

DCN: 2197

14 March 2005

Air Force Briefing Notes

Date: Wednesday, March 9, 2005

Time: 08:00-09:30

Place: 3E808

Chairman: Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Executive Secretary: Lt Col Johansen

Key Attendees:

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Laffey, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Milam
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Mr. Fred Pease

Items of Import:

- BRAC 2005 Goals were to maximize warfighting capability by optimizing squadron size, increasing crew ratios and adjusting Active/ARC mix, to realign infrastructure to meet future defense strategy by sustaining air superiority and air sovereignty and accomplishing mobility basing, to maximize operational capability by eliminating excess capacity, and to capitalize on joint activity opportunities.
- USAF liaisons to JCSGs were less effective than an actual Air Force representative JCSG member may have been.
- Air Force reduces capacity by about 17.8 percent but there are still recommendations coming in that need to be knitted together.
- Did not take savings for military personnel.
- MILCON is overestimated – there is a 20% fudge factor.

Questions that arose:

- Where in your organization were JCSG recommendations deconflicted? *Resolutions started at the DAS level and may have generated other recommendations. We also had bi-lateral conversations to resolve issues.* (Salomon)
- Why is 24 the optimal squadron size for fighters? (Salomon)
- What is a Center for Excellence? What did the JCSGs recommend with respect to Indian Springs? *E&T JCSG had a candidate recommendation, but did not send it forward. Air Force decided to go ahead with the recommendation.* (Johnson)

- Where is Indian Springs? *Nevada, near Ft. Irwin, CA and Nellis AFB, NV.* (Salomon)
- Why isn't a receiver considered a realignment (e.g. MacDill)? (Salomon)
- How was capacity defined? *The difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size. Excess capacity exists where a squadron can be added at no cost (Slide 18).* (Johnson)
- Did the Air Force Audit Agency validate capacity? *Yes, they are present at all deliberative meetings.* (Johnson)
- Do your military value weights really have the precision to the hundredths place (e.g. 3.92%)? (Salomon)
- Were the "Mission Essential Bases" (Slide 31) analyzed at all? *Yes, but only as receivers.* (Salomon)
- What happened to the OSD principles (they aren't explicit on Slide 35)? *We will relate ours to theirs.* (Salomon)
- Is the Guard on board? *Absolutely, we are freeing up manpower for new roles.* (Johnson)
- Why leave numerous ECS enclaves? *The ECS units are tasked separately from the fighter squadron and don't go with the mission. They provide general support – CSS.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of Los Angeles AFB? *JCSG took it off the table because it had highest military value. We had an enabling scenario.* (Johnson)
- Why move plans out of Indian Springs if you have capacity there? (Salomon)
- How do you define realignment? *If more than one-third of non-mission personnel is left, then it is a realignment. If remaining non-mission personnel is less than one-third, then that is considered an enclave. Did you excess the rest of the base? Yes, and reducing the footprint sometimes created a cost.* (Johnson)
- What are "quantifiable benefits" (Slide 49)? (Pirie)
- Where do you stand with your recommendations? *None have briefed to the IEC. We are all done with them, except a couple of recommendations that are "follow the fleet" type recommendations.* (Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- The Red Team has found it difficult to track goals, principles, imperatives, strategies, etc. and the application of military judgment. Be prepared to describe the dependencies or interrelationships between goals, principles, your strategy, and your military judgment. The candidate recommendations are supposed to be strategy-drive, data-verified and this needs to be apparent in your presentation and articulation.
- The decision process needs to be well documented and when you present to the Commission, you should have a chart that explicitly demonstrates how decisions were made.
- Make a chart that displays and rationalizes (with data support) optimum squadron sizes. For those recommendations where you do not reach the stated optimum, you need to explain why not in your justification. Failing to give such an explanation undermines your entire process.
- Review argument for increased crew ratios to be consistent. Ensure reliability data supports argument.
- The point of slides 7-9 is unclear. Add bullet point to the slide so that it is obvious what audience is to take away from the slide.

- To not look at ranges is a missed opportunity – need to have supporting justification for taking ranges off the list.
- Check with OSD to determine whether you need separate candidate recommendations for receiver sites.
- Create a slide similar to Slide 13 that shows receiver sites.
- Show, on Slide 13, the reduction in capacity due to BRAC 2005 actions.
- Put development of goals and principles (i.e. your strategy) at the beginning of your process slide (Slide 14).
- Help DoD develop a DoD-wide metric for success.
- Rename Imperatives (Slide 27) and connect them not only to the OSD principles, but also to your stated goals (Slide 3) and principles (Slide 35) – create an explicit hierarchy.
- Typographical error on Slide 36 - # 5 was modeled and was not an imperative.
- Numerous candidate recommendations, like the sample on Slide 38, used the justification that the action “enables future total force transformation”. This requires further explanation.
- May want to incorporate a before and after type slide into presentation that demonstrates which bases have new types of planes, which is significant from a maintenance perspective.
- Create a backup chart that demonstrates how many pilots are affected by C-130 movements (Slide 45), how many pilots are assigned to a new base and how many have a new mission.
- Make UAV Group movement slide (Slide 47) consistent with other similar slides.
- Review recommendations with large MILCON and “Never” paybacks. Perhaps add a quad chart that links enablers (from other services and/or from JCSGs) together so that all savings can be counted. Use the Navy’s “Fenceline Closures Chart” as an example or a template.
- Help DoD define realign and show savings – there needs to be consistency across DoD.
- Have a crisp example prepared to explain “quantifiable benefits” (Slide 49).
- The purpose of BRAC is to reduce excess capacity. Strengthen rational and justification of all recommendations by explicitly linking actions to the Air Force’s overall strategy, to the Force Structure Plan, and/or to BRAC Selection Criteria. This is necessary to avoid the appearance of using BRAC money for new MILCON to get Air Force situated and to overcome the Commission’s potential hostility surfacing from small political actions.
- Many of the recommendations include leaving expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements in an enclave. For many of them, they cite the need to “retain intellectual capital” as the justification for retaining an enclave. We need an explanation as to why these elements cannot be moved allowing for a total base closure. Especially as in the case of USAF-0033V2 (Slide 66) – where receiving location is 12 miles from losing location, and yet, an enclave is left behind.
- For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value (e.g. USAF-0037 – Slide 72), we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy. If “military judgment” was used, we need to know which aspect of military judgment.

- Be careful when stringing recommendations together – commission will look at the recommendations individually.

Additional observations to consider:

- Box top scenario development and top down driven comments imply non-data driven candidate recommendations. Change wording to better describe scenario development process.
- Need to solidify/disentangle your strategy, goals, imperatives, and principles. Statements on the bottom of Slides 3 and 11 really seem to be your strategy – as opposed to the reduction of capacity or to save money. If this is true, Slides 48 and 49 are irrelevant as your stated goal was not to save money.
- Military value analysis is distinct from all other groups who determined military value by mission or function of an installation. USAF appears to do military value analysis by warfighting platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value in support of the total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is using.
- Several of the recommendations include the movement of aircraft that seem to be tangentially related (at best) to the core of the recommendation. Why are these movements rolled up as part of a candidate recommendation? Can't they be done outside of the BRAC process?
- For the most part, the AF candidate recommendations seemingly do not involve the disposal of property. If property is excessed, it needs to be apparent in quad charts or at least in the one-page recommendation description. If property is not excessed, why not?
- Some quad charts say the base is being "realigned," but the one-pager describes it as a closure or vice versa. You need to be consistent.
- USAF-0035: Recommendation is to close, but the documentation shows units remaining (to fulfill Air Sovereignty Alert mission). Quad sheet says no natural resources infrastructure issues, but one-pager says there could be wetlands issues that restrict additional operations. What is the MILCON for?
- USAF-0039: The wing is inactivating and all the aircraft are retiring, but there is MILCON, why? Why do the ECS elements remain? Why are Sioux Falls, SD and Gulfport-Biloxi, MS part of the community impact sheet when there is no mention of anything moving from/to those locations?
- USAF-0051: What will the AF do to solve the potential housing shortage at Mt. Home? Moves F-15s from the base ranked #1 in mil value to the base ranked #23, in part because the weather is more predictable in ID than in NC. Can this be documented?
- USAF-0052: Follows from DON-0067 and DON-0084. Why does the Engineering Squadron remain as an enclave? What is the cumulative effect (costs/savings) of the recommendations involving Willow Grove?
- USAF-0053 & USAF-0114: Why include movement of Singapore F-16s (Block 52) from Cannon to Luke as part of these recommendations? Clarify that "B52" means "Block 52" vice the aircraft.
- USAF-0055: The one-pager states that environmental impacts at Nellis need to be evaluated, but there is no explanation regarding how Nellis is part of the scenario.
- USAF-0081: Review the legality of "realigning in place".

- USAF-0086: What is the real rationale for moving out a ANG wing, and then transferring its aircraft to another wing at the same base? “Enables Future Total Force Transformation” is insufficient justification.