

DCN: 2151

15 March 2005

Army Briefing Notes

Date: Thursday, March 10, 2005

Time: 10:30-12:30

Place: 2D201

Chairman: Dr. Craig College

Executive Secretary: Mr. Larry Wright

Army Key Attendees:

- Dr. Craig College
- COL Kurt Weaver
- COL William Tarantino
- Mr. Patrick McCullough
- Mr. Larry Wright
- Mr. Larry Wickens

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Army to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Dr. Craig College

Items of Import:

- The United States Army is pleased with the JCSG process and is ready to start integrating JCSG recommendations with USA recommendations.
- Universe was 97 major installations.
- Capacity analysis does not use DoD guidance – metric results yield 27% excess capacity, which is not correct due to overseas personnel.
- Broke universe up into following groups for capacity analysis: Maneuver Space, General Instructional Space, Administrative Space, Depot Maintenance, Armament Production, Ammunition Storage, Mobilization, Training and Testing Acres, and Mission Expansion.
- Changed military value analysis from 13 stove pipes, which prevented inter-category comparisons, to one consolidated measure for overall military value evaluation.
- Eight leased sites are included on Military Value Ranking list.
- IGPBS – Being coordinated with BRAC actions. Some realignment actions are enablers for IGPBS Conus bed-down actions.
- OSD told Army to utilize the wedge.

Questions that arose:

- What is MVI? *The Military Value of an Installation. It is our “1 to N” list. MVP is the Military Value Portfolio – which indicates those installations that are absolutely necessary for missions and which are dispensable.* (Salomon)

- Did the Army representatives on the JCSGs report back to you? *Yes, but I am not their boss. They are responsible to the VCSA and Under Secretary, but ultimately responsible to the Secretary of the Army.* (Johnson)
- Did you look at ranges? Are you aware that the Education and Training JCSG took big ranges off the table? *Education and Training and Technical JCSGs had crossover ownership issues with ranges.* (Salomon)
- Are the requests for clarification from installations or JCSGs? *JCSGs. We had dozens of metrics from dozens of questions so sometimes there was conflicting data.* (Johnson)
- What has been OSD's reaction to the new excess capacity projections? *We have been having this discussion with OSD since February. OSD understood that the original estimate was a "back of the envelope" calculation and that the numbers could change. However, now the excess capacity numbers seem to be written in stone.* (Salomon)
- What is the capacity of a footprint? *Consider a brigade. How many facilities, ranges, equipment, etc. are necessary to support that brigade? Match those numbers to Ft. Bliss, for example, and see how many brigades the location can support.* (Salomon)
- There is no surge requirement? *The Army does not have to maintain additional facilities or installations for surge.* (Johnson)
- Shouldn't it be -27% in the excess/shortage column for maneuver space (Slide 14¹)? *No, this is the 2003 baseline number, but with the future force movements, this will become a shortage.* (Salomon)
- If Yuma is so expensive, why is the Army keeping it? *It is needed for future brigades.* (Johnson)
- Weight number 3, future, means what? *This is basically selection criterion 3, those capabilities needed to support contingencies and/or new mission.* (Salomon)
- So you used military judgment in your interviews, and then, you used military judgment again if the results of the model aren't quite "right"? *Someone needs to tell me what attributes to measure and/or what is important – this was the purpose of the interviews. Then military judgment is applied if the attributes were unable to capture all the important nuances.* (Salomon)
- Why didn't you use imperatives?
- How are you using BRAC to make room for new activations? *Moving a BCT from Ft. Hood to FT. Carson and one from FT. Riley to Ft. Bliss. Why? There are differences in heavy vs. light range requirements.* (Salomon)
- How did the proposals that were stopped get reviewed? Was this just a big exercise in military judgment?
- Do you use any enclaves? *Yes, sometimes. For example in the closures of Ft. Gillem.* (Johnson)
- After your actions concerning Ft. Knox, what is left? *Recruiting Command. Have you considered closing it? At what cost? OSD has told us to review the actions surrounding Ft. Knox.* (Johnson)
- Is it wise to backfill Walter Reed? (Johnson)
- Did you look at Recruit Depots? *Yes, some were reduced. In some cases, the MOS training moves with the mission.* (Johnson)

¹ All references to presentation slides refer to your "left" presentation unless otherwise noted.

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- The Red Team has concerns about integration as different groups have calculated military value, capacity and surge differently. Also, there are differing definitions of transformational and enclave. Be ready to tackle these challenges.
- Your Army Vision is good – it is precisely the idea. BRAC is about a way to get where you want to be.
- The Army Basing Study should be strategy driven, add strategy to the beginning of your analysis chart (Slide 5).
- The DoDIG recommended that the databases be locked. However, this criticism seems less relevant to services due to the close relationship with Army Auditors.
- Add a chart to your presentation that explains and/or provides an example of the structure of a brigade and the capacity of a footprint.
- Consider developing a table that demonstrates why Army does not have a surge requirement. DoD will certainly need a DoD-wide surge capacity requirements table for the Commission.
- Add a column on your “Metric Results” Chart (Slide 14) that has future excess/shortage projections that can be compared to the baseline numbers provided.
- For consistency, either use a negative sign or parentheses with red type (red) in all your charts and slides (e.g. compare Administrative Space slide to Depot Maintenance). Fix the slide numbers so that they match (i.e. – 61 of 19 makes no sense).
- Think carefully about the story you want to tell the Commission, and then, present only that data which supports your story. Additional data that you ignore can work against you – case in point, the capacity of White Sands.
- To defend going from 12% to 33% for your weight on “future”, you are going to need a tight argument and clearer justification. This promotes discretion to override other military value attributes.
- Military Value vs. Military Judgment is a poor choice of words - change the title on Slide 36. The point of the slide is the link between military value and military judgment and not any potential competition between them.
- Tie the discussion of Slide 39 (left) and Slide 40 (right) back to MVP discussion and that you kept installations you need to accomplish the mission. Your model needs defense in hearing, but you have 9 exceptions that are added after the fact.
- White areas, non-coverage areas, on the “Staging Areas and Critical Infrastructure” map may cause problems. Make the same point with bulleted comments like those on the previous slide (Slide 42).
- Add reachback capabilities to list for “BRAC objectives for the RC” (Slide 51).
- Again, be careful how you tell your story. You need a strong, supported argument to use BRAC funds and environmental cover to enable an action that would happen anyway, but is occurring during the BRAC window. It is as much how you articulate what you are doing as it is what you are doing.
- “Operational Army” slide (Slide 61): Use BRAC terms (i.e. – “activate” will work against you, perhaps say “Restructuring”). There are bullets that went off the bottom of the page.
- There is no rationale for why any of the proposals on Slide 62 were stopped and nothing that does not have a data-supported explanation should be shown to the Commission.

- It is going to be hard to justify RC actions that never pay back without a definition or some guidance as to how transformation fits into the law. An aggregate measure of the change in military value and the savings resulting from RC actions would be helpful. The “ifs” in your recommendations are already changing the BRAC language, which could be a problem.
- Story surrounding overseas troops and justifying “never” paybacks has to be told carefully and reexamined for process credibility.

Additional observations to consider:

- Reserve center closures and MILCON for new Armed Forces Reserve Centers dominate recommendation.
- COBRA analysis, capacity analysis and military value calculations were not done for ANG and reserve candidate recommendations.
- BRAC is being used to move within the same city in at least 7 candidate recommendations and appears to use BRAC to justify desired MILCON.
- Many candidates are contingent on free land offers from states. If state should renege, will non-BRAC funds be used for land acquisition? Existing facilities are described as being unsafe or unsatisfactory – yet moves from these often seem to be contingent on free land.
- If existing facilities are unacceptable would they have been abandoned without BRAC? If yes, why are such moves BRAC actions? If no, then is the need really compelling?
- How were the offers of free land incorporated into the decision making process?
- Where are the IGPBS candidates in the process?
- Clarksville, TN closure candidate recommendation is not consistent in reporting criteria 6 job losses in COBRA and quad chart.
- Realignment of NAS Willow Grove by relocating Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, NJ should include Fort Dix military value ranking and capacity analysis.
- Closure of Oswald USARC in Everett, WA candidate recommendation should include excess capacity information for NS Everett.