

BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

JUL 27 2005

Received

Matthew F Winterbauer
111 W Rutledge Ave
Petersburg, IL 62675

22 July 2005

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am writing out of concern about the Pentagon proposal to close/realign Air National Guard units with F-16 fighter squadrons/maintenance groups.

As Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Ca) said on July 20th, the Air Force's service plan for its future fighter force includes "well below 2,000" aircraft. He also said it is unclear if the service will field an adequate number of fighters in coming years to carry out homeland defense missions while also maintaining the necessary force structure to fill out the service's 10 air expeditionary forces. The Air Force plan is to divide air expeditionary forces into 10 equally capable packages, which will be eligible for 120-day deployments every 20 months. (It appears that, given these concerns and facts, it's a poor time to be reducing the number of fighter squadrons.)

It is evident that poor planning for the structure of the army and manning for the Active Duty Army and Army National Guard has resulted in severe shortages of ground forces needed at home and abroad today. The frequency and duration of deployments is taking its toll on the army as evidenced by problems with retention and recruiting.

By reducing the number of fighter squadrons/maintenance groups, the Air Force and Air National Guard is heading down the same path.

Rep. Hunter suggested bridging the gap between the smaller future fighter inventory and the service's defense needs by continuing production of either the F15E Strike Eagle or the F-16 fighter.

Presently, the Air Force plans to reduce the current F-16 fleet by 50% in the next 10 years. This is the main factor driving the plan to close/realign Air National Guard bases that currently possess F-16 aircraft. The majority of the F-16 aircraft slated for retirement could be kept in service for another 10 to 15 years at a fraction of the cost of replacing them.

The Air National Guard F-16 fighter squadrons slated for realignment/closure are units that have evolved over 50 years. 50 years of continuity has produced experienced, competent maintenance groups, which, once disbanded, cannot be reassembled.

Rep. Hunter is correct to assert that a future fighter force of "well below 2,000" is insufficient. The new generation of fighter aircraft may be able to do great things, but one fighter aircraft can only be one place at one time. The same goes for the pilot that flies the aircraft and the maintenance group that maintains it. Today's fighter force of about 3,400 is needed. It is a bad idea to reduce the number of aircraft, aircrew, and experienced fighter squadron maintenance groups.

The Air National Guard's F-16 fighter squadrons and maintenance groups should be kept intact. The frequency and duration of AEF deployments should not be increased.

The majority of the Air National Guard Units possessing F-16 aircraft have very strong community support. These bases should be kept open. Their F-16's should be kept in service until they can be replaced. These units should continue to participate in AEF rotations as part of the Future Total Force.

Air Force leaders appear to be willing to sell their souls to obtain more F/A-22 Raptors and F-35 Joint Strike fighters. Removal of fighters from the Air National Guard is too high a price to pay. Elimination of Air National Guard fighter squadrons makes no sense when cost and performance facts are reviewed. The Air National Guard is a bargain for the taxpayer.

Please dig into the facts and make an informed decision concerning the Air National Guard F-16 unit realignment/closure issue.

Please vote to keep the Air National Guard F-16 units intact.

Sincerely,

Matthew F Winterbauer

Matthew F Winterbauer

For your further consideration, some statements made by senior leaders in the Air Force and Air National Guard are misleading.

BRAC Commission

JUL 27 2005

Received

It has been said that every national guard member who wishes to continue serving will have an opportunity to do so after BRAC. This will not be possible, especially for units whose aircraft are realigned to another state. Maintenance Groups at these units will be disbanded and the people will no longer have jobs. They will no longer be available to serve the ANG or AF.

Reports have been misleading that indicate or imply that the end result of these realignments is a bigger flying squadron with a number of aircraft and personnel roughly equal to the number of aircraft and personnel totaled at the preexisting units. The fact is the units being plussed up are only increasing from 15 aircraft to 18 or 24 aircraft. The increase in personnel at the plussed up units will only be modestly increased. These plussed up units will be no better able to support an AEF than the 15 PAA units that currently exist. In fact, they will be less able because there will be fewer units to "rainbow" with to supply aircraft, equipment, and qualified volunteer personnel.

The problem of qualified personnel shortages will be further aggravated by the need for increased frequency and duration of deployments caused by the smaller number of units available to deploy.

Reducing the number of fighter squadrons/maintenance groups is a bad idea.

Sincerely,
Matt Winterbauer

June 20, 2005

BRAC Commission

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
BRAC 2005 Independent Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

JUL 20 2005

Received

Dear Chairman Principi:

We are writing to request that the Commission conduct a hearing on the Air Force's proposal to turn 23 Air National Guard bases into enclaves. At this time, we do not believe the concept has been examined by anyone outside the Pentagon. We are very concerned about this new concept for several reasons.

First, it is not clear that an enclave base can sustain expeditionary combat units. Once flying units are removed from the enclave bases, many will no longer be able to support military or civilian aircraft operations. Even in cases where there is a civilian landing area, the loss of rated firefighters will lead many shared airports to lose FAA ratings and fail to meet minimal Air Force and civilian criteria for landing and loading. This will make quick deployments to new locations difficult as units like security police, civil engineers, and communications teams normally deploy with a decent amount of equipment and weaponry. That equipment and weaponry must be moved to airports that can receive and secure them, delaying deployments.

In addition to the basic logistics, it is not at all clear that Expeditionary Combat Support personnel will stay in Air Guard units that do not have airplanes or regular contact with air operations. Recruiting new personnel for the Air Guard will also be made more difficult. Essentially, the "air" is being taken out of the Air Guard that these individuals joined or look to join. Retention and recruitment are also concerns for those who work on and fly the planes that will leave the enclaves. These are some of our most experienced and skilled maintainers and crews. Particularly in cases where there will be no nearby unit within 50, or even 250, miles, the Air Force and the nation will lose these experienced professionals. Recent experience with the B-1B bomber supports this concern. GAO's September 2002 analysis (GAO-02-846) pointed out,

Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a reduction in B-1B bombers from 93-60 would affect DOD's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most cost-effective alternative....As a result, the Air Force understated the potential savings for some options...Our comparison of active and Guard units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and higher mission capable rates than their active duty counterparts.

Given the on-going war effort, it is critical that we have a better understanding of the possible retention impacts of creating enclaves.

Second, we are concerned that this is an effort to circumvent the BRAC process. The Air Force has indicated that these bases will be kept in anticipation of follow-on missions. At the same time, they plan to shrink the facilities. We have seen no evidence that the Air Force has made any adjustments to its budgeting policies to accommodate the enclave concept. It is our understanding that budgeting is normally done by allocating funds for an installation based on the personnel and missions it supports. For a base without a mission and greatly reduced personnel, it appears the current system would provide minimal funds. Such a scenario leaves in question whether these bases will shrink so much that they no longer have the capacity to accommodate the growth required for follow-on missions. In the long-term, we are concerned that these enclaves may eventually lead to base closures, which would happen slowly and without following the BRAC process.

Finally, we are concerned that enclaves simply will not meet the homeland security needs of governors. We have heard that originally the 23 enclave bases were going to be closures. It is our understanding that the Air Force belatedly recognized that this would dramatically reduce the ability of governors to meet their homeland security needs. Their solution was to create enclave bases. Yet, we have not seen any evidence that enclaves will actually serve the needs of governors. As we have not seen all of the Air Force data yet, we can only raise this as a point to be investigated. While each state has a different overall situation, we do not believe that enclave bases will provide the governors with what they need for homeland security.

Nowhere in the BRAC legislation is enclave mentioned as an option. At this point, we have heard a lot of generalizations, but have seen little analysis to support this new concept. We respectfully request that the Commission hold a hearing specifically on the enclave concept.

Thank you for your service on this critical Commission. Please contact us if you have any questions.

Sincerely,




To: Members of the BRAC Commission

Sirs;

The Air force has overlooked one good potential for consolidation and cost reduction.

The AF Special Operations Command is small compared the other AF Major Commands, e.g. Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. That smallness makes it ineffectual as a Major Command. It cannot adequately support its two assigned bases, and cannot get the attention of the Air Staff. Consequently, AFSOC should revert to numbered Air Force status and be aligned under Air combat command.

The analogy is:

9th AF is the air arm of CENTCOM

2nd AF is the air arm of SOUTHCOM

....and

xx AF (formerly AFSOC) can continue to be the air arm of SOCOM.

Savings of 200+ manpower positions (over \$6 mil/yr) would result.

Thanks for your consideration of this taxpayer input.

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 authorized another BRAC round ^{July 2, 2005} for fiscal year 2005. At first glance the 2005 BRAC was based on the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, as Military value is the primary consideration for the Commission. The differences are indeed noteworthy, but subtly noted in the RAND Corporation's BRAC Report. The 2005 BRAC Commission has nine, not eight members, to reduce the probability of tie votes". In addition, "The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires "that any selection criteria relating to the cost savings of proposed closures take into account the impact of the closure on other federal agency operations on that installation." The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 that created the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds did not include such language.

The 2005 BRAC round encapsulates just what the acronym states, base realignment and closures, and a new target is the nation's National Guard, and more succinctly the realignment and closure of Air National Guard facilities. This authorization would soon turn from hot to scorching with many who see this as a states' rights issue. United States Law; Title 10, United States Code, Section 18238 and Title 32, United States Code, Section 104 (c) require permission of the governors of the states in which National Guard units and installations are located prior to "changing" or "relocating or withdrawing any of the National Guard units." The National Guard leadership based at the Pentagon negotiated for open Army realignment with the States' Adjutant Generals; however, the Air National Guard decisions were made covertly and without the governors or Adjutant Generals knowledge. Late in 2003 some Air National Guard Adjutant Generals became aware of a National Guard Bureau's "Transformational Plan" to realign and close Air National Guard facilities without input from any of the states' National Guard leadership. This Transformational Plan was called Vanguard and was to be the National Guard Bureau's flagship policy for BRAC integration. Vanguard's proposals mirrored the policy as to what the Army Air Forces (AAF), and soon to be delegated as a separate service, the United States Air Force (USAF) attempted from 1946 through 1950.

These five defining years set forth Air National Guard precedence and policy for over fifty-five years. If the BRAC 2005 Commission retains its goal of realigning and closing Air National installations, the Pentagon will surely face a Constitutional States' Rights issue. However, the timing is clearly now on the side of the Pentagon as states cannot even request legal opinion from the highest court as the Supreme Court will now sit out its traditional summer recess until October. Waiting for September for sending the BRAC report to the President while the Supreme Court is in recess may be part of a larger and well thought out plan to maneuver the Active Duty to gain control of and covertly federalize Air National Guard units, reduce current fighters, tankers, and cargo plane numbers within the ANG while ensuring the newest fighters projected into the inventory are allocated strictly to Active Duty units. Apparently, the Pentagon sees no real purpose for part-time, state Air National Guard forces, as was the case when the Air Force became a separate service.

The Vanguard Policy was to realign and merge the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserves and have *one* Air Reserve component. For example, Vanguard was to relocate the 103 Fighter Wing from Connecticut and the 104 Fighter Wing from Massachusetts, close both A-10 units, and merge the units into one wing and stage the new wing at the Massachusetts' Westover Air Force Reserve Base. However, the Pentagon's attorneys most likely researched the legality and implemented alterations with some Vanguard's proposals, but not significantly change the construct of merging the nation's air reserve components and work around established precedence. The precedence began as early as 1946 and is clearly reflected in an Army Air Forces policy letter to the commanding Active Duty General in charge of the Air Defense Command (ADC) for homeland defense. The May 1946 Methods and Procedure Letter restricted "the ADC from advising on the selection of Air Guard bases. States would retain absolute authority over the selection of bases regardless of ADC's requirements." In addition, an "economic arrangement was accomplished through service contracts, obligating both parties to the three-fourths (federal), one-fourth (state) formula for airfield operating expenses, were drawn up for each airfield." In 1946 as today, is the contested issue with governors, the selection of Air National Guard bases. State Adjutants Generals in cooperation with state and local politicians usually performed this function. From the outset and birth of the Air National Guard, the Air Force could only advise the states on the location of Air National Guard airfields.

In so much as the Active Duty's current plan on monopolizing aircraft, there will be intrinsic paradoxes in such policy that will eventually undermine this entirely new Active Duty Doctrine itself. Just as is the case

of this round of BRAC, Active Duty believes the current Air National Guard protocols to be increasingly irrelevant as warfare evolves beyond set primary authorized aircraft for state air forces, this doctrine will itself become the irrelevant policy as new fighter aircraft production is severely reduced, by the current Secretary of Defense himself, and as the F-22 Raptor, and ultimately Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, will be one of the prime air fighter assets in the decades to come. Air domination has always been fought, but not always won, with according to the best of what the market place of western science and technology can produce.

Nonetheless, the oldest and most enduring of America's military traditions is the reliance for defense on citizen-soldiers. Our militia protocols are based in the Constitution itself in what has been a tried and tested policy, for we are primarily a militia nation and we should not lose sight of this ideal as the National Guard truly represents the truest form of democracy and maintains a check and balance to Active Duty monopolization of the United States military posture. Our militias continue to equate with this identifiable idealism, we serve society and represent our communities rather than society relying solely on producing raw recruits to serve a federal standing military. All that we hold sacred in our system of government; the separation of Church and State, the civilian control of the military, the establishment of an empowered middle class, the open exchange of ideas among a free citizenry has origins throughout the small communities of cities and towns. And it is our cities, small and large towns alike, that where our National Guard members represents a dichotomy of both state and federal missions. This latest round of BRAC threatens our nation's greatest contributions to freedom, our contract with the American people, the Constitution.

From the onset of military aviation, the National Guard was engaged. In 1909, less than a year after the Army purchased its first airplane, the First Aero Company, Signal Corps, New York National Guard came into existence. By the time of its pre-World War II mobilization in 1940, the National Guard from throughout the nation could provide twenty-nine observation squadrons manned by nearly 5,000 officers and men. In early 1946, with the creation of the first Air Guard unit, and then with the formation of the Air Force as a separate, independent military service the next year, the Air National Guard emerged as a separate reserve component and began its modern development into a viable, powerful member of the aerospace team. The Armed Forces Reserve Acts of 1950, 1952, 1955, and US Supreme Court Case MARYLAND, FOR THE USE OF LEVIN V. UNITED STATES 381 U.S. 41, NO. 345. codified the Air National Guard as truly reliable militia force and set the stage as an equal partner in the Total Force Policy in 1970. With the current BRAC Commission, it is indeed testing and perhaps redefining the meaning of the Constitution's Militia Clauses and our citizen airmen's democratic way of serving our nation, governors may have no choice but to live by a new precedence of restructuring the Air National Guard and finally ceding all sovereign power to an all-encompassing *Federated Air Force*.

The Air Force did struggle with the National Guard Bureau and the states to gain greater operational control of all Air Guard units and this struggle included an abortive drive to convert the Air Guard to a strictly Federal Reserve force incorporated into the Air Force Reserve. This redirected policy was ultimately futile and counterproductive. The Air Force was compelled to develop a working relationship with a reserve component it did not want if it could not fully control and the political exigencies of national security prevailed. Will this renewed attempt to gain full control of the Air National Guard occur as our nation is in the throes of a two front war with a deadly insurgency and near civil war in Iraq and a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan while this BRAC round intends to strip the Air National Guard of its air assets? With a huge influx of Title 10 Officers serving in the National Guard Bureau today, the Pentagon may have hedged its bet that it now has adequate "presence of interest" for effecting total reserve policy and merging the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserves while using BRAC as its vehicle for ultimately merging and eliminating the Air National Guard.

While the military organization and the construct of organizing our militias and standing army was a subject of intense debate within our halls of governance during the writing of the Constitution, how is it that a nine-man commission should be in a position to play the role of the Congress? And without the consent of governors and the Adjutant Generals, how is it that this round of BRAC can undo federal policy and precedence regarding the National Guard and be in such a position to make decisions that will govern the lives of tens of thousands of uniformed men and women of men? Does not this belie our history and fabric of democracy? The BRAC Commission's combination of multiple resources and responsibilities engages our respect. But, we also desire to know what decisions this Commission will

make based on what choices were available, and what were the data and environmental impacts that influenced the Pentagon's current decisions. Recently, the Chairman of the BRAC Commission requested legal opinion from the Attorney General of the United States "regarding the authority of the Secretary of Defense to effect changes to National Guard and Air National Guard units and installations." The Attorney General of the United States' response was terse as he declined to provide legal opinion based on attorney-client privilege.

In January 1951, Secretary of Defense George Marshall announced a new series of long-range reserve forces policies. These policies were largely the result of recommendations made by a special congressional subcommittee and in its recommendations also sought broad public and political support for reserve programs. Marshall policies, thirty-nine, included: "The organization, administration, training, and supply of the reserve forces of the three military departments, except as otherwise prescribed by law, would be completely integrated with similar functions for the regular services," and [t]he strength and organization of the National Guard, both ground and air, would be assured." But perhaps the last of his thirty-nine policies is what the nation currently needs most, "Policies affecting the reserve forces had to be widely publicized." To put closure on this issue and close this Pandora's Box once again, the Pentagon shall put forth faith in the governors and Adjutant Generals and allow the states for open negotiated realignment as it did for the Army National Guard.

v/r

Wayne B. Ferris
US Air Guardsman
4605 Bigelow Commons
Enfield, CT 06082
(860)-662-1296
e-mail: wayneenfield@aol.com