

## Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), Section I of the Army Plan (TAP), is the Army's institutional strategy and serves as its principal long-range planning document. The ASPG expresses the Senior Leadership's intent for how the Army will fulfill its Title 10<sup>1</sup> obligations to the Joint Force and the Nation in support of Defense and National Strategies.<sup>2</sup> The ASPG provides a long-term perspective (10 to 20 years) for planning at all levels and a common understanding of the Army's contribution to National Security and the Joint Team.

Last year's ASPG provided a new vision and direction for the Army in the context of a security environment fundamentally changed by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).<sup>3</sup> This year's document will not alter that direction significantly, but will identify areas where additional emphasis is needed to maintain momentum for transformation and change.

To provide necessary focus, the Army is introducing ten new strategic imperatives. They are: Implement Transformation Initiatives, Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense, Improve Proficiencies Against Irregular Challenges, Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations, Achieve Army Force Capabilities to Dominate in Complex Terrain, Improve Army Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness, Improve Global Force Posture, Improve Capabilities for Battle Command, Improve Joint Fires Capability and Improve Capabilities for Joint Logistics. These strategic imperatives will guide how the Army organizes, trains and equips its forces to ensure mastery of the full range of military operations and dominance in armed conflict.<sup>4</sup>

The Army Campaign Plan directs how the Army will build these capabilities.<sup>5</sup> These imperatives are related to our Title 10 functions. The Title 10 functions explain the Army's mission, while the strategic imperatives clarify how the Army will accomplish its mission to meet the challenges of the current and projected security environment. Unlike our statutory requirements, strategic imperatives change with time, the strategic environment and joint force requirements.

### Army Strategic Imperatives

**Implement Transformation Initiatives**

**Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense**

**Improve Proficiencies Against Irregular Challenges**

**Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations**

**Achieve Army Force Capabilities to Dominate in Complex Terrain**

**Improve Army Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness**

**Improve Global Force Posture**

**Improve Capabilities for Battle Command**

**Improve Joint Fires Capability**

**Improve Capabilities for Joint Logistics**

<sup>1</sup> Title 10, subtitle B, The Army, is US code governing the roles and responsibilities of the Army. US Code Title 10 is available online at <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/index.html> (link valid as of 22 September 2004). By Title 10, the Army functions are Train, Organize, Equip, Administer, Maintain, Supply, Service, Recruit, Mobilize/Demobilize the Army, and Construct, Outfit and Repair Equipment.

<sup>2</sup> See Annex A, "National Strategic Guidance"

<sup>3</sup> See Annex D, "The Security Environment"

<sup>4</sup> The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in a memorandum dated 28 Jan 2003. For a graphic depiction of the ROMO, please see Annex D, The Security Environment.

<sup>5</sup> See ASPG-ACP Crosswalk in Annex C

## **An Army at War**

We remain an Army and a Nation at War. It is a war unlike any our Nation has seen, prosecuted not by states and Armies, but by extremists employing irregular means to erode our power and our resolve. In Iraq and Afghanistan and many other places around the globe, our Soldiers are on the front lines of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), a war that is as much an ideological struggle as a military one. This will be a protracted war, requiring the Army as a member of the Joint Team and the interagency to master the full range of military operations and dominate all forms of armed conflict.<sup>6</sup> As the National Security Strategy states, The War on Terrorism “will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time.”<sup>7</sup> Providing forces and doctrine to win this war remains the Army’s number one priority.

The past year has been a challenging one for the Army at all levels. The Army is focusing its resources to ensure that the operational force has the requisite capabilities to sustain and win the GWOT. Future force capabilities and resources must be focused on the most promising technologies that can be developed and fielded to the operationally engaged force. However, we must be aware of risk and ensure we strike a balance between winning the current fight and transforming for the next one. To win the extended Global War on Terrorism and honor our global commitments, transformation is imperative. We must not let present capabilities wither nor fail to invest in our future. We must transform now to prevail in the GWOT and sustain our global commitments.

We now find ourselves in a limited period of time when conditions favorable to perform in stride transformation have converged. The GWOT has focused people, both inside and outside of the Army on the compelling need for transformation. Today, Congressional support through Supplemental appropriations funds our Army’s operations in the GWOT and the RESET of forces once they redeploy from theater. The Army is leveraging these funds to RESET these units in order to better prepare our Soldiers and units for future challenges.

### **“The Ends, Ways and Means” of Army Strategy**

The Army’s mission is to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army’s Strategic Goal is to remain relevant and ready by providing the Joint Force with essential capabilities to dominate across the full range of military operations. The Army’s Strategic Objectives succinctly elaborate the Army’s purpose as a force provider. The Army’s Strategic Objectives are “Trained and Equipped Soldiers and

---

<sup>6</sup> For a full treatment of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved range of military operations, see Annex D, “The Security Environment.”

<sup>7</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, page 5.

Developed Leaders;” and “Relevant and Ready Land Power for the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team.”

These Strategic Objectives are the “Ends” of the Army strategy. They explain what the Department of the Army does to support the national strategy. The Army provides land power capabilities to the Combatant Commanders, including trained and equipped Soldiers and leaders. These two objectives are the basis for all Army Strategy.

The “Ways” of a strategy are the methods an organization uses to achieve its “Ends.” The Army has two different types of “Ways.” The first of these is our Title 10 functions. These functions are constant and mandated by law. The second category of “Ways” is the Army’s Strategic Imperatives. These imperatives are not static. They elaborate on how the Army should focus itself to be relevant and ready to meet the challenges of the current and future security environment. Overlaying and enabling these “Ways” are the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. These provide an overarching framework that should underpin all of our actions and decisions.

The “Means” of a strategy are the resources it has to achieve the “Ends.” The “Means” of the Army’s Strategy are our people, the physical assets the Army uses to perform its functions and our financial resources. These include Soldiers, leaders, Department of the Army Civilians and the resources Congress allocates to us. They also include our installations and the equipment that helps the Army project power in support of the Combatant Commander. Our most important resource is our people throughout the Army who plan and execute the campaign of change that will ensure a relevant and ready future force and the information through which we manage and operate. The Army Campaign Plan synchronizes many of our means to transform into a fully modularized force trained and capable of responding to the multiple challenges of the current and future security environment.

When considering Army strategy, this framework should focus thinking and provide direction. By fully adopting the “Ends, Ways, Means” framework and capabilities based planning, the Army can express its strategy in a succinct, coherent and simple manner that reflects both national and department level strategy.

## **Balancing Risk**

As we remain engaged, new challenges continue to emerge. Our Army must simultaneously prepare for future challenges and meet the Combatant Commander’s immediate needs for relevant and ready land power. Given limited resources, there is tension between meeting current demands and preparing for the future that require us to carefully balance risk.

We must sustain and improve how we recruit, organize, supply, equip, train and mobilize Soldiers, leaders and units for the operational environment we face. Our pace of operations in an uncertain environment is creating significant challenges that require

Careful management to sustain our ability to meet our strategic ends. Identifying and mitigating the risks associated with our mission will ensure the Army remains relevant and ready to do whatever our Nation asks of us.

### **Trained and Equipped Soldiers and Developed Leaders**

Our first Strategic Objective is trained and equipped Soldiers and developed leaders. As people are the Army's most valuable resource, assuring Army Soldiers and leaders are adequately prepared to meet the substantial demands of our current, complex security environment is vital.

The "ways" the Army uses to meet this strategic objective are the Title 10 functions: train, organize, equip, etc. Although these "ways" are static and codified by law, the manner in which we execute them is not. The Army has changed and adapted how it performs its Title 10 functions to meet the requirements of sustaining an Army at War.

Underpinning everything the Army does are the Army values and the Warrior Ethos. Values are a non-negotiable element of our Army culture and Army Transformation.<sup>8</sup> A highly complex, nonlinear battlespace creates situations where expediency may compete with morality. For the Army to expect moral decisions, Soldiers and leaders require a solid foundation and regular training in Army Values. This training will ensure all members of the Army team, when confronted with morally uncertain situations, understand what "doing the right thing" means. The Warrior Ethos is equally vital to our culture. It is the foundation of the American Soldier's total commitment to victory in peace and war. Soldiers who live the Warrior Ethos always put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit and never leave a fallen comrade behind. They are trained and equipped to engage and destroy the enemies of the United States in close combat.

**Trained and Equipped Soldiers:** The Soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. Our focus must be to recruit, train, equip and retain physically fit, healthy, quality Soldiers imbued with the Army values and warrior ethos and who live by the Soldier's creed. We must remember that we are Soldiers first and specialists second, and only with quality Soldiers can the Army ensure the victories required on today's battlefields and those of the future.

Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown the need for Soldiers who are not only well trained and equipped, but who are also adaptable and capable of responding to rapidly changing situations and are attuned to cultural conditions. In addition to rigorous, repetitive training in weapons and fieldcraft, Soldiers also require training in how to adapt to quickly evolving situations, not just how to react to changes, but also how to shape the environment to create the best possible outcomes.

---

<sup>8</sup> The Army Values are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage.

This requires a commitment to provide commanders increased capabilities to train Soldiers, leaders and units anytime, anywhere. Ensuring mastery across the ROMO requires new and innovative approaches to training and a robust training support system.

Iraq in particular has proven to be a non-linear battlefield. Given the security environment, we can expect this to become the norm. This requires all Soldiers understand they are warriors first and that they must be ready to fight. The distinctions between combatant and noncombatant have blurred, as have the distinctions between combat operations and stability operations. Simultaneous operations across the range of military operations, rather than sequential operations will likely be the rule. To succeed in such an environment, Soldiers and leaders must be capable of rapidly and accurately assessing the evolving situation. In order to make accurate assessments, they must also be capable of using all the tools at their disposal. This requires Soldiers and leaders who understand and are capable of leveraging the latest technology and Joint Capabilities. It also requires Soldiers and leaders who are knowledgeable of culture, history and the language of the area of operations.

To ensure our Soldiers are fully trained and equipped to meet the challenges they will face, we must ensure that we are executing our mission in a way that accounts for the current environment. To ensure our Soldiers' success, we have undertaken the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) to provide Soldier equipment designed to enhance protection and effectiveness in today's challenging environment. Equipment and technological improvements must be fielded to all components Army wide to ensure compatibility and interoperability. We must also use the RFI to improve our training capability based on the experience of our combat tested leaders and lessons learned. Our training support systems must be modernized to provide a higher level of proficiency and readiness that this new environment demands.

The challenge of serving a Nation at war highlights the importance of providing for the physical, materiel, mental and spiritual well-being of our Soldiers, civilians and family members before, during and after deployments. Their well-being is linked to Army readiness and our sustained viability as an all-volunteer force. Army Well-Being contributes to the Army's ability to provide trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commander. A leadership imperative, Army Well-Being provides a means for leaders at all levels to focus on taking care of people within the context of accomplishing the mission.

**Developed Leaders:** The complexity of the operational environment affects all levels of leadership. No longer can leaders succeed by dealing only with those in uniform. Today's environment requires lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers to communicate regularly with a variety of actors; from interagency partners, to members of non-governmental organizations, to local leaders, to members of the U.S. and foreign media. To succeed, leaders at all levels must have situational understanding that extends beyond the tactical level. This requires a robust leader development system that grows leaders who are prepared, versatile and adaptive and

who have a broad understanding of the political and military objectives of the campaign, as well as the potential implications of their actions upon those objectives.

Much has been learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army now has a cohort of leaders with diverse and extensive operational experience. As an Army, we must draw upon their experience. We must leverage their successes and ensure that lessons learned are captured and institutionalized where appropriate, rather than forcing new leaders to relearn the same lessons again and again. The stated complexity, demands, and expectations of our leaders can only be met through a cohesive and continuous approach to learning.

Not all Army Leaders wear uniforms. Recent experiences have shown the value of DA Civilians and contractors throughout all phases of a military campaign. DA Civilians provide critical capabilities to supplement Soldier skills. We have made significant progress in our deployment of DA Civilians into combat. However, we must continue to improve in this area.

### **Relevant and Ready Land Power to the Combatant Commander as Part of the Joint Team**

Our second strategic objective is relevant and ready land power to the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team. Our Title 10 functions also support this strategic objective. In addition, the Army has added ten strategic imperatives that will improve our ability to field relevant and ready land forces.

The Army is a critical member of the Joint Team in an environment that is becoming increasingly more combined and interagency in the conduct of sustained operations. The Army is continuously working to improve its Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities. We are enhancing the capabilities required to increase speed, reach and precision and our ability to engage routinely in joint operations at significantly lower operational and tactical levels than today.

Over the past year, much has been done to ensure the Army's campaign quality. In *Serving a Nation at War*, General Schoomaker explains the concept of campaign quality by stating...

The campaign quality of an Army ... is not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> *Serving A Nation at War*. Page 7.

While it is the Joint Force Commander who is responsible for winning wars and the Joint Force that fights them, it is the Army's responsibility to provide the land power that will win the fight and set the conditions for enduring peace. Our relevance is in relation to the value of Army forces to the Joint Force and the Army's ability to produce leaders that can serve as successful Joint Force and Combatant Commanders. Because it is difficult to predict the exact combination of challenges our forces and leaders will be called upon to defeat, we must field versatile land forces capable of dominance across the spectrum of conflict and adaptive leaders capable of joint force employment under a wide range of conditions and with an understanding that military participation will be required beyond the conclusion of Major Combat Operations.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Army must retain its ability to dominate in a "traditional conflict." U.S. land forces clearly occupy a dominant position in the world when it comes to defeating traditional military challenges. We must certainly retain that overmatch, particularly in the face of a number of capable armies that could challenge U.S. allies and interests, now and in the future. In some areas we have accrued excessive conventional overmatch and we will continue to make well-informed decisions to convert excessive overmatch to more relevant capabilities across the active and reserve components.

We must make jointness a natural condition for everything we do. Given the nature of the security environment, sustained operational commitments and challenges inherent in responsively implementing the Defense Strategy, joint interdependence is a strategic and operational imperative. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance on other Service and Joint Capabilities. It maximizes complementary and reinforcing effects and minimizes vulnerabilities. The Army will continue initiatives that leverage joint interdependence, a concept that is central to both the expeditionary mindset and the campaign quality we seek. The concept of interdependence also extends to interagency and coalition partners, enhancing the ability of Army and Joint forces to effectively achieve joint force campaign objectives.<sup>10</sup>


Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) are key components of how we determine, validate, and refine capabilities. The overarching priorities of winning the current war and transforming the force now will drive our CD&E activities. CD&E plans will support capability generation in the near, mid, and long term. They must be focused and balanced to support Army strategic imperatives and Army Campaign Plan Objectives. Army CD&E must include a balanced examination of threats and operations across the full range of military operations. A continuous cycle of innovation, experimentation, experience, and change will enable the Army to improve capabilities to provide dominant and enduring land power to the joint force now and in the future.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> In *Serving a Nation at War*, GEN Schoomaker identified five key joint interdependencies. They are Fire and Effects, Battle Command, Force Projection, Air and Missile Defense, and Logistics. *Serving a Nation at War*, page 20. Accessible online at <http://www.army.mil/jec/>. Link active as of 17 Sep 2004.

<sup>11</sup> See Annex B, Concept Development and Experimentation Guidance.

The Army Staff has conducted a strategic mission analysis to identify aspects of the Joint Campaign for which our land power contributions must be optimized. The result is a number of strategic imperatives that collectively describe how we will increase our relevance to Joint Forces and our readiness to prevail in a Joint campaign. The strategic imperatives fall into two basic categories relative to the Joint Force commander's campaign: those that contribute to particular operational requirements and those that are necessary functional enablers. The Army will work to improve its capability to conduct operations in support of homeland defense and stability operations as well as improving its capabilities against irregular challenges and achieving dominance in Complex Terrain. We will also pursue functional improvements that span all phases of the typical campaign; Battle Command, Joint Fires, Joint Logistics and Global Posture. Underpinning all of these efforts, the Army will continue to implement transformation initiatives and ensure that it is balancing risk through execution of the Army Campaign Plan. (See Chart Below.)



### Implement Transformation Initiatives

The Army continues to transform its organizations to meet the challenges of the security environment and ensure mastery across the full range of military operations. To ensure that the Army is capable of fielding the relevant and ready forces the Combatant Commander requires, we have undertaken five major transformation initiatives. They are: Implement Modularity, Developing the Network, Developing and Fielding the Future Combat System (FCS), Force Stabilization and AC/RC Rebalance.

**Implement Modularity:** Modularity is the Army's major force transformation initiative which involves the total redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, flexible and deployable force. This redesign centers on what is called a Brigade Combat Team (Unit of Action) [BCT(UA)]. This unit is a stand-alone and standardized tactical force of between 3,500 to 4,000 Soldiers that is organized the way it fights. The Army will implement the plan to resource up to 48 Active Component BCT (UA)s and exactly 34 National Guard BCT (UA)s and 12 Army Expeditionary Packages.

Modularity has several major advantages. These include:

- At least a 30% increase in the combat power of the active component of the force.
- An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%
- Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters
- Force design upon which the future network centric developments can be readily applied
- Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle:
  - One year deployed and two years at home station for the active component
  - One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve force
  - One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard force
  - Reduced mobilization times for the reserve component as a whole

An operational Army organized around Modular Brigade Combat Teams and support forces will better meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism.

**Developing the Network:** Also critical to Army transformation is the creation of a net-centric, knowledge based environment and its use to transform how we make decisions and operate. Net-centricity, to include knowledge-based decisions and operations will translate information superiority into combat power by interconnecting people and systems independent of time or location, achieving improved situational awareness, access to knowledge sources and shortened decision cycles. These, in turn, will achieve decision and leader superiority.

**Developing and Fielding FCS:** Also key to Army transformation is fielding the Future Combat System (FCS). Future Combat Systems and Science and Technology programs are focused on spiraling higher payoff technologies into the Current Force as soon as they become available. Simultaneously, our Current Force, with these enhanced capabilities, will influence and inform the development of the Future Force.

**Force Stabilization:** To support transformation, the Army is transitioning to an improved manning system- force stabilization- that places greater emphasis on building

and sustaining cohesive, deployable, combat ready units for Combatant Commanders. We must not over rely on any component and we must ensure that the total force is managed so that a sustainable rotation cycle is achieved.

The Army force generation process leverages force modularity to create and maintain rapidly deployable modular forces, both active and reserve component, capable of configuring in a number of force and capability packages to meet the Combatant Commander's requirements. Units are managed through progressive operational capability force levels consisting of Reset/Train, Ready and Available Forces with the process culminating in full mission capability and deployability. Rebalancing the force optimizes it to support continuous operations and improve strategic responsiveness. Unit Stabilization keeps teams together throughout deployments. Together, these initiatives relieve stress on the force and provide training time and predictable deployment schedules while retaining the Army's capability to surge for major combat operations.

**AC/RC Rebalance:** Our current Active and Reserve Component structure is not optimized for today's requirements for rapid deployment and sustainment. To optimize it, we are rebalancing Active and Reserve components. When completed, we will have restructured and rebalanced more than 100,000 positions within our Army. We are restructuring the force to increase units with special skills that are routinely in high demand by the Combatant Commanders, such as infantry, military police, transportation and civil affairs.

We are also transferring more combat support and combat service support structure into the Active Component to improve its rapid deployment capability and ability to sustain operations during the first 30 days of a contingency. This increase in high-demand units will reduce the requirements for immediate mobilization of Reserve Component units or provide training time for later unit rotational cycles.

### **Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense**

Defense of our homeland is a full time requirement and a persistent feature of the GWOT campaign. All Army components are involved in Homeland Defense. The change brought on by the onset of the GWOT necessitate a range of policy, organizational, doctrinal and force structure changes to address challenges to our homeland—particularly – irregular challenges.

Defending the U.S. from attack is our nation's highest priority. Our enemies seek to harm us not only on distant shores, but also on American soil. The attacks on 9/11 proved our vulnerability. Protecting the homeland is a mission that extends beyond U.S. borders. It includes destroying terrorist networks abroad that seek to attack the U.S. The Army contributes an active, layered defense of the United States first by providing relevant Army capabilities to Combatant Commanders in forward regions to defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance. The Army also provides capabilities in the approaches to the United States, the global commons, and

at home to physically defend the nation from attack. Such a defense will require timely, actionable and fused intelligence, agile and strategic responsiveness of a proactive, layered, mutually supporting defense in depth that can mass superior forces to deter, detect, defend, defeat and possibly mitigate threats to the homeland. Homeland Defense also includes support to lead federal agencies in broader homeland security operations.

**In order to improve our capabilities to defend the Homeland, the Army will establish a Homeland Defense Focus Area.** The members of this Focus Areas team will make recommendations for the development and implementation of solutions to improve HQDA oversight for Homeland Defense. Additionally, the focus area team will develop a recommendation for the appropriate manning of military and non-military Homeland Defense organizations. Finally, the focus areas team will analyze the feasibility and implications of a fully functional Army Service Component Command for NORTHCOM.

### **Improve Proficiencies Against Irregular Challenges**

The Department of Defense's Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) 06-11 defines irregular challenges as unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. They will constitute the Nation's most persistent challenge for the foreseeable future. Irregular challenges are byproducts of the current strategic environment and spring from an inability of our adversaries to confront U.S. power symmetrically. Experiences over the past decade from Mogadishu to the Shah-i-Kot Mountains demonstrate the increasing frequency of the irregular challenge.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have shown that insurgencies can arise out of regime change and can hinder follow on stability operations. The current enemy has adopted asymmetric strategies and tactics that enable it to mitigate U.S. strengths. U.S. forces must adapt to the new strategic environment and develop proficiencies that counter these tactics. To improve proficiencies for irregular challenges, the Army must begin by defining what they encompass. Certainly terrorism and insurgency are common faces of such challenges. Other examples of irregular challenges are attacks against economic targets and infrastructure, or propaganda campaigns against the U.S. The integration and synchronization of all information operations (IO) elements, including civil, psychological, public information, space and other, is key to countering enemy propaganda and shaping world opinion. Effective IO employment will set conditions in the information environment to amplify the effects of Joint combat operations.

To succeed, the Army must develop a more sophisticated understanding of the implications of the new environment at the operational and strategic levels. Our tactical forces are adapting to reduce the numbers of casualties from enemy use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). However, countering IEDs is only a small piece of combating irregular challenges, and not an operational level issue. We must develop doctrine and

capabilities, such as enhanced target acquisition and more precise weapons systems that reflect the reality of the battlespace our Soldiers on the ground face in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army will require tailored, timely, actionable and focused intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to improve proficiencies against irregular challenges.

**To ensure the Army's capability to effectively combat irregular challenges, the Army will establish an irregular challenges Focus Area.** Adapting the Army to effectively combat irregular challenges is not a discrete problem with a single solution. Moreover, it is an iterative process. Effectively combating irregular challenges requires an intellectual and cultural commitment to constantly reexamine our assumptions and methods at the tactical through strategic level.

### **Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations**

Over the past decade, the Army, as a member of the Joint Force, has participated in a variety of stability operations including the ongoing ones in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. Given the nature of the GWOT, combined with that of the projected security environment, the Army as a member of the Joint Force must ensure its ability to conduct both sustained combat operations and nearly simultaneous operations to ensure stability.<sup>12</sup> The Army recognizes the criticality of preserving the success of major combat operations and establishing conditions that will provide for an enduring peace.

To achieve this imperative, the Army must improve its capability to perform stability operations as a member of the Joint Force. The Army's ongoing modular reorganization has improved the Joint Force's ability to rapidly assemble and deploy capabilities for stability operations. However, more work remains.

**To this end, the Army is creating a Stability Operations Focus Area mandated to identify and implement initiatives to increase Army capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency and multinational context.** Members of the Focus Area team should identify initiatives for both immediate implementation and for ensuring full-spectrum capabilities of the future force as well as assess stability operations requirements for all force sizing construct elements.

---

<sup>12</sup> The draft Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations, v. 1.07. proposes four cases under which Stability Operations will be required. They are: Case 1 – An allied or friendly nation-state requests US or multinational assistance in protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Case 2 – US and its allies conduct major combat operations to defeat a hostile nation-state that acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior. Case 3 – US and its allies intervene in a nation, or region that becomes ungovernable, collapses economically and disintegrates into sub national units under the control of warlords and their militias or worse, complete anarchy. Case 4 – US and its allies conduct operations to defeat a transnational, non-state organization, whose ideology involves significant degradation of human rights that places at risk large segments of a population and acts in ways that destabilize legitimate governments, threatens whole regions, and exceeds the accepted norms of international behavior. This is available online at [http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab\\_joc.doc](http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab_joc.doc) (link valid as of 22 Oct 2004).

## **Achieve Army Force Capabilities to Dominate in Complex Terrain**

The kinds of operations that Army forces will be called upon to execute are more likely than ever to be conducted in complex terrain. While the need to be capable of conducting open maneuver warfare remains, the likelihood of long duration, high intensity open warfare is lower. Combatants and non-combatants will seek the protection of complex terrain, including urban areas, jungles and remote mountainous areas. While we have made great strides in improving effectiveness in these conditions, our current capabilities and skills are not adapted sufficiently to truly dominate and achieve timely, decisive results. We must assess nearly every battlefield operating system for effectiveness in complex environmental conditions. We must adapt our methods and equip our Soldiers and units for success.

## **Increase Army Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness**

To ensure our strategic responsiveness, the Army will adjust its goals and processes for mobilization and deployment. The Army must provide rapidly and immediately employable Army forces to the joint warfight. This means moving beyond “breaking” a combat unit at home station, shipping its individual parts, re-assembling it in theater, readying it for combat and then executing the warfight. Department of Defense joint swiftness goals do not allow us time for a lengthy Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) process; therefore, we will adjust Army deployment metrics to ensure they nest within the overarching joint swiftness goals. These revised deployment metrics will guide synchronization and leveraging of existing Army Power Projection Program (AP3) capabilities and concepts with Joint mobility programs and initiatives such as seabasing, strategic lift, enhanced theater access, and Joint deployment training to increase Army strategic responsiveness across the complete range of Joint operations.

## **Improve Global Force Posture**

Proper Force Posture ensures our ability to seize the initiative and our ability to sustain a significant land campaign. While the U.S. military is unrivaled in its ability to project combat power, the demands on that capability are increasing. The global scope of the current war and the wide range of challenges require responsiveness that can no longer be met with large, in-place forces and well-established infrastructure. The United States military is about to undertake the most extensive force posture restructuring since the end of World War II. It is imperative that the Army fully avail itself of the opportunities created by this change to maximize capabilities and the ability to rapidly respond/deploy to any crisis whenever and wherever it occurs. To accomplish this imperative, the Army must remain engaged with traditional allies and new partners through a vigorous international activities program, even as it reorients its force posture. Fully reorienting our force posture to facilitate logistics and execute a joint force campaign includes more than a basing strategy. It also includes proper prepositioning of war reserves and materiel, as well as initiatives to improve strategic and intra-theater

lift capabilities. We must make the transition from a deployment to an employment strategy.

### **Improve Capabilities for Battle Command**

Winning the Global War on Terrorism will be a protracted operation. To optimize itself for the long-term, the Army must leverage reachback and observation capabilities, as well as improve our capability for Battle Command. At all levels, Commanders and Leaders continue as the most important element of Battle Command. However, they must leverage new technological capabilities to gain an enhanced common operational picture.

Standardized Battle Command Capabilities operating within robust networks will enable modularity efforts. Further, these capabilities will improve our joint interdependency and situational awareness across the force. When coupled with improved intelligence and target acquisition systems we are fielding, the Army will improve its ability to fight for and maintain information superiority with faster speeds of command, enhanced self synchronization between units and dramatically increase combat effectiveness.

Joint Forces will operate in a network centric environment. The Army must continue to work closely with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to ensure its command and control capabilities are “born joint” and can operate seamlessly with both inter-agency and coalition partners across the full range of military operations. We will continue to improve our Commander’s ability to employ modular, mobile command and control. We will also continue to spiral network capability forward as they become available so as to bridge the network gap between the current and future force.

### **Improve Joint Fires Capability**

The Army’s ability to dominate any form of the traditional armed conflict is a necessary overmatch that we must retain. Our future force concepts call for decisive maneuver through simultaneously distributed operations, continuous operations at high operational tempo, and direct attack of key enemy capabilities and centers of gravity.<sup>13</sup>

A networked approach to fires, both lethal and non-lethal, and true joint fires interdependence are necessary elements of this future concept. We must achieve fully interoperable joint battle command and joint fire control systems. What is needed is a seamless interface between communications and computer networks. Fire support coordination must become absolutely joint to achieve the responsiveness and effectiveness required.<sup>14</sup>

The future force will be equipped with enhanced systems and capabilities that improve our current platform and readiness. We will be full partners in joint initiatives to

---

<sup>13</sup> Final Coordinating Draft TRADOC PAMPHLET, TP 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations, 4 Jan 05. Page iv.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Fires and Effects Interdependence- Illustrative ConOps. Page 1.

improve integration of necessary joint fires across the entire spectrum of conflict in support of land force operations throughout the range of military operations from small scale counterinsurgency to strategic global strike. Our concept development, experimentation and capabilities generation processes must proceed along a joint path with that purpose in mind.

## **Improve Capabilities for Joint Logistics**

The speed, operational distances, and demands of modern combat operations require constant, effective and timely logistical support. The Army is not only responsible for providing its own comprehensive logistics support; it is also responsible for support to other services. In order to meet these requirements, a common logistics operating environment is required to ensure commonality and interoperability. Army logisticians must ensure an integrated supply chain reaching across the breadth and depth of resources in a joint, interagency and multinational theater.

To improve Army logistics capabilities, the Army will develop and implement Army Combat Service Support (CSS) Concepts, Policy and Doctrine that support theater opening and distribution based logistics. Additionally, the CSS community will establish complete and accurate “End-to-End” asset visibility that incorporates platform level digital initiatives; total asset visibility and in-transit visibility. The Army G4 has identified four focus areas critical to transforming logistics in support of an expeditionary Army: They are: Connect the Logistician; Modernizing Theater Distribution; Improving Force Reception, and Integrating the Supply Chain. Focused logistics must also address the growing proliferation of contractor logistics support systems. The Army will evolve logistics doctrine and ensure it is fully integrated throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

**Conclusion:** Last year, the Army introduced the concept of in stride transformation and the balance we must strike between the current force and the future force. These remain the underpinnings of our strategy to provide land forces capable of dominating across the full range of military operations. The Army has learned valuable lessons during our operational experiences of the past year. To fully implement these lessons learned; we have introduced the ten strategic imperatives.

The past twelve months have challenged both Army and American resolve. Nonetheless, the Nation and the Army are steadfastly committed to our goals. America remains a nation at war, continuously engaged against terrorists whose goal is the destruction of our freedom and our way of life. The United States and its Army is also at war with insurgents who employ a wide range of irregular means to undercut stability and prevent the growth of basic freedoms. The United States and its coalition partners will prevail. That is certain. And the Army, as a member of the joint force, will have a key role in that success. To meet the challenges at hand, as well as prepare for those over the horizon, the Army must continue to transform its forces, systems, training and processes. Only through this transformation can we guarantee our ability to accomplish the missions our nation asks of us.