Comments on Testimony before the BRAC Commission

Ref DCN 4982 and 21 June 2005 Testimony

Purpose: The concept of operations, B-1 aircraft capabilities, aircrew training requirements, tactics techniques and procedures (TTP), and Ellsworth / Dyess regional training capabilities have all dramatically changed since 1995 and the last BRAC . This paper comments on direct testimony given to the BRAC (reference DCN 4982.

Testimony: "In Afghanistan, the B-1 accounted for 40%, by weight, of the weapons delivered. In Iraq, 34%. No other weapon system came close."

Comment: The B-1 has performed extremely well and continues to be the "backbone" of the long range strike mission. However, starting with the first use of the B-1in combat (*Desert Fox* in December 1996) the weapons have ALWAYS been employed from mid altitude (above 18,000 feet). There has been "show of force" low altitude "fly bys" in Afghanistan. This has had the effect of disbursing suspected Taliban. However, when weapons are used, they are "guided weapons" from medium or high altitude. The B-1 has *NEVER* dropped a weapon in *ANY* conflict at low altitude.

The low altitude delivery was the major tactic technique during the Cold War. The Air Force has B-1 low level training requirements to keep that skill available. It is part of the capability that the aircraft and crewmembers need to train to maintain this skill, but today's combat emphasis is above 18,000 ft operations training on "sensor to shooter" with speed and efficiency. This happens every day in SWA at medium to high altitude. Again, the B-1 has never dropped weapons at low level during any conflict.

Testimony by Gen. Loh: "I mention this brief history because when the Air Force consolidated to two bases in 2001, it violated one of the guiding principles I consistently and scrupulously followed for long range bomber operations; that is, do not operate more than 36 heavy, long range-bombers from a single base."

Comment: As indicated in the testimony, the AF has not observed this policy since at least 2001 and did not follow this policy in the 1995 BRAC as B-52s were moved from Castle AFB (closed) to Barksdale AFB. In fact, Barksdale has had over 36 Bombers for many years. Barksdale AFB presently has 48 B-52 PAA aircraft [see BCEG Minutes 24 Aug 2004] and when including all attrition reserve, training, backup inventory, etc. they have 59 B-52s at Barksdale. As stated in testimony, the

"Loh rule" was not the policy of AF leadership in 2001 and it is not the policy of today's AF leadership as it faces the future with an AEF concept and the Global War On Terrorism. Today's policy reflects the reality of today's threat and today's AEF concept of operation. In fact, today's leaders and today's AF leadership articulated today's AF policy

> "The Air Force recommendations in this report maximize war fighting capability…effectively consolidating older weapons systems into fewer, larger squadrons."

[Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005 (Volume V, Part 1 of 2) p 1. para 1.3].

Testimony: "Operational readiness suffers because too many crews must share too few training ranges and training airspace."

Comment: This can be true if training assets are not available, but NOT true if B-1s are moved to Dyess. Ellsworth's training capability is limited due to significantly fewer regional aircrew training assets (ECM, live drop ranges, electronic warfare sites, low level routes and MOA airspace). Dyess has a robust training environment. Per DoD certified data, aircrew training requirements can be accomplished within 300 NM of Dyess … several can not be accomplished within 300NM of Ellsworth. [ref. AFI 11-2b-1v1,2,3; DoD certified data 1245, 1274,1266]

Testimony: "Logistics suffers because there is too little support infrastructure to handle greatly expanded maintenance, supply and transportation needs"

Comment: The B-1 fleet is homogeneous and all the B-1 aircraft are the same configuration (parts, engines and cockpit configurations etc.). As a result, there are efficiencies of maintenance, logistics and aircrew training that are not available with some aircraft fleets (C-130, P-3, -135 aircraft, etc.). In fact, following the consolidation of B-1s to 2 bases the Mission Capability (MC) rate rose to record high levels. This was despite the fact that we had aircraft deployed to Diego Garcia for SWA, Guam for East Asia, and 2 installations to support. This showed that consolidation has a positive (NOT negative) impact on the B-1 fleet readiness and logistics issues.

If B-1 unique parts are short, having them at a single location eliminates transportation delays, costs, and the need for prioritization between the "present need" at one base vs. the "possible future need" at another base. The Boeing repair facilities and organic B-1 engine repair facilities presently at Dyess become even more cost effective and responsive for the entire B-1 fleet. Lastly, if the AF needs to forward deploy special equipment, the consolidation at Dyess will free up even more assets for possible "pre-positioning" of B-1 specialized equipment (stands, test equipment, etc) to overseas forward operating locations (FOLs).

Testimony: "Quality of life suffers because one base cannot provide adequately for all the medical, housing and other needs of our people."

Comment: This is not true for Dyess. Keep in mind that in the 1990s Dyess had more than 90 large aircraft, i.e., B-1s, KC-135s and C-130s, and was able to provide adequately for the needs of its people. Placement of all B-1s at Dyess will allow long term investment in homes, long term employment in the "larger" Dyess community and the use of a single school system for the families. Abilene has always supported the medical needs of the AF and the medical community is growing with the addition of a third major hospital in Abilene this year. Abilene has documented capability to add over 2000 military families in the schools and in housing. In fact, Abilene had over 550 housing starts in the month of April 2005. In addition, it will decrease PCS moving costs for the DoD. [ref DoD certified data, *JPAT 7 Installation and Activity Reports Air Force as of April 20, 2005 and BRAC Hearing 11 July 2005 San Antonio, TX*]

Testimony: "In addition, having two B-1 bases allows the Air Force the option of adding back more B-1s from inactive status as it did just recently"

Comment: After the Air Force reduced the fleet from 90 to 60, the success of the B-1 in SWA led to Congress adding back 7 aircraft. An effort was made to bring back another 5 but this met stiff resistance and the Air Force said it would be too expensive. The retired B-1s are NOT in flyable condition. Some are on static display, like the ones at Ellsworth and Dyess AFB. Others have been cannibalized for spare parts.

Testimony: "Moreover, having the entire B-1 fleet stationed at a base with only one runway presents an unacceptable security risk … an enemy could render the entire B-1 fleet inoperable with a single weapon"

Comment: The Civil engineers of today's expeditionary AF have a requirement to accomplish rapid runway repair "in X minutes". In addition, Dyess has a 13,500-foot by 200-foot parallel taxiway that has served as an emergency back-up runway for decades. It has NEVER been needed. The taxiway at Ellsworth can not be used because of airfield layout. This issue of single location and/or single runway is true at many of the AF installations today: Whiteman (B-2), Beale (U-2), Robbins (E-8), Offutt (E-4) etc. It should not be treated as a unique issue for B-1s.

Testimony: "Closing Ellsworth shuts down forever valuable training airspace in the northwest U.S. and aggravates the available training ranges and airspace at the receiving base."

Comment: We assume this is refers to Powder River. This statement is then inaccurate. If the Powder River MOA is still required by DoD (and not excess-

excess), it can be kept available when Ellsworth is closed, even though Ellsworth may be the "primary user" for the area. If Powder River were to be closed, it would be because its stated "unique" capability is not required by other installations or the requirement is being filled by existing, more capable ranges / MOAs closer to home station. The use of Powder River might be limited because the requirement to fly low for accurate weapons delivery has drastically decreased (B-1 low level training requirements is defined by AFI as flight below 5000 feet AGL) as the GPS and laser guided weapons become the basic standard of employment. According to DoD certified data, Dyess has a 2.3 times the MOA volume and 3.7 times the IR routes than Ellsworth. Therefore, there is no "aggravation" of training ranges if B-1s move to Dyess. The opposite is true if B-1s were to move to Ellsworth as suggested as an alternative. [Ref DoD certified data 1245, 1274,1266]

Testimony: As a result of a class action lawsuit, there are currently training range restrictions at Dyess. Dyess' primary low-level training route (IR-178) and the Lancer MOA, together known as the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), is controlled by a District court order. For example, flying is only allowed at 500 ft. or above for low-level routes. According to Gen. Loh, low-level training is necessary. Specifically, low-level entry training (at 100 A.) to avoid detection is still very important.

Comment: An AF response has been given to the issue of RBTI (reference DCN 5321). This document states, "there is no permanent restriction issue pending in court. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the original EIS analysis, which used wingtip vortices affects at high altitude extrapolated to 300 ft AGL, as insufficient … If the results support flight at 300 ft AGL, the Air Force will follow the normal process of obtaining FAA approval to use the RBTI as originally requested. None of the court's rulings require the Air Force to return to court for approval as part of this process… If the results do not support operations at 300 ft AGL, the 500 ft restriction will most likely apply…. The training requirement to fly at 300 ft AGL, however, can be accomplished at restricted ranges" [note: Powder River and Lancer are both MOAs and NOT Restricted Areas, thus the same restrictions would then apply to both]. "Given that possibility, Dyess AFB still has access to closer low-altitude ranges and airspace than Ellsworth AFB. Even at 500 ft AGL, the RBTI is still valuable."

If the new EIS finds an issue with the altitude flown, this would likely influence restrictions on low level operations for the B-1, regardless of location. Current *AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-2B-1, VOLUME 1 and dated 4 JUNE 2004* indicates, "Low level can be logged as a training event at altitudes "below 5000' AGL." Also, in *AFI 11-2B-1V3 11 MARCH 2002 Para 7.10.2* it states, "Minimum operating altitudes/Set Clearance Planes (SCP) are 300 feet day and 500 feet night/IMC" and in para 7.10.2.1, "Minimum TF altitudes for military training routes in FLIP AP/1B and AP/3 and those provided by the local airspace managers at the originating activity will take precedence if higher than the altitudes listed above."

Testimony: "Criteria four concerns cost and manpower. Closing Ellsworth will not reduce cost or manpower. In the long run, trying to operate 67 B-1s from a single base will cost more than operating two B-1 bases at peak efficiency for each."

Comment: Stationing 26 B-1s at Ellsworth and 39 at Dyess is NOT efficient base loading. This would leave "excess-excess" capability at both bases, NOT "peak efficiency". It is a well established fact that significant "open the door manpower costs" are required for an installation of any size. Two bases mean 2 wing staffs, 2 of each type of group staffs, 2 civil engineers, etc, etc ,etc. The savings of consolidation at Dyess is substantial. Per certified COBRA data, 3,308 military and 438 civilians will move from Ellsworth and only 1,918 military and 129 civilians are gained by Dyess. This is a substantial savings of 1,390 military and 309 civilian positions (a total of 1,699 positions) to operate the same number of B-1s at Dyess vs. operating out of both Ellsworth and Dyess.

Looking at the recurring costs of dual bases vs. consolidation, COBRA's "today's costs" are reduced by $24.7M / year in recurring cost of operating the same number of B-1 and C-130 aircraft. Dyess is a more efficient operation than Ellsworth by measuring recurring cost of BOS and sustainment. Dyess supports 35% more personnel (5,777 vs. 3,753) than Ellsworth for only 18% more BOS costs per year. Sustainment costs efficiencies are even more pronounced. Gross sustainment costs today are higher at Ellsworth for support of 29 B-1s than the sustainment costs at Dyess for operating 36 B-1s AND 29 C-130s ($14.4M vs. $14.3M). Simply put, the DoD certified data shows Dyess is a more cost effective location to operate and the recurring savings in manpower, BOS and sustainment costs are substantial if B-1s are consolidated at Dyess.

Testimony: "Criteria seven concerns the ability of the receiving infrastructure to support the mission. Closing Ellsworth will cause enormous, long-term infrastructure problems at the receiving base that will adversely impact operational readiness of the B-1 fleet."

Comment: The AF certified data under criteria 7 shows that Abilene has the necessary infrastructure to support the additional missions and personnel.

COUNTER POINT to BRAC DCN 4979, Entitled:

"Issues for BRAC Staff Consideration"

A. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1: Closing Ellsworth will not create the savings Air Force estimates.

1. GAO Analysis of Air Force Selection Process for Base Closures and Realignments (GAO-05-785, July 2005) specifically noted:

- In ***Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations*** (p. 124), the "BRAC Commission may wish to consider .... the closure of Ellsworth AFB, **SD."**

- Over 60% of the Air Force's net savings are cost avoidances from military personnel however, eliminations are not expected to result in end strength (p. 123). ***Will closing Ellsworth actually save $1.853.3 billion?***

COUNTER POINT:

Per COBRA data, 3,308 military and 438 civilian positions will move from Ellsworth and only 1,918 military and 129 civilian positions are gained by Dyess. This is a substantial savings of 1,390 military and 309 civilian positions (a total of 1,699 positions) to operate the same number of B-1s at Dyess vs. operating out of both Ellsworth and Dyess. The facts are that there are manpower savings from this action. The same numbers of aircraft are being operated with fewer people. This is efficiency.

Since the C- 130 move costs 225 manpower authorizations, even more savings can be realized by reversing the DOD recommendation to move C-130s out of Dyess. This will result in efficient loading of Dyess.

Exact recurring B-1 sustainment and BOS support are difficult to determine from published COBRA data. However, there are some excellent indicators of cost reduction through consolidation at Dyess. Dyess supports 35% more personnel than Ellsworth (5,777 vs. 3,753) with only 18% more BOS costs per year. Sustainment costs efficiencies are even more obvious. Gross sustainment costs are higher at Ellsworth (operating only 29 B-1s) than the sustainment costs at Dyess (operating 36 B-1s AND 29 C-130s ($14.4M vs. $14.3M)). In other words, Ellsworth has a higher gross sustainment cost for a significantly smaller operation. Simply put, the DoD certified data shows Dyess is a more cost effective location to operate and the recurring savings in manpower, BOS and sustainment costs are substantial if B-1s are consolidated at Dyess.

B. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1. Item 1.

- Claiming BRAC associated personnel savings without end strength reductions does not provide dollar savings that can be applied outside of personnel accounts and could

require other sources for up-front investment costs (p. 124). ***How will the cost ($299.1 million), to close Ellsworth be funded?***

COUNTER POINT:

The $299.1 million one time cost is for all parts of this COBRA Scenario (B-1 and C-130 moves to / from Dyess). The payback is from BOS savings, sustainment savings, and personnel cost avoidance. Moving the C-130s from Dyess costs 225 additional manpower authorizations, creates unnecessary personnel moves, and costs more in military construction than leaving them at Dyess. Thus, keeping the C-130s at Dyess would make the actual payback faster. Sustainment costs and BOS costs are less at Dyess than at Ellsworth (See above).

C. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2. Item 1.

- The estimated savings from closing Grand Forks AFB, ND ($2.656.3 billion) was reduced to $1.982 billion by a realignment versus closure decision in the week prior to the approval of the final recommendations (p. 129). Ellsworth is rated as a higher valued base in 7 of 8 Air Force functions; ***why not close Grand Forks?***

- The Air Force did not develop one composite score for each base across all eight mission areas rather they established index scores in each mission area **and were not able to clearly delineate between lower and higher military** value rankings ***If composite scores were used, would Ellsworth 's rating as higher value in 7 of 8 mission areas have clearly defined it as a base to be retained?***

COUNTER POINT:

When comparing all 8 categories for Dyess and Ellsworth. Dyess is ranked 14th of 154 installations and Ellsworth ranked 25th of 154. Dyess MCI was greater for 5 of 8 areas (Bomber, Airlift, Fighter, SOF, and UAV) and 5 of 6 flying missions. Bomber Rankings: Dyess is ranked 20th and Ellsworth is ranked 39th. Airlift Rankings: Dyess is ranked 11th and Little Rock is ranked 17th, Peterson is ranked 30th, and Elmendorf is 51st.

D. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 2.

The consolidation of the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and the closure of Ellsworth may not realize:

- The reported savings of $1.853 billion as it includes a significant percentage of personnel savings which can not be applied outside of personnel accounts;

- Any cost associated with consolidated B-1B flying operations in the Dyess area will be increased by $14,000 per mission due to an increase of 0.7 hrs of flight time when

compared to similar missions flown at Ellsworth (estimated twenty year cost could range as high as $280 million).

COUNTER POINT:

The longer missions at Dyess are due to the differences in missions between Dyess and Ellsworth, not the location of MOAs. If comparisons are made between primary MOAs: Powder River is 58 NM from Ellsworth (1 of 34 named MOAs /ranges) while Lancer is 28 NM from Dyess (1 of 126 named MOAs /ranges). Moreover, Dyess has the initial B-1 aircrew training at the FTU. This squadron is larger and flies more hours at home station than the squadron that deploys for significant periods of time. FTU, throughout the AF, historically fly longer average sorties. Almost all sorties require air refueling, multiple patterns (engine out, no flap, no slat, precision, non precision, visual) as well as a full array of combat training activities of ECM, bombing, low level routes, basic flight maneuvers (BFMs), and high altitude operations of ECM and bombing. Many times pattern activities are demonstrated by an instructor and then practiced by the student crew member. These added activities on a single sortie all add to sortie length. On the other hand, once a crew member is qualified and in the operational squadron the requirements many times require less time (i.e. it is easier to maintain currency and proficiency than it is to acquire it). If the FTU was at Ellsworth, the sorties would likely be longer because they have fewer local low level routes, fewer MOAs, and fewer capabilities (or in some cases no capabilities) to accomplish required aircrew training.

E. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 2.

- The estimated savings of consolidated flying operations due to limited or inaccessible aerial training areas/altitudes in the Dyess area and/or the continued use of the Powder River Military Operating Area, specifically,
    - Powder River MOA missions flown from Dyess AFB will require an added five hours of flight time at a cost of $100,000.00 per mission or $100 million per 1,000 missions flown --- twenty year cost for such could range from $1 to 2 billion.

COUNTER POINT:

Low level is just one of many training activities required for mission ready status. Low level is not utilized as a day to day tactic in today's combat operations, nor does the training have to be accomplished at Powder River. Per AFI, the stated requirement to log low level training is below 5000 feet AGL. See below:

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-2B-1,
VOLUME 1
4 JUNE 2004
Flying Operations
B-1 AIRCREW TRAINING
A2.4.8. Low Altitude Events (LE).

A2.4.8.1. **Low Altitude Navigation (Low Alt Nav).** May be accomplished in a low level route, Military Operating Area (MOA) or restricted area (below 5,000 feet AGL). Crewmembers may take credit for two events if the low level route or MOA permits more than 30 minutes of low altitude navigation and includes two or more target areas. No more than two events may be logged in a single route/MOA

In fact, Dyess has many opportunities to accomplish low level training at altitudes below 500 feet. See below chart about low level routes at Dyess #38 and Ellsworth #39:

Org	1 Route Name/# ()	2 Route Length where Min Altitude is Less Than 500' AGL ()	3 Route Length (NM)	4 Effective Times Available Per Year (Hrs/Yr)	5 Hours Scheduled Per Year (Hrs/Yr)	6 Terrain Type (see amplification) ()	7 Feed into Bombing/ECM Range? (list range) ()
38	IR 128	234.1	405.6	8760	0	FLAT	YES - MELROSE
38	IR 180	281.9	405.9	8760	0	FLAT	YES - MELROSE
38	IR 500	432.1	542.1	8760	0	FLAT - ROLLING	NO
38	IR 501	277.9	387.5	8760	0	FLAT - ROLLING	NO
38	IR-126	295.1	458.3	8760	250	MOUNTAINOUS	YES, NELLIS RANGE
38	IR-150	200.5	295.3	8760	10	MOUNTAINS - FLAT AND ROLLING	NO
38	IR-177	272.2	363.2	8760	10	MOUNTAINS - FLAT & ROLLING	NO
38	IR-178	353.6	611.4	8760	2467	MOUNTAINOUS	YES, LANCER MOA/ESS
38	IR-266	340.5	458.4	8760	100	MOUNTAINS	NO
38	IR-320	210.7	449.9	8760	15	MOUNTAINOUS	NO
	Dyess Totals	2898.6	4377.6	87600	2852	6 mtn, 2 flat rolling, 2 flat3 feed into range, 2 with drop capabillity	
39	IR-473	623	716	8736	0	Mountainous	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-485	249	311	8736	1	Flat and Rolling	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-492	465	581	8064	0	Flat and Rolling	Belle Fourche ESS
39	IR-499	308	359	8736	4	Mountainous	N/A
	Ellsworth Totals	1645	1967	34272	5	2 mtn, 2 flat rolling, 3 feed the exact same range , no drop	

F. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 3.

The cost to close Ellsworth AFB ($299 million) is the most expensive of all Air Force recommended actions and provides the least rate of return over the 20 years of calculated

savings. Other major closures and realignments provide returns on investment in a range two to five times greater.

COUNTER POINT:

Referencing GAO Report pp.120-124, the cost of the entire scenario is one of the largest costs, but also has one of the highest savings and therefore, has a payback period of 1 year. Of the AF recommendations it ranks #5 of 42 changes in annual savings ($161M savings per year). According to the GAO report data, the savings from the move of B-1s to Dyess is greater than the cumulative savings of 64 of the 72 listed DoD recommendations for the AF. The scenario also includes the inefficient move of C-130s from Dyess to lower ranked MCI bases. These C-130 moves add recurring costs of an additional 225 manpower authorizations and inefficient MILCON adds that duplicate existing facilities at Dyess that can not be utilized by inbound additional B-1s.

Because the C-130 portion of the scenario adds costs (recurring manpower and one time MILCON) .... when the C-130 moves from a MCI ranked Dyess # 11 to Little Rock # 17th, Peterson # 30th, and Elmendorf # 51st are reversed, the savings would be greater and the payback period even shorter.

G. ALLEGATION:

Issue #1, Item 4.

The $124 million MilCon cost to prepare Dyess for a consolidate B-1B mission will still position Dyess with less facility space than a closed Ellsworth.

COUNTER POINT:

Consolidation of the B-1 fleet at Dyess removes "excess – excess" facilities and right sizes them at Dyess. This efficiency is improved even more if C-130s remain at Dyess ... which properly loads the base.

H. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2: Retaining Ellsworth will create savings the Air Force has not considered.

1. As there may be no cost savings realized by consolidating the entire B-1B fleet at Dyess AFB, TX and closing Ellsworth, two alternative initiatives are available for consideration:

COUNTER POINT:

This is factually inaccurate. The previous mentioned facts disprove this statement.

I. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 1.

- Retain Ellsworth's current B-1B mission; close Grand Forks AFB, ND and realize the estimated savings of $2.656 billion (or such an amount as allowed) and designated Ellsworth AFB as the base for continued strategic presence in **the north central U.S.**

- Ellsworth was the only base in the north central U.S. judged suitable for the bed down of the Global Hawk mission (ACC Environmental Impact Statement, March 2001); Ellsworth should be designated for the emerging UAV mission;

- In terms of other future missions, Ellsworth ranked first in six of eight Air Force categories (Bomber, Airlift, Tanker, Fighter, SOF, C2ISR and Space) when compared to Grand Forks and Minot (other two north central bases).

COUNTER POINT:

When comparing all 8 categories for Dyess and Ellsworth. Dyess is ranked 14th of 154 and Ellsworth ranked only 25th of 154. Dyess MCI was greater for 5 of 8 areas (Bomber, Airlift, Fighter, SOF, and UAV).

J. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 1.

- If it is the judgment of the commission that the B-1Bs should be consolidated at one base, retain Ellsworth as the principal base to house the B-1 mission. Ellsworth is better suited to maintain and operate all B-1B's than Dyess forthe following reasons:

  - The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Dyess AFB are under control of the federal courts; do not currently provide a suitable B-1B crew training area and are subject to one or possibly two Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements and probable future flight operating restrictions;

  - The Military Operating Area and low level route used by Ellsworth AFB is better suited for all B-1B training and qualification missions; is more readily accessible to Ellsworth; requires fewer total flying hours to accomplish similar missions; and is not subject to the controversy of the Dyess ranges.

  - As Ellsworth can handle 71 large aircraft, it requires only $63.9 million in construction cost to bed down two additional squadrons. A third additional squadron can be housed in an existing facility recently made available by the construction of a new B-1B squadron operations facility.

COUNTER POINT:

This statement is not corroborated by the Air Force. In fact the AF, in response to a BRAC inquiry dated July 15, 2005 (DCN 4943), counters the statement that all the B-1s fit at Ellsworth. The AF states, "Ellsworth was presented as capable of receiving 71 B-1s, but as the ramp laydown presented to the Commission clearly shows, the parking density would be extremely problematic. Hangar access and taxiways are blocked. All available ramp space, regardless of location, is completely full making airfield management difficult." In short, all the B-1s do NOT fit because ramp configuration would prevent required movement of aircraft. On the other hand, in the same document

the AF states, "the 29 June 2005 ACC site survey of Dyess AFB reports the entire B-1 fleet can be comfortably bedded down with room to spare."

K. ALLEGATION:

Issue #2, Item 2.

Ellsworth is also the most logical choice as a bed down base for the Airborne Laser platform (ABL), having both unencumbered airspace and a hanger capable of housing two B-747 aircraft.

COUNTER POINT:

The "747 ready facility" is currently used as a fitness area with a running track. As of 21 June, the ceiling was being significantly lowered to allow heating and cooling systems to be installed for the people utilizing the fitness center. Moreover, E-4 (747) aircraft currently divert to Dyess AFB on a regular basis and are evidence that Dyess has 747 compatibility. In addition, BCEG minutes from 30 Sept. 2004 laid out the requirements for ABL. They included access to White Sands Range-- the largest volume of unobstructed range in the US with altitudes from Surface to Space. This range is 453 miles from Dyess and 1,119 miles form Ellsworth.

L. ALLEGATION:

- The Bottom Line is Ellsworth should be retained. Ellsworth provides more current and future value to the Air Force than competing large aircraft bases; maintains a base for high tempo B-1B operations; immediate access to an unrestricted MOA; strategic presence in the north central U.S. and can either bed down emerging missions or all B-1B aircraft.

COUNTER POINT:

The Air Force does not concur with this statement. In a letter to the BRAC dated July 15, 2005 (DCN 4943), the AF states, "Bomber MCI scores clearly indicate Dyess is the best B-1 bomber installation. Dyess has FAA approved training airspace volume 2.3 times that available at Ellsworth AFB ...It has a superb low level access giving it a 9.10 point lead in the bomber MCI over Ellsworth. The range complex within 300NM also gave Dyess a 3.12 point advantage...Dyess AFB airspace and training environment is well worth the investment to train and employ the B-1 fleet."

DCN 6845

DCN 5321

Resp

Re: BI-0135 (CT-0551) Dyess AFB and RBTI Litigati

Requester: BRAC Commission / Allan Blair/Jim

Commission Provided Background: Attached mem
litigation filed by the Davis Mountains Preservation
(Davis Mountains) vs. USAF.

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ow as th	bombers [illegible] RB	[illegible]
ntinues	[illegible]	[illegible]
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ACC Clarification of Commission Background: [illegible]
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Questions:

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Response: [illegible]

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

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

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB

Requester: Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission (Mr Arthur Beauchamp)

Question 1: During the recent BRAC Commissioners visit to Ellsworth AFB, SD, it was discovered that the Air Force underestimated the square footage capability at Ellsworth by 80,000 sq feet. Please validate this?

Response: We are unable to address the underestimated square footage capability at Ellsworth because it is not qualified as to type of square footage. If the square footage of the installation is incorrect by 80,000 square feet, it was an installation reporting error. However, even without the error, it would not change the relative MCI ranking of Ellsworth AFB.

Question 2: Assuming that the square footage was underestimated, what is the impact, if any, on the MCI scoring for Ellsworth given this added capacity? Does it improve? If so, by how many points?

Response: A review of Mission Compatibility Indexes (MCIs) shows Ellsworth AFB received maximum credit for the following attributes that involve square footage/yardage: runways (Question 9), and ramp area and serviceability (Question 8). The square footage reflected by Ellsworth's ability to hangar large aircraft (Question 19) resulted in an installation effective score of 1.46, 1.45 points less than the 2.91 maximum effective score. If the installation had scored the maximum points for the ability to hangar large aircraft, the difference in bomber MCI scores between Ellsworth (48.55) and Dyess (59.85) would be reduced from 11.35 points to 9.90 points. An increase in square footage, therefore, would not result in a revised recommendation to the Commission.

Question 3: In discussion with Ellsworth personnel and the Ellsworth community, as well as our own analysis we determined that Ellsworth AFB has the basic capacity to beddown all 67 B-1 Bombers in the Air Force fleet with a MILCON investment of about $69M. While the MILCON cost to prepare Dyess to receive the consolidated B-1 Fleet is $124M. Can you also confirm this? If so, why not consolidate the B-1 fleet at Ellsworth given this cost savings?

Response: Air Combat Command presented its capacity brief to the BCEG the week of 24 August 04. The $66.7M was the cost briefed to the BCEG to prepare Ellsworth to receive 2 additional squadrons of B-1s. Ellsworth was presented as capable of receiving 71 B-1s, but as the ramp laydown presented to the Commission clearly shows, the parking density would be extremely problematic. Hangar access and taxiways are blocked. All available ramp space, regardless of location, is completely full making airfield management difficult. No mention is made as to whether the parking plan presented to the Commission conforms to ACC standards for clearance and jet blast considerations.

Dyess AFB, by comparison, was briefed as able to support 66 aircraft without moving the 28 currently assigned C-130s from the field. COBRA estimated $124M to move 2 B-1 squadrons to Dyess, and that was the figure on which the BCEG based its recommendation. ACC concluded

15 July 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0134 (CT-0547) Ellsworth AFB

its site survey of Dyess AFB, 24 June 2005, and estimated $159M to implement the Air Force recommendation.

Bomber MCI scores clearly indicate Dyess is the best B-1 bomber installation. Dyess has FAA approved training airspace volume 2.3 times that available at Ellsworth AFB giving it a 4.36 effective score advantage. It has superb low level access giving it a 9.10 point lead in the bomber MCI over Ellsworth. The range complex within 300NM also gave Dyess a 3.12 point advantage. Attached are two graphics that depict the airspace for both Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB for comparison. This operational environment would be complex and difficult to replicate at other locations and is geographically connected to the installation.

The costs briefed by ACC in its capacity brief for both Ellsworth AFB and Dyess AFB cannot be equivalently compared. The cost estimate for adding two squadrons to Ellsworth AFB does not include the significant base operations support bill or infrastructure build that would be required to host the added aircraft or manpower for a mission increase. The Ellsworth AFB ramp laydown presented to the Commission further confirms the difficulty of basing the entire B-1 fleet at Ellsworth. On the other hand, the 29 June 2005 ACC site survey of Dyess AFB reports the entire B-1 fleet can be comfortably bedded down with room to spare. The Dyess AFB COBRA estimate and subsequent ACC site survey provide the accuracy needed to confidently support the DoD beddown recommendation.

Ultimately, military judgment led the BCEG to weigh the operational advantage of keeping Dyess AFB as the premier B-1 installation against cost and concluded the Dyess AFB airspace and training environment is well worth the investment to train and employ the B-1 fleet.

Approved.

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Officer, Base Realignment and Closure

2 Attachments:
1. Ellsworth - Airspace within 300NM
2. Dyess - Airspace within 300NM

DCN 6845

DCN 4943



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

17 June 2005

Inquiry Response

Re: BI-0073 (CT-0342) Dyess AFB Letters - Sen Hutchinson (15 Jun 05)

Requesters: Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson
Senator John Cornyn
Representative Randy Neugebauer

Question 1: What are the ramp capacities for Dyess, Ellsworth, and Little Rock?

Response: Ramp capacities are contained in the responses to question 008 Ramp/Apron Space, in Section 28, Real Property (*Sections 21-30 (13.1MB)*) and can be accessed on the BRAC web site http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/minutes/brac_databases.html. Organization identifiers from the installation list (Installation List (38KB)) are as follows: Dyess-38, Ellsworth-39, and Little Rock-68.

Question 2: Please provide copies of all studies concerning the ramp capacity at Dyess, Ellsworth, and Little Rock.

Response: The capacity analysis for Dyess and Ellsworth are contained in the BCEG minutes of 24 August 2004. No formal capacity analysis was accomplished for Little Rock AFB by the Air Force because Little Rock AFB fell under the purview of the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group. During the scenario phase of the Air Force analysis the Air Education and Training Command was asked if Little Rock had adequate capacity to bed down additional C-130 aircraft. Their informal analysis confirmed that adequate capacity existed to accommodate the Dyess C-130 aircraft.

Question 3: In recommending the transfer of the C-130s from Dyess to Little Rock, did the Air Force intend to preserve a certain amount of Dyess' ramp capacity to accommodate future missions?

Response: The Air Force maintains additional capacity throughout its basing structure to accommodate surge requirements to support its operational requirements.

Question 4: The available COBRA analysis concerns only the DOD's recommendations. Please provide the DOD's COBRA analysis for the scenario under which the B-1s at Ellsworth would be transferred to Dyess, and Dyess would retain its two C-130s squadrons. If the DOD did not perform this analysis, please provide the basis for deciding not to do so. Also, if this COBRA analysis has not been done, I would appreciate if the Air Force would prepare such an analysis and provide a copy to me.

Response: The Air Force did not perform a COBRA analysis for a scenario for all B1-Bs and two Squadrons of C-130 aircraft at Dyess. The Air Force philoshophy emphasized consolidating like mission design series aircraft at the same location to enhance

operational and maintenance efficiencies. In addition, the capacity analysis for Dyess showed that such a scenario would result in significant additional MILCON costs.

Question 5: Please provide any COBRA analyses that were done for the consolidation of all B-1s at Ellsworth.

Response: There was none accomplished.

Question 6: How many B-1s will be transferred from Ellsworth to Dyess?
Response: The 24 PAA assigned to Ellsworth will be transferred to Dyess.

Question 7: Will all 67 B-1s be based at Dyess after the transfer? If not, how many B-1s will be based at Dyess and where will the remaining B-1s be based?

Response: All B-1Bs will be assigned to Dyess except for two test coded B-1Bs based at Edwards AFB CA.

Question 8: What are the classifications of the B-1s at Dyess, i.e., the number of aircraft that are combat-coded, training-coded, test coded and BAI/Attrition Reserve?

Response: This data was provided in the classified Future Force Plan provided to Congress on 15 March 2005 by the Joint Staff in accordance with Public Law 101-510 Section 2912(a)(94) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

Question 9: How will the B-1s be classified upon their transfer to Dyess?

Response: The mission coding of aircraft in the B1-B fleet will be based on training and operational missions needs. This coding may vary, over time, as mission needs, maintenance requirements, and attrition factors affect the aircraft fleet.

Approved

DAVID L. JOHANSEN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Division

DCN 6845

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 2005

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez
Acting Secretary
Department of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

Dear Secretary Dominguez:

I am writing to request information concerning the Defense Department's recommendations that the B-1s at Ellsworth AFB be transferred to Dyess AFB, and the C-130s at Dyess AFB be transferred to Little Rock AFB, Ehrendorf AFB and Peterson AFB. Specifically, please provide written information concerning the following:

1. How many B-1s will be transferred from Ellsworth to Dyess?

2. Will all 67 B-1s be based at Dyess after the transfer? If not, how many B-1s will be based at Dyess and where will the remaining B-1s be based?

3. What are the classifications of the B-1s at Dyess, i.e., the number of aircraft that are combat-coded, training coded, test coded and BAI Attrition Reserve?

4. How will the B-1s be classified upon their transfer to Dyess?

Since the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission is currently reviewing data for upcoming regional meetings, I respectfully request a response as soon as possible.

Thank you for your attention in this matter. If you should have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Kay Bailey Hutchison
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison

John Cornyn
Senator John Cornyn

Randy Neugebauer
Rep. Randy Neugebauer



Dyess AFB – Abilene, Texas

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

Dyess AFB – Abilene, Texas

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

Dyess AFB – Abilene, Texas

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

Dyess AFB – Abilene, Texas

DCN 6845

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Comparative Military Value Rankings Between Ellsworth AFB, Grand Forks AFB, & Minot AFB

With Dyess AFB

"Real" 1st Rankings	Air Force Function	1st in Rankings	2nd in Rankings	3rd in Rankings
Dyess 56.17	Bomber	Ellsworth 50.81	Minot 45.72	Grand Forks 38.48
Dyess 65.95	Lift	Ellsworth 59.40	Minot 54.34	Grand Forks 50.53
Ellsworth 83.73	Tanker	Ellsworth 83.73	Grand Forks 63.52	Minot 62.74
Dyess 58.96	Fighter	Ellsworth 58.06	Minot 56.64	Grand Forks 55.88
Dyess 53.14	SOF	Minot 45.12	Ellsworth 43.91	Grand Forks 43.75
Ellsworth 87.72	C2ISR	Ellsworth 87.72	Minot 77.04	Grand Forks 76.33
Dyess 72.37	UAV	Grand Forks 70.93	Ellsworth 69.73	Minot 67.53
Ellsworth 84.12	Space	Ellsworth 84.12	Minot 83.93	Grand Forks 82.64

Dyess Air Force Base

The DoD Recommendation to Transfer C-130s From Dyess to Lower Ranked Bases Will Be Costly and Inefficient

DoD Recommendation:

- The DoD recommends transferring Dyess's 32 C-130s to Little Rock, Elmendorf and Peterson. The DoD's proposal:
  - Transfers C-130s from a more highly ranked base to lower ranked bases.
  - Requires 225 additional military and civilian personnel.
  - Costs an additional $18 million in MILCON funds.
  - Costs additional funds to transfer personnel.
  - Does not result in logistical efficiencies because Dyess's C-130H1 models would be mixed with C-130Es, C-130H3s and the new C-130J.
  - Puts unreasonable stress on Little Rock's single main runway, training ranges, assault strips and drop zones.
  - Is not supported by a certified capacity analysis of Little Rock.

Better Alternative:

- Recommend that the BRAC Commission keep the 32 C-130s at Dyess, which would give the Air Force two optimally-sized 16-aircraft C-130 squadrons.

Justifications:

- Criteria #1, 2, 3 and 4: The DoD recommends transferring Dyess's C-130s to Little Rock, Peterson and Elmendorf even though **Dyess had a higher MCI score than all these bases**.

	Rank	Score
Dyess	**11**	**65.95**
Little Rock	17	63.25
Peterson	30	57.2
Elmendorf	51	51.6

- Criteria #4: The Cobra Model shows that the AF will need **an additional 225 personnel** when C-130s are moved from Dyess.

	Additional Personnel (Mil and Civ)
Little Rock	+1,185
Peterson	+463
Elmendorf	+257
Subtotal:	+1,905
Less Dyess Personnel	(1,680)
Net Increase Requirement..	+225

- The AF must also pay **the additional cost of transferring 1,680 personnel** to Little Rock, Peterson and Elmendorf.

- Criteria #5: The MILCON cost to consolidate the B-1s and **to move** Dyess's C-130s under DoD proposal is $185M (Cobra Model). However, the AF's estimate to consolidate the B-1s at Dyess and **keep** the C-130s at Dyess is only $167M (AF BCEG Minutes, Aug. 14, 2004). Thus, the AF will have to pay **an extra $18 million to move the C-130s from Dyess**.

- Capacity and Efficiency of Operations: A key advantage of keeping the C-130s at Dyess is that all its 32 aircraft are the same, i.e., the H1 model. If the C-130s at Little Rock were identical, there might be efficiencies in terms of operations, maintenance and logistics. In fact, **Little Rock will have five significantly different C-130 models:**

  - C-130Es
  - C-130Hs
  - C-130H1s
  - C-130H3s
  - C-130Js

- **C-130Es:** Built in the 1960s and early 1970s, using the Allison T56-A-7 engine.
  C-130Hs: An upgraded "E" model.
  C-130H1s: Introduced in 1974, using a different engine, the Allison T56-A-15 engine.
  C-130H3s: Digital cockpits that are different from the C-130Es and C-130H1s.
  C-130Js: Introduced in 1999, it is substantially different from the older C-130 models. It has a Rolls Royce AE2100D3 engine, fully integrated digital cockpit, improved fuel, environmental and ice protection systems and an enhanced cargo-handling system.

- Having 118 C-130s at Little Rock will put stress on its single main runway and existing training ranges, assault strips and drop zones. Little Rock's single main runway may already be at its capacity with the 87 aircraft stationed there today. Per DoD certified data, Little Rock logs 110,000 takeoffs/landings each year, more than triple the activity at Dyess, which has 36,200. Adding the 4,300 takeoffs/landings for Ellsworth's B-1s would give Dyess a total of 40,500. Little Rock has more than double this amount with its existing C-130s.

- It is unclear whether Little Rock has sufficient ramp space for 118 C-130s. More importantly, it appears that the DoD did not prepare a formal, certified capacity analysis. In response to a question from Senators Hutchison and Cornyn and Congressman Neugebauer, the Air Force stated:

  > **no formal capacity analysis was accomplished for Little Rock AFB by the Air Force because** Little Rock AFB fell under the purview of the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group. During the scenario phase of the Air Force analysis the Air Education and Training Command was asked if Little Rock had adequate capacity to bed down additional C-130 aircraft. **Their**

Airlift

Rank	Base	Airlift	Current / Future Mission	Condition of Infrastructure	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	Cost of Ops / Manpower
1	Eglin AFB	79.43	72.45	81.55	100	90.39
2	Seymour Johnson AFB	78.03	71.25	83.82	83.34	85.03
3	Charleston AFB	74.09	64.57	83.15	79.91	75.49
4	Barksdale AFB	72.43	52.92	87.48	97.7	80.79
5	Altus AFB	71.3	64.97	73.95	87.04	80.99
6	Pope AFB	69.99	71.21	73.4	46.19	86.08
7	Hurlburt Field	69.61	75.12	67.11	50.15	87.18
8	Tinker AFB	68.62	55.2	80.62	76.23	85.8
9	Shaw AFB	67.7	71.86	59.5	78.12	85.64
10	Eielson AFB	67.34	61.25	73.03	84.43	16.54
11	Dyess AFB	65.95	54.87	76.82	68.94	77.64
12	Holloman AFB	65.78	61.34	70.94	62.43	75.23
13	Edwards AFB	65.53	55.18	75.19	79.33	40.87
14	Fairchild AFB	64.22	52.54	72.85	79.72	73.99
15	Nellis AFB	63.95	59.85	72.31	53.08	43.94
16	Robins AFB	63.89	52.22	71.87	78.5	87.45
17	Little Rock AFB	63.25	49.25	73.05	80.66	88.12
18	Andrews AFB	62.05	54.38	70.4	67.79	41.74
19	Tyndall AFB	61.75	68.65	50.88	67.84	90.98
20	MacDill AFB	60.12	47.48	66.41	88.14	76.56
21	Maxwell AFB	59.9	70.78	55.31	22.48	85.68
22	March ARB	59.86	56.53	71.33	31.15	45.41
23	Mountain Home AFB	59.77	46.58	68.64	81.35	68.58
24	Ellsworth AFB	59.4	42.43	72.78	76.53	81.32
25	McEntire AGS	59.35	71.7	49.85	35.48	85.19
26	Hill AFB	58.83	45.27	66.57	84.33	77.82
27	McChord AFB	57.95	49.64	71.78	38.95	57.08
28	Whiteman AFB	57.82	39.47	71.25	82.33	74.42
29	Columbus AFB	57.51	53.22	58.08	65.55	94.97
30	Peterson AFB	57.2	58.4	59.78	39.75	61.91
31	Langley AFB	56.57	53.37	54.97	72.81	77.2
32	Key Field AGS	56.39	64.14	50.02	42.43	75.4
33	Charlotte/Douglas IAP AGS	56.27	70.45	49.46	12.94	81.48
34	Dover AFB	56.06	48.75	66.73	43.17	64.93
35	Davis-Monthan AFB	55.89	45.11	66	59.49	71.89
36	Grissom ARB	55.66	42.59	68.46	58.32	73.25
37	Kirtland AFB	55.47	49.12	58.01	70.63	69.56
38	Sheppard AFB	55.21	60.81	52.33	39.24	86.04
39	McConnell AFB	54.65	45.85	65.92	43	75.83
40	Beale AFB	54.63	38.4	70.78	65.31	42.78
41	Buckley AFB	54.62	56.16	52.45	56.83	53.78
42	Minot AFB	54.34	39.7	65.42	70.91	73.42
43	Wright-Patterson AFB	54.27	44.62	58.95	74.34	74.09
44	Travis AFB	53.86	41.24	72.89	40.31	24.22
45	Luke AFB	52.17	50.43	55.68	41.35	68.92
46	Westover ARB	52	42.8	58.47	68.13	49.23
47	Forbes Field AGS	51.93	43.85	61.74	42.08	77.32
48	McGuire AFB	51.8	39.42	62.51	67.95	37.26
49	Moody AFB	51.72	52.29	41.64	81.05	91.37
50	Ellington Field AGS	51.65	47.25	53.91	60.12	61.2
51	Ellsworth AFB	51.6	29.97	70.05	85.17	8.86
52	Birmingham IAP AGS	50.93	53.99	48.35	40.7	77.96

informal analysis confirmed that adequate capacity existed to accommodate the Dyess C-130 aircraft.

- Such an "informal analysis" is not sufficient for this major realignment proposed by the DoD.

Bottom Line:

- Given (1) Dyess's higher military value, (2) the additional MILCON costs, (3) the additional manpower and personnel costs, (4) the efficiencies of having C-130H1 models at Dyess, (5) the inefficiencies of having four different C-130 models at Little Rock, and (6) the stress on Little Rock's facilities and ranges, the DoD recommendation to transfer Dyess's C-130s to Little Rock **substantially deviates** from selection criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

The Selection Criteria And Sound Military Judgment Fully Support Consolidating the B-1 Fleet at Dyess

Background.

- The DoD has recommended that the 67 aircraft of the B-1 fleet be consolidated at Dyess. This is clearly supported by the BRAC selection criteria. For example:
- Dyess ranked 20th for bombers.
  Ellsworth ranked only 39th.
- Dyess has 126 ranges within 300 NM.
  Ellsworth has only 34 ranges within 300 NM.
- Dyess has enough ramp space to beddown 67 B-1s and its 28 C-130s. The AF has stated:
  - Dyess has so much ramp space that it can "support 66 aircraft without moving the 28 currently assigned C-130s from the field."
- However, if all the B-1s were at Ellsworth, the AF has stated:
  - "Parking density would be extremely problematic."
  - "Hangar access and taxiways would be blocked."
  - "All available ramp space is completely full making airfield management difficult."

Consolidation of the B-1 Fleet Is Needed, Justified and Supported By Sound Military Judgment.

- There are unfounded allegations that the B-1s should not be consolidated at Dyess because of the simplistic catch phrase of "don't put all your eggs in one basket." This simplistic catch phrase is no substitute for the highly detailed analysis and the sound military judgment of the current DoD and AF leadership.
- Dyess is the B-1 training base and has the majority of the B-1s. Consolidating the fleet at Dyess will provide the Air Force significant efficiencies in:
  - Training
  - Operations
  - Maintenance
  - Annual MILCON savings
  - Personnel Savings

  These efficiencies and savings are a primary goal of the BRAC process. Consequently, consolidation, by its very nature, will achieve a key goal of the BRAC process. In fact, this is the reason that the AF, the Army, the Navy and the DoD are realigning and closing bases.

Consolidation of the B-1s Is Fully Consistent With the Consolidation of Other Aircraft.

- Consolidation of the 67 B-1s is fully consistent with the DoD's longstanding policy of consolidating other fleets of less than 75 aircraft.
  - B-58s
  - F-111s

- 4-2s
- F-117s
- B-2s
- JSTARs

- Consolidation of the B-1s at one base in 1995 might have been difficult when the B-1 fleet had more than 90 aircraft. With the recent retirement of 33 B-1s, the B-1 fleet now has only 67 aircraft. Consolidation today makes sense.

Unfounded Allegations Regarding "Security".

- Some have raised unfounded allegations concerning security of a consolidated fleet.
- The entire B-1 fleet would rarely, if ever, be physically at Dyess. Unlike 1995, the B-1s today are often deployed overseas. Also, as with any other aircraft, several B-1s are in depot undergoing overhauls at any one time. Thus, there will typically be fewer than 50 B-1s actually at Dyess.
- From a security standpoint, the AF bomber fleet will still be dispersed.
  - Whiteman: B-2s
  - Dyess: B-1s
  - Barksdale: B-52s
  - Minot: B-52s
- The Commission should consider that
  - the current DoD and Air Force leadership have made their recommendation in the context of the post-9/11 environment.
  - the DoD and Air Force leadership, in their military judgment, have fully taken into account the necessary security measures to protect the bomber fleet.
- If the Commission were to override the DoD recommendation for Dyess, it would have to apply the same rule to dispersing other Air Force aircraft, the Navy's fleet and numerous Army components. The resulting BRAC process would become one of dispersions and inefficiencies.

Unfounded Allegations Regarding a "Natural Disaster".

- Some have raised unfounded allegations regarding a possible "natural disaster".
  - Dyess has been a key Air Force base for 50 years. During this 50 years, there have been no problems with "natural disasters," i.e., no problems with tornadoes, hurricanes, or earthquakes.
  - As for "natural disasters," according to news reports, the Rapid City area had a tornado in 1967 and gets major snowstorms during the winter.
- In fact, Dyess has received aircraft from Gulf Coast bases that were moved to avoid hurricanes.
- If the "natural disaster" allegation were to be applied to Dyess, then, to be consistent, the Commission would have to make changes to most DoD recommendations.
  - The East and Gulf Coast bases are susceptible to hurricanes and would have to be shut down.

- The West Coast bases are susceptible to earthquakes and would have to be shut down.
- Ellsworth and other bases in the Northern tier are susceptible to blizzards and would have to be shut down.

Unfounded Allegations Regarding a Single Runway.

- Some have raised unfounded allegations regarding Dyess's single runway.
  - Most bases have only a single runway.
  - Dyess, like all Air Force bases, is prepared for emergencies and would quickly repair any damage to its runway.
  - Dyess has a 13,500-foot long parallel taxiway that could easily be used as a runway if there should ever be an emergency.

July 25, 2005


Transient Ramp Space
for future missions
Parallel Taxiway: 13,000' x 200'
Alternate use as an emergency runway
Runway: 13,500' x 300'
Ramp Loading:
67 B1-B's
31 C130's
Without any aircraft TDY, In Depot, in Hangars, or in the air.
C-130
Drop
Zone
C-130 Assault Strips