



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

DCN: 9313

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

18 May 04

MEMORANDUM FOR AFAA/FSS (ATTN: MS EDSALL)

FROM: SAF/IEBB  
1665 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington DC 20330-1665

SUBJECT: Air Force Audit Agency Draft Report of Audit, Base Realignment and Closure  
Data Collection System (Project F2003-FB4000-0924.000) (Yr Memo, 5 May 04)

Attached for your use are SAF/IEBB comments on the subject draft report.

If you have any questions or concerns with our comments, please contact Mr Marty Bullock,  
SAF/IEBB, DSN 222-5122, or Col Tom Fleming, SAF/IEBB, DSN 222-9515.

// Col Fleming, 18 May 04 //

THOMAS F. FLEMING, Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Attachment:  
Draft Audit Comments

cc:  
AF/IEB  
AF/XP-BRAC

## SAF/IEBB INFORMAL COMMENTS

to accompany

Air Force Audit Agency  
Draft Report of Audit, Review of Base Realignment and Closure  
Data Collection System (Project F2003-FB4000-0924.000)

On 5 May 2004 your office provided a copy of the reference document. After review and analysis of the report, SAF/IEBB provides the following comments for your use. To augment the comments below, reference SAF/IEBB “Widget Reliability Testing” Memorandum, 12 May 04.

### Reference Audit Report Tab A, Audit Results 1 – Reliability and Accuracy:

- a. Accuracy as described by AFAA denotes absolute quality of computed results as documented. WIDGET does not compute nor calculate any values but the individuals entering data do. To certify the accuracy, to the “best of one’s knowledge” there are eight layers of review required by WIDGET once an answer is entered. These layers are in place to ensure WIDGET answers are complete and factual. For reference purposes, an answer is not entered into WIDGET until it has been ‘locked’ by the installation answerer (or the equivalent individual at other locations).
- b. Correct answers are a function of individuals entering the data and each level of review thereafter, and as such meet the ICP requirement of being completed to the best of one’s knowledge.
- c. Reliability of WIDGET is documented in previous discussions and in the management and development document. To summarize, WIDGET reliability is a function of the internet service provider and the environment operated by them. In this case it is Air Force Pentagon Communications Agency (AFPCA) and it is the AFPCA environment which provides round the clock access within the HAF DMZ environment.
- d. Recommendation: Revise the terminology associated with WIDGET to clarify to the reader the issues being addressed.

### Reference Audit Report Tab A, Audit Results 2 – Testing:

- a. The condition described in the first sub-paragraph was corrected so MAJCOM and HAF Points of Contact have ‘read only’ privileges once a section is locked at the MAJCOM or HAF level. The addition of a ‘forcing’ function is evident in the tool and is documented as to the addition date (24 NOV 2003). Documentation reveals the associated change was completed by the developer. The developer immediately incorporated the change but this particular change was not the subject of specific testing, nor is there documentation that an integration test was completed. Informal tests were conducted to ensure the change was effected in WIDGET and the change was deployed in Data Call #1. During Data Call #1, there were no trouble tickets submitted that indicated a failure associated with the change nor that the tool continued to demonstrate the identified anomaly. Prior to the deployment of Data Call #2 SAF/IEBB will conduct a complete exercise of WIDGET and provide documented results to AFAA.
- b. The condition described in the second sub-paragraph is an administrative function addressed in SAF/IEB memorandum of 2 Oct 03. The comment supposes a change in the coding of WIDGET was necessary when in fact the change reinforced the processes described in the operating

instruction. Some things that happened during testing reflected upon the process of gathering data as well as on the tool used to collect data. In the instance where the tool failed or produced an error, correction were made to overcome the error. The full discussion is reflected in the 2 Oct 03 memorandum.

**Reference Audit Report Tab B, Internal Controls:**

In the second paragraph, page 6, the comment implies SAF/IEBB did not complete action required by the 28 Oct 03 AFCA letter. This information was, in fact, provided to AFAA on 21 Apr 04. Request comments be added to indicate that the timed condition was met.

**Reference Audit Report Tab B, Audit Results 3 – Security Procedures:**

Request a review of the impact statement. The current statement implies no protection for WIDGET exists. The Air Force Communications Agency and the hosting activity, AFPCA, have indicated the level of security in use for WIDGET is adequate as evidenced by the Certificate of Networthiness (issued by AFCA) and the Certificate to Operate (issued by AFPCA).

**Reference Audit Report Tab B, Audit Results 4 – Separation of Duties:**

Request a review of the impact statement. Although the statement in the impact paragraph is factual, the statement is subjective and may be misinterpreted to indicate there is great risk for inaccurate data being used in BRAC analysis. I recommend an objective rating of the risk be included in this statement to provide a relative value by which the risk can be assessed and to provide a reference as to the level of risk incurred by the condition.