

142^d Fighter Wing
OREGON AIR NATIONAL GUARD

priority 1.0

MISSION

goal:

1.1 *Always Ready to*
Deploy,
Fight,
and **Win**

Commissioner Skinner



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 3, 2005

The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Commissioner
The Base Realignment and Closure Commission
The Polk Building, Suite 600 & 625
2521 South Clark Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Commissioner Skinner:

We were honored to testify before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission on June 17 in Portland, Oregon. The testimony from military professionals and elected officials at the hearing clearly illustrated the risks presented by the Department of Defense's proposed realignment of the Oregon National Guard's 142nd Fighter Wing. While we were disappointed that you could not join us, we would like to present the enclosed packet of information to provide you with an overview of the information presented to your colleagues that day.

In this era of heightened threats from terrorists and rogue nations, the first priority of the federal government, and particularly the Department of Defense, is to ensure the safety of our fellow citizens from conventional and unconventional threats. The 142nd Fighter Wing plays a crucial role in protecting the entire Pacific Northwest region. Realigning the 142nd Fighter Wing would leave the citizens of the Pacific Northwest vulnerable. In addition, a close analysis of the Pentagon's accounting reveals that the realignment would actually cost the government money instead of saving it.

In short, the proposed realignment of the 142nd Fighter Wing would not accomplish either of the goals of the BRAC process: eliminating inefficiency and waste while maintaining America's defenses.

Thank you for taking the time to review this information as you consider the Pentagon's recommendations. Should you need any further information or have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Gordon H. Smith
United States Senate



Ron Wyden
United States Senate



THEODORE R. KULONCOSKI
Governor

August 2, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In my May 25, 2005 letter, I wrote to you expressing my deep concerns with the Department of Defense's recommendations to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission to relocate and transfer F-15 fighter aircraft and personnel from the 142nd Fighter Wing at Portland Air National Guard Base, Portland, Oregon. Given Oregon's geographic location and unquestionable need for air superiority in the Pacific Northwest, this recommendation places the entire region at risk if it is accepted.

I am writing to advise you officially that, as Governor of Oregon, I do not consent to the deactivation, relocation or withdrawal of the 142nd Fighter Wing. Further, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §18238 and 32 U.S.C. §104(c), my consent is necessary for the Department of Defense to implement the recommended actions regarding the 142nd Fighter Wing.

Accordingly, pursuant to the above-referenced statutes, the actions proposed by the Department of Defense cannot proceed. It is my present intention to file a lawsuit in Oregon's federal district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the proposed actions.

Sincerely,

THEODORE R. KULONCOSKI
Governor

TRK:LCC:mb

cc: Chairman Anthony J. Principi, BRAC

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Portland Air National Guard (ANG) Base Point Paper

The Department of Defense recommendations to the BRAC Commission concerning re-alignment of assets assigned to the 142 Fighter Wing, Portland Air National Guard Base, Oregon,:

- 1) *compromise the security of the Pacific Northwest by failing to consider Homeland Defense,*
- 2) *do not save money*
- 3) *stem from a flawed criteria development and military value analysis process*

1. Security of Pacific Northwest compromised by failing to consider Homeland Defense:

- DoD recommended realignment **below pre-September 11th, 2001** posture and readiness for Northwest United States (See *“Alert Posture”* Tab)
- Homeland defense CONOPS was not a base selection focus area; Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS, and Global Mobility CONOPS
- Unable to meet CONPLAN 3310-02 alert requirements with a 2 aircraft detachment:
 - Unable to defend against multi-axis attacks
 - No immediate operational surge capability
- Leaves Pacific Northwest vulnerable to cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle threat (See *“Threat”* Tab)
- Homeland Defense not considered in Military Value analysis (See *“Military Value”* Tab)

“There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis . . . USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function.”

- USAF BRAC Red Team, White Paper, 11 March 2005
- Consolidation of reserve component F-15 units (from 18 aircraft units to 24 aircraft units) eliminates aircraft otherwise available for the Northwest homeland defense mission
- Establishment of an F-15 Aggressor Squadron at Nellis AFB, Nevada eliminates 18 aircraft otherwise available for Northwest homeland defense missions
- Violates United States Code Title 10 and reduces manpower available to state governors for regional emergencies and homeland defense

2. Cost Analysis:

- According to publicly released cost analysis information, closing Portland ANG Base costs money (see *“Cost Analysis”* Tab)
 - No net dollar savings for military personnel

“. . . 47% of the estimated total dollar savings are attributable to military personnel cost reductions. However, rather than reducing end-strength, DoD indicates that the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas . . .”

- SECDEF Response to Commission, 1 July 2005 Letter, GAO BRAC Analysis Report
 - Alert detachment cost modeling was not included in analysis
 - Closing Portland ANG Base will cost taxpayers \$5.4 million

- BRAC #1 principle of effective recruiting and training does not consider the ANG human capital loss
 - Nearest Oregon ANG facility greater than a 6 hour drive
 - Loss of human capital at Portland ANG Base = \$140 million
 - Cost to train replacements = \$67 million

3. Air Force BRAC criteria development and military value analysis flawed:

- Only one Air Force criteria used to analyze all components (Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve)
- Military Value assessment criteria are partial to active duty bases and biased against ANG city basing; ANG is penalized for being cost effective, right-sized, and efficient (See "*Military Value*" Tab)
- No measurement of reserve component recruiting and retention

Recommendation: Maintain, at a minimum, the existing F-15 force structure at Portland ANG Base and sufficient and appropriate sovereign air defense protection for all regions in the United States

Pre-Sept 11th Alert Forces

Portland

Otis

Riverside


Langley

Homestead

Home Station
Alert Detachment


Ellington

Tyndall




Today's Operation NOBLE EAGLE

Alert Forces






Operation NOBLE EAGLE

Post-BRAC Alert Forces



Post-BRAC USAF Fighter Forces




- Training/Non Air Defense Dedicated




250 mile radius around population centers
= 2 hrs on-station without tanker

**Pre-BRAC USAF Fighter
Aircraft Dedicated to Air
Defense of the Northwest:
15**

**Post-BRAC USAF Fighter
Forces Dedicated to Air Defense
of the Northwest:
2**



**USAF Fighter Aircraft in
Europe:
146**




Cruise Missile Threats to the NW



“By 2015, the CIA estimates that up to two dozen nations will be able to pose a serious cruise missile threat . . .”

- CRS Report for Congress, Cruise Missile Defense, 2 May 2005






“... The threat is real and is quite serious and will probably get more serious in the future.”

- Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study, DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, May 2004

Asymmetric / Irregular Threats

“In response to continued and repeated enemy violations of Lebanese airspace, a Mirsad 1 drone carried out a recon flight over several Zionist settlements . . . Hezbollah warned . . . that the planes could carry explosives to strike targets deep inside Israel”

- SpaceWar, Hezbollah UAV Drone Flies Over Northern Israel, 11 Apr 2005



MILITARY VALUE

“In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below) will consider:

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and manpower implications.

-- Final Selection Criteria, Military Value, 12 Feb 2004

Homeland Defense, the DoD's #1 priority, WAS NOT considered in BRAC's military value analysis.

- Congressional and public calls for developing base selection criteria were ignored:
 - Senator Hutchison's "Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria", 21 Jan 2004 (Page 3)

“The DoD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001.”
 - DoD memo on Final Selection Criteria, Analysis of Public Comments, 12 Feb 2004
- Base final selection quantitative analysis did not include Homeland Defense factors
 - Slides accompanying SAF/IEB memo on Military Value, 9 Oct 03: Focus areas only included Space and C4ISR CONOPS, Global Response/Strike CONOPS and Global Mobility CONOPS
 - Emphasis clearly shifted to global operations
 - Only 2 of 1800 questions from the BRAC Data Call concerned Homeland Defense
 - Question 4.1206
 - Question 21.1013
 - BRAC “Data Call” did not create questions to include proximity or ability to protect:
 - Major urban centers
 - Vital national assets (Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Plants, Dams, etc.)
 - Transportation facilities
 - International Borders
 - Military Compatibility Index (MCI) analysis was deficient:
 - Portland did not receive any credit for munitions storage to complete its Homeland Defense mission
 - Airspace (40% of MCI rating value) was not adequately considered
 - Airspace congestion was not adequately considered

- Training airspace was the single most important fighter MCI measurement
 - No credit was given for access to airspace (only owning airspace)
 - Air-to-ground airspace was evaluated for homeland defense fighter units
- US Air Force Strategic Planning Directive for FY 2006 – 2011
 - MAJCOMS must define current AF force structure's capability to meet Defense Strategy requirements, including capabilities for Air Defense Levels 1-5.
 - Military Value did not consider a Military Base's ability to meet the requirements of Air Defense Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4.
- Air Sovereignty/Air Defense scenario *specifically addressing command established air defense response criteria* inexplicably deleted by the Base Closure Executive Council
 - Scenario #3 of 127 registered USAF scenarios
 - Description: Determine airfields and installations sufficient to support air sovereignty/air defense mission
 - Imperative: Basing to fulfill the air sovereignty protection site and air defense response criteria stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM

OPR: Maj J. Baenen
142FW/DOW

JAN. 21. 2004 10:58AM
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON
TEXAS

SENATOR HUTCHISON

NO. 8476 P. 2/2

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORTATION
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4304

January 21, 2004

Mr. Peter Potochney
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment)
Director, Base Realignment and Closure
Room 3D814
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C., 20301-3300

Comments on BRAC Selection Criteria
OSD BRAC Office Tracking #0020
Page 1 of: 2
Date Received in 3D814: 1/21/2004
FAX

Dear Mr. Potochney:

As outlined in the Federal Register Volume 68/Number 246 by the Department of Defense (DOD), an installation's military value is the most important factor for assessing the future viability of a base. Military value is defined by the draft Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) criteria as follows:

- The current and future mission requirements and impact on operational readiness of the DOD's total force
- The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace.
- The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements
- The cost and manpower implications

While military value is important in assessing the criticality of installations, the DOD should also conduct a comprehensive study of U.S. military facilities abroad and assess whether existing U.S. base structures and locations meet the needs of current and future missions. It would be unwise to close or realign domestic bases that may be needed for troops returning from outdated facilities abroad. Criteria to assess the value of overseas bases is vital to better management of our military infrastructure.

The DOD should also consider homeland security issues and how closing or realigning installations affects our national security. The current draft criteria, very similar to the criteria proposed in three previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the national security issues our country faces in the wake of September 11, 2001.

Several times in past years, the military has closed a base only to later realize its costly mistake. Now is the time for a fair, honest and non-political BRAC, and I urge the DOD to weigh all issues in developing the 2005 BRAC criteria.

Sincerely,


Kay Bailey Hutchison

Web=hp/hutchison.senate.gov

BRAC – At What Cost?

Portland Personnel Reductions:	\$ 19.1 M
Atlantic City Payroll Increase:	\$ () M
New Orleans Payroll Increase:	<u>\$ () M</u>
Base X Manpower Savings:	\$ 3.8 M

Alert Detachment at Portland: \$5.4 M

Net COST to taxpayer: \$ (1.6) M