



BRAC 2005 - Query Response Manager



Response to E450

Question:

1. Construction costs to replace the Headquarters are greatly understated (\$79 million vs. \$277 million)
2. Costs cost to relocate the secure telecommunications hub were ignored.
3. The value of being next to an airport with unparalleled access and economical point to point travel to major cities in the United States and around the world was not considered.
4. Intangible costs like the disruption and relocating FORSCOM and subordinate commands in the middle of a war were not considered
5. Walking away from \$200M in new construction at Fort Gillem
6. Cost was only 10% of military value weight but appears to be the primary reason for closing Fort McPherson regardless of other more heavily weighted military value strengths of the headquarters
7. The interactions required between 9th Air Force and Third Army are of lesser military value than the Third Army (force requester) interface with FORSCOM and USARC (force providers).
8. First Army, is a coordinator for military support to civilian authorities including homeland defense, and the capabilities that are offered at Fort Gillem by FEMA, GEMA, the Red Cross, CDC, CID Laboratory, the U.S. Army Reserve Secure Facility and National Guard and moving the headquarters for First Army, 2nd Recruiting Brigade and the 52nd EOD Group will impact adversely on training readiness and detract from support for homeland defense and impede efficient command and control between headquarters and subordinate units.
9. The Third Medical Command, the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Center and the Atlanta Military Entrance Processing Station are unaccounted for in DoD's analysis.
10. The Army's recommendation to disperse headquarters, limits command and control at additional cost substantially deviating from the requirements of DoD BRAC Criteria 3

and 4 and dispersal of major headquarters whose synergy is critical to mission value deviates substantially from Criteria 1.

Answer:

1. The construction costs estimated in the COBRA analyses for the various units moving off of Forts McPherson and Gillem are based on the unit facility requirements as determined by the Army's approved Real Property Planning System (RPLANS) and the DoD Facility Pricing Guide. Construction requirements reflect Army and DoD standards for space and are not based upon the current facilities occupied by the organizations. Further, the Army estimated \$65M for MILCON related expenses for moving FORSCOM and USARC to Pope AFB and an additional \$34M for moving 3rd US Army to Shaw AFB. The Army can not comment on the \$277M replacement cost without an explanation of what it includes.

2. The Defense Information Systems Activity (DISA) was consulted for costs associated with moving the Headquarters activities on Forts McPherson and Gillem. DISA provided a certified cost estimate of \$300,000 for the relocation of FORSCOM.

3. The Army's Military Value included a measure for accessibility. Accessibility was defined as a combination of an installation's proximity to major DoD installations and airports within a given radius. Fort McPherson, Ft. Gillem and Ft. Bragg all score the same in accessibility.

4. Intangible costs for BRAC recommendations are considered. The Military Value analysis and the criterion 6, 7 and 8 analyses were designed to consider the intangible costs and difficulties associated with the recommendations. Other upheaval associated with relocating organizations such as personnel relocations and continuity of operations, will be considered and planned for during implementation.

5. Money that has already been spent by DoD for facilities and operations was not a consideration for BRAC analysis.

6. The primary factor for closing Ft. McPherson was the inability of Ft. McPherson to accept any missions other than administrative missions. The administrative facilities on Forts McPherson can be (and already are) duplicated on larger, more flexible installations that provide the military with more value and capabilities. The low military value of Ft. McPherson was the driver to close the installation and relocate the tenant organizations. Ft. McPherson was ranked 57 out of 87 Army installations. It was ranked in the lower half of installations in 13 of 21 capabilities and was only in the top 20 in one area (Achieve Cost Efficient Installations Capability). It ranked in the lowest 20 installations in 7 capabilities. areas.

7. FORSCOM and USARC were coordinated with when determining possible locations for them. Neither organization indicated a relationship with 3rd Army that would be adversely affected if the three organizations were not co-located. The 3rd US Army was relocated to Shaw AFB in order to co-locate it with the Air Force component of the Central Command. This will not adversely affect 3rd Army's

relationship with FORSCOM since 3rd Army has the same relationship with FORSCOM as other Army Component Commands that are not co-located with FORSCOM.


8. Under the transformation of the US Army, 1st Army will be assuming the missions and responsibilities of 5th US Army. The new headquarters will continue to provide support to Homeland Defense organizations across the entire United States. Training readiness will not be adversely affected because all of the organizations relocating from Ft. Gillem are administrative and management in nature. There are no training missions on Ft. Gillem.

9. The 3rd Medical Command and the Military Entrance Processing Station were not part of the Army baseline of organizations on Ft. Gillem. These organizations will be moved or included in the Ft. Gillem enclave depending on the direction of the Army Staff and the higher headquarters for those organizations. The Army Reserve Military Intelligence Center is included in the Ft. Gillem enclave.

10. The Army's military value analysis, with input for the headquarters organizations at Ft. McPherson and Ft. Gillem, indicates that the relocations recommended will improve command and control, increase synergies between organizations and significantly improve the overall effectiveness of the US Army.

References:

Approved By:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James H. ...", is written over a faint, illegible printed name.

Date: 18-Jul-05