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White Paper

Main Issues to Discuss:

- Integration of Military Department recommendations with JCSG recommendations and with each other has yet to begin. This process will be time consuming and the overall DoD story needs to be pulled together.
- Universe – the entire process is undermined, if the Department cannot say confidently and convincingly that all installations, functions, and activities were considered.
- Measure of success – PRV does not capture everything. Amount of lease space eliminated, infrastructure capacity reduced, etc. need to be included.
- Definitions
 - Enclaves – Size of enclaves differ. How small is small? (ECS-Expeditionary Combat Support units)
 - Transformational – groups are using this as justification in very different ways. Some are using “transformational” to support new mission development or recapitalization vice enabler of excess capacity reduction.
- Consistency of Approach
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in military value analysis.
 - USAF does military value analysis by platform rather than by installation mission or function.
 - USA did not calculate military value of Guard and Reserve or perform COBRA analysis on them.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken in capacity analysis.
 - USAF defines capacity based on the difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size.
 - There is no consistency in approach taken to determine surge requirements.
 - Transformational options – groups are citing these as guidelines and they seem to be in a draft form never to go final. Are groups supposed to follow or incorporate them or not?
- Documentation: Some additions and deletions of candidate recommendations are being done outside of the deliberative process before submission to ISG.
- Misuse of BRAC (i.e. never or 100+ year paybacks)
 - Standing-up new BCTs
 - JSF bed-down
 - Bed-down of returning overseas troops
 - Guard/Reserve Center reconstruction
- Intelligence JCSG