

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE  
AND REALIGNMENT  
COMMISSION**



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INVESTIGATIVE HEARING  
WASHINGTON, DC**

**JUNE 14, 1995  
ROOM 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING**



**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

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
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**HEARING AGENDA  
JUNE 14, 1995  
SH 216, HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING**

**8:30AM - 10:00AM DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY:**

Witnesses: The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.  
Secretary of the Army

General Gordon R. Sullivan  
Chief of Staff of the Army

The Honorable Robert Walker  
Assistant Secretary of the Army  
(Installations, Logistics,  
and Environment)

Brigadier General James E. Shane, Jr.  
Director of Management, Office of the  
Chief of Staff

Major General John R. D'Araujo, Jr.  
Director, Army National Guard

**10:15AM - 11:45AM DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE:**

Witnesses: The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall  
Secretary of the Air Force

General Ronald R. Fogleman  
Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base Realignment  
and Transition

Mr. James Boatright, Consultant to the Secretary of  
the Air Force

11:45PM - 1:00PM Break: SD-212.

**1:00PM - 2:30PM DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY:**

Witnesses:           The Honorable John H. Dalton  
                          Secretary of the Navy

                          Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda  
                          Chief of Naval Operations

                          General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.  
                          Commandant of the Marine Corps

                          The Honorable Robin B. Pirie, Jr.  
                          Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment


**2:30PM - 3:30PM OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DEFENSE  
LOGISTICS AGENCY:**

Witnesses:           The Honorable Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
                          (Economic Security)

                          Mr. Robert E. Bayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
                          (Installations)

                          Lieutenant General George T. Babbitt, Jr., USAF, Principal Deputy  
                          Director, Defense Logistics Agency

                          Ms. Marge V. McManamay, BRAC Team Chief, Defense  
                          Logistics Agency





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
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**ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN**

**COMMISSIONERS:**

**AL CORNELLA**  
**REBECCA COX**  
**GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)**  
**S. LEE KLING**  
**RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)**  
**MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)**  
**WENDI LOUISE STEELE**

**OPENING STATEMENT**

**CHAIRMAN ALAN J. DIXON**

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY**  
**FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS**

**Washington, DC**

**June 14, 1995**

GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THIS HEARING OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION. MY NAME IS ALAN J. DIXON AND I AM CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH RECOMMENDING TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH DOMESTIC MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SHOULD CLOSE OR BE REALIGNED.

WITH US TODAY ARE MY FELLOW COMMISSIONERS, AL CORNELLA, REBECCA COX, J.B. DAVIS, S. LEE KLING, BENJAMIN MONTOYA, JOE ROBLES AND WENDI STEELE.

WE ARE IN THE FINAL WEEKS OF OUR ASSIGNMENT. FINAL DELIBERATIONS WILL BEGIN JUNE 22 HERE IN THIS ROOM. IN THE FIFTEEN WEEKS SINCE WE RECEIVED SECRETARY PERRY'S LIST OF 146 PROPOSED CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS, THE COMMISSION HAS CONDUCTED 12 INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS IN WASHINGTON – 13 INCLUDING TODAY.

WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN SOME 85 HOURS OF TESTIMONY AT 16 REGIONAL HEARINGS HELD ALL AROUND THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING GUAM AND ALASKA.

AT THOSE HEARINGS, WE HEARD PRESENTATIONS FROM COMMUNITIES FROM 35 STATES PLUS GUAM AND PUERTO RICO. YESTERDAY AND THE DAY BEFORE, WE HEARD TESTIMONY FROM MORE THAN 200 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHOSE STATES AND DISTRICTS ARE AFFECTED BY THE LIST.

IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING 29 HEARINGS, THE COMMISSIONERS HAVE AMONG THEM MADE ALMOST 200 VISITS TO SOME 75 BASES ON THE CLOSURE LIST, AND COMMISSION STAFF HAS MADE ANOTHER 75 BASE VISITS TO GATHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

AS EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM PROBABLY KNOWS, ON MAY 10 THE COMMISSION VOTED TO ADD 35 BASES TO THE LIST FOR CONSIDERATION FOR CLOSURE OR FURTHER REALIGNMENT.

IN THE MONTH SINCE THEN, WE HAVE VISITED ALL THOSE INSTALLATIONS AND CONDUCTED REGIONAL HEARINGS AT WHICH THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES WERE HEARD.

TODAY, WE HAVE ASKED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO COME HERE, IN PART, TO STATE THEIR POSITIONS REGARDING THE BASES WE ADDED TO THE SECRETARY'S LIST. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE GLAD TO HEAR FROM THE DEPARTMENT REGARDING ANY BASE ON THE LIST AND WE WILL ASK SOME QUESTIONS OURSELVES ABOUT SOME OF THE INSTALLATIONS ON THE MARCH 1 LIST BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AT OUR BASE VISITS AND REGIONAL HEARINGS.

WE WILL HEAR FROM THE THREE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS IN 3 SEPARATE PANELS, AND THEN CONCLUDE WITH A PANEL OF WITNESSES FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

WE WILL BEGIN WITH THE ARMY FROM NOW UNTIL 10 A.M. WE WILL HEAR FROM THE AIR FORCE FROM 10:15-11:45 A.M. AND THEN BREAK FOR LUNCH UNTIL 1 P.M.

FROM 1-2:30 P.M. WE WILL HEAR FROM THE NAVY, AND THEN FROM 2:30-3:30 P.M. WE WILL HEAR FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY.

**WE ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE WITH US A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF WITNESSES FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.**


**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY TOGO D. WEST, JR IS WITH US TODAY.**

**WE ALSO HAVE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN; THE HONORABLE MIKE WALKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES SHANE, DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF; AND MAJOR GENERAL JOHN D'ARAUJO, JR, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.**

**AS ALWAYS, I MUST REMIND YOU THAT THE BASE CLOSURE LAW REQUIRES ME TO SWEAR IN WITNESSES BEFORE THEY TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMISSION. IF THE ARMY REPRESENTATIVES WILL PLEASE STAND AND RAISE THEIR RIGHT HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?**

**SECRETARY WEST, YOU MAY BEGIN.**



**STATEMENT BY  
THE HONORABLE TOGO D. WEST, JR  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
BEFORE THE  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 14, 1995  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**INTRODUCTION**

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. General Sullivan and I appreciate this final opportunity to discuss your alternatives to our closure and realignment recommendations as well as address your questions regarding the Army's original list. We hope our comments will be helpful as you begin your final deliberations.

To start, it is worth noting that the Army's recommendations are the product of over a year's worth of painstaking analysis, informed military judgment and comprehensive oversight and review. As I stated in earlier testimony, our decisions were not arrived at easily nor were they made in haste. They build upon the work done by the three previous Commissions and leave us with the infrastructure needed to keep our Army trained and ready into the 21st century.

Yet we understand it is the Commission's duty and obligation to consider making changes to the Secretary of Defense's list and, if supported by persuasive analysis and compelling justification, add more installations to that list. We would like to offer our assessment of these possible additions, considering both the financial and operational implications on our plans to support the national military strategy and posture the Army for the 21st century. I believe the Army has cooperated and assisted when asked to review and analyze closing or realigning installations in the manner suggested by the Commission at the hearing on May 10th.

**ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO BRAC LIST**

Other than Fort Holabird, MD, the Army does not see any merit in adding another installation to the original list. After Defense Investigative Service departs from Fort Holabird, we have no further use of the property. The other alternatives are a different matter:

Oakland Army Base. The Army studied the feasibility of closing the ports at both Bayonne and Oakland and concluded the loss of Oakland represents an unacceptable operational risk. The Army needs this critical port facility to support the rapid deployment of equipment during peace and war. Oakland is essential for the

deployment of our CONUS-based forces to respond to any national security threats that could emerge in the Pacific region. Its closure would leave the Army without a port facility on the west coast. The financial savings simply do not justify the risk.

Tobyhanna Depot. The Army has made the hard choices to divest itself of excess depot maintenance capacity and consolidate workload from five to three depots (ground, air and communication/electronics). DoD's recommendations on Letterkenny and Red River provide the optimum savings while supporting our core wartime requirements. They earned the support of the Secretary of Defense's Joint Cross Service Group. Tobyhanna is our center of excellence for communications and electronics. Closing it would directly contradict the Army's own military value assessment, which ranks Tobyhanna as the number one Army depot. It is the newest depot and least costly to operate. Our stationing strategy for the future calls for the retention of an electronics-oriented maintenance depot in order to meet the battlefield demands of the future. A fully digitized Army prepared to exploit information-age technology requires a modern depot capable of servicing and sustaining equipment. The cost to close Tobyhanna would be three times as great as realigning Letterkenny, DoD's current recommendation. Moreover, the savings would only be 25% as much over 20 years. Tobyhanna is an installation the Army must retain.

Letterkenny Depot. DoD's proposal to realign Letterkenny preserves DoD's missile consolidation effort, achieves substantial savings for a reasonable investment and reduces the overcapacity in ground equipment maintenance in the depot system. Alternatives to move tactical missile maintenance to Hill AFB would incur costs anywhere from four to nine times greater and produce significantly less in the way of savings. Extensive facility upgrades would be necessary to support tactical missile maintenance at Hill AFB. We do not see this as more feasible or desirable than the Army's and DoD's recommendation.

Space and Strategic Defense Command. The Army made a concerted effort to move activities out of leased space, when it was cost effective to do so. Our own analysis shows that moving Space and Strategic Defense Command to a nearby installation would have significant costs and take over 30 years to pay off. It would also disrupt preexisting plans to move SSSC along with the Program Executive Office - Missile Defense onto Redstone Arsenal at a later date. A decision to relocate Space and Strategic Defense Command from leased space would be a poor substitute for terminating the lease and disestablishing and redistributing the assets of Aviation and Troop Support Command. If unable to execute this plan as recommended, the Army will forfeit substantial savings from reductions in both management and facility overhead and forego the operational advantages of aligning its functions with related research and development centers at other locations.

Summary. Making the above four changes to the original list would cost

approximately \$200M more and save up to \$45M less than our original list and also incur greater operational risk. Investing in alternative BRAC recommendations that produce fewer savings would be at the expense of readiness and force modernization. We urge you to weigh the Army's assessment very carefully and hope you agree with us that these changes would be undesirable, unwarranted and unwise.

## ORIGINAL BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS

During the past few months, you have made extensive visits to our installations to observe their operations and listen to the sincere voices of the local communities and elected representatives. The Army has been listening, too. Their strong convictions and fervent opposition have our admiration. It is very moving to witness the great pride our friends and neighbors have in the Army and our installations. Nevertheless, with little exception, we are unaware of any compelling arguments that would cause us to change our original military judgment. However, we have learned new information which makes one realignment and two closures no longer viable. We have provided our recommendations to the Office of Secretary of Defense.

Dugway Proving Ground. The crux of our recommendation to close Dugway centered on the relocation of the chemical/biological testing elements to Aberdeen Proving Ground and smoke/obscurants testing elements to Yuma Proving Ground. Permit restrictions preclude conducting testing at these two sites, thereby obviating the relocation of the testing elements. Efforts to transfer English Village to the Utah National Guard were previously underway prior to the development of the BRAC 95 recommendation and would therefore require no action by the Commission to effect its disposal.

Caven Point, NJ, U.S. Army Reserve Center. The Army recommended closing and relocating this facility to Fort Hamilton, NY. While planning for implementation, it has been discovered that new construction (\$10.5M) is required to execute the move. The minor savings (\$137,000 annually) do not justify this expense. Furthermore, this new facility requires a larger area than is available for construction at Fort Hamilton.

Valley Grove, WV, Area Maintenance Support Activity. The Army recommended closing and relocating this facility to Kelly Support Center, PA. We have since learned that Congress added a construction project (\$6.8M) to build a new maintenance shop at the Wheeling-Ohio County Airport. The project is now underway, obviating the need to move to a new facility at Kelly Support Center.

We have also received new information which warrants minor modifications to several other recommendations:

Fitzsimons Medical Center, CO. The Army recommended closing this facility

and relocating its Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston. We recently learned that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) is evaluating several joint service training consolidation alternatives which might show it is more cost-effective to relocate the school elsewhere. Modifying the language of the recommendation so it does not specify the gaining location is desirable.

Sierra Army Depot, CA. The Army recommended realigning this facility, eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and retaining an enclave for operational project stocks. We have learned that we are unable to demilitarize all of the ammunition by 2001, necessitating the retention of some storage.

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. The Army recommended closing this facility, relocating the Eastern Area Command Headquarters and 1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth and retaining an enclave for Navy tenants. The Army's Military Traffic Management Command is considering an internal reorganization which could result in the merger of their area commands at another eastern installation besides Fort Monmouth. The Navy has indicated a preference for moving their activities. Modifying the language of the recommendation so it does not specify the gaining location or retention of an enclave is desirable.

We understand that the Commission may have questions for the Army in a number of areas, including the following:

Leased Facilities. The Army performed a military value analysis on leased facilities and concluded they all had low military value. We provided a detailed description of our assessment regarding the leased facility that houses Aviation and Troop Support Command in a letter to the Commission dated April 14, 1995. Our determination that this leased facility had low military value, coupled with the resulting financial savings and operational advantages, formed the basis for our recommendation.

Depots. The Army's recommendations to close Red River Depot and realign Letterkenny eliminate excess capacity and achieve significant savings. A single ground combat vehicle depot (Anniston) supports our peacetime requirements and can meet surge requirements in the event there are two major regional contingencies.


Family Housing. Divestiture of family housing quarters reduces burdensome maintenance and repair costs and is a major part of the Army's overall housing strategy. The Army is closing housing areas that support small garrison and headquarters units and keeping those that support major troop concentrations. We must balance overall quality of life for the soldier with readiness and modernization of the U.S. Army.

Fort McClellan. We have furnished the environmental permits for Fort Leonard Wood in support of the training missions transferring from Fort McClellan. The Army is confident it can accomplish its smoke training mission while at the same time exercising good environmental stewardship.

## CONCLUSION

The Army's BRAC recommendations make it possible to stride confidently toward the 21st century unburdened by excess infrastructure. We continue to believe that our original recommendations are the right choices for the Army and for the nation. The Army must be allowed to divest of unnecessary infrastructure during this last round of BRAC or we run the risk of having scarce funds drain away from programs with higher priorities. We count on being able to reinvest these savings in the areas of equipment modernization, quality of life and training -- important components of current and future readiness.

Mr. Chairman, GEN Sullivan and I will be happy to answer your questions.



## ARMY PANEL

### COSTS AND SAVINGS

1. Secretary West: Within the last two weeks, the Army has submitted revised COBRAs on many of its recommendations to this Commission. **SLIDE** As this chart shows, the Commission's staff analysis shows both one-time costs being reduced 13 percent (\$1.1 billion to \$1.0 billion), annual recurring savings being reduced 12 percent (\$676 million to \$597 million), and the 20-year net present value being reduced 10 percent (\$7.5 billion to \$6.6 billion).

Do these correctly reflect the Army's program to be considered by this Commission?

What factor led to these substantial changes to the Army's recommendations?

2. General Sullivan: Costs and savings estimates for thirty out of forty five (67%) of the Army's recommendations have been revised since 1 March. This number is substantially higher than the number of Army costs and savings estimates revised for the 1993 round.

What factor led to the large number of revised costs and savings estimates received by the Commission over the last several weeks?

3. General Sullivan: The costs and savings' estimates for Fort Ritchie have been significantly changed since 1 March. In fact, Ft Ritchie represents 43% of the change in projected annual savings and 47% of the decrease in Net Present Value for the Army's recommendations.

In light of these facts, do you have any changes to propose to the recommendation for Fort Ritchie?

ARMY RECOMMENDATIONS

COST AND SAVINGS  
(\$ M)

	ANNUAL	20-YEAR
	<u>RECURRING SAVINGS</u>	<u>NET PRESENT VALUE</u>
INITIAL	1,139	7,502
REVISED	997	6,727
CHANGE	- 142	- 775
%	- 12.5 %	- 10.3 %
	- 11.7 %	

## MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

1. Secretary West: The Army's recommendations concerning Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas establish Reserve Component enclaves.

How do these recommendations save scarce training funds if operation and maintenance of the installation is expected to be transferred from the Active Army to the Reserve Components?

Won't the increases in costs and time to travel to other training areas more than offset the savings you expect to achieve and result in a decrease in readiness?

Will the Reserve Components be able to compete on an equal basis with Active Component forces for training areas to conduct annual training on Active Component installations or will they be required to schedule their densities around Active Component use?

2. General Sullivan: When you testified before us on March 7, you stated that the Army needs to put Reserve Component soldiers within 50 miles of an armory or equivalent facility and within 250 miles of some kind of training area so that at least 10 of the 14 days allocated to annual training can be devoted to training. It appears that some of the installations identified by the Army in the justification to its recommendation do not meet the training area standard.

Are the Army's recommendations consistent with this standard?

3. Secretary West: The Army's recommendations on Forts Pickett, Indiantown Gap, and Chaffee are not consistent in defining the enclaves (Pickett – "minimum essential training areas and facilities"; Indiantown Gap – "minimum essential facilities"; Chaffee -- "minimum essential building and ranges").

Should the definition of Reserve Component enclaves be consistent, that is state "minimum essential facilities, ranges and training areas"?

4. General Sullivan: The Army recently changed its COBRA on Fort Indiantown Gap to be consistent with data provided by the community. As a result, one-time costs decreased by 60 percent to \$5.1 million and annual recurring savings

decreased by 71 percent to \$6.7 million.

Do these annual recurring savings justify closing the installation and establishing a Reserve Component enclave that is likely to cost an equivalent amount to operate and maintain?

Why didn't the Army adjust the COBRAs for all installations in this category to reflect community input?

5. General Sullivan: How will the National Guard and other Reserve Component units receive the funding required to operate and maintain the enclaves remaining at Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Fort Pickett if the Commission adopts your recommendations, as the individual states in which the enclaves are located obviously aren't expected nor able to pay for those costs?
6. General D'Araujo: What is your perspective—your personal view—of the impact of the Army's recommendations for Major Training Areas on the National Guard's training and readiness, and future access to those training areas?

## HOUSING

1. Secretary West: The Army has several recommendations that result in closing a significant number of family housing units. All of these housing units are mainly at locations serving non-deployable units in urban areas. Most of them are also in high-cost areas, such as New York, Detroit, or San Juan, or remote areas, such as Dugway Proving Ground.

With the recent emphasis on quality of life in the military, how can the Army justify closing housing areas and increasing the out-of-pocket costs to its soldiers and their families, particularly the junior enlisted soldier?

2. Secretary West: The Army has a three-pronged strategy to meet the family housing requirements of the 21st century that includes a plus-up in funding, a program to dispose of excess or uneconomically repairable units, and transition to business operation/privatization.

Where do the Army's recommendations fit into this strategy?

Wouldn't it be better to allow initiatives that would privatize family housing develop and be implemented rather than adversely affecting the quality-of-life of more than 2,500 soldiers, civilians, and their families?

3. Secretary West: **SLIDE** This chart shows the Commission staff's evaluation of the costs associated with operating the housing at the designated installation and the increase in housing allowances based on current occupants.

Their analysis suggests that the projected savings of \$13.2 million from closing the housing at the 5 designated installations would be offset by increased housing allowances of \$11.2 million.

Do you still believe it to be a good decision to dispose of family housing at these installations to achieve marginal savings and as a result adversely affect the quality of life of the soldier and his family?

FAMILY HOUSING  
(\$K)

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>COST OF HOUSING</u>	<u>COST OF ALLOWANCES</u>	<u>ANNUAL SAVINGS</u>
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UT	789	671	118
FORT HAMILTON, NY	3,461	2,738	723
FORT TOTTEN, NY	1,688	1,058	630
PRICE SUPPORT CENTER, IL	1,192	1,160	32
SELFRIDGE ARMY GARRISON. MI	<u>6,063</u>	<u>5,535</u>	<u>528</u>
TOTAL	13,193	11,162	2,031

NOTE: DUGWAY COSTS HAVE BEEN OFFSET BY RENT PAID BY CIVILIAN OCCUPANTS (1,300).

4. Secretary West: Secretary Perry has stated two-thirds of military housing is substandard and only one-third meets current standards. The housing at Price and Selfridge meets DoD standards and has minimal deferred maintenance.

Is it a good business decision to close this housing?

## DEPOTS

1. General Sullivan: The Army's recommendations to close Red River Army Depot and realign Letterkenny Army Depot would reduce the Army's ground combat vehicle maintenance depot infrastructure to one depot – Anniston Army Depot. Numbers indicate that this would fully commit Anniston Army Depot in peacetime and, using Army forecasts, result in a 46% shortfall in wartime. This would require Anniston Army Depot to operate two 8-hour shifts, 7 days a week to support wartime sustainment requirements. In addition, there is a concern relating to retention of a single ground maintenance depot.

Is this a prudent risk for the Army to accept?

What measures are necessary to offset the wartime shortage in depot maintenance infrastructure?

2. Secretary West: Reduction to three depots in the Army inventory will maximize infrastructure and reduce excess. Communities have stated that a better method is to retain some infrastructure for teaming with industry. The foundation for this argument is that teaming with industry is beneficial to both DOD and the industry in sustaining peacetime requirements. DOD retains installation capacity for surge and industries gain access to quality facilities. In addition, these facilities would be readily available for wartime requirements.

Did the Army look at teaming with industry as an alternative to closing depots?

Should the Commission consider downsizing in the case of ground combat vehicle maintenance depots instead of closure as a way to offset the wartime infrastructure shortfall?

3. Secretary West: The recently published Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 24 May 1995, states that, "One impediment is how the services set core...." The conclusion is that current core exceeds real needs of the national security strategy in most cases. The Commission recommends that, "DOD move to a depot maintenance system relying on the private sector."

Is the Army confident that core adequately reflects requirements for support of the national security strategy?

4. All Panelists: How do you see the Army's recommendations on depots fitting with the recommendations of the Roles and Missions Commission in this area?
5. General Sullivan: Input from Army Materiel Command through The Army Basing Study shows a wartime projected ground vehicle workload associated with the 2-Major Regional Contingency scenario of 12.8 million direct labor hours. Maximum potential capacity of Anniston Army Depot is 4.5 million hours on a single eight hour shift five day workweek. Meeting wartime requirements would dictate a 114-hour workweek assuming that output and work schedule increase proportionally.

Is output directly proportional to increases in work schedule?

How would the Army be able to meet wartime requirements with just Anniston?

6. Secretary West: If this Commission should decide to realign Letterkenny Army Depot and keep Red River Army depot open:

Should the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission continue to be transferred to Anniston Army Depot or should this Commission redirect it to Red River Army Depot?

7. Secretary West: The Commission is considering consolidation of all services' tactical missile maintenance at Hill Air Force Base. What are your views on this proposed move?

## **MEDICAL**

1. **Secretary West:** The DoD recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center includes a specific recommendation to “relocate Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space.”

Would the needs of the Department be better met with less restrictive language, such as “... relocate CHAMPUS activities to a location to be determined during execution?”

2. **Secretary West:** It has come to the Commission’s attention that the Army is considering asking the Commission to change the recommendation pertaining to the relocation of the US Army Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston.

Is this correct?

To what location does the Army wish to send this organization if this Commission endorses the recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center?

## PORTS

1. General Sullivan: Defense officials, port authorities, and community groups have defended military ownership of CONUS ocean terminals with the arguments that the flexibility of staging equipment on-site and on short notice; the security of military property; and the capability to handle overweight, out-sized, and non-container equipment give military ports unique advantages unavailable at commercial ports.

Are those valid arguments?

Do they apply equally to Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal and Oakland Army Base?

If so, why is Oakland Army Base critical to Defense requirements and Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal excess infrastructure?

2. General Sullivan: The Army's operational blueprint for assessing ports states, in part, "There is no operational requirement to retain military ports whose primary capabilities can be duplicated at a commercial port." During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the majority of forces deployed through commercial ports. By seeking to retain Oakland Army Base, the Department would have the Commission accept that total commercial port capacity is insufficient to handle military deployment requirements – even though the Army today is significantly smaller than the structure supporting Operation Desert Storm.

What factors lead you to conclude the Army must continue to own and operate CONUS military ports when all other aspects of the structure are declining?

3. General Sullivan: Local Defense Department officials argued the need for Oakland Army Base on the merits of the port's criticality in deploying forces to Asia during a Major Regional Contingency. **SLIDE** Their analysis, apparently based on the 1994 12-division Army, shows that without Oakland Army Base major combat units will be seriously late arriving at their destinations. **SLIDE** The Commission staff's analysis of your stationing plan for the 10-division Army questions whether Oakland Army Base will deploy ANY combat units of the 5 and 1/3 division power projection corps.

Has the Department of the Army analyzed potential units deploying through Oakland Army Base modeled on the 10 division Army stationing plan?


If so, please share the results with the Commission.

If the argument for retaining Oakland Army Base is its use for sustaining operations, is not most sustaining materiel capable of being placed in containers?

4. General Sullivan: Commercial ports appear increasingly unwilling to guarantee staging and berthing access to military cargo within the 48-hour time frame of Port Planning Orders. They argue they need more time to clear facilities operating near capacity without seriously damaging their relationships with customers. The Maritime Administration has begun informal discussions with both civilian and military transportation officials on ways to increase notification times to commercial port authorities.


Do you believe it feasible to notify port authorities of military shipping requirements earlier in the deployment planning sequence?

# DEPLOYMENT FLOW TWELVE DIVISION FORCE



# DEPLOYMENT FLOW

## TEN DIVISION FORCE



## AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. Secretary West: The General Accounting Office, in its response to Commission questions on ammunition storage installations dated 1 June 1995, stated:

“Army officials have indicated that they are reexamining their BRAC recommendations for their ammunition depots in terms of whether they should retain an option to enclave areas at the affected depots for contingency storage needs.”

What conclusions did the Army’s reexamination yield?

Given that the rate of weapons demilitarization is highly dependent on funding and the amount of capacity retained in the system, can you estimate how long these enclaves will remain?

If the enclaves are to remain in place until no longer required, under what legal authority will the eventual closures be accomplished?

How will savings be accounted for?

2. Secretary West: According to certified Army data, Sierra Army Depot is the only installation at which START treaty-mandated destruction of rocket motors can be carried out.

How does the Department of Defense plan to meet those treaty obligations if the DoD recommendation to realign Sierra is accepted?

## **FORT McCLELLAN TO FORT LEONARD WOOD**

1. **Secretary West:** When you last appeared before the Commission, you indicated that the permitting process for the move of Fort McClellan was underway.

Please give the Commission a status report?

2. **General Sullivan:** The permit for smoke training issued by the state of Missouri limits smoke emissions to 3700 pounds during any 24-hour period. It also specifically prohibits the introduction of graphite, brass, or viscosity reducers into the smoke oil.

How will these restrictions affect Army smoke training?

Does the Army contemplate requesting amendment of this permit in the near term?

If so, how?

3. **Secretary West:** Were the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention considered by the Army when compiling its recommendations?

Which, if any, recommendations did the Convention affect?

4. **General Sullivan:** One criticism of the proposed move of the Chemical School is that the resulting turbulence would impair the nation's ability to deal with a proliferating chemical threat.

How confident are you that the move, if approved, could be accomplished without compromise to the Chemical School's mission?

## LEASES

1. Secretary West: The Missouri Congressional delegation and the community have expressed grave concern that the Army has not complied with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 by not performing installation assessments and military value analyses on its leased facilities. Yet there are recommendations concerning three leases – Aviation-Troop Command, Concepts Analysis Agency, and Information Systems Software Command.

Please explain why you believe the Army's recommendations concerning leases are consistent with the force structure and final selection criteria giving priority to military value, the first four criteria.

2. General Sullivan: What operational efficiencies will be gained by combining Aviation-Troop Command with the Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal?

Could similar efficiencies be achieved by combining Space and Strategic Defense Command and Missile Command?

3. Secretary West: The Army estimates 786 civilian positions could be eliminated by combining Aviation-Troop Command and Missile Command. However, the community believes the personnel saving are significantly overstated, and only 48 positions would be eliminated as shown on this chart.  
**SLIDE**

Please comment on each of the differences.

4. Secretary West: The community also argues that ATCOM could achieve the projected personnel savings by downsizing in place. Thus, avoiding the approximately \$100 million one time moving and military construction costs.

In your view, is this a valid argument?

## ATCOM PERSONNEL SAVINGS

<b>CLAIMED BY ARMY</b>	<b>786</b>
<b>ADDITIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS</b>	<b>- 205</b>
<b>AREA SUPPORT POSITIONS REMAINING IN ST. LOUIS</b>	<b>- 56</b>
<b>BASE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL NEEDED AT REDSTONE</b>	<b>- 90</b>
<b>MISSION SUPPORT PERSONNEL</b>	<b><u>- 387</u></b>
<b>COMMUNITY POSITION</b>	<b>48</b>

## **PROVING GROUNDS**

1. **General Sullivan**, Will Army's planned closure of English Village have a significant impact on the military value of Dugway Proving Ground?
2. **General Sullivan**: Has the Utah National Guard been successful in getting approval to take over English Village, and if so, is the estimated \$11 million transition cost likely to be funded?


## **MISCELLANEOUS**

1. **Secretary West:** The Army recommended the closure of Caven Point Army Reserve Center, New Jersey, and the Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, West Virginia.

However, based on information gathered as a result of the Commission staff's base visit, the Army revised the initial COBRAs pertaining to these two recommendations. Neither one is now economically feasible and the Caven Point recommendation is not operationally sound.

Does the Army want the Commission to reject those two recommendations?

2. **Secretary West / General Sullivan:** Are there any other recommendations that the Army wants the Commission to reject or change?



**OPENING STATEMENT: AIR FORCE WITNESSES**

**WE WILL NOW HEAR FROM SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE SHEILA E. WIDNALL. WITH SECRETARY WIDNALL IS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN**

**WE ALSO HAVE MAJOR GENERAL JAY D. BLUME, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND TRANSITION; AND JAMES BOATRIGHT, CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY.**

**IF THE AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES WILL PLEASE STAND AND RAISE THEIR RIGHT HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?**

**SECRETARY WIDNALL, YOU MAY BEGIN.**

# Document Separator

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
JUNE 14, 1995

Since the 6th of March, when I last had an opportunity to discuss with you the BRAC recommendations affecting Air Force installations, I know that you and your staff have been very busy with your review. The Air Force has also been working steadily to refine the cost and savings analysis associated with our BRAC 95 recommendations, and has provided you with updated COBRA products and additional information. This further consideration has reconfirmed my view that, with one exception that I will discuss later, the Secretary of Defense's recommendations represent the best choices for reduction of excess Air Force infrastructure considering current and future operational and fiscal requirements.

This morning, I would like to focus on some of the issues that have been raised by communities and your staff regarding our recommendations. Because the Commission added all five Air Force depot installations for consideration for closure or further realignment, and because of the very significant potential impact of that action, I will spend the majority of my time discussing depots. Let me state at the beginning, I strongly support the depot downsizing recommendation as the best, and indeed the only really viable course for reducing Air Force depot infrastructure and excess logistics capacity.

Our recommendation to downsize all our depot installations rather than to close any one or two of them has been the subject of considerable comment. Those critical of our recommendation have typically expressed the concern that failure to reduce depot infrastructure by a total closure will require a continued commitment of funds to support our depot bases. I would like to spend some time responding to this concern and other questions that have been posed concerning our approach.

The Air Force also initially assumed that the total closure of a depot base would be the best approach to reduce capacity. This assumption led our analysis until the overall Air Force BRAC picture began to take shape. As we began to view the funding obligations for the total Air Force package of potential actions, it became clear that our current budget would be very seriously affected by the substantial one-time costs associated with depot closures. In our March 6th testimony, the Air Force presented some of the relevant financial aspects that led me to insist that we examine other more innovative ways to reduce depot capacity and infrastructure. The result was our proposal to consolidate depot activities along the lines of technical repair centers. This proposal reduces infrastructure and capacity, ensures future efficiencies and savings and, at the same time, avoids the very significant one-time costs associated with the closure of such large and complex installations.

Some have suggested that the downsizing proposal achieves neither capacity nor infrastructure reduction but would simply result in empty, unused buildings on our logistic centers. This clearly is not the case. Early in the process, the Air Force analysis concluded that there is approximately one depot equivalent excess capacity, with approximately one and a half

depot equivalents of excess infrastructure, measured by square footage. Our site surveys identified over a depot's worth of excess capacity that would be eliminated through our recommendation. Infrastructure equivalent to one and a half depots has been specifically identified by building number for elimination or potential reuse by other agencies. As a result of the consolidation and downsizing initiative, both capacity and square footage will be dramatically reduced. The refined cost and savings estimates provided to your staff to accomplish these reductions, including some improved consolidations, indicate a one-time cost of \$233.5 million, annual savings of over \$92 million, and a Twenty Year Net Present Value savings of \$975.3 million.

I have previously addressed some of the issues related to manpower reductions and closure timing in a letter to you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to touch on them briefly here and then to emphasize some of the fiscal concerns that I have regarding this subject. As you know, the Commission staff has presented in previous hearings the possibility of substantially increased savings from depot closures if greater manpower reductions and faster closure schedules are assumed. They have suggested that the Air Force eliminates only seven percent of the depot positions in its closure scenarios. That figure, however, is based on eliminated positions measured against the entire population of an Air Force depot installation. It is extremely misleading, because depot-related positions may account for less than half of the total population of an Air Force depot installation. Operational missions, DoD and non-DoD tenants, and other Air Logistic Center functions account for a large segment of our depot base populations. The closure of a depot activity by itself would not reduce the manpower required for those other missions. Nor do we believe that relocation of workload to other depots would result in significant reductions of

manpower. Due to past workload consolidation efforts at our depots, there is very little redundant execution of workload at the different depots. As a result, most manpower positions and related equipment will have to be transferred to the depots receiving workload from a closed facility. There would be some manpower savings related to overhead and management functions, but they are already properly reflected in the Air Force analysis. Although the suggested use of higher assumed manpower savings may be appropriate for small, single-use depot maintenance facilities, this approach is not accurate or realistic for the very large, multi-faceted missions supported on Air Force logistics center installations. When measured properly against the depot-related manpower authorizations, Air Force scenarios eliminate between twelve and fifteen percent of the total ALC positions, including twenty percent of the overhead and over half of the Base Operating Support positions dedicated to running the installations.

More importantly, even assuming greater manpower savings does not alleviate the fundamental concern the Air Force faces in contemplating depot installation closures - that is, the cost to close. As I have previously discussed, the one-time costs associated with the closure of a depot, even for the various scenarios provided by your staff, are enormous -- indeed, the least expensive scenario is priced at over \$560 million. To understand the full impact of these costs, it is important also to consider their distribution by year. The nature of BRAC actions requires that expenses related to relocating missions and workload such as military construction be incurred early, to accommodate the necessary mission relocation before a closure can take place. Our current estimate of costs across Fiscal Years 1996 to 2001, compared to available budget resources, indicates considerable budget shortfalls in some years if the Commission approves all our original recommendations except the Kirtland AFB realignment. Although we have sufficient

funds to cover the one-time costs associated with these closure and realignment actions across the entire period, we have a shortfall in FYs 96 and 97 ranging from \$50 million to almost \$250 million in each year. We will likely deal with this short-term problem by delaying closure dates on certain actions, and thus moving expenses into later years, where funds remain.

We will not be able to do this if we have to close a depot. If, for example, a depot installation is closed, we will have a shortfall across the entire period in excess of \$317 million. There will be no reserve in the later years to solve the large shortfalls in the first several years. This problem would be further exacerbated if your staff's suggestion of earlier closures were followed, since more costs would be required in those earlier years. In either event, the closure of a depot would have dramatic adverse impacts on our budget and necessarily draw essential funds from other, top priority programs. We would have to draw from readiness, modernization and quality of life initiatives that are so critical to our future Air Force.

Quite simply, the methods suggested to increase savings and make a closure more attractive do not resolve our difficulties and do not make closure a fiscally viable alternative. The Air Force considered these very issues during its deliberations earlier this year and in reaching the difficult decision to downsize rather than close our depot installations. I continue to believe that a dispassionate review of the proposed reductions in capacity, square footage, and personnel, as well as the necessary constraints imposed by the operational and fiscal realities, will lead to the conclusion that the Air Force recommendation is prudent, cost effective, and the only responsible alternative. I strongly support it and urge you to do the same.

I would also like to address some of the recommendations concerning our Laboratory bases. We have devoted considerable attention to the closure of Rome Laboratory and the attendant costs. The refined costs presented to you as a result of our site survey are reliable estimates for implementing this recommendation. Splitting the functions of Rome Lab between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom Air Force Base has provided considerable efficiencies compared to a relocation to either site alone. We have also examined the costs of transferring the technical equipment involved and have included appropriate calibration and installation costs. This action is cost effective and operationally sound with a reasonable payback of the investment within six years. Of course, this action is also a significant step toward the broader goal of implementing cross-service consolidation of laboratory assets.

The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base is likewise sound and should be approved. In our subsequent review process, we have identified additional efficiencies, such as the School of Aerospace Medicine's use of lecture halls and other facilities currently used by the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. I am concerned, however, that the Commission may view the low costs for the cantonment option proposed by the San Antonio Community representatives as attractive. From my perspective, cantonment is not a viable option. The proposed cantonment would retain a substantial installation without its own support establishment, requiring cumbersome scheduling and travel for routine maintenance, personnel services, and other normal, day-to-day requirements. The large number of personnel who would remain at Brooks would not receive adequate support under the bare bones concept required by the cantonment. The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, with the

majority of its activities relocating to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, will achieve the long-term reduction in Laboratory capacity and infrastructure we need for a reasonable investment.

As the Secretary of Defense has communicated to you, the recommendation regarding the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base no longer represents a cost effective measure. With this one exception, I strongly urge the Commission to approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close or realign Air Force installations.

I would like to turn to General Fogleman now to provide additional comments on various operational considerations related to the recommendations.

# Document Separator

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

Like the Secretary, I appreciate this opportunity to address you once again on the Air Force recommendations for closure or realignment, as well as the installations added by you for consideration. The nature of my testimony today has to do with some very real operational concerns that I have about these additions.

First and foremost, in the large aircraft base category, I am strongly opposed to the closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base. I want to spend a few minutes on this subject so as to leave no doubt on where I stand on this important operational question. I believe we must retain the core tanker wing at Grand Forks. While I recognize the financial attractiveness of a full closure, I cannot overemphasize the need to place operational considerations ahead of potential savings in this instance.

Those operational considerations arise from the very nature of post-Cold War military operations. I say military, not Air Force, because all U.S. military components must shape their capabilities around the reality we face. That reality includes fewer forward-deployed forces, greater emphasis on short-notice contingencies and various operations other than war. The common need in all these actions is greater mobility. As you know, actions in the 1993 BRAC round firmly established Air Mobility Wings on each coast to concentrate resources for rapid

response and deployment support. During that same period, as AMC Commander I formed three core tanker wings, at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.

At that time I firmly believed that the organizational improvements, operational capabilities, and fiscal efficiencies of a core tanker wing were essential to our ability to respond quickly to the critical refueling requirements of the mobility mission. I am even more convinced today that the three core tanker wings was the right way to go. Grand Forks Air Force Base is positioned well to support not only these missions, but also requirements under the Single Integrated Operations Plan, or SIOP. I should note that, although we have indicated an abundance of tankers in this region, this measurement is based on a comparison of tanker resources to training requirements, not SIOP requirements or operational contingencies. The movement of Malmstrom Air Force Base tanker assets to MacDill Air Force Base, under the Air Force recommendation, will bring resources and requirements into a reasonable balance.

I've written you a letter that provides my rationale in some detail. The operational concerns have also been endorsed by the senior war fighters, CINC STRATCOM and CINC TRANSCOM, who share my thoughts and resolve for the Grand Forks tanker wing.

Let me offer some remarks on the Undergraduate Flying Training bases and our recommendation to close Reese Air Force Base. I understand and agree with the Commission's belief that the flying training bases are all excellent bases that effectively support their important

mission. It will not be easy to see Reese close, just as it has been difficult for every excellent installation closed in previous rounds. It is clear to me, however, that if the Air Force must close a UPT base, Reese is the right choice. The conclusion is reinforced by the fact that every analysis performed by the Air Staff, the Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training, and your staff has supported the closure of Reese Air Force Base.

There has been some question of the need to close a flying training base. The conclusion of Air Education and Training Command is that we have an excess capacity of one base. I understand that some would argue we will need more pilot production beyond the period analyzed in the BRAC process. At this point we are comfortable that we will be able to meet our foreseeable production requirements after the closure of Reese Air Force Base, if the joint initiatives that are beginning to mature reach full productivity.

Since the Commission added additional bases for consideration in the Air Force Reserve category, I want to make several comments on the alternatives. Let me begin by stating that our Air Reserve Component forces are critical as an integral part of the variety of post-Cold War operations that I referred to earlier. Our ability to continue to rely on our reserve forces requires that we recognize the need to support the unique recruiting and training requirements of those units. After careful review of the bases in these categories, we concluded that we could accommodate the reduction of one F-16 and one C-130 unit. Those reductions match the force reductions experienced as we drew down to a 20 fighter wing force. While further closures are

Perhaps possible from an "iron-on-the-ramp" perspective, closure of additional units would mean the removal of units from prime recruiting and retention locations.

It would also mean a reduction in presence in a number of communities. There is no better way to communicate to the American public the reality of military actions than when co-workers and neighbors see their friends don uniforms and serve as pilots, crew chiefs, and countless other critical positions. These various factors, unique to reserve and guard units, make it clear that no more than the recommended reductions should be acted upon.

Beyond these general statements, I wholeheartedly support the Secretary's initiative on the potential inactivation of the Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare International Airport. Selecting this unit as the C-130 unit to inactivate and providing an opportunity for the City of Chicago to relocate the Air National Guard activity at their expense provides a reasonable solution to our need to inactivate a reserve unit and their desire to obtain the entire property.

On the issue of Reserve F-16 bases, I cannot agree with any action considered by the Commission that would result in the inactivation of the unit at NAS Fort Worth Carswell Field. The collocation of Navy and Air Force reserve operations at that location, recommended by the 1993 BRAC Commission, has proven to be a real success story. For the Air Force Reserve, it represents a cost-effective tenant operation in a location that is superb for recruiting and retention. Because of its location on a military installation, few savings to the Department of Defense will result from its closure. Disrupting this model installation is simply unjustified.

I have emphasized the operational aspects of the various actions under consideration, because my job is to ensure that we can carry out the missions we are assigned. I want however, also to add a word on the issue of depot closure. I understand very well those who call for the closure of an Air Force depot in BRAC. It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in the manner that best serves the total operational mission of the Air Force. To do otherwise, to force the Air Force to absorb the enormous costs associated with a depot closure, would directly and adversely impact modernization, readiness and the quality of life initiatives that are so important to our people.

As the Secretary discussed, reducing excess capacity by closing a depot would severely harm the very programs that we are committed to protecting -- programs that ensure an effective Air Force of the future. And it is unnecessary. The downsizing initiative presents a very attractive and viable alternative to achieve the necessary reductions without crippling our budget. Does it go as far as closure? No, but it does achieve comparable reductions that will ease the pressure that excess capacity places on our budget. I believe it is the only responsible approach to this issue, and wholeheartedly support it.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

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
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The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base is likewise sound and should be approved. In our subsequent review process, we have identified additional efficiencies, such as the School of Aerospace Medicine's use of lecture halls and other facilities currently used by the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. I am concerned, however, that the Commission may view the low costs for the cantonment option proposed by the San Antonio Community representatives as attractive. From my perspective, cantonment is not a viable option. The proposed cantonment would retain a substantial installation without its own support establishment, requiring cumbersome scheduling and travel for routine maintenance, personnel services, and other normal, day-to-day requirements. The large number of personnel who would remain at Brooks would not receive adequate support under the bare bones concept required by the cantonment. The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, with the

majority of its activities relocating to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, will achieve the long-term reduction in Laboratory capacity and infrastructure we need for a reasonable investment.

As the Secretary of Defense has communicated to you, the recommendation regarding the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base no longer represents a cost effective measure. With this one exception, I strongly urge the Commission to approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close or realign Air Force installations.

I would like to turn to General Fogleman now to provide additional comments on various operational considerations related to the recommendations.



## **AIR FORCE PANEL**

### **GENERAL**

1. General Fogleman: In the last four years, the Air Force basing decisions have been strongly influenced by a “One Base, One Wing, One Boss” concept.

With a vast amount of excess infrastructure and declining budgets why does it make sense for the Air Force to continue to adhere to this concept?

Why is it not cost effective and efficient to operate multi-mission bases today when it was effective and efficient for more than 30 years?

## **DEPOTS**

1. **Secretary Widnall:** You have testified that closing air logistics centers is not affordable because of the high initial cost and relatively slow return on investment.

Secretary Perry's decision to withdraw the recommendation to realign Kirtland Air Force base, frees up \$278 million in closing costs. Adding this amount to the \$127 million currently projected as the cost of the Air Force depot downsizing initiative provides a total of \$405 million, or 70 percent of your estimated cost to close one of the Air Force depots.

Do you still see the cost to close as a major impediment to closing an Air Force depot in light of the decision on Kirtland?

2. **Secretary Widnall:** In a written response to the Commission, General Blume addressed the 15 percent productivity savings assumed in your depot downsizing option by noting that:

"Nothing was revealed during the [Air Force's] site surveys that challenged the 15% productivity improvement planning factor. Savings above 15% are expected in many cases, and savings below 15% may occur in some instances. On the whole, the site surveys support the planned savings of approximately 15 percent."

In our visits to the Air Force's depots over the past three weeks, we have seen that each depot has machine shops, plating facilities and software support facilities, to name just a few examples.

Why isn't it reasonable to assume that any closure of a depot would yield efficiencies and manpower savings in these kinds of activities, rather than require the transfer of every position in these activities to the receiving depot as the Air Force assumed in its analysis?

If the 15% productivity manpower savings in your depot downsizing option was applied to a depot closure, wouldn't that make the annual savings from a depot closure economically attractive?

3. Secretary Widnall: If the Commission decided to close 1 or 2 Air Force depots, do you think the workload should be transferred to other Air Force depots or should the Commission look for opportunities to cross-service this workload in other Services' depots or transfer some of the workload to the private sector?

4. Secretary Widnall: How much of the depot workload should be interserviced if the Commission closes one or two Air Force depots?

5. Secretary Widnall: The Commission staff received two revisions to the Air Force's depot BRAC recommendation. However, the Commission has not formally received a revised BRAC position

Which downsizing proposal represents your BRAC position?

What would be the impact on the Air Force if the Commission approved the March 1 version of the depot BRAC recommendation?

6. Secretary Widnall: The Air Force's recommendation to downsize air logistics centers is clearly a work still in progress. If the Commission were to approve the Air Force's BRAC recommendation in either its initial or revised forms, the force of law would be behind its implementation.

How would you effect changes to the downsizing plan if you found that it needed to be altered again?

7. Secretary Widnall: You have testified that closing air logistics centers is not affordable because of the high initial cost and relatively slow return on investment. But COBRA results are very sensitive to assumptions regarding personnel reductions. For example, had the Air Force used assumptions similar to those used by other Services, the savings from Air Force depot installation closures would have risen rather dramatically.

Did you review the assumptions behind your closure COBRAs to determine if they could be made more cost effective?

Was any sensitivity analysis done on these assumptions?

8. Major General Blume: McClellan Air Force Base personnel indicated that the Air Force may have miscalculated their depot's functional value. They asserted a simple summation of commodity scores would rank McClellan's depot number one.

Would you comment on this McClellan analysis?

9. General Fogleman: Hill Air Force Base community representatives believe the tactical missile guidance and control section workload could be assigned to Hill for little or no additional costs. They say experienced personnel, equipment, and facilities are already in place to handle the work.

Do you agree with this assessment?

10. Secretary Widnall: The COBRA cost/savings model does not recognize as a savings the annual facility and equipment investment requirement, most of which is deleted when a base closes. In the case of an air logistics center base, this infrastructure and equipment cost is about \$3 billion. If replaced every 60 years, the annual investment approaches \$50 million. Closing bases deletes this requirement at the closed base and allows concentration at the remaining bases.

Since the COBRA is a comparative tool, why isn't this \$50 million real savings being recognized as a savings and used for decision purposes?

## **TEST AND EVALUATION**

1. General Fogleman: The estimated cost of moving the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor (REDCAP) and Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) to Edwards AFB, CA has more than doubled. As a result, the return on investment period for each of these actions has increased significantly.

In view of these increases, do you still believe the effort to consolidate electronic warfare test facilities at Edwards AFB is more cost-effective than, and thus preferable to, electronically linking these facilities at their current locations?

2. Secretary Widnall: In what way does the Air Force plan to comply with Congressional direction that a "Master Plan" be developed before relocation of any electronic combat equipment?

## **BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, TX**

1. Major General Blume: The latest Air Force numbers reveal a one time cost of \$211 million to close Brooks AFB and annual savings of \$32.2 million. The San Antonio community cantonment proposal shows a one time cost to close of \$11 million and annual savings of \$17.6 million as well as a more favorable net present value.

Given these significant cost savings, does the Air Force still support the complete closure of Brooks?

2. Major General Blume: During a hearing before this Commission on March 6, you indicated you would provide the Air Force position regarding retention of the housing on Brooks for use by military personnel assigned to other installations in the San Antonio area if Brooks is closed.

Can you tell us now what the Air Force position is regarding retention of Brooks housing if the base closes?

## **ROME LAB**

1. Mr. Boatright: The most recent Air Force estimate for the one time cost to close the Rome Lab has increased from \$52.8 million to \$79.8 million. The latest Commission staff estimate for that cost is \$118.6 million. The Commission staff estimate also reduces the annual savings from of \$13 million to \$5.9 million and increases the return on investment period from 6 years to 31 years.

Does the Air Force still support closure of Rome Lab?

## **GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, ND**

1. **General Fogleman**: The Commission has received letters from you, the Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic Command, the Commander-in-Chief of United States Transportation Command, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense regarding the significant military value of the core tanker mission at Grand Forks AFB. In your judgment, is there any alternative location which could satisfy the core tanker requirement if Grand Forks AFB were to be closed?
2. **Secretary Widnall**: Deputy Secretary Deutch notified the Commission on May 9th that a legal review by representatives of DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council Staff had concluded "there will be no determination by the Secretary that would require retention of the missile group at Grand Forks."

Under the Department's recommendation, will any ICBMs or silos remain in place after inactivation of the 321st Missile Group?

Would a Commission recommendation to close all facilities in the ICBM field have a detrimental impact on the interagency position

If the 321st Missile Group is inactivated and all ICBMs are removed from Grand Forks Air Force Base, does Grand Forks Air Force Base remain an ABM site under the terms of the ABM treaty?

If the 321st Missile Group is inactivated, will it be necessary to demolish or relocate any of the Grand Forks ABM facilities?

Are there any ABM-related costs associated with the recommendation to inactivate the 321st Missile Group? If so, what are these costs, and will they be considered as part of inactivation?

## UPT BASES

1. General Fogleman: How much capability will the Air Force retain to increase pilot production in the future if one Undergraduate Pilot Training base is closed by this Commission?

2. General Fogleman: We understand the Air Force is considering plans to reconfigure its Undergraduate Pilot Training bases in accordance with a "training track" syllabus, so that some training tracks will be accomplished only at specific UPT bases.

In what way will this initiative be affected by closure of any particular UPT base?

3. Secretary Widnall: If the Commission rejects the DoD recommendation to close Reese AFB, TX, what action do you believe we should take--substitute another UPT base or simply close none?

## C-130 RESERVE BASES

1. General Fogleman: It appears that some C-130 Air Reserve units share some of the same recruiting areas, such as Pittsburgh and Youngstown , or Chicago and Milwaukee. If one of these locations were closed, reservists could choose to remain in the Reserves by transferring to the other nearby unit if positions were available. On the other hand, it appears that the Reserve units in Niagara Falls and Minneapolis-St. Paul do not share recruiting areas with any other unit. Thus, if one of these locations were closed, their reservists would likely be lost.

If this is the case, should the Commission take the proximity of some of the units into consideration?

Did the Air Force take the proximity of Pittsburgh and Youngstown into consideration , in its decision to recommend Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station for closure?

2. General Fogleman: The Air Force is planning to expand the Air Reserve Station at Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport to support 16 C-130 aircraft.

Is the expense of this expansion prudent in light of the excess capacity that exists at other C-130 installations?

Is the Air Force concerned about the unit's ability to recruit the number and type of personnel required to support a 16 aircraft wing?

3. General Fogleman: Inasmuch as the Air Force identified an excess capacity of two Reserve C-130 bases and plans to retire 12 C-130 aircraft from the Air Force Reserve inventory by the beginning of FY1997, why wouldn't it be beneficial to close one site and retire aircraft and close a second site and relocate aircraft to other suitable units?

4. Secretary Widnall: If the Commission adopts your recent recommendation to inactivate the C-130 Air Force Reserve unit at Chicago O'Hare, what are the Air Force's specific plans for the Air National Guard KC-135 unit at the site?

5. Secretary Widnall: Would you please provide the Commission the further details on O'Hare you mentioned in your June 9th letter?

## **HOMESTEAD AIR RESERVE BASE, FL**

1. General Fogleman: As the Commission prepares for its final deliberations, it would be helpful if we could have your views on Homestead Air Reserve Base's military value. Please comment on its value as a staging/divert base for Caribbean operations and as a peacetime training location as well as any other activities you believe to be militarily significant.

If the Commission were to close Homestead, would the Air Force lose its access to supersonic airspace presently used for training at Homestead?

If the Commission were to close Homestead, does the Air Force have an appropriate staging base to make use of that airspace?

**301ST FIGHTER WING, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
FORT WORTH JOINT RESERVE BASE, TX**

1. General Fogleman: In a May 19, 1995 memo to you, Major General Robert McIntosh, Chief of Air Force Reserve, stated Homestead Air Reserve Base and the 301st Fighter Wing at Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base should remain open regardless of the disposition of Bergstrom Air Reserve Base. He added if Bergstrom is not closed by the Commission, the Air Force will use conversion actions to meet F-16 program requirements.

What conversion actions would the Air Force use in this scenario?

2. General Fogleman: If the 301st Fighter Wing is inactivated, how will Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base be affected in terms of joint training, readiness, and cost savings?

## **BERGSTROM AIR RESERVE BASE, TX**

1. Mr. Boatright: You have been quoted during this process as well as during the 1993 process on commitments made to the Austin community regarding Bergstrom ARB, TX and the city's plans to develop an international airport at Bergstrom. Those filmed comments as well as the Commission's concerns regarding recruiting resulted in a rejection of the Secretary's recommendation in 1993.

Mr. Boatright, would you like to comment on your commitments to the Austin, Texas community and the relationship of those comments and the 1993 Commission recommendation to the Air Force 1995 proposal to close Bergstrom ARB?

## ONIZUKA AIR STATION, CA

1. Secretary Widnall: It is our understanding the Air Force would like to close Onizuka Air Station once the classified tenants' missions phase out or "fly out."

Do you believe realigning Onizuka at this time is still warranted, given the significant decrease in cost savings--down from \$30.3M to \$16.1M--in the revised COBRA analysis?

2. General Fogleman: The United States has a requirement for satellite control redundancy.

Is it correct to conclude that this redundancy no longer needs to be provided by a dual-node backup system?

## ROSLYN AIR GUARD STATION, NY


1. Major General Blume: In a recent letter to the Commission you stated that the site survey regarding the closure of Roslyn Air Guard Station revealed that the costs to relocate the unit have increased substantially, but you are now including proceeds from the sale of the station's property to offset these increased costs. It is our understanding that this recommendation is cost-effective only if the proceeds from the sale of this property are used.

Since you have not included such proceeds in any other BRAC 95 calculation, and DoD policy generally considers realization of proceeds from property sales unlikely, why is the Air Force planning to use proceeds from property sales at Roslyn to offset relocation costs?

## **NEWARK AIR FORCE BASE, OH**

1. Secretary Widnall: Senator Glenn has asked the Commission to review the 1993 decision to close Newark Air Force Base in light of the GAO report indicating the cost-to-close Newark had doubled and the annual recurring savings from closing Newark will not be realized. Members of the Air Staff have told the Commission staff the Air Force is prepared to proceed with privatization-in-place at Newark, pending a final decision from you.

Please tell the Commission your plans in this matter.





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
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**ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN**

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**RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)**  
**MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)**  
**WENDI LOUISE STEELE**

**OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DIXON**

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY FROM  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS**

**AFTERNOON SESSION**

**Washington, D.C.**

**June 14, 1995**

**GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.**

**THIS AFTERNOON, WE WILL BEGIN WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NAVY, WHO WILL BE WITH US UNTIL 2:30 P.M. THEY ARE:**

**\* THE HONORABLE JOHN H. DALTON, THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY;**

**\* ADMIRAL J.M. BOORDA, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS;**

**\* GENERAL CARL E. MUNDY, JR., THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS; AND**


**\* THE HONORABLE ROBIN B. PIRIE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT.**

**AT 2:30 P.M., WE WILL WELCOME JOSHUA GOTBAUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY; ROBERT E. BAYER, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INSTALLATIONS; GENERAL GEORGE T. BABBITT, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY; AND MARGE MCMANAMAY, BRAC TEAM CHIEF FOR THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY.**

**IF THE PANELISTS WILL PLEASE RISE AND RAISE THEIR RIGHT HANDS,  
I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU  
ARE ABOUT TO GIVE BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND  
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH  
AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?**

**SECRETARY DALTON, YOU MAY BEGIN.**



Remarks as prepared for delivery by  
The Honorable John H. Dalton  
Secretary of the Navy  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
Washington, D.C.  
14 June 1995

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, it is, once again, an honor for me to appear before you. Today I will present our position on the installations which the Commission added to the list for consideration on May 10, 1995.

In approaching this assignment I must reiterate our objective in this round of base closure: to achieve a more streamlined, efficiently located, and responsive baseline of support, capable of meeting the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps. We in the Department of the Navy continue to have confidence in our previous recommendations. When taken together with the decisions made in prior rounds, we believe these recommendations are the right recommendations for the Department -- recommendations that result in an infrastructure able to support the forward deployed, Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary force that projects this nation's resolve around the world. In my testimony before you on March 6th, I reviewed our recommendations in detail and explained the basis for them. While I will not repeat that description of our analysis, I am prepared to answer any questions on our recommendations and process.

My purpose today, Mr. Chairman, is to speak specifically about that portion of the Commission's expanded list of Department of Defense recommendations which relate to the Navy and Marine Corps. I recognize and applaud the care and diligence that you and your staff have brought to the process. There are five basic areas of additions that I believe warrant your careful reflection. I will address them starting with our valuable assets on the Atlantic and then move to the Pacific area.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is an integral component of our nuclear powered fast attack submarine program and mission. It is extremely important for the support of our SSNs and the Department of the Navy's depot infrastructure. Following on the four ship maintenance depot closures that have already been approved in the base closure process and one closure conducted outside of the process, our recommendation to close the Long Beach Naval Shipyard and the Ship Repair Facility in Guam reduce the remaining excess capacity by about half. To reduce this excess further, our recommendation transfers additional depot workload to the remaining shipyards from other Department activities, predominantly technical centers.

Including our present recommendations, we will have left only five of the original 12 ship depot activities, resulting in two per fleet and one overseas in the Western Pacific. Each of the remaining four shipyards is nuclear capable, thus providing robust support and the required flexibility for all aspects of fleet operational readiness.

The Commission's proposal to close Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would bring the excess capacity in our shipyards down to about one-percent - creating an unacceptable level of risk as we strive to support ever-increasing global initiatives with dwindling numbers.

The retention of some excess shipyard capacity was not an oversight, Mr. Chairman. It was a military judgment decision by senior Department of the Navy military and civilian leadership. This conscious decision was made to provide necessary flexibility to meet future uncertainties in nuclear shipyard requirements. Let me speak for a moment about the uncertainty of future requirements. Mr. Chairman, the ultimate size and nature of the nuclear submarine fleet is in the throes of dramatic and fluid changes. The SSN force level is projected to decline by nearly 50 percent. There is debate concerning introduction of new classes of submarines. These factors, as well as world events, affect decisions on whether to refuel or to defuel our Los Angeles Class fast attack submarines. These boats are the backbone of our submarine force. Decisions to refuel, defuel or inactivate nuclear powered submarines have a significant impact on nuclear depot workload to be assigned to Portsmouth. Our recommendation, which retains Portsmouth, protects nuclear capacity for greater flexibility.

Whatever the future holds, it is clear that the SSN 688 attack submarine will be the mainstay of our submarine fleet into the next millennium. In that context, it is important to remember that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard currently is the center of excellence for our SSN 688 class submarine depot maintenance. It is the only planning yard within the Navy where engineering modifications and maintenance procedures are designed for this class of submarine. As the regional maintenance hub of the Northeast Region, it is within 170 miles of the major submarine concentration at New London, Connecticut. Twenty-two of 57 SSN 688 class major depot availabilities are planned to be performed at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard through Fiscal Year 2005. That's 39 percent of the availabilities for major submarine depot maintenance. The anticipated nuclear workload for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 requires four nuclear shipyards, and there is no room for any slippage. Delays of any kind could result in the removal of ships from the operating fleet. When a SSN 688 submarine reaches the end of its 120 month operating cycle, it is restricted from submerging and is lost as a fleet operational asset. Without Portsmouth, our remaining drydocks and facilities

would have to be scheduled "heel-to-toe." There would be no time allowed for required maintenance of the drydocks themselves, and considerable schedule adjustments would have to be made for non-SSN ships. If any significant accident occurs or emergent repair is required, or if any ship maintenance availability is altered for any reason, and we will have fast attack submarines surfaced and tied up at the dock waiting for maintenance. In our opinion, Mr. Chairman, we would be operating on, and perhaps over, the edge, and be in jeopardy of not meeting our global commitments.

The question might be asked, "What about private shipyards?" Mr. Chairman, no SSN refueling workload is available or manned in the private sector. The Department estimates it would take about three years to stand-up and man such a facility at a cost of between \$45-100 million. Skeptics point to Electric Boat Company in Groton, Connecticut as a potential refueling source, but Groton has not refueled any type of submarine for over 20 years and does not currently have the necessary facilities to do so. While Newport News Ship Building Company has previously refueled fleet ballistic missile submarines, it does not currently have the facilities for Los Angeles Class, fast attack submarines. If you seriously contemplate a private shipyard, consideration must be given to the requirement to extensively train and maintain a dedicated private workforce in place, under contract. You can't begin such an effort when the problem emerges - it just takes too long. Therefore, we believe that assignment to the private sector is not a prudent choice. The cost of closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and then replicating it in the private sector just doesn't make sense.

Mr. Chairman, the right answer, the essential answer, is to retain Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Maintaining a modest nuclear excess capacity provides the flexibility and a critical hedge against future uncertainties. This retention is absolutely necessary to meet the requirements of the future force structure, given both maintenance and operational constraints.

Turning now to Naval Air Station Atlanta, Chairman Dixon, we believe NAS Atlanta is a cornerstone of the future Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Force.

After BRAC-93 was completed, Naval Reserve Air Station excess capacity was still at 27 percent. In order to reduce that excess, in this round we recommended the closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth, leaving a more acceptable excess capacity of about 15 percent in Reserve Air Stations. At the same time, our analysis of active duty air facilities showed that the nearby Brunswick, Maine Air Station would have only been at 50-percent loading by Fiscal Year 2001. Further research revealed that, by transferring the reserve P-3 and C-130 squadrons from South

Weymouth to the active Air Station at Brunswick, we could bring that facility up to 75 percent of its capacity. This also furthers the integration of active and reserve force structure. For these reasons we recommended closing NAS South Weymouth.

Since BRAC-91, 40 percent of our Naval Reserve Air Stations have been closed in major demographic areas such as Chicago, Detroit, and Memphis. By accepting the Department's plan this round for reserve and active duty assets, all remaining reserve air stations will be JOINT facilities, like the new joint activity at NAS Fort Worth.

When we evaluated closing the Reserve Air Station at Atlanta, a number of factors became evident. For example, NAS Atlanta has low overhead because of its adjacent location to Dobbins Reserve Air Force Base. The synergies created by Dobbins maintaining the runway, and NAS Atlanta operating the medical facilities, are examples of how six reserve components at this joint facility have woven a network of operations that reduces costs for all. NAS Atlanta is our least expensive Reserve Naval Air Station to operate by over \$4.5 million a year. Coupled with Dobbins, it is already, in essence, a joint base. Like the facility created by the BRAC-93 process at Fort Worth, NAS Atlanta, if left open, will be a model for the future of the Joint Reserve Force.

Turning now to demographics, the population of Atlanta has grown more than 40 percent from 1980 to 1992. This is a very positive trend for purposes of Reserve recruiting. In addition, Atlanta is a major airline hub with over 35,000 air transportation employees providing civilian job skills that are easily transferrable and critically important to the Navy and Marine Corps Air Reserve Units in Atlanta. The Marine Corps Reserve considers Atlanta absolutely pivotal to its future unit manning projections. The Marine Corps has chosen to regionalize its reserve forces, and the Atlanta area is the regional Marine Corps Reserve Base for the Southeastern United States. Relocating the Marine Corps Reserve would require us to build excess capacity at other locations in the region and expend up to \$63 million in new military construction to support the Marine Reserves.

The snapshot used in our military value matrix did not show high scores in this demographic area. As a result we undertook a more complete analysis. It reveals that the anomaly was due to the moving of new, only partially manned Marine Corps Reserve units to Atlanta just three months before the demographics were measured. Therefore, these units had not been completely formed. Further our analysis shows that the more mature Air Force Reserve units on the base complex at Dobbins are manned in excess of 100 percent. This, we believe, shows the more complete richness of the demographic base in Atlanta.

Another strength of Atlanta is its geographic location. It is positioned equidistant from fleet concentrations in Norfolk and Jacksonville, making it the ideal location for support of the personnel and cargo transport needs of the Fleet Commanders. It is also the best location for an important Naval Reserve E-2 Squadron in its crucial role of Caribbean drug interdiction operations.

Mr. Chairman, your objective and ours is to reduce excess capacity. Closing NAS Atlanta would require the Department to create additional capacity at other air stations, while incurring one time costs of from between \$73 and \$89 million, which certainly does not meet our common objective. Since NAS Atlanta can accommodate and man the three additional squadrons proposed to be stationed there, with no military construction expenditures, we believe NAS Atlanta should remain open as an important part of our Navy-Marine Corps Air Reserve structure and our future Navy and Marine Corps Total Force.

With regard to the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at Point Mugu, California, the Department of the Navy feels strongly that Point Mugu is a critical national asset for research, development, training and engineering for the Navy.

The Point Mugu Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division has been studied extensively in BRAC -91, -93, and -95. BRAC-91 resulted in a major consolidation of the China Lake and Point Mugu sites. The actions and realignments to date have focused on the purification of functions to eliminate duplications and to intertwine organizations. The managers at Point Mugu and China Lake have direct line responsibilities for personnel and functions residing at both sites. BRAC-91 and subsequent management actions have already reduced staffing at China Lake and Point Mugu by 2,000 employees. We now have an efficient, irreplaceable set of land and sea ranges collocated with and integral to research and development laboratories that are unique within the Department of Defense. As a result of these actions, China Lake and Point Mugu now rate number one and two in military value among all Navy technical activities.

Aggressive BRAC-93 and -95 analyses shows that Point Mugu is an asset with capabilities and capacities critical to the Department of Defense. For example, all the air tracking for Southern California Offshore Training Ranges and Fleet exercises are controlled at these facilities, along with the range safety control for the Sea Test Range. Emergency airfield services are provided, as well as air target presentations for weapons exercises at sea. The Point Mugu Air Warfare Center provides development, testing and in-service engineering for weapons and platforms not only for the Navy but for all military departments. This is an important test site for the Tomahawk, AMRAAM, SPARROW, SIDEWINDER, HARM, SLAM, Minuteman, and Peacekeeper weapons systems, as well as the AEGIS and F-14 and EA-6B systems.

Point Mugu also provides a broad range of support for Naval Reserve and Air National Guard and active forces. In addition, the training and air embarkation and weapons qualification facilities for Pacific Fleet SEABEES are located at Point Mugu.

The closure of this facility would provide no reduction in numbers of technical personnel, even if all Point Mugu research and development functions were transferred. And, there would only be limited reductions in base support staff, since most would still be required to support the test range.

Mr. Chairman, there are no specific functions being performed at Point Mugu that are already being performed at any other Department of Defense sites. Although there are other Defense Department sites that do similar things, in order for them to absorb Point Mugu functions, those operations would have to be replicated or relocated. As a result of the '91 round of base closure, facilities and capabilities located at Point Mugu are uniquely tailored to support the specific functions that are tied to physical capabilities of Point Mugu. No other Department of Defense sea range has an equivalent or acceptable combination of geographic diversity, available air, sea space, deep water, connectivity with other Department of Defense research and development sites, and proximity to fleet concentrations.

Chairman Dixon and Commissioners, the current integrated mix of facilities and capabilities at the China Lake and Point Mugu sites represents five years of consolidation and realignment efforts. Redundant organization structures and functions have been eliminated. The remaining functions are critical. The Navy has already accomplished significant infrastructure reductions with the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division in the smartest and most economical manner. It is our belief that spreading the Point Mugu functions to several other locations would undermine the unique synergy created through the previous BRAC rounds.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I want to clarify what I believe is a significant point concerning the Public Works Center at Guam. This facility was not recommended to me for closure. It was, however, very thoroughly considered by the group that I charged with the responsibility of developing base closure and realignment recommendations. It was their determination that, with the retention of the Telecommunications Center, the Naval Magazine, the Naval Hospital and other government facilities with a total of more than 3,300 personnel, plus approximately 2,600 personnel assigned by the Air Force, there was more than a sufficient customer base to warrant retention of a public works center. The alternative was the establishment of a public works department at each one of those activities, which is the standard practice in the Department of the Navy when there is not a public works center to consolidate and take care of numerous collocated

operations. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, the size of a public works center is going to be dependent on the number of operations it supports. Given the current size of the activities being supported, we believe the appropriate course of action is as we recommended, the retention of the Public Works Center Guam. Additionally, we have already begun a dialogue with the Government of Guam, and we are looking at turning over for reuse many of the facilities that we have recommended closing. We will continue to have a robust presence on Guam, and our use of Guam will continue at a pace that will make a public works center a necessary activity to support not only those Navy activities that are on the island, but also those who require access to the land and facilities for a variety of military purposes.

The four activities in California added by the Commission were not a surprise. The General Accounting Office's report to the Commission clearly recommended further scrutiny of the decision to remove these facilities from the Department of Navy list. However, I still believe that my decision was the equitable thing to do. The job losses in California portrayed to me were disproportionate, aside from the economic impact. Because there were no overwhelming cost savings to the taxpayer, as was the case with the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, I determined that the correct thing to do was not to engage in any further closures that would result in civilian job losses. Accordingly, I support the retention of the Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona; the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Francisco; Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San Francisco; and Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland. Mr. Chairman, please remember that California was not given a free ride in this round of base closure. Given the force basing adjustments and the proposed closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, California will lose 2,500 military and 2,300 civilian jobs.

Mr. Chairman, as the result of further analysis by your staff, and the discussions they have had with affected communities and with my base closure staff, it has been suggested that I address certain specific issues relating to the Department of the Navy's recommendations.

I would like first to reemphasize the obvious fact that our budgetary top line has come down dramatically. Frankly, we can no longer afford to keep bases for which we have no mission requirement. Such is the case with Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska and Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak, Maryland. There are no active or reserve squadrons stationed on Adak. All of the major tenants have disestablished or are closing their facilities and relocating. In short, Mr. Chairman, Naval Air Facility, Adak is a facility that costs \$25 million a year to operate and has no mission. With regard to Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak, the Department of the Navy has no requirement

to retain the technical facilities at White Oak, and no Department of Defense or government agency has identified a requirement significant enough to motivate them to fully support those facilities.

Additionally, our force and resource levels have gone down to the point that we just do not need certain things any longer to get the work done. In the case of Long Beach Naval Shipyard, its nonnuclear "large deck" drydock capability is not needed to support either scheduled or emergent workload. Long Beach was retained in previous base closure rounds because of unique surge concerns. It is now 1995, and the world has changed. As a result, the Department of Defense is divesting itself of excess "surge" assets, as in the case of the recommended closure of the previously retained Philadelphia drydocks. With respect to our recommendation to close Naval Air Station, Meridian, there is always concern when faced with the loss of flexibility arising from the divestiture of an asset like Meridian. However, the issue in this case is one of affordability.

Finally, wherever we can consolidate activities and do the work in one facility that is now being done at two, with little or no loss in efficiency, that is what we are seeking to do. A number of our recommendations are based on the economies that arise from collocation of like activities. In each case, we have kept the activity that provides the greater benefit, and have consolidated like operations to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale. That is the case with the recommendation to close the Navy Surface Warfare Center Detachment at Annapolis. Machinery research and development functions will be integrated with machinery in-service engineering functions at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Philadelphia. The Magnetic Field Lab is combined at existing facilities at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Carderock, Maryland, and the Intermediate Scale Fire Testing Facility is consolidated with the extensive fire testing facilities at the Naval Research Laboratory.

In the case of the movement of the Nuclear Power School to Charleston, this relocation reduces the number of moves that our Nuclear Power School students have to make, since half of them go directly to Charleston for follow-on training.

The movement of the South Weymouth Reserve squadrons to Naval Air Station Brunswick supports the total force requirement for a Northeast air station. It reduces excess capacity for regular and reserve air stations, allows for active and reserve integration, and preserves reserve demographics in the Northeast.

The collocation of SPAWAR with one of its major field activities in San Diego integrates the technical operations with the support structures, eliminates a great deal of duplicative activity by integrating multiple functions at one location, and

locates it at a Fleet concentration where we use surface, undersea and air platforms to do command and control, communications, computing and intelligence testing and evaluation.

And finally, the retrenchment of our resources in the Pacific Theater, from Guam to the Hawaiian Islands, represents a shift in operating policy which will save the Department \$42 million a year in infrastructure costs. We will need access to Guam in the event of a mobilization requirement and so would welcome commercial, privately maintained and modernized facilities on Guam to avoid mothballing costs and restart delays.

As in the case of Guam, other communities are coming forward with initiatives to privatize facilities recommended for closure by the Department of the Navy. We support privatization initiatives, such as have been suggested at the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis and the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville, so long as they entail private sector facilities and employees competing under applicable statutes, policies and regulations. Flexibility in language is essential to providing the ability to consider all of these options since the Department of the Navy will, of course, be bound by any final Commission recommendation language with regard to these facilities or others. As in any business transaction, however, the best interest of the Department of the Navy and the Nation must prevail.

I would like to conclude by saying, once again, that we take no joy in our recommendations. This is a painful process, which I am sure you more fully recognize as a result of your extensive and ambitious schedule of base visits throughout the nation. In each location, concerned citizens have gathered at hearings, hopeful that, somehow, someone would turn back the tide and stop the closure of their facilities. Your task of ensuring that the recommendations presented to the President are the right recommendations for the Department of Defense and the nation is both difficult and critical. We are heartened, however, by the growing number of communities that are recognizing the opportunities that can come from reuse of these facilities. We have opened dialogue with several of these groups and are hopeful that the outcomes will be beneficial for all parties. As I have said before, these communities will forever be a part of the extended Navy family.

This concludes my remarks, and I am prepared to answer your questions.



## NAVY PANEL

### NAVAL TECHNICAL CENTERS

1. Secretary Pirie: The DoD recommendation to redirect the Naval Sea Systems Command to move from NSWC White Oak to the Washington Navy Yard has been presented to the Commission as a part of an overall plan for the development of the Washington Navy Yard as an administrative center. This overall plan calls for significant improvements to the Navy Yard that are far more extensive than just rehabilitation of the buildings that the Naval Sea Systems Command will occupy. Please comment on the Navy's plan to obtain funding for this work.
  
2. Secretary Pirie: Do you believe that community proposals to privatize the Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville, KY and the Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis, IN are feasible?
  
3. Admiral Boorda: Do you believe that industrial, economic, and performance advantages will be lost by separating aircraft launch and recovery, manufacturing and prototyping from aircraft launch and recovery testing and fleet support functions at Naval Air Warfare Center, Lakehurst, NJ?
  
4. Admiral Boorda: Do you believe that if Naval Warfare Assessment Division Corona is relocated to different commands, the independent assessment capability the functions previously provided will in any way be compromised?
  
5. Secretary Dalton: The community has told us that a significant part of the Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Headquarters current mission relates to contact with organizations they support including your acquisition staff and other systems commands, most of which are in the Washington area. The closure scenario calls for leaving a SPAWAR staff of only 15 in Washington and does not provide for any additional travel expenses from the new site in San Diego. Is this sufficient to allow SPAWAR to continue to perform their mission?
  
6. Secretary Pirie: Unlike the other services, your COBRA analyses often do not count the cost of government employees performing tasks to implement the closure actions. For example, in the cases of Annapolis and Indianapolis these costs appear to be substantial in relation to the COBRA one-time cost figures. Please explain your rationale for this decision.

7. Secretary Pirie: The community has stressed the importance of the relationship between the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) which are now collocated in Philadelphia. How did the Navy evaluate the effect on ASO's operation after the NATSF relocation to San Diego?

## GUAM INSTALLATIONS

1. Secretary Pirie: In your letter to Representative Underwood of Guam you stated that it is the Navy's objective to stimulate local economic growth

“through long-term leases, outright transfers or any other mutually agreeable arrangement, as much of the land area and facilities as possible on Guam...”

Guam government officials and community representatives do not feel this is sufficient given the history of relations with the Navy on Guam. Do you believe specific re-use language in the Commission's report would assist in the economic revitalization of Guam?

2. Admiral Boorda: We have received comments from the operational chain of command in the Pacific that there remains a requirement to retain the fuel farm on Guam, yet it is presently recommended for closure. Would you please comment on this?

3. Secretary Pirie: Since the closure of Public Works Center Guam shows such a long payback, do you believe that realigning the PWC as a detachment of PWC Pearl Harbor is a viable alternative?

## NAVY AIR STATIONS

1. Admiral Boorda: Questions have been raised about whether the Naval Reserve can staff a reserve aviation unit more than 150 miles away from a major population center. Why does the Navy believe that it's recommendation to move units from the Boston area to the Brunswick, ME area will be successful ?

2. Secretary Dalton: The South Weymouth community has stated that the Navy has violated their analysis procedures by considering a closure scenario that closes a reserve air station and moves its units to an active air station. Please explain why you believe your recommendation was developed in accordance with Navy procedures.

3. Secretary Dalton: Recently, the Commission received a letter from the Secretary of Transportation expressing concern about the impact of closing Naval Air Facility Adak, AK on Coast Guard operations. Please explain how the Navy gave consideration to the Coast Guard's operational needs?

4. Admiral Boorda: Concerning Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), and your letter of May 25, 1995 to Congressman Montgomery on this topic, could you please elaborate on your concern/comments, specifically the risks associated in conducting all intermediate/advanced strike training at a single base? In your words, you stated that this would be a difficult task and reduce the capacity for surge operations and "that could be unacceptable." Considering the increased pilot training requirements, do you still support the recommendation to close NAS Meridian?

5. Admiral Boorda: The Navy's analysis for pilot training bases reviewed closure scenarios against the requirement to meet a certain pilot training rate. That rate was based on the maximum pilot training rate planned during the evaluation period plus a 20% factor.

Considering the Navy's recent change in their planned strike pilot training rate, what maximum rate should the Commission use when evaluating the proposed NAS Meridian closure?

6. Admiral Boorda: The Navy requested a redirect of Navy F/A-18's from NAS Cecil Field, FL. Specifically this redirect moved 8 F/A-18 squadrons and Fleet Replacement Squadron to NAS Oceana in lieu of sending a large majority of these aircraft to MCAS Cherry Point, as originally approved by the 1993 Commission. A large factor which influenced the 1993 Commission to direct the F/A-18's to Cherry Point in the first place was the Military Value benefits which came with dual siting Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. Could you please tell Commission why this joint basing was not a major factor in making the 1995 recommendation to the Commission?

7. General Mundy: We have been told that the Glenview, IL community offered a low cost lease arrangement to the Navy to allow a Marine Corps reserve unit to remain at the former NAS Glenview rather than move to facilities that would be constructed at Dam Neck, VA using BRAC funds. A redirect was not sent to the Commission concerning this proposal. Do you want the Commission to consider this proposal?

8. General Mundy: The March Air Force Base community has told the Commission that moving Marine Corps helicopter squadrons to March instead of Miramar is a superior scenario. They state that the cost of this alternative is slightly better, but of even greater importance is the separation of the large numbers of helicopters and fighters that the current plan calls for collocating at Miramar.

The Department of the Navy has responded that costs for the March scenario are higher and that joint fixed and rotary wing operations at Miramar can be accommodated. From the point of view of the person responsible for implementing our decision, what is your assessment of the Marine helicopters to March scenario?



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 May 1995

Dear Sonny,

In response to your letter of 18 May regarding NAS Meridian, let me say up front that there is a sizable amount of data that has to be re-certified given the matters you pointed out that prevents me from answering all of your specific questions at this time. Let me answer what I can now and we'll continue to work the data as it is developed.

First, you are correct that several events have occurred since DoN's analysis and DoD's recommendation were made regarding Meridian. As you know, DoN's analysis of training air stations was based on the FY 01 force structure with an annual Strike PTR of 336. Based on this requirement, DoN recommended Strike training be single-sited at NAS Kingsville which incorporated NAF Corpus Christi as an outlying field. Since that analysis, two events have occurred that change the underlying assumptions:

- Navy was given the requirement to fulfill the USAF EF-111 mission which requires us to buy 4 additional EA-6B squadrons and our own needs require us to buy back 6 additional F/A-18 squadrons across the FYDP. This plus up - provided we can successfully buy the 10 squadrons - is a 5 percent increase in Strike PTR (336 to 360).

- CNATRA has recommended accelerating the relocation of E-2/C-2 training (36 PTR) from NAS Pensacola to NAS Kingsville. Because the requirements for E-2/C-2 training are about half that of Strike, this would equate to roughly 22 additional Strike PTR.

Compounding these is the fact that procurement rate for T-45 aircraft of 12 per year, concomitant with the end of service life of TA-4J trainers, slows the transition to an all T-45 training syllabus which is significant because the alternative split of T-2/T-45 syllabus would require about 20 percent more flights per student.

If all of these are considered together, the requirements at NAS Kingsville will increase by about 18 percent. Based on the calculated capacity for Kingsville/Corpus Christi, this will require operating at near 100 percent capacity from FY 01 through FY 04, assuming Meridian closes in FY 01 (vice FY 99 as recommended). Operating this close to maximum capacity would be difficult and uncomfortable - and unsatisfactory if we had to increase PTR for a significant operational surge requirement. But I'd be less than honest if I didn't acknowledge that Navy has the ability to absorb some increased capacity with managed alternatives such as increased workdays, increased night flying,

detachments, and shifting some Strike related training into the JPATS aircraft when it comes on line. Again, this is recognizing the risk associated with additional unknowns like aircraft groundings, bad weather in excess of planned figures, and missed carrier quals due to CV/CVN operational commitments or weather.

With regards to the Samis and Hamilton report, the Naval Facilities Command has been directed to provide an assessment - and I will forward that on to you when it's done - but for the moment, I can't give you a good response on that.

In summary, if both NAS Kingsville and Meridian were to remain open - even at a PTR of 360 - we would be operating each base at well below capacity. The combination of increased Strike PTR and a single Strike training base makes successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and reduces our capacity for surge operations - and that could be unacceptable. But the trade off remains the degree of difficulty of risks versus costs to operate 2 Strike training bases.

Sonny, I will continue to look hard at everything I can to give you the best answer possible and I will keep you informed as new developments arise.

Sincerely and very respectfully,



J. M. BOORDA  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-2403

## PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

1. Secretary Pirie: At our meeting in Portsmouth, you alluded to the costs for closing a shipyard that go well beyond the costs that are covered by the BRAC account. Are there closure costs other than environmental cleanup that will not be covered by the BRAC account?

2. Admiral Boorda: If submarine force levels remain at 45-55 as projected in the Bottom Up Review and you obtain the new attack submarine to your requested procurement plan, does the Navy still require Portsmouth?

3. Admiral Boorda: You were quoted in a May 4 interview as saying the following.

“If you look at our planning for modernization in the [future] there is a mountain of requirements. If—and these are big ifs—we realize all the savings from base closings, if we are allowed to keep all the savings from downsizing, we could probably climb that mountain. [However], the budget five years from now never comes true. If it is smaller, we have a real modernization problem.”

Are you concerned that the savings the Navy is projecting from the 1995 base closures will not come true? Wouldn't one way to ensure that you have money for modernization be to further reduce your infrastructure?

4. Secretary Pirie: Is the Navy unwilling to consider using the private sector for submarine refuelings? The Navy is using the private sector to refuel nuclear carriers and with the Long Beach closure, the Navy will be dependent on the private sector for much of its non-nuclear work on the West Coast. In addition, the private sector performed nuclear submarine refuelings in the past.

## **LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD**


1. **Admiral Boorda**: We have heard that 40% of the sailors homeported in San Diego are on ships that can't be dry-docked any closer than Portland, OR. How would the closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard affect the sailors aboard those ships?
2. **Admiral Boorda**: How will the Navy handle large-deck overhauls in the Pacific fleet with the loss of Drydock #1 at Long Beach?

## MISCELLANEOUS

1. Secretary Dalton: DoD recommended the closure of Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal with Military Sealift Command remaining there in an enclave. However, based on information gathered as a result of the Commission's base visit, Military Sealift Command would prefer to move to available office space in the Hampton Roads area.

Does the Navy want the Commission to revise this recommendation?

2. Secretary Dalton/Admiral Boorda: Are there any recommendations that the Navy wants the Commission to reject or change?



**OPENING STATEMENT: OSD & THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

**WITH US FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS  
JOSHUA GOTBAUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ECONOMIC  
SECURITY; AND ROBERT E. BAYER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS.**

**FROM THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY IS AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT  
GENERAL GEORGE T. BABBITT, JR., THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF  
THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY AND MARGE V. MCMANAMAY, BRAC  
TEAM CHIEF FOR THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY.**

**IF THE THESE REPRESENTATIVES WILL PLEASE STAND AND RAISE  
THEIR RIGHT HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU  
ARE ABOUT TO GIVE BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND  
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH  
AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?**

**SECRETARY GOTBAUM, YOU MAY BEGIN.**

# Document Separator

STATEMENT OF  
**JOSHUA GOTBAUM**  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)

BEFORE THE  
  
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE  
AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

Chairman Dixon and members of the Commission:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Secretary's recommendations and the possible changes to them that you are considering. Before getting to specifics, I would like to make a few points about the process we have followed and the law under which we all operate.

First, an aggressive closure program remains absolutely necessary. ***Only an aggressive base closure program will provide the savings necessary to the future readiness of our armed forces.***

There has been much rhetoric recently that the decade-long decline in defense spending will now be reversed. Even if, as now appears possible, the Congress may provide a small increase in FY96, the overall level of defense spending will nonetheless have dropped some 40%. The force structure has been reduced by a similar amount. Yet our infrastructure, worldwide, is down by about 20%.

As you know, the recommendations forwarded by the Secretary involve the closure or realignment of over one hundred military installations. If implemented, we estimated these recommendations would result in a net savings to the Department and the taxpayers of some \$18 billion over the next two decades (net of implementation costs and discounted to present value). Without these savings, we simply will not be able to afford the defense we need with the budget we have.

You have, in the past months, been reminded of the pain that base closure imposes on communities across the country. In case after case, communities, their representatives in Congress and their expert consultants -- including many distinguished retired officers -- have provided rationales, estimates, and justifications for doing something else, for doing something less, for leaving just a few operations on this or that base.

As you hear and weigh these arguments, please remember that their supporters are under no obligation to maintain the analytical rigor, the certified data or the consistent procedures under which both the Department of Defense and your Commission must operate. Similarly, communities do not have the responsibility to properly preserve and fund the nation's defense capability within finite resources.

The law requires that the Secretary's recommendations, as well as alternatives, be based on a rigorous analytical process, on a comparison made as objectively as possible. Like you and with you, we have in the past three months reviewed our own recommendations and alternatives in the light of sustained analysis and criticism from affected communities and their many consultants. With a very few exceptions, we believe that our February 28 recommendations are still correct, and address the right mix of bases -- both those recommended for closure and those that will endure. This does not mean that the results are perfect or without error, as we will discuss in a few moments. But they did follow a discipline and a set of objectives that differs considerably from most of the analyses that have been presented to the Commission by those seeking to change those recommendations.

We also ask that, like any other "court of review", you recognize the professional operational and military judgment that has been incorporated into these recommendations. This Commission has been extremely diligent in its work. You have logged hundreds of hours, held dozens of hearings and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. Now you are down to the last stage. Your role, of course, is to review whether the Department has, however unintentionally failed -- substantially -- to apply the selection criteria and force structure. If you find instances in which you decide to change any of the Secretary's recommendations, you are of course required to apply the same criteria and force structure plan. We ask that you do so rigorously, and with a constant recognition of the fact that these closures, however painful, are necessary.

Which brings me to the last general point. This Commission has, very commendably, taken up the issue whether further base closure will be needed. We hope you will answer strongly in the affirmative. *Future base closure authority will be necessary.*

Worldwide, the three previous BRAC rounds and our overseas closures will reduce our infrastructure by approximately 20 percent. The BRAC 95 recommendations will reduce domestic infrastructure by another 6 percent. In one respect, this is an impressive accomplishment; I doubt if any Federal agency could match it. Nonetheless, the job is clearly not yet done. Even after BRAC 95 has been implemented, we will continue to have excess infrastructure.

The Secretary has recognized this, and recommended at least one further round of base closures in about three or four years, after we have had a chance to absorb those that will already have been approved and to reflect upon the force requirements of the post-Cold War world. There are, of course, those who counsel otherwise. They note the undeniable pain that closures cause and add the promise of increased Defense budgets that we are unlikely ever to see.

Until Congress again provides the legislative authority for a base closure process that works, we will need the ability to implement the one it has already provided. We believe the existing authority provided by Title 10, Section 2687, should be revised to allow modifications to base closure recommendations during the interim period between BRAC rounds and to permit the proposal of base closures or realignments that cannot prudently await another BRAC round. In this regard, the key issues to be addressed are the continuing requirements to waive the NEPA for closure and realignment decisions, and extend the Pryor Amendments to allow application to post BRAC 95 recommendations.

Today, you have already heard testimony from the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. On behalf of the Secretary and the Department as a whole, I would like to discuss some of the particular cases that are before you. I would then be happy to answer any questions you may have.

### **Air Force Depots**

First and foremost, there has been, understandably, a great deal of emphasis placed upon the Air Force proposal to restructure its maintenance depots. The Department of Defense

recognizes the need and strongly supports the reduction of Air Force depot capacity. The USAF proposal to downsize in place at all five of its depots would do so. Given the limitations on up-front closure costs imposed by current fiscal realities, this initiative represents the achievement of significant reductions in a responsible manner. I know that the Commission has spent a great deal of time reviewing that analysis and trust that your deliberations on this issue will carefully evaluate the Air Force rationale for these actions.

### **Tactical Missiles**

The local community has argued to the Commission that the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base would be a better place to perform depot maintenance of tactical missiles than a downsized Letterkenny Army Depot. We recognize both the community's concern and the fact that Hill does have excess capacity, but continue to believe strongly that the Department as a whole is best served by completing the transition to joint missile depot maintenance that was begun by this Commission in 1993.

At your request, we analyzed consolidating tactical missile maintenance at Ogden. Our analysis was based upon the projected requirements at Letterkenny, including the storage requirements for the "all-up" rounds. We confirmed this methodology with members of your staff. Additionally, site visits were made by Army, Air Force, and Letterkenny tactical missile personnel under the leadership of the Depot Joint Cross-Service Group.

The results of our analysis have already been briefed to you, and the detail provided to your staff. Since BRAC 93, Letterkenny has obtained the facilities, equipment and training to perform work on 13 of the 21 missile systems to be consolidated. They are already performing almost 70% of the planned maintenance work. That capability would be kept and, coupled with the electronics and communications capability at Tobyhanna, makes the Letterkenny consolidation the best course of action. After all the work that has been done at Letterkenny since the BRAC 93 decision, the bottom line is intuitive -- transfer of this workload to Hill AFB would result in increased personnel requirements at Hill, necessitate a change in storage plans and/or increased military construction, and cause considerable disruption.

Although some in the Ogden community suggest otherwise, the Air Force has testified before you this morning that it does not want this workload. The Department has made a conscious effort to maintain the intent of the consolidation mandated in BRAC 93. I urge you not to disrupt it.

### **Combat Vehicles**

The Secretary concurred with the Army's and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance's recommendation to close Red River Army Depot. This was not an easy choice, but it was a necessary one. If the Secretary's recommendation is not adopted, in Fiscal Year 1999, the Department will have approximately twice the capacity required to repair combat vehicles. When you compare core requirements against maximum potential capacity, without BRAC 95 relief, the Department would be utilizing only 37 percent of the maximum potential capacity available. Clearly something must be done.

Anniston Army Depot is the only depot in the DoD already facilitized to perform maintenance on the full range of ground combat vehicles, including the M1A2 tank. Anniston also has the available current capacity to absorb all of the Army's combat vehicle workload with minimal expense. It is a multi-mission installation that is a key element of the Army's long term base structure.

### **Rome Laboratory**

As this Commission knows only too well, the local community is concerned that Rome is an excellent facility whose closure would be felt throughout central New York State. Here, too, the Department agrees, but we have no alternative: we have more laboratory facilities, even excellent ones, than we can afford. Consolidating efforts at two other excellent labs, Hanscom AFB and Ft. Monmouth, will at the same time reduce costs, encourage interservice research and enhance quality. Consolidation of such activities at Fort Monmouth was recommended to the services by the Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group with the active support of the service acquisition executives. This is an important attempt to improve interoperability of communications equipment, beginning during the development process. It addresses a persistent problem we have faced during joint operations.

There are, as the Commission knows, charges that the Air Force adjusted its estimates of closure costs and savings to reach a predetermined conclusion. This is flatly untrue, although different estimates -- of different closure configurations -- were made at different times. When the Air Force looked at sharing the Army's resources at Fort Monmouth, the cost to close Rome Lab changed because the Air Force would not need to duplicate its resources at Hanscom AFB. *That* is why there were revisions. As with all other recommendations, we have provided all of the data used to the Commission. We hope you can lay these charges to rest.

### **Reserves**

In another area with significant cross-servicing importance, the Commission has examined the potential for closure of the Air Force reserve unit at Naval Air Station Fort Worth -- while keeping the Navy activities -- as an alternative to the proposed inactivation of the remaining Air Force Reserve F-16 unit at Bergstrom ARB. We believe this would not be a cost-effective alternative. The Fort Worth joint reserve operation is highly effective and represents an excellent example of the cooperative sharing of resources and responsibilities we are trying to foster. While the Austin community has accommodated the Air Force Reserve in its new civil airport plans for the former Bergstrom AFB and supports retention of this unit, I believe that retaining the F-16 unit at Fort Worth is a much better alternative for the Air Force, and ultimately, for the Austin community too. I strongly urge the Commission to confirm the action taken in BRAC 93 regarding NAS Fort Worth, and preserve the jointly located units at this facility.

### **Pilot Training**

Another issue concerns undergraduate pilot training. There have been questions regarding the impact of *possible* increases in Navy strike training requirements resulting from

potential force structure changes on our recommendations to close Reese AFB and NAS Meridian. Our recommendations regarding pilot training are based on the six-year force structure plan as required by the Base Closure Act and we believe they are correct. The Secretary's recommendations will allow both the Navy and the Air Force to accommodate any anticipated future increases in pilot training requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations has confirmed this in writing. Therefore, I ask the Commission to support our recommendations regarding undergraduate pilot training bases.

### **Ballistic Missile Treaty Implications**

I must also reiterate the determination of the former Deputy Secretary of Defense that the treaty issues associated with the ballistic missile defense options do not affect the Grand Forks AFB recommendation. As the Deputy Secretary reported to the Commission in his letter of May 9th, based on an interagency review there would be no determination by the Secretary of Defense that would require retention of the missile group at Grand Forks. Further, as I noted in my letter of June 8th to you, we have sacrificed no flexibility regarding ballistic missile defense, should our recommendation be approved. The Secretary's recommendation to realign Grand Forks remains the soundest course of action regarding this facility.

You have also raised the question whether Grand Forks AFB should be closed entirely and its tanker wing unit reassigned. Such a closure would, of course, provide savings. Nonetheless, we hope the Commission will recognize and defer to the uniform military judgment on this matter. Retention of the core tanker wing at Grand Forks is essential to military operations. That is the judgment of every operational commander concerned. The ability of Grand Forks to provide efficient, cohesive support to deployment obligations as well as its optimal positioning for strategic commitments have been well documented.

### **Kirtland AFB**

In its site survey process, conducted after the Secretary provided his recommendations to the Commission, the Air Force discovered that there had been a significant understatement of the costs of relocating units from Kirtland AFB, as well as an underestimate of the support that the Department of Energy received from this installation. The new estimates have already been provided to you. As a result, we are no longer recommending the realignment of Kirtland.

### **Housing**

The Commission has expressed concern that the Department might excess military family housing units at closing bases, even though the Department has an overall housing deficit, and that active duty personnel might remain in the area who could use this housing.

The quality of life of our military members and their families is one of Secretary Perry's highest priorities. During implementation, we can and will take a careful look at the housing at every base being closed or realigned. We already have full authority and retain the housing we need where there is a significant requirement and it is economically attractive. For example, the Navy took over Army housing at Fort Sheridan and the Air Force took over Navy housing at

NAS Moffett. No action by the Commission in this area is necessary. (We will not, however, retain or develop the support infrastructure that active bases have.)

### **Community Efforts at Privatization**

As you know, Indianapolis and Louisville, as well as other communities, have been actively pursuing economic redevelopment of closing bases through privatization of excess DoD assets. We are supportive of these efforts and have drafted our recommendations to allow them without further action by the Commission.

In some cases, however, communities have urged the Commission to require DoD to maintain facilities or workload even after the facility is "closed". Such an approach would maintain the excess capacity that we are trying to eliminate.

### **Conclusion**

Mr. Chairman, we recognize and appreciate the Commission's central role in the base closure process. I remain confident that our goals are identical: to balance the Department of Defense base and force structures, and preserve readiness through the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure. I am encouraged by the leadership you have exercised and the continuing open dialogue between the Commission and the Department of Defense that has been a hallmark of our relationship during this difficult but important process.

# Document Separator

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

Like the Secretary, I appreciate this opportunity to address you once again on the Air Force recommendations for closure or realignment, as well as the installations added by you for consideration. The nature of my testimony today has to do with some very real operational concerns that I have about these additions.

First and foremost, in the large aircraft base category, I am strongly opposed to the closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base. I want to spend a few minutes on this subject so as to leave no doubt on where I stand on this important operational question. I believe we must retain the core tanker wing at Grand Forks. While I recognize the financial attractiveness of a full closure, I cannot overemphasize the need to place operational considerations ahead of potential savings in this instance.

Those operational considerations arise from the very nature of post-Cold War military operations. I say military, not Air Force, because all U.S. military components must shape their capabilities around the reality we face. That reality includes fewer forward-deployed forces, greater emphasis on short-notice contingencies and various operations other than war. The common need in all these actions is greater mobility. As you know, actions in the 1993 BRAC round firmly established Air Mobility Wings on each coast to concentrate resources for rapid

response and deployment support. During that same period, as AMC Commander I formed three core tanker wings, at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.

At that time I firmly believed that the organizational improvements, operational capabilities, and fiscal efficiencies of a core tanker wing were essential to our ability to respond quickly to the critical refueling requirements of the mobility mission. I am even more convinced today that the three core tanker wings was the right way to go. Grand Forks Air Force Base is positioned well to support not only these missions, but also requirements under the Single Integrated Operations Plan, or SIOP. I should note that, although we have indicated an abundance of tankers in this region, this measurement is based on a comparison of tanker resources to training requirements, not SIOP requirements or operational contingencies. The movement of Malmstrom Air Force Base tanker assets to MacDill Air Force Base, under the Air Force recommendation, will bring resources and requirements into a reasonable balance.

I've written you a letter that provides my rationale in some detail. The operational concerns have also been endorsed by the senior war fighters, CINC STRATCOM and CINC TRANSCOM, who share my thoughts and resolve for the Grand Forks tanker wing.

Let me offer some remarks on the Undergraduate Flying Training bases and our recommendation to close Reese Air Force Base. I understand and agree with the Commission's belief that the flying training bases are all excellent bases that effectively support their important

mission. It will not be easy to see Reese close, just as it has been difficult for every excellent installation closed in previous rounds. It is clear to me, however, that if the Air Force must close a UPT base, Reese is the right choice. The conclusion is reinforced by the fact that every analysis performed by the Air Staff, the Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training, and your staff has supported the closure of Reese Air Force Base.

There has been some question of the need to close a flying training base. The conclusion of Air Education and Training Command is that we have an excess capacity of one base. I understand that some would argue we will need more pilot production beyond the period analyzed in the BRAC process. At this point we are comfortable that we will be able to meet our foreseeable production requirements after the closure of Reese Air Force Base, if the joint initiatives that are beginning to mature reach full productivity.

Since the Commission added additional bases for consideration in the Air Force Reserve category, I want to make several comments on the alternatives. Let me begin by stating that our Air Reserve Component forces are critical as an integral part of the variety of post-Cold War operations that I referred to earlier. Our ability to continue to rely on our reserve forces requires that we recognize the need to support the unique recruiting and training requirements of those units. After careful review of the bases in these categories, we concluded that we could accommodate the reduction of one F-16 and one C-130 unit. Those reductions match the force reductions experienced as we drew down to a 20 fighter wing force. While further closures are

perhaps possible from an "iron-on-the-ramp" perspective, closure of additional units would mean the removal of units from prime recruiting and retention locations.


It would also mean a reduction in presence in a number of communities. There is no better way to communicate to the American public the reality of military actions than when co-workers and neighbors see their friends don uniforms and serve as pilots, crew chiefs, and countless other critical positions. These various factors, unique to reserve and guard units, make it clear that no more than the recommended reductions should be acted upon.

Beyond these general statements, I wholeheartedly support the Secretary's initiative on the potential inactivation of the Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare International Airport. Selecting this unit as the C-130 unit to inactivate and providing an opportunity for the City of Chicago to relocate the Air National Guard activity at their expense provides a reasonable solution to our need to inactivate a reserve unit and their desire to obtain the entire property.

On the issue of Reserve F-16 bases, I cannot agree with any action considered by the Commission that would result in the inactivation of the unit at NAS Fort Worth Carswell Field. The collocation of Navy and Air Force reserve operations at that location, recommended by the 1993 BRAC Commission, has proven to be a real success story. For the Air Force Reserve, it represents a cost-effective tenant operation in a location that is superb for recruiting and retention. Because of its location on a military installation, few savings to the Department of Defense will result from its closure. Disrupting this model installation is simply unjustified.

I have emphasized the operational aspects of the various actions under consideration, because my job is to ensure that we can carry out the missions we are assigned. I want however, also to add a word on the issue of depot closure. I understand very well those who call for the closure of an Air Force depot in BRAC. It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in the manner that best serves the total operational mission of the Air Force. To do otherwise, to force the Air Force to absorb the enormous costs associated with a depot closure, would directly and adversely impact modernization, readiness and the quality of life initiatives that are so important to our people.

As the Secretary discussed, reducing excess capacity by closing a depot would severely harm the very programs that we are committed to protecting -- programs that ensure an effective Air Force of the future. And it is unnecessary. The downsizing initiative presents a very attractive and viable alternative to achieve the necessary reductions without crippling our budget. Does it go as far as closure? No, but it does achieve comparable reductions that will ease the pressure that excess capacity places on our budget. I believe it is the only responsible approach to this issue, and wholeheartedly support it.



## DOD PANEL

### RETURN ON INVESTMENT (COBRA)

1. Secretary Gotbaum: On 1 March, DoD submitted 146 realignment or closure actions to the Commission. To date, the services have revised 63 of these 146 recommendations resulting in an increase in the One-Time Cost of \$170 million and a decrease in the annual savings of \$130 million (See chart 1). In general do you agree with the revised estimates of the costs and savings associated with this round's recommendations?
2. Secretary Gotbaum: For this round the services have changed the cost and savings estimates for 63 of the 146 installations recommended by DoD. These changes represent 43 percent of the installations affected by this round. This percentage is far higher than that experienced in the 1993 round. Can you explain the reason for this increase in the number of changes to the costs and savings estimates for this round?
3. Secretary Gotbaum: The revised COBRA data provided to the Commission results in a 7.4% decrease in the annual savings and a 7.4% decrease in the net present value for this round. This seems to indicate that DoD overestimated the savings associated with this round of closings and realignments. What confidence do you have that the revised costs and savings estimates that have been submitted will result in the savings now reported by the services?

# 1995 DoD Return on Investment

	<b>1-Time Cost (\$B)</b>	<b>Annual Savings (\$B)</b>	<b>Net Present Value (\$B)</b>
<b>DoD Submission (1 March 1995)</b>	<b>3.74</b>	<b>1.77</b>	<b>21.03</b>
<b>DoD Revisions to date* (13 June 1995)</b>	<b>3.91</b>	<b>1.64</b>	<b>19.47</b>
<b>Differences</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>- 0.13</b>	<b>- 1.56</b>
<b>% Change</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>- 7.4%</b>	<b>- 7.4%</b>

**\*63 out of 146 original actions  
have been revised (43%).**

## **DOD LABORATORIES**

1. **Secretary Gotbaum:** DoD's recommendation regarding the closure of NSWC White Oak is that, in essence, the continued operation of the unique facilities located there is no longer needed. This recommendation was seemingly contradicted in testimony before this Commission by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he referred to one of these facilities, the Hypersonic Wind Tunnel, as a "unique national capability." In addition, other federal agencies, such as the Defense Nuclear Agency, have attested to a continuing need for White Oak facilities.

Is it still the Department's recommendation to discontinue operations of these facilities? If not, how should closing White Oak while providing for the continued operation of the technical facilities be addressed by the Commission?

2. **Secretary Gotbaum:** The Director of Defense Research and Engineering has stated that relocating the Army and Air Force research offices to leased space in Arlington, VA would create a benefit from being collocated with Office of Naval Research, Advanced Research Program Agency, and National Science Foundation who are currently located there in leased space (see attached letter).

The Navy has requested a redirect to allow Office of Naval Research to remain in leased space in Arlington, VA rather than move to the Washington Navy Yard. The redirect has an annual cost of about \$1.4 million. Part of the Navy's justification is the opportunity for collocation with Army and Air Force research groups. However, no recommendations were submitted to the Commission to relocate the Army and Air Force organizations to Arlington, VA.

What are the prospects for relocating the Army Research Office and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research to leased space in Arlington, VA and would future base closure actions be required to perform the moves?



## COSTS/SAVINGS

1. Secretary Gotbaum: The Air Force made a major issue of the environmental cleanup costs and in fact stated that indirectly this was a consideration in not recommending logistics centers for closure. Do you think the Commission should give any weight to environmental cleanup costs in making our decisions?
2. Secretary Gotbaum: The COBRA cost/savings model does not recognize as a savings the annual facility and equipment investment requirement which is deleted when a base is closed. In the case of an Air Force depot base, this equipment and infrastructure replacement cost is about \$3 billion. If replaced every 60 years, the annual investment approaches \$50 million. Closing bases removes this requirement. Since the COBRA model is a comparative tool, why isn't this \$50 million in real savings recognized and used for decision purposes?
3. Secretary Gotbaum: In previous testimony to the Commission you stated that the COBRA analyses provides an estimate of the closure costs. However, the Navy has excluded certain base closure related costs from its COBRA analyses when these costs are DoD civilian labor expenses. This has the effect of making the one-time costs shown in the COBRA understate the true costs of implementing the recommendation. In some cases there is a significant cost differential.

For example, including these costs for disassembly, reassembly and calibration of lab equipment for Naval Surface Warfare Center Annapolis would raise the one-time cost for this recommendation from about \$25 million to about \$50 million.

How have you taken this into account in your evaluation of the affordability of the Navy's recommendations?

## **DEPOTS**

1. Secretary Gotbaum: How much of the Air Force depot workload should be interserviced if the Commission chooses to close one or two depots?
2. Secretary Gotbaum: What should the Commission do to encourage interservicing?
3. Secretary Gotbaum: DoD has requested closure of several depots and downsizing of all Air Force Depots. In most case very specific recommendations have been made as to where the workloads would be performed. Also, some communities have presented privatization in place options.

Due to the dynamics of what is happening in the maintenance area and the possibility that this Commission may close several Depots, do you believe that the workload distribution could best be directed by the Depot Maintenance Council?

## **CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

1. Secretary Gotbaum: Were the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention considered by the Department when compiling its recommendations?

Which, if any, recommendations did the Convention affect?

2. Secretary Gotbaum: Does the Chemical Weapons Convention require that the United States retain a Chemical Defense Training Facility?

If so, does it specify the location of that facility?

## **GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, ND**

1. Secretary Gotbaum: Deputy Secretary Deutch notified the Commission on May 9th that a legal review by representatives of DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council Staff had concluded "there will be no determination by the Secretary that would require retention of the missile group at Grand Forks."

Under the Department's recommendation, will any ICBMs or silos remain in place after inactivation of the 321st Missile Group?

Would a Commission recommendation to close all facilities in the ICBM field have a detrimental impact on the interagency position

If the 321st Missile Group is inactivated and all ICBMs are removed from Grand Forks Air Force Base, does Grand Forks Air Force Base remain an ABM site under the terms of the ABM treaty?

If the 321st Missile Group is inactivated, will it be necessary to demolish or relocate any of the Grand Forks ABM facilities?

Are there any ABM-related costs associated with the recommendation to inactivate the 321st Missile Group? If so, what are these costs, and will they be considered as part of inactivation?

## HOMESTEAD AIR RESERVE BASE, FL

1. Secretary Gotbaum: It would be helpful if the Commission could have your views on Homestead's military value. In terms of supporting the Unified Commanders, what is its value for Caribbean operations, and as SOUTHCOM prepares to move to Miami, what functions will Homestead provide for day-to-day or contingency activities?

## **FUTURE BRAC ACTIONS**

1. Secretary Gotbaum: What does DoD recommend for the future of the base realignment and closure process?



## **DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

### **STORAGE CAPACITY**

1. General Babbitt: If one or more ALCs were to close, what action would you recommend the Commission take with the DLA supply depot at the closing ALC?


If closure of one or more ALCs would require retention of previously recommended closure candidates, could you recommend specific installations you wish to retain? How quickly could you provide that contingent recommendation to the Commission?

2. General Babbitt: If all of the recommended closures in the storage system are adopted, are you satisfied that you will have adequate storage for classified and sensitive items?

3. General Babbitt: The Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) assets are currently stored at the Ogden Distribution Depot. The depot has been recommended for closure. The Army, which is responsible for DEPMEDS, has stated that they wish to retain the mission in the Ogden area.

I assume that DLA will explore moving the assets to Hill AFB. However, given the Army's desire, what options are you exploring if Hill AFB can't accept the DEPMEDS mission due to space limitations?

If the Ogden Distribution Depot closes, is transferring the depot land to the community and then leasing the facilities to support the DEPMEDS mission a viable option?





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**WENDI LOUISE STEELE**

**CLOSING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DIXON**

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY FROM  
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS**

**Washington, D.C.**

**June 14, 1995**

**WE HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THIS 29TH AND FINAL PUBLIC HEARING  
OF THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION.**

**I WANT TO THANK ALL THE WITNESSES WHO HAVE APPEARED  
BEFORE US TODAY. THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE BROUGHT US HAS BEEN  
EXTREMELY VALUABLE.**

**WE WILL NEXT MEET IN THIS ROOM ON THURSDAY, JUNE 22, TO BEGIN  
OUR FINAL DELIBERATIONS.**

**THIS HEARING IS ENDED.**