

DCN 2083

TO: Honorable Anthony Principi, Chairman BRAC
FROM: George T. Nickolas, USN (Ret.) – Davenport, Iowa



Subject: Rock Island Arsenal Island

1. This FAX contains a 4 Page Letter; 2 Page Biographical on George Nickolas; 3 Page article "How to defeat America and 3 Page Article "Ground down" both from June 2005 Armed Forces Journal; and RATION AMMUNITION from May 10, 1952 Army and Navy Journal.
2. The enclosures are forwarded to help your consideration. I have a great concern about the future of our Defense of the United States. The more we disarm the closer the point when we have to shift from conventional to atomic responses.
3. A close examination of our sources of supplies for critical war equipment would surprise even the most intelligent member of this and past administration. The last jeep built for the US Military was a "world car" because the drive train and transmission were built in Japan, engine in Germany and the pistons in South America. The optics that were ground for the M1 and M60 tank were obtain from behind the Iron Curtain and ground by East Germans (here on special passports at a company in Melbourne, Florida).
4. Industry will not build facilities to meet mobilization rates. They will only build facilities to cover the proposed contract rates that have a noted future requirement. That is why the Government had to build the ammunition plants during World War II. It took 3 years to build the base needed to invade France. One only has to look at when our troops were in England to get ready for France and look at how long it took to build the plants, produce the ammo, and move it to Europe. Money was provided in June and September 1940, nearly 18 months prior to our entry into World War II, to build the ammo plants and to outfit a 2 million-man army.

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June 6, 2005

Honorable Anthony Principi
Chairman Base Realignment
and Closure Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Principi:

I am a retired Contracting Officer and former Chief of the Review and Compliance Division of Headquarters, US Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command that was headquartered on Rock Island Arsenal Island. This group was merged with the Tank and Automotive Command in the 1990's. It was a mistake then and I believe that it is a mistake now. I have no relationship with any group to save jobs at the Rock Island Arsenal Island. My concern centers on what is best for the defense of the United States. What follows is an attempt to recommend a common sense approach to base realignment dealing with the personal weapons, light and heavy artillery and ancillary equipment that support those weapons at the various levels in the Army and other services.

I am enclosing several documents. First, is a scaled down biographical on myself that with a concentration to the last part of my life from 1980 to the present time. This is provided you a perspective on me and my relationship to the small arms mission in the US Army and my Industrial Base Concerns. Second, two articles from the June 2005 Armed Forces Journal that should concern your commission's activities. Third, an item from the Army and Navy Journal dated May 10, 1952 on "Ration Ammunition."

I heard recently that the Department of Defense indicated in its decision to move people to Warren, Michigan that they could build an office building for 5 million dollars. Private Industry is in the process of building an office building on Rock Island Arsenal and it will house less people than are scheduled to be located from Rock Island to Warren, Michigan. The cost of that building I believe is 20 million dollars. Also, if the General Service Administration can construct a building for 5 million dollars that is permanent to house around 700 people, I would like to know how. In the past ten years the City of Davenport has not been able to build a building for fewer than 10 million dollars. I recently talked to builder of reasonable priced hotel and he indicated the cost for 100 rooms would be over 10 million dollars. As a former Contracting Officer for the U.S. Army and the author of the last revision to the Cost and Price Analysis Course used by the United States Navy, I can tell you with a great degree of confidence that no building to service 500 people or even a smaller number will cost only 5 million dollars. Who ever put that estimate in the decision-making paper affecting a mission transfer should be fired. It is a false figure that appears to be developed to favorably affect an outcome that they wanted made.

What would be more realistic? I would believe that somewhere between 25 million to 40 million dollars would be within the arena. Why? Because besides building cost you have network hookups, fiber optics, secure rooms, and etc. These special items cost a lot of money. All of these capabilities exist on Rock Island Arsenal Island and are already in use by activities located there.

A few years ago, 1997 to be specific, I investigated the capabilities of Rock Island Arsenal Island to accommodate additional missions. At that time the Arsenal Island had space that was readily available or could be rehabilitated at a reasonable price to accommodate over 4,000 office workers. The buildings and parking are already in place. The buildings are not the World War II temporary construction that was quickly constructed, but building with over three foot thick limestone walls. Many of them have been rehabilitated over the years into office space. At the time, I was looking at a cost effective way for the US Army to locate additional missions to the Arsenal Island and save DoD money.

As a contributor to many investigative and improvement task forces in my career in government employment, I had an opportunity to visit several of the subordinate commands of the Army Materiel Command. I became familiar with their operational people and missions.

Instead of the move to place the small arms and weapons mission under TACOM, a more appropriate move would have been to combine the Small Arms and Artillery Research and Development mission and the Production community at Rock Island. That would bring back to Rock Island the Research and Development mission that existed prior to 1976. Why would this have been smart? The President of Sony Corporation once said that improvements and innovations result when engineers work closely with the manufacturing process and not in an ivory tower away from production. When the Research and Development of small arms and artillery was located at Rock Island, production capabilities were close at hand. It provided for concurrent engineering, design and production engineering at one site. It eliminated costly travel and coordination problems associated with separate and isolated engineering activities. Engineers could develop a concept and take it to the manufacturing facilities to work hand in hand with production staff to work out the kinks. This led to the development of good technical data packages that facilitated good contracting with industry.

I know that this method worked because I was involved in Research and Development Contracting. The old co-location also provided a vehicle to help contractors who experienced a production problem after they had received a contract-utilizing contractor developed and government accepted technical data. A good example of this was during the development of the chin weapons system for the AH1 Cobra Helicopter when the first producer experienced manufacturing problems. The Aircraft Armament Project Manager, engineers, and Rock Island Arsenal production staffs were able to solve the production problems to allow the contractor to successfully perform on that contract.


When I visited with Senator Grassley's Office a few years ago while in Washington, D.C. there was a mention of a person at Headquarters Army that had it in for Rock Island. The conversation indicated that this person did everything in his power to adversely affect the missions at Rock Island Arsenal Island. When I heard his name I remember that he had worked at Rock Island and was passed over for a position there and later accepted a job in Washington, D.C.

I have also heard that there is concern about the physical security of missions at Rock Island Arsenal Island. Any thought of physical security problems does not understand the location of

Journal, First Quarter 1982 issue. This provided the military information on the ability of the contractors to surge, during the performance of their contracts, for the items they were producing for the government. The Colonel at Hill AFB wrote in a letter to the U.S. Air Force Acquisition Chief that the surge concept developed at the HQ US Armament Materiel Readiness Command was better than the D to P concept of mobilization (see my biographical more information).

In conclusion, give serious consideration to revising the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. Take the Small Arms and Artillery Mission away from TACOM's control and re-unite the Research and Development of weapons and ammunition with the production procurement at Rock Island. Allow the Research and Development Engineering the ability to make innovations in a production setting. Several private manufacturing facilities in the area and the fine Universities in close commuting distance from Rock Island can supplement future needs for skills that are currently available at Rock Island. Iowa State University has an outstanding Engineering Program and so does the University of Illinois. Another alternative might be to locate HQ U.S. Army Materiel Command on Arsenal Island and provide the Commanding General with excellent quarters. The five other mansions could house other high-ranking generals in a very scenic setting.

Sincerely yours,



GEORGE T. NICKOLAS, USN (RET.)
Certified Professional Contract Manager and
Fellow of the NCMA

Enclosures

**Limited Biographical for
GEORGE T. NICKOLAS, CPCM
With emphasis on the 1980 to Present Period**

George Nickolas was born in Davenport, Iowa on July 3, 1933. He attended Davenport Public Schools. Graduated from Davenport High in 1951 and entered the United States Navy and served until retired on disability February 1955.

He graduated from Augustana College with a BA degree in Economics 1959. Attended the University of Iowa Law College for 22 semester hours during the spring and Summer School session of 1959. Graduated from Long Term Training with the U.S. Army in August 1975 at the Florida Institute of Technology (FIT) in Melbourne, Florida with a M.S. Degree in Acquisition and Contract Management (an MBA Program with a concentration in Contracting). He taught Incentive Contracting and Basic Government Contracting for the Florida Institute of Technology on Rock Island Arsenal Island in 1976-77.

He operated Nickolas' Accounting and Tax Service from 1958 to 1995. Entered Government Employment in the Purchasing Career field in October 1961.

Following the Congressman Ichord Investigation of the U.S. Industrial Base with his 1980 report, George Nickolas worked on a concept he called "Surge Contracting" at HQ U.S Army Armament Readiness Command at Rock Island, Illinois. The concept was published in the Congressional Record and also in Defense Management Journal First Quarter 1982 issue. The issue highlighted the article, "Ready Response to a Surge: New Contracting Techniques." with the following quote: "Planning for a surge proceeds under the assumption that war powers will not be available to facilitate the increase in defense industrial output needed to satisfy surge requirements. But, in the absence of such powers, contracting procedures can inhibit acceleration of industrial production. Therefore the U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command has developed a package of innovative contracting techniques designed to better enable the nation's industrial base to respond timely and adequately in a surge." Nickolas won the HQ AMC writing award for the article. He also briefed his concept all over the United States. The Air Force at Hill AF Base indicated that they believed his surge concept was better than Mobilization Planning because it was more realistic. Mobilization Planning calls for building construction and expansion to meet wartime consumption requirements.

When the Competition in Contracting Act was being introduced to the Contracting Community, Nickolas was assigned the responsibility to make sure all the subordinate offices of the command had training. This included all of the 6 major purchasing offices and the procurement support teams at the 26 Army Ammunition Plants.

Nickolas was rotated from his assignment as the Chief of Policy Division at ARRCOM to the Review and Compliance Office and was told he must submit at least one research paper to the Federal Acquisition Research Symposium. For one of the Federal Acquisition Research Symposiums, he submitted 8 abstracts for papers and had 4 selected for presentation.

Nickolas was rotated for training to the Ammunition Contracting Division in the Procurement Directorate for the Command. This assignment was to broaden his background in all types of contracting. He served several months as the Chief of the Large Caliber Branch and then was rotated to the Small Caliber Branch to finish up his yearlong assignment. During this period of time, he was given a special assignment to head up the Tiger Team to purchase difficult to acquire items. Utilizing his talents in the use of innovative contracting methods he was successful on several occasion in obtaining items that had been solicited several times without results. He found ways to get the job done. One of the important items was for a barrel shaped tire that was used on the M102 cannon trail to make the turning the weapon easier. He went to

every contractor that had been solicited to find the reason for not wanting to bid to make the item. The quantity was so small to make them interested in purchasing the equipment necessary to make the special tires was a response he received from many of the rubber contractors. Nickolas was successful in getting Firestone Rubber Company to take the contract. He obtained an increased quantity and the Command set up a special item for the purchase of the necessary special tooling needed to produce the tires.

During his final years of government service he worked on his special concern of the Industrial Base. He wrote, "The Industrial Base Under Siege" which was published in several magazines. It was featured in the National Contract Management Magazine, "Contract Management July 1987" as the cover-featured article. The article was adapted from a paper that Nickolas presented at the Fifth Annual Mobilization Conference held by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., in May 1986.

During this period of time he also helped author an AMC Regulation incorporating his Surge Contracting Techniques, was assigned to a special project to improve the Army's Contracting Methods short of violating the law, and obtain a deviation to test two of his ideas for contracts to help the U.S. Army manage their Contractor Operated Government Owned Plants. He also developed a contract type called Dog Legs and Plateaus. This concept helped settle difficult negotiations and protected the government and contractor in high cost risk contracts. He presented this concept in the fall 1989 Federal Acquisition Research Symposium following his retirement from Federal service.

As a special note, during the Bi-Centennial Celebration of the U.S. Constitution, Nickolas spoke over 200 times all over the United States on the United States Constitution. He was the Keynote Speaker for the Modern Woodmen of America celebration of the 200th anniversary of the US Constitution. The Bi-Centennial Commission recognized Nickolas for his contribution to the success of the Bi-Centennial Celebration.

During his career with the U.S. Army at Rock Island, Nickolas authored several government newspaper columns on veteran's benefits. He received a letter from Admiral Zumwalt for his column that appeared in the Navy Newspaper in Vietnam called "The Sea Lawyer." He also wrote "Veterans Corner" for the Target Newspaper published by Rock Island Arsenal. His patriotic writing and speaking earned him 4 of his 6 Freedom Foundation Awards while employed by the U.S. Army. The Daughters of the American Revolution with their George Washington Medal of Honor also recognized him for his patriotism. The U.S. Army awarded him the Patriotic Civilian Service Award.

Following his retirement from the Federal Government, Nickolas was hired to update the Cost and Price Analysis Course for the U.S. Navy. He also taught the course under a contract with an eastern firm at many locations. He also taught Incentive Contracting, Contracting for Technical Personnel, and several other contracting courses. He was hired as Adjunct Instructor at St. Ambrose University to teach Purchasing and Contracting, Cost and Price Analysis, Negotiation Techniques, Introduction to Economics and other courses.

In 1993 he ran for the Davenport City Council and was elected. He served 5 terms on the Davenport City Council between January 1994 and December 2003. During this period of service he chaired the Finance Committee for two terms and served one term as Mayor Pro Tem.

Following his retirement he has been active in veteran's organization and the Veterans Party of Iowa that he incorporated for the founders of the organization. Nickolas is a fifty-year member of the Disabled American Veterans and served as Department of Iowa Commander 1966-67 and as National President of the State Commanders and Adjutants Association of the Disabled American Veterans in 1971.

Operations in Iraq and elsewhere have eroded U.S. military capability to the point that America is at significant risk.



M. SCOTT MAHASKEY, AP/

Ground down

The Army and Marine Corps are dangerously understrength

BY GEN. BARRY R. McCAFFREY, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

The Army and Marine Corps are at risk of experiencing a disaster during the coming three years. There is little reserve or surge capability to respond to new challenges.

In spite of this self-evident truth, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and some of his key civilian leaders argue that there is no personnel shortage — and that manpower increases are both unnecessary and unaffordable. This strategic blindness stems from an ideological viewpoint described best by military historian Frederick Kagan as “a belief that war is all about destroying targets, that ground forces are unnecessary and that technology is supreme.”

The evidence of this real and

growing problem, as well as the experience of military history, has been denied or ignored.

By any measure, the ground combat units of the Army and Marines are at their limit. Active-duty troop strength has dropped from 2.2 million in 1987 to 1.5 million today. Active-duty Army strength has plummeted from 800,000 in 1988 (and remember, there were more than 1.6 million soldiers during Vietnam) to an authorized level of 482,400.

Today, more than 315,000 soldiers, including reserves, are deployed in more than 120 countries. About 160,000 soldiers assigned to Iraq and Kuwait battle a bitter threat in Iraq. More than 18,000 warriors confront the remnants of the Taliban and are solidifying democracy in Afghanistan. Thousands more stand guard in the

Horn of Africa, the Balkans, Guantanamo Bay, South Korea, Okinawa, logistics and air bases in Europe and other regional contingencies across the globe.

The current activated Army force of 640,000 is barely meeting its deployment requirements by heavy reliance on National Guard and Army reservists. The Army Guard has 113,000 troops deployed and the Army Reserve 47,000. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pete Schoomaker recently testified before a Senate hearing that he’s

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

“committed to providing the troops requested, but I can’t promise more than I’ve got.”

The Marine Corps is similarly stretched to the limit. The nation’s 178,000 Marines have been bolstered by 13,000 reservists. About 25,000 Marines are facing a violent Sunni insurgency in Iraq’s Anbar province. Thousands of other Marines are at sea serving as strategic reserves, or are stationed ashore in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Marine deployments have doubled from two years ago. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee recently told senators that

“the demand on the force has increased exponentially.”

America had 9 percent of its 140 million citizens in uniform during World War II. Compare that to the war on terrorism with less than one-half of 1 percent of the 290 million American population under arms. Army and Marine ground combat forces are fighting a real war. We have suffered about 15,000 killed and wounded in the war on terrorism. Casualties among U.S.

combat units in Iraq now approach the loss rates in Vietnam.

This is a volunteer and extremely small military. And many might argue that the country is not *really* at war — that only the armed forces and the CIA are. But the fact is that the ground combat capability of the U.S. armed forces to strike first has been weakened to the point that it puts America at significant and unnecessary risk.

HOW MANY?

The crucial first issue is how many troops are enough? The Army needs an increase in active strength of 80,000 soldiers, and 25,000 more Marines (at a minimum) are needed to carry out the

PERSPECTIVE

national security challenges we now face. We must also ask: How would we recruit and retain such a force, and how much would it cost? The inadequate size of our ground combat force has put such stress on our retention and recruiting that over time we will fail to attract and retain the competent and courageous men and women who have so successfully carried out military operations since Sept. 11, 2001.

Five of the six reserve components as well as the active Army and Marine Corps have failed to meet recruiting goals. The Army National Guard has failed to meet monthly goals throughout the current fiscal year. This after missing its mark by 7,798 recruits in fiscal 2003 and by 6,792 in fiscal 2004.

The Guard is now short 3,168 Army captains, those who lead key companies and company-sized units and serve in key staff positions.

The enlistment rate among active-duty Army soldiers for follow-on service in the Reserve or Guard has suffered major shortfalls.

Army ROTC enrollment has dropped 16 percent over the past two school years. Army African-American enlistments are down disastrously. The enlistment of women in the Army, regular and reserve, also is down.

Not surprisingly, soldier quality, as measured by top category Army recruits (CAT I through IIIA) also is down. And the overall measurement of American youth's "propensity to enlist at age 17 to 21" is now down 20 percent.

We have a recruiting crisis which, as Schoemaker correctly pointed out to the media, is "not an Army problem ... It's a national challenge."

Army active-duty and reserve retention figures are widely touted as evidence that we do not have a manpower problem. However, the numbers cited by the Pentagon civilian leadership mask reality and expose their real fear of incurring what they believe to be the unacceptable personnel costs of increasing end strength.

What is absolutely true is that the morale of the men and women

of our ground combat fighting forces is extremely high. They are the toughest, best-trained and most confident soldiers and Marines we have ever fielded.

The Selected Retention Bonus Plan has been extremely effective targeting soldiers and Marines for re-enlistment through lump-sum payments of up to \$40,000. Soldiers re-enlisting in the combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan can receive tax-free payments of \$15,000 on the spot. These incentives, combined with good unit leadership and the pride of defending America, have resulted in substantial retention numbers. Elite combat formations, such as the U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division now fighting in Iraq, have achieved 250 percent of their required re-up goals.

MISLEADING NUMBERS

These numbers, though, can be misleading. Actual required U.S. active ground combat power is produced through an enormous reliance on the reserve components, civilian contractor support,

call-ups of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) and the so-called "stop-loss" program.

If these programs had not been implemented, our active-duty military capability to carry out the current level of operations would have collapsed sometime this year.

The reserve components have called up 412,000 National Guard and Reserve soldiers since Sept. 11. They now constitute more than one-third of our deployed combat force. The stop-loss program has become a "back door draft" keeping 13,445 soldiers of all components on active combat duty.

In addition, civilian contractors serve in lieu of Army combat power throughout the combat zones. We could not continue current operations without the continuing deployment of these dedicated employees. Hundreds of contractors have been killed or wounded.

Civilian contractors are carrying out logistics, security, drug eradication and administrative responsibilities that are essentially military in nature. Some are armed

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PERSPECTIVE



M. SCOTT MAHASKEY, APJ

Increasing the ground combat capability of the U.S. armed forces over the next two years may be necessary to reduce the military's vulnerability to new strategic requirements.

and conducting military police-type missions employing helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and armored vehicles. These civilian contractors operate in high legal risk and on the margins of the Law of Land Warfare.

Contractor operations are also more expensive in many respects than those performed by the uniformed military people they directly replace. Ground commanders are keenly aware that contractors cannot be required to perform their vital duties during extreme conditions of danger. Contractors are quite simply a more politically delectable quick-fix to make up for inadequate Army active-duty ground combat power.

There are an estimated 30,000 civilian contractors working with U.S. forces in Iraq. They are the second-largest coalition contingent after the active U.S. military forces. They are also greater than the sum of all non-U.S. forces. In any other war, these logistics, maintenance, and security contractor functions would have been executed by armed, uniformed military personnel.

Congress should increase the

ground combat capability of the U.S. armed forces on an emergency basis in the coming two years. We are vulnerable to any new strategic requirements.

We cannot sustain the current rate of deployments and will be forced to begin a significant reduction in deployed units regardless of the on-the-ground realities. The president had the moral and political courage to strike back at the gathering threats in Afghanistan and Iraq after the dreadful losses of Sept. 11, but we must now recruit, train and maintain an Army and Marine Corps that can continue to dominate our enemies.

The Defense Department's senior leaders argue that we cannot afford the cost of building manpower-intensive ground combat capabilities. They also suggest that American youth simply will not step forward and defend us. Finally, they assert it would take years to increase the size of the required ground combat capability — too late to affect the temporary nature of the threat.

These are weak arguments. Defense Department civilian officials note that personnel compensation

costs make up more than 35 percent of the Pentagon's \$402 billion budget. Where is the logic? We are at war. America is now spending far less on defense as a percentage of our gross national product than during previous threats to our security, such as World War II. Let's calculate the larger costs of losing our position of security, wealth and influence in a dangerous world.

Can America's ground combat capabilities be increased rapidly, or is a 30,000-soldier increase the maximum we can absorb in three years? In World War II we took a tiny military force and rapidly expanded it to 16 million men and women deployed worldwide. We could promote the top 30 percent of the current U.S. Army non-commissioned officer and officer leadership on the spot and suffer no loss of effectiveness. And we can produce disciplined, competent physically strong soldiers and Marines in 30 weeks of intensive training. In 24 months we could easily expand the Army by 80,000 troops, and the Marines by 25,000.

Will America's young people step forward to defend us in sufficient

numbers, or have the bitter losses in Iraq and Afghanistan scared off our young men and women?

The real question is whether we can create a package of educational, compensatory and political inducements to achieve our ground combat personnel goals. America's parents, coaches and educators must ask our nation's youth to defend us.

This is not the job of Army and Marine recruiters. This is the responsibility of our most senior political leaders — the president, members of Congress, state governors and local mayors. This message must be on television and be repeated at high school and college graduations and wherever young men and women gather.

The second requirement is to reward military service in the same complete way that we backed our troops in World War II. These new soldiers and Marines need not stay until retirement — we need them to join us for three years to fight. In return, we should expand the targeted bonus program that is achieving such excellent results. Four years of college tuition and a substantial cash signing bonus will bring in the infantrymen, military police and logistics first-term soldiers that we need. Combat is primarily a young person's business.

We have started something we must finish in this war on terrorism — or we will put the American people at significant peril. The Army and the Marine Corps need the nation's support. The responsibility of defending the country is a shared one: those who are privileged to wear the uniforms of the armed forces, the men and women who serve in the Congress, and the American people. We must act now, or be prepared to deal with even more serious threats in the years ahead. ■

Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey is the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. He serves as an NBC news commentator on national security issues and heads an Alexandria, Va.-based consulting firm.





PERSPECTIVE

How to defeat America

Tie up the military, attack the homeland and, above all, instill fear

By RALPH PETERS

Our country's leaders and opinion-makers refuse to face the realities of war in the 21st century. Lulled by impressive battlefield successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, where our military overmatch obscured the changing terms of conflict, we continue to restrict our definition of what is permissible in warfare while real and potential enemies broaden their visions of how the struggles of the future must be fought.

We want to wage war as cleanly as possible, to limit costs and consequences. Our enemies are prepared to fight on fronts we barely imagine and to embrace the cataclysmic nature of conflict. We seek narrow, manageable wars, but our opponents believe that defeating America demands a new form of total war waged so widely it has no modern precedent.

Our terrorist enemies of the moment are heralds of the future, even as they are throwbacks to the past. As we agonize over which targets are legal, they reject all laws of war, traditional or codified. We worry over the means; they focus on ends. Afraid to speak forthrightly about war, we allowed the ugly, but minor, abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison to become a paralyzing issue, while terrorists delighted in beheading hostages on videotape. We want to restrict our aim to enemy combatants, but our present and future enemies target social, economic, information, educational, health care and belief systems. We attempt to limit the number of enemy casualties, while our enemies focus on inflicting as many casualties as possible on us, our allies and civilian populations.

Our ideal war would have no penalties for anyone involved, while our enemies revel in inflicting penalties on our soldiers and on civilians. We hope to bribe our enemies into loving us, but the

hard currency of war is fear. To placate critics who remain safely at home, we rush to punish combat veterans for battlefield missteps. We attempt to make war with lawyers at the commander's elbow, while our enemies turn our own delusions against us.

We are afraid to win. But neither can today's terrorists win — unless we quit. If we can avoid outright foolishness, terrorism will be defeated, if not eradicated. Yet, terrorists, ragtag militias and global-criminals are far from the only dangers to our safety and our civilization. The minds behind the foreign militaries of the future are thinking far more creatively and ruthlessly than we allow ourselves to do.

A major war with China is unlikely, but its potential costs demand that we consider the prospect more imaginatively than we have allowed ourselves to do (and China serves as the maximal

model of future opponents). For now, a war with China is little more to us than a construct deployed to justify the purchase of weapons systems conceived to fight the long-gone Soviet military. Should such a war occur, we assume it would be fought head-on, military to military.

But the Chinese (and even our potential allies, the Indians) believe that the only way to win against the United States — or to achieve a useful stalemate — is to rethink war itself. As a minimum, future opponents will refuse to play by our rules. From the terrorists of the Middle East to the general staffs of Asia, the key questions are: On how many nontraditional fronts can we engage? How can we inflict unbearable pain on American society? And even if we cannot defeat America, how can we make an American victory impossible?

In the course of a recent discussion, an Air Force general asked me what I would do if I were an enemy planning a war with the United States. My immediate answer was, "Three things: Pursue weapons of

mass destruction; do whatever it takes to win the global media battle; and employ mass — military and civilian — against the numerically inferior U.S. armed forces in their technological straitjackets."

■ **Weapons of mass destruction.** We need to get beyond the traditional, limited definition that includes only nukes, bugs and gas. Each of those remains of great potential value to an enemy. Nuclear weapons (and imitative devices) can inflict mass casualties, destroy major weapons platforms and play havoc with American battlefield electronics, our new and self-imposed Achilles' heel. Biological weapons have great terror value and, properly engineered, could be a catastrophic weapon of last resort for a power convinced it could trade population more readily than the United States could do. Chemical weapons, while useful in slowing battlefield activities, may be most effective as terror weapons directed against civilians.

But we need to think in more innovative terms, to consider effects as well as tools. In our super-developed society, the digital attacks of the future, conducted as part of a comprehensive effort, could do more damage than many traditional WMDs. Wouldn't a grand attack, employing cyber-sabotage and physical damage, on our all-too-vulnerable power-generation and -distribution network amount to a "strategy of mass destruction"? Wartime strikes that produced sustained power failures could lead to far more deaths than a terrorist attack with chemical or biological weapons. An energy-dependent society such as ours simply could not function if widespread power outages lasted months or even weeks.

Likewise, our over-centralized food supply is far easier to disrupt than that of an underdeveloped country. The massive processing facilities that replaced local suppliers can be brought to a standstill by introducing disease carriers or polluting key production nodes. Few might starve, but

mass panic and defeatism could be even more valuable to our enemies. Similarly, strikes against our fuel processing, storage and distribution system would have an effect an order of magnitude greater than such actions would have had in the primitive era of World War II.

Yet each of the vulnerabilities highlighted above, if examined in isolation (as the war on terrorism has conditioned us to do), makes the challenge of future total war seem less menacing that it is. No state enemy bold enough to confront the United States in future decades would content itself with one-off attacks against a single aspect of our infrastructure. The key for such an enemy would be to conduct layered, simultaneous, stand-off attacks to achieve devastating synergy. Well-designed, efficient strikes against key nodes in our power, communications, energy and food-supply sectors could achieve far greater results than a concentration on the complete destruction of any one source of our well-being.

How to beat America? Fight holding actions against its military, inflicting as many casualties as possible, while punishing the homeland. Attack America's information systems, sabotage its crucial data banks, make it difficult to conduct everyday routines, excite competition for resources taken for granted and, above all, introduce fear. Attack the brain, rather than the body. The most effective biological weapon might not be one with a 90 percent mortality rate, but an engineered or refined disease with a 30 percent mortality rate and graphic symptoms that left survivors with enduring health problems.

■ **Paralyze the society.** Just as it is often more useful to wound an enemy, rather than kill him, thus inflicting the additional systemic costs of evacuating and treating the casualty, so, too, shocking the civilian health-care system with enormous numbers of disease victims terrified of dying could be more useful than simply causing

large numbers of deaths.

Preparation of the battlefield for future war would involve weakening the financial position of the United States during the build-up to war, hollowing out our industrial base and inducing reliance on foreign sources of crucial supplies that could be interdicted (sound uncomfortably familiar?). Propaganda, too, would be far more useful if developed carefully and employed for years prior to a conflict rather than if it were introduced during a fast-moving war. Future state opponents will attempt to win as much of the conflict as possible before our military engages.

Above all, the enemy of the future wins simply by not losing. WMD, defined far more broadly than we do today, will be a part of any wise enemy's war plan. We need to escape the narrow vision we have of WMD by incorporating new categories, from tomorrow's behavior-control weapons to advanced digital attacks.

■ **Win the global media battle.** The first purpose of this is to align world opinion against the United States and to cause America's active allies to withdraw from the conflict, denying us legitimacy, bases, numbers, resources and moral support. The media struggle would also aim to add another level of paralysis to our war-making efforts by inspiring a series of disparate regional crises that dissipated American power and complicated Washington's decision-making processes. The ultimate goal would be to interact with other asymmetric assaults to convince Americans that the price of continuing the war is too great to bear.

While it certainly would be foolish for an opponent to underestimate American courage and resolve (as the terrorists did on 9/11), we also must avoid relying on false historical analogies. Yes, the Germans and Japanese continued to resist, despite extensive bombing campaigns that produced mass civilian casualties. And I'm not suggesting that Americans would rush to surrender (although a weak administration might negotiate for peace). But we do need to assess the enormous distance developed societies have traveled since the 1940s, when Germany's agriculture was horse-powered, Japan's food supplies were local, access

to data was limited and the world still walked to work. The societies of World War II were sustainable under bombardment. Could ours endure multiple catastrophic disruptions, even in the absence of casualties?

Complexity equals fragility. The American character may remain robust, but our infrastructure is more vulnerable than it ever has been. By layering cataclysms atop one another, while exploiting the power of the global media to publicize events, could a 21st-century enemy persuade us to seek a disadvantageous peace? The ultimate mission of the enemy's media fight is to convince Americans to quit.

■ **Employ mass.** In order to defeat the United States in a future war, an enemy will need to calculate ruthlessly when it comes to accepting — or actively pursuing — high numbers of casualties on his own side. Whether unleashing biological weapons or forcing nuclear exchanges, the side that believes it has a clear demographic advantage is the side that will raise the stakes with less hesitation. Whether the goal is to inflict a catastrophic defeat upon the United States or only to gain a specific strategic advantage, an enemy who does not fear his own losses, military or civilian, has a tremendous psychological edge.

On a lesser scale, terrorists have been willing to inflict civilian casualties on their host societies when they found it tactically advantageous or,




ILLUSTRATION BY MARCIA STAMER, AFI

PERSPECTIVE

even better, if they could shift the blame onto American shoulders (with the media's help). In a general war, civilian casualties that could be blamed, however questionably, on American forces would support the global media struggle. Our enemies will seek to win with blood — as much of their own as necessary. This does not mean that we should hesitate to act, only that we must be prepared to endure the second- and third-order effects.

When fighting against America's superior technology, deploy superior numbers of human beings. Force Americans to kill and to keep on killing. Shock the Americans with your willingness to suffer casualties. Create images of massacre. Give the Americans no respite. Force the Americans to appear as murderous bullies.

Human beings aren't the only tools available to "swarm" American efforts. If there is one obvious vulnerability to America's technoservices — our Air Force and Navy — it lies in the ever-diminishing numbers of combat systems they can deploy. Our pursuit of hyper-ca-

pable, devastatingly expensive aircraft and ships means that we have ever fewer of them. One grows sick of hearing how less is really more. At some point, less is just less.

When the risk of losing an aircraft or ship becomes a dominant consideration in shaping a war plan, we have crippled ourselves before the shooting starts. The Navy is terrified of losing an aircraft carrier (let alone several). Conditioned to peace, the Air Force dreads risking a single B-2 — and the F/A-22, should we buy more of those grotesquely useless aircraft, is unlikely to be employed boldly, even if a mission could be found for it.

No matter the hyperbolic promises of defense contractors, a single system can only address a finite number of threats. Instead of attempting to compete with the U.S. military technologically, the obvious counter is to field overwhelming numbers of mid-tech systems — enough to sacrifice nine aircraft for the 10th to down a weapons-depleted American fighter. Attack American ships with volleys and short-interval

waves of cruise missiles and alternative weapons, as well as with weapons of mass destruction.

Shock the over-refined American system by introducing multiple threats that U.S. collection systems may well be able to identify, but which the limited number of available American combat systems will not be able to defeat. Use mass and speed against the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Use human attrition against the Army and Marines. If you cannot defeat the U.S. in a traditional sense, make the cost of sustaining the conflict unbearable.

As we try to make of war a sterile thing, with minimal pain and embarrassment, with slight bloodshed and little damage, our enemies of the moment and our potential future opponents calculate how to make war as destructive and painful as possible. We design weapons to produce ever-smaller, more-precise effects, to minimize collateral damage. For our enemies, the collateral damage is increasingly the point. We have deduced ourselves as to the nature of

war by falling for surreal theories concocted by think tanks and listening to the divorced-from-reality promises of contractors of whom war is a matter of pro and abstractions.


Instead of attempting to narrow war down to a "cakewalk" without penalties — a polite affair that can win on technical points — we need to expand our definition of warfare as widely as our enemies are doing. This does not mean that we will imitate all of their behaviors, only that we need to be ready to counter them.

We have entered a new age of comprehensive war. The old rules are finished. We need to learn the new ones, to the extent that rules still exist. ■

Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of the forthcoming book on strategy, "New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy."



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the Korean front for several months. Previously, the presence of mounted troops in the battle area has usually been followed by a Red offensive. However, there are no other indications of offensive operations, and observers doubt that the enemy intends to mount a drive in the foreseeable future.

April 26, 1952

RATION AMMUNITION

In Washington General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, told a Congressional committee that it had become necessary to ration some important types of ammunition in Korea because production still does not equal normal battle expenditures, and World War II stocks of these items have been exhausted or are approaching depletion. In Korea it was confirmed that there had been ammunition rationing to conserve reserve stocks, but it was stated that the present supply is adequate to meet the current tactical situation. The normal rate of battle expenditures of ammunition referred to by General Collins is apparently that which may be expected under combat conditions considerably more active than those prevailing during the present lull in ground fighting. However, it is quite conceivable that under full-scale operations, which might ensue if truce negotiations were broken off, ammunition shortages in Korea might become quite serious.

May 10, 1952

GEN. PULLER RECEIVES MEDAL

Brig. Gen. Lewis B. "Chasny" Puller, one of the most decorated Marine Corps officers, now has another medal to add to his collection, which includes five Navy Crosses.

He has been awarded his third Air Medal for meritorious achievement in aerial flight while serving as assistant commander of the First Marine Division in Korea from 7 April to 17 May, last year. His citation stated that he had participated in daring flights in light, unarmed aircraft over an active combat area in the face of grave hazards in order to obtain information which later proved valuable in ground combat operations.

Recently commander of the Third Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, Calif., he assumed command of the Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, at

Coronado, San Diego, Calif., this week.

June 7, 1952

ENEMY NEARS MILLION

During the past year the numerical strength of the enemy has greatly increased and now approaches a million men in Korea. There has also been a marked build-up in Red air power, in artillery, in armor and in military supplies. This menacing increase in the potential capabilities of the enemy has led some observers to conclude that an early Red offensive may be in prospect. However, the relatively balanced distribution of enemy troops across the front, and the extensive field fortifications and land mines installed by the Reds appear to point to a defense in depth rather than to early offensive operations. Furthermore, the strong defensive positions occupied by the Allies, together with United Nations' air dominance of the battle area, would make a major Red attack extremely costly to the enemy.

June 7, 1952

ENEMY TRIES VAINLY TO RETAKE POSITIONS

Much of the land fighting during the first part of this week centered around a hill mass west of Chorwon, important portions of which were captured by the Allies late last week. Repeated night counter-attacks were made by the enemy this week, but all were beaten back by elements of the United States 45th Division.

The persistence of the Red attacks on these newly-won UN positions evidences the value placed by the enemy on this dominant terrain feature. This area had been held by the Reds for more than a year, and is north of the cease-fire line originally fixed but subsequently disregarded by the truce conference.

The Red hill positions west of Chorwon were attacked last week by Allied tank-infantry teams, and three important heights were captured by the 45th Division, after stubborn Red resistance was overcome. Almost immediately, enemy counter-attacks were begun and repeated nearly ever night, but each was repulsed with heavy Red losses.

It is estimated that at least 1,000 of the enemy were killed and wounded in this area during the recent fighting. The Red counter-attacks were supported by unusually heavy mortar and artillery fire. The volume and intensity of the fire were probably the heaviest of the war.

June 21, 1952

RAIDING PARTY ACTIVE

A small United Nations raiding party fought a half-hour engagement with an enemy platoon west of Yonchon, inflicting a number of casualties on the Reds.

A reinforced North Korean battalion, estimated to number more than 750 troops, made repeated strong night attacks on Allied advance positions along the Heartbreak Ridge sector of Eastern Korea. A heavy Red artillery and mortar barrage of 1,300 rounds preceded the attacks. The Reds struck simultaneously at four points along a four and a half-mile front. The Allies repulsed the

attacks with heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.

United Nations troops also repulsed small enemy probing attacks on advance positions northwest of the Punch Bowl and west of the Mundung-ni Valley. An enemy platoon made a light early morning attack northwest of Kansong, but was driven back by Allied troops in a brief action.

A powerful striking flotilla, led by the U.S. Battleship Iowa, carried out an attack on the enemy-held part of Chongjin, in extreme Northeast Korea, despite adverse weather conditions. Air spotters directed the naval fire on factory areas, where resultant primary and secondary explosions indicated heavy damage. Leaving the harbor, the warships blanketed with fire a headland south of Chongjin, from which Red gunners had been firing on United Nations minesweepers.

The U.S. Cruiser Juneau and the Destroyer Richard Anderson delivered interdiction fire at the eastern end of the land battle line, hitting gun emplacements, trenches, observation posts, roads, and supply areas. In the same vicinity, near Kojo, the U.S. Destroyer Perkins laid direct fire on mortar and gun positions, and on a tunnel within which motor vehicles were concealed.

July 5, 1952

STRONG ARMOR

The land struggle for Old Baldy, west of Chorwon on the western front, began late last week. Chinese troops, with strong armor, artillery and mortar support attacked the hill, then in the possession of the Allies, on Thursday occupying the crest on Friday afternoon. For the next few days there was a heavy artillery duel in the vicinity, and numerous clashes between attacking Allies and Red defenders.

Allied troops again occupied the hill briefly on Tuesday, 22 July, during the pre-dawn darkness. However, the Chinese made a strong counter-attack with tank, artillery and mortar support and recaptured the crest. United Nations troops dug in on the southeast slope and continued the battle.

Heavy artillery fire and air attacks were directed against the enemy on the hilltop. Air Force, Navy and Marine Shooting Stars and Panther jets, as well as propeller-driven Mustangs, Corsairs and Skyraiders, hit the Reds in successive waves with high explosives, napalm, and machine gun fire. One enemy tank and several trucks were destroyed and numerous casualties were inflicted. Three Allied tanks were reported knocked out by enemy artillery fire. It was estimated that the enemy had sustained more than 1,000 casualties in this battle.


In the fighting in this sector, the U.S. 45th Division, which has been heavily engaged for weeks, was replaced this week by the veteran U.S. 2nd Division.

Northeast of Old Baldy, a United Nations patrol ambushed an enemy company on its way to a midnight attack on an Allied outpost. The Red company was dispersed with the loss of 35 killed and wounded.

July 26, 1952

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the operations. Being on an Island with water on all sides makes it one of the most secure places in the Army. If anyone was concern they should be more concerned about the location of many of the Navy Offices in Crystal City in the Washington area. In my entire career, both military and civilian there are few places that can be made as secure at Rock Island Arsenal Island. As I mentioned, it is positioned on an Island with water on all sides. There are four bridges that lead to the Island and they are all secured with guards and high fences. One of the bridges is a railroad bridge that services the manufacturing facilities on the Island. It would be difficult to attack the Island by car or boat. Most of the offices and facilities are far away from the water, roads and bridges or the main gates. In addition, in all my years at Rock Island, I found that the Island does not flood, it can easily be secured by opening the Davenport to the Island bridge, closing the Rock Island bridge to the Island, and the same is true of the Moline bridge to the Island and the Department of Veterans Affairs National Cemetery which is at the east end of the Island.

Over the years there have been suggestions that more missions be located on Rock Island Arsenal Island. The Arsenal office buildings are set in a college campus type arrangement within easy walking distance of each other. They are capable of housing, without a lot of major expense, thousands of additional people in office spaces. No major construction is required. The buildings may be listed as being built in the 1860 and 1870's, but they are in excellent condition and can be easily remodel. In addition, Rock Island Arsenal has the second largest quarters for officers in all of government. Only the White House is larger. There are also several other mansions that overlook the Mississippi River suitable for housing other General Officers. These other mansions are larger than quarters I have seen housing 4 star officers in other services or the U.S. Army. During the Second World War over 16,000 people worked on the Island.

In the 1970's, while I was away at graduate school, a decision was made to move the research and development mission to Picatinny Arsenal. When I returned from Graduate School, I was recruited to work on the Divisional Air Defense System (DIVADS) research and development project as the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) for the Command. It was in the process of transition to Picatinny, but the Project Manager Colonel Parker wanted the solicitation issued by me because of his faith in my proven ability. After the system transition to Picatinny the Project Manager called me several times with technical problems the normally a PCO could handle. But, the mind set at Picatinny had caused him problems in the contracting for the DIVADS. Colonel Parker urged me to stay on as the PCO for the system. But, I had been promoted to the Chief of the Policy Office of the Command and my boss did not want to split my time helping the DIVADS Project Manager. In fact, she revoked my Contracting Officer's Warrant to preclude my ability to sign any documents for the Project Manager.

I do not believe that the mission for research and development should have been transferred to Picatinny. Why? To repeat what I have said before, I think that Morita the Chairman of Sony Corporation in the 1980's hit the nail on the head when he said that innovation takes place when engineers are close to the production line. Rock Island Arsenal has a job shop and production facility capability that allows engineering to test all of their concepts in the development of weapons. One of the best recent examples of this is in the development of the 155 mm cannon that was developed and prototype built at Rock Island, but lost out in competition with a British Gun because of Washington, D. C. politics. The Rock Island weapon was superior to the British weapon in many ways. You can ask Congressman Lane Evans about that issue. Congressman Lane Evans knows me because I worked on his Congressional District Veterans Advisory Group for years.

I would be happy to be of service to your commission. For your information, I also authored a concept call "Surge Contracting" which was published in the Defense Management