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Associate General Counsel

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**



**WASHINGTON, DC
OSD, GAO, OBC HEARINGS**

MONDAY JULY 18, 2005



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

**OSD, GAO, OBC HEARINGS
MONDAY, JULY 18, 2005
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
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Hearing Chair: Chairman Anthony J. Principi





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OSD, GAO, OBC HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY 18, 2005 8:30AM

SD-106 – Dirksen Senate Office Building

HEARING AGENDA

- I. Opening Statement by Chairman Anthony J. Principi
- II. Swearing in Witnesses – D.F.O. David Hague
- III. OSD Testimony (*approx. 120 mins*)
- IV. GAO Testimony (*approx. 120 mins*)
- V. OBC Testimony (*approx. 120 mins*)
- VI. Closing Statement by Chairman Anthony J. Principi





BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Chairman's Opening Statement

2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Information Hearing

Secretary of Defense Response to Additions Considerations
Government Accounting Office Report on BRAC Process
Overseas Basing Commission Findings

8:30 a.m.
July 18, 2005

Senate Dirksen Room 106

Good Morning,

Today the Base Closure and Realignment Commission will be hearing from several distinguished witnesses representing the Department of Defense, the Government Accountability Office, and the Overseas Basing Commission as we continue to assess the Secretary of Defense's 2005 BRAC recommendations.

As part of our first panel, I would like to welcome Michael Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group; General William Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; General Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and Admiral Robert Willard - Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Thank you for your participation in this extremely important review process.

As you are aware, before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission can even consider making a change to the Department of Defense's recommendations – a change that would add military installations for closure or realignment, or expand a realignment, we are required by statute, to seek an explanation from you as to why such

actions were not included on the May 13, 2005 list. On July 1st, this Commission forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a series of questions seeking further explanation and comment on a number of installations that we felt warranted further consideration. We greatly appreciate the timely receipt of the Department's written explanation last week. The Commissioners and staff have read your responses and we welcome this opportunity to elaborate on your explanations further.

No deliberation will be made on whether to include any of these installations for further study of closure or realignment until the Commission's open hearing tomorrow. The purpose of this morning's session is to clarify the process and rationale behind certain BRAC recommendations.

The testimony we will hear today and our subsequent deliberations will lead to decisions about adding bases for further consideration, not because we have determined that we need to close more bases than the Secretary of Defense has recommended, but because we want to make sure the best possible closure or realignment

choices are made. Our job as an independent Commission is to render a fair judgment on the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. In some cases, we cannot make that fair assessment without first being able to make direct comparisons between installations that are part of the Secretary's recommendations and similar installations that were not included in the May 13th recommendation list.

I want to make it clear that it is not our intent to disrupt or to unreasonably target communities that may have breathed a sigh of relief in May when the Secretary's list of recommendations was released or to further burden communities already facing losses. We are, as a Commission, acutely aware of the anxieties communities experience when faced with the prospect of losing an important military presence in their local area. Through our site visits and regional hearings, we have witnessed first hand the close relationships between so many communities and the military members that make those communities home.

I've said this before, but it bears repeating. This Commission takes its responsibility very seriously to provide an objective and independent analysis. We continue to study carefully each Department of Defense recommendation in a transparent manner, steadily seeking input from affected communities, to make sure those recommendations fully meet the Congressionally mandated requirements.

And, as the Commission has traveled across the nation, visiting many installations, including Air National Guard Bases, we have heard a number of issues raised regarding the Air National Guard recommendations. Representatives of Air Guard facilities speak of the potential negative aspects the recommendations would have on retention, recruitment and training. We have heard them tell us how aircraft relocations may not provide the optimal mix and how air guard support of the homeland security mission may suffer. And we have heard the Adjutants General concerns that they were not an integral part of this decision making process.

The issues raised concern us as well and, as a result, our second panel this morning will deal exclusively with the Commission's questions regarding the Air National Guard recommendations. We will hear from Lieutenant General Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs; Major General Gary Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs; Major General Scott Mayes, the Commander of 1st Air Force and Commander of the Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region, and Lieutenant General Daniel James, Director of the Air National Guard. The Commission looks forward to hearing your views on this important subject.

Following the testimony of our first two panels, we will hear from the Government Accountability Office's Comptroller General, the Honorable David Walker who will offer testimony on the GAO's analysis of the Defense Department's BRAC selection process. This separate view and examination of the methodology used to arrive at the decisions embodied in the Secretary's realignment or

closure proposals is an important step in the Commission's process.

And finally, at 1:30 today, we look forward to hearing from Commissioners of the Overseas Basing Commission, chaired by Mr. Al Cornella. As we continue to assess the BRAC proposal's ability to support military force structure, including the 70,000 military personnel anticipated to return to our shores, the afternoon's testimony should provide important insight and additional framework for our independent assessment.

At this time I would invite all our Department of Defense witnesses for this hearing to please stand for the administration of the oath required by the Base Closure and Realignment statute. The oath will be administered by Dan Cowhig, the Commission's Designated Federal Officer.



SWEARING IN OATH

Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give, and any other evidence that you may provide, are accurate and complete to the best of your knowledge and belief, so help you God?



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OSD, GAO, OBC HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY 18, 2005 8:30AM

SD-106 – Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Panel I

Michael W. Wynne - Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group

General William L. Nyland - Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

General T. Michael Moseley - Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Admiral Robert F. Willard - Vice Chief of Naval Operations


Panel II

Lieutenant General Stephen Wood - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for Plans and Programs

Major General Gary W. Heckman - Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Air Force for Plans and Programs

Major General Scott Mayes - Commander, 1st Air Force and Commander,
Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Command Region

Lieutenant General Daniel James, III - Director, Air National Guard



Michael W. Wynne Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Michael W. Wynne is the Under Secretary Of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. He was named to this position May 23, 2003.

In this role, Mr. Wynne is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System, research and development, advanced technology, developmental test and evaluation, production, logistics, installation management, military construction, procurement, environmental security, and nuclear, chemical, and biological matters.

Mr. Wynne came to the Department of Defense as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. He continues to hold this position to which the Senate confirmed him on July 12, 2001, along with his Under Secretary duties.

Before joining the Bush Administration, Mr. Wynne was involved in venture capital. He nurtured small technology companies through their startup phase as a member of the NextGenFund Executive Committee, and served in executive positions of two of those companies.

In 1999, Mr. Wynne retired as Senior Vice President from General Dynamics (GD), where his role was in International Development and Strategy. He spent 23 years with General Dynamics in various senior positions with the Aircraft (F-16's), Main Battle Tanks (M1A2), and Space Launch Vehicles (Atlas and Centaur) Divisions.

In between his assignments at GD, Mr. Wynne spent three years with Lockheed Martin (LMT), selling the Space Systems division to then-Martin Marietta. He successfully integrated the division into the Astronautics Company and became the General Manager of the Space Launch Systems segment, combining the Titan with the Atlas Launch vehicles.

Prior to joining industry, Mr. Wynne served in the Air Force for seven years, ending as a Captain and Assistant Professor of Astronautics at the US Air Force Academy, where he taught Control Theory and Fire Control Techniques. Mr. Wynne graduated from the United States Military Academy, holds a Masters in Electrical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Masters in Business from the University of Colorado. He has attended short courses at Northwestern University (Business) and Harvard Business School (PMD-42). He is a Fellow in the National Contracts Management Association, and has been a Past President of the Association of the United States Army, Detroit Chapter and the Michigan Chapter of the American Defense Preparedness Association. He has published numerous professional journal articles relating to engineering, cost estimating and contracting.



Phillip Grone Deputy Under Secretary for Installations and Environment

Mr. Philip W. Grone was appointed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment on November 1, 2004, after having served as that post's principal assistant deputy since September 2001. Mr. Grone has management and oversight responsibilities for military installations worldwide, which have a land area covering over 46,000-square miles and containing 587,000 buildings and structures valued at more than \$640 billion. His responsibilities include the development of installation capabilities, programs, and budgets; base realignment and closure; privatization of military housing and utilities system; competitive sourcing; and integrating installations and environment needs into the weapons acquisition process. Additionally, he has responsibility for environmental management, safety and occupational health; environmental restoration at active and closing bases; conservation of natural and cultural resources; pollution prevention; environmental research and technology; fire protection; and explosives safety. Mr. Grone also serves as the Department's designated Senior Real Property Officer as well as the DOD representative to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.



Mr. Grone came to the Pentagon in 2001 with more than 16 years of Capitol Hill experience. He served as the Deputy Staff Director and the Assistant Deputy Staff Director for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) from 2000-2001, where he managed all committee hearing, mark-up, floor, and conference activities, including the production of the annual defense authorization bill.

From 1995-2001, Mr. Grone served as Staff Director of the HASC Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. In that position, he led the staff development of the annual military construction authorization bill. The legislative accomplishments of that subcommittee during his tenure included the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, the privatization of defense utility infrastructure, reform of the Sikes Act (concerning natural resource management on military installations), and various withdrawals of the public lands for military training and readiness.

Mr. Grone also served as the Subcommittee Professional Staff Member for the HASC Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations; Professional Staff Member for the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress; and Legislative Assistant to U.S. Representative Willis D. Gradison, Jr. of Ohio.

Mr. Grone graduated from Northern Kentucky University, *summa cum laude*, with a B.A. and earned his master's degree from the University of Virginia.

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Robert F. Willard is a Los Angeles native and a 1973 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

An F-14 Naval Aviator, Adm. Willard served consecutively in Fighter Squadron Twenty Four (VF 24), Fighter Squadron One Twenty Four (VF-124), and Fighter Squadron Two (VF-2) at NAS Miramar, deploying aboard *USS Constellation*, *USS Ranger* and *USS Kitty Hawk*. He then joined Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) as Operations Officer and Executive Officer, as well as Aerial Coordinator for the Paramount movie *Top Gun*.

In 1987 Adm. Willard reported to Fighter Squadron Fifty One (VF 51), where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of the Screaming Eagles, embarked in *USS Carl Vinson* (CVN 70). He subsequently attended Navy Nuclear Power Training before rejoining *Carl Vinson* as Executive Officer. Adm. Willard then commanded the flagships *USS Tripoli* (LPH 10) and *USS Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) in various operations including Somalia, and the Persian Gulf.

As a flag officer, Adm. Willard has served on the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities); Commander, Carrier Group Five embarked in *USS Kitty Hawk* (CV 63); Deputy and Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Seventh Fleet, embarked in *USS Blue Ridge* (LCC 19) in Yokosuka, Japan; and most recently, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (DJ8) on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Adm. Willard's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, four Legions of Merit and other various awards. He was the 1982 Pacific Fleet Tailhooker of the Year.



GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY

Selected for reassignment as Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

General T. Michael Moseley is Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council.

General Moseley graduated from Texas A&M University in 1971 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science. He earned a Master of Arts degree from Texas A&M University in 1972, also in political science. He has commanded the F-15 Division of the USAF Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nev., the 33rd Operations Group at Eglin AFB, Fla., and the 57th Wing, the Air Force's largest, most diverse flying wing, also at Nellis. The general has served as the combat Director of Operations for Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia. General Moseley also commanded 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces while serving as Combined Forces Air Component Commander for operations Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The general is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been awarded the Order of National Merit (Officer) and the Order of National Merit (Commander) by the president of the French Republic. The Order of National Merit is the second highest French military award. He has also been awarded the United Arab Emirates' Military Medal, 1st Class, by the president of the U.A.E.



General Moseley's staff assignments have been a mix of operational, joint and personnel duties. These include serving in Washington, D.C., as Director for Legislative Liaison for the Secretary of the Air Force; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia/Pacific and Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief of the Air Force General Officer Matters Office; Chief of Staff of the Air Force Chair and Professor of Joint and Combined Warfare at the National War College; and Chief of the Tactical Fighter Branch, Tactical Forces Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

EDUCATION

1971 Bachelor of Arts degree in political science, Texas A&M University, College Station
1972 Master of Arts degree in political science, Texas A&M University, College Station
1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1981 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
1984 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1988 U.S. Air Force Joint Senior Battle Commander's Course, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
1990 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2000 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala., and Hurlburt Field, Fla.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1972 - May 1973, student, undergraduate pilot training, Webb AFB, Texas
2. May 1973 - July 1977, T-37 instructor pilot and spin flight test pilot; flight check pilot, and standardization and evaluation flight examiner, 3389th Flying Training Squadron, 78th Flying Training Wing, Webb AFB, Texas
3. July 1977 - September 1979, F-15 instructor pilot, flight lead and mission commander, 7th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Holloman AFB, N.M.
4. September 1979 - August 1983, F-15 weapons and tactics officer, instructor pilot, and flight lead and mission commander; standardization and evaluation/ flight examiner, 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron and 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan
5. August 1983 - June 1984, course officer, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. June 1984 - June 1987, Chief, Tactical Fighter Branch, Tactical Forces Division, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
7. June 1987 - June 1989, Commander, F-15 Division, and instructor pilot, Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
8. June 1989 - June 1990, course officer, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
9. June 1990 - August 1992, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Chair and Professor of Joint and Combined Warfare, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
10. August 1992 - January 1994, Commander, 33rd Operations Group, Eglin AFB, Fla.
11. January 1994 - May 1996, Chief, Air Force General Officer Matters Office, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
12. May 1996 - November 1997, Commander, 57th Wing, Nellis AFB, Nev.
13. November 1997 - July 1999, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Asia/Pacific and Middle East, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
14. July 1999 - October 2001, Director, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
15. November 2001 - August 2003, Commander, 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw AFB, S.C.
16. August 2003 - present, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 2,800

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15A/B/C/D

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Air Medal

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Achievement Medal

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Korea Defense Service Medal
French National Order of Merit (Commander)
French National Order of Merit (Officer)
United Arab Emirates' Military Medal, 1st Class

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

2003 H.H. Arnold Award, the Air Force Association's highest honor to a military member in the field of National Security

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant July 9, 1971
First Lieutenant July 9, 1974
Captain Jan. 9, 1976
Major Oct. 1, 1983
Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 1986
Colonel April 1, 1991
Brigadier General Dec. 1, 1996
Major General Feb. 1, 2000
Lieutenant General Nov. 7, 2001
General Oct. 1, 2003

(Current as of June 2005)



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN G. WOOD

Lt. Gen. Stephen G. Wood is Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. General Wood develops, integrates, evaluates and analyzes the U.S. Air Force Future Years Defense Program that exceeds \$682 billion, and the Air Force Long-Range Plan to support national security objectives and military strategy. The general is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff.

General Wood was commissioned in the Air Force in 1974 upon graduation from the Air Force ROTC program at the University of Washington, Seattle. He has served in various operational and staff assignments including duty as an F-4D pilot, AT-38 instructor pilot, F-16 weapons instructor and squadron operations officer. He has commanded two fighter squadrons, an operations group, a fighter wing and, most recently, the Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

General Wood is a command pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours in the F-4, T-33, AT-38 and F-16, including 49 combat missions during Operation Desert Storm.



EDUCATION

- 1974 Bachelor's degree in history, University of Washington, Seattle
- 1981 Master's degree in international relations, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces
- 1982 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1984 U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
- 1986 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
- 1994 National War College, Washington, D.C.
- 1994 Master's degree in national security policy, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. April 1975 - April 1976, student, undergraduate pilot training, Craig AFB, Ala.
2. April 1976 - August 1977, student and F-4 pilot, MacDill AFB, Fla.
3. August 1977 - April 1979, F-4D pilot, 91st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Bentwaters, England
4. April 1979 - June 1982, AT-38 instructor pilot, 435th and 436th tactical fighter squadrons, Holloman AFB, N.M.
5. June 1982 - June 1985, F-16 instructor and weapons officer, 17th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Shaw AFB, S.C.
6. July 1985 - June 1986, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
7. June 1986 - September 1989, F-16 weapons officer and executive officer to the director of operations, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii
8. September 1989 - July 1990, F-16 instructor pilot and assistant operations officer, 496th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Hahn Air Base, West Germany
9. July 1990 - October 1991, F-16 operations officer and Commander, 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Hahn AB,

Germany (January 1991 - May 1991, F-16 pilot and operations officer, operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Southwest Asia)

10. October 1991 - August 1993, F-16 Squadron Commander, 389th Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho

11. August 1993 - June 1994, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

12. June 1994 - July 1996, Chief, Joint Training Teams, Headquarters U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va. (October 1994 - April 1995, Joint Task Force-190/Multi-National Force liaison officer, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti)

13. July 1996 - June 1997, Commander, 8th Operations Group, Kunsan AB, South Korea

14. June 1997 - November 1998, Chief, House Liaison Office, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

15. November 1998 - May 2000, Commander, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa AB, Japan

16. May 2000 - June 2002, Deputy Director of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. (November 2001 - February 2002 and March 2002 - May 2002, Director, Combined Air and Space Operations Center, Operation Enduring Freedom, Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia)

17. June 2002 - October 2004, Commander, Air Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nev.

18. October 2004 - present, Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 3,400, including 183 combat hours

Aircraft flown: F-4, T-33, AT-38 and F-16

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with silver oak leaf cluster

Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters

Aerial Achievement Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant April 28, 1975

First Lieutenant Dec. 4, 1976

Captain Dec. 4, 1978

Major May 1, 1985

Lieutenant Colonel Feb. 1, 1990

Colonel Feb. 1, 1994

Brigadier General Aug. 1, 2000

Major General Sept. 1, 2003

Lieutenant General Oct. 18, 2004

(Current as of June 2005)

MAJOR GENERAL GARY W. HECKMAN

Retiring effective Oct. 1, 2005.

Maj. Gen. Gary W. Heckman is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for planning and programming, and for manpower activities within the corporate Air Force. He develops, integrates, and analyzes long-range and strategic plans, the more than \$520 billion Future Year Defense Program, manpower and organizational requirements, and management innovation to support national security objectives and military strategy. His primary areas of focus are Air Force play in the Base Realignment and Closure process and the Quadrennial Defense Review.



The general received his commission from Officer Training School in 1973. His flying tours in both special operations and air mobility weapon systems include command of the 16th Special Operations Group, consisting of 10 squadrons at Hurlburt Field, Fla. A charter joint specialty officer, he has extensive special operations and air mobility staff experience in plans, programming, operational requirements, and policy and strategy at the unit, numbered air force, major command, Air Staff and unified command levels.

EDUCATION

1972 Bachelor of Arts degree in education, University of Northern Iowa

1978 Squadron Officer School

1981 Master of Public Administration degree, Troy State University

1981 Air Command and Staff College, by seminar

1984 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

1989 Air War College, by correspondence

1992 Master of Arts degree in national security and strategic studies, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

1995 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

1999 Program for Senior Managers in Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

2003 National Security Studies Leadership Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, N.Y.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. February 1973 - February 1974, student, undergraduate navigator training, Mather Air Force Base, Calif., later, student, C-130 upgrade training, Little Rock AFB, Ark.

2. March 1974 - September 1976, C-130E navigator and instructor navigator, 21st Tactical Airlift Squadron, later, assistant chief for tactics and techniques, 374th Tactical Airlift Wing, Clark Air Base, Philippines

3. September 1976 - September 1979, AC-130H gunship navigator, instructor navigator and flight examiner, 16th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

4. October 1979 - October 1980, readiness initiatives officer, Air Staff Training Program, Readiness Analysis and Initiatives Group, Directorate of Operations, later, ASTRA airlift force

development staff officer, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

5. October 1980 - July 1983, plans officer, Directorate of Plans, 1st Special Operations Wing, later, Chief of Contingency Plans, 2nd Air Division, and AC-130H instructor navigator, 16th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
6. August 1983 - January 1984, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
7. February 1984 - August 1987, force plans staff officer, Directorate of Plans and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, West Germany
8. August 1987 - October 1989, Director, Directorate of Plans and Policy, Headquarters 23rd Air Force and Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
9. October 1989 - July 1991, Deputy Director of Programming and Policy, Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
10. August 1991 - June 1992, student, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
11. July 1991 - August 1994, Chief, Mobility, Training and Special Operations Requirements Division, Directorate of Operational Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
12. September 1994 - June 1996, Commander, 16th Special Operations Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
13. June 1996 - December 1997, Assessment Director, Directorate of Plans, Programs and Strategic Assessments, later, Director of Resources, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
14. December 1997 - August 1998, Chief of Staff and Director, Center for Command Support, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
15. August 1998 - October 2001, Director, Center for Force Structure, Resources and Strategic Assessments, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
16. October 2001 - present, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Master navigator

Flight hours: More than 3,000

Aircraft flown: AC-130H/U, C-9A, C-130B/E, E-3A, EC-135, MC-130E/H/P and various civilian aircraft

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Air Medal

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Achievement Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Jan. 17, 1973

First Lieutenant Jan. 17, 1975

Captain Jan. 17, 1979

Major Nov. 1, 1982

Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 1985

Colonel Feb. 1, 1991

Brigadier General Sept. 1, 1997

Major General Aug. 1, 2001

General Richard Cody- Vice Chief of Staff Army

General Richard A. Cody became the 31st Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, on June 24, 2004.

General Cody was born in Montpelier, Vermont, on 2 August 1950. He was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduation on 6 June 1972 from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes completion of the Transportation Corps Officer Basic and Advanced Courses; the Aviation Maintenance Officer Course; the AH-1, AH-64, AH-64D, UH-60, and MH-60K Aircraft Qualification Courses; the Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. General Cody is a Master Aviator with over 5,000 hours of flight time, and is an Air Assault graduate.



Prior to his current assignment, General Cody spent 32 years in a variety of command and staff assignments, most recently serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army. Other key assignments include Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell; Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, Tirana, Albania; Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Commander, 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Combined Field Army, Korea; and Director, Flight Concepts Division.

General Cody has served several tours with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as Commander, 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment (Attack) during Operation Desert Storm; Aviation Brigade Executive Officer, 101st Aviation Brigade; Battalion Executive Officer and Company Commander in the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion, and Battalion S-3 in the 55th Attack Helicopter Battalion. He served as a Platoon Commander in the 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry and A Company (Attack), 24th Aviation Battalion and as Commander, E Company (AVIM), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Awards and decorations which General Cody has received include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Air Medal (with numeral device "3"), the Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Army Achievement Medal, the Southwest Asia Service Medal (2 battle stars), the Humanitarian Service Medal, the NATO Medal, and the Southwest Asia Kuwait Liberation Medal.

General Cody and his wife have two sons, both serving as commissioned officers in the United States Army.

Mr. Raymond Dubois – Acting Under Secretary of the Army

Mr. Raymond F. DuBois was directed by President George W. Bush to serve as the Acting Under Secretary of the Army, and was sworn in on March 8, 2005 . As Acting Under Secretary of the Army, Mr. DuBois assists the Secretary of the Army in fulfilling statutory responsibilities for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training and mobilizing the Army and managing its \$98.5 billion annual budget, to include military construction, and more than 1.3 million active duty, National Guard, Army Reserve and civilian personnel.



Mr. DuBois also continues to serve as the Director of Administration and Management and is the principal staff assistant to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on all manpower, real estate, and organizational planning for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). He is responsible for Washington Headquarters Services, a 2,500-employee \$1.3 billion agency where as the "mayor" of the Pentagon, he oversees all administrative services within the National Capitol Region, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, and the \$5.5 billion Pentagon Renovation Program.

Mr. DuBois served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment from April 2001 until November 2004. In this capacity he managed the Base Realignment and Closure analytic process and the Defense Department's installations, housing, utilities, energy, competitive outsourcing and environmental programs worldwide valued at more than \$600 billion.

From 1995 to 2000, Mr. DuBois was President of Potomac Strategies International LLC which provided strategic management and financial support to companies worldwide in the aerospace, electronics, telecommunication and telemedicine industries. From 1990-1995 he was with Digital Equipment Corporation as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policies of the Aerospace, Defense Electronics, and Government Group and later Worldwide Marketing Director for the Defense Industries Group.

Mr. DuBois served in the United State Army from 1967 to 1969, including nearly thirteen-months in Vietnam as a Combat Intelligence Operations Sergeant, where he was awarded the Army Commendation Medal. He was also awarded the Civilian Distinguished Service Medal in 1976 while serving as the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army. He is also the recipient of the Department of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award and the Department of the Army Commander's Award for Public Service.

Mr. DuBois earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Princeton University .

General William L. Nyland

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

General William L. "Spider" Nyland is currently serving as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington D.C.

Gen. Nyland was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps under the NROTC program upon graduation from the University of New Mexico in 1968. In addition to attaining an M.S. degree from the University of Southern California, his formal military education includes The Basic School (1968), Naval Aviation Flight Training (NFO) (1969), Amphibious Warfare School (1975), Navy Fighter Weapons School (TopGun) (1977), College of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College (1981), and Air War College (1988).




After being assigned to VMFA-531, General Nyland was ordered to Vietnam where he flew 122 combat missions with VMFA-314 and VMFA-115. General Nyland's other tours included Instructor RIO, VMFAT-101; Squadron Assistant Operations Officer and Operations Officer, VMFA-115; and Brigade FORSTAT and Electronic Warfare Officer, 1st Marine Brigade. He also served as Operations Officer and Director of Safety and Standardization, VMFA-212; Aviation Safety Officer and Congressional Liaison/Budget Officer, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; and Operations Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-24, 1st Marine Amphibious Brigade. He commanded VMFA-232, the Marine Corps' oldest and most decorated fighter squadron, from July 1985 to July 1987.

General Nyland subsequently served as section chief for the Central Command section, European Command/Central Command Branch, Joint Operations Division, Directorate of Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. In July 1990, he assumed command of Marine Aviation Training Support Group, Pensacola. Following his command of MATSG he assumed duties as Chief of Staff, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing on July 5, 1992, and assumed additional duties as Assistant Wing Commander on November 10, 1992. He was promoted to Brigadier General on September 1, 1994 and was assigned as Assistant Wing Commander, 2nd MAW serving in that billet until December 1, 1995.

He served next on the Joint Staff, J-8, as the Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resources, completing that tour on June 30, 1997. He was advanced to Major General on July 2, 1997, and assumed duties as the Deputy Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. He served next as the Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina from July 1998 to June 2000. He was advanced to Lieutenant General on 30 June 2000 and assumed duties as the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He next assumed duties as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation on 3 August 2001. He was advanced to General on 4 September 2002 and assumed his current duties on 10 September 2002.

His personal decorations include: Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal with eight Strike/Flight awards, and Joint Service Commendation Medal.





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600

Arlington, VA 22202

Telephone: 703-699-2950

July 1, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As you are aware, before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission can even consider making a change in your recommendations that would add military installations for closure or realignment, or expand a realignment, we are required by Section 2914(d)(3) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, to seek an explanation from you as to why such actions were not included on your May 13, 2005 list. A series of issues on installations on which we seek such explanation is enclosed. No deliberation will be made on whether to include any of these installations for further study of closure or realignment until the Commission's open hearing of July 19, 2005. Therefore, we would greatly appreciate receipt of your explanation no later than July 18th.

In addition, we invite you or your representative to elaborate on these explanations at a public hearing to be held in the Washington, D.C. area at 8:30 a.m. on July 18, 2005.

If, at the July 19 hearing, seven or more Commissioners support adding an installation to your list for consideration, at least two Commissioners will visit each of the installations added to your list and public hearings will be conducted regarding them. While this is a requirement of law, the Commission's view is that such public hearings are not only mandatory, but also highly desirable.

At the Commission's final deliberations during the week of August 22, the vote of at least seven Commissioners will be required to effect any change in your recommendations that would close or realign an installation that you did not recommend for such closure or realignment, or expand a realignment that you recommended.

Your assistance in complying with this stringent timetable will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Anthony J. Principi
Chairman

Enclosure

Chairman: Anthony J. Principi

Commissioners: The Honorable James H. Bilbray, The Honorable Philip E. Coyle III, Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret), The Honorable Jim Hansen, General James T. Hill, USA (Ret), General Lloyd Newton, USAF (Ret), The Honorable Samuel K. Skinner, Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret)

Executive Director: Charles Battaglia

1. MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO, CA

ISSUE:

- Why was Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA, not closed and consolidated with Marine Corps recruit training at MCRD Parris Island, SC?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- The Marine Corps operates two stand-alone recruit depots -- one on each coast. Consolidation of all recruit training to MCRD Parris Island generates training efficiencies, reduces excess capacity, and saves recurring costs due to fence-line closure of MCRD San Diego, and may generate offsetting revenues due to potential commercial development after a DoD property transfer. Consolidating recruit training at one location may theoretically increase operational risks; however, the Department of Navy and Air Force have successfully implemented similar transformational options experiencing little or no actual risk to recruit training while maintaining a surge capability. Military value of MCRD San Diego is lower than MCRD Parris Island partially due to encroachment and land constraints.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- None
-

2. NAVAL SHIPYARD PEARL HARBOR, HI

ISSUE:

- Why was the Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI, not closed and the ship depot repair function realigned to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Four naval shipyards perform depot-level ship refueling, modernization, overhaul and repair work. There appears to be sufficient excess capacity in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor is less efficient than Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, according to Department of Navy data and additional savings could be found from reduced unit costs at the receiving shipyards because of a higher volume of work. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor has low military value compared to other shipyards according to DoD analysis supporting the recommendation to close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- DON-23: Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME

3. NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, ME

ISSUE:

- What considerations were given to a complete closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and what were the driving factors in deciding on realignment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Closure would appear to reduce excess capacity, may save approximately four times more than DoD's realignment recommendation and could open land to State or community development to offset economic impact.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- DON-18: Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME
-

4. NAVY BROADWAY COMPLEX, SAN DIEGO, CA

ISSUE:

- Why was the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA, not considered for closure and realignment of existing functions to Naval Station San Diego, CA?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Consolidating Navy activities in a more secure location at the Naval Station complex at 32nd Street could improve security and allow for future commercial development.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- None
-

5. REALIGNMENT OF NAVAL MASTER JET BASE

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA? Was movement of the assets assigned to Moody AFB, GA to Cannon AFB, NM, considered and if so, what were the driving considerations not to do so?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Realigning the Master Jet Base at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA, would appear to alleviate the severe encroachment which affects NAS Oceana training and operations as well as operations at the outlying field, Fentress OLF. Moody AFB, GA, would appear to have the necessary room for expansion and suffers less encroachment. Cannon AFB, NM, would appear to have ample space and facilities to accommodate any aircraft currently operating or planned for movement to Moody AFB, NM.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- AF-6: Realign Eielson AFB
 - AF-32: Close Cannon AFB
 - AF-35: Maintenance realignment from Shaw AFB
 - E&T-14: Realignment of Undergraduate Pilot Training.
-

6. GALENA AIRPORT FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL), AK

ISSUE:

- Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Galena is one of two FOLs in Alaska that serve as alert bases for air intercept aircraft in support of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) missions. The requirement for maintaining two FOLs in Alaska may no longer be valid. The mission could be accomplished by maintaining one FOL and two Air Force bases in Alaska.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- AF-6: Eielson AFB, AK; Moody AFB, GA; and Shaw AFB, GA
 - AF-7: Kulis Air Guard Station, AK; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
 - AF-18: Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; Nellis Air Force Base, NV; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK
 - AF-43: Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD; and Dyess Air Force Base, TX
-

7. POPE AIR FORCE BASE, NC

ISSUE:

- What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather close Pope AFB NC, under Fort Bragg, NC? Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- DoD appears to have determined that much of the benefits of the collocation of the joint forces that will operate together (CAS aircraft, operational planning staffs) are outweighed by the ability to schedule support as necessary through third parties.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- USA-8: Fort Gillem, GA
- USA-8: Fort McPherson, GA
- AF-35: Pope Air Force Base, NC, Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, PA; and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV
- H&SA-35: Create Joint Mobilization Sites

8. GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, ND

ISSUE:

- What considerations drove the recommendation to realign rather than close Grand Forks AFB, ND? What is the number of UAVs planned for assignment to Grand Forks AFB, ND, and what is the timing of the potential deployment?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- While there is no “emerging mission” programmed within the BRAC timeline (2006-2011), there are indications that the Air Force is considering assigning UAVs to Grand Forks AFB, ND.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- AF-37: Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND
-

9. AIR NATIONAL GUARD

ISSUE:

- Were the Adjutants General and Governors of the States consulted in the re-allocation of aircraft, personnel, facilities and missions from their states? What impact does the realignment of the ANG have on the homeland defense and homeland security missions?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Many of the Air Force’s recommendations address Air National Guard installations. While only four of these installations will completely close, many Guard installations will lose aircraft and personnel leaving only an “expeditionary combat support” unit remaining, with several states losing their entire flying missions. Many of these aircraft will relocate to other locations, which may negatively impact personnel recruiting and retention as well as State and Homeland Security missions.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Various
-

10. DEFENSE FINANCE ACCOUNTING SERVICE

- DFAS Buckley Annex, CO
- DFAS Columbus, OH
- DFAS Indianapolis, IN

ISSUE:

- Why were keeping DFAS Buckley Annex, CO, DFAS Columbus, OH, and DFAS Indianapolis, IN, open and closing the remaining DFAS sites the only scenario

considered? Why did DoD not consider other options, which could have avoided military construction costs and possibly produced a more cost effective option?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Closing or realigning these installations may reduce operating and sustainment costs, balance mission and strategic redundancy requirements, eliminate excess capacity and avoid closing other DFAS installations that provide a lower locality pay and have an existing infrastructure for expansion without military construction or additional leasing.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- HSA-37: Defense Finance & Accounting Service
-

11. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

- Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA
- Defense Language Institute Monterey, CA
- Air Force Institute of Technology Wright Patterson AFB, OH

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to the closure or realignment of the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson AFB, OH, and the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, CA, with Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, CA, to create a consolidated professional development education center?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Consolidating the Professional Development Education currently provided by the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Army's Defense Language Institute would provide significant savings and efficiencies to the Department of Defense by (1) eliminating redundant support structure for advanced education, (2) reducing infrastructure; and (3) consolidating command and instructional staff.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- None
-

12. JOINT MEDICAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

- Navy Bureau of Medicine, Potomac Annex, DC
- Air Force Medical Command, Bolling AFB, DC
- TRICARE Management Authority, Leased Space, VA
- Office of the Army Surgeon General, Leased Space, VA

ISSUE:

- What consideration was given to establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters, through collocation of disparate Department of Defense Surgeons General, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD?

ISSUE BACKGROUND:

- Such a consolidation could eliminate 166,000 square feet of leased space within the National Capitol Region and enable the closure of the Potomac Annex, DC. The National Naval Medical Center, MD, has a higher military value ranking than present locations. Establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters would take advantage of the transformation of legacy medical infrastructure proposed in recommendation MED-4, which establishes the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD.

ASSOCIATED DOD RECOMMENDATIONS:

- MED-4: Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD
- TECH-5: Co-locate Extramural Research Program Managers





**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

JUL 14 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

In your letter of July 1, 2005, you asked for the Department's comments on a number of installations in advance of the Commission's voting at your hearing on July 19, 2005, to consider these installations for closure or realignment analysis. Your July 12, 2005 letter requested witnesses to address the Commission's concern regarding recommendations impacting the Air National Guard.

The Commission's independent assessment of the Department's recommendations and the subsequent reviews by the President and the Congress are each important steps to ensure that the final recommendations are fair, consistent with the selection criteria and force structure plan and will, in fact, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our military infrastructure. As such, while the Department stands behind its recommendations, it fully supports the Commission's analysis of alternatives. As you undertake your review, please consider that each of the Department's recommendations is part of a comprehensive, integrated, and interdependent package. The recommendations submitted by the Department of Defense strengthen national security by reshaping the domestic installations at which U.S. military forces and their associated support elements perform their assigned missions.

The Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups have provided the attached responses to the issues you raise. While I appreciate the opportunity to testify on July 18, 2005, Mr. Michael Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), will lead a panel that will include General William Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. They are jointly designated to discuss the issues at the hearing. Additionally, we will provide a second panel to deal exclusively with the Commission's concerns regarding recommendations concerning the Air Guard. This panel will be led by Lt Gen Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs, and will include Maj Gen Gary Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and



Programs, Maj Gen Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force, and Commander,
Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and Brig Gen
Anthony Haynes, Air National Guard Assistant for BRAC.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on these issues. If I can be of
further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.


ACTING

Enclosure:
As stated

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA, not closed and consolidated with Marine Corps recruit training at MCRD Parris Island, SC?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Geo-centric recruiting/shipping/recruit training command and control would be compromised.
- Replication of facilities would require in excess of 100 years to payback.
- Recruit pipeline requirements cannot sustain a single point of failure.

DISCUSSION:

The consolidation of Marine Corps recruit training at a single site was evaluated but not recommended. After extensive analysis, the Department of the Navy (DON) concluded that single-siting recruit training would degrade recruit training command and control, limit surge capability, and require fiscally burdensome duplication of already-existing mission and modern facilities. Also, because significant reductions in overhead have already occurred outside of the BRAC process, single-siting recruit training would not produce significant billet eliminations.

DON analysis of Marine Corps recruit training went through several stages and included a thorough review of the available certified data along with consideration of input from Marine Corps leadership. The review of capacity data showed that, when allowing for surge, there is virtually no excess capacity in Marine Corps recruit training. The scenario to close MCRD San Diego and consolidate at MCRD Parris Island (DON-0066) was developed based on data that showed the availability of buildable acres at MCRD Parris Island. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 27 Sep 2004).

During scenario analysis, the DON considered input from Marine Corps leadership, who identified a number of issues of concern with the proposed Parris Island consolidation, including creating the risk of a single point of failure and limiting the ability to handle unexpected surge requirements, or even normal requirements in the event of future growth in end-strength. These factors would have an adverse effect on an organization that is heavily committed to sourcing three Marine Expeditionary Forces worldwide and waging the Global War on Terrorism. The Marine Corps has aligned its recruiting/shipping/recruit training mission geographically under the command of each of the Recruit Depot Commanding Generals. This unity of command and control allows for the necessary detailed demographic knowledge to effectively recruit, and for the geographic proximity for recruit and follow-on training to efficiently ship new Marines

on that coast. This synergy has supported the Marine Corps' historic success in meeting recruiting mission, and becomes increasingly vital in an era of increasingly competitive recruiting and accelerated operational deployments during the Global War on Terrorism. Restructuring of this command and control relationship could be required if recruit training were single sited at Parris Island. Single-siting the training function would cause a significant increase in the span of control for the Eastern Recruiting Region commander, and likely necessitate organizational changes with increased staffing requirements. The Marine Corps also depends heavily on a sustained pipeline of trained recruits. As a predominantly single enlistment force, any disruption in the recruiting/training continuum would disrupt the pipeline to provide new Marines to the operating forces. Short perturbations can be handled because of the two recruit depot operating construct. Significant concerns were raised with the consideration of single siting, especially in a hurricane prone region. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 18 Oct 04 and 26 Oct 04, IEG Report of Deliberations of 4 Nov 04).

The COBRA analysis of the MCRD San Diego closure shows one-time costs of \$570.1M and steady state savings of \$14.2M, resulting in a Payback exceeding 100 years. This result was compared to the analysis of this scenario conducted during BRAC 1995. MILCON costs were considerably lower, and the anticipated number of eliminated personnel was significantly higher in BRAC 1995 than for scenario DON-0066. During the course of the past ten years, the Marine Corps has eliminated excess capacity and implemented initiatives to consolidate MCRD-related billets. For that reason, few billets are eliminated (with their associated cost savings) and the great majority of MCRD San Diego billets will need to be relocated to MCRD Parris Island in order to perform the recruit training function. In addition, a complete set of new recruit training facilities would have to be constructed there to accommodate the three additional Recruit Training Battalions in facilities built to hurricane-proof standards. Additional MILCON is required for non-recruit training activities located at MCRD San Diego that would have to be relocated elsewhere. MCRD consolidation on one coast will also increase recruiting related travel costs.

Based upon the cost analysis and concerns about negative impacts on the recruiting/training missions, the DON Infrastructure Evaluation Group decided not to forward DON-0066 for consideration as a candidate recommendation (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05).

2. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI

Commission issue: Why was the Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI, not closed and the ship depot repair function realigned to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Industrial JCSG found excess capacity sufficient to justify closure of one shipyard.
- Military judgment favors retention of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard because of its strategic location and multi-platform capabilities.

DISCUSSION:

As noted in the minutes and report of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, all four naval shipyards were analyzed to determine if there was sufficient capacity for any three of the shipyards to absorb the workload of the fourth based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan. That evaluation revealed that there is sufficient excess capacity to realign the workload of either Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard or Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG then reviewed military value and COBRA data to determine which closure was the preferred alternative.

The quantitative military value scores for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard were very close. Shipyard total cost and proximity to ship homeports were evaluated as part of the quantitative military value analysis. The total cost attribute favored Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, while the homeport proximity favored Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG also evaluated the differences in drydock and workload capabilities between the two shipyards.

The COBRA analysis indicated that realigning the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard depot function would produce greater net present value savings than realigning the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard depot function. However, the net present value savings associated with the DON fenceline closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard produces savings about the same as realigning the depot function at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

Although the quantitative military value score for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was slightly lower than that of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, it was the military judgment of the Industrial JCSG that Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's critical geographical location, adjacent to a significant portion of the Fleet and forward positioned in the central Pacific, combined with its capability to dock a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, provided a higher overall military value to the Department. This judgment is supported by the DON, as indicated by its submission of the closure recommendation. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is strategically located to support DoD's current and future mission capabilities in the Pacific. Loss of this critical asset will have an adverse impact on operational warfighting

capability, training and readiness. Additionally the Combatant Commander expressed operational concerns with a closure of the Pearl Harbor Shipyard in that it would result in reduced theater presence as a result of the associated increased transit times, a loss of emergent CVN drydock capability (the only option west of Washington state) and a general concern with the loss of availability of "logistics, supply and operational support services throughout the Pacific." Finally, the Navy was concerned with the personnel retention implications that would result from a closure of Pearl Harbor in that it would result in a significant increase in dockings being conducted out of homeport.

3. Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

Commission issue: What considerations were given to a complete closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and what were the driving factors in deciding the realignment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Realignment versus closure was extensively debated within DON, and DON ultimately recommended closure.
- The IEC modified closure to realignment because of a desire to retain strategic presence in the Northeast U.S. and for a surge capability.

DISCUSSION:

The Department of the Navy did develop and analyze a scenario to close NAS Brunswick. When combined with other aviation recommendations, the closure of NAS Brunswick would have reduced the excess capacity for the Aviation Operations function from 19 percent to 8 percent. Such a recommendation not only allowed consolidation of Maritime Patrol Operations on the East Coast with attendant increased maintenance and training efficiencies, but it also produced significant steady-state savings of \$94.6M and a 20-year net present value of \$843.2M.

During the review of scenario analysis the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), expressed concerns that closing NAS Brunswick could result in diminished strategic flexibility, as well as impact future basing flexibility. (See DAG Reports of Deliberations of 6 Dec 04, 11 Jan 05, 17 Jan 05, and 24 Jan 05). These concerns led to review of the availability of possible detachment sites for Maritime Patrol operations and analysis of additional alternatives to closure so the leadership had full visibility of the various trade-offs in making their decisions. (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05 and 17 Feb 05, DAG Reports of Deliberations of 8 Feb 05, and 15 Feb 05). After reviewing the additional analyses, the Department of the Navy decided to forward the closure scenario to the Infrastructure Executive Council as a candidate recommendation because of the significant savings associated with the closure, combined with the options available to address operational concerns.

When the candidate recommendations were reviewed in final deliberations, the IEC determined that NAS Brunswick should be realigned instead of closed to retain an active presence in New England for homeland defense and surge capability. (See IEC Minutes of 2 May 05 and 4 May 05). This decision is consistent with the concerns expressed by the Fleet in that it provides strategic flexibility by maintaining an ability to rapidly position aircraft in the Northeast should an increased threat materialize.

4. Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA, not considered for closure and realignment of existing functions to Naval Station San Diego, CA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- All activities/functions located at the Broadway Complex were evaluated by either Department of the Navy or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups.
- DON BRAC analysis did not develop a recommendation to close Broadway Complex because none of the activities on this property were recommended for relocation.

DISCUSSION:

The Broadway Complex in San Diego is property owned by the Navy and located on slightly less than 15 acres of contiguous property in downtown San Diego with 857K square feet (SF) in three separate buildings. It houses several commands; the two largest commands are Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego and Commander, Navy Region Southwest. All of the functions located on this property were reviewed by either DON or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs). The BRAC analyses performed by DON and the appropriate JCSGs, including capacity and military value analysis, did not identify any scenarios to realign activities from the Broadway Complex.

Within the DON BRAC process, a fenceline (a distinct parcel of land that supported one or more functional activities undergoing BRAC analysis) was not considered for closure unless sufficient assets were proposed to be removed so as to effectively eliminate all missions aboard the fenceline. Since no mission activities were recommended to be relocated, DON did not issue a recommendation to close this fenceline.

Although DON recognizes the AT/FP concerns and the potential for increased development of the Broadway Complex parcel, scarcity of available DON owned waterfront property in the San Diego area suggests determination of the disposition of the Broadway complex is better addressed through ongoing negotiations between the City of San Diego, local developers and the DON outside the BRAC process.

5. Realignment of Naval Master Jet Base

5a. Commission issue: What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base (MJB) located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA?

5a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Navy examined several alternatives for an east coast MJB, including Moody AFB.
- While Moody is a feasible alternative to Oceana, it has a number of factors that make it less desirable than retaining Oceana, including significant one-time MILCON costs.
- While Oceana is the most suitable option of all east coast TACAIR bases considered, encroachment at Oceana presents significant challenges to long-term operational requirements.
- The best basing alternative for East Coast tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century Master Jet Base, but such action would occur outside the BRAC window.

DISCUSSION:

The Navy has given extensive consideration to the possible realignment of the Oceana MJB out of concern over likely long-term encroachment issues. Our assessment included Moody AFB as well as a range of other feasible Defense Department air facilities. In the case of realignment to Moody AFB, while it was considered a feasible alternative, it would incur significant one-time costs (almost \$500 million) and result in a long payback period (14 years). We concluded the best long-term basing alternative for East Coast Navy tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century naval air station able to accommodate legacy and planned high performance aircraft, but such action would optimally occur outside the BRAC window.

Selecting a location and building from the ground up is by far the preferred choice as it gives us the most flexibility to ensure we accommodate future capabilities, while allowing for sufficient “buffers” to preclude potential encroachment issues. This approach, if pursued, would allow for a truly modern air station, with commensurate energy, environmental and community consideration designed into the facility from the very beginning. By contrast, relocating to Moody (built in 1940) or another existing installation within the timeframe of this BRAC would require extensive infrastructure upgrades, take significant time and resources, and still would not attain the operational or quality of life standards expected of this century.

5b. Commission issue: Was movement of the assets assigned to Moody AFB, GA to Cannon AFB, NM, considered and if so, what were the driving considerations not to do so?

5b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Need for Battlefield Airmen Training works at Moody AFB
- Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity
- Cannon AFB Military Capacity Index (MCI) was lower than Moody AFB

DISCUSSION:

Early in the process the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) and the Air Force analyzed scenarios to realign Moody AFB. The JCSG scenario distributed the Moody training aircraft to other Air Education and Training Command (AETC) bases. The Air Force scenario distributed the Special Operations Forces/Combat Search and Rescue (SOF/CSAR) aircraft to Davis Monthan AFB, AZ. Transferring the SOF/CSAR aircraft from Moody to Cannon was not considered because Cannon's SAF/CSAR MCI was lower than Moody.

During the BRAC process, the Air Force identified an emerging need for a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus for the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) family of specialties such as Combat Rescue, Combat Control, Terminal Attack Control and Special Operations Weather. Moody was identified as a potential site for this purpose. Of all Air Force bases, Moody had the right infrastructure/range complex and proximity to other areas such as the Gulf Range Complex at Eglin and Tyndall. The Air Force decided to leave the CSAR aircraft at Moody and place A-10 aircraft there also (Moody scored 8 points higher than Davis-Monthan for SOF/CSAR). Also, as a part of the BRAC process, the Army proposed the realignment of the Armor Center/School to Fort Benning, GA and the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin (to be in close proximity with the Air Force Special Operations Command). Therefore, the establishment of a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus at Moody can provide a center of excellence for airmen in expeditionary combat support fields and also provide Air Force and joint training opportunities within operational proximity of Moody AFB. A-10/CSAR aircraft collocated at Moody AFB will provide an east coast CSAR training efficiency similar to Davis-Monthan AFB. Moody AFB is rated 11 of 154 in the SOF/CSAR MCI and is also in the top ten of all installations in 4 of the other 7 MCIs. It remains one of the Air Force's most valuable installations.

Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity to the base, and for the A-10 aircraft, that is mandatory. Cannon AFB did not rank well within the SOF/CSAR MCI and therefore, the Air Force did not consider Cannon AFB to beddown the active duty A-10 mission.

6. Galena Airport Forward Operating Location (FOL), AK

Commission issue: Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Air Force BRAC analysis did not develop a scenario.
- No force structure to move.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force did not consider moving the operational support mission from Galena Airport to Eielson AFB, which is over 300 miles from Galena. Consistent with the requirement to consider the impact on homeland defense, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) left Galena open primarily because of its operational role and because it had no day-to-day force structure assigned. Initial BRAC inputs made by the Combatant Commander through the Joint Staff did not include Galena or other FOLs to be considered for closure. However, based on the Commission's July 1, 2005 letter, the Joint Staff contacted the Combatant Commands for their comments concerning the potential operational impact if the Galena FOL is closed and closing the Galena, AK, FOL and moving its missions to Eielson, AFB, AK will not create unacceptable risk to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)/U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) mission accomplishment.

7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

7a. Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, NC under Fort Bragg, NC?

7a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Supports Army plan for relocation of FORSCOM.
- Maintains airfield capability for Army presence and Air Force force structure.
- Allows efficient consolidation of installation management functions.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, was made to support the Army recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command and allows for closure of Fort McPherson, GA and Atlanta leased space. All Air Force property and facilities will be administratively transferred to the Army. The financial analysis included expected recurring expenses paid by the Air Force to the Army as a result of the Air Force presence that will remain. This

coordination on installation management builds upon and subsumes the H&SA candidate recommendation (H&SA-0009) to combine Installation Management of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, NC.

7b. Commission issue: Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

7b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Existing operational relationships will continue.
- Additional operational and training synergies will emerge from new relationships.

DISCUSSION:

As a part of the coordination between the Army regarding a tenant Air Force presence on an expanded Fort Bragg, the Army indicated that it would allow a tenant C-130 unit with a maximum size of 16 PAA (911th Airlift Wing, AFRC). Other Air Force functions that currently exist at Pope AFB, will remain at Fort Bragg to continue the present operational relationships, they include: 3rd Aerial Port Squadron; 18th Air Support Operations Group; 14th Air Support Operations Squadron; Det 1 of the 373rd Training Squadron; and 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. Additionally, new opportunities for on-going joint operations at Fort Bragg will continue with planned deployment of air assets to Fort Bragg/Pope for joint training with the Army.

The Pope recommendation also includes the transfer of A-10s to Moody AFB, GA. Operational and training synergies will occur with new relationships between the A-10 unit at Moody and Army units at Ft. Benning, GA, the recommended location of the Army's Maneuver Training Center (consolidation of Infantry and Armor schools). Locating Air Force A-10s near this consolidated Army training will lead to new opportunities of realistic close air support training for the Army and the Air Force and potential joint training between the Battlefield Airmen at Moody, the Maneuver Center of Excellence and east coast CSAR training capability with CSAR helicopters and A-10s.

8. Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign rather than close Grand Forks AFB, ND? What is the number of UAVs planned for assignment to Grand Forks AFB, ND, and what is the timing of the potential deployment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Ensures continued strategic presence in the North Central U. S.
- Positioned to accept emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission.

DISCUSSION:

The original Air Force candidate recommendation to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) was to close Grand Forks, AFB. The IEC reviewed it in context with other Service and Joint Cross-Service Group candidate recommendations. To address an IEC concern over a continued strategic presence in the north central U.S., the Air Force presented an option to realign Grand Forks AFB but maintain the tanker moves out of Grand Forks to support other high-value tanker realignments. The IEC adopted this recommendation.

The justification for the Grand Forks AFB recommendation specifies that the base would be retained for an emerging mission, of which UAVs may be one (in addition to continuing support of the 10th Space Warning Squadron). Specific future plans for UAVs (in terms of numbers and timing) are undefined in BRAC; however, the post-BRAC intent of the Air Force is to dovetail an emerging mission with the departure of the old mission.. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have signed out to the Commission a separate letter to that effect (Reference: Department of Defense recommendation to realign Eielson AFB, AK, and Grand Forks AFB, ND, 7 Jun 05). A portion of that background paper on Grand Forks stated "...Specifically, the Air Force strategic vision for Grand Forks AFB is to become a home to a "family of UAVs," with associated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance support functions. In cooperation with the North Dakota Air National Guard (ANG), the Air Force would establish a Predator MQ-1 ANG unit with an Active Duty Associate unit to backfill F-16 retirements at Fargo's Hector Field. Growth of this mission will include transition to the Predator MQ-9, eventually add the Global Hawk UAV with the Grand Forks Tanker realignment and FTF emerging mission and associations at both locations."

9. Air National Guard

9a. Commission issue: Were the Adjutants General and Governors of the States consulted in the re-allocation of aircraft, personnel, facilities and missions from their states?

9a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- The State Adjutants General were provided significant briefing during the BRAC process.

DISCUSSION:

Adjutants General (TAGs) were briefed on the force structure, organizational, and military value factors that formed the foundation of the Air Force BRAC analysis. Senior Air Force staff, Guard and active, briefed the TAGs in December 2003 at the TAG meeting in Baltimore. That session included a discussion of the force structure and squadron size assumptions that were eventually included as part of BRAC later that winter. The senior BRAC staff, Guard and active, appeared before the TAGs again in

July 2004 to give them feedback into the senior military value discussion (which included the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) and the Chief, Air Force Reserve) that formed the foundation for the MCI (mission compatibility index) weightings. The BRAC staff did this well prior to the completion of the MCIs and the release of the capacity and military value data calls to the installations. These MCIs provided the starting point for Air Force BRAC deliberations. The Guard representative to the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) later provided a comprehensive, personal briefing to the Chief, National Guard Bureau in April 2005 when the Air Force deliberations were entering their final phase.

The Air Force BRAC charge was to accommodate a shrinking force structure in order to ensure we placed right-sized squadrons at the best combination of bases to achieve both homeland and overseas defense objectives. Effectively organized flying squadrons were key to future warfighting effectiveness. To achieve this, we restored our operational squadrons to sizes that would result in more effective and efficient use of a shrinking force structure. Over the past 10 years, the AF reduced the number of squadrons in its active component to ensure effective sized squadrons in an era of declining total force structure. During the same period, the AF retained essentially the same number of squadrons in the reserve component and reduced the number of aircraft in each squadron to 'maintain flags.' Consequently, although the Air Force BRAC process maintained the proportionality of the active, Guard, and Reserve components, the combination of a further reduced force structure and the need to restore Guard and Reserve units to effective sizes resulted in a greater reduction in the number of squadron flags in the reserve component than the active duty.

Initially the Air Force considered closing the bases losing flying missions. Following deliberation, however, the Air Force concluded that the expeditionary combat support (ECS) forces that remained after we effectively sized the flyers were themselves quite effective both for Title 10 expeditionary missions and Title 32 state missions. Some believe that these bases should be closed, however, the Air Force strongly believes these ECS forces provide viable expeditionary and state support and their base of operations should not be moved. Any adjustment to the lay down of the ECS forces will need to be re-evaluated for impact on the support to civil authorities.

9b. Commission issue: What impact does the realignment of the ANG have on the homeland defense and homeland security missions?

9b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Homeland Security, Air Sovereignty, and Civil Support are adequately addressed.

DISCUSSION:

Balancing the Air Force to meet both the homeland and expeditionary defense needs of the Nation was another key consideration. This was most acute in the C-130 force, where the current average Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) for active crews is 150 days per year TDY with the Guard and Reserve activated. When the 2-year reserve component activation is complete, Air Mobility Command estimates the average active PERSTEMPO will rise above 200 days per year without the BRAC recommendations. To assist with the assessment of homeland defense, the Air Force consulted with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and also with the most senior staff members of the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) during the AF BRAC process. The USNORTHCOM favorably reviewed our recommendations and the ANG staff was completely involved as full partners in the BCEG throughout the process. The BCEG focused its Homeland Security deliberations on comprehensive air sovereignty requirements and not on the specific mission of any single unit or location. The support to civil authorities' roles and missions of airlift units in times of crisis are borne by the airlift/transportation system as a whole. For Civil Support missions, the Air Force requires the ability both to proactively plan with civil agencies as well as rapidly respond to man made or natural disasters when tasked. Important capabilities to enable these types of missions include: 1) Crisis Management to prevent and protect (law enforcement support and safeguarding the supply chain), 2) Consequence Management to respond locally (CBRNE/WMD and natural disaster mitigation), and 3) Providing Agile Combat Support (ACS) or Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) infrastructure to assist civil authorities in the areas of medical support, food deliveries, protection from the elements, etc. at both local and national levels. In an effort to balance warfighting and civil support requirements the AF recommendations retain ECS units in twenty "Enclaves" to continue support of local authorities. We believe both aspects of homeland security, air sovereignty and civil support, are adequately addressed within the Air Force recommendations.

In his letter dated May 4, 2005, Admiral Keating, Commander US NORTHCOM, agreed stating, "Following a thorough review, we find that they (the draft 2005 BRAC recommendations) do not create an unacceptable risk to the accomplishment of our homeland defense or defense support of civil authorities."

10. Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)

Commission issue: Why were keeping DFAS Buckley Annex, CO, DFAS Columbus, OH, and DFAS Indianapolis, IN, open and closing the remaining DFAS sites the only scenario considered? Why did DoD not consider other options, which could have avoided military construction costs and possibly produced a more cost effective option?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Optimization Model was used to develop Best Value solution.
- No Military Construction involved.

DISCUSSION:

The Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA) JCSG followed an iterative process that reviewed all DFAS locations as potential gaining locations. The process considered options and concluded the three-location combination, DFAS-Denver, DFAS-Columbus and DFAS-Indianapolis, represented the best value solution for DFAS by maximizing military value. The Optimization Model was used to develop the best value solution for DFAS, from both facilities and business operations perspectives. Within the optimization model the following constraints were applied against the 26 DFAS locations: (i) Maximize military value, (ii) Minimize number of locations, (iii) Minimum of two locations – to support strategic redundancy, (iv) Minimize military construction, and (v) Retain anchor locations for business operations integrity. The model resulted in the best value solution, and the economics (cost/savings) of the solution were then developed using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model.

The DFAS recommendation does not include costs for new construction. It does include costs associated with the possible reactivation of part of building #11, at Defense Supply Center-Columbus (DSC-C), OH. Because of the lack of detailed costing information associated with a reactivation, renovation equal to 29% of construction costs was used. The cost in COBRA is thus a conservative estimate, as the DSC-C reported that building #11 is in good condition and should only require a lesser expense for reactivation.

11. Professional Development Education

Commission issue: What consideration was given to the closure and realignment of the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at Wright Patterson AFB, OH, and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, CA, with Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) at Monterey, CA, to create a consolidated professional development education center?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Consolidation of the Naval Postgraduate School and Air Force Institute of Technology was considered but did not include the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
- Maintaining graduate education is a core competency of the Department.

DISCUSSION:

The Education & Training (E&T) JCSG analyzed a full set of scenarios for all three institutions, including closure (privatize the functions), consolidations, and realignments. One of the scenarios (E&T-0022) consolidated NPGS and AFIT at Monterey, CA but did not include DLI in that consolidation. This scenario was not recommended in favor of E&T-0003 (the privatization of NPGS and AFIT), which was later integrated with DON-0070 (the closure of the installation housing NPGS). The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) later also deleted this candidate recommendation in recognition of the value provided by having military postgraduate education facilities that (1) recognize the uniqueness of professional military education, (2) acknowledge the importance of sustaining a world class educational facility as a component of our military structure, and (3) recognize the long-term benefits achieved from having a dedicated military campus that attracts future military leaders from other countries.

12. Joint Medical Command Headquarters

Commission issue: What consideration was given to establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters, through collocation of disparate Department of Defense Surgeons General, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD?

Response:

KEY ISSUES:

- Joint Medical Command was not considered but co-location was.
- Co-location not cost effective.

DISCUSSION:

The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group determined that consideration of a Joint Medical Command, with its complex command and control ramifications, was outside the scope

of their charter. The Medical JCSG approach, approved by the Infrastructure Steering Group, was to focus on medical capacity and efficiencies. The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group addressed collocation of the Medical Headquarters functions in the National Capital Region. Due to the complexities of instituting Joint Command and Control structures, no recommendations instituting a Joint Command Structure was developed.

The H&SA JCSG developed several scenarios for collocation of medical headquarters functions within the National Capitol Region. These scenarios included collocation into space made available by the candidate recommendation to close the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS), as well as building space at Ft Belvoir, VA, and Bethesda, MD. The financial analysis of these scenarios is detailed below. The IEC decision to retain USUHS, the only financially viable receiving location, eliminated further discussion on the collocation of medical headquarters in the National Capitol Region.

	To Ft Belvoir	To Bethesda	To USUHS
One Time Costs	\$94.3M	\$107.3M	\$51.5M
Net Implementation Costs	\$77.1M	\$89.0M	\$29.4M
Annual Recurring Savings	\$6.2M	\$6.6M	\$9.0M
Payback Period	19 Years	20 Years	6 Years
NPV at 2025	\$10.2M (Cost)	\$17.0M (Cost)	\$47.4M (Savings)



Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Department of Defense Panel I

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure
Steering Group;

General William L. Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps;

General T. Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and
Admiral Robert F. Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

July 18, 2005

General Questions

1. Both the Navy and Air Force have single site initial recruit training, yet the Marine Corps, the smallest of the four services, retained two, Marine Recruit Depot San Diego, California and Marine Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. The Marine Corps cited cost as the reason for not pursuing closing MCRD San Diego, approximately \$540 million net implementation cost, yet those costs do not include any consideration for revenues the department might recoup for disposing of the property. Has the department done an analysis of how much the actual cost and savings might be if it closed MCRD San Diego and made that property available for reuse?

2. One of your stated goals for the BRAC 2005 round was achieving greater levels of jointness. The Navy did not recommend realigning or closing Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, despite growing encroachment issues and some question about Oceana's viability as the Navy's east coast main jet base in the future. Yet, there is no evidence that the Navy and the Air Force went beyond preliminary data sharing to have a fuller discussion of either the Navy's moving to, or their joint use of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia and what levels of jointness they may be able to achieve. Can you tell the Commission why such considerations did not take place and why you believe retaining Naval Air Station Oceana is the best alternative for the Department.

3. The Navy is realigning and retaining Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine, yet relocating all of the aircraft and associated personnel to Naval

Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. The department's rationale is that the airfield may be of use in the future for homeland defense missions should other airfield not be available. The department is giving up \$600 million in savings over 20 years to retain an airfield it may only use for contingencies. Why should the Commission not change the recommendation back to its original proposal and close Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine?

4. What is the Department of Defense's response to the lawsuit brought by the state of Pennsylvania to deactivate the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard stationed at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove? Has the Department of Defense been named in any additional lawsuits concerning BRAC recommendations? How should the BRAC commission proceed with recommendations affecting the Air National Guard in light of this legal challenge?
5. The Department of Defense recommendation to close Otis Air National Guard Base will financially affect federal tenants located on the base. The GAO reported that Coast Guard officials estimated they would incur about \$17 million in additional annual operating costs to remain at Otis Air National Guard Base. The Coast Guard will be financially challenged to assume the full cost of operating the air field and other infrastructure on the installation. Has the Department met with Coast Guard officials in order to accurately assess the fiscal and operational impacts on this agency as a result of the proposed closure of Otis Air National Guard Base? What is the rationale for the Air Force to leave Otis Air National Guard Base if estimated savings are reduced by significant costs incurred by other federal agencies remaining at the base?
6. Since the release of the BRAC recommendations, many of the State ANG officials have raised concerns over their lack of involvement in the BRAC process. Could you please elaborate on how the Air Force involved the Air National Guard in their decision-making process?
7. The State Air National Guard leaders have also raised concerns regarding the impact of the proposed actions on homeland defense. Could you explain how the Air Force considered homeland defense--both the federal air defense role and state role of providing support to civil authorities--in the BRAC process?

8. GAO has estimated the cost to implement BRAC at \$24 billion. In addition, the Overseas Basing Commission has stated that DoD has underestimated the cost to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). They estimate the costs to implement IGPBS between \$16 billion and \$20 billion, while DoD has estimated the costs to implement IGPBS at between \$9 billion and \$12 billion, with only about \$4 billion of this amount currently budgeted and about \$3 billion of this amount is in the BRAC account. Further, this does not even include the other competing demands on DoD's resources such as the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Army modularity, Army increased end-strength, and other steady-state requirements. All of these efforts will continue to stretch the department's already strained resources.

a. Given all of these competing demands for resources, where do you see the department getting all of the needed funds to fully implement this BRAC round?

9. We understand that the Services are conducting site surveys and other detailed analyses related to many of their BRAC recommendations. These efforts provide more detailed and up-to-date data on the BRAC actions.

a. Can you please assure us the Department will endeavor to provide this information to the Commission in a timely manner?

b. Have any of these efforts provided information that would make the Department reconsider its original (May 13th) recommendation?

10. We understand that the Air Force's BRAC staff worked Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve recommendations through the respective National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) headquarters, and did not consult directly with individual state Air National Guard (ANG) or AFRC units or Adjutants General.

a. Did Air Force BRAC staff contact individual *Active Duty* wings/squadrons or Numbered Air Force personnel to consult with, or review specific recommendations within their respective organizations?

- b. Did Air Force BRAC staff consult with individual Major Commands to review or comment on recommendations within their respective commands?
 - c. Were Headquarters Air Force directorates (other than Air Force BRAC staff given any opportunity to review or consult on any recommendations, whether Active, Guard or Reserve?
 - d. How would you characterize the manner in which Headquarters Air Force personnel were allowed to participate in the Air Force BRAC process as compared to staff from the National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserves?
11. The Adjutants General had stated their concerns in the past with the Air Force's "Future Total Force" transformation initiative and its implications for the Air National Guard.
- a. Are the Air Force BRAC recommendations integral to the Air Force's "Future Total Force"? Can the Air Force achieve its "Future Total Force" objectives without BRAC?
 - b. Was the Adjutants General reaction to the BRAC recommendations predicted? If so, why didn't the Air Force seek the consent of the TAGs?
 - c. Can the Air Force and TAGs work together to develop a mutually acceptable alternative to the Air Force BRAC recommendations that meet the interests of both parties? If so, can this agreement be achieved outside of BRAC?

Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

12. What options were considered associated with NAS Brunswick?
13. Could P-3 mission requirements be met through detachments operating from other bases in the Northeast?
14. How does consolidating all P-3s to a single site on the East coast affect military value?
15. What forces, other than P-3s, do you anticipate supporting at the realigned base?

16. What level or tempo of operations can be supported at the realigned base?

17. How does realignment of NAS Brunswick reduce excess capacity or infrastructure?

Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA

18. How does the Navy use the Broadway Complex today? How does the Broadway complex and property fit into the Navy's comprehensive regional master plan for San Diego?

19. Does the Navy need additional waterfront property in the San Diego region to successfully address its current mission, or implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations affecting San Diego?

20. Regardless of the method or process used, how many military and civilian jobs would be affected if the Navy relinquished control of the Broadway Complex?

21. Does the Navy lease land and an office building from the San Diego Port Authority? Is this land adjacent to the Broadway Complex? What is this land used for, and why wasn't the Navy-owned Broadway complex considered to accommodate this requirement?

22. Has the Navy's redevelopment plan or requirement to maintain ownership of the Broadway Complex changed dramatically over time? For example, does the Navy's current plan call for the Department to maintain a headquarters or administrative presence on Broadway after disposition? If so, how large a presence? And, if not, where does the Navy believe the current Navy tenants should be relocated?

23. In what year did Congress first authorize the Navy to enter into a public/private venture that would permit the Department to out-lease the Broadway property in return for new Navy office space and/or cash?

24. Congress authorized Navy to redevelop the Broadway Complex in conjunction with local authorities. What plans or actions has the Navy taken to use this authority since that Congressional action?

25. Does the Navy have a current or projected shortage of headquarters and administrative office space on their facilities in the San Diego Bay area? How many of the three buildings located within the Broadway Complex are used for general purpose office space? How much of the 15 acre Broadway Complex are used for parking?
26. Does the Navy use the current vacant space at Broadway to accommodate Navy demand for overflow (or surge) requirements for administrative space in the San Diego waterfront area? Does the Navy continue to own the pier located adjacent to the Broadway Complex? If not, when and why was it disposed?
27. Would it be fair to say the City was, and continues to be, receptive to the Navy's plans for Broadway? Has the City's reaction or support of the Navy's plans substantially changed over time?
28. What is the significance of the Development Agreement the Navy executed with the City of San Diego in 1992? Has the Development Agreement with the City facilitated or hindered the Navy's plans to redevelop the Broadway property?
29. Under the terms of this agreement, will the Navy maintain the right to continue to use a portion of the property for "Navy" uses? Will the Navy continue to maintain operational access to the waterfront portions of the Broadway property? Finally, how much and what kinds of private commercial development would be permitted by the Development Agreement?
30. What mission requirements require the current Navy tenants to be located at Broadway?
31. What internal Navy factors or changes, like personnel restructuring or decreased demand for Navy office space in the San Diego area, or external factors outside the Navy's control such as a down turn in the San Diego real estate market, have on the Navy's plans for Broadway?

Marine Corps Recruiting Depot San Diego, CA

32. Military Judgment has a valuable role in making decisions and developing strategies for USMC. When the decision was made not to close MCRD San Diego, was USMC's military decision strongly influenced by DOD's COBRA run which showed a 100+ year payback? If not, what was the source of information, data and analysis that brought you to this conclusion?

33. Another statement has been made about the high risk of a single site for recruit training.

- a. Was the conclusion based on military judgment or a comprehensive evaluation of single site recruit training?
- b. What example can you provide of an instance when recruit training was interrupted for a significant period of time?

34. Arguments have been presented today against closing MCRD and consolidating the recruit training at MCRD Parris Island. Are these arguments based on well documented evaluations that can be provided to the Commission?

- a. If not what is the source for making this decision, conclusion or judgment?

35. The Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team noted on 26 January 05, that BRAC 95 stated a 1-time cost of \$294.78M, a 2 year payback and a 20 year NPV savings of \$520.27M. This represents over a "billion dollar swing" in ten years.

- a. With this significant deviation or reversal in results, did DoN or USMC perform an assessment to determine what happened between now and then?
- b. Where lessons learned from the Navy's successful consolidation of three recruit training locations into a single training site for recruits applied to this analysis?
- c. Have there been any significant interruptions to Navy recruit training at a single site?

Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI

36. Volume IV of the DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission states that the revised 20 Year Force Structure Plan

submitted to Congress on 15 March “amended the ship composition, reducing submarines by 21 percent and doubling the number of prepositioning ships.” In the “Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan For The Construction of Naval Vessels For FY2006”, submitted by the Secretary of the Navy on 23 March 2005, there is no appreciable reduction in submarines until after 2019. What is the difference in these two documents? How are these documents used in the calculation of depot maintenance capacity?

37. Should Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor close, what number of personnel would each remaining shipyard likely be required to hire annually over the next five to seven years to respond to the increased workload?
38. Is there a difference in savings between closure of one of the smaller shipyards versus realignment of workload among the four shipyards?
39. What are the anticipated environmental costs for realignment of Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor?
40. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is only one of two locations on the west coast with CVN dry dock capabilities that performs both fleet maintenance and major overhaul work on multiple platforms. What would be the effect on operational readiness and training for the Navy to lose this capability in the Pacific?

Realignment of Naval Master Jet Base

41. The COBRA analysis for a “Close NAS Oceana Scenario” indicated that moving all the Navy’s jets to Moody Air Force Base would have an economic payback period of 13 years to offset the nearly \$500million in one time costs. Why didn’t the Navy pursue Moody Air force Base as a suitable alternative?
42. In earlier BRAC rounds the Navy transferred F-18 squadrons from Cecil Field to Naval Air Station Oceana, Marine Corps Air Stations Cherry Point and Beaufort reportedly to avoid new construction at Cherry Point and to use excess capacity at NAS Oceana. What is the Navy’s position now regarding the desire to single-site all of the east coast fighter/attack squadrons?

43. Please outline the requirements of the training ranges and assets necessary for the Navy's Master Jet Base. Provide the space requirements (land and water), proximity to the main air field, target areas and the fidelity of scoring instrumentation as well as proximity of other military assets such as ships or joint operating elements.
44. Please provide the Commission with the Navy's position, including applicable documentation regarding the proposed development by the Near Post, LLC group on the site of the Seashire Inn in November 2003. What is the height of the tallest building in the planned development, and what is the approved minimum altitude at that point approximately 2.5 miles from the approach end of Runway 23? Are the Visual Flight Rules and Instrument Flight Rules minimum altitudes the same for that particular position?
45. Approximately how many aircraft per year would be expected to fly over that point (existing Seashire Inn) during day and night VFR conditions? How many IFR approaches could be expected annually?

Moody Air Force Base, GA

46. Navy Scenario DoN-0153 called for the closure of NAS Oceana, and the realignment of Oceana's Master Jet Base aircraft and personnel to Moody AFB, GA. This scenario, which was rejected by the Navy's Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) on 27 Jan 05, estimated a one-time cost of \$490.4M, not including potential MilCon costs associated with installations receiving the displaced Air Force aircraft and personnel currently at Moody, or the A-10 aircraft and personnel recommended for realignment into Moody.
- a. What was the Air Force's position on realigning all the Air Force aircraft and manpower out of Moody AFB in order to allow Moody to bed down the Master Jet Base?
 - b. Based on our analysts' recent visit to Moody, there are only about 300 military family housing units at the base. Is that about right?
 - c. Also, how many unaccompanied enlisted and officer quarters are available at Moody?
 - d. The original Navy recommendation included MilCon costs at Moody of \$363M, of which the only housing cost included was

\$59M for enlisted unaccompanied housing. Would you be able to estimate costs for additional housing at Moody to support the 10,000 total inbound personnel?

47. The Navy estimates the Master Jet Base will bring approximately 10,000 direct jobs to Moody, a 10% increase in the MSA's job base, not including indirect jobs or family members. What is your assessment of the surrounding community's ability to support and sustain that large of an increase, particularly with regard to housing, schools and childcare, infrastructure, and other quality of life issues?

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

48. As late as 26 Apr 05 the Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) approved Grand Forks Air Force Base as a closure.

- a. Does the Air Force now wish to keep Grand Forks AFB open
- b. What has changed since then?
- c. Was the staff developing the Air Force's BRAC recommendations aware of the service's intent to base Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) at Grand Forks?
- d. When does OSD or the Air Force plan to put the UAV's in the budget submission to Congress?

49. In 2003, the Air Force briefed Congress about its future program for the tanker force as published in its "Tanker Roadmap." At the time, Grand Forks was to be the second of only three bases to bed down the new KC-767 tankers, getting 32 of the new jets.

- a. We're aware that the KC-767 lease deal was cancelled, and that the Air Force is wrapping up a "Tanker Replacement Analysis of Alternatives" now. When the Air Force does commit to procuring new tankers, would you still like to base them at Grand Forks?
- b. If so, when would you envision the base getting the new tankers?

50. In a letter to BRAC Chairman Principi dated 7 Jun 05, both the Chief of Staff and Acting Secretary of the Air Force have stated the service's vision for Grand Forks AFB is "to become a home to a 'family of UAVs,' with associated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions."

- a. Can you tell us what specific types of UAVs will be based at Grand Forks AFB?

- b. When will those UAVs begin arriving at Grand Forks?
- c. How many people will be required at the base to support those missions?
- d. Have any defined force structure, manpower, or other airframe related details been included in any current or planned programmatic actions?

51. What aircraft are currently restricted from retirement by National Defense Authorization Act language?

- a. Has Congress specifically inserted any funds designated to repair and/or operate KC-135Es noted for retirement in the BRAC recommendations?
- b. How much will it cost to repair, maintain and operate KC-135Es, C-130Es, F-117s and F-16s through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) if those aircraft are not retired as programmed and listed in the BRAC recommendations?

Galena Airport Forward Operating Location (FOL), AK

52. As you know, the Air Force is recommending Eielson AFB, AK to be realigned and placed in a “warm” status? Why does the Air Force need to maintain two Forward Operating Locations (Galena and King Salmon) in Alaska in addition to Eielson?

53. How would closure of the Galena Forward Operating Location impact the Air Sovereignty Alert mission? Could that mission be supported from Eielson AFB, since it would remain open in “warm” status?

Pope Air Force Base, NC

54. As part of its recommendation to realign Pope AFB, eight C-130H aircraft are to be relocated from Yeager Airport Air Guard Station to Pope AFB in conjunction with eight additional C-130H aircraft from Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station to form a 16 aircraft Air Force Reserve/Active Duty associate unit. Additionally, 25 C-130E's from Pope AFB's 43rd Airlift Wing are to be transferred to Little Rock AFB to consolidate the C-130 fleet there. Finally, real property accountability is to be transferred to the Army.

- a. How will Title 32 affect the recommendation to transfer aircraft from Yeager Airport AGS to Pope AFB?
- b. What is the rationale for consolidating tactical aircraft in a single location when they need to be distributed to remote locations in order to satisfy their assigned missions?
- c. Who will be responsible for maintaining the runway at Pope AFB to Air Force standards, the Army or the Air Force? How will this be accomplished?
- d. Where will the 43rd Air Wing Headquarters be located?
- e. Doesn't reducing the Air Force presence at Pope AFB reduce jointness and operating efficiency between the Army and Air Force, especially in the areas of interservice command and control, and planning? How will this reduction be offset?

Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)

55. Given that personnel costs represent approximately half of DFAS's budget, why wasn't locality pay given a higher weight in your military value analysis over such things as being on DOD owned installation?
56. Given that a DFAS site can be anywhere, why is being on a DoD owned installation of such great value? It is the second most important factor on your military analysis.
57. Given the fact that many of 26 DFAS operating sites were chosen in order to ameliorate the economic impact of BRAC bases in the early 1990s, what further consideration of this fact was given when choosing the current sites? Many of these sites are still in areas that have not fully recovered from the impact of these closures.

Professional Development Education

58. The Department has consistently stated that it must maintain its ability to conduct graduate education programs and retain its postgraduate education facilities because (1) professional military education is unique, (2) it is an important component of our military structure, and (3) there are long-term benefits from having dedicated facilities that attract future military leaders from other countries. Considering your stated position on

the importance the Services' postgraduate programs, I have two questions.

- a. First, why is it necessary for each service to independently operate their own postgraduate schools to achieve the Departments' goals for these education programs?
- b. Second, what makes postgraduate education so unique for Air Force and Naval officers that these services must maintain their own schools instead of primarily relying on the public university system as the Army does for its officers?

59. On May 2, the Navy in an Executive session of the IEC, moved to have all education recommendations withdrawn from the BRAC process because "...education is a core competency of the Department and relying on the private sector to fulfill that requirement is too risky." Would you please explain how relying on this nations' public university system, which seems to serve every other segment of the nation so well, is too risky for the military?

Joint Medical Command Headquarters

60. The military value criteria used by the Secretary, place specific emphasis on the impact of "joint war-fighting," when considering a recommendation to close or realign a military installation. The Secretary has demonstrated the importance of this value in his recommendation to consolidate medical health care and research activity at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD. Why were the Medical Command Headquarters that are spread across the National Capitol Region in disparate locations, not included by the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group in this recommendation?
61. The Secretary's July 14, 2005, letter to the Commission suggested that collocation of Medical Command's would not be financially viable as a stand alone recommendation. Yet, other data supplied by the Department of Defense identified annual reoccurring savings of at least \$18.14 million per year. In making his determination, did the Secretary rely on the assumption that no personnel savings could be achieved through collocation? Furthermore, did his determination presuppose that the Commission would approve his recommendation to relocation DARPA and the Office of Naval Research to Bethesda, MD.?

62. The Navy Bureau of Medicine Potomac Annex, Washington, D.C. has an estimated 80,700 sq. ft. of excess capacity, which works out to about 46% of the facility. This figure will be increased if the Secretary's recommendation to realign the Potomac Annex by moving the DoD Biomedical Science & Technology RDA function to Fort Detrick, MD, is approved by the Commission. Why was this excess capacity not addressed by the Secretary's recommendations through closure instead of realignment and could you see a benefit in reducing this excess infrastructure further?



**Questions for Chairman Principi
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Department of Defense Panel II

The Honorable Lieutenant General Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs;
Major General Gary W. Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of
the Air Force for Plans and Programs;
Major General Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force and
Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Command
Region; and
Lieutenant General Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard
July 18, 2005

1. General Wood: Please help the Commission understand the relationship of the often mentioned "emerging missions" as they apply to the Air National Guard recommendations presented to the Commission. Specifically, how and when do you intend to fund, program, develop and deploy the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles such as the UAV/predator and even the recently discussed new light cargo aircraft.
2. BRAC is about reducing excess base infrastructure and not about moving aircraft. Hundreds of aircraft are proposed to move with your recommendation, affecting 80% of the ANG installations in the country, yet the installation map looks about the same. Your proposal seems essentially "Programmatic." Why do you want us to approve this under BRAC?
3. The GAO reports that 60% of the net annual recurring savings are cost avoidances from military personnel eliminations. How can you claim manpower savings if net end strength of the ANG remains the same?
4. Don't you think it might be hard to recruit for an Air Guard unit that has no "air?" Also, how does one recruit against an unknown mission for these units which are awaiting emerging missions?

**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Department of Defense Panel II

The Honorable Lieutenant General Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs;
Major General Gary W. Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of
the Air Force for Plans and Programs;
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Region; and
Lieutenant General Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard
July 18, 2005

1. The Commission has heard from numerous governors and adjutants general over their concern with the lack of Air Force and Air National Guard communication and collaboration with the states in the development and finalization of the BRAC ANG recommendations to the Commission. What has the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force done to rectify this situation, or more importantly, what do you plan to do?
2. A recent Air Force PR release indicated an initiative to supplement the Air National Guard mission with the establishment of a future "light cargo aircraft", a presumably shortened C-130 type cargo carrier that could be deployed to Army and Air Guard units.
 - a. What role do you foresee this aircraft will play in future missions of the Air National Guard or in support of Homeland Security.
 - b. Where is the development and deployment of the future light cargo aircraft in your funding plan?
 - c. Is new light cargo aircraft, along with the potential of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), one of the "emerging missions" you have mentioned as a potential for the ANG?
 - d. Is the F-22 another such "emerging mission"?
3. Given the concern expressed by a great number of state governors and adjutants general regarding redeployment Air National Guard assigned aircraft to other components and states, do you envision taking any remedial action to make more aircraft available to support Air National

Guard requirements over a broader number of states than provided in the BRAC recommendations?

4. In the Adjutants General (TAG) hearing 30 Jun in Atlanta, an ANG speaker noted that “the ANG provides 40% of the [combat] coverage for 7.3% of the budget.”
 - a. Are these figures substantiated by Air Force budget data? If not, what is an approximate operational use to cost ratio?
 - b. Including missions flown while on federalized missions or in support of contingency missions such as Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, do the costs incurred by ANG forces to support the missions included in ANG budgets (the 7.3%), or are they sourced elsewhere within DOD budgets?
 - c. While activated, or flying in support of federal missions, how do ANG and AFRC costs to execute a given mission compare to those of the Active Duty?
5. Were utilization rates of aircraft considered and/or weighted in any Mission Compatibility Index (MCI) calculation comparing installations? Did utilization rates differ between Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard installations flying a given model-design (F-16A/B/C/D), KC-135D/E/R/T)? If so, how?
6. Many States and TAGs have raised concerns on the BRAC recommendations with respect to the Air National Guard on their impact on the Homeland Security or Air Sovereignty Alert mission.
 - a. Were U.S. Northern Command and its component command, the First Air Force, involved in the BRAC decision making process? If so, how?
 - b. What is Northern Command’s and the First Air Force’s assessment of the impact of the Guard recommendations, particularly the ones involving Air Sovereignty Alert sites, on the Homeland Security mission?
7. A key question a Commissioner likes to ask is: “Is the pain worth the gain?” Understanding that Military Value is the primary consideration, economics play a part too. What are the projected NPV 20 year savings to the DoD for the closures and realignments affecting ANG units only?

8. A review of the BCEG minutes leaves us to believe that Candidate Recommendations were intentionally “bundled” in order to get the money savers to “carry” other individual base closures or realignments that were on their own a cost, or offered little savings. Is this true?
9. With respect to the Mission Capability Index, or MCI, the matrix tool you used to justify your recommendations... We have these comments from the field: (Please respond after each issue.)
 - a. Why were the ANG units measured up against the same criteria as the active component? Other services did it differently. They said the NGB imposes limits on how big a Guard installation can be.
 - b. The MCI questions – especially with respect to routes and ranges, do not reflect the way we fight today.
 - c. There was not enough opportunity for similar smaller installations to be measured against each other.
 - d. In some cases, erroneous data was used – or new information such as recently completed hangers or additional ramp space was not factored in.
 - e. Some units interpreted the questions differently and answered accordingly.
10. Even after the MCI scores were computed, some of the decisions cited “Military Judgment,” and favored bases with lower MCI scores. Why?
11. Active/ARC Mix: In testimony on May 17, Acting Sec Dominguez said “We have maintained the balance across the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve Components both in aircraft and manpower.” Yet, in a meeting on 1 July, Maj Gen. Heckman (co-chair of the BCEG said): The force structure is going down. The balance is planned to change also. For C-130s: Before BRAC: (400) C-130s with 31% of the balance Active; Post – BRAC plan: (373) C-130s with 43% of the balance Active.
 - a. If the C-130 mix is changing, what else changes such that the secretary’s statement holds true with respect to the overall mix?
 - b. Enclaves: How big is an enclave?
 - c. Of what types of units does it consist?
12. “Reducing the Footprint”... It is unclear to many units destined to become enclaves as to where their new fence-line will be. Will excess property be disposed of or mothballed?

13. Our sense is that the loss of experienced personnel related to these proposals will be huge. Few aircrew will follow the aircraft, and even fewer maintenance and support personnel. There could be unanticipated training costs. The training “pipeline” would only seem to be so big. On top of that the combat status of a unit could degrade. Do any of these issues cause concern?
14. Future aircraft: With the accelerated retirement of F-15s and F-16s there is concern that the follow-on aircraft will not be on line in time to cover the threat. Your thoughts?
15. Dissimilar Aircraft: In reassigning and combining certain aircraft at different bases, there is concern that versions of aircraft such as C-130 H2s and H3s would be placed together. Were the operational and maintenance impacts considered in this case?
16. Unit Strength: In some cases units with over 100% strength are losing aircraft to units with less than 90% overall strength. If the low-strength units cannot fill the billets they currently have, how can they be expected to fill even more when their authorized aircraft total increases?
17. We understand there is a “City Basing” experiment in the works in Vermont. Please tell us about it and elaborate on the future of City Basing.
18. Isn’t the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the “supported” department and DoD the “supporting” one? If this is the case, why wasn’t DHS consulted by the Air Force in the development of these recommendations?





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OSD, GAO, OBC HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY 18, 2005 10:30AM

SD-106 – Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

David M. Walker - Comptroller General of the United States

Barry W. Holman - Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Michael Kennedy - Assistant Director Defense Capabilities and
Management



Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management, GAO

Mr. Holman joined the U.S. General Accounting Office (now known as the Government Accountability Office) in 1974. Over the years he has had increasing responsibilities for diverse reviews in the defense and international security area, including work involving military and civilian personnel, military readiness and training, facilities infrastructure, and Defense management reforms. Currently, he directs engagements involving defense infrastructure issues, including the military base closures, for GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management team. The 2005 BRAC round is the second BRAC round in which he has been engaged in monitoring and reporting on DOD's BRAC process and recommendations.

Mr. Holman holds an undergraduate degree in business management from Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia; and a graduate degree in public administration from Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania. In 1988 he completed a year of resident study at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

David M. Walker Biography

David M. Walker became the seventh Comptroller General of the United States and began his 15-year term when he took his oath of office on November 9, 1998. As Comptroller General, Mr. Walker is the nation's chief accountability officer and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), a legislative branch agency founded in 1921. GAO's mission is to help improve the performance and assure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Over the years, GAO has earned a reputation for professional objective, fact-based, and nonpartisan reviews of government issues and operations.



The long tenure of the Comptroller General gives GAO a continuity of leadership and independence that is rare within government. Both elements help to allow GAO to consider long-range and cross-governmental issues and alert policymakers to problems looming on the horizon, such as the growing burden of entitlement programs or the nation's deteriorating infrastructure.

Before his appointment as Comptroller General, Mr. Walker had extensive executive level experience in both government and private industry. Between 1989 and 1998, Mr. Walker worked at Arthur Andersen LLP, where he was a partner and global managing director of the human capital services practice based in Atlanta, Georgia. He was also a member of the board of Arthur Andersen Financial Advisors, a registered investment advisor. While a partner at Arthur Andersen, Mr. Walker served as a Public Trustee for Social Security and Medicare from 1990 to 1995. Before joining Arthur Andersen, Mr. Walker was Assistant Secretary of Labor for Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs from 1987 to 1989 and in 1985, was Acting Executive Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. His earlier technical, professional, and business experience was with Price Waterhouse, Coopers & Lybrand and Source Services Corporation, an international human resources consulting and search firm.

Mr. Walker currently serves as Chair of the U.S. Intergovernmental Audit Forum, the Center for Continuous Auditing, and as a principal of the U.S. Joint Financial Management Improvement Program. He is on the Board of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions and various educational and not-for-profit entities. He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration, the National Academy of Social Insurance and an active member of various professional, public service, and other organizations, including the Sons of the American Revolution. Mr. Walker is also listed in *Who's Who in the World* and *Who's Who in America*.

Mr. Walker is the author of *Retirement Security: Understanding and Planning Your Financial Future* (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) and a co-author of *Delivering on the Promise: How to Attract, Manage and Retain Human Capital* (Free Press, 1998). He has also written numerous articles and opinion letters on a variety of subjects. Mr. Walker is frequently quoted on a range of government and management issues and has been the subject of several cover stories in various national, professional and governmental journals.

Mr. Walker is a certified public accountant. He has a B.S. degree in accounting from Jacksonville University, a Senior Management in Government Certificate in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, an Honorary Doctorate in Business Administration from Bryant College and an Honorary Doctorate of Public Service from Lincoln Memorial University. He is married to the former Mary Ethredge, and they have two adult children - a daughter, Carol, and a son, Andy.





Highlights of GAO-05-785, a report to congressional committees

MILITARY BASES

Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment

Why GAO Did This Study

On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense submitted proposed base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to an independent commission for its review. The Commission must submit its recommendations to the President by September 8, 2005, for his acceptance or rejection in their entirety. Congress has final action to accept or reject these recommendations in their entirety later this year. The law requires that GAO issue a report on the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations and selection process by July 1, 2005. GAO's objectives were to

1) determine the extent to which DOD's proposals achieved its stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze whether the process for developing recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues with the recommendations that may warrant further attention. Time constraints limited GAO's ability to examine implementation details of most of the individual recommended actions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making a recommendation to DOD aimed at tracking and periodically updating savings, and is highlighting issues for the BRAC Commission's consideration.

In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the recommendation to establish a system to track and periodically update BRAC savings estimates.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering transformation, and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a record number of closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally large, but most savings are derived from 10 percent of the recommendations. While GAO believes savings would be achieved, overall up-front investment costs of an estimated \$24 billion are required, and there are clear limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly \$50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult to track over time. Some proposals represent efforts to foster jointness and transformation, such as initial joint training for the Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on various transformation options.

DOD's process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented. DOD's process placed strong emphasis on data, tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military services and seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common business-oriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the unique aspects of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland defense needs. Data accuracy was enhanced by the required use of certified data and by efforts of the DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies in checking the data.

Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad range of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in developing certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, or potential impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified certain candidate recommendations, including some that were changed by senior DOD leadership late in the process that may warrant attention.





GAO

Statement Before the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT
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MILITARY BASES

Observations on DOD's
2005 Base Realignment and
Closure Selection Process
and Recommendations

Statement of David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States





Highlights of GAO-05-905, a statement before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

MILITARY BASES

Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection Process and Recommendations

Why GAO Did This Study

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 222 base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 BRAC actions, to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for its review. DOD expects the proposals, if approved, would generate net annual recurring savings of about \$5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012 and net savings of nearly \$50 billion over a 20-year period, despite an expected cost of over \$24 billion to implement the recommendations. The Commission is charged with reviewing these proposals and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005. The Commission requested GAO to provide testimony before the Commission summarizing the results of its report, issued on July 1, 2005, on the 2005 BRAC process. This statement presents GAO views on (1) whether DOD's selection process in developing BRAC actions was logical and reasoned, (2) selected issues regarding the recommendations, and (3) certain challenges associated with implementing the BRAC recommendations, if approved.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. However, in its July 1, 2005 report on the BRAC process (GAO-05-785), GAO recommended that DOD establish mechanisms for tracking and updating BRAC savings estimates. DOD agreed.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-905.

To view the full product, click on the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned process for assessing its bases and considering potential BRAC actions. The process was organized in a largely sequential manner with an emphasis on ensuring that reliable data were obtained and used, with special audit assistance from military service audit agencies and the DOD Inspector General. Despite some overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, the three military departments and seven joint cross-service groups generally followed the sequential BRAC process to evaluate facilities and functions, and identify recommendations in their respective areas. DOD's analytical process also addressed requirements of the BRAC legislation regarding the certification of data, basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan and emphasizing use of military value criteria as a primary basis for decision making—including consideration of such facets as homeland defense and surge capabilities—which the Congress added for emphasis in 2005.

GAO did, however, identify a number of issues with the proposed recommendations that may warrant attention by the BRAC Commission. For example, while GAO believes savings could be achieved from DOD's proposals, there are certain limitations associated with the magnitude of the savings projected by DOD. About 47 percent, or \$2.5 billion of DOD's projected net annual recurring savings is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or eliminate dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings are also projected from efficiency measures and other actions related to a variety of recommendations, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and may be difficult to track and achieve over time. GAO also identified many recommendations requiring far longer periods of time for savings to offset the costs associated with implementing the recommendations than was typical in the 1995 BRAC round, raising questions about the cost/benefit ratio of selected recommendations.

There are significant implementation challenges that lie ahead, to the extent proposed recommendations are approved, which could have a bearing on the ultimate savings realized and overall success of the BRAC round. They include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the adverse impacts on operations, including steps to mitigate the potential loss of specialized human capital skills; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation of recommendations in line with approved actions, along with mechanisms to ensure the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from implementing the recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining communities affected by BRAC recommendations, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide you with the results of our work on the defense base realignment and closure (BRAC) 2005 selection process and recommendations. First, I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and your fellow Commissioners for undertaking the very important, complex and controversial task of reviewing the Department of Defense's (DOD) list of proposed recommendations and recognizing you have to forward your recommendations to the President in September of this year. I am well aware that your task is especially demanding, given the limited time in which you have to do your work and the broad scope of your responsibilities. However, I would like to point out that your work is of critical importance since, while reasonable people can and will differ on specific recommendations, it is clear that DOD must reduce its excess support infrastructure in order to generate savings for higher priority needs, including the military and business transformation efforts in light of 21st century trends and challenges.

We have frequently reported in recent years on the long-term challenges DOD faces in managing its portfolio of facilities, halting degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up funds to better maintain enduring facilities and meet other needs. Because of these long-standing issues, DOD's management of its support infrastructure has been included in our list of high-risk areas since 1997. While the previous four rounds of closures and realignments have helped reduce excess infrastructure and generate savings, DOD's infrastructure costs continue to consume a larger-than-necessary portion of the DOD budget, and as a result, DOD has not been able to devote funds to more critical needs.

While the 2005 BRAC round affords the department an additional opportunity to further reduce infrastructure and generate savings, it will not, in itself, be sufficient to stem the overall rising costs of DOD's operations and much more will need to be done to transform the department. It is critical that DOD continue to search out ways to reduce unnecessary spending and significantly improve its business processes. Further, it must recognize that tough choices need to be made in connection with a variety of initiatives (e.g., weapons systems) and areas (e.g., health care) that are not affordable or sustainable over the longer term, given our large and growing long-term deficits. Moreover, reducing unnecessary defense costs and creating more efficiency within DOD is an important step in addressing the nation's growing fiscal imbalances. Over the long term, the nation's growing fiscal imbalances, if left unchecked, will ultimately impede our economic growth; have an adverse impact on

our future standard of living; and in due course, affect our ability to address key national and homeland security needs. These factors create the need to make choices at a national level that will only become more difficult the longer they are postponed.

Now, if I could turn your attention to the specifics of the 2005 BRAC round. On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense publicly announced his list of recommended realignment and closure actions. The department's list consists of 222 recommendations involving an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions—including 33 major base closures and 30 major realignments, plus numerous other closures and realignments. The department expects that these recommendations, if approved, would generate net annual recurring savings of about \$5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012 and nearly \$50 billion in net present value savings over a 20-year period, despite an up-front expected cost of over \$24 billion to implement those recommended actions. In my testimony today, I will address (1) whether DOD's selection process in developing the recommended actions was logical and reasoned; (2) selected issues regarding the recommendations that the BRAC Commission may wish to consider as part of its analysis of DOD's recommendations; and (3) certain challenges we see in implementing DOD's proposed BRAC recommendations, if they are approved.

To analyze the BRAC selection process and the proposed recommendations, we monitored various aspects of the process as it evolved over time leading up to and following the public release of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. We sought to assure ourselves that DOD followed a logical, reasoned, and well-documented decision-making process leading to the proposed recommendations. With the approval of the large number of recommendations occurring in the final weeks of the process, the broad scope and complexity of the recommendations, and the limited time available for us to report our results, we generally focused greater attention following the announcement of the proposed closures and realignments on those issues affecting more than one recommendation than on issues pertaining to the implementation of individual recommendations. However, as time permitted, we visited selected installations to better gauge the operational and economic impact of the proposed recommendations. We generally experienced good access to relevant documentation and to key senior officials and staff involved in the BRAC process.

My statement is based primarily on our July 1, 2005, report on the 2005 BRAC selection process and recommendations, which was provided to

you at that time.¹ Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

DOD's decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. DOD established a structured and largely sequential process for obtaining and analyzing data that provided an informed basis for identifying and evaluating BRAC options. At the same time, initial difficulties in obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner often added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in the process. That notwithstanding, DOD's process relied on certified data² and the use of various analytical models to evaluate the data. Further, as the military services and joint cross-service groups assessed the importance of installations, facilities, and functions, they were consistent in following the key considerations set forth in the BRAC law—such as military value—although they varied somewhat in their analytical approaches based on unique aspects of the functions being evaluated. As Congress mandated, DOD prepared and considered its 20-year force structure plan in completing its BRAC analysis.³ Further, DOD focused on the military value selection criteria as the predominant decision-making factor, including legislatively mandated emphasis for this BRAC round on such elements as homeland defense and surge capability. As in previous rounds, military judgment was also interwoven throughout the process. While the effort to ensure the accuracy of the voluminous amounts of data used in the process proved challenging for the services and joint cross-service groups, the DOD Inspector General and the military service audit agencies played key roles in pointing out data limitations, fostering corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the process through their validation efforts, and generally found the data sufficiently reliable to support BRAC decision making.

¹ GAO, *Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignment*, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

² During the BRAC process, data were certified by senior officials at DOD offices and installations. Each official certified that the information was accurate and complete to the best of his or her knowledge and belief.

³ P.L. 101-510, section 2912(a)(1)(A) required DOD to develop a 20-year force structure plan as the basis for its BRAC analysis.

While we believe savings could be achieved, there are certain limitations associated with DOD's savings projection. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or eliminate dollar savings available for other uses. Furthermore, about \$500 million of the net annual recurring savings is based on business process reengineering efforts, but some assumptions supporting the expected efficiency gains have not been validated; while savings are likely to be realized, the precise magnitude of the savings is uncertain. For example, one of DOD's recommendations—to create fleet readiness centers in the Navy by integrating different levels of maintenance to reduce repair time—is estimated to yield \$215 million in net annual recurring savings as a result of overhead efficiencies, but such assumptions have not been validated and actual savings likely will be shaped by how the recommendation is implemented. We have also identified issues regarding lengthy payback periods associated with some proposals, which is the time required to recoup up-front investment costs for closing or realigning a facility or function and vacating lease space. Collectively, the issues we identified suggest the potential for reduced savings that are likely to be realized in the short term during the implementation period, which could further reduce net annual recurring savings realized in the long term. The short-term impact is that these reduced savings could adversely affect DOD's plans for using them to help offset the up-front investment costs required to implement the recommendations and could further reduce or eliminate the amount of dollar savings available for transformation and modernization purposes.

Significant challenges lie ahead for implementing BRAC recommendations that I would like to bring to the Commission's attention—challenges that if not adequately met, could greatly affect how successful the BRAC round will be viewed retrospectively. First, a need exists for proper transition planning to minimize the impact of the loss of specialized human capital skills in implementing recommended actions for ongoing defense operations. For example, if the decision is made to close the Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine, with the expected loss of skilled personnel associated with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines at the shipyard, these skills, which Navy officials stated may take up to 8 years to fully develop, will need to be replicated at other shipyards assuming the future workloads. A similar concern was expressed by Army officials exist regarding the planned closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Second, as we previously recommended, DOD needs to establish mechanisms to monitor implementation of the recommendations, including the tracking

and periodic updating of savings estimates. This was not a routine practice in the previous BRAC rounds. Third, DOD needs to ensure that it has plans to adequately address and fund the environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer to other users. Our prior work on the previous rounds has shown that environmental restoration constraints have delayed the services from rapidly transferring unneeded property to other users that can put the property to productive reuse. Finally, as has been the practice in previous rounds, there will likely be a need for assistance from various sources for communities losing large numbers of jobs and personnel as a result of BRAC recommendations. This time, assistance will also be needed by communities faced with a significant influx of personnel, if the relevant BRAC recommendations are approved, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies.

Background

The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, required DOD to give priority to selection criteria dealing with military value and added elements of specificity to criteria previously used by DOD in prior BRAC rounds.⁴ In large measure, the final criteria closely followed the criteria DOD employed in previous rounds, with greater specificity added in some areas, as required by Congress. To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established a common analytical framework to be used by the three military departments and the seven joint cross-service groups.⁵ Each service and group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions and identifying closure and realignment options. Despite the diversity of bases and cross-service functions analyzed, each of the groups was expected to first analyze capacity and military value of its respective facilities or functions, and then to identify and evaluate various closure and realignment scenarios and provide specific recommendations. The analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, excess capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge requirements.

The military value analysis consisted of assessments of operational and physical characteristics of each installation, or specific functions on an

⁴ P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001).

⁵ The seven joint cross-service groups were Education and Training; Headquarters and Support Activities; Industrial; Intelligence; Medical; Supply and Storage; and Technical.

installation related to a specific joint cross-service group's area of responsibility. These would include an installation's or function's current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. This analysis also relied on data calls to obtain certified data on the various attributes and metrics used to assess each of the four military value criteria and permit meaningful comparisons between like installations or facilities with reference to the collective military value selection criteria.

The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. These scenarios were to be derived from consideration of the department's 20-year force structure plan, capacity analysis, military value analysis, and, as appropriate, the exercise of military judgment through consideration of transformational options, applicable guiding principles, objectives, or policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint cross-service groups.

The BRAC 2005 round is different from previous base closure rounds in terms of number of actions, projected implementation costs, and estimated annual recurring savings. While the number of major closures and realignments is just a little greater than those in individual previous rounds, the number of minor closures and realignments, as shown in table 1, is significantly greater than those in all previous rounds combined.⁶ DOD data indicate that over 200,000 military and civilian personnel jobs, exclusive of personnel returning from overseas locations, will be affected by the implementation of the DOD's BRAC recommended actions, if they are approved. Further, it is likely that thousands of contractor personnel will be similarly affected.

⁶ DOD defines a major closure as one where plant replacement value exceeded \$100 million. DOD defines plant replacement value as the cost to replace an existing facility with a facility of the same size at the same location, using today's building standards. DOD defines a major base realignment as one with a net loss of 400 or more military and civilian personnel.

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds

Dollars in billions

Round	Major bases			Total actions	Costs	Net annual recurring savings
	Closure	Realignments	Minor closures and realignments			
1988	16	4	23	43	\$2.7	\$0.9
1991	26	17	32	75	5.2	2.0
1993	28	12	123	163	7.6	2.6
1995	27	22	57	106	6.5	1.7
Total (for previous BRAC rounds)	97	55	235	387	\$22.0	\$7.2
Total (for 2005 BRAC round)	33	30	774	837	\$24.4	\$5.5

Source: DOD.

The large increase in minor closures and realignments is attributable partly to actions involving the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air National Guard and vacating leased space.


DOD's projected cost to implement the proposed actions is \$24.4 billion compared to a \$22 billion total from the four previous rounds through 2001, the end of the 6-year implementation period for the 1995 BRAC round.⁷ The increase in costs is due partly to significant military construction and moving costs associated with Army recommendations to realign its force structure, and to recommendations to move activities from leased space onto military installations. For example, the Army projects that it will need about \$2.3 billion in military construction funds to build facilities for the troops returning from overseas. Likewise, DOD projects that it will need an additional \$1.3 billion to build facilities for recommendations that include activities being moved from leased space.

⁷ We most recently reported that these costs were \$23.3 billion through fiscal year 2003 and they excluded an estimated \$3.6 billion in costs that are needed to complete environmental cleanup at BRAC bases in future years. Also, they did not include about \$1.9 billion in costs incurred by other DOD and federal agencies to provide assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC as a result of prior BRAC rounds. GAO, *Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures*, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005).

DOD Developed a Generally Logical and Reasoned Process for Making BRAC Decisions

DOD's decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. In establishing the framework for the 2005 BRAC round, DOD provided overall policy guidance for the BRAC process, including a requirement that its components develop and implement internal control plans to ensure the accuracy and consistency of their data collection and analyses. These plans also helped to ensure the overall integrity of the process and the information upon which OSD considered each group's recommendations. OSD also established a common analytical framework used by each military department to analyze its service-unique functions and by each of the seven joint cross-service groups to analyze its common business-oriented functions. The military departments and each joint cross-service group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions that shaped its analysis. The process began with a set of sequential steps by assessing capacity and military value, developing and analyzing scenarios, then identifying candidate recommendations, which led to the final list of recommendations. Military judgment also played a role throughout the process. Figure 1 illustrates the overall sequential analytical process generally employed to develop BRAC recommendations.

Figure 1: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC Recommendations



Source: GAO.

*A scenario is a proposal that has been declared for formal analysis by a military department or joint cross-service group deliberative body and is officially accounted for and tracked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the sequential process, initial difficulties associated with obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in the process. To assist in the process for analyzing and developing recommendations, the military services and joint cross-service groups used various analytical tools that helped to ensure a more consistent approach to BRAC analysis and decision making. For example, all of the groups used the DOD-approved Cost of Base Realignment Actions

(COBRA) model to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment for BRAC scenarios and, ultimately, for the final 222 BRAC recommendations. DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among various BRAC options.

BRAC Process Incorporated Key Legislative Requirements

The BRAC process follows a historical analytical framework with many elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons learned from previous rounds. For example, the selection process essentially followed a framework similar to that employed in previous BRAC rounds, with more specificity in selected military value areas like surge and homeland defense as required by Congress. At the same time, DOD incorporated into its analytical process other legal considerations for formulating its realignment and closure recommendations. As required by BRAC legislation, DOD certified the data used in the selection process and based its recommendations on the congressional specified selection criteria, its 20-year force structure plan, and gave priority consideration to the military value criteria.

DOD collected capacity and military value data that were certified as to their accuracy by hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions across the country.⁸ These certified data were obtained from corporate databases and from hundreds of defense installations. In total, DOD projects that it collected over 25 million pieces of data as part of the BRAC process.⁹ Given the extensive volume of requested data from the 10 separate groups (3 military departments and 7 joint cross-service groups), we noted that the data collection process was quite lengthy and required significant efforts to help ensure data accuracy. In some cases, coordinating data requests, clarifying questions and answers, controlling database entries, and other issues led to delays in the data-driven analysis DOD originally envisioned. As such, some groups had to develop strategy-based proposals. As time progressed, however, these groups reported that they obtained the needed data, for the most part, to inform and support their scenarios. At the same time, because of data limitations, a few of the

⁸ Each official who submitted data for BRAC analysis certified that the information was accurate and complete to the best of his or her knowledge and belief.


⁹ Noted by the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before the BRAC Commission on May 16, 2005.

joint cross-service groups relied on some data from commercially available databases to support their decision making. While it was difficult for these data to be validated in a fashion similar to most other DOD collected data, the data came from widely used databases and were approved by the chairs of the relevant joint cross-service groups.

Each of the military services and the seven joint cross-service groups considered DOD's 20-year force structure plan in its analysis. DOD based its force structure plan for BRAC purposes on an assessment of probable threats to national security during a 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. DOD provided this plan to Congress in March 2004, and as authorized by the statute, it subsequently updated it 1 year later in March 2005. Based on our analysis, updates to the force structure affected some ongoing BRAC analyses. For example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group reassessed its data pertaining to overhauling and repairing ships based on the updated force structure and decided that one of its two smaller shipyards—Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth—could close. However, as you know, much debate continues over the size of the Navy's future force structure.

DOD gave primary consideration to its military value selection criteria in its process. Specifically, military value refers to the first four selection criteria: an installation's current and future mission capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. The manner in which each military service or joint cross-service group approached its analysis of military value varied according to the unique aspects of the individual service or cross-service function. These groups typically assessed military value by identifying multiple attributes or characteristics related to each military value criterion, then identifying qualitative metrics and measures and associated questions to collect data to support the overall military value analysis. For example, figure 2 illustrates how the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group linked several of its military value attributes, metrics, and data questions to the mandated military value criteria.

Figure 2: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value for Major Administrative and Headquarters Activities



Source: GAO analysis of Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group data.

^aThe BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

^bMilitary value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The major administrative and headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 14 military value attributes.

^cMilitary value metrics are measures for the attributes. The major administrative and headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 20 military value metrics.

^dThe major administrative and headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 31 data call questions.

Based on congressional direction, there was enhanced emphasis on two aspects of military value—an installation’s ability to serve as a staging area for homeland defense missions and its ability to meet unanticipated

surge.¹⁰ Each military department considered homeland defense roles in its BRAC analysis and coordinated with the U.S. Northern Command—a unified command responsible for homeland defense and civil support. Our analysis shows that all three military departments considered homeland defense needs, with the Air Force recommendations having the most impact. According to Air Force officials, the U.S. Northern Command identified specific homeland defense missions assigned to the Air Force, which it incorporated into its decision-making process. Navy officials likewise discussed the impact of potential BRAC scenarios on the Navy's maritime homeland defense mission with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the U.S. Coast Guard. In this regard, for example, the Navy decision to retain Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, was influenced, in part, because the U.S. Coast Guard wanted to consolidate its West Coast aviation assets at this installation for homeland defense purposes. According to Army officials, most of the Army's role in supporting homeland defense is carried out by the Army National Guard. The U.S. Northern Command reviewed the recommendations and found no unacceptable risk to the homeland defense mission and support to civil authorities.

DOD left it to each military service and joint cross-service group to determine how surge would be considered in its analysis. Generally, all the groups considered surge by retaining a certain percentage of infrastructure, making more frequent use of existing infrastructure, or retaining difficult-to-reconstitute assets. For example, the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group set aside 10 percent of its facility infrastructure for surge, while the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group factored additional work shifts in its analysis. The military services retained difficult-to-reconstitute assets as the primary driver to satisfying the statutory requirement to consider surge capability. Both the Army and Navy gave strong consideration to infrastructure that would be difficult to reconstitute, such as large tracts of land for maneuver training purposes or berthing space for docking ships. For example, the Navy has a finite number of ships and aircraft and would likely have to increase operating tempo to meet surge needs. The Air Force addressed surge by retaining sufficient capacity to absorb temporary increases in operations, such as responding to emergencies or natural catastrophic events like hurricane damage, and the capacity to permanently relocate all of its aircraft stationed overseas in the United States if needed.

¹⁰ Homeland defense and surge considerations are in the military value selection criteria 2 and 3, respectively, as reflected in P.L. 101-510, section 2913(b)(2)&(3).

As noted earlier, the BRAC process used in 2005 followed a historical analytical framework with many elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons learned from previous rounds. We have noted previously in examining lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds the general agreement that this framework has served the BRAC decision-making process well, even as improvements were made to the process for each BRAC round.¹¹ If future BRAC rounds are held, as suggested by the Secretary of Defense in transmitting his 2005 BRAC recommendations to the Commission, we believe it will be important to document lessons learned from this round to determine what actions might be needed to strengthen the process for the future. We believe that will be especially important given the broad range of realignment actions proposed for this BRAC round, compared with previous rounds.

DOD Audit Agencies Helped to Improve the Accuracy of Data Used during the BRAC Process

The DOD Inspector General and the services' audit agencies played an important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses were accurate and certified by cognizant senior officials. Through extensive audits of the capacity, military value, and scenario data collected from field activities, these audit agencies notified various BRAC teams of data discrepancies for corrective action. The audit activities included validation of data, compliance with data certification requirements employed throughout the chain of command, and examination of the accuracy of the analytical data. While the auditors initially encountered problems with regard to data accuracy and the lack of supporting documentation for certain questions and data elements, most of these concerns were resolved. In addition, the auditors worked to ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis. These audit agencies also reviewed other facets of the process, including the various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations.

Issues Related to DOD's Recommendations

We identified issues regarding various DOD's recommendations that may warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. The issues we are highlighting in this statement relate to cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods for many recommendations, and efforts to move DOD organizations out of leased space onto military bases. Other issues are further discussed in our July 1, 2005, report on the 2005 BRAC process.

¹¹ GAO, *Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds*, NSIAD-97-151 (Washington D.C.: July 25, 1997).

Issues Related to Projected Savings

DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly \$50 billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring savings of about \$5.5 billion. While we believe the 2005 BRAC process could produce savings for DOD, we must emphasize that the majority of the projected savings are related to a small percentage of the recommendations (see app. I). Also, a large portion of projected savings are related to military personnel reductions but the lack of planned end-strength reductions reduces dollar savings available for other purposes. Also, we believe there is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of savings likely to be realized in other areas, given unvalidated assumptions regarding expected efficiency gains from business process reengineering efforts and projected savings from sustainment, recapitalization, and base operating support.¹² Table 2 summarizes the projected one-time cost, the cost or savings anticipated during the 6-year implementation period for the closure or realignment, the estimated net annual recurring savings, and the projected 20-year net present value cost or savings of DOD's recommendations.¹³

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 Recommendations

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

DOD component	One-time (cost)	Net implementation (cost) or savings	Net annual recurring (cost) or savings ^a	20-year net present value (cost) or savings ^b
Army	(\$9,963.4)	(\$8,519.1)	\$497.6	(\$3,038.6)
Navy	(2,099.8)	440.7	753.5	7,713.7
Air Force	(1,883.1)	2,635.5	1,248.5	14,560.3
Joint cross-service groups	(10,466.1)	1,372.8	2,985.1	29,569.1
Total	(\$24,412.4)	(\$4,070.1)	\$5,484.7	\$48,804.5

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

¹² Sustainment refers to recurring maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep facilities in good working order. Recapitalization refers to major renovation or reconstruction activities (including facility replacement) needed to keep facilities modern and efficient in an environment of changing standards and missions. Base operating support refers to a collection of day-to-day programs, activities, and services, such as food services, grounds maintenance, and custodial services, needed to keep the bases and installations in running order.

¹³ These projections exclude environmental restoration costs, which historically have not been included in BRAC costs and savings analyses because restoration is a liability that exists regardless of whether a base is closed, but are included in implementation budgets once BRAC recommendations have become binding.


*Projected annual recurring savings after the 6-year implementation period.

*DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

Table 2 also shows the Navy, Air Force, and joint cross-service groups all projecting net savings within the 6-year implementation period, as well as significant 20-year net savings. In contrast, because of the nature of the Army's proposed actions and costs, such as providing infrastructure for troops returning from overseas and the consolidation and recapitalization of reserve facilities, the Army does not achieve net savings either during the implementation period or within 20 years.

As figure 3 shows, 47 percent of the net annual recurring savings can be attributed to projected military personnel reductions. About 40 percent (\$2.1 billion) of the projected net annual recurring savings can be attributed to savings from operation and maintenance activities, which include terminating or reducing property sustainment and recapitalization, base operating support, and civilian payroll.

Figure 3: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings



Note: Analysis does not include data from one classified recommendation.

Furthermore, about \$500 million of the “other” savings is based on business process reengineering efforts, but some of the assumptions supporting the expected efficiency gains have not been validated. Also, a significant portion of the projected savings involving sustainment and recapitalization is for space being vacated as functions and activities are moved from one base to another. However, in various instances, plans for the vacated space are uncertain as is the magnitude of the projected savings.

Military Personnel Savings

Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel; but end-strength levels will not be reduced as DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas. Without reducing end-strength levels, there are no dollar savings from military personnel that

can be applied elsewhere. At best, these freed-up resources could be viewed as a cost avoidance, if the resources are redeployed to an area of need and, as a result help offset any expected congressional action to otherwise authorize an increase in end-strength. On the other hand, if an increase in end-strength is not planned and you are simply redirecting the freed-up resources to another area of need, it could be viewed as enhancing capabilities and achieving more effective utilization of your personnel resources, not dollar savings.

For example, although the Air Force projects net annual recurring savings of about \$732 million from eliminating about 10,200 military positions, Air Force officials stated the active duty positions will be reassigned to relieve stress on high demand career fields and the reserve positions to new missions yet to be identified. Likewise, the Army is projecting savings from eliminating about 5,800 military positions, but it has no plans to reduce its end strength. Finally, the Navy is projecting it will eliminate about 4,000 active duty military positions, which a Navy official noted will help it achieve the end-strength reductions already planned. As we noted during our review of DOD's process during the 1995 BRAC round, since these personnel will be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, they do not represent dollar savings that can be readily reallocated outside the personnel accounts.¹⁴ Not recognizing that these are not dollar savings that can be readily applied elsewhere could create a false sense of savings available for use in other areas traditionally cited as beneficiaries of BRAC savings, such as making more funds available for modernization and better maintenance of remaining facilities.

Sustainment, Recapitalization,
and Base Operating Support
Savings

DOD is also projecting savings from the sustainment and recapitalization of facilities that are scheduled to be demolished, as well as from facilities that might remain in DOD's real property inventory when activities are realigned from one base to another. For example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group is claiming about \$20 million in annual recurring savings from the recapitalization of facilities at installations responsible for destroying chemical weapons at three locations recommended for closure.¹⁵ However, the Army had already expected to demolish these chemical destruction facilities upon completing the destruction of the chemical weapons at each site and the Army has not identified future

¹⁴ GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment, GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995).

¹⁵ The sites are the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; and Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah.

missions for these installations. As a result, we do not believe it is appropriate for the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group to claim any recapitalization savings related to these installations.

DOD is also projecting savings from the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities in cases where functions or activities would be realigned from one base to another. However, it is not clear to what extent the proposed realignments would result in an entire building or portion of a building being vacated, or if entire buildings were vacated, whether they would be declared excess and removed from the military services' real property inventory. Our analysis shows that the supply and storage group's recommendations project about \$100 million in sustainment and recapitalization savings from realigning defense distribution depots. The group estimates its recommendations will vacate about 27 million square feet of storage space. Supply and storage officials told us their goal is to vacate as much space as possible by rewarehousing inventory and by reducing personnel spaces, but they do not have a specific plan for what will happen to the space once it is vacated. In addition, until these recommendations are ultimately approved and implemented, DOD will not be in a good position to know exactly how much space is available or how this space will be disposed of or utilized. As a result, it is uncertain how much of the estimated \$100 million in annual recurring savings will actually occur.

Savings Based on Business Process Reengineering

DOD projected net annual recurring savings in the "other" category as shown in figure 3 include about \$500 million that is based on business process reengineering efforts. Our analysis indicates that four recommendations—one from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group and three from the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group—involve primarily business process reengineering efforts. However, the expected efficiency gains from these recommendations are based on assumptions that are subject to some uncertainty and have not been validated.

Our analysis indicates that \$215 million, or 63 percent, of the estimated net annual recurring savings from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation to create fleet readiness centers within the Navy is based on business reengineering efforts that would result in overhead efficiencies. Although the data suggest there is the potential for savings, we believe the magnitude of the savings is somewhat uncertain because the estimates are based on assumptions that have undergone only limited testing. Realizing the full extent of the savings would depend on actual implementation of the recommended actions and modifications to the Navy's supply system. The industrial group and the Navy assumed that combining depot and intermediate maintenance levels would reduce the

time needed for an item to be repaired at the intermediate level, which in turn would reduce the number of items needing to be kept in inventory, as well as the number of items being sent to a depot for repair. These assumptions, which were the major determinant of the realignment savings, were reportedly based on historical data and pilot projects and have not been independently reviewed or verified by the Naval Audit Service, the DOD Inspector General, or us.

Furthermore, our analysis indicates that \$291 million, or about 72 percent, of the net annual recurring savings expected from the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group's three recommendations are also based on business process reengineering. In the COBRA model, the savings are categorized as procurement savings and are based on the expanded use of performance-based logistics and reductions to duplicate inventory.¹⁶ Supply and storage group staff said that these savings accrue from reduced contract prices because the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will have increased buying power since it is responsible for purchasing many more items that before were purchased by each of the services. In addition, savings accrue from increased use of performance-based agreements,¹⁷ a key component of performance-based logistics. The group estimates DLA can save 2.8 cents on each contract dollar placed on performance-based agreements. In addition, savings result from reductions in the amount of stock that must be held in inventory. Supply and storage staff said that these savings are attributable to reductions in the cost of money, cost of stock losses due to obsolescence, and cost of storage. The group estimates that together these factors save about 17 percent of the estimated value of the acquisition cost of the stock that is no longer required to be held in inventory. These savings estimates, for the most part, are based on historical documentation provided by DLA, which time did not allow us to validate. The extent to which these same savings will be achieved in the future is uncertain. As noted above, how these actions are implemented could also affect savings. We are concerned that this is another area that could lead to a false sense of savings and lead to premature reductions in affected budgets in advance of actual savings being fully realized, as has sometimes occurred in past efforts to achieve savings through business process reengineering efforts.

¹⁶ Performance-based logistics is defined as the purchase of weapon system sustainment as part of an integrated weapon system package based on output measures, such as weapon system availability, rather than input measures, such as parts and technical services.

¹⁷ Performance-based agreements are defined as the negotiated agreements between the major stakeholders that formally document the performance and support expectations and resources to achieve the desired outcome.

Transformation Cited as Justification for Many Recommendations despite Lack of Clear Agreement on Transformational Options

While furthering transformation was one of the BRAC 2005 goals, there was no agreement between DOD and its components on what should be considered a transformational effort. As part of the BRAC process, the department developed over 200 transformational options for stationing and supporting forces as well as for increasing operational efficiency and effectiveness. The OSD BRAC office narrowed this list to 77 options, but agreement was not reached within the department on these options, so none of them were formally approved. Nonetheless, each service and joint cross-service group was permitted to use the transformational options as appropriate to support its candidate recommendations. Collectively, these draft options did not provide a clear definition of transformation across the department. The options ranged from those that seemed to be service specific to those that suggested new ways of doing business. For example, some transformational options included reducing the number of Army Reserve regional headquarters; optimizing Air Force squadrons; and co-locating various functions such as recruiting, military and civilian personnel training, and research, development and acquisition and test and evaluation, across the military departments. In contrast, some options suggested consideration of new ways of doing business, such as privatizing some functions and establishing a DOD agency to oversee depot-level reparable.

While the transformational options were never formally approved, our analysis indicates that many of DOD's recommendations reference one or more of the 77 transformational options as a resulting benefit of the proposed actions. For example, 15 of the headquarters and support activities group recommendations reference the option to minimize leased space and move organizations in leased space to DOD-owned space. Likewise, 37 of the Army reserve component recommendations reference the option to co-locate guard and reserve units at active bases or consolidate guard and reserve units that are located in proximity to one another at one location. Conversely, a number of the scenarios that were initially considered but not adopted reference transformational options that could have changed existing business practices. For example, the education and training group developed a number of scenarios—privatizing graduate education programs and consolidating undergraduate fixed and rotary wing pilot training—based on the draft transformational options, but none were ultimately approved by the department.

Some Proposals Have Lengthy Payback Periods

Many of the 222 recommendations DOD made in the 2005 round are associated with lengthy payback periods, which, in some cases, call into question whether the department would be gaining sufficient monetary value for the up-front investment cost required to implement its

recommendations and the time required to recover this investment. Our analysis indicates that 143, or 64 percent, of DOD's recommendations are associated with payback periods that are 6 years or less while 79, or 36 percent, of the recommendations are associated with lengthier paybacks that exceed the 6-year mark or never produce savings. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the number of recommendations with lengthy payback periods varied across the military services and the joint cross-service groups, as shown in table 3.

Table 3: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD Component

DOD component	Number of recommendations	Payback period			
		Immediate to 6 years	7 to 9 years	10 years and greater	Never
Army	56	26	3	22	5
Navy	53*	45	2	6	0
Air Force	42	29	6	7	0
Education and training	9	5	0	3	1
Headquarters and support activities	21	14	2	5	0
Industrial	17	13	3	1	0
Intelligence	2	0	2	0	0
Medical	6	3	1	2	0
Supply and storage	3	3	0	0	0
Technical	13	5	5	3	0
Total	222	143	24	49	6
Percentage	100	64	11	22	3

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

*While the DOD BRAC report lists 21 Navy recommendations, several of these have multiple actions, thus bringing the total to 53 recommendations.

As shown in table 3, the Army has five recommendations and the education and training group has one recommendation that never payback, as described below:

- Army realignment of a special forces unit from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
- Army realignment of a heavy brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Carson, Colorado;
- Army realignment of a heavy brigade to Fort Bliss, Texas, and infantry and aviation units to Fort Riley, Kansas;
- Army reserve component consolidations in Minnesota;

-
- Army reserve component consolidations in North Dakota; and
 - Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group's establishment of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

According to Army officials, these five recommendations have no payback because, in part, they must build additional facilities to accommodate the return of about 47,000 forces currently stationed overseas to the United States as part of DOD's Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy initiative. According to the education and training group, its one recommendation with no payback period is due to the high military construction costs associated with the new mission to consolidate initial training for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force.

We also identified some portions of DOD's individual recommendations that are associated with lengthy payback periods for certain BRAC actions but are imbedded within larger, bundled recommendations. The following example illustrates this point.

- A proposal initially developed by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group to move the Army Materiel Command from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, had more than a 100-year payback period with a net cost over a 20-year period. However, the proposal did not include some expected savings that if included, would have reduced the payback period to 32 years. Concurrently, the group developed a separate proposal to relocate various Army offices from leased and government-owned office space onto Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which would have resulted in a 3-year payback period. The headquarters group decided to combine these two stand-alone proposals into one recommendation, resulting in an expected 20-year net present value savings of about \$123 million with a 10-year payback.

Vacating Leased Space

Fifteen of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group's recommendations include a one-time savings of over \$300 million from moving activities from leased space onto military installations. These recommendations, if approved, would reduce total DOD leased space within the National Capital Region¹⁸ from 8.3 million square feet to about 1.7 million square feet, or by 80 percent. While our prior work

¹⁸ The National Capital Region includes Washington, D.C.; the Maryland counties of Montgomery and Prince George's; and the Virginia counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William and the City of Alexandria, Virginia.

generally supports the premise that leased property is more expensive than government-owned property, the recommendations related to vacating leased space also raise questions about a limitation in projected savings and impact on local communities.

The one-time cost savings represents costs expected to be avoided in the future by moving from leased facilities into government owned and protected facilities rather than upgrading existing leased space to meet DOD's antiterrorism/force protection standards.¹⁹ According to a DOD official, after the June 1996 Khobar Tower bombing incident in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the department created a task force of mostly engineers to develop minimum force protection standards for all DOD-occupied locations. The official also stated that the standards were not the result of a formal threat assessment. The force protection standards for leased buildings apply only where DOD personnel occupy at least 25 percent of the net interior usable area; only to the portion of the building occupied by DOD personnel; to all new leases that are executed on or after October 1, 2005, and to leases renewed or extended on or after October 1, 2009.

Initially, the joint cross-service group prepared military value data call questions that could determine whether a leased location met the force protection requirements. However, group officials stated that most of these questions were discarded because of inconsistencies in how the questions were answered. As noted in our July 1 report, we have also learned that the Pentagon Force Protection Agency will shortly begin 10-month antiterrorism and force protection vulnerability assessments of about 60 DOD-occupied leased buildings in the National Capital Region. One could question whether this action should not have been completed prior to recommending a broad-based divestiture of leased space.²⁰

Another significant issue related to the leased space, at least in the National Capital Region, is the impact of such a major divestiture of leased space on community infrastructure. Four of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group's recommendations involve moving personnel from leased space to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, increasing Fort

¹⁹ Unified Facilities Criteria: DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-010-01, 8 Oct. 2003).

²⁰ After DOD's recommendations were published, we obtained data from the General Services Administration indicating that leased termination costs associated with 10 leases that are scheduled to expire after the BRAC implementation period would be approximately \$76 million.

Belvoir's population by about 10,700.²¹ The recommendations include military construction projects to build facilities for these personnel on Fort Belvoir. In addition, the recommendations include \$55 million to improve roads and other infrastructure in the area surrounding the base. However, it is uncertain at this time whether this will be sufficient to fully support the impact on the surrounding community's infrastructure or the likelihood that local governments will seek federal assistance to help communities reduce the impact—costs that will have the effect of increasing one-time costs and offsetting short-term savings from the recommendations.

Significant Challenges Ahead for Implementing BRAC Recommendations

While we realize that the BRAC Commission is charged with reviewing DOD's proposed list of recommended BRAC actions and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005, there are significant challenges ahead for implementing BRAC recommendations which I would like to bring to the Commission's attention—challenges that will likely affect how successful this BRAC round could be viewed historically. These challenges include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the impact of the loss of specialized human capital skills in implementing recommended actions on ongoing defense operations; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation, including the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from implementing BRAC recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining communities affected by the BRAC recommendations.

Transition Plans for Minimizing Disruption of Operations due to Loss of Specialized Skills

A significant challenge facing the department is the need for transition plans to address the human capital skills that are likely to be lost and in need of replacement in order to provide for uninterrupted operations as BRAC recommendations are implemented. In its cost and savings analyses, the department estimated in most instances that, as a standard factor in its COBRA model, about 75 percent of the personnel at a facility being closed or realigned would move to the gaining installation receiving the mission or workload.

However, in some cases, this percentage may be overstated resulting in less actual movement than anticipated, which may in turn present challenges for gaining bases. For example, Industrial Joint-Cross Service

²¹ The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group is also proposing to move about 8,500 personnel to Fort Belvoir.

Group officials told us that based on the Navy's prior experience in closing shipyards, they did not expect many personnel to move to other shipyards if the Portsmouth shipyard were closed. They further told us that because it takes about 8 years for personnel to become fully proficient in maintaining nuclear-powered submarines, this would present a challenge for the other yards to replicate the loss in skills due to the unwillingness of workers to move with the relocated workload. Officials at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, expressed similar concerns regarding the planned closure of the base and plans for a large portion of the work to be transferred to the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Information provided by these officials suggest that the potential loss of a large retirement age population must be balanced against the impact on ongoing mission activities providing real-time assistance to warfighters and transformation initiatives.

In other cases, the loss of personnel skills at a location may cause some concern but may not be as difficult to reconstitute. For example, DOD projects that about 7,400 personnel would move under the proposal to consolidate the Defense Finance and Accounting Service from 26 to 3 sites. While the actual number of personnel that may move is unknown, a Defense Finance and Accounting Service official stated that the accounting skills required are available at the receiving sites. Our analysis indicates that over 4,590, or 62 percent, of the workforce at the 26 sites are classified as accounting-related civilian positions at General Schedule grade 11 or below.

Should there be recommendations where the loss of personnel is extensive, particularly for those skills requiring extensive education, training, and experience, it could prove challenging to the department to satisfactorily provide for the replacement of these critical skills. In this regard, it is important that the department develop transition plans that would recognize the loss of human capital skills and provide for replacement capability to minimize disruption of ongoing defense operations. Without such a plan, the department could be at risk in providing the necessary support to our military forces.

Mechanisms for Monitoring Implementation and Tracking and Updating Savings Estimates

As noted in our July 1, 2005, report, the department has proposed various BRAC actions involving business process changes and other actions, such as in joint basing, where likely savings will very much depend on implementation actions, the details of which are yet to be developed. We believe it will be important that DOD monitor implementation of these actions to ensure compliance with proposed actions. With respect to savings estimates, we believe it is also critical that the department devise a

mechanism to track and periodically update its savings estimates from the final recommendations in order to provide not only Congress but the public with a full accounting of the dollars saved through the BRAC process. Our interest in this area is evidenced by our recommendation in our July 2005, report to provide for this. However, given the problems in tracking savings from the previous rounds, and the large volume of BRAC actions that are more oriented to realignments and business process engineering rather than closures, along with our concerns about claimed military personnel savings, we believe it is of paramount importance that DOD put in place a process to track and periodically update its savings estimates.

**Plans for Addressing
Environmental Restoration**

In accordance with long-standing DOD practice in previous rounds, estimated environmental restoration costs for bases undergoing closure or realignment are not included in DOD's cost and savings analyses. Such costs are excluded for comparative purposes based on DOD's position that restoration is a liability that the department must address regardless of whether a base is kept open or closed. Nevertheless, DOD did give consideration to such costs in addressing selection criterion 8, and included available information on estimated restoration costs as part of the data supporting its BRAC recommendations. DOD data indicate that estimated restoration costs for its 33 major base closures would be about \$949 million, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD's Recommended Major Base Closures

Dollars in millions		
Military service	Number of major closures	Estimated environmental restoration costs ^a
Army	14	\$723.3
Navy	9	154.5
Air Force	10	71.3
Total	33	\$949.1

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

^aEstimated costs include some costs not specifically reported in DOD's May 2005 report to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. While the Army and Navy generally reported these costs, the Air Force did not but its costs were noted in supporting documentation.

As shown in the table 4, the Army is expected to incur the largest share of estimated restoration costs due to the proposed closure of several ammunition plants and chemical depots. While the DOD BRAC report does not specifically identify the potential for additional restoration costs at DOD installations, available supporting documentation does identify some additional costs. For example, the Army estimated that range restoration at Hawthorne Army Depot could cost between \$27 million to \$147 million in addition to the \$383 million reported and included in the estimates in table 4. Further, the Army recognizes that additional restoration costs could be incurred at six additional locations that have ranges and chemical munitions, but these costs have not yet been determined.

More recent environmental restoration cost data indicate that the estimates are increasing. As noted in a June 2005 Congressional Research Service report,²² the estimates for the recommended 33 major base closures have increased by nearly \$600 million to over \$1.5 billion. Estimated costs to complete environmental restoration now exceed \$100 million at each of the following proposed major closures: Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada (\$465 million); Otis Air National Guard Base,

²² Congressional Research Service, *Military Base Closures: Role and Costs of Environmental Cleanup*, (Washington, D.C.: June, 27, 2005). The report used information from the Department of Defense, *Defense Environmental Programs Annual Report to Congress for FY 2004*, dated April 2005.

Massachusetts (\$373 million); Fort Monroe, Virginia (\$201 million); and Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah (\$180 million).

Service officials told us that the projected cost estimates for environmental restoration are lower, in general, than evidenced in previous rounds, because the environmental conditions of today's bases are much better than those closed or realigned in previous rounds, primarily because of DOD's ongoing active base environmental restoration program. Nonetheless, our prior work has indicated that as closures are implemented, more intensive environmental investigations occur and additional hazardous conditions may be uncovered that could result in additional, unanticipated restoration and higher costs. Finally, the services' preliminary estimates are based on restoration standards that are applicable for the current use of the base property. Because reuse plans developed by communities receiving former base property sometimes reflect different uses for the property, this could lead to more stringent and thus more expensive restoration in many cases.

While it is uncertain at this point what the ultimate restoration costs at BRAC-affected bases will be, it is likely that environmental restoration has the potential to slow the transfer of unneeded base property freed up by the BRAC process to communities surrounding those bases. Our prior work has shown that environmental restoration is the primary impediment to the transfer of unneeded property to others for reuse. In our January 2005 report²¹ we noted that, as of September 30, 2004, the reasons why most of the 140,000 acres from the prior four rounds remained untransferred were due to issues regarding environmental restoration. Such delays in the transfer of property have adverse effects on BRAC communities, as this property cannot be put to productive reuse. In this regard, we believe it is critical that the department adequately plan for and fund environmental restoration requirements to provide for the expedited transfer of unneeded property to others for subsequent reuse.

Assistance for BRAC-Affected Communities

The recommended actions for the 2005 BRAC round will have varying degrees of impact on communities surrounding bases undergoing a closure or realignment. While some will face economic recovery challenges as a result of a closure and associated losses of base personnel, others, which expect large influxes of personnel due to increased base activity, face a different set of challenges involving community

²¹ GAO, *Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closures*, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005).

infrastructure necessary to accommodate growth. These communities may likely require assistance from various sources to help them address the many challenges facing them as they plan for either economic recovery or infrastructure growth as a result of recommended BRAC actions.

DOD data indicate that most economic areas across the country are expected to be affected very little by DOD's recommended actions, but a few could face substantial impact. Almost 83 percent of the 244 economic areas affected by BRAC recommendations fall between a 1 percent loss in employment and a 1 percent gain in employment.²⁴ However, for some of these areas, the projected impact is fairly significant, ranging up to a potential direct and indirect loss of up to nearly 21 percent. In this regard, six communities—Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada; Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; Submarine Base New London, Connecticut; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota—had negative employment impacts ranging from 8.5 percent to 20.5 percent.

Our prior work has shown that a variety of factors will affect how quickly communities are able to rebound from the negative economic consequences of closures and realignments. They include such factors as trends associated with the national, regional, and local economies; natural and labor resources; effective planning for reuse of base property; and federal, state, and local government assistance to facilitate transition planning and execution. Our prior work has shown that most communities surrounding closed bases in the previous rounds have been faring well in relation to key national economic indicators—unemployment rate and the average annual real per capita income growth rates.²⁵ In our January 2005 report, for example, we further reported that while some communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than others, most have recovered or were continuing to recover from the impact of BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative impact from the economic downturn nationwide in recent years.

²⁴ Some of the recommendations had multiple actions that affected more than one economic area.

²⁵ GAO, *Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures*, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005); GAO, *Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Realignment and Closures*, GAO-02-433 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002); and GAO, *Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds*, GAO/NSIAD-99-36 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 1998).

The 2005 round, however, also has the potential to significantly affect a number of communities surrounding installations, which are expected to experience considerable growth in the numbers of military, civilian, and civilian support personnel. DOD indicated that about 20 installations are expected to experience a net gain of over 2,000 military and civilian personnel. This is particularly evident for several Army bases, such as Fort Belvoir, Virginia which is expected to have a net gain of over 20,000 military and civilian personnel, where personnel increases are likely to place additional demands on community services, such as providing adequate housing, schools, and other infrastructure support, for which the communities may not have adequate resources in the short term.

Based on the experience from the previous BRAC rounds, we believe it is likely that additional federal costs are likely to be incurred, although these costs are not required to be included in DOD's cost and savings analyses, for providing assistance to BRAC-affected communities. These costs include transition assistance, planning grants, and other assistance made available to communities by DOD and other federal agencies. As we reported in January 2005,²⁶ in the previous four BRAC rounds, DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department of Labor, the Economic Development Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Aviation Administration provided nearly \$2 billion in assistance through fiscal year 2004 to communities and individuals, and according to DOD officials, these agencies are slated to perform similar roles for the 2005 round. We believe it is important that those agencies that have traditionally provided assistance are prepared and adequately budget for the necessary funds to provide assistance to those communities affected by the BRAC 2005 process. As previously discussed, the number of bases in the 2005 BRAC round that will gain several thousand personnel from the recommended actions could increase pressure for federal assistance to mitigate the impact on community infrastructure, such as schools and roads, with the potential for more costs than in the prior rounds.

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the Commission may have at this time.

²⁶ GAO, *Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closures*, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005).

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this statement, please contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5581. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Nelsie Alcoser, Shawn Arbogast, Raymond Bickert, Andrew Edelson, Mike Kennedy, Glenn Knoepfle, Nancy Lively, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David Mayfield, Richard Meeks, Hilary Murrish, Charles Perdue, Robert Poetta, Jim Reifsnyder, James Reynolds, and Laura Talbott.

Appendix I: 20-Year Net Present Value Savings from the Top 10 Percent of DOD's BRAC 2005 Recommendations

Dollars in millions

Recommendation	20-year net present value savings
Realign to establish Navy Fleet Readiness Centers	\$4,724.2
Realign supply, storage, and distribution management	2,925.8
Realign Eielson Air Force Base, AK	2,780.6
Close Cannon Air Force Base, NM	2,706.8
Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC	2,515.4
Realign to create joint basing	2,342.5
Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND	1,982.0
Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and recruiting centers for Army and Air Force	1,913.4
Realign inventory control points and consolidate depot-level reparable procurement management	1,889.6
Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD	1,853.3
Close Submarine Base New London, CT	1,576.4
Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service	1,313.8
Consolidate transportation command components	1,278.2
Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME	1,262.4
Close Fort Monmouth, NJ	1,025.8
Realign maneuver training	948.1
Close Brooks City-Base, TX	940.7
Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at Fort Lee, VA	934.2
Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA	910.9
Close Fort McPherson, GA	895.2
Close and realign Naval Station Ingleside, TX, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, respectively	822.2
Realign various medical activities by converting inpatient services to clinics	818.1
Total savings from recommendations listed above	\$38,359.6
Total savings from all BRAC 2005 submitted recommendations	\$48,804.5
Percentage of recommendations listed above of all recommendations	79%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

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**Questions for Chairman Principi
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Government Accountability Office Panel

The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States;
and

Mr. Barry W. Holman, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
Mr. Michael Kennedy – Assistant Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Government Accountability Office

July 18, 2005

1. How accurate are DoD's savings estimates? If DoD is not reducing military personnel, how can savings be claimed for reducing such personnel? In addition, many of the savings are from business process reengineering efforts. How confident are you that DoD can achieve savings from business process reengineering efforts that have yet to be proven? Given that point, how likely are we to see down the road costs escalating even further and savings not materializing?
2. On page 4 of your report, you state that most of the projected savings are from 10 percent of the 222 recommendations. Would you please provide this list of which of the recommendations provide the majority of savings?
3. Some of DOD's proposed BRAC actions, if implemented, would seem to have the potential to increase costs to other government agencies such as the Coast Guard. Have you done any analysis on how this impacts DOD's projected cost and savings?
4. What do you see as the successes and opportunities missed this BRAC round in terms of advancing jointness among the services and across common support functions? Did you see any improvements in this area this time compared to prior BRAC rounds?

**Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

Government Accountability Office

The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States;
and

Mr. Barry W. Holman, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, and
Mr. Michael Kennedy, Assistant Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Government Accountability Office

July 18, 2005

Mr. Walker:

1. Could you elaborate more on the 21st century challenges you see for DOD and the role BRAC plays in meeting them?
2. GAO's report points out difficulties DOD personnel had in agreeing on transformation options to be used in the BRAC process. What do you see as the implications of this for Defense transformation overall?
3. As you know, the Navy has proposed the closing of its New London, Connecticut submarine Base as well as its Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Maine. Yet, there is considerable uncertainty over the Navy's future force structure and some suggest the Navy's move is more of an effort at seeking budget based capabilities rather than maintaining facilities that likely will be needed to respond to future requirements. Where do you come out on an issue like this?
4. How would you assess the importance of savings from the current BRAC process to DOD?
5. What advice would you have for the Commission in assessing DOD's recommendations that have a high up-front cost and/or require multiple years for savings to accrue to the point of offsetting the up-front investment costs and to begin yielding a return in the form of net savings?
6. Your statement notes the importance of human capital considerations in implementing BRAC decisions. What advice would you have for the

Commission in weighing human capital considerations in its decisions on closing or realigning bases?

7. You are on record as saying DOD is number one in the world in fighting and winning armed conflicts but that they are a D, graded on a curve, giving DOD the benefit of the doubt, on financial management and other business areas. Given that, how can we be confident of savings from BRAC in general and particularly for the number of recommendations included in this BRAC round that are predicated on implementing business process reengineering?

Cost/Savings Questions

8. You estimate up-front investment costs to implement this BRAC round at \$24 billion. This figure is greater than the costs to implement the entire four previous BRAC rounds, which is \$22 billion. Given the great amount of funds needed to implement this BRAC and that most of the savings, if any, from the military cannot be used for other needs and business process reengineering savings have yet to be proven, do you believe that the disruption that this BRAC round will entail in order for the Secretary of transform the department is worth the any perceived gains?
9. You estimate the cost to implement BRAC at \$24 billion. In addition, the Overseas Basing Commission also has stated that DoD has underestimated the cost to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). They estimate the costs to implement IGPBS between \$16 billion and \$20 billion, while DoD has estimated the costs to implement IGPBS at between \$9 billion and \$12 billion, with only about \$4 billion of this amount currently budgeted and about \$3 billion of this amount is in the BRAC account. Further, this does not even include the other competing demands on DoD's resources such as the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Army modularity, Army increased end-strength, and other steady-state requirements. All of these efforts will continue to stretch already strained resources.

10. Given all of this, in your opinion, where do you see DoD getting the additional funds to fully implement this BRAC round, let alone all of its other competing demands?
11. Is GAO's understanding that DOD's approach to this BRAC is principally to obtain longer-term military value by disposing of excess base installation infrastructure rather than to save money near-term?
12. While each service cannot count the saving from the drawdown of overseas force structure as part of BRAC, what is your view on reapplying these saving to the cost of executing BRAC restationing implementation costs?
13. Are the military spaces saved as a result of consolidation within the reserve components eliminated from the force structure or are they reallocated within the existing force structure? If relocated, will other savings associated with consolidation be sufficient to offset the implementation costs? Have any savings been taken for the potential sale of excess real property?
14. GAO's report points out the large amount of savings being projected by DOD from its BRAC recommendations, yet your report also raises a number of questions about the likely magnitude of those savings. How would you characterize your major concerns about DOD's savings estimates?
15. How complete a picture do you think DOD's analysis supporting its 2005 BRAC recommendations gives concerning total costs and savings of the proposed actions, particularly using the COBRA model to calculate those costs?
16. Could you elaborate on GAO concerns regarding the lengthy timeframes required for savings to offset the upfront costs associated with implementing many of the BRAC actions?
17. GAO has expressed concern about the adequacy of DOD's efforts to track and update savings estimates from prior BRAC rounds? To what extent do you have similar concerns for this current BRAC round?

18. How do GAO's concerns over savings being projected from the 2005 BRAC round compare with any concerns or uncertainties GAO has expressed over savings projections from prior BRAC rounds?

Funding Questions

19. What is GAO's understanding of the use of BRAC funds for restructuring units or moving units or units' equipment as opposed to closing or changing installation infrastructure to accommodate changes to installation use?

20. What is GAO's view regarding the sufficiency of DOD funding planned to address all BRAC actions? Is the amount of funding the DOD recommends sufficient?

Infrastructure/Quality of Life Questions

21. One of the military value criteria is to look at the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. With that in mind, I have a few questions.

- a. First, DoD, in conjunction with the BRAC process, is planning to bring back thousands of troops from overseas locations to bases in the United States. Many of these troops will be going to bases such as Fort Bliss and Fort Carson, do you believe that both the base and the community infrastructure at these locations can be support such a large influx of troops and family members?
- b. What impact will all of this movement have on the local communities?
- c. What additional costs do you see the government incurring to support local communities, such as additional funds for schools, that are not funded through the BRAC process?
- d. Further, how will this affect the quality of life of the service member and his/her family? Will this have an adverse impact on retention in the future if the needed quality of life services are not in place when troops are transferred?

22. Fort Belvoir in the D.C. area is scheduled to get over 20,000 personnel, with over 11,000 from leased space locations in the D.C. area. Do you believe the road system around Fort Belvoir can handle this large influx of personnel? If not, what additional government costs that are not included in the BRAC costs will be incurred in the future to alleviate the demand on the local infrastructure?

Net Fires Center, Maneuver Training Question

23. GAO, in preparing its BRAC report, examined information related to DOD's BRAC recommendations for "Maneuver Training" consolidation at Fort Benning, and "Net Fires Center" consolidation at Fort Sill.

- a. What does GAO's examination indicate regarding DOD's determinations for these recommendations' costs and personnel efficiencies, and improvements in the military value criteria?

Fort McPherson, Pope AFB Question

24. If the Army were to station FORSCOM HQ on Fort Bragg proper, rather than Pope AFB, would GAO consider that a change to this recommendation since this recommendation was based on enabling the Army realignment of Fort MacPherson?

Pope AFB Questions

25. Does GAO believe that military value is enhanced and efficiencies gained with the Army running an airfield that will have the same level of training activity or more (with the addition of an additional BCT to the 82d Airborne Division) in the future?

26. Does GAO have any observations or comments on the loss of already existing synergies, joint culture and joint-contingency operations planning capabilities between Pope AFB and Ft Bragg?

27. Does GAO have any observations on the TDY costs associated with a requirement to increase the flow of lift aircraft into Pope to support daily Army and Air Force training requirements?

Postgraduate Education Training Question

28. The GAO in its report noted that various issues warranted further consideration by this Commission. One of these issues involves the last minute elimination by senior DOD officials of a recommendation to change how post graduation training is provided. Why do you believe that this commission should give further consideration to this issue?
29. GAO staff observed the deliberative discussions for the numerous ideas that were considered for inclusion in the final DoD recommendation list. In GAO's opinion, did the Department depart from its approved selection criteria in deleting the ideas for changing postgraduate education referred to by the department as
- a. E&T-0003 which would have privatized programs now conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School and AFIT?
 - b. E&T-0022 which would have consolidated the Naval Postgraduate School and AFIT?

Environmental Question

30. Do you have any concerns over how DOD environmental restoration costs were considered in its BRAC recommendations? Are you concerned that DoD did not include even the expected costs of accelerated cleanup in its closure calculations?

Leased Space Questions

31. Some have expressed much concern about DOD's BRAC recommendations that would shift many activities from leased space into new facilities to be constructed on military installations.
- a. To what extent were such actions included in prior BRAC rounds?
 - b. What concerns, if any, does GAO have with the recommendations involving leased space?
 - c. To what extent have DOD recommendations that will add over 20,000 personnel to Fort Belvoir made any provision for funding to ameliorate community impacts such as in the area of transportation impact?

Jointness Question

32. Has GAO made any assessments of efforts in the past by DOD to foster joint basing arrangements that could shed light on the feasibility of DOD's recommendations to create joint basing arrangements as part of this BRAC round?

Medical Questions

33. To what extent did the medical joint cross-service group consult with or otherwise consider Veterans Administration facilities as part of its analysis of potential BRAC recommendations?

34. To what extent did the medical joint cross-service group consider the potential for increased out-of-pocket costs to beneficiaries such as military retirees and their dependents, under TRICARE as a result of downsized inpatient military treatment facilities?


Excess Capacity Question

35. How would you assess the success of DOD's recommendations toward reducing excess capacity within the department? Do you have any observations on where DOD ended up compared with the attention given to DOD's data more than a year ago projecting excess capacity in the 25 percent range?

Other Questions

36. As you know, this Commission and the public encountered significant delay in getting access to data supporting DOD's BRAC recommendations following the Secretary of Defense's announcement of those recommendations on May 13, 2005.

- a. How would you assess the adequacy of GAO's access to DOD's data needed to support GAO's own analysis of DOD's analytical process and recommendations?
37. What assessments has GAO made regarding the percentage of personnel who are willing to move with work transferred to other bases in implementing BRAC closure and realignment decisions? What factors are likely to affect those decisions?
38. To what extent did your work find the military services or joint cross-service groups recommending closure or realignment of facilities having higher military value than those not subject to a BRAC action? Where that occurred, how does that impact the requirement for DOD to base decisions primarily on military value?
39. Could you elaborate on the extent to which the military services considered homeland defense in their BRAC analyses and recommendations?
40. GAO has expressed concern over the size of reserve enclaves created in prior BRAC rounds. Do you have any similar concerns regarding this BRAC round?





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OSD, GAO, OBC HEARING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY 18, 2005 8:30AM

SD-106 – Dirksen Senate Office Building

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
Al Cornella - Chairman

Vice Admiral Anthony (Tony) A. Less, USN (Ret.)

Brigadier General Keith Martin, PA ARNG (Ret.)

James A. Thompson

Patricia J. Walker – Executive Director



OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSIONER BIOS

AL CORNELLA, Chairman

Rapid City, South Dakota

The Honorable Al Cornella is a businessman from Rapid City, South Dakota. U.S. Senator Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota) appointed him to the Commission.

He served in the U.S. Navy, including service in Vietnam in 1966-67. He has also served on various local, state and federal boards and commissions dealing with military issues, environmental regulation and economic development. Mr. Cornella has been involved with the base closing process since 1991. In 1995, he served as a commissioner on the United States Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC).

He presently serves on the Academic Advisory Board of the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology, the State of South Dakota Board of Military Affairs, the South Dakota State Chamber of Commerce board of directors, and is the development chairman of Crazy Horse Memorial Foundation.

Since 2000, he has served as South Dakota State Chairman of Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), an agency of the Department of Defense.

LEWIS E. CURTIS III, Vice-Chairman Major General, USAF (Ret.)

Fair Oaks Ranch, Texas

General Lew Curtis was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Senator Bill Frist (R-Tennessee). He retired from the Air Force after 35 years in command and staff positions primarily affecting the areas of aircraft maintenance, logistics management, and acquisition. In addition to other positions General Curtis held the position of the Air Force's designated acquisition commander for all Air Force jet engines.

While the Commander of the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, General Curtis managed the acquisition and logistics functions of approximately 15,000 military and civilian personnel supporting logistical aircraft and the inventory of jet engines for transport and fighter aircraft.

His acquisition background included Air Force programs and selected NASA efforts and he led the development of the integrated weapon systems program which set the standard for today's materiel management processes.

General Curtis has been a consultant with GIG Concepts, Inc. since 1995. He provides experience and advice to various Defense contractors in support of their business development, competitive assessments, and strategic planning. In addition to his business acumen, he served six years as a member of the Texas Military Planning Commission.

**ANTHONY (Tony) A. LESS, Commissioner
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)**

Clifton, VA

Vice Admiral Tony Less was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Senator Bill Frist (R-Tennessee). He retired as Vice Admiral in the U.S. Navy in 1994. After his retirement, Admiral Less became the President of the Naval Association a non-profit organization and for seven years was the Vice-President for Government Programs with Command Aerospace for there Bloomfield, CT and DC offices.

Admiral Tony Less is the Senior Vice President for Naval Sector Programs at Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd., a position he has held since 2003. Burdeshaw is an association of retired senior military officers, government civilians, and corporate executives whose experience assists clients in matching their technology and capabilities with U.S. and foreign military and other governmental requirements.

As a Naval officer, Vice Admiral Less, was the Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and held several leadership position such as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations as well as Commander Joint Task Force Middle East/Commander Middle East Forces and Commander of Carrier Group One

**KEITH MARTIN, Commissioner
Brigadier General, PA ARNG (Ret.)**

Shavertown, Pennsylvania

General Keith Martin as appointed to the Commission by U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California). He has enjoyed a 34-year career in military service as a commissioned officer in the Active Army, Army Reserve and Pennsylvania Army National Guard. He saw combat duty in Southeast Asia and served in various overseas assignments to include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

In February 2003, he was appointed Director of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by Governor Edward Rendell. For 30 years prior to that, he was a news reporter and anchor in Pennsylvania, Florida and New York.

H. G. (Pete) TAYLOR, Commissioner Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.)

Belton, Texas

General Pete Taylor was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California). He retired from the U.S. Army in 1993 after more than 33 years of active service, which included staff and command positions at every level from platoon through Commander General of III Corps and Ft. Hood, Texas.

General Taylor served the Army in various levels of responsibility including Commander of the 24th Infantry Division and Ft. Stewart, Georgia,, and Commander of the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, CA.

Upon retiring from the Army, General Taylor became Vice-Chairman of the Board of the Heights State Bank, Harker Heights, Texas, where he served until 2002. He has also provided consulting services in leadership, training and management to defense-oriented corporations.

General Taylor has been active in community affairs, including scouting, Rotary, United Way and as a member of the Killeen Independent School Board of Trustees.

He served four years as chairman of the Texas Strategic Military Planning Commission and is chairman of the Heart of Texas Defense Alliance, a three-county central Texas defense advocacy group.

He was born in Tennessee and is a graduate of Middle Tennessee University. He also holds a Master's degree from Kansas State University.

JAMES A. THOMSON, Commissioner

Santa Monica, California

Dr. James A. Thomson was appointed to the Commission by U.S. Senator Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota). Since August 1989, he has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit, non-partisan institution that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis. He joined RAND in 1981 and has served there as director of the research program in national security, foreign policy, defense policy and arms control.

From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Thomson was a member of the National Security Council staff, where he was primarily responsible for defense and arms control matters related to Europe. From 1974 to 1977, he was an analyst in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

He holds degrees from the New Hampshire and Purdue Universities and has been awarded honorary doctorate degrees by Purdue and Pepperdine Universities.

PATRICIA J. WALKER, Executive Director

Alexandria, Virginia

Ms. Patricia Walker is the Executive Director of the Overseas Basing Commission. She is responsible for policy, guidance and direction of the Commission staff and provides Commissioners counsel on appropriate actions for their consideration and deliberation. She concurrently holds the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Materiel and Facilities).

She co-authored a report entitled Putting Quality at the Top of the Agenda. She was a contract negotiator for all overseas military fuel requirements in the Defense Fuel Supply Center and established the first Foreign Military Sales program in Central America; as an Acquisition professional she served on the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council; she transitioned to the Military installations arena as the Deputy Director to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security; Assistant Director for Analysis and Investment for the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs and Installations; Co-Chair of the Privatization and Outsourcing Integrated Policy Team; and participated on the DoD Quality of Life Task Force. In 1988 and 1991, Ms. Walker served on the Secretary of Defense senior staff responsible for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) analyses and recommendations.



CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

U.S. Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress

Jon D. Klaus
National Defense Fellow
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

On August 16, 2004, the Bush Administration announced a proposal to significantly alter the U.S. overseas military basing posture. The proposal would, if implemented, establish new overseas operating sites, and transfer up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe and Asia back to the United States. The Administration argues that current U.S. global basing arrangements are a product of World War II and the Korean War. With the end of the Cold War, these basing arrangements need to be updated to ensure that U.S. forces are optimally positioned to respond to potential 21st-Century military threats. The Administration's proposal has received mixed reactions from non-DOD observers. A May 2004 Congressional Budget Office report raises questions concerning the potential cost effectiveness of changing the current Army overseas basing posture. The Administration's proposal raises several potential oversight issues for Congress. This report will be updated as necessary.

Introduction and Issue for Congress

On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a proposal to significantly alter the U.S. overseas military basing posture. The proposal would establish new overseas operating sites, and transfer up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe and Asia back to the continental United States (CONUS). The issue for Congress is whether to approve, modify, or reject the Bush Administration's proposal. Budget and oversight decisions that Congress makes on this issue could have significant political and diplomatic implications. Decisions could also significantly affect U.S. military capabilities, Department of Defense (DOD) funding requirements, and the upcoming 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.¹

¹ For more on the 2005 BRAC round, see CRS Report RS21822, *Military Base Closures: DOD's* (continued...)

Background

The Administration's Proposal. Implementing the Administration's proposal would bring about the most profound reordering of U.S. military troops overseas in about 50 years. The proposal calls for the transfer of up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from a number of overseas main operating bases in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The Administration would then establish new secondary and tertiary facilities — called forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, respectively — in various new locations around the world. In contrast to main operating bases, which have permanently stationed forces and family support structures, forward operating sites would be maintained by a limited number of military personnel and might have some stored equipment. These sites would host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. Cooperative security locations, would be “bare bones” sites maintained by contractors or host-nation personnel, with little or no permanent U.S. presence. These locations would provide contingency access and be a focal point for regional access. Forward operating sites and cooperative security locations would supplement main operating bases and act as “lily pads” to facilitate the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to various parts of the world.

Examples of main operating bases include Ramstein Air Base Germany and Camp Humphreys in South Korea. Examples of forward operating sites include Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and Thumrait and Masirah Island air bases in Oman. Examples of cooperative security locations include the air base at Dakar, Senegal, and the airport at Entebbe, Uganda. U.S. officials have reportedly held talks on establishing new operating sites with Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Sao Tome and Principe (off the coast of Africa), Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore.²

At a September 23, 2004, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the proposed transfer of 70,000 troops back to CONUS would be completed over a period of six to eight years. To date, Administration officials have proposed regional plans for Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

Europe. The Administration's proposal would transfer up to 40,000 European-based U.S. troops, mostly from the Army, to CONUS. The U.S. Army Commander in Europe, General B. B. Bell, has stated that he envisions most of the 40,000 troops coming from the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division, which are currently based in Germany. Additional troops to be withdrawn would come from Corps and Theater-level support units. Bell stated that he wants to transfer a new Army Stryker brigade to the Army's training center at Grafenwöhr, Germany, where new barracks and family housing are being built. Under the Administration's proposal, U.S. units permanently based in the United States would periodically deploy for training to forward operating sites in Eastern Europe.

¹ (...continued)

2005 *Internal Selection Process*, by Daniel Else and David Lockwood, and CRS Report RL32216, *Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round*, by David E. Lockwood.

² Robert Burns, “U.S. To Close 35 Percent Of Overseas Bases,” *Associated Press Newswires*, September 23, 2004.

Asia and the Pacific. In addition to consolidating headquarters and facilities in Japan and Korea, the Administration's basing proposal would involve creating new "nodes" for U.S. special operations forces and "multiple access avenues" for deploying U.S. troops in to contingencies in the region. DOD officials have stated that 12,500 troops would be withdrawn from South Korea, with the first 5,000 to be withdrawn by the end of 2004, another 3,000 in 2005, another 2,000 in 2006, and the final 2,500 in 2007-2008.³ Of the 5,000 to be withdrawn this year, 3,700 of the Army troops will come from the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, which have already been deployed to Iraq. DOD reportedly is also considering transferring additional U.S. military forces to non-CONUS bases in the Pacific region. Navy Admiral Thomas Fargo, chief of U.S. Pacific Command, has proposed that Army Stryker brigades, along with Air Force C-17 transport aircraft and high-speed transport ships, may be transferred to Alaska and Hawaii. He also stated that an aircraft carrier strike group may be transferred forward in the Pacific, as well as, Air Force bombers and Navy submarines being transferred to Guam, which is a U.S. territory.⁴

Western Hemisphere and Africa. DOD's proposal envisions a diverse array of smaller cooperative locations for contingency access. These locations could be important to an increased U.S. presence due to the spread of radical Islam, an AIDS epidemic, a tenuous transition of power in Guinea, and the potential instability in oil-rich Nigeria. In addition to Sao Tome and Principe (off the coast of Africa), potential host nations in Africa that have been mentioned include Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda.⁵

Administration Rationale. The Administration's proposal is the result of a review of U.S. global military basing arrangements that began in mid-2001, preceding the attack of September 11. Administration officials say that the global posture review can trace its origins to the 2001 Report of the statutory Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as the National Security Strategy of 2002. Administration officials began the review out of a concern that current U.S. basing arrangements are pre-dominantly a legacy of the U.S. involvement in World War II and the Korean War. They believe these basing arrangements are not optimal for responding to future military challenges in other geographical regions. They further believe that changes that have been made in U.S. global military basing arrangements since the end of the Cold War have simply reduced the numbers of U.S. military forces stationed at principal overseas locations, while not adequately reviewing whether these locations are still appropriate.

Reactions To Administration Proposal. The Administration's proposal has received mixed reactions from Congress and outside observers. Congress has held several hearings to examine the Administration's proposal. Congressional hearings have been held by the House Armed Services Committee, the most recent being held on June 23,

³ Vince Crawley, "Troops Withdraw From South Korea, First of 3 Phases To Be Completed This Year," *Air Force Times*, October 18, 2004, p. 24.

⁴ See, for example, Vince Crawley, "Pentagon Gives Congress Plan For Overseas Basing," *Air Force Times*, October 11, 2004, p. 12.

⁵ DOD In Talks With South, West African Nations About Basing Rights," *Inside the Pentagon*, October 21, 2004, p. 1.

2004, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the most recent being held on September 23, 2004. Congress also established the Overseas Basing Commission, which has held three meetings thus far, the most recent being held on November 9, 2004.⁶ Though global posture review was not the Commission's intended task, this Commission has held two hearings to discuss the Administration's proposal and its impact on the overseas basing structure. It has become apparent that some analysts agree with the Administration's logic and support the overall proposal, while others have expressed concerns.

Michael O'Hanlon, of the Brookings Institute, expressed some concerns about the proposal, stating that DOD consultations with the State Department, Congress, and U.S. allies have been belated and insufficient, allowing misperceptions about the proposal to grow. He stated that some of the Administration's proposed changes for the basing of Army units, if taken too far, could worsen the current deployment strains being experienced by the Army as it sustains deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Administration's proposal, he stated, does not sufficiently reduce Marine Corps forces on Okinawa, where 20,000 Marines are based on a densely populated island — a situation that has led to local political opposition and put the broader U.S. military base network in Japan at some risk. A reduced presence of 5,000 to 7,000 Marines in Okinawa, he said, would be more appropriate.

Lawrence Korb, of the Center for American Progress, stated that developing new global basing arrangements should be part of an overall process for developing a national security strategy. In most cases, he stated, it is less expensive to base troops overseas than in the United States, particularly when host countries underwrite some of the costs involved, and that closing overseas bases will not save money unless the troops serving overseas are demobilized. He also stated that U.S. troops serving overseas as a group act as excellent ambassadors for the values we are trying to promote around the world, and that when closing bases overseas, it is important that it be done in concert with our allies and host nations.

Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and now president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that the DOD has not adequately studied how realigning the forces abroad can be used to strategically shape the international environment in the coming decades. "It appears to me that the kinds of changes to U.S. military posture that DOD is contemplating today are driven by operational expediency, rather than strategy." He continued his testimony by stating: "The problem with this is that, in order to be sustainable over the long-term, U.S. bases overseas must be part of an overall political, diplomatic, and strategic framework."⁷ Dr.

⁶ The Overseas Basing Commission, formally known as the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, was established by the FY2004 Military Construction Appropriations Act (H.R. 2559/P.L. 108-132 of November 22, 2003). The commission is tasked to independently assess whether the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute current missions, and to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging defense requirements. It has been active since May 2004.

⁷ Chris Strohm, "Effort to Realign Military Bases Abroad Seen as Short-Sighted," *GovExec.com*, (continued...)

Hamre also expressed concern that status of forces agreements (SOFAs) can take up to five years to negotiate. He thought these SOFAs would be challenging, especially until the U.S. has reached an understanding with the new hosts on the nature of the relationship and the rights and responsibilities of each party.

Ambassador Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, advised the Overseas Basing Commission to examine several criteria in making recommendations on the overseas basing, such as the efficiency and effectiveness of supporting foreign military operations from the U.S., the value of contingency basing overseas, the cost and needs of forces deployed abroad, and the ability of political and military organizations to work together to prevent conflicts. He asked the commission to also evaluate the “total mission” requirements of the U.S., as opposed to the “total force” needs of the military.

CBO Report On Army Overseas Basing. The Congressional Budget Office study, *Options for Changing the Army's Overseas Basing*, dated May 2004, examined seven alternatives for changing the Army's overseas basing arrangements in Europe and South Korea. The report concluded the following:

Because the United States has invested heavily over the past 50 years in base infrastructure for its troops stationed overseas, any major shifting of forces — either between overseas locations or to the United States — would require significant spending to provide that infrastructure somewhere else.

There would be limited annual savings to offset the large initial investment needed to restation U.S. forces, unless U.S. presence overseas was greatly reduced. In that case, annual savings could exceed \$1 billion, but the net up-front investment would be substantial — on the order of \$7 billion.

Restationing Army forces would produce, at best, only small improvements in the United States' ability to respond to far-flung conflicts. The reason is that deploying Army units to many potential trouble spots from the likely locations of new bases would not be significantly faster than deploying them from current bases.

Bringing forces that are permanently stationed in Europe and South Korea back to the continental United States (CONUS) and maintaining a presence in those regions through unit rotations would reduce the need for infrastructure overseas. It would also reduce instability in Army units by lessening the extent to which soldiers come and go, thus potentially enhancing unit cohesion. But maintaining the current level of overseas presence with unit rotations would limit the forces available for other operations — including the occupation of Iraq — and could hurt retention in the Army by increasing family separation.

If large numbers of forces were relocated from overseas, the need for additional basing in CONUS for tens of thousands of personnel could preclude some of the closings that might otherwise occur as part of the 2005 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC).

Potential Oversight Issues for Congress

Potential oversight issues for Congress concerning the Administration's proposal to alter U.S. global military basing arrangements include the following:

Deployment Flexibility. What effect would implementing the Administration's proposal have on the ability of U.S. forces to respond to potential contingencies in various parts of the world? Would the Administration's proposed combination of main consolidated operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations improve U.S. military deployment flexibility, reduce it, or result in no net change? Are the Administration's assumptions regarding the locations and utility of some of its proposed new basing locations reasonable?

Cost. How would implementing the Administration's proposal affect DOD costs, both in the near term and long term? Are the Administration's estimates regarding the potential costs of the proposal accurate? Has the Administration adequately taken into account the potential costs for increased airlift and sealift assets that might result from transferring troops from Europe and Asia back to the United States?

2005 BRAC Round. How might implementing the Administration's proposal affect the 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process? Would transferring 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia to the continental United States reduce the need for closing domestic U.S. military bases? Is DOD, in identifying candidate domestic bases to be closed or realigned under BRAC, adequately taking into account the potential effect on domestic base capacity requirements of transferring these troops back to the United States?

Army Personnel. How would implementing the Administration's proposal affect the Army's ability to sustain current deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere? Would it reduce current deployment strains on Army personnel, increase them, or produce no net change? What effect might the Administration's proposal have on Army recruiting and retention? Has the Administration adequately taken current Army deployment strains into account in considering the timetable for implementing its proposal?

Relations With Allies. What effect would implementing the Administration's proposals have on relations with allies, particularly Germany and South Korea? To what extent, if any, might allied reaction be influenced by the amount of consultation that DOD conducted with allies before the plan was publicly announced?

Local Legal Arrangements. Would sufficient legal arrangements — such as Status of Forces agreements, cross-servicing agreements, and agreements under the International Criminal Court treaty — be in place for new basing locations that would be established under the Administration's proposal? If these arrangements are not in place, how would this affect the legal status of U.S. forces serving in these locations and the DOD's ability to use these bases?

Arms Control. How is the Administration's proposal affected by the Conventional Forces in Europe arms control treaty, which limits the amount of NATO equipment that can be stationed in Eastern European countries?



Suggested Commissioner Questions
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Overseas Basing Commission Panel

The Honorable Al Cornella - Chairman
Vice Admiral Anthony (Tony) A. Less, USN (Ret)
Brigadier General Keith Martin, PA ARNG (Ret)
Lieutenant General H.G. (Pete) Taylor, USA (Ret)

July 18, 2005

General Questions

1. During the hearing on 18 May 2005 Secretary Harvey offered to provide a breakdown of where the Army plans to station the 47K troops returning from OCONUS. As well, DOD's 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Report* identifies over 13,000 personnel as "undistributed or Overseas Reductions," associated with a category called "Germany, Korea, and Undistributed." Does the Overseas Basing Commission (OSBC) know what is planned for these troops? Who are they and where will they go?
2. The ongoing QDR, BRAC, and the OSBC are interrelated. There is a possibility that decisions made as a result of the ongoing QDR may contradict some of the BRAC and Overseas Basing decisions. Did OSD attempt to integrate QDR and Overseas Basing analyses and decisions?
3. Did you identify other military assets and or units currently stationed overseas that were not recommended by OSD for return to CONUS that you feel should be moved to stateside installations?
4. Given uncertainties regarding future force structure requirements, and an ongoing QDR process, how can the BRAC Commission be confident that overseas bases may not be needed in the future?
5. Could you briefly describe how well you think the proposed overseas basing recommendations achieve their goals, particularly in the areas of satisfying the 1-4-2-1 military strategy? What were the various metrics

established to help determine the extent to which the goals would be achieved?

6. Are there any agreements that have been made between the US and Host Nations that require US forces to return to the US on a specified timeline? If so, what would it require to change that timeline?

QUALITY OF LIFE

7. Did you find evidence that OSD had adequately considered Quality of Life issues such as housing, healthcare, educational facilities in both the on and off base communities they chose to receive the returning forces from overseas? Were the costs for such infrastructure adequately budgeted by the services or OSD?
8. Are the unit moves from overseas to CONUS locations synchronized with the preparation by the receiving installations and communities to adequately house, educate, train and support arriving military personnel and their families? If not, do you have any recommendations to mitigate their challenges?
9. Are you concerned that retention levels will suffer at these major receiving installations if adequate infrastructure is not immediately available? Is the Commission aware of any OSD and/or service plans that synchronize the efforts of installation managers and IGPBS to ensure "conditions are set" for soldiers and families prior to their arrival?

CAPACITY/SURGE

10. Based on OSBC analysis, can you tell us what the overall capacity reduction is projected to be for the Department of Defense, in terms of actual operational forces reduced, military and civilian support personnel positions reduced, square miles of bases and training ranges reduced, storage space eliminated, etc?
11. Based on the OSBC analysis, how will IGPBS help the services to better respond to future surge requirements? To what extent did surge requirements factor into your overall deliberations?


COST

12. One of DoD's military value criteria is to look at the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. DoD, in conjunction with the BRAC process, is planning to bring back thousands of troops from overseas locations to bases in the United States. Many of these troops will be going to bases such as Fort Bliss and Fort Carson, do you believe that both the base and the community infrastructure at these locations can support such a large influx of troops and family members? What impact will it have on the local communities? What additional costs do you see the governments incurring that are not funded through the BRAC process? Further, how will this affect the quality of life of the service member and his/her family?
13. In your report, you state that that DoD has underestimated the cost to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). You estimate this cost to be between \$16 billion and \$20 billion. DoD has only estimated the costs to implement IGPBS at between \$9 billion and \$12 billion, with only about \$4 billion of this amount currently budgeted and about \$3 billion of this amount is in the BRAC account. In addition, GAO has estimated the cost to implement BRAC at \$24 billion. Further, this does not even include the other competing demands on DoD's resources such as the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Army modularity, Army increased end-strength, and other steady-state requirements. All of these efforts will continue to stretch already strained resources.
- a. Given all the direct or indirect relationship of funding through the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, in your opinion, where do you see DOD getting the additional funds to fully implement the BRAC round and IGPBS, let alone all of its other competing demands?
 - b. What would the commission recommend be cut and/or delayed?
14. To what extent has DOD fully calculated the costs of implementing its overseas rebasing initiative, including need for new facilities overseas, new training range requirements, as well as mobility and repositioning

requirements? To what extent will there be any overall net savings from the overseas rebasing initiative considering the upfront costs of implementing that effort as well as changes in future operating costs that will be associated with that effort?

ENVIRONMENTAL

15. Are there any overseas installations where environmental cleanup and restoration costs are significant such that they may cause funding challenges not currently anticipated?





SECRET

BRAC 2005 Closure and Realignment Impacts by State

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Alabama									
Abbott U.S. Army Reserve Center Tuskegee	Close	(2)	(1)	0	0	(2)	(1)	0	(3)
Anderson U.S. Army Reserve Center Troy	Close	(15)	0	0	0	(15)	0	0	(15)
Armed Forces Reserve Center Mobile	Close	(27)	0	22	0	(5)	0	0	(5)
BG William P. Screws U.S. Army Reserve Center Montgomery	Close	(15)	(3)	0	0	(15)	(3)	0	(18)
Fort Ganey Army National Guard Reserve Center Mobile	Close	(13)	0	0	0	(13)	0	0	(13)
Fort Hanna Army National Guard Reserve Center Birmingham	Close	(28)	0	0	0	(28)	0	0	(28)
Gary U.S. Army Reserve Center Enterprise	Close	(9)	(1)	0	0	(9)	(1)	0	(10)
Navy Recruiting District Headquarters Montgomery	Close	(31)	(5)	0	0	(31)	(5)	(5)	(41)
Navy Reserve Center Tuscaloosa AL	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
The Adjutant General Bldg, AL Army National Guard Montgomery	Close	(85)	0	0	0	(85)	0	0	(85)
Wright U.S. Army Reserve Center	Close	(8)	(1)	0	0	(8)	(1)	0	(9)
Anniston Army Depot	Gain	0	(87)	0	1,121	0	1,034	0	1,034
Dannelly Field Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	18	42	18	42	0	60
Fort Rucker	Gain	(423)	(80)	2,157	234	1,734	154	0	1,888
Redstone Arsenal	Gain	(1,322)	(288)	336	1,874	(986)	1,586	1,055	1,655
Birmingham Armed Forces Reserve Center	Realign	(146)	(159)	0	0	(146)	(159)	0	(305)
Birmingham International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(66)	(117)	0	0	(66)	(117)	0	(183)
Maxwell Air Force Base	Realign	(740)	(511)	0	0	(740)	(511)	0	(1,251)
Alabama Total		(2,937)	(1,253)	2,533	3,271	(404)	2,018	1,050	2,664

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Alaska									
Kulis Air Guard Station	Close	(218)	(241)	0	0	(218)	(241)	0	(459)
Eielson Air Force Base	Realign	(2,821)	(319)	0	0	(2,821)	(319)	200	(2,940)
Elmendorf Air Force Base	Realign	(1,499)	(65)	397	233	(1,102)	168	0	(934)
Fort Richardson	Realign	(86)	(199)	0	0	(86)	(199)	(1)	(286)
Alaska Total		(4,624)	(824)	397	233	(4,227)	(591)	199	(4,619)
Arizona									
Air Force Research Lab, Mesa City	Close	(42)	(46)	0	0	(42)	(46)	0	(88)
Allen Hall Armed Forces Reserve Center, Tucson	Close	(60)	0	0	0	(60)	0	0	(60)
Leased Space - AZ	Close/Realign	0	(1)	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)
Marine Corps Air Station Yuma	Gain	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	5
Phoenix Sky Harbor I	Gain	0	0	10	29	10	29	0	39
Fort Huachuca	Realign	0	(212)	0	44	0	(168)	1	(167)
Luke Air Force Base	Realign	(101)	(177)	0	0	(101)	(177)	0	(278)
Arizona Total		(203)	(436)	10	78	(193)	(358)	1	(550)
Arkansas									
El Dorado Armed Forces Reserve Center	Close	(24)	0	0	0	(24)	0	0	(24)
Stone U.S. Army Reserve Center, Pine Bluff	Close	(30)	(4)	0	0	(30)	(4)	0	(34)
Little Rock Air Force Base	Gain	(16)	0	3,595	319	3,579	319	0	3,898
Camp Pike (90th)	Realign	(86)	(91)	0	0	(86)	(91)	0	(177)
Fort Smith Regional	Realign	(19)	(59)	0	0	(19)	(59)	0	(78)
Arkansas Total		(175)	(154)	3,595	319	3,420	165	0	3,585

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
California									
Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell	Close	(72)	0	48	0	(24)	0	0	(24)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Oakland	Close	0	(50)	0	0	0	(50)	0	(50)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, San Bernardino	Close	0	(120)	0	0	0	(120)	0	(120)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, San Diego	Close	(3)	(237)	0	0	(3)	(237)	0	(240)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Seaside	Close	(10)	(51)	0	0	(10)	(51)	0	(61)
Naval Support Activity Corona	Close	(6)	(886)	0	0	(6)	(886)	0	(892)
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Det Concord	Close	0	(71)	0	0	0	(71)	0	(71)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Encino	Close	(33)	0	0	0	(33)	0	0	(33)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Los Angeles	Close	(48)	0	0	0	(48)	0	0	(48)
Onizuka Air Force Station	Close	(107)	(171)	0	0	(107)	(171)	0	(278)
Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant	Close	0	(4)	0	0	0	(4)	(85)	(89)
Leased Space - CA	Close/Realign	(2)	(14)	0	0	(2)	(14)	0	(16)
AFRC Moffett Field	Gain	0	0	87	166	87	166	0	253
Channel Islands Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	4	15	4	15	0	19
Edwards Air Force Base	Gain	(14)	0	23	42	9	42	0	51
Fort Hunter Liggett	Gain	0	0	25	18	25	18	0	43
Fresno Air Terminal	Gain	0	0	57	254	57	254	0	311
Marine Corps Base Miramar	Gain	(46)	(3)	87	34	41	31	0	72
Marine Corps Reserve Center Pasadena CA	Gain	0	0	25	0	25	0	0	25
Naval Air Station Lemoore	Gain	(39)	0	44	35	5	35	0	40
Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake	Gain	(44)	(14)	198	2,329	154	2,315	0	2,469
Naval Base Point Loma	Gain	(12)	(341)	312	350	300	9	0	309
Naval Station San Diego	Gain	(1)	(2)	1,085	86	1,084	84	2	1,170

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Vandenberg Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	44	101	44	101	0	145
Beale Air Force Base	Realign	(8)	(171)	0	0	(8)	(171)	0	(179)
Camp Parks (91st)	Realign	(25)	(18)	0	0	(25)	(18)	0	(43)
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin	Realign	0	(31)	0	0	0	(31)	0	(31)
Human Resources Support Center Southwest	Realign	0	(164)	0	0	0	(164)	0	(164)
Los Alamitos (63rd)	Realign	(92)	(78)	0	0	(92)	(78)	0	(170)
March Air Reserve Base	Realign	(71)	(44)	0	4	(71)	(40)	0	(111)
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton	Realign	(145)	(6)	0	7	(145)	1	0	(144)
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow	Realign	(140)	(330)	0	0	(140)	(330)	51	(419)
Naval Base Coronado	Realign	(71)	(587)	0	198	(71)	(389)	0	(460)
Naval Base Ventura City	Realign	(244)	(2,149)	5	854	(239)	(1,295)	0	(1,534)
Naval Medical Center San Diego	Realign	(1,596)	(33)	0	0	(1,596)	(33)	(1)	(1,630)
Naval Weapons Station Fallbrook	Realign	0	(118)	0	0	0	(118)	0	(118)
California Total		(2,829)	(5,693)	2,044	4,493	(785)	(1,200)	(33)	(2,018)
Colorado									
Leased Space - CO	Close/Realign	0	(11)	0	0	0	(11)	0	(11)
Buckley Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	13	81	13	81	0	94
Fort Carson	Gain	0	0	4,178	199	4,178	199	0	4,377
Peterson Air Force Base	Gain	0	(27)	482	19	482	(8)	36	510
Schriever Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	44	51	44	51	0	95
Air Reserve Personnel Center	Realign	(159)	(1,447)	57	1,500	(102)	53	(59)	(108)
United States Air Force Academy	Realign	(30)	(9)	0	0	(30)	(9)	(1)	(40)
Colorado Total		(189)	(1,494)	4,774	1,850	4,585	356	(24)	4,917

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Connecticut									
SGT Libby U.S. Army Reserve Center, New Haven	Close	(14)	(7)	0	0	(14)	(7)	0	(21)
Submarine Base New London	Close	(7,096)	(952)	0	0	(7,096)	(952)	(412)	(8,460)
Turner U.S. Army Reserve Center, Fairfield	Close	(13)	(4)	0	0	(13)	(4)	0	(17)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Area Maintenance Support Facility Middletown	Close	(13)	(5)	0	0	(13)	(5)	0	(18)
Bradley International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(23)	(88)	26	15	3	(73)	0	(70)
Connecticut Total		(7,159)	(1,056)	26	15	(7,133)	(1,041)	(412)	(8,586)
Delaware									
Kirkwood U.S. Army Reserve Center, Newark	Close	(7)	(2)	0	0	(7)	(2)	0	(9)
Dover Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	115	133	115	133	0	248
New Castle County Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(47)	(101)	0	0	(47)	(101)	0	(148)
Delaware Total		(54)	(103)	115	133	61	30	0	91
District of Columbia									
Leased Space - DC	Close/Realign	(103)	(68)	0	79	(103)	11	0	(92)
Bolling Air Force Base	Realign	(96)	(242)	0	0	(96)	(242)	(61)	(399)
Naval District Washington	Realign	(108)	(845)	28	522	(80)	(323)	40	(363)
Potomac Annex	Realign	(4)	(5)	0	0	(4)	(5)	(3)	(12)
Walter Reed Army Medical Center	Realign	(2,679)	(2,388)	28	31	(2,651)	(2,357)	(622)	(5,630)
District of Columbia Total		(2,990)	(3,548)	56	632	(2,934)	(2,916)	(646)	(6,496)

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Florida									
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Orlando	Close	(9)	(200)	0	0	(9)	(200)	0	(209)
Navy Reserve Center ST Petersburg	Close	(12)	0	0	0	(12)	0	0	(12)
Eglin Air Force Base	Gain	(28)	(42)	2,168	120	2,140	78	0	2,218
Homestead Air Reserve Station	Gain	0	(12)	0	83	0	71	0	71
Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	(6)	45	22	45	16	0	61
MacDill Air Force Base	Gain	(292)	0	162	231	(130)	231	0	101
Naval Air Station Jacksonville	Gain	(72)	(245)	1,974	310	1,902	65	58	2,025
Naval Station Mayport	Gain	(6)	0	403	13	397	13	0	410
Hurlburt Field	Realign	(48)	(6)	0	0	(48)	(6)	0	(54)
Naval Air Station Pensacola	Realign	(857)	(1,304)	555	114	(302)	(1,180)	(97)	(1,573)
Naval Support Activity Panama City	Realign	(12)	(12)	0	0	(12)	(12)	0	(24)
Patrick Air Force Base	Realign	(136)	(59)	0	0	(136)	(59)	0	(195)
Tyndall Air Force Base	Realign	(48)	(19)	11	0	(37)	(19)	0	(56)
Florida Total		(1,520)	(1,905)	5,318	903	3,798	(1,002)	(39)	2,757

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Georgia									
Fort Gillem	Close	(517)	(570)	6	0	(511)	(570)	0	(1,081)
Fort McPherson	Close	(2,260)	(1,881)	0	0	(2,260)	(1,881)	0	(4,141)
Inspector/Instructor Rome GA	Close	(9)	0	0	0	(9)	0	0	(9)
Naval Air Station Atlanta	Close	(1,274)	(156)	0	0	(1,274)	(156)	(68)	(1,498)
Naval Supply Corps School Athens	Close	(393)	(108)	4	0	(389)	(108)	(16)	(513)
Peachtree Leases Atlanta	Close	(65)	(97)	0	0	(65)	(97)	0	(162)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Columbus	Close	(9)	0	0	0	(9)	0	0	(9)
Dobbins Air Reserve Base	Gain	0	0	73	45	73	45	0	118
Fort Benning	Gain	(842)	(69)	10,063	687	9,221	618	0	9,839
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany	Gain	(2)	(42)	1	193	(1)	151	0	150
Moody Air Force Base	Gain	(604)	(145)	1,274	50	670	(95)	0	575
Robins Air Force Base	Gain	(484)	(225)	453	224	(31)	(1)	781	749
Savannah International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	17	21	17	21	0	38
Submarine Base Kings Bay	Gain	0	0	3,245	102	3,245	102	20	3,367
Georgia Total		(6,459)	(3,293)	15,136	1,322	8,677	(1,971)	717	7,423
Guam									
Andersen Air Force Base	Realign	(64)	(31)	0	0	(64)	(31)	0	(95)
Guam Total		(64)	(31)	0	0	(64)	(31)	0	(95)
Hawaii									
Army National Guard Reserve Center Honokaa	Close	(118)	0	0	0	(118)	0	0	(118)
Naval Station Pearl Harbor	Gain	(29)	(213)	0	324	(29)	111	0	82
Hickam Air Force Base	Realign	(311)	(117)	159	7	(152)	(110)	0	(262)
Hawaii Total		(458)	(330)	159	331	(299)	1	0	(298)

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Idaho									
Navy Reserve Center Pocatello	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station	Realign	(22)	(62)	0	1	(22)	(61)	0	(83)
Mountain Home Air Force Base	Realign	(1,235)	(54)	697	23	(538)	(31)	0	(569)
Idaho Total		(1,264)	(116)	697	24	(567)	(92)	0	(659)
Illinois									
Armed Forces Reserve Center Carbondale	Close	(32)	0	0	0	(32)	0	0	(32)
Navy Reserve Center Forest Park	Close	(15)	0	0	0	(15)	0	0	(15)
Greater Peoria Regio	Gain	0	0	13	21	13	21	0	34
Scott Air Force Base	Gain	(252)	0	131	832	(121)	832	86	797
Capital Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(52)	(133)	22	0	(30)	(133)	0	(163)
Fort Sheridan	Realign	(17)	(17)	0	0	(17)	(17)	0	(34)
Naval Station Great Lakes	Realign	(2,005)	(124)	16	101	(1,989)	(23)	(10)	(2,022)
Rock Island Arsenal	Realign	(3)	(1,537)	157	120	154	(1,417)	0	(1,263)
Illinois Total		(2,376)	(1,811)	339	1,074	(2,037)	(737)	76	(2,698)

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Indiana									
Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Grissom Air Reserve Base, Bunker Hill	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy Recruiting District Headquarters Indianapolis	Close	(27)	(5)	0	0	(27)	(5)	(6)	(38)
Navy Reserve Center Evansville	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Newport Chemical Depot	Close	(210)	(81)	0	0	(210)	(81)	(280)	(571)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Lafayette	Close	(21)	0	0	0	(21)	0	0	(21)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Seston	Close	(12)	0	0	0	(12)	0	0	(12)
Leased Space - IN	Close/Realign	(25)	(111)	0	0	(25)	(111)	0	(136)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis	Gain	0	(100)	114	3,478	114	3,378	3	3,495
Fort Wayne International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	(5)	0	62	256	57	256	0	313
Hulman International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(12)	(124)	0	0	(12)	(124)	0	(136)
Naval Support Activity Crane	Realign	0	(672)	0	0	0	(672)	(11)	(683)
Indiana Total		(326)	(1,093)	176	3,734	(150)	2,641	(294)	2,197
Iowa									
Navy Reserve Center Cedar Rapids	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy Reserve Center Sioux City	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Dubuque	Close	(19)	(5)	0	0	(19)	(5)	0	(24)
Des Moines International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	(31)	(172)	54	196	23	24	0	47
Sioux Gateway Airport Air Guard	Gain	0	0	33	170	33	170	0	203
Armed Forces Reserve Center Camp Dodge	Realign	(217)	(1)	0	0	(217)	(1)	0	(218)
Iowa Total		(281)	(178)	87	366	(194)	188	0	(6)

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ			
Kansas										
Kansas Army Ammunition Plant	Close	0	(8)	0	0	0	(8)	(159)	(167)	
Forbes Field Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	53	194	53	194	0	247	
Fort Leavenworth	Gain	(16)	0	211	8	195	8	0	203	
Fort Riley	Gain	0	0	2,415	440	2,415	440	0	2,855	
McConnell Air Force Base	Gain	(27)	(183)	704	28	677	(155)	0	522	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Wichita	Realign	(22)	(56)	0	0	(22)	(56)	0	(78)	
Kansas	Total	(65)	(247)	3,383	670	3,318	423	(159)	3,582	
Kentucky										
Army National Guard Reserve Center Paducah	Close	(31)	0	0	0	(31)	0	0	(31)	
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Lexington	Close	(5)	(40)	0	0	(5)	(40)	0	(45)	
Navy Reserve Center Lexington	Close	(9)	0	0	0	(9)	0	0	(9)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Louisville	Close	(30)	(13)	0	0	(30)	(13)	0	(43)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Maysville	Close	(16)	(2)	0	0	(16)	(2)	0	(18)	
Louisville International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	6	
Fort Campbell	Realign	(433)	0	73	9	(360)	9	0	(351)	
Fort Knox	Realign	(10,159)	(772)	5,292	2,511	(4,867)	1,739	184	(2,944)	
Navy Recruiting Command Louisville	Realign	(6)	(217)	0	0	(6)	(217)	0	(223)	
Kentucky	Total	(10,689)	(1,044)	5,365	2,526	(5,324)	1,482	184	(3,658)	

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Louisiana									
Baton Rouge Army National Guard Reserve Center	Close	(128)	0	11	0	(117)	0	0	(117)
Naval Support Activity New Orleans	Close	(1,997)	(652)	0	0	(1,997)	(652)	(62)	(2,711)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Baton Rouge	Close	(18)	0	0	0	(18)	0	0	(18)
Roberts U.S. Army Reserve Center, Baton Rouge	Close	(30)	0	0	0	(30)	0	0	(30)
Leased Space - Sidel	Close/Realign	(1)	(102)	0	0	(1)	(102)	(48)	(151)
Barksdale Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	5	60	5	60	0	65
Naval Air Station New Orleans	Gain	0	0	1,407	446	1,407	446	3	1,856
Naval Air Station New Orleans Air Reserve Station	Realign	(4)	(308)	45	76	41	(232)	0	(191)
Louisiana Total		(2,178)	(1,062)	1,468	582	(710)	(480)	(107)	(1,297)
Maine									
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Limestone	Close	0	(241)	0	0	0	(241)	0	(241)
Naval Reserve Center, Bangor	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth	Close	(201)	(4,032)	0	0	(201)	(4,032)	(277)	(4,510)
Bangor International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	45	195	45	195	0	240
Naval Air Station Brunswick	Realign	(2,317)	(61)	0	0	(2,317)	(61)	(42)	(2,420)
Maine Total		(2,525)	(4,334)	45	195	(2,480)	(4,139)	(319)	(6,938)

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs. Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Maryland									
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Patuxent River	Close	0	(53)	0	0	0	(53)	0	(53)
Navy Reserve Center Adelphi	Close	(17)	0	0	0	(17)	0	0	(17)
PFC Flair U.S. Army Reserve Center, Frederick	Close	(20)	(2)	0	0	(20)	(2)	0	(22)
Leased Space - MD	Close/Realign	(19)	(156)	0	0	(19)	(156)	0	(175)
Aberdeen Proving Ground	Gain	(3,862)	(290)	451	5,661	(3,411)	5,371	216	2,176
Andrews Air Force Base	Gain	(416)	(189)	607	489	191	300	(91)	400
Fort Detrick	Gain	0	0	76	43	76	43	(15)	104
Fort Meade	Gain	(2)	0	684	2,915	682	2,915	1,764	5,361
National Naval Medical Center Bethesda	Gain	0	0	982	936	982	936	(29)	1,889
Naval Air Station Patuxent River	Gain	(10)	(42)	7	226	(3)	84	6	87
Naval Surface Weapons Station Carderock	Gain	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	6
Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi	Realign	0	(43)	0	0	0	(43)	0	(43)
Bethesda/Chevy Chase	Realign	(5)	(2)	0	0	(5)	(2)	0	(7)
Fort Lewis	Realign	0	(164)	0	0	0	(164)	0	(164)
Martin State Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(17)	(106)	0	0	(17)	(106)	0	(123)
Naval Air Facility Washington	Realign	(9)	(9)	0	0	(9)	(9)	0	(18)
Naval Station Annapolis	Realign	0	(13)	0	0	0	(13)	0	(13)
Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head	Realign	0	(137)	0	42	0	(95)	0	(95)
Maryland Total		(4,377)	(1,306)	2,807	10,318	(1,570)	9,012	1,851	9,293

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Massachusetts									
Malony U.S. Army Reserve Center	Close	(100)	(55)	0	0	(100)	(55)	0	(155)
Otis Air Guard Base	Close	(62)	(443)	0	0	(62)	(443)	0	(505)
Westover U.S. Army Reserve Center, Cicopee	Close	(13)	0	0	0	(13)	0	0	(13)
Barnes Municipal Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	(5)	23	89	23	84	0	107
Hanscom Air Force Base	Gain	(47)	(223)	546	828	499	605	0	1,104
Westover Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	69	11	69	11	0	80
Natick Soldier Systems Center	Realign	0	(19)	0	0	0	(19)	0	(19)
Naval Shipyard Puget Sound-Boston Detachment	Realign	0	(108)	0	0	0	(108)	0	(108)
Massachusetts Total		(222)	(853)	638	928	416	75	0	491
Michigan									
Navy Reserve Center Marquette	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Pansan U.S. Army Reserve Center, Lansing	Close	(25)	0	0	0	(25)	0	0	(25)
Selfridge Army Activity	Close	(126)	(174)	0	0	(126)	(174)	0	(300)
W. K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station	Close	(68)	(206)	0	0	(68)	(206)	0	(274)
Detroit Arsenal	Gain	(4)	(104)	4	751	0	647	0	647
Selfridge Air National Guard Base	Gain	(3)	(76)	72	167	69	91	(76)	84
Michigan Total		(233)	(560)	76	918	(157)	358	(76)	125
Minnesota									
Navy Reserve Center Duluth	Close	(8)	0	0	0	(8)	0	0	(8)
Fort Snelling	Realign	(130)	(124)	0	0	(130)	(124)	0	(254)
Minnesota Total		(138)	(124)	0	0	(138)	(124)	0	(262)

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Mississippi									
Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant	Close	0	(4)	0	0	0	(4)	(50)	(54)
Naval Station Pascagoula	Close	(844)	(112)	0	0	(844)	(112)	(7)	(963)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Vicksburg	Close	(26)	(2)	0	0	(26)	(2)	0	(28)
Columbus Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	104	3	104	3	0	107
Jackson International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Human Resources Support Center Southeast	Realign	0	(138)	0	0	0	(138)	(10)	(148)
Keesler Air Force Base	Realign	(181)	(31)	0	0	(181)	(31)	(190)	(402)
Key Field Air Guard Station	Realign	(33)	(142)	0	0	(33)	(142)	0	(175)
Naval Air Station Meridian	Realign	(15)	0	0	0	(15)	0	(1)	(16)
Mississippi Total		(1,099)	(429)	104	4	(995)	(425)	(258)	(1,678)
Missouri									
Army National Guard Reserve Center Jefferson Barracks	Close	(67)	0	0	0	(67)	0	0	(67)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Kansas City	Close	(37)	(576)	0	0	(37)	(576)	0	(613)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, St. Louis	Close	(2)	(291)	0	0	(2)	(291)	0	(293)
Marine Corps Support Center Kansas City	Close	(191)	(139)	0	0	(191)	(139)	(3)	(333)
Navy Recruiting District Headquarters Kansas	Close	(21)	(6)	0	0	(21)	(6)	(6)	(33)
Navy Reserve Center Cape Girardeau	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Leased Space - MO	Close/Realign	(709)	(1,234)	0	0	(709)	(1,234)	(150)	(2,093)
Rosecrans Memorial Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	8	27	8	27	0	35
Whiteman Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	3	58	3	58	0	61
Fort Leonard Wood	Realign	(181)	(2)	71	25	(110)	23	0	(87)
Lambert International Airport- St Louis	Realign	(34)	(215)	0	0	(34)	(215)	0	(249)
Missouri Total		(1,249)	(2,463)	82	110	(1,167)	(2,353)	(159)	(3,679)

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Montana									
Galt Hall U.S. Army Reserve Center, Great Falls	Close	(14)	(3)	0	0	(14)	(3)	0	(17)
Great Falls International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(26)	(81)	0	0	(26)	(81)	0	(107)
Montana	Total	(40)	(84)	0	0	(40)	(84)	0	(124)
Nebraska									
Army National Guard Reserve Center Columbus	Close	(31)	0	0	0	(31)	0	0	(31)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Grand Island	Close	(31)	0	0	0	(31)	0	0	(31)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Kearny	Close	(8)	0	0	0	(8)	0	0	(8)
Naval Recruiting District Headquarters Omaha	Close	(19)	(7)	0	0	(19)	(7)	(6)	(32)
Navy Reserve Center Lincoln	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Offutt Air Force Base	Realign		(227)	54	69	54	158	0	(104)
Nebraska	Total	(96)	(234)	54	69	(42)	(165)	(6)	(213)
Nevada									
Hawthorne Army Depot	Close	(74)	(45)	0	0	(74)	(45)	(80)	(199)
Nellis Air Force Base	Gain	(265)	(5)	1,414	268	1,149	263	0	1,412
Naval Air Station Fallon	Realign	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Reno-Tahoe International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(23)	(124)	0	0	(23)	(124)	0	(147)
Nevada	Total	(369)	(174)	1,414	268	1,045	94	(80)	1,059
New Hampshire									
Doble U.S. Army Reserve Center Portsmouth	Close	(39)	(5)	0	0	(39)	(5)	0	(44)
Armed Forces Reserve Center Pease Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	20	28	20	28	0	48
New Hampshire	Total	(39)	(5)	20	28	(19)	23	0	4

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
New Jersey									
Fort Monmouth	Close	(620)	(4,652)	0	0	(620)	(4,652)	0	(5,272)
Inspector/Instructor Center West Trenton	Close	(11)	(1)	0	0	(11)	(1)	0	(12)
Kilmer U.S. Army Reserve Center, Edison	Close	(23)	(21)	0	0	(23)	(21)	0	(44)
SFC Nelson V. Brittin U.S. Army Reserve Center	Close	(34)	(1)	0	0	(34)	(1)	0	(35)
Atlantic City International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	(3)	(53)	62	263	59	210	0	269
Fort Dix	Gain	0	0	209	144	209	144	0	353
McGuire Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	498	37	498	37	0	535
Picatinny Arsenal	Gain	0	0	5	688	5	688	0	693
Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst	Realign	(132)	(54)	0	0	(132)	(54)	0	(186)
Naval Weapons Station Eggenston	Realign	0	(63)	2	0	2	(63)	0	(61)
New Jersey	Total	(823)	(4,845)	776	1,132	(47)	(3,713)	0	(3,760)
New Mexico									
Cannon Air Force Base	Close	(2,385)	(384)	0	0	(2,385)	(384)	(55)	(2,824)
Jenkins Armed Forces Reserve Center Albuquerque	Close	(35)	(1)	0	0	(35)	(1)	0	(36)
Kirtland Air Force Base	Gain	(7)	0	37	176	30	176	0	206
Holloman Air Force Base	Realign	(17)	0	0	0	(17)	0	0	(17)
White Sands Missile Range	Realign	(13)	(165)	0	0	(13)	(165)	0	(178)
New Mexico	Total	(2,457)	(550)	37	176	(2,420)	(374)	(55)	(2,849)

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
New York									
Armed Forces Reserve Center Amityville	Close	(24)	(4)	0	0	(24)	(4)	0	(28)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Niagara Falls	Close	(1)	0	0	0	(1)	0	0	(1)
Carpenter U.S. Army Reserve Center, Poughkeepsie	Close	(8)	(1)	0	0	(8)	(1)	0	(9)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Rome	Close	0	(290)	0	0	0	(290)	0	(290)
Navy Recruiting District Headquarters Buffalo	Close	(25)	(6)	0	0	(25)	(6)	(6)	(37)
Navy Reserve Center Glenn Falls	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy Reserve Center Horsehead	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy Reserve Center Watertown	Close	(9)	0	0	0	(9)	0	0	(9)
Niagara Falls International Airport Air Guard Station	Close	(115)	(527)	0	0	(115)	(527)	0	(642)
United States Military Academy	Gain	0	0	226	38	226	38	0	264
Fort Totten / Pyle	Realign	(75)	(74)	0	0	(75)	(74)	0	(149)
Rome Laboratory	Realign	(13)	(124)	0	0	(13)	(124)	0	(137)
Schenectady County Air Guard Station	Realign	(10)	(9)	0	0	(10)	(9)	0	(19)
New York	Total	(294)	(1,035)	226	38	(68)	(997)	(6)	(1,071)

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
North Carolina									
Navy Reserve Center Asheville	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Niven U.S. Army Reserve Center, Albermarle	Close	(34)	0	0	5	(34)	5	0	(29)
Charlotte/Douglas International Airport	Gain	0	0	6	0	6	0	0	6
Fort Bragg	Gain	(1,352)	0	5,430	247	4,078	247	0	4,325
Seymore Johnson Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	345	17	345	17	0	362
Army Research Office, Durham	Realign	(1)	(113)	0	0	(1)	(113)	0	(114)
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point	Realign	(16)	(664)	64	8	48	(656)	(20)	(628)
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune	Realign	(182)	(16)	0	15	(182)	(1)	(9)	(192)
Pope Air Force Base	Realign	(5,969)	(345)	1,148	1,153	(4,821)	808	(132)	(4,145)
North Carolina	Total	(7,561)	(1,138)	6,993	1,445	(551)	307	(161)	(422)
North Dakota									
Grand Forks Air Force Base	Realign	(2,290)	(355)	0	0	(2,290)	(355)	0	(2,645)
North Dakota	Total	(2,290)	(355)	0	0	(2,290)	(355)	0	(2,645)

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Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ			
Ohio										
Army National Guard Reserve Center Mansfield	Close	(59)	(2)	0	0	(59)	(2)	0	(61)	
Army National Guard Reserve Center Westerville	Close	(12)	0	0	0	(12)	0	0	(12)	
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Dayton	Close	0	(230)	0	0	0	(230)	0	(230)	
Mansfield Lahm Municipal Airport Air Guard Station	Close	(63)	(171)	0	0	(63)	(171)	0	(234)	
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron	Close	(26)	0	0	0	(26)	0	0	(26)	
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Cleveland	Close	(24)	(1)	0	0	(24)	(1)	0	(25)	
Parrott U.S. Army Reserve Center Kenton	Close	(9)	(1)	0	0	(9)	(1)	0	(10)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Whitehall	Close	(25)	0	0	0	(25)	0	0	(25)	
Leased Space - OH	Close/Realign	0	(187)	0	0	0	(187)	0	(187)	
Armed Forces Reserve Center Akron	Gain	0	0	0	0	37	0	0	37	
Defense Supply Center Columbus	Gain	(2)	(960)	65	2,655	63	1,695	0	1,758	
Rickenbacker International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	
Toledo Express Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	14	112	14	112	0	126	
Wright Patterson Air Force Base	Gain	(69)	(729)	658	559	589	(170)	75	494	
Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport	Gain	0	0	0	8	0	8	0	8	
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Cleveland	Realign	(15)	(1,013)	0	0	(15)	(1,013)	0	(1,028)	
Glenn Research Center	Realign	0	(50)	0	0	0	(50)	0	(50)	
Rickenbacker Army National Guard Bldg 943 Columbus	Realign	(4)	0	0	0	(4)	0	0	(4)	
Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(66)	(225)	0	0	(66)	(225)	0	(291)	
Ohio Total		(374)	(3,569)	774	3,335	400	(234)	75	241	

This list does not include locations where there were no changes in military or civilian jobs.
Military figures include student load changes.

State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Oklahoma									
Armed Forces Reserve Center Broken Arrow	Close	(26)	0	32	0	6	0	0	6
Armed Forces Reserve Center Muskogee	Close	(14)	(2)	0	0	(14)	(2)	0	(16)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Tishomingo	Close	(30)	0	0	0	(30)	0	0	(30)
Krowse U.S. Army Reserve Center Oklahoma City	Close	(78)	(6)	0	0	(78)	(6)	0	(84)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa	Close	(32)	0	0	0	(32)	0	0	(32)
Oklahoma City (95th)	Close	(31)	(22)	0	0	(31)	(22)	0	(53)
Fort Sill	Gain	(892)	(176)	4,336	337	3,444	161	(3)	3,602
Tinker Air Force Base	Gain	(9)	(197)	9	552	0	355	0	355
Tulsa International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	22	81	22	81	0	103
Vance Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	93	6	93	6	0	99
Allus Air Force Base	Realign	(16)	0	0	0	(16)	0	0	(16)
Will Rogers World Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(19)	(145)	103	46	84	(99)	0	(15)
Oklahoma	Total	(1,147)	(548)	4,595	1,022	3,448	474	(3)	3,919
Oregon									
Navy Reserve Center Central Point	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Umatilla Army Depot	Close	(127)	(385)	0	0	(127)	(385)	0	(512)
Portland International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(112)	(452)	0	0	(112)	(452)	0	(564)
Oregon	Total	(246)	(837)	0	0	(246)	(837)	0	(1,083)

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ			
Pennsylvania										
Bristol	Close	(9)	(2)	0	0	(9)	(2)	0	(11)	
Engineering Field Activity Northeast	Close	(4)	(188)	0	0	(4)	(188)	0	(192)	
Kelly Support Center	Close	(174)	(136)	0	0	(174)	(136)	0	(310)	
Naval Air Station Willow Grove	Close	(865)	(362)	0	0	(865)	(362)	(5)	(1,232)	
Navy Crane Center Lester	Close	(1)	(54)	0	0	(1)	(54)	0	(55)	
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading	Close	(18)	0	0	0	(18)	0	0	(18)	
North Penn U.S. Army Reserve Center, Norristown	Close	(22)	(1)	0	0	(22)	(1)	0	(23)	
Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station	Close	(44)	(278)	0	0	(44)	(278)	0	(322)	
Serrenti U.S. Army Reserve Center, Scranton	Close	(47)	(8)	0	0	(47)	(8)	0	(55)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Bloomsburg	Close	(20)	(2)	0	0	(20)	(2)	0	(22)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Lewisburg	Close	(9)	(2)	0	0	(9)	(2)	0	(11)	
U.S. Army Reserve Center Williamsport	Close	(25)	(4)	0	0	(25)	(4)	0	(29)	
W. Reese U.S. Army Reserve Center/OMS, Chester	Close	(9)	(1)	0	0	(9)	(1)	0	(10)	
Letterkenny Army Depot	Gain	0	0	0	409	0	409	0	409	
Naval Support Activity Philadelphia	Gain	0	(10)	0	301	0	291	0	291	
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Lehigh	Gain	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	8	
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Pittsburgh	Gain	0	0	7	0	7	0	0	7	
Tobyhanna Army Depot	Gain	(1)	(82)	3	355	2	273	0	275	
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna	Realign	0	(15)	0	0	0	(15)	0	(15)	
Human Resources Support Center Northeast	Realign	0	(174)	0	0	0	(174)	(9)	(183)	
Marine Corps Reserve Center Johnstown	Realign	(86)	0	0	0	(86)	0	0	(86)	
Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg	Realign	0	(11)	0	0	0	(11)	0	(11)	
Navy Philadelphia Business Center	Realign	0	(63)	0	0	0	(63)	0	(63)	

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Pitt U.S. Army Reserve Center, Corapolis	Realign	(119)	(101)	0	0	(119)	(101)	0	(220)
Pennsylvania	Total	(1,453)	(1,494)	18	1,065	(1,435)	(429)	(14)	(1,878)
Puerto Rico									
Army National Guard Reserve Center Humacao	Close	(26)	0	0	0	(26)	0	0	(26)
Lavergne U.S. Army Reserve Center Bayamon	Close	(25)	(1)	0	0	(25)	(1)	0	(26)
Aguadilla-Ramey U.S. Army Reserve Center/BMA-126	Realign	(10)	0	0	0	(10)	0	0	(10)
Camp Euripides Rubio, Puerto Nuevo	Realign	(43)	0	0	0	(43)	0	0	(43)
Fort Buchanan	Realign	(9)	(47)	0	0	(9)	(47)	0	(56)
Puerto Rico	Total	(113)	(48)	0	0	(113)	(48)	0	(161)
Rhode Island									
Hawco U.S. Army Reserve Center, Providence	Close	(20)	(4)	0	0	(20)	(4)	0	(24)
USARC Bristol	Close	(24)	0	0	0	(24)	0	0	(24)
Naval Station Newport	Gain	(122)	(225)	647	309	525	84	(76)	533
Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	17	29	17	29	0	46
Rhode Island	Total	(166)	(229)	664	338	498	109	(76)	531
South Carolina									
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Charleston	Close	0	(368)	0	0	0	(368)	0	(368)
South Naval Facilities Engineering Command	Close	(6)	(492)	0	0	(6)	(492)	(45)	(543)
Fort Jackson	Gain	0	0	435	180	435	180	0	615
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort	Gain	0	0	0	12	0	12	0	12
McEntire Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	418	8	418	8	0	426
Shaw Air Force Base	Gain	(74)	(1)	816	76	742	75	0	817
Naval Weapons Station Charleston	Realign	(170)	(149)	45	24	(125)	(125)	0	(250)
South Carolina	Total	(250)	(1,010)	1,714	300	1,464	(710)	(45)	709

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
South Dakota									
Ellsworth Air Force Base	Close	(3,315)	(438)	0	0	(3,315)	(438)	(99)	(3,852)
Joe Foss Field Air Guard Station	Gain	(4)	0	32	27	28	27	0	55
South Dakota	Total	(3,319)	(438)	32	27	(3,287)	(411)	(99)	(3,797)
Tennessee									
U. S. Army Reserve Area Maintenance Support Facility Kingsport	Close	(30)	(2)	0	0	(30)	(2)	0	(32)
Leased Space - TN	Close/Realign	0	(6)	0	0	0	(6)	0	(6)
McGee Tyson APT Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	58	190	58	190	0	248
Memphis International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	2	6	2	6	0	8
Naval Support Activity Mid South	Gain	0	0	372	601	372	601	88	1,061
Nashville International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(9)	(172)	0	0	(19)	(172)	0	(191)
Tennessee	Total	(49)	(180)	432	797	383	617	88	1,088

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Texas									
Army National Guard Reserve Center # 2 Dallas	Close	(90)	0	0	0	(90)	0	0	(90)
Army National Guard Reserve Center (Hondo Pass) El Paso	Close	(106)	0	0	0	(106)	0	0	(106)
Army National Guard Reserve Center California Crossing	Close	(47)	0	0	0	(47)	0	0	(47)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Ellington	Close	(14)	(45)	0	0	(14)	(45)	0	(59)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Lufkin	Close	(10)	0	0	0	(10)	0	0	(10)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Marshall	Close	(15)	(1)	0	0	(15)	(1)	0	(16)
Army National Guard Reserve Center New Braunfels	Close	(106)	0	0	0	(106)	0	0	(106)
Brooks City Base	Close	(1,297)	(1,268)	0	0	(1,297)	(1,268)	(358)	(2,923)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, San Antonio	Close	(32)	(303)	0	0	(32)	(303)	0	(335)
Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant	Close	(2)	(18)	0	0	(2)	(18)	(129)	(149)
Naval Station Ingleside	Close	(1,901)	(260)	0	0	(1,901)	(260)	(57)	(2,218)
Navy Reserve Center Lubbock, TX	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy Reserve Center Orange, TX	Close	(11)	0	0	0	(11)	0	0	(11)
Red River Army Depot	Close	(9)	(2,491)	0	0	(9)	(2,491)	0	(2,500)
U.S. Army Reserve Center # 2 Houston	Close	(2)	0	0	0	(2)	0	0	(2)
Leased Space - TX	Close/Realign	(78)	(147)	0	0	(78)	(147)	0	(225)
Carswell ARS, Naval Air Station Fo	Gain	0	(12)	8	116	8	104	0	112
Dyess Air Force Base	Gain	(1,615)	(65)	1,925	129	310	64	0	374
Fort Bliss	Gain	(4,564)	(223)	15,918	370	11,354	147	0	11,501
Fort Sam Houston	Gain	(117)	0	7,765	1,624	7,648	1,624	92	9,364
Laughlin Air Force Base	Gain	0	0	102	80	102	80	0	182
Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Ft. Worth	Gain	(54)	(5)	330	41	276	36	2	314
Randolph Air Force Base	Gain	(576)	(174)	164	705	(412)	531	63	182

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Corpus Christi Army Depot	Realign	0	(92)	0	0	0	(92)	0	(92)
Ellington Field Air Guard Station	Realign	0	(3)	0	0	0	(3)	0	(3)
Fort Hood	Realign	(9,135)	(118)	9,062	0	(73)	(118)	0	(191)
Lackland Air Force Base	Realign	(2,489)	(1,223)	235	453	(2,254)	(770)	(116)	(3,140)
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi	Realign	(926)	(89)	0	0	(926)	(89)	(10)	(1,025)
Sheppard Air Force Base	Realign	(2,519)	(158)	51	2	(2,468)	(156)	0	(2,624)
Texas Total		(25,722)	(6,695)	35,560	3,520	9,838	(3,175)	(513)	6,150
Utah									
Deseret Chemical Depot	Close	(186)	(62)	0	0	(186)	(62)	0	(248)
Fort Douglas	Realign	(15)	(38)	0	0	(15)	(38)	0	(53)
Hill Air Force Base	Realign	(13)	(147)	291	24	278	(423)	0	(145)
Utah Total		(214)	(547)	291	24	77	(523)	0	(446)
Vermont									
Burlington International Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	3	53	3	53	0	56
Vermont Total		0	0	3	53	3	53	0	56

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ			
Virginia										
Fort Monroe	Close	(1,393)	(1,948)	0	0	(1,393)	(1,948)	(223)	(3,564)	
Leased Space - VA	Close/Realign	(6,199)	(15,754)	0	0	(6,199)	(15,754)	(972)	(22,925)	
Defense Supply Center Richmond	Gain	0	(77)	0	83	0	6	0	6	
Fort Belvoir	Gain	(466)	(2,281)	4,537	8,010	4,071	5,729	2,058	11,858	
Fort Lee	Gain	(392)	(2)	6,531	1,151	6,139	1,149	56	7,344	
Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall	Gain	(52)	(22)	453	206	401	184	81	666	
Langley Air Force Base	Gain	(53)	(46)	780	68	727	22	0	749	
Marine Corps Base Quantico	Gain	(50)	0	496	1,357	446	1,357	1,210	3,013	
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek	Gain	0	0	10	27	10	27	0	37	
Naval Shipyard Norfolk	Gain	0	0	177	1,774	177	1,774	85	2,036	
Naval Station Norfolk	Gain	(373)	(1,085)	3,820	356	3,447	(729)	89	2,807	
Naval Support Activity Norfolk	Gain	(6)	0	573	205	567	205	16	788	
Arlington Service Center	Realign	(224)	(516)	435	406	211	(110)	(383)	(282)	
Center for Naval Research	Realign	(25)	(313)	0	0	(25)	(313)	0	(338)	
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Arlington	Realign	(7)	(401)	0	0	(7)	(401)	0	(408)	
Fort Eustis	Realign	(3,863)	(852)	962	1,432	(2,901)	580	169	(2,152)	
Naval Air Station Oceana	Realign	(110)	(3)	0	53	(110)	50	0	(60)	
Naval Medical Center Portsmouth	Realign	(463)	(25)	28	0	(435)	(25)	(1)	(461)	
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren	Realign	0	(503)	0	169	0	(334)	(17)	(351)	
Naval Weapons Station Yorktown	Realign	0	(179)	0	0	0	(179)	0	(179)	
Richmond International Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(25)	(101)	0	0	(25)	(101)	0	(126)	
U.S. Marine Corps Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault	Realign	0	(32)	0	0	0	(32)	0	(32)	

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Virginia	Total	(13,701)	(24,140)	18,802	15,297	5,101	(8,843)	2,168	(1,574)
Washington									
1LT Richard H. Walker U.S. Army Reserve Center	Close	(38)	0	0	0	(38)	0	0	(38)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Everett	Close	(57)	0	0	0	(57)	0	0	(57)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Tacoma	Close	(20)	0	0	0	(20)	0	0	(20)
U.S. Army Reserve Center Fort Lawton	Close	(53)	(54)	0	0	(53)	(54)	0	(107)
Vancouver Barracks	Close	(29)	(16)	0	0	(29)	(16)	0	(45)
Fort Lewis	Gain	(2)	(1)	187	46	185	45	0	230
Human Resources Support Center Northwest	Gain	0	0	0	23	0	23	0	23
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island	Gain	(34)	0	0	173	(34)	173	0	139
Naval Station Bremerton	Gain	0	0	0	1,401	0	1,401	0	1,401
Fairchild Air Force Base	Realign	(26)	(172)	0	0	(26)	(172)	0	(198)
McChord Air Force Base	Realign	(460)	(143)	36	7	(424)	(136)	(7)	(567)
Submarine Base Bangor	Realign	0	(1)	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)
Washington	Total	(719)	(387)	223	1,650	(496)	1,263	(7)	760
West Virginia									
Bias U.S. Army Reserve Center, Huntington	Close	(1)	0	0	0	(1)	0	0	(1)
Fairmont U.S. Army Reserve Center	Close	(88)	0	0	0	(88)	0	0	(88)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville	Close	(16)	0	0	0	(16)	0	0	(16)
Ewra Sheppard Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	7	3	7	3	0	10
Yeager Airport Air Guard Station	Realign	(27)	(129)	0	0	(27)	(129)	0	(156)
West Virginia	Total	(132)	(129)	7	3	(125)	(126)	0	(251)

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State Installation	Action	Out		In		Net Gain/(Loss)		Net Mission Contractor	Total Direct
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ		
Wisconsin									
Gen Mitchell International Airport ARS	Close	(44)	(302)	24	56	(20)	(246)	0	(266)
Navy Reserve Center La Crosse	Close	(7)	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	(7)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison	Close	(23)	(3)	0	0	(23)	(3)	0	(26)
Olson U.S. Army Reserve Center, Madison	Close	(113)	0	0	0	(113)	0	0	(113)
U.S. Army Reserve Center O'Connell	Close	(11)	(1)	0	0	(11)	(1)	0	(12)
Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison	Gain	0	0	40	8	40	8	0	48
Dane County Airport	Gain	(4)	0	22	37	18	37	0	55
Fort McCoy	Realign	(379)	(82)	97	133	(282)	51	0	(231)
Wisconsin	Total	(581)	(388)	183	234	(398)	(154)	0	(552)
Wyoming									
Army Aviation Support Facility Cheyenne	Close	(23)	0	0	0	(23)	0	0	(23)
Army National Guard Reserve Center Thermopolis	Close	(19)	0	0	0	(19)	0	0	(19)
Cheyenne Airport Air Guard Station	Gain	0	0	21	58	21	58	0	79
Wyoming	Total	(42)	0	21	58	(21)	58	0	37
zz Germany, Korea, and Undistributed									
Undistributed or Overseas Reductions	Realign	(14,889)	(2)	718	670	(14,171)	668	0	(13,503)
zz Germany, Korea, and Undistributed	Total	(14,889)	(2)	718	670	(14,171)	668	0	(13,503)
Grand Total		(133,769)	(84,801)	122,987	66,578	(10,782)	(18,223)	2,818	(26,187)

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