



BRAC 2005 - Query Response Manager



Response to E0521

Question:

1. Please provide certified data on the cost to relocate the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) communications hub located at Fort McPherson, GA.
2. Please provide DoD's analysis of the attached community developed alternatives for Forts McPherson and Gillem.

Answer:

1. On 4 August 2005, the BRAC Commission requested the Army provide comments on several community developed scenarios addressing the closures of Forts Gillem and McPherson. The community provided paper contains two alternative scenarios with COBRA cost analyses and a discussion of "critical military value points". The two scenarios proposed by the Atlanta community close Ft. McPherson and move the three major HQs (3rd Army, FORSCOM & USARC) to Ft. Gillem. The first scenario retains all units currently on Ft. Gillem, at Ft. Gillem. The second moves the 1st US Army HQs to Rock Island Arsenal and the 52nd EOD Group to Ft. Benning.
2. The Army cannot comment on the costs and savings the community provided for each of the two alternative scenarios, since the data used was not certified. However, the current recommendation also saves a significant amount of money; it is based on certified data; and it significantly improves military value.
3. The critical military value discussion included with the Atlanta alternatives contains eight issues, each is commented on below:
 - a. Predicting Costs/Savings Effectively. The Atlanta community maintains that the ability to predict cost savings over a 20-year period is problematic and that the COBRA one-time cost and implementation period costs should be used as the cost discriminators in BRAC evaluations. The NPV was one of several types of costs that the Army considered when developing recommendations. The one-time costs and implementation costs were also considered. These costs were used to assess the feasibility of implementing recommendations against the finite BRAC wedge. The 20-year NPV was given lesser consideration because the Army measured its return on investment by improvement in military value, not by the Net Present Value.
 - b. Pain and Risk Versus Potential Gain. The Army did not use COBRA values to define Pain versus Gain. The decision to close Ft. Gillem and Ft. McPherson were

based on the military value of installations to the US Army. Ft. McPherson and Ft. Gillem rank 51st and 52nd, respectively, out of 87 Army installations and both have a limited capacity to accept missions other than the support of administrative organizations. Further, the organizations residing on the two installations can be relocated to other, higher ranking installations (Pope/Bragg-5th, Benning-9th, Campbell-14th, Redstone-30th, Eustis-33rd) that provide the Army with more flexibility to accept other non-administrative missions. The pain of investment in relocating these organizations is not only balanced by monetary savings, but by achieving several of the Army's BRAC objectives. These included the divestiture of excess infrastructure, the positioning of the Army to better support Joint operations and the enabling of better training opportunities for Army units.

c. Budget Projection Versus Funding Requirement. The community paper discusses the need for the Services to use significant portions of each Services' Total Obligation Authority (TOA) to support the difference between the \$25 Billion BRAC implementation estimate and the \$13 Billion BRAC Wedge. The community did not include the savings achieved by BRAC recommendations during the implementation period that must be spent on BRAC implementation (per the FY05 Strategic Planning Guidance). Further, these costs are estimates and will be refined during implementation to best support all of the military's goals and strategic objectives.

d. Co-location Does Not Always Equal Jointness. The community paper states "to divest 3rd Army of the capability to coordinate directly and on-site with its force providers (FORSCOM & USARC) makes no sense". The relocation of 3rd Army to co-locate it with its Air Force CENTCOM counterpart (9th Air Force) is designed to promote a joint relationship. This relationship will foster improved joint war planning and execution efforts in support of CENTCOM operations. This will not have an adverse impact on the relationship between 3rd Army and its force providers. This is illustrated by the relationship between these same two force providers and all other Army Combatant Commands, none of which are located in the Atlanta area.

e. Workforce Availability. During the BRAC Commission hearings in Atlanta on 17-19 May, concern was expressed about the loss of skilled professionals who would not relocate with FORSCOM, USARC & 3rd Army. These three commands are administrative headquarters and the most valuable skill their employees possess is an intimate knowledge of Army operations. Meeting the demand for employees will be accomplished by various Army personnel programs, and the fact that both Fayetteville, NC and Louisville, KY have large dependent and retiree populations to draw on for skilled personnel.

f. Enclaves are Like Islands. The community paper expresses several misconceptions about the units to remain in the Ft. Gillem enclave. Each of the organizations slotted to remain in the enclave has a mission in local area (such as the Reserve units, National Guard units, and Military Entrance Processing Station) or could not be replicated elsewhere. The Army's Installation Management Agency will continue to provide administrative and logistical support to the installation and the recommendation left a

small garrison support staff to do so. Several organizations were moved to "Base X" to await further stationing actions. However, the MEPS and the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Center are not among them. In fact, the Navy is relocating a small Reserve Intelligence unit to the enclave at Ft. Gillem to co-locate with the Army unit.


g. Military Effectiveness Versus Cost Efficiency. The concerns expressed in the paper that the Army will degrade its ability to effectively manage the deployment and repatriation of forces overseas was addressed at every step of the recommendation development process. The Army G3, force structure and modernization offices were consulted and provided the Army TABS office with information on stationing throughout the BRAC analysis. Deployment and surge capabilities were also considered in order to allow effective continuity of operations and management of war efforts. It is the view of the Army leadership that relocating these Headquarters to installations from which soldiers actually deploy, can only enhance the Army's ability to go to war.

h. Recruiting an Army. The Army is currently facing challenges in recruiting. However, the closure recommendations for Ft. Gillem and Ft. McPherson will have little impact on recruitment in the Atlanta area. Local recruiting offices were not considered under BRAC. Their location will continue to be determined by the Army's recruiting Command based on local demographics.

4. The BRAC Commission has also requested new certified data on the cost of relocating the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) communications hub currently located on Ft. McPherson. DISA has provided the Army with a new estimate of \$17.09 Million to perform this relocation.

References:

Approved By:


Craig E. College
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Infrastructure Analysis)
OASA (IA)

Date: 10-Aug-05