

DCN 5565

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
June 22, 2005

BRAC
2521 South Clark Street Suite600
Arlington VA 22202

Subject: Eglin Air Force Base Florida

Attached are several local newspaper articles provided for your BRAC consideration. In summary they depict the Eglin AFB local area as expensive in terms of cost of living, with congested airspace.

Thank you for your consideration,




George Newman



ON YOUR MARK, GET SET, MOW!

Nation's newest racing craze is cutting down the competition at speeds of up to 90 mph

See Sports, B6



84-year-old granny takes thrill ride high above Destin

See Local/State, C1

Tyco executives' lavish lifestyles on company cash will cost them

See Business, C9

Daily News

NORTHWEST FLORIDA

SATURDAY, JUNE 18, 2005

50

Unemployment rates - May 2005

Area	%
Walton	2.6
Okaloosa	2.8
Santa Rosa	3.4
State	4.0
Nation	4.9

Source: Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation

Daily News/CRAIG TERRY

Worker well running d

Walton, Okaloosa counties again top list of state's lowest unemployment rates.

By MORRIS FRASER
Daily News Business Editor

For the second straight month, and to the frustration of many employers, Walton County has the state's lowest unemployment rate.

As determined by the Agency for Workforce Innovation, the

May rate is 2.6 percent and follows a 2.7 percent rate for April that also led the state.

Okaloosa County and Monroe County, in the Florida keys, are tied for second best at 2.8 percent.

Walton has had one of the five lowest unemployment rates since January, which is

affecting the ability of businesses in the county to hire and keep quality employees.

According to Pam Tedesco, president and CEO of the Walton County Chamber of Commerce, the strong economy and lack of affordable housing are contributing to the problem of not having enough bodies to fill positions.

She said the problem has expanded beyond the lower-income hospitality and restaur-

ant industries.

"I think what's really interesting is that we're starting to see hospitals, banks looking for help," she said. "And they bring in high-level employees who left because they couldn't afford to live here."

Marilyn Gurske, branch manager for BankTrust in Santa Rosa Beach, said her bank has just overcome a hiring deficiency.

"Right now we're finally full

staffed," she said. "I think it's a tremendous maybe would go a month, the did have a applicants." But the q those who di problem.

"Tellers, we with no exper them," Gurske

Plea

Base Realignment and Closure

BRAC TALK RESHUFFLE

"I was interested because my dad is retired military and I grew up in the military. Whether Eglin was affected or not was so important because it's the lifeblood of this community. If it was going to end up smaller, we'd all be affected."

TRAVIS TATE
Crestview

"I checked the Internet today at work to see what was going on ...

I wondered how it might affect people I know, friends who are still at Hurlburt. My personal opinion was that nothing would close here, because Hurlburt is headquarters for AFSOC and Eglin being what it is."

RICHARD CHARLES
Fort Walton Beach

"I think whether Eglin closed or got smaller would have a big effect, because Eglin is the town, if you

From A1

"Of course, bringing in the Army should solidify Eglin's position as a joint-use base for many years in the future," said U.S. Rep. Jeff Miller, R-Chumuckla.

It's not clear yet, however, where the Green Berets would set up headquarters. Hurlburt or Duke fields are options because they're home to Air Force special operations units, which would make joint training more convenient.

Also coming to Eglin from five other military bases are 811 Joint Strike Fighter primary flight training jobs. That puts Miller in an unusual position, because 400 of those billets are coming from Naval Air Station Pensacola, which is in his district.

Rounding out the list of troops slated to move to Eglin are 83 positions from two locations: Hill Air Force Base in Utah and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency weapons development center in Fort Belvoir, Va.

These changes are not final. The BRAC list must pass muster with a commission appointed to evaluate the Defense Department proposal and then get the OK from Congress.

"If these recommendations are, in fact, approved, it would have a significant impact on Eglin Air Force Base," said Eglin's commander, Col. Edmond B. Keith. He figured it would take tens of millions of dollars to build the infrastructure to support the coming troops.

The new positions will have a significant impact on the Emerald Coast's financial health.

Rick Harper, director of the University of West Florida Haas Center for Business Development, estimated the additional troops and their working spouses would contribute about \$220 million a year to the area's economy. Eglin's current contribution has been calculated at about \$1.4 billion annually.

"The bottom line is ... I think



Daily News file photo

Above, pilots wait for the all-clear before departing their F-15s on Eglin Air Force Base after a tour in Iraq in this file photo. Under the BRAC proposal, Eglin would become a joint training site for the Joint Strike Fighter. Below, flag-waving residents welcome troops home from Iraq.

ON THE NET

A full listing of the military bases affected by BRAC can be found on the Daily News Web site at nwdailynews.com

we can expect that to result in a positive economic impact for the Okaloosa-Walton area," the economist said.

But Harper acknowledged that more people moving to the area has some negatives.

Among the trouble would be more traffic, a fact that escapes few folks familiar with the area.

"My first reaction is that that's a lot of new cars on the road," said Karen Hardell, an accountant in Crestview. "But I think it's going to be great for business in Crestview. All 2,200 people will probably love living in Okaloosa County."

Valparaiso Mayor Bruce Arnold and at least another local mayor worried about the skyrocketing price of real estate, wondering how troops coming from other bases around the country would be able to afford living along the Emerald Coast.

But "we'll find a way of



accommodating them," Arnold added.

Overall, Arnold saw many more advantages than disadvantages to the realignment.

"Basically, for the area, for the job market, for the young people, this is great," he said. "I think (most) everybody will embrace this as good news."

There's no question about it."

■ Business Editor Morris Fraser and North Okaloosa Editor Kelly Humphrey contributed to this story. Staff Writer Mladen Rudman can be reached at 863-1111, Ext. 443, or mladenr@nwdailynews.com

BRAC TALK

"I think it's always great for the community to grow. There'll be more money for businesses, and that's good. The downside is the traffic, but on the other hand it's great if you're selling a house."



RACHEL TINKLEPAUGH
Crestview

"I was concerned, especially since I have a business here, and one in Panama City. I wanted to know what was going to happen to both bases. ... I was hoping it would at least stay the same."

DEVENDRA MOHAN
Panama City Beach

"As part of a military family, I think it's awesome they're putting jobs here. It's going to be great for our community"



07092005

Anthony J. Principi
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

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All the other BRAC recommendations list the military units that are moving. In the case of the Eglin recommendation, they cover very broad areas, and have led to confusion and the possible inclusion of the 46TS's Command and Control (C2) Test and Evaluation (T&E) mission. I believe there must have been a complete misunderstanding of the definition of C4ISR and Information Systems that would lead anyone to consider consolidating it with EW. Three of the biggest indicators of this are:

1) How can C4ISR testing be considered for consolidation, if Eglin (46 TS) does over half of all the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Electronic Systems Command (ESC) C4ISR acquisitions, (They are responsible for all new AF C4ISR acquisitions), and only one program out of the other half was tested at Edwards? Eglin is the only AFMC C4I T&E facility. All C4I T&E has already been consolidated at Eglin, per AF/TE direction in 1996 (See attachment 1). As it is currently planned this wouldn't be a consolidation at Edwards AFB, it would be a total mission move, and hence there would be no return on the investment. It would be a complete waste of money to move this mission area. All Eglin EW testing was already moved to Edwards in the 1995 BRAC.

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3) Only Eglin certified it had facilities to support Info Systems, Sensors and EW (question 4284), however Edwards indicated it only had facilities for sensors and EW. (See attachment 2)

I believe the BRAC decision-makers were not aware of the major changes that have taken place in the last 10 years in the area of C2 T&E, and assumed it could be consolidated with legacy EW testing. If Air Force Manuals separate the C4I (AFMAN 99-111) and Electronic Warfare (AFMAN99-112) Test and Evaluation processes because they lack similarity, why would anyone assume they could be consolidated? In addition, these manuals are over 10 years old and the C4ISR impacts, processes and definitions of C4ISR have changed significantly and diverged tremendously from sensors and/or EW in that period. Eglin has been designated, and is the only Air Force base conducting developmental T&E of strategic C2 systems. Since the Eglin C4ISR mission area's creation in 1995, the only interaction the 46 TS had with Edwards AFB facilities or personnel has been on a few datalink tests. The datalink portion of Eglin's C4ISR mission involves only one of the 46 TS's nine organizational areas. In addition, over the last 10 years the 46 TS has created detachments and located personnel where they are required to do the C4ISR T&E mission. We are at Hanscom AFB MA supporting ESC acquisition test managers, Langley AFB VA supporting operational testing at the Transformation Center, Maxwell-Gunter AFB AL supporting DISA, Peterson Field CO supporting Space Command, and San Antonio TX supporting Information Operations. We are where we need to be to do the mission, and we haven't seen a need for a detachment at Edwards. In addition, of all the Air Force C2 Combined Test Forces (CTF), no organization from Edwards is a member of any of them!

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If the Eglin C4ISR capability is moved, who will support the Southeast U.S. Link-16 training network used daily by the 48 Eglin F-15s at the 33 Fighter Wing, and the numerous Tyndall F-22s. This capability would also be required by the JSF training planning to be moved to Eglin.

The location of the C4ISR testing at Eglin allows complete end-to-end testing of the C2 kill chain from the planning of the Air Tasking Order (Daily plan of airpower support for the Joint Forces Combatant Commander's air battle plan), to the networking of the aircraft Wings and Squadrons, to the software aircrews use to plan combat missions and use to program the aircraft computer and advanced weapons, to the datalinks and satellite

connectivity that allows real-time mission updating/retasking and make time critical targeting possible.

The manpower proposed to transfer is management and leadership positions. The in-depth C2 testing and systems knowledge is provided by the over 200 contractors in the 46 TS. C2 testing is a technically intensive discipline with a limited expertise pool to draw from. A significant point is the BRAC plan does not include any contractor personnel moves. In addition, the Office Of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy is not to move contractors. How can you replace the loss of this expertise and still preserve a C2 DT&E capability. Additionally, during the 1995 BRAC EW realignment, only one person actually transferred from Eglin to Edwards! This will all be implemented at a time when the Air Force is accelerating the development and fielding of C4ISR systems. What will the strategic impacts be to the nation's ability to field and test C4I systems if the only Squadron with the capability to do interoperability testing is, in effect disbanded? No one else is doing this critical work, and we can not wait 10 years to build it again somewhere else. This is particularly important as we enter a more network-centric way of commanding and controlling our warfighters.

This decision is wrong and will result in major impacts to this nation's command and control capabilities! Please contact me if you have any questions or need further information.

W. Scot Crookshanks
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Niceville Fl 32578



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

DRC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

SUBJECT: Responsible Test Organization (RTO) for Test and Evaluation (T&E) of C4I Systems

Over the past few years, the Air Force has been struggling with how to improve developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) for C4I systems. The T&E Mission Element Board (MEB) has been the forum for healthy discussions concerning establishing a C4I RTO structure as a way to improve C4I DT&E. In order to come to closure on this topic, I would like to offer some observations and suggest a solution for you to consider implementing.

MEB efforts to date appear to treat RTO as a location/test center versus a responsibility (or function) that may be assigned to a test center or other test agencies. The C4I RTO discussion has drifted to a contest over where to locate a single C4I RTO, with the key contestants being AFFDTC at Eglin AFB and ESC at Hanscom AFB. We need to refocus efforts on the C4I RTO function--specifically how to ensure this function is performed with the same structured and disciplined approach as used for aircraft and munition systems.

The AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 1994 Software T&E Study identified inadequate DT&E as one of the primary root causes of problems in OT&E. The quality of DT&E was scattered and haphazard for C4I programs; some did well, others did not. Those that did poorly tended to have the SPO serving as the RTO, even though the proper test expertise did not reside in the SPO.

We view RTO as a function being performed predominantly by test organizations such as those residing at our test centers. However, it is permissible to assign the RTO function outside the test center structure as long as we ensure the selected organization is qualified to serve as an RTO. The Airborne Laser Lab (ABL) program is a recent example. Given the current phase and nature of the program, the SPO is presently best qualified to conduct RTO duties. However, we anticipate the RTO function will transition to one of our test centers at the appropriate time.

With proper oversight and management we can improve C4I DT&E by infusing structure and discipline. Establishing the C4I SFTC office was an important step towards bringing this structure and discipline to the C4I T&E mission area. Now it is time for our next step--to establish a single focal point with the overall responsibility of managing the C4I test function. This single focal point

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

Eglin AFB Facilities/Capabilities

Org	1 Orgcode (Text)	2 Technical Capability (List)	3 Test Resource Category (List)	4 Test Resource Name or Descriptor (Include Unique Identifier) (Text)	5 Peak Year for Test Hours (List)	6 Annual Test Hours in Peak Year (Hr)	7 Annual Test Events during Peak Year (Count)	8 Annual Labor Hours expended during Peak Year (Hr)
22 46 TW		Air Platforms	Digital Modeling and Simulation	SEEK EAGLE Modeling and Simul	FY 03	8760	804	99434.6
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Hardware in the Loop	Data Link Test Facility	FY 02	1920	16	23993
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Hardware in the Loop	Guided Weapons Eval Facility (GW)	FY 01	8760	43207	130472.4
22 46 TW		Information Systems Technology	Installed System Test	Command and Control OPS	FY 03	3000	25	843658.6
22 46 TW		N/A	Installed System Test	McKinley Climatic Laboratory	FY 02	7248	302	106644.8
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Installed System Test	Preflight Integration of Munitions	FY 02	1298.2	259	77366
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Installed System Test	Base Installation Security Systems	FY 96	640	42	103564.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Arenas (C80s)	FY 95	7600	608	56832.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gun Test Facilities (A-22, C-64, C-	FY 03	5866.8	375	62320
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Munitions Storage Area (C-74A)	FY 03	4402.8	575	32660.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Simulated Test Environment for Mu	FY 94	3184.4	243	22992.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Kinetic Energy Munitions Test Facil	FY 98	2979.3	351	46773.1
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Shallow Water Mine Pond (B-70)	FY 02	300.5	36	11040.4
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Chicken Little Compound	FY 01	8760	1556	144717.8
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Air to Ground Ranges	FY 97	8760	4078	348964.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Armament Systems Test/Training E	FY 97	8760	6973	53531.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Command Guidance Transmitter S;	FY 94	686.5	222	10743.6
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Electro Optical Evaluation Complex	FY 95	6867.8	801	118438.1
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Electronic Systems Test Facility (A	FY 98	835.5	137	17522.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Frequency Control Analysis (FCA)	FY 94	5338	627	42522.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	General Purpose Support Systems	FY 94	771.3	266	31439.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Global Positioning System and Data	FY 01	1661	743	58570.8
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gulf Test Ranges	FY 96	8760	6503	201945.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Hellfire Production Verification Test	FY 94	3579.8	320	101702.7
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Multi-Spectral Test and Training En	FY 94	8760	650	283260.2
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Photo Optics Support	FY 94	8863	881	124190.6
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Radars (FPS-16s)	FY 94	7524.1	1729	109402.9
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Communication (Bldg 44)	FY 94	4663.9	1764	93165.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Mobile Targets Support (RV)	FY 01	779.3	136	85582.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Telemetry Measurement	FY 96	5429.9	1285	64727.9

Attachment 2

6V2R

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva**Key Points:**

- For TECH-0008, the Military Value roll-up did not combine JTIC and the Army activities at Fort Huachuca in Ground T&E.
- For RDAT&E Maritime Sensors proposed scenario to move to Dahlgren violates Military Value in that Crane has a higher Military Value score. However, expert military judgment concluded Dahlgren's location co-located with the fleet is more important.
- Only Patuxant River's Air (not maritime) Sensor work was included in the Air Sensors RDAT&E scenarios and expert military judgment concluded that Air Sensor RDAT&E work should be consolidated at the Air/Space activities.

Army Land System Scenario Review - Dr. Rohde**Key Points:**

- Time did not permit discussion of this scenario.

Criteria 6-8 Overview - CDR Melone**Key Points:**

- Time did not permit discussion of Criteria 6-8..

The TJCSG will meet again on Thursday, 2 December 2004 in Pentagon Rm 4E987 from 0900-1100 hrs EST.

Action Items:

1. Dr. Short will further develop the scenario data process to incorporate additional detail and present to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
2. The subgroups will identify where any shifts in Military Value have occurred, document why any changes occurred and ensure the results from the roll-up methodology are reasonable. The subgroups will look at each of their scenarios to ensure they still make sense given the new Military Value calculations using the roll-up methodology. Any concerns will be presented to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
3. The Analysis Team will perform a sensitivity analysis for the roll-up methodology and present to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
4. The Army Principal will prepare the justification statement for why Aberdeen deleted from scenarios TECH-0002, TECH-0018, TECH-0019, and TECH-

RECEIVED

07092005

28 Jun 2005

Harold W. Gehman Jr.
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

DRC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
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MEB efforts to date appear to treat RTO as a location/test center versus a responsibility (or function) that may be assigned to a test center or other test agencies. The C4I RTO discussion has drifted to a contest over where to locate a single C4I RTO, with the key contestants being AFFDTC at Eglin AFB and ESC at Hanscom AFB. We need to refocus efforts on the C4I RTO function—specifically how to ensure this function is performed with the same structured and disciplined approach as used for aircraft and munition systems.

The AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 1994 Software T&E Study identified inadequate DT&E as one of the primary root causes of problems in OT&E. The quality of DT&E was scattered and haphazard for C4I programs; some did well, others did not. Those that did poorly tended to have the SPO serving as the RTO, even though the proper test expertise did not reside in the SPO.

We view RTO as a function being performed predominantly by test organizations such as those residing at our test centers. However, it is permissible to assign the RTO function outside the test center structure as long as we ensure the selected organization is qualified to serve as an RTO. The Airborne Laser Lab (ABL) program is a recent example. Given the current phase and nature of the program, the SPO is presently best qualified to conduct RTO duties. However, we anticipate the RTO function will transition to one of our test centers at the appropriate time.

With proper oversight and management we can improve C4I DT&E by infusing structure and discipline. Establishing the C4I SFTC office was an important step towards bringing this structure and discipline to the C4I T&E mission area. Now it is time for our next step—to establish a single focal point with the overall responsibility of managing the C4I test function. This single focal point

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

Eglin AFB Facilities/Capabilities

Org	1 Orgcode (Text)	2 Technical Capability (List)	3 Test Resource Category (List)	4 Test Resource Name or Descriptor (Include Unique Identifier) (Text)	5 Peak Year for Test Hours (List)	6 Annual Test Hours in Peak Year (Hr)	7 Annual Test Events during Peak Year (Count)	8 Annual Labor Hours expended during Peak Year (Hr)
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Attachment 2

over

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- Time did not permit discussion of this scenario.

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07092005

RECEIVED

Philip E. Coyle
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

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1) How can C4ISR testing be considered for consolidation, if Eglin (46 TS) does over half of all the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Electronic Systems Command (ESC) C4ISR acquisitions, (They are responsible for all new AF C4ISR acquisitions), and only one program out of the other half was tested at Edwards? Eglin is the only AFMC C4I T&E facility. All C4I T&E has already been consolidated at Eglin, per AF/TE direction in 1996 (See attachment 1). As it is currently planned this wouldn't be a consolidation at Edwards AFB, it would be a total mission move, and hence there would be no return on the investment. It would be a complete waste of money to move this mission area. All Eglin EW testing was already moved to Edwards in the 1995 BRAC.

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I believe the BRAC decision-makers were not aware of the major changes that have taken place in the last 10 years in the area of C2 T&E, and assumed it could be consolidated with legacy EW testing. If Air Force Manuals separate the C4I (AFMAN 99-111) and Electronic Warfare (AFMAN99-112) Test and Evaluation processes because they lack similarity, why would anyone assume they could be consolidated? In addition, these manuals are over 10 years old and the C4ISR impacts, processes and definitions of C4ISR have changed significantly and diverged tremendously from sensors and/or EW in that period. Eglin has been designated, and is the only Air Force base conducting developmental T&E of strategic C2 systems. Since the Eglin C4ISR mission area's creation in 1995, the only interaction the 46 TS had with Edwards AFB facilities or personnel has been on a few datalink tests. The datalink portion of Eglin's C4ISR mission involves only one of the 46 TS's nine organizational areas. In addition, over the last 10 years the 46 TS has created detachments and located personnel where they are required to do the C4ISR T&E mission. We are at Hanscom AFB MA supporting ESC acquisition test managers, Langley AFB VA supporting operational testing at the Transformation Center, Maxwell-Gunter AFB AL supporting DISA, Peterson Field CO supporting Space Command, and San Antonio TX supporting Information Operations. We are where we need to be to do the mission, and we haven't seen a need for a detachment at Edwards. In addition, of all the Air Force C2 Combined Test Forces (CTF), no organization from Edwards is a member of any of them!

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This decision is wrong and will result in major impacts to this nation's command and control capabilities! Please contact me if you have any questions or need further information.

W. Scot Crookshanks
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scotc10@aol.com
1318 Rosewood Cove
Niceville Fl 32578



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

JRC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

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December 1, 2004

Attachment 3

BRAC FOUO

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva

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Draft Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Unt

James E. Bilbray
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

JRC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JUN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

SUBJECT: Responsible Test Organization (RTO) for Test and Evaluation (T&E) of C4I Systems

Over the past few years, the Air Force has been struggling with how to improve developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) for C4I systems. The T&E Mission Element Board (MEB) has been the forum for healthy discussions concerning establishing a C4I RTO structure as a way to improve C4I DT&E. In order to come to closure on this topic, I would like to offer some observations and suggest a solution for you to consider implementing.

MEB efforts to date appear to treat RTO as a location/test center versus a responsibility (or function) that may be assigned to a test center or other test agencies. The C4I RTO discussion has drifted to a contest over where to locate a single C4I RTO, with the key contestants being AFFDTC at Eglin AFB and ESC at Hanscom AFB. We need to refocus efforts on the C4I RTO function—specifically how to ensure this function is performed with the same structured and disciplined approach as used for aircraft and munition systems.

The AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 1994 Software T&E Study identified inadequate DT&E as one of the primary root causes of problems in OT&E. The quality of DT&E was scattered and haphazard for C4I programs; some did well, others did not. Those that did poorly tended to have the SPO serving as the RTO, even though the proper test expertise did not reside in the SPO.

We view RTO as a function being performed predominantly by test organizations such as those residing at our test centers. However, it is permissible to assign the RTO function outside the test center structure as long as we ensure the selected organization is qualified to serve as an RTO. The Airborne Laser Lab (ABL) program is a recent example. Given the current phase and nature of the program, the SPO is presently best qualified to conduct RTO duties. However, we anticipate the RTO function will transition to one of our test centers at the appropriate time.

With proper oversight and management we can improve C4I DT&E by infusing structure and discipline. Establishing the C4I SFTC office was an important step towards bringing this structure and discipline to the C4I T&E mission area. Now it is time for our next step—to establish a single focal point with the overall responsibility of managing the C4I test function. This single focal point

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

Eglin AFB Facilities/Capabilities

Org	1 Orgcode (Text)	2 Technical Capability (List)	3 Test Resource Category (List)	4 Test Resource Name or Descriptor (Include Unique Identifier) (Text)	5 Peak Year for Test Hours (List)	6 Annual Test Hours in Peak Year (Hr)	7 Annual Test Events during Peak Year (Count)	8 Annual Labor Hours expended during Peak Year (Hr)
22 46 TW		Air Platforms	Digital Modeling and Simulation	SEEK EAGLE Modeling and Simulation	FY 03	8760	804	99434.6
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Hardware in the Loop	Data Link Test Facility	FY 02	1920	18	23993
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Hardware in the Loop	Guided Weapons Eval Facility (GW)	FY 01	8780	43207	130472.4
22 46 TW		Information Systems Technology	Installed System Test	Command and Control OPS	FY 03	3000	25	643658.6
22 46 TW		N/A	Installed System Test	McKinley Climatic Laboratory	FY 02	7248	202	106644.8
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Installed System Test	Preflight Integration of Munitions an	FY 02	1298.2	259	77366
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Installed System Test	Base Installation Security Systems	FY 96	640	42	103564.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Arenae (C80s)	FY 96	7600	606	56832.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gun Test Facilities (A-22, C-64, C-	FY 03	5866.8	375	62320
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Munitions Storage Area (C-74A)	FY 03	4402.6	575	32660.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Simulated Test Environment for Mu	FY 94	3184.4	243	22992.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Kinetic Energy Munitions Test Facil	FY 96	2979.3	351	46773.1
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Shadow Water Mine Pond (B-70)	FY 02	300.5	36	11040.4
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Chicken Little Compound	FY 01	8760	1556	144717.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Air to Ground Ranges	FY 97	8760	4078	348964.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Armament Systems Test/Training E	FY 97	8760	6973	53531.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Command Guidance Transmitter S	FY 94	686.5	222	10743.6
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Electro Optical Evaluation Complex	FY 95	6667.8	901	118438.1
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Electronic Systems Test Facility (A	FY 96	835.6	137	17622.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Frequency Control Analysis (FCA)	FY 94	5338	627	42522.3
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	General Purpose Support Systems	FY 94	771.3	268	31439.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Global Positioning System and Data	FY 01	1661	743	56570.6
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gulf Test Ranges	FY 96	8760	6503	201945.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Hellfire Production Verification Test	FY 94	3579.8	320	101702.7
22 46 TW		Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Multi-Spectral Test and Training En	FY 94	8760	650	283269.2
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Photo Optics Support	FY 94	6893	681	124180.6
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Radars (FPS-16s)	FY 94	7524.1	1729	109402.9
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Communication (Bldg 44)	FY 94	4683.9	1764	93165.7
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Mobile Targets Support (RM	FY 01	779.3	136	95592.5
22 46 TW		Weapons Technology	Measurement	Telemetry Measurement	FY 98	5429.9	1265	64727.9

Attachment 2

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

EGwards AFB Facilities (Note no Information System Technology Capabilities listed)

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	77 FB2805	Air Platforms	Digital Modeling and Simulation	Manned Flight Simulation Lab	FY 01	1125	1155	9308
	77 FB2805	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Hardware in the Loop	F-16 Avionics Test Station SIL	FY 01	1558	1558	18945
	77 FB2805	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Installed System Test	Bentfield Anechoic Facility BAF	FY 01	2850	9	56594
	77 FB2805	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Falcon North	FY 03	1051	220	8815
	77 FB2805	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Rickey Mission Control Center	FY 03	6760	1630	98173
	77 FB2805	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Birk Flight Test Facility	FY 01	2959	282	23066
	77 FB2805	Air Platforms	Installed System Test	Installed Engine Horizontal Thrust	FY 02	121	5	121
	77 FB2805	Air Platforms	Measurement	Weight and Balance Facility	FY 03	N/A	112	87
	77 FB2805	Weapons Technology	Installed System Test	Gun Butt	FY 03	67	7	9
	77 FB2805	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Hardware in the Loop	AFEWES	FY 02	6024	3	23616

December 1, 2004

Attachment 3

BRAC FOUO

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva

Key Points:

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Army Land System Scenario Review - Dr. Rohde

Key Points:

- Time did not permit discussion of this scenario.

Criteria 6-8 Overview - CDR Melone

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Action Items:

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RECEIVED

James V. Hansen
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

07092005

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All the other BRAC recommendations list the military units that are moving. In the case of the Eglin recommendation, they cover very broad areas, and have led to confusion and the possible inclusion of the 46TS's Command and Control (C2) Test and Evaluation (T&E) mission. I believe there must have been a complete misunderstanding of the definition of C4ISR and Information Systems that would lead anyone to consider consolidating it with EW. Three of the biggest indicators of this are:

1) How can C4ISR testing be considered for consolidation, if Eglin (46 TS) does over half of all the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Electronic Systems Command (ESC) C4ISR acquisitions. (They are responsible for all new AF C4ISR acquisitions), and only one program out of the other half was tested at Edwards? Eglin is the only AFMC C4I T&E facility. All C4I T&E has already been consolidated at Eglin, per AF/TE direction in 1996 (See attachment 1). As it is currently planned this wouldn't be a consolidation at Edwards AFB, it would be a total mission move, and hence there would be no return on the investment. It would be a complete waste of money to move this mission area. All Eglin EW testing was already moved to Edwards in the 1995 BRAC.

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3) Only Eglin certified it had facilities to support Info Systems, Sensors and EW (question 4284), however Edwards indicated it only had facilities for sensors and EW. (See attachment 2)

I believe the BRAC decision-makers were not aware of the major changes that have taken place in the last 10 years in the area of C2 T&E, and assumed it could be consolidated with legacy EW testing. If Air Force Manuals separate the C4I (AFMAN 99-111) and Electronic Warfare (AFMAN99-112) Test and Evaluation processes because they lack similarity, why would anyone assume they could be consolidated? In addition, these manuals are over 10 years old and the C4ISR impacts, processes and definitions of C4ISR have changed significantly and diverged tremendously from sensors and/or EW in that period. Eglin has been designated, and is the only Air Force base conducting developmental T&E of strategic C2 systems. Since the Eglin C4ISR mission area's creation in 1995, the only interaction the 46 TS had with Edwards AFB facilities or personnel has been on a few datalink tests. The datalink portion of Eglin's C4ISR mission involves only one of the 46 TS's nine organizational areas. In addition, over the last 10 years the 46 TS has created detachments and located personnel where they are required to do the C4ISR T&E mission. We are at Hanscom AFB MA supporting ESC acquisition test managers, Langley AFB VA supporting operational testing at the Transformation Center, Maxwell-Gunter AFB AL supporting DISA, Peterson Field CO supporting Space Command, and San Antonio TX supporting Information Operations. We are where we need to be to do the mission, and we haven't seen a need for a detachment at Edwards. In addition, of all the Air Force C2 Combined Test Forces (CTF), no organization from Edwards is a member of any of them!

If in the area of Information Systems Test and Evaluation (T&E) military value (MV), Eglin (.3174) has almost twice the MV of Edwards (.1833). Why is C4ISR being moved to a location with a lower MV? It seems "military judgement" was used (See attachment 3), but it must have been applied in error. The BRAC representative for the Navy even expressed concerns about this judgement decision (14 Nov 2004 Issue # 11-15-04-01). Even if this judgement had anything to do with the slightly greater FTE capacity at Edwards, this is also in error, since it didn't take in to account the 50,000 square foot uniquely designed C2 Test Operations facility, a recently completed, 5 year, \$20M MILCON. The BRAC plan does not include any MILCOM at Edwards, and the new Eglin C4I Test Operation facility was specifically designed to encompass end-to-end interoperability testing of network/battlespace C4I systems covering the spectrum from strategic objective planning to the bomb hitting the target and battle damage assessment (BDA).

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connectivity that allows real-time mission updating/retasking and make time critical targeting possible.

The manpower proposed to transfer is management and leadership positions. The in-depth C2 testing and systems knowledge is provided by the over 200 contractors in the 46 TS. C2 testing is a technically intensive discipline with a limited expertise pool to draw from. A significant point is the BRAC plan does not include any contractor personnel moves. In addition, the Office Of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy is not to move contractors. How can you replace the loss of this expertise and still preserve a C2 DT&E capability. Additionally, during the 1995 BRAC EW realignment, only one person actually transferred from Eglin to Edwards! This will all be implemented at a time when the Air Force is accelerating the development and fielding of C4ISR systems. What will the strategic impacts be to the nation's ability to field and test C4I systems if the only Squadron with the capability to do interoperability testing is, in effect disbanded? No one else is doing this critical work, and we can not wait 10 years to build it again somewhere else. This is particularly important as we enter a more network-centric way of commanding and controlling our warfighters.

This decision is wrong and will result in major impacts to this nation's command and control capabilities! Please contact me if you have any questions or need further information.

W. Scot Crookshanks
850 897-8033
scotc10@aol.com
1318 Rosewood Cove
Niceville Fl 32578

DR 2



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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Army Land System Scenario Review - Dr. Rohdc

Key Points:

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Criteria 6-8 Overview - CDR Melone

Key Points:

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07092005



Samuel K. Skinner
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

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connectivity that allows real-time mission updating/retasking and make time critical targeting possible.

The manpower proposed to transfer is management and leadership positions. The in-depth C2 testing and systems knowledge is provided by the over 200 contractors in the 46 TS. C2 testing is a technically intensive discipline with a limited expertise pool to draw from. A significant point is the BRAC plan does not include any contractor personnel moves. In addition, the Office Of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy is not to move contractors. How can you replace the loss of this expertise and still preserve a C2 DT&E capability. Additionally, during the 1995 BRAC EW realignment, only one person actually transferred from Eglin to Edwards! This will all be implemented at a time when the Air Force is accelerating the development and fielding of C4ISR systems. What will the strategic impacts be to the nation's ability to field and test C4I systems if the only Squadron with the capability to do interoperability testing is, in effect disbanded? No one else is doing this critical work, and we can not wait 10 years to build it again somewhere else. This is particularly important as we enter a more network-centric way of commanding and controlling our warfighters.

This decision is wrong and will result in major impacts to this nation's command and control capabilities! Please contact me if you have any questions or need further information.

W. Scot Crookshanks
850 897-8033
scote10@aol.com
1318 Rosewood Cove
Niceville FL 32578

DRC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

SUBJECT: Responsible Test Organization (RTO) for Test and Evaluation (T&E) of C4I Systems

Over the past few years, the Air Force has been struggling with how to improve developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) for C4I systems. The T&E Mission Element Board (MEB) has been the forum for healthy discussions concerning establishing a C4I RTO structure as a way to improve C4I DT&E. In order to come to closure on this topic, I would like to offer some observations and suggest a solution for you to consider implementing.

MEB efforts to date appear to treat RTO as a location/test center versus a responsibility (or function) that may be assigned to a test center or other test agencies. The C4I RTO discussion has drifted to a contest over where to locate a single C4I RTO, with the key contestants being AFFDTC at Eglin AFB and ESC at Hanscom AFB. We need to refocus efforts on the C4I RTO function—specifically how to ensure this function is performed with the same structured and disciplined approach as used for aircraft and munition systems.

The AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 1994 Software T&E Study identified inadequate DT&E as one of the primary root causes of problems in OT&E. The quality of DT&E was scattered and haphazard for C4I programs; some did well, others did not. Those that did poorly tended to have the SPO serving as the RTO, even though the proper test expertise did not reside in the SPO.

We view RTO as a function being performed predominantly by test organizations such as those residing at our test centers. However, it is permissible to assign the RTO function outside the test center structure as long as we ensure the selected organization is qualified to serve as an RTO. The Airborne Laser Lab (ABL) program is a recent example. Given the current phase and nature of the program, the SPO is presently best qualified to conduct RTO duties. However, we anticipate the RTO function will transition to one of our test centers at the appropriate time.

With proper oversight and management we can improve C4I DT&E by infusing structure and discipline. Establishing the C4I SFTC office was an important step towards bringing this structure and discipline to the C4I T&E mission area. Now it is time for our next step—to establish a single focal point with the overall responsibility of managing the C4I test function. This single focal point

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

Eglin AFB Facilities/Capabilities

Org	1 Orgcode (Text)	2 Technical Capability (List)	3 Test Resource Category (List)	4 Test Resource Name or Descriptor (Include Unique Identifier) (Text)	5 Peak Year for Test Hours (List)	6 Annual Test Hours In Peak Year (Hr)	7 Annual Test Events during Peak Year (Count)	8 Annual Labor Hours expended during Peak Year (Hr)
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Attachment 2

over

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva**Key Points:**

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Niceville Fl 32578



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

DR2

11.9 JAN 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

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Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

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Attachment 2

OVER

December 1, 2004

Attachment 3

BRAC FOUO

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva

Key Points:

- For TECH-0008, the Military Value roll-up did not combine JTIC and the Army activities at Fort Huachuca in Ground T&E.
- For RDAT&E Maritime Sensors proposed scenario to move to Dahlgren violates Military Value in that Crane has a higher Military Value score. However, expert military judgment concluded Dahlgren's location co-located with the fleet is more important.
- Only Patuxant River's Air (not maritime) Sensor work was included in the Air Sensors RDAT&E scenarios and expert military judgment concluded that Air Sensor RDAT&E work should be consolidated at the Air/Space activities.

Army Land System Scenario Review - Dr. Rohde

Key Points:

- Time did not permit discussion of this scenario.

Criteria 6-8 Overview - CDR Melone

Key Points:

- Time did not permit discussion of Criteria 6-8..

The TJCSG will meet again on Thursday, 2 December 2004 in Pentagon Rm 4E987 from 0900-1100 hrs EST.

Action Items:

1. Dr. Short will further develop the scenario data process to incorporate additional detail and present to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
2. The subgroups will identify where any shifts in Military Value have occurred, document why any changes occurred and ensure the results from the roll-up methodology are reasonable. The subgroups will look at each of their scenarios to ensure they still make sense given the new Military Value calculations using the roll-up methodology. Any concerns will be presented to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
3. The Analysis Team will perform a sensitivity analysis for the roll-up methodology and present to the TJCSG at the 2 December 2004 TJCSG Meeting.
4. The Army Principal will prepare the justification statement for why Aberdeen deleted from scenarios TECH-0002, TECH-0018, TECH-0019, and TECH-

Draft Deliberative Document - For Discussion Purposes Only - Do Not Release Unt

Sue E. Turner
BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

28 Jun 2005

07092005



I am writing you as a concerned citizen, retired Air Force Lt Colonel, an ex-Operations Officer from the 46 Test Squadron (46 TS) at Eglin AFB Florida, and a contractor supporting the 46 TS Business Office for the last 10 years. As the Operations Officer in charge of planning and coordinating the 1995 BRAC move of the 46 TS Electronic Warfare (EW) mission to Edwards AFB CA, I have several major concerns about the proposal to "Realign Eglin Air Force Base, FL, by relocating Air & Space Sensors, Electronic Warfare & Electronics and Information Systems Test & Evaluation to Edwards Air Force Base, CA."

All the other BRAC recommendations list the military units that are moving. In the case of the Eglin recommendation, they cover very broad areas, and have led to confusion and the possible inclusion of the 46TS's Command and Control (C2) Test and Evaluation (T&E) mission. I believe there must have been a complete misunderstanding of the definition of C4ISR and Information Systems that would lead anyone to consider consolidating it with EW. Three of the biggest indicators of this are:

1) How can C4ISR testing be considered for consolidation, if Eglin (46 TS) does over half of all the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Electronic Systems Command (ESC) C4ISR acquisitions, (They are responsible for all new AF C4ISR acquisitions), and only one program out of the other half was tested at Edwards? Eglin is the only AFMC C4I T&E facility. All C4I T&E has already been consolidated at Eglin, per AF/TE direction in 1996 (See attachment 1). As it is currently planned this wouldn't be a consolidation at Edwards AFB, it would be a total mission move, and hence there would be no return on the investment. It would be a complete waste of money to move this mission area. All Eglin EW testing was already moved to Edwards in the 1995 BRAC.

2) Since basically none of the ESC C4ISC testing is conducted at Edwards (But they do a great deal of sensor and electronic warfare systems), how can Edwards AFB claim manpower of 552 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) and Eglin only have 66. Eglin does \$18.9M dollars worth in FY03 (we've grown about 30% a year since then) of C4I testing a year compared to \$6M dollars a year for Edwards. Obviously everyone wasn't using the same definition of Information Systems Technology T&E. In the case of Eglin, the 66 FTEs listed were only the military and government FTEs directly conducting T&E of new C4ISR application or systems. There are approximately 300 government and contractor personnel in the 46 TS.

3) Only Eglin certified it had facilities to support Info Systems, Sensors and EW (question 4284), however Edwards indicated it only had facilities for sensors and EW. (See attachment 2)

I believe the BRAC decision-makers were not aware of the major changes that have taken place in the last 10 years in the area of C2 T&E, and assumed it could be consolidated with legacy EW testing. If Air Force Manuals separate the C4I (AFMAN 99-111) and Electronic Warfare (AFMAN99-112) Test and Evaluation processes because they lack similarity, why would anyone assume they could be consolidated? In addition, these manuals are over 10 years old and the C4ISR impacts, processes and definitions of C4ISR have changed significantly and diverged tremendously from sensors and/or EW in that period. Eglin has been designated, and is the only Air Force base conducting developmental T&E of strategic C2 systems. Since the Eglin C4ISR mission area's creation in 1995, the only interaction the 46 TS had with Edwards AFB facilities or personnel has been on a few datalink tests. The datalink portion of Eglin's C4ISR mission involves only one of the 46 TS's nine organizational areas. In addition, over the last 10 years the 46 TS has created detachments and located personnel where they are required to do the C4ISR T&E mission. We are at Hanscom AFB MA supporting ESC acquisition test managers, Langley AFB VA supporting operational testing at the Transformation Center, Maxwell-Gunter AFB AL supporting DISA, Peterson Field CO supporting Space Command, and San Antonio TX supporting Information Operations. We are where we need to be to do the mission, and we haven't seen a need for a detachment at Edwards. In addition, of all the Air Force C2 Combined Test Forces (CTF), no organization from Edwards is a member of any of them!

If in the area of Information Systems Test and Evaluation (T&E) military value (MV), Eglin (.3174) has almost twice the MV of Edwards (.1833). Why is C4ISR being moved to a location with a lower MV? It seems "military judgement" was used (See attachment 3), but it must have been applied in error. The BRAC representative for the Navy even expressed concerns about this judgement decision (14 Nov 2004 Issue # 11-15-04-01). Even if this judgement had anything to do with the slightly greater FTE capacity at Edwards, this is also in error, since it didn't take in to account the 50,000 square foot uniquely designed C2 Test Operations facility, a recently completed, 5 year, \$20M MILCON. The BRAC plan does not include any MILCOM at Edwards, and the new Eglin C4I Test Operation facility was specifically designed to encompass end-to-end interoperability testing of network/battlespace C4I systems covering the spectrum from strategic objective planning to the bomb hitting the target and battle damage assessment (BDA).

If the Eglin C4ISR capability is moved, who will support the Southeast U.S. Link-16 training network used daily by the 48 Eglin F-15s at the 33 Fighter Wing, and the numerous Tyndall F-22s. This capability would also be required by the JSF training planning to be moved to Eglin.

The location of the C4ISR testing at Eglin allows complete end-to-end testing of the C2 kill chain from the planning of the Air Tasking Order (Daily plan of airpower support for the Joint Forces Combatant Commander's air battle plan), to the networking of the aircraft Wings and Squadrons, to the software aircrews use to plan combat missions and use to program the aircraft computer and advanced weapons, to the datalinks and satellite

connectivity that allows real-time mission updating/retasking and make time critical targeting possible.

The manpower proposed to transfer is management and leadership positions. The in-depth C2 testing and systems knowledge is provided by the over 200 contractors in the 46 TS. C2 testing is a technically intensive discipline with a limited expertise pool to draw from. A significant point is the BRAC plan does not include any contractor personnel moves. In addition, the Office Of Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy is not to move contractors. How can you replace the loss of this expertise and still preserve a C2 DT&E capability. Additionally, during the 1995 BRAC EW realignment, only one person actually transferred from Eglin to Edwards! This will all be implemented at a time when the Air Force is accelerating the development and fielding of C4ISR systems. What will the strategic impacts be to the nation's ability to field and test C4I systems if the only Squadron with the capability to do interoperability testing is, in effect disbanded? No one else is doing this critical work, and we can not wait 10 years to build it again somewhere else. This is particularly important as we enter a more network-centric way of commanding and controlling our warfighters.

This decision is wrong and will result in major impacts to this nation's command and control capabilities! Please contact me if you have any questions or need further information.

W. Scot Crookshanks
850 897-8033
scotc10@aol.com
1318 Rosewood Cove
Niceville Fl 32578



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

DR 2

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFMC/DO

11.9 JAN 1996

FROM: HQ USAF/TE
1650 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1650

SUBJECT: Responsible Test Organization (RTO) for Test and Evaluation (T&E) of C4I Systems

Over the past few years, the Air Force has been struggling with how to improve developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) for C4I systems. The T&E Mission Element Board (MEB) has been the forum for healthy discussions concerning establishing a C4I RTO structure as a way to improve C4I DT&E. In order to come to closure on this topic, I would like to offer some observations and suggest a solution for you to consider implementing.

MEB efforts to date appear to treat RTO as a location/test center versus a responsibility (or function) that may be assigned to a test center or other test agencies. The C4I RTO discussion has drifted to a contest over where to locate a single C4I RTO, with the key contestants being AFFDTC at Eglin AFB and ESC at Hanscom AFB. We need to refocus efforts on the C4I RTO function—specifically how to ensure this function is performed with the same structured and disciplined approach as used for aircraft and munition systems.

The AF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 1994 Software T&E Study identified inadequate DT&E as one of the primary root causes of problems in OT&E. The quality of DT&E was scattered and haphazard for C4I programs; some did well, others did not. Those that did poorly tended to have the SPO serving as the RTO, even though the proper test expertise did not reside in the SPO.

We view RTO as a function being performed predominantly by test organizations such as those residing at our test centers. However, it is permissible to assign the RTO function outside the test center structure as long as we ensure the selected organization is qualified to serve as an RTO. The Airborne Laser Lab (ABL) program is a recent example. Given the current phase and nature of the program, the SPO is presently best qualified to conduct RTO duties. However, we anticipate the RTO function will transition to one of our test centers at the appropriate time.

With proper oversight and management we can improve C4I DT&E by infusing structure and discipline. Establishing the C4I SFTC office was an important step towards bringing this structure and discipline to the C4I T&E mission area. Now it is time for our next step—to establish a single focal point with the overall responsibility of managing the C4I test function. This single focal point

Section 32 Technical, Question 4284 Test Resource Usage Peak

Eglin AFB Facilities/Capabilities

Org	1 Orgcode (Text)	2 Technical Capability (List)	3 Test Resource Category (List)	4 Test Resource Name or Descriptor (Include Unique Identifier) (Text)	5 Peak Year for Test Hours (List)	6 Annual Test Hours In Peak Year (Hr)	7 Annual Test Events during Peak Year (Count)	8 Annual Labor Hours expended during Peak Year (Hr)
	22 46 TW	Air Platforms	Digital Modeling and Simulation	SEEK EAGLE Modeling and Simul	FY 03	8760	804	99434.6
	22 46 TW	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Hardware in the Loop	Data Link Test Facility	FY 02	1920	18	23993
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Hardware in the Loop	Guided Weapons Eval Facility (GW	FY 01	8760	43207	130472.4
	22 46 TW	* Information Systems Technology	Installed System Test	Command and Control OPS	FY 03	3000	25	643658.6
	22 46 TW	N/A	Installed System Test	McKinley Climatic Laboratory	FY 02	7248	302	106644.8
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Installed System Test	Preflight Integration of Munitions an	FY 02	1298.2	259	77366
	22 46 TW	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Installed System Test	Base Installation Security Systems	FY 96	640	42	103564.3
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Arenas (C80a)	FY 95	7600	608	56832.7
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gun Test Facilities (A-22, C-64, C-	FY 03	5866.8	375	62320
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Munitions Storage Area (C-74A)	FY 03	4402.8	575	32660.5
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Simulated Test Environment for Mu	FY 94	3184.4	243	22992.3
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Kinetic Energy Munitions Test Facil	FY 98	2979.3	351	46773.1
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Shallow Water Mine Pond (B-70)	FY 02	300.5	36	11040.4
	22 46 TW	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Chicken Little Compound	FY 01	8760	1556	144717.8
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Air to Ground Ranges	FY 97	8760	4078	348964.5
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Armament Systems Test/Training E	FY 97	8760	6973	53531.3
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Command Guidance Transmitter S;	FY 94	686.5	222	10743.6
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Electro Optical Evaluation Complex	FY 95	6667.8	801	118436.1
	22 46 TW	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Electronic Systems Test Facility (A	FY 98	835.5	137	17622.3
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Frequency Control Analysis (FCA)	FY 94	5338	627	42522.3
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	General Purpose Support Systems	FY 94	771.3	266	31439.7
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Global Positioning System and Dat	FY 01	1661	743	58570.8
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Gulf Test Ranges	FY 96	8760	6503	201945.7
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Hellfire Production Verification Test	FY 94	3579.8	320	101702.7
	22 46 TW	Sensors, Electronics and EW	Measurement	Multi-Spectral Test and Training En	FY 94	8760	650	283260.2
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Photo Optics Support	FY 94	6863	881	124190.6
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Radars (FPS-16s)	FY 94	7524.1	1729	109402.9
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Communication (Bldg 44)	FY 94	4663.9	1764	93165.7
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Range Mobile Targets Support (RM	FY 01	779.3	138	95592.5
	22 46 TW	Weapons Technology	Measurement	Telemetry Measurement	FY 96	5429.9	1265	64727.9

Attachment 2

OVER

December 1, 2004

Attachment 3

BRAC FOUO

C4ISR Subgroup - Mr. Mleziva

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FAX: 11 Pages including cover

31 May 2005


To: BRAC Attn: Katie (703) 699-2735

Subject: Eglin Air Force Base Florida's gain of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Initial Joint Training (IJT) Site

Ma'am,

Here's information and position regarding SECDEF's recommendations on Eglin AFB Florida. I would appreciate BRAC's consideration of the presented material.

Thank You,



GEORGE H. NEWMAN
(850) 729-0924
newman@cox.net

RECEIVED
05312005

GEORGE H. NEWMAN
335 Ruckel Drive
Niceville FL 32578
(850) 729-0924
newman@cox.net

May 26, 2005

Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2551 South Clark Street Suite 600
Arlington VA 22202

Subject: Against Eglin Air Force Base Florida's gain of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Initial Joint Training (IJT) Site

This feedback is in response to the Secretary of Defense's May 13, 2005 BRAC recommendations regarding Eglin Air Force Base Florida's gain of the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site. It is my assessment that current fighter aircraft operations in concert with any additional fighter aircraft operations will contribute to an increase in mid-air collision mishap potential at Eglin AFB. As such, it is my recommendation both the JSF IJT and 33rd Fighter Wing's F-15 operations be located/relocated to a less congested military base.

Eglin AFB Director of Base Safety stated with respect to the air traffic control system at Eglin that it was, "the busiest Air Force base in the free world." (Attachment 1).

Civil air traffic takeoff/landings in the Eglin AFB area have almost doubled from 54,007 landings in 1988 to 102,171 landings actual/projected for 2005 (Attachment 2).

Eglin AFB Total airline landings (actual and projected) Dec 2004-Nov 2005: 8149

Eglin AFB Total airline landings (actual) 1988: 3670

Destin Airport (actual) Jan 2004-Dec 2004: 94022

Destin Airport (actual) Jan 1988-Dec 1988: 50337

Conclusion: It has been established that Eglin AFB's air traffic control system is the busiest AF system in the free world and Eglin's air traffic becomes more congested every day. High speed fighter aircraft operations in this congested military-civil-air carrier flight environment contribute to an increase in mid-air collision mishap potential at Eglin AFB Florida.

Recommendation: both the JSF IJT and 33rd Fighter Wing's F-15 operations be located/relocated to a less air traffic congested military base.



GEORGE H. NEWMAN

Attachments:

1. Air Force Form 707A
2. Civil Aircraft Landings (Provided by FAA & County)
3. Safety Assessor's Biography

30 SEP 1988

I. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA (Reau...FR 36-10 carefully before filling in any item.)

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) NEWMAN, GEORGE H.		2. SSN 446-46-7216	3. GRADE Major	4. DAFSC X1455Y
5. PERIOD OF REPORT From: 1 Dec 87 Thru: 17 Aug 88		6. NO. DAYS SUPERVISION 261	7. REASON FOR REPORT CRO	
8. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION HQ ARMAMENT DIVISION, AFSC, EGLIN AFB FL				9. PAS CODE ED0HFB7H

II. UNIT MISSION DESCRIPTION
 Numbered Air Force equivalent responsible for research, development, test, and evaluation of DOD and allied forces nonnuclear armament, range systems and associated equipment. Manages acquisition of domestic and foreign military weapons systems, subsystems, and related equipment as directed by USAF.

III. JOB DESCRIPTION
 1. DUTY TITLE: Chief of Flight Safety
 2. KEY DUTIES, TASKS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES: Led the Flight Safety program at the largest Air Force base in the free world. Provided the safety guidance needed to accomplish munitions testing on 43 different test aircraft including F-16, F-15, A-10, F-111, F-4, T-38, UH-1, and C-130. Directs coordinated safety efforts of six different major flying organizations from three major commands to operate in the most congested airspace in the USAF. Flies photo chase mission in the T-38 to the very edges of the operating envelope.

IV. IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
 --Provided changes to Air Force procedures to monitor F-100 engines in the F-16 to increase the reliability of the engine.
 --Provided guidance during flight profile development that completely eliminated a potential for midair collisions on one system development test.
 --Investigated six minor mishaps and provided recommendations that have been adopted Air Force-wide.
 --Managed resources to provide a viable flight safety program while being 25 percent undermanned in his division.

V. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

	DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS	MEETS STANDARDS
--	-------------------------	-----------------

1. Job Knowledge Has knowledge required to perform duties effectively. Strives to improve this knowledge. Applies knowledge to handle nonroutine situations.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. Leadership Skills Sets and enforces standards. Motivates subordinates. Works well with others. Fosters teamwork. Displays initiative. Self-confident. Has respect and confidence of subordinates. Fair and consistent in evaluation of subordinates.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. Professional Qualities Exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, and honesty. Adheres to Air Force standards. Accepts personal responsibility. Is fair and objective.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Organizational Skills Plans, coordinates, schedules, and uses resources effectively. Schedules work for self and others equitably and effectively. Anticipates and solves problems. Meets suspenses.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. Judgment and Decisions Makes timely and accurate decisions. Emphasizes logic in decision making. Retains composure in stressful situations. Recognizes opportunities and acts to take advantage of them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Communication Skills Listens, speaks, and writes effectively.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

VI. RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Major Newman has provided excellent management and leadership of the Flight Safety Division. He has provided inputs to over 30 different test projects that were essential to the completion of all these tests without loss of life or aircraft. His investigations of incidents that occur in the air traffic control system of the busiest Air Force base in the free world have been thorough. He provided changes to operations that have continued to improve the operations of air traffic in the Eglin area. Recommend selection for Senior Service School.

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION JAMES A. SAMPSON, LTC, USAF Armament Division (AFSC) Eglin AFB FL	DUTY TITLE Director of Base Safety	DATE 6 Sep 88
	SSN [REDACTED] 7	SIGNATURE <i>James A. Sampson</i>

VII. ADDITIONAL RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Major Newman has led the Flight Safety division in an outstanding manner. His safety guidance resulted in the 3247 Test Squadron's recognition as the best test and evaluation unit in AFSC. Challenge with command and select for Senior Service School.

CONCUR NONCONCUR

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION EDWARD L. HUBBARD, COL, USAF Armament Division (AFSC) Eglin AFB FL	DUTY TITLE Deputy for Safety	DATE 6 Sep 88
	SSN [REDACTED] 9	SIGNATURE <i>Edward L. Hubbard</i>

VIII. REVIEWER

CONCUR NONCONCUR

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION GLENN E. MESSERLI, Colonel, USAF Armament Division (AFSC) Eglin AFB FL	DUTY TITLE Chief of Staff	DATE 6 Oct 88
	SSN [REDACTED] 3	SIGNATURE <i>Glenn E. Messerli</i>

Instructions

All: Recommendations must be based on performance and the potential based on that performance. Promotion recommendations are prohibited. Do not consider or comment on completion of or enrollment in PME, advanced education, previous or anticipated promotion recommendations on AF Form 709, OER indorsement levels, family activities, marital status, race, sex, ethnic origin, age, or religion.

Rater: Focus your evaluation in Section IV on what the officer did, how well he or she did it and how the officer contributed to mission accomplishment. Write in concise "bullet" format. Your comments in Section VI may include recommendations for augmentation or assignment.

Additional Rater: Carefully review the rater's evaluation to ensure it is accurate, unbiased, and uninflated. If you disagree, you may ask the rater to review his or her evaluation. You may not direct a change in the evaluation. If you still disagree with the rater, mark "NONCONCUR" and explain. You may include recommendations for augmentation or assignment.

Reviewer: Carefully review the rater's and additional rater's ratings and comments. If their evaluations are accurate, unbiased, and uninflated, mark the form "CONCUR" and sign the form. If you disagree with previous evaluators, you may ask them to review their evaluations. You may not direct them to change their appraisals. If you still disagree with the additional rater, mark "NONCONCUR" and explain in Section VIII. Do not use "NONCONCUR" simply to provide comments on the report.

ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES
 NUMBER OF LANDING PER MONTH
 (ACTUAL)

MONTH	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
JANUARY		113	114	114	143	164	157	168
FEBRUARY		64	102	102	131	154	158	154
MARCH		91	118	118	147	171	164	174
APRIL		79	117	117	145	171	162	201
MAY		90	121	121	146	177	166	230
JUNE		89	116	116	173	170	159	223
JULY		131	153	153	173	168	173	232
AUGUST		140	119	148	170	171	173	234
SEPTEMBER		113	118	144	168	164	161	225
OCTOBER		118	119	149	175	175	176	237
NOVEMBER	31	109	107	131	174	155	166	220
DECEMBER	111	108	108	140	156	153	170	222
TOTAL:	142	1245	1412	1553	1901	1993	1985	2520

**BEGAN OPERATION ON 11/15/82

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
NUMBER OF LANDINGS PER MONTH (SCHEDULED)

MONTH	1989			1990			1991			1992		
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
JANUARY	120	121	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
FEBRUARY	112	87	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	85
MARCH	120	89	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
APRIL	115	85	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
MAY	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
JUNE	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
JULY	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
AUGUST	97	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
SEPTEMBER	115	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90
OCTOBER	124	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
NOVEMBER	120	90	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	89
DECEMBER	124	93	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	90
TOTAL:	1,323	1,117	1,091	1,086	1,091	1,086	1,091	1,086	1,091	1,086	1,091	1,091

ROYALE AIRLINES
NUMBER OF LANDINGS PER MONTH (ACTUAL)

MONTH	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
JANUARY		63			
FEBRUARY		SERVICE TERMINATED			
MARCH					
APRIL					
MAY					
JUNE					
JULY	65				
AUGUST	79				
SEPTEMBER	68				
OCTOBER	75				
NOVEMBER	75				
DECEMBER	65				
TOTAL:	362	63			

NOTE: ROYALE AIRLINES BEGAN SERVICE JULY 5, 1988

OPERATIONS
2004

	DAP	MIRACLE STRIP	BSAP	SUNSHINE	TOTAL
January	3391	3210	3210	3210	6601
February	3217	3221	3221	3221	6438
March	5944	3290	3290	3290	9234
April	5362	3210	3210	3210	8572
May	5690	3289	3289	3289	8979
June	5353	3213	3213	3213	8566
July	6175	3234	3234	3234	9409
August	5409	3254	3254	3254	8663
September	4053	3203	3203	3203	7256
October	4778	3184	3184	3184	7962
November	4600	3389	3389	3389	7989
December	4343	3284	3284	3284	7627
Total	58315	38861	38861	38861	94022

CAVOK, INC.
 AIRPORT ACTIVITY REPORT
 CALENDAR YR 1988

MONTH:	SINGLE	TWIN	TURBO	JET	HELI.	TOTAL
JANUARY	2368	400	196	72	18	3054
FEBRUARY	2479	361	204	61	52	3157
MARCH	3100	524	337	108	35	4104
APRIL	2995	609	491	142	75	4312
MAY	4250	713	552	191	109	5815
JUNE	3666	827	510	132	69	5204
JULY	4260	735	511	206	73	5785
AUGUST	3755	641	348	142	87	4973
SEPTEMBER	2347	488	314	96	93	3338
OCTOBER	3052	550	316	86	64	4068
NOVEMBER	2749	457	221	66	61	3554
DECEMBER	2242	394	215	74	48	2973
TOTAL:	37,263	6,699	4,215	1,376	784	50,337

MAY-31-2005 08:06 From: NEWMAN
 Sent By: OKALOOSA REGIONAL AIRPORT;

850 729 0924
 651 7164;

To: 18005069511465603774 P.10
 May-25-05 14:01; Page 4/4

Flight Safety Auditor

George H. Newman

Mr. Newman is a former Senior Flight Safety Auditor for the SAIC ESOHCAMP program. He was responsible for assessing the flying safety programs of ANG bases throughout the United States, ensuring their compliance with DoD, USAF, and ANG compliance directives. He was the Kirtland AFB Inspector General, responsible for assessing readiness, discipline, efficiency and economy of wing units, and implementing IG policies and programs. As Logistics Group Commander at Prince Sultan Air Base, he was responsible for aircraft maintenance and logistics for the largest composite combat wing in the USAF. His group executed over \$45M in contractual responsibilities, ensured combat readiness of \$1.1B of conventional munitions. He was responsible for a \$10M budget. As Chief of Flight Safety, Armament Division, Eglin AFB, he led the flight safety program directing coordinated safety efforts of six separate major flying organizations operating in the most congested airspace in the USAF. He is a Command Pilot with more than 34 years of civilian and military experience and held DCID 1/14 SBI/SSBI-PR 950623 Security Clearance upon military retirement.

EDUCATION/REGISTRATIONS

- Masters Degree, Management, *Troy State University*, 1988
- Bachelor of Science, Aeronautical Technology, *Okla. State Univ*, 1974
- Graduate, USAF Senior Officers, Aircraft Maintenance Course, 1992
- Graduate, USAF Flight Safety, Officers Course, 1986
- Commercial Pilot Rating, FAA
- Aircraft Airframe Mechanic, FAA
- Aircraft Powerplant Mechanic, FAA

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY

- Senior Flight Safety Auditor, SAIC, 2002-2004
- Inspector General, Kirtland Air Force Base 1998-2000
- Commander, Logistics Group, Saudi Arabia 1997-1998
- Chief of Flight Safety, Armament Division 1987-1988

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

ANG, ESOHCAMP, Nationwide

Senior Flight Safety Auditor for SAIC ESOHCAMP program where he has evaluated the compliance of MACA, BASH, and Mishap Response plans, HATRs and other issues relating to airfield and flight safety.

Air Force, Armament Division, Eglin AFB, FL

As Chief of Flight Safety, he led the flight safety program at the largest USAF base in the free world by directing coordinated safety efforts of six separate major flying organizations operating in the most congested airspace in the USAF. He conducted mishap prevention program activities involving a mix of 45 test and test support aircraft, evaluated test plans, flight profiles and test aircraft modifications. He flew safety chase on test missions involving developmental munitions.

Air Force, Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia

As the Logistics Group Commander, he was responsible for command safety oversight of a 1000 person logistics operation that included aircraft maintenance, vehicle operations & maintenance, supply, and contracting. There were zero Air Force aircraft maintenance related mishaps, and there were zero logistics personnel injuries during his command.

Air Force, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM

As Inspector General, he assessed readiness, discipline, efficiency and economy of wing units, and implemented IG policies and programs for 22,800 employees. The thoroughness of his assessments is reflected in the excellent ratings received during Air Force evaluations of two priority "A" munitions depots under his assessment purview.