

DCN: 3821

ALABAMA

Morning Session

60 Minutes

**ATLANTA, GA REGIONAL HEARING
SCHEDULE OF PRESENTERS**

		<u>Opening Remarks</u>
11:00AM-11:11AM	11 Minutes	Senator Richard Shelby Senator Jeff Sessions
		<u>Redstone Arsenal</u>
11:11AM-11:19AM	8 Minutes	Ms. Irma Tudor Mr. Joe Fitzgerald, Tennessee Valley BRAC Committee
		<u>Anniston Army Depot</u>
11:19AM-11:26AM	7 Minutes	Mr. Nathan Hill, Calhoun County Chamber
		<u>Fort Rucker</u>
11:26AM-11:33AM	7 Minutes	Mr. Charles Nailen, Friends of Ft. Rucker
		<u>Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base</u>
11:33AM-11:44AM	11 Minutes	BG Paul Hankins, USAF (Ret.), Montgomery Chamber
		<u>Birmingham Air National Guard</u>
11:44AM-11:53AM	9 Minutes	MG C. Mark Bowen, The Adjutant General
		<u>Closing Remarks</u>
11:53AM-11:57AM	4 Minutes	Governor Bob Riley

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Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented by: Senator Richard Shelby
Phone: 202-224-5744
Email: Laura_Friedel@shelby.senate.gov

I would like to thank the Commissioners for being here today to further examine the important role Alabama's military installations play in our national security. I am joined today by Senator Sessions, Members of the House of Representatives, Governor Riley, mayors, state officials, and elected and appointed community leaders from Alabama's military base communities.

Overall, the BRAC recommendations were favorable for Alabama, and we appreciate the Department of Defense recognizing and reinforcing Alabama's contributions to our nation's defense.

Alabama is the heart of the Army's extensive missile and space research and development (R&D) programs.

It is home to Army Aviation, provides the full spectrum of Air Force education initiatives, and maintains every tracked vehicle in the Army inventory. Alabama has an unsurpassed network of universities, research facilities, and industrial expertise not duplicated anywhere else in the United States. Every major defense and aerospace technology company is present in Alabama. Alabama provides worldwide leadership in missile technology, launch capabilities, and aviation R&D. Alabama represents a critical mass of unique assets and capabilities essential to protecting our nation's security interests, and its strategic position is critical to our national defense.

We were pleased with the majority of the BRAC recommendations. Overall, Alabama will increase in both missions and personnel with the addition of:

- The Army Materiel Command;
- Headquarters for the Space and Missile Defense Command;
- Extensive Missile Defense Agency missions;
- The Aviation Logistics School;
- And an addition of both C-130s and F-16s for our National Guard

The recommendations increase efficiency, support consolidation, and realign the force to support research, development, and training in ways that will enhance our military. I am pleased to see DoD has recognized Alabama's bases' role in our national security.

However, there are five recommendations we respectfully ask you to reexamine. We believe that the recommendations in these areas either deviated substantially from DoD's military value criteria or that the issues were not properly assessed, resulting in flawed recommendations. As Alabama continues its testimony today, I urge the Commission to further investigate these matters.

Today you will hear not only from me about the BRAC recommendations, but from Senator Sessions, a variety of community leaders, as well as Governor Riley. Further, we have included the testimony from Alabama's Congressmen in your package.

I will now briefly address two of the five issues we would like the BRAC Commission to reconsider.

First, Fort Rucker, already home to Army and Air Force rotary wing training is slated to receive enlisted aviation training as well. This consolidation makes sense. We fight jointly - we must train jointly and I fully support this recommendation.

However, one piece of the rotary wing puzzle is missing. Navy rotary wing training was not included in the consolidation. The Army and Air Force have been successfully training together for 30 years. It makes perfect sense to train all three Services at the same location. In a warfighting environment that is becoming ever more joint, in a future filled with common airframes, shared services, and dual-hatted commanders, the Navy's helicopter training should be co-located with the Army and Air Force at Fort Rucker.

The Navy will argue that their training is unique, because it is necessary for Navy aviators to train over water and replicate landing on carriers. The Navy will contend that Whiting Field should remain as their site for rotary training. However, the Navy overlooks these facts:

Fort Rucker's rotary training already meets or exceeds all of the Navy's requirements for over water training. Fort Rucker is only 30 minutes from the water and trains Army, Air Force, and foreign countries' pilots in over-water survival training and provides "dunker" training for simulating in-water crashes. Every aspect of Navy rotary training can be accomplished at Fort Rucker.

Fort Rucker's training airspace is the size of South Carolina. Fort Rucker is rated number 7 in military value among all Army training installations and higher than Whiting Field in 6 of 7 "military value" criteria. Fort Rucker has every simulator and training device necessary to train aviators of all Services, while Whiting Field's simulation assets are already overextended.

With the capacity to easily expand to host Navy rotary training, it is apparent that this consolidation would be both cost-effective, saving DoD approximately \$100 million dollars, and synergistic. It just makes good sense to consolidate all three Services' rotary flight training, and I ask the Commission to consider relocating the Navy rotary wing pilot training to Fort Rucker.

The second issue I wish to address is consolidation of resources. In many cases, consolidation saves money and eliminates duplicative services, but it does not make sense in every situation.

Many aspects of national security operations need to be redundant - sustained in several geographic areas or by multiple commands. If one goes down, another can seamlessly replace it.

That is why DoD's recommendation to combine the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG), located at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, with other information technology assets into a new information systems R&D center at Hanscom Air Force Base is perplexing. This appears to be a simple consolidation of R&D information system functions at one location. However, that is not the case.

The underlying flaw in this recommendation is that the OSSG has a 24/7 operations and sustainment mission for Air Force, DoD, and joint information technology systems. It is not an R&D group. The OSSG is the sole agency overseeing the operations and sustainment of Air Force IT missions.

The OSSG is co-located at Maxwell-Gunter with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) – the organization that is similarly responsible for the operational side of DoD IT networks. The operational expertise that exists in these two organizations and their associated contract workforce could not be realistically duplicated, hired, or replaced in a timely manner. Its loss would result in a direct reduction of support to our combat forces during a time of war.

If the OSSG were moved to Hanscom, all of its operational functions would have to be reconstituted, resulting in significant additional costs with no efficiency or synergistic gains. Additionally, the existing relationship between OSSG and DISA would be destroyed.

I support consolidation – when it makes sense. However, moving the OSSG to Hanscom does not appear to provide cost savings or any synergistic advantage. According to a COBRA model that used current endstrength and contractor data, it would actually cost \$413 million over 20 years to reproduce the OSSG mission at Hanscom. It is clear that in this instance, consolidation does not make sense. I ask the Commission to consider amending DoD's recommendation so that the OSSG remains at Maxwell Gunter.

The speed and intensity of modern war means that the United States will not have time to leisurely build up forces or construct new bases in the future, as we have in the past. Therefore, we need to ensure that the decisions made today do not adversely affect the way we fight tomorrow.

Again, I would like to thank the Commission for this opportunity to discuss the role Alabama's installations play in our nation's defense and the impact of the BRAC recommendations.

Thank you.

State of Alabama

**BRAC Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005**



Senator Richard Shelby

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented by: Jeff Sessions

Alabama

Phone: 202-224-6608

Email: Archie_Galloway@sessions.senate.gov

Statement for the Record
Senator Jeff Sessions
June 30, 2005

Good morning, Commissioner Gehman, and members of the 2005 BRAC Commission. I am Jeff Sessions and I am honored to appear before you today. I am here to represent my constituents, my state, and its military communities. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Shelby.

My task this morning is simple:

- (1) provide a brief national BRAC perspective, and
- (2) request your acceptance of three issues.

PERSPECTIVE:

I have been a member of the U.S. Senate for over 8 years, and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) for six. BRAC is no stranger to me. The loss of a major installation in 1995 left Alabama shaken, but unbowed. Economic recovery has taken 10 years. Though a post-1995 BRAC skeptic, I voted in favor of the 2005 round. It was the right thing to do. Our nation, while at war, must transform itself. Global repositioning of U.S. forces, this BRAC round, and the ensuing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are the keys to transformation.

BRAC PROCESS

Collectively, yours is one of the most daunting tasks given any commission. You have little time to assess, deliberate, or visit all the places you would like. My task then is to shed light on three issues I think you should consider.

First Issue:

First, I request the commission reconsider that portion of DOD's recommendation regarding CECOM's move from New Jersey to Maryland, and consider reassigning the aviation avionics and survivability functions to AMCOM.

Our analysis shows that there are cost savings of over \$50 million annually and inflation costs savings of \$30 million that could be saved if functions are moved to AMCOM.

This analysis is a result of a re-tabulation of the Cobra data, which will be more fully explained in Huntsville's presentation.

These are aviation specific functions that are better located at the newly designated Rotor Craft Center of Excellence being established by the BRAC decision at Redstone.

Second Issue:

Mr. Nathan Hill of Anniston will make a presentation that makes a strong case for limiting DLA's role in purchasing major end items for the uniform services.

Substantial sums will be taken from purchasing these items and transferred to overhead.

For example, this decision impacts engine purchases at Anniston Army Depot and Aviation parts at Redstone.

This is an issue of national importance.

Third Issue:

Third, it has been especially painful to me to learn of the recommendation to move the 117th Air Refueling Wing.

These pilots have, as reservists and on active duty, flown thousands of missions. I have visited them and their commanders several times.

This is a national level issue. Indeed, you will have a separate hearing on the

subject later this afternoon.

I'll make these comments about the 117th. The Birmingham runway will soon be 12,000 feet and allow heavier fuel loads and greater distance than the gaining airfields. There will be costs and inconvenience for reserve pilots and crews and it is estimated 80% will not be able to continue to serve, as they would like, under these conditions.

MG Mark Bowen, our Alabama TAG will explain the details of this analysis.

I want to thank the Commission for its consideration today, and yield to our first presenter--Mrs. Irma Tudor-- from Huntsville.

END

State of Alabama

**BRAC Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005**



Senator Jeff Sessions

Statement for the Record

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

2005 BRAC Commission Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Presented by:
Tennessee Valley BRAC Committee
Irma Tudor
(256) 535-2000
www.tvbrac.org

Hello, I am Irma Tudor the founder and CEO of a 350 person defense contracting firm. Today, I am speaking on behalf of the Tennessee Valley BRAC Committee. The DoD has recommended significant relocations to Redstone Arsenal including: Major portions of the Missile Defense Agency; the Army's Materiel Command Headquarters, the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command Headquarters, and the Army's Security Assistance Command. We support these sound recommendations. They take advantage of the multi-mission, multi-agency capabilities unique to Redstone.

The proposed move of portions of the Missile Defense Agency and the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command Headquarters will co-locate two organizations that already have a significant presence at Redstone--over 50% of SMDC and MDA's largest program are already located at Redstone.

The relocation of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Army's Security Assistance Command to Redstone enables DoD to disperse headquarters activities outside the DC area, and also consolidate headquarters that interact daily.

Since you will not have the opportunity to visit, we have a short video to acquaint you with Team Redstone and the surrounding community.

3.0 minute video

As you can see, DoD's recommendations take advantage of the unique expertise and facilities at Redstone. To further maintain and enhance this national asset we suggest you consider the following modifications to DoD's recommendations.

First, Senator Sessions requested that relocation of the Communications Command to Aberdeen be reconsidered. The Communications Command currently manages a number of aviation elements. These elements are integral to the aviation missions at Redstone and should be located at Redstone.

Second, We recommend the Joint Robotics Program Office remain at Redstone Arsenal. Redstone develops the unmanned ground and air vehicles for the Army's Future Combat System. The challenge for robotics is the integration of systems--not the development of vehicles. TACOM builds vehicles. Relocating it to Detroit fragments development and destroys the synergy that exists at Redstone.

Third, we recommend you keep the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training of the School at Redstone. Redstone has the existing range area and hosts the FBI's premiere hazardous devices school-a one of a kind facility. Synergy with the FBI, the school, range availability and permitting at Redstone deliver efficiency and military value.

Finally, we want to ensure that Redstone's exemplary record with the 1995 BRAC is clear: The Army's records show that more than 60% of those offered relocation to Redstone accepted. We are confident we can repeat that success.

Thank you.

Transcript of Video Prepared for BRAC Commission for hearing in Atlanta, Georgia on
June 30, 2005

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Presented by:
Tennessee Valley Brac Committee
256-535-2000
www.tvbrac.org

Redstone Delivers for the Nation

(facility)

37,000 acre facility
secure guarded installation
no significant encroachments
no environmental issues
on site airfield
extensive test ranges
32,000 employees

(agencies)

130 resident agencies and organizations
Army Aviation and Missile Command
Army Space and Missile Defense Command
DIA's Missile and Space Intelligence Center
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center
NATO
TRADOC and FBI's Explosive Ordnance Disposal School
MDA's Ground based Missile Defense Program
Center for Excellence for Unmanned Vehicles

(surrounding areas)

900,000 people in the region
206,000 military retirees and their families
2nd largest research park in the nation
highest concentration of engineers in the country
two major universities
45 graduate degree programs
17 Ph.d degree programs
#1 Engineering Management Program in the nation
Regional Airport
 100 daily flights
 9 daily round trip flights to DC
 direct flights to 14 destinations

(BRAC recommendations)

Over 60% accepted transfer to Redstone in BRAC '95
MDA, SMDC relocation to Redstone
Missile Defense began at Redstone
Over 50% of SMDC's now at Redstone
MDA's largest program managed at Redstone

25,000+ missile and aerospace specialists in the area

AMC relocation to Redstone

Redstone houses #1 ranked commodity command
largest commodity command

Majority of Army's Foreign Military sales managed at Redstone
(recent news events about our area)

Huntsville Ranked #6 on Forbes list of Top Cites for Business
Forbes Magazine, May 2005

Huntsville in South's Top three Metro's for quality of life
Expansion Management Magazine, March 2005

University of Alabama in Huntsville Graduate Engineering Management
Program Ranked #1 in the country
Society for Engineering Management, January 2005

Huntsville Ranked 4th "America's Best Places to Live and Work"
Employment Review, January 2003

Huntsville Ranked 1st "Best Places to live for Black Americans"
Family Digest Magazine, March 2003

Huntsville has Highest Concentration of Inc. 500 Fast Growing Private
Companies
Inc. Magazine, October 2004

Huntsville "One of Nation's Top Values for Salaries and Cost of Living"
Salary.com, May, 2005

Redstone Delivers for the Nation

2005 Redstone Arsenal



Tennessee Valley BRAC Committee

DoD's proposed moves to Redstone

- ▮ Major portion of Missile Defense Agency
- ▮ Army's Materiel Command Headquarters
- ▮ Army's Space and Missile Defense Headquarters
- ▮ Army's Security Assistance Command Headquarters

Other Recommendations for Consideration

- ✦ Aviation functions of Communications Command to Redstone
- ✦ Joint Robotics Program Office
- ✦ Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training Department

Statement for the Record

Anniston

2005 BRAC Commission Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Presented by: Nathan Hill

Title: Military Liaison Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce

Phone: 256-237-3536

Email: nathanh@calhouchamber.com




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Attachments:

1. Community Comments Provided to GAO Regarding Anniston Army Depot Regarding Capacity for Growth
2. Depot Video

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Anniston Army Depot has been a critical part of the Department of Defense (DoD) Industrial Base for over 60 years. Anniston is a healthy, productive installation capable of supporting the Warfighter's current and future military requirements. Anniston's extensive infrastructure, skilled workforce, and technologies can be readily adapted to support any model or type of tracked or wheeled combat vehicle or artillery system within the DoD inventory - regardless of type, function, size, or propulsion. Anniston has overlaid business practices across installation functions that have leveraged the internal capabilities as well as those of the private sector to maximize the return on investment. The result of this innovative approach is weapon system life cycle cost reductions and enhancement of the installation's readiness to support the Warfighter.

The DoD set as a goal to transform the operating capacity of its base infrastructure to maximize warfighting capability and efficiency. As the top ranked (Military Value) Army industrial installation, the Secretary of Defense recommended that Anniston Army Depot's Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) current designation for the Army be expanded to include all combat vehicles (both tracked and wheeled) for all of DoD. This move, along with the additional consolidation of artillery, small arms, and associated components at Anniston meets the criteria and stated goals of BRAC 2005. The consolidation will result in a direct enhancement of operational readiness of the industrial base (the installation and its private sector partners) to respond to warfighting requirements; the ability to accommodate contingencies; the mobilization of future joint force requirements; the reduction in operating costs and more efficient use of resources.

Anniston has proven its Military Value through its performance of depot missions both on the installation and on the ground in Southwest Asia and has verified its value through its submission of certified data over the past 18 months.

Since 9/11, workload has more than doubled from 2.4 million to 5.5 million direct labor hours (DLH) this fiscal year. For the fifth year in a row, production has been accomplished under budget - saving dollars for additional weapons and supplies supporting our Warfighters. Anniston has been able to achieve these impressive results through the employment and integration of new hires, through training and through private sector partnering as shown in the chart below. This chart illustrates Anniston's elasticity in adjusting its workforce and using partnering to meet increased workload requirements, which will provide dividends for future increases or decreases in workload.

On-Board Strength History FY89 to FY05



As of 30 April 05

* Avg. Age ANAD Only

In recent years Anniston has become the DoD leader in public/private partnerships as verified by a Government Accountability Office report (GAO-03-423). Anniston's numerous partnerships with private industry have resulted in the formation of an integrated, effective public/private industrial base without equal anywhere in DoD. Private defense contractors such as General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Honeywell, and United Defense Limited Partnership, (UDLP) have operations on Anniston Army Depot, working alongside Anniston employees to jointly support vehicle maintenance, modernization, technology insertion, and contingency requirements. The benefits of the partnerships have surfaced across the life cycles of the vehicle systems supported and in the fielding of joint teams that have supported logistics and maintenance needs of the Warfighter within theaters of operations.

The quality of the infrastructure directly affects the readiness of an installation to support military requirements. Anniston facilities are in a high state of readiness as reflected in the Installation Readiness Report. Key facilities including training, maintenance and production, supply, medical, administrative, housing & community, utilities, and mobility have ratings of C1 and C2 or GREEN. An existing building has been converted to enable Honeywell and the Depot to co-manufacture new turbine engines for the M1 tanks—the only place where new engine production will be performed. The private sector has invested \$4.277 million in new facilities at the site which, coupled with the DoD investment, have upgraded and reduced the average age of the physical plant,

allowing efficiencies to be infused into core operations. There are no encroachment environmental issues or other impediments that would hinder implementation.

Anniston has a workforce capable of supporting the full breadth of skill sets required in the Combat Vehicle Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE). Anniston Army Depot is located in an area that is a growing automotive industry corridor with a training system tailored to support this industrial sector. The Alabama Industrial Development Training system (AIDT) has a prime focus to train people in the automotive skills as demonstrated with the start-up and expansion of industries such as Daimler-Chrysler/Mercedes Benz, Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Ford and Toyota Trucks.

CITE Anniston has the skilled workers, facility, and equipment to expand industrial operations to meet proposed surge capacity requirements. Anniston's capacity is flexible, readily adaptable to accommodate new system workload with minimal effort and cost. Partnering provides elasticity, allowing the industrial base to expand and to contract to meet changing needs.

CITE Anniston continues its superior service to the Warfighter through best practices and supply chain management. For this reason, acknowledging that management of service-specific Class IX materiel and purchasing of Depot Level Repairables (DLR's) are essential core capabilities of the respective services, it is our recommendation, along with that of other depot level maintenance installations, that the BRAC Commission should reject the transfer of that authority to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

Establishing Anniston as the CITE for all ground combat vehicles and providing the Commander with command and control authority of all maintenance and related supply operations will optimize military value and better support to our Warfighters.

SECTION I DoD CITE ANNISTON'S CRITICAL AND ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER

Anniston has a proud history of supporting our Warfighters from the Korean War to the current Global War of Terror. Anniston has the infrastructure, resources and culture to meet the operational readiness requirements in peacetime and war. When extension of industrial base capabilities becomes an essential part of support to the Warfighter, Anniston responds. The following chart is a snapshot of places the Depot is supporting or has recently supported the Warfighter within the US and throughout the world - in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Worldwide Support

Over 150 missions
(19 OCONUS)
Over 400 personnel

CONUS


Ft Stewart, GA – Army & NG AVLB Rpr
Ft Stewart, GA, NG – M1 Fuel Cell Replacement
Ft. Stewart – DHI, MWO Application
Ft Lewis, WA – Tech Support M198 How
Ft Riley, KS – Towing Eye Replacement
Ft Riley, KS – M1 Eng DS+ Augmentation
Ft Riley, KS – AVLB Rpr
Ft Knox, KY – DHI, MWO Application
Charleston, SC – M60 Port Inspection
Goose Creek, SC – M88 Voltage Conversion
SIAD, NV – ROWPU Repair & Mod

Ft Hood, TX – AVLB Rpr
Ft Irwin, CA – AVLB Rpr
Ft Carson, CO – AVLB Rpr
Ft Carson, CO – M9 ACE H/O
Ft Bragg, NC – NG AVLB Rpr
Ft Polk, LA – AVLB Rpr
Ft Bliss, TX – M1 AIM Inspect
Ft Knox, KY – AVLB Rpr
Tennessee, NG – AVLB Rpr
Various Sites – M58 Fielding

OCONUS

Taiwan – M60 H/O
Egypt – 1790 Eng Insp
Germany – AVLB Rpr & AIM Insp
Germany – M9 ACE Hull bottom Rpl
Germany – Paladin Gun Mount Rpl
Qatar – M1A1 Asst
Germany M1 Insp

Korea – AVLB Repair
Korea – M58 Smoke
Kuwait – M58 Smoke, FRA, HMMWV
Bosnia – AVLB Repair
Kosovo – AVLB Repair
Korea – M1 Insp
Netherlands – M1A1 Inspection



Workers at CITE Anniston will continue their commitment to deploy with the Warfighter; and while in theater use their extensive cross-trained skills to repair equipment and return it to the field. At all times, whether in peace or conflict, CITE Anniston will continue to reset or reconstitute weapon systems to ensure military readiness.

Anniston deployed 476 employees in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to establish a forward deployed depot. Anniston provided 36% of all civilians deployed, and Anniston employees in country performed 90% of the combat vehicle maintenance mission. At the conclusion of the war, Anniston reconstituted 1,388 various heavy tracked combat vehicles. Anniston has deployed in excess of 250 employees in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and another 100 employees to various locations around the globe since January 2003.

As the Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for Combat Vehicles, Anniston has the capability and capacity to respond in strength to contingency and mobilization requirements that emerge from conflict. **Anniston was the first to fabricate vehicle armor protection kits and has produced almost one-third of the total number produced** across the nation with approximately 3,700 kits produced. Anniston civilian volunteers in Iraq install the kits on the Warfighters' vehicles when they are shipped from the Depot and other plants.

Over the past two years, production at the depot has included approximately 2,000 Combat Vehicles, 5,000 Engines, 100,000 Small Arms, and even larger numbers of other vehicle components. **Anniston has met or exceeded all production schedules, operating under budget for five straight years – the most efficient depot in DoD, and has produced a product exceeding all quality standards and proudly handed them off to the Warfighter.** The capabilities and business practices residing in the CITE allow the DoD to realize benefits in readiness and cost efficiencies through leveraging of the public/private resources available in the CITE.

General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a written posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee on February 16 and 17, 2005 noted that, “High operational and training tempo is putting 5 year’s worth of wear on equipment per year, placing a huge demand on maintenance, supply, depot repair and production. In some units, combat-related damage is high, and there is substantial equipment damage caused by the harsh environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, many units leave their equipment overseas when they return from deployment, requiring re-supply and reconstitution as they train for their next deployment...” The DoD depends on the skills and expertise of its civilian workforce as a force multiplier. We simply could not perform our mission without the support, dedication, and sacrifice of our DoD civilian employees at home and overseas.”

Anniston maintains a skilled workforce capable of maintaining and providing logistic support for all DoD Ground Combat Vehicles. This skill base of machinists, heavy equipment mechanics, welders, engineers, electronic mechanics, pneudraulic mechanics, and others stand ready to deploy anywhere in the world at any time. These employees are proficient in the inspection and repair of multiple families of combat vehicles, artillery, electronic components, and small arms. They carry with them institutional knowledge not readily available from any other single source.

The consolidation of the remaining vehicle systems/components identified in the Secretary of Defense’s BRAC recommendations into Anniston will allow the DoD to leverage the capabilities and support elements that have historically been provided by the Anniston team and achieve additional operational efficiencies from its industrial facilities.

SECTION II DoD CITE ANNISTON ABILITY TO PERFORM & SUSTAIN MISSIONS

BRAC 05 recognizes Anniston Army Depot as a designated DoD Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for the inclusive commodity of all ground combat vehicles (track and wheeled) and all associated Depot Level Reparable components that make up those vehicles. The recommendation supports **transformation by reducing duplication of capabilities at multiple locations into a robust multi-functional maintenance center that capitalizes on the best business practices of DoD’s Industrial Base.** The recommendation enables DoD to achieve maximum

utilization of existing capacity, while achieving the most favorable economic efficiencies for all of DoD because of the existing private sector presence at Anniston. This will allow DoD to maintain an installation that can meet the Force Structure Requirements for the next 20 years as Defense resources are reduced and/or redirected.

Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) is the premier joint combat system support provider in the world. For over 60 years, Anniston Army Depot's combat vehicle maintenance capabilities have been viable and critical entities within the Department of Defense (DoD) industrial base. **Anniston is the only Department of Defense facility with the technology, skills, and infrastructure to support all combat vehicles from the heaviest to the lightest.** In October 2002, Anniston was designated as the Army's Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for combat vehicles (except Bradley), artillery (towed and self propelled), and small caliber weapons. Anniston's extensive facilities, equipment, technologies, and skills (many of which are one of a kind within the vast Department of Defense industrial base) can be readily adapted to support any model or series of tracked or wheeled vehicles within the DoD inventory regardless of type, function, size, or propulsion. Charts below provide information on some of the joint operations and support provide by Anniston.

Joint Service Support									
	ARMY	AF	NAVY	MARINES	NG	FMS	DOHS	FEMA	AR
Combat Vehicles/Artillery									
Stryker	◆								
M1/M60 FOV	◆			◆	◆	◆			
M88 FOV	◆			◆	◆	◆			
M113 FOV	◆			◆	◆	◆			
FOX	◆								
FAASV	◆				◆				
Self Propelled Howitzer	◆				◆	◆			
Towed Howitzer	◆			◆	◆	◆			
Bridges (AVLB, MGB, etc...)	◆			◆	◆	◆			
AVLB Flying Squad	◆				◆				
Other Vehicles/Components	◆			◆	◆	◆			◆
Small Arms									
Pistols	◆	◆		◆	◆	◆			
Rifles	◆	◆		◆	◆	◆			
Machine Guns	◆	◆		◆	◆	◆			
Mortars	◆		◆	◆	◆	◆			◆
Rail & Generator									
Locomotives/Rail Equip.	◆	◆	◆						
Generators	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆		◆	◆
Ammunition	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆			◆
Other	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆

Marine Corps *Workload*

M1A1 Overhaul



- ◆ FY03 – 16 Vehicles Completed - Sec 103
- ◆ FY03 – 46 Vehicles Completed - FY04
- ◆ FY04 – 8 Vehicles Completed - FY04; 56 Vehicles Carried into FY05
- ◆ FY05 – 124 Vehicles

Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV)



- ◆ FY03 – 3 Programs
 - ◆ 1 - Program Manager
 - ◆ 1 - Tech Manuals
 - ◆ 1 - Eval of ABV Fleet
- ◆ FY03 - ABV Overhaul (July 03)
- ◆ FY04 – FY03 Program Worked in FY04 (Program Complete)
- ◆ FY05 – Full Production (July 4, 1 New, 3 Overhaul)


Expeditionary Assault Bridge (EAB)



- ◆ FY05 – 1 Vehicle
- ◆ FY06 – 3 Vehicles

Joint Service Support

United States Marine Corps



M1 Abrams



Maritime Pre-positioning Force

CITE Family of Systems

The weapon systems currently supported at Anniston represent a wide range within the DoD inventory. These systems include the M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams Battle Tanks, M88 Recovery Vehicle (both A1 and A2 Hercules), M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (and entire M113 Family, such as the 577 Command Post Vehicle), M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzer, Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV), M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE), Stryker Family of Vehicles, M93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS), Towed Howitzers (M198, M119A1, and M102), and Bridge Systems (AVLB, MGB, and IRB). Anniston overhauls all major subassemblies (depot reparable – with the exception of some electronics) of these weapons including engines, transmissions, final drives, recoils, gun mounts, hydraulic components, fire control, electronics, electro-optics, optics, and other components. DoD's recommendation to bring the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Multiple Launch Rocket System to Anniston will place the entire family of ground combat vehicles at one installation, providing "one face the soldier." Following is a picture of the different types of ground combat vehicles worked at Anniston.



Anniston, the Army's sole Small Arms Maintenance/Secure Storage depot, has the capabilities and capacity to store millions of small arms under mandated security standards for the entire Department of Defense.

In fact, **Anniston currently performs maintenance on over 90% of DoD's small arms inventory supporting the Army, Navy, and Air Force.** Anniston overhauls numerous weapons including the M16A2 rifle, M4 Carbine, MK19 40mm Grenade Launcher, M230 30mm Chain Gun, M2 .50-cal Machine Gun, M9 9mm Pistol, M249 5.56mm Squad Automatic Weapon, M134 7.62mm Gatling Machine Gun, M240 7.62mm Machine Gun, M60 30 cal. Machine Gun, and 120mm and 81mm Mortars. Anniston continues to meet the needs of our Warfighters in Iraq in the repair and return of many of these critical weapons.

CAPACITY

Based on the peacetime (prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom) workloads. Anniston will have the capacity to increase first shift operations to support surges in workload. Additionally, **Anniston can accommodate and support all Department of Defense combat vehicles (tracked or wheeled), artillery systems, and small arms workload within planned (funded) and available expansion capabilities on a single shift basis while staying within the goal of 85% capacity utilization goals.** Increased partnering with industry will provide even more capacity to support workload surges during mobilization. No other DoD installation can match Anniston in this regard.


Incoming Activities:

- Depot maintenance of Armament and Structural Components, Combat Vehicles, Construction Equipment, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, and Fire Control Systems and Components from Red River Army Depot, Texas.
- Depot maintenance of Combat Vehicles and Other Equipment from Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.
- Depot maintenance of Other Components from NAVWPNSTA Seal Beach, California.
- Depot maintenance of Engines and Transmissions, Other Components and Small Arms from Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, California.

Departing Activities:

- Disestablishes the storage and distribution functions for tires; packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and compressed gases.
- Consolidates the supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL, with all other supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories that exist at Anniston Army Depot to support depot operations, maintenance, and production. Retains the minimum necessary supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories required to support Anniston Army Depot, and to serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point. Relocate all other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Warner Robbins Strategic Distribution Platform.

DoD CITE Anniston's capacity will be increased with construction of the Powertrain Flexible Maintenance Facility (funded in 2005) that will have the capability of supporting all current and future engines, including FCS. Anniston has additional industrial expansion capability that could increase capacity even further with no encroachment problems to accommodate and support multiple weapon system platforms. Flexibility in the facility enables Anniston to expand its current capabilities to add future propulsion systems as they are developed. The next chart provides an artist rendition of the Powertrain facility undergoing contract award now.



Implementation of the BRAC recommendations includes moving the existing rubber processing (core mission) plant located at another depot to Anniston. The existing rubber plant is used to denude and re-rubberize reclaimed track and other rubber products primarily for ground combat vehicles. Moving and establishing the rubber process at ANAD will increase military value and enhance the ANAD's designated role as the Center of Industrial Technical Excellence for all DoD Ground Combat Vehicles.


The added benefit to moving the rubber capability to Anniston is that it could provide surge capacity. Adding band-bearing machines to the process could enable ANAD to rubberize the new band track. United Defense, whose industrial plant is located less than five miles from CITE Anniston, currently produces almost all of the metal track components used on DoD's tracked combat vehicles. Track could be rubberized with minimum transportation cost to provide a surge capability that was desperately needed early on in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Since the BRAC recommended decisions are based on the force structure requirements over the next 20 years, a new rubber process could be built to not only support the current combat vehicle requirements, but could also incorporate support for the Future Combat System (FCS) to be fielded in the next 20 year period. Thus the new process could be designed to support both the steel sectional track now used on current ground

combat vehicles and the new segmented band track likely to be used on the FCS ground systems. (It should be noted that any existing rubber processing plant would have to undergo major re-design to support the future requirements.) Anniston's new processes and facility will take DoD's rubber applications to the next level and support the 20 year force structure.

Workforce

For over 60 years, Anniston has employed and maintained a combat skill base of artisans found nowhere else. The Depot has worked with area Technical Schools and established Co-op programs, beginning at the high school level, that provide and will continue to provide a skilled labor pool to meet all the CITE needs. Some of the critical skills employed at Anniston are list on this chart.



Anniston's highly skilled work force exhibits a broad spectrum of skills. Anniston can deploy employees at a moment's notice to support combat vehicles, artillery, small arms weapons and unique requirements not readily available in the private sector. Anniston provides unsurpassed fielding operations and repair support both at home and abroad, in times of peace and conflict.

Anniston Army Depot is located along Alabama's growing automotive industry corridor with a training system that has been developed to attract and retain persons with those required skills. The Alabama Industrial Development Training system (AIDT) is the

nation's top-rated state industrial training program. AIDT's capability to train people in automotive skill sets has been demonstrated with the start-up and expansion of industries such as Daimler-Chrysler/Mercedes Benz, Honda, Hyundai, and Toyota Trucks. More importantly, the system is being used in a plant that is only twenty miles from Anniston Army Depot, Honda Manufacturing of America. Honda began operations in 2001 with 1200 employees and has doubled in size since then. AIDT was able to meet their needs with a customized training program.

FACILITIES

Quality infrastructure directly affects the readiness with which an installation or a community can absorb growth to support military requirements. Anniston's facilities and supporting infrastructure are well-situated for growth. Over the past 10 years, approximately \$328M in investment has been made in new facilities, repair and maintenance of existing facilities and new equipment. These investments result in state-of-the-art capability to support combat systems and components. Investments in facilities and equipment over the past ten years by the Depot and Partners are shown on the chart below.

Facilities & Equipment Investment Past 10 Years		
Investor	Facility	Equipment
Depot	\$208.7 M	\$119.8 M
Partnering Initiatives (est.)	\$7.2 M	\$15.0 M
Power Train Facility	\$24.0 M	\$38.0 M

Plant Replacement Value: **\$1.6 Billion**

The private sector has invested \$4.28 M in new and renovated facilities on site. This has brought state of the art capability into the CITE for the following weapon systems and components:

- New Production of Stryker Vehicles
- New Production of Gunner's Primary sights
- New Production of M1Tank AGT-1500 Turbine Engines
- New Production of M1 Turbine Engine Recuperators

The private sector investment complements the Anniston mission areas by infusing state-of-the-art capabilities to support combat vehicles and complementing the core functions of the depot. The private sector investment coupled with the DoD investment have stabilized and reduced the average age of the physical plant and allowed for efficiencies to be infused into core operations. Other key facilities at Anniston are also in a high state of readiness as reflected in the Installation Readiness Report. Key facilities have ratings of GREEN.

There are no encroachments issues that compromise the depot's ability to support current or future mission requirements or implement the Secretary of Defense's BRAC recommendations. Anniston is located in a region where local zoning and land use planning complements the mission activities at the site. The State of Alabama has invested \$27 M in a 5-lane access road to Interstate 20 and another \$25 M is planned for a 5-lane access road north of the installation. Work is currently underway for an additional 5-lane access road along Highway 202 with a new entrance into the installation and bridge over railroad tracks.


There are no anticipated environmental issues to prevent implementation of the BRAC recommendations. Through extensive discussion with the Alabama Department of Environmental Management concerning the influx of missions, no impediments have been identified.

Relationship of Anniston Army Depot and Private Partners

Anniston Army Depot is the Department of Defense leader in development of public/private partnerships. Anniston's numerous partnerships with private industry have resulted in the formation of a public/private industrial base without equal anywhere in DoD. These partnerships create win/win opportunities for both the public and private sectors by capitalizing on the strengths and efficiencies of each. Private defense partners such as General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Honeywell, and United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP), all original equipment manufacturer (OEM) contractors for major DoD weapon systems and components, have extensive operations on Anniston Army Depot, working alongside Anniston employees. United Defense also operates its Steel Products Division facility in the Anniston area. UDLS' off-depot capacity is expanding to increase partnering with the Depot. These private contractors are all OEM's of major weapon systems and provide a viable source of surge capacity during mobilization workload requirements. A series of charts providing examples of Anniston's partnerships follow:

Partnering GAO 2003 Report

Figure 2: Percentage of Workload Performed under Partnerships in Fiscal Year 2002 at 14 Depots That GAO Visited




Partnering Per 2003 GAO Report

Examples

Depot/Partnership (year initiated)	Private-sector partner	Reason(s) for partnership
Anniston Army Depot		
38 year (1/2003)	General Dynamics Land Systems	Contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities and advantageous labor rates
For Vehicle Upgrade/Services and Facility Use (1994)	General Dynamics Land Systems	Contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities and advantageous labor rates
M113 Family of Vehicles Overhaul and Conversion (1997)	United Defense Limited Partnership	Program manager directed work share and contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities
Helicopters (1998)	United Defense Limited Partnership	Program manager directed work share
Partnership for Reduced Operation and Support Cost—Engine (1999)	Honeywell	Program developed by program manager, contractor, and depot to enhance current depot engine overhaul programs and reduce operations and support costs

- ❖ GAO Cited 14 Examples of Active Partnerships Between the Private Sector & Anniston Army Depot
- ❖ The Five Examples Listed Include the Two Major Ground Combat Vehicle OEM's & the M1 Tank Engine Manufacturer
- ❖ Major Reasons for Partnering Listed Are Operating Cost Reductions, Unique Capabilities at Anniston, & Program Manager Directive Because of Cost, Capabilities & Proven Track Record



Existing public/private partnerships supporting weapons systems at other DoD locations can be transferred intact to Anniston Army Depot. Anniston's knowledge and experience in developing and executing partnering agreements will make these transitions seamless and prompt. As stated earlier, Anniston Army Depot is the leader among DoD installations in partnering with private industry. General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP) and Honeywell are current partners of Anniston on multiple agreements involving many weapon systems including the Stryker Vehicle, M1A1/A2 Abrams Tank, M113 Family of Vehicles, M93 Fox NBCRS Vehicle, M109A6 Paladin Self-propelled Howitzer, M88A2 Hercules Recovery Vehicle, and the AGT1500 Turbine Engine (M1A1 Abrams Tank). These private contractors have operational capacity directly on Anniston Army Depot and outside the gates of the Depot. This added source of surge support through partnering is not included in the Department of Defense method of calculating capacity and capacity utilization. Therefore it is an additional indication of Military Value for the top-rated industrial installation. The major system to move to Anniston under the BRAC recommendations is the Bradley Vehicle and we have partnership agreements in place with UDLP—the OEM for that vehicle.

Anniston recently signed a partnership with Boeing, the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) for the Future Combat Systems (FCS) as described in this article from our local newspaper, *the Anniston Star*.

ANNISTON STAR.com	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SECTIONS Front Page News <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anniston Alabama International Local Community Local Business Local Politics Local Education Local Sports Local Entertainment Local Health Local Crime Local Environment Local Agriculture Local History Local Culture Local Arts Local Science Local Technology Local Transportation Local Energy Local Environment Local Agriculture Local History Local Culture Local Arts Local Science Local Technology Local Transportation Local Energy Sports Lifestyle Entertainment Business Religion Technology Community Classroom Opinion Columns Obituaries Alerts Classifieds ● ISSUES Iraq 9/11 Memorial PCBs Fraternation McClain Message Board ● SEARCH Search Archives Go Browse Articles Web Directory ● DIRECTORIES Star Homes Local Churches Local Businesses ● SERVICES Get The Star 	<p style="text-align: center;">DAY PASS REGISTER SUBSCRIBE RENEW FORUM CONTACT US HELP RSS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">-- PAF</p> <h2 style="text-align: center;">CALHOUN COUNTY</h2> <h3 style="text-align: center;">Anniston Army Depot, Boeing to collaborate</h3> <p style="text-align: center;">By Matthew Korade Star Staff Writer 06-16-2005</p> <p>The Anniston Army Depot and aerospace-defense giant Boeing plan to sign an agreement Monday to identify mutually beneficial business opportunities.</p> <p>Boeing follows supply-chain management practices that could improve the quality of the depot's repairs while speeding completion time. Officials say they envision a working relationship that would result in improved products, services, and solutions for customers.</p> <p>Jay Kappmaier, general manager of advanced logistics services for Boeing, and Depot Commander Col. Alexander B. Raulerson will be at the depot Monday for the signing.</p> <p>As a Department of Defense leader in public-private partnerships, the depot has forged several long-term partnerships with leading defense-industry manufacturers, including United Defense, General Dynamics and Honeywell.</p> <p>About Matt Korade New York native Matt Korade is senior writer for The Anniston Star.</p> <p>Contact Matt Korade Phone: 256-235-3546 256-241-1991 FAX: mkorade@annistonstar.com E-mail:</p>

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With a signed memorandum of understanding with Boeing, the LSI for FCS and with a history of successful partnerships with the two major OEM's of Ground Combat Vehicles, GDLS and UDLP, Anniston stands poised to assume its CITE mission. These relationships enable the spiraling in of innovations and new technologies during the development, testing, manufacture, fielding, and life cycle management of Future Combat Systems Ground Combat Vehicles.

SECTION III INCREASED MILITARY VALUE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Implementation of the BRAC recommendations to consolidate all combat vehicles (both track and wheeled) capability at Anniston will improve the ability of the DoD to transform the operating capacity of its base infrastructure to maximize warfighting capability and efficiency. The consolidation will result in a direct enhancement of operational readiness of the industrial base (installation and its private sector partners) to respond to war fighting requirements, the ability to accommodate contingencies and mobilization of future joint force requirements, reduce operating costs, and achieve an efficient use of resources.

The DoD will benefit from the existing partnerships with private industry on those systems transferring into the Anniston complex. Anniston will continue to partner and work with the same OEM'S to leverage the advantages currently being realized by the DoD on incoming systems. The DoD will be able to realize the potential for surge capacity during mobilization workload requirements because of the existing resources that the OEMs have at the site.

- The DoD will benefit from the ability to **streamline business process** and information systems that support the family of combat vehicles between the CITE depot, contractor and logistics community.
- The DoD will benefit from the opportunity to **reduce overhead** at the four locations required to support combat vehicles. The DoD will leverage the workforce, facilities and infrastructure at the CITE where the majority of all other combat vehicle systems are already supported, providing "one face to the Warfighter."
- The DoD will be able to **minimize future investments** in base infrastructure required to sustain readiness in facilities. Consolidating capabilities at Anniston will eliminate the need to stabilize physical plant facilities at underutilized plant locations. It will allow the DoD to get maximum return on its investment in facilities across the entire family of combat vehicles.

SECTION IV SUPPLY AND STORAGE: DLA CONSIDERATIONS

While Anniston Army Depot is ready to embrace its role as the Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for Ground Combat Vehicles (Tracked and Wheeled), one issue remains that could pose **a serious impediment to all depot level maintenance missions – whether joint or service-specific** – the relinquishing of responsibility for the management of Consumables and the relinquishing of acquisition of Depot Level Repairables (DLR's) to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA.)

Based on our review of the BRAC documents, it appears that the Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group erred when it recommended transfer of service-related supply operations from the services to DLA without a comprehensive analysis of the impact on the services. The recommendation to move the management of service related consumables along with related depot maintenance internal supply operations, and the transfer of the acquisition of DLR's will significantly impact the services ability to support the Warfighter.

As recently as 07 June 2005, DLA Vice Admiral Lippert stated that 2,007 positions would transfer in place at 23 industrial installations. This means that these personnel who are integrally-related to the repair, maintenance and remanufacturing process and subsequently, could determine whether such functions produce successful outcomes no longer directly report to the Depot Commanders.

We recommend the BRAC commission acknowledge that **management of service-specific Class IX materiel (including depot maintenance related supply operations) and the purchasing of Depot Level Repairables (DLR's) are essential core capabilities of the respective services** and therefore, reject the transfer of that authority to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

To accomplish these actions should be taken:

1. GAO should conduct a detailed audit of all data and purported savings used by DoD to make the recommendations in the Supply and Storage sections of the BRAC recommendations.
2. Institute "best purchasing and supply management practices" system across DOD such that purchasing is not separated from supply management.
3. Services retain management of service-peculiar consumables and acquisition of DLR's and a policy be developed mandating the use of Strategic Supplier Alliances (DLA/services plan parts procurements together and utilize one another's contracts).

4. Depot Commanders retain command and control authority of all maintenance and supply operations as is right and appropriate with their responsibility.

We offer the following rationale for our recommendation:

1. **Commanders bear the responsibility for outcomes.**

- *Without control of their own supply operations, commanders will be able to optimally manage supply chain and work flow functions*
- *DLRs, critical to the readiness of weapons systems, will be purchased by embedded DLA contracting personnel, over whom the service acquisition centers will have no command and control, thereby impacting the Depot Commander's most important mission to support the Warfighter*

2. **Transfer of authority to DLA's does not significantly increase DLA's**

purchasing power. Services still purchase end items which represent about 75% of contract dollars awarded. True leverage is with the agency buying the end items.

- *Adding DLRs to DLA's spend base will not significantly increase DLA's buying leverage, especially for sole source buys which represent large portion of DOD business, approximately 39% of the Fiscal Year dollars.*
- *Many DLR procurements are sole source/procurements with only one supply source. DOD buying power remains with the services given original equipment manufacturers (OEM's) end item relationships/large dollar value of end item purchases; facilitates a close working relationship to address weapon system readiness requirements.*
- *DLA's expertise is high-volume, common, highly competitive items (approximately 97% of FY03 contracts were less than \$25K.) Skilled personnel residing at service Inventory Control Points are needed to develop supplier strategies that harmonize total life cycle management for highly engineered, technically complex DLRs.*

3. **Service retention of weapon system consumables enables leveraging of dollars spent in all phases of the weapon system's life cycle** through the use of smart purchasing practices with all providers.

- *Many consumables share the same source of supply with the more expensive and/or technically complex weapon systems and reparable. Transfer to DLA actually splits DOD's spending power with many key suppliers.*

4. **DLA lacks the technical expertise to employ enterprise-wide management.**

Since transferring a significant amount of consumables from the services to DLA in the late 1990s, DLA has transferred thousands back to the services, due to technical complexity (design changes, complexity of repair, and critical safety concerns.)

- *Supply functions at a maintenance Depot include determining requirements based on methods such as using Depot overhaul factors rather than demand history and consumptions records that would normally be used by DLA. Also the supply operations at a maintenance Depot includes identifying and managing constantly changing requirements based on asset condition, inspecting both new and reclaimed parts, movement and routing of those parts to the right place at the right time, and organizational management and control of the supplier and maintainer*
- *Forecasting and procuring consumables for weapon systems that are no longer in production requires item management and engineering skills, along with Depot maintenance skills to procure and/or fabricate many essential parts. Even though in many*

instances for the immediate future, the same employees will change "position in place," there will be more limited availability of suitable replacements as these experts move on or retire since this combination of skills does not reside in DLA. There are maintenance experts who know the supply needs for their weapons systems, but there are few supply experts who know the maintenance needs of such systems. The skills are not interchangeable.

- *Item managers are responsible for long range forecasting of Depot overhaul and repair programs with a parallel responsibility of forecasting and procuring service-peculiar parts. This expertise is necessary since many of these parts are long lead procurements and since forecasting failures cause delays in production.*

5. The transfer of authority will raise costs by causing delays of implementation of new technology and by reducing reclamation of parts.

- *A large percentage of consumables used in the repair and overhaul process at a Depot come from reclaiming those items after the disassembly of the weapon system and components. Tracking items from disassembly, reclamations, and reuse is an integral part of the maintenance mission. Reclaimed parts are significantly lower in costs than new parts. Transfer to DLA could actually discourage the use of reclaimed parts since new parts could be more readily available in spite of the higher cost.*
- *Significant adverse cost and schedule impacts will occur to enterprise automation systems in both DLA and the services, delaying much needed, modernized logistics automation capability from getting in the hands of service and DLA logisticians/sustainment personnel. Note: this is also a major factor for the consumable issue.*

CONCLUSION

Anniston is the only installation within the Department of Defense capable of supporting a consolidated combat vehicle, artillery, and small arms workload and is the ideal installation to be the CITE for DoD's Ground Combat Vehicles. Anniston's internal capabilities, along with those of jointly located private defense partners, make Anniston a prime location for consolidation of DoD Combat Vehicles, Artillery, and Small Arms weapon systems.

- **Consolidation of DoD combat vehicle, artillery, and small arms workload at Anniston Army Depot is in direct agreement with the Secretary of Defense strategic goals and directives for BRAC 2005**
- **Anniston Army Depot and its industrial partners have the infrastructure, skills, and technologies needed to support all DoD combat vehicle systems, artillery, and small arms weapons.**
- **Anniston can accommodate all DoD combat vehicles, artillery, and small arms workload within available expansion capacity while staying within the goal of 85% capacity utilization.**
- **Command and Control Authority for management of service-specific Class IX Consumables and purchase of Depot Level Repairables (DLR's) should remain with the Services and Depot Commanders who are ultimately responsible for production outcomes.**
- **The positive recommendations adhere to guiding principles and criteria to improve joint service missions, eliminate redundancy, enhance force protection, increase efficiency and joint-service operability, reduce costs, and transform the Department of Defense.**

DOD **CITRE** Anniston

THE PREMIER **JOINT COMBAT SYSTEM**
SUPPORT PROVIDER



WORLDWIDE

- ' SUPPORT FOR THE WARFIGHTER
- ' ABILITY TO PERFORM & SUSTAIN MISSIONS
- ' INCREASED MILITARY VALUE

**Anniston Stands Poised
to Assume the
Additional Systems & Components
into the
DOD Center for
Industrial Technical Excellence (CITE) for
Ground Combat Vehicles, Tracked & Wheeled**

Advantages of CITE Anniston

- ◆ Support for the Warfighter
- ◆ Ability to Perform and Sustain Missions
 - ✦ Skilled Workforce
 - ✦ Expertise in Partnering with Private Industry
- ◆ Increased Military Value

Support to the US Warfighter

- ❖ Nicknamed “The Warfighter’s Pit Crew”
- ❖ Organized for Solider Support
 - ❖ Proud History of Support - Korean War to Global War on Terror
- ❖ Projected Depot Capabilities Into Theaters of Operations
 - ❖ Established Forward Depot in Desert Storm/ Desert Shield
 - ❖ Deployed 476 Civilian Volunteers
 - ❖ Reconstituted 1,388 Combat Vehicles
- ❖ Operation Iraqi Freedom
 - ❖ Deployed Over 250 Civilian Volunteers
 - ❖ First to Produce Vehicle Armor Kits – 1/3 of All Manufactured (3700)
 - ❖ Produced Over 2,000 Combat Vehicles, 100,000 Small Arms, 5,000 Engines and Thousands of Other Components
 - ❖ Established Forward Repair Activities in Kuwait and Iraq and Performed Add-on Armor Installation at Both Sites

Ability to Perform & Sustain Missions

- ❖ DOD's Leader in Partnering With Industry
 - ❖ With Over 25% of Workload Via Partnering (Per 2003 GAO Report)
- ❖ Capacity of CITE to Accept Additional Joint Workload
- ❖ Expansion Capability to Support DOD Transformation and 20 Year Force Structure
- ❖ State-of-the-Art Power Train Facility Designed and Awaiting Contract Award Adds Capacity
- ❖ Existing Skill Base Stands Ready for Transfer of Workload
- ❖ Assured of Permitting Incoming Work, Including Rubber Process
- ❖ Winner of Numerous Environmental Awards
- ❖ No Encroachment with Significant Growth Capabilities

Skill Base

Can Support the Full Range of Combat Vehicles, Artillery & Small Arms

- ❖ Continuous Training and Improvement
- ❖ Alabama's Automotive Corridor
 - ❖ Honda, Mercedes, and Hyundai
- ❖ Outstanding Technical Schools
- ❖ Alabama Industrial Development Training
 - ❖ Best in the Nation - Trains All New Honda Plant Associates – No Cost
- ❖ Depot's High School Co-op
 - ❖ First in DOD and Adopted by Mercedes and Auburn
- ❖ Working Relationships With Colleges and Universities
 - ❖ Alabama, Auburn, Jacksonville, Mississippi State, and Gadsden


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Plant Replacement Value: \$1.6 Billion

Partnering GAO 2003 Report

Figure 2: Percentage of Workload Performed under Partnerships in Fiscal Year 2002 at 14 Depots That GAO Visited



Partnering Per 2003 GAO Report

Examples

Depot/Partnership (year initiated)	Private-sector partner	Reason(s) for partnership
Anniston Army Depot		
Stryker-1 (2001)	General Dynamics Land Systems	Contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities and advantageous labor rates.
Fox Vehicle Upgrade-Services and Facility Use (1996)	General Dynamics Land Systems	Contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities and advantageous labor rates.
M113 Family of Vehicles Overhaul and Conversion (1997)	United Defense Limited Partnership	Program manager directed work share and contractor sought out depot for its unique capabilities.
Hercules (1998)	United Defense Limited Partnership	Program manager directed work share.
Partnership for Reduced Operation and Support Cost—Engine (1998)	Honeywell	Program developed by program manager, contractor, and depot to enhance current depot engine overhaul programs, and reduce operations and support costs.

- ❖ GAO Cited 14 Examples of Active Partnerships Between the Private Sector & Anniston Army Depot
- ❖ The Five Examples Listed Include the Two Major Ground Combat Vehicle OEM's & the M1 Tank Engine Manufacturer
- ❖ Major Reasons for Partnering Listed Are Operating Cost Reductions, Unique Capabilities at Anniston, & Program Manager Capabilities & Proven Track Record Directive Because of Cost,

Combat Vehicles Worked at Anniston



**M93 FOX
VEHICLE**

**M113
ARMORED
PERSONNEL
CARRIER**

**M119
TOWED
HOWITZER**

**M88
RECOVERY
VEHICLE**

**M60
BRIDGE
LAUNCHER**



**70 TON
BRIDGE
LAUNCHER**

**M109A6
SELF PROPELLED
HOWITZER**

STRYKER

**M1 ABRAMS
TANK**




**M9 ARMORED
COMBAT
EARTHMOVER**

**MEDIUM
GIRDER
BRIDGE**

**FIELD
ARTILLERY
AMMUNITION
SUPPLY VEHICLE**

**M198 TOWED
HOWITZER**



**Multiple Launch
Rocket System**



Bradley Fighting Vehicle

Increased Military Value

Anniston CITE Provides:

- ❖ One Face to Warfighter
- ❖ Cost and Time Savings Through Streamlined Business Processes and Information Systems
- ❖ Reduction of Overhead and Leveraging of Skilled Work Force, Facilities and Equipment
- ❖ Reduced Need for Future Spending on Infrastructure to Maintain State-of-the-Art Facilities and Equipment to Support the Warfighter
- ❖ Better Management and Control of Components and Parts for Combat Vehicles, Artillery and Small Arms

Transfer of Service Specific Materiel Functions to DLA

- ❖ DoD BRAC Recommends Transferring
 - Management of Service Specific Class IX materiel to DLA
 - Acquisition of Depot Level Repairables to DLA
 - 2,007 Positions in place from Depot/Shipyard Commanders to DLA
- ❖ We Recommend You:
 - Acknowledge these are Core Capabilities of the Services and not Transferable to DLA

The Department of Defense
Center for Industrial Technical Excellence

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT



Thanks ANAD Partners!

AFGE 1945

Raytheon

BR Williams Trucking

Robbins-Gioia

General Dynamics
Land Systems

United Defense
Limited Partnership

Honeywell

Westinghouse

- ❖ Support for the Warfighter
- ❖ Ability to Perform and Sustain Missions
 - ❖ Skilled Workforce
 - ❖ Expertise in Partnering with Private Industry
 - ❖ Increased Military Value

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA

**2005 BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
JUNE 30, 2005**

**PRESENTED BY: MR. C. CHARLES NAILEN, JR.
CHAIRMAN, FRIENDS OF FORT RUCKER
PRESIDENT/CEO BBG SPECIALTY FOODS, INC.
PRESIDENT/CEO GGG FOODS, INC.
PHONE: 334.793.0083X101
EMAIL: charles.nailen@kfctacobell.com**

INTRODUCTION

My name is Charles Nailen and I am the Chairman of the Friends Of Fort Rucker and a businessman operating out of Dothan, Alabama. I am accompanied by numerous mayors, city commissioners, businessmen and retired members of the Army from Southeast Alabama, the home of Fort Rucker and the Home of Army Aviation.

It is my great honor to represent the Friends of Fort Rucker and to speak to you today on behalf of the communities surrounding Fort Rucker. First let me thank you for the great service you and your staff are providing in what must surely be one of the most difficult and thankless jobs in government. You have a heavy burden, and we appreciate your professionalism and dedication to the task at hand.

In the case of Fort Rucker, we are one of the fortunate installations that is recommended for growth. We would like to point out today why we believe that recommendation was made, and why, for the same reasons, the Commission should consider expanding that growth as part of the BRAC process.

THE FACTS

I know that you must deal with FACTS regarding the BRAC selection criteria, so here are the Fort Rucker facts. I will list them and then elaborate briefly on each.

First, Fort Rucker is an installation that is a leader in transformation. Fort Rucker is a **JOINT WARFIGHTING FACILITY** with **ROOM TO EXPAND** and a Plan to do it. The Pentagon's measure of the military value of Fort Rucker has increased significantly since the 1995 BRAC due to major new infrastructure, consolidation, and training innovations. We are the premier rotary wing aviation training center in the United States, and I believe that is why we are slated for growth.

Second, Fort Rucker is an installation blessed with a vast land area and huge air space available for aircraft training.

Third, Fort Rucker is an installation with the priceless ability to surge to meet contingencies and war fighting requirements.

Fourth, Fort Rucker provides great value to the government: a very low operational cost for a very high quality training product.

The above FACTS in conjunction with additional FACTS cited later in this Statement lead us to the following:

- We strongly support the Department of Defense's recommendation that the Aviation Logistics School be relocated from Fort Eustis to Fort Rucker.
- We respectfully request the Commission to reconsider the realignment of the Aviation Technical Test Center from Fort Rucker to Redstone Arsenal.
- We respectfully request the Commission to recommend relocating the Navy rotary wing pilot training from Whiting Field to Fort Rucker and making Fort Rucker the **JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR ROTARY WING TRAINING**.

THE DETAILS

FACT #1: I am pleased to be able to report that Fort Rucker, despite its long heritage and accomplishments in military aviation, has not been resting on its laurels since BRAC 1995. Fort Rucker is a JOINT BASE, conducting undergraduate rotary wing pilot training not only for the Army, but also for the Air Force, numerous Government Agencies and over 600 foreign students annually. In addition, the Air Force will commence advanced rotary wing training at Fort Rucker in October of this year. Since the last BRAC, with the leadership of the Department of Defense and with the support of our citizens and our Congressional delegation, \$162 million has been invested in military construction, including \$20 million for a state of the art flight simulation center and a new simulation curriculum known as Flight School XXI executed through a contract for the next 19.5 years and valued at approximately \$1.1 billion. Flight School XXI is a strategic element of Aviation Transformation. It decreases aviator time for integration into field units. It improves leader/aviator experience in "Go-To-War" aircraft. Flight School XXI decreases training in non-modernized aircraft and outdated simulation. Instead of a student learning three different aircraft during flight training, the student now has a trainer for the first portion and flies his "Go-To-War" aircraft for the second portion of the flight training. Graduating pilots now have as many as 117 hours of flight simulation training, compared to 30 before. Flight School XXI gets the pilots to the field sooner and reduces the trainees, transients, holdovers and students account.

As noted above, Flight School XXI simulations consist of a \$1.1 billion effort over a 19.5-year services contract. There are 59 mid and high-fidelity simulators training individual/crew and collective tasks. Eighteen of these are reconfigurable collective training devices. Two buildings will house these devices: The Aviation Warfighting Simulation Center (65,000 square feet) located on Fort Rucker and Warrior Hall (140,000 square feet) located in Daleville, Alabama. The contractor builds, owns, operates, maintains, upgrades, and schedules Flight School XXI simulators.

Some comments about Flight School XXI graduates from the field:

- “These guys are coming in with a whole different capability than the regular flight school students. They require minimum training and readiness level and progress 50% faster in 50% of the flying hours.” (Assistant Division Commander).
- “Individuals arrived with undoubtedly more experience and proficiency. The readiness level progression time was cut by 50%.” (Brigade Commander).

As a result of these efforts, Fort Rucker is ranked number seven in military value among all Army training installations, and is a leader in the measure of an installation’s impact on operational readiness and joint training. In the past, Army and Air Force pilots graduating from initial rotary wing pilot training were not as ready to immediately step in and fly operational missions upon reporting to their first unit. Thanks to Flight School XXI, and thanks to the great new resources we have at the installation for flight simulation, that has changed.

FACT #2: The second military value BRAC selection criteria is availability of land and facilities. Fort Rucker is blessed with over 63,000 acres of land and over 32,000 square miles of aircraft training area. **Over 1,000 acres of land with infrastructure is currently available for expansion.** As previously noted, over the past 10 years, the Army has invested \$162 million in military construction. That has been for classroom space, hangars and housing. Fort Rucker houses about one-fourth of the Army’s aircraft fleet and flies about one-third of the active Army’s flying hours. Clearly, **Fort Rucker has the land and facilities to accept any new missions** from the Army and Air Force and, as I will point out later, from the Navy.

FACT #3: The third military value BRAC selection criteria is the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future force requirements. The detailed analyses performed by the Education & Training Joint Cross-Service Group clearly indicate that **Fort Rucker has substantial excess capacity in all areas evaluated** : runway capacity, apron space, classroom capacity and simulator capacity (See Appendix A). In addition to these areas and the land and facilities for Fort Rucker discussed above, a couple of other factors are key here. This is a community that has military aviation in its civilian DNA. The sound of a helicopter is the “sound of freedom” in our area, and we have shown from Vietnam on, that this community understands and supports the need for surge requirements. We support whatever is necessary to accomplish training. We also have a long and proven history of State and Congressional support for the facilities and actions necessary to nurture and grow the facility.

FACT #4: My fourth point relates to the last military value BRAC selection criteria, the cost of operations and manpower. The Southeast is one of the

lowest cost areas for construction and annual operating expenses. And **our section of rural Alabama is the lowest cost area in the Southeast.** In fact, in the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association's 2005 first quarter Cost of Living report that compares the Fort Rucker area to 294 other metropolitan areas, our area was ranked the 42nd lowest overall area to live in. Our area was also rated 10% below the national average cost of living in their analysis that included costs for housing, healthcare, utilities, transportation, food and services. Three years ago a survey by the National Construction Estimators ranked our area as the second lowest in the cost of construction, 18% below the national average. A review of the Pentagon's BRAC Data clearly indicates our low operational costs were a major factor in the decision to recommend moving the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker. Even so, Fort Rucker decided years ago to continue with initiatives that would further lower our cost of operation.

One of Secretary Rumsfeld's preferred business practices is privatization of functions that are not "core" defense businesses. **Fort Rucker was the first installation in the Army to privatize all four of its utilities with annual savings in excess of \$1.5 million.** In addition, Fort Rucker is at the forefront of housing privatization with implementation of the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI). The Contractor has committed to an investment of approximately \$140 million to renovate or replace over 1,500 housing units. These privatization actions allowed Fort Rucker to concentrate on its core mission of training pilots and allowed companies whose core business is providing utilities to do so for Fort Rucker. In addition, 58% of the Fort Rucker workforce are contract employees, including 28% of the instructors. This effort fully supports the Pentagon's goal of public-private partnerships and allows Fort Rucker to support the third military value goal of rapidly responding to changing pilot training requirements.

**RECOMMENDED MOVE OF AVIATION LOGISTICS SCHOOL FROM
FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA TO FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA**

I would now like to comment on the Department of Defense's recommendation to move the Aviation Logistics School that conducts the enlisted aviation training from Fort Eustis to Fort Rucker. I am not alone in the belief that this recommendation is the long overdue completion of the Army's 1983 decision to form the Aviation branch. There is a great synergy in training the total flight crew, from senior officers to privates, in one place. We believe it will work well for all the reasons cited in the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group detailed recommendations:

- "This recommendation consolidates Aviation training and doctrine development at a single location. Consolidating Aviation Logistics training with the Aviation Center and School fosters consistency, standardization and training proficiency. It allows the Army to reduce the total number of

Military Occupational Skills (MOS) training locations thereby lessening the TRADOC footprint. This proposed move will enhance military value, support the Army's force structure plan, and maintain sufficient surge capability to address future unforeseen requirements. In addition, this move will improve training capabilities while eliminating excess capacity at institutional training locations. This will provide the same or better level of service at a reduced cost. This recommendation supports Army Transformation by collocating institutional training, MTOE units, RDTE organizations and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and engage training."

- This recommendation "...uses excess training capacity at Fort Rucker while creating space for additional TDA activities at Fort Eustis (better utilizing each installation's capabilities), which improves the current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operations readiness of the Department of Defense's total force, including the impact on joint war fighting, training and readiness."
- "...This recommendation improves the Army's training and readiness capability by providing Aviation training at one location, which fosters consistency, standardization and training proficiency. It also facilitates task force stabilization."
- "The consolidation of the Aviation training at Fort Rucker ensures the Army has the surge capability necessary to accommodate unforeseen requirements for both institutional training and for future force structure changes. By leaving Fort Eustis, the Army has created space for additional activities, such as operational units and other TDA activities. This recommendation has taken advantage of excess Aircraft Maintenance Hangar, Unit Headquarters Building, Enlisted Unaccompanied Personnel Housing, Dining Facility, Vehicle Parking space at Fort Rucker."
- "This consolidation of institutional training with other TDA units at a single installation promotes force stabilization and creates future stationing alternatives at reduced costs. Reduced costs are possible due to cross installation assignments, an overall smaller footprint, which requires fewer sustainment dollars and a smaller Army recap program. This recommendation will also improve the condition of facilities while creating cost and manpower savings through consolidation of mission and functions in instructors and school support elements in the institutional training area."

It makes perfect sense to have the flight crew that must fly and fight as a team to train as a team. For this reason, as well as from the military value

perspective described above, we fully support this decision, and will work with you and the Commission staff to ensure it works.

We also are fully aware that implementing the Fort Eustis decision will cause disruptions for many of the dedicated employees that have supported this mission at Fort Eustis. Many in our community have served in the military, or have supported those who served, so we recognize the difficulties of family moves. All of us in the Fort Rucker community stand ready to do whatever it takes to make the relocation of the Fort Eustis workers as painless as possible.

**REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF REALIGNMENT OF THE
AVIATION TECHNICAL TEST CENTER
FROM FORT RUCKER TO REDSTONE ARSENAL**

As previously noted, we are extremely pleased the Army recognized the military value of Fort Rucker by recommending the move of the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker, but I have to comment on the Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC) mission that the Pentagon recommended move from Fort Rucker to Redstone Arsenal. We believe that the Pentagon did not adequately evaluate this recommendation, and we respectfully request the Commission to review the following pertaining to the ATTC decision.

- Redstone has very limited airspace but Fort Rucker has airspace availability equivalent to the size of the state of South Carolina – over 32,000 square miles.
- Not only does Fort Rucker have the available airspace, it also has a superior advantage in year round flying conditions. Even though the distance between the two installations is only a few hundred miles, the flying conditions at Fort Rucker are far superior. Since most of the ATTC testing must be done under non-icing visual conditions, Fort Rucker has a decided advantage in available flying days.
- There is great synergy of having the 40 ATTC aircraft collocated with the Fort Rucker fleet of 600 aircraft. The ability of Fort Rucker to provide back up maintenance, spare parts and test pilots to ATTC has greatly increased ATTC's mission capability in the past and we fear that since these resources and expertise are not available at Redstone, ATTC may well suffer.
- There is also a great synergy between the “schoolhouse” and the “experimental” pilots that will be lost with such a move. Over 70% of the work performed by the ATTC originates from the Directorate of Combat Development located at Fort Rucker. Relocating the ATTC to Redstone just makes the process more cumbersome.

- Fort Rucker is also the proponent for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and ATTC conducts some UAV tests at Fort Rucker as we have a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified UAV air space (50 by 25 nautical miles from 2,000 to 10,000 feet). We are also concerned that the synergy between the rest of Fort Rucker's UAV mission and this UAV testing will be lost and that the FAA approved airspace may not be able to be duplicated at Redstone.
- Finally, if the ATTC is moved, it will lose the advantage of being so close to the Eglin Air Force Base's state of the art instrumented range that is just minutes away from Fort Rucker. Moving ATTC to Redstone will hurt this important link to the test ranges at Eglin.

**REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CONSOLIDATION OF NAVY
UNDERGRADUATE ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING AT
WHITING FIELD, FLORIDA TO FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA**

Finally, let me address one of the recommendations that we think the Pentagon should have made, but did not. We frankly believe the facts would show a strong military and cost value by the Navy moving its rotary wing pilot training from Whiting Field to Fort Rucker. Our rationale follows:

- The two services use essentially the same trainer aircraft.
- The Air Force conducts their initial rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker.
- The Air Force has made the decision to relocate its advanced rotary wing training to Fort Rucker commencing in October of this year.
- Fort Rucker conducts rotary wing pilot training for numerous Government Agencies.
- Fort Rucker conducts rotary wing pilot training for over 30 foreign countries, graduating over 600 students annually.

In addition to the reasons cited above, Fort Rucker has adequate land, facilities, and airspace to support the Navy rotary wing pilot training – NOW! The Pentagon's own BRAC analysis shows this and also shows that Fort Rucker's military value ranking is better than Whiting Field's in 6 of the 7 evaluated areas (See Appendix B).

Also, as previously noted, the detailed analyses performed by the Education & Training Cross-Service Group clearly indicate that Fort Rucker has substantial excess capacity in all areas evaluated: runway capacity, apron space, classroom capacity, and simulation capacity (Appendix A). It is extremely important to note for this discussion that the Pentagon's own analysis of

simulator surge capacity indicates that there is very little excess simulator capacity at Whiting Field. However, Fort Rucker is just completing the installation of a state of the art war fighting simulation center with substantial excess capacity.

Over 12 years ago, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, said it best in giving testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 30, 1993: "...we have too much depot capability, too much training capability, too many bases, too many test facilities, too many test ranges. That is where the money is and that is what we need to go after. **Within that we have more capacity than we need to train helicopter pilots. I have believed this for many years. I believe the proper place to do the centralization and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama...**" (Emphasis Added) (Appendix C)

Many in the Pentagon believe that movement of the Navy's rotary wing pilot training to Fort Rucker should have been recommended in the previous BRAC rounds and cannot understand how the Department of Defense did not make this one of the BRAC 05 recommendations as it clearly fosters basic rotary wing pilot consistency, standardization and training proficiency across the entire Department of Defense. It also fosters the key military value, **JOINTNESS**, and train to fight together initiatives that Secretary Rumsfeld based BRAC 05 on.

We do not want to seek gain from a natural disaster, but we believe that the cost to rebuild last fall's hurricane damaged facilities at Whiting Field is the final straw that should have made the Navy's rotary wing pilots join us at Fort Rucker. We believe this was a viable scenario in the BRAC deliberations early this spring, but the decision was made late in the process to leave the Navy training at Whiting.

As noted above, the Army conducts its rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker; the Air Force conducts its initial rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker; the Air Force will commence its advanced rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker in October; numerous Government Agencies conduct their rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker; and over 600 students from Foreign Countries receive rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker. In the face of what is currently being performed at Fort Rucker, the Commission has to ask itself: **If Rotary Wing Pilot Training is being performed successfully for everyone else, then why can't the training for the Navy be performed at Fort Rucker?**

The training for the Navy can be performed at Fort Rucker. And it can be performed NOW!

We respectfully request the Commission to recommend relocating the Navy rotary wing pilot training to Fort Rucker and **making Fort Rucker the JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR ROTARY WING TRAINING.**

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the Fort Rucker community is honored that in their BRAC 05 recommendations, the Department of Defense recognized the past contributions that Fort Rucker has made to our National defense by recommending the move of the Aviation Logistics School. The Fort Rucker communities will do everything it possibly can to make this relocation as smooth as possible.

We look forward to working with the Commission and your staff, and again respectfully request the Commission to review the factors in the decision to move the Aviation Technical Test Center from Fort Rucker to Redstone Arsenal.

We further request the Commission to relocate the Navy rotary wing pilot training to Fort Rucker and making Fort Rucker the **JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR ROTARY WING TRAINING.**

EXHIBITS

- Exhibit A** Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Capacity Analysis Report To The Infrastructure Steering Group; 20 April 2005, Page 7
- Exhibit B** Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Analysis Report To The Infrastructure Steering Group; 20 April 2005, Page 2
- Exhibit C** Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 30, 1993, by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The following is the testimony of General Colin Powell, CJCS, before the House Armed Services Committee, Tuesday March 30, 1993. His response is to a question from Congressman Everett concerning his support for the concept of basic helicopter consolidation.

General Powell:

This one of the areas where we took a hard look at our four aviation elements or Four Air Forces as they are called, and I reaffirmed the fact that the Nation is well served in my judgment by allowing each of our services to keep an aviation component. The United States Air Force is the one and only United States Air Force, and we are well served by having naval aviation, Marine aviation, and fixed wing aviation in the Army and the Marine Corps as well and I will go to my grave believing that.


However, inside those four Air Forces we have too much depot capability, too much training capability, too many bases, too many test facilities too many test ranges. That is where the money is and that is what we have to go after. Within that we have more capacity than we need to train helicopter pilots. I have believed this for many years. I believe the proper place to do the centralization and where it can be done very well is a Fort Rucker, Alabama. This has been a controversial issue for many years and we are now with the Secretary's response to my roles missions submission, we will now go see how to maximize the use of Fort Rucker for rotary wing initial training. We have to convince other constituencies that we are doing this in a cost effective way and you know who these other constituencies are. I am committed to push this as hard as possible because I think there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings, in consolidations such as this, and not answering rhetorical questions about why we have four Air Forces. We need them but we can save money in making this kind of consolidation. The exact persons to conduct the study and the time line of the study, I would like to provide that for the record if I may, Congressman.



US ARMY AVIATION CENTER AND FORT RUCKER HOME OF THE ARMY AVIATION BRANCH

Presentation To:
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented By: **C. Charles Nailen, Jr., Chairman**
Friends of Fort Rucker



Military Value Fact #1

Fort Rucker Is A Joint Base That Is A Leader In Transformation

- ❖ Fort Rucker is a JOINT BASE
- ❖ Army
- ❖ Air Force
- ❖ Government Agencies
- ❖ Foreign Countries
- ❖ Fort Rucker has invested in the future
 - ❖ \$162 Million in Military Construction
 - ❖ \$1.1 Billion in Flight School XXI (19.5 year contract)
 - ❖ \$20 Million State of the Art Simulation Center

Military Value Fact #2
Fort Rucker Has Available Land, Facilities, And Associated Airspace

- ❖ 63,000 Acres of LAND.
- ❖ AIRSPACE the size of South Carolina (over 32,000 square miles).
- ❖ Over 1,000 Buildable Acres of Land with infrastructure in place.
- ❖ Available LAND, FACILITIES, and AIRSPACE to accept new missions.

Military Value Fact #3
SUBSTANTIAL SURGE CAPACITY

❖ Fort Rucker has the ability to accommodate.....

SURGE

and

FUTURE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

❖ Community Support

Military Value Fact #4
COST OF OPERATIONS

- ❖ Southeast Alabama is a LOW COST Area
- ❖ Fort Rucker was first in the entire ARMY to PRIVATIZE ALL UTILITIES
- ❖ 58% of the workforce are CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

AVIATION LOGISTICS SCHOOL RELOCATION

- ❖ We strongly support the recommendation to move the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker.
- ❖ We must FLY AND FIGHT AS A TEAM -- So, we must TRAIN AS A TEAM.

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

- ❖ Essentially Same Training Aircraft.
- ❖ Fort Rucker conducts Initial Rotary Wing Pilot Training for Air Force.
- ❖ Air Force Advanced Rotary Wing Training is moving to Fort Rucker in October.
- ❖ Fort Rucker conducts training for numerous Government Agencies.
- ❖ Fort Rucker conducts training for over 30 Foreign Countries.

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

If Fort Rucker is successfully performing helicopter training for everyone else, then why can't the training for the Navy be performed there?

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

- ❖ Fort Rucker has substantial EXCESS Runway Capacity, EXCESS Apron Space, EXCESS Classroom Capacity, and EXCESS Simulator Capacity.*
- ❖ DOD Analysis of Whiting Field's Simulators capacity indicates Simulators are almost at Maximum Capacity.*
- ❖ Fort Rucker's Simulators are STATE OF THE ART. Whiting Field's are not.

* Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Capacity Analysis Report To The Infrastructure Steering Group; 20 April 2005, Page 7.

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

❖ Fort Rucker's Military Value Ranking is SUPERIOR to Whiting Field's in 6 out of 7 areas evaluated.*

* Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Analysis Report To The Infrastructure Steering Group; 20 April 2005, Page 2

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

FORT RUCKER CAN
CONDUCT TRAINING
FOR THE NAVY!

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

AND FORT RUCKER
CAN DO IT
NOW!

NAVY ROTARY WING PILOT TRAINING RELOCATION

Fort Rucker should be named the:

JOINT CENTER OF
EXCELLENCE FOR
ROTARY WING
TRAINING

SUMMARY

- ❖ Fully support recommendation to move Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker.
 - ❖ Request Commission relocate Navy Rotary Wing Pilot Training for the establishment of a DOD JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR ROTARY WING TRAINING.
- Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors who fight JOINTLY should train JOINTLY.

SUMMARY

IT JUST MAKES CENTS!

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
MAXWELL-GUNTER AFB, ALABAMA
2005 BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
JUNE 30, 2005

Presented by: Brig Gen (ret) Paul Hankins
Special Assistant, City of Montgomery and Montgomery
Area Chamber of Commerce
Phone: 334-240-9436
Email: phankins@montgomerychamber.com

Mr. Chairman we are pleased to be able to provide the Commission our written comments. This comprehensive opening statement is provided for the record, and is in addition to the oral testimony given this day.

The Montgomery Community has a long history of supporting the United States Air Force and the Department of Defense. That support has included organizational changes whether or not they were in the best interest of the Community. Today, we are pleased to continue that record by supporting the Secretary of Defense's drive for transformation of our military forces through Base Realignment and Closure efforts to create an efficient and effective force that:

- Increases military value
- Reduces costs of military operations, and
- Forges true Jointness among the Military Services.

In this context, we support the concept of an Air Force C4ISR Research and Development RDAT&E Center of Excellence, as proposed by Secretary Rumsfeld. However, the movement of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) from Maxwell-Gunter to Hanscom Air Force Base as part of this research and development center runs counter to the basic premise of this initiative.

By the nature of its mission, OSSG is not a research and development organization, it is an operations and sustainment organization that ensures the day-to-day running and upkeep of IT combat support systems. In the case of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group, this involves providing continuous, 24-hour-a-day, 365-day-a-year IT support. This is their primary mission: providing daily, effective, and continuous sustainment support for over 100 operational software applications that underpin combat systems in the field—around the world, including our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and even here in the United States for Homeland Defense. This support is provided across the entire spectrum of operations, from the warning order to bombs on target to include those systems that provide essential combat and logistical support. Accordingly, its movement would involve consolidating disparate, dissimilar activities.

We ask that the Commission review this recommendation with the following questions in mind:

- 1) Does this recommendation fit the BRAC concept of "Centers of Excellence" or meet the BRAC criteria?**
- 2) Does it increase military value or decrease risk for the warfighter?**
- 3) Does it increase the ability to operate jointly?**
- 4) Does it save money or is at least cost neutral?**

If you conclude, as we have, that the answers to each of these four questions is **no**, then the recommendation to consolidate Operations & Sustainment with the C4ISR Research and Development, Acquisition, Test & Evaluation functions at Hanscom is inconsistent as articulated in the context of a Center of Excellence outlined in the BRAC report.

Therefore, the Secretary's recommendation should be amended to move only RDATE activities to Hanscom Air Force Base and retain Operations and Sustainment activities at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base.

At this point I would call your attention to the fact that there are organizations on Maxwell-Gunter that fall into the research and development area -- the Operating Location of the Development and Fielding Systems Group and part of the Engineering and Integration Systems Squadron that falls into the research and development area (about 20% of that Squadron). The Secretary's recommendation in this regard is logical and should be supported.

I would like to now review each of the above four questions in detail.

Does this recommendation fit the BRAC concept of "Centers of Excellence" or meet the BRAC criteria?

The Operations and Sustainment Systems Group at Maxwell-Gunter AFB provides operations and support to Information Technology (IT) systems throughout the Air Force. In fact, it is the **ONLY** place in the Air Force that provides operations and sustainment to the enterprise-wide IT systems that currently support the warfighter and the weapons systems of the entire United States Air Force.

One can view the functions of OSSG as an IT Depot. Just as aircraft depots support weapon systems, the Operations System Support Group provides depot support for information technology systems. Research and development activities accomplish the acquisition and testing mission but do not provide day-to-day depot level sustainment support. For example, the F-15 aircraft is supported by the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, which oversees all modifications and refinements for the aircraft as well as providing major maintenance as opposed to Research and Development for the F-15, which is done at the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson AFB. The OSSG provides identical levels of support to operational information systems such as the Core Automated Maintenance System or CAMS, which is the Air Force wing level maintenance system.

For example, a recent modification was made on CAMS that significantly improved its ability to support users at all levels. This modification enabled the system to be moved from separate databases to a centralized database, thus allowing users at all

levels to have access to the Air Force enterprise information. Minor modifications and support actions are handled in the same way. These depot type operations are not handled by an RDATE&E organization.

This is also true of most businesses. Just as Air Force Depots are not collocated with Research, Development and Acquisition Centers; the same model is often used in the commercial business world. Examples are:

American Express has their Headquarters in New York but they do their operations processing and customer contact outside of New York in places like Fort Lauderdale FL.

Citicorp has their Headquarters in New York but they do their credit card operations processing outside of New York in places like North Dakota.

Hyundai has their Headquarters in South Korea, the production is done in Montgomery AL, their research is done in Michigan, and their testing in California.

Why do these organizations have their operations in a different location than their Headquarters or Research and Development? Because the skills and experiences needed for each are different. Therefore the work goes where the skills and experience are available at the least cost. The Air Force should do the same with IT systems. Go where it is best to do the work at the least cost.

It is important to note that Maxwell-Gunter AFB has the facilities to fully support the needs of the OSSG in its present configuration. As its mission grows, it will be able to continue to meet the demands of the warfighter as there is a \$12.8 million military construction project under way to construct a new Integrated Operational Support Facility, which will be fully operational in the summer of 2006. This modern facility is replacing Korean War and Cold War era buildings and consolidating them into one building that will be able to expand to meet the challenges of the modern cyber-warfare climate.

Moreover, if the Secretary's recommended move were to take place, there is nowhere else within the Department of Defense that can support the Air Force and take up the slack that inevitably would occur during the transition. New facilities at Hanscom AFB, to include a Network Operations Center, would have to be constructed and systems would have to be on line and operating with a trained and experienced workforce in place before the OSSG at Maxwell Gunter AFB could be phased out. There are no provisions in the recommendation to accommodate such a transition.

If the proposed Center of Excellence is about RDATE&E, then operations and sustainment are more closely aligned to the warfighter than they are to Research and Development - so why move OSSG if it does not fit.

Next let's look at military value.

Does it increase military value or decrease risk for the warfighter?

As we examined the detailed elements of the proposed realignment, we found the DOD substantially deviated from their military value criteria. These inconsistencies involve risk, decrease military value, and actually increase cost to the Air Force and the Department of Defense.

Let's look at the specific elements of risk associated with this potential realignment and the impact on the operation and sustainment mission as it pertains to military value.

The unparalleled buildup of military, DoD civilian, and contractor synergism and expertise over the last 30-plus years resulted in an irreplaceable consortium of intellectual capital and program expertise. This expertise consists of retired military people working as civil servants and contractor employees, working on base and off, that form a unique collaboration within the Montgomery community. We know that you have heard from others, as you have visited around the country, that highly trained and experienced engineers and technicians will not move when a base is closed or realigned. Documented studies show that at best only 20-35% of the engineers, scientists, highly trained technicians, and contractors move in similar situations. This should not have been taken lightly or discounted when the DoD made its recommendation to realign the OSSG to Hanscom AFB, and we know that the 2005 BRAC Commission fully recognizes the seriousness of this recommendation relative to the operational readiness and worldwide network operating support of the United States Air Force.

The ensuing steep learning curve of a workforce untrained in the Air Force's current IT products and processes is a recipe for disaster in terms of supporting current and future warfighting operations. It could take as long as 4 to 6 years to transition to the new facilities and recruit and train a viable workforce. We firmly believe that should the Commission accept this recommendation, as proposed by the Secretary, it will create a significant risk to the warfighter and operational readiness of the Air Force for an unacceptable period of time and an no payback. Military value that exists today at Maxwell-Gunter would be lost or at best severely diminished at a critical time with troops involved in combat operations in two theaters of operation while waging a Global War on Terrorism that demands the highest degree of technological support. The attributes of BRAC Criterion 1 will be negated and the Secretary of

Defense will have deviated substantially from the BRAC criteria if this recommendation is carried forward.

This recommendation proposes a move of OSSG personnel to occur in 2008, which obviously requires completed buildings to be in place at Hanscom AFB to successfully accomplish the move. The operations and sustainment mission requires a complicated IT facility with sophisticated environmental controls. That said, in order to comply with MILCON appropriations requirements and construction lead times, the proposed timeline does not appear to be executable until at least 2009, at the earliest.

Today we are at war. The weapons and systems that our troops are using today require constant and continual IT support. It is also important to point out that the Operations and Sustainment System Group has the ability to accommodate surge, an element of BRAC Criterion #3. At Maxwell-Gunter, the group is collocated and interfaces with other Air Force and Department of Defense organizations including the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, Secretary of the Air Force Financial Systems Office, and most notably, a Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Defense Enterprise Computing Center, which provides the network backbone on which USAF systems run. OSSG works closely with these activities, lending support to their needs and gaining from their experience, expertise, and capacities. This creates invaluable synergy among similar organizations that multiplies the support provided to the warfighter, a synergy that would atrophy with a move to Hanscom AFB. The recommended realignment breaks apart this relationship, thereby diminishing the organization's military value. We would submit, moving this critical support system at time of war to another location involves a tremendous amount of risk — a risk our military can ill afford.

The following are just four examples of the 100-plus in-service systems supported by OSSG. It is important to note that these are just four of the programs sustained to ensure that critical systems are effectively running whether for Operation Enduring Freedom in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan or on the back streets of Baghdad in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These are not research and development programs funded by RDT&E dollars. These are operational systems funded by dollars that Congress appropriated for operations and maintenance. Therefore, even Congressional funding defines the differences between these missions. It is this essential operational support that the nation's airmen demand every day and every hour. For example:

The **Integrated Logistics System for Supply Operations** provides operational support for the retail/base level supply systems. The central element of this system is the operational Standard Base Supply System, which manages base-level inventory for the Air Force.

The **Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS)** is the primary support system for operations support of aircraft and equipment maintenance in use by Combat Air Forces today. The system supports maintenance activities associated with Aircraft, Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles (UAVs), Missiles, Engines, Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), Automated Test Equipment (ATE), and Communications-Electronic equipment.

The **Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool (LOGCAT)** is an automated planning capability that accurately and rapidly identifies resources at potential force beddown location. It identifies limiting factors and supports deployment package tailoring based on asset availability at the desired location.

The **Combat Ammunition System or (CAS)** is a one-stop, real-time, state-of-the-art automated munitions system that gives war planners and war fighters the capability to track, manage and plan responses to rapidly changing world conditions. In short, this operational system supports real time mission planning from inventory to weapon load out to bombs on target.

Whether peacetime or war, there is hardly a facet of the Air Force enterprise that is not serviced by the men and women of the OSSG organization. They have an enduring impact across the entire spectrum of Air Force operations. From crisis planning to deployment of an Air and Space Expeditionary Force to the heart of the Joint Force Air Component Commander's Air Operations Center to bombs on the target, the OSSG is inextricably involved. Their involvement is by necessity continuous, and ongoing. An Air Force Wing Commander is not concerned with the next generation fighter now but he is interested in keeping his planes in the air. Similarly, this Commander is not focused on research and development for new IT systems but is keenly interested in the current systems being operational and working properly when he needs them. Information Technology, as wonderful as it is, requires the intervention of an expert when systems go wrong. As we speak, there is an airman somewhere with a problem on one of the 100+ IT systems that will rely on the operational support provided by the OSSG.

In light of these military value arguments, we do not understand why the Secretary of Defense would recommend moving this organization. Any time you move an organization, you assume a certain level of associated risk.

When you're involved in ongoing combat operations, would you be willing to assume unnecessary risk if it reduced your combat capability? We think not.

If the realignment doesn't fit, decreases military value and increases risk to the warfighter - then why would you move OSSG?

Next, let's review the question of jointness.

Does it increase the ability to operate jointly?

The Operation and Sustainment Systems Group corporate relations and cooperative agreements with the Defense Information Support Agency, commonly known as DISA, have evolved over the years into a mutually beneficial relationship. This relationship showcases how agencies from across the DoD enterprise can build strong, efficient and effective bonds that keep the needs and goals of the warfighter at the forefront. This jointness enables these two organizations to work together to solve issues before they become problems, and to quickly fix problems that do arise in the IT support to our warfighters. Can the OSSG, if moved from Maxwell-Gunter, operate without being collocated with DISA? Certainly they can operate in a remote mode, but it will not operate as efficiently and effectively. In today's world, systems and operators work hundreds and even thousands of miles apart. Do systems run and does the work get done? Yes they do, but why would you want to take apart a system that works when the personnel are collocated and when there is no financial or operational imperative that justifies such a move. Will the organization benefit or will the personnel benefit? If the answer is no, which we believe it is, then it makes little sense to proceed down that path. DISA and OSSG personnel work in close harmony with one another and over the years employees move between both organizations. This cross flow of personnel further strengthens the bond between the two organizations and this closeness has allowed for phenomenal success in support of the Air Force. For example:

When terrorists attacked the Pentagon on 9/11, within minutes OSSG was contacted to assist in restoring communication connectivity to the Air Force portion of the Pentagon. A team from OSSG, with the coordination and assistance of Personnel from DISA, made it happen. They had the classified and unclassified network operating within 48 hours! This was accomplished when aircraft were not flying, cell phones in some areas didn't operate and travel by road was difficult. Collocation, in-depth knowledge of each other's systems, and interaction on a daily basis made this happen. It could not have been accomplished in a virtual environment.

Additionally, initiatives being worked within DISA envision the creation of joint mission management centers for all the Services, beginning with the Air Force. These centers will provide a one-call, problem-solving point of contact for Information Technology applications across the spectrum of warfighter needs, either in a direct or referral-to-expert mode, and in all likelihood will evolve out of the four DISA centers

that currently exist in the United States. Given the jointness and close working relationship that exists between the OSSG and the intellectual capital and facilities, Maxwell-Gunter is an obvious location to host a DISA Mission Management Center of Excellence to interact with an Air Force Network Operations Center (Attachment 1). The DISA organization is not leaving, but if OSSG were to go to Hanscom AFB it is conceivable that sometime in the not to distant future the Air Force would be looking to relocate them back to Maxwell-Gunter to capitalize on the DISA location and the past successes.

If the realignment doesn't fit, it doesn't add military value, increases risk to the warfighter, and if it doesn't promote or enable better joint operations - then why do it?

Finally, let's examine Cost.

Does it save money or is at least cost neutral?

In addition to lowering the military value and hence jeopardizing support to the warfighter, we believe no cost savings will be achieved. After a thorough review of the COBRA Model calculations, we identified several inconsistencies impacting cost. The "heart" of the issue revolves around authorized end strength. The going in assumption for the COBRA calculations is that there are dollars associated with the military and civilian end strength numbers. In reality, the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group is a working capital funded organization (as opposed to mission funding), and as such, end strength authorizations have no funds associated with them. By law in a working capital fund, revenue must be aligned with cost and not associated with end strength. Furthermore, as part of the Secretary's Transformation Initiative, the OSSG was right-sized in the last two years, eliminating 350 positions to create a Most Efficient Organization (MEO) that could compete in a future A-76 study, they are in fact at MEO strength and no manpower savings would be achieved with realignment. The "savings" associated with end strength authorizations, as assumed in the BRAC COBRA calculations, have already been taken in the MEO process. Additional discrepancies identified in the COBRA Model calculations include:

- COBRA data reduces the OSSG personnel levels below the personnel numbers that the organization identified as the MEO or Most Efficient Organization numbers during their right sizing. The MEO identified 1,015 personnel, as the number required to compete within the A-76 framework, yet the Department used the personnel level of 839 to base their cost justifications. The figure used in the COBRA Model is 30% lower than the authorized end strength personnel level, and 18% below the actual onboard number with no rationale provided.

- There is no data in COBRA Model on contractor support and the associated costs. There are approximately 940 contractors (about 50% of the workforce) working in Montgomery both on-site and off-site directly supporting the OSSG. A preliminary review of contractor support costs by labor man-hour between the two geographic areas indicates at least a 30-35% increase in the cost for a man-hour support of a person with the same knowledge and skill requirements by moving the work from Maxwell Gunter AFB, AL, to Hanscom AFB, MA. Even without including the additional costs of each officer, enlisted and civilian who will receive larger locality pay, there is a potential 15% increase in the overall manpower cost to operate in the long term due to contractor labor costs.
- The model calls for MILCON funds in FY06 and FY07. Based on the requirement to Congress of MILCON requests two years prior to execution and the fact that the FY06 budget is under Congressional review, it appears the proposed realignment could not take place any earlier than FY09. A further complicating factor is the need for a sophisticated and environmentally sensitive Information Technology facility.

We have run some specific COBRA alternatives that are attachments to this statement. This table summarizes the results of those COBRA Model runs. As you will see from the table, when accurate manpower data is used, there are no cost savings.

<i>COBRA Model Excursions - Maxwell AFB, AL</i>				
	Baseline DOD Scenario	Alternative 2- Include Missing Contractor Data to Baseline Case	Alternative 3 - Move OSSG using Onboard Personnel	Alternative 4 - Onboard Personnel plus RDT&E Portion of OSSG moves
Net Present Value	-\$229M	+\$119M	+\$413M	+\$98M
Payback Period	8 years	51 years	Never	48 years
Issues	Authorized versus onboard; No contractors included	Contractors 50% of the workforce	Working capital funding onboard versus authorized with no funds	Long time for payback
Impact	No real savings	Includes reality of contractors in the analysis	Cost plus mission degradation	Completes C4ISR COE alignment

One might be prepared to assume a certain degree of risk if it involved significant savings, but you certainly wouldn't make a move that involved clear risk of reducing combat capability when you're involved in hostilities ... and it costs you significantly more money!

Conclusion

It is logical to consolidate and create a Center of Excellence for the C4ISR RDAT&E. However, OSSG is not and should not be considered a research and development function. It is an operational element that operates the Air Force Network Operating Center with a 24-hour-a-day, 365-days-a-year Help Desk. It sustains current IT systems so warfighters have the capability and capacity to carry out their day-to-day missions. It is not logical to integrate an operational element into a research and development entity. This is especially true if it comes at a significant cost to the Department of Defense, the corporate Air Force and to the individual military, civilian, and contractor workers who make this system work.

The Montgomery community is, always has been, and will continue to be a strong advocate and vibrant supporter of the Department of Defense and the United States Air Force. We clearly understand and fundamentally agree with Secretary Rumsfeld's desire to transform our military so it remains the world's premier force. Nonetheless, BRAC decisions must be made for sound, logical reasons based on all the facts, and they must improve and not weaken military value. We ask the Commission to agree with the Secretary where it makes sense, but use your statutory authority to amend the recommendations when they have little military value, increase costs of military operations, and diminish joint synergies. It simply does not make sense to force dissimilar functions to merge to create alleged efficiencies and cost savings that from our analysis are simply not there.

We also ask that you and the Commission staff examine the data, weigh the risks, and reconsider the proposed realignment of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group from Maxwell-Gunter to Hanscom AFB.

Thank you for your time and attention.

Attachments: See Page 12

5 Attachments:

1. DISA Data Centers For The Future
2. COBRA Analysis Reports
 - a. Baseline
 - b. Alternatives
3. Regional Hearing - Oral Presentation Slides
4. Statement of U.S. Representative Everett
5. Statement of U.S. Representative Rogers



Data Centers for the Future

Rick Fleming
Center for Computing Services
April 27, 2005



Operational Tenets

- **Always On and Always Secure**
- **Unbounded Capacity**
- **Emphasis on Quality of Service (QoS)**

**Apply priority and precedence design and execution
at transaction and data object level**



REPORT
FOR
MONTGOMERY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
COBRA Model Analysis
Regarding
Operations and Sustainment Systems Group
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Recommendation



23 June 2005

Submitted by:
Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc.
1604 Spring Hill Road
Suite 200
Vienna, Virginia 22182

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I. Executive Summary

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld provided the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission the *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report* on May 13, 2005. The report contained recommendations to align the United States base force structure with the force structure that is expected to be needed over the next 20 years. The report recommendations focus on implementing Department of Defense (DoD) global force reposturing, facilitate the ongoing transformation of United States military forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century and restructure important support functions to capitalize on advances in technology and business practices. The BRAC goals are to support United States military force transformation, address the new and emerging security challenges, promote jointness and achieve significant savings.

To accomplish the BRAC process, the DoD organized into two analysis groups: the Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs). The Military Departments looked at installations specifically devoted to their individual requirements as well as supporting operational forces, while the JCSGs focused on bases and functions that represent DoD's common infrastructure.

One JCSG, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group explored research, development, acquisition, test and evaluation (RDAT&E) functions across the Department of Defense. One of the Technical JCSG subgroups, Command, Control, Communications and Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) provided a recommendation to create a C4ISR RDAT&E Center of Excellence at Hanscom AFB, MA, by realigning many units to include the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) located at Maxwell AFB, AL.

The subgroup based their recommendation on an evaluation of military value criteria, a review of scenarios to maximize military value and minimize capacity retained and a comparison against other considerations to include Payback Period, Environmental Factors, Community Infrastructure and Economic Impact.

The BRAC COBRA Model was then used to calculate the savings associated with this realignment of the OSSG. Upon examination of the COBRA Model data concerning the OSSG (referred to as the Baseline Case), Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc. (WBB) found numerous inconsistencies in the assumptions and data: military and civilian manpower numbers were inaccurate, contractor data was omitted and military construction to complete the realignment was overly optimistic.

Accordingly, WBB captured and evaluated these inconsistencies in alternative scenarios. Four significant alternative scenarios examined included:

- Alternative 1 – No realignment of the OSSG. WBB ran this alternative first, based on the fact that the OSSG mission is predominately operations and sustainment vice RDAT&E—the intent of the C4ISR RDAT&E Center of Excellence. The results of the COBRA Model indicated a Net Present Value of +\$159M (i.e., no savings) with a Payback Period of 100 years. The impact of this alternative is that without the realigning the OSSG, the BRAC recommendation to create a C4ISR RDAT&E Center of Excellence would not be realized
- Alternative 2 – Baseline Case, but included the Missing Contractor data. This excursion examined the DoD COBRA run as given (Baseline Case), but included the 940-contractor current OSSG workforce.

In other words, accepting the DoD COBRA data and simply adding in the OSSG contractor workforce. The COBRA Model yielded a Net Present Value of +\$119 M (i.e., no savings) with a Payback Period of 51 years. In essence, this excursion adds the reality of the contractor workforce in the DoD COBRA calculations—with no savings realized

- Alternative 3 – Move the OSSG, but use the onboard or actual workforce (military, government civilian and contractor) located at Maxwell AFB, AL, today. The intent is to see the impact of moving the OSSG (in line with the BRAC recommendation) with the correct number of personnel. Using this information, the COBRA Model gave a Net Present Value of +\$413M (i.e., no savings) and there is not a Payback Period (i.e., the payback is never reached)
- Alternative 4 – Onboard personnel or the actual workforce (military, government civilian and contractor) located at Maxwell AFB, AL, today and move the RDT&E portion of the OSSG to Hanscom AFB, MA, in line with the intent of the BRAC recommendation to create a C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence. In this case, the COBRA Model calculated a Net Present Value of +\$.98M (i.e., no savings) and a Payback Period of 48 years

The results of these three last alternatives are summarized in the table below.

COBRA Model Excursions – Maxwell AFB, AL				
	Baseline DoD Scenario	Alternative 2 - Include Missing Contractor Data to Baseline Case	Alternative 3 - Move OSSG using Onboard Personnel and Contractor Personnel	Alternative 4 - Onboard Personnel plus RDT&E Portion of OSSG moves
Net Present Value	- \$229M	+\$119M	+\$413M	+\$\$.98M
Payback Period	8 years	51 years	Never	48 years
Issues	Authorized versus onboard; No contractors included	Contractors 50% of the workforce	Working capital funding onboard versus authorized with no funds	Long time for payback
Impact	No real savings	Includes reality of contractors in the analysis	Cost plus mission degradation	Completes C4ISR COE alignment

COBRA Model Alternatives Comparison Table

After running several excursions or alternate scenarios, WBB concluded that no savings were possible if the correct manpower figures were used in the COBRA Model.

II. Introduction

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission a report containing the Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations to realign or close military installations within the United States and its territories. Secretary Rumsfeld complied with requirement on May 13, 2005.

The DoD recommendations are intended to align US base structure with the force structure that is expected to be needed over the next 20 years. These proposals focus on implementing DoD global force reposturing, facilitate the ongoing transformation of US forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century and restructure important support functions to capitalize on advances in technology and business practices. Overall, these recommendations are designed to support force transformation; address new threats, strategies and force protection concerns; consolidate business-oriented support functions; promote joint and multi-Service basing; and, provide significant savings.

As required by law, the BRAC process entailed comprehensive and comparable analyses of all installations in the United States and its territories, using military value as the primary consideration. In reviewing its base structure, DoD considered the capabilities needed to support potential mobilization and surge requirements, as well as the unique installation needs of Reserve Component forces. Moreover, DoD placed special emphasis on retaining the infrastructure and capabilities necessary to respond to contingencies.

DoD organized its analysis into two groups: the Military Departments which analyzed installations devoted exclusively to their requirements, as well as supporting operational forces; and Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) which scrutinized the bases and functions that constitute the DoD's common support infrastructure. The joint groups were composed of senior representatives of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff and OSD.

One JCSG, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group (TJCSG) was chartered to review the following DoD technical functions: Research; Development and Acquisition; and, Test and Evaluation. The research function included basic research, exploratory development and advanced development. The development and acquisition function included system development and demonstration, systems modifications, experimentation and concept demonstration, product/in-service life-cycle support and acquisition. The test and evaluation function included the formal developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) and the formal operational test and evaluation (OT&E).

To baseline the TJCSG analysis and recommendation development, the group established two guiding principles and an overarching strategic framework. The two principles were:

- Provide efficiency of operations by consolidating technical facilities to enhance synergy and reduce excess capacity
- Maintain competition of ideas by retaining at least two geographically separated sites, each of which would have similar combination of technologies and functions. This would also provide continuity of operations in the event of an unexpected disruption

In concert with these two principles, the TJCSG used a strategic framework to establish multifunctional and multidisciplinary technical Research, Development, Acquisition, Training & Evaluation (RDAT&E) Centers of Excellence which should provide the scientific and technical advances to enable DoD to develop capabilities and weapons that are technologically superior to those of potential adversaries into the future. Furthermore, the multifunctional and multidisciplinary nature of the Centers of Excellence should allow for more rapid transition of technology and enhance integration of multiple technologies. Finally, the Centers of Excellence were to be complemented by DoD's existing technical facilities that have a disciplinary focus.

The TJCSG also recognized that to effectively accomplish the DoD's RDAT&E functions, key partners outside DoD were essential, to include other government organizations, industry, universities and the international community. Finally, the rapidly changing and uncertain environment of the 21st century required that the TJCSG analysis and recommendations ensure that surge capability would be available for the future Defense RDAT&E infrastructure.

TJCSG recommendations provided the Department Centers of Excellence in the following three areas: Defense Research laboratories; RDAT&E Centers; and, Integrated Command, Control, Communications and Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Centers.

To organize its efforts, the TJCSG established five subgroups, each of which took responsibility for evaluating a set of technical activities. The subgroup of importance to the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce was the C4ISR Subgroup. Each subgroup conducted a detailed analysis for capacity, military value, scenario development and analysis; and finally developed and evaluated candidate recommendations.

III. Base Realignment and Closure Commission Language

The specific language regarding Maxwell AFB, AL, in the *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report*, May 2005, is contained below.

Consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development & Acquisition Test & Evaluation

Recommendation: Realign Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Lackland Air Force Base, TX, by relocating Air & Space Information Systems Research and Development & Acquisition to Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. Realign Eglin Air Force Base, FL, by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.

Justification: This recommendation will reduce the number of technical facilities engaged in Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics and Information Systems RDAT&E from 6 to 2. Through this consolidation, the Department will increase efficiency of RDAT&E operations resulting, in a multi-functional Center of Excellence in the rapidly changing technology area of C4ISR.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is \$254.4M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of \$115.3M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$36.2M with a payback

expected in 8 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$238.0M.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,250 jobs (1,262 direct jobs and 988 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Dayton, OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.44 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 384 jobs (220 direct jobs and 164 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.32 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,254 jobs (1,971 direct jobs and 1,283 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Montgomery, AL, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.6 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 212 jobs (110 direct jobs and 102 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the San Antonio, TX, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure Assessment: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has the potential to impact air quality at Hanscom AFB, MA, and Edwards AFB, CA. Additional operations at Hanscom AFB, MA, and Edwards AFB, CA, may impact archeological sites, which may constrain operations. This recommendation may require building on constrained acreage at Hanscom AFB, MA. Additional operations on Edwards AFB, CA, may impact threatened and endangered species and/or critical habitats. The hazardous waste program at Hanscom AFB, MA, will need modification. Additional operations may impact wetlands at Hanscom AFB, MA, which may restrict operations. This recommendation has no impact on dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; waste management; or water resources. This recommendation will require spending approximately \$0.5M cost for waste management and environmental compliance activities. This cost was included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the bases in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.

Each recommendation, rooted in the Department's long-term force structure plan and installation inventory, was measured against eight criteria. The Department gave priority consideration to military value (Criteria 1-4), then considered costs and savings (Criteria 5) and finally assessed the economic impact on local communities, the community support infrastructure and the environmental impact (Criteria 6-8).

IV. Military Value Criteria

As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary consideration in developing DoD's recommendations for base realignments and closures. For DoD, military value has two components: a quantitative component; and a qualitative component. The qualitative component is the exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. The quantitative component assigns attributes, metrics and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions.

To arrive at a quantitative military value score, subgroup members began by identifying attributes or characteristics for each criterion. They weighted attributes to reflect their relative importance based on things such as their military judgment or experience, the Secretary of Defense's Transformational Guidance and BRAC principles. Metrics were subsequently developed to measure these attributes. The metrics were also weighted to reflect relative importance, again using military judgment, transformational guidance and BRAC principles. Once attributes had been identified and weighted, the subgroup members developed questions for use in military value data calls. If more than one question was required to assess a given metric, these were likewise weighted. Each analytical subgroup member prepared a scoring plan, and data call questions were forwarded to the field. These plans established how answers to data call questions were to be evaluated and scored. With the scoring plans in place, the Military Departments and JCSGs completed their military value data calls. These were then forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The analytical subgroup members input the certified data responses into the scoring plans to arrive at a numerical score and a relative quantitative military value ranking of facilities/installations against their peers.

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, DoD gave priority consideration to military value (the four criteria listed below):

- (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness
- (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations
- (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training
- (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications

In addition to the Military Value criteria, other factors were considered.

V. Scenario Development

With the capacity and military value analyses complete, the TJCSG then began an iterative process to identify potential closure and realignment scenarios. These scenarios were developed using either a data-driven

optimization model or a strategy-driven approach. Each approach relied heavily on the military judgment and experience of the subgroup members.

The optimization models incorporated capacity and military value analysis results and force structure capabilities to identify scenarios that maximized military value and minimized the amount of capacity retained. These models were also used to explore options that minimized the number of sites required to accommodate a particular function or maximized potential savings. As data results were analyzed, the subgroup members evaluated additional scenario options.

A second methodology of generating scenarios for analysis was driven by the TJCSG strategy. Scenarios developed by this method were verified against data collected in earlier capacity and military value analysis.

VI. Other Considerations Criteria

Once the decision makers determined that the particular scenario was consistent with or enhanced military value, they proceeded to evaluate the scenario against the remaining selection criteria. Those criteria include determining Payback and Economic Impact, Assessing Community Infrastructure and determining Environmental Impact. The Other Considerations criteria specifically include the following:

- (5) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs
- (6) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations
- (7) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions and personnel
- (8) The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management and environmental compliance activities

In the final stages of the scenario analysis process, using analysis against all eight selection criteria, each analytical subgroup member determined which of its scenarios to recommend for approval. Any scenario recommended became a candidate recommendation. The OSSG became one of those recommendations.

VII. Operations and Sustainment Systems Group


The Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) is part of the Operations Support Systems Wing located at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. The Operations Support Systems Wing has more than 3,600 people assigned (to include 230 officers, 670 enlisted personnel, 1,200 civilians and 1,500 contractors). The Operations Support System Wing designs, acquires, installs and maintains operations support systems for the Air Force and the DoD. The wing, one of four acquisition wings at Headquarters Electronic System Command, acquires and maintains systems used by virtually every organization on Air Force bases world wide. The Wing is responsible for ACAT I programs valued at over \$3.1B located world wide and is considered the Information Technology Center of Excellence for the Warfighter. The primary mission areas include:

- Program Management
- Operations and Sustainment

- Information Technology Commodities Acquisition

The wing is composed of four geographically separated units (see diagram below):

- Development Fielding Systems Group (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH)
- Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (Maxwell AFB, AL)
- Engineering/Integration Systems Squadron (Maxwell AFB, AL)
- Force Protection Systems Squadron (Hanscom AFB, MA)




Electronics System Center with the Operations Support Systems Wing

The largest organization within the Operations Support Systems Wing is the OSSG. The OSSG provides technical and customer service support as well as acquisition and program management oversight for over 160 Combat Support Information Technology (IT) systems. The mission of the OSSG is to, *“Provide and support secure combat support information systems and networks for the Air Force and DoD components using innovative IT contracts to acquire and manage Enterprise services and commodities.”*

The OSSG also manages the Air Force standard desktop environment, and serves as the Air Force lead for software program management under the auspices of the DoD Enterprise Software Initiative. The OSSG provides Air Force Network Operations Security for circuits and routers, and provide situational awareness for their DoD customers. Their Field Assistance Branch is responsible for over 11 systems worldwide as well as providing the Air Force infrastructure support for systems such as the Integrated Logistics System for Supply Operations, the Deliberate Crisis Action Planning Execution System, the Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool, the Combat Ammunition System, the Global Combat Support System-AF, the Defense Management

System, the Combat Information Transport System and firewalls. The OSSG has over 1,100 government employees to include a mix of officer, enlisted, civilian and contractors in geographically separated locations. See the diagram below.



Operations and Sustainment Systems Group

Additionally, the OSSG has an annual Working Capital Fund operating budget of \$303M. Finally, the OSSG manages 51 Air Force Contracts and Basic Purchasing Agreements with a total value of \$13.1B.

VIII. COBRA Model Analysis

COBRA is an economic analysis model. It estimates the costs and savings associated with a proposed base closure or realignment action. The model output can be used to compare the relative cost benefits of alternative BRAC actions. COBRA is not designed to produce budget estimates, but to provide a consistent and auditable method of evaluating and comparing different courses of action in terms of the resulting economic impacts for those costs and savings measured in the model.

The COBRA Model calculates the costs and savings of base stationing scenarios over a period of 20 years. It models all activities (moves, construction, procurements, sales, closures) as taking place during the first 6 years, and thereafter all costs and savings are treated as steady-state. The key output value produced is the Payback Year. This is the point in time where savings generated equal (and then exceed) costs incurred. In other words, this is the point when the realignment/closure has paid for itself and net savings begin to accrue. The Payback Period is the period between the end of the realignment action and the Payback year.

The COBRA Model allows alternative closure/realignment scenarios to be compared in terms of when the Payback Year is reached. Should a Payback Year not be achieved for a specific scenario, that scenario will result in a net cost rather than savings. Similarly, if a scenario has a long Payback Period it will not start to generate net savings until well after the BRAC action would have been completed. Such an action would generally be less economically beneficial than one with an earlier Payback Year.

The COBRA Model also calculates and reports the Net Present Value (NPV) for the 20 year planning period of each scenario analyzed. NPV is the present value of future costs of a scenario, discounted at the appropriate rate, minus the present value of future savings from the scenario. All dollar values, regardless of when they occur, are measured in constant base-year dollars. This is important because it eliminates artificial distinctions between scenarios based on inflation, while highlighting the effects of timing on model results. Costs and savings are calculated for each year of the 20 year planning period. For each year, total costs and savings are then summed to determine a net cost for that year. The net cost of each year is then added to the net cost for preceding years to determine the total net cost to that point in time. The sum of the total net costs for all 20 years is the Net Present Value of the scenario.

A. Baseline Case – DoD Scenario

Using the COBRA Model, WBB examined the scenario concerning the Maxwell AFB, AL, and the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group data as provided by the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce. This option will be referred to as the DoD Baseline Case. The COBRA Model calculated the Net Present Value of -\$229M (i.e., no savings) and a Payback Period of 8 years for this scenario.

After a thorough review of the COBRA Model calculations, WBB identified several inconsistencies impacting savings. The “heart” of the issue revolves around authorized end strength for the OSSG. The going in assumption for the COBRA Model calculations is that there are dollars associated with the military and civilian end strength numbers. In reality and as noted earlier, the OSSG is a working capital funded organization (as opposed to mission funding). The distinction is important. In a working capital funded organization, end strength authorizations have no funds associated with them. Moreover and by law, with a working capital fund revenue must be aligned with cost and not associated with military and civilian end strength. Furthermore, given that the OSSG just accomplished a Most Efficient Organization (MEO) competition, the OSSG is in fact at MEO strength now and no manpower savings would be realized or achieved with realignment—the savings has already been taken. Simply put, the “savings” associated with the military and civilian end strength authorizations, as assumed in the BRAC COBRA Model calculations, have already been taken in the MEO process. WBB identified some additional discrepancies in the COBRA Model calculations. They include:

- The COBRA Model data reduces the OSSG personnel levels below that which the organization identified in the recent MEO process. The MEO identified 1,015 personnel (as seen in the Actual Onboard Column below) as the number required competing within the A-76 framework, yet DoD used a figure of 839 to base their cost justifications. The figure used in the COBRA Model calculations is 30 percent lower than the authorized end strength personnel levels, and 18 percent below the actual onboard number—with no rationale provided. See the chart below

	Authorized	30% Reduction used in COBRA	Actual Onboard (5/25/2005)	Delta from COBRA to Onboard
Officers	135	95	101	+6
Enlisted	534	374	431	+57
Civilians	528	370	483	+113
Total	1197	839	1015	+176

Operations and Sustainment Systems Group Manpower Table

- There is no data in the COBRA Model on contractor support and the associated costs. There are approximately 940 contractors (approximately 50 percent of the OSSG workforce) working in Montgomery both on-site and off-site directly supporting the OSSG. A preliminary review of contractor support costs by labor man-hour between the two geographic areas (Montgomery, AL, and Boston, MA) indicates at least a 30 to 35 percent increase in the cost for a man-hour of support from a person with the same knowledge and same skill requirements by moving the work from Maxwell AFB, AL, to Hanscom AFB, MA. Even without including the additional costs of each officer, enlisted and civilian who will receive a larger locality pay, there is a potential 15 percent increase in the overall manpower cost to operate in the long-term due to contractor labor costs
- The COBRA Model calls for Military Construction (MILCON) funds in FY06 and FY07. Based on the statutory requirement to Congress of MILCON requests two years prior to execution and the fact that the FY06 budget is under Congressional review now, it appears the proposed realignment could not take place any earlier than FY09. A further complicating factor is the need for a sophisticated, environmentally sensitive Information Technology facility to house the OSSG

In summary, the DoD Baseline Case has several "apparent" inconsistencies in the data used for the calculations. Therefore the savings (Net Present Value and the Payback Period) appear to be suspect. (Baseline Case COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 1.)

Accordingly, WBB ran five alternative scenarios or excursions. These alternative scenarios captured and evaluated the inconsistencies noted during the DoD Baseline Case COBRA Model data review. The five excursions examined include the following:

- Alternative 1 – No realignment of the OSSG. WBB ran this alternative first based on the fact that the OSSG mission is predominately operations and sustainment vice RDAT&E—the intent of the BRAC recommendation realignment to create a C4ISR RDAT&E Center of Excellence
- Alternative 2 – Baseline Case, but include the Missing Contractor data. This excursion examined the DoD COBRA run as given, but included the OSSG 940-person contractor workforce to ensure the entire OSSG workforce was included in the realignment computations
- Alternative 3 – Move the OSSG, but use the onboard or actual workforce located at Maxwell AFB, AL,

today. The intent is to see the COBRA Model results of moving the entire OSSG with the correct number of personnel (military, government and contractor)

- Alternative 4 – Use the onboard or actual workforce located at Maxwell AFB, AL, today and move the RDT&E portion of the OSSG (165 personnel) to Hanscom AFB, MA. This excursion was run to meet the intent of the BRAC recommendation to create the C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence with the RDT&E portion of the OSSG
- Alternative 5 – Baseline Case, plus move onboard or actual workforce associated with the RDT&E portion of the OSSG (165 personnel) to Hanscom AFB, MA. This last COBRA Model run takes the COBRA Model data as given and moves the RDT&E portion of the OSSG to create the C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence at Hanscom AFB, MA

The variables across the scenarios include the number of military, government civilians and contractors; and varying the organization move to include the RDT&E portion of the OSSG.

B. Alternative 1 - No Realignment of OSSG

Alternative 1 is a scenario to examine completely taking Maxwell AFB, AL, and the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group out of BRAC COBRA Model calculations. This alternative was examined because the OSSG mission is predominately operations and sustainment, not RDT&E as presented in the BRAC recommendation to create the C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence

Modification to COBRA Assumptions: Maxwell AFB, AL, is completely removed from the scenario.

Results: Essentially this excursion indicates the concept of the C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence is only feasible from a cost savings perspective if Maxwell AFB, AL, and the OSSG, or some organization of similar size, is included in some form or fashion. In short, using this scenario, the C4ISR Center of Excellence would not be realized. Using this alternative, the COBRA Model calculates the Net Present Value of +\$159M (i.e., no savings) and a Payback Period of 51 years. (Alternative 1 COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 2.)

C. Alternative 2 – Include Missing Contractor Data to Baseline Case

This alternative examines a scenario where the COBRA Model uses the Baseline Case with the approximately 940 contractors included in the movement of the OSSG to Hanscom AFB, MA.

Modification to COBRA Assumptions: The contractor costs are included in the COBRA Model calculations. Due to the fact that contractor manning is over half the OSSG workforce, the contractor costs were added to the model as Base Information (Dynamic) to account for these costs. The support is the equivalent of “industrial operations” and was removed from Maxwell AFB, AL, and added to Hanscom AFB, MA. A cost of doing business factor of 30 percent was included for contracting at Hanscom AFB, MA. The data points gathered to support the 30 percent figure range from 20 to 40 percent—the average was included. A contractor figure of 864 was input in the model at a man-year contract cost rate of \$100K was used for the Montgomery locale.

Results: Importantly, this excursion includes the contractor workforce—the major component of the OSSG. To make the BRAC COBRA Model analysis credible, the entire workforce must be factored in. This realignment action could not be a success with a reasonable portion of the workforce. Using this modified scenario, the COBRA Model calculates the Net Present Value of +\$119M (i.e., no savings) and a Payback Period of 51 years. (Alternative 2 COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 2.)

D. Alternative 3 - Move OSSG, but utilize actual onboard military, government civilian and contractors

The Alternative 3 scenario is a slight adjustment to Alternative 2 above. This alternative incorporates the actual or onboard number of military and government civilians at the post-MEO end strength, plus it includes the appropriate contractor data (the 940 personnel).

Modification to COBRA Assumptions: The actual onboard number of personnel vice the authorized end strength personnel numbers were used along with the contractor data (940 contractors) to see if the results were similar to the baseline and Alternative 2 excursions. Onboard personnel numbers are a true reflection of the cost savings available vice using the inflated authorized end strength. Base manpower savings remained the same as in the Baseline Case run. A 10 percent savings of personnel from the OSSG was used from the onboard personnel numbers to account for management overhead savings. This yielded an end strength reduction of 10 officers, 43 enlisted personnel and 48 contractors.

Results: This excursion allows a review of a Working Capital Funded organization vice a mission funded activity. This scenario also takes into account the recently completed MEO. Using this modified scenario, the COBRA Model calculates the Net Present Value of +\$413M (i.e., no savings) and the Payback Period is never reached. The impact is a substantial cost, plus probable mission degradation. (Alternative 3 COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 2.)

E. Alternative 4 - Utilize actual onboard military, government civilians and contractors plus move the RDT&E portion of OSSG

Alternative 4 is a slight excursion from Alternative 3. In this alternative the onboard manpower numbers are considered as in the previous alternative, but just the RDT&E portion of the OSSG is realigned to Hanscom AFB, MA.

Modification to COBRA Assumptions: Using the data in Alternative 3, the RDT&E personnel are moved. This includes 5 officers, 10 enlisted personnel, 62 civilians and 89 contractors. As compared to Alternative 3, 17 personnel vice 85 base personnel are eliminated. The remaining personnel are Operations and Sustainment focused with the OSSG.

Results: This alternative completes the C4ISR Center of Excellence alignment at Hanscom AFB, MA. However, the Payback Period is a substantial amount of time. Using this modified scenario, the COBRA Model

calculates the Net Present Value of +\$.98M (i.e., no savings) with a Payback Period of 48 years. (Alternative 4 COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 2.)

F. Alternative 5 - Baseline, plus onboard personnel and move the RDT&E portion of the OSSG

Finally, Alternative 5 takes the Baseline Case, plus the onboard personnel of the RDT&E portion of the OSSG and realigns them to Hanscom AFB, MA. It also includes the contractor workforce (approximately 940 personnel).

Modification to COBRA Assumptions: Uses the baseline numbers for manpower and moves the same personnel as Alternative 4.

Results: Using this modified scenario, the COBRA Model calculates the Net Present Value of -\$129M and a Payback Period of 10 years. These are "false savings" as the savings come from moving the authorized versus onboard figures. (Alternative 5 COBRA Model Data is in Appendix 2.)

IX. Conclusion

The Department of Defense uses a methodical approach to determine BRAC realignment and closure recommendations. A thorough review by either the Military Departments or the Joint Cross-Service Groups examines the military value, develops appropriate scenarios and evaluates a set of four additional criteria. Finally COBRA, an economic analysis model, is used to calculate the associated recommendation cost and savings to determine a Net Present Value and Payback Period.

With respect to the proposed recommendation to realign the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group from Maxwell AFB, AL, to Hanscom AFB, MA, to form the C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence, several inconsistencies were found in the COBRA Model data provided by the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce. The major discrepancies included the use of incorrect manpower figures, the omission of the contractor workforce and an overly optimistic MILCON projection to meet the timely realignment of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group.

WBB captured these oversights and ran several new excursions or alternate scenarios to evaluate these inconsistencies. Two observations became apparent: creating a C4ISR RDT&E Center of Excellence is not feasible without including the OSSG or some similarly sized organization; after reviewing all alternatives, savings are not achieved when using the correct number of personnel (military, government civilian and contractor) in any combination of realignment alternatives. The results are summarized in the table below.

COBRA Model Excursions – Maxwell AFB, AL						
	Baseline DoD Scenario	Alternative 1- No Realignment of OSSG	Alternative 2- Include Missing Contractor Data to Baseline Case	Alternative 3 - Move OSSG using Onboard Personnel and Contractor Personnel	Alternative 4 - Onboard Personnel plus RDT&E Portion of OSSG moves	Alternative 5 – Baseline, Plus Onboard personnel and RDT&E Portion of OSSG moves
Net Present Value	- \$229M	+ \$159M	+\$119M	+\$413M	+\$98M	- \$129M
Payback Period	8 years	100 years	51 years	Never	48 years	10 years
Issues	Authorized versus onboard; No contractors included	Maxwell AFB not included in scenario	Contractors 50% of the workforce	Working capital funding onboard versus authorized with no funds	Long time for payback	Authorized versus onboard
Impact	No real savings	COE efforts not realized	Includes reality of contractors in the analysis	Cost plus mission degradation	Completes C4ISR COE alignment	False savings

A negative Net Present Value is good (-)

COBRA Model Excursions Comparison Table

Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc.

As can be readily seen in the table, under no circumstances is a savings achieved involving the realignment of the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group if the correct manpower figures are used.

Appendix 1: COBRA Data Baseline Case Files

Appendix 2: COBRA Data Excursion Files

Rep. Terry Everett (R-AL)
Statement before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Regional Hearing Atlanta, GA
June 30, 2005

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission:

It is my honor to appear before you today in support of the military installations residing in the Second District of Alabama. I would like to begin by thanking you and your staff for undertaking this most crucial of tasks to ensure that our military is properly structured to fight the ongoing war on terror. A critical element in fighting this war is a mission performed by the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) at Maxwell-Gunter AFB, located in my congressional district.

I am very disappointed in the Pentagon's recommendation to realign the OSSG to Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. Since 1993, I have authorized over \$275 million in military construction to modernize Maxwell-Gunter including state-of-the-art dorms, educational facilities and the 1,500-foot runway expansion. In addition, I recently secured \$12.8 million for the Integrated Operation Support Facility to support the mission of the OSSG at Gunter. Furthermore, I recently met with Lt. Gen. Charles Johnson, Commander of the Air Force Electronic Systems Command, about leadership and funding issues that I had concerning the OSSG. Shortly thereafter, Greg Garcia was named as the new director of the OSSG, while other military leadership positions that have been vacant due to retirements are beginning to be filled.

Despite my efforts, the Pentagon has made an unwise decision and called for the realignment of 1,251 civilian and military jobs from Maxwell-Gunter AFB to Hanscom AFB, which is the parent organization of the OSSG. The OSSG has provided world-class combat operational support to Air Force bases and DoD agencies around the world from Montgomery for more than 30 years. It does not need to be moved in order to continue to perform this critical national security mission. Most significantly, the transfer of the OSSG to Hanscom AFB would necessitate a reproduction of infrastructure, personnel, and contractor base, and therefore could potentially harm the warfighter during this transition because of OSSG's combat support mission. Additionally, a move to a significantly higher cost area, like Massachusetts, is expected to cost over \$254 million with any potential payback not expected for another eight years.

The OSSG is the only organization with experience fielding systems across the entire Air Force and DoD. Moreover, Gunter is home to one of four major Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) nodes which provide the backbone on which Air Force Systems run -- a synergy that does not exist at Hanscom AFB. The DISA presence, along with the OSSG, enables testing of enterprise-wide combat support software applications in an operational environment. With its extensive background, experience, and expertise, this organization is truly a one of a kind national resource and belongs in Montgomery.

Thank you for your valuable service to our nation and your attention to this critically important issue.

Testimony for Congressman Mike D. Rogers (Alabama)
Base Realignment and Closure Commission – Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Thank you, Chairman Principi, and Members of the BRAC Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with my colleagues from Alabama, and thank you for allowing me to include my remarks before the Commission.

Before I begin, I would like to express my appreciation to each of you for your service on this panel. This process is one of acute importance to our national security. While you will be challenged over the next few months to accept or reject the recommendations made by the Department of Defense, I have complete confidence in your ability to do what is best for our military and best for our national defense.

Alabama's Third Congressional District is home or contiguous to three major military installations of critical importance to our military's readiness: the Anniston Army Depot, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, and Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia.

I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the Department's recommendations regarding Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base. On the whole, the recommendation to consolidate the Air and Space C4ISR Research and Development and Acquisition and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) is a reasonable proposal. Elimination of duplicative facilities is critical in any organization, and I support the concept of reducing the RDTAT&E technical facilities to increase the program's overall efficiency.

However, I disagree wholeheartedly with the Secretary's recommendation that the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) located at Maxwell-Gunter in Montgomery, Alabama, be included in the Secretary's recommendation to consolidate the Air and Space C4ISR RDAT&E.

Simply put, OSSG is not a research and development organization. OSSG integrates, operates and sustains secure combat support information systems and networks for the Air Force and Department of Defense components. The systems that OSSG operates and sustains touch nearly every mission on every Air Force Base worldwide, and provide our warfighters with the right combat support information in the right place and at the right time.

The OSSG provides our Air Forces real-time military value. The day-to-day continuous support and upkeep of its IT systems provides essential operational and combat support for our nation's warfighters.

Mr. Chairman, the primary mission of the OSSG is to provide and support secure combat information systems and networks for the Air Force and Department of Defense components, not RDAT&E. The Standard Systems Group at Maxwell-Gunter does not

belong in the Secretary's recommendation to consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation.

I respectfully ask you and your colleagues on the Commission reconsider the Department's recommendation to move, and subsequently, combine these critical OSSG missions with the Air Force's research and development functions, and help ensure our men and women in battle continue to benefit from the expertise provided from the highly trained workforce of Maxwell-Gunter's OSSG.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OSSG

Where Does It Fit?

- ❖ What Is Operations and Sustainment?
- ❖ What Are Key Questions for the BRAC Commission?
 - ▶ Does It Fit?
 - ▶ Does It Increase Military Value?
 - ▶ Does It Increase/Enable Joint Operations?
 - ▶ Does It Save Money?

If Not Then What?

AMEND DOD'S RECOMMENDATION

Does It Fit?

- ❖ Creates a “Center of Excellence” for RDA&E
 - ❖ Not Operations and Sustainment
- ❖ Merges Disparate Missions and Workforces
 - ❖ OSSG Functions as an IT Depot
 - ❖ OSSG Follows Current Business Practice of Movement to Low-Cost Ops Centers
- ❖ Ignores Existing Capacity
 - ❖ Existing Physical Plant / New Construction
 - ❖ Workforce Leveraging Between Air Force IT Ops & DOD Ops

DOES NOT FIT!

Does It Increase Military Value?

- ❖ Risks Corporate Knowledge of Current Workforce
 - ❖ Synergy of 30 Years Shared Knowledge and Experience
 - ❖ Age of Current IT Systems Demands Functional Expertise and Accumulated Experience
 - ❖ R&D Workforce is Different Than Ops & Sustainment Workforce
- ❖ Risks the Physical Synergy with DISA
 - ❖ Jointly Used Systems & Equipment
 - ❖ Common Workforce Expertise
 - ❖ Personal Relationships

SEPTEMBER 11th

DECREASES MILITARY VALUE
INCREASES RISK TO WARFIGHTER

Does it Increase / Enable Joint Operations?

- ❖ DISA Handles IT Operations for DOD
 - ❖ Shared Mission
 - ❖ Shared Workforce
 - ❖ Shared Systems and Equipment
- ❖ Co-Location of OSSG and DISA Is a Force Multiplier During Surge / Mobilization
 - ❖ Constant Teaming On Site
 - ❖ Redundancy of Systems
 - ❖ Greater Whole – All Operational Workforce
- ❖ Future DOD Vision
 - ❖ Mission Centers
 - ❖ Impact Not Analyzed by DOD

DEGRADES JOINT OPERABILITY

Does it Save Money?

- ❖ **Lost Intellectual Capital – CAN'T BE COSTED**
 - ❖ **Ops and Sustainment Capability Comes from Experience / Interaction with Users**
 - ❖ **MIT / Harvard Grads Seek Cutting Edge Jobs and Cost Government More to Hire**
- ❖ **DOD Cost Analysis Was Limited In Scope and Inaccurate**
 - ❖ **Did Not Cost Contractor Workforce**
 - ❖ **Did Not Cost "MEO" Sized Workforce**
 - ❖ **Did Not Cost Dual Ops During Lengthy Transition**

NO COST SAVINGS EXIST

COBRA Model Excursions – Maxwell AFB, AL

	Baseline DOD Scenario	Alternative 2 Include Missing Contractor Data to Baseline Case	Alternative 3 Move OSSG using Onboard Personnel	Alternative 4 Onboard Personnel Plus RDT&E Portion of OSSG Moves
Payback Period for Movement	8 Years	51 Years	Never	48 Years
Net Present Value (payback after 20 Yrs)	-\$229M	+\$119M	+\$413M	+\$0.98M
Issues	Authorized vs. onboard; No contractors included	Contractors 50% of the workforce	Working capital funding onboard vs. authorized with no funds	Long time for payback
Impact	No real savings	Includes reality of contractors in the analysis	Cost plus mission degradation	Completes C4ISR COE alignment

OSSG

Where Does It Fit?

- ❖ **Answers to Key Questions**
 - ▶ It Doesn't Fit
 - ▶ It Doesn't Increase Military Value
 - ▶ It Doesn't Increase/Enable Joint Operations
 - ▶ It Doesn't Save Money

Conclusion

AMEND DOD'S RECOMMENDATION

Statement For The Record

117th Air Refueling Wing, Birmingham, Alabama

2005 BRAC Commission Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Presented By: MG Crayton M. Bowen
Title: The Adjutant General
Phone: (334) 271-7200
E-Mail: crayton.mark.bowen@us.army.mil

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Birmingham Air Guard Base / 117ARW Written Testimony

Birmingham International Airport Air Guard Station is home to the 117th Air Refueling Wing. The unit transitioned to the KC135R aircraft over 10 years ago in 1994.

The Department of Defense has recommended the realignment of Birmingham's KC-135R aircraft. Four (4) aircraft would move to Knoxville McGhee-Tyson, two (2) to Phoenix Sky Harbor, and two (2) to Bangor. Birmingham would lose 183 full time and 326 traditional guard positions. The Secretary has also recommended keeping an Expeditionary Combat Support (Enclave) force in Birmingham.

We have serious concerns associated with the DoD's recommendations to realign the nation's tanker fleet, and specifically relating to Birmingham's 117th Air Refueling Wing.

First, we believe that the DoD substantially deviated from the Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 with the recommendation to realign the Birmingham Air Guard. It's clear that the DoD ignored and failed to consider military value, which was contrary to the law.

Secondly, we will highlight the DOD's apparent failure to consider Birmingham's mission capability and existing infrastructure. We will demonstrate the clear advantages of keeping Birmingham in place by showing its overwhelming global reach capabilities.

- **Concerns With DoD Recommendations**

- Substantial Deviation from the Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
- Disregard of Mission Capability and Infrastructure

As the Commission is aware, the law states, "The Secretary shall give priority consideration to the military value criteria." This value was to be computed based upon these four criteria.

- **Military Value Criteria:**

- Mission Capabilities, Impact on Operational Readiness
- Availability of Land, Facilities and Airspace
- Ability to Accommodate Contingency, Mobilizations, Surges, Training...
- Cost of Operations and Manpower Implications
- Military Value Was To Be The "Primary Consideration"

Ref: Issue Analysis /Legislative Criteria; Tab 1

This is how the DoD substantially deviated from the law. Birmingham’s military value was rated at 63. **Six Air National Guard Tanker wings determined to have less military value than Birmingham are remaining in place. In many cases these lower valued units will see an increase in the number of aircraft they possess.** The DoD substituted its own definition of “military value” and included the arbitrary use of “military judgment” to justify these recommendations. In fact the DoD’s own “Red Team” believed the BRAC process was being used only to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding rather than **reducing** infrastructure.

- **Six Air National Guard Tanker Wings Ranking Lower in Military Value Than Birmingham are Remaining or Robusting.**

Overall Military Value
(Lower Number = Higher Value)

Birmingham IAP AGS (R)	63
Sioux Gateway APT AGS (E)	67
McGee Tyson APT AGS (E)	74
Pittsburgh IAP AGS (R)	80
Gen Mitchell IAP AGS (R)	86
Pease INT Trade Port AGS (R)	105
Bangor IAP AGS (E)	123

Note: “Military Judgment” used to justify deviation from law

“For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value, we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy”

The BRAC Red Team

Ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol. 5, p. 107; Tab 2

Ref: Tanker MCI Analysis; Air Force Analysis and Recommendations, Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 2; Tab 3

Ref: Airlift MCI Analysis; Air Force Analysis and Recommendations, Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 1; Tab 4

Ref: BRAC Red Team Observations of Trends, 14 Mar 2005, Tab 20

Additionally, the Military Value Assessment is incomplete. In a Post “Nine – Eleven” environment what is more important than our homeland’s protection? Our fighter aircraft cannot adequately perform their interceptor missions without tanker support. The DoD’s analysis makes no mention of the tanker role in the air sovereignty alert mission. Birmingham has been supporting an Air Sovereignty Alert mission of the highest priority since “Nine - Eleven.” Many Air Guard tanker units provide Air Sovereignty Alert

Support. Has the impact on the removal of some of these tanker units on this tasking been considered?

- **Military Value Assessment is Flawed**

- Air Sovereignty Alert Requirements Disregard Tankers
 - Fighter Air Sovereignty Alert Impotent without In-flight Refueling
 - No Mention of Tanker Role
 - Birmingham – On alert since 9-11

Ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol. 5, p 11, par. 1.1.2; Tab 5

- “Red Team” Findings
 - Finds Inconsistency of Assessment in:
 - Military Value Analysis

“Supporting explanation for use of military judgment, especially over-rides of military value, are consistently weak.”

“Military Judgment is used frequently to override military value results....Need more guidance on what military judgment includes.”

The BRAC Red Team

- Capacity Analysis

“There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis...USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.”

The BRAC Red Team

Ref: BRAC Red Team 2005 Discussion Topics, 14 Mar 2005, Page 1 Tab 20

- Concerns of Integrity
 - Misuse of BRAC Process
 - AF Focuses on Operational Needs Rather Than Reduction of Excess Infrastructure

“The BRAC Red Team believes the Air Force presentations give the perception that in many cases the Air Force is using BRAC only to move aircraft and gain MILCON Funding rather than reducing excess infrastructure.”

The BRAC Red Team

Ref: BRAC Red Team AF White Paper, 18 Apr 2005, Tab 20

- 15 Specific Flawed Assumptions in Tanker Data Call

- Data Fields Inappropriately Weighted For Specific Type Aircraft
 - Example: Runway Length Accounts for 9.55% and Proximity to Airspace Accounts for 39.1%
 - The receiver aircraft determines where and when air refueling is needed, not the tanker.

Ref: 117ARW Military Value Data Assessment, Maj. Trent Mitchell, Tab 21

The nation-wide tanker realignment plan is flawed. It severely degrades operational readiness eliminating six existing combat-capable “R”-model squadrons while creating seven NEW “R”-model flying units.

The original Air Force E-model retirement plan left capable “R” model units in place. In the current proposal, it would appear that BRAC is being used by the Air Force to circumvent current legislation and carry out changes that could not be accomplished by any other legal vehicle.

The BRAC recommendations set the optimum tanker squadron size at 16 aircraft, but also states that 12 are acceptable. However, there is no indication as how that number was determined. In fact, a news release from 2003 stated that the Air Force had standardized the size of a KC-135R squadron at 16 jets per active duty squadron and 8 jets for the Air Reserve Component. Even now, after the BRAC process, Guard tanker units will range in size from 8,10, 12 and 16 jet units.

Ref: USAF News Release, Roadmap Outlines Recapitalization of Tanker Fleet 18 Jun 2003, Tab 22

Also, apparently little value was given to demographics and an areas ability to recruit for the larger sized units. Also, it appears that no consideration was given to how many new unit members will need to be trained, however a recent move by the Illinois tanker unit from Chicago to Scott AFB, resulted in an almost 80% turnover in personnel.

Ref: E-Mail regarding Air Force briefing to SASC staff 14 Jun 2005

- **Tanker Plan Flawed Nation Wide**
 - Degrades Combat Capability and Operational Readiness
 - Eliminating Six Combat Ready “R” Model Units
 - Creating Seven New “R” Model Units
 - Accomplished by Retirement of “E” Model Aircraft

“...aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.”

The BRAC Red Team

- Original Air Force “E” Model Retirement Plan Left Combat Capable “R” Model Units In Place

Ref: BRAC Red Team 2nd AF Briefing Notes, 19 Apr 05, Page 2; Tab 20

Ref: USAF News Release, Roadmap Outlines Recapitalization of Tanker Fleet 18 Jun 2003, Tab 22

Ref: AMC Tanker Roadmap Slideshow, 19 Feb 2002, Tab 22

Since converting to the KC-135R aircraft over 10 years ago, \$73 million has been spent on Birmingham’s infrastructure to make it a world-class tanker base. We have room **TODAY** in Birmingham to bed down 13 KC-135R aircraft at no cost to taxpayers, yet “military judgment,” in lieu of military value was used to realign our jets to other locations that require additional infrastructure to accept our aircraft. Current data indicates that Knoxville is physically unable to accommodate the 12 aircraft that they are proposed to receive. The DoD’s report indicates the savings to the Department over 20 years to realign Birmingham is \$460 thousand dollars. That amounts to \$23,000 per year. Is this an example of military judgment?

- **\$73 Million Spent to Construct World-Class Tanker Facility**

Ref: 117ARW FY 04 Economic Impact Analysis; Tab 6

- **Birmingham IAP Will Support 13 KC-135’s Today With No Additional Construction**

Ref: 117ARW Ramp Diagram; Tab 7

- **McGhee-Tyson is Physically Unable to Accommodate 12 Aircraft**

Ref: Cobra Report, Tab 2, Military Value and Capacity Supporting Information; Tab 8

Ref: Future Mission Expansion Cost Comparisons Spreadsheet; Tab 24

- **Birmingham Airport’s Ability to Accommodate Contingency, Mobilizations, Surges, and Training...**

- 24-Hour Air Traffic Control Tower

- Additional Parking and Large Cargo Areas For Mobilizations, Surges and Expanded Alert Operations

Ref: AOPA Airport Directory Publication / Birmingham, 17 Jun 2005; Tab 9

Ref: Birmingham International Airport Diagram; Tab 10

- **If realigned, the net present value of the savings to DoD over 20 years is \$0.46M (\$23,000 per year)**

Ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol. 5, p. 107; Tab 2

- **One-Time Cost to Move Birmingham Jets - \$11 Million**

Ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol. 5, p. 107; Tab 2

- **\$70 Million Economic Impact to Birmingham Area**

Ref: 117ARW Economic Impact Statement; Tab 6

Ref: Letter from Birmingham Chamber of Commerce; Tab 6

- **Birmingham Targeted as “Enclave” Base for Expeditionary Combat Support?**

- Future of ECS Personnel Uncertain
- “Air” Removed from Air Guard
- Manpower Implications

- NGB Expects 80% Loss of Personnel as Unit Moves

Ref: E-Mail regarding Air Force briefing to SASC staff 14 Jun 2005

- One of The Most Diverse Flying Squadrons in the Nation
 - 15% Minority
 - 11% Female
- 100%+ Manned Flying Squadron

Ref: 117OG Minority and Manpower Organizational Chart; Tab 13

- Loss of Aircrew and Maintainers Experience Not Considered at Enclaved Units

- Average Pilot Experience
 - Average Years in KC-135’s - 15 Years
 - Average Total Flying Time - 3803 Hours
 - Average Combat Time - 447 Hours
- Average Maintainer Experience
 - Average Maintenance Experience - 15 Years
 - Average KC-135 Experience - 8 Years


Ref: Congressional Letters to The Honorable Anthony J. Principi; Tab 11

Ref: 117ARW Aircrew and Maintainer Experience Summary, Tab 12

- Loss of Rated Firefighters
 - Airports may lose FAA Ratings
 - May Fail to Meet Civilian Criteria for Landing/Loading



Operationalizing GIG Enterprise Services






Virtualization & Convergence

- **NETOPS**
- **Computing**
- **Networks**
- **Storage**



Mission Management Centers



- **Joint and Coalition Situational Awareness Monitoring and Reporting**
 - Near real time
 - End to End (consumer to producer)
- **Single point of entry for each functional area**
- **“On-star”-like capability**




Virtual Computing

- **Virtual Data Centers**
 - DECC Equivalency
- **Virtual Computing**
 - Grid Computing or 'Container' Concept
 - Dynamically Share Resources
 - Autonomic
 - Provisioning
 - Self-Healing
- **Application Design and Implementation**
 - Services Oriented Architecture
 - Platform and OS Independent
- **Enforcement of Standards and Net-centricity**
 - Net-centric Checklist



Virtual Data Centers



- ★ System Management Centers
- Other DISA data centers
- ◆ Other DoD data centers
- ◆ Outsourced data centers

- Certification of network worthiness
 - Authenticity
 - Trusted nature
 - Timely
- Single, integrated management structure




Virtual Networks

- **Convergence**
 - HAIPE
 - VOIP
 - Video Streaming
 - Interactive Video
- **CS IA Architecture**
- **Wireless**
- **Gateway Services**
- **Content Delivery Networks**
- **Metro-Ethernet**
- **IPv6**
- **Wide Area File Services**



Closed Architecture Model





Virtual Storage

- **No Physical Boundaries**
- **Storage Area Networks**
- **Shared Storage**
- **Content Aware**
- **Access Aware**
- **QoS Capable**
- **Content Delivery Storage/Caching**
- **Data at Rest Encryption**



Content Staging – Circa 2009

Tsunami Relief Mission



- JTF and JTF-GNO model the mission and network
 - Identify applications and data to be used
 - Identify performance challenges
- Decisions made to stage some content forward
 - Most will be available through reachback
 - Some to Guam
 - Some to Utapao
- Servers configured at Guam teleport and Utapao



The Future

- **Bits/bytes become content**
- **Data exposed before processing**
- **Management of data at rest**
- **Intelligence in Content Delivery and Retrieval Mechanisms vs. Application or Client**
- **Priority and Precedence End to End**
- **Fewer Management Centers with Greater Functional Expertise**
- **Managed Services at Application or Service Level**
 - **Command and Control**
 - **Combat Support**
 - **Data Base**
 - **CRM**
 - **ERP**
 - **Web Services**

- Costs Related to Replacement Shifts Burden to Community

Ref: AF Analysis and Recommendations Vol. 5, p. 107; Tab 2

The Birmingham Airport's 12,000-foot runway makes the 117th Air Refueling Wing the most capable Air National Guard tanker airfield in the eastern half of the United States. KC-135R aircraft stationed at Birmingham's International airport would be able to takeoff with the most fuel under the widest variety of weather conditions.

Birmingham is an unmatched force multiplier using a "Nine – Eleven" scenario. In addition, it provides non-stop global deployment and airlift capability to current theaters of U.S. operation.

There are clear advantages of keeping Birmingham in place by looking at its overwhelming global reach capabilities.

- **Birmingham IS the Most Capable ANG Tanker Base in Eastern Half of the U.S.**

- Most Gross Weight Lifted Under Widest Variety of Weather Conditions

Ref: KC-135R Performance Calculations, FSAS Calculator Ver. A.0, February 13, 2003, & Nationwide Airfield Analysis, Tab 14

- **12,000 Ft. Runway and Low Field Elevation Allows Optimum Tanker Operations**

- Sustaining Largest Domestic Tanker Capability in Eastern Half of the Nation Using a 9-11 Scenario


Ref: KC-135R Performance Graphics – Birmingham; Tab 25

Ref: KC-135R Performance Calculations, FSAS Calculator Ver. A.0, February 13, 2003 & Nationwide Airfield Analysis, Tab 14

Ref: KC-135R Domestic Flight Plans, Combat Flight Planning Software Ver. 3.2; Tab 15


- Provides Non-Stop Global Deployment and Airlift Capability to Current Theaters of U.S. Operation

Ref: KC-135R International Flight Plans, Combat Flight Planning Software Ver. 3.2; Tab 16



This chart says it all. The green shaded area depicts Birmingham capability with a 12,000-foot runway. Compare that to the red shaded area representing the capability of Knoxville with a 9,000 runway, and the result is stunning. Knoxville is scheduled to gain four of Birmingham's jets.

This scenario represent the type missions that the 117th performed in the days and weeks following "Nine – Eleven" and is assigned this same mission today for Air Sovereignty Alert. The DoD used "military judgment" to place these aircraft at Knoxville to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Simply stated, for Knoxville to perform this mission outside of the red ring would require two jets – Birmingham can do the job with one! **The green ring represents "military value" and the red ring represents "military judgment."**



Here again, looking at Birmingham’s unmatched, non-stop global reach in the Pacific in comparison to Knoxville. The green dot represents a Birmingham aircraft departing from Birmingham and landing at Guam with three hours of fuel to spare. The red dot, representing a Knoxville jet, falls well short.



The results are just as impressive going the other direction. This slide again shows Birmingham's global reach capability with a jet flying non-stop beyond Baghdad to Qatar with 20,000 pounds of fuel remaining. Birmingham Tankers are always one hop away from any of the World's hot spots. The Knoxville jet, once again, falls well short of the target.

Commissioner's, the DoD's "military judgment" to realign Birmingham also falls well short of the target.

ISSUE ANALYSIS / LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA

ISSUE

The Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from and failed to comply with The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the Fiscal Year (FY) 05 Authorization Act in recommending moving KC-135R aircraft from the Birmingham IAP AGS (117th ARW) to McGhee-Tyson APT AGS (134th ARW, Knoxville), Bangor IAP AGS (101st ARW), and Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP AGS (161st ARW).

LEGISLATION

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the Fiscal Year (FY) 05 Authorization Act states at Section 2913. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND.:

(a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA. – The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c).

(b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA. – The military value criteria are as follows:

(1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

(2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

(3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

(4) The cost of operations and manpower implications.

(c) OTHER CRITERIA. – The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows:

(1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure and realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

(2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

(3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

ISSUE ANALYSIS / LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA

(4) The environment impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and the environmental compliance activities.

(d) **PRIORITY GIVEN TO MILITARY VALUE.** – The Secretary shall give priority consideration to the military value criteria specified in subsection (b) in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations.

(e) **EFFECT ON DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCY COSTS.** – The selection criteria relating to the cost savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or realignment of military installations shall take into account the effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other activity of the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military installations.

(f) **RELATION TO OTHER MATERIALS.** – The final selection criteria specified in this section shall be the only criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory referred to in Section 2912, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005.

(g) **RELATION TO CRITERIA FOR EARLIER ROUNDS.** – Section 2903(b), and the selection criteria prepared under such section, shall not apply with respect to the process of making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations in 2005.

ANALYSIS

Military Value versus Military Judgment

Congress clearly stated its requirement in Section 2913(d) that, “The Secretary shall give **priority consideration to the military value criteria specified in subsection (b)** in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations.” [**Emphasis added.**] Military value was to be computed based upon the four (4) criteria set out at 2913(b). While other criteria (2913(c)) were to be considered, military value was the overriding factor upon which the Secretary’s recommendations were to be based.

According to a BRAC Red Team White Paper,

Supporting explanation for use of military judgment, especially over-rides of military value, are consistently weak. **There is a lot of hand-waving going on when it comes to military judgment.** [**Emphasis added.**] “Military judgment” is that judgment involving subjects that are peculiarly within the expertise of military professionals. Subjects such as cost and “buildable acreage”, (sic) therefore, cannot be subjects of “military judgment” such as to overcome military

ISSUE ANALYSIS / LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA

value quantitative analytical determinations, since they are within the expertise of other professions too.

[BRAC Red Team White Paper, Page 2, 25 February 2005.]

By comparison then, military value is the result of a quantitative analytical process while military judgment is vaguely defined as some form of judgment “peculiarly within the expertise of military professionals.” Congress mandated military value as the priority criteria to be considered, not “hand-waving” to justify overriding military value in making BRAC recommendations.

Specific Recommendations

The Department of the Air Force noted in its Analysis and Recommendations, BRAC 2005 [Volume V, Part 1 of 2], that 154 installations in its study were rated in each of eight Mission Compatibility Indices (MCIs). The specific MCI analyzed below is the Tanker MCI beginning at page 76 of that document. For ease of review, only those Tanker units within the Air National Guard are included. These are rank ordered from best to least, based upon their overall MCI score, in Table 1, below. Contrary to military value where the lower number indicates a higher ranking, the MCI score is valued from higher number to lower number.

Table 1. Tanker MCI

Base	Overall MCI Score	Crt 1 Current and Future Mission	Crt 2 Condition of Infrastructure	Crt 3 Contingency Mobilization Future Forces	Crt 4 Costs of Ops / Manpower
Salt Lake City IAP AGS	71.78	99.99	51.62	25.26	71.72
Forbes Field AGS	66.07	79.78	57.88	34.24	77.32
Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP AGS	65.27	83.26	50.26	30.23	68.42
Scott AFB	65.12	74.93	61.26	38.75	53.95
Rickenbacker IAP AGS	61.40	65.89	65.91	19.60	71.11
Selfridge ANGB	58.24	61.13	59.15	45.09	42.51
McGuire AFB	57.57	48.27	68.82	58.82	37.26
Birmingham IAP AGS	57.30	68.27	48.57	37.93	77.96
Sioux Gateway APT AGS	56.36	75.00	39.74	33.71	79.98
Portland IAP AGS	55.44	72.49	40.93	35.96	60.13
McGhee-Tyson APT AGS	55.32	67.74	45.40	31.72	86.02
Pittsburg IAP AGS	54.44	61.23	51.76	30.56	69.30
Gen Mitchell IAP AGS	54.00	65.19	47.02	30.15	59.38
Key Field AGS	52.83	67.84	38.01	39.62	75.40
Pease INT Trade Port AGS	50.62	44.47	62.12	35.33	33.80
Niagara Falls IAP ARS	44.63	54.98	33.64	39.93	55.66
Bangor IAP AGS	42.68	40.25	42.64	48.67	63.61

ISSUE ANALYSIS / LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA

Birmingham is an eight (8) Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) KC-135R Model Tanker unit that possesses nine aircraft (9) total aircraft (8 PAA, 1 Basic Aircraft Inventor (BAI)). The Secretary of Defense [hereinafter, Secretary] is proposing sending two (2) aircraft to Phoenix Sky Harbor, four (4) aircraft to McGhee-Tyson, and two (2) to Bangor. Phoenix is a recently converted R-Model unit, and both Mc-Ghee Tyson and Bangor are E-Model units.

In justifying moving Birmingham's KC-135R aircraft, the Air Force states, "Phoenix Sky Harbor (37) scored higher than Birmingham (63) in military value." Table 1 does illustrate that Phoenix (65.27) also rated higher on the Tanker MCI scale than Birmingham (57.30). The Air Force goes on to state, "Although McGhee-Tyson (74) and Bangor (123) ranked lower, **military judgment** argued in favor of retaining and adding force structure to these installations to increase their overall effectiveness." [Emphasis added.] Not only did McGhee-Tyson and Bangor rank lower than Birmingham in military value, they also ranked lower on the Tanker MCI scale at 55.32 and 42.68, respectively.

The Air Force stated Bangor would be increased to a 12 aircraft unit because of the critical nature of the Northeast Tanker Task Force and air bridge missions it supports. As for Knoxville, "The Air Force considered McGhee-Tyson's available capacity and Air National Guard experience in replacing aging, high maintenance KC-135E aircraft with re-engined KC-135R models and in increasing the squadron from 8 to 12 aircraft."

Looking first to Bangor, the 101st does participate in the Northeast Tanker Task Force and air bridge missions. However, those missions are also heavily supported by Pease INT Trade Port AGS (157th ARW), an existing KC-135R unit. Geographically, Pease is very close to Bangor. Bangor was rated dead last overall on the Tanker MCI, but the Air Force used its **military judgment** in deciding to make this a 12 PAA KC-135R Model unit because of the "critical nature" of its missions. The Secretary deviated substantially from BRAC's objective criteria in making this recommendation.

As for McGhee-Tyson, as noted above, the Secretary of Defense relied upon **military judgment**, as opposed to BRAC's objective criteria, in recommending moving Birmingham's aircraft. McGhee-Tyson is an E-model unit, not an R-model unit. By the Air Force's own admission, its overall military value is 74, compared to Birmingham's much higher value of 63. Again, in this instance, The Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from BRAC's objective criteria in making this recommendation.

As noted above, Congress mandated, "The Secretary shall give **priority consideration to the military value criteria specified in subsection (b)** in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations." [Emphasis added.] Obviously, the Secretary did not give priority consideration to Birmingham's greater military value. Instead, these recommendations, if accomplished, would place scarce, high value assets at two locations having a much lower military value than is offered by maintaining those KC-135Rs at Birmingham. This would result in a significant negative impact on current and future mission capabilities and a significant negative impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense.

Other Related Recommendations

Another recommended move of KC-135R aircraft that bypasses Birmingham's higher military value, and further illustrating The Secretary's failure to comply with controlling legislation, involves moving aircraft currently belonging to the Fairchild ANG (141st ARW) to Sioux Gateway Airport Air Guard Station (185th ARW). The Secretary has recommended moving eight (8) KC-135R aircraft from the 141st ARW at Fairchild AFB to the 185th ARW (ANG) in Iowa. The Air Force states as its justification, "In distributing KC-135R force structure to Sioux Gateway Air Guard Station (67), **the Air Force applied military judgment** in replacing aging, higher maintenance KC-135E force structure at Sioux Gateway with newer models to increase the unit's capability **and retain trained, experienced aircrews and maintenance technicians.**" [Emphasis added.]

In this instance, the Secretary again ignores Birmingham's higher military value (63) as well as the operational capability and experience it already possesses. Additionally, the justification to move KC-135Rs to this unit based upon their trained and experienced aircrews and maintenance personnel is a bald assertion not supported by the facts; the 185th has been a KC-135E Model Tanker unit for only a couple years, while Birmingham received its first KC-135R in June 1994. Further, Birmingham (57.30) ranks higher on the Tanker MCI scale (see Table 1) than the 185th (56.36).

One last example of the Secretary deviating substantially from BRAC requirements involves Niagara Falls IAP ARS (107th ARW) and Bangor (101st ARW). The Secretary of Defense is recommending moving eight (8) KC-135R aircraft from Niagara, a unit that possesses a higher military value, to Bangor.

In a news story reported in the Buffalo News concerning this recommendation, when asked why this was being planned, it reported that, "Top Air Force officials relied on their "collective judgment" in deciding to recommend their Niagara Falls base for closure, disregarding military value rankings that showed Niagara outperforming several other bases slated to remain open, an Air Force spokesman confirmed Tuesday." Quoting further from this story, "Air Force spokesman Douglas Karas said the Air Force's "mission compatibility index" was just one of the factors considered in the base-closure decisions."

This reported noted, ". . . Karas said **the Base Closure Executive Group sometimes deviated from its own rating system.** The 12-member [Base Closure Executive Group] drew up the Air Force's list of suggested base closures." Karas was further quoted as saying, "There were cases in the analysis process where lower ranked bases were retained. **In those cases, the Base Closure Executive Group used their collective judgment, that, when combined with the MCI scores, resulted in the retention of lower-ranked installations.** This was true in Niagara's case." [Emphasis added.]

Quoting Mr. Karas further, the news report stated, "Bangor was retained because, in the military judgment of the Base Closure Executive Group, its Northeast location and current capability to host tanker force operations **were important factors not highlighted within the MCI process.**" [Emphasis added.]

ISSUE ANALYSIS / LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA

Amazingly, an Air Force spokesman is literally admitting the 12-member Base Closure Executive Group that drew up the Air Force's list of suggested base closures sometimes deviated from its own rating system and substituted their "collective judgment" in recommending to retain or upgrade "lower-ranked installations" rather than rely upon the objective criteria set out in BRAC. Supposedly, this was to account for "important factors not highlighted within the MCI process." These admissions by Mr. Karas are clear evidence the Secretary deviated substantially from and failed to comply with The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the Fiscal Year (FY) 05 Authorization Act in recommending moving KC-135R aircraft within the Air National Guard.

CONCLUSION

Congress clearly stated its requirement in Section 2913(d) that, "The Secretary shall give **priority consideration to the military value criteria specified in subsection (b)** in the making of recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations." [**Emphasis added.**] Military value was to be computed based upon the four (4) criteria set out at 2913(b). While other criteria (2913(c)) were to be considered, military value was the overriding factor upon which the Secretary's recommendations were to be based. Congress did not intend for the Air Force to allow a 12-member Base Closure Executive Group charged with developing the Air Force's list of suggested base closures to sometimes deviate from its own rating system and substitute their "collective judgment" in deciding to retain or upgrade "lower-ranked installations." Congress intended, and the law requires, that such recommendations be based upon the objective criteria set out in BRAC.

Casual review of the sited documents clearly reveals the Secretary did not comply with the requirement stated at Section 2913(d), above. For the BRAC process to have credibility and achieve its intended result, its requirements must be judiciously followed. Capricious and arbitrary recommendations, based upon the "collective judgment" of an Executive Group, or "hand-waving" to explain overriding military value, cannot be substituted for the objective criteria BRAC demands. If the Air Force's 12-member Base Closure Executive Group is confident there were "important factors not highlighted within the MCI process," then that group should seek changes in the criteria rather than attempt to substitute their "collect judgment" in some cases.

The Secretary's unwarranted recommendations regarding Birmingham ignore the results of a quantitative analytical process and would assign scarce, high value assets at locations that do not offer the United States the highest in military value. No amount of "hand-waving" can justify ignoring Birmingham's documented military value. Based upon the criteria Congress set out in law, Birmingham obviously should retain its assigned KC-135R aircraft. The Secretary's recommendation to move these aircraft to units with lower military value flies in the face of BRAC's very intention.



**Birmingham
Regional**

Chamber of Commerce



June 21, 2005

Colonel Paul Brown
Commander, 117th Air Refueling Wing
540 Eastlake Blvd.
Birmingham, Alabama 35217

VIA FACSIMILE: 205.714.2224

Dear Col. Brown:

As you know, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) has selected the 117th Air Refueling Wing of the Alabama National Guard, located in Birmingham, Alabama, to be realigned. I am writing you today to voice the Birmingham Chamber's strong opposition to this realignment.

The Department of Defense has recommended that the aircrafts from the 117th be sent to McClellan-Tyson APT AGS (134th Refueling Wing, Knoxville), Bangor International Airport AGS (101st Air Refueling Wing), and Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport AGS (151st Air Refueling Wing). This action appears to be in direct conflict to the specific guidelines as defined by the BRAC legislation itself. The law states that the final criteria used by the defense secretary in making recommendations "shall be the military value and other *specified* criteria." Birmingham scored better (63) than Mc-Ghee Tyson (74) and Bangor (123), yet lost based on *unspecified* "military judgment."


In fact, when you base the decision on military value and specified criteria, the decision of the commission conflicts with the clear mandate of the legislation. For example:

- The 117th Air Wing is a combat ready KC-135 R unit. The 134th is a KC-135 E unit, which represents an older less efficient engine that is due to be replaced by the newer R unit. As such, when replacement ultimately occurs, there would be a loss of combat readiness while the pilots and support personnel learn the intricacies of the R unit. This would result in added costs to the federal government.
- The Defense Department has invested \$73 million dollars in building new facilities and updating existing structures at the 117th Air Wing in Birmingham. This financial investment enables the 117th to accept four more KC-135 R's for a total of 12 aircrafts with no increase in cost. The 134th does not have the infrastructure in place to accept the KC-135's from Birmingham at this time.

- Currently the Birmingham International Airport, where the 117th is based, is expanding its runway from 10,000 to 12,000 feet. *This added runway capability was not included in the BRAC analysis.* When complete in December 2006, the expanded runway will allow a fully loaded KC-135 R to fly 6568 nautical miles to Al-Udied, Saudi Arabia with 20,000 lbs of fuel remaining. The same KC-135 R taking off from McChhee Tyson's 9000 foot runway can only travel 4545 nautical miles requiring a re-fueling somewhere in or over Romania.

In conclusion, the 117th Air Wing of the Alabama National Guard has a proud history of meritorious service in multiple conflicts and wars. The geographic location and facility upgrades make it the logical choice for the KC-135 R program. We encourage the members of the commission to review the recommendations in light of these points and to act in favor of retaining the operations of the 117th at its present Birmingham location.

Very Truly Yours,



Russell M. Cunningham, III
Interim President & CEO

cc:

Members, Alabama Congressional Delegation
Governor Bob Riley, Alabama
Mayor Bernard Kincaid, City of Birmingham
Commission President, Larry Langford, Jefferson County

**FY 04 - 117ARW
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS
FINANCIAL SUMMARY**

This document was formerly called the Economic Resource Impact Statement (ERIS). In August 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management specified a new methodology for computing a military installation's economic impact and changed the name of the document from the ERIS to the Economic Impact Analysis (EIA). This change makes Air Force EIA estimates consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission methodology.

117ARW's current economic area is referred to as the Birmingham-Hoover Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and includes Jefferson, Saint Clair, Shelby and Blount Counties. It shall be noted that **59%** of base employees reside in just these four county areas resulting in a **\$21,820,931** payroll.

It should also be noted that an additional **22%** of base employees reside in Calhoun, Cullman, Etowah, Madison and Tuscaloosa Counties resulting in a **\$6,879,729** payroll.

Total Economic Impact (Secretary of the Air Force/Financial Management formula (SAF/FM formula))	\$59,106,912
Total Secondary Jobs Created (SAF/FM formula)	302
Estimated Annual Dollar Value of Secondary Jobs Created (SAF/FM formula)	\$10,965,922
Annual Gross Payroll for Fiscal Year 2004	\$33,861,710
Total Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2004	\$14,279,280
Future Construction Projects for Fiscal Year 2006	\$11,483,000
Value of Major Capital Assets and Resources	\$1,013,486,876

PROJECTED FY 05 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Projected Fiscal Year 2005 Total Economic Impact	\$61,034,824
Projected Fiscal Year 2005 Total Secondary Jobs Created	299
Projected Fiscal Year 2005 Estimated Annual Dollar Value of Secondary Jobs Created	\$10,856,989
Projected Annual Gross Payroll for Fiscal Year 2005	\$35,927,835

FIRE PROTECTION

117ARW Fire Department provides fire protection to the airport with federal funds.

Facility Replacement Value	\$2,821,520
Trucks and Equipment	2,423,000
Annual Salaries Fiscal Year 2004	730,057
Fiscal Year 2004 Utilities	53,900
Landing Fees	<u>40,000</u>
TOTAL	\$6,068,477

TAXES PAID FROM SALARIES

For Fiscal Year 2004

City of Birmingham	\$170,917
Jefferson County	<u>\$ 87,795</u>
TOTAL	\$258,712

AIRCRAFT FUEL JP-8

11 September 2001 - Present

15,855,422 gallons of aircraft fuel purchased from local distributor that had a direct economic impact, as listed below.

FY 05 to Present:	\$3,320,025
FY 04	\$3,310,321
FY 03	\$4,807,882
FY 02	\$6,797,702
FY 01 (11 – 30 Sept)	<u>\$2,144,769</u>
TOTAL	\$20,380,699

MAJOR CAPITAL ASSETS

As of 30 September 2004

Aircraft	9 assigned KC-135R
Land	192.4 Acres
Buildings	38 with a total 345,293 S/F
Vehicles	82
Powered Aerospace Ground Equipment	96
Non-Powered Aerospace Ground Equip.	71
Telephone Exchange	3 T-1 trunks totaling 69 lines
Local Area Network	545 terminals
Closed Circuit TV System	1
Teleconferencing System	1
Command Post Comm System	1
SIPRNET	1
Land Mobile Radios	239

VALUE OF MAJOR CAPITAL ASSETS AND RESOURCES

KC-135R (9 @ 60 million each)	\$540,000,000
Buildings (replacement cost)	428,790,000
Vehicles, powered & non-powered support equip	18,252,000
Information systems	1,173,500
Computers (Hardware)	1,412,800
Inventories (General, RSP & Mobility bags)	<u>23,858,576</u>
TOTAL	\$1,013,486,876

FUTURE CONSTRUCTION

FY 2006 – FY 2008

16 Major Projects with estimated value	\$11,483,000
--	--------------

**SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND GROSS
PAYROLL**


Classification	# Assigned	FY2004 Gross Payroll
Appropriated Fund Military		
Traditional Guardsman Officer	106	\$ 3,557,363
Traditional Guardsman Enlisted	753	9,533,014
Subtotal	859	\$13,090,377
Active Guard Reserve (AGR)		
Officer	12	\$ 1,696,086
Enlisted	78	5,313,724
Subtotal	90	\$ 7,009,810
Air Technicians		
Federal Employees	211	\$12,288,440
State Employees		
Firemen	13	\$ 730,057
Security	6	274,000
Other (Building Maint, Facility Repair, Real Property)	9	393,753
Subtotal	28	\$ 1,397,810
Non-appropriated Fund Employees		
Base Exchange	7	\$ 75,273
TOTAL PAYROLL		\$33,861,710

EXPENDITURES

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE	FY04	FY05 (Projected)
Travel and Transportation of Persons	1,152,888	1,200,000
Transportation of Things	25,442	40,000
Automated Data Processing	146,639	150,000
Communications	128,264	70,000
Other Contract Services	526,836	321,800
Flying Supplies	2,104,552	1,750,000
General Supplies	1,342,875	927,100
Non-Fly DLR	34,821	30,000
Equipment	142,252	-0-
Fire Fighters Agreement	730,057	762,700
Operations and Maintenance Agreement	1,130,448	1,224,300
Security Agreement	274,000	261,500
Medical	79,386	100,000
Real Property Maintenance	1,353,656	1,077,100
Drug Interdiction	75,742	179,000
Environmental	15,367	35,200
Recruiting & Advertising	42,755	42,500
Aviation Fuel	<u>3,353,751</u>	<u>4,960,900</u>
TOTAL	\$12,738,797	\$13,132,100
MILITARY PERSONNEL		
Clothing	\$ 157,012	130,100
Subsistence	58,497	60,000
Annual Training Travel	510,717	397,300
School Training Travel	359,905	288,000
Special Training Travel	172,508	72,500
Student Loan Repayments	<u>150,921</u>	<u>170,000</u>
TOTAL	\$ 1,409,560	\$1,117,900
TOTAL APPROPRIATED FUNDS	\$14,148,357	\$14,250,000

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS FROM FY 93 TO PRESENT

<u>Proj #</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FY</u>	<u>Cost</u>
BRKR052998	USPFO APPROVED CLASS M & R	FY05	\$496,300
BRKR042998	USPFO APPROVED CLASS M & R	FY04	\$1,353,656
BRKR032998	USPFO APPROVED CLASS M & R	FY03	\$1,836,349
BRKR002016	REPAIR BASE HVAC	FY02	\$115,000
BRKR992018	REPAIR COMMUNITY SUPPORT	FY02	\$259,000
BRKR962044	REPAIR INTEL FACILITY	FY02	\$1,000,000
BRKR992082	REPAIR CHILLER AIRCRAFT HANGAR	FY01	\$111,000
BRKR992065	REPAIR HVAC HOOD DINING HALL	FY01	\$150,000
BRKR012998	USPFO APPROVED CLASS M & R	FY01	\$220,000
BRKR962043	REPAIR ROOF/EXTERIOR BLDG 175	FY01	\$1,125,000
BRKR001502	REPLACE BASE ENGINEER COMPLEX	FY00	\$4,200,000
BRKR962006	CONSTRUCT FENCING BASEWIDE	FY99	\$438,000
BRKR962007	RENOVATE BUILDING 151, WING HEADQUARTERS	FY99	\$1,710,000
BRKR972009	REPAIR RUNWAY 05/23	FY99	\$2,994,000
BRKR962005	CONSTRUCT GATE HOUSE	FY98	\$295,000
BRKR962002	REPAIR ROOF/EXTERIOR BLDG 149	FY98	\$875,000
BRKR001423	JOINT MEDICAL TRAINING	FY97	\$3,683,100
BRKR952994	REPLACE BASE LIGHTING	FY96	\$192,000
BRKR882013	REPAIR BASE PAVEMENTS- PHASE I	FY96	\$373,000
BRKR952020	REPAIR BASE PAVEMENTS- PHASE II	FY96	\$675,000
BRKR919594	ALTER KC-135R AIRCRAFT SHOPS	FY96	\$4,400,000
BRKR942202	MINOR CONVERSION PROJECTS	FY95	\$150,000
BRKR942206	ALTER BLDG 495 FOR SCIF	FY95	\$150,000
BRKR929503	ADD ALTER SQUADRON OPERATIONS	FY95	\$1,100,000
BRKR001536	CONSTRUCT COMMUNICATION FACILITY	FY95	\$1,700,000
BRKR929882	UPGRADE BASE STORMWATER DRAINAGE	FY95	\$2,500,000
BRKR919601	AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON & FUEL SYSTEM	FY95	\$15,000,000
BRKR932204	CONSTRUCT BASE ENTRANCE TRAFFIC SIGNAL	FY94	\$49,000
BRKR922207	ALTER WING HEADQUARTERS	FY94	\$125,000
BRKR882014	CONSTRUCT SUPPLY SHED	FY94	\$154,000
BRKR802003	CONSTRUCT HAZMAT PHARMACY	FY94	\$295,000
BRKR949724	PETROLEUM OPERATIONS FACILITY	FY94	\$450,000
BRKR882007	REPAIR ROOFS BLDGS 141/142	FY94	\$590,000
BRKR919593	CONSTRUCT FUEL CELL HANGAR	FY94	\$4,400,000
BRKR909592	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR	FY94	\$5,500,000
BRKR919531	EAST LAKE BLVD RELOCATION	FY94	\$6,200,000
BRKR929510	REPLACE UNDERGROUND FUEL	FY93	\$500,000
BRKR001420	CONSTRUCT FIRE STATION	FY93	\$2,100,000
BRKR001421	CONSTRUCT VEHICLE MAINTENANCE COMPLEX	FY93	\$2,300,000
BRKR000955	CONSTRUCT JET FUEL STORAGE	FY93	<u>\$3,000,000</u>
		TOTAL	\$72,764,405



Birmingham International (BHM)
BIRMINGHAM, AL
Publicly Owned, Public Use
4.0 mi. NE of city.
N33-33.78 W086-45.21
Mag Var: 1 deg W
Phone: 205-595-0533 Fax: 205-592-4827

FBO/Facility Information
[Airport Diagram](#)
[Taxi Diagram](#)
[Kneeboard Format](#)
[Member Comments](#)
US Terminal Procedures
ASF Accident Reports **NEW**
[Return To Directory Search](#)
[Exit Directory](#)

Nav aids:

Type:	ID:	Freq:	Radial:	Distance:
VOR	VUZ	114.4	129	9.80 mi.
NDB	BH	224	057	5.60 mi.
NDB	ROE	394	235	4.60 mi.

Communication Freqs:

Unicom - 122.95
TWR - 118.25
CLNC DEL - 125.675
FSS - ANNISTON 123.65 122.2

TWR - 119.9
GND - 121.7

Approach Freqs: Birmingham:127.675 N; Birmingham:123.8 S;

WX Contact: ATIS 119.4 ; ASOS 205-591-6172;

FSS: ANNISTON 866-609-8684 **NEW**

Elevation: 644 MSL
Hours: 24
Tower Hours: 24
Fees: None
Charts: ATLANTA; L14
Traffic Pattern: All Aircraft: 1644 MSL;

The 117th is the only Air National Guard tanker Wing Co-located with a depot-level KC-135 repair facility. The 117th aircrews frequently augment PEMCO active duty aircrews during peak production periods. In fact, the 117th proposed to assume the entire flight test mission at PEMCO. Capitalizing on this natural partnership makes perfect sense.

- **Mission Capability and Infrastructure**

- Only ANG Tanker Wing Co-located With a KC-135 Depot repair Complex
 - 117th ARW Provides:
 - Aircrew Augmentation During Peak Production
 - 117th Proposed to Assume Flight Test Mission

Ref: 117ARW Flight Test Mission Proposal (PEMCO), 26 June 2000; Tab 17

- **Legacy Flying Squadron**

- Oldest Continuous Flying Unit in DoD History
- Organized in 1919 By James Meissner, a Member of Eddie Rickenbacker's "Hat-in-the-Ring" Squadron
- Federally Recognized in 1922

Ref: 117ARW Historical Documents; Tab 18

The recommendation to realign the Air National Guard tanker fleet will degrade operational readiness and makes no sense. The DoD substantially deviated from the military value criteria specified in the law. The Air Force admitted deviating from military value and instead substituted "military judgment." Military value was ignored in the realignment of the Birmingham. If the DoD had made its recommendation based on military value calculations, **we wouldn't be here today**. The Birmingham Air Guard Base has documented military capability and is ready to accept more jets **today** at no additional infrastructure cost. The unit has proven time and again its value to the country. The 117th Air Refueling Wing is the most capable Air National Guard tanker unit in the eastern half of the U.S.

Ref: Washington News Bureau Article, 25 May 05, Tab 23

- **Summary...**

- Substantial Deviation from the Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
- Disregard of Impact to Mission Capability and Established Infrastructure
- Air National Guard Performs 34% of Air Force Missions at 7.2% of Air Force Budget

Ref: ANGSC standard brief Excerpt, 16 May 05, Tab 19

The relocation of tanker assets nation-wide, especially in Birmingham, is a flawed decision and creates reduced operational readiness. This is a force structure decision, which rightly belongs in the hands of the Congressional Defense Committee after a thorough analysis.

*Reject the DoD Redistribution plan for the Air Refueling
Tanker Fleet.*

Alabama Air National Guard

Lean, Lethal and Low Cost

117 ARW

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Birmingham, AL

Name	Combat Hrs SUM	Combat Support SUM	Total SUM	Rating Date (Original)	Flying Year
Armistead, R.	226.8	231.4	3153.9	30-Aug-93	12
Bailey, R.	97.7	211.9	3072.3	1-May-85	10
Barrow, J.	74.9	108.1	4083.5	24-Apr-91	14
Berryhill, S.	235.7	88.1	7363.5	8-Oct-81	24
Brickner, M.	219.4	147.3	4988.5	2-Nov-85	20
Brown, P.	100.4	263.8	6557.4	6-Oct-75	30
Carille, J.	115.4	293	4391	22-Jul-88	17
Cumming, P.	60.2	361.1	2195.9	22-Nov-91	14
Graham, S.	235.6	740.9	5243.5	20-Jan-89	15
Grant, R.	373.7	314.6	4852.6	10-Mar-89	15
Griffin, L.	205.4	221.5	1982.8	16-Nov-94	11
Hawkins, G.	172.3	233.4	3235.5	7-Apr-94	11
Honbarrier, K.	100	9.1	2317.5	1-Jun-88	17
Howard, T.	178.2	173.2	2320.9	18-Nov-94	11
James, C.	256.9	408.5	4998.8	27-Aug-84	21
King, R.	211.4	410	3006.5	1-Oct-93	12
Metcalf, M.	15.3	223.1	2056.2	12-May-95	10
Mitchell, J.	158.7	307.4	4886.7	11-May-92	13
Mix, D.	184.9	524.8	4444.7	17-Mar-88	17
Muse, G.	59	171.4	4015.3	30-Jan-82	23
Owens, D.	153.5	671.1	3074.3	11-Jun-93	12
Phillips, M.	95.4	23.2	3016.1	12-Feb-92	13
Preston, D.	179.9	227.7	3141.2	2-Nov-85	20
Rabuczewski, T.	205.2	220.1	1533.3	20-Feb-98	7
Reinhardt, R.	86.7	205.5	6762.2	11-May-73	32
Warren, R.	79.8	345.5	2611.7	7-Dec-94	11
Weaver, F.	263.7	459.8	3785.5	3-Sep-91	14
West, G.	278.3	411.8	3411.8	5-Jul-94	11
Total Hours	4626.4	7888.4	106510.1		437

Average Total Flying Time (AC) 3803 hrs
 Average Total Combat/Combat Support Flying Hours (AC) 447 hrs
 Average Total Flying Years (AC) 16 yrs

Grant, Scott, Ltc, 106ARS, DOO, 2406

From: Harris, Stephen, TSG, 117AGS, 2246

Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 12:49 PM

To: Newton, Jeffrey Lt Col 117AMXS/CC Baird, Johnny SMSGT 117ARW LGGGA Grant, Scott, Ltc, 106ARS, DOO, 2406

Subject: Exp List.xls

117th AMXS Aircraft Experience

	Gener	KC-13	Total	Age
	(Civ. Or			
Allen D.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	24
Baird J.	42 Yrs.	14 Yrs.	42 Yrs.	59
Brewer S.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	24
Brothers R.	12 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	12 Yrs.	37
Brown P.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	21
Champion B.	20 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	20 Yrs.	40
Clark H.	22 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	22 Yrs.	53
Coleman C.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	35
Collier M.	17 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	17 Yrs.	37
Cooper P.	29 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	29 Yrs.	47
Creel G.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	27
Dailey J.	26 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	26 Yrs.	43
Decker K.	22 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	22 Yrs.	43
Doak G.	7 Yrs.	7 Yrs.	7 Yrs.	25
Fallin N.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	25
Fife N.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	29
Gonzalez R.	27 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	27 Yrs.	53
Graves R.	33 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	33 Yrs.	51
Grubbs J.	25 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	25 Yrs.	43
Harris S.	13 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	13 Yrs.	31
Heatherly J.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	21
Henderson B.	6 Yrs.	6 Yrs.	6 Yrs.	27
Hines G.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	27
Holsombeck K.	17 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	17 Yrs.	32
Hood B.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	27
Jones K.	8 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	29
Lindsey T.	19 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	19 Yrs.	43
Lovell B.	23 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	23 Yrs.	42
Massey J.	25 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	25 Yrs.	47
Morgan W.	6 Yrs.	9 Yrs.	15 Yrs.	38
Mullins H.	21 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	21 Yrs.	44

<i>Murphree M.</i>	8 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	29
<i>Nichols H.</i>	23 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	23 Yrs.	41
<i>Nicholson G.</i>	27 Yrs.	24 Yrs.	27 Yrs.	42
<i>Nixon A.</i>	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	24
<i>Park J.</i>	24 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	24 Yrs.	44
<i>Phillips D.</i>	24 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	24 Yrs.	43
<i>Rodgers S.</i>	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	21
<i>Russell J.</i>	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	22
<i>Santarles C.</i>	37 Yrs.	13 Yrs.	37 Yrs.	54
<i>Smith T.</i>	27 Yrs.	15 Yrs.	27 Yrs.	47
<i>Stone C.</i>	5 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	26
<i>Straate C.</i>	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	21
<i>Tedder L.</i>	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	23
<i>Tyler T.</i>	16 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	16 Yrs.	36
<i>Williams K.</i>	19 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	19 Yrs.	39
<i>Wingenter T.</i>	8 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	8 Yrs.	27
<i>Winter D.</i>	14 Yrs.	14 Yrs.	14 Yrs.	50
<i>Collins J.</i>	18 Yrs.	11 Yrs.	18 Yrs.	40
Total	742	400	742	
Average	15	8	15	36

KC-135R Performance Analysis

Maj. Trent Mitchell, 106ARS
15 Jun 2005

Birmingham Air National Guard Station

Vs.

McGhee-Tyson Air National Guard Station

- Data was derived from Computer Based FSAS Calculator Program Ver. A.0
- Each takeoff is based on 90F (32C), Altimeter setting of 29.92 , no headwind benefit
- Runway grade conditions are down hill (best case).
 - McGhee-Tyson = -6%
 - Birmingham = -5%
- Takeoff Conditions
 - Basic Aircraft Weight = 122,500 lbs.
 - Static Takeoff
 - Takeoff Rated Thrust
 - 30-Max Takeoff Profile
 - Air Conditioning – OFF
 - Engine Anti Ice – OFF
- Results:
 - McGhee Tyson
 - Max Takeoff Gross Weight = **286,700 lbs.**
 - Max Fuel = **164,200 lbs.**
 - Birmingham
 - Max Takeoff Gross Weight = **319,100 lbs.**
 - Max Fuel = **196,600 lbs.**

Nationwide ANG Airfield Comparison

March ARB, CA KRIV	13,300	1,535	86	104	over 120
Birmingham IAP, AL KBHM	12,000	644	82	over 120	over 120
Lincoln Airport, NE KLNC	12,901	1,219	81	104	over 120
Fairchild AFB, WA KSKA	13,901	2,462	72	97	115
Bangor IAP, ME KBGR	11,440	192	70	102	118
Rickenbacker IAP, OH KLCK	12,102	744	68	102	118
Pease Int'l Tradeport, NH KPSM	11,321	100	57	102	118
McConnell AFB, KS	12,000	1,371	45	97	113
Pittsburgh IAP, PA KPIT	11,500	1,204	27	95	111
McGuire AFB, NJ KWRI	10,001	131	-9	91	109
Meridian IAP, MS KMEI	10,003	297	-15	90	99
Scott AFB, IL KBLV	10,000	459	-17	88	106
General Mitchell IAP, WI KMKE	9,690	723	-25	84	104
Niagara Falls IAP, NY KIAG	9,829	589	-31	79	104
Salt Lake IAP, UT KSLC	12,400	4,227	-38	75	95
Phoenix-Sky Harbor IAP, AZ KPHX	11,489	1,135	N/A - Temp Out of Range	84*	111**
Selfridge ANGB, MI KMTC	9,000	579	N/A - Temp Out of Range	37	95
McGhee-Tyson IAP, TN KTYS	9,005	981	N/A - Temp Out of Range	46	97
Forbes Field, KS KFOE	12,802	1,078	N/A - Weight Bearing	N/A - Weight Bearing	over 120
Sioux City, IA KSUX	9,002	1,098	N/A - Weight Bearing	N/A - Weight Bearing	N/A - Weight Bearing
Portland, OR KPDX	11,000	30	45	100	117

* Restricted to 10,300' runway weight bearing restriction

** May use 11,489' runway

Performance based on best available runway.

Factors affecting performance
include Runway length, Runway
slope, pressure altitude and
temperature

117ARW Additional Mission Proposal:
With
Defense Contract Management Agency Pemco
Birmingham, AL

History:

Pemco aeroplex is a civilian contractor providing KC-135 programmed depot level maintenance (PDM), major modifications (TCTO's) and repairs deemed too extensive for field units or contract field teams. The majority of Pemco's government contract provides the five-year PDM tear-down inspections and repairs to the all MAJCOMS operating several variants of the 135. Following this major maintenance, functional check flights (FCF) are required by T.O. prior to the government's "buy back" of the aircraft into service. These flights require experienced instructor crewmembers in all positions as well as an in-depth knowledge of the 135's systems and their operating tolerances. This mission is currently performed by two active duty Air Force crews assigned to the Defense Contract Management Agency in a joint assignment at Pemco. These crews maintain a continuous availability Monday through Friday and one weekend per month to the contractor to perform these FCF's upon the completion of the repairs. Daylight and good weather (VFR) are required for these flights.

The typical tour length for an active duty Pemco crewmember is three years. The training and qualification for Pemco FCF crewmember is lengthy considering the multiple 135 models and mission differences facing the new recruit in addition to a high level of corporate knowledge gained only through experience in the FCF environment. This "spin up" time is compounded by aircraft availability driven totally by Pemco's production. Consequently, the rapid turnover rate counteracts the experience gained by the new crewmembers. All flight activities are dependent upon the contractors production schedule whether it's one flight per day or no flights in two weeks. The only other responsibilities facing these crewmembers are the administrative support mechanisms required in any flight operation i.e. training records, qualification records, safety, life support etc. and technical support to the contractor and government quality assurance personnel. The required duties of FCF crewmembers extend beyond the traditional guidelines spelled out in T.O.'s for a typical refueling mission. Navigators for example are used primarily as systems evaluation officers specializing in 135 pressurization / pneumatics and electrical systems in addition to traditional navigation systems.

Pemco is located at the Birmingham International Airport on city-leased property employing approximately 1800 and hosting nearly 40 government civilians charged with the oversight of the multimillion dollar contract. Office hours are typically between 0730-1500 daily.

Proposal:

The 117ARW could staff the Pemco crewmember positions by active duty attrition in a cheaper and more efficient manner in two phases:

Phase I: As the current active duty crews at Pemco experience natural attrition, the 117ARW would gain 1 complete 4-person aircrew in either AGR or technician pay status. During this phase, the Pemco FCF duties would be accomplished by this "50/50" split of active duty and ANG crews. The existing "interfly" letter of agreement would be used to accomplish the required training. Approximately 1 week of E-model simulator training and 1 week of flying training would be required to cover the applicable difference course. All four crew positions would attend this training due to the high levels of systems knowledge requirements.

Phase II: Following phase I and as the Active Duty crews at Pemco experiences continued natural attrition, the 117ARW would begin taking on 100% of the FCF support responsibility at Pemco without the necessity of another "full time" crew therein allowing a second active duty crew return to their AMC parent command. Through careful workload analysis at Pemco as of 1 July 00, it has been determined that the additional workload could be handled with a second crew through MPA workdays on an "as needed" basis (seek workdays breakout). It is important to mention that this second crew or a portion thereof would be used during periods when Pemco's needs necessitated more than a basic four-person crew or when training / leave was needed. For example: a second pilot may be needed during a time that the "primary" pilot was at simulator etc. In this case, one pilot could be on MPA mandays for one week. MPA days would also be needed to cover required E-difference training and initial FCF training.

It is our intent to implement this plan (if approved) in a manner that would be virtually invisible to the contractor and DCMC Pemco while improving the overall quality of the product to its parent MAJCOMs.

Points:

- **Location** – The Birmingham Air National Guard is conveniently located across the airfield from the Pemco facility.
- **Continuity** – The turnover problem facing Pemco is all but eliminated by the inherent 'homesteading' in an Air National Guard unit
- **Cost** – Same job being accomplished at an overall smaller cost to the Air Force (1 full time crew plus 1 "part time" crew on mandays as needed that would replace 2 full time active duty crews. Also, no PCS relocations equals less money
- **Training** – FCF training would not be dependent on Pemco's aircraft. The same training could be conducted aboard 117ARW aircraft in conjunction with regularly scheduled training sorties. In addition, E-model training would be greatly facilitated by the 117th's close working relationship with the Knoxville, ANG (a KC-135E unit). E-model training could be accomplished in a timely manner with the TN ANG rather than depending on E-model availability at Pemco. Also, ANG crews would receive their proficiency training through the Guard and not require flight time solely for training on Pemco aircraft. This would greatly shorten FCF flight durations – a great benefit to the contractor

- **Experience** - The KC-135 experience level available in the 117ARW greatly exceeds that provided to DCMC Pemco through the AFMPC. Several Guard members are former FCF crewmembers relocated from the Pemco assignment with a deal of experience in that exact operation.
- **Availability** – The 117th would actually be able to provide increased availability since there would be a larger pool of crewmembers to cover periods of high demand. Also, the Guard typically conducts operations on scheduled weekends – a major problem for active duty crews.
- **Efficiency** – The Air National Guard would be able to utilize their “Pemco designated” crew during periods of low productivity at the facility. If Pemco did not require flight crew availability whether it’s four hours or two weeks, the resources could be readily used at the 117th in support of its daily refueling missions. Also, The Air National Guard could perform this task with the second crew funded on an “as needed” basis via MPA days (see “workdays breakout” below).
- **Objectivity** – The Air National Guard would be most in touch with the current command procedures and objectives required of the airframe. Pemco crewmembers currently do not maintain currencies in the following areas: night landing, air refueling, formation or boom operator contacts.

Requirements:

- (2) KC-135 Instructor Pilots (AGR/Technician)
- (1) KC-135 Instructor Navigator (AGR/Technician)
- (1) KC-135 Instructor Boom Operator (AGR/Technician)
- (2) KC-135 Instructor Pilots (MPA days as needed)
- (1) KC-135 Instructor Navigator (MPA days as needed)
- (1) KC-135 Instructor Boom Operator (MPA days as needed)
- Logistical support for the addition of four crewmembers to the Birmingham Air National Guard’s staff

Important Point

Additional crewmember positions would need to be in addition to the 117ARW’s current manning document and would need to be in a non-deployment capacity.

These positions could not be deployed during a “call up” due to the importance of the depot’s airframe “inflow” to the MAJCOM’s. In times of crisis, Pemco’s output is always increased to meet defense demands

Workdays Breakout

Training

E-mod Difference

Pilot x 2	Simulators	14
Navigator	Simulators	7
Boom Operators	Simulators	7
Pilot x 2	Ground / Flying	14
Navigator	Ground / Flying	7
Boom Operators	Ground / Flying	7
<hr/>		
Total E-Difference		56

KC-135 FCF Qualification

Pilot x 2	Ground / Flying	14
Navigator	Ground / Flying	10
Boom Operators	Ground / Flying	7
<hr/>		
Total FCF Qualification		31

FCF Duties (per month based on model month)

Flying - 6 flights / month (6 x 4 crewmembers)	24
Preflight inspections (additional)	
<i>Average 2 preflights per flight a one-day slip due to mx. deficiency</i>	12
Postflight followups / Ground acceptance	4
Forecast to fly by contractor (waiting on a jet)	32
<u>Administrative duties / systems research</u>	<u>16</u>
Total days required per month	88
"Part timer" MPA Days required	
(average 25% of full time requirements)	22
<u>Days provided by full time crew (subtraction)</u>	<u>-80</u>
Total Projected MPA days needed per month	30
Total Projected MPA days needed per year	360
<u>Total MPA Days needed for initial training (above)</u>	<u>87</u>
Total MPA days (to cover first year of Pemco FCF's)	447

As of 26 June 00

Summary

The 117ARW has devised a "common sense" approach to streamline an important Air Force process

- We're in the right location
- We have a vested interest in the product - we're also a customer
- We can do it: cheaper and more efficiently by eliminating a current "duplication of effort"
- We have tremendous resources, experience and innovation that can make the process "tighter"

ST 23 1922
OCT 23 1922
U.S. MILITIA

WAR DEPARTMENT
Militia Bureau
WASHINGTON

M.B.-210.12 -Alabama.

October 19, 1922.

Subject: Federal recognition.

To: The Adjutant General of Alabama.

1. The records of this office show that the War Department extended Federal recognition, subject to examination, to

Major James Armand Meissner, Air Service,
Alabama National Guard.

2. The record of the examining board showing that the provisions of Section 75, National Defense Act, have been complied with in this case, has been approved by the Secretary of War and the Federal recognition is made permanent.

For the Chief, Militia Bureau:



L. G. Scherer,
Assistant.

Report of board dated August 11, 1922.

21031 Michigan Ave.

1922

OCT 27 1922

National Aeronautic Association of U. S. A.

(INCORPORATED)

HOWARD E. COFFIN
President

B. H. MULVIHILL
Vice President

B. F. CASTLE
Treasurer

JOHN B. COLEMAN
Recording Secretary

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS MILLS BUILDING WASHINGTON D. C.
CABLE ADDRESS NATDERO. TELEPHONE MAIN 8504

October 25th, 1922.

The Adjutant General,
State of Alabama.

Dear Sir:

This is to acquaint you with the fact that Major J.A. Meissner introduced a resolution which was unanimously adopted at the National Aeronautic Association Convention on October 13th, assuring the several districts of the support of this Association in their efforts to establish and maintain National Guard Aero Squadrons. Furthermore, that the formation of these Squadrons would be very instrumental in gaining the support of the Militia Bureau to the end that those Squadrons already established might be assured of the necessary financial support from the Militia Bureau Funds for continuation.

The presence of Major Meissner as a delegate from the 4th District at this convention was essential as he was instrumental in the formation and carrying thru of the progressive policies adopted by the Association.

Very truly yours,

B. H. Mulvihill
B. H. Mulvihill,
Vice-President

"AMERICA FIRST IN THE AIR"



ANG Percentage of Total Air Force

54 States
& Territories

88 Flying Wings

579 Missions

106,700 Personnel

1,180 Aircraft

100%	Interceptor Mission
95%	Engineering & Installation
75%	Combat Comm.
75%	State Augmentation
62.5%	Air Traffic Control
50%	Control Sqdn.
50%	Support Ops Center
49%	Theater Airlift
45%	Tanker Mission
43%	Red Horse Mission
34%	Fighter Mission
30%	Prime Beef Mission
28%	Support Ops Sqdn.
26%	Rescue Mission
25%	Logistics Support
23%	Humanitarian Assistance
16%	Strategic Airlift
15%	Aeromedical Mission
12%	Bomber Mission
10%	AEF Chaplain Service
06%	EAF Clinical Mission

34%
AFTEMPO
for
7.2%
of AF
Budget

25 February 2005

BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics

Observations of Trends:

- Seems to be no plan as to how to present to the Commission
 - Need to operate under a “One BRAC” concept:
 - How to develop the final product? Offer a common approach for briefings – consistency is key.
 - Need to go over all little decisions so no one can say “I don’t know anything about that”...everyone needs to be on same page.
 - Resolution of conflicting CRs
 - Tough questions are dodged – need to prepare more for commission presentation
 - Different JCSGs use different terminology.
 - There is no overall measure of success being tracked or reported.
 - Overall, DoD needs to build the presentation with the same level of detail and consistency as any other presentation for Congress.
- Recommendations are not consistently tied back to strategy.
 - There needs to be obvious link between overall BRAC 2005 goals, JCSG and MilDep strategies and guiding principles.
 - Justifications on quad-chart are weak and generic.
 - Supporting explanation for use of military judgment, especially over-rides of military value, are consistently weak. There is a lot of hand-waving going on when it comes to military judgment. “Military judgment” is that judgment involving subjects that are peculiarly within the expertise of military professionals. Subjects such as cost and “buildable acreage”, therefore, cannot be subjects of “military judgment” such as to overcome military value quantitative analytical determinations, since they are within the expertise of other professionals too.
- Weights determining military value are inconsistent – and mix function value with installation value - will there be an overall ranking?
- Military Judgment is used frequently to override military value results. However, majority of judgment factors used are economic and business related rather than military unique. Need more guidance on what military judgment includes.
- Surge capabilities requirements are inconsistent and have no common definition.
 - Commission needs to be briefed on why JCSGs were allowed individually to define surge and how they subsequently did so.
- Under Threshold Actions:
 - Justifications for including under threshold actions within program are lacking or very weak.
 - Others are dropping from consideration some under threshold activities, while including others.
- Informal policy was established to exclude some ranges from consideration. Policy needs to be documented, or better yet, all ranges considered.
- Need a consistent definition for privatization. Currently there is a mixing of privatization of functions and privatization of installations. Should apply careful legal review to each privatization candidate recommendation to ensure proper terminology is used.
- Databases are still being changed and/or updated after CRs developed. No policy published on when to lock base data and gain specific ISG approval for corrections.

- Transformation rationale, when used, is consistently vague and unsupported. Need more explanation of how transformational options were developed, used, and how they fit into strategy.
- Many consolidations have long paybacks and high MILCON requirements for new construction with weak justifications for receiving site selection and clear exclusion of other service potential receiving site consideration.
 - A payback of Never or 100+ years without a very strong argument/justification will threaten the credibility of the BRAC process.
 - Many realignments lack ties to force structure requirements or military value improvement and appear to only justify new MILCON.
- There seems to be limited interaction among groups – especially when they have contingent/enabling/following CRs.
- Joint Basing recommendations need more backup in terms of implementation
 - Funding: Who pays for what?
 - How will different service standards be reconciled?
- Overseas unit relocations
 - Need better justification of need for realignments that make room for returning overseas units.
 - Should be following actions rather than driving requirements.
 - Different people are interpreting Nicole Bayert's 06 December 2004 finding differently.
- Have not been able to get the Intelligence JCSG presentation scheduled. We have requested an unclassified version of the presentation.

Possible Actions:

- Commission Presentation
 - Create working group to put presentation standards together.
 - Develop strategy for presentation to commission: Who and what.
 - Develop common approach and consistent briefing format.
 - Standardize terminology in presentations.
- Strategy Linkage to Recommendations
 - Put strategy development block on common process chart.
 - Create consistent format for strategy presentation.
 - Require explanation of strategy links in quad justification block.
- Military Value
 - Develop common matrix for all military value determinations with weights and approve for use.
- Military Judgment
 - Provide legal guidance as to what can be included in consideration factors when groups are exercising military judgment.
- Surge Requirements
 - Request groups to tie surge requirements to 1-2-4-1 strategy and develop matrix to align surge requirements and approve for use.
 - DoD should issue overarching discipline on how groups should be using common terms and approaches to surge.
- Thresholds
 - DoD should not use term “under threshold” in recommendation language.

- If groups consider some “under threshold” activities or functions, then, for consistency, they ought to consider all “under threshold” activities or functions.
- Database
 - Lock changes to database and require ISG approval for necessary corrections.
 - Date for locking should be established soon.
- Overseas unit relocations
 - Overseas actions should inform BRAC.
 - Need strong, well understood rules on what BRAC can pay for in the moves.
 - Any cost or savings from outside U.S. Territory are not covered in BRAC.
 - All realignments from an U.S. base to another location are covered under BRAC.
 - Should be clear on whether BRAC funds can be used to build new facilities for overseas units.

14 March 2005

BRAC 2005 Discussion Topics**Observations of Trends:**

- Integration of Military Department recommendations with JCSG recommendations and with each other has yet to begin. This process will be time consuming and the overall DoD story needs to be pulled together. (DoD strategy plus group strategies plus BRAC rules gives results).
- Universe – the entire process is undermined, if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered.
- Measure of success – PRV does not capture everything. Need an overall score card. Amount of lease space eliminated, infrastructure capacity reduced, etc. need to be included.
- Definitions
 - Enclaves – Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (AF ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)
 - Transformational – groups are using this as justification in very different ways. Some are using “transformational” to support new mission development or recapitalization vice enabler of excess capacity reduction.
- Consistency of Approach
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.
 - Overall, some groups imbed military judgment within the military value calculation, while others apply military judgment to the results of military value calculation (i.e. – *ex ante* vs. *ex post* application of military judgment.)
 - USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value for support of total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is examining. USAF would have been more consistent by using installation functions and/or missions.
 - USA did not calculate military value of Guard and Reserve or perform COBRA analysis on them.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.
 - USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken to determine surge requirements.
 - Transformational options – groups are citing these as guidelines, but they seem to be available only in a draft form. Some guidance should be put out on the use of these options.
- Documentation: It appears that some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG.
- Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)
 - Standing-up new BCTs
 - JSF bed-down
 - Bed-down of returning overseas troops
 - Guard/Reserve Center reconstruction

- Examination of Range Capacity
 - No one is really looking at reducing excess range capacity.
 - Current candidate recommendations imply that “DoD does not have any excess ranges”.
- Intelligence JCSG Presentation

Possible Actions:

- Definitions
 - Send out common definition of an enclave and limit the size without higher approval. The groups need to have a benchmark such as “less than 31 people” to help them define small.
 - Send out criteria to be satisfied for an action to be considered transformational in accordance with SecDef guidance.
- Differing Approaches
 - Surge – capture different approaches into on DoD matrix.
 - Military Value Analysis – Include military judgment as qualitative portion of military value analysis
 - Capacity Analysis – carefully review Air Force use of capacity analysis and ensure it is converted to mission or function support capacity.
 - Transformational Options
 - Either decide on a formal list and publish it or take them off the table and direct groups to stop citing them.
- Misuse of BRAC
 - Consolidate candidate recommendations to eliminate negative NPVs and extremely long paybacks. Ensure candidate recommendations meet BRAC requirements for period of accomplishment, reduce overall excess capacity in line with the Force Structure Plan, and raise average military value.

18 April 2005

White Paper

Main Issues to Discuss:

- The BRAC Red Team believes the Air Force presentations give the perception that in many cases the Air Force is using BRAC only to move aircraft and gain MILCON funding rather than reducing excess infrastructure.
- Discussion within the Red Team has produced several potential routes to dispel such a perception and gain a more favorable reception for the Air Force package.

Causes of the Perception:

- Air Force goals for BRAC 2005 appear to focus on operational requirements rather than reduction of excess infrastructure capacity under the BRAC Law.
 - Military value analysis has uniquely been done by platform as opposed to by installation or supporting function—which results in multiple military values for the same installation and the need to override military value results.
 - Military capacity has been redefined to be the difference between current and optimum squadron sizes rather than functional support capabilities.
 - Proposals appear to use BRAC to determine where FYDP aircraft changes should be implemented and use BRAC funds to make the changes without including associated savings under BRAC.
 - Many of the aircraft changes are already reflected in the FYDP and any resulting savings have been taken.
 - BRAC actions should result in savings in installation and personnel costs.
 - As currently reflected, most Air Force actions do not result in savings and do not require the BRAC provisions.
- Proposals show personnel position savings while allegedly not reducing overall end strength.
- Even though number of aircraft is coming down, Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) groups are left almost everywhere with no defined mission.
 - Perception supported by answers to questions: ECS groups are used to maintain “end strength” in search of missions.
- In many cases, military value is being overridden by Air Sovereignty Alert requirements, Active Reserve Component (ARC) mix, and recruiting demographics—need to show how these are tied to the Force Structure Plan and/or the Final Selection Criteria.

Potential Solutions:

- Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force's method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- If the moves are accomplished under BRAC, all savings and costs must be reflected under BRAC—other mission and personnel requirements should be paid for outside BRAC (can use BRAC savings).
- Provide better explanation of the role of Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) units.
 - All savings must be part of BRAC—savings can then be applied to other missions.
 - Create a chart that shows:
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- Provide better explanation for need for Homeland Defense Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) Facilities.
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan and/or Final Selection Criteria.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Closing leased facilities could improve Air Force story—recommend including these facilities on your closure list. Plus, by doing so, you will be consistent with other Services since they are including leased facilities on their closure lists.
- Justifications for Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks AFB, ND need to be stronger as these are closures in close proximity to each other with little other regional military presence. There also needs to be stronger rationales for other associated realignments.

19 April 2005

Second Air Force Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, April 18, 2005

Time: 08:30-10:30

Place: 5C279

Chairman: Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Executive Secretary: Lt. Col. Johansen

Key Attendees:

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

Items of Import:

- Since the first meeting with the Red Team the United States Air Force (USAF) has attempted to utilize BRAC language and terminology.
- USAF is completed with the bulk of its “laydown” in terms of candidate recommendations to be submitted, although further refinements are being made.
- USAF had not originally taken savings for people in the same way the other groups and services were, but we have since gone back and recalculated savings associated with manpower and personnel to be more consistent with the other groups.

Questions that arose:

- What do you mean by infrastructure? *Operational areas as well as buildings connected to an installation.* (Salomon)
- What does the red, blue, or shading indicate on this map (Slide 5, middle map)? *White is a high speed area, shaded is where we are authorized to turn off the lights and operate. Red is ranges? Yes. How many ranges did you close? One, at Cannon AFB. There are 30 ranges that USAF uses, but most of these have other missions as well.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Are all the Services in agreement with having a Joint Center of Excellence at Indian Springs? *No, we are pulling that candidate recommendation. That UAV Center of Excellence was originally Education and Training JCSG responsibility and they decided it was really a RD&A matter, so they passed it on to the Technical JCSG. We only had an enabling scenario to move stuff out of Indian Springs, which without the Center of Excellence is not necessary.* (Johnson)
- What point do you want the audience to take away from this slide (Slide 6)? Do you follow-up on these later in your briefing? *There are recommendations going forward for all these.* (Salomon)

- You have a lot of “Red” in the Northeast – losing sites or bases being closed – have you discussed this with NORTHCOM? *Absolutely, NORTHCOM is on board.*
- What does cumulative mean (Slide 46, USAF-1006V2 – EIT Summary)? *It is the total for the implementation period, but we can take it off this chart as it may be confusing.* (Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Be careful when discussing people vs. billet savings vs. authorized positions. If you take savings for eliminated billets or authorized positions, should show that these positions go off the books or reprogrammed.
- Be careful with your wording – the use of “infrastructure” on Slide 2 seems to be referring to aircraft, but later in your brief (Slide 9) “infrastructure” is used to mean installations and operating areas.
- “AF Goals for BRAC 2005” are not obviously linked to DoD BRAC goals (Slide 2). Make sure your subsequent slides are consistent with the “AF BRAC 2005 Goals” bullet points. (E.g. - The title of Slide 4 is more loosely linked to the second bullet point on Slide 2 than the titles of Slides 3 or 5 are linked to the first and third bullet points, respectively.)
- Add a legend for maps on Slide 5 so that the meaning of the color coding and shading is clear.
- BRAC is about reducing excess capacity – your AF Installation map will look about the same after BRAC, which will open you and DoD up to criticisms.
- Closing ranges – closed Cannon, but according to your explanation of your map, Cannon has one of the best locations. Other 30 ranges that are used by the AF have other associated missions. Similarly, if you overlay the civilian air traffic map on your AF Installations map – it would tell you to move everything to the Northwest, yet you close Ellsworth, SD and Grand Forks, ND. The story you would like to tell with these maps is really about tactical air, so consider highlight tactical aviation bases.
- Be consistent. If you are not going forward with the UAV Center of Excellence remove it from the “Joint Opportunities” slide (Slide 6) and from the “emerging needs” section of slide 4.
- Consider using BRAC terminology on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) (I.e. – Discuss closures, realignments, and associated cost savings).
- Bullet two on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) is really the only BRAC action— but these reductions are already programmed to take place in the FYDP. Explain up front that you are using BRAC to determine action for aircraft disposal in compliance with the Force Structure Plan. However, aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.
- Justifications for the closure of Cannon AFB, NM Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks, ND need to be strengthened as well as the justifications for any associated realignments.
- Include the closure of any leased facilities on your closure list (Slide 10).
- Check military value of every site on lists on Slides 10 and 11. You want to make sure that you are not moving from installations with higher military value to lower ranked installations. Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)

- Need chart explaining
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- If these are already programmed changes – why are they being done under BRAC? Need to explain up front that Military Value analysis done in BRAC aides the determination of where programmed reductions in aircraft occur. But also need an explanation for why people reductions are not occurring under BRAC.
- Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA)
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Recommendations using maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan or Final Selection Criteria.
- “Capturing Intellectual Capital” is unusual terminology, use more descriptive wording.
- Add statement to candidate recommendation that ECS is remaining at Louis Munoz Marin IAP AGS (USAF-0069).

Additional observations to consider:

- Should have a reason for why USAF is not reducing endstrength as part of BRAC.
- Ensure that savings for FYDP actions completed as part of BRAC are accounted for in accordance with the BRAC statute and/or OSD policy.
- Some candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Close ● Realign ● Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● moving ● relocating ● consolidating ● privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● enclaves ● functions ● activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

Attribute: Operating Environment
Label: ATC Restrictions to Operations
Effective %: 6.90

Question: List the percentage of installation departures delayed by Air Traffic Control. If the percentage delayed = 0, get 100 points. Otherwise, if the percentage delayed is $\geq 3\%$, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the percentage delayed between 0 to 3% on a 100 to 0 point scale.

Source: CAMS (Computerized Aircraft Maintenance System)/ G081

PROBLEM 1: The basic premise of this metric is severely flawed. "ATC Restrictions to Operations" is scored based solely upon departure delays attributed to ATC. It ignores the fact that ATC restrictions include so many other factors, such as restrictions on climb and descent, restrictions toward flying directly to/from training areas, ability to train in the local pattern (e.g., do touch-and-goes), and the number of times ATC imposes altitude restrictions on airspace due to commercial traffic. These restrictions are particularly burdensome in the Northeast U.S. and at busy airports in the Southwest. Touch-and-goes at Phoenix are a complete implausibility, yet such training is conducted at Birmingham on a daily basis. An aircraft can seldom depart Pittsburgh and fly directly anywhere simply due to the saturation of the airspace. Meanwhile, at Birmingham, we are usually cleared directly onto our planned route of flight before reaching 10,000' (i.e., in the first 3 to 5 minutes of the flight).

PROBLEM 2: "ATC Restrictions to Operations" is weighted at 6.9%. Put another way, in terms of a base's military value, ATC restrictions weighed higher than fuel support (4.15%), hangar capability (3.32%), mission encroachment (2.08%), fuel to support surge capability (3.85%), large scale deployment capability (1.65%), growth potential (1.35%), and all four factors associated with cost added together (4.09% total for all four). For KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft, this is a particularly difficult argument to justify. Why might an occasional ATC delay be more important than the capability to support the wartime mission? This question appears to be lifted from the fighter MCI page and geared toward an F-15 or F-16 burning precious fuel on the ground while waiting for takeoff.

PROBLEM 3: By this formula, a delay is a delay, whether it is one minute or twenty. If 3% of takeoffs are delayed, an installation gets zero points. What if Base X has 3% delays but they are all less than five minutes? What if Base Y has 1% delays but all are a mission-impacting 15 minutes? This is simply not considered. More importantly, this criteria does not consider the tanker mission at all, which can a/ways adjust for a 5 minute delay. For example, at Birmingham IAP, a 5 minute delay has no mission impact whatsoever, and in 4 years of flying here I cannot recall a single ATC delay that exceeded this. Conversely, at Phoenix, mission delays are frequent due to very high commercial traffic; so much so that it is very difficult to get a 2-ship formation airborne without a significant, mission-impacting delay. Nevertheless, "military judgment" states that Phoenix should get Birmingham's aircraft.

PROBLEM 4: CAMS is the worst possible source for information on this topic. As noted in Problem 3 above, CAMS considers only departure delays, which is only a small piece of the ATC puzzle, and, worse, CAMS information does not even accurately portray that. Say an aircraft has a small maintenance delay on the ground, a delay not long enough to be recorded as delay. That aircraft then taxis a little late. If cleared for takeoff immediately, there is no delay, but if there is even a small additional delay in receiving the takeoff clearance, the over all delay, if there is one, will be attributed to ATC, not maintenance. This unwritten rule is practiced Air Force-wide. This does not mean that CAMS data is irrelevant, but it does mean that CAMS data by itself is the wrong source to make a decision of this magnitude.

PROBLEM 5: The final problem for this area is its prejudice. The question itself is designed such that it favors active or former active-duty bases over Guard/Reserve bases. Guard and Reserve bases are often located at airports that share facilities with FAA and corporate-sponsored aviation and therefore have control towers that must prioritize departures. Active Duty and former active duty bases serve their own first. While this may seem desirable, it completely ignores the cost savings to the Air Force provided by facilities which are supplied and maintained by commercial aviation and the FAA (e.g., runways, ATC, approach and departure facilities, airfield maintenance, fire protection, etc., etc.).

Bottom Line: *ATC restrictions to operations is a valid argument for a base's military value and should be considered. The problem here is this criteria is far too simplistic to provide an accurate picture. It looks at such a small piece of the ATC equation that in the end it fails to actually address the issue.*

Attribute: Geo-locational Factors

Label: Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)

Effective %: 39.10

Question: For each airspace:

If the Airspace/Route Designator does not start with AR, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace is > 850 miles, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 850 miles, get 10 points.

Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 250 miles, get 100 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the distance to the airspace from 250 miles to 850 miles on a 100 to 10 point scale.

This is the base raw total. Once you have a base raw total, find the highest, and the lowest, non-zero raw total across all bases.

If the raw total = 0, the score = 0.

Else, if the raw total = the highest raw total, the score = 100.

Else, if the raw total = the lowest, non-zero raw total, the score = 10.

Else, pro-rate the raw total between the lowest non-zero raw total and the highest raw total on a 10 to 100 scale.

Source: FLIP AP-1A; FLIP AP-1B; IFR Supp; Falcon View or other certified flight planning software.

PROBLEM 1: This question ignores what should be obvious: the tanker mission is to go where the fuel is needed, not to go to conveniently located airspace and wait for the receiver to come to us. This means that this question is simply the wrong question to ask. What is important is not our proximity to A/R tracks, but our proximity to the receiver units who need the gas. It is the receiver that determines where and when air refueling is needed, not the tanker. Therefore the important question is how close is the tanker base to its customers, and if there is no A/R track there, we work with the FAA to establish one. This factor, which is the only relevant one, was not even considered. (It seems this question was formulated with reference to airspace requirements to operate fighter aircraft. Air refueling airspace is very small by comparison and more easily coordinated when needed.)

(Continued.)

PROBLEM 2: This question only considers airspace that has an "AR" designator. By itself, just this one oversight renders the data irrelevant. This is because it skews the data to favor tanker bases in the middle of the country. Tanker bases in Kansas or Oklahoma use AR-designated airspace for nearly every refueling sortie. Tanker units closer to the coast use off-shore "warning" areas for many refuelings, yet under these criteria they receive no credit. Furthermore, "letter-of-agreement" airspace exists in many areas where air refueling happens every day, but again, the units that do this get no credit for it.

A perfect example is the RAMP-1 airspace over Tyndall AFB, FL where the F-15 schoolhouse conducts air refueling with local tanker units nearly every weekday 52 weeks per year. Birmingham, refuels in this airspace almost daily, but based on these criteria, gets no credit for it.

With close to half of all available MCI points coming from the airspace criteria, the least a unit should be able to expect is that all air refueling airspace will count. This point simply cannot be made bluntly enough.

PROBLEM 3: The 40% weighting given to airspace suggests that proximity to training airspace is over 4 times more important to the tanker mission than runway length, which scored only 9.55%. If you boil this down to reality, it states that the ability to fly a training mission in as little flight time as possible is over 4 times more important than being able to support an operational deployment or a homeland defense mission. This is because training missions depart at very light gross weights and require minimal runway length, a fact that will not surface from the MCI equations because the weighting given to runway length is miniscule in comparison. **The problem is this:** operational and homeland defense missions must takeoff at very high gross weights and require runway lengths that even some military airfields do not have. Again, this will not surface from the MCI equations because so little value is given to runway length as compared to airspace proximity. A near 40% weighting to training airspace is simply absurd in the context of only a 9.5% weighting given to runway length.

It is like determining which team goes to the World Series by committee, with a 40% weighting given to Spring Training and a 9.5% weighting given to the Pennant Race. It just doesn't make any sense.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth

Effective %: 4.15

Question: Check the current fuel hydrant system capability.

20% of the score is based upon the best type of fuel hydrant available.

80% of the score is based upon the number of qualified refueling points/outlets.

Type of Fuel Hydrant:

Check each Fuel System. Ignore those that are not aircraft fueling hydrants.

If any one of them is a Type III, get 100 points.

Otherwise, If any one of them is a Type I or II, get 75 points.

Otherwise, If any one of them is a Type IV or V, get 25 points.

Otherwise, get 0 points.

Number of Qualified Refueling Points/Outlets:

Sum the number of qualified refueling points/outlets.

If the sum of qualified refueling points/outlets \geq 24, get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the sum of qualified refueling points/outlets = 0, get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the sum between 0 and 24 on a 0 to 100 scale.

Source: ACES-RP; existing record drawings or physical verification.

I agree with this one. I am not a fuel expert (I am a mission expert), but it is nevertheless obvious to me that some forms of refueling capability are more desirable than others. While it may be argued that it is overall capability, not means, that should be scored, the question does consider this by giving a 20% weighting to the best fuel hydrants while giving an 80% score to capability overall. It appears to me that someone who is a fuels expert came up with this criteria.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Ramp Area and Serviceability

Effective %: 7.89

Question: Total the square yardage of every serviceable ramp at the installation.

If the total square yards of serviceable ramp is \geq 851,000, get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the total square yards of serviceable ramp is \geq 504,000, get 75 points.

Otherwise, if the total square yards of serviceable ramp is \geq 168,000, get 25 points.

Otherwise, get 0 points.

Source: FLIP; AFCEA Pavement Evaluation/Condition Report/Survey; Existing Record Drawings or Physical Verification; Base Real Property Records.

PROBLEM 1: While this point is definitely one that should be counted, the premise for it is dramatically skewed away from the Guard and Reserve. The only bases that could score anything appreciable here are either huge active duty or former active duty bases with more ramp space than they could possibly ever use. The later question, "Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment" is far more relevant as it addresses a base's ramp space toward supporting a specific and realistic contingency and it is more appropriately weighted (not to

mention the fact that if you have already addressed the issue under that question, why re-address it here).

PROBLEM 2: This question is simply the wrong question to ask. Instead of basing the criteria on serviceable parking spots for the appropriate aircraft, this question addresses a base's capability to host a major air offensive. While this may be an appropriate question for some active duty installations, it completely sets aside the charter and mission of the Guard and Reserve to be an augmenting, primarily part-time force. Our mission is to train using the recruiting pool of a geographic area and then mobilize and deploy when called upon. Our mission has never been to hold enormous quantities of unused ramp space in reserve and then host scores of active duty deployers when a crisis occurs. The real situation is exactly the reverse, but it is not possible to score it using these criteria.

This question is worded toward such a dramatic amount of ramp space that it appears to specifically target Guard and Reserve units for closure.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Runway Dimension and Serviceability

Effective %: 9.55

Question: Check the dimension of all serviceable runways that support the installation. Calculate a score for each runway at the installation as follows:

If the runway is not serviceable, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the runway is < 150' wide, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the runway is < 7,000' long, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the runway is >= 12,000' long, get 100 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the runway length from 7,000' to 12,000' on a 50 to 100 scale to get the points. The overall score is the highest score received by any one runway.

Source: FLIP; AFCESA Pavement Evaluation/Condition Report/Survey; Existing Record Drawings or Physical Verification; Base Real Property Records.

This question alone, and how it is scored, invalidates the tanker MCI scoring process. Here is why:

PROBLEM 1: If someone is not thoroughly familiar with the tanker mission, he or she might be persuaded that a question such as proximity to A/R tracks (the first question asked) is so important that it should be weighted 4 times more heavily than runway length. But the mission expert would ask how can you do your wartime mission if you can't get your airplane off the ground? **For the tanker mission, the question of runway length addresses the mission more than any other.** While any runway over 7000' can support the training mission (at least in a basic way), the ability to deploy to the CENTCOM or PACOM AOR in minimum time is dependent on just one criteria: runway length. So if runway length is that important, why is it almost negligible when compared to proximity to training airspace? This is a very important question to ask. Based upon the BRAC MCI, the ability to access training airspace very near to the base is 4 times more important than the capability to support the wartime mission. This premise is flawed fundamentally and cannot stand up to scrutiny.

(Continued.)

PROBLEM 2: This question also renders moot the tanker's crucial role in our nuclear deterrent force. Right now, all over the United States, KC-135 aircraft are allocated to this mission. The ability to support this mission comes down to just one thing: *getting the aircraft airborne from home station at the maximum possible gross weight*. The ability to get airborne at maximum gross weight centers one major component: the runway, both its length and its weight bearing capacity. The system BRAC used for measuring this crucial capability is flawed in two ways:

(1) Runway length is weighted at just 9.55%. With such a small weighting, an installation's overall MCI score can and very likely will mask the mission impact of a shorter runway. As a result, other, less relevant factors (such as proximity to A/R tracks) will override runway length. Installations with inadequate runways may be favored over more capable ones. In the end, this is going to prove very costly to the Air Force and the taxpayers because lengthening a runway is a very, very expensive process and takes years, not months, to do. The degradation in force capability is critical and cannot be quickly or easily fixed (if at all). In the end, using the criteria set forth by BRAC, this dilemma will not even surface until after the decision is made, and then it is too late.

(2) Runway weight bearing capacity is valued at just 7.25% (half of 14.53% under the heading of "Installation Pavement Quality"). Considered separately in this way, one will mask the other. To prove it, what good is a runway well over 10,000' if it cannot support the weight of your aircraft? (This is the case at Phoenix, which is gaining aircraft.) Worse, what use is a runway that can support your aircraft at maximum gross weight but is so short the aircraft could never takeoff at that weight anyway? (This is the case at Knoxville, which is gaining aircraft.) But how valuable is a runway that is both long enough and has the weight bearing capacity to get the airplane airborne at any gross weight under nearly all conceivable circumstances? (This is the case at Birmingham, which is losing all of its aircraft).

The question of Runway Dimension and Serviceability is THE fundamental question for KC-135 operations. It should receive the highest weighting of all considered factors because it matters far more than the rest. The near 40% weighting given to airspace should have been given to a joint consideration of runway length and weight-bearing capacity. Such consideration would have afforded far more credibility to the DOD BRAC recommendation.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft

Effective %: 3.32

Question Check the facilities to hangar large aircraft.

Total the gross square feet for hangars for each installation.

Ignore all hangars whose door opening size < 131'. Also ignore all hangars whose gross square feet < 6000.

If the sum above is < 6000 square feet, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the sum above is = the highest score received by any installation, get 100 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the sum above between 6000 and the highest score received by any installation on a 25 to 100 point scale.

Source: ACES-RP, Record Drawings, Base Real Property Records; pre-populated from ACES-RP; "Service Facility Condition Code" rated 1 through 6 in accordance with OSD BRAC library.

Hangar capability is definitely an important attribute for BRAC to consider, but this question does ignore some pertinent data, particularly ceiling height inside the hangar, which is also very important. If the ceiling does not have adequate height, no matter how many square feet, you cannot get the entire aircraft inside because the tail will not clear. A hangar should be weighted more heavily if the aircraft can be placed inside and the doors closed. At many installations, the doors must be closed around the tail of the aircraft leaving a sizeable portion of the aircraft remaining outside. This point is not considered.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Level of Mission Encroachment

Effective %: 2.08

Question: Characterize the level of encroachment for the area in which the installation is located.

There are four categories of acres for this purpose: 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and 80+.

For each category, compute a category total as follows:

If the total acres in that category = 0, get 0 points.

Otherwise, compute the ratio of residential acres to the respective total acres

Subtract the 65-69 category total from 1, then multiply the result by 0.13.

Subtract the 70-74 category total from 1, then multiply the result by 0.19.

Subtract the 75-79 category total from 1, then multiply the result by 0.28.

Subtract the 80+ category total from 1, then multiply the result by 0.4.

Add the above 4 amounts together and multiply the result by 100 for the raw total.

Add these points to the raw total as follows:

If the installation purchased "Restrictive Easements" on undeveloped or developed land, add 7 points. See OSD Question 1209, columns 2 and 3 for this data, where a Yes in either qualifies for the 7 points.

If the installation confirms "Land Use Controls that Correlate w/ AICUZJLUS Recommendation.", add 5 points.

If the installation is in a state that has Mandatory Coordination of Development Proposals or there is a Local Joint Land Use Coordinating Board, add 1 point.

The above process can compute a score from 0 to 113.

If the computed score is > 100, it is dropped to 100.

Source: 1207: AFI 32-7063, AFH 32-7084, AICUZ Report, Base Comprehensive Plan F Series maps or D Series as noted in AFI 32-7062 Atch7, local governmental zoning or land use planning authorities; 1208: AFI 32-7063, AICUZ Report, MAJCOM Approved Noise Study; 1209: State legislation, local referendums to purchase lands, zoning ordinance, noise exposure maps, noise control plans, documentation of state purchases of land.

This question appears to me to be appropriately calculated and weighted. Encumbrance is an important issue for BRAC to consider and, in my opinion, should be given at least as much weight as it is given here.

Attribute: Key Mission Infrastructure

Label: Installation Pavements Quality

Effective %: 14.53

Question: Identify if the installation pavement for the primary runway can support Tanker aircraft operations. If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

Compute the runway pavement suitability score and the apron pavement suitability score. Each of these is worth 50% of the overall score.

Runway Pavement Suitability:

Find the highest PCN among all the runways. Compute a score for every runway with that PCN and use the highest scoring runway. Score the runway for runway pavement suitability as follows:

Get the KC-10 ACN.

Get the KC-135 ACN.

If the PCN is N/A or 0, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the KC-10 ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and ≤ 1.0 , then get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the KC-135 ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and ≤ 1.0 , then get 75 points.

Otherwise, if the KC-135 ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and ≤ 1.1 , then get 50 points.

Otherwise, get 0 points.

Apron pavement suitability:

Score each apron for pavement quality and choose the highest scoring apron.

Get the KC-10 ACN.

Get the KC-135 ACN.

If the PCN is 0 or N/A, get 0 points.

Sum the apron pavement square yardage where the KC-10 ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and ≤ 1.0 .

Sum the apron pavement square yardage where the KC-135 ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and ≤ 1.0 .

If the KC-10 square yardage $\geq 532,000$, get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the KC-135 square yardage $\geq 336,000$, get 75 points.

Otherwise, if the KC-135 square yardage $\geq 168,000$, get 50 points.

Otherwise, get 0 points.

Source: AFCESA Pavement Evaluation Report and Base General Plan; Existing Record Drawings or Physical Verification; Base Real Property Records; FLIP; ASSR

PROBLEM: This question is fundamentally and fatally flawed. By considering a runway's weight bearing capacity under this question and considering its length under another misses the point. These two must be considered together and then weighted much more heavily than they are. This argument is spelled out in detail under the question of "Runway Dimension and Serviceability." To summarize though, the weight bearing capacity of a ramp or a runway simply doesn't mean anything if the runway is not long enough to takeoff at that weight. By applying different weightings to these criteria, one may mask the other.

Attribute: Mobility/Surge

Label: Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge

Effective %: 3.85

Question: Check the installation's sustained jet fuel dispensing rate capability. Sum the JP5 and JP8 figures for jet fuel dispensing.

If the sum is $\geq 2,500,000$ gallons, get 100 points. If the sum is = 0 gallons, get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the sum of gallons between 0 and 2,500,000 on a 0 to 100 point scale.

Source: Base Support Plan as required by AFI 10-404, Attachment 20

I have heard several arguments that this question addresses an invalid point for a tanker wing at home stations. I personally believe that this question is appropriately worded and weighted because an installation will always have sufficient capacity to support its own aircraft. Given the fact that DOD wants to move toward more centralized basing of aircraft at fewer bases, it is important to be able to disperse those assets somewhere should the need arise. With a weighting of only 3.85%, I find this question to be valid and appropriate in its current form. The problem is that there is no funding to beef up this capability, so an installation is likely to have excess capability only if it is left over from some earlier aircraft or mission.

Attribute: Mobility/Surge

Label: Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment

Effective %: 1.65

Question: State installation's parking MOG for C-17 equivalents using surveyed/approved transient parking ramps. If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

Find the total number of C-17 MOGs.

If the total is ≥ 6 , get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the total is ≥ 4 , get 75 points.

Otherwise, if the total is ≥ 2 , get 25 points.

Otherwise, get 0 points.

Source: ASR (Airfield Suitability Report)

I understand that some are arguing the validity of this question based on the fact that when tankers deploy they transport their own equipment and personnel along with them and usually go to bases where significant air transport is not needed for bed down. I believe this argument misses the point of the question. Like in the last question, a base will always be able to park its own aircraft. The question here is it possible for the base to support other aircraft if dispersal or other military need requires it. This is a question of genuine military value, and I find it to be appropriately worded and weighted.

Attribute: Growth Potential

Label: Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance

Effective %: 1.35

Question: Check the attainment designation classifications of the installation's NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standard) for the following applicable criteria: Attainment, Nonattainment, Nonattainment (Deferred), Maintenance, and Unclassifiable. Identify the amount of the SIP emissions budget for non-attainment and maintenance criteria pollutants, if any, allocated to the installation. Use the following formula to compute this score:

Multiply the Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA by the Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance *B* for the base score. Add the SIP Score to the base score. If the base score is now over 100, reduce it to 100.

SIP Score: Sum the Installation SIP Growth Allowance (Tons/Year)" for the following constituents: '001. VOC' and '002. Nox'.

If the total is > 0, then SIP Score = 20, otherwise it is 0.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA and *B*: Perform the following calculation for each of the specified criteria pollutants and pick the lowest value from them all. The criteria pollutants are '002. PM10', '004. S02', '005. CO', '007. O3 (8hr)*'.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA: If the NAAQS Designation is attainment, Unclassifiable, Nonattainment (Deferred), Unclassifiable/Attainment, unclassifiable/Attainment (EAC), Nonattainment-deferred (EAC), Attainment (EAC) or N/A, get 100.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Designation is Maintenance, get 77.778.84

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Marginal, Subpart 1, Moderate, Primary, or Secondary, get 66.667. See OSD Question 213, column 3 for this data.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Serious, get 43.5.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Severe, Severe-15, or Severe-17, get 25.714.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Extreme, get 7.

Otherwise, get 0.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance *B*: If the NAAQS Designation is Attainment, Unclassifiable, Nonattainment (Deferred), Unclassifiable/Attainment, Unclassifiable/Attainment (EAC), Nonattainment-deferred (EAC), Attainment (EAC) or N/A, get 1.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Designation is Maintenance, get .9.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Marginal, Subpart 1, Moderate, Primary, or Secondary, get .9.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Serious, get .8.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Severe, Severe-15, or Severe- 17, get .7.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Extreme, get 1.

Otherwise, get 0.

The impact of environmental law on military operations is an inescapable and very expensive proposition if not carefully considered. It should be considered and weighted at least as heavily as it is here.

Attribute: Growth Potential

Label: Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth

Effective %: 1.58

Question: Identify the number of "buildable," unconstrained, development acres available for industrial operations. Sum the number of suitable acres at the installation.

If the number of acres is ≥ 150 , get 100 points. If < 5 acres, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the number of acres between 5 and 150 on a 0 to 100 point scale.

Source: AFI 32-7062, AICUZ Study Base Comprehensive Plan component plans such as Cultural Resource Management Plans, Natural Resource Management Plans and special studies, Base comprehensive plan maps.

PROBLEM: This question is constructed such that it is skewed in favor of current or former active duty bases and against the majority of Guard and Reserve units. To include this question in a unit's MCI while not separately addressing the cost savings the Guard and Reserve provide the Air Force is most unfortunate. Guard and Reserve bases are often located at airports that share facilities with FAA and corporate-sponsored aviation and therefore do not bill the Air Force or the DOD for such things as runways, taxiways, ATC facilities and personnel, approach facilities and equipment, security, airfield management, maintenance, wildlife management, and fire protection (just to name a few). There is always room for some growth, but based on this question, unless that room for growth is enormous (even 5 acres is a sizeable quantity), most Guard and Reserve units do not stand a chance here.

Attribute: Growth Potential

Label: Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth

Effective %: 1.58

Question: Buildable acres for air operations growth. If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts. Sum the number of suitable acres at the installation.

If the number of acres is ≥ 150 , get 100 points. If < 5 acres, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the number of acres between 5 and 150 on a 0 to 100 point scale.

Source: AFI 32-7062, AICUZ Study Base Comprehensive Plan component plans such as Cultural Resource Management Plans, Natural Resource Management Plans and special studies, Base comprehensive plan maps.

See "Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth," previous question, for comment.

Criterion: Cost of Ops / Manpower

Attribute: Cost Factors

Label: Area Cost Factor

Effective %: 1.25

Question: Evaluate the Area Cost Factor for each installation. Find the lowest area cost factor listed for that installation.

If the area cost factor ≤ 0.78 , get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the area cost factor ≥ 1.42 , get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the area cost factor between 0.78 and 1.42, on a 100 to 0 point scale.

Source: DoD Facilities Pricing Guide, Table B, March 2004

PROBLEM: It would be easy to support this question (and at a much higher weighting) if BRAC was truly and ultimately about saving money. However, an argument like this loses credibility very quickly when so few dollars are saved. In the meantime, we do something unnecessary that costs far more. The perfect example:

Base X is more capable of performing the mission than Base Y due to its infrastructure. Base X's aircraft are also more modern and more capable than Base Y's. More importantly, Base X has a higher MCI than Base Y. Nevertheless, Base X will lose its aircraft to Base Y. The reason: "Military Judgment."

Unfortunately, Base Y is not trained to operate or maintain Base X's aircraft. Therefore, before they can be operational, the entire unit will have to go through conversion training at a cost to the government of ZZZ million dollars. While this is going on, Base Y will be encumbered from performing its mission for a significant period of time. This will require other units to take up the slack until Base Y is ready to fly again.

In the meantime, Base X has lost all of their aircraft and years of combat experience leave the Air Force.

All of this has cost the Air Force millions. These dollars could have been saved if Base X had just continued to perform its mission while the base found a new mission for Base Y or closed it down.

The above scenario is a reflection of actual recommendations of BRAC 2005; the names have been changed to protect the innocent.

When one sees so many dollars go out the door under this scenario, it is difficult to take a question like this one seriously. Pennies saved under "Area Cost Factor" bring the entire proposal under question when so much more is spent where it need not be.

Criterion: Cost of Ops / Manpower

Attribute: Cost Factors

Label: Utilities cost rating (U3C)

Effective %: 0.13

Question: Check the Utilities Costs and Climatic Consideration (U3C) Rating for the installation.

If the U3C rating is $\leq .59$, get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the U3C rating is ≥ 2.29 , get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the U3C rating between .59 and 2.29 on a 100 to 0 scale.

Source: ASHRAE Standards; DoD 5126.46-M-2, Defense Utility Energy Reporting System; UFC 3-400-02, DOE Website: Buildings Energy Databook: Table 7.4 Typical Commercial Buildings.

Any cost savings to the government based on this question would truly be very small, but given its weighting, it is hard to argue for or against it.

Criterion: Cost of Ops / Manpower

Attribute: Cost Factors

Label: BAH Rate

Effective %: 0.88

Question: Check the 2004 monthly BAH rate for an O-3 with dependents.

If the BAH rate ≤ 746 , get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the BAH rate ≥ 2013 , get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the BAH rate between 746 and 2013 on a 100 to 0 scale.

Source: www.dtic.mil/perdiem/bah.html

See argument under "Area Cost Factor."

Attribute: Cost Factors

Label: GS Locality Pay Rate

Effective %: 0.25

Question: Check the 2004 locality pay rate for the GS pay schedule.

If the pay rate ≤ 10.90 , get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the pay rate ≥ 20.37 , get 0 points.

Otherwise, pro-rate the pay rate between 10.90 and 20.37 on a 100 to 0 scale.

Source: Office of Personnel Management Web page.

See argument under "Area Cost Factor."



NEWS RELEASE

United States Air Force

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 1690 AIR FORCE Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1690
Telephone: (703)695-0640 Fax: (703)614-7486

Roadmap outlines recapitalization of tanker fleet

6/18/2003 - WASHINGTON -- The Air Force released a plan today outlining the retirement of the remaining 133 E-model KC-135 Stratotankers and the proposed integration of the 100 KC-767A tankers it is leasing from Boeing.

Through the "tanker roadmap," the Air Force is laying out the initial stages of tanker recapitalization which run through 2017, according to Col. Scott E. Wuesthoff, chief of the Air Force global mobility division at the Pentagon. This recapitalization is critical because the average age of the service's KC-135 E-model tanker is more than 43 years old and getting older every day, Wuesthoff said.

The KC-767s have greater range, carry a larger payload and more passengers, can be aerially refueled itself and can refuel any type of receiver aircraft with its boom or drogue.

"It is also capable of taking off at maximum gross weight from approximately 1,000 more runways around the world than the KC-135, allowing the warfighter numerous options and increased flexibility," he said.

"These Eisenhower-era aircraft are the oldest combat weapons system in the inventory and have been experiencing ever increasing maintenance costs and serious corrosion problems, which equate to decreasing availability and less bang-for-the-buck," he explained.

"As the Air Force retires the 133 E-model KC-135s and brings on board the 100 KC-767s, the Air Force gains both capability and availability."

The tanker roadmap addresses the realignments in the tanker force structure associated with the introduction of the KC-767As and the retirement of the KC-135Es. As part of the overall roadmap, the following ARC units will convert from E-models to R-models: Salt Lake City International Airport, Utah; Bangor IAP, Maine; Pittsburgh IAP, Penn.; Forbes Field, McGhee-Tyson ANGB, Tenn.; McGuire AFB, N.J.; Scott AFB, Ill.; Sioux City ANG, Iowa; Beale AFB, Calif.; and Selfridge ANGB, Mich.

"As we retire the E-models from the Air Reserve Component, we'll standardize the number of primary aircraft assigned to a squadron," Wuesthoff said. "For the ARC, that will be eight R-model KC-135s and for the active duty that number will be 16."

Fairchild Air Force Base, Wash., will be the first active-duty base to receive KC-767s when it begins the transition from KC-135 R-models to the new tanker; deliveries begin in fiscal 2006. Upon completion of the tanker force structure movements in 2010, the roadmap indicates Fairchild will have 32 767s. The transition will increase the number of personnel assigned per crew position on each aircraft from 1.36 to 1.75. A tanker crew complement consists of the aircraft commander (pilot), co-pilot, and boom operator. To prepare McConnell for the new KC-767, the Air Force plans to pump up to \$200 million of military construction into the base. The eight tanker R-model Air National Guard squadron at Fairchild will be unaffected by the active duty changes.

McConnell AFB, Kan., currently has 48 R-model tankers in active-duty service and nine R-models in the Air National Guard. There are 10 E-models at Forbes Field. The active force at McConnell will lose 18 aircraft in 2004-2005 before they begin adding to the fleet to peak at 64 active duty tankers. In addition, McConnell is slated to retain eight of the nine R-model ANG aircraft, giving them a total of 72 tankers overall, justifying their "super-wing" designation. The ANG at Forbes Field will drop two of their E-models in 2004 and switch to all R-models by 2006, giving them an end state of eight R-models.

Grand Forks AFB, N.D., is slated to begin its transition from 48 R-models in 2005 and eventually gain 32 767s by 2009. This move also adds up to \$176 million in military construction.

MacDill AFB, Fla. is slated to give up its 12 R-model tankers by 2010 and receive 32 767s by 2011. This move will raise its end-state personnel, but final figures are yet to be determined. Military construction as a result of the transition may reach up to \$200 million.

Finally, Robins AFB, Ga., will be the last base to deplete its tanker inventory; the base will not receive new tankers, but this action will make way for future missions.

"This is really only the first step in the recapitalization of the fleet," Wuesthoff said.

A new tanker requirements study and associated analysis of alternatives to determine the best options to recapitalize the remaining tankers are currently in the planning stages because the strategic environment has changed as a result of 9/11, post 9/11 operations and our overall military strategy, he explained. All viable options will be considered during this analysis. "Ensuring we have a robust air refueling force enables us to protect our homeland, conduct combat operations worldwide and provide humanitarian relief around the world," he said. "We're an aerospace nation, and our tankers allow us to do things no other nation in the world can do. They're an essential part of the overall global mobility equation."

AMC TANKER ROADMAP

Photos removed

Units: Affected by KC-135 Redux

	<u>E-Model</u>	<u>R-Model</u>	<u>Net Loss</u>	<u>Old Unit</u>	<u>New Unit</u>
<u>AMC</u>					
Fairchild, WA		-18	-18	48 Rs	30 Rs
McConnell, KS		-18	-18	48 Rs	30 Rs
Grand Forks, ND		-12	-12	48 Rs	36 Rs
<u>AFRC</u>					
Selfridge	-8	8	0	8 Es	8 Rs
Beale	-8	8	0	8 Es	8 Rs
<u>ANG</u>					
Bangor	-2		-2	10 Es	8 Es
Forbes	-2		-2	10 Es	8 Es
McGhee-Tyson	-2		-2	10 Es	8 Es
McGuire	-4		-4	20 Es	16 Es
Pittsburgh	-20	16	-4	20 Es	16 Rs
Phoenix	-10	8	-2	10 Es	8 Rs
Salt Lake City	-10	8	-2	10 Es	8 Rs
Scott	-2		-2	10 Es	8 Es

Unit Conversions

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 04



24 R-Models → AMC

Fairchild (-12)
McConnell (-12)



24 R-Models → ARC

Selfridge (+8) (AFRC)
Pittsburgh (+16)



44 E-Models displaced → ed/7 to BAI

Selfridge (-8) AFRC)
Salt Lake City (-2)
Pittsburgh (-20)
Bangor (-2)
Forbes (-2)
McGhee-Tyson (-2)
McGuire (-4)
Scott (-2)
Phoenix (-2)

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 05



16 R-MC → AMC

Fairchild (-6)
McConnell (-6)
Grand Forks (-4)



16 R-MC → ARC

Phoenix (+8)
Beale (+8) (AFRC)



16 E-Models dis → 6 retired)

Phoenix (-8)
Beale (-8) (AFRC)

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 06




8 R-Models



Grand Forks (-8)




8 R-Models



Salt Lake City (+8)



8 E-Models dis
retired)



Salt Lake City (-8)

AFRC Tanker Force Structure Changes

Base	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>FY</u>	Final Force Structure
Beale	8 KC-135E	8 KC-135R	FY05	8 KC-135R
March	10 KC-135R	8 KC-135R	FY04	8 KC-135R
Grissom	20 KC-135R	16 KC-135R	FY04	*16 KC-135R
Seymour Johnson	10 KC-135R	8 KC-135R	FY04	8 KC-135R
Selfridge	8 KC-135E	8 KC-135R	FY04	8 KC-135R
Andrews	8 C-141C	8 KC-135R	FY04	8 KC-135R

*** Two, 8 PAA KC-135 R Squadrons**



ANG Tanker Force Structure Changes

Base	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>FY</u>	Final Force Structure
Bangor	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135E	<u>FY04</u>	8 KC-135R
Forbes	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135E	<u>FY04</u>	8 KC-135R
McGhee Tyson	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135E	<u>FY04</u>	8 KC-135R
McGuire	20 KC-135E	*16 KC-135E	<u>FY04</u>	16 KC-135R
Phoenix	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135R	<u>FY05</u>	8 KC-135R
Pittsburgh	20 KC-135E	*16 KC-135R	<u>FY04</u>	16 KC-135R
Salt Lake	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135R	<u>FY06</u>	8 KC-135R
Scott	10 KC-135E	8 KC-135E	<u>FY04</u>	8 KC-135R


*** Two, 8 PAA KC-135 R Squadrons**

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 05



Plus 100 KC-767



Fairchild (-6)
McCormick (-6)
Grand Forks (-4)



Phoenix (+8)
Beale (+8) (AFRC)



Phoenix (-8)
Beale (-8) (AFRC)

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 06

Plus 100 KC-767



AMC

24 R-Models

AMC

Grand Forks (-8)
Fairchild (-16)



AMC

11 KC-767

AMC

Fairchild (+11)



ARC

24 R-Models

ARC

Salt Lake City (+8)
McGhee-Tyson (+8)
Forbes (+8)



ARC

24 E-Models dis

24 retired)

Salt Lake City (-8)
McGhee-Tyson (-8)
Forbes (-8)

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 07

Plus 100 KC-767



24 R-Models
Active Duty

Fairchild (-14)
Grand Forks (-8)
Altus (-2)




16 KC-767
AMC

Fairchild (+16)



24 R-Models
ARC

McGuire (+16)
Bangor (+8)



24 E-Models
24 retired)

McGuire (-16)
Bangor (-8)

Timing: KC-135 Redux in FY 08

Plus 100 KC-767



16 R-Models
AMC

Grand Forks (-24)
Robins (-12)
Altus (-2)
McConnell (+18)
Kadena (+1)
Mildenhall (+1)



20 KC-767
AMC

Fairchild (+1)
Grand Forks (+19)



16 R-Models
ARC

Sioux City (+8)
Scott (+8)



8 E-Models dis
retired)

Sioux City (-8)
Scott (-8)

Proposed ANG Flow Retire All Es By FY08 No Follow-On

	FY04				FY05				FY06				FY07				FY08				FY09				FY10				FY11							
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Base	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Bangor																																				
Bangor																																				
Birmingham	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Eielson	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Fairchild																																				
Fairchild	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Forbes	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Forbes																																				
Mitchell	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Hickam	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Key Field	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Lincoln	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
March	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
McConnell	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
McGhee Tyson	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
McGhee Tyson																																				
McGuire	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
McGuire																																				
Niagara	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Pease	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Phoenix	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Phoenix																																				
Pittsburgh																																				
Pittsburgh	4	6	10	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Rickenbacker	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Salt Lake	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Salt Lake																																				
Scott	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Scott																																				
Sioux City	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Sioux City																																				

Proposed AFRC Flow Retire

All Es By FY08 100 KC-767

	FY04				FY05				FY06				FY07				FY08				FY09				FY10				FY11											
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4				
Base	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Beale																																								
Beale							4																																	
Grissom	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16				
March	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				
Portland	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				
Selfridge																																								
Selfridge	2	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				
Seymour-Johnson	10	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				
Tinker	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				
Andrews	4	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8				

R-Model

Gain

By JERRY ZREMSKI
News Washington Bureau
5/25/2005

WASHINGTON - Top Air Force officials relied on their "collective judgment" in deciding to recommend their Niagara Falls base for closure, disregarding military value rankings that showed Niagara outperforming several other bases slated to remain open, an Air Force spokesman confirmed Tuesday.

Responding to an e-mailed set of questions, Air Force spokesman Douglas Karas said the Air Force's "mission compatibility index" was just one of the factors considered in the base-closure decisions.

Asked why at least nine bases with airlift missions were slated to stay open when they had lower "MCI" scores than Niagara, Karas said the Base Closure Executive Group sometimes deviated from its own rating system. The 12-member group drew up the Air Force's list of suggested base closures.

"There were cases in the analysis process where lower ranked bases were retained," Karas said. "In those cases, the Base Closure Executive Group used their collective judgment, that, when combined with the MCI scores, resulted in the retention of lower-ranked installations. This was true in Niagara's case."

Karas did not provide a detailed explanation of why those lower-ranking airlift missions were kept open, while Niagara's 914th Airlift Wing would be dispersed to other states and its base closed.

However, Karas provided some insight into the base closure group's recommendation to keep an Air National Guard station in Bangor, Maine, open even though it ranked lower than Niagara.

Both bases now host Air National Guard units that perform refueling missions, but the Air Force decided to keep the Bangor base, which is the first U.S. facility that planes would be able to land at when returning from Europe.

"Bangor was retained because, in the military judgment of the Base Closure Executive Group, its Northeast location and current capability to host tanker task force operations were important factors not highlighted within the MCI process," Karas said.

"Bangor routinely supports the Atlantic Air Bridge, and along with the Pease International Tradeport, provides an important air refueling service for airlift deploying and redeploying from Europe and the Middle East," he added.

The aging KC-135 refueling tankers in Bangor will be replaced by the newer models from Niagara, Karas added.

The Air Force developed separate MCI scores for each of its military missions, and then ranked its facilities based on the missions each performed. That means Niagara was ranked on both its capability to perform airlift and refueling operations.

"The Air Force then evaluated those scores, and used military judgment to recommend Niagara Falls for closure," Karas said.

A lobbyist for New York State on the issue, John M. Simmons, said the Air Force's response proves that the base-closure recommendations followed "a judgmental, and not an analytical, process."


The Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) will pass judgment on the suggested shutdowns, and can remove facilities from the base-closure list if it determines that the Pentagon erred in putting them there.

The Pentagon was supposed to judge each base primarily on its military value - yet in this case, Simmons said, the Air Force bypassed the tool it created for judging military value.

"The Air Force in their response acknowledge that they themselves ignored the results of a key analytical tool . . . created for the BRAC process," Simmons said. "They simply took the position that their judgment trumped the analysis."



117th Air Refueling Wing



Concerns With DoD Recommendations

- Substantial Deviation from the Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
- Disregard of Mission Capability and Infrastructure

Deviations From BRAC Act...

Six Air National Guard Tanker Wings Ranking Lower in Military Value Than Birmingham are Remaining or Robusting.

Overall Military Value

(Lower Number = Higher Value)

Birmingham IAP AGS (R)	63
Sioux Gateway APT AGS (E)	67
McGee Tyson APT AGS (E)	74
Pittsburgh IAP AGS (R)	80
Gen Mitchell IAP AGS (R)	86
Pease INT Trade Port AGS (R)	105
Bangor IAP AGS (E)	123

Note: "Military Judgment" used to justify deviation from law

Deviation From BRAC Act...

- Military Value Assessment is Incomplete
 - Air Sovereignty Alert Requirements Disregard Tankers
 - Fighter Air Sovereignty Alert Impotent without In-flight Refueling
 - No Mention of Tanker Role
 - Birmingham – On alert Since 9-11

Deviations From BRAC Act...

- Tanker Plan Flawed Nation Wide
- Degrades Combat Capability and Operational Readiness:
 - Eliminating Six Combat Ready “R” Model Units
 - Creating Seven New “R” Model Units
- Original AF “E” Model Retirement Plan Left Combat Capable “R” Model Units In Place

Mission Capability and Infrastructure

- ❖ Birmingham IS the Most Capable ANG Tanker Base in Eastern Half of the U.S.
 - ❖ Most Gross Weight Lifted Under Widest Variety of Weather Conditions
- ❖ 12,000 Ft. Runway and Low Field Elevation Allows Optimum Tanker Operations
 - ❖ Ten times Greater Coverage in Square Miles than Knoxville Using a 9-11 Scenario
 - ❖ Provides Non-Stop Global Deployment and Airlift Capability to Current Theaters of U.S. Operation

Birmingham
1148 Statute Miles

NEW YORK CITY

WASHINGTON D.C.

ATLANTA

CAPE CANAVERAL

MIAMI

NEW ORLEANS


CRAWFORD, TX

(Knoxville)
McGhee Tyson
384 Statute Miles

KC135-R Operational
Radius Assumptions:

- Optimum runway at both locations
- Temperature - 90° F
- Remain on Station 4 Hours
- Offload - 90,000 lbs Fuel
- Return to Base

9-11 MODEL



PACIFIC REACH

(Non-Stop)

KC-135R Departing For Guam
With 29,000lbs Cargo or 29,000lb Fuel Offload

6271 Statute Miles

A KC-135R Departing From
McGhee Tyson Arrives This Point
With 20,000 lbs Fuel Remaining


Guam

7852 Statute Miles

A KC-135R Departing From
Birmingham Arrives Guam
With 20,000 lbs Fuel Remaining

Wake Island


Hawaii





Mission Capability and Infrastructure

- ❖ Only ANG Tanker Wing Co-located With a KC-135 Depot repair Complex
- ❖ 117th ARW Provides:
 - ❖ Aircrew Augmentation During Peak Production
- ❖ 117th Proposed to Assume Flight Test Mission



Summary...

- Substantial Deviation from the Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
- Disregard of Impact to Mission Capability and Established Infrastructure

***Reject the DOD Redistribution plan for
the Air Refueling Tanker Fleet***

Alabama Air National Guard

117ARW



“Learn, Lethal and Low Cost”

Statement for the Record
Alabama Governor Bob Riley
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented by: The Honorable Bob Riley
Title: Governor of Alabama
Phone: 334-242-7100

Statement for the Record
Alabama Governor Bob Riley
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. I'm proud to be here with you today, and I thank you for the important job you are doing for our country. My job this morning is to wrap up the State of Alabama's testimony.

As you've heard from our presentations, we have five specific recommendations we want you to reexamine and change.

Before I summarize those recommendations, however, I want to remind you of several recommendations you should not change.

Do not change the recommendations to relocate the Army Materiel Command, the Space and Missile Defense Command, and several missile defense activities to Redstone Arsenal. Relocating these activities to Redstone Arsenal makes good sense. It exponentially increases overall military value by locating them next door to the largest defense-centric research and development park in America.

Do not change the recommendations to relocate activities to Anniston Army Depot where DoD will create a Center of Industrial Technical Excellence for Ground Combat Vehicles (Wheel and Track). This fact says it all: DoD rates Anniston Army Depot as having more overall military value to our nation than any other depot.

Do not change the recommendation to relocate the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker. This recommendation consolidates aviation training and doctrine development at a single location. It would be virtually impossible to find a location other than Fort Rucker that could duplicate the climate and training environment we have there.

Do not change the recommendations to relocate training and maneuver activities to Fort Benning. There is plenty of room for expansion at Fort Benning. I know, because over thirteen thousand acres of Ft. Benning are located in Alabama.

For Alabama, it boils down to this: I compliment Secretary Rumsfeld and his department for their hard work. DoD has made several sound and responsible recommendations. Don't change them.

And I want you to know that I will do whatever it takes to make these recommendations happen.

However, there are the five recommendations the State of Alabama is respectfully asking you to reexamine and change. We ask because we share your commitment to put national security and good government first. Moreover, we are equally committed to doing whatever it takes to ensure these recommendations are changed. As a summary, these recommendations are:

1- Reconsider DoD's recommendation to relocate all elements of the Army's Communications-Electronics Command to Aberdeen Proving Ground

2- Keep materiel management as a service core capability, and reject the transfer of this function to the Defense Logistics Agency

3- Recommend relocating the Navy rotary wing pilot training to Fort Rucker

4- Amend DoD's recommendation so that the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group remains at Maxwell-Gunter AFB

For the life of me, I don't understand why DoD made this recommendation. It creates more risk to the warfighter and adds no military value or cost savings. And finally,

5- Reject the DoD redistribution plan for the air refueling tanker fleet

When the DoD plan recommends shutting down the 117th in Birmingham and relocating its planes to places with a lower military value, less capability, and inferior infrastructure, we are not maximizing the effectiveness of our national assets.

Finally, let me say that if we can help you in any way with your deliberations or analysis, please let us know.

Thank you again for your time, attention, and service to our country.

State of Alabama

BRAC Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Governor Bob Riley

State of Alabama



Commission Actions

- ◆ Reconsider Recommendation to Relocate CECOM to Aberdeen
- ◆ Reject Transfer of Materiel Management to the DLA
- ◆ Relocate Navy Rotary Wing Pilot Training to Ft. Rucker
- ◆ Amend Recommendations to Allow OSSG to Remain at Maxwell-Gunter
- ◆ Reject Redistribution Plan for Air Refueling Tanker Fleet

Statement for the Record

2005 BRAC Commission Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Robert "Bud" Cramer (5th-AL)

Representing Redstone Arsenal

Phone: (202) 225-4801

Budmail@mail.house.gov

I am Congressman Bud Cramer and I represent the 5th district of Alabama, which is home to Redstone Arsenal. Thank you for taking the time to hear what Alabama and the Department of Defense both have to gain from this process from our perspective.

The Department of Defense has recommended significant relocations to Redstone, which I fully support. These moves will take advantage of many capabilities and existing resources that are unique to Redstone Arsenal.

North Alabama has a proud tradition of being fully supportive of the military and of our defense industry. Part of this is due to the fact that so many of us have military backgrounds. In fact, our area includes over 206,000 military retirees and family. Moreover, our universities educate and help attract quality people to support our military missions. We are also proud of the fact that Huntsville has the second largest research park in the nation and has the second highest concentration of scientists and engineers.

As you know, Redstone has a long history and boasts unique expertise and facilities. Among the many assets it houses, Redstone is now home to the Army Aviation & Missile Command (AMCOM), Army Space & Missile Defense Command (SMDC), DIA's Missile & Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, the FBI's Explosive Ordnance Disposal School, as well as MDA's Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) Program Office, in addition to numerous program managers and program executive offices.

I am supportive of the recommendation to move portions of the Missile Defense Agency and the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command Headquarters (SMDC). History supports this move, as missile defense began in Huntsville, and over 50% of SMDC is currently housed there. MDA's largest program, GMD, is also managed from Redstone.

Furthermore, I support the recommendation to relocate Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Army's Security Assistance Command (SAC) to Redstone. Moving these to Redstone would assist the Department of Defense to disperse headquarters activities away from the dense concentration in the D.C. area, and also consolidate headquarters that interact daily, which would improve overall military value. An added benefit to these moves would be the alignment with another Army Materiel Command subordinate command, AMCOM, which is already located on Redstone Arsenal.

In closing, I fully support the specific recommendations being presented to you today by members of our community and I look forward to assisting with the best transition possible that come as a result of your decisions.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Spencer Bachus (6th-AL)

**Representing Birmingham International Airport Air
Guard Station, 117th Air Refueling Wing**

Phone: 202 225-4921

Email: Julie.busbee@mail.house.gov

**Statement of
The Honorable Spencer Bachus, United States Congressman (AL-6)
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing**

**Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005**

Chairman Principi and members of the BRAC Commission, thank you for allowing me to contribute to your hearing on the 2005 BRAC Recommendations for Alabama and Georgia.

Thank you for the opportunity to acknowledge and express my appreciation to each of you for your service on the Commission. The BRAC process is critical in ensuring the United States remains equipped with the most capable military forces and that national security needs are met.

The Air Force's proposal to turn 23 Air National Guard bases, including Birmingham's 117th Air Refueling Wing, into "enclaves" greatly concerns me. I am unaware of any existing enclave bases and am highly skeptical the concept is practical, or even proper, under BRAC. As to the 117th ARW specifically, it is illogical. Closing the 117th ARW makes no sense from a military and national security standpoint or from a dollars and cents standpoint.

The creation of enclaves is a concept that concerns me for several reasons:

First, it is not clear that an enclave base can sustain expeditionary combat units. Once flying units are removed from the enclave bases, many will no longer be able to support military or civilian aircraft operations. Even in cases where there is a civilian landing area, the loss of rated firefighters will cause many shared airports to lose FAA ratings and fail to meet minimal Air Force and civilian criteria for landing and loading.

Second, I am concerned that this is an effort to circumvent the BRAC process. The Air Force has indicated that these bases will be kept in "anticipation" of follow-on missions; however, they plan to "shrink" the facilities. It seems this shrinkage will hinder the growth required for a follow-on mission down the road. So, in reality, these enclaves are closures that will happen slowly and without following the BRAC process.

Third, in addition to logistical concerns, recruitment of new Air Guard personnel and retention of Expeditionary Combat Support and air crew personnel will become increasingly difficult. Given recent experience with the B-IB and the on-going war effort, it is critical that we have a better understanding of the possible retention impacts of creating enclaves. GAO's September 2002 analysis (GAO-02-846) pointed out:

Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a reduction in

B-1B bombers from 93-60 would affect DOD's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most cost-effective alternative...As a result, the Air Force understated the potential savings for some options...Our comparison of active and Guard units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and higher mission capable rates than their active duty counterparts.

As the Commission is aware, the law states, "The Secretary shall give priority consideration to the military value criteria." However, **military value was ignored** in the realignment of Birmingham Air National Guard base.

Birmingham's military value was rated at 63. Yet, six Air National Guard Tanker wings determined to have **less** military value than Birmingham are remaining in place with some seeing an increase in aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, since converting to the KC-135R aircraft over 10 years ago, \$73 million has been spent on Birmingham's infrastructure to make it a world-class tanker base. There is room today to bed down 13 KC-135R aircraft at no cost to taxpayers, yet "military judgment," in lieu of military value was used to realign our jets to other locations that **require costly additional infrastructure** to accept our aircraft. When the capability of the 117th with a 12,000-foot runway is compared to McGhee-Tyson with a 9,000-foot runway, the result is even more puzzling.

The city of Birmingham will have to assume operation of the fire station, fire fighting equipment and 15 full-time firefighters that currently protect the Birmingham Airport, if the current recommendations are to take effect. This comes to a cost of \$250,000 a year. Compare this with the Secretary's report indicating a savings to the Department of only \$23,000 a year!

In summary, the realignment of the 117th is part of a larger questionable enclave proposal, which violates the military value, legal requirement, and the "realignment" of the 117th ARW **will cost, not save, the taxpayers millions of dollars**. Therefore, I respectfully ask you and your colleagues on the Commission reconsider the Department's recommendation to realign the KC-135R aircraft of the 117th Air Refueling Wing, and consider holding a hearing on the enclave concept. Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in these proceedings and to express my concerns regarding the decision to realign the 117th Air Refueling Wing. The State of Alabama is grateful for those decisions that have been made to positively impact the state of Alabama.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Terry Everett (AL-02)
Representing Maxwell-Gunter AFB & Fort Rucker
Phone: 202-225-2901

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission:

It is my honor to appear before you today in support of the military installations residing in the Second District of Alabama. I would like to begin by thanking you and your staff for undertaking this most crucial of tasks to ensure that our military is properly structured to fight the ongoing war on terror. I represent two major installations in my congressional district, Fort Rucker in the Wiregrass and Maxwell-Gunter AFB in Montgomery. I am also proud to represent the 908th AF Reserve wing and the 187th Air National Guard fighter wing located at Dannelly Field. All were impacted by the Department of Defense's BRAC recommendations. Critical elements in fighting this war are missions performed by the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) at Maxwell-Gunter AFB and Fort Rucker, located in my congressional district.

Maxwell-Gunter AFB -- OSSG

I am very disappointed in the Pentagon's recommendation to realign the OSSG to Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. Since 1993, over \$275 million in military construction has been authorized to modernize Maxwell-Gunter including state-of-the-art dorms, educational facilities and the 1,500-foot runway expansion. In addition, \$12.8 million was appropriated for the Integrated Operation Support Facility to support the mission of the OSSG at Gunter. Furthermore, I recently met with Lt. Gen. Charles Johnson, Commander of the Air Force Electronic Systems Command, about leadership and funding issues that I had concerning the OSSG. Shortly thereafter, Greg Garcia was named as the new director of the OSSG, while other military leadership positions that have been vacant due to retirements are beginning to be filled.

Despite my efforts, the Pentagon has made an unwise decision and called for the realignment of 1,251 civilian and military jobs from Maxwell-Gunter AFB to Hanscom AFB, which is the parent organization of the OSSG. The OSSG has provided world-class combat operational support to Air Force bases and DoD agencies around the world from Montgomery for more than 30 years. It does not need to be moved in order to continue to perform this critical national security mission. Most significantly, the transfer of the OSSG to Hanscom AFB would necessitate a reproduction of infrastructure, personnel, and contractor base, and therefore could potentially harm the warfighter during this transition because of OSSG's combat support mission. Additionally, a move to a significantly higher cost area, like Massachusetts, is expected to bring a price tag of over \$254 million with any potential payback not expected for another eight years.

The OSSG is the only organization with experience fielding systems across the entire Air Force and DoD. Moreover, Gunter is home to one of four major Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) nodes which provide the backbone on which Air Force Systems run -- a synergy that does not exist at Hanscom AFB. The DISA presence, along with the OSSG, enables testing of enterprise-wide combat support software applications in an operational environment. With its extensive background, experience, and expertise, this organization is truly a one of a kind national resource and belongs in Montgomery.

Fort Rucker – Aviation Logistics School

On the other hand, I was very pleased that the Department of Defense (DoD) recognized the significance of the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker by realigning the Aviation Logistics School with the aviation pilot training. This move consolidates Army Aviation training and doctrine development at Fort Rucker. I could not agree with DoD's belief that consolidating aviation logistics training with the Aviation Center and School will foster consistency, standardization, and training proficiency. As the premier rotary wing aviation training center in the United States, this move finally completes the formation of the Army's decision to create an aviation branch in 1983. The benefits of being able to train the entire flight crew, from the maintainers to the pilots, is quite significant. There is no reason why a flight crew who must go to war as a team should not train as a team.

In addition to the increase in military value, the relocation of the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker makes economic sense. This recommendation will not only allow the Army to reduce the total number of Military Occupational Skills (MOS) training locations, which shrinks the TRADOC footprint, but also eliminates excess capacity at institutional training locations, thereby providing the same or better level of service at a reduced cost. These reduced costs are achieved due to the fact that the proposed arrangement requires fewer sustainment dollars and a smaller Army recapitalization program. The annual recurring savings of almost \$43 million will go a long way in supporting the Army's transformation efforts. For these reasons, I strongly urge the Commission to adopt this recommendation.

Fort Rucker – Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC)

While I am very pleased that DoD has recommended moving an important mission to Fort Rucker, I am very concerned about its proposal to realign the Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC) to Redstone Arsenal. This issue is very close to me personally as I have been intimately involved with it for over 10 years. In the mid-90s, there was an effort made within the Pentagon to move the ATTC out of Fort Rucker. As is the case now, I was very troubled by this, and began to investigate in an effort to determine if this would be best for the Army, highlighted by a personal meeting with the then-Secretary of the Army, Togo West. This culminated when my amendment was included in the House version of Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act (HR 1530) which blocked the Army's proposal to relocate the ATTC until an outside independent study of the proposal could be completed. After an analysis of the move was completed, not only did the ATTC stay at Fort Rucker, but the Airworthiness Qualification Test Directorate was moved from Edwards AFB to Fort Rucker as well. I believe the arguments presented then still have substantial merit today.

At Fort Rucker, the ATTC is able to have their fleet of approximately 40 test aircraft maintained by the large maintenance and logistics operation on post that will be significantly bolstered by the relocation of the Aviation Logistics School from Fort Eustis, the group responsible for training our helicopter maintainers. A move to

Redstone disregards these significant costs of keeping the test fleet flying. The vast pool of pilots and aircraft from the Aviation Center also facilitates the ATTC's ability to realize a greater return on the testing dollar invested.

Another problem with this recommendation revolves around airspace. As the home of Army Aviation, Fort Rucker is blessed with over 32,000 square miles of airspace to conduct its mission. This irreplaceable natural asset cannot be duplicated in Huntsville. A potential move also undermines the synergies that currently exist between the schoolhouse and the experimental pilots. Finally, with Fort Rucker being the Army proponent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it is crucial that the ATTC be able to leverage the expertise associated with this pronency to conduct its tests on UAVs. Fort Rucker also has Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified UAV air space, which may not be able to be duplicated at Redstone.

Fort Rucker – Consolidation of Rotary Wing Pilot Training

Finally, I would like to bring to the Commission's attention another area of interest to me, the consolidation of rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker. Although DoD did not make this recommendation, I believe a thorough review of the facts will prompt the Commission to include this in its final list. Currently, both the Army and Air Force conduct their rotary wing pilot training at Fort Rucker, and has sufficient capability to support Navy initial rotary wing pilot training.

Numerous reviews conducted by DoD and the GAO dating back to 1974 have been made regarding the relocation of this Navy mission. In addition, when Colin Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he testified before the House Armed Services Committee that he supported this consolidation at Fort Rucker. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of the reviews have called for the Navy to move their operation to Fort Rucker for a number of reasons. Past studies have indicated that tens of millions of dollars per year could be saved by going through with this consolidation. Unit costs would be reduced for both aircraft maintenance and logistics. Additionally, both the Army and the Navy use the same training helicopter which would allow for further savings by using the Army's existing instructor pilots. This consolidation will also advance a key component of DoD's way ahead, jointness.

Alabama Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Components

With the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have relied on both our active and reserve forces quite heavily. Over 50 percent of the National Guard's nearly 350,000 Army and 107,000 Air National Guard members had been activated for overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or homeland missions, such as guarding active Air Force bases. These operations have resulted in a high demand for Guard members overall and especially for those trained with certain skills, such as security personnel and tanker pilots. These contributions are vital to the war on terrorism and homeland security.

Both the 908th AF Reserve Mobility Unit and the 187th Air National Guard Fighter Wing are prime examples of what these forces can bring to the fight. As two of the premier units within the Air Force, I was pleased to see that DoD recognized this as well in adding an additional three F-16s to the 187th and four C-130s to the 908th. The addition of the C-130s creates an optimally sized reserve component squadron. The move of the F-16s will align common versions of these Block 30 aircraft at Dannelly Field. Moreover, DoD has recommended that 60 firefighter positions move to Dannelly as well to better support this mission. I support these decisions and hope the Commission will include them in its final report to the President.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with you on the BRAC recommendations. I look forward to working with you and your staff in implementing the Department's recommendation to the move of the Aviation Logistics School to Fort Rucker, as well as the realignment of the F-16s and C-130s to Dannelly Field and Maxwell-Gunter AFB, respectively. Furthermore, I would be happy to provide you with further information in your review of the factors involved in the decision to move the Aviation Technical Test Center from Fort Rucker to Redstone Arsenal and the consolidation of rotary wing pilot training.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Robert Aderholt (4th-AL)

Representing District Four of Alabama
Phone: (202) 225-4876

I am Congressman Robert Aderholt and I represent the 4th Congressional District of Alabama. I appreciate this opportunity to express my support for what Redstone Arsenal has to offer the U.S. Department of Defense.

The district I am privileged to represent literally borders Redstone Arsenal. Many of the families who live in district four commute to work at Redstone and other locations in the 5th district. When considering the duties of the federal government, it can legitimately be argued that providing for the nation's defense is the primary duty. Working for the U.S. military is not only a job for many of the families in the district I represent, it is a deep commitment to the future of our country.

North Alabama, particularly at the time of World War II and ever since then, has been the home of many of our nation's top scientists engaged in both military and space exploration related activities. I am honored to be starting my fourth term as a member of the appropriations subcommittee which oversees military construction. During that time, I have strongly supported the upgrading of facilities throughout the state, but especially those in north Alabama which relate to missile defense. Additionally, constituents I represent serve in the Guard and Reserve – both in the 4th district, but also in neighboring districts.

I am also aware of many additional high-tech areas of research, including robotics and the many applications it can have – which holds great promise in keeping our men and women in combat out of harm's way as much as possible.

In closing, I wish to say that I fully support the proposals made by the communities in Alabama, and I look forward to working with you as these important transitions are made for the betterment of our nation's defense.

Thank you for time and consideration.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented by: Congressman Artur Davis (AL-7)
Representing the 117th Air Refueling Wing, Birmingham, AL
Phone: (202) 225-2665

Chairman Principi, distinguished members of the Commission, I want to convey my appreciation for your hard work and dedicated efforts at strengthening our nation's military and ensuring our citizens' security. There is no higher calling than defending your country and I am grateful for your service in that defense.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, I am here today to express my strongest support for the 117th Air Refueling Wing (ARW) of the Alabama Air National Guard, based out of Birmingham International Airport, in my district. This unit utilizes nine KC-135R tankers (recently acquired in 1994), operates with 183 full time and 326 traditional guard positions, and by January 2006, will utilize newly-completed 12,000-ft runways, the longest runways in the region.

As you know, your Commission has recommended realigning this base and redistributing its assets to McGee-Tyson Airport in Tennessee, Phoenix Sky Harbor in Arizona, and Bangor Airport, in Maine, presumably to reduce inefficiency and strengthen our nation's tanker force. Along with the unified voice of the Governor of Alabama, the state's entire Congressional delegation, and the state's National Guard units, I respectfully request the Commission to reconsider its decision to realign the 117th ARW.

In its current configuration, the 117th ARW brings far too much to our nation's national security and homeland defense efforts to be eliminated, and, additionally, any effort to realign the base will actually cost more money to the U.S. Treasury than it will save. In short, Members of the Commission, realigning the 117th fails the two primary tests set out at the outset of this round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC): it reduces our nation's military capacity and fails to save sufficient money to justify its realignment.

On the question of military capacity, the 117th clearly provides our tanker force with a military global reach that is vastly superior to those provided by many of the bases remaining in place. In fact, utilizing your Commission's own evaluation formula, the 117th scored a quantifiably better military value than six other Air National Guard Tanker wings that are either remaining in place or seeing an increase in the number of aircraft they possess. I refer now to Chart 1.

Chart 1: Tanker Wings with Less Military Value than Birmingham, but are Retaining or Robusting

<u>Birmingham IAP AGS (R)</u>	<u>63</u>
Sioux Gateway APT AGS (E)	67
McGee Tyson APT AGS (E)	74
Pittsburgh IAP AGS (R)	80
Gen Mitchell IAP AGS (R)	86
Pease INT Trade Port AGS (R)	105
Bangor IAP AGS (E)	123

The reality behind these numbers is striking. The Birmingham International Airport's 12,000-foot runway makes the 117th Air Refueling Wing the most capable Air National Guard tanker airfield in the eastern half of the United States. Stationed by veteran Guardsmen and women, the unit's KC-135R tankers are only ten years old, coupling personnel experience with advanced equipment unmatched in the region. In terms of capacity, the tanker aircraft stationed at Birmingham would be able to takeoff with the most fuel under the widest variety of weather conditions of any other Tanker unit in the country. This makes Birmingham an unmatched force multiplier during a "9-11"-type scenario, and provides non-stop global deployment and airlift capability to current theaters of U.S. operation.

When matched up against the ARW basing from the 9,000 foot runway at McGee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, the destination for four of the 117th ARW's realigned aircraft, Birmingham's superiority is starkly revealed. In a "9-11"-type scenario for a homeland security mission in the continental United States, the 117th ARW is capable of performing missions that cover three times the number of statute miles that the ARW based in Knoxville can cover. To cover even half of Birmingham's statute miles, the Knoxville ARW would have to use two aircraft for every single tanker used by Birmingham.

Birmingham's superiority becomes even more obvious when its global reach is compared with Knoxville's. While Birmingham's 117th ARW can easily reach Guam in a Pacific Theater mission, the Knoxville unit falls short by several thousand miles. Likewise, the 117th ARW can fly directly into the theater for operations in the Middle East, while the Knoxville unit is forced to refuel in Turkey before continuing onwards.

Both of these cases demonstrate the realities behind Birmingham's high military value rating and superior global reach over at least one of the bases that the Commission has recommended retaining. I respectfully submit to the Commission that this decision makes little sense for strengthening our nation's military capacity.

As our state's delegation has testified, we believe that the Commission erred in favoring the somewhat hazy variable of "military judgment" over the formula-derived "military value" variable in its recommendation for the 117th ARW. In light of Birmingham's veteran force, newer equipment, and longer runways – the building blocks for superior military capacity – I would urge the Commission to reconsider its "military judgment" on what the 117th ARW contributes to our nation's global and homeland security operations. The military value of this unit is beyond dispute.

Finally, this recommendation fails to save the U.S. taxpayer sufficient dollars to justify realignment. Since converting to the KC-135R aircraft over 10 years ago, the Department of Defense has spent \$73 million on Birmingham's infrastructure to make it the world-class tanker base it demonstrably is. Realigning this base wastes all of this money already spent on this project. The 117th ARW currently has the capacity in Birmingham to bed down 13 KC-135R aircraft at no charge to taxpayers, yet "military judgment," in lieu of military value, may be used to realign Birmingham's jets to other

locations that require additional infrastructure to handle the aircraft. For example, current data indicates that McGhee-Tyson is physically unable to accommodate the 12 aircraft that they are proposed to receive. Realignment will therefore result in greater expense to taxpayers who are asked to foot the bill for additional and unnecessary infrastructure.

Worse yet for the taxpayer, the one-time cost for moving these aircraft is \$11 million, yet the DoD's report indicates the savings to the Department over 20 years to realign Birmingham is only \$460,000 dollars. That amounts to "savings" of \$23,000 a year -- still significantly less than the cost of moving the aircraft in the first place. This clearly fails to save the U.S. taxpayer sufficient dollars to justify realignment, and so I must ask the Commission in all sincerity, if this is an example of sound military judgment, then what constitutes un-sound military judgment?

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate my support for the 117th ARW based at Birmingham International Airport, and strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to realign a base that is vital to our nation's national security.

Testimony for Congressman Mike D. Rogers (Alabama) Base Re-alignment and Closure Commission – Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Thank you, Chairman Principi, and Members of the BRAC Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with my colleagues from Alabama, and thank you for allowing me to include my remarks before the Commission.

Before I begin, I would like to express my appreciation to each of you for your service on this panel. This process is one of acute importance to our national security. While you will be challenged over the next few months to accept or reject the recommendations made by the Department of Defense, I have complete confidence in your ability to do what is best for our military and best for our national defense.

Alabama's Third Congressional District is home or contiguous to three major military installations of critical importance to our military's readiness: the Anniston Army Depot, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, and Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia.

I would now like to discuss the Pentagon's recommendations regarding the Anniston Army Depot. On the whole, I believe the Department's proposal to consolidate all ground combat vehicles along with the Depot's artillery, and small arms weapons systems at ANAD is a logical recommendation, and accurately reflects Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to more efficiently utilize the military's key industrial facilities.

For over 60 years, ANAD has proudly supported our nation's warfighters both in Calhoun County and in theater. As the Department of Defense's Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) for combat vehicles, and the most efficient Depot in the U.S. Military today, ANAD is the optimal place to consolidate DoD's ground combat vehicle systems and components.

Anniston has been a trail blazer in the use of private-public partnerships to fulfill its defense maintenance mission. These successful partnerships are, to date, responsible for the production of many critical weapon systems, including the Stryker Vehicle, M1A1/A2 Abrams Tank and M113 Family of Vehicles.

ANAD also has the necessary surge capacity to meet the growing need for heavy vehicle maintenance. Its highly trained civilian workforce continues to meet the military's need for heavy armored vehicles, and has demonstrated an ability to adapt to the rapidly changing needs of the 360-degree battlefield.

Anniston has also been successful in meeting the Department's vision for greater inter-service work. Far from being simply a maintenance depot for Army vehicles, the facility now overhauls Marine tanks, Air Force rail locomotives, small arms for all services and under the BRAC recommendations additional equipment for the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, these positive recommendations made in relation to Anniston fully support the Department's strategy to improve efficiency, increase inter-service workloading, and maximize usage of the military's heavy industrial base. They are critical to increasing combat effectiveness for our troops on the field, and further transforming the U.S. military to meet the challenges of 21st century.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Mike D. Rogers (3rd-AL)
Representing: Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base
Phone: 202 225-3261
Email: mike.rogers@mail.house.gov

Testimony for Congressman Mike D. Rogers (Alabama)

Base Re-alignment and Closure Commission – Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

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I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the Department's recommendations regarding Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base. On the whole, the recommendation to consolidate the Air and Space C4ISR Research and Development and Acquisition and Test and Evaluation (RDAT&E) is a reasonable proposal. Elimination of duplicative facilities is critical in any organization, and I support the concept of reducing the RDAT&E technical facilities to increase the program's overall efficiency.

However, I disagree wholeheartedly with the Secretary's recommendation that the Operations and Sustainment Systems Group (OSSG) located at Maxwell-Gunter in Montgomery, Alabama, be included in the Secretary's recommendation to consolidate the Air and Space C4ISR RDAT&E.

Simply put, OSSG is not a research and development organization. OSSG integrates, operates and sustains secure combat support information systems and networks for the Air Force and Department of Defense components. The systems that OSSG operates and sustains touch nearly every mission on every Air Force Base worldwide, and provide our warfighters with the right combat support information in the right place and at the right time.

The OSSG provides our Air Forces real-time military value. The day-to-day continuous support and upkeep of its IT systems provides essential operational and combat support for our nation's warfighters.

Mr. Chairman, the primary mission of the OSSG is to provide and support secure combat information systems and networks for the Air Force and Department of Defense components, not RDT&E. The Standard Systems Group at Maxwell-Gunter does not belong in the Secretary's recommendation to consolidate Air and Space C4ISR Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation.

I respectfully ask you and your colleagues on the Commission reconsider the Department's recommendation to move, and subsequently, combine these critical OSSG missions with the Air Force's research and development functions, and help ensure our men and women in battle continue to benefit from the expertise provided from the highly trained workforce of Maxwell-Gunter's OSSG.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement for the Record
2005 BRAC Commission Hearing
Atlanta, Georgia
June 30, 2005

Presented By: Congressman Mike D. Rogers (3rd-AL)
Representing: Dannelly Field Air Guard Station
Phone: 202 225-3261
Email: mike.rogers@mail.house.gov

Testimony for Congressman Mike D. Rogers (Alabama)
Base Re-alignment and Closure Commission – Atlanta, Georgia

June 30, 2005

Thank you, Chairman Principi, and Members of the BRAC Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with my colleagues from Alabama, and thank you for allowing me to include my remarks before the Commission.

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Alabama's Third Congressional District is home or contiguous to three major military installations of critical importance to our military's readiness: the Anniston Army Depot, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, and Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia. East Alabama is also the home base for the proud men and women who serve in the National Guard's 187th Fighter Wing at Dannelly Field Air Guard Station.

Regarding the 187th Fighter Wing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to voice my opinion that the Department of Defense's Base Closure and Realignment recommendations reflect Alabama's exemplary National Guard units. I am proud to represent a district and state that has a premiere National Guard which has historically served in great numbers when called to duty.

Specifically, I believe the recommendation to distribute three F-16's to the 187th Fighter Wing at Dannelly Field Air Guard Station accurately reflects the BRAC goals of increased efficiency and military value to our nation. The 187th has deployed several times over the years, and most recently has completed several successful missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The unit successfully has nineteen years and over 55,000 flight hours without a Class A aircraft mishap, and has received numerous Flight Safety awards from the Air Force Air Combat Command and the Air National Guard for its safety record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.