

**THE
LIGHT FORCE
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
CONCEPT**

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deal with Chuffo
A.P. Hill*



LFNTC PLANNING GROUP
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR TRAINING
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VA 23651
AUTOVON 680-3798/2893

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I. Introduction/Executive Summary.

1. This concept describes the requirement for, implementation and operation of a Light Force National Training Center (LFNTC).
2. The need for a Light Force National Training Center (LFNTC) is based on its potential role in supporting enhanced readiness by providing advanced battalion level collective training and achieving a level and type of training not available at unit home station.
3. The most likely land threat remains that of regional contingencies. Light forces will be deployed first to react to such threats. They are also required to be ready to respond to situations requiring reinforcement of forward deployed forces. Readiness in both areas can be improved by achieving an enhanced level of tactical competency within light battalions. That enhanced tactical competency can best be achieved through an advanced level of collective training not available at home station. Advanced training results from successfully providing five critical collective training parameters: deployment, adequate unfamiliar rugged terrain, professionally developed scenarios based on known threats and contingencies, force on force maneuver against a trained opposing force and objective evaluation to a uniform standard of performance.
4. As described here, the concept for a LFNTC envisions the establishment of a training facility at a dedicated installation to which Army Active and Reserve Component light force battalions would deploy and train under highly realistic and demanding conditions. The facility would be staffed with a permanent Operations Group (Ops Gp) to plan, control, evaluate and provide feedback on unit training. A permanent Opposing Force (OPFOR) Detachment would be established, trained and equipped to replicate a wide range of low to mid intensity threat.
5. Training at the LFNTC will be ARTEP based and combined arms in nature. Battalions will deploy with normal attachments and supporting units. Scenarios will be drawn from appropriate ARTEP missions and tasks, but will be sufficiently flexible to reflect the anticipated conditions of low to mid intensity conflict. Specific objectives and scenario for each rotation will be developed based on the unit commander's requirements and needs.
6. The LFNTC Concept combines the major advantages afforded by the NTC at Fort Irwin, with the unique training requirements of light forces while achieving resourcing economies wherever possible. The LFNTC Operations Group will consist of 287 military personnel, and the Opposing Force element of 208 military personnel. The Operations Group and Opposing Force are organized into two teams which will support rotations on an alternating basis. Both the Ops Gp and OPFOR are to be TDA organizations. The OPFOR will require augmentation for some scenarios.

The two organizations will provide the planning staff, maneuver controllers and threat representation needed to conduct an advanced level of training. The instrumentation available at Fort Irwin will not be duplicated at the LFNTC. MILES, limited television, and a maneuver control capability will be employed to support maneuver and evaluation requirements. A vigorous, competitive contracting effort will determine the appropriate and cost effective level of instrumentation for the LFNTC.

7. Each battalion rotation will consist of a 10 day FTX. Those FTX will be continuous free play exercises which will challenge all echelons of the battalion. The characteristics of the LFNTC will cause the unit to exercise all aspects of tactical operations and critical combat tasks in as close a manner to actual combat as is possible in training. The FTX, combined with home station deployment time and post exercise after action review and redeployment, will require approximately 21 days from a participating battalion's training program. Twenty-eight single battalion rotations will be conducted at the LFNTC annually.

8. Site selection is critical to the success of the LFNTC. The installation selected must contain adequate (minimum of 50,000 acres) maneuver space, as well as terrain characteristics and facilities to support light force training. Minimal facilities which are required at the LFNTC include: access to a C141 capable airfield, drop zones, landing zones, and impact areas suitable for development of necessary ranges. Those basic characteristics will be enhanced by development of a MOUT complex which will afford battalion level MILES exercises as an overall contribution to realism. The intent of the LFNTC is to develop those facilities into a total training environment which will represent a training asset and opportunity not available at the unit's home station. HQ TRADOC has investigated nine installations: Three of them, Fort A. P. Hill, VA, Fort Chaffee, AR, and Camp Shelby, MS, were found adequate for further study. Because of its unique characteristics of terrain and topography, existing facilities both on and off post, extensive off post maneuver area, existing USAF tactical airlift and tactical fighter training, geographic location with regard to light force installations, and BASOPS, Fort Chaffee is recommended by TRADOC as the most operationally suitable site for the LFNTC.

9. The LFNTC will accommodate the Army's light forces by serving to enhance light battalion readiness for rapid deployment in response to contingencies, and to reinforce the Army's forward deployed elements. If supported as described in this concept, the Light Force National Training Center will be implemented in three phases:

a. A concept evaluation to be conducted in FY 86 using a temporary staff as described in Part VII.

b. An Interim LFNTC established at the operationally and environmentally preferred site with a scaled down Operations Group and OPFOR and capable of supporting 15 rotations starting in FY 87-88, with a prototype rotation occurring in Feb 1987 (see Part V).

c. The objective LFNTC with full staffing, facilities and capabilities as described in Part IV.

10. Only the objective LFNTC supports training of the entire light force structure at a level commensurate with heavy force training at Ft Irwin. That level provides one LFNTC training opportunity every two years for priority light battalions. The LFNTC will operate in conjunction with NTC Irwin. The latter facility will continue to conduct at least four heavy-light rotation annually as doctrinal excursions. Those rotations will contribute to the training of the total light force structure.

11. Resources required to implement all phases of the LFNTC are described in Part IX.

II. The Light Force Training Requirement.

1. The Army Plan (draft, Dec 85) describes the Army training goal as follows:

(U) ". . . provide a total Army of professionals prepared to mobilize, deploy, fight and win anywhere in the world. This goal directly supports the Army's mission to deter any attack upon U.S. National interests and, if deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any environment. The goal recognizes that force structure and force modernization initiatives increase the Army's warfighting capabilities only to the extent that units and equipment are manned by motivated, highly proficient, well led soldiers."

2. The Dec 83 Army plan focused more specifically on light force training, stating:

(U) "Develop and implement training programs that provide elite forces to Light Infantry Divisions. Focus will be on employment in all geographic areas; low to mid intensity warfare emphasizing the lower spectrum; high individual and unit standards; and leader proficiency and small unit cohesion. Training will encompass: airborne and air assault operations type training; environmental training; enhanced physical fitness; and small unit operations emphasizing ranger type mission training."

3. Recent guidance concerning NTC development (Army Plan, draft, Dec 85) included the following:

(U) "Determine the purpose, justification, scope investment

and sustainment costs, manpower requirements and alternatives for a light forces NTC; resource the requirement if a decision is made to establish it."

4. TRADOC addresses the training objectives articulated in the Army Plan in terms of a light force training requirement. Two interrelated initiatives describe training responding to that requirement. Both initiatives contribute to an overall intent of improving operational readiness and unit capability through training. The two initiatives address requirements of the entire light force, both active and reserve component, and must be considered to be mutually supportive. The initiatives are:

a. Development of a training strategy for the Light Infantry Divisions: TRADOC made an assessment of the training implications of the Light Infantry Division (LID) initiative in FY 84 and with FORSCOM developed a training strategy to support its implementation. The training strategy encompasses soldier and leader training and training support. The strategy's training initiatives include institutional course revision, training and doctrinal literature revision, the formation of infantry and artillery COHORT battalions, fielding of branch and new organization training teams from the service schools, design of a Light Fighters Course for use by divisions and initiation of new Light Leader and Sapper Leader Courses by the Infantry and Engineer Schools, respectively. The training strategy addresses conversion training and training support, but in and of itself but, does not provide a basis for sustaining light force capabilities over time.

b. Development of a Light Force National Training Center: TRADOC has developed this concept to describe the requirement for creation of a NTC which meets the unique training requirements of the Army's light forces and contributes to sustainment of superior light force units. The concept recognizes the emerging force structure and objectives described under the Army of Excellence (AOE) program and describes a means by which advanced training of those battalions can be achieved and sustained over time. The LFNTC is only one component of a larger battalion collective training concept. A combination of environmental training sites, exercise participation and one dedicated CONUS facility, the LFNTC, are envisioned as necessary to achieve the standard of light force collective training described under the AOE. Through use of the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC), the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC), other environmental training sites and the LFNTC described in this concept, all light battalions can be afforded an opportunity to conduct a variety of deployment training. That training experience coupled with Joint Readiness Exercise participation will support the contingency nature of light force mission readiness in terms of rapid response, a wide environmental spectrum, and demanding collective training. This

conceptual approach best meets the guidance provided in the Army Plan to develop and sustain the capabilities of light infantry forces, in general, and to enhance readiness for their assigned contingencies.

III. The LFNTC Requirement.

1. The Army's primary peacetime mission is to prepare for war. By maintaining a high state of readiness, the Army contributes to the deterrent effect of the U.S. defense establishment. Today, land deterrence must not only address the most dangerous threat, the Soviet capability against Western Europe, but also the less dangerous, but more likely low intensity threat represented by a variety of regional contingencies. Throughout history, military leaders have attempted to devise means by which to prepare their units for the demands of war during times of peace. However, that formidable challenge has been met with only limited success.

2. Today, the U.S. Army operates the world's most advanced facility for the training of Mechanized Infantry and Tank Battalions. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, affords such units an unparalleled opportunity to train to defeat the most dangerous threat, an attack by Soviet forces in Central Europe. The NTC accomplishes that task by overcoming traditional obstructions to meaningful unit training, and through application of advanced technology heretofore unknown or unavailable. Dedicated, relatively unrestricted maneuver space is available which permits doctrinally correct employment of the heavy TF for all missions. The Operations Group (Ops Gp) provides observer/controllers. That permanent controller staff also enhances the standardization of unit evaluation and application of doctrine. The Operations Group accomplishes the significant exercise planning and preparation normally required of unit staffs. The dedicated Opposing Force (OPFOR) at Fort Irwin provides a realistic portrayal of the threat. The OPFOR's training and equipment contributes significantly to training effectiveness. The complex instrumentation at the NTC offers an advanced level of maneuver control and objective training evaluation and feedback. Finally, extensive live fire ranges afford the opportunity for battalions to conduct evaluated live fire exercises against a realistic target array, while employing the majority of organic and supporting weapons systems.

3. While Fort Irwin meets the needs of the Army's heavy battalions, it is not suitable for the realistic training of light units. Light battalions have unique capabilities and operate in a manner which require unique training facilities. Their contingency orientation and low to mid intensity conflict focus make their training different from that of heavy forces. In addition, the factors of mission, enemy, troops available, terrain and time (METT-T), under which light units are employed, demand a different training environment from that at Fort Irwin.

4. Establishment of a Light Force National Training Center (LFNTC) will afford light force battalions a facility which supports an optimum level of combined arms training enhancing their readiness to respond to the most likely threat, the low to mid intensity conflict. Such a facility also enhances light force readiness to reinforce or augment forward deployed forces such as USAREUR and Eighth Army against the mid to high intensity threat. The LFNTC will provide a level of training not normally available at home station.

a. Unit readiness represents a number of factors. Clearly, an improved tactical competency within units contributes to readiness. Tactical competency in light forces can be achieved through training focusing on their contingency character, a recognition of a range of conflict to which they must respond, and their employment in both augmented and un-augmented modes.

(1) Because of their contingency orientation, light forces must be prepared to deploy to fight today, particularly in the low to mid intensity conflict characterized by the regional contingency. That most likely threat will be met first by light forces. The conditions to be found there are likely to be uncertain and the threat unorthodox. Forces committed are also likely to fight on unfamiliar ground. In training, those conditions can best be replicated by:

(a) Use of an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) type fly-away.

(b) Training away from the familiarity of home station.

(c) Exercise of the entry-lodgement-expansion scenario/process.

(d) Employment of an OPFOR trained to represent a range of likely threat.

(e) The exercise of the full (combat, combat support, combat service support) combined arms under AirLand Battle conditions operating at the end of the air line of communications.

(2) A range of conflict must be represented in training to effectively enhance light force readiness. Light forces are subject to deployment not only to regional contingencies, but also to reinforce forward deployed forces. For each situation, readiness to perform distinct, unique missions, oriented on the level of conflict, must be trained. Such missions include:

(a) Regional Contingency (low to mid intensity conflict):

1. All conventional tactical missions and tasks, but performed in an unconventional setting.

2. Peacekeeping.

3. Counter/anti-terrorism.

4. Civil action.

5. Security.

6. Military assistance.

(b) Reinforcement of forward forces (mid intensity conflict):

1. MOUT.

2. Economy of force.

3. Rear battle.

4. Deep attack.

(3) Light forces are subject to tailoring for specific situations and missions based on factors of METT-T. Training must reflect similar force packaging. Readiness is enhanced by training such packages under realistic conditions. Packaging includes involvement of non-divisional units, many of which could be from the Reserve Components, a recognition of the broad definition of combined arms (combat, combat support and combat service support), and the exercise of appropriate command and control of such packages, even at battalion level.

b. An advanced level of collective training mentioned previously can best be accomplished by focusing on training the battalion, by providing enhanced conditions of realism and by exercising a full range of ARTEP tasks and tactical missions.

(1) By focusing the training at the battalion level particular economies of time and resources are accomplished. Typically, during higher level exercises such as JRX, the training time of the lower echelons of organizations is underutilized. Individuals, squads and platoons are often not fully employed or involved at all times. Training focusing on the battalion, will ensure that all echelons and individuals are heavily involved and challenged realistically throughout the course of a given scenario.

(2) Realism is also improved by other factors.

(a) Light battalions should train as they are expected to fight. In that regard, a primary requirement for advanced collective training is that it take place on the type of rugged, or close terrain where light forces would normally be employed.

(b) A dedicated Opposing Force (OPFOR) element supports

- (d) Masked attack.
- (e) Archipelago defense.
- (f) Baited attack.

(5) Serious consideration was given to the need for live fire training as part of the LFNTC concept. A number of problems call into serious question whether the training value received in a battalion live fire problem justifies the significant expenditure required.

(a) A particular problem in any live fire exercise is the accurate representation of the enemy. Not only is it difficult to get any targets to look like an enemy, it is virtually impossible to have a target array move with the flexibility of a thinking enemy in reaction to friendly maneuver and fires. There is no effective way to represent enemy fires during these exercises resulting in units paying insufficient attention to OPSEC and use of cover and concealment.

(b) For live fire exercises to be most productive, there is a need for specific valid feedback on accuracy, volume and distribution of fires down to the lowest level. While significant strides have been made in this area, there is no near term, reliable capability to solve those problems for the battalion task force. Even if this capability existed, there is insufficient time in a stress-based scenario with missions coming in rapid succession, to collect, analyze and transmit detailed gunnery feedback all the way down to squad, team and individual level.

(c) Safety is a constant concern in any live fire training. The training at Fort Irwin has shown that the Army can eliminate many of the administrative safety restrictions that were used in the past and rely primarily on those fire control measures specified in our doctrine which have always accomplished two tasks, (1) massing fires and (2) preventing fires on friendlies. Despite this, there is still a reluctance on the part of soldiers and leaders at all levels to "go flat out" in a peace time live fire exercise because of a concern for safety. This is understandable, but must be considered as the relative training value of these exercises is assessed.

(d) There are enormous costs associated with the development, construction and operation of a light infantry task force multi-purpose range. Light force doctrine requires reliance on coordinated small unit actions, dispersion, and use of difficult terrain. These characteristics make the construction of realistic ranges doubly difficult. No good estimate of resources is available at the present time for a range that

would provide sufficient validity, reliability and flexibility to successfully train light battalion task forces.

(e) Service ammunition is always going to be a constrained resource. It is likely that any ammunition to be expended at the LFNTC will come from the annual FORSCOM allocation. This means reduced quantities of ammunition would be available to support home station training.

Consideration of these factors has led to the conclusion that a battalion task force live fire range is not cost effective for the LFNTC. On-going efforts to improve the simulation of all weapons systems in force on force training offers the best return for training dollars. Since the primary purpose of the LFNTC is to train the battalion task force, resources to develop more sophisticated live fire ranges and ammunition are best directed to the division/post level where the responsibility for those kinds of training rests.

c. A final need for the LFNTC is based on providing training beyond that available at home station. That level of training and conditions touches on many of the points already mentioned. Capabilities not available at home include training on unfamiliar ground, extensive MOUT training, an Operations Group and OPFOR, and the total training environment.

(1) Training on unfamiliar ground is fundamentally important to light forces. Because of their contingency orientation, light force units must be prepared to arrive on unfamiliar ground, and immediately adapt to and use that ground to best tactical advantage. Sufficient maneuver area is also important to enhanced tactical competency. Although light division installations all have sufficient acreage for training, any given battalion often is forced to accept less than an optimally sized training area. Similarly, many home stations do not have the kind of rugged close terrain which best supports light force training. Unit leaders and soldiers also rapidly become familiar with the maneuver areas at their home station so that in training true terrain evaluation and utilization as part of the tactical situation does not always occur. A large dedicated maneuver area allows for flexibility of scenarios and contributes to the creation of that all important "battlefield" training environment.

(2) Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) training is a high priority requirement for the light forces. The likelihood of their conducting MOUT in all levels of conflict is substantial. Training for MOUT must be realistic. A MOUT complex comprising a number of facilities supports such training and reinforces the creation of a realistic training environment. Such facilities would include a MILES force on force capability for platoons, companies, and battalions.

(3) A dedicated operations group and opposing force detachment relieve units of the major training support requirements of planning, controlling, evaluating and opposing unit exercises. Such elements have proven their worth at Fort Irwin. They provide continuity and support standardization and doctrinal consistency. The OPFOR for light force training must have the flexibility of representing a range of threat from terrorists through Soviet regular forces. Both the Ops Gp and OPFOR will enhance tactical expertise in the force by exposing personnel assigned to them to a wide range of contingencies.

5. The factors described above can be summarized through a light force training requirement (Fig 1), described in terms of tasks, conditions and standards. Tasks are doctrinally based and should reflect a revitalized look at how infantry must fight to win.

Training conditions must address rapid deployment of the light force into unfamiliar/restricted terrain to face an unconventional and varied threat, and provide a training vehicle to train light force units to ARTEP standards. Standards require the capability of objective evaluation with feedback to the unit and the Army to improve unit leadership, tactical competence and Army doctrine.

THE LIGHT INFANTRY TRAINING REQUIREMENT —

	<u>TASK</u>	<u>CONDITIONS</u>	<u>STANDARDS</u>
REQUIREMENTS:	TACTICAL DOCTRINE & TECHNIQUES — "NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · RAPID DEPLOYMENT · UNCONVENTIONAL/VARIED THREAT · RESTRICTED TERRAIN · LIVE FIRE · MOUT · SPECIALIZED MISSION SCENARIOS 	ARTEP STANDARD OBJECTIVELY EVALUATED WITH FEEDBACK TO UNIT AND THE ARMY TO IMPROVE UNIT ING READINESS AND ARMY DOCTRINE

Figure 1

ACTIONS TO ACCOMPLISH TNG REQUIREMENTS —

ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS:	<u>TASK</u>	<u>CONDITIONS</u>	<u>STANDARDS</u>
	NEW DOCTRINE FROM CGSC, USAIS, OTHER SCHOOLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · DEPLOYMENTS · NON COOPERATIVE OPFOR TRAINED IN LOW TO MID INTENSITY THREAT · ADEQUATE MANEUVER AREAS W/RESTRICTED AND VARIED TERRAIN · LIVE FIRE RANGES · MOUT TNG FACILITIES · TNG SCENARIOS REFLECTING ANTICIPATED MISSIONS AND CONDITIONS OF COMBAT. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · PEACEKEEPING · COUNTER/ANTITERRORIST · CIVIL ACTION · SECURITY · MILITARY ASSISTANCE · HOSTAGE RESCUE · ANTI GUERRILLA 	TRAINED EVALUATORS TIED TO SERVICE SCHOOLS, SUPPORTED BY INSTRUMENTATION AND CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING OBJECTIVE EVALUATION

Figure 2

The requirement can be accomplished by a number of actions (Fig 2). First, revision of doctrine based on historical lessons and current capabilities and threat can be undertaken. Training conditions can be provided by light force unit deployments into an unfamiliar geographical locations that provide adequate maneuver areas with restricted and varied terrain to conduct operations against a non-cooperative OPFOR trained in low to mid intensity threat. The requirement in standards can be achieved by providing trained evaluators tied to service schools and supported by adequate instrumentation to conduct objective evaluation of unit training. The Army's current capabilities vary (Fig 3). Revision of its light force doctrine spurred by the LID and other AOE light initiatives is underway. Conditions can be met to varying degrees through existing and programmed training and training facilities. The ability to meet the requirement in standards is most difficult due to a lack of uniform standard enforced by a single permanent evaluation capability. There is, then, a "delta" in the areas of conditions and standards which must be filled to meet the stated training requirements. To do so, five critical collective training parameters must be met:

- a. Deployment.
- b. Adequate unfamiliar rugged terrain.

LIGHT INFANTRY TNG STATUS —

	<u>TASK</u>	<u>CONDITIONS</u>	<u>STANDARDS</u>
STATUS/ CURRENT CAPABILITIES	GREEN: DOCTRINE UNDER DEVELOPMENT BY TRADOC. VALIDATION BY 7 ID	AMBER: - EDRE ONGOING AT CO/BN LEVEL - OPFOR NOT TRAINED NOR UNCOMPROMISING EXCEPT FOR HIC THREAT AT FT IRWIN - AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE RESTRICTED TERRAIN VARIES - MPRC BEING DEVELOPED FOR CO LEVEL LIVE FIRE - MOUT FACILITIES BEING DEVELOPED FOR FIRE TM LIVE FIRE AND PLT MAN'R - SCENARIOS DEVELOPED BY UNITS AND SUPPORTED FROM WITHIN UNIT ASSETS - ALL TRAINING CONDUCTED VS NORMAL HOME STATION DISTRACTORS	RED: NON STANDARD. SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION BY UNIT PERSONNEL
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 60%; margin: 0 auto; padding: 5px;"> <p>A DELTA EXISTS BETWEEN THESE CAPABILITIES AND THE REQUIREMENT!</p> </div>			

Figure 3

c. Professionally developed scenarios based on known threats and contingencies.

d. Force on force maneuver against a trained opposing force.

e. Objective evaluation to a uniform standard of performance.

6. Those parameters can be best met by establishment of a Light Force National Training Center. Taken together, the issues discussed above provide substantial justification for enhanced training of light force battalions. That training can be best and most economically carried out at a Light Force National Training Center. The remainder of this document describes such a facility and its implementation.

IV. Objective LFNTC.

1. The objective LFNTC described in this section includes all capabilities and facilities to train the total light force structure. The ultimate goal is to establish that capability. The training objective of the LFNTC is:

To provide a collective training facility at which light infantry, motorized, air assault, airborne, and ranger battalions, and special operating forces of the reserve and active components and regular infantry of the reserve components conduct advanced collective training to ARTEP standards under

conditions which realistically reflect those anticipated of low to mid intensity combat.

2. Using units.

a. The specific units which are envisioned as potential LFNTC users are as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------------|
| (1) | 6ID - 6 LT INF BN's | 3 RC LT INF BN's |
| (2) | 7ID - 9 LT INF BN's | |
| (3) | 9ID (MTZ) - 9 MANEUVER BN's | |
| (4) | 10ID - 6 LT INF BN's | 3 RC LT INF BN's |
| (5) | 25ID - 9 LT INF BN's | |
| (6) | 29ID (NG) | 9 RC LT INF BN's |
| (7) | 82 ABN DIV - 9 ABN INF BN's | |
| (8) | 101 ABN DIV (AASLT) - 9 AASLT BN's | |
| (9) | RGR REGT - 3 RGR BN's | |

b. Because of their similar characteristics, airborne, light infantry and ranger battalions will be the principal users of the LFNTC. Because of their enhanced lethality and mobility, battalions of the motorized and air assault divisions will find training utility at the LFNTC, but will also conduct battalion training at NTC Irwin. The 6ID is not considered a primary user because of its theater focus.

c. The resulting priority user population is therefore:

Abn Bn	9	(82 Abn Div)
MTZ/AASLT Bn	9	(9ID/101 AASLT Div - 1/2 total bn in conjunction with training at NTC Irwin)
LID Bn	24 (+12 RC)	(7ID, 10ID+RO, 25ID, 29ID)
Rgr Bn	3	(75 Inf Regt)
	<hr/>	
	45 (+ 12 RC)	

d. Additionally, units representing some 60 battalions of other reserve component units may find training utility at the LFNTC. FORSCOM, OCAR and NGB will prioritize their attendance based upon war/contingency plans and other requirements.

3. LFNTC Characteristics. The unique training requirements of light forces suggest the need for unique characteristics in the LFNTC. The following are the capabilities which will be incorporated in the LFNTC.

a. The installation selected must have suitable terrain reflecting that on which light battalions would likely be employed. A variety of rugged, restrictive terrain provides conditions which best support light force training.

b. A C141 capable airfield is a requirement for the

realistic and cost effective deployment of battalions. The contingency operations with which light forces are normally associated dictate scenarios which require tactical airlift, establishment of a lodgement or airhead, and sustainment through an air LOC, all of which require a suitable airfield capability. Although both C130 and C141 aircraft can support such operations, a C141 capability will reduce the cost of rotations, provides greater deployment flexibility and reflects the method anticipated for actual commitment of forces. Because of limited availability of such facilities, it is not required to initially provide a CSA capability.

c. Adequate maneuver space is a fundamental requirement. Based on battalion level rotations, it is felt that a minimum of 50,000 acres for maneuver is required to perform the range of missions and tasks described in current ARTEP and doctrine (reference: TC 25-1, Training Land). 50,000 acres will allow for execution of scenarios reflecting a full range of conflict, whether they be low intensity counter-insurgency operations, or mid intensity conventional operations.

d. The LFNTC must provide the Army with its most advanced facility for training associated with Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). The LFNTC will provide an instrumented MOUT facility capable of supporting battalion level force on force (MILES) MOUT training using a 32 building facility. Additional MOUT facilities will be situated throughout the maneuver area to replicate population density and to create a total training environment. A small industrial type facility will support scenarios dealing with defense or seizure of critical installations. Four, 5, and 6 building facilities will replicate population density (Figure 4).




Figure 4

e. The instrumentation to support LFNTC (definition here excludes MILES) will be used to assist in accomplishing the following tasks:

- (1) Exercise control.
- (2) Tactical After Action Reviews (end of mission).
- (3) Functional Area After Action Reviews (CS, CSS usually conducted after two or three missions).
- (4) Final After Action Review and take home package (end of rotation).
- (5) Lessons Learned (periodic as required).

f. Instrumentation will be procured through competitive contracting procedures. A statement of work stating specific requirements will be completed by 31 December 1985. Instrumentation requirements are similar in nature to the system employed at the NTC; however, to accomplish the LFNTC instrumentation capability is more difficult:

- (1) Position location to less than 5 meters.
- (2) Reliable transmission of data from field players to a central analysis facility in densely vegetated terrain.
- (3) Weapons firing, coding, near miss, and kill data for individual weapons for force on force engagements.
- (4) Light weight, rugged, player devices.
- (5) Tactical video with studio quality editing.
- (6) Capability to tape, edit radio nets.
- (7) Real time display following analysis and transmittal of relevant after action review data to field sites (portable or fixed facilities).
- (8) Portable instrumentation system capable of being rapidly deployed and installed in different locations.

g. A market assessment will be conducted to identify off-the-shelf, state-of-the-art technology. Contractors will identify various responses to meet this desired level of instrumentation. Contractor responses will include time schedules and initial resource estimates. Selected contractors would be funded to produce limited hardware to demonstrate the validity and reliability of candidate instrumentation concepts. Hardware demonstrations will be concluded by June 1987. It

should be recognized that it may not be possible to achieve desired instrumentation goals quickly. For example, position location in dense terrain will not be practical until the Army has access to the global positioning system and PLRS. This will occur in the FY 88 or 89 time frame. At each step of the procurement process the instrumentation capabilities and costs will be assessed prior to proceeding to the next milestone. Incremental procurement of the hardware should be followed by operational testing to ensure design expectations are realized by trainers on the ground.

h. The effort to develop instrumentation for the LFNTC should not proceed as a stand-alone project. Other Army requirements for instrumentation of ranges and training areas in CONUS and USAREUR dictate that compatibility and cost savings through combined efforts be achieved. The Directorate of Ammunition, Ranges and Targets (DAART) will take the lead in the LFNTC instrumentation procurement to ensure this occurs.

i. Based on an annual capacity of 28 rotations and the priority user population described previously, the type battalion share of annual rotations is as follows:

<u>Type Bn</u>	<u>Total Bn</u>	<u>Annual Share of Rotations</u>
ABN	9	4
MTZ/AASLT	9	5
LID	24 + (12 RC)	12 + 5 RC
RGR	3	2

j. The LFNTC Organization: This paragraph describes the two major components of the LFNTC organization, the Operations Group (Ops Gp), and the Opposing Force (OPFOR). The sizes of the Ops Gp and OPFOR are critical to their ability to support the anticipated rotation density (28 rotations annually).

(1) Operations Group:

(a) Approximately 287 military personnel are required to perform the planning, maneuver control and evaluation functions in support of battalion rotations. The Ops Gp is envisioned as a TDA organization, (Figure 5), and is described at Annex C.

(b) Sufficient personnel to provide a 24-hour capability are included in the Ops Gp structure to ensure support of anticipated scenarios.

(c) The Ops Gp is organized into the following major elements:

1. The Operations Center (Ops Ctr) element, controls and assesses unit training and performance by monitoring radio nets and reviewing orders and reports. It also provides the notional

OPERATIONS GROUP




Figure 5

brigade headquarters and OPFOR command and control. The Ops Ctr element is organized into two identical teams to support the 28 rotation density. The operations center controls all scenario events and serves as the repository for unit performance and control data.

2. The Battalion Observer/Controller (O/C) element which provides direct maneuver control and performs the training evaluation on the ground with the unit. That element is also organized into two identical teams (Figure 6). The Bn O/C element is staffed to provide observer/controllers to the battalion, its organic elements, as well as attachments.

3. The MOUT Control Element operates and directs maintenance of the MOUT facilities.

4. The Plans Cell conducts the long range planning for rotations, to include scenario development, and liaison/-coordination with using units. Much of the plans cell will be contracted.

(2) The OPFOR, also a TDA organization, will contain approximately 206 military personnel. That element will be capable of representing the threat for a number of scenarios, (Figure 7).

(a) The OPFOR must be capable of performing a wide range of roles to include representing guerillas, militia, national forces of underdeveloped states, major power surrogate or special

operational forces or even sophisticated major power forces appropriate to light force scenarios.

(b) In addition to threat, the OPFOR must be capable of individual role-playing, for example: hostages, key friendly local government and military personnel and forces, friendly local populations and even media representatives.

(c) The OPFOR retains the threat expertise and maintains a supply of foreign weapons, equipment and vehicles equipped with visual modification (VISMOD) kits to support scenarios.




FIG. 11 BATTALION OBSERVER/CONTROLLER TEAM

Figure 6

(d) Because of the many requirements placed on it, the OPFOR depicted at Figure 7 will be a cadre around which a more extensive OPFOR can be built through augmentation. For most rotations, a rifle company augmentation should be provided. Such an augmentation would ideally be on site for 60 day periods. Other necessary augmentation, particularly for mid intensity scenarios, would include air defense, combat engineers, mortars, anti-tank, scouts and armor. The core TDA OPFOR includes an organic capability to replicate a Soviet Airborne battalions vehicle array (27 BMD) reinforced with a tank platoon.

(3) Elements of both the Ops Gp and OPFOR will be organized into two teams. Each team will support one rotation. Within each team, the OIC will have flexibility in managing his personnel to ensure a 24-hour support capability. Although the Ops Gp and OPFOR teams will experience extensive periods of down time, experience at Fort Irwin indicates the need to adequately balance rotation support, duty and non-duty days. An analysis of support over time (Figure 8) indicates the balance between

OPPOSING FORCE DETACHMENT




Figure 7

non-duty, duty and field time anticipated to be experienced by the Ops Gp and OPFOR. Extensive periods of internal training time are required for the Ops Gp and OPFOR to maintain proficiency and to train new personnel. The two standdown periods and standard rotation start days will further enhance the ability of the Ops Gp/OPFOR to manage available time.

Figure 8 - OPS GP/OPFOR DUTY DAYS - OBJECTIVE

AVAILABLE DAYS (ANL)	365	
DUTY: 14 x 10 (ROTATIONS)	- 140	
	<hr style="width: 50px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>	
	225	
14 x 6 PRE/POST OPS	- 84	
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	141	
NON-DUTY: REMAINING WEEKENDS (36x2)	- 72	
	<hr style="width: 50px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>	
	69	
WEEKEND COMP TIME (14x2)	- 28	
	<hr style="width: 50px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>	
	41	
XMAS	- 14	
	<hr style="width: 50px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>	
	27	Available for internal training.

(4) Within the Observer/Controller (O/C) element of the Ops Gp, personnel are structured to support 24 hour operations without degradation of quality of evaluation. O/C's will be equipped with like mobility as the unit undergoing training. All O/C will generally remain in the field with the unit throughout the rotation, however, adequate structure is present to allow for alternating groups of O/C to observe unit activities and control maneuver at all times.

k. Deployment will be modified Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE). Maneuver units will move by tactical airlift and enter the LFNTC by airborne or airland insertion based on unit capability. Combat support and combat service

support units may deploy by tactical airlift or administratively but within doctrinal parameters. Aviation units will be transported using USAF tactical airlift or will self-deploy. Arrival and availability of CS/CSS and aviation elements will be timed so as to reflect a realistic deployment sequence. Assets will not be available to the battalion earlier than anticipated during an actual deployment.

l. Training scenarios will be drawn from the full range of low to mid intensity conflict. Scenarios will be developed well in advance by the plans element of the Ops Gp in conjunction with the unit concerned. Determination of training objectives, level of conflict and scenario events will be made in conjunction with the unit chain of command based on the training requirements of that unit.

m. BASOPS should ideally be adequate to support the level and frequency of rotations already described. Minimum upgrade of BASOPS is considered a major factor in site selection. A BASOPS assessment has been made for Ft Chaffee and is reflected in the resource section of this concept and at Annex D. That BASOPS will provide CL I, III, IV supply distribution replicating a brigade support area. Back up organizational and DS maintenance will be limited.

4. Operation of the LFNTC.

a. Command Control. The LFNTC will be a joint FORSCOM/TRADOC installation operated primarily to support training of Forces Command units. Respective MACOM responsibilities will be defined in a Memorandum of Understanding to be developed during implementation of the concept. The LFNTC Operations Group will fall under the supervision of the Commander, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC. The installation, itself, will be commanded by an O-7. The schedule of unit rotations will be developed by HQ FORSCOM, in conjunction with other using MACOM.

b. Planning - The Commander, LFNTC, supported by the Operations Group, is responsible for the detailed planning of each training rotation and scenario. Approximately 180 days prior to the start of a given rotation, Plans Cell representatives from the Ops Gp will begin coordination with unit personnel in accordance with the established rotation schedule. Initial coordination will establish training objectives, scenario characteristics and specific tasks which the unit commander desires to have exercised during his rotation. That visit will also permit the Ops Gp to brief the battalion leadership on lessons learned. During the following 30 days a preliminary exercise outline will be developed by the Plans Cell and will be briefed back to the unit chain of command (division, brigade and battalion commanders) at D-150. At this point the battalion

commander will normally receive only a general event or task list. Sequence of events and specific scenario will not be provided to the battalion commander prior to rotation. During the succeeding 120 days (D-150 to D-30) detailed event lists and scenarios will be developed by the Plans Cell. Coordination will be continuous with the rotational battalion parent organization. Administration information such as rules of engagement will be provided during coordination visits taking place during this period. Confirmation of troop lists, support requirements and specific deployment information will be accomplished NLT D-30. During the following 20 days, operations orders, frag orders, event lists, overlays, etc., comprising a complete support package for the rotation will be completed by the Plans Cell preparatory to hand-off to the appropriate Battalion Observer/Controller (O/C) and OPFOR teams.

c. Pre-Deployment: At D-4, designated personnel from the Battalion Observer/Controller and OPFOR teams associated with the rotation will receive a scenario briefing from the Plans Cell. All members of the Bn O/C and OPFOR teams will then begin detailed preparation for the rotation. On D-4, selected members of the Bn O/C Team will deploy to the unit home station. That Bn O/C element provides the unit's brigade operations order on D-3. Although LFNTC rotations are not envisioned as no-notice alert situations, pre-deployment preparation and procedures will be carried out in accordance with unit capabilities and procedures. For example, a unit rotating from the 82d Abn Div will upload and deploy as if it were the Division Ready Force (DRF) 1 battalion. During pre-deployment, the Bn O/C element with the unit will support unit planning and facilitate any administrative or support coordination with the LFNTC. Pre-deployment activities will include an administrative briefing to unit personnel concerning LFNTC rules of engagement, safety procedures and other non-tactical matters.

d. Concurrent with the pre-deployment phase at unit home station, supporting Ops Gp and OPFOR teams at the LFNTC will be preparing for the rotation. Such preparations will include rehearsal, general familiarization with scenario, reconnaissance and instrumentation checks.

e. Deployment: Deployment will be in accordance with the capabilities and procedures of the unit involved, with insertion normally by either airborne or airland means, utilizing USAF tactical airlift and other means. The small Bn O/C element will deploy with the rotating battalion. The only administrative activity which will occur after H-Hour, D-Day, will be the link up of remaining battalion O/C's with their unit counterparts.

f. Ten day FTX: The 10 day field training exercise is the heart of LFNTC training. Scenarios will reflect real world situations based on current threat and intelligence sources. A

wide range of scenarios will be possible. The characteristics of a given scenario will be based on the training needs of the unit as determined by its commander and parent unit chain of command. General scenarios are described at Annex A.

g. AAR - After action reviews (AAR) will be critical to the effectiveness of the LFNTC.

(1) Due to the more fluid nature of light force operations, AAR's will not typically occur at set intervals. AAR will be provided periodically for battalion command and control and maneuver after each major mission or on a daily basis. AAR's for CS and CSS will occur in all functional areas every two to three missions. A concerted attempt will be made to focus on the key learning points for each type of mission. AAR's provided throughout the course of the FTX will reflect a feedback philosophy which will permit unit leaders to take corrective action during the FTX.

(2) A final AAR will be conducted on the afternoon of the first day following conclusion of the FTX (D+10). That AAR will be from 3-6 hours in length and will consist of a more detailed review of the entire rotation scenario. The Battalion O/C and OPFOR Teams will participate in preparation of a final battalion training report on the morning of D+10. The AAR will be a presentation of key elements of that report. A written copy of the battalion training report will be provided to the unit prior to its departure from the LFNTC. The battalion task force commander will also participate in this final AAR to develop initial priorities and strategies for his future home station training.

h. Support - The BASOPS elements of the LFNTC installation will be designed to provide the combat service support normally provided by some brigade, as well as division and corps level CSS units. Resupply points for CL I, III, and V, water, limited maintenance backup, and aero-medevac, will be provided by the LFNTC installation. Following the FTX, the LFNTC BASOPS will support unit preparation for redeployment. One to three days of post operations time will be provided for redeployment. Billets will be available for unit use and LFNTC dining facilities will support the unit during that period. The battalion TF will include a CS/CSS slice which will ensure the unit's realistic ability to support and sustain itself in the field. The TF will deploy with CL V initial basic load and CL IX PLL. No administrative maintenance or support will be permitted.

i. Operations Group - The Operations Group is described in some detail in Figures 5 and 6, and Annex C.

(1) Its design with two controller and operations center teams affords the capability to support the density of 28 rotations per annum. Within each team, sufficient personnel structure is afforded to support continuous 24 hour a day

operations. Senior O/C at company and battalion levels will have flexibility in employing their O/C elements to cover anticipated operations. O/C duties and degree of involvement will be determined by the senior O/C in order to prevent any individual from being rendered ineffective due to fatigue.

(2) It is expected that the LFNTC Ops Gp and OPFOR will develop substantial subject matter expertise in the areas of light force operations, training, weapons, threat, light infantry, airborne and air assault operations. To facilitate that expertise, training periods will be designated throughout the annual schedule. During those periods, formal Ops Gp/OPFOR unit training will occur to include train up of newly assigned personnel. The command climate, cohesiveness, and esprit of the Ops Gp/OPFOR must be maintained at a high level. Regimental affiliation with one or more light force regiments should be considered. Close affiliation with TRADOC schools, particularly the Infantry School and Special Warfare Center will be highly beneficial. The desired character of the Ops Gp/OPFOR envisions their maintaining a strong positive attitude and enthusiasm concerning their critical role in supporting the combat readiness of the force and the training of light battalions. In that regard, stand-down periods between rotations described in Figure 8 would also periodically include additional Ops Gp/OPFOR unit training and liaison with TRADOC schools and FORSCOM units. The types of training envisioned for the Ops Gp/OPFOR would include foreign weapons, individual MOS, threat, and extensive physical training. Attendance at institutional schools such as Pathfinder, Ranger, Air Assault, Air Movement, SERE, Advanced Land Recon and NCOES must also be facilitated. The ability to conduct such ambitious training is supported by the level of staffing of the Ops Gp/OPFOR elements. In summary, assignments to the LFNTC, despite its demands, would become sought after by the Army's best soldiers, NCOs, and officers with light force affiliation.

V. Interim LFNTC.

1. The Interim LFNTC retains the major characteristics of the full LFNTC with certain components of the LFNTC requiring long term programming and higher staffing levels not being included. The Interim LFNTC provides a basis for expansion to the Objective LFNTC described in Part IV. The Interim LFNTC will support fifteen rotations annually. Major components of the interim LFNTC include:

a. Dedicated Site: The interim LFNTC will be established at a dedicated site with sufficient maneuver area (50K acres) and impact area to support realistic light battalion training. Establishment of the interim facility with sufficient terrain permits training utilizing a wide range of scenarios, as well as the ability to exercise sound mission doctrine. Additionally, a dedicated site would enhance the smooth expansion to a full up

LFNTC. The Interim LFNTC would be ideally established at the operationally preferred site, Ft Chaffee, AR.

b. Mission Staff: The staff required to operate the Interim LFNTC activity are as follows:

(1) Operations Group: The permanent party element (TDA organization) staffed and equipped to plan, control, and evaluate light battalion training as described in Part IV. Approximately 155 military personnel are required to perform the maneuver control and evaluation functions. A 24 hour operational capability is included in the Ops Gp structure which is organized into one Operations Center Team and one Battalion Observer/- Controller (O/C) element. Initially, command of the LFNTC will reside with the Ops Gp commander. Dual staffing is not provided. The plans cell is staffed with DA civilian personnel or by contract. Some positions would be filled by reservists on AGR tours. TRADOC will provide all military spaces required.

(2) The Opposing Force (OPFOR) Detachment is the permanent party (TDA) element staffed, equipped, and trained, to replicate potential threat forces ranging from terrorists, regional national forces, to major power forces. This element will contain approximately 107 military personnel. In addition to threat, the OPFOR will be capable of individual role playing, as described in Part IV. Only one team of OPFOR is provided for the Interim LFNTC.

(3) Enhanced BASOPS: To support the LFNTC mission, it is envisioned that the selected site will require upgrade. The upgrade includes additional staff, improvement to selected buildings and facilities, non-personnel requirements and equipment additions. The BASOPS staff and equipment enhancement will sustain the establishment of the objective LFNTC. The BASOPS TDA based on Ft Chaffee is at Annex D.

(4) The MCA projects required to support a full up LFNTC will not be required to implement the interim LFNTC. Plans for a Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) training complex will be developed for implementation in accordance with MCA guidelines. Contract and troop project support will be utilized to establish initial MOUT facilities.

c. LFNTC Instrumentation will be as described in Part IV, however, Interim LFNTC instrumentation will be more limited in quantity, but sufficient to support effective maneuver control, objective training evaluation and feedback. The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) will be used to support training realism. MILES will be provided at the Interim LFNTC in sufficient quantity to support the OPFOR and O/C only, but will include the Claymore, MITS and M16A2/SAW capability at the earliest possible date. A contract maintenance capability

will be provided as will a 20% equipment float for DX. Instrumentation other than MILES will consist of limited position location capability, mobile television and taping of key radio nets for later evaluation by the unit and Ops Gp personnel. The exact level of instrumentation available will be determined by the progress of the competitive procurement effort.

d. The MOUT complex will be phased in. Initiatives will be taken to establish MOUT facilities using troop projects and contract support.

2. The quality of support provided by the Ops Gp and OPFOR will be identical to that provided at the Objective LFNTC. The single O/C, operations center and OPFOR teams are the same as those described for the Objective LFNTC. OPFOR augmentation will be as described for the objective LFNTC.

VI. Site Selection.

1. Initial site analysis has been concluded. Nine installations were originally considered. Of those, six have been eliminated due to major shortcomings. Primarily, major installations were eliminated due to the presence of TRADOC schools of FORSCOM operational units. The three remaining sites are felt by TRADOC to have potential for use as the LFNTC. The three suitable sites are Fort A.P. Hill, VA, Camp Shelby, MS, and Fort Chaffee, AR. Based on operational factors, Fort Chaffee is the preferred alternative. TRADOC has implemented development of an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to final site selection.


2. Minimum criteria for site suitability are as follows:

- a. 50,000 acres of maneuver area.
- b. Suitable close terrain.
- c. Suitable areas for range development.
- d. Drop zones and landing zones.
- e. C141 airfield access.
- f. BASOPS established.
- g. Community support.

3. The suitable sites along with currently identified advantages and disadvantages of each are indicated below.


- a. Fort A. P. Hill, VA (Figure 14 and 15).

FT. A.P. HILL



FT. A.P. HILL

73,000 ACRES



- (1) Advantages.
 - (a) Adequate maneuver areas and ranges.
 - (b) Good terrain.
 - (c) 1 MOUT facility presently programmed for FY 87.
 - (d) Good BASOPS, except for family housing.
 - (e) C130 airstrip which could be upgraded to C141.
 - (f) 1 DZ.
 - (g) Active component staff in place.
- (2) Disadvantages.
 - (a) Not centrally located for all light forces.
 - (b) No auxillary maneuver area.
 - (c) Limited support in local community (closest sizable city, Fredericksburg, VA - 20 miles).

(d) RC training location with extensive facilities supporting same.

(e) No C141 airfield (at present closest is Richmond, VA - 50 miles). (f) Impact area clearing required to achieve optimal maneuver space.

(g) Impact area (ranges) and maneuver area separated by major public highway (U.S. 301) with limited (3) crossing points.

(h) Wildlife preserve located inside maneuver area.

(i) Engineer Night Vision Laboratory facilities located in maneuver area.

(j) BASOPS upgrade required.

(k) No government housing.

b. Fort Chaffee, AK (Figures 16, 17, 18).

(1) Advantages.

(a) Excellent maneuver areas to include auxillary locations (50K acres on post, 2.5 mil. acres off post).

(b) Adequate range areas to include established USAF tactical fighter range.

(c) Excellent terrain, with extensive range of topography.

(d) C141 capable airfield in close proximity (Fort Smith, Arkansas - 3 mi.).

(e) Good community support (Fort Smith, Arkansas - 5 miles, pop: 75,000).

(f) Good BASOPS except for family housing.

(h) 2 DZ.

(i) Centrally located for light forces.

(j) Major river crossing site on reservation.

(k) Active component staff in place.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) RC training location.

(b) Seasonally severe weather (April-May).

(c) BASOPS upgrade required.

(d) No government housing.

FT. CHAFFEE 73,000 ACRES




Figure 16

FT. CHAFFEE




Figure 17




Figure 18

c. Camp Shelby, MS (Figures 19 and 20).




Figure 19

- (1) Advantages.
 - (a) Excellent maneuver area to include auxillary locations.
 - (b) Adequate range areas.

- (c) Excellent terrain.
 - (d) Adequate BASOPS except for family housing.
 - (e) Centrally located for light forces.
 - (f) DZ.
 - (g) Good community support (Hattiesburg, MS - 6 miles. pop. 45,000).
- (2) Disadvantages.
- (a) Complex state/federal ownership.
 - (b) Extensive RC training.
 - (c) BASOPS upgrade required.
 - (d) No government housing.
 - (e) No C141 airport (nearest Pine Belt Regional Airport - 30 mi).




Figure 20

VII. Light Force NTC Concept Evaluation Plan.

1. The purpose of the LFNTC Concept Evaluation is to provide the senior leadership of the Army with sufficient information and recommendations concerning the need, feasibility and costs of the LFNTC leading to a decision to establish (or not establish) a permanent fixed site facility. A final test report would be completed by 15 June 1986.

2. Three FORSCOM battalions representing a cross section of light force maneuver units will deploy to the evaluation test site during the period 1 Apr-16 May 86. Each battalion will undergo a 10 day training rotation reflecting current low to mid intensity threats, utilizing TRADOC developed supporting scenario(s). Each 10-day rotation will be supported by a temporary TRADOC Ops Gp (see Annex E) and FORSCOM OPFOR. As many of the LFNTC characteristics as possible will be replicated during the concept evaluation.

3. FORSCOM will identify the three participating battalions and based on scenario will determine the Bn TF task organization for the scheduled test rotations. The battalions will be selected from the priority light force units described in Part IV. CL I, III and V supplies for the three battalions will be drawn from normal training allocations. FORSCOM will provide the OPFOR which will include one rifle company, tank platoon and other assets as dictated by the scenario(s). The OPFOR will be provided for the period 1 Jan - 30 May 86 for pre-evaluation train up and rotation support.

4. TRADOC will provide the operations group staffed to effectively plan, control, evaluate, and prepare the concept evaluation report of the three test rotations. The Ops Gp will be a temporary organization assigned on a TDY status to the selected test site during the period 1 Mar - 31 May 86. The core of the Ops Gp may be provided by the light battalion observer/controller cell to be assigned to the NTC (Ft Irwin) Ops Gp effective FY 86. The remainder of the LFNTC evaluation Ops Gp will be provided by augmentation using TRADOC Service School SME and IRR.

5. The TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) will provide the testing and evaluation expertise required for developing the LFNTC Concept Evaluation. The evaluation will be designed to produce data in the mission performance of each battalion participating in the LFNTC. A team of TCATA personnel will develop a data collection process which will permit subject matter experts (SME) to record the results of unit actions and will train the SME's in data collection duties. During the collection of field data, the TCATA team will control the data collection process. The team will reduce the data to a usable format and provide it to TRADOC.

6. This plan has been developed to accommodate either a major FORSCOM installation or Ft Chaffee as the evaluation test site. If a FORSCOM installation is selected as the evaluation site, that installation will provide BASOPS and other support as required by the BN TF, Ops Gp, and OPFOR. If Ft Chaffee is selected as the evaluation site, ECS #15 (a FORSCOM activity) and Ft Sill will augment the Ft Chaffee staff to provide equipment, maintenance, and other required support to the Ops Gp and OPFOR.

7. There is a strong desire to provide state-of-the-art technology to support the LFNTC Concept Evaluation. However, any vendor bidding on a request for proposal (RFP) to provide instrumentation for the evaluation would require substantial lead time to provide instrumentation for use in the evaluation. The TRADOC Contracting Activity (TCA) would require a minimum of 6 to 9 months to complete all procedural actions on the contract. This time estimate is predicated on receipt of a "letter perfect" Statement of Work (SOW) from the proponent. Iterative revisions to the SOW will lengthen the process. Even under a "best case" scenario a contract would not be awarded and contractor performance could not commence before April 1986. Further, as a minimum, vendors would require time to: develop a concept design, assemble and test hardware/software, and install instrumentation to be tested at the test site. Since all vendor actions will be time intensive, a conservative estimate of the length of time required by the contractor to meet hardware/software requirements to be evaluated is 9 to 12 months. This estimate is based on recent USATSC experience involving a contract for design and demonstration of a prototype instrumented system (i.e., Multiple Object Location System (MOLS) involving technology similar to, but on a smaller scale, that is required by LFNTC). The contractor commenced work on the program in October 1985 and the demonstration was completed 11 months later. Given the expected required time for contracting procedures and vendor performance, instrumentation requirements for the conduct of a LFNTC Concept Evaluation during the April/May 1986 time frame cannot be met.

8. Instrumentation to support the Light Forces National Training Center Concept Evaluation will be supported from TRADOC resources with some hardware augmentation from Defense Development Research and Engineering (DDR&E) assets. Up to 100 ground player systems to provide position location information only may be available and feasible. This would permit verified position location for squads, selected C/CS, OPFOR, and fire markers. However, this equipment would need to be tested on the actual terrain to be used to ensure it will perform as expected. Additional instrumented data would be made available through the recording of player unit tactical radio nets and video recording of selected tactical operations. Coupling these capabilities with instrumented position location would provide hard information for the development of After Action Reviews. TRADOC funds have been identified to support his effort.

9. The objective of the concept evaluation will be to provide detailed information in the following areas:

a. Proficiency of leaders, soldiers and units at all echelons. Measurement of performance will be continuous from deployment through redeployment.

b. Perceptions of key personnel (Operations Group, OPFOR, and the units' chain of command) concerning home station train-up, LFNTC lessons learned and methods of training.

c. Detailed costs (funds, personnel, equipment, terrain) of conducting LFNTC operations.

10. The evaluation of the LFNTC Concept requires measurements of unit combat, combat support, and combat service support competency. The methodology for assessments of performance will be essentially based upon the tasks and their respective standards in the published ARTEP and Army Master Training Plans (AMTP). The Operations Group observer controllers will be responsible for assessing unit performance and providing assessment feedback to the units. Where the Combined Arms Center has developed observable events (OE) and elements of information (EI) to be collected and captured these will be included as elements in the assessment process. Also included will be applicable principles and fundamentals within appropriate field circulars, technical manuals, field manuals, and unit SOPs which individuals and units must demonstrate competency to be successful in combat.

a. Observer/controller assessments will cover EDRE as well as LFNTC exercise training activities. Division, brigade and/or regiment Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will be the standards on which unit deployment/redeployment proficiency is judged. The LFNTC Operations Group will use checklists to record all essential activities as required by unit SOP.

b. Unit and leader proficiency will be assessed and documented during and across missions using current ARTEP, AMTP, and other subjective and objective measures. Friendly and enemy force casualties will be collected as a result of direct and indirect fire, minefields, and chemical attack. The observer controllers will assess and collect the combat, combat support, and combat service support performance data essential to successful execution of the seven task force operating systems as well as NBC defense. These systems are:

- Maneuver
- Fire Support
- Intelligence

- Air Defense
- Mobility, Countermobility
- Combat Service Support
- Command and Control
- NBC Defense

c. The observer controllers will use data collection instruments to capture and record essential performance from squad to battalion level and also essential leader tasks. Assessments will be recorded daily to provide a data base from which to assess incoming proficiency, improvement trends, and outgoing proficiency. Observer controllers will use their assessments to provide feedback through mission after action reviews (AARs), teaching and coaching, final after action review, lessons, observations, and Take Home Packages (THPs). Through the AAR process and the Take Home Packages the unit chain of command to include the division, regiment, and brigade trainers will be provided the tools to assess benefits to their unique training requirements.

d. Personal perceptions will also serve as a measurement of the benefits of the LFNTC training experience. It is intended to capture the perceptions of those who trained at the LFNTC while the experience is still fresh in the minds of the leaders and soldiers. A list of data requirements will be determined that provide the means to analyze and validate the LFNTC concept. The data requirements will address the perception of realism and training benefits provided by LFNTC training. It is intended that the unit chain of command be interviewed using the structured interview as the survey instrument.

e. The structured interview will contain a combination of fixed response and open-ended response items. Questions may be grouped to those asked of all respondents and those which pertain to a specific duty echelon. Pattern analysis building and question refinement will produce a list of questions that ensures that sufficient information will be gathered to validate the objectives of the concept evaluation.

f. Data will be collected by a survey/interview team which will obtain the necessary data from the three rotational battalions and their headquarters. Interview responses will be recorded by members of the survey team.

g. All collected data will be coded, formatted, entered, and verified using a computer. Data reduction will be completed using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS). The results of the survey analysis will be combined with Operations Group and

Opposing Force observations to form the conclusions in the final concept evaluation report.

(1) Resource data will be collected to record exact resources and funds expended in the concept evaluation effort. At a minimum the following will be collected:

- Deployment costs.
- Expenditures of all classes of supply by rotational battalion, OPFOR, and Ops Gp.
- Headquarters (FORSCOM, TRADOC) costs.
- Terrain requirements.
- BASOPS.
- Contractural costs, leases, loans, etc.

h. Exact records will be collected and reported in the final report. Recording of resource expenditures will support the second major objective of the concept evaluation which is to provide a baseline for resource decisions associated with the objective LFNTC.

11. Milestones for the LFNTC Concept Evaluation are shown here:

- 10 Oct 85: Submission of LFNTC Concept Plan to HQDA.
- 15-18 Oct 85: Initial TRADOC/FORSCOM planning conference (IPR #1).
- 28-30 Oct 85: Obtain specific unit input for scenarios.
- 1 Nov 85: Task Operations Group Support.
- 18-19 Nov 85: TRADOC/FORSCOM IPR #2.
- 1 Dec 85: Completion of general scenarios.
- 13 Dec 85: Confirm final support requirements.
- 17-18 Dec 85: TRADOC/FORSCOM IPR #3.
- 31 Dec 85: Completion of Instrumentation SOW.
- 3 Jan 86: Delivery of OPFOR training package to FORSCOM unit.
- 13-14 Jan 86: TRADOC/FORSCOM IPR #4.
- 15 Jan 86: Publish RFP for Instrumentation demonstration.
- 14 Feb 86: Final scenario development/documentation.
- 24-25 Feb 86: Final TRADOC/FORSCOM IPR.
- 28 Feb 86: Complete OPFOR home station training.
- 1 Mar 86: Operations Group advance party to test site; initiate intel build up for rotation #1.
- 6-7 Mar 86: OPFOR/OC's deploys.
- 10-21 Mar 86: On site training for OC's/OPFOR.
- 19 Mar 86: Initiate intel build-up for rotation #2.
- 25-26 Mar 86: Scenario rehearsal and recon.
- 1-10 Apr 86: Rotation #1.

- 7 Apr 86: Initiate intel build-up for rotation #3.
- 19-28 Apr 86: Rotation #2.
- 7-16 May 86: Rotation #3.
- 20-21 May 86: OPFOR redeploys.
- 23-30 May 86: O/C redeploy.
- 30 May 86: Preliminary report complete.
- 15 Jun 86: Complete staffing of preliminary report.
- 21 Jun 86: Brief MACOM commanders.
- 1 Jul 86: Brief CSA.

VIII. Implementation.

1. The LFNTC will be implemented in three phases:

- a. The Concept Evaluation (see Part VII).
- b. The Interim LFNTC (see Part V).
- c. The Objective LFNTC (see Part IV).

2. The advantages of a phased approach are significant. Procedures and supporting systems can be introduced in a logical and orderly fashion culminating in the operation of the objective LFNTC at a time when all supporting subsystems and adequate resources are available. This measured approach to implementation will ensure the most effective training capability (Figure 22).

LFNTC IMPLEMENTATION




Figure 22

3. The LFNTC concept evaluation occurring in FY 86 will validate the basic concept in terms of Ops Gp/OPFOR structure, rotation length, responsibilities of MACOM's and key individuals, support requirements, instrumentation and costs. A key objective of the

concept evaluation will be to ensure that the LFNTC affords an advanced collective training experience for light battalions. The concept evaluation will be completed with a recommendation to HQDA NLT 15 June 1986.

4. Subject to results of the Concept Evaluation, the Interim LFNTC will be established. The Interim LFNTC will provide a LFNTC training capability at a limited staffing level and without commitment to required MCA projects. The intent of the Interim LFNTC is to permit a phase-in of the Ops Gp and OPFOR during FY 87 with prototype rotations occurring in late FY 87. BASOPS enhancements as required will be phased into the selected site during FY 87. Instrumentation development, procurement, testing and acceptance will also take place during the initial year of Interim LFNTC implementation. Once established, the Ops Gp and OPFOR will undertake internal training leading to the first prototype rotation. During FY 88, the goal of the Interim LFNTC will be to reach a capability to train 15 battalion task forces annually. 5. Implementation of the Objective LFNTC will depend on resourcing decisions. Transition to the objective requires a timely personnel and funding commitment. As a result, the precise timing of a build-up to the Objective LFNTC cannot be identified now. Notionally, the move to the objective capability could not occur before FY 89 and would ideally begin in FY 90 following initial MCA project starts in FY 89. The decision to progress to the Objective LFNTC would be accompanied by consideration of a decision to transfer the LFNTC from TRADOC to FORSCOM control.

IX. Resource Requirement.

1. Resources to conduct all phases of LFNTC implementation, concept evaluation, Interim LFNTC and Objective LFNTC, are described here.

2. Concept Evaluation:

a. If conducted at Ft Chaffee -

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds (\$000)</u>		<u>OPA</u>	<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>			<u>OMA</u>	<u>OMAR</u>		
1. Test Directorate and Ops Gp.	96	TRADOC	6	UFR	20.9			UFR
2. OPFOR.	1 Rifle Co (+)	FORSCOM						
3. CL I, III, and deployment of OPFOR.					225.0			UFR
4. OPFOR CL V.					No cost			TRADOC
5. Ops Gp TDY to include coordination with units.					459.7			UFR
6. 3 Bn TF deployments.					3600.0			UFR
7. Instrumentation Demonstration.					1824.0		1643	UFR
8. 3 Bn TF CL I, III, V					3000.0			

42

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds</u> <u>OMA</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>		<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>				<u>OMAR</u>	<u>OPA</u>	
9. Ops Gp Operating Funds.					41.2			UFR
10. BASOPS Support Chaffee/ Sill.	61	TRADOC			138.9	157.3		UFR
11. BASOPS Temporary Hires.			23			88.4		UFR
12. Tng Dev Contract.					520.0			UFR
13. MILES Maint.					6.0			UFR
Total:	157 + 1 Rifle Co		29		9835.7	245.7	¹⁶⁴³ 1643	
					Total Funds:	11,724.4		

b. If conducted at Ft Bragg:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds (\$000)</u>		<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>			<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	
1. Test Dir Ops Gp	96	TRADOC	6	UFR	20.9		UFR
2. OPFOR	1 Rifle Co (+)	FORSCOM					
3. CL I, III for OPFOR					100.0		UFR

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds (\$000)</u>		<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>			<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	
4. BASOPS Tempy Hires (Ft Bragg)			12	UFR	69.0		UFR
5. BASOPS Spt (Ft Bragg)					327.0		UFR
6. MILES Maint					6.0		UFR
7. 2 Bn TF Deployments					2700.0		UFR
8. 3 Bn TF CL I, III, V					3000.0		UFR
9. OPFOR CL V					No cost		TRADOC
10. Ops Gp TDY to include coord w/units					459.7		UFR
11. Instr Demo					1824.0	1643.0	UFR
12. Ops Gp Operating Funds					41.2		UFR
13. Tng Dev Contract					520.0		UFR
Total: 96+1 Rifle (+)			18		9067.8	1643.0	

Total Funds: 10710.8

3. Interim LFNTC:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds (\$000)</u>		<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>			<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	
1. Ops Gp.	155	TRADOC	19	UFR	548.9(R)		UFR
2. OPFOR.	107	TRADOC	1	UFR	28.9(R)		UFR
3. BASOPS Enhancement.	36	TRADOC	222	UFR	5283.7 ² (R)		UFR
4. BASOPS Enhancement Operations.					4276 ² (R)		UFR
5. BASOPS Enhancement Equipment.						5933.8 ¹	UFR
6. Ops Gp/ OPFOR Equipment.						15117.3 ²	UFR
7. Ops Gp/ OPFOR Operations.					4986.9(R)		UFR
8. Unit Deployments (15 Bn).					22097.5(R)		UFR
	<u>MIL</u>		<u>CIV</u>		<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	
TOTAL:	298		242		37,221.9	21051.1	
				Total Funds:	58,273.0		

¹Incl 107.6 BCE.

²Incl HSC and USAISC requirements.


(R) Recurring

4. Objective LFNTC: These resources assume prior establishment of the Interim LFNTC. The resources for establishment of the Objective LFNTC are represented by the total of para 3 and 4. Objective LFNTC resources have been submitted through TAA 92 and PARR 92.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Civ</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Funds(\$000)</u>			<u>Source</u>
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Source</u>			<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	<u>MCA</u>	
1. Ops Gp Expansion.	133	TAA 92	5	TAA 92	469.9(R)			POM 92
2. OPFOR Expansion.	99	TAA 92						POM 92
3. MPRC, MOUT and Admin Bldgs.							32401.8	POM 92
4. Ops Gp/ OPFOR Equipment and Opns.					3355.4 8405.0	11,898		POM 92
5. Unit Deployments (13 Bn)					18902.5(R)			POM 92
6. BASOPS Enhancement Operations 92	36	TAA 92	221	TAA 92	9936.7(R) 3676.7	3087.9 107.5(BCE)		POM
	<u>MIL</u>		<u>CIV</u>		<u>OMA</u>	<u>OPA</u>	<u>MCA</u>	
TOTAL:	268		226		44,746.2	15,093.4	32,401.8	
					TOTAL FUNDS:	92,224.4		

(R) Recurring

45



ANNEX A - SCENARIOS

1. Enclosed are sample scenarios for low and mid intensity conflict.
2. The scenarios are presented only as a start point and do not presume to describe actual LFNTC exercises as they will be conducted.
3. Full development of scenarios will occur as Ops Gp personnel are assigned and planning begins on the ground. Current unit experience with FTX and ARTEP evaluations as well as service school doctrinal expertise will be used.

LIC

SITUATION: U.S. Bn is invited into an underdeveloped friendly nation to assist with intervention of guerilla operations being conducted by a hostile nation. U.S. Bn is committed under authority of the U.S. Ambassador to support U.S. national interests in the area. Principal purpose of U.S. intervention is to show the flag, however, the battalion must be aware of possible terrorist activities directed against it and of the need to initiate military operations in support of the host nation forces. Bn is assigned responsibility for one district.

TASK ORG: As shown in model, less ADA Plt(+) and FA Btry. Only one Atk Helr Tm (2 AH1, 2 OH58) is deployed. MI Plt consists of interrogation, HUMINT, and limited COMINT collection and analysis capability.

THREAT: Organized guerilla forces supported by hostile neighbor nation. Force employs terrorist/guerilla tactics and is equipped with a wide range of modern small arms, man-portable AT wpns (RPG), mortars, rockets and man-portable AD Wpns. The guerilla force has the capability to operate with modern secure tactical communications. The guerilla force has day/night and all weather capabilities.

Special Requirements. OPFOR is required to represent the following:

- Host nation key personnel/forces.
- Civilian population.
- U.S. Foreign Service personnel.
- News media.

Type Bn Requirements/Remarks:

Other LIC missions include -

- Hasty rescue/evacuation
- Peacekeeping

MIC

SITUATION: U.S. battalion is deployed as part of a larger force to reinforce forward deployed or previously deployed forces, allied (host nation) forces. Host nation has experienced a conventional invasion by a neighbor state supported by a Soviet surrogate.

TASK ORGANIZATION: As shown, plus AT PLT, if available, from parent division assets, full Atk Hel Co, CEWI with additional ELINT capability and GSR, NBC PLT with recon/decon capability.

THREAT: Conventional, organized military national forces with all small arms, mortars, FA, limited armor, mechanized vehicles, chemical wpns, helicopter support (atk & lift), limited close air support. Forces include organized special operational and airborne capability.

Special Requirements: Bde (notional) retains control of CSS.
Resupply to support Bn tactical operations
is simulated by NTC BASOPS.
Resupply of MOPP gear required.
Coordination with host nation forces.



ANNEX B - BATTALION TASK ORGANIZATIONS


1. This annex describes a general organization and strengths associated with a light battalion task force training at the LFNTC.
2. Attached and supported units are standardized.
3. It is recognized that unit strengths and equipment vary by type battalion and will change as organizational designs are revised under AOE.

SAMPLE ROTATION


BN TASK ORG

TOTAL: 51/29/750

AUGMENTATION



3/0/64
6 105 HOW



II 33/2/508




4/13/20
7 AH 1
4 OH 58




AUGMENTATION



1/2/20
FASCO (-)




S+S




I (-)



TAM




4/10/12
6 UH 60



1/0/30
3 VULCAN
6 STGR
1 FAAR



1/1/20
GSR
INT'R
EW



3/1/30



ANNEX C - OPERATIONS GROUP/OPPOSING FORCE TDA

1. The enclosed TDA described the Ops Gp and OPFOR required for the Objective LFNTC and the Interim LFNTC.
2. TDA's include associated tactical equipment for all LFNTC mission organizations.
3. Non-tactical equipment such as instrumentation system hardware is not reflected on the TDA.

7 OCT 85

DRAFT OPS GP/OPFOR TDA

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
01		LFNTC COMMAND GROUP							
	01	COMMANDER	07			O	1		
	02	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	05	11/54	IN	O	1		
	03	AIDE DE CAMP	02	11A	IN	O	1		
	04	ENLISTED AIDE	E6	94B		E	1		DVR
	05	SECRETARY	GS5	0318		C	1		
	06	ARNG ADVSR	05	11/54	IN	O	1		AGR
	07	USAR ADVSR	05	11/54	IN	O	1		AGR

02 LFNTC OPERATIONS GROUP (OPNS GP) HQS

01	OPNS GP DIRECTOR	06	11/54	IN	O	1	1	INT CDR
02	OPNS GP EXEC OFFCR	05	13/92	FA	O	1	1	AGR
03	OPNS GP OPNS OFFCR (S3)	04	11/54	IN	O	1	1	
04	OPNS ADVSR	04	11/54	IN	O	1	1	AGR
05	OPNS GP S3 (AIR)	03	13/54	FA	O	1	1	
06	OPNS GP OPNS NCO	E8	11B		E	1	1	
07	OPNS GP A OPNS NCO	E6	13B		E	1	1	
08	OPNS GP ADJ (S1)	03	11/41	IN	O	1	1	
09	OPNS GP PSNCO	E7	71L		E	1	1	
10	OPNS GP PERS CLK	E4	71L		E	1	1	
11	OPNS GP SUP OFFCR (S4)	03	11/92	IN	O	1	1	
12	OPNS GP SUP NCO	E7	76Y		E	1	1	
13	OPNS GP SUP CLK	E4	76Y		E	1	1	
14	OPNS GP CSM	E8	11Z		E	1	1	
15	SECRETARY TO DIR	GS6	00318		C	1	1	
16	SECRETARY TO S3	GS5	00318		C	1	1	

02A OPNS GP SIG SEC

01	CE OFFICER	03	SC		O	1	1	
02	TAC COM CH	E7	31V4		E	1	1	
03	TAC SIG RDO CH	E5	31K20		E	1	1	
04	TAC COMM SYS SUP	E5	31V20		E	1	1	
05	TAC COMM SYS OP/MECH	E4	31V10		E	2	2	

<u>PARA</u> <u>RMKS</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	
		2 OBSERVER/CONTROLLER (O/C) TEAMS							
03		2 BN CMD/CONT O/C TEAMS							
	01	BN SENIOR O/C	05	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	02	BN SR ENL O/C	E8	11B		E	2	1	
	03	BN OPS O/C	04	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	04	BN A OPS O/C	03	11/54	IN	O	2	1	AGR
	05	BN INTEL O/C	03	35A	MI	O	2	1	
	06	BN OPS NCO O/C	E8	11B		E	2	1	
	07	BN INTEL NCO O/C	E7	96B		E	2	1	
	08	BN ADMIN O/C	03	11/41	IN	O	2	1	
	09	BN ADMIN NCO O/C	E7	71L		E	2	1	
	10	BN LOG O/C	03	11/92	IN	O	2	1	AGR
	11	BN LOG NCO O/C	E7	76Y		E	2	1	AGR
	12	SECRETARY	GS-5	00318		C	2	1	
04		2 BN HHC O/C TEAMS							
	01	HHC SR O/C	04	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	02	SCT PLT O/C	03	12/54	IN	O	2	1	
	03	SCT PLT NCO O/C	E7	19D		E	2	1	
	04	MTR PLT O/C	03	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	05	MTR PLT NCO O/C	E7	11C		E	2	1	
	06	AT PLT O/C	E7	11H		E	2	1	
	07	AT PLT NCO O/C	E7	11H		E	2	1	
	08	SPT O/C	E7	76Y		E	2	1	
	09	SPT A O/C	E6	63B		E	2	1	
05		6 RIFLE CO O/C TEAMS							
	01	RIFLE CO SR O/C	04	11/54	IN	O	6	3	
	02	RIFLE CO A O/C	E8	11B		E	6	3	
	03	PLT SR O/C	03	11/54	IN	O	18	9	
	04	PLT O/C	E7	11B		E	18	9	
	05	SQD O/C	E6	11B		E	30	15	

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
		BN ATTACHMENTS/SUPPORTING UNIT O/C TMS							
06		2 FIELD ARTY O/C TMS							
	01	FA SR O/C	04	13/54	FA	O	2	1	
	02	FA O/C	03	13/54	FA	O	2	1	
	03	FA SR ENL O/C	E7	13B		E	2	1	
	04	FA ENL O/C	E6	13F		E	2	1	
07		2 ENGINEER O/C TMS							
	01	ENGR SR O/C	03	21	EN	O	2	1	
	02	ENGR O/C	E7	12B		E	2	1	
	03	ENGR O/C	E6	12B		E	2	1	
08		2 AIR DEF ARTY O/C TMS							
	01	ADA SR O/C	03	14B	AD	O	2	1	
	02	ADA O/C	E7	16R		E	2	1	
	03	ADA O/C	E6	16P		E	2	1	
09		2 AVIATION O/C TMS							
	01	AVN SR O/C	04	15	AV	O	2	1	
	02	AVN SR PILOT O/C	CW4	100B		WO	2	0	
	03	AVN O/C	03	15	AV	O	2	1	
	04	AVN PILOT O/C	WO3	100B		WO	2	1	
	05	AVN PILOT O/C	WO3	100E		WO	2	1	
	06	AVN NCO O/C	E7	67N		E	2	1	
	07	AVN NCO O/C	E6	67Y		E	2	1	
10		2 MEDICAL O/C TMS							
	01	MED SR O/C	03	67A	MS	O	2	1	
	02	MED TECH O/C	WO3	011A		WO	2	1	
	03	MED O/C	E7	91B		E	2	1	

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
11		2 INTELLIGENCE O/C TMS							
	01	INTEL SR O/C	03	37A	MI	O	2	1	
	02	INTEL O/C	E7	98G		E	2	1	
12		2 CBT SVC SPT O/C TMS							
	01	SR CSS O/C	04	92	QM	O	2	1	
	02	CSS O/C	03	91A	ORD	O	2	1	
	03	AVN MNT O/C	03	71A	AVN	O	2	0	
	04	MAINT TECH O/C	W03	630A		WO	2	1	
	05	AVN MAINT TECH O/C	W03	160A		WO	2	1	
	06	LOG ENL O/C	E7	76Y		E	2	1	
	07	MAINT ENL O/C	E7	63B		E	2	1	
13		2 OPERATIONS CENTER TMS 2 BDE C2 CELLS							
	01	BDE SR CONTROLLER	04	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	02	A BDE CONTROLLER	03	35A	MI	O	2	1	
	03	BDE CONTOLLERS	E6	11B		E	4	2	
	04	SECRETARY	GS-4	00318		C	2	1	
14		2 TAC OPNS CTR TMS							
	01	SR TOC OFFICER	04	11/54	IN	O	2	1	
	02	TOC OFFICER	03	11/54	IN	O	2	1	AGR
	03	TOC NCO	E6	11B		E	4	2	
	04	CO CONTROLLER	03	11	IN	O	6	3	
	05	CO ASST CONTROLLER	E6	11B		E	6	3	
	06	FA/AD CONTROLLER	03	13	FA	O	2	1	
	07	FA/AD AS CONTROLLER	E7	16R		E	2	1	
	08	AVN CONTOLLER	03	15	AV	O	2	1	AGR
	09	AVN AS CONTROLLER	E7	67	AV	E	2	1	
	10	MANR-CNTR MANR-CNTR	03	21	EN	O	2	1	
	11	MANR-CNTR MANR-CNTR	E7	12B		E	2	1	
	12	CHEM CONTROLLER	02	74	CML	O	2	1	
	13	CHEM AS CONTROLLER	E6	54C		E	2	1	
	14	CSS CONTROLLER	04	92A	QM	O	2	1	AGR
	15	CSS AS CONTROLLER	03	91A	ORD	O	2	1	

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
	16	CSS AS CONTROLLER	E7	76Y		E	2	1	
	17	SECRETARY	GS-4	00318		C	2	1	
15	2 OPFOR CONTROL TEAMS								
	01	SR OPFOR CONTROLLER	04	11	IN	O	2	1	
	02	OPFOR CONTROLLER	03	11	IN	O	2	1	
	03	OPFOR CONTROLLER	E7	11B		E	2	1	
	04	OPFOR CONTROLLER	E6	11B		E	2	1	
	05	SECRETARY	GS-4			C	2	1	
16	LIVE FIRE CONTROL TEAM								
	01	LIVE FIRE OIC	03	11/54	IN	O	1	1	
	02	LIVE FIRE NCOIC	E7	11B		E	1	1	
	03	LIVE FIRE RGE OFFR	E7	11C		E	1	1	
	04	LIVE FIRE RGE SP	E6	11B		E	1	1	
17	MOUT CONTROL TEAM								
	01	MOUT OIC	03	11/54	IN	O	1	1	
	02	MOUT NCOIC	E7	11B		E	1	1	
	03	MOUT RGE OFFR	E6	11B		E	2	2	
18	PLANS CELL PLANS CELL HQ								
	01	PLANS OFFR	04	11/54	IN	O	1	1	
	02	A PLANS OFFR	03	35A	MI	O	1	1	OPS GP S2
	03	PLANS NCO	E7	96B		E	1	1	

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
19			5 PLANS TMS						
	01	PLANS TM OIC	03	11/54	IN	O	5	3	
	02	PLANS TM OFFR	01	13	FA	C	10	10	
	03	PLANS TM NCO	E7	11B		E	5	3	
	04	PLANS TM NCO	E6	13F		E	5	3	
	05	PLANS TM NCO	E6	76Y		E	5	3	
	07	CLK/TYP	GS-3	0318		C	4	2	
20			OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) DETACHMENT OPFOR HQ						
	01	OPFOR DET CDR	04	11/54	IN	O	1	1	
	02	OPFOR DET XO	03	35A	MI	O	1	1	
	03	OPFOR DET 1SGT	E8	11B		E	1	1	
	04	OPFOR DET SUP SGT	E6	76Y		E	1	1	
	05	OPFOR DET CLK	E5	71L		E	1	1	
	06	OPFOR DET SUP CLK	E4	76Y		E	1	1	
	07	OPFOR DET ARMORER	E5	76Y		E	1	1	
	08	OPFOR DET ARMORER	E4	76Y		E	1	1	
	09	SECRETARY	GS-4	00318		C	1	1	
21			2 OPFOR TMS 2 ARM CAV PLTS						
	01	PLT LDR	02	12C	AR	O	2	1	
	02	PLT SGT	E7	19D		E	2	1	
	03	VEH CDR	E6	19D		E	30	15	
	04	VEH DVR	E4	19D		E	30	15	
22			2 UNCON'L WARFARE PLTS						
	01	PLT LDR	02		SO	O	2	1	
	02	PLT SGT	E7	11BS		E	2	1	
	03	SP OPS NCO	E6	11BS		E	6	3	
	04	SP OPS NCO	E5	11BS		E	6	3	
	05	INTEL NCO	E6	96B		E	2	1	
	06	INTEL NCO	E5	96C		E	2	1	
	07	CA NCO	E5			E	2	1	

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>OBJ</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>INTERIM</u> <u>LFNTC</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
	08	CA SP	E4			E	8	4	
	09	INTEL SP	E4	96B		E	8	4	
	10	SO SP	E4	11B		E	12	6	

23

2 MANEUVER PLTS

01	PLT LDR	02	11	IN	O	2	1
02	PLT SGT	E7	11B		E	2	1
03	SQD LDR	E6	11B		E	8	4
04	TM LDR	E5	11B		E	8	4
05	RIFLEMAN	E4	11B		E	64	32

ANNEX D - BASOPS TDA (Ft Chaffee Model)

1. The enclosed TDA is an ammended version of the US Army Garrison, Ft Chaffee, TDA reflecting both existing and enhanced structure.
2. The enhanced structure includes additions to support the LFNTC Ops Gp and OPFOR and rotational battalions.

Remarks:

A - Auth (requires fac to - current)
 C - Current requirement
 E - Enhancement
 P - Present TDA
 U - Upgrade

TDA -HQ TRADOC
 US ARMY GARRISON
 FT CHAFFEE, AR
 (INTERIM LFNTC - BASOPS SPT)

PARA	LIFE	DESCRIPTION	GR	MOS	HR	REQ	REMARKS	TDA/PL	APS
01		<u>INSTL CDR</u>							
	01	Instl Cdr	06	13A00	FA	1	1C	UP 00101	815796.N3
	02	Exec Ofcr	13	00301	GS	1	1C	P 00102	815796.N3
	03	Secy (Steno)	05	00318	GS	1	1C	P 00103	815796.N3
	04	CSH	E9	00250	E	1	1E		815796.N3
01A		<u>Visitors Bureau</u>							
	01	Protocol Ofcr	03	00042	AC	1	1E		815796.N3
	02	A Protocol Ofcr	E6	71L	E	1	1E		815796.N3
	03	Clerk Typist	03	00322	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
01B		<u>Post Safety Ofc</u>							
	01	Safety Ofcr	09	00018	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
02		<u>Person & Admin Div</u>							
	01	Admin Ofcr	11	00341	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
	02	Secy (Typist)	04	00318	GS	1	1C	P 00203	815796.N3
	03	Mail & File Clk	04	00305	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
	04	Mail & File Clk	03	00305	GS	1	1C 1A	P 00204	815796.N3
02A		<u>Mil Pers Spt Br</u>							
	01	Pers Sgt	E7	752/71L30	E	1	1C	UP 00202	815796.N3
	02	Mil Pers Act Sp	E5	75E	E	1	1E		815796.N3
	03	SIDPERS Clk	E5	75F	E	1	1E		815796.N3
	04	Admin Sp	E5	71L	E	1	1E		815796.N3
	05	ID Clerk	04	00204	GS	1	1C	P 002C02	815796.N3
	06	Hgmt Clk	04	00344	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
	07	Mil Pers Rec	05	00205	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
	08	Mil Pay Clk	05	005454	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
02B		<u>CIV PERS BR</u>							
	01	Staff Asst	05	00203	GS	1	1E		815796.N5
	02	Gen Pers Spec	11	00203	GS	1	1C	P S111 TDA	815796.N5
	03	Records Spec	06	00303	GS	1	1E		815796.N5
	04	Clerk	04	00303	GS	1	1C	P S111 TDA	815796.N5
	05	Personnel Asst	05	00203	GS	1	1E		815796.N5
02C		<u>PAC</u>							
	01	Pub Aff Ofcr	04	11/46	IN	1	1E		951214
	02	Pub Info Spec	09	1081	GS	1	1E		951214
	03	Pub Aff Spv	E6	71Q30J8	E	1	1E		951214
	04	Journalist	E4	71Q10J8	E	1	1E		951214

02D	01	02	03	03A	03	03B
09 188	07 030	07 030	07 030	11/09 00301	09/07 00301	09 00301
Mtr Spv Rec Spec	Sports Spec	Sports Spec	Opns Offcr	Rge Con Offcr	Ass Rge Oper	Trg Aide Dir
01 188	02 030	02 030	04 13A/54	E6 11830	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
02 030	03 030	07 030	04 13A/54	E5 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
03 030	03 189	07 030	04 13A/54	E6 11830	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
04 030	03 189	07 030	04 13A/54	E5 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
05 030	03 189	07 030	04 13A/54	E4 13820/13D10	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
06 1410	05 1410	07 030	04 13A/54	E3 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
07 1410	02 1410	07 030	04 13A/54	E2 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
08 188	07 188	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
09 189	05 189	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
10 030	07 030	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
11 1712	07 1712	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
12 1712	05 1712	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
13 0361	07 0361	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
14 0322	07 0322	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
15 111	E6 111	07 030	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
01 185	09 185	07 186	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Arvy Comm Sec	Ch ASC	Social Sys Asst	Opns/Range Div	Rge Con Offcr	Ass Rge Oper	Trg Aide Dir
02 185	09 185	07 186	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
03 0080	07 0080	04 00316	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Security Spec	Secy	04 00316	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
04 00303	07 00303	03/04 00322	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Opns Asst	Opns Offcr	03/04 00322	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
05 00301	09/07 00301	09/07 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Ass Rge Oper	Ass Rge Oper	09/07 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
06 03502	04 03502	03 03502	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Rge Rpt Sp	Rge Rpt Sp	03 03502	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
08 00016	05 00016	05 00016	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Draftsman	Draftsman	05 00016	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
01 00301	09 00301	09 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Trg Aide Dir	Trg Aide Dir	09 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
02 01020	09 01020	09 01020	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Illustrator	Illustrator	09 01020	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
03 00301	07 00301	05 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Trg Aide Spec	Trg Aide Spec	05 00301	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
04 00222	03 00222	03 00222	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Supply CTR Typ	Supply CTR Typ	03 00222	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
05 04715	12 04715	12 04715	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Exhibit Ikr/Mod	Exhibit Ikr/Mod	12 04715	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
07 04102	09 04102	09 04102	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Painter	Painter	09 04102	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
08 06907	06/05 06907	06/05 06907	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Whman	Whman	06/05 06907	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
10 01060	05 01060	05 01060	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Photo	Photo	05 01060	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
11 01060	05 01060	05 01060	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Photo (Lab)	Photo (Lab)	05 01060	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
12 01071	11 01071	11 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Video Tech	Video Tech	11 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
13 01071	09 01071	09 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Video Tech	Video Tech	09 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
14 01071	07 01071	07 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Video Tech	Video Tech	07 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
15 01071	09 01071	09 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020
Video Prod Sp	Video Prod Sp	09 01071	04 13A/54	E1 13820	E4 13820/13D10	09 01020

03C

01	Av. Pl	04	13	AV	1	1E	815796.D6
02	Airfield CDR	12	00018	CS	1	1E	815796.D6
03	Safety Tech	07	02151	CS	3	3E	815796.D6
04	Flt Disp	09	02151	CS	1	1E	815796.D6
05	Flt Disp Spv	04	0322	CS	1	1E	815796.D6

04

01	Provost Marshall	04	31A00	MP	1	1C	815796.T4
02	Provost Marshall	E7	95840	E	1	1C	815796.T4
03	Detective	06	00083	CS	1	1E	815796.T4
04	Spv Police Ofcr	09	00083	CS	1	1E	815796.T4
05	Police Ofcr	03	00083	CS	8	8E	815796.T4
06	Patrol Spv	06	00083	CS	5	5E	815796.T4
07	Police Ofcr	04	00083	CS	11	11E	815796.T4
08	Sec' Guard	04	00085	CS	5	5E	815796.T4
09	Desk Clerk	03	00305	CS	5	5E	815796.T4
10	P H Clerk	04	00322	CS	1	1E	815796.T4

05

01	Fin Mgt Ofc	11/09	00560	CS	1	1C	815796.HI
02	Spv Bud Analyst	09/07	00560	CS	1	1C	815796.HI
03	Bud Analyst	07/05	00561	CS	1	1C	815796.HI
04	Bud Asst Typ	05/05	00561	CS	2	2E	815796.HI

05A

01	Contracting Ofc	11	01102	CS	1	1E	815796.B3
02	Contr Ofcr	9	01102	CS	1	1E	815796.B3
03	Contr Spec	5	01105	CS	1	1E	815796.B3

06

01	Log Div	04	92A	QM	1	1C	815796.H3
02	Log Ofcr	05/04	00310	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
03	Steno Secy Typ	03	00322	CS	1	1E	815796.B5
04	Clerk Typ	W0	02604	E	1	1E	815796.B5
05	Food Serv Tech	11	02604	WC	1	1C	815796.C
05A	Elec Mech	10	02604	WC	2	2E	815796.C

06A

01	Supply Branch	10	02003	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
02	Sup Hgt Ofcr	09	02001	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
03	Ammo Sup Spec	07	02005	CS	1	1C	722892
04	Supv Sup Tech	06	02005	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
05	Sup Tech	06	02005	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
06	Sup Clk	05	02005	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
06A	Pur Agt Typ	05	01105	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
07	Accts Tech Sup Clk	04	00525	CS	1	1C	722892
08	Purch Agt Data Proc	04	01105	CS	1	1C	815796.B5
09	Sm Arms Repair	08	06610	WC	1	1E	815796.B5
10	Fuel Dist Sys Wkr	07	05413	WC	1	1C	815796.B5
11	Hhswkr (HWO)	07	06907	WC	1	1C	815796.B5
12	Hhswkr (Flt Of)	07	06907	WC	1	1C	815796.B5
13	Motor Veh Op	06	05703	WC	1	1C	815796.B5
14	Whse Wkr	06	06907	WC	2	2C 1A	815796.B5
14A	Whse Wkr	05	06907	WC	1	1C	815796.B5
15	Whse Wkr	05	06907	WC	1	1E	815796.B5
16	POL opr	05	00881	WC	2	2E	72289.2
17	Sup Clk	04	02005	CS	2	2E	815796.B5
18	Sup Clk (Ammo)	04	02005	CS	1	1E	815796.B5
19	Whse Wkr	05	06907	WC	1	1E	815796.B5
20	Sup Clk	03	02005	CS	1	1E	815796.B5
	Ammo Insp	08	06501	WC	1	1E	815796.B5

Sanitation Sec

07E 01 09 05406 WC 1 1C 815794.J
02 09 05406 WC 2 2C 815794.J

Elec Sec

07F. 01 05 02801 WS 1 1C 815796.K
02 10 02805 WC 4 4C 015794.K
03 10 02810 WC 4 4C 815794.K

BD CMD Sec

07G 01 10 05701 WS 1 1C 815794.K
02 10 05716 WC 0 2E 815794.K
03 08 05026 WC 2 1E 815794.K
04 09 05026 WC 1 1C 815794.H3
05 08 03603 WC 3 2E 815794.K
06 07 05703 WC 7 3E 815794.K
07 07 05703 WC 1 1C 815794.K
08 06 05705 WC 2 2E 815794.K
09 04 06904 WC 1 1C 815794.K
10 03 03502 WC 4 2L 815794.K
11 10 05716 WL 2 2E 815794.K
12 07 04823 WL 1 1E 815794.K
13 03 00322 CS 1 1E 815794.H6

Bldg Struc Sec

07H 01 09 04701 WS 1 1C 815794.K
02 09 04607 VL 1 1C 815794.K
03 10 03806 WC 4 4C 815794.K
04 09 04012 WC 5 3E 815794.K
05 09 04104 WC 1 1C 815794.K
06 09 04607 WC 11 2E 815794.K
07 09 04618 WC 1 1C 815794.K
08 09 03617 WC 1 1C 815794.K

Engr Hv Eq Sec

07I 01 09 05803 WS 1 1C 815794.H9
02 04 00303 CS 1 1C 815794.H9
03 10 05803 WC 8 3E 815794.H9
04 06 06904 WC 1 1C 815794.H9
05 10 03703 WC 2 2E 815794.H9
06 05 05806 WC 2 2E 815794.H9

Fire Pmnt Secy

07J 01 10 00081 CS 1 1C 815794.H1
02 07 00081 CS 2 2C 815794.H1
03 06 00081 CS 3 3C 815794.H1
04 05 00081 CS 5 2E 815794.H1
05 05 00081 CS 2 2E 815794.H1
06 04 00081 CS 20 4E 815794.H1

SJA

08 01 03 Legal Ofcr JAG 1 1E 815794.M1
02 05 986 CS 1 1E 615794.N3

Chaplain

09 01 03 Chaplain Chap 1 1E 815794.G1
02 04 56 Chaplain Chap 1 1E 815794.G1
03 E6 71H Chaplain Chap 1 1C 815794.G1
04 E4 71H Chaplain Chap 1 1C 815794.G1

TDA - HQ TRADOC
 US ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER
 FT SILL, OK
 (LFHTC-BASOPS SPT)


<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>HCS</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TDA P/L</u>	<u>AMS</u>
01	01	<u>Contracting</u> Purchase Agent	05	01105	GS	1	1E		815796.B3
02	01	<u>Aviation</u> Obs Hel Pilot	12	2161	GS	2	2E		815796.D6
	02	Util Hel Pilot	12	2161	GS	5	5E		815796.D6
	03	Pilot	03	15	AV	1	1E		815796.D6
03	01	<u>Mil Pers Spt (TAD)</u> Mil Pay Clk	04	00545	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
04	01	<u>Civ Pers</u> Personnel Clk	04	00263	GS	1	1E		815796.N3
05	01	<u>Engr</u> Sup Clk: (Data Transcript)	04	02005	GS	1	1E		015794.H6

TDA - HQ - USAISC
 US ARMY GARRISON
 FT CHAFFEE, AR
 (LFMTC-INFORMATION SYSTEMS SPT)

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>PK</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TDA P/LS</u>	<u>AHS</u>
		<u>Data Processing</u>							
01	01	Computer Sys Anlst	09	00334	GS	1	1E		393196.P2
		<u>Air Traffic Control</u>							
02	01	Tower Chief	12	2152	GS	1	1E		395114
	02	Shieft Supv	11	2152	GS	2	2E		395114
	03	Tower Controllers	10	2152	GS	4	4E		395114
		<u>Commun Center</u>							
03	01	Supv Comm Spec	11	393	GS	1	1E		395701
	02	Supv Gen Comm	07	392	GS	1	1E		
	03	Gen Comm Oprs (Computers)	05	392	GS	11	11E		395701

TDA - HQ - HSC
 US ARMY GARRISON
 FT CHAFFEE, AR
 (INTERIM LFTTC - MEDICAL SPT)

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>HOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TDA P/L</u>	<u>AMS</u>
01	01					1	1E		847792.2
	02	Med Surg Nurse	04			1	1E		847792.2
	03	Dental Ofcr	03			1	1E		847792.2
	04	Clinic NCO	E7			1	1E		847792.2
	05	EIT (Med Sp)	E6			1	1E		847792.2
	06	EIT (Med Sp)	E5			2	2E		847792.2
	07	EIT (Med Sp)	E4			4	4E		847792.2
	08	EIT (Med Sp)	E3			3	3E		847792.2
	09	Dental Sp	E4			1	1E		847792.2
	10	Diag/Radi Tech	06	647		1	1E		847792.2
	11	Hed Tech	07	645		1	1E		847792.2
	12	Dental Asst	06	681		1	1E		847792.2
	13	Pharm Tech	05	661		1	1E		847792.2
	14	LPT	05	620		1	1E		847792.2
	15	Hed Rec Tech	05	675		1	1E		847792.2
	16	Hed Clk	04	675		2	2E		847792.2




ANNEX E - LFNTC CONCEPT EVAL OPS GP TDA

The enclosed TDA reflects the proposed ad hoc Ops Gp to be provided by TRADOC to support the LFNTC Concept Evaluation in FY 86.

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LIN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GD</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
01		<u>Test Directorate</u>						
	01	Test Directorate	06	11/54	IN	0	1	TR
	02	Executive Officer	05	11/54	IN	0	1	TR
	03	Admin Officer	03	11/41	IN	0	1	CAC
	04	Ops Offr	04	11/54	IN	0	1	CAC
	05	A Ops Offr	03	11	IN	0	1	IN
	06	Log Offr	03	11/92	IN	0	1	LOGC
	07	SGM	E8	11B		E	1	IN
	08	Admin NCO	E7	71L		E	1	FA
	09	Ops NCO	E7	11B		E	1	IN
	10	Asst Ops NCO	E6			E	1	SW
	11	Log NCO	E7	76		E	1	FA
	12	Supply SGT	E6	76Y		E	1	FA
	13	Threats/Intel NCO	E7	96B		E	1	MI
	14	Typist	GS3	0318		C	1	
		<u>Operations Center</u>						
02		<u>Notional BDE Control Cell</u>						
	01	SR BDE Contr	04	11/54	IN	0	1	CAC
	02	BDE Contr	03	11/54	IN	0	1	IN
	03	BDE Contr	E7	96B		E	1	MI
	04	BDE Contr	E6	18B		E	1	SW
	05	Typist	GS3	0318		C	1	
03		<u>Battalion Control Cell</u>						
	01	SR BN Contr	04	11/54	IN	0	1	CAC
	02	ASST BN Contr	03	11/54	IN	0	1	IN
	03	HHC Contr	03	11/54	IN	0	1	IN Irwin
	04	Rifle CO Contr	03	11/54	IN	0	3	IN Irwin
	05	Fire Spt Contr	03	13	FA	0	1	FA
	06	CSS Contr	03	92	QM	0	1	QM
	07	M-C-M Contr	03	12	EN	0	1	EN
	08	AVN Contr	03	15	AV	0	1	AVN
	09	Asst BN Contr	03	37A	IN	0	1	MI
	10	Asst CSS Contr	02	91A	ORD	0	1	OR
	11	Ops NCO	E7	11B		E	1	SMA
	12	Asst Ops NCO	E6	37A		E	1	MI
	13	Fire Spt Contr	E7	13B		E	1	FA
	14	CSS Contr	E7	76Y		E	1	QM

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LIN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GD</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
	15	M-C-M Contr	E7	54C		E	1	CML
	16	AVN Contr	E7	67N		E	1	TAM
	17	Fire Spt Contr	E6	13B		E	1	FA
	18	Typist	GS3	0318		C	1	
04		<u>OPFOR C² Cell</u>						
	01	OPFOR Contr	03	37A	MI	0	1	MI
	02	Asst OPFOR Contr	02	11	IN	0	1	SW
	03	Asst OPFOR Contr	E6	18B		E	1	SW
	04	Asst OPFOR Contr	E6	91B		E	1	MI
05		<u>BN O/C Team</u> <u>BN C² O/C Cell</u>						
	01	SR BN O/C	05	11/54	IN	0	1	Irwin
	02	Asst BN O/C/Ops	04	11/54	IN	0	1	Irwin
	02A	Ops O/C	03	11/54	IN	0	1	Irwin
	03	Intell O/C	03	37A	MI	0	1	Irwin
	04	Admin Log O/C	03	11/92	IN	0	1	Irwin
	05	Asst O/C	03	11/41	IN	0	1	Irwin
	06	SR Enl O/C	E8	11Z		E	1	Irwin
	07	Asst Ops O/C	E7	96B		E	1	MI
	08	Asst Intell O/C	E7	96B		E	1	MI
	09	Admin/Log O/C	E7	63B		E	1	LOG
	10	Typist	GS3	0318		C	1	
06		<u>HHC O/C Cell</u>						
	01	CO O/C	04	11/54	IN	0	1	Irwin
	02	Scout O/C	E7	19D		E	1	Irwin
	03	MTR O/C	E7	11C		E	1	Irwin
	04	AT O/C	E7	11H		E	1	Irwin
	05	SPT O/C	E7	76Y		E	1	QM
	06	Asst O/C	E6	11B		E	1	IN
07		<u>3 Rifle CO O/C Cells</u>						
	01	CO O/C	04	11/54	IN	0	3	Irwin
	02	Asst CO O/C	03	11/54	IN	0	3	IN
	03	Plt O/C	E7	11B		E	3	IN
	04	SQD O/C	E6	11B		E	3	IN
08		<u>FA O/C Cell</u>						
	01	FA O/C	04	13	FA	0	1	FA
	02	Asst FA O/C	E7	13B		E	1	FA
	03	Asst FA O/C	E6	13F		E	1	FA

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LIN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GD</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
09		<u>ENGR O/C Cell</u>						
	01	ENGR O/C	03	12	EN	0	1	Irwin
	02	Asst ENGR O/C	E7	12B		E	1	EN
	03	Asst ENGR O/C	E6	12B		E	1	EN
10		<u>ADA O/C Cell</u>						
	01	ADA O/C	03	14	AD	0	1	Irwin
	02	Asst ADA O/C	E7	16R		E	1	AD
11		<u>AVN O/C Cell</u>						
	01	AVN O/C	04	15	AV	0	1	AVN
	02	Asst AVN O/C	03	15	AV	0	3	AVN
	03	SR Pilot O/C	W0	100B	AV	W0	3	AVN
	04	AVN Ops O/C	E7	67N		E	2	TAM
	05	AVN Maint O/C	E7	67Y		E	2	AVN
12		<u>MED O/C Cell</u>						
	01	SR MED O/C	03	67A	MS	0	1	AHS
	02	Asst MED O/C	E7	91B		E	1	AHS
13		<u>CSS O/C Cell</u>						
	01	SR CSS O/C	04	92	QM	0	1	LOGC
	02	Asst CSS O/C	03	91A	ORD	0	1	OR
	03	Asst CSS O/C	W0	630A	ORD	W0	1	OR
	04	Asst CSS O/C	E7	76Y		E	1	QM
	05	Asst CSS O/C	E6	63B		E	1	OR



* ONE RIFLE CO O/C CELL:

SR CO O/C	04	1
ASST CO O/C	03	1
PLT O/C	E7	3
SQD O/C	E6	2
		<u>7</u>

