Versus THEM"

The New Way


Cooperation

Collaboration


Co-Ownership

Union/Management Partnerships

MSPB Appeals




Unfair Labor Practices




Great Results

Negotiated Grievances




Arbitrations




- **Total Depot Dollar Savings - \$600,000** (does not include cost to make members whole)
- **Zero Grievances in Ammunition Directorate (200 members); Estimated Dollar Savings of over \$200K** (includes cost to make members whole)

Red River Army Depot FY 94 CUMULATIVE NET OPERATING RESULTS




Proposal for Rewarding RRAD Workforce




- AWARD BASIS
 - NOR Savings
 - Broad/Moderate - \$500 per member
 - Broad/Substantial - \$1,000 per member

- ELIGIBILITY
 - Four Quarters - 100%
 - Three Quarters - 75%
 - Two Quarters - 50%
 - One Quarter - 25%

THE VITAL LINK




Red River Army Depot FY 95 CUMULATIVE NET OPERATING RESULTS



SHARED VISION

SHARED VALUES



HONESTY

ETHICS

ACCOUNTABILITY

RESPECT

TRUST


SUPPORT





A New Way of Thinking---A New Way of Doing Business



DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT RED RIVER



Distribution Is Our Business



TEXAS



We
Support
The
Soldier

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

CLASSIFICATION

NO.

GS

325

WG/WS/WL

698

MILITARY

1

TOTAL

1,024



We
Support
The
Soldier


FACILITIES

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SQ FT</u>
COVERED STORAGE	2,202,496
OUTSIDE STORAGE	2,925,790
TOTAL SPACE	5,128,286
GENERAL HEATED/UNHEATED	38
HAZARDOUS/FLAMMABLE	8
CHILLED	3
CONTROLLED HUMIDITY	13
TOTAL WAREHOUSES	62
SHEDS/SHELTERS	130



We
Support
The
Soldier

PROFILE OF ASSETS IN STORAGE




As of 31 Jan 95



We
Support
The
Soldier

Defense Distribution Depot Red River's Major Customers




Over 50% of all stateside military posts, camps, and stations are located in the
Red River central distribution area.



ISSUE/RECEIPT WORKLOAD



We
Support
The
Soldier



LINE ITEMS



INDEX OF MISSION AREA TOUR CHARTS

TITLE	CHART NUMBER
WHITING BRIDGE CRANE	1
SET ASSEMBLY/DISASSEMBLY OPERATIONS, BUILDING 581	2
MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM	3
BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE RETURNED FROM USING UNIT	4
STANDARD INTEGRATED COMMAND POST SYSTEM	5
BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SYSTEM PREPARED FOR ISSUE	6
VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS	7
TRACK SHOE ASSEMBLIES	8
DEDICATED CUSTOMER PACK AREA	9
DIRECT DELIVERY	10
DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS CENTER	11
HAZARDOUS MATERIEL STORAGE FACILITY	12
MAINTENANCE MISSION	13
PRODUCTION FACILITIES	14
SUB-ASSEMBLY SUPPORT FACILITY, BUILDING 345	15
PRODUCTION LINES, BUILDING 345	16
ENGINE REBUILD AND RECLAMATION	17
X200-4 TRANSMISSION COMPONENT TEST EQUIPMENT	18
FLAME SPRAY OPERATION	19
MACHINING OPERATIONS, BUILDING 345	20
HYDRAULIC COMPONENT REPAIR AND TEST FACILITY, BUILDING 345	21
TRACKED VEHICLE COMPLEX	22
AUTOMATED HULL BLAST CLEANING SYSTEM	23
CINCINNATI GILBERT COMPUTER NUMERICAL CONTROL MILLING MACHINE	24
VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AREA	25
BODY REPAIR OPERATIONS	26
AUTOMATED PARTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER	27
DYNAMOMETER	28
BRADLEY TRANSMISSION TEST FACILITY	29
LAND COMBAT SYSTEMS OVERHAUL FACILITY, BUILDING 407	30
METAL FABRICATION FACILITY	31
AIR DEFENSE AND LAND COMBAT SYSTEMS REPAIR FACILITY	32
VEHICLE FLOAT TEST FACILITIES	33
VEHICLE TEST TRACK AND FACILITIES	34
MISSILE RECERTIFICATION OFFICE	35




VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Whiting Bridge Crane**
 - ▶ **Bridge Crane Equipped With Two 30-Ton Hoists Providing 60 Ton Total Capacity**
 - ▶ **Crane Travels 720 ft., Spans 2 Rail Spurs and the Main Rail Line, and is 150 ft. Wide**
 - ▶ **Equipped for 24-hour Operations Capable of Loading/Unloading 300-400 Vehicles**




SET ASSEMBLY/ DISASSEMBLY OPERATIONS BUILDING 581



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Tool Set Assembly/Disassembly Operation**
- **Basic Issue Items - Set Assembly Operation**
- **Component of the End Items**
- **Electrostatic Discharge Processing Station**



VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM**
 - ▶ **Mission Is Unique To DDRT Where Final Inspection Is Made For U.S. Army Missile Command**
 - ▶ **History and Overview Of The Weapon System and Its Unique Capabilities**
 - ▶ **DDRT Multiple Launch Rocket System Process**



VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Bradley Fighting Vehicle Returned From Using Unit**
 - ▶ **Receipt Process**
 - ▶ **Basic Issue Items, Receipt, Recovery, Process and Redistribution**



VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Standard Integrated Command Post System**
 - ▶ **Basic Issue Items**
 - ▶ **The Latest Version of the Command Post Vehicle with Fielding to Units Just Beginning**



VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Prepared for Issue**
 - ▶ **Basic Issue Items**
 - ▶ **Basic Issue Items Packaged and Packed for Shipment**



VEHICLE AND ARTILLERY OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Different Systems Processed**
 - ▶ **Diversified Workload Requiring Multi-skilled Personnel**
 - ▶ **7 Categories of Equipment Equalling Over 30 Different Systems**
 - ▶ **Current or Planned Maintenance Programs on the Majority of the Systems**

- **Defense Distribution Depot - Red River Major Items Workload**

- **Current and Projected Inventory**

- **Certified Process Control Plan**
 - ▶ **Last 6 Months Process Assessment**



TRACK SHOE ASSEMBLIES



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Stored in Two Low Cost Warehouses**
- **Processed at DDRT for Worldwide Distribution**



DEDICATED CUSTOMER PACK AREA



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Replaced Terminals with Radio Frequency Scanners**
- **Created Laser Card Data Transmission Device**
- **Benefits**
 - ▶ **Reduces Order Ship Time**
 - ▶ **Improves Materiel Availability**
 - ▶ **Improves Accuracy**
 - ▶ **Creates Intransit Visibility**
 - ▶ **Increases Productivity**



DIRECT DELIVERY



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Ship to 7 Largest Customers**
- **Consistent Reliable Next Morning Delivery**
- **3-5 Day Reduction in Order Ship Time**



DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS CENTER



We
Support
The
Soldier

680,000 SF OF CONSTRUCTION:
360,000 SF OF STORAGE SPACE
280,000 SF OF OPERATIONAL SPACE
40,000 SF OF ADMINISTRATIVE WING

STATUS OF 75 ACRE CONSTRUCTION SITE:
80% OF CONCRETE FOOTINGS COMPLETE
ALL UNDERGROUND & DRAINAGE COMPLETE
ALL MATERIALS ORDERED & AT
CONSTRUCTION SITE OR AT
MANUFACTURER'S SITE
20% COMPLETE WITH COE PROJECTED COMP
DATE OF MAY 97 & CONTRACTOR'S COMP
DATE OF JUN 96

NOTICE TO PROCEED ON 7 JUN 94:
GEORGE HYMAN CONSTRUCTION BASED IN
MARYLAND
\$32 MILLION CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
IN ADDITION, \$6.7 MILLION OF SITE WORK &
ELECTRICAL SUB-STATION COMPLETED

DOC FACILITY UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS:
STATE-OF-THE-ART VENTILATION & LIGHTING WITH
EMPHASIS ON QUALITY OF LIFE & PRODUCTIVITY
LOAD/UNLOAD 50 TRUCKS AT SAME TIME WITH STAGING
FOR ADDITIONAL 100 TRUCK VANS
1000 LBS/SF FLOOR LOADING FOR MAXIMUM
FLEXIBILITY
25 FEET STACKING HEIGHT THROUGHOUT FACILITY
RAIL DOCK CAPABILITY WEST OF SITE

DOC - NEW HUB OF OPERATIONS:
CENTER OF 3.2M SF OF STORAGE & OPERATIONS
MOST IN-BOUND TRUCKS WILL BE PROCESSED HERE
CONVERTS OPERATIONAL SPACE IN BLDG 595 TO STORAGE
ALLOWS US TO VACATE 450,000 SF OF SUB-STANDARD
STORAGE
ENHANCES SUPPORT TO FT. HOOD, FT. POLK, AND OTHER
MILITARY CUSTOMERS
PROVIDES RAPID RESPONSE FOR CRISIS SITUATIONS
CAN BE OPERATED ON A THREE-SHIFT BASIS



HAZARDOUS MATERIEL STORAGE FACILITY



We
Support
The
Soldier

NOTICE TO PROCEED:	APRIL 1994
CONTRACTOR:	FOUR THIRTEEN, INC.
COST:	\$3.2 MILLION
PROJECT FEATURES:	
* NEW BUILDING	29,300 SQUARE FEET
* EXISTING FACILITY UPGRADES:	
FLAMMABLE STORAGE	40,000 SQUARE FEET
ACID STORAGE	6,000 SQUARE FEET
* TOTAL HAZ CAPACITY	75,300 SQUARE FEET
* NEW BLDG & UPGRADES IN COMPLIANCE WITH OSHA/EPA	
ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	SEPTEMBER 1995
STATUS:	60% COMPLETE



RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT

MAINTENANCE MISSION



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Vehicle Missions**

- ▶ **Bradley Fighting Vehicle - 8 Configurations**
- ▶ **Multiple Launch Rocket System**
- ▶ **M113 Family of Vehicles - 24 Configurations**
- ▶ **Trailers, Trucks, Army Construction Equipment**

- **Supporting Missions**

- ▶ **Overhaul of Major Assemblies - Engines, Transmissions, Electronic Systems**
- ▶ **Generators, Reverse Osmosis Purification Units, Hydraulic Pumps, Valves, Actuators**
- ▶ **Fielded On-Site Customer Assistance Visits**
- ▶ **Technical Data Development**



PRODUCTION FACILITIES



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Maintenance Production Facilities Cover Over 45 Acres**
- **43 Buildings Devoted to Repair, Overhaul, or Rework of Assigned Weapon Systems**
- **1.4 Million Square Feet of Production Facilities**
- **Equipment Value In Excess of \$110 Million**



SUB-ASSEMBLY SUPPORT FACILITY **BUILDING 345**



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **371,000 Square Feet**

- **Primary Operations Include:**
 - ▶ **Repair and Overhaul of Engines, Transmissions, Hydraulic Components, and Other Hydraulic/Mechanical Components**
 - ▶ **Milling Operations**
 - ▶ **Vehicle Disassembly**
 - ▶ **Electroplating**
 - ▶ **Component Cleaning and Painting**

- **Flexible - Used to Support Current Programs and Augment Production Capability for New Programs, and/or Mobilization Requirements, i.e., BRAC 93 Tooele Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Workload**



PRODUCTION LINES BUILDING 345



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Augment Production Capability for New/Additional Programs**
- **Flexible in Adapting/Reconfiguring for Mobilization or Surge Requirements**
- **Currently Beginning New Program for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (BRAC 93 - Tooele Workload Transfer)**



ENGINE REBUILD AND RECLAMATION



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Repair/Overhaul for Various Vehicle and Engine Electrical/Mechanical Components**
- **Engine Assembly Area for the Bradley, MLRS, M9ACE, and M113 Family of Vehicles Engines**
- **Site for New Generator Test Facility for BRAC 93 Tooele Transfer Workload (30, 60, and 100 KW Generators)**
- **Partnering with United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP)
- Currently Supplying Bradley Personnel Heaters and Instrument Panels**



X200-4 TRANSMISSION COMPONENT TEST EQUIPMENT



**We
Support
The
Soldier**

- **Supports Overhaul/Test of M113A3 Transmission Components**
- **Only Maintenance Point, Public or Private, Equipped With This Capability**
- **Eliminates Army's Need for Contractor Support in the Testing of Individual Transmission Components**
- **M9ACE Transmission and Steering Unit - BRAC 93 Workload Transfer from Tooele Army Depot**



FLAME SPRAY OPERATION



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Reconditions Shafts, Worn Bearing Surfaces, and Seal Surfaces**
- **\$1.2 Million First Year Savings**
- **New Automated Facility with Expanded Capability - Aluminum Spray and Thermoplastics**



MACHINING OPERATIONS BUILDING 345



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Additional Machining/Heavy Welding Capability for Vehicle Body Reconfiguration**
- **Area Also Supports Battle Damaged Vehicle Bodies**
- **Area Can Be Easily Adapted to Meet Additional or New Requirements**



HYDRAULIC COMPONENT
REPAIR AND TEST FACILITY
BUILDING 345



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Recently Modernized**
- **Accomplishes Overhaul/Repair and Testing of All Hydraulic Assemblies and Components**
- **Only DoD Depot Equipped to Test the Multiple Launch Rocket System Hydraulics**



AUTOMATED HULL BLAST CLEANING SYSTEM



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Complete Removal of Paint and Nonskid Materials from Vehicle Hulls and Other Large Components**

- **Man-Hour Savings (Vehicle Hulls)**
 - ▶ **Conventional Sandblast - 15.0 Man-hours/Vehicle**
 - ▶ **Automated Hull Blast - 4.5 Man-hours/Vehicle**

- **Closed System Captures Hazardous Waste for Easy Disposal**
 - ▶ **Generates 1/8 the Hazardous Waste of Conventional Methods**



TRACKED VEHICLE COMPLEX



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **218,480 Square Feet (5 Acres Under One Roof)**
- **Allows Rework/Overhaul/Repair of Assigned Vehicles in a Single Facility**
- **Designed for Flexibility in Adapting to Changes in Weapon System Assignments**
- **Operations Include Painting, Cleaning, Assembly, Vehicle Hull Abrasive Cleaning, Machining, Welding, and Component Cleaning**



CINNATI GILBERT
COMPUTER NUMERICAL CONTROL
MILLING MACHINE



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Milling Machine Supports Requirement for Machining Surfaces at Different Angles Without Moving the Part - i.e., Bradley Fighting Vehicle System**
- **Has 5 Axis, True 3-Dimensional Machining, Accurate Repeatability**
- **Sized to Accept Both Light and Heavy Tracked Vehicles**
- **Man-Hour Savings**
 - ▶ **Conventional Methods - 81 Man-Hours**
 - ▶ **Team Driven Gilbert - 10 Man-Hours**
- **Operational Savings in Excess of \$2 Million Per Year**



VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AREA



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Supports Vehicle Assembly Operations**
- **Flexible - Area Easily Adapted to Assemble a Variety of Vehicles Simultaneously**
- **Lifting Capability Upgraded to Provide Increased Vehicle Throughput**
- **Work Station Instructions and Pre-Kitting of Parts Has Reduced Cycle Time From 13 to 4 Workdays**
- **Crane Capacity Capable of Supporting Light and Heavy Tracked Vehicles**



BODY REPAIR OPERATIONS



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Supports Reconfiguration of Vehicle Bodies**
- **Light Welding of Brackets and Conversion Kit Components**
- **Supports Prototype Design and Fabrication**



AUTOMATED PARTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Two Central Parts Storage and Distribution Facilities**
- **Utilizes Automated Wire Guided Vehicles to Deliver Parts Throughout the Storage and Maintenance Facilities**
- **Achievements**
 - ▶ **Just in Time Delivery**
 - ▶ **Maximum Utilization of Floor Space for Production**
 - ▶ **Control and Accountability of Parts Inventory**



DYNAMOMETER



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Capability to Test Engine, Transmission and Power Pack**
- **Total of 28 Test Cells**
 - ▶ **12 Fully Automated Engine Test Cells**
 - ▶ **4 Fully Automated Transmission Test Cells**
 - ▶ **6 Power Pack Test Cells**
 - ▶ **6 Transfer-Steer Differential, Power Generators**
- **Capacity Will Support Changing/Additional Requirements With No Loss in Ongoing Production**
- **Only X200-4 M113A3 Transmission Test Cell in Department of Army**



BRADLEY TRANSMISSION TEST FACILITY



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Supports the Transmission Testing Requirements for:**
 - ▶ **Bradley Fighting Vehicle System**
 - ▶ **Multiple Launch Rocket System**
- **Generates 60% of Its Own Power**
- **Adjacent Facility Under Construction Will Provide Testing Capability for the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover Equipment Steering Unit (BRAC 93 - Tooele Army Depot Workload Transfer)**



LAND COMBAT SYSTEMS OVERHAUL FACILITY BUILDING 407



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **24,000 Square Feet With Overhead Crane Support**
- **Provides Final Operational Testing of Multiple Launch Rocket System**
- **Provides Build-up, Test and Mating of Turret to Bradley Vehicle Body for the A2 Conversion Program**
- **Bradley Turret Alignment Tower**
 - ▶ **One-of-a-Kind, Isolated Foundation**
 - ▶ **Checks Plumb Travel of Integrated Sight Unit**



METAL FABRICATION FACILITY



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **State-of-the-Art Machining/Welding/Sheet Metal Working Facility**
- **Contains Specialized Computer Numerical Control (CNC) Equipment**
 - ▶ **Precision Plate Saw**
 - ▶ **Plasma-Arc Cut/Turret Punch**
 - ▶ **Laser Cut/Turret Punch**
 - ▶ **Plate Shears**
 - ▶ **Lathe**
 - ▶ **Machining Center**
- **Provides Fabrication Capability in Support of CORE Workload**
 - ▶ **Single Channel Ground/Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)**
 - ▶ **Identification Panels (Battleboards)**
- **Provides Prototype Capability**
 - ▶ **Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)**
 - ▶ **Opposing Forces Surrogate Vehicle (OSV)**
 - ▶ **M113 Stretch Vehicle**
 - ▶ **Air Force - Explosive Ordnance Disposal Vehicle**



AIR DEFENSE AND LAND COMBAT SYSTEMS REPAIR FACILITY



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Provides for the Repair/Overhaul of:**
 - ▶ **Guided Missile Systems**
 - ▶ **Launcher Systems**
 - ▶ **Circuit Boards**
 - ▶ **Radar and Fire Control Systems**
 - ▶ **Aircraft Armament Subsystems (COBRA and Apache Helicopters)**

- **Range Supports Ability to Test-Fire Weapons Systems Up to 40mm**



VEHICLE FLOAT TEST FACILITIES



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Float Test of Bradley Fighting Vehicle System**
- **Shallow Water Fording for M113 Armored Personnel Carrier Family of Vehicles**



VEHICLE TEST TRACK AND FACILITIES



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **Lighted 1.0 Mile Oval**
- **Banked Turns and Retainer Walls on Turns for Safety**
- **Track Width Allows for Multiple Vehicle Testing**
- **Four Bay Facility - For Final Inspection Before Shipment**
- **Defense Logistics Agency - Shares Test Track**



MISSILE RECERTIFICATION OFFICE



We
Support
The
Soldier

- **HAWK and PATRIOT Certified Round Concept**
- **Capability to Expand for Future Systems**
- **Unique Facility Requirements**
 - ▶ **Radio Frequency Shielding**
 - ▶ **Category 1 Blast Walls**
- **Production Capacity**
 - ▶ **4 HAWK Missiles Per Day**
 - ▶ **2 Patriot Missiles Per Day**





WHEELABRATOR/FRYE AUTOMATED HULL BLAST CLEANING SYSTEM



We
Support
The
Soldier

Benefits of Operation of Hull Blast

Computer Controlled

The automated blast system removes paint and nonskid in 36 minutes

Efficient Operational Cost

There is a 92% to 96% recovery rate for blast medium which operates at 1/3 the cost of conventional sandblast bays

Versatility of Operation

The hull blast is utilized to clean different materials beyond the original operation plan

Environmental & Employee Safety

Material is enclosed in a cabinet that traps and disposes of hazardous waste in sealed containers. Reduction in hazardous waste generation produces only 1/8 the hazardous waste of conventional sand blast bays.

Manhour Savings

Conventional sandblast took 15.0 manhours

Automated hull blast takes 4.5 manhours

This is a 67% increase in production.

Operational Savings

The yearly savings for operation of the hull blast compared to conventional sand blast bays is 1.8 million dollars.



CINCINNATI GILBERT CNC 5 AXIS MILLING MACHINE



We
Support
The
Soldier

Team Driven Continuous Improvement

Over the past year efficiency has improved 51% because of experience gained.

One-of-a-Kind, Detachable Line Contouring Head

This gives TRUE three dimensional contouring capabilities which allows surfaces at different angles to be machined without moving the part.

Extreme Repeatability

The machine is equipped with an infrared probe which collects information about the vehicle. Using this information, the computer automatically adjusts each program to compensate for inconsistencies between vehicles.

Sophisticated GTE Fanuc Multi-Tasking Computer Control

This allows the machine to perform one task while instructions for another task are being written into the computer's memory.

Versatility of Operation

This machine has a large work capacity and is able to machine any vehicle with dimensions up to 8 ft. tall x 27 ft. long x 16 ft. wide.

Manhour Savings

Conventional methods used 81 manhours.
Team driven Gilbert uses 10 manhours.

Operational Savings

There are over \$2 million dollars per year savings using the Gilbert machine compared to standard methods.



BRADLEY A2 UPGRADE PROGRAM



We
Support
The
Soldier

Provides soldier with the best and safest armored personnel carrier
in the world

First production vehicle completed six months ahead of schedule

Accelerating production from 18 to 25 vehicles per month

Reduced production manhour rate by 20% (510 hours) per vehicle

Annual cost savings compared to new production vehicles is \$265 million

Annual cost savings compared to upgrade by private defense contractor
is \$75 million



MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) PROGRAM



We
Support
The
Soldier

Overhauled 61 MLRS since program began in 1988

Initiating action to accelerate production to 8 vehicles per month

Modified 428 MLRS both CONUS and OCONUS

Competed with private industry for overhaul of 23 MLRS Launchers and won bid - Cost avoidance of \$5.2M

Repaired 110 launchers throughout the world under the Vehicle Operation Life Extension Program saving millions of dollars

Future repair efforts

- Joint repair venture with UDLP of M270 Launchers
- Application of next generation modifications



TACTICAL (WHEELED) VEHICLE PROGRAM



We
Support
The
Soldier

Long history of tactical vehicle maintenance

Tactical workload transfer in BRAC 93

Over 4,000 tactical vehicles in a Mechanized Army Division

Started production on programs without specialized test equipment

- M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE)
- Engines and transmissions (Solved M9 ACE readiness problem at Ft. Riley)
- Heavy Equipment Transporter
- Small Emplacement Excavator

Finalizing actions for maintenance support to the Marine Corp

- High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
- 5 & 10 ton trucks



OPPOSING FORCES SURROGATE VEHICLE PROGRAM



We
Support
The
Soldier

National Training Center needed replacement for Sheridan Tank

- Logged nearly 80 million miles
- Maintenance problems and high costs
- Cost per mile \$16.38 for M113 vs \$37.06 for Sheridan

Private defense contractor

- Long lead time to design and build
- High cost

Red River Complex designed and built three prototypes

- Simulates foreign threat vehicles
- Designed from poster
- Input from soldiers
- Standard Army Components (Bradley and M113)
- Completed first production vehicle ahead of original schedule

Benefits

- Met the soldiers' needs
- Easy to maintain
- Annual maintenance savings of approximately \$15 million



AUTOMATED PARTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER



We
Support
The
Soldier

Automated system to route parts throughout the maintenance shops

Routing includes:

- Parts rebuild operations
- Central cleaning
- Painting
- Two central parts storage and distribution buildings
- Vehicle assembly

System consists of:

- Central mainframe computers
- Wired guided paths throughout maintenance shops
- 45 automated guided vehicles
- 135 load and unload stands

Implemented in 1988

Current modernization and upgrade (\$1,437,101) is scheduled to be completed on 1 Jun 95

Achievements

- Just in time delivery
- Maximum utilization of floor space for production
- Control and accountability of parts inventory



AUTOMATED PARTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER



We
Support
The
Soldier

Two central parts storage and distribution facilities

Utilizes automated wire guided vehicles to deliver parts throughout the storage and maintenance facilities

Achievements

- Just in time delivery
- Maximum utilization of floor space for production
- Control and accountability of parts inventory