



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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HQ USAF/XP
1070 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1070

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi

In your letter of July 21, 2005, you provided a list of questions for the record from testimony given on July 18. Attached please find the Air Force's response. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Commission to testify on recommendations regarding the Air National Guard, and for the opportunity to provide further clarification on these issues.

We look forward to working with the Commission and your staff as you finalize your deliberations on these matters of great importance to the Future Total Air Force. We stand ready to offer any further assistance you may need.

Sincerely

Stephen G. Wood
STEPHEN G. WOOD
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs

Attachment:
Responses to Questions for Record

Questions for the Record
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Department of Defense Panel II

The Honorable Lieutenant General Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for Plans and Programs;

Major General Gary W. Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Plans and Programs;

Major General Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force and Commander, Continental
U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region; and
Lieutenant General Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard

July 18, 2005

1. Please help the Commission understand the relationship of the often mentioned "emerging missions" as they apply to the Air National Guard recommendations presented to the Commission. Specifically, how and when do you intend to fund, program, develop and deploy the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles such as the UAV/predator and even the recently discussed new light cargo aircraft. (XP)

For the purposes of Future Total Force, emerging missions are those missions or platforms entirely new to the Air Force as a whole (e.g. F/A-22), new to the ANG or Reserve (e.g. Predator), or are seeing a significant growth in requirements (e.g. Red Horse, Information Operations, Distributed Common Ground System).

In order to match existing requirements to available resources, the Air Force Future Total Force Directorate stood up the FTF integrated process team (IPT) in September 2004. Membership includes representatives from the National Guard Bureau, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve Command, all major commands and various Air Staff directorates. We also receive critical input from the adjutants general (TAG) via two TAG-appointed representatives who not only sit on our integrated process team, but also serve as integral members of the FTF staff on a day-to-day basis. We firmly believe that open communication between these stakeholders will provide the best foundation for the future.

All decisions made by the IPT and approved by senior leadership of each component are fed into the Air Force Corporate Process. This provides the link between FTF initiatives and programming/ budgeting actions. Each emerging mission identified as an FTF initiative runs through analysis, development, resourcing, time-phasing, and making the best fit between mission requirements and the needs of the Active Duty, Reserve and ANG.

The USAF intends to increase MQ-1 Predator funding with the FY06 Unfunded Priority List and supplemental request of \$360M which will lay the foundation for the MQ-1 Predator expansion. This expansion will equip an AZ and a TX ANG squadron in FY06, an Active Duty AFSOC and an ND ANG squadron in FY07, as well as a NY squadron in FY08. In addition, two additional ANG units will receive equipment within the FYDP.

Regarding the deployment of these assets, AZ ANG and TX ANG will provide COCOM support by flying Combat orbits in June 2006.

As for the new light cargo aircraft, work is ongoing to determine the AF requirement. The ongoing QDR is also considering DoD requirements for light cargo aircraft and the USAF will be prepared to fund and program for any future requirement.

2. How viable will enclaves be over the next several years without a weapons system attached to them? (IEB)

The decision to create an enclave was independent of a specific weapon system. Most enclaves will host an existing mission in the ANG unit currently stationed at the installation. Rather than enumerate each squadron, flight, group, etc., the Air Force collectively referred to the units remaining as an enclave. Perhaps a more accurate term is ECS or Expeditionary Combat Support. They are the firefighters, security forces, civil engineers, communications experts, military personnel flights, aerial ports, MWR, supply, logistics readiness, transportation (amongst others) units that get flying units to the fight and keep them working once they arrive in theater. The misconception is the enclave has NO mission. The ECS has a very specific mission now that will carry in to the future. Manpower disassociated with the flying mission WILL have to wait for emerging missions, retrain, or, if they do not decide to retrain, will either move to a location with a mission for which they are qualified or leave the ANG. (IEBB)

3. Are the Expeditionary Combat Support packages, as outlined in several ANG recommendations, actually funded? (IEB)

Yes.

4. What is the likelihood of the enclaves getting a future mission? (XP)

“Enclaves” typically contain AEF-deployable expeditionary combat support missions such as medical, security forces, civil engineering, communications, services, etc. They also provide critically important state capabilities. The Air Force has worked closely with the Air National Guard to design a support wing structure known as the “Combat Support Wing” (CSW). The CSW will robust individual state Joint Forces Headquarters, streamline communication and access for both federal and state taskings. The CSW has the capability to present forces to governor for everything from supporting forest fire fighting to vital base opening and sustainment capabilities in deployed locations.

With regard to potential future missions, the Air Force is currently working in partnership with the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to determine if a new mission will be assigned to units designated as enclaves by the Air National Guard during the BRAC process. If a new mission is slated to go into these locations, it will be based on current and future mission requirements. We are relying heavily on the recommendations of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to determine where these missions will be assigned and what manpower will be available to populate the mission.

5. The Commission has heard from numerous governors and adjutants general over their concern with the lack of Air Force and Air National Guard communication and

collaboration with the states in the development and finalization of the BRAC ANG recommendations to the Commission. What has the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force done to rectify this situation, or more importantly, what do you plan to do? (IEB)

On the issue of how the Air Force communicates with TAGs and Governors, the Air Force stands by Title 10 which states, "*The National Guard Bureau is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several States.*" The Air Force has and continues to abide by the chain of command established by Congress. For BRAC, HQ AF communicated directly with 11 Major Commands (MAJCOMs) (ACC, AMC, AFSPC, AETC, AFMC, AFRC, NGB, AFSOC, PACAF and two direct reporting units). [Note the National Guard Bureau was a "MAJCOM" for the purposes of BRAC]. Using this chain of command the Air Force ensured equitable treatment for Guard and Active Duty installations.

In addition, senior AF general officers, to include the Vice Chief of Staff, briefed the TAGs on the military value principles that would guide BRAC, briefed the TAGs on the 2025 force structure, and briefed the TAGs on some specific effects we expected on the number of Guard flying squadrons.

We see two key responsibilities we have to the Commission. First, we must be accountable to the Commission to explain how and why we proposed what we proposed in our recommendations. Second, given alternatives, we must advise the Commission on the consequences of what is proposed and how we would implement the proposals. At your direction, the Chief of the NGB and the TAGs met on July 22nd to identify alternatives and rationale to serve as points of discussion among the Department, the NGB, and the TAGs. We made available to the TAGs the key ANG Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) member who was present at and key to all BCEG deliberations throughout BRAC. He had full authority to share all our BRAC information and rationale. The AGAUS July 25th letter that resulted from that meeting stated that the AGAUS was not prepared to discuss alternatives within BRAC.

We're encouraged by your invitations to the CSAF; the Chief, NGB; and Maj Gen Lempke of the AGAUS to testify at the Aug 11th hearing and believe this will encourage the generation, presentation and discussion of alternatives.

6. A recent Air Force PR release indicated an initiative to supplement the Air National Guard mission with the establishment of a future "light cargo aircraft", a presumably shortened C-130 type cargo carrier that could be deployed to Army and Air Guard units. (XP)

a. What role do you foresee this aircraft will play in future missions of the Air National Guard or in support of Homeland Security?

At an Air Force Media Roundtable, Lt Gen Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, expressed an interest in a Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA) capability. Although conceptual at this point, LCA will most likely provide capabilities for carrying

relatively small loads. He believes these aircraft could move people or equipment necessary for Homeland Defense within the continental United States or within the 50 states and the territories and be used by Combatant Commanders overseas when needs dictate.

b. Where is the development and deployment of the future light cargo aircraft in your funding plan?

At this time, neither the Army nor the Air Force has committed to purchase any light cargo aircraft. This initiative may be considered post-BRAC.

c. Is new light cargo aircraft, along with the potential of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), one of the "emerging missions" you have mentioned as a potential for the ANG?

Light cargo aircraft is not currently one of the missions being considered during Future Total Force emerging mission deliberations. However, this does not preclude it from being added as the concept is further defined. We are certain that the list of emerging missions will continue to grow as new requirements are defined.

d. Is the F-22 another such "emerging mission"?

The F/A-22 is indeed a critical new platform and a key part of the FTF plan. As a matter of fact, F/A-22 Active/ARC integration is already underway in the Langley-Richmond FTF test case.

7. Given the concern expressed by a great number of state governors and adjutants general regarding redeployment Air National Guard assigned aircraft to other components and states, do you envision taking any remedial action to make more aircraft available to support Air National Guard requirements over a broader number of states than provided in the BRAC recommendations?

The 2025 force structure and resulting BRAC laydown of aircraft is about transforming our force and innovative organizational constructs that will synergize the strengths of all Air Force components in order to maximize warfighting and homeland defense capabilities. If BRAC adjustments are made, specific emerging missions or associate unit plans will adjust ... FTF is an iterative process. However, it is important to note that our legacy weapon systems will be retired programmatically regardless of BRAC, as they are quickly approaching the end of their service life. Due to the exponential increase in capability of new aircraft, there will not be a one-for-one replacement of old systems with new, which is in line with historical trends since World War II. Movement of cargo aircraft between states and components is taking place due to an imbalance resulting in a large number of C-130 being assigned to Guard and Reserve units. The high TEMPO of intratheater airlift during GWOT has resulted in the use of involuntary mobilization to accomplish the mission. Because the Air Force understands the disruption can cause to our citizen airmen's lives and due to the fact that this mobilization authority runs out in 2006, we had to make some tough choices regarding C-130 basing and utilization. While some C-130s will be reassigned to active duty locations, we also plan to stand up active

associate units at Guard and Reserve C-130 locations, in order to maximize the use of these planes. Doing so will help us to solve the mobilization dilemma while allowing us to rotate our active duty personnel into the AOR while maintaining the proper balance of stateside presence. (XP)

8. In the Adjutants General (TAG) hearing 30 Jun in Atlanta, an ANG speaker noted that “the ANG provides 40% of the [combat] coverage for 7.3% of the budget.” (NGB, IEB)

a. Are these figures substantiated by Air Force budget data? If not, what is an approximate operational use to cost ratio?

The Air Force could not substantiate the figures given in the Adjutants General (TAG) hearing June 30, 2005 in Atlanta. However, the ANG's budget for FY05 is \$7.3B, which is 6.1% of the total AF budget of \$119.6B. Absent the original source information In order to provide an answer to the Commission, we request additional clarification in the testimony given.

b. Including missions flown while on federalized missions or in support of contingency missions such as Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, do the costs incurred by ANG forces to support the missions included in ANG budgets (the 7.3%), or are they sourced elsewhere within DOD budgets?

One must bear in mind that the research and development, procurement and depot sustainment costs for these federally-owned aircraft operated by the states is included in the federal costs and not in the 7.3% cited by the ANG speaker.

The 7.3% referred to in your question, provides an ANG trained, ready and on call to perform missions at the call of federal (or State) authorities. The per capita cost of EMPLOYING the ANG in federal status is identical per capita to that of the active Air Force. Maintaining the proficiency level of the ANG is less than the AC due to task maturity of the force.

**NOTE: The ANG budget for FY05 is \$7.3B, 6.1% of the total AF budget of \$119.6B (see note 1). “Combat coverage” is not a term used by the XP community; therefore, we are unable to validate that figure (see note 2).

Note 1: Budget data for FY05 taken from the FY06 PB, round three database in ABIDES (06pb3_upbase.his-pb).

Note 2: For FY05, the FY06 PB round three (06pb3_upbase.his-pb) shows that ANG possesses 540 Combat PAA, 35.1% of the total AF 1537 Combat PAA including only A-10, F-117, F-15, F-16, F-22, and F-35 weapon system codes.

c. While activated, or flying in support of federal missions, how do ANG and AFRC costs to execute a given mission compare to those of the Active Duty? While activated, costs to execute are essentially the same.

9. Were utilization rates of aircraft considered and/or weighted in any Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) calculation comparing installations? Did utilization rates differ between Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard installations flying a given model-design (F-16A/B/C/D), KC-135D/E/R/T)? If so, how? (IEB)

Utilization rates were not considered in MCIs because they are not a discriminator among installations. We measured installations against all mission areas, whereas, utilization rates differ and are determined by a variety of factors including aircraft age, condition, use, and requirements and could distort the true value of a base since they are transitory in nature.

10. Many States and TAGs have raised concerns on the BRAC recommendations with respect to the Air National Guard on their impact on the Homeland Security or Air Sovereignty Alert mission. (IEB)

USNORTHCOM has been involved in our process for nearly 2 years and had final right of refusal on our recommendations before we submitted them; ADM Keating approved our recommendations. The AF BRAC recommendations close Otis and build a new ASA alert facility at Bradley, approximately 96 miles and 12 minutes flight time (at 470 knots true air speed) away. Bradley's Air Sovereignty Alert coverage is actually an improvement over Otis as it covers the same sites as Otis plus 3 additional sites not covered by Otis. All other ASA installations impacted by BRAC will keep the ASA commitment. Bottom line: BRAC made no significant change in the ASA coverage.

a. Were U.S. Northern Command and its component command, the First Air Force, involved in the BRAC decision making process? Yes. If so, how? (IEB)

The initial Air Force closure and realignment recommendations were overlaid with NORTHCOM/NORAD Homeland Security/Air Sovereignty requirements for distance and response time. In the few instances where the recommendations impacted Homeland Security/Air Sovereignty coverage, adjustments were made to satisfy NORAD/NORTHCOM distance and response time requirements.

b. What is Northern Command's and the First Air Force's assessment of the impact of the Guard recommendations, particularly the ones involving Air Sovereignty Alert sites, on the Homeland Security mission?

The DoD basing recommendations were reviewed by the NORTHCOM/NORAD Commander and his staff, as evidenced by Admiral Keating's statement, 4 May 05: "Following a thorough review, we find that they [*the draft 2005 BRAC recommendations*] do not create an unacceptable risk to the accomplishment of our homeland defense or defense support of civil authorities."

11. A key question a Commissioner likes to ask is: "Is the pain worth the gain?" Understanding that Military Value is the primary consideration, economics play a part too. What are the projected NPV 20 year savings to the DoD for the closures and realignments affecting ANG units only? (IEB)

The primary determinant for the DoD process was military value and not cost. True, the cost savings from the DoD recommendations are small, but that's not the 'gain.' The 'gain' is being able to use our force structure over the next 20 years in organizations and locations that are effective--placing the right forces in the right sizes at the best combination of bases for homeland and global defense of the Nation as a whole. Absent implementation of BRAC recommendations and a reduction in the number of ineffectively sized Guard and Reserve fighter squadrons, we estimate 'pain' which will threaten the Nation's ability to do its mission. In the case of fighter squadrons, current 15 PAA squadrons will average 11 to 12 PAA, an ineffectively small size, by FY 2011. In

the case of the C-130 force, we expect that regressing from 12 PAA to 8PAA C-130 squadron sizes carries a 15% effectiveness 'pain.' Applied to a 150-aircraft ANG fleet, that means 20-25 aircraft—nearly three entire squadrons' worth of effective capability 'gain'--will not be available for federal and state missions if DoD BRAC recommendations are not implemented. Moreover, the current average PERSTEMPO for Active C-130 crewmembers is 150 days *with the Guard and Reserve mobilized*. We estimate that, absent implementation of BRAC recommendations, PERSTEMPO will rise to an unsustainable level of 200+ days per year after the current mobilization ends. Allocating more aircraft to the ANG would undo the careful balance the BRAC recommendations maintain in the mix among the active and reserve components.

12. A review of the BCEG minutes leaves us to believe that Candidate Recommendations were intentionally "bundled" in order to get the money savers to "carry" other individual base closures or realignments that were on their own a cost, or offered little savings. Is this true? (IEB)

No – the final candidate recommendations reflect linked actions and to comply with the constraints of the COBRA model. We looked at weapon systems as scenario mission groups; COBRA has an installation perspective. Candidate recommendations were only "linked" when they enabled other recommendations. If they were not "enablers" or did not produce an NPV savings they were cancelled.

13. BRAC is about reducing excess base infrastructure and not about moving aircraft. Hundreds of aircraft are proposed to move with your recommendation, affecting 80% of the ANG installations in the country, yet the installation map looks about the same. Your proposal seems essentially "Programmatic." Why are you wanting us to approve this under BRAC? (IEB)

The AF recommendations as submitted provide the best return on investment of any of the MilDeps or Joint Cross Service Groups. That said, reducing infrastructure is just one of the SecDef's four BRAC goals. The others relate to improving warfighting effectiveness (arguably the most important), meeting future defense strategies, and taking advantage of joint opportunities. BRAC is necessary to our nation meeting its homeland and global defense obligations.

The key factor guiding us is the BRAC law. The law dictates we use a 20-year force plan. For the Air Force, that means meeting the defense needs of the nation with fewer aircraft. We've had to face force reductions in the past, mostly in our active force but also in our Air Reserve Component. Over the past 15 years we have met this challenge in our Active Force by keeping our squadrons sized effectively and reducing the number of squadrons as reduced the number of aircraft. On the other hand, at their request, we have met this challenge in our Guard force by maintaining the numbers of squadrons, but reducing the number of aircraft in each squadron. This is no longer feasible and history shows that these kinds of actions cannot be accomplished programmatically.

To ensure improved warfighting effectiveness in the face of this reduced future force structure, we had to organize these fewer, more capable aircraft into larger, more

effective squadrons at the best combination of bases to meet both homeland defense and overseas expeditionary requirements.

Although the Air Force Future Total Force (FTF) plan was not the overarching guide used to develop BRAC recommendations, the Air Force used the 2025 Force Structure plan and the BRAC selection criteria to develop its BRAC recommendations. In this regard, the FTF process was complementary to the BRAC process. “Non-BRAC programmatic actions” within Air Force recommendations clearly define those actions that are occurring regardless of BRAC. For clarity, the Air Force included non-BRAC programmatic actions to ensure the total combined impact of BRAC recommendations and programmatic actions at a specific installation were captured.

14. With respect to the Mission Capability Index, or MCI, the matrix tool you used to justify your recommendations... We have these comments from the field: (Please respond after each issue. (IEB)

a. Why were the ANG units measured up against the same criteria as the active component? Other services did it differently. They said the NGB imposes limits on how big a Guard installation can be.

The Guard and Reserve benefited vis a vis the active bases from the AF BRAC process. We used the same criteria for Active/ARC to comply with statutory requirement to consider all bases equally. In our approach to evaluate bases for BRAC, the Air Force developed a list of 154 bases to consider for closure or realignment. This list included all installations with flying missions—active, Guard and Reserve. Since we used, as a fundamental philosophy, the principle of proportionality, the ANG bases did not, at the end of the day, compete against active duty bases. Active Duty bases with better MCI ratings—notably Cannon and Grand Forks—lost their aircraft because the aircraft were needed to populate Guard and Reserve units.

b. The MCI questions – especially with respect to routes and ranges, do not reflect the way we fight today.

The MCIs do reflect the way we operate today. MCIs were designed to measure aspects of an installation relative to military value. MCIs were carefully constructed by the AF operational community to delineate capabilities needed for warfighting training. The value of the installation was determined by proximity to mission related capabilities and the qualities of those capabilities themselves

c. There was not enough opportunity for similar smaller installations to be measured against each other.

The Guard and Reserve benefited vis a vis the active bases from the AF BRAC process. We used the same criteria for Active/ARC to comply with statutory requirement to consider all bases equally. In our approach to evaluate bases for BRAC, the Air Force developed a list of 154 bases to consider for closure or realignment. This list included all installations with flying missions—active, Guard and Reserve. Since we used, as a fundamental philosophy, the principle of proportionality, the ANG bases did not, at the end of the day, compete against active

duty bases. Active Duty bases with better MCI ratings—notably Cannon and Grand Forks—lost their aircraft because the aircraft were needed to populate Guard and Reserve units.

d. In some cases, erroneous data was used – or new information such as recently completed hangers or additional ramp space was not factored in. The AF Audit Agency conducted a near-real-time audit of AF data calls and certification and was satisfied. The GAO also found our process sufficient. Where we find inaccurate data, we reevaluate to confirm our recommendations are still valid. None of the inaccuracies found to date indicate the need to change the DOD recommendations.

e. Some units interpreted the questions differently and answered accordingly. The AF Audit Agency conducted a near-real-time audit of AF data calls and certification and was satisfied. The GAO also found our process sufficient. Where we find inaccurate data, we reevaluate to confirm our recommendations are still valid. None of the inaccuracies found to date indicate the need to change the DOD recommendations.

15. Even after the MCI scores were computed, some of the decisions cited “Military Judgment,” and favored bases with lower MCI scores. Why? (IEB)
Military judgment is the collective wisdom of the advisors we have on the BCEG, the Air Staff and the Secretary’s Staff. The MCI scores accommodate most but not all of the characteristics that comprise military value. Where we apply military knowledge and judgment to MCI outcomes, we cite the characteristics below:

1. Active/Guard/Reserve Proportionality
2. Air Sovereignty.
3. Change for Operational / Logistical Reasons.
4. Test Bases.
5. Training Bases.
6. ARC Demographics.
7. Joint Interoperability.

Where we deviate from the MCI ratings, we can justify that deviation.

16. The GAO reports that 60% of the net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations. How can you claim manpower savings if net end strength of the ANG remains the same? (IEB)

One of the basic entering argument we operated under was a prescribed budget and manpower level and being able to operate within those constraints. Dollars freed up by BRAC recommendations are available to apply to other dollar requirements. Manpower freed up by BRAC recommendations are available to apply to other manpower or dollar requirements. The USAF calculated savings, as did all the Military Departments and the seven Joint Cross Service Groups, as OSD directed in OSD Policy Memorandum.

17. Active/ARC Mix: In testimony on May 17, Acting Sec Dominguez said “We have maintained the balance across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve Components

both in aircraft and manpower.” Yet, in a meeting on 1 July, Maj Gen. Heckman (co-chair of the BCEG said): The force structure is going down. The balance is planned to change also. For C-130s: Before BRAC: (400) C-130s with 31% of the balance Active; Post – BRAC plan: (373) C-130s with 43% of the balance Active. (IEB)

a. If the C-130 mix is changing, what else changes such that the secretary’s statement holds true with respect to the overall mix?

We maintained proportionality in our mobility air forces (MAF) and combat air forces (CAF) and Secretary Dominguez refers to our maintaining that balance. Within the CAF and MAF we had to make compensating adjustments with the various weapon systems to maintain the balance. For instance, within the CAF, F-16s retire at a high rate and we had to make adjustments. Within the MAF, operational requirements dictated we increase the tactical airlift active manning and decrease the strategic airlift manning. (IEBB)

b. Enclaves: How big is an enclave?

An enclave size varies with the composition and function of the units it encompasses. For instance, at Duluth, the 148 FW's expeditionary combat support remains to support air sovereignty alert. BRAC manpower documents estimate this contingent will consist of 79 military, 110 civilians and 449 drill. Key Field's ECS differs slightly with 79 military, 64 civilian and 576 drill.

c. Of what types of units does it consist?

Enclaves typically will contain AEF deployable agile combat support such as medical, security forces, CE, communications, services, etc. that have both Title 10 and Title 32 missions and typically have about 100 Full time and 500 Drill. If the recommendation specifically names another unit, that unit and its mission will remain, for example the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) at Reno-Tahoe.

18. Don’t you think it might be hard to recruit for an Air Guard unit that has no “air?” Also, how does one recruit against an unknown mission for these units which are awaiting emerging missions? (NGB)

We do have some comparisons for recruiting at ANG locations with no “Air” presence. Many of our Geographically Separate Units do not possess aircraft. In fact, as noted in your next question, the challenges in recruiting are based on many factors, too include: the mission, location, population, education, etc.... These challenges are met by placing the right mission, at the right place, at the right time. Units awaiting emerging missions still have a current and valuable mission today. Any transition occurring to a new or emerging mission has to be done at an appropriate rate to ensure that the stand down of one mission occurs commensurate with the stand up of another mission. The current Air Force grew up hearing the sound of freedom as a manned airframe but the next generation will know that as the sound of a UAV or IO or Space Ops, not necessarily air breathing, manned aircraft. This new generation is growing up in the computer age where video games are part of every family's home – a well suited breeding ground for our future missions.

19. “Reducing the Footprint”... It is unclear to many units destined to become enclaves as to where their new fence-line will be. Will excess property be disposed of or mothballed? (IEB)

Excess property will be disposed of.

20. Our sense is that the loss of experienced personnel related to these proposals will be huge. Few aircrew will follow the aircraft, and even fewer maintenance and support personnel. There could be unanticipated training costs. The training “pipeline” would only seem to be so big. On top of that the combat status of a unit could degrade. Do any of these issues cause concern? (IEB, NGB)

No – Because the Air Force considered the potential impact on aircrew, maintenance and support personnel availability and training. The Air Force included the costs of training using methodologies developed by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. But more to the point, the Air Force needs fewer people in manned flying missions and more people in the emerging missions key to our future warfighting effectiveness. In fact we have more new missions on the horizon than resources with which to fill them. With this in mind, we will do our best to mitigate the turmoil these recommendations may cause. We will continue to work hard with the Reserve Force to develop solutions to avoid many of the potential issues you have outlined.

21. Future aircraft: With the accelerated retirement of F-15s and F-16s there is concern that the follow-on aircraft will not be on line in time to cover the threat. Your thoughts? (XP)

BRAC personnel did not develop the 2025 Force Structure Plan. The Air Force force structure plan used in the BRAC process was developed based on the Secretary of Defense assessment of the probable threats to national security as required by the law and is deemed appropriate to the threat. We know it’s difficult to project that far into the future, but we did that through over 2 years of analysis based upon the most current data and threat projections made by the experts

The AF developed the Future Total Force (FTF) plan to enable US Joint Forces to engage current and emerging threats through 2025 and beyond. The FTF construct began with an understanding of the future battle space threat environment and the presumption that access for US Joint Forces should be assured in all scenarios. Within this framework, we understood that our legacy force would have a limited capability in the early stages of any future conflict. The FTF plan retires the portion of the force that would have the highest cost to maintain and least capability. It does so in a time-phased approach, so as new transformational aircraft (F/A-22 and F-35) achieve sufficient numbers to ensure access and support the Joint Force Commander, the legacy force will then be retired. This phased approach allows fiscal savings to be invested in our future force while minimizing the high costs of maintaining a rapidly aging fleet. A portion of the legacy force (F-15, F-16, and A-10) will remain in service through 2025.

22. Dissimilar Aircraft: In reassigning and combining certain aircraft at different bases, there is concern that versions of aircraft such as C-130 H2s and H3s would be

placed together. Were the operational and maintenance impacts considered in this case? (IEB)

Our intent is not to have block mixing that adversely affects operations. The operational and maintenance impacts were considered and the Air Force consolidation of like aircraft proved a practical solution to improve efficiency.

23. Unit Strength: In some cases units with over 100% strength are losing aircraft to units with less than 90% overall strength. If the low-strength units cannot fill the billets they currently have, how can they be expected to fill even more when their authorized aircraft total increases? (NGB, IEB)

Strength data cannot be the only factor considered with the placement of force structure. Many things factor into a unit's overall strength data, such as recruiting, recent conversions, already stressed career fields at another unrelated location within the unit (such as Combat Communications), etc. Additionally, the plus up in aircraft may be related to flowing Active Duty personnel to that location, or, simply the economics of placing additional aircraft at one location versus another.

Taking any unit's overall strength percentage at one snapshot in time is not a clear indicator of their overall ability to fill vacancies. The ANG has demonstrated, even at a time of war, that it can and will maintain personnel readiness.

There are only 3 ANG units that are below 90% that are gaining aircraft through the BRAC proposals: 153AW, Cheyenne, WY (83%); 158FW, Burlington, VT (89.5%); 104FW, Barnes, MA (88.6%). The rest of the ANG units receiving aircraft are above 90% overall strength.

1. 153AW, Cheyenne, WY is proposed as an associate wing with the AD and will therefore increase in manpower with the increase in aircraft.
2. 158FW, Burlington, VT is receiving its aircraft from the 177FW, Atlantic City, NJ (99.6%) and the 177FW will remain in place with an F-15 mission.
3. 104FW, Barnes, MA is receiving its aircraft from the 103FW, Bradley, CT (93.5%). These units are 18.2 miles apart and is expected that recruitment will not be a problem.

24. We understand there is a "City Basing" experiment in the works in Vermont. Please tell us about it and elaborate on the future of City Basing. (XP)

Community basing, formerly "city basing," involves assigning Air Force active duty (AD) personnel at an Guard or Reserve base or other location where normal AD base support and infrastructure is not available and the Active Duty Airmen live in the local community. The Air Force has begun a test phase of Community Basing in summer 2005 by stationing 10 3-level AD aircraft maintenance personnel for two years with the Vermont Air National Guard's 158th Fighter Wing, an F-16 unit. The goal of this test phase is for the ANG to train and season these maintainers based on the high experience levels in the ANG. Follow-on community basing initiatives will most likely include assigning AD personnel from other functional areas and in larger numbers. Furthermore, now that BRAC recommendations have been released, we have the opportunity to explore Community Basing at mobility units as well.

We believe the future of Community Basing is very promising. Not only does the AD benefit from the rich experience in our Guard and Reserve units, it also keeps us connected to communities across America.

25. Isn't the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the "supported" department and DoD the "supporting" one? If this is the case, why wasn't DHS consulted by the Air Force in the development of these recommendations? (IEB)

In ADM Sullivan's Testimony before the Commission in Atlanta, he stated on behalf of Secretary Chertoff, "We are confident that the Department of Defense and the Air Force will continue to be able to capably carry out its roles in Homeland Defense in the air domain which supports our Homeland Security efforts at DHS."



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

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July 21, 2005

*Lieutenant General Stephen Wood
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs
1070 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C., 20330*

Dear General Wood:

I would like to thank you for your testimony before the Commission on July 18, 2005. I would also like to express my appreciation for the valuable testimony presented by your colleagues.

During your testimony, you agreed to respond expeditiously to any questions for the record that the Commission might devise. Enclosed please find a list of these questions for the record. I would appreciate your response no later than July 28, 2005.

Thank you again for your cooperation in this regard. Your continued assistance is critical as the Commission strives to create a fair, open, and constructive deliberative process.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Anthony J. Principi".

*Anthony J. Principi
Chairman*

Enclosure.

Chairman: Anthony J. Principi

Commissioners: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, The Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret), The Honorable Jim Hansen, General James T. Hill, USA (Ret), General Lloyd Newton, USAF (Ret), The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret)

Executive Director: Charles Battaglia