

15 March 2005

Army Briefing Notes**Date:** Thursday, March 10, 2005**Time:** 10:30-12:30**Place:** 2D201**Chairman:** Dr. Craig College**Executive Secretary:** Mr. Larry Wright**Army Key Attendees:**

- Dr. Craig College
- COL Kurt Weaver
- COL William Tarantino
- Mr. Patrick McCullough
- Mr. Larry Wright
- Mr. Larry Wickens

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Army to BRAC Red Team**Presenter:** Dr. Craig College**Items of Import:**

- The United States Army is pleased with the JCSG process and is ready to start integrating JCSG recommendations with USA recommendations.
- Universe was 97 major installations.
- Capacity analysis does not use DoD guidance – metric results yield 27% excess capacity, which is not correct due to overseas personnel.
- Broke universe up into following groups for capacity analysis: Maneuver Space, General Instructional Space, Administrative Space, Depot Maintenance, Armament Production, Ammunition Storage, Mobilization, Training and Testing Acres, and Mission Expansion.
- Changed military value analysis from 13 stove pipes, which prevented inter-category comparisons, to one consolidated measure for overall military value evaluation.
- Eight leased sites are included on Military Value Ranking list.
- IGPBS – Being coordinated with BRAC actions. Some realignment actions are enablers for IGPBS Conus bed-down actions.
- OSD told Army to utilize the wedge.

Questions that arose:

- What is MVI? *The Military Value of an Installation. It is our “1 to N” list. MVP is the Military Value Portfolio – which indicates those installations that are absolutely necessary for missions and which are dispensable.* (Salomon)

- Did the Army representatives on the JCSGs report back to you? *Yes, but I am not their boss. They are responsible to the VCSA and Under Secretary, but ultimately responsible to the Secretary of the Army.* (Johnson)
- Did you look at ranges? Are you aware that the Education and Training JCSG took big ranges off the table? *Education and Training and Technical JCSGs had crossover ownership issues with ranges.* (Salomon)
- Are the requests for clarification from installations or JCSGs? *JCSGs. We had dozens of metrics from dozens of questions so sometimes there was conflicting data.* (Johnson)
- What has been OSD's reaction to the new excess capacity projections? *We have been having this discussion with OSD since February. OSD understood that the original estimate was a "back of the envelope" calculation and that the numbers could change. However, now the excess capacity numbers seem to be written in stone.* (Salomon)
- What is the capacity of a footprint? *Consider a brigade. How many facilities, ranges, equipment, etc. are necessary to support that brigade? Match those numbers to Ft. Bliss, for example, and see how many brigades the location can support.* (Salomon)
- There is no surge requirement? *The Army does not have to maintain additional facilities or installations for surge.* (Johnson)
- Shouldn't it be -27% in the excess/shortage column for maneuver space (Slide 14¹)? *No, this is the 2003 baseline number, but with the future force movements, this will become a shortage.* (Salomon)
- If Yuma is so expensive, why is the Army keeping it? *It is needed for future brigades.* (Johnson)
- Weight number 3, future, means what? *This is basically selection criterion 3, those capabilities needed to support contingencies and/or new mission.* (Salomon)
- So you used military judgment in your interviews, and then, you used military judgment again if the results of the model aren't quite "right"? *Someone needs to tell me what attributes to measure and/or what is important – this was the purpose of the interviews. Then military judgment is applied if the attributes were unable to capture all the important nuances.* (Salomon)
- Why didn't you use imperatives?
- How are you using BRAC to make room for new activations? *Moving a BCT from Ft. Hood to FT. Carson and one from FT. Riley to Ft. Bliss. Why? There are differences in heavy vs. light range requirements.* (Salomon)
- How did the proposals that were stopped get reviewed? Was this just a big exercise in military judgment?
- Do you use any enclaves? *Yes, sometimes. For example in the closures of Ft. Gillem.* (Johnson)
- After your actions concerning Ft. Knox, what is left? *Recruiting Command. Have you considered closing it? At what cost? OSD has told us to review the actions surrounding Ft. Knox.* (Johnson)
- Is it wise to backfill Walter Reed? (Johnson)
- Did you look at Recruit Depots? *Yes, some were reduced. In some cases, the MOS training moves with the mission.* (Johnson)

¹ All references to presentation slides refer to your "left" presentation unless otherwise noted.

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- The Red Team has concerns about integration as different groups have calculated military value, capacity and surge differently. Also, there are differing definitions of transformational and enclave. Be ready to tackle these challenges.
- Your Army Vision is good – it is precisely the idea. BRAC is about a way to get where you want to be.
- The Army Basing Study should be strategy driven, add strategy to the beginning of your analysis chart (Slide 5).
- The DoDIG recommended that the databases be locked. However, this criticism seems less relevant to services due to the close relationship with Army Auditors.
- Add a chart to your presentation that explains and/or provides an example of the structure of a brigade and the capacity of a footprint.
- Consider developing a table that demonstrates why Army does not have a surge requirement. DoD will certainly need a DoD-wide surge capacity requirements table for the Commission.
- Add a column on your “Metric Results” Chart (Slide 14) that has future excess/shortage projections that can be compared to the baseline numbers provided.
- For consistency, either use a negative sign or parentheses with red type (red) in all your charts and slides (e.g. compare Administrative Space slide to Depot Maintenance). Fix the slide numbers so that they match (i.e. – 61 of 19 makes no sense).
- Think carefully about the story you want to tell the Commission, and then, present only that data which supports your story. Additional data that you ignore can work against you – case in point, the capacity of White Sands.
- To defend going from 12% to 33% for your weight on “future”, you are going to need a tight argument and clearer justification. This promotes discretion to override other military value attributes.
- Military Value vs. Military Judgment is a poor choice of words - change the title on Slide 36. The point of the slide is the link between military value and military judgment and not any potential competition between them.
- Tie the discussion of Slide 39 (left) and Slide 40 (right) back to MVP discussion and that you kept installations you need to accomplish the mission. Your model needs defense in hearing, but you have 9 exceptions that are added after the fact.
- White areas, non-coverage areas, on the “Staging Areas and Critical Infrastructure” map may cause problems. Make the same point with bulleted comments like those on the previous slide (Slide 42).
- Add reachback capabilities to list for “BRAC objectives for the RC” (Slide 51).
- Again, be careful how you tell your story. You need a strong, supported argument to use BRAC funds and environmental cover to enable an action that would happen anyway, but is occurring during the BRAC window. It is as much how you articulate what you are doing as it is what you are doing.
- “Operational Army” slide (Slide 61): Use BRAC terms (i.e. – “activate” will work against you, perhaps say “Restructuring”). There are bullets that went off the bottom of the page.
- There is no rationale for why any of the proposals on Slide 62 were stopped and nothing that does not have a data-supported explanation should be shown to the Commission.

- It is going to be hard to justify RC actions that never pay back without a definition or some guidance as to how transformation fits into the law. An aggregate measure of the change in military value and the savings resulting from RC actions would be helpful. The “ifs” in your recommendations are already changing the BRAC language, which could be a problem.
- Story surrounding overseas troops and justifying “never” paybacks has to be told carefully and reexamined for process credibility.

Additional observations to consider:

- Reserve center closures and MILCON for new Armed Forces Reserve Centers dominate recommendation.
- COBRA analysis, capacity analysis and military value calculations were not done for ANG and reserve candidate recommendations.
- BRAC is being used to move within the same city in at least 7 candidate recommendations and appears to use BRAC to justify desired MILCON.
- Many candidates are contingent on free land offers from states. If state should renege, will non-BRAC funds be used for land acquisition? Existing facilities are described as being unsafe or unsatisfactory – yet moves from these often seem to be contingent on free land.
- If existing facilities are unacceptable would they have been abandoned without BRAC? If yes, why are such moves BRAC actions? If no, then is the need really compelling?
- How were the offers of free land incorporated into the decision making process?
- Where are the IGPBS candidates in the process?
- Clarksville, TN closure candidate recommendation is not consistent in reporting criteria 6 job losses in COBRA and quad chart.
- Realignment of NAS Willow Grove by relocating Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, NJ should include Fort Dix military value ranking and capacity analysis.
- Closure of Oswald USARC in Everett, WA candidate recommendation should include excess capacity information for NS Everett.

6 April 2005

Second Army Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, April 04, 2005

Time: 1300-1500

Place: 3D572

Chairman: Dr. Craig College

Executive Secretary: Mr. Larry Wright

Army Key Attendees:

- Dr. Craig College
- COL Kurt Weaver
- COL William Tarantino
- Mr. Patrick McCullough
- Mr. Larry Wright
- Mr. Larry Wickens

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the Army to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Dr. Craig College

Items of Import:

- The Army believes the end result of this process needs to be DoD recommendations that were the result of a DoD strategy.
- Started with 97 sites, will retain 71, but will close 26 sites plus Walter Reed and possibly Rock Island.

Questions that arose:

- Why do you need to “Reshape”? Did the Train/Alert/Deploy Model not work during this last crisis? *Yes, from the changing and continuing nature of operations in Iraq, it has become evident that the Reserves cannot be mobilized as quickly as necessary.* (Johnson)
- Footprint implies real estate, but in BRAC, people reductions are what saves you money, what do you really mean by footprint? *We think of people, but also square footage and acreage.* (Pirie)
- What do you want Commissioners to take away from Slide 11? What savings will you count? Will they count the same savings?
- So this is reserve not guard (Slide 13)? *Both.*
- Why did Florida not participate (Slide 15)? (Johnson)
- Pope will be part of Fort Bragg right? *Yes, the name is still uncertain.*
- But there are no signed agreements? Is this going to hurt us? *I believe I am covered because these ideas came from the Governors to begin with and the language will be such that it will ultimately be up to the governors to say, “Yes, we want this” or “No thanks”.* (Salomon)

- Are you pushing joint or are these really multi-component (Slide 16)?
- What’s moving to Crane (Slide 24)? *Some depot stuff, AAP items.* (Salomon)
- Why not close Watervliet? *We need the gun tube forge that is located there.* (Johnson)
- How many ranges did you close? *Zero.* I heard there was one closed at Hawthorne. *Yes, there was technically one closed there, but it is quite small and it is not a testing range.* (Johnson)
- That’s the one STRATCOM disagrees with, the movement of CoCom C4ISR Development and Acquisition Consolidation to Peterson AFB? *Yes.*
- So it would be \$12B is you didn’t build anything to fit in overseas moves (Slide36)? *I think it would be closer to \$10B since about there is about \$5B in movement costs.*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- “Mandate” may be too strong – should soften this (Slide 3).
- “Army BRAC Strategy” is more a process (Slide 5) and then the “Focus” slides (Slides 6 and 7) are your strategy.
- Be sure to use BRAC language - Slides 6, 13, and 16. (E.g. - “Reshape” is not a BRAC word, consider “Realign” instead.)
- Depending on how the recommendations will be briefed to the Commission, you make want to make evident which of these bullet points the Army did and which ones the JCSGs did (Slides 6 and 7). If JCSGs are going to brief the commission, make sure it is clear on Slide 7 that these were areas that were looked at by JCSGs.
- Consider reordering the words on the footer of Slides 6 and 7 – Reduce excess is a number one priority in BRAC and should probably be first.
- Move IGPBS bullet to end of list on “Operational Army – Active Component Objectives slide” (Slide 8) to create a smooth transition into following slide.
- Consider changing title of Map on slide 10 to “BCT UA Endstate” and show both losing European actions as well as gainers
- Separate IGPBS and Modular Force Transformation into two bullet points, use BRAC language, and show not only where units are moving from, but also where the units are moving to (Slide 11).
- Consider changing the titles of Slides 11 and 12 as “Operational Army” is not descriptive. Also the title on Slide 15 – “Army Reserve Command and Control Proposals” – should “Command” be “Component”?
- Make sure it is clear on the chart that you looked at gainers and losers for a specific movement - i.e. – Headquarters (Slide 18).
- Make sure that you have coordinated with Education and Training JCSG (Slides 19-21).
- Double check all acronym expansions.
- Make “RDT&E” Slide (Slide 25) title consistent with rest of slide - is the “A” missing?
- Consider adding the two “something” to the RDT&E map (Slide 27).
- Be careful with using “Joint Base” when it is really joint base operations.
- Give Walter Reed Army Medical Center its own bullet point under Realign since more than inpatient functions are being realigned (Slide 32).
- Consider finding a rewording for “4th Estate” as it is an unclear term.
- Correct the typographical error in “one-time costs” for “Total BRAC” line on your “Quantitative Rollup” slide (Slide 32).

- The JCSG candidate recommendations are effectively folded into yours – provides a good base model of an “integrated brief”.
- Coordination with JCSGs is important as you need to be well versed in their actions. Should try to avoid having to say to the Commission, “I’ll get back to you on that.”
- Story for the Guard and Reserves needs to be a tight, supported argument.

Additional observations to consider:

- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.
- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

02 March 2005

Department of the Navy Briefing Notes

Date: Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Time: 09:00-11:00

Place: 3E808

Chairman: Ms. Anne Davis

Executive Secretary: CDR Beth Hartmann

DON Key Attendees:

- Mr. Dennis Biddick, Chief of Staff Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT)
- Mr. Dave LaCroix, Counsel for IAT
- CAPT Chris Nichols, IAT Team Lead Operational Branch
- CAPT Matt Beebe, IAT Team Lead HSA Branch
- CAPT Gene Summerlin, IAT Team Lead E&T Branch

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the Department of the Navy to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Ms. Anne Davis

Items of Import:

- Considered presentation to BRAC Red Team as rehearsal for Commission
- Continuing to refine the data
- DoD Principles drive service considerations (formerly called imperatives) and DON strategy
- Keeping costs at or below current levels was a major driver
- Balancing consolidation and maintaining presence was also major consideration
- Set out at the beginning the “universe”, which was derived on a functional basis
- Did not include additional surge capacity percentages, but looked at 20 year force level forecast
- Considered Homeland Defense issues
- Transformation Options – 2 apply to DON
- Anticipating Force Structure Changes in March
- Used Optimization Model – applied additional rules when necessary to be consistent with strategy and service considerations. These rules were designed to open the field of consideration, the universe, as wide as possible.

Questions that arose:

- Are you confident you covered the entire universe? *Not as confident as I would like to be. We have undertaken the review of functions omitted by JCSGs.* (Johnson)
- Are you going to submit 80 Candidate Recommendations? *No. We are about done, there are a couple left to be decided upon, but that will be all.* (Johnson)

- The first bullet of your strategy gets away from the BRAC language. Why not use regular BRAC terms? The rest of the bullets seem to be military judgment considerations. (Salomon)
- Why don't you have a block for the application of military judgment in your approach? *We can add it in. Judgment being applied is imbedded throughout. We see military value as a way to quantify military judgment. And then in some cases military judgment is used again to decide against something.* (Salomon)
- Do your recommendations go to the ISG or directly to IEC? *They go to the ISG for informational purposes, but officially the recommendations are delivered directly to IEC.* (Johnson)
- Do the optimization model work well? *For the most part, yes. It did not work so well for aviation functions.* (Johnson)
- Would you call the last three rules on this slide (Slide 12) military judgment? *Yes, they reflect the strategic force lay-down – that is, are the right capabilities in the right place?* (Johnson)
- Are all the billets military? *No, they are both civilian and military.* (Salomon)
- Other than political issues, are there other issues with relocating SUBASE New London? *There may be an issue with SSNs and SSBNs located together.* (Johnson)
- Does this slide (Slide 18) show all aviation actions? *Yes.* (Johnson)
- Isn't Ft. Gillem closing? *Not totally.* (Salomon)
- Are there other sites to support reservists displaced by the movement of functions from NAS Atlanta? Is there evidence of how this impacts the pilots? What has happened in the past with such actions? (Salomon)
- Is the Marine Corps participating? *Yes, they have some recommendations that relate to reserve activities. Otherwise, they seem to be sized and located appropriately.* (Johnson)
- What is a SFG? *Army Special Forces Group?* Why involved in a possible Navy recommendation? *Because the Army asked the Navy to be a receiving site.* (Salomon)
- Was there coordination with the States on reserve realignments (Guard realignments)? *Yes.* (Johnson)
- Recommendation is to move out of NAVFAC EFD South Charleston (Slide 36)? *Yes, sub-divide to Mid-West and Mid-Atlantic.* (Johnson)
- Does closure of NAVFAC EFA Northeast close Philadelphia? *No, just gets us out of leased space.* (Johnson)
- What are REDCOMs? *These commands manage reserve activities for the region.* (Johnson)
- Did you look at closing MCRD San Diego and moving to Camp Pendleton? (Pirie)
- What is the impact on excess capacity of Officer Accession Training? *None. So the same strategy did not apply to Navy classrooms? These are PME courses which are sized and located effectively so there was no opportunity to reduce capacity.* (Salomon)
- What Weapons Stations are you looking at? (Johnson)
- What about the PG school, is that a clean closure? *No, the Navy Research Lab Detachment and Fleet Numeric and Oceanographic Center are left. The NRL is to be moved while the FNOC may move or stay as an enclave.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of transferring Crane to the Army? (Johnson)
- Why Cambria – this is a small action that does not be done under BRAC? *We considered all functions/installations regardless of size.* (Pirie)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Your military value analysis approach is not consistent with other groups that we have seen so far.
- Create a table that consolidates the surge capacity considerations that were used by JCSGs to inform their recommendations concerning Navy functions.
- Need to strengthen the link between military judgment for keeping SUBASE San Diego and overall DON strategy.
- Criteria 7 and 8 seem to be inconsistently applied in quad charts. Be sure that the everyone in the Department of the Navy is on the same page.
- It is useful/helpful that you showed all considerations, not just the resulting candidate recommendations.
- Typographical error (missing negative sign) on savings and NPV on Slide 21.
- Army/Navy Reserve Center scenarios are confusing. Find a way to present package in totality.
- Slide 51 summarizing fenceline closures enabled by JCSG activities is extremely helpful and necessary.
- Link between rules and strategy needs to be explained in more detail.

Additional observations to consider:

- Northeast consolidation discussion should include additional rationale for maintaining excess capacity (i.e. – Everett).
- Argument for retaining two Marine Corps recruit depots is weak and should be reexamined as this is not consistent with the Navy and Air Force.
- Some quad charts need a strengthened argument for why military judgment was used to override military value.
- Need to amend quad charts by adding receiving sites as they were missing in some cases.
- Several activities are being relocated to a non-DoD facility. Has NASA concurred with realignment to Stennis Space Center? No mention of coordination was made.
- MILCON avoidance is an important consideration, however, it should not automatically outweigh the other BRAC criteria.
- Additional discussion is needed on the role of USMC participation in the overall Navy process.

20 April 2005

Department of the Navy Second Briefing Notes

Date: Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Time: 1400-1500

Place: 3E808

Chairman: Ms. Anne Davis

Executive Secretary: CDR Beth Hartmann

DON Key Attendees:

- Ms. Anne Davis
- Mr. Dennis Biddick, Chief of Staff Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT)

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the Department of the Navy to BRAC Red Team*

Presenter: Ms. Anne Davis

Items of Import:

- 53 candidate recommendations to go forward. We have 10 closures, 13 including leased facilities and an additional 33 reserve centers.

Questions that arose:

- When you did your military value analysis, did you do so by each of these five functions in the blue box (Slide 4)? *Yes, installations are ranked with respect to each function they perform. It was our belief that support of any given base to a function is independent of other functions also being performed there.* (Salomon)
- What is JAST, DAG, I&I? *Joint Action Service Team, DON Analysis Group, and Inspector and Instructor.* (Salomon)
- Didn't you have a map of the Reserve Center actions? *Yes. Did you "hit" one state more than another? No, our strategy was to keep at least one Navy Reserve Center in each state and to keep at least one Marine Corps Reserve Center in those states where there is one now.* (Salomon)
- Are these billets military? *Yes. Are they active duty? Yes, they are Navy TARs and tend to be I&Is in the Marine Corps. And these billets will be totally eliminated? The billets will be reapplied elsewhere for the Marine Corps, and for the Navy some will be reapplied and some won't. What about civilians? Those billets will be eliminated.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Where do the savings come from in this recommendation (DON-0168A – Relocate NWDC)? *Lower cost of living in Norfolk, VA and they downsize a little in terms of square footage.* (Salomon)
- What does it mean when it says "Action eliminated" (Slide 28)? *These were found to be prohibitively costly.* (Salomon)

- This says disestablish graduate education, is this right (Slide 29 – DON-0070C)? *I believe, the actual candidate recommendation write-up says privatize graduate education.* (Salomon)
- Is it the Department or the Marine Corps that is registering a complaint about this candidate recommendation (DON-0165R)? *The Secretary and the CNO are worried about consolidated the maintenance functions. The Marine Corps is worried about having all maintenance activities on the east coast.* (Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Add leased space and reserve centers to your closure list.
- May want to add a map that summarizes end result of reserve center recommendations.
- Be able to explain the difference between a Weapons Station and an Ammunition Depot.
- Strengthen savings statement on DON-0168A.
- References to other groups' analysis should be corrected. Military value explanation is difficult to understand. Reword so that analysis results from other groups is well integrated into DON results (e.g. - DON-0002R, DON-0161BR, and DONCR-0165R).
- Ensure that CoCom is in agreement with closure of Brunswick and that there is not a Homeland Defense requirement.

14 March 2005

Air Force Briefing Notes

Date: Wednesday, March 9, 2005

Time: 08:00-09:30

Place: 3E808

Chairman: Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Executive Secretary: Lt Col Johansen

Key Attendees:

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Laffey, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Milam
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Mr. Fred Pease

Items of Import:

- BRAC 2005 Goals were to maximize warfighting capability by optimizing squadron size, increasing crew ratios and adjusting Active/ARC mix, to realign infrastructure to meet future defense strategy by sustaining air superiority and air sovereignty and accomplishing mobility basing, to maximize operational capability by eliminating excess capacity, and to capitalize on joint activity opportunities.
- USAF liaisons to JCSGs were less effective than an actual Air Force representative JCSG member may have been.
- Air Force reduces capacity by about 17.8 percent but there are still recommendations coming in that need to be knitted together.
- Did not take savings for military personnel.
- MILCON is overestimated – there is a 20% fudge factor.

Questions that arose:

- Where in your organization were JCSG recommendations deconflicted? *Resolutions started at the DAS level and may have generated other recommendations. We also had bi-lateral conversations to resolve issues.* (Salomon)
- Why is 24 the optimal squadron size for fighters? (Salomon)
- What is a Center for Excellence? What did the JCSGs recommend with respect to Indian Springs? *E&T JCSG had a candidate recommendation, but did not send it forward. Air Force decided to go ahead with the recommendation.* (Johnson)

- Where is Indian Springs? *Nevada, near Ft. Irwin, CA and Nellis AFB, NV.* (Salomon)
- Why isn't a receiver considered a realignment (e.g. MacDill)? (Salomon)
- How was capacity defined? *The difference between actual squadron size and optimum squadron size. Excess capacity exists where a squadron can be added at no cost (Slide 18).* (Johnson)
- Did the Air Force Audit Agency validate capacity? *Yes, they are present at all deliberative meetings.* (Johnson)
- Do your military value weights really have the precision to the hundredths place (e.g. 3.92%)? (Salomon)
- Were the "Mission Essential Bases" (Slide 31) analyzed at all? *Yes, but only as receivers.* (Salomon)
- What happened to the OSD principles (they aren't explicit on Slide 35)? *We will relate ours to theirs.* (Salomon)
- Is the Guard on board? *Absolutely, we are freeing up manpower for new roles.* (Johnson)
- Why leave numerous ECS enclaves? *The ECS units are tasked separately from the fighter squadron and don't go with the mission. They provide general support – CSS.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of Los Angeles AFB? *JCSG took it off the table because it had highest military value. We had an enabling scenario.* (Johnson)
- Why move plans out of Indian Springs if you have capacity there? (Salomon)
- How do you define realignment? *If more than one-third of non-mission personnel is left, then it is a realignment. If remaining non-mission personnel is less than one-third, then that is considered an enclave. Did you excess the rest of the base? Yes, and reducing the footprint sometimes created a cost.* (Johnson)
- What are "quantifiable benefits" (Slide 49)? (Pirie)
- Where do you stand with your recommendations? *None have briefed to the IEC. We are all done with them, except a couple of recommendations that are "follow the fleet" type recommendations.* (Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- The Red Team has found it difficult to track goals, principles, imperatives, strategies, etc. and the application of military judgment. Be prepared to describe the dependencies or interrelationships between goals, principles, your strategy, and your military judgment. The candidate recommendations are supposed to be strategy-drive, data-verified and this needs to be apparent in your presentation and articulation.
- The decision process needs to be well documented and when you present to the Commission, you should have a chart that explicitly demonstrates how decisions were made.
- Make a chart that displays and rationalizes (with data support) optimum squadron sizes. For those recommendations where you do not reach the stated optimum, you need to explain why not in your justification. Failing to give such an explanation undermines your entire process.
- Review argument for increased crew ratios to be consistent. Ensure reliability data supports argument.
- The point of slides 7-9 is unclear. Add bullet point to the slide so that it is obvious what audience is to take away from the slide.

- To not look at ranges is a missed opportunity – need to have supporting justification for taking ranges off the list.
- Check with OSD to determine whether you need separate candidate recommendations for receiver sites.
- Create a slide similar to Slide 13 that shows receiver sites.
- Show, on Slide 13, the reduction in capacity due to BRAC 2005 actions.
- Put development of goals and principles (i.e. your strategy) at the beginning of your process slide (Slide 14).
- Help DoD develop a DoD-wide metric for success.
- Rename Imperatives (Slide 27) and connect them not only to the OSD principles, but also to your stated goals (Slide 3) and principles (Slide 35) – create an explicit hierarchy.
- Typographical error on Slide 36 - # 5 was modeled and was not an imperative.
- Numerous candidate recommendations, like the sample on Slide 38, used the justification that the action “enables future total force transformation”. This requires further explanation.
- May want to incorporate a before and after type slide into presentation that demonstrates which bases have new types of planes, which is significant from a maintenance perspective.
- Create a backup chart that demonstrates how many pilots are affected by C-130 movements (Slide 45), how many pilots are assigned to a new base and how many have a new mission.
- Make UAV Group movement slide (Slide 47) consistent with other similar slides.
- Review recommendations with large MILCON and “Never” paybacks. Perhaps add a quad chart that links enablers (from other services and/or from JCSGs) together so that all savings can be counted. Use the Navy’s “Fenceline Closures Chart” as an example or a template.
- Help DoD define realign and show savings – there needs to be consistency across DoD.
- Have a crisp example prepared to explain “quantifiable benefits” (Slide 49).
- The purpose of BRAC is to reduce excess capacity. Strengthen rational and justification of all recommendations by explicitly linking actions to the Air Force’s overall strategy, to the Force Structure Plan, and/or to BRAC Selection Criteria. This is necessary to avoid the appearance of using BRAC money for new MILCON to get Air Force situated and to overcome the Commission’s potential hostility surfacing from small political actions.
- Many of the recommendations include leaving expeditionary combat support (ECS) elements in an enclave. For many of them, they cite the need to “retain intellectual capital” as the justification for retaining an enclave. We need an explanation as to why these elements cannot be moved allowing for a total base closure. Especially as in the case of USAF-0033V2 (Slide 66) – where receiving location is 12 miles from losing location, and yet, an enclave is left behind.
- For those recommendations that involve the movement of aircraft from an installation with a high military value to one with a lower military value (e.g. USAF-0037 – Slide 72), we need a better explanation as to why this movement fits into the overall strategy. If “military judgment” was used, we need to know which aspect of military judgment.

- Be careful when stringing recommendations together – commission will look at the recommendations individually.

Additional observations to consider:

- Box top scenario development and top down driven comments imply non-data driven candidate recommendations. Change wording to better describe scenario development process.
- Need to solidify/disentangle your strategy, goals, imperatives, and principles. Statements on the bottom of Slides 3 and 11 really seem to be your strategy – as opposed to the reduction of capacity or to save money. If this is true, Slides 48 and 49 are irrelevant as your stated goal was not to save money.
- Military value analysis is distinct from all other groups who determined military value by mission or function of an installation. USAF appears to do military value analysis by warfighting platform rather than by installation mission or function. Since military value is not based on installation value in support of the total force structure, there are several military values for a base depending on which platform one is using.
- Several of the recommendations include the movement of aircraft that seem to be tangentially related (at best) to the core of the recommendation. Why are these movements rolled up as part of a candidate recommendation? Can't they be done outside of the BRAC process?
- For the most part, the AF candidate recommendations seemingly do not involve the disposal of property. If property is excessed, it needs to be apparent in quad charts or at least in the one-page recommendation description. If property is not excessed, why not?
- Some quad charts say the base is being "realigned," but the one-pager describes it as a closure or vice versa. You need to be consistent.
- USAF-0035: Recommendation is to close, but the documentation shows units remaining (to fulfill Air Sovereignty Alert mission). Quad sheet says no natural resources infrastructure issues, but one-pager says there could be wetlands issues that restrict additional operations. What is the MILCON for?
- USAF-0039: The wing is inactivating and all the aircraft are retiring, but there is MILCON, why? Why do the ECS elements remain? Why are Sioux Falls, SD and Gulfport-Biloxi, MS part of the community impact sheet when there is no mention of anything moving from/to those locations?
- USAF-0051: What will the AF do to solve the potential housing shortage at Mt. Home? Moves F-15s from the base ranked #1 in mil value to the base ranked #23, in part because the weather is more predictable in ID than in NC. Can this be documented?
- USAF-0052: Follows from DON-0067 and DON-0084. Why does the Engineering Squadron remain as an enclave? What is the cumulative effect (costs/savings) of the recommendations involving Willow Grove?
- USAF-0053 & USAF-0114: Why include movement of Singapore F-16s (Block 52) from Cannon to Luke as part of these recommendations? Clarify that "B52" means "Block 52" vice the aircraft.
- USAF-0055: The one-pager states that environmental impacts at Nellis need to be evaluated, but there is no explanation regarding how Nellis is part of the scenario.
- USAF-0081: Review the legality of "realigning in place".

- USAF-0086: What is the real rationale for moving out a ANG wing, and then transferring its aircraft to another wing at the same base? “Enables Future Total Force Transformation” is insufficient justification.

19 April 2005

Second Air Force Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, April 18, 2005

Time: 08:30-10:30

Place: 5C279

Chairman: Mr. Pease, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis

Executive Secretary: Lt. Col. Johansen

Key Attendees:

- Mr. Pease, DASAF, Basing and Infrastructure Analysis
- MG Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Plans and Programs
- Col Kapellas, Division Chief, Air Force BRAC Office
- Lt Col Johansen

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by the United States Air Force to BRAC Red Team

Items of Import:

- Since the first meeting with the Red Team the United States Air Force (USAF) has attempted to utilize BRAC language and terminology.
- USAF is completed with the bulk of its “laydown” in terms of candidate recommendations to be submitted, although further refinements are being made.
- USAF had not originally taken savings for people in the same way the other groups and services were, but we have since gone back and recalculated savings associated with manpower and personnel to be more consistent with the other groups.

Questions that arose:

- What do you mean by infrastructure? *Operational areas as well as buildings connected to an installation.* (Salomon)
- What does the red, blue, or shading indicate on this map (Slide 5, middle map)? *White is a high speed area, shaded is where we are authorized to turn off the lights and operate. Red is ranges? Yes. How many ranges did you close? One, at Cannon AFB. There are 30 ranges that USAF uses, but most of these have other missions as well.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Are all the Services in agreement with having a Joint Center of Excellence at Indian Springs? *No, we are pulling that candidate recommendation. That UAV Center of Excellence was originally Education and Training JCSG responsibility and they decided it was really a RD&A matter, so they passed it on to the Technical JCSG. We only had an enabling scenario to move stuff out of Indian Springs, which without the Center of Excellence is not necessary.* (Johnson)
- What point do you want the audience to take away from this slide (Slide 6)? Do you follow-up on these later in your briefing? *There are recommendations going forward for all these.* (Salomon)

- You have a lot of “Red” in the Northeast – losing sites or bases being closed – have you discussed this with NORTHCOM? *Absolutely, NORTHCOM is on board.*
- What does cumulative mean (Slide 46, USAF-1006V2 – EIT Summary)? *It is the total for the implementation period, but we can take it off this chart as it may be confusing.* (Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Be careful when discussing people vs. billet savings vs. authorized positions. If you take savings for eliminated billets or authorized positions, should show that these positions go off the books or reprogrammed.
- Be careful with your wording – the use of “infrastructure” on Slide 2 seems to be referring to aircraft, but later in your brief (Slide 9) “infrastructure” is used to mean installations and operating areas.
- “AF Goals for BRAC 2005” are not obviously linked to DoD BRAC goals (Slide 2). Make sure your subsequent slides are consistent with the “AF BRAC 2005 Goals” bullet points. (E.g. - The title of Slide 4 is more loosely linked to the second bullet point on Slide 2 than the titles of Slides 3 or 5 are linked to the first and third bullet points, respectively.)
- Add a legend for maps on Slide 5 so that the meaning of the color coding and shading is clear.
- BRAC is about reducing excess capacity – your AF Installation map will look about the same after BRAC, which will open you and DoD up to criticisms.
- Closing ranges – closed Cannon, but according to your explanation of your map, Cannon has one of the best locations. Other 30 ranges that are used by the AF have other associated missions. Similarly, if you overlay the civilian air traffic map on your AF Installations map – it would tell you to move everything to the Northwest, yet you close Ellsworth, SD and Grand Forks, ND. The story you would like to tell with these maps is really about tactical air, so consider highlight tactical aviation bases.
- Be consistent. If you are not going forward with the UAV Center of Excellence remove it from the “Joint Opportunities” slide (Slide 6) and from the “emerging needs” section of slide 4.
- Consider using BRAC terminology on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) (I.e. – Discuss closures, realignments, and associated cost savings).
- Bullet two on your “Summary” slide (Slide 9) is really the only BRAC action— but these reductions are already programmed to take place in the FYDP. Explain up front that you are using BRAC to determine action for aircraft disposal in compliance with the Force Structure Plan. However, aircraft retirements really do not need to be BRAC actions.
- Justifications for the closure of Cannon AFB, NM Ellsworth AFB, SD and Grand Forks, ND need to be strengthened as well as the justifications for any associated realignments.
- Include the closure of any leased facilities on your closure list (Slide 10).
- Check military value of every site on lists on Slides 10 and 11. You want to make sure that you are not moving from installations with higher military value to lower ranked installations. Given that each installation has multiple military value rankings, it is imperative that recommendations that are inconsistent with the ranking of installations for the platform in question be fully justified.
- The underlying rationales for the Air Force’s method of determining military value and capacity (including optimal squadron sizes) need to be carefully articulated and well supported.
- Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)

- Need chart explaining
 - what functions or MOSs ECSs cover,
 - how an ECS is allocated,
 - when they deploy,
 - what mission the ECS is charged with,
 - how ECSs support Homeland Defense,
 - and explains why DoD needs to have ECSs at numerous bases.
- If these are already programmed changes – why are they being done under BRAC? Need to explain up front that Military Value analysis done in BRAC aides the determination of where programmed reductions in aircraft occur. But also need an explanation for why people reductions are not occurring under BRAC.
- Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA)
 - Explain what the ASA sites are and why BRAC is required to make changes—why are they a new mission?
 - Create a chart that lays out the requirements for coverage.
 - Ensure that NORTHCOM agrees with sites and are on the same page.
- Recommendations citing more suitable recruiting demographics in one location over another need to be linked to a supporting document with recruiting data across all installations.
- Recommendations using maintenance of ARC mix need to be supported by documentation that explains why the ARC mix is important and how maintaining the proper mix supports the Force Structure Plan or Final Selection Criteria.
- “Capturing Intellectual Capital” is unusual terminology, use more descriptive wording.
- Add statement to candidate recommendation that ECS is remaining at Louis Munoz Marin IAP AGS (USAF-0069).

Additional observations to consider:

- Should have a reason for why USAF is not reducing endstrength as part of BRAC.
- Ensure that savings for FYDP actions completed as part of BRAC are accounted for in accordance with the BRAC statute and/or OSD policy.
- Some candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Close ● Realign ● Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● moving ● relocating ● consolidating ● privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● enclaves ● functions ● activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

17 February 2005

Education and Training JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, February 14, 2005

Time: 10:30-12:00

Place: 2D201

JCSG Chairman: Mr. Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(P&R)

JCSG Executive Secretary: Mr. Robert Howlett

JCSG Key Attendees:

- **Mr. Charles S. Abell**, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)
- **Col James Briggs, USAF**, POC, Specialized Skills Training Subgroup
- **BG Maffey**, Professional Development Education Subgroup
- **Mr. Tom Macia, USA**, POC, Ranges Subgroup
- **CAPT Gene Summerlin, USN**, POC, Flight Training Subgroup
- **Nancy Weaver**, E&T JCSG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Education and Training JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Nancy Weaver

Items of Import:

- Analytical process is really parallel rather than linear and steps are overlapping.
- Final military value report is pending.
- Final capacity report is pending.
- The JCSG received no documented surge capability requirements.
- Candidate recommendations are based on 5 guiding principles, strategy did not consider closing ranges; JCSG viewed their job as to make ranges better, not close them, and thus they did not look for excess ranges.
- Optimization model gave alternatives and/or options, not the optimal solution

Questions that arose:

- Where is your strategy? *Later in brief.* (Salomon)
- Were there common definitions for professional development statistics? Such as student-to-teacher ratios? And were these included in military value? *Yes* (Salomon) How did you deal with ITRO? (Salomon)
- Have you found corrupt data? *Yes* (Johnson) How do you know that someone is not “cooking the books”? *JCSG members were given latitude for judgment, and could ask for clarification when necessary.* (Salomon)

- Did the services concur with surge capability military judgments on percentage? *There was no formal doctrine and did not go back to services for concurrence.* (Salomon)
- Did guiding principles have weights or priority? *No.* (Salomon)
- Did any part of strategy link to reducing excess capacity? *Overall BRAC goals were taken as given, which guided the development of guiding principles, which in turn drove sub-strategies for E&T sub-groups.* (Pirie)
- How do you take care of ranges that should not exist in first place? *We only looked at larger ranges, those big enough to do joint training, and left it up to services to decide which installations to close. We only looked at how to better use what we have- these are the “one of a kind” CRs.* (Johnson)
- If you are closing the NPS or AFIT, what happens to other functions? *Move other functions out via other recommendations from services.* (Johnson)
- On slide 32, CR – 0039, why is payback so long? Is this recommendation just modernizing a facility? What about Fort Eustis – isn't there diver training there? What would be left at Truman Annex? *We looked at it and found that Panama City did not have same facilities as Truman Annex, so moving was beneficial. What's left is a Navy/Intel JCSG problem.* (Johnson and Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Strategy
 - Slide and discussion need to be moved to beginning of presentation
 - Needs to be obvious link between overall BRAC 2005 goals and strategy/guiding principles
 - The more pervasive your strategy is, the better – try to tie strategy/guiding principles to justifications as much as possible. This will strengthen your recommendations and give them consistency.
 - Double check justification on following CRs: 0003, 0022, 0029, 0030
- Military Value:
 - Process to develop weights needs to be more explicit and better justified
 - Be careful not to mix comparisons of military values of installations and functions
 - Support for military judgment needs to be strong when moving functions to installation that has lower military value.
- Universe: Be careful how you say what you did and did not consider. You must, by law, consider all ranges equally. Look at them all, and then have a reason - linked to strategy - as to why the smaller ranges were not considered.
- Policy:
 - Some CRs are resulting in job loss of less than 300 which means they can be done outside of BRAC, you need to have some supporting argument as to why to include them in BRAC.
 - Surge numbers need to be supported and verified – everyone needs to know where they came from and acknowledge them.
- Justifications are reasons that should be tied to strategy
- Have an example of a CR was deleted and why.
- For privatization recommendations you should remove the military value comparison form the discussion as it is confusing.

Additional observations to consider:

- E&T – 0003: Justification is not consistent with strategy.
- E&T – 0029: Statement of “Engineering Branch Courses” is not a justification, but rather a statement of fact.
- E&T – 0039: One time costs seem to be high for this CR. Need to explain benefits better to make high costs understandable.

06 April 2005

Education and Training JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, April 04, 2005

Time: 10:00-11:30

Place: 3E752

JCSG Chairman: Mr. Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(P&R)

JCSG Executive Secretary: Mr. Robert Howlett

- Mr. Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)/Chairman, Education & Training Joint Cross-Service Group
- Col James Briggs, USAF, POC, Specialized Skills Training Subgroup
- Col Jerry Lynes, USMC, Chairman, Professional Development Education Subgroup
- Mr. Tom Macia, USA, POC, Ranges Subgroup
- CAPT Gene Summerlin, USN, POC, Flight Training Subgroup
- Nancy Weaver, E&T JCSG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Education and Training JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Items of Import:

- E&T-0004A and E&T-0058 have not gone to IEC and there are two other candidate recommendations that have yet to go to the ISG.

Questions that arose:

- What is the “SecDef’s Vector”? (Salomon)
- Were you able to make any progress [on joint pilot training?]? *No. We are preparing modestly, most services didn’t like the proposal because it was “too joint”. Then we had through-put issues. We thought it was a good idea for the future but they [the services] weren’t ready.* (Johnson)
- What do you mean by “jet pilot” (Slide 5)? What point are you trying to make? “Jet pilot” is a broad category. *We were tasked to look at JSF.* Ok, you might want to have a backup chart that indicates what is and is not included in “jet pilot”. (Salomon)
- What are UFT, FTU, and FRS (Slide 5)? *Undergraduate flight training,* (Salomon)
- What do you mean by “Preserve Service and Joint Combat training programs” (Slide 5)? Does this mean that you took these programs off the table and did not look at them? *No, it means that we were not going to modify the curriculum of these programs.* (Salomon)
- Can you say you looked at ranges and did not close any? *Yes.* (Johnson)
- Does “Roadmap” really help you? *We say roadmap because we had strategies that were unsuccessful.* Consider not mentioning those unsuccessful strategies (Slides 5, 6, 7, and 8). (Salomon)
- Is the DoDIG pleased (Slide 11)? *Yes.* (Johnson)

- How did you handle surge? *We asked the services if they required any surge in the E&T area, and the services came back with the answer “No.” We did have a fudge factor, a “capability hedge”. You should look back to policy to double check this. (Salomon)*
- Are there really 3,318 installations where there are or will be JSFs (Slide13)? (Salomon)
- What does “9 of 9” mean (Slide 15)? (Salomon)
- Did you use Optimization Model throughout? *It depended. If there was a high number of options we used the optimization model. If there were just a couple alternatives, we just reviewed each alternative ourselves. Did you use it for ranges? We used a type of optimization to achieve jointness in that they looked for combinations of ranges with joint attributes. (Johnson)*
- What does “military unique sub-elements of extant grad-level” mean (E&T-0003R)? *These are special courses that the CNO has recently said we can find in the private sector. The only remaining issue with this recommendation is how international students will be handled as far as funding is concerned. What about the Homeland Security Masters? Professors for those courses usually flew in to teach as opposed to being resident professors or the classes taught via distance learning, so we can send students to a class and continue distance learning from various locations.*
- How are you going to reconcile the never payback (E&T-0052)? *The \$209M in implementation costs are contract costs which come from outside BRAC. (Johnson)*
- Why call it the “Land Warfare University? *That’s what the Army wanted to call it.*
- What do you mean by “Lowest One-Time Cost” in justification (E&T-0062)? What are the alternatives? (Salomon)
- What is left at Ft. Knox when you move this out (E&T-0063)? (Johnson)
- Is the Army comfortable with a “maneuver center” (E&T-0063)? What does this mean? (Salomon)
- Is there really room for everything at Ft. Lee? (Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- No other group has discussed the “SecDef’s Vector” - should try to be consistent with other groups.
- Add “excess capacity” to your “Transforming E&T Through BRAC” slide (Slide 3). Although minimizing redundancy or duplication gets at excess capacity, you should try to use BRAC language.
- Be careful with your wording. On slide 5, “Preserve Service...programs” may imply that you did not look at these at all. On Slide 6, “Re-balance Joint...spectrum” implies that it is not balanced now. Neither of these two implications are the point you are trying to make with these two statements.
- Strategy seems to be confused with goals or desired endstate. On May 16th, the SecDef has a strategy. Should try to state a strategy in the beginning of presentation that has a high level of generality and is integrable with an overall DoD strategy.
- Put a strategy block in your “process overview” chart (Slide 9) to indicate that this was a strategy-driven process. You may also want to indicate where military judgment was applied in this process or at least be able to say where during a briefing.
- Double check the JSF universe number on Slide 13 – 3318 seems quite high.
- Typographical error on Slide 16 – “Principals” should be principles.
- May want to use a more positive statement in your justification for E&T-0003R as opposed to “Eliminates need for...NPS and AFIT.”

- Consider adding two columns to cost and savings numbers on E&T-0052. One column for BRAC costs and another for JPO numbers.
- DoD’s story for JPO and overseas moves has to be consistent – should help them find a way to articulate the story.
- Double check the military value block on quad chart for E&T-0058. Why are there so many sites? Furthermore, why is the job loss so high?
- Be careful with the daisy chain – there is a lot going on at Fort Eustis.
- Your candidate recommendations really need to be tied to your strategy. Consider creating a chart that has your strategy on it and use the same words in your justifications.
- Clarify what you mean by “jet pilot”.
- You are breaking new ground in some cases and it might help to show what is and what is not BRAC.
- Figure out a way to reconcile the fact that you handled surge differently than other groups and the Services.
- Develop a strong argument to justify the military judgment used to take graduate pilot training off table. Furthermore, going to need a strong rationale for why the 58% excess capacity in UPT has not been addressed.

Additional observations to consider:

- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.
- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.
- E&T-0003R: How was the capacity of the private sector to absorb additional graduate students analyzed? If it was analyzed (and it's presumably sufficient), why would there need to be a caveat that some curricula elements may need to be relocated?

- E&T-0012: Since move to lower mil value installation is recommended in order to combine like schools, need more information about why co-location of schools is beneficial especially because candidate recommendation description says merging of common support functions is "probable" (rather than a guaranteed).
- E&T-0014: Candidate recommendation description states that it supports transformation options, but we were told these options were never formalized. Consider re-wording.
- E&T-0032: Can the Department build on the new parcel acquired at Fort McNair?
- E&T-0039: Why are the one-time costs so high and the payback so long? Why is there an outdoor recreation facility in the MILCON costs?
- E&T-0046: How does this recommendation impact the "mil value" of the losing installations (e.g., Moody, Randolph, and Whiting Field)? Have the Services evaluated these installations in light of this recommendation? Why not consolidate UPT into even fewer locations--why do you need 7 training bases? What are the MILCON costs for (they are only listed by facility # not type of facility)?
- E&T-0052: There appear to be some significant environmental hurdles to successful implementation. Can these be overcome? What are the MILCON costs for (they are listed by facility # not type of facility)?
- E&T-0061: This candidate recommendation appears to have been put forward by the Army. The environmental impacts seem significant; is the Army confident they will not become impediments to successful implementation? Why is there an "exchange sales facility" included in the MILCON costs?
- E&T-0062: Note this candidate recommendation appears to have been put forward by the Army. Why is Rucker, the receiver, losing military and civilian personnel?
- E&T-0063: This candidate recommendation appears to have been put forward by the Army. The environmental impacts seem significant; will they be an impediment to successful implementation? Why is there a chapel, dental facility, exchange sales facility, and indoor physical fitness facility as part of the MILCON?
- E&T-0064: This appears to have been put forward by the Army. How are the environmental impacts going to be dealt with? Why are a chapel, an indoor physical fitness facility, a child care facility, a recreation center, a dental facility, and an exchange sales facility part of the MILCON costs?

21 February 2005

Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Thursday, February 17, 2005

Time: 16:00-18:00

Place: 3E808

JCSG Chairman: Mr. Don Tison, Deputy G-8, US Army

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Carla Coulson, US Army

JCSG Key Attendees:

- Mr. Don Tison (SES), Chairman & USA Member
- Mr. Bill Davidson (SES), USAF Member
- Mr. Howard Becker (SES), OSD Member
- Mr. Mike Rhodes (SES), USMC Member
- RDML Jan Gaudio, USN Member
- Col Dan Woodward, (USAF) Joint Staff Member
- COL Carla Coulson (USA), Deputy to Mr. Tison
- CAPT Mike Langohr (USN), Deputy to RDML Gaudio
- Mr. Doug McCoy (USAF), Deputy to Mr. Davidson
- Col Steve Snipes (USAF), Deputy to Mr. Rhodes
- LTC Chris Hill (USA), OIC-Analytical Team

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenters: Mr. Don Tison, LTC Chris Hill, and COL Carla Coulson

Items of Import:

- National Capital Region refers to area within 100 mile radius of the Pentagon
- Used guiding principles. There was no overarching strategy but there is a strategy for each function.
- Capacity analysis and Military Value analysis is pending
- Analysis Overview
 - Multi-attribute Values Theory
 - Multi-dimension sensitivity analysis
 - Joint Functional Analysis
 - Data issues were resolved via a “strategy driven, data verified” approach
- Optimization models were different for each functional area
- BOS plus up criteria are different for each service.

Questions that arose:

- What is the “Fourth Estate”? *All DoD agencies except the Services.* (Johnson)
- How did you measure surge? *Functional areas defined surge.*
- Were there any significant changes when you did sensitivity analysis on weights? *No* (Salomon)
- Was it DoD guidance to get out of leased space? *Yes, but there is no supporting documentation – there was the general sense that being in the NCR is not good – most space in NCR is leased, so connection was made that vacating leased space is favorable.* (Johnson)
- Who does the most joint mobilization? *Mostly the Army.* Why do you need BRAC to do this? *Don’t.* (Johnson)
- Is HSA – 0047 supported by all services? *Not sure, we are working on it.* (Johnson)

Informal Observations provided at briefing:

- Put strategy at the beginning of diagram on approach slide
- May want to consider privatization options, as this is a “Best Practice” it would support your stated guiding principles.
- Use strategy instead of “Guiding Principles”
- Create chart describing how each group handled surge that includes numbers.
- Be sensitive to wording. (E.g. 4th estate, “modified COBRA” – don’t indicate that COBRA doesn’t work as that undermines the entire BRAC process.)
- Eliminations need to be analytically based, and obviously so.
- Why 200GSF? Why not 100GSF? Provide justification for the use of the 200GSF metric.
- DFAS results could be your Achilles heel – since you close installation with highest Military Value and keep the lowest. Explanation for doing so needs to be strengthened – at least make sure it is closely tied to the discussion about the optimization model and how the model affects outcomes.
- Don’t show commission slide indicating that functional areas are all following different methods.
- Southbridge is leased space – if you are making an exception and staying in leased space – other communities are going to be asked to be an exception also. Have a strong explanation ready for why staying at Southbridge.
- HSA – 0018: Justification needs to be linked to strategy. Need to say up front that closing highest military value location because otherwise, the MILCON costs would have been huge. Point out that optimization model found sites that had the necessary capacity. Be able to answer the question: why not privatize?
- Strive for consistency: On quad chart – Military Value box, all recommendations should use same wording. Same for Impacts box – “Criterion 6” (“Criterion 7”) vs. “Economic” (“Community”). Some recommendations list issues such as “Air quality at Ft. Eustis, others just state that there are minor issues. List any issues on all quad charts.
- Present a net, net (“rolled up”) scenario for Ft. Lee, as you are moving a number of functions there. Be sure Ft. Lee has the capacity.

Additional observations to consider:

- Need stronger justifications for long paybacks.
- Need stronger justifications for large MILCON numbers, BRAC cannot be used simply to finance MILCON.
- Need supported explanations for the use Military Judgment, particularly when overriding military value results
- Ideas for implementation of joint-basing would be useful – Comptroller might cause problems since O&M program is not set up to support joint basing. (E.g. – landlord/tenant arrangements)
- Need universal support from services.
- Complex linkages between recommendations may be problematic – “Rolled up” scenarios may not help since Commission will vote on individual recommendations. It may be ok to get 2 out of 3. However, some members may like to see the “rolled up” scenario.

31 March 2005

Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Monday, March 28, 2005

Time: 16:00-18:00

Place: 3E808

JCSG Chairman: Mr. Don Tison, Deputy G-8, US Army

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Carla Coulson, US Army

JCSG Key Attendees:

- Mr. Don Tison (SES), Chairman & USA Member
- Mr. Bill Davidson (SES), USAF Member
- Mr. Howard Becker (SES), OSD Member
- Mr. Mike Rhodes (SES), USMC Member
- RDML Jan Gaudio, USN Member
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- COL Carla Coulson (USA), Deputy to Mr. Tison
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- Col Steve Snipes (USAF), Deputy to Mr. Rhodes
- COL Charlie Sachs HSA JCSG
- LTC Ty Brown HSA JCSG
- LTC Chris Hill (USA), OIC-Analytical Team
- Ms. Elisa Turner HSA JCSG
- Ms. Deborah Culp IG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenters: Mr. Don Tison, LTC Chris Hill, and COL Carla Coulson

Items of Import:

- The guiding principles were a point of discussion in all reports.
- As of right now, 48 candidate recommendations have been approved by ISG.
- Memorandum in approximately November of 2003 stresses the need to move out of the NCR or outside of 100 mile radius of the Pentagon.
- The requirement that leased space be AT/FP compliant by 2009 was a consideration for recommendations concerning the NCR.
- All data issues have been resolved.
- With Mobilization data excess capacity is 26.65%. Without Mobilization data, which is highly variable (MOB excess equals 87.16%), excess capacity is 26.61%
- Military Value runs hopefully will be completed the first week of April.

Questions that arose:

- Are there any reductions in people? *Technical JCSG has some responsibility for people reductions.*
- Does everyone support this (HSA-0047)? *Yes, we had conversations with MDA and SMDC.*
- Has the database been closed? *No, as a group finishes, we close that group. So closing as you go rather than in total? Yes.*
- What does it mean that the “Navy will assume responsibility for the execution of” BOS and SRM? Is that true for all? *No, for example Pope is closing so that will be real estate transfer.*
- Is that a first – to move Military personnel to Federal Bureau of Prisons? *No, we have previous instances of this.*
- Support to CoCom in contingencies? *Yes.*
- Is there any synergism between this (HSA-0131) and the FBI? *We believe so; they will all be located on the part of Quantico that is on the west side of 95.*
- That’s going to be where (HSA-0099)? *At Ft. Meade.*
- What makes up Ventura? *Point Mugu and Port Hueneme. What else is at Port Hueneme? Seabee support.*
- You call this joint, but isn’t it really just the Army (HSA-0133)? *Yes. But the Marines mobilize after training? Yes, but this doesn’t preclude that.*
- Will that be part of STRATCOM? *No, co-located, and there are concerns as to whether Omaha can support the move to Offutt.*
- Who are you co-locating with in this recommendation (HSA-0071)? *AFIS – American Forces Information Service.*
- Isn’t there still an AT/FP problem at Patuxent River (HSA-0077)?
- So IMA will be at 2 locations? *Yes, Ft. Sam Houston and Ft. Eustis. And contracting will be co-located? Yes.*
- But some of MSC is not part of TRANSCOM? *Correct, in fact the largest part is not.*
- How are you going to put this into BRAC terms (HSA-0114)?
- For which function is this military value? To what function do these quantitative military value scores refer (HSA-0130)?

Informal Observations provided at briefing:

- Should really start with your strategy and fold in guiding principles and “transformational options”.
- Rename the 5th slide currently titled “Eliminate Redundancy, Duplication, and Excess Capacity” – this is really your Strategy.
- The term “4th estate” is unclear. Re-word HSA-0106. Justification for vacating leased space needs to be stronger and any directives to do so should be clearly documented.
- Verify that the BRAC statute recognizes leased space as an installation.
- Put HSA-0069 in BRAC format. For example, “Realign Ft. Belvoir...” as opposed to “Realign 15 leased installations...”.
- In the Military Value block of quad chart, “favored” is a poor choice of words in the military judgment sentence for HSA-0130. Re-word this sentence.
- Have to be careful how you define your success? If getting out of leased space and getting outside 100 mile radius of Pentagon are your goals, then with Anacostia or

Andrews you only meet one condition. Tie this slide back to your strategy and show how you succeeded and followed strategy.

- There is a typographical error in the Red Team’s advanced copy of the briefing on the “How do we define success” slide – last bullet point said “About 3 of 48 ...” as opposed to “About 32 of 48...”
- Integration of the story will be difficult and you need to make sure the facts are presented, properly caveated, and avoid giving the commission the ability to say, “You substantially deviated from the force structure plan and/or the final selection criteria.”

Additional observations to consider:

- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.
- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
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10 February 2005

Industrial JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Friday, February 4, 2005

Time: 15:00-16:00

Place: 3E1019

JCSG Chairman: Acting USD (AT&L) Honorable Michael Wynne

JCSG Executive Secretary: Mr. Jay Berry

JCSG Key Attendees:

- RADM Bill Klemm, Naval Sea Systems Command, Logistics, Maintenance and Industrial Operations Directorate
- Mr. Allen Beckett, Associate Director for Maintenance, USAF
- Ms. Willie Smith

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Industrial JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Honorable Michael Wynne

Items of import:

- Functional breakout: munitions, maintenance, ship overhaul and repair
- Utilized tools: optimization model, IVT, COBRA
- Be aware there are some negative paybacks
- Contingencies/followers/enablers are exist and are clearly noted

Questions that arose:

- Data Security (Johnson and Salomon)
 - One individual gate-keeper
 - Data will be available to Commission and Congress
 - Updates were made to a copy, to double check for mistakes, then originals were changed
- Specific data question: Labor Rates (Salomon)
 - Not often similar estimates across services, how were these reconciled/verified?
 - Suggestion made to make chart to explain how labor rates were made comparable across depots/installations/services
- Combat field support – new terminology (Salomon)
 - Included all non-deployable intermediate
 - Suggestion made to not use this term, as it is unclear what it means
- Did 50-50 play into recommendations? (Salomon)
- Does intermediate follow the fleet? *Yes.* (Johnson)
- How did you ensure you accounted for all IM activity, the universe?
 - Depot work done at non-depot centers

- How did you handle special repair activities? Is this depot repair? (Salomon)
- What are the time limits on CDM closure/missions completeness?
 - RE: does this follow the BRAC rule for being completed in 6 year time frame?
 - Furthermore, how do these closures fit into strategy?

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Refrain from using new terminology like combat field support
- BRAC goals should be your strategy while stated strategy should be your approach
- Strategy is what you want to keep as it falls in line with the FSP

Additional observations to consider:

- IND – 0024: Does not seem to be consistent with strategy. There is a stated strategy to consolidate depots with intermediate-level ship maintenance activities. Relationship of working capital fund accounting conversion and application of criteria 1-4 is very unclear.
- IND – 0030: Criteria 7 indicates increased housing cost in San Diego. By policy, criteria 7 examines “the availability if both the existing and potential receiving communities infrastructure to support the force, missions, and personnel.” BAH allowance adjust for differing cost of housing expenses, does it not?
- IND – 0096: Should strengthen ties to strategy justification to better explain why a realignment of \$15K NPV and 18 year payback is worthwhile.
- IND – 0108: Relocation to a receiving site which has lower military value. Explanation is military judgment due to readiness support, accessibility and out-loading ease, however, none of these are mentioned in the strategy. Should strengthen argument by using strategy to augment military judgment in overriding military value.
- IND – 0118, IND – 0119, IND – 0120: Chemical demilitarization mission extends past BRAC completion date; may be considered disestablishments rather than closures. Should strengthen justification and strategy argument to explain inclusion in institutions not yet built with on-going missions past 6 years.
- IND – 0121: Please indicate to what PBX and Zuni refer.

01 April 2005

Industrial JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Time: 1600-1700

Place: 3D1019

JCSG Chairman: Acting USD (AT&L) Mr. Michael Wynne

JCSG Executive Secretary: Mr. Jay Berry

JCSG Attendees:

- RADM Bill Klemm, Naval Sea Systems Command, Logistics, Maintenance and Industrial Operations Directorate
- Mr. Allen Beckett, Associate Director for Maintenance, USAF
- Mr. Dave Pauling, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Maintenance Policy programs and Resources)

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Industrial JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Honorable Michael Wynne

Items of import:

-

Questions that arose:

- What do the colors signify (“Munitions Sites” Slide) some are red and some are orange? *Orange represents closure of the function at the site and red signifies closure of installation because the Industrial function is the only function there.* (Salomon)
- Why does one say “Metal Parts” and the other says “Armaments”? Are you comparing 2 different functions? *We broke the paradigm by putting munitions at an arsenal.* (Salomon)
- Is this a total closure (IND-0122)? *Yes, this is a total closure because the Industrial function is the sole function at the installation.* (Johnson)
- Where do savings come from (IND-0115)? *Maintenance of automated line is expensive and this reduces overhead significantly. Is it going to be disestablished or moth-balled? Disestablished.* (Johnson)
- Why is there zero job loss (IND-0114)? *Because the site is being off-loaded to community and they plan to absorb those people/jobs.* (Johnson)
- In the COBRA report, \$60M of the \$63.8M one time cost is “other”, what is in this (IND-0114)? *This accounts for the movement of such things as bomb racks and Tomahawk Missile containers and footprint reduction including Benét Lab centralization. Do we know what hourly rate Watervliet will charge? Yes, we can add an asterisk in the COBRA.* (Salomon)
- Wasn’t this a hold-over from a previous round of BRAC (IND-0116)? *Yes, it was actually separated from Kelly AFB and moved to Lackland, AFB.* (Johnson)

- Do gun mounts remain (IND-00083A)? *Yes, if we did anything else, we would have to move them which would result in a high one-time cost.* (Salomon)
- Who is the receiver (IND-0083B)? Is Seal Beach still there? *Yes, we are just disestablishing the depot maintenance.* (Salomon)
- Are your Ground Maintenance Capacity charts really based on uncertified data? *Solid line is represents the first data call. Then there was an increase, shown by dotted box. The Army has certified the aggregate numbers, but not the breakouts. But will be certified before you are finished?* *Yes.* (Salomon)
- FRC map is useful chart as it has a lot of information on it, but what is closing? *Closures on 4th line of next chart. IND-0103.* (Johnson)
- How will budgetary issues affect this? *Not sure.* I would find out because having to so say to a Commissioner “I’ll get back to you.” Will not be beneficial. (Salomon)
- What’s missing from the legend for the FRC Savings Profile? *It is not a legend to the pie chart. We will make it bullet points instead of colored boxes.* (Salomon)
- Is there anything else at New London (IND-0037)? *There is some training that goes on there. Education and Training JCSG look at that function and the Navy is considering a closure.* (Johnson)
- Are you planning to present this chart (Pearl Harbor/Portsmouth comparisons) to the Commission? *Not sure.* Let’s look at the story. Why do you need Pearl Harbor? And then, what do you really need there? Is it really necessary to have full ship maintenance yard there? *Yes, we need Pearl Harbor and we need full ship maintenance in the short run until Force Structure Plan changes, then will be able to downsize to intermediate maintenance yard.* If you want to downsize, need to start now because you cannot do “BRAC-like” things absent BRAC. Do you have insights now to do the types of things to get fence line closures now? *No, reductions fall outside BRAC window.* Might be missing a window of opportunity and should try to reduce footprint and realign from shipyard to ship repair facility. (Salomon/Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- May want to change the wording of the legend on “Munitions Sites” Slide to “Closure Enablers Briefed to ISG” or “Candidates”.
- Military judgment statement is not necessary especially since you are not overriding any military value rankings (IND-0112). At least re-word to simply state “Rock Island is most cost effective...”
- May want to remove military judgment sentence (IND-0122). At least re-word to make the statement positive as opposed to negative (e.g. – “...ongoing production output vice *layaway* capacity.”
- May want to consider linking this recommendation to Red River so as to avoid anyone thinking OSD is trying to be underhanded.
- Should strengthen your argument with some numbers on the overhead reductions (IND-0115).
- Fifteen-year payback is a long time (IND-0114) and from the discussion it sounds as if you are using MILCON to move contractors, and then lease back the buildings to the community. Should look hard at this recommendation to make sure you are doing what is best for DoD.
- For consistency, in the military value part of quad charts, either use rankings or quantitative numbers.

- Re-word IND-0083B & IND-127A to say “Closed” instead of “eliminates” so that the candidate recommendations follow the proper BRAC format.
- First sub-bullet on “Cost and Savings Overview” Slide is unclear. It is probably missing an “at” before “Letterkenny”.
- Need to strengthen your military judgment statements in the quad charts of candidate recommendations IND-0127A and IND-0127B by explaining why the judgment used is necessary or consequential.
- Should re-word FRC candidate recommendations so that they are in BRAC terms. Be careful in your use of the words consolidation and integration. (CRs 103, 104, 123, 124, 125, and 126.)
- Be consistent in your wording of the Military value tab on quad charts.
- Re-word IND-0056 and choose different word for “shipyards”.

Additional observations to consider:

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10 March 2005

Medical JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Wednesday, March 9, 2005

Time: 14:30-16:00

Place: 1A1079

JCSG Chairman: LTG George Taylor, Surgeon General, USAF

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Mark Hamilton

JCSG Key Attendees:

- LTG George Taylor, USAF SG
- VADM Donald Arthur, Navy SG
- Mr. Ed Chan, ASD(HA)/CP&P
- MG Daniel Porr, J-4 Medical
- COL Mark Hamilton, MJCSG
- Dr. Eric Christensen, CNA
- MAJ Kimberly Coltman, USAF SG
- MAJ Tony Cook, HA Analyst
- Dr. Don Curry, USA OTSG
- MAJ Karrie Fristoe, HA/TMA
- MAJ Michaelle Guerrero, AF/SG
- COL Jay Harmon, J4-MRD
- MAJ Doug Harper, AF/SGSF
- CAPT Nancy Hight, USN
- COL Barbara Jacob, USAF/SG
- Dr. Bob Opsut, OSD/HA
- CAPT Al Shimkus, BUMED
- Mr. Maurice Yaglom, USA SG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Medical JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: LTG George Taylor

Items of Import:

- Tricare for life has impacted program requirements significantly.
- Three functions of MJCSG are Healthcare Education and Training, Healthcare services, and Research and Development.
- Capacity is defined by function and sub-function.
- Surge
 - Primary/specialty care: No surge capacity requirement because overflow can be absorbed by Tricare
 - Inpatient services: 20% of current
 - Education and Training: No surge capacity requirement

Questions that arose:

- What is the source of the metrics such as RWP, RVU, and DWV? *These are standard throughout the medical industry – used by AMA, ADA, and Medicare.* (Salomon)
- Are the TOE forces, deployable medical units, included in scope of effort? *We looked at “brick and mortar” type items – the infrastructure. Scope includes the work done at the fixed facilities: medical treatment facilities, education and training facilities, and research and development facilities.* (Salomon)
- If there are seasonal or random fluctuations throughout the year and the steady-state is to run at 80% capacity, then why is the remaining 20% of capacity called surge? Is it not the case that the steady-state accommodates surge and therefore, additional surge requirements are unnecessary? (Johnson)
- Where/how does Tricare fit in? *Medical treatment facilities are part of Tricare.* (Salomon)
- How many people were treated in the Tricare Program last year? *Roughly 5 million. Eight million are eligible, 6 million use the program and 4 million are enrolled.* (Salomon)
- What is your strategy? *The previous slide – “Analysis Approach” (Slide 6, but each function also has its own strategy.* (Salomon)
- Of the 181 Medical treatment facilities, you only looked at 64 (3 + 5 + 56)? *No. Of the 181, only three are relevant to Medical Basic Enlisted Training, only 5 relevant to Medical Specialty Enlisted Training, etc.. The 181 is the universe of Medical Treatment Facilities.* (Salomon)
- Why is Sheppard AFB have the highest military value? *It is only with respect to educational facilities.* (Johnson)
- Are there other potential arguments to closing USUHS other than possible conflict with Title 10? *No, NORTHCOM is on board.* (Johnson)
- Was the optimization model run on all 181 medical treatment facilities? Or just the 13 at the bottom of the chart (Slide 20)? *Optimization model run on all 181.* (Salomon)
- Why do you use the Optimization Model of some and Average Daily Patient Load for others? (Salomon)
- Have you cleared/coordinated with the VA? *No, we did not count on the VA capacity, we just recognized it exists.* (Salomon)
- Will there be Air Force people at Fort Bragg. *Yes.* (Salomon)
- Are you breaking new ground with actions for San Antonio area? *Not really.* (Johnson)
- What kind of support is there for the Walter Reed recommendation? What’s outside BRAC? What’s in the POM? Why is there such as drop in Military Value from Bethesda to WRAMC? Will care be degraded as staff leaves prior to relocation as a result of this realignment? *We believe the fact that the move is only 7 miles, that this will be less of a problem than in other cases where retaining the same staff is impossible.* (Johnson, Salomon)
- What about Edgewood? *Technical JSCG is considering activities at that installation.* (Johnson)
- Did you look at all Joint-Basing recommendations? *Yes.*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Add source of resource metrics to “Medical 101” Slide (Slide 4).
- Make sure capacity measures are the same as used by the Technical JCSG (Slide 7).

- Consider making a chart for surge that has a format similar to Slide 7 as opposed to bullets as on Slide 8.
- Need to have an over arching strategy and recommendations need to be specifically linked to it. The overarching strategy will be similar to (and ultimately supported by) the MSM strategy on bottom on Slide 35.
- Charts like that on slides 12, 20, and 34 are unclear. Find a more apparent means of displaying the information. Perhaps put numbers in the arrows.
- Use of military judgment has to be well documented and supported.
 - Overriding military value with military judgment as was done in MED-0005 discredits the military value analysis. Have precise answers and background when this occurs. If it is the case that the recommendation maximizes military value subject to capacity constraints, justification should explicitly state this and cobra results should be supporting material.
- Look to documents from the birth of USUHS to use that language to bolster your case for why it is no longer needed.
- Capacity as a function of remaining functional military value graph (Slide 21) may be unclear to some. Explanation of the military value/capacity trade-off needs to be clarified.
- Slide 22: Rejected/Accepted wording may be unclear. Make sure it is clear that “rejected” indicates “closure”; perhaps change wording. Include a legend for your color coding.
- Is making Ft. Knox a clinic wise considering it is a relatively large “gainer” site for other BRAC actions? *Ft. Knox may in reality be a loser, depending on Army’s pending decision.* (Salomon)
- In your justifications (MED-0004, MED-0049, MED-0050, MED-0052, MED-0053, MED-0054), what is a “more eligible population”? Consider changing the wording, perhaps “larger” is a more appropriate word choice than “more”. Also, “inefficient patient operations” is troubling choice of words. Need to use words with the correct connotation. Consider “underutilized” as opposed to “inefficient”.
- Justifications can be “cookie-cutter”, however, they need to be explicitly linked to and support your overarching strategy.
- MED-0050: In Impacts section, take “Other Risks” out.
- Your process should be strategy-driven. Make sure your presentation of recommendations clearly indicates this (RE: The use of Optimization Model, ADPL, MSM Optimization).
- Be careful with language such as “Professional judgment” (Slide 36). It is not clear what role this should, does or does not play in BRAC actions.
- Change title of Slide 37: “Two or More Collocated **Inpatient** Military Treatment Facilities” – Remove San Diego and Hawaii from map.
- Column headings on Slide 38 are unclear.
- MED-0002: Justification for this recommendation cannot be “cookie cutter”. The 9 year payback may be less compelling than necessary – really double check the payback numbers.
- Back-up Slides: Inpatient metrics do not tell your entire story. Be careful in saying realignment will result in “better care” as this implies care now is inadequate.
- Chart 10 of Back-up Slides: Military personnel redistributed should be clearer on TOE units in the future.

Additional observations to consider:

- Do any of the MJCSG recommendations involve the disposal of property?
- Note that for several of candidate recommendations, COBRA runs account for the realignment of military personnel through a line item in recurring savings rather than as a movement of military personnel to Base X. [Red Team staff raised this issue prior to briefing through Alex Yellin who is working with the Medical JCSG staff to correct the COBRA analysis.]
- MED-0004a: Why Cherry Point when there are others Navy facilities with a lower functional military value?
- MED-0004b: Doesn't look like Langley (who will assume some of the inpatient care load) is part of the COBRA analysis. How will any resource sharing agreement with the VA Hospital affect costs at Fort Eustis? Why Fort Eustis when there are other facilities with lower functional military value?
- MED-005: Used military judgment to consolidate at Fort Sam Houston rather than Sheppard or Great Lakes (with higher military value) because of cost of developing joint center and proximity to large medical facility.
- MED-0017: Is this dependent on the Pope/Bragg joint basing candidate recommendation?
- MED-0022: Is this dependent on the McChord/Lewis joint basing candidate recommendation?
- MED-0030: Need more information re: capacity for private medical schools to provide enough recruits. Where is additional funding for Health Professional Scholarship Program (HPSP) going to come from and is that accounted for in the COBRA run?
- MED-0050: Need more information on the impact of closing the residency program. This facility has an above average ADPL, why not disestablish another installation's inpatient mission instead?
- MED-0053: What is causing the MILCON savings? What is the arrangement Great Lakes has with the VA hospital and how does this candidate recommendation impact that?

07 April 2005

Medical JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Tuesday, April 05, 2005

Time: 1500-1630

Place: 2C836*

JCSG Chairman: LTG George Taylor, Surgeon General, USAF

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Mark Hamilton

JCSG Key Attendees:

- LTG George Taylor, USAF SG
- COL Mark Hamilton, MJCSG
- Dr. Eric Christensen, CNA
- MAJ Kimberly Coltman, USAF SG
- MAJ Tony Cook, HA Analyst
- Dr. Don Curry, USA OTSG
- MAJ Karrie Fristoe, HA/TMA
- MAJ Michaelle Guerrero, AF/SG
- COL Jay Harmon, J4-MRD
- MAJ Doug Harper, AF/SGSF
- CAPT Nancy Hight, USN
- COL Barbara Jacob, USAF/SG
- Dr. Bob Opsut, OSD/HA
- CAPT Al Shimkus, BUMED
- Mr. Maurice Yaglom, USA SG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second* Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Medical JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: LTG George Taylor

Items of Import:

- Integration and the DoD story is next challenge.
- Medical and Technical recommendations should be combined where appropriate.

Questions that arose:

- Is your overarching strategy in your write-up? *Yes.* (Salomon)
- Did you talk to Education and training? *Yes, they said they had no surge requirement, but we will double check.* (Salomon)
- If the workload can be absorbed by TRICARE network, why aren't you closing more facilities (Slide 8, second bullet point)? *First, recall that these are outpatient services. Second, we kept facilities that allowed us to meet our mission, and based on the FY06 POM manpower requirements, we kept facilities that would allow us to keep our medical professionals occupied and trained.* (Salomon)

- Is there any basis for the 20% surge requirement for inpatient services? *It is standard in the medical field to run inpatient services at 80% of capacity. So really, daily operations offer 20% of capacity for surge.*
- What is the deal that was made with the city (MED-0012)? *The Air Force was supposed to payoff the property over a certain period – like a recapitalization account – but no money ever changed hands. Is there a termination clause? Yes, we will double check with the Air Force. (Johnson/Turnquist)*
- What do you mean by infeasible FTE increase? *There is not enough physical space – square footage - to move the people if TECH-0032 is not approved.*
- What does “Infectious Disease, quantitative not determinative” mean (MED-0024)?
- Nothing drives this? Jointness is the goal (MED-0025)?
- Do you do anything with Edgewood? They also do chemical and biological defense research. *The Medical JCSG doesn’t, but TECH-0032 addresses Edgewood. (Salomon)*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Add achieve and maintain the highest standard of care and completing mission to your strategy.
- Expand acronyms such as RVUs and RWPs for the Commission (Slide 7).
- Try to find an explanation or rationale that will help DoD explain the various surge requirements.
- Use BRAC language – “Close” as opposed to “Clear” (MED-0012).
- Use “Joint” carefully. Do not say joint if it is just co-located.
- Rationale or story surrounding the linkage between Medical and Technical candidate recommendations on Slide 14 needs to be clear. Make sure that Medical and Technical JCSGs are on the same page.
- Fix title on Slide 15 as “55” is an old candidate recommendation number.
- Add numbers of people to pie charts on “Endstate” Slide (Slide 17).
- Drivers for MED-0025 need to be positive. Rationale should state that the recommended action is the right thing to do because it brings researchers together, that Wright-Patterson AFB is the right place because it has the highest military value, and then stress that a by-product is that Brooks-City Base can be closed.
- Use BRAC language – “Realign Fort Detrick...” as opposed to “Collocate...at Fort Detrick” (MED-0028).

Additional observations to consider:

- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.

- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.

21 February 2005

Supply and Storage JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Thursday, February 17, 2005

Time: 10:00-12:00

Place: 3E808

JCSG Chairman: VADM Keith W. Lippert, USN, Director DLA

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Louis Neeley, USAF

JCSG Key Attendees:

- LTG Claude V. Christianson, USA/G-4, Army Principal
- RDML Alan S. Thompson, USN/N41, Navy Principal
- Lt Gen Donald J. Wetekam, USAF/IL, Air Force S&S JCSG Principal
- BG Edward G. Usher, USMC/HQMC, Marine Corps Principal
- Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF/JS/J4, Joint Staff Principal
- William Neal, CIV/SES USA, Army Alternate
- CAPT Walter F. Wright, USN, Navy Alternate
- Susan C. Kinney, CIV/15 USMC, Marine Corps Alternate
- Michael A. Aimone, CIV/SES USAF, Air Force Alternate
- CDR Goodwin, USN XO
- Mr. Williams, CTR, Army Team
- CAPT Coderre, USN, Navy Team
- Col King, USAF, Air Force Team,
- Lt Col Truba, Marine Corps Team
- Capt Rivera, USMC, Marine Corps Team
- Lt Col Nalepa, USMC, Data Team
- LCDR Stark, USN, Data Team
- Major Champagne, USAF, Data Team

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Supply and Storage JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: VADM Keith W. Lippert

Items of Import:

- Strategy – shift from linear to networked force centric construct
- Transformation options
- Customer wait time used as metric
- Network military value is different
- DDs and ICPs were split for review purposes
- Supply, Distribution, Storage are three relevant areas
- Maximized surge 20%
- Avoid single point of failure

- Used FY03 numbers as baseline
- Military Value has 4 weighted criteria, a complexity factor and a transportation factor – Military judgment was used to determine the weights
- Used optimization model
- Force targeted groups
- 16 ICP, 19DD, 15 Depot retail supply
- DRMOs – 67 activities – dropped from consideration
- Privatize some functions

Questions that arose:

- Why do you double up on the cost section of your strategy (i.e. - economies and efficiencies? *Our overall weighing factors were to be able to accomplish the mission and remove excess capacity.* (Salomon)
- If customer wait times and location are important, why weren't they part of military value calculations? Does this mean the military value wasn't all inclusive? *No, military value was based on the "network" value.* (Johnson)
- In the design of your approach process, was saving money the primary goal? (Slide 12 of briefing.) *Not necessarily.* (Johnson)
- How was surge capacity defined? *Surge capability requirements numbers were developed individually by each sub-group under OSD guidance. Is this guidance in writing? No. It was informal guidance as result of public comments.* (Salomon/Johnson)
- Are there any unresolved issues with the DoDIG? *No.* (Salomon)
- Why use FY03 system demand levels? Did everyone use FY03 numbers? (Salomon)
- What are transformation options? (Johnson/Salomon/Pirie)
- S & S – 0043: Who will do ICP work? There is residual at Detroit and Hill AFB, but the management function has gone away. *Yes, management function is taken away, but there are still contracts to manage.* What about batteries? (Johnson)
- What are backroom functions?
- Did you look at location for S & S – 0035? *Doesn't matter.* Why can't go to 1 or 2 ICPs then? *Too much risk.* (Johnson) Does the Army really have ICPs? *Yes. There are design unstable DLRs and consumables that services are managing.* (Salomon)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Use of military judgment has to be well documented and supported.
- Be careful how you pitch the transformational options because you have to maintain objectivity of the process. You don't want to make it sound like you have the answer before you start the review process and look at the data.
- Put strategy in your Approach chart (Slide 11 of briefing).
- Reorder goals of Approach process so as to indicate the order of import (Slide 12 of briefing.).
- Surge capability requirements need to be well documented. As presented they were inconsistent and loosely tied back to strategy.
- Give an example for the excess capacity grouping "Other Activities of Interest".
- Give an example of a military value computation. Past commissions have scrutinized military value calculations - an example strengthens your argument. Make sure example demonstrates how the Complexity and Transportation factors were applied.

- Remove below threshold argument from Slide 22. It is not necessary and could lead to confusion as other JCSGs are including below threshold activities and functions. Make sure, however, that the A-76 argument fits in with stated strategy.
- Tie back to your strategy the discussion of other activities that were dropped from consideration OR document that the Services are looking at these activities, which are closely tied to installations. (e.g. – if a service closes a base, then the base level supply closes as well.)
- Backroom management is not descriptive. Find an alternative, more descriptive phrase.
- Strive for consistency: On quad chart – Military Value box, use “1 out of 5” format for all Candidate recommendations. Similarly, on quad chart – Impacts box, consistently use “Criterion 6” (“Criterion7”) or “Economic” (“Community”).
- S & S – 0046: Not “De-conflicted w/MilDeps” (at the time of the briefing) – uncheck box.

Additional observations to consider:

- Placed great emphasis on customer wait time, but did not include minimization of wait time in strategy or in metric for military value
- Why are there ICP residuals?
- May be missing an opportunity when you decide to not consider DRMOs.
- S & S – 0004: Need to strengthen case for going from 2 to 4 SDPs. If customer wait time is so important, it needs to be a part of your strategy or military value metric. Justification for overriding military value needs to be strengthened. If minimization of new MILCON and customer wait time is the justification, there needs to be a link between this and your strategy. Perhaps show some customer density numbers by region.
- S & S – 0044 and S & S – 0045: Inconsistent with previous stated approach to not consider below BRAC threshold functions.

01 April 2005

Supply and Storage JCSG 2nd Briefing Notes

Date: Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Time: 1300-1445

Place: 2C836

JCSG Chairman: VADM Keith W. Lippert, USN, Director DLA

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Louis Neeley, USAF

JCSG Attendees:

- LTG Claude V. Christianson, USA/G-4, Army Principal
- RDML Alan S. Thompson, USN/N41, Navy Principal
- Lt Gen Donald J. Wetekam, USAF/IL, Air Force S&S JCSG Principal
- William Neal, CIV/SES USA, Army Alternate
- CAPT Walter F. Wright, USN, Navy Alternate
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- CDR Goodwin, USN XO
- Mr. Williams, CTR, Army Team
- CAPT Coderre, USN, Navy Team
- Col King, USAF, Air Force Team,
- Lt Col Truba, Marine Corps Team
- Capt Rivera, USMC, Marine Corps Team
- Lt Col Nalepa, USMC, Data Team
- LCDR Stark, USN, Data Team
- Major Champagne, USAF, Data Team

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: *Second Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Supply and Storage JCSG to BRAC Red Team*

Presenter: VADM Keith W. Lippert

Items of Import:

- Supply and storage is a follower activity and therefore the S&S JCSG had to adjust scenarios and candidate recommendations as military departments or other JCSGs were putting forward their own scenarios and candidate recommendations.

Questions that arose:

- Do the services agree with the need for a “more expeditionary aspect”? *Yes. I have not seen a case made for expeditionary in your briefing or candidate recommendation justifications. Okay. We will come back to it in the course of the briefing. (Salomon)*
- I’m not getting your point (Slide 6). Which one did you use? *The bottom one. Where’s the military judgment on the bottom one? It is included in the Military Value and Capacity analysis and Force Structure Capabilities surrounding the scenario analysis. Okay, you may want to indicate that on the chart. (Salomon)*

- And the services agree (S&S-0035)? *Yes.* (Johnson)
- And that’s what’s tied to “related support functions” (S&S-0035)? *Yes, it is the expertise needed to give DLA the procurement function.* (Salomon)
- Is there excess capacity in the 16 ICPs? *Yes, we ranked them from 1 to 16 and determined that we could draw a line after 11. We could close or give back to the appropriate service the bottom 5 and the assumption was that the workload could be moved to meet surge requirements.*
- Why are you doing this under BRAC? *It is a Transformational Option.* But that is not a BRAC reason and you can do this without BRAC. (Salomon)
- Have you really made your case for moving out of Red River (S&S-0048)? *Red River no longer will have a maintenance activity, so supply and storage activities should also move. Susquehanna doesn’t have a maintenance activity either. But that is a different type of supply and storage function.* (Salomon/Johnson)

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Military judgment is an application of military expertise and should not be used to explain or rationalize business re-engineering.
- Transformational options are not one of the final selection criteria and should be incorporated into your strategy as opposed to being left as stand-alone entities. In the absence of official DoD policy on transformational options, you may want to avoid citing specific “Transformation Option” numbers (i.e. – TO #20). Consider re-naming the “Transformational Options” and use the fact that transformation is part of the Force Structure plan, so these options support the Force Structure Plan, which has a legal basis.
- Your argument for DRMOs is fine, except you need to be careful how you tell the story. The statute says that everything must be looked at and so instead of saying DRMOs were not included, make sure your story indicates that you looked at DRMOs, determined them to be inappropriate for BRAC, but, by the way, they are being competed under A-76.
- Be prepared to make a well-supported and documented case for what is generating the savings. You cannot just assume that this action will automatically save 20%. What is your reference?
- Statement in Military Value part of quad chart is a disclaimer and needs to be changed (S&S-0035).
- Strengthen Slide 16 (list of DLRs and Consumables) by indicating what pieces of DLR stay with the services.
- Strengthen Slide 18 (S&S-0035R - map) by indicating what goes where, either on the map or in a separate table.
- Make sure that S&S-0035 is in BRAC language.
- May want to create a follower argument for S&S-0048 – this candidate recommendation needs to stand on its own despite the linkage to the Army’s plans for Red River.

Additional observations to consider:

- Almost all candidate recommendations are not in the correct format for submission. Ensure that all candidate recommendations are in the following format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Justification phrases should be removed from candidate recommendation statements.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.
- During the integration process, need to add retained actions (if any) at each losing installation.
- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified in terms of military value or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.
- S&S-0043, S&S-0044, and S&S-0045: Justification on quad chart says "supports transformation by privatizing..." which is vague and should be re-worded or removed. Also, reduction in excess capacity is listed last, and since this is the purpose of BRAC, it should be the first justification. (The justification in the write-up is in the correct order.)
- S&S-0048: Candidate recommendation write-up justification needs to be re-written in BRAC terms. As it reads now, it seems like this recommendation is more business re-engineering than BRAC. The elimination of excess and redundancies to save money should be mentioned first, not last, as it is now. Should strengthen the argument for why military judgment was used to override military value based on "optimizing support to customers" and to minimize MILCON.

24 March 2005

Technical JCSG Briefing Notes

Date: Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Time: 14:30-16:30

Place: 3E808

JCSG Chairman: Dr. Ronald Segal, Director DR&E, Mr. Al Shaffer, Executive Director

JCSG Executive Secretary: COL Buckstad, Ms. Felix

JCSG Key Attendees:

- Mr. Matt Mleziva, Air Force
- Mr. Brian Simmons, Army
- Dr. Barry Dillon, Marines
- RADM Jay Cohen
- Mr. Jay Erb, JCS
- Mr. Al Shaffer, CIT Chairman
- Mr. Gary Strack, OSD
- Mr. Andy Porth, OSD BRAC
- Mr. Jerry Schiefer, OSD BRAC
- COL Robert Buckstad, OSD
- Mr. Roger Florence, DoD IG
- Dr. Stewart, Air Force
- Dr. Rohde, Army
- Ms. Felix, OSD
- Mr. Ryan, Navy
- Dr. Higgins, Navy

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson
- Honorable Robin Pirie
- General Leon Salomon
- Mr. John Turnquist

Subject: Candidate Recommendation Briefing by Technical JCSG to BRAC Red Team

Presenter: Mr. Al Shaffer

Items of Import:

- Three main functions: Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation with a purview of roughly 650 facilities corresponding to about 144 installations and 157K FTEs.
- Two principles and four strategies drove the development of candidate recommendations.
- Competition of ideas is key and so where possible single-threads were avoided.
- Developed eight technical capability measures. In the end, only three (Work Years, Building Use, and Test Resource Workload) were used for capacity calculations, however, the other 5 provided insight.
- Military Value is a combination of quantitative factors (such as facility size and function) and qualitative factors (i.e. - military judgment).
- Acquisition function is included in review process.

- Combined research laboratories are actually co-locating – it is less about real estate and more about reducing overhead and people.

Questions that arose:

- What is the hierarchy of your principles and strategies? *Principles drive the strategy.* Are the 4 strategies in order of importance? *No.* (Salomon)
- How did you define surge? *Ten percent of current capacity.* (Johnson)
- Your military value analysis is different from the rest of the groups then? *Yes, and we normalized military value within bins. We cannot compare tank builders to space system builders.* (Salomon)
- You use military judgment as a subset of military value? *Yes.* (Salomon)
- So you are not looking at contracting? *No, we are looking at the management structure, but not at the contracting plant representatives.* (Salomon)
- You did nothing with the engineers? *No.* Did they participate? *No.* *We talked with the Army and brought in the Office of General Counsel. Army said that they are not covered by Title 10. That is, that “Civil Works” are excluded so the Corps of Engineers is outside of Title 10.* (Johnson)
- What is the status of Los Angeles AFB? *We have a candidate recommendation that takes all technical functions out to enable closure and a companion recommendation that evaluates closure. We inactivated our scenario and were asked to reactivate it, so we did. It is now our understanding that the Air Force was asked to reactive their scenario also.* (Johnson)
- If Indian Head is closed, do the other three sites have capacity to handle energetic materials? *Yes, we have a candidate recommendation coming through to allow for this possibility.* (Johnson)
- Is there a problem with moving/creating the C4ISR center at Peterson AFB? *Yes, the Joint Staff asked us to move it to Offutt AFB because DISA Proper is moving there. And STRATCOM disagrees with Peterson? Yes, they want to move to Offutt also . Is Peterson the highest military value? No, but we think it is the right move.* (Johnson)
- Is SOCOM supporting the move out of Ft. Eustis? *Yes, SOCOM said let it go.* (Johnson)
- Facilities with less than 30 people were not looked at? *Fewer than 30 was used as an initial filter, but we then circled back to double check that we eliminated excesses where we could.* (Johnson)
- What is left at Lakehurst (Tech-0005)? *700 people to support catapult function. There was no other way to do this to achieve this end.* (Pirie)
- Is DTRA on board (TECH-0018A)? *Yes, they are moving to 3 locations.* (Salomon)
- In all your recommendations, are there reductions in people? *We assumed a 15% reduction across the board.*
- Did you look at Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)?
- Is the military value of King’s Bay higher than Cape Canaveral (TECH-0018E)? *Not really as Naval Ordnance Test Unit Cape Canaveral is the sole functional representative in that ranking.*
- So the Army has no responsibility for this joint facility (TECH-0020)? *No, co-location on NASA permitted property.*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- On your TJCSG “Principles and Strategies” Slide (Slide 3) use bullet points instead of numbers. You should have one overarching strategy as opposed to four. Hierarchy of principles and strategies is unclear now – be careful how you tell the story.
- TJCSG Principle 2 should not be a simple assertion. It needs to be supported with examples and evidence that the private sector does not supply sufficient competition of ideas.
- Be careful with how you talk about surge. You cannot just say it is “hard to define surge” and pick a number. Give an example, from a time of war or from a particular mission, that demonstrates that technical facilities increased output, work hours, or test hours by 10%.
- Military judgment cannot be “I believe this.” Judgment has to have a supported rationale.
- Change title on “Combined Research Laboratories” Slide (Slide 11). Say co-located. When you are telling the TJCSG story be careful with the words combined, consolidate, joint, co-locate, etc.
- Make sure the Commission understands what Research, Development, Acquisition, Test and Evaluation are. Add a chart to explain these or add color coding to Slide 4.
- Argument for a joint center at Peterson AFB needs to be clearly articulated. Alternatives have to be systematically eliminated to show how and why Peterson is the best choice.
- Make sure commission knows what is defined as a Test and Evaluation facility.
- Reduction in number of facilities is a good measure, but the story has got to be told just right.
- It is hard to track candidate recommendations back to your strategy versus the desired end state of your scenario families.
- You should promote and/or take credit for jointness whenever you can.
- Commission will question long paybacks and recommendations that just build new facilities.
- On quad charts: “Military value not highest for all” is problematic without an actual listing of installations ranked by military value.
- Be careful with daisy chain connections. Your recommendations need to be able to stand on their own.
- Seems like military judgment overruled military value in about half of these recommendations. Make sure that your application of military judgment is consistent and well supported.
- Review all costs, savings, and paybacks.
- Review TECH-0018B to make sure you are not rebuilding facilities to house outdated functions.

Additional observations to consider:

- Should ensure that candidate recommendations are in the correct format:

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Since transformation is not one of the final selection criteria, transformational justifications have no legal basis and should be removed. These candidate recommendations should be justified using BRAC terms as found in the final selection criteria or the force structure plan.
- Candidate recommendations should be organized in presentation in the following order:
 - Tier I: Traditional BRAC – Military value applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier II: Strategy Driven – Military judgment applied, net savings, capacity reduction.
 - Tier III: Operationally Driven – Military judgment overrides, net savings.
 - Tier IV: Transformationally Driven – No military value justification, military judgment sole rationale, not cost effective, long paybacks.
- Actions that are independent of each other should not be lumped together into the same candidate recommendation.
- TECH-0005: JFCOM concern for "Centers of Excellence" critical infrastructure protection. Justification bullets are true but weak support for the candidate recommendation. Does not mention real strategy of three full life-cycle rotary wing support activities. Title of joint centers is somewhat misleading as three rotary wing air platform centers (one for each service) does not seem very joint. Should tie strategy into justification better. Should be more than just Army strategy for override of Redstone Arsenal functional military value.
- TECH-006: JFCOM concern for "Centers of Excellence" critical infrastructure protection. Should tie strategy of consolidating full life-cycle support activities into two fixed wing air platform centers into justification.
- TECH-0009A: Justification should talk more to what will be operationally gained by consolidation and closure of some Air Force Research Laboratory operating locations. Appears on surface to shift divisions within AFRL and recapitalize the command with \$259M of MILCON. While it pays back in 7 years, the up-front investment is very high.
- TECH-0018A: Should indicate what installation closure is facilitated. Should discuss strategy in justification which appears to be to create through consolidation a full spectrum weapons/armaments "Center of Excellence" for the Air Force to complement China Lake, CA and Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- TECH-0018B: Should clarify where 5 closures are facilitated and to what extent (i.e. % of installation freed up).
- TECH-0020: Since the gaining site is not DoD property, should indicate that NASA has concurred with providing additional permitted space.
- TECH-0032: What aspect of military judgment was used to decide on consolidation at Aberdeen and Fort Detrick?
- TECH-0040: Since ONR and DARPA are in leased space currently, there is no need to justify installation military value decisions as compared to Anacostia. Suggest dropping research manager discussion which is confusing and focusing on force protection and joint office synergy in co-location.
- TECH-0042A: Should include military value and name of fourth retained technical facility.
- TECH-0047: STRATCOM concern as to consolidation site and requested alternate scenario of Offutt AFB, Omaha, NE be considered. Peterson AFB has lowest MV of all consolidated sites. Need to expand on military judgment issue for benefits of co-location with a CoCom.

10 March 2005

Technical JCSG Office Call Notes

Date: Tuesday, March 8, 2005

Time: 08:30-09:30

Place: 3E1014

JCSG Chairman: Dr. Ronald Sega, Director DR&E

JCSG Executive Secretary: Dr. Jim Short

JCSG Key Attendees:

- Dr. Ronald Sega, Director DR&E
- Mr. Matt Mleziva, Air Force
- Mr. Brian Simmons, Army
- Dr. Barry Dillon, Marines
- RADM Jay Cohen
- Mr. Jay Erb, JCS
- Mr. Al Shaffer, CIT Chairman
- BG Fred Castle, OSD
- Mr. Gary Strack, OSD
- Mr. Andy Porth, OSD BRAC
- Mr. Jerry Schiefer, OSD BRAC
- COL Bob Buckstad, OSD
- Dr. Jim Short, OSD
- Mr. Roger Florence, DoD IG

Red Team Attendees:

- Honorable H.T. Johnson

Subject: Office Call by BRAC Red Team to Technical JCSG

Presenter: Mr. Al Shaffer

Items of Import:

- Recommendations attempt to provide infrastructure to increase innovation for DoD.
- Military Value is a combination of quantitative factors (such as facility size and function) and judgment.
- Military Value analysis results indicate that multi-function, multi-disciplinary sites are the most valuable.
- Sensitive to articulation especially when using the words joint, consolidated, and co-located as these three have distinct meanings.
- Data has been challenging
- Three main functions: Research, Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation
- Focused on facilities with greater than 30 people or self-contained units.
- Single-threads (sites) are avoided as idea competition is important. If there is a recommendation that results in a single site, it is noted that a single site is preferable to building another or looked for other agencies that do similar research.
- Recommendations attempt to enable jointness, create large combined research centers, and co-locate Research Project Managers.

Questions that arose:

- Did you look outside the Department for other capabilities and potential competition as opposed to retaining capability at dual sites? *Yes.*
- How did you define surge? *Ten percent of current capacity.*
- What role does STRATCOM play? *A UCP role. The decision was made that Peterson was the best choice.*
- How do you define success? *We don't have metric. Potentially, reducing the number of activities engaged in "something" that RDAT&E are doing or NPV versus annual cost, ROI, sustained savings, eliminated FTE's or number of closures.*

Informal observations provided at briefing:

- Strategy needs to be straight forward and obvious and candidate recommendations need to be explicitly tied back to it.
- If you are not looking at activities or facilities with fewer than 30 people, do not mention, but it is a missed opportunity to not look at these activities.
- Cast the TJSCG story so that it can be integrated with the overall DoD story.
- Dual approach to military value is good. However, wherever you use military judgment, it must be sufficiently, strongly justified.
- Help DoD define success, surge, and transformation.
- The Red Team has heard mixed opinions about Army global positioning and use of MILCON for unit bed-down construction.

Additional observations to consider:

- Eighteen locations were exempted from consideration with less than 31 FTE work years in function due to the "Military Judgment" that benefits were outweighed by cost of analysis. This determination seems more like simple business decision than military judgment. Need to explain what aspect of military judgment was used.
- Since ONR and DARPA are in leased space currently, there is no need to justify installation military value decisions as compared to Anacostia. Suggest dropping research manager discussion which is confusing and focusing on force protection and joint office synergy in co-location.
- Dual sourcing of capabilities within the Department should be carefully justified as it may unnecessarily retain excess capacity, particularly when alternate intellectual capability competition exists within other agencies of the government and/or the private sector.