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BRAC Commission

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August 11, 2005

Mr. R. Gary Dinsick
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 S. Clark Street
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Arlington, VA 22202

SUBJECT: Clarification on the Army's Response to BRAC Commission Questions Concerning the Recommended Closure of Fort Monmouth

Dear Mr. Dinsick:

On behalf of the BRAC Commission, you requested comment from the Army on 22 questions concerning the recommended closure of Fort Monmouth. On July 12, 2005, the Army submitted their reply in response and the Fort Monmouth Community would like to offer comments on the Army contentions. The format utilized will be to restate the question and then provide comment on the adequacy of the Army answer.

Thank you for asking these very penetrating questions and for your consideration of our attached reply.

Sincerely yours,

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SUBJECT: Clarification on the Army's response to BRAC Commission questions concerning the recommended closure of Fort Monmouth

Question 1: The justification for the recommendation to "Relocate the US Army Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point, NY" states that this move "increases training to enhance coordination, doctrine development, training effectiveness and improve operational and functional efficiencies". Please discuss these improvements.

The Army answer that references direct interaction and coordination among both the instructors and staff is inconsistent with the fact that the substantially higher construction costs at West Point (recent 1391 Form had an estimate of $207M plus a 9% design fee for a total of $226M) are at least in part driven by the need to maintain a separation between the USMA cadets and the USMAPS cadet candidates.

With a $200+M increase in construction cost beyond what the COBRA contemplated, it would seem that no "excess capacity in training installations" would be eliminated.

Question 2: Part of the recommendation is to "Relocate the Joint Network Management System Program Office to Fort Meade, MD." What are the functions that these personnel perform, and what is the efficiency that will be gained from this movement?

The Joint Network Management System is a program executed by the Program Manager for Tactical Radio Communications Systems under the Program Executive Office (PEO) Command, Control, and Communications Tactical.

The Army is the Executive Agent for this Joint program which enables warfighters to plan and manage the diverse array of legacy and advanced information systems with focus on the Joint Task Force (JTF) backbone across military and commercial satellite systems and service unique systems. The JNMS will permit high level planning, detailed planning and engineering, spectrum planning and management and network management. The system will be heavily utilized at the Joint Task Force level linking the strategic and tactical components into a seamless network.

The program should remain with an existing set of programs being executed at Fort Monmouth, such as: Integrated Systems Control (ISYSCON); Tactical Internet Management System; Army Key Management System (AKMS); and Information Dissemination Management Tactical (IDM-T). The technical support is being provided by Fort Monmouth network management experts in PM-TRCS and PM-WIN-T and the JNMS Program Office should not be separated from that technical expertise.

Consistent with our recommendation that Fort Monmouth should **not** be moved to Aberdeen, this component should also remain at Fort Monmouth.

Question 3: Please elaborate on the functions and mission of people impacted by the recommendation to "Relocate Information Systems, Sensors, Electronic Warfare, and Electronics Research and Development & Acquisition (RDA) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD."

The Army answer simply listed the organizations affected by the recommendation with little or no "elaboration" on their functions and missions, as was requested by the Commission. We believe both the Fort Monmouth briefings to the Commissioners and the Community information has sufficiently amplified the importance of the Fort Monmouth mission and we see no need to elaborate further, other than to state that the significance of the Life Cycle mission clearly has not been adequately considered by the Army and DOD.

Question 4: Are there any drawbacks to consolidating the PEO EIS functions at Ft. Belvoir?

There are major concerns and drawbacks with the consolidation of PEO EIS functions at Fort Belvoir. First, the Army inaccurately characterized the entire function of PEO EIS as "development of Business Information Systems."

In contradiction to the Army's inaccurate characterization, two of PEO EIS PM's (DCATS and DCASS) located at Fort Monmouth do not develop Business Information Systems, but rather develop strategic warfighting systems. These systems provide the reachback for the warfighter to the sustaining base.

This warfighter support capability benefits from geographic co-location with the developers of tactical C4ISR warfighting systems. For example, PM DCATS supports Joint Warfighters, Major Commands and Combatant Commanders with dedicated worldwide strategic satellite ground component and long haul terrestrial microwave communications systems, technical control facilities, command center upgrades, base radios, combat vehicle intercom systems and deployed forces infrastructure.

Central to its success is the ability of this group to share ideas and solve problems on a daily basis with other PEO/PM, engineering, logistics and acquisition personnel collocated at Fort Monmouth who are engaged in the tactical world.

Secondly, the Army answer is focused on collocating the PEO EIS PMs at Fort Monmouth with other PEO EIS elements at Fort Belvoir. The Army's answer fails to address the fact that the PEO EIS PMs at Fort Monmouth have historically drawn upon other members of Team C4ISR for their matrix support. For example, PEO EIS PM DCATS relies significantly on embedded matrix support from the CERDEC and other functional organizations in C-E LCMC (such as the Logistics and Readiness Center (LRC), Software Engineering Center (SEC), Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) and Acquisition Center) and is collocated with the CERDEC's Space & Terrestrial Communications Directorate in the Joint Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Engineering Center (JSEC).

Moving this function to Fort Belvoir separates it from the matrix support and the JSEC, which will move to APG.

PEO EIS PM DCATS Project Leaders work side-by-side with JSEC engineers and technicians in the Satellite Labs (Control Systems Lab, Strategic Systems Lab, Tactical Systems Lab, and DOD Teleport Testbed) to design and develop new satellite communications architectures to introduce technology insertion and to meet expanding warfighter communications needs, as well as modeling problems in the field.

This team provides 24/7 technical assistance to the deployed forces to troubleshoot problems and provide solutions, often within hours of receiving the problem. The CERDEC supplies a large number of Project Leaders in support of the PM DCATS mission.

The CERDEC's relocation to APG would greatly impact their ability to continue providing the support currently in place. The level of expertise that this organization brings to PM DCATS is essential to the successful programs developed.

Moving PEO EIS's other offices at Fort Monmouth to Fort Belvoir appears to consider no other factor but collocation with PEO EIS HQ. The PEO EIS should be allowed the flexibility/discretion to move its other program management organizations to the locations that provide the maximum benefit to the Army and the warfighter. For example, it may be more beneficial to relocate the Assistant Project Manager Joint Computer-aided Acquisition Logistics System (APM JCALS) and Assistant Project Manager Tactical Logistics Data Digitization (APM TLDD) to Fort Lee, to be collocated with the parent office, PM Logistics Information Systems, if it is determined that it makes better sense from a managerial/organizational efficiency perspective. This same flexibility should be provided to determine the ultimate location for the PM DCASS, which plays a significant role in modifying/replacing the installation infrastructure that is critical to Network Centric Warfare and Transformation.

Question 6. Please discuss the recommendation to "Realign Fort Belvoir, VA by relocating and consolidating Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Research, Development and Acquisition activities to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and by relocating and consolidating Information Systems Research and Development and Acquisition (except for the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD" and the benefits from the justification that state: "The recommendation establishes a Land C4ISR Lifecycle Management Command (LCMC) to focus technical activity and accelerate transition."

The Army answer purports to discuss the benefit of forming a Land C4ISR LCMC, but the benefits are not clearly defined. In addition, there already exists a Land C4ISR LCMC at Fort Monmouth. The Army answer fails to address how it can make sense to move C4ISR activities from an installation with substantially higher relevant military value (in terms of Info Systems and Sensors, Electronics & Electronic Warfare

Research and Development & Acquisition, as the Technical JCSG rated them) to an installation (i.e., APG) with a substantially lower relevant military value (in the same terms).

Discussion of Recommendation:

Approximately 7% of Team C4ISR is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. For this discussion, Team C4ISR will be divided into two groups. The first group consists of logisticians and software engineers who are located at Fort Belvoir for the primary purpose of supporting Team C4ISR customers resident at Fort Belvoir and in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Relocation to APG severs the supplier-customer relationship. With the lack of collocated support, these customers will seek other providers for this support which may or may not be available. The personnel relocated to APG will be without customer reimbursement resulting in an increase of direct costs to the Army.

The second group comprises the Team C4ISR center of excellence for Night Vision/Electro-Optics (NV/EO) at Fort Belvoir. This group includes scientists, engineers, program managers and support personnel who have received worldwide recognition for their accomplishments. Moving this group to APG will separate them from other smaller tri-service R&D facilities that have a similar focus on military sensor technology development. These Tri-Service R&D organizations include: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Naval Research Lab, Army Research Lab, and the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center. Additionally, moving this group will separate them from PMs that will remain at Fort Belvoir – these are important customers for NV/EO technology. These PMs include: PM Close Combat Systems (Mines & Countermines), PM Soldier Sensors & Lasers and PM Force Protection.

The current facilities located at Fort Belvoir and Fort AP Hill provide for unencumbered access to external test capabilities that are critical extensions to the sensor development laboratories. These include: Aircraft (Manned and Unmanned) Sensor Integration and Testing at Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir: 5.2 km fenced laser range facility for testing non eyesafe lasers; countermine lanes for testing live explosive mines that include both recently buried mines as well as mines that have been buried for many years; and a 5-km drop zone for testing navigation, targeting and surveillance sensors both in daylight as well in a darkened environment.

The unencumbered access near Fort Belvoir allows NV/EO technical work to more quickly adapt sensor technologies for the varying field environments in a quick-turn test, fix, test relationship. There is also concern associated with the night time, high ambient light level (5X that at the Fort AP Hill Drop Zone) caused by the APG external ranges' proximity to Baltimore as well as the potential interruption of laser/optical system bench development and Focal Plane Array epitaxial crystal growth caused by the relatively high shock and vibration environment caused by the explosive testing and live fire mission of APG.

Information Technology has enabled a "virtual co-location" of the NV/EO group with the larger mass at Fort Monmouth. The geographic separation has not been an impediment to achieving mission requirements. As a matter of fact, NV/EO is one of Team C4ISR's leading areas of accomplishment.

A recent National Defense University correspondence to the Commission states: " The proposed closure of Fort Monmouth and their Fort Belvoir elements are troubling. Also because of the need to construct new facilities at Aberdeen (there is no core of C4ISR expertise or culture there) the consolidation would take several years."

The recommendation does not establish, but rather in contradiction moves an existing Land C4ISR Life Cycle Management Command from Fort Belvoir and Fort Monmouth to APG.

Discussion of Benefits:
Fort Belvoir was rated 2nd in Military Value in the Army for Sensors, Electronics and Electronic Warfare – Research and 3rd in the Army for Sensors, Electronics and Electronic Warfare – Development and Acquisition.

Aberdeen Proving Ground, the recommended relocation site, was rated 6th and 4th in the Army, respectively for these categories.

The proposed move certainly will put the NV/EO capability at great risk at a time when the nation is prosecuting the Global War on Terror, modularizing the force and transforming the future force.

Question 7: Are there any concerns regarding the payback portion which states: "The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $822.3M. The net of all costs and savings to the Department of Defense during the implementation period is a cost of $395.6M. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $143.7M with a payback expected in 6 years."

The Army's reply that they do not expect the savings used in the COBRA analysis to change is evasive at best. We know that newly certified data has been provided to the Army and that certified data considerably reduces the recurring savings with a significant impact on payback.

Our team of experts have significantly analyzed the Army COBRA data and conclude that the payback is more likely to be 33 years and when recruitment and training are included the payback is 44 years. Considerable amount of data has been provided to the BRAC analysts and our COBRA data has also been provided for independent verification. The cost issues are summarized here with information taken from our report to the BRAC Commissioners.

Criteria 4 and 5 demand reasonable cost benefit in BRAC recommendations. Assumptions made and data used in the DOD recommendation regarding Fort Monmouth/Belvoir defy credibility: costs are underestimated by $700M, recurring savings overestimated by $69M, bringing the payback period to 33 years.

Military construction and refurbishment estimates for both Fort Monmouth and the Night Vision Electronic Sensor Directorate at Fort Belvoir unfortunately omitted large areas or did not consider costs to rebuild existing specialized facilities.

Costs for several Fort Monmouth special capabilities slated to be relocated were not properly estimated (e.g., the satellite ground station cluster).

Over the past several years Fort Monmouth has invested in instrumented C4ISR ranges, inter-range high bandwidth connectivity and high bandwidth connectivity from the ranges to Fort Monmouth and then onward to other portals in DOD. These costs were not considered. Nor were costs to connect on-base C4ISR facilities at modern (and existing) standards. West Point Prep relocation costs are understated by $202M.

Estimated costs to set up an aviation C4ISR capability at Aberdeen's Phillips Field are inaccurate and not valid. Fort Monmouth's flight capability at nearby Lakehurst has significantly more ramp and hangar space than that available at Phillips.

One time costs for Aviation related MILCON are underestimated.

Recurring-costs (not calculated herein) associated with conducting R&D flight operations in distant areas void of the FAA Chesapeake Sector's airspace constraints will be significant.

The Army's cost estimates for Base operations support (BOS) for Aberdeen after Fort Monmouth moves are understated. Customer unique mission support services costs, above basic facilities services, were not calculated. There were several other BOS errors, all of which contributed greatly to reducing estimated annual savings.

The Main Report provides calculations based on conservative assumptions and national research on relocating/reconstituting workforces. A conservative estimate is that it costs between 75% and 100% (depending on pay grade, skill level, certification level) of an annual employee's salary to recruit, relocate and clear a replacement employee. One also adds costs in lost time while a new employee is trained to a level of average productivity (three year average).

These costs are not included in DOD BRAC deliberations. Costs to the Army and taxpayer will be $300M, if the lost workforce can be re-constituted at all.

There are certain to be program disruptions as already discussed. The disruption costs cannot be quantified by those preparing this report, but one must note that the potential for such disruptions unfortunately was not part of the record of BRAC discussions released by the DOD. Costs in terms of time or security were also not discussed in DOD BRAC deliberations.

Question 9: In unclassified terms, please name and describe all laboratory, test and certification facilities. Please note specifically: estimated time to newly construct each of those facilities to include time to achieve any required certifications; any certifications required; estimated cost to newly construct; length of time that old and new facilities would need to be co-operational before old facility could be "turned off".

The Army's answer alludes to 64 lab, test & certification facilities at Fort Monmouth and another 46 at Fort Belvoir, with details in an attached spreadsheet which was not posted on the Commission website. The community expert analysts conducted a comprehensive and certifiable analysis of the various laboratories and provided a detailed spread sheet to the BRAC Army staff---we believe that data is a more accurate representation of the sophisticated laboratory facilities at Fort Monmouth and Fort Belvoir. From that list of facilities we designated 14 that were considered special facilities that could not be easily moved—these were detailed in our report to the BRAC commission.

Question 11: In unclassified format, please note and discuss any unique features of the Ft. Monmouth installation itself, to include any support to outside organizations or agencies. Is the impact to these organizations discussed in the recommendation? If not, please describe any impacts like relocation or potential continued operation in place.

The Army response did not include the impact of the BRAC recommendation on the FEMA Region II COOP Alternative Operations Facility, it merely identified it as a non-DOD tenant.

The Army's response also did not address the recommendation's impact on Fort Monmouth's Homeland Defense mission in support of the City of New York, the National Guard Bureau, the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, Army Corps of Engineers and the State of New Jersey.

Question 13: There has been significant mention of the loss of intellectual capital. Given the current Ft. Monmouth workforce, on average, how many years of experience do senior system personnel have with that system? How long does it take, and what kind of training or education is required for someone to be considered a "system expert"? Is there any way to quantify the impact of the loss of this experience upon a system and the soldier?

We believe that the Army's recognition of the significance of the intellectual capital loss that has led it not to answer this question yet. Our statistics and estimates are accurate. Our recent Harris survey indicates that less than 20% of the workforce is

planning to move. In addition two previous moves have also resulted in less than 20% moves and have demonstrated a significant loss in workforce productivity. We predict a very significant loss of capability with a resultant impact on products to the warfighter. The Army and others have commented negatively on the age of the workforce but the average age is 48 years old and the average years of experience are 18 years.

The type of work done at Fort Monmouth/Belvoir requires years of experience and "greening" of the workforce to understand the needs of the Army and now the Joint Warfighter. The question or crisis is not just a matter of replacing an engineer with a new hire out of some university. It takes roughly 10-15 years for an engineer/scientist to progress to a mid level manager and 20 years to a senior manager. It is those mid level and senior managers that will not move and cannot be replaced simply by a new hire.

"Greening" a replacement workforce will take over 10 years at least and that's an intangible that has not been adequately considered by the BRAC process. In addition, there is a considerable salary differential between government mid/senior managers and industry and we do not anticipate any significant number of "experienced" industry personnel taking government jobs due to significant pay differences.
The loss of a highly skilled workforce of this quality and quantity has never been experienced in DOD, it is unique in this BRAC.

To displace over 5000 government personnel plus approximately 4000 contractor support personnel to a location without C4ISR foundation and without a C4ISR skilled workforce to absorb some of the losses will create unacceptable disruption in important C4ISR programs.

The BRAC analyses use 75% relocation as a standard for calculations — from historical analysis, technical workforces in previous BRACs moved at a rate less than 20%. A June 2005 Harris Poll indicates that less than 20% of the Fort Monmouth government employees will definitely move.

The technical workforce supply, upon which the Army relies, is in crisis by DOD's own admission in Congressional testimony and briefings right up through April 2005. While the loss of thousands of scientists and engineers and certified acquisition officials in this BRAC move will cause unacceptable program disruption, the unlikely ability to reconstitute such a large and talented workforce in a useful timeframe is an equally serious problem.

Costs to reconstitute the lost workforce will be significant (calculated to be $300M).

Question 19: Why were the facilities at Natick and Adelphi not brought into an Army C4ISR recommendation?

The costs associated with the closure of Fort Monmouth are not accurate. If the errors identified in the response to question number seven are corrected, a similar finding to that of Natick and Adelphi would have been found: the closure of Fort Monmouth and relocation of mission to APG results in extraordinarily high one-time costs to implement and a very unacceptable long payback period. Fort Monmouth would also have been left open and not recommended for closure given the reasons for the other installations.

Question 21: What were the first and second choice locations ahead of Aberdeen? Why were they rejected? How was Aberdeen deemed the best facility?

The Army's discussion of the reasons for rejection of Alternative #1 includes its concern about taking one element now at Fort Monmouth and breaking it into two. Yet, there is apparently not as much concern about breaking the essence of Team C4ISR by relocating it at the risk of losing its critical intellectual capital.

The Army response also states that the move of the Ordnance Center & School (OC&S) offers substantial space to house Fort Monmouth personnel. The coordination and discussions thus far between Fort Monmouth personnel and APG personnel indicate that very little of the OC&S space is suitable for Fort Monmouth requirements. It appears that a decision that should have been driven by technical capabilities was driven by the number of available acres – many of which are polluted or under water.

The TJCSG assigned Military Value rankings by technical areas and functions in the BRAC process. The following rankings that directly relate to C4ISR were reported for Fort Monmouth:

- 1st in Army in Information Systems Technology – Development and Acquisition
- 1st in Army in Information Systems Technology – Research
- 1st in Army in Sensors, Electronics and Electronic Warfare – Development and Acquisition
- 3rd in Army in Sensors, Electronics and Electronic Warfare – Research

The Army response also talks about APG being a "full spectrum Research, Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Army installation." APG may perform each of those functions for some commodities or technology areas, but the key consideration ought to be there is comparatively little C4ISR work done at APG. There is little (if any) synergy, for example, between C4ISR RDA and T&E and Chemical/Biological Defense RDA and T&E.

The Army response also states that "the Army has a critical requirement to build a networked future force and the related technology areas coming together at APG will

enable faster technology transition to meet the warfighter." It is difficult to conceive how that might be true if 75% or more of the intellectual capital – the brains, the innovation, the experience and the corporate synergy – is lost as a result of this recommendation!

Finally, the Army response states that an alternative that would consolidate the C4ISR center at Fort Monmouth was rejected because of a long payback period and because insufficient land was available to support outdoor testing at Fort Monmouth. This is another indication of the outright failure on DOD's part to consider the existing synergy between Fort Monmouth and nearby Fort Dix. We would certainly welcome an opportunity to review the data and cost considerations.