

BRAC 2005 GOALS AND CHINA LAKE

by

PHIL ARNOLD

**China Lake Defense Alliance
IWW 2000 Community and Economic Development Corporation**

August 2003

103-06A – NMC32 – Community Input
Navy/MC–Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake–CA
BRAC COMMISSION – FY 2005
COFF: _____ DISPOSITION: Permanent



Sunday, July 10, 2005

Les and David,

We had planned to go through our updated briefing for the Commission's Los Angeles Regional Hearing at the end of the community program on Monday at Cerro Coso Community College. As you know Les, we're challenging the decision to not move program managers to the Integrated Weapons and Armaments RDT&E Center. It's not that they object to the community challenging the Navy. They are concerned that because of their attendance at the presentation might lead to community attendees' interpretation that they are endorsing our challenge. We want to be sensitive to their concerns

We have asked Mayor Holloway not to introduce us to speak at the end of the community briefings as shown on the program. We would like for the program to end at that point and meet with you privately for 15 to 20 minutes at the Heritage Hotel lobby. We found something very interesting in the COBRA report regarding the proposed Electronic Warfare relocation and some other things.

We'll see you at Cerro Coso, but just won't be on the program.

The attached material includes the Powerpoint slides for Los Angeles, a hard copy of the supporting material and a CD. In addition to the regional hearing material, we've enclosed copies of the proposal by our counterparts for Edwards Air Force Base and Naval Base Ventura County for a Joint Aerospace RDT&E Center, which you have seen Les, and three papers written a couple of years ago to support our thinking about BRAC. The CD has digital versions of that material as well for the library.

See you tomorrow,



Phil Arnold
375-6389,
Cell 382-0499

Attached:

Los Angeles Hearing briefing material
Concept paper on Joint Aerospace RDT&E Center
BRAC papers on China Lake

FOREWORD

This is the second in a series of papers prepared by members of the China Lake Defense Alliance on China Lake's position in the forthcoming Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round scheduled for 2005. Each paper deals with the assets and capabilities of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division facility at China Lake, California as they relate to BRAC.

The China Lake Defense Alliance is a group of community volunteers working in partnership with the City of Ridgecrest and Kern County to assure that China Lake continues beyond BRAC 2005 as a premier full spectrum research, development, test, evaluation and training resource for national defense. The Alliance is a component of the IWV 2000 Community and Economic Development Corporation, a nonprofit corporation.

IWV 2000 and the China Lake Defense Alliance are not affiliated with the Navy or NAVAIR Weapons Division, China Lake.

China Lake Defense Alliance
Ridgecrest, California

Papers in Series

1. Comments on the Future of the Weapons Division – Matt Anderson – July 2003
2. BRAC 2003 Goals and China Lake – Phil Arnold – September 2003
3. Full Spectrum RDT&E Centers: A 21st Century Perspective – Phil Arnold – September 2003

PREFACE

In building a program to support the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division base at China Lake in the forthcoming Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the China Lake Defense Alliance volunteers are engaged in activities similar to those of communities throughout the country. As a background for our program we believe that it's important to place China Lake's assets and capabilities fully in context with the directions being taken by the Department of Defense and military services.

Our approach:

1. Anticipate the future mission leadership responsibilities of China Lake as the United States enters the post-Cold War era. Matt Anderson's paper in this series looks at China Lake's future roles in supporting national defense.

2. Evaluate China Lake's assets and capabilities for the future in the context of the BRAC goals set by the Secretary of Defense. This paper summarizes thoughts along those lines.

3. Assess the role of a "full spectrum" RDT&E center in the 21st century. A third paper in this series deals with the role of a full spectrum center in the RDT&E and training environment of the future.

Although this paper focuses on China Lake's position relative to Department of Defense goals, the relationship of China Lake with the Point Mugu Weapons Division facility and Edwards Air Force Base is an important factor. The partnership of these three bases and their relationships to other Southwest Complex bases have to be understood to fully appreciate the value of each to national defense.

Phil Arnold

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 process differs from earlier BRAC rounds in two significant ways:

First, the Secretary of Defense's goals for the round extend beyond reducing the military support infrastructure to free up funds for other purposes. He sees the round as directly supporting the transformation of the defense establishment from a Cold War structure into a responsive force configuration for the challenges facing the United States in the first decades of the 21st century.

Second, the Secretary plans to manage the process from the top. In past BRAC rounds the Secretary of Defense and his staff were content to issue general guidance and allow the military services and agencies to internally manage the assessment process. As a result, past BRAC rounds have led to decisions supporting individual service goals with a minimal joint usage of base facilities. BRAC 2005 has been structured to facilitate consideration of joint use of facilities.

In his guidance to the Department of Defense on transformation, the Secretary defines three transformation areas: *how we fight, how we do business, and how we work with others*. His guidance deals with a variety of factors including leadership, technology, tactical and strategic planning and analysis, business practices, and force structure.

He sets three specific BRAC goals:

1. Eliminate excess capacity
2. Rationalize and reconfigure infrastructure with defense strategy
3. Align infrastructure to accommodate greater joint activity.

All of the goals, particularly Goals 2 and 3, are clearly associated with transformation.

If BRAC 2005 is to meet the Secretary's goals, each military installation must be assessed in terms of the goals and the transformation process. This paper is a qualitative assessment of China Lake's assets, capabilities, and associations in the context of BRAC and transformation goals. The formal BRAC assessment and associated data calls must be based on meeting the Secretary's goals to meet direction from the top.

The assessment of China Lake in terms of Secretary Rumsfeld's Goals:

1. Eliminate excess capacity. As a large, full service facility supporting all of the services in a variety of missions, China Lake clearly can support consolidation of functions from a variety of locations within the Navy and across service lines. As a full spectrum research, development, test, evaluation (RDT&E) and training center, China Lake has the further advantage of supporting all RDT&E functions in a joint, unified, co-located command within its general air warfare and weapon development mission areas:

2. Rationalize and reconfigure infrastructure with defense strategy. China Lake's location, size, and full range of capabilities - research, technology advancement, development support, production oversight experience, test and evaluation, modeling and simulation, system engineering at all levels from guided missiles to aircraft-weapon integration to network centric warfare, and in-service engineering support - make it ideally suited to support the concepts developed in the transformation process. Its remote location and perpetual freedom from residential and commercial encroachment assure that it will be available to support national defense into the far future. Finally, it is situated adjacent or near to major installations of all of the services to support joint activities of every kind.

3. Align infrastructure to support joint activity. China Lake with its nearby partners, the Point Mugu Naval Air Warfare Center facility and Edwards Air Force Base, can support nearly all aspects of air warfare RDT&E with minimal added investment. The unencroached land, sea and air space and experienced military-civilian work force cannot be duplicated anywhere. Joint RDT&E service programs, training exercises and battle experiments are routine, and the consolidation of air warfare missions could be achieved with the least possible impact. China Lake also routinely hosts detachments of allies for test and training, and can expand its existing role in supporting other agencies in homeland defense system development, test and training.

China Lake has developed an enviable reputation in its 60 years of existence for technical and management innovation, developing affordable systems that work, and translating military needs into achievable technical requirements. Today China Lake's scientists, engineers, and military officers are deeply involved in developing new concepts to meet the challenges of the future. BRAC 2005 offers an opportunity for the Department of Defense and military services to take advantage of the unique capability of China Lake and extend its mission responsibilities to meet the challenges as the United States takes on new responsibilities in the world.

INTRODUCTION

The planned process for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 is similar in many respects to earlier BRAC rounds – the Secretary of Defense presents recommendations to an independent review commission, the commission reviews and modulates the Secretary's recommendations and forwards its recommendations to the President, who decides whether to approve or disapprove as a package. If he approves, the recommendation is forwarded to Congress, which must vote to disapprove of the package as a whole or the realignment and closure process starts per the Commission's recommendations.

There are a few changes in the Congressionally mandated process from earlier BRAC rounds and a major change in the Defense Department management approach. The changes in the implementing legislation altered the size of the commission and changed the commission ground rules to make it a bit more difficult to change the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. The President can send the commission recommendation package back for one iteration before he must disapprove or send the recommendations to Congress. The big change in management approach is that the Office of the Secretary of Defense plans to take a more assertive role in managing the process than in the past. In earlier BRAC rounds the Secretariat issued guidance on issues such as moving toward joint use of facilities, but the services took a strong lead in the assessment and recommendations. In BRAC 1995 the services ignored guidance for joint use of facilities for the most part. In BRAC 2005 the process is being structured to assure that serious consideration is given to joint service use of bases.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S BRAC GOALS

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's objectives for BRAC 2005 were made clear in a letter sent to the Department of Defense (DoD) departments and agencies on November 15, 2002. He wrote, "*At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, sustainment and recapitalization of which diverts scarce resources from defense capability. However, BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes both warfighting capability and efficiency.*" Also in the same letter he wrote, "*A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity.*"

Mr. Rumsfeld's letter, entitled *Transformation through Base Realignment and Closure*, can and should be the basis for evaluating China Lake's position in the BRAC assessment process. A copy of the letter is included as the Appendix in this paper. We can analyze Mr. Rumsfeld's comments in the light of what we know about transformation and draw conclusions about how China Lake should fit into the BRAC 2005 assessment.

Secretary Rumsfeld's goals for BRAC 2005 are:

1. Eliminate excess physical capacity
2. Rationalize and reconfigure infrastructure with defense strategy
3. Align the infrastructure to implement greater joint activity.

The second and third goals are directly related to Department of Defense *transformation*. Since transformation is a driving force for DoD and for BRAC, in any examination of how China Lake or other bases stack up it's important to understand where DoD is headed in this transformation process. Guidance from the Secretary of Defense is available to help us put BRAC 2005 and the transformation process in context.

TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

Although United States and the Soviet Union forces never engaged each other in combat, our Cold War force structure was designed to wage a full-scale war with the USSR. The emphasis was to stop a conventional armored attack from the East into Western Europe. Heavily armed American forces were positioned in Europe and the Western Pacific. Tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe, and a survivable, long-range nuclear strike capability from the sea and continental United States was positioned as the nuclear deterrent. A containment strategy ensured a relatively static strategic situation. A certain global stability was realized although localized conflicts occurred in which great pains were exercised to assure that the conflicts didn't spread into larger wars involving NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

After the Soviet empire collapsed, the relatively stable world situation quickly unraveled. The United States, as the only superpower, was the principal source of military force to stabilize trouble spots on the globe. After September 11, 2001, the United States has entered into what promises to be a long period of counter-terror suppression and has assumed a leadership role in attempting to solve the long-standing ferment in the Middle East. Adversaries are technologically inferior and unable to stand against US power in force-on-force engagements. Enemies use terrorism and asymmetric warfare tactics to exploit vulnerabilities associated with engaging the United States and other developed societies. In the future, if the United States fails to maintain a technological advantage, future adversaries could build a capability to counter our forces in a conventional force-on-force conflict.

The United States has taken on this new role after substantially reducing the size of its military force structure. Commitments around the world in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, the Balkans and elsewhere are placing a heavy strain on active and reserve military personnel and equipment. The Defense Department and military services have responded to the new role and stresses with plans to transform the defense structure through new operational concepts and application of advanced technology. The transformation

process has been formally defined by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a guidance document distributed throughout the Department of Defense.¹

In the this document transformation is defined as “*a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.*”

The transformation guidance document lists three pillars for transforming the US force structure:

- *Transforming how we fight* – developing joint warfighting concepts and supporting capabilities: doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel and facilities

- *Transforming how we do business* – transforming business and planning practices, resource allocation, accelerated acquisition cycles, output-based management, and a reformed analytic process. Initiatives range from improving the quality of life of service personnel to acquisition reform to an improved war planning process.

- *Transforming how we work with others* – building interagency cooperation, regional partnerships and international military cooperation.

The Secretary of Defense’s guidance deals with the gamut of factors – leadership, technology, tactical and strategic planning and analysis, and force structure transformation.

BRAC GOALS AND CHINA LAKE

The Secretary of Defense’s BRAC goals of eliminating excess capacity, rationalizing the infrastructure with the national defense strategy, and facilitating greater joint activity in the context of transformation structures a process for evaluating any military base’s prospects for BRAC and for making decisions on retention, realignment or closure. In this section we’ll step through each goal and examine China Lake’s position in supporting goal fulfillment.

Goal 1: Eliminate excess physical capacity.

Eliminating excess capacity can be accomplished by:

- Consolidating small bases into larger bases to gain economies of scale
- Consolidating separate bases that do similar work.

¹ *Transformation Planning Guidance*, Department of Defense, April 2003

For political and historical reasons the services operate many small bases around the country, each of which has its own support or overhead functions. Many were closed or realigned in earlier BRAC rounds, but others continue to exist. Overhead costs associated with these bases can be reduced by consolidating their functions into larger bases.

China Lake certainly is large enough to accommodate functions performed by other bases, has the capacity to support a large administrative load, and has the additional advantage that it has instituted management practices in the past decade that have lowered overhead rates significantly. Functions moved to China Lake should be mission-compatible with China Lake.

Consolidating larger bases that do similar work can be accomplished within each military service, but the second and third DoD BRAC goals can best be supported by consolidating across service lines. Consolidating larger bases can realize savings by reducing overhead expenses, but they also can make more efficient use of scarce resources and enhance inter-service cooperation (Goal 3).

Consolidation at some locations such as China Lake can also greatly reduce encroachment pressures where duplicative or similar functions presently are performed at locations near population centers or with ranges encroached by commercial air routes.

Goal 2: Rationalize and reconfigure infrastructure with defense strategy.

This discussion is about China Lake, but it should be taken in the context of the organizational relationship of China Lake and Point Mugu as the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division. Point Mugu's Sea Range complements China Lake's land-based ranges to complete the land-sea-air capability.

Meeting the national defense strategy drives transformation and its three pillars. The Department of Defense's transformation process is specifically aimed at bringing the country's fighting forces and support infrastructure into line with the 21st century national defense strategy. BRAC 2005 as an instrument to support national defense strategy, then, should be designed to support transformation as defined by the Secretary of Defense. Most of the media attention and language in the law authorizing BRAC 2005 has focused on readiness issues and bases housing operational forces or training facilities. RDT&E bases such as China Lake also have an important role in transformation and can be assessed from the standpoint of supporting the national defense strategy:

Transforming how we fight calls for conversion from a defense structure of large forces fighting as individual services and relying on heavy equipment in relatively static battle lines to a highly mobile force that can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world. The services will fight jointly and rely on superior intelligence, real time communications networked to units throughout the battle, air power in direct support of ground and sea units, long range precision weapons and extensive use of unmanned surveillance and combat vehicles.

China Lake is well positioned to play a major role in transforming how we fight. It is fully engaged in developing technology, supporting development and testing, and supporting training in the areas of precision guided weapons, electronic warfare, unmanned air vehicles and unmanned combat air vehicles, and integrating advanced weapons and platforms. It also is deeply involved in developing and perfecting the new tools of network centric warfare to tie together the intelligence, planning, and strike operations into a responsive, quick reaction capability of which we had a glimpse in Operation Iraqi Freedom.²

Specific qualifications of China Lake:

- The staff possesses experience, skills and knowledge that place them in the first rank of professionals in the field. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz has stated, " I think the record shows that at key installations like China Lake where we have, perhaps, one of the best civilian work forces any country could ever have – private sector or government. It's produced some of the most remarkable technological breakthroughs."³ China Lake's military-civilian team has demonstrated the ability to work at the leading edge of technology from its inception as a rocket RDT&E center in 1943 to today, where it is melding conventional weapons technology and new concepts in network centric warfare.
- China Lake has the most complete set of facilities for weapons development in the world with laboratories, ground test facilities, full-service ground and air ranges, and a military-civilian team with a 60-year record of developing systems that work at an affordable cost.
- China Lake's land area covers 1.2 million acres and its air space occupies 20,000 square miles supported by a full-capability naval air station. The nearby Point Mugu facility has an fully instrumented sea range encompassing 30,000 square miles expandable to 196,000 square miles and is next to a deep-water port. The climate is ideal for testing, and the land terrain varies from flat to mountainous with a near sea level supersonic flight corridor. The Point Mugu sea range accommodates submarine, surface and air tests at all altitudes and includes an isolated island with airfield and test instrumentation.
- China Lake is located in a remote area of the Mojave Desert surrounded by federal land insulated from residential, commercial or industrial development. A small area on the southern border of the northern section contains the town of Ridgecrest, housing the base employees and community infrastructure. The Ridgecrest area is also bounded by federal land and is not subject to future urban

² For a detailed discussion of network centric warfare and other elements of the new warfare see *Comments on the Future of the Weapons Division*, Anderson, China Lake Defense Alliance, July, 2003

³ Testimony to House Armed Services Committee, May 1, 2003

sprawl. Although no military base is totally immune to encroachment (particularly environmentalist pressures), China Lake is as close as one can get.

- Even for a base as large as China Lake, modern long-range weapons and aircraft and force-level exercises and experiments cannot be contained on a single reservation. China Lake is part of the Southwest Defense Complex, an existing cluster of major RDT&E and training bases in six southwestern states that cover the gamut of RDT&E and training needs for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and RDT&E needs of NASA and the Department of Energy. The major aerospace firms have facilities in Southern California as well.

- A special relationship exists between Edwards Air Force Base, Point Mugu and China Lake. The three facilities are linked by wide band telecommunications; Edwards conducts weapon systems tests at China Lake and low-level flight testing over the Point Mugu Sea Range. The 20,000 square mile R-2508 air space is jointly managed by China Lake, Edwards Air Force Base, Fort Irwin National Training Center and the Federal Aviation Administration -- a model for interagency and inter-service cooperation that has withstood the test of time.

• *Transforming how we do business* has many aspects ranging from improving the quality of life of service personnel to reforming the analytic and acquisition process. For China Lake the key considerations are supporting the DoD and military service planning and systems acquisition management.

China Lake has earned a reputation over the years for innovation in management as well as technology. The personnel demonstration project is a model, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz' remarks quoted above were occasioned by a Congressional committee question concerning a proposed DoD civilian personnel system initiative.

The primary contribution that China Lake can make, however, to transforming business practices is in adapting its full spectrum leadership in weapon system RDT&E to the process of acquiring and integrating systems. In the past the concept of "system" has evolved from a weapon or piece of equipment in the mid-20th century to a fully armed and capable platform in the late 20th century to a fully networked joint fighting force with national intelligence support in the opening years of the 21st century. China Lake's engineers are already working with Fleet personnel to develop new ways to acquire information from multiple sources, process and integrate the information, and rapidly display the battle picture to the warrior in real time in combat. Some of this technology was used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the designs continue to be refined and expanded. The recent battle experiment Millennium Challenge 2002 is an illustration of the evolving role of China Lake in transforming how the military services do business.

In the analytic area, China Lake is a leading RDT&E center for developing modeling and simulation techniques that tie together multiple locations and integrate analytical models, virtual systems and real platforms. These techniques have been demonstrated and have been used in force-level battle experiments.

- *Transforming how we work with others* includes not only facilitating better cooperation at high levels between agencies and other governments but working directly with other agencies and allies in developing new operational concepts, systems and capabilities, and in assisting in training personnel in how to use these concepts, systems and capabilities. RDT&E and training centers can contribute in the latter area.

Because of its many advantages for flying and training, China Lake is a preferred location by many governments for testing and training, and for familiarization with new systems being purchased from the United States. The United Kingdom has a permanent administrative site at China Lake, and deployments have been made over the years by units from Western Europe and Asia. China Lake engineers and facilities have supported other US government agencies for a variety of services for many years.

Goal 3: Align infrastructure to accommodate greater joint activity.

The armed forces are being structured for greater joint activity, and the systems they use have a high degree of commonality and interoperability. Joint RDT&E and training bases in tactical aviation are both feasible and desirable to save money and to enhance opportunities to achieve greater commonality and interoperability.

If the excesses in the RDT&E and training infrastructure are to be reduced without sacrificing capability in meeting long range military needs, consolidation across service lines is the obvious solution. To accomplish joint service consolidations without unacceptable loss in capability, the receiving facilities must have the capability in place, or at least have the potential capability, to accommodate the key warfare RDT&E functions without excessive investment. It must have all or most of the necessary facilities, skills, land, sea or air space, terrain, and climate to perform the RDT&E or training function and must not be encroached nor under long-range threat of residential, commercial or other encroachment pressures. Finally, its location should be in the vicinity of other military, industrial and research facilities engaged in complementary activities. China Lake meets these requirements in the field of weapon RDT&E and aircraft-weapon integration better than any other installation in the United States.

In addition, China Lake's location with respect to other partner installations facilitates its ability to accomplish joint missions:

- **China Lake is integrated with and near to Point Mugu.** Besides being the home of the Pacific Sea Range, Point Mugu is located next to a deep-water port and supports the Navy's West Coast Port Hueneme surface weapons test operations. It also sits on the coast near Vandenberg Air Force Base whose space launches depend upon Point Mugu's instrumentation support.
- **China Lake is located next to Edwards Air Force Base.** Edwards Air Force Base has direct access to China Lake ranges for testing aircraft-weapons integration without the need for costly, time-consuming deployment. Edwards

test personnel can monitor telemetered data without leaving facilities at Edwards. The proximity of Edwards, China Lake and Point Mugu is ideal for joint air weapons system development, test, and training. In the event of consolidating total air warfare RDT&E in the three-base complex, China Lake's airfield could accommodate basing the Naval and Marine Corps aircraft.

- **China Lake is the home of the Navy's air operational test squadron (VX-9), is next door to Nellis Air Force Base, and is within easy flying distance of Fallon Naval Air Station.** VX-9 is the Navy's aviation operational development test group. Nellis is the primary Air Force operational training center, and Fallon is home to tactics development and pre-deployment air wing training. The proximity of these facilities directly supports joint operational testing, training and tactics development.

- **China Lake is adjacent to the Fort Irwin National Training Center and near to Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Training Base.** The close proximity to key Army and Marine Corps training centers enhances the capability to support joint training exercises and experiments. Cooperation, especially with Fort Irwin, has increased significantly in the past few years as exemplified by Millennium Challenge 2002, and sizable growth in Naval aviation support to Army and Marine Corps ground operations is expected in future years.

CONCLUSIONS

BRAC 2005 decisions on military base retention, realignment or closure should directly support the goals set by Secretary Rumsfeld in his guidance memo of November 15, 2002. It is quite possible to analyze China Lake's standing in the BRAC assessments in relation to these goals. Although this report does so qualitatively, it is quite possible to do so quantitatively if the questions in the data calls are designed to assess each base's capabilities in terms of the goals.

It is clear that China Lake meets the goals. It's also clear that it is superior to other bases with similar missions:

1. Its professional military-civilian work force has the breadth, depth and experience to handle the 21st century weapon systems RDT&E job.
2. It has the most complete set of facilities available for all aspects of air weapon system RDT&E and training especially when coupled with nearby facilities at Point Mugu, Edwards Air Force Base, and Fort Irwin.
3. Its ranges, coupled with the Point Mugu Sea Range, have the dimensions, climate, terrain, and isolation to safely support long range weapon system RDT&E.

4. With the other Southwest Defense Complex ranges the capacity exists to support testing, training and experimentation on a regional scale.
5. Its minimal encroachment potential for the future provides the stability desired for investment over the long term.
6. Its staff and products are important to assisting the Department of Defense to support close working relationships with other agencies and allies.
7. Its proximity and established working relationship with Edwards Air Force Base, Point Mugu, Fort Irwin and the Southwest Defense Complex offer a complete air warfare RDT&E and training capability.

In addition to these considerations, China Lake has developed an enviable reputation over its 60-year history for technical innovation, developing systems that work at a reasonable cost, and translating military needs into achievable technical requirements. Today, the scientists, engineers and military officers at China Lake are deeply involved in the transformation process to develop the new capabilities needed to meet the challenges of the new millennium.

APPENDIX

Secretary of Defense Memorandum of November 15, 2002

Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

November 15, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

Subject: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure

As a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review, we embarked on a comprehensive review of our defense and security needs toward transforming the force. New force structures must be accompanied by a new base structure. The first step was my request to the Chairman to direct the geographic combatant commanders to prepare, in coordination with their Service component commands, draft overseas basing plans for their respective areas of responsibility.

Congress authorized a base realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005. At a minimum, BRAC 2005 must eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, sustainment and recapitalization of which diverts scarce resources from defense capability. However, BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes *both* warfighting capability and efficiency. I am directing this process begin immediately, under the structure set out herein.

Two senior groups, as reflected in the attachment, will oversee and operate the BRAC 2005 process. The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary, and composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Chiefs of Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), will be the policy making and oversight body for the entire BRAC 2005 process.



U18364-02

The subordinate Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), chaired by the USD(AT&L) and composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for installations and environment, the Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) (DUSD(I&E)), will oversee joint cross-service analyses of common business oriented functions and ensure the integration of that process with the Military Department and Defense Agency specific analyses of all other functions. The USD(AT&L) will have the authority and responsibility for issuing the operating policies and detailed direction necessary to conduct the BRAC 2005 analyses.

A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Prior BRAC analyses considered all functions on a service-by-service basis and, therefore, did not result in the joint examination of functions that cross services. While some unique functions may exist, those functions that are common across the Services must be analyzed on a joint basis.

Accordingly, the BRAC 05 analysis will be divided into two categories of functions.

- Joint cross-service teams will analyze the common business-oriented support functions and report their results through the ISG to the IEC.
- The Military Departments will analyze all service unique functions and report their results directly to the IEC.

Within 150 days of this memorandum, the ISG will recommend to the IEC the specific functions to receive joint analysis and the metrics for that analysis for my approval. The Military Departments through their representatives on the ISG, as well as the Defense Agencies, should communicate regularly with the ISG to ensure that their recommendations are fully consistent with the joint cross-service teams' recommendations.

A comprehensive infrastructure rationalization requires an analysis that examines a wide range of options for stationing and supporting forces and functions, rather than simply reducing capacity in a status-quo configuration. To that end, in accordance with the force structure plan and selection criteria, the ISG will recommend to the IEC for my approval a broad series of options for stationing and supporting forces and functions to increase efficiency and effectiveness. The Military Department and the joint cross-service analytical teams must consider all options endorsed by the IEC in the course of their analysis. The analytical teams may consider additional options, but they may not modify or dismiss those endorsed by the IEC without my approval.

In accordance with section 2909 of BRAC 90, as amended, BRAC 2005, as directed by this memorandum, will be the exclusive means for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation located in the United States until April 15, 2006. This exclusivity clause does not apply to closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable. Closures or realignments to which section 2687 is not applicable will require approval on the basis of guidance issued by the USD(AT&L). Competitive sourcing conducted under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76 may proceed independently.

In accordance with the direction of Congress expressed in the BRAC legislation, the Department will not make any binding closure or realignment decisions prior to the submission of final recommendations to the Commission no later than May 15, 2005. The process and structure outlined in this memorandum are designed to ensure the Department's ability to provide recommendations by this date and to meet several interim statutory requirements, including publishing draft selection criteria by December 31, 2003, and final criteria by February 16, 2004. In addition, the Department must provide Congress a force structure plan, inventory, capacity analysis, and certification of the need for BRAC with the FY 2005 budget documentation.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of BRAC 2005. This effort requires the focus and prioritization only senior leadership can bring. I am confident we can produce BRAC recommendations that will advance transformation, combat effectiveness, and the efficient use of the taxpayer's money.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Attachment
BRAC 2005 Organization



BRAC 2005 Leadership





