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August 19, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
2521 S. Clark St., Ste. 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

Re: Supplemental Point Paper on 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard

Dear Chairman Principi:

On behalf of the Governor's Base Development Committee and the Suburban Horsham Willow Grove Chamber of Conference Regional Military Affairs Committee, I am submitting the enclosed supplemental point paper related to the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing at NAS JRB Willow Grove.

The purpose of this point paper is to address any questions about the inspection status of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing. Although this should not be an issue, we recognize that there may be some curiosity about this matter.

Thank you and your staff again for reviewing this material. Please feel free to contact me if you have questions or need additional information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dennis T. Guise".

Dennis T. Guise  
Chief Counsel

POINT PAPER  
ON  
111<sup>TH</sup> FIGHTER WING OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION

**Purpose:** This paper will discuss the unsatisfactory rating the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing (FW) received during its combined Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) that took place from 2-12 May 2005. Because the unit was rated unsatisfactory for maintenance, it received an overall unsatisfactory even though the unit performed very strongly in other areas evaluated in the inspection. This report will cover the particulars of this inspection and explain the process of an Air Combat Command (ACC) ORI. Additionally, this paper will show that the unsatisfactory result is an anomaly in the long and distinguished history of this unit, and it will describe the measures the unit is taking to correct the deficiencies identified in this ORI.

**Relationship to BRAC Process:** The ORI for which the 111<sup>th</sup> FW received an unsatisfactory rating in maintenance was completed just one day before the release of the DoD BRAC report, which recommended deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> FW as part of the closure of NAS JRB Willow Grove. Obviously, the Navy and the Air Force made their recommendations with regard to Willow Grove long before these ORI results were known. The maintenance rating of the 111<sup>th</sup> in a single ORI should, of course, have had no impact on installation and facility reviews related to the 2005 BRAC round. Any suggestion that the 111<sup>th</sup> FW deserves to be deactivated because of its maintenance rating in this single ORI is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the inspection process and the military value of this unit.

**Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspections:** Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs) generally consist of two distinct phases. Phase I (PH I) evaluates the unit's ability to transition from peacetime readiness to a wartime posture. PH I consists of Initial Response. Phase II (PH II) evaluates a unit's ability to perform wartime or contingency missions. PH II consists of Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO).<sup>1</sup>

The ACC Inspector General uses the five-tier rating system for evaluating all areas, sub-areas, items, sub-items, and elements. Inspectors assign ratings based on performance and use objective criteria whenever possible. Furthermore, inspectors will apply Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC) to each of the applicable major graded areas and sub areas IAW AFI 90-201, paragraph 2.2.4.<sup>2</sup>

**Operational Readiness Inspection, 2-12 May 2005:** Under the authority of Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, as implemented by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-201, the Inspector General, Headquarters ACC, conducted an ORI at Willow Grove Air Reserve Station (ARS), 2-12 May 2005. The purpose of the inspection was, "To evaluate initial response, employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate for the 111<sup>th</sup> FW in accordance with AFI 90-201, ACC Supplement 1, Addendum A."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> AFI 90-201, ACC Supplement, Addendum A, page 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, page 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Although the unit performed admirably in many areas<sup>4</sup> and earned many favorable comments, the unit was rated unsatisfactory overall as a result of **maintenance practices and procedures**.

**Maintenance Inspection Details:** The ACC/IG report was reviewed at the unit and headquarters levels. While most maintenance processes and procedures were adequate (and in many cases above average), deficiencies identified during the ORI were a result of failures to follow established maintenance procedures. Some problems can be attributed to the “fog of war” during the ORI and an attempt to get the mission done. Issues identified during aircraft acceptance were with the J Hooks and jack plugs, which is a fleet wide issue and the result of long standing accepted A-10 configuration practices, and failure of the Depot to update technical order data. Tool accountability issues occurred during shift change and can be attributed to poor ORI planning.<sup>5</sup> The IG identified a supposed munitions problem with providing bad carts. This issue was the result of a locally established procedure to mark carts nearing their life cycle with an “H” to alert munitions to carefully review the number of scribes. This “H” was interpreted by the IG to mean the cart was no longer serviceable. This local procedure to scribe the carts with an “H” should have been addressed by QA as an unauthorized procedure but never was. The problems with our weapons loading can all be traced to one load crew. Procedures have been thoroughly reviewed and found to be adequate. The problem was with the one crew that consistently failed to perform as trained. They have been decertified and load crews reconfigured. No QA problems were identified in this area. The problems with launch/recovery operations were not in any one specific area. Many of the issues identified by the IG were subjective and could have gone either way.

**Corrective Action:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has addressed and complied with all ACC/IG and ANG/LG write-ups and recommendations. The command reviewed all leadership positions within the Maintenance Group and made changes where appropriate. The Maintenance Commander in place for the ORI has been replaced. Numerous key leadership positions, some of which were assigned duties outside of aircraft maintenance, have been changed. The Production Supervisor, who missed the ORI because his wife was terminally ill, is now back on the job. The Chief of Quality Assurance was relieved of additional duties in order to fully concentrate his efforts in the QA section. The unit is completely reviewing all Compliance and Standardization Requirements Lists (C&SRL's) to ensure compliance with all accepted standards. The unit has requested assistance from ANG and ACC in Weapons, QA and flightline maintenance. Reviews to date have been very favorable with one inspector commenting that he is very impressed with the programs and procedures in place. The unit has requested additional help from ANG to provide assistance to conduct acceptance reviews of aircraft and provide an Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) for their upcoming ORE in November 2005.

**The Way Ahead:** The 111<sup>th</sup> has taken an aggressive approach to correct deficiencies identified during the inspection. Below is the unit “roadmap” to prepare for the follow inspection scheduled for April 2006:

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<sup>4</sup> The inspection involved ratings of 165 separate areas. The 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing received **19 Outstandings, 56 Excellents, 64 Satisfactory scores, 22 Marginals and 4 Unsatisfactory scores** in this inspection. The overall rating of unsatisfactory was assigned because of the importance given to the small handful (4) of areas with unsatisfactory ratings. From the perspective of the unit and its higher headquarters, the number of marginal and unsatisfactory ratings was unacceptably high warranting the prompt and decisive response as described in this paper.

<sup>5</sup> Tool accountability had been an item addressed by Quality Assurance (QA) in numerous discrepancy reports, and it should have been corrected before the inspection.

- June 2005
  - **ANG Readiness Center Standardization Team** (5 person)
    - Their assessment was that we have a safe maintenance operation, *but* that we need definite work in QA, weapons loading, munitions and the CTK (tool kits) program.
  - **'COMBAT SHIELD'** (5 person) Electronic warning assessment program evaluation of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) equipment.
    - Equipment, training and operations by active duty team from Eglin AFB. Their assessment was very positive and comment was "Best Seen to Date".
- July 2005
  - **Begin Compliance & Standardization Requirements List(C&SRL) process**
    - Began a 10-week long maintenance self-inspection.
    - Purchase CTK kits, organize and scribe kits (2 months).
- August 2005
  - C&SRL process continues
    - Normal Fort Drum summer deployment
    - Unit Training assembly (UTA) 27-28 Aug / Saturday and Sunday flying
- September 2005
  - Unit Training Assembly (UTA) 17-18 Sep, Saturday fly; Sunday ground training
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  - UTA 10-11 Dec, Saturday PM & Night Fly, Sunday – ground training and Christmas Party
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  - Jan UTA, Saturday fly; Sunday ground training
- February 2006
  - **ORE**, Saturday and Sunday flying
  - Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) from outside the ANG A-10 community
- March 2006
  - UTA, Saturday and Sunday flying
- April 2006 Saturday flying; Sunday ground training
  - **ORI**, 27 Apr - 2

**111<sup>th</sup> FW Inspection History:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has had a tremendous amount of success in recent inspections. “An inspection provides a snapshot of a unit’s immediate ability to conduct operations in the manner tasked.”<sup>6</sup> Below is a table that contains results from those inspections:

**111<sup>th</sup> FW RECENT INSPECTIONS**

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DDESB Explosive Safety survey	Oct 00	In Compliance
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Standardization and Evaluation	May 98	Excellent
ORI Phase II	Oct 97	Excellent
ORI Phase I	Jul 95	Outstanding

**Unit Mission:** The mission of the 111th Fighter Wing (FW) is to provide and maintain operationally ready, highly trained, well-equipped military personnel who provide combat-ready A-10 aircraft and support elements in response to wartime and peacetime tasking under federal or state authority. The 111th Fighter Wing is indispensable in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as the unit is prepared to support Air Force war contingency requirements and can support the Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions as well as a variety of peacetime missions as required. The 103rd Fighter Squadron is the operational combat arm of the 111th. Their primary mission is to provide combat-ready forces able to conduct day and night Close Air Support (CAS) for our joint and coalition ground forces. Other flying missions include, Airborne Forward Air Control (AFAC), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Air Interdiction (AI), and Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). In addition, the 111<sup>th</sup> is staffed with well-trained and well-equipped personnel who could respond to state emergencies. These include firefighters, security police, civil engineer, medical squadron, and other support personnel.

**Recent Unit History:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has been a key player in recent years, particularly since the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. With the demands increasing on active units, the Air National Guard (ANG) has been tasked to step forward and support the active force. The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has certainly performed exceptionally well during this time of war. The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has performed combat operations in operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, SOUTHERN WATCH, and NOBLE EAGLE since 1995. This unit is the only organization in the ANG to voluntarily forward deploy for both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, conducting combat operations in two deployments, in just a five-month period. Despite the fact that unit

<sup>6</sup> ACC Final Operational Readiness Inspection report, 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Willow Grove ARS, PA, page 5.

personnel were located on austere bases that were subject to hostile fire, the 111<sup>th</sup> met all mission requirements.

During operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the unit had a mission capable rate of 95 percent. This is far above the standard 80 percent that is the goal during normal operations. This is even more impressive when considering the harsh conditions the equipment and personnel had to endure. During operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the 111<sup>th</sup> was the lead unit for a short notice, out-of-cycle Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. During this period, the unit flew 100 percent of their tasked missions while operating in "blackout" conditions at an airfield frequently enduring rocket attacks.

Since 1995, the unit performed three separate deployments in support of operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Like the deployment to Afghanistan, the 111<sup>th</sup> was the first ANG unit to deploy to Kuwait in the summer of 1995. Follow on deployments occurred in 1999 and in 2001. The wing provided more months of support to SOUTHERN WATCH **than any other ANG unit** during this period. These highly successful deployments earned the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing three outstanding unit awards.

The 111<sup>th</sup> also supported operation NOBLE EAGLE with many personnel personally requested to support the Pentagon and ANG Crisis Action Teams (CAT). Members of the unit's Security Forces Squadron, Medical Group, Logistics Group, Civil Engineering Squadron, Logistics Readiness Squadron, and other areas served in an outstanding manner in order to support requirements.

**Conclusion:** The 111<sup>th</sup> is an exceptional unit with a maintenance function that stumbled during the May 2005 Operational Readiness Inspection. The unit was and is combat ready. The unit is now focused on core maintenance competencies. The unit has requested assistance from ANG and ACC to provide personnel to review our processes, identify problems, recommend changes, and most importantly validate our ability to get the job done. The Quality Assurance program has been reinvigorated to ensure the process is done formally and that all personnel are accountable for their actions.

During the week ending on Friday, May 13, 2005, this unit faced adversity as a result of the untimely death of a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Unsatisfactory ORI result and proposed deactivation through BRAC. The 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing has recovered to face the challenge to bring about positive results. A lesser unit without the committed team effort of all the 111FW airmen may have failed to quickly reestablish its combat ready status going on to support recent home station and deployed operations to include live joint close air support.

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ON  
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**Operational Readiness Inspection, 2-12 May 2005:** Under the authority of Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, as implemented by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-201, the Inspector General, Headquarters ACC, conducted an ORI at Willow Grove Air Reserve Station (ARS), 2-12 May 2005. The purpose of the inspection was, "To evaluate initial response, employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate for the 111<sup>th</sup> FW in accordance with AFI 90-201, ACC Supplement 1, Addendum A."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> AFI 90-201, ACC Supplement, Addendum A, page 5.

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Although the unit performed admirably in many areas<sup>4</sup> and earned many favorable comments, the unit was rated unsatisfactory overall as a result of **maintenance practices and procedures**.

**Maintenance Inspection Details:** The ACC/IG report was reviewed at the unit and headquarters levels. While most maintenance processes and procedures were adequate (and in many cases above average), deficiencies identified during the ORI were a result of failures to follow established maintenance procedures. Some problems can be attributed to the “fog of war” during the ORI and an attempt to get the mission done. Issues identified during aircraft acceptance were with the J Hooks and jack plugs, which is a fleet wide issue and the result of long standing accepted A-10 configuration practices, and failure of the Depot to update technical order data. Tool accountability issues occurred during shift change and can be attributed to poor ORI planning.<sup>5</sup> The IG identified a supposed munitions problem with providing bad carts. This issue was the result of a locally established procedure to mark carts nearing their life cycle with an “H” to alert munitions to carefully review the number of scribes. This “H” was interpreted by the IG to mean the cart was no longer serviceable. This local procedure to scribe the carts with an “H” should have been addressed by QA as an unauthorized procedure but never was. The problems with our weapons loading can all be traced to one load crew. Procedures have been thoroughly reviewed and found to be adequate. The problem was with the one crew that consistently failed to perform as trained. They have been decertified and load crews reconfigured. No QA problems were identified in this area. The problems with launch/recovery operations were not in any one specific area. Many of the issues identified by the IG were subjective and could have gone either way.

**Corrective Action:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has addressed and complied with all ACC/IG and ANG/LG write-ups and recommendations. The command reviewed all leadership positions within the Maintenance Group and made changes where appropriate. The Maintenance Commander in place for the ORI has been replaced. Numerous key leadership positions, some of which were assigned duties outside of aircraft maintenance, have been changed. The Production Supervisor, who missed the ORI because his wife was terminally ill, is now back on the job. The Chief of Quality Assurance was relieved of additional duties in order to fully concentrate his efforts in the QA section. The unit is completely reviewing all Compliance and Standardization Requirements Lists (C&SRL’s) to ensure compliance with all accepted standards. The unit has requested assistance from ANG and ACC in Weapons, QA and flightline maintenance. Reviews to date have been very favorable with one inspector commenting that he is very impressed with the programs and procedures in place. The unit has requested additional help from ANG to provide assistance to conduct acceptance reviews of aircraft and provide an Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) for their upcoming ORE in November 2005.

**The Way Ahead:** The 111<sup>th</sup> has taken an aggressive approach to correct deficiencies identified during the inspection. Below is the unit “roadmap” to prepare for the follow inspection scheduled for April 2006:

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<sup>4</sup> The inspection involved ratings of 165 separate areas. The 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing received **19 Outstandings, 56 Excellents, 64 Satisfactory scores, 22 Marginals and 4 Unsatisfactory** scores in this inspection. The overall rating of unsatisfactory was assigned because of the importance given to the small handful (4) of areas with unsatisfactory ratings. From the perspective of the unit and its higher headquarters, the number of marginal and unsatisfactory ratings was unacceptably high warranting the prompt and decisive response as described in this paper.

<sup>5</sup> Tool accountability had been an item addressed by Quality Assurance (QA) in numerous discrepancy reports, and it should have been corrected before the inspection.

- June 2005
  - **ANG Readiness Center Standardization Team** (5 person)
    - Their assessment was that we have a safe maintenance operation, *but* that we need definite work in QA, weapons loading, munitions and the CTK (tool kits) program.
  - **'COMBAT SHIELD'** (5 person) Electronic warning assessment program evaluation of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) equipment.
    - Equipment, training and operations by active duty team from Eglin AFB. Their assessment was very positive and comment was "Best Seen to Date".
- July 2005
  - **Begin Compliance & Standardization Requirements List(C&SRL) process**
    - Began a 10-week long maintenance self-inspection.
    - Purchase CTK kits, organize and scribe kits (2 months).
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  - C&SRL process continues
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    - Unit Training assembly (UTA) 27-28 Aug / Saturday and Sunday flying
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  - Jan UTA, Saturday fly; Sunday ground training
- February 2006
  - **ORE**, Saturday and Sunday flying
  - Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) from outside the ANG A-10 community
- March 2006
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- April 2006 Saturday flying; Sunday ground training
  - **ORI**, 27 Apr - 2

**111<sup>th</sup> FW Inspection History:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has had a tremendous amount of success in recent inspections. “An inspection provides a snapshot of a unit’s immediate ability to conduct operations in the manner tasked.”<sup>6</sup> Below is a table that contains results from those inspections:

**111<sup>th</sup> FW RECENT INSPECTIONS**

<i>INSPECTION TYPE</i>	<i>DATE</i>	<i>RATING</i>
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Standardization and Evaluation	Oct 02	Outstanding
Navy Explosive Safety Inspection (Joint Inspection)	Aug 02	Pass [pass/fail]
ECAMP	May 02	In Compliance
DDESB Explosive Safety survey	Oct 00	In Compliance
ECAMP	May 00	In Compliance
Standardization and Evaluation	May 98	Excellent
ORI Phase II	Oct 97	Excellent
ORI Phase I	Jul 95	Outstanding

**Unit Mission:** The mission of the 111th Fighter Wing (FW) is to provide and maintain operationally ready, highly trained, well-equipped military personnel who provide combat-ready A-10 aircraft and support elements in response to wartime and peacetime tasking under federal or state authority. The 111th Fighter Wing is indispensable in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as the unit is prepared to support Air Force war contingency requirements and can support the Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions as well as a variety of peacetime missions as required. The 103rd Fighter Squadron is the operational combat arm of the 111th. Their primary mission is to provide combat-ready forces able to conduct day and night Close Air Support (CAS) for our joint and coalition ground forces. Other flying missions include, Airborne Forward Air Control (AFAC), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Air Interdiction (AI), and Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). In addition, the 111<sup>th</sup> is staffed with well-trained and well-equipped personnel who could respond to state emergencies. These include firefighters, security police, civil engineer, medical squadron, and other support personnel.

**Recent Unit History:** The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has been a key player in recent years, particularly since the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. With the demands increasing on active units, the Air National Guard (ANG) has been tasked to step forward and support the active force. The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has certainly performed exceptionally well during this time of war. The 111<sup>th</sup> FW has performed combat operations in operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, SOUTHERN WATCH, and NOBLE EAGLE since 1995. This unit is the only organization in the ANG to voluntarily forward deploy for both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, conducting combat operations in two deployments, in just a five-month period. Despite the fact that unit

<sup>6</sup> ACC Final Operational Readiness Inspection report, 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Willow Grove ARS, PA, page 5.

personnel were located on austere bases that were subject to hostile fire, the 111<sup>th</sup> met all mission requirements.

During operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the unit had a mission capable rate of 95 percent. This is far above the standard 80 percent that is the goal during normal operations. This is even more impressive when considering the harsh conditions the equipment and personnel had to endure. During operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the 111<sup>th</sup> was the lead unit for a short notice, out-of-cycle Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. During this period, the unit flew 100 percent of their tasked missions while operating in "blackout" conditions at an airfield frequently enduring rocket attacks.

Since 1995, the unit performed three separate deployments in support of operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Like the deployment to Afghanistan, the 111<sup>th</sup> was the first ANG unit to deploy to Kuwait in the summer of 1995. Follow on deployments occurred in 1999 and in 2001. The wing provided more months of support to SOUTHERN WATCH than any other ANG unit during this period. These highly successful deployments earned the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing three outstanding unit awards.

The 111<sup>th</sup> also supported operation NOBLE EAGLE with many personnel personally requested to support the Pentagon and ANG Crisis Action Teams (CAT). Members of the unit's Security Forces Squadron, Medical Group, Logistics Group, Civil Engineering Squadron, Logistics Readiness Squadron, and other areas served in an outstanding manner in order to support requirements.

**Conclusion:** The 111<sup>th</sup> is an exceptional unit with a maintenance function that stumbled during the May 2005 Operational Readiness Inspection. The unit was and is combat ready. The unit is now focused on core maintenance competencies. The unit has requested assistance from ANG and ACC to provide personnel to review our processes, identify problems, recommend changes, and most importantly validate our ability to get the job done. The Quality Assurance program has been reinvigorated to ensure the process is done formally and that all personnel are accountable for there actions.

During the week ending on Friday, May 13, 2005, this unit faced adversity as a result of the untimely death of a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Unsatisfactory ORI result and proposed deactivation through BRAC. The 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing has recovered to face the challenge to bring about positive results. A lesser unit without the committed team effort of all the 111FW airmen may have failed to quickly reestablish its combat ready status going on to support recent home station and deployed operations to include live joint close air support.

POINT PAPER  
ON  
111<sup>TH</sup> FIGHTER WING OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION

**Purpose:** This paper will discuss the unsatisfactory rating the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing (FW) received during its combined Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) that took place from 2-12 May 2005. Because the unit was rated unsatisfactory for maintenance, it received an overall unsatisfactory even though the unit performed very strongly in other areas evaluated in the inspection. This report will cover the particulars of this inspection and explain the process of an Air Combat Command (ACC) ORI. Additionally, this paper will show that the unsatisfactory result is an anomaly in the long and distinguished history of this unit, and it will describe the measures the unit is taking to correct the deficiencies identified in this ORI.

**Relationship to BRAC Process:** The ORI for which the 111<sup>th</sup> FW received an unsatisfactory rating in maintenance was completed just one day before the release of the DoD BRAC report, which recommended deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> FW as part of the closure of NAS JRB Willow Grove. Obviously, the Navy and the Air Force made their recommendations with regard to Willow Grove long before these ORI results were known. The maintenance rating of the 111<sup>th</sup> in a single ORI should, of course, have had no impact on installation and facility reviews related to the 2005 BRAC round. Any suggestion that the 111<sup>th</sup> FW deserves to be deactivated because of its maintenance rating in this single ORI is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the inspection process and the military value of this unit.

**Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspections:** Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs) generally consist of two distinct phases. Phase I (PH I) evaluates the unit's ability to transition from peacetime readiness to a wartime posture. PH I consists of Initial Response. Phase II (PH II) evaluates a unit's ability to perform wartime or contingency missions. PH II consists of Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO).<sup>1</sup>

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