

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

AUG 27 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP**SUBJECT: Considerations for the BRAC Analytic Process**

The Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) has agreed that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation. The military value analysis that the Department will undertake is the quantitative analytical foundation. The exercise of military judgment occurs through the application of the BRAC principles approved by the Infrastructure Executive Council.

At its July 23, 2004, meeting the ISG decided that the principles enumerate the essential elements of military judgment sufficiently and that mandating the use of the detailed imperatives drafted by the Military Departments to support the principles, as originally envisioned, is unnecessary.

The ideas contained in the draft imperatives, however, have merit as considerations within the BRAC analysis. The attached draft memorandum formally transmits these considerations for the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSG) and the Military Departments to use as appropriate in their deliberations. The attached list does not include those imperatives the BRAC DAS's had previously agreed to recommend to the ISG for deletion.

Please provide your coordination on the attached draft memorandum and list of considerations by September 10, 2004. If you have any questions, please contact Peter Potochney, Director, Base Realignment and Closure, at 614-5356.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael W. Wynne".

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment: As stated



DRAFT**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS (JCSGs)****SUBJECT: Considerations for the BRAC Analytic Process**

The Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) has agreed that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation. The military value analysis that the Department will undertake is the quantitative analytical foundation. The exercise of military judgment occurs through the application of the BRAC principles approved by the Infrastructure Executive Council.

At its July 23, 2004, meeting the ISG decided that the principles enumerate the essential elements of military judgment sufficiently and that mandating the use of the detailed imperatives drafted by the Military Departments to support the principles, as originally envisioned, is unnecessary.

The ISG believes that while the draft imperatives should not be mandatory constraints on the BRAC analytical process the ideas expressed therein are appropriate considerations in the decision making process. Accordingly, the ISG recommends that the Military Departments and the JCSGs use the attached list of considerations as additional factors to inform their deliberative process, as appropriate. My point of contact is Peter Potochney, Director, Base Realignment and Closure, at 614-5356.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

cc: Infrastructure Steering Group Members

Attachment: As stated

Principles and Corresponding Considerations

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel that are highly skilled and educated and that have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

1. Consider the value of preserving the required training capabilities in the United States to support the following missions: airborne; air assault; urban operations; Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS); obscurant, chemical live agent, and electro-magnetic operations; and Marine Air-Ground Task Force live fire and combined arms training.
2. Consider the value of preserving access to air, land, and sea areas and facilities (to include wargaming/simulation/experimentation) in the following environments: cold weather, tropical weather, swamps, littoral, mountainous, and desert conditions with operationally efficient access and proximity to meet current and future Service and Joint training/test/operational requirements for both Active and Reserve Component forces and weapons systems.
3. Consider the value of locating operational squadrons (with the exception of Naval Reserve Squadrons) and Navy or Marine Corps Fleet Replacement Squadrons within operationally efficient proximity (e.g., for the Department of the Navy, farther than one un-refueled leg) of DoD-scheduled airspace, ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.
4. Consider the value of locating Department of the Navy undergraduate flight training separate from operational squadrons.
5. Consider the value of preserving the organizational independence of Air Force flight training units from combat units.
6. Consider the value of locating Carrier Strike Groups/ Expeditionary Strike Groups / Maritime Prepositioning Groups or their individual elements within operationally efficient proximity of ranges and OPAREAs. Operationally efficient proximity is generally defined as within 3 underway days from air, sea and over the shore maneuver space for the Groups, or for individual operational ships and aircraft an approximate distance of 6 underway hours for ships, 12 underway hours for submarines, and 1 un-refueled sortie for aircraft.
7. Consider the value of preserving organic institution(s) for Service specific strategic thought, innovation, joint and coalition security policy.

8. Consider the value of locating Navy specific skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms in Fleet concentration areas.
9. Consider the value of locating Navy specific initial skills training with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities, and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements.
10. Consider the value of preserving parcels of land in the United States that: consist of 37,000 contiguous acres or larger; are currently suitable for mounted ground maneuver training; and unencumbered by major restrictions (e.g., environmental contamination or unexploded ordnance) as a capability to accommodate surge, contingency, and future force structure/weapons systems requirements
11. Consider the value of Geographically positioning infrastructure and all elements of the MAGTF to enhance training, maintenance and deployment of Marine Forces as MAGTFs. This necessitates retaining/acquiring sufficient sea access, air space, air-to-ground training ranges and maneuver areas, for training and deployment purposes; preserving necessary rail access, explosives safety arcs, and staging areas.
12. Consider the value of preserving access to educational programs which include specific focus on those areas which are uniquely related to distinctive Service capabilities (e.g., maritime, land warfare).

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

Consider the value of supporting access to basic quality of life services (e.g., housing, MWR-like services, education, child development, medical, etc.).

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Consider the value of keeping core elements of the Headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy (including the Commandant of the Marine Corps), or the Department of the Air Force from the National Capital Region.

2. Consider the value of preserving the last remaining Service specific Reserve Component presence in a state.
3. Consider the value of preserving the capability to support surge, mobilization, continuity of operations, evacuations for natural disasters, or conduct core roles and missions (e.g., sea-based operations, combined arms, etc.).
4. Consider whether a closure or realignment involving joint basing of a function should increase the average quantifiable military value of that function or decrease the cost for the same average quantifiable military value, when compared to the status quo.
5. Consider the value of preserving the capability to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria requirements stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM.
6. Consider the value of preserving START Treaty land-based strategic deterrent.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

- 1 Consider the value of preserving the capability to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of expeditionary, maritime, air, and land warfare.
2. Consider the value of preserving the minimum required non-renewable infrastructure (i.e., air, land, sea, and space ranges and frequency spectrum) to ensure successful RDTE&A and life-cycle support of emerging and existing technologies in support of expeditionary, maritime, air and land warfare operations.
3. Consider the value of preserving the Army's RDT&E capability necessary to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of Land warfare; the DON's RDT&E capability necessary to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of Maritime and Amphibious warfare; and the Air Force's RDT&E capability necessary to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of Air warfare.
4. Consider the value of preserving the Air Force lead for design, development, and testing of manned and unmanned air and space platforms (exception is carrier-based); air and space armaments and munitions; or C4ISR networks required for predictive battlespace awareness and full spectrum C2 of air and space forces.
5. Consider the value of preserving the Air Force lead for science and technology related to air and space vehicles and materials, sensors, air and space propulsion, directed energy, and air munitions.
6. Consider the value of preserving the Army's single headquarters organizational structure that combines responsibility for developmental and operational test and evaluation.
- 7 Consider the value of providing RDT&E infrastructure and laboratory capabilities to attract, train, and retain talent in emerging science and engineering fields.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

Consider the value of preserving access to ammunition storage facilities which will not complete planned chemical demilitarization before 2011.

2. Consider the value of preserving ship maintenance capabilities to:
 - Dry dock CVNs and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific.
 - Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear-powered ships.
 - Dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor compartments.
3. Consider the value of preserving the following critical industrial capabilities: casting and forgings of ground components; white phosphorous-based munitions; chemical and biological defense equipment; the manufacture of gun tubes, mortars, and cannon tubes; and rubber track and road wheels that are required by law, not commercially available, ensure competition, meet small volume and discontinued repair parts requirements, and provide sustainment, surge, and reconstitution in support of Joint expeditionary warfare.
4. Consider the value of preserving the Department of the Navy lead for engineering, producing, maintaining, and handling ordnance and energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment.
5. Consider the value of preserving the Army integrated business process for life cycle materiel management of rotary wing aircraft, ground combat and tactical vehicles, individual and platform mounted weapons, the land component of C4ISR, and chemical and biological defense equipment, all of which are integral to the conduct of Joint expeditionary land warfare.
6. Consider the value of preserving the capability of a Service to define its requirements (all classes of supply), integrate its logistics support, and acquire appropriate support for its unique material.
7. Consider the value of preserving inherent Service capabilities where concepts of operations differ from other Services (e.g. MALS support to the FRSSs, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, Navy IMAs, reach back support for sea-based logistics, etc).
8. Consider the risks presented by creating a single point of failure in logistics operations.
9. Consider the fact that the DON requires a depot maintenance industrial complex that delivers best value cradle-to-grave results in cost-efficiency (total unit cost),

responsiveness (schedule compliance and flexibility), and quality (compliance with specifications).

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Consider the value of preserving the capability to simultaneously deploy, support, and rotate forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts in support of operational plans (including prepositioning logistics support capabilities) due to reduced quantities of, or reduced access to port facilities, local/national transportation assets (highways and railroad), and airfields or lack of information infrastructure reach back capabilities.

2. Consider the value of preserving the capability for Fleet basing that supports the Fleet Response Plan and Sea-basing concepts:
 - CVN (Nuclear Carrier) capability: 2 East Coast ports, 2 West Coast ports, and 2 forward-based in the Pacific.
 - SSBN (Nuclear Submarine Ballistic Missile) basing: 1 East Coast port, 1 West Coast port.
 - MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) and rotary wings located within one unrefueled sortie from overwater training areas.
 - OLF (Outlying Landing Field) capability to permit unrestricted fleet operations, including flight training, if home base does not allow.
 - CLF (Combat Logistics Force) capability: 1 East Coast and 1 West Coast base that minimize explosive safety risks and eliminate waiver requirements.
3. Consider the value of preserving unimpeded access to space (polar, equatorial, and inclined launch).
4. Consider the value of preserving and aligning sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training and facilities) integral to the operational forces; as well as an efficient reach back system to ensure the continuum of care for those operating forces and their families.
5. Consider the value of preserving the capability to provide responsive airlift to the POTUS, special air missions, and visiting heads of state to and from the National Capital Region.
6. Consider the value of preserving:
 - two air mobility bases and one wide-body capable base on each coast to ensure mobility flow without adverse weather, capacity, or airfield incapacitation impacts; and
 - sufficient mobility bases along the deployment routes to potential crisis areas to afford deployment of mobility aircraft.

7. Consider the value of preserving the capability to absorb overseas forces within the United States.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

Consider the value of preserving sufficient organic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/analytic infrastructure to meet warfighting and acquisition requirements while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.