

2 Aug 2005

Inquiry Response**Re:** BI-0171 (CT-0706)**Requester:** R. Gary Dinsick, Army Team Leader

Question 1: Lift requirements at Pope-Bragg. Please identify lift requirements at Pope AFB. Please do not limit it only to a "number of chutes required" solution, but include all planned short haul deployments, (within C-130 distances) as well as daily training based on historical data.

Air Force Answer 1: 43 AW does not track the Ft Bragg requirements. See accompanying data provided by 18th Corp.

Question 2: Additional Brigade Combat Team at Bragg. While the Fort Bragg recommendation realigns 7th SFG to Eglin AFB, does OSD believe the lift requirement at Pope-Bragg will increase based on the activation of an additional BCT, and by how much?

Army Answer 2: Based on recent coordination with the Army G3 Force Management Office, we believe that the net increase in population at Fort Bragg from FY03 to FY11 is approximately 1800 authorizations. This increase reflects all known changes in authorizations at Fort Bragg due to BRAC, Army Modular Force Transformation, and the return of forces from overseas. Therefore, we believe that the maximum increase in paid parachute positions is 1800. This would be less than a five percent increase in the lift requirement.

Question 3: 43d Airlift Wing support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by the C-130 aircraft of the 43d Wing permanently stationed at Pope AFB? Is there any reason why that number would be currently smaller than the historic average (aircraft maintenance issues, deployments)?

Air Force Answer 3: The 43 AW conducts a significant portion of the JAATT missions that support Ft. Bragg (Primary source of data is the 18 Corps G3 Air. Numbers were crosschecked with 43 AW data). In FY 04 the 43 AW provided approximately 65% of the C-130 JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg. Raw data shows of the 977 C-130 sorties contracted by the 18 ABC, the 43 AW supplied 644. In FY 05 (Oct 04 – Jun 05), the 43 AW supplied 436 of the 608 sorties for a 71% rate. As another FY 05 metric, the 43 AW supported 85 of the scheduled 154 missions. Again, missions can translate to multiple sorties on multiple days. There also have been 229 C-130 aircraft scheduled so far in FY 05 with the 43 AW providing 140. A longer snap shot using an AMC historical database and GDSS reports shows the following: From Jan 99 thru 11 Sep 01 the 43 AW flew 1752 of the actual 3986 sorties flown for a 43% rate. From 11 Sep 01 to Present the 43 AW has flown 1354 of the 3754 sorties flown for a 36% rate. Overall sortie count for entire C-130 fleet is down significantly the last two years from historical data due high deployment rates and maintenance issues.

Question 4: Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied C-130s from Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units?

Air Force Answer 4: Source of data is 18 Corps G-3 Air. In FY 04, approximately 18% (177 of 977) of the JAATT sorties for Ft Bragg "lift" were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units. For FY 05, to date, approximately 12% (74 of 608) of the sorties were satisfied by ANG and AFRC units.

Question 5: Other support of the current lift requirements. Over the last two years, how much of the lift requirement at Fort Bragg has been satisfied by strategic lift capabilities (i.e., C-5 or C-17)?

Air Force Answer 5: See accompanying slides provide by the 18th Corp.

Question 6: No C-130's permanently stationed at Pope AFB. If no C-130's are permanently stationed at Pope AFB, what corresponding support infrastructure will no longer be necessary? What savings will be realized by no longer needing this infrastructure? How will these potential savings be offset by increased support from other Active, Air Reserve or Guard units that must spend TDY funds to satisfy the lift requirements?

Air Force Answer 6: If no C-130 aircraft are stationed at Pope AFB the following facilities would be excess: Buildings 900, 738, 741, 750, 735, 731, 730, 724, 721, 720, 715, 718, 706, 568, 558, 555, 554, and 550. In order for savings to occur, the assumption must be made that facilities will not be occupied. With zero annual utility, maintenance, and custodial costs the savings would equal over \$1.3M annually. This assumption would change if USA personnel occupy the facilities and the Ft. Bragg Garrison incurs additional costs to maintain the facilities. A ROM for the cost incurred to use TDY C-130 aircrews vice 43 AW crews is \$175 K per year.

Question 7: 7th SFG to Eglin. The DoD justification for relocating the 7th SFG to Eglin AFB included, among other justifications, the fact that it would be "creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg." Please define this "space" as maneuver, barracks, or otherwise. During a visit to Fort Bragg, the Commission learned that no barracks space would be made available as the 7th SFG vacates, since other Special Operations units will expand to fill the vacancies? Did DoD consider in its costs the additional funds required to build new barracks for the additional BCT?

Army Answer 7: The Army Basing Study Group (TABs) considered space as facilities, training ranges and maneuver space. We followed a standard process for the analysis of facility requirements and documented the results in the Cost of Base Realignment and Closure Action (COBRA) model in our recommendations. Using the certified Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS), the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was removed from Fort Bragg and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was added. RPLANS uses available or excess space across all facility codes before building a requirement for new construction. In cases where a BRAC-related action creates excess space, we either documented the excess space as facility space shutdown in the COBRA model or RPLANS considered the excess space in

determining new construction requirements. TABS did not include undefined or potential requirements that were not approved by the Army in our analysis. At the time the recommendation was completed, we did not have documented requirements for a potential expansion of Army Special Operations Command units at Fort Bragg. Therefore, it was not included as BRAC-related action. Recent coordination with the Army G3 force management office only shows a future requirement (FY08) for a new civil affairs brigade. However, it only has authorizations for 319 Soldiers. This is far less than the 7th SFG. There is a net savings in facilities at Fort Bragg based on the move of the 7th SFG. We applied that savings or efficiencies to the activation of the Infantry BCT as it is BRAC-related as well. It would not have been appropriate to include the cost of the future Special Operations units, as they are not BRAC-related. Finally, as we stated in the response to question 2 above, we believe that the total gain in authorizations at Fort Bragg is only 1800, when all actions are considered. If there are additional requirements at Fort Bragg, the Army will fund them outside of BRAC.

Question 8: 43D Airlift Wing joint planning and contingency operations support. What does OSD believe is the 43d Wing's contributions to jointness with respect to Army units at Fort Bragg? How will the planned Air Force Reserve/Active Associate Squadron be able to replicate the joint planning and contingency support capabilities that exist within the 43D Airlift Wing? Do the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requirements of Fort Bragg units require the joint planning and contingency support capabilities of the 43D Airlift Wing?

Air Force (AFRC) Answer 8: In regard to 43rd Wing's contribution to jointness with respect to Army units at Ft Bragg, it would be an understatement to limit this to one squadron. The jointness at Ft Bragg extends beyond the 43rd Wing and includes every AMC stratlifter and tactical airlifter (to include the ARC) to manage the day-to-day training and real world requirements. An operation that continually requires multi-service integration to meet routine training objectives requires a higher level of planning and coordination to compensate for the numerous external factors (weather, logistics, time constraints, etc.). The 43AW does not have a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirement. Depending on what the requirement is would drive what the wing is asked to support. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirements for Ft Bragg would be vetted from JFCOM to TRANSCOM followed by flowing to AMC and TACC. The designated joint planners generally come out of HQ staffs above the wing level, so as not to impede the wings primary mission of providing crews to support the requirement. For local training exercises the 43rd wing tactics shop generally provides the lead C-130 planners, which could be replicated in the planned capabilities between the Reserve wing and active duty associate personnel.

Approved



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Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

Airborne Requirement

- **Division Ready Brigade (DRB 1) 3140 Paratroopers**
 - Highest State of Readiness for One of Three Brigades
 - Ready to Deploy from Pope AFB Within 18 Hours

- **20,000 Paratroopers (1 Jump every 90 days)**
(XVIII Abn Corps Separate Bdes & 82d Abn Div)
 - Large Package Week BN & Below
(4 x per year 4 x C17s & 6 x C130s)
 - Joint Forcible Entry Exercise Bde and Above
(4 x per year 9 x C17s & 6 x C130s)

- **82d Abn Div Current Strength: 15,000 (+/-)**
 Modular Force: 18,000
 - No significant impact of transformation on the DRB

DRB lift requirement (82d ABN Div RSOP, Chapter 6)

DRF 1	29 x C-17s	(821 pax + HD/CDS)
DRB	217 x C-17s	(3140 pax + HD/CDS)

Airborne Proficiency (Corps G7 FY 04 Paid Parachutist Report)

XVIII Corps SEP BDEs	<u>Auth. Parachutist Psns.</u> 5,555
82d ABN DIV	13,879 *
TOTAL	19,434

FY04 Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement (Individual Aircraft Flights)

	Total # Contracted	# Contracted by 43AW	# Contracted by other Active units	# Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve
XVIII ABC Separates	360	274 (76.1 %)	9 (2.5 %)	77 (21.4 %)
82d ABN Division	617	370 (60 %)	147 (23.8 %)	100 (16.2 %)
TOTAL	977	644 (65.9 %)	156 (16 %)	177 (18.1 %)

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

FY05 Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement (Individual Aircraft Flights)

	Total # Contracted	# Contracted by 43AW	# Contracted by other Active units	# Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve
XVIII ABC Separates	185	148 (80 %)	7 (3.8 %)	30 (16.2 %)
82d ABN Division	423	288 (68.1 %)	91 (21.5 %)	44 (10.4 %)
TOTAL	608	436 (71.7 %)	98 (16.1 %)	74 (12.2 %)

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Historical Fort Bragg C-130 Lift Requirement Summary

	Total # Contracted	# Contracted by 43AW	# Contracted by other Active units	# Contracted by Air Guard / AF Reserve
FY 04	977	644 (65.9 %)	156 (16 %)	177 (18.1 %)
FY 05	608	436 (71.7 %)	98 (16.1 %)	74 (12.2 %)
TOTAL	1585	1080 (68.1 %)	254 (16 %)	251 (15.9 %)

For Proficiency training only

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**FY04 Fort Bragg C-17 Lift
Requirement (Individual Aircraft Flights)**

	FY 04	FY 05
XVIII ABC Separate Brigades	262	228
82d ABN DIV	534	487
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TOTAL	796	715

For Proficiency training only

Numbers represent what aircraft were JA/ATTed, NOT what actually flew.

Historical Strategic Deployment Data (Individual flights)

	C-17	C-5	Civ Contract
FY 04	30(288)	13(46)	21(102)
FY 05	22(153)	8(8)	74(42)
TOTAL	<hr/> 52(441)	<hr/> 21(54)	<hr/> 95(144)

Black = Army Data

Red = Air Mobility Command Data