Thicksten Grimm Burgum, Inc.
106 North Carolina Ave. SE
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 546-3414
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fax

to: LARRY JACKSON

fax #: 703-696-0550

from: LARRY TAUB

date: May 8, 1995

subject: LBNSY

pages: 3

NOTES: LARRY, This is a proposed plan from the Port of LB to the Navy made in 1992-3. The Port was willing to spend $100 million to consolidate and modernize QOL facilities at the Shipyard. This is still on the table and has not been acted upon by the Navy. LARRY

Proposal for Consolidation/Relocation of Long Beach Naval Station Support Functions by the Port of Long Beach

The Port proposes to acquire Long Beach Naval Station lands on Terminal Island (127 acres) and the Navy Mole (93 acres), according to the plan prepared by Vickerman · Zachary · Miller/ Dames & Moore. In return, the Port would:

- Manage and fund the demolition of buildings on the property and the relocation of retained functions to the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) and the Naval Shipyard (NSY). These relocation costs are estimated at $98 million, and the work could be completed by the end of 1998.
- Manage environmental clean-up of the property to expedite the process. The Navy would be responsible for clean-up costs.
- Compensate the Navy in the form of demolition/relocation, environmental management, land swaps and cash payments if required to equal fair market value of the subject properties.

Our next steps in the process would be to:

- Work together through the Navy Working Group to finalize the reuse study. This group, which includes the major commands at the Long Beach Naval Complex, a representative from NAVFAC, and the Port, has worked closely and cooperatively throughout the study process. The study was planned for completion in mid-July; actual completion will probably be in early August.
- Document the agreed-upon responsibilities of all parties in a Memorandum of Understanding. The Port will prepare a draft.
- Prepare special legislation necessary to accomplish the transfer. This legislation will be needed to permit the Port to pay directly for demolition and relocation and to manage environmental clean-up.
- Initiate detailed planning/engineering studies, including an Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement.
- Jointly determine the fair market value of the property.

THE PORT OF LONG BEACH

Master Plan for Consolidation/Relocation of Naval Station Support Functions

Order-of-Magnitude Construction Budget Estimate

	QUANTITY		ITEM COST	SUB-TOTAL
BUILDING DEMOLITION				$2,853,900
PRIMARY CONSOLIDATION AREA	242,600	SF	$363,900	
PORT RE-USE AREA	1,680,000	SF	$2,490,000	
SITE PREPARATION	220	AC	$2,395,800	$2,395,800
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION				$90,990,200
PRIMARY CONSOLIDATION AREA				
Admin/Comm Services	68,000	SF	$8,742,800	
BEQ (E1 to E6)/Enlisted Galley	258,000	SF	$24,091,700	
BEQ (E7 to E9)/BOQ/Navy Lodge	96,000	SF	$7,854,700	
Consolidated Clubs and Mess	66,000	SF	$9,107,200	
Medical/Dental/Pharmacy	72,000	SF	$10,199,800	
Naval Exchange (shops/stores/warehous	126,000	SF	$7,664,100	
Commissary	50,000	SF	$3,713,900	
Chapel/Child Care Facility	15,000	SF	$1,829,100	
Storage	48,000	SF	$3,090,300	
Gas Station and Repair	15,000	SF	$1,479,300	
Protective Services (fire and police)	9,600	SF	$1,158,900	
SERVMART	26,000	SF	$1,650,000	
Gymnasium/Indoor Courts	44,000	SF	$4,841,200	
Ball Fields/Outdoor Courts			$225,200	
Swimming Pool (25M)			$352,000	
Parking Structures			$5,000,000	
INFRASTRUCTURE/LANDSCAPING			$1,500,000	$1,500,000
TOTAL				$97,739,900

This Order-of-Magnitude Construction Budget Estimate has been derived from the Navy's manual (MIL-HDBK-1010). These are historical costs, escalated to 1994 with an area cost weighting.

Costs associated with environmental mitigation, permitting, engineering or legal action, or with the potential relocation of SIMA (which is not within the primary consolidation area), or the marina and the fuel pier (which would not need to be relocated until Phase III) have not been included.

Vickerman · Zachary · Miller

PIGEON

VOL. XLI NO. 042 LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD LONG BEACH, CA 90822-5099 JULY 8, 1988

s up at Pier E for "Military Weekend"



ABOVE, WHILE CREW AND FAMILIES line the rail, *USS NIMITZ* was guided by Long Beach tugboats toward Pier E where she was later opened to ticket holders for tours of the ship. This marks the first time in 13 years a carrier has visited Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

Below, aircraft tails make a serrated effect against the sky as the tugboats gently nudge *USS NIMITZ* up to the pier during her visit to Long Beach Naval Shipyard during the Independence Day weekend. The ship stopped at the Shipyard on route from her homeport at Puget Sound to San Diego to participate in the City of Long Beach's International City Celebration of the City's 100th birthday.



USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) 18-19 JAN '92
AT PIER E

LB orders

------- ULTIMATE ACTIVITY (M) -------
COMMANDING OFFICER: ENSURE ALL LT'S THROUGH CAPT'S COMPLETE OFFICER RETENTION QUESTIONNAIRES UNDER OPNAVINST 1040.8 SERIES AS PART OF MEMBER'S CHECK-IN PROCEDURES.

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE HOUSING REFERRAL OFFICE PRIOR TO NEGOTIATING ANY AGREEMENT FOR OFF-BASE HOUSING. (OPNAVINST 11101.13 AND OPNAVINST 11101.21 SERIES)
FOR A LIST OF LOCATIONS OF NAVY TEMPORARY LODGES AND TYPES OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE AREA OF YOUR NEW DUTY STATION FOR USE UNTIL PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE OBTAINED, SEE SECNAVINST 11107.2 SERIES. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL THE NAVY LODGE RESERVATIONS CENTER'S TOLL FREE NUMBER (1-800-NAVY-INN).
PAGE 06 RUEACNP3221 UNCLAS
NUMERICAL RELIEF FOR [redacted]
------- SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS -------

SD orders

------- ULTIMATE ACTIVITY (M) -------
COMMANDING OFFICER: ENSURE ALL LT'S THROUGH CAPT'S COMPLETE OFFICER RETENTION QUESTIONNAIRES UNDER OPNAVINST 1040.8 SERIES AS PART OF MEMBER'S CHECK-IN PROCEDURES.
FOR A LIST OF LOCATIONS OF NAVY TEMPORARY LODGES AND TYPES OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE AREA OF YOUR NEW DUTY STATION FOR USE UNTIL PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE OBTAINED, SEE SECNAVINST 11107.2 SERIES. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL THE NAVY LODGE RESERVATIONS CENTER'S TOLL FREE NUMBER (1-800-NAVY-INN).
YOU ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE HOUSING REFERRAL OFFICE PRIOR TO NEGOTIATING ANY AGREEMENT FOR OFF-BASE HOUSING. (OPNAVINST 11101.13 AND OPNAVINST 11101.21 SERIES)
NUMERICAL RELIEF FOR [redacted].
MEMBER ADVISED: LOCATION IS A CRITICAL HOUSING AREA (CHA) WHERE A SHORTAGE OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, INCLUDING BACHELOR, HOUSING EXISTS AND DIFFERING VHA ENTITLEMENTS EXIST. YOU ARE ADVISED TO USE HOUSE HUNTING TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY IF AUTHORIZED BY MILPERSMAN 6810400. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT DEPENDENTS NOT BE MOVED INTO THIS AREA UNTIL SUITABLE HOUSING IS LOCATED. CALL YOUR LOCAL FAMILY HOUSING OFFICE, OR REVIEW OPNAVINST 11101.43 AND CURRENT NAVADMIN ON CHA'S TO CONFIRM ELIGIBILITY, AND SECNAVINST 7220.82 FOR PROCEDURES TO REQUEST VHA AT DEPENDENT'S LOCATION.
------- SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS -------

SAN DIEGO

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 1 (SAN DIEGO)

ARS	38	BOLSTER (LONG BEACH) ?	
FFG	10	WADSWORTH	
FFG	12	GEORGE PHILIP	
FFG	14	SIDES	
FFG	19	JOHN A. MOORE	
FFG	23	LEWIS B. PULLER	
FFG	25	COPELAND	
FFG	27	MAHLON S. TISDALE	
LST	1184	FREDERICK	
LST	1186	CAYUGA (LONG BEACH) ?	
LST	1198	BRISTOL COUNTY	

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 9 (LONG BEACH; EVERETT EFF 30SEP94)

FFG	33	JARRETT (SAN DIEGO)	

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 13 (SAN DIEGO)

AD	42	ACADIA	
AD	43	CAPE COD	
AR	8	JASON	
DD	965	KINKAID	
DD	967	ELLIOT	
DD	986	HARRY W. HILL	
DDG	54	CURTIC WILBUR	
DDG	62	FITZGERALD	(PCO)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 33 (SAN DIEGO)

DD	972	OLDENDORF	
DD	973	JOHN YOUNG	
DD	976	MERRILL	
DDG	53	JOHN PAUL JONES	
DDG	63	STETHEM	(PCO)
DDG	994	CALLAGHAN	
DDG	996	CHANDLER	
FFG	30	REID	
FFG	46	RENTZ	
FFG	48	VANDEGRIFT	
FFG	51	GARY	

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON 9 (SAN DIEGO)

AGF	11	CORONADO	
LHA	1	TARAWA	
LHA	5	PELELIU	
LHD	2	ESSEX	
LHD	4	BOXER	(PCO)
LPD	5	OGDEN	
LPD	6	DULUTH	
LPD	7	CLEVELAND	
LPD	9	DENVER	
LPD	10	JUNEAU	
LPD	10	TRIPOLI	
LPD	11	NEW ORLEANS	
LSD	36	ANCHORAGE	
LSD	39	MOUNT VERNON	
LSD	40	FORT FISHER	
LSD	43	FORT MCHENRY	
LSD	45	COMSTOCK	
LSD	47	RUSHMORE	
LSD	49	HARPERS FERRY	(PCO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 3 (SAN DIEGO)

ARD	30	SAN ONOFRE

SAN DIEGO DOCKERS

11 FFG = 2255
6 DD = 2004
6 DDG = 1980
6 CG = 2184
7 LPD = 2975
7 LSD = 2394
3 LST = 759
1 AGF = 516
2 AO = 2734
1 AR = 842
1 AORM = 130
1 AFDM = 70

TOTAL 18,843

SAN DIEGO NONDOCKERS

CVN (ANG) = 3125
CV-63 = 2773
CV-64 = 3017
LHA-1 = 940
LHA-5 = 940
LHD-2 = 1081
LHD-4 = 1081

TOTAL 12,957

EXCLUDING AIR WING AND TROOPS

DOCKERS 18,843
NONDOCKERS 12,957 = 40
31,800

12,957 ~ 60% = 77

NONDOCKER FAMILIES
7774.2

AS	37	DIXON

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 11 (SAN DIEGO)

ARDM	5	ARCO
AS	41	MCKEE

CRUSIER DESTROYER GROUP ONE
CONSTELLATION CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP ONE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CV	64	CONSTELLATION (NORTH ISLAND)
CG	50	VALLEY FORGE (SAN DIEGO)

CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE
(VINSON CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUSIER DESTROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CG	49	VINCENNES (SAN DIEGO)
CG	54	ANTIETAM (LONG BEACH)

CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE
(KITTY HAWK BATTLE GROUP)
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP FIVE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CV	63	KITTY HAWK (NORTH ISLAND)
CG	62	CHANCELLORSVILLE (SAN DIEGO)
CG	63	COWPENS (SAN DIEGO)

CARRIER GROUP THREE
(LINCOLN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP THREE (ALAMEDA)

CG	59	PRINCETON
CG	67	SHILOH

CARRIER GROUP SEVEN
(NIMITZ CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND)

CG	57	LAKE CHAMPLAIN
AFDM	14	STEADFAST

NAVSURFPAC READINESS SUPPORT GROUP (SAN DIEGO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 3 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	647	POGY
SSN	652	PUFFER
SSN	662	GURNARD
SSN	677	DRUM
SSN	713	HOUSTON

SSN	716	SALT LAKE CITY

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 11 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	701	LA JOLLA
SSN	721	CHICAGO
SSN	724	LOUISVILLE
SSN	752	PASADENA
SSN	754	TOPEKA
SSN	758	ASHEVILLE
SSN	759	JEFFERSON CITY

COMMANDER SUBMARI8NE GROUP 5 (SAN DIEGO)

CHIEF OF STAFF
SUBMARINE BASE BANGOR
SUBMARINE BASE SAN DIEGO
NAVAL SUBMARINE TRAINING FACILITY

SSN	707	PORTSMOUTH

COMMANDER SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT GROUP 1 (SAN DIEGO)

COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET ALAMEDA
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET BRAVO
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET UNMANNED VEHICLE
DEEP SUBMERGENCE UNIT SAN DIEGO

DSRV	1	MYSTIC	(SVC)
DSRV	2	AVALON	(SVC)
DSV	3	TURTLE	(SVC)
DSV	4	SEA CLIFF	(SVC)
AGSS	555	DOLPHIN	(SAN DIEGO)

COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET SIERRA

PEARL HARBOR

COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE GROUP MIDPAC (PEARL HARBOR)

CHIEF OF STAFF
MOBILE DIVING AND SALVAGE UNIT ONE

AO	177	CIMARRON	
AO	180	WILLAMETTE	
ARS	42	RECLAIMER (NRF)	
ARS	50	SAFEGUARD	
ARS	52	SALVOR	
FFG	37	CROMMELIN REUBEN	
FFG	57	~~REUBIN~~ JAMES	
DD	984	LEFTWICH	
DD	985	CUSHING	
DD	990	INGERSOLL	
DD	992	FLETCHER	
DDG	56	JOHN S. MCCAIN	
DDG	59	RUSSELL	(PCO)
DDG	60	PAUL HAMILTON	(PCO)
MOTU	1	(PEARL HARBOR)	
SIMA		PEARL HARBOR	

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUPK SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND)

CG	73	PORT ROYAL (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESGROYER GROUP ONE (SAN DIEGO)

CG	65	CHOSIN (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESGROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO)

CG	70	LAKE ERIE (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 1 (PEARL HARBOR)

SSN	639	TAUTOG
SSN	642	KAMEHAMEHA
SSN	648	ASPRO
SSN	666	HAWKBILL
SSN	672	PINTADO
SSN	680	WILLIAM H. BATES
SSN	682	TUNNY
SSN	684	CAVALLA
SSN	715	BUFFALO
SSN	717	OLYMPIA

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 7 (PEARL HARBOR)

SSN	692	OMAHA
SSN	695	BIRMINGHAM
SSN	696	NEW YORK CITY
SSN	697	INDIANAPOLIS
SSN	698	BREMERTON
SSN	711	SAN FRANCISCO
SSN	718	HONOLULU
SSN	725	HELENA

OTHER THAN SAN DIEGO (WEST COAST)

COMMANDER COMBAT LOGISTICS GROUP 1 (OAKLAND)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AE	22	MAUNA KEA	(CONCORD)
AE	29	MOUNT HOOD	(CONCORD)
AE	32	FLINT	(CONCORD)
AE	33	SHASTA	(CONCORD)
AE	35	KISKA	(CONCORD)
AOE	1	SACRAMENTO	(BREMERTON)

AOE	2	CAMDEN	(BREMERTON)
AOE	7	RAINIER	(BREMERTON)
AOR	3	KANSAS CITY	(OAKLAND)
AOR	7	ROANOKE	(BREMERTON)
MOTU	9	(SAN FRANCISCO)	
SIMA (NMRF) SAN FRANCISCO			(ALAMEDA)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 9 (LONG BEACH; EVERETT 30 SEP 94)

DD	964	PAUL F. FOSTER	(EVERETT) — ?
DD	971	DAVID R. RAY	(EVERETT) — ?
FFG	54	FORD	(EVERETT)
FFG	61	INGRAHAM	(EVERETT)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 13 (SAN DIEGO)

AD	37	SAMUEL GOMPERS	(ALAMEDA)

CARRIER GROUP THREE
LINCOLN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP THREE (ALAMEDA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CVN	72	ABRAHAM LINCOLN	(ALAMEDA; TO BREMERTON '95)
CGN	36	CALIFORNIA	(BREMERTON)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO)

CVN	70	CARL VINSON	(ALAMEDA; TO BREMERTON '96)
CGN	41	ARKANSAS	(ALAMEDA)

CARRIER GROUP SEVEN
NIMITZ CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CVN	68	NIMITZ	(BREMERTON) — Sched. TO GO to North Island
CGN	35	TRUXTON	(BREMERTON)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 17 (BANGOR)

TRIDENT REFIT FACILITY, BANGOR
TRIDENT TRAINING FACILITY

SSBN	726	OHIO	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	727	MICHIGAN	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	728	FLORIDA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	729	GEORGIA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	730	HENRY M. JACKSON	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	731	ALABAMA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	732	ALASKA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	733	NEVADA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP 5 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	688	LOS ANGELES	(MARE ISLAND)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT GROUP 1 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	683	PARCHE	(MARE ISLAND)

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

COMMANDER MSC PACIFIC (ALAMEDA)

CO, MSC OFFICE	SEATTLE
CO, MSC OFFICE	SAN DIEGO
CO, TAGOS SUPPORT UNIT PACIFIC	
MASTER, USNS KILAUEA	TAE 26
MASTER, USNS MARS	TAFS 1
MASTER, USNS SAN JOSE	TAFS 7
MASTER, USNS SPICA	TAFS 9
MASTER, USNS OVSERVATION ISLAND	TAGM 23
MASTER, USNS ASSERTIVE	TAGOS 9
MASTER, USNS AUDACIOUS	TAGOS 11
MASTER, USNS TENACIOUS	TAGOS 17
MASTER, USNS EFFECTIVE	TAGOS 19
MASTER, USNS VICTORIOUS	TAGOS 21
MASTER, USNS WATERS	TAGS 45
MASTER, USNS MERCY	TAH 19
MASTER, USNS MERCURY	TAKR 10
MASTER, USNS HIGGINS	TAO 190
MASTER, USNS WALTER S. DIEHL	TAO 193
MASTER, USNS ERICCSON	TAO 194
MASTER, USNS TIPPECANOE	TAO 199
MASTER, USNS PECOS	TAO 197
MASTER, USNS GUADELUPE	TAO 200
MASTER, USNS YUKON	TAO 202
MASTER, USNS ALBERT J. MYER	TARC 6
MASTER, USNS ZEUS	TARC 7
MASTER, USNS NARRAGANSETT	TATF 167
MASTER, USNS CATAWBA	TATF 168
MASTER, USNS NAVAJO	TATF 169
MASTER, USNS SIOUX	TATF 177
MASTER, USNS CURTIS	TAVB 4

OVERSEAS

COMMANDER LOGISTICS GROUP WESTPAC (SINGAPORE)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AFS	3	NIAGARA FALLS	(GUAM)
AFS	4	WHITE PLAINS	(GUAM)
ATS	2	BEAUFORT	(SASEBO)
ATS	3	BRUNSWICK	(SASEBO)
MOTU	7	(YOKOSUKA)	

CARRIER GROUP FIVE
INDEPENDENCE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP FIVE (YOKOSUKA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CV	62	INDEPENDENCE
CG	52	BUNKER HILL
CG	53	MOBILE BAY

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 15 (YOKOSUKA)

DD	996	HEWITT
DD	975	OBRIEN
DD	991	FIFE
FFG	38	CURTS
FFG	41	MCCLUSKY
FFG	43	THACH
FFG	60	RODNEY M. DAVIS

AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 1 (WHITE BEACH, OKINAWA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

LCC	19	BLUE RIDGE	(YOKOSUKA)

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON 11 (SASEBO)

LHA	3	BELLEAU WOOD	(SASEBO)
LPD	8	DUBUQUE	(SASEBO)
LSD	42	GERMANTOWN	(SASEBO)
LST	1189	SAN BERNADINO	(SASEBO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP SEVEN (YOKOSUKA)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AS	32	HOLLAND	(GUAM)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-D97-F29
BSAT/JC
15 June 1993

The Honorable James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Attn: Matthew P. Behrman
Director of Staff

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards

Dear Chairman Courter:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has requested Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) output reports for additional realignment and closure scenarios for the Naval Shipyards. We are providing the COBRA output reports and, as appropriate, the economic and environmental impact data, as attachments to this letter. Also provided, as requested by Mr. Larry Jackson of your staff, are the Military Value and Capacity analyses for each of the five scenarios.

Our initial COBRA output reports reflected an approach that closed the two yards independently and then aggregated the results; all five of the Commission-requested alternatives were combination closures. Our methodology would not produce comparable results when looking at the series of aggregations unless we could display a clear financial result at gaining shipyards of workload transfer. In order to produce a true comparison, we have run both the DoD recommended closure scenario as well as the five Commission-directed variations using the same methodology. These attached six naval shipyard closure scenarios have been developed against that baseline directly derived from the certified data received in response to the Military Value and Capacity Data Calls. The COBRA output reports are priced using the FY 1994 budget composite rates at the closing yards and those rates adjusted for workload transfer at the gaining yards.

The five alternatives explored clearly demonstrate the direct relationship between the reduction of capacity and estimated savings. It is important to place any potentially viable alternative in the larger context of all the required closure criteria. None of the alternatives improve the residual military value of our recommendation. Only the alternatives closing three shipyards produce substantial savings above the DoD recommendation. The nuclear workload required by the mandated force levels is not supported with alternatives that include the closure of either Portsmouth or Norfolk Naval Shipyards. Finally, several of these scenarios require a dependence on the private sector for accomplishment of increasing quantities of workload. The

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards. continued

capability and commitment of the private shipyards to maintain the skills and facilities necessary to accomplish increasingly complex Navy workloads, without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and maintenance workload, is unproven. Principal dependency on the private sector to accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned, emergent and urgent repair puts Fleet readiness at risk.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-D96-F29
BSAT/JC
11 June 1993

The Honorable James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Attn: Matthew P. Behrman
Director of Staff

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment Scenarios for Naval Shipyards

Dear Chairman Courter:

Some aspects of the additional scenarios requested by your staff cannot be fully captured or accurately assessed with the existing tools, the COBRA, that we are using to evaluate aspects of various alternative recommendations. I would like to provide a larger framework within which our output reports can be placed.

The particular alternatives are based upon a restructuring of the present public-private shipyards relationship, specifically the closure of certain shipyards while retaining critical physical capabilities under a Government Owned and Operated/Contractor Utilized (GOOCU) management. This option has been proposed for docks which are big enough and capable of accommodating aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships, e.g. DD#1 at Long Beach Naval Shipyard and the DD#4-8 area at Norfolk. The COBRA has been run on these alternative configurations, but that model does not fully represent the costs incurred by operations under this type of management.

For example, the identified costs associated with retaining DD#1 at Long Beach in a condition meeting the certification standards for naval shipyards and useable on an emergent basis are below. Readiness of such drydocks includes maintaining the supporting utilities, conducting preventive maintenance and recurring maintenance programs (pump, motors, etc.) to certification requirements, the caisson readiness program and the security watch. These are the minimum costs, incurred *regardless of the level of utilization* of the drydock.

Description	Cost (p.a.)
Maintenance and security of DD to certifiable state	$1,805,000
Environmental permits	37,000
Fully facilitized industrial building	500,000
Total	$2,342,000

In addition, *every* work package will incur additional costs. Unavoidable costs, not yet quantified, include the management, local and remote, for supervision of this maintenance and for the contracting operations. Also, the terms of usage for any areas of the adjacent shipyard released for non-government reuse must ensure that those applications do not create an encroachment issue obviating the continued usage of this industrial facility. This is another very real, but not readily quantifiable, financial impact.

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards, continued

Some of these additional costs can be estimated, though they will vary with the specific work package to be executed. For example, an estimate of the additional cost to dock a Nimitz class aircraft carrier into such a facility are:

	ManDays	Material	Total
Drydock build/set-up	681	$264,500	$581,846
Equipment rental		46,400	46,400
Docking/Undocking ship	232.5	47,360	155,705
Drydock pumpwell operations	15	6,340	13,330
Hookup/disconnect services	64	17,796	47,620
4160V Transformer (ship/install)	45	45,672	66,642
Radiological Surveys	114	22,049	72,973
Totals:	1151.5	$450,157	$986,756

Additional costs which cannot be approximated here include the required direct labor and infrastructure eliminated by yard closure — skilled tradesmen and appropriate supervisors must be brought in from other sites, housed and fed for the duration. Ship maintenance and repair involve significant quantities of supplies and equipments: every work package executed will require ready railhead and trucking access.

Operating public drydocks as a GOOCU facility provides little value to the Navy. The monetary savings are unproven. More important, this approach eliminates the capability and capacity to perform core workload within the public sector. The commitment of the private sector to maintain the skills and facilities necessary to accomplish complex Navy workloads, without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and maintenance workload, is unknown. Principal dependency on the private sector to accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned, emergent and urgent repair puts Fleet readiness at risk and outside Navy control.

Options which are constrained by the BRAC-93 process from complete consideration require a fuller examination in the context of the actual operations such management changes will impose. In that context, two significant economic issues must be remembered. While we may be willing to maintain a physical plant for potential use and pay the marginal costs, the private sector will not keep a pool of underutilized workers on hand to use this plant unless the government is also prepared to pay for this cost. Without these workers on-board, the plant availability doesn't avail us much. Secondly, the reservation of this industrial area can largely frustrate community reuse plans, which in turn frustrate economic recovery, and produces other substantial costs. Only in this larger framework should closure of these facilities be considered. During our deliberations, we believed the better approach for the government was to maintain the public shipyard as the military value of our certain ability to support active Fleet units is our paramount concern and the raison d'etre for public depot facilities.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Neanakis
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

2 MAY 1995

Dear Mr. Yellin,

I am sending this material via Federal Express to ensure that you and Larry Jackson have the same information. I provided the matrix breakdown and comparison to Larry on Wednesday , 26 April. I also gave Larry (see enclosed) a copy of the Drydock Utilization Data Call # 9 Table 1.2a. figures from NAVSEA which substantially deviates from the " official" Data Call numbers. It would be interesting to see how NAVSEA arrived at the figures for ship (11.1) and total (ships) (drydocks).

Today , per Larry Jackson's request, I am sending drawings which depict this shipyard's ability to drydock certain classes of ships. The only exception is the LPH class for which drawings are not available at this time. The original LPH drawings were at Philadelphia , sent to Bremerton and then on to Boston.

I know that you and Larry talk, but realize how busy you both are , so I thought that I'd also give you a copy.

J. Ryan

PS. Thought you might be interested in (1) CVNs which were berthed at Pier E, (2) recent military orders about lack of Navy housing in San Diego and (3) 40% (12,957) of all sailors stationed (excluding air wing and troops) in the San Diego homeport area and whose ships cannot be drydocked in San Diego. If you figure 60% of the sailors are married, then 7774 families are affected by not having a drydock that can accommodate their ship.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-D97-F29
BSAT/JC
15 June 1993

The Honorable James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Attn: Matthew P. Behrman
Director of Staff

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards

Dear Chairman Courter:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has requested Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) output reports for additional realignment and closure scenarios for the Naval Shipyards. We are providing the COBRA output reports and, as appropriate, the economic and environmental impact data, as attachments to this letter. Also provided, as requested by Mr. Larry Jackson of your staff, are the Military Value and Capacity analyses for each of the five scenarios.

Our initial COBRA output reports reflected an approach that closed the two yards independently and then aggregated the results; all five of the Commission-requested alternatives were combination closures. Our methodology would not produce comparable results when looking at the series of aggregations unless we could display a clear financial result at gaining shipyards of workload transfer. In order to produce a true comparison, we have run both the DoD recommended closure scenario as well as the five Commission-directed variations using the same methodology. These attached six naval shipyard closure scenarios have been developed against that baseline directly derived from the certified data received in response to the Military Value and Capacity Data Calls. The COBRA output reports are priced using the FY 1994 budget composite rates at the closing yards and those rates adjusted for workload transfer at the gaining yards.

The five alternatives explored clearly demonstrate the direct relationship between the reduction of capacity and estimated savings. It is important to place any potentially viable alternative in the larger context of all the required closure criteria. None of the alternatives improve the residual military value of our recommendation. Only the alternatives closing three shipyards produce substantial savings above the DoD recommendation. The nuclear workload required by the mandated force levels is not supported with alternatives that include the closure of either Portsmouth or Norfolk Naval Shipyards. Finally, several of these scenarios require a dependence on the private sector for accomplishment of increasing quantities of workload. The

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards. continued

capability and commitment of the private shipyards to maintain the skills and facilities necessary to accomplish increasingly complex Navy workloads, without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and maintenance workload, is unproven. Principal dependency on the private sector to accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned, emergent and urgent repair puts Fleet readiness at risk.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-D96-F29
BSAT/JC
11 June 1993

The Honorable James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Attn: Matthew P. Behrman
Director of Staff

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment Scenarios for Naval Shipyards

Dear Chairman Courter:

Some aspects of the additional scenarios requested by your staff cannot be fully captured or accurately assessed with the existing tools, the COBRA, that we are using to evaluate aspects of various alternative recommendations. I would like to provide a larger framework within which our output reports can be placed.

The particular alternatives are based upon a restructuring of the present public-private shipyards relationship, specifically the closure of certain shipyards while retaining critical physical capabilities under a Government Owned and Operated/Contractor Utilized (GOOCU) management. This option has been proposed for docks which are big enough and capable of accommodating aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships, e.g. DD#1 at Long Beach Naval Shipyard and the DD#4-8 area at Norfolk. The COBRA has been run on these alternative configurations, but that model does not fully represent the costs incurred by operations under this type of management.

For example, the identified costs associated with retaining DD#1 at Long Beach in a condition meeting the certification standards for naval shipyards and useable on an emergent basis are below. Readiness of such drydocks includes maintaining the supporting utilities, conducting preventive maintenance and recurring maintenance programs (pump, motors, etc.) to certification requirements, the caisson readiness program and the security watch. These are the minimum costs, incurred *regardless of the level of utilization* of the drydock.

Description	Cost (p.a.)
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In addition, *every* work package will incur additional costs. Unavoidable costs, not yet quantified, include the management, local and remote, for supervision of this maintenance and for the contracting operations. Also, the terms of usage for any areas of the adjacent shipyard released for non-government reuse must ensure that those applications do not create an encroachment issue obviating the continued usage of this industrial facility. This is another very real, but not readily quantifiable, financial impact.

Re: Alternative Closure/Realignment for Naval Shipyards, continued

Some of these additional costs can be estimated, though they will vary with the specific work package to be executed. For example, an estimate of the additional cost to dock a Nimitz class aircraft carrier into such a facility are:

	ManDays	Material	Total
Drydock build/set-up	681	$264,500	$581,846
Equipment rental		45,400	46,400
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Totals:	1151.5	$450,157	$986,756

Additional costs which cannot be approximated here include the required direct labor and infrastructure eliminated by yard closure — skilled tradesmen and appropriate supervisors must be brought in from other sites, housed and fed for the duration. Ship maintenance and repair involve significant quantities of supplies and equipments: every work package executed will require ready railhead and trucking access.

Operating public drydocks as a GOOCU facility provides little value to the Navy. The monetary savings are unproven. More important, this approach eliminates the capability and capacity to perform core workload within the public sector. The commitment of the private sector to maintain the skills and facilities necessary to accomplish complex Navy workloads, without the ensured profit of a continuous construction and maintenance workload, is unknown. Principal dependency on the private sector to accomplish this workload and to respond to unplanned, emergent and urgent repair puts Fleet readiness at risk and outside Navy control.

Options which are constrained by the BRAC-93 process from complete consideration require a fuller examination in the context of the actual operations such management changes will impose. In that context, two significant economic issues must be remembered. While we may be willing to maintain a physical plant for potential use and pay the marginal costs, the private sector will not keep a pool of underutilized workers on hand to use this plant unless the government is also prepared to pay for this cost. Without these workers on-board, the plant availability doesn't avail us much. Secondly, the reservation of this industrial area can largely frustrate community reuse plans, which in turn frustrate economic recovery, and produces other substantial costs. Only in this larger framework should closure of these facilities be considered. During our deliberations, we believed the better approach for the government was to maintain the public shipyard as the military value of our certain ability to support active Fleet units is our paramount concern and the raison d'etre for public depot facilities.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Neimeyer
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-778-F17
BSAT/JS
29 March 1993

The Honorable Steve Horn
House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Horn

The responses to your query concerning the Department of the Navy's (DON) recommendation to the Base Closure Commission are addressed in the attachment to this letter. The data provided was extracted from the ninety cubic feet of certified DON BRAC-93 data that we have gathered as part of the deliberative process.

I hope the information provided in the attachment satisfactorily addresses your questions.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachment

NSY NUCLEAR WORK CAPACITY ANALYSIS

	Capacity Measure	Throughput (000 Mandays)			Percent	Portsmouth		Norfolk		Charleston	
		Predicted	Capacity	Excess	Excess	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
FY93	Atlantic Shipyards	1,817	2,307	490	21%	619	805	846	1134	352	368
	Pacific Shipyards	2,023	2,379	356	15%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	**3,840**	**4,686**	**846**	**18%**						
FY94	Atlantic Shipyards	1,571	2,410	839	35%	599	1046	684	891	288	473
	Pacific Shipyards	2,107	2,908	801	28%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	**3,678**	**5,318**	**1,640**	**31%**						
FY95	Atlantic Shipyards	1,883	2,574	691	27%	515	899	872	1084	496	591
	Pacific Shipyards	2,020	2,927	907	31%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	**3,903**	**5,501**	**1,598**	**29%**						
FY96	Atlantic Shipyards	2,137	3,004	867	29%	607	1046	924	1210	606	748
	Pacific Shipyards	1,977	2,900	923	32%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	**4,114**	**5,904**	**1,790**	**30%**						
FY97	Atlantic Shipyards	2,020	2,712	692	26%	572	943	903	1018	545	751
	Pacific Shipyards	2,280	3,415	1,135	33%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	**4,300**	**6,127**	**1,827**	**30%**						

SHIPYARDS:

ATLANTIC
Portsmouth, NH
Norfolk, VA
Charleston, SC

PACIFIC
Puget Sound, WA
Mare Island, CA
Pearl Harbor, HI

Puget Sound		Mare Island		Long Beach		Pearl Harbor		Guam	
Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
1220	1325	470	614	0	0	333	440		
								0	0
1239	1565	654	895	0	0	214	448		
								0	0
1099	1441	624	954	0	0	297	532		
								0	0
1250	1505	447	955	0	0	280	440		
								0	0
1537	1760	652	1140	0	0	91	515		
								0	0

NSY NON-NUCLEAR WORK CAPACITY ANALYSIS

	Capacity Measure	Throughput (000 Mandays)			Percent	Portsmouth		Norfolk		Charleston	
		Predicted	Capacity	Excess	Excess	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
FY93	Atlantic Shipyards	1,259	1,757	498	28%	163	192	577	942	519	623
	Pacific Shipyards	1,738	2,504	766	31%						
	SRF Guam	140	254	114	45%						
	TOTAL	3,137	4,515	1,378	31%						
FY94	Atlantic Shipyards	1,117	1,887	770	41%	142	249	560	1068	415	570
	Pacific Shipyards	1,613	2,328	715	31%						
	SRF Guam	170	237	67	28%						
	TOTAL	2,900	4,452	1,552	35%						
FY95	Atlantic Shipyards	771	1,809	1,038	57%	141	332	333	972	297	505
	Pacific Shipyards	1,501	2,544	1,043	41%						
	SRF Guam	148	250	102	41%						
	TOTAL	2,420	4,603	2,183	47%						
FY96	Atlantic Shipyards	727	1,441	714	50%	121	249	431	851	175	341
	Pacific Shipyards	1,353	2,473	1,120	45%						
	SRF Guam	201	255	54	21%						
	TOTAL	2,281	4,169	1,888	45%						
FY97	Atlantic Shipyards	787	1,677	890	53%	121	313	489	1027	177	337
	Pacific Shipyards	1,592	2,610	1,018	39%						
	SRF Guam	255	275	20	7%						
	TOTAL	2,634	4,562	1,928	42%						

SHIPYARDS:

ATLANTIC
Portsmouth, NH
Norfolk, VA
Charleston, SC

PACIFIC
Puget Sound, WA
Mare Island, CA
Long Beach, CA
Pearl Harbor, HI

SRF GUAM

Puget Sound		Mare Island		Long Beach		Pearl Harbor		Guam	
Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
453	528	431	474	568	1058	286	444	140	254
409	494	308	366	536	1016	360	452	170	237
410	646	291	353	539	1015	261	530	148	250
421	639	292	361	454	1023	186	450	201	255
722	797	338	482	400	966	132	365	255	275

CHAS	LB	MARE	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
0	0	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
14.8771	14.8912	13.0486	16.0796	10.1096	11.5314
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	0	1
1	1	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	0	1
1	1	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	0
0	1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
2.32714	3.49072	2.82582	3.49072	2.32714	2.32714
1	1	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	1
43.5	47.8	38.6	63.9	41.4	26.0

NOTE: This matrix reflects correction of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

												Peets	Norda
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				QUALITY OF LIFE	0	0	0	0	0	18.2016	16.7347	15.8744
1	6	11	c•	Is the average wait for housing one month or less?	0	1	0	1	10	1.66	0	0
1	6	11	d•	Is the average wait for housing six months or less?	0	1	0	1	6	1.00	1	1
1	6	13	a•	Are the MWR facilities and programs acceptable?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	1
1	6	13	b•	Does the activity have an adequate gymnasium?	0	1	0	1	8	1.33	1	1
1	6	13	c•	Are the Base Family Support Facilities and Programs acceptable?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	1
1	6	13	d•	Does the activity possess adequate child care facilities?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	1
1	6	13	e	Is off base housing rental and purchase available and affordable?	0	0	0	1	10	1.15	1	1
1	6	13	j	Are there opportunities for spousal employment in the area of the NSY?	0	0	0	1	7	0.80	1	1
1	6	14	a	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours within the activity/commuting area?	0	0	0	1	7	0.80	0	1
2	6	11	e	Are there any special factors that improve QOL not otherwise addressed?	0	1	0	1	3	0.50	1	1
2	6	13	e•	Are there community colleges or universities or vocational shools within a 30-mile radius?	0	0	0	1	6	0.69	1	1
2	6	13	k•	Is the activity located within 50 miles of a major metropolitan center?	0	0	0	1	4	0.46	1	1
2	6	14	b	Is the average commute time 30 minutes or less? ✓	0	0	0	1	7	0.80	1	1
3	6	10	a•	Is the NSY free of access, egress, parking restrictions?	0	1	0	0	2	0.10	1	1
3	6	11	e•	Are there any factors that drive the demand for housing?	0	1	0	1	1	0.17	1	1
3	6	12	a•	Is the percentage of housing units having all required amenities 90% or greater?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	1
3	6	12	b•	Are housing units free of major shortcomings?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	1
3	6	12	c•	Is the occupancy rate of base housing 98% or higher	0	1	0	1	4	0.66	1	1
3	6	12	d•	Is the occupancy rate of the BEQ 95% or higher?	0	1	0	1	4	0.66	1	0
3	6	12	e•	Is the occupancy rate of the BOQ 95% or higher?	0	1	0	1	4	0.66	1	1
3	6	13	g	Does the activity have on base college level education? ✓	0	0	0	1	4	0.46	1	1
3	6	13	l•	Is there any capability for unique medical or dental care in the area?	0	0	0	1	4	0.46	1	1
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	0	0	0	0	0	3.49072	2.82582	2.32714
1	6	10	d	Are crews of customer ships berthed in BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.66	1	1
2	6	10	f	Are the families of the crews of customer ships provided Gov't quarters in the vicinity of the NSY?	0	1	0	1	7	1.16	1	0
3	6	10	d	Are crews of customer ships berthed in barges?	0	1	0	1	4	0.66	0	1

100	41.2	57.0

NOTE: This matrix reflects correction of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

RESPONSES					
CHASN	LONGB	MAREI	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
5.9732	8.8792	5.0839	18.9362	12.4966	0.98858
0	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	1
1	1	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
.73797	4.2782	4.31999	5.54256	4.23818	3.49988
1	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	1
1	1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	1	1
0	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	0	0

=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

14:55

Ques Impo	DC No	Pg No	Qst Ltr	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 20	M 10	C 30	SCORE	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA
				DRYDOCKS						27.7886	3.61745	14.9631
1	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock a CVN?	1	1	1	0	10	1.64	0	1
1	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.64	0	1
1	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32	1	0
1	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.48	0	0
1	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.64	0	0
1	6	16	d	With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	10	1.64	0	1
1	6	16	d	With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.48	0	0
1	6	16	d	With a CVN and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	10	1.64	0	1
1	6	16	d	With 3 SSN-688 drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.48	0	0
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.82	1	0
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.82	1	1
2	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	0
2	6	16	d	With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	0
2	6	16	d	With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
2	6	16	d	With a CVN and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
2	6	16	d	With 3 SSN-688 drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.15	0	1
3	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66	1	0
3	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66	0	0
3	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.33	0	0
3	6	16	d	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSD, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66	0	1
3	6	16	d	With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66	0	0
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				LOCATION FACTORS	0	0	0	0	0	8.1531	4.80425	4.31999
1	6	10	b	Were more than 300 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	8	0.92	1	1
1	6	10	b	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent?	0	0	0	1	10	1.15	0	0
1	6	7	b	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	1	0	1	1	7	1.60	1	1
2	6	10	b	Were more than 200 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	5	0.57	0	0
2	6	10	b	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent?	0	0	0	1	7	0.80	0	0
2	6	10	c	Can a technical workforce be recruited without difficulty for the NSY?	0	0	1	1	6	0.88	1	0
2	6	15	b	Were less than a total of 4000 mandays lost in FY-90 and FY-91 due to poor weather conditions ?	1	0	0	1	4	0.79	1	1
3	6	10	b	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	10	b	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 50 percent?	0	0	0	1	4	0.46	1	1
3	6	10	b	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 30 percent?	0	0	0	1	1	0.11	0	0
3	6	15	a	Were less than a total of 2000 mandays lost in FY-90 and FY-91 due to poor weather conditions?	1	0	0	1	2	0.39	0	1
3	6	7	a	Does the four closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	0	2	0.16	1	1

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

												Ports	World
3	6	7	a	Does the four closest fleet homeport concentrations average more than 1500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	0	1	0.08	0	0
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				OPERATING FACTORS	0	0	0	0	0	11.34	5.89846	5.17376
1	6	7	c	Does the NSY have a FY-92 composite manday rate of less than $500.00?	0	0	0	1	7	0.80	1	0
1	6	7	c	Does the NSY have a FY-92 composite manday rate of less than $400.00?	0	0	0	1	10	1.15	0	1
1	6	8	c	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 15 years? ✓	0	1	0	0	10	0.51	1	0
1	6	8	c	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years? ✓	0	1	0	0	7	0.36	0	0
1	6	8	b	Is the Average AIS maintenance backlog (4 yrs) < $100M (FY93$) ?	0	1	0	1	8	1.33	1	0
1	6	8	b	In FY93$, is FY91 AIS maintenance backlog retirement > 60% ?	0	1	0	1	8	1.33	0	0
1	6	8	a	Did the total investment over the last 10 years at the NSY exceed $200M?	0	1	0	0	10	0.51	0	1
1	6	8	a	Did the total investment over the last 10 years at the NSY exceed $100M?	0	1	0	0	8	0.41	1	0
1	6	8	a	Are investments in excess of $100M planned at the NSY over the next 5 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.36	1	0
1	6	8	a	Are investments in excess of $50M planned at the NSY over the next 5 years?	0	1	0	0	9	0.46	0	1
1	6	8	a	Are there no environmental restrictions in the continued operations of the NSY? ✓	1	1	0	0	10	1.33	1	1
1	6	8	d	Are there no encroachments of record at the NSY? ✓	0	1	0	0	7	0.36	1	1
1	6	8	e	Is the NSY clear of any environmental restrictions to expansion?	0	1	1	0	7	0.58	0	1
1	6	8	f	Is there significant undeveloped acreage or waterfront at the NSY? ✓	0	0	1	0	7	0.22	0	1
2	6	8	b	In FY93$, is FY91 AIS maintenance backlog retirement > 30% ?	0	1	0	1	5	0.83	0	0
3	6	8	g	Does the NSY provide utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities? ✓	0	1	0	0	2	0.10	1	1
3	6	6	a	Was the average cost to transport equipment, machinery, and components > $1.0M in FY90/FY91?	0	0	0	1	2	0.23	1	1
3	6	6	b	Was the effort to manage transport services less than an average of 10K manhours in FY90/FY-91?	0	0	0	1	2	0.23	1	1
3	6	6	c	Will additional costs not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed?	0	0	0	1	2	0.23	1	0
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				CONTINGENCY	0	0	0	0	0	0.65831	0.12539	0.21944
1	6	9	b	Can the direct labor mandays at the NSY be expanded by >1,000,000 MDs /yr with a second shift?	0	0	1	0	8	0.25	0	0
2	6	9	b	Can the direct labor mandays at the NSY be expanded by >800,000 MDs / yr with a second shift?	0	0	1	0	5	0.16	0	1
3	6	9	b	Can the direct labor mandays at the NSY be expanded by >500,000 MDs / yr with a second shift?	0	0	1	0	2	0.06	1	0
3	6	9	c	Can nuclear carriers be berthed at this NSY for holiday surge berthing? ✓	0	0	1	0	1	0.03	0	0
3	6	9	c	Can SSBN/SSN be berthed at this NSY for holiday surge berthing? ✓	0	0	1	0	1	0.03	1	0
3	6	9	c	Can CG/LPD/FFG be berthed at this NSY for holiday surge berthing? ✓	0	0	1	0	1	0.03	1	1
3	6	9	a	Is there more than 600,000 SF of surplus covered industrial space at the NSY?	0	0	1	0	2	0.06	0	0
3	6	9	a	Is there more than 500,000 SF of surplus covered industrial space at the NSY?	0	0	1	0	1	0.03	0	1
					0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0	0
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	0	0	0	0	0	30.3677	8.20953	14.106
1	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1,000,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	10	0.82	0	0
1	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 400,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	9	0.74	0	0
1	6	5	a	Does the fraction of work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities exceed 10 percent?	1	0	0	1	10	1.97	1	1
1	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COH?	1	0	0	0	10	0.82	0	0
1	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive SSBNs/SSNs?	1	0	0	0	10	0.82	0	0
1	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SSBN ROH/RFOH?	1	0	0	0	10	0.82	0	0
1	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SSN ROH/RFOH?	1	0	0	0	10	0.82	1	0
1	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOH?	1	0	1	0	10	1.13	0	1
2	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 600,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	1	1
2	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 200,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	6	0.49	0	1
2	6	5	a	Does the total of other productive work exceed 300,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	5	0.41	0	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

WASH	LB	MARE	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0
.15237	6.57766	4.65782	6.6537	3.71739	6.77057
0	1	1	0	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
0	1	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0
0.12539	0.31348	0.12539	0.34483	0.25078	0.0627
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
9.20868	9.36553	7.66854	14.9684	5.28582	0.79972
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

CHASN	LB	MARE	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	1
1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	1
1	1	1	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

												Ports	NARVA
2	6	5	a	Does the fraction of work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities exceed 4 percent?	1	0	0	1	6	1.18	0	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	0	1
2	6	3	c	Does the NSY have special facilities, equipment or skills to support depot work on CVNs?	1	1	0	0	5	0.67	0	1
2	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.41	0	1
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	1	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SSBN ERPs?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	1	0
2	6	3	c	Does the NSY have special facilities, equipment or skills to support depot work on SSBNs?	1	1	0	0	5	0.67	0	0
2	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.41	0	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SSN DMPs?	1	0	0	0	6	0.49	1	1
2	6	3	c	Does the NSY have special facilities, equipment or skills to support depot work on SSNs?	1	1	0	0	5	0.67	1	1
2	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.41	1	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY inactivate CGNs?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	0	1
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRA?	1	0	1	0	6	0.68	0	1
2	6	3	c	Does the NSY have special facilities, equipment or skills to support depot work on CGNs?	1	1	0	0	5	0.67	1	1
2	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	1	0	5	0.57	0	1
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/AGFs?	1	0	1	0	7	0.79	0	1
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CV/BBs?	1	0	1	0	7	0.79	0	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform ROHs on CGs?	1	0	1	0	7	0.79	0	0
2	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRA on DDG-993/DDG-51s?	1	0	0	0	7	0.57	0	0
2	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.41	0	0
3	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 300,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	4	0.33	0	0
3	6	4	a/b	Does the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 100,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	3	0.25	0	0
3	6	5	a	Does the total of other productive work exceed 100,000 mandays on the average, annually?	1	0	0	0	2	0.16	1	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRA?	1	0	0	0	4	0.33	1	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships?	1	1	0	0	4	0.53	1	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform off-site availabilities on nuclear propelled ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.34	1	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships?	1	0	0	0	2	0.16	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LCC/LHD/LHA/LKA/LPD/LST/AGFs?	1	0	1	0	4	0.45	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs?	1	0	1	0	4	0.45	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CV/BBs?	1	0	1	0	4	0.45	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.34	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs?	1	0	1	0	4	0.45	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs? (post NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.45	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRA on DDs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.34	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DSRA/SRA on FFGs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.34	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFTs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DSRA/SRA on MHC/PHMs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	1
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRA on ASR/ATSs?	1	0	1	0	1	0.11	0	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDM?	1	0	1	0	1	0.11	1	0
3	6	3	a/b	Does the NSY perform TA/RA/VR on non-nuclear propelled ships?	1	0	0	0	1	0.08	0	1
3	6	3	c	Does the NSY have special facilities/equipment/skills to support depot work on non-nuclear ships?	1	1	0	0	1	0.13	0	1
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CV/BBs?	0	0	1	0	3	0.09	0	1
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.34	0	1
3	6	3	d	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.23	0	1

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

Activity: 60258

1. Capacity Utilization, continued

1.2 Calculate the utilization index for the commodity groups applicable to depot maintenance work at your activity. Provide your answers expressed as a percentage (%) in Table 1.2.a by commodity groups for the Fiscal Years requested.

Table 1.2.a: **Utilization Index**

COMMODITY GROUP	INDEX (%)					
	FY 1995	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	
7.1 Radar	18	18	18	18	18	
7.2 Radio Comm.	18	18	18	18	18	
						R
7.5. Nav, Aids	18	18	18	18	18	
7.6 Electro-Optics	18	18	18	18	18	
7. 7 Satellite Control	18	18	18	18	18	
11.1 Ships	75	81	74	88	88	R
11.2 Weapon Systems	82	89	81	97	97	
11.3 Shipyard Support	50	50	50	50	50	
13.1 Bearing Refurbishing	13	14	13	16	16	
13.3 TMDE	27	27	27	27	27	
Total (ships)(drydock)	75	81	74	88	88	R
Total (all others)	33	34	32	35	35	R

BEAM

VOL. XLI NO. 042 LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD JULY 8, 1988
LONG BEACH, CA 90822-5099

up at Pier E for "Military Weekend"



ABOVE, WHILE CREW AND FAMILIES line the rail, *USS NIMITZ* was guided by Long Beach tugboats toward Pier E where she was later opened to ticket holders for tours of the ship. This marks the first time in 13 years a carrier has visited Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

Below, aircraft tails make a serrated effect against the sky as the tugboats gently nudge *USS NIMITZ* up to the pier during her visit to Long Beach Naval Shipyard during the Independence Day weekend. The ship stopped at the Shipyard on route from her homeport at Puget Sound to San Diego to participate in the City of Long Beach's International City Celebration of the City's 100th birthday.





USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) 18-19 JAN '92
AT PIER E

LB orders

------- ULTIMATE ACTIVITY (M) -------
COMMANDING OFFICER: ENSURE ALL LT'S THROUGH CAPT'S COMPLETE OFFICER RETENTION QUESTIONNAIRES UNDER OPNAVINST 1040.8 SERIES AS PART OF MEMBER'S CHECK-IN PROCEDURES.

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE HOUSING REFERRAL OFFICE PRIOR TO NEGOTIATING ANY AGREEMENT FOR OFF-BASE HOUSING. (OPNAVINST 11101.13 AND OPNAVINST 11101.21 SERIES)
FOR A LIST OF LOCATIONS OF NAVY TEMPORARY LODGES AND TYPES OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE AREA OF YOUR NEW DUTY STATION FOR USE UNTIL PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE OBTAINED, SEE SECNAVINST 11107.2 SERIES. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL THE NAVY LODGE RESERVATIONS CENTER'S TOLL FREE NUMBER (1-800-NAVY-INN).
PAGE 06 RUEACNP3221 UNCLAS
NUMERICAL RELIEF FOR [redacted]
------- SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS -------

SD orders

------- ULTIMATE ACTIVITY (M) -------
COMMANDING OFFICER: ENSURE ALL LT'S THROUGH CAPT'S COMPLETE OFFICER RETENTION QUESTIONNAIRES UNDER OPNAVINST 1040.8 SERIES AS PART OF MEMBER'S CHECK-IN PROCEDURES.
FOR A LIST OF LOCATIONS OF NAVY TEMPORARY LODGES AND TYPES OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE AREA OF YOUR NEW DUTY STATION FOR USE UNTIL PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE OBTAINED, SEE SECNAVINST 11107.2 SERIES. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL THE NAVY LODGE RESERVATIONS CENTER'S TOLL FREE NUMBER (1-800-NAVY-INN).
YOU ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE HOUSING REFERRAL OFFICE PRIOR TO NEGOTIATING ANY AGREEMENT FOR OFF-BASE HOUSING. (OPNAVINST 11101.13 AND OPNAVINST 11101.21 SERIES)
NUMERICAL RELIEF FOR [redacted].
MEMBER ADVISED: LOCATION IS A CRITICAL HOUSING AREA (CHA) WHERE A SHORTAGE OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, INCLUDING BACHELOR, HOUSING EXISTS AND DIFFERING VHA ENTITLEMENTS EXIST. YOU ARE ADVISED TO USE HOUSE HUNTING TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY IF AUTHORIZED BY MILPERSMAN 6810400. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT DEPENDENTS NOT BE MOVED INTO THIS AREA UNTIL SUITABLE HOUSING IS LOCATED. CALL YOUR LOCAL FAMILY HOUSING OFFICE, OR REVIEW OPNAVINST 11101.43 AND CURRENT NAVADMIN ON CHA'S TO CONFIRM ELIGIBILITY, AND SECNAVINST 7220.82 FOR PROCEDURES TO REQUEST VHA AT DEPENDENT'S LOCATION.
------- SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS -------

SAN DIEGO

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 1 (SAN DIEGO)

ARS	38	BOLSTER (LONG BEACH) ?	
FFG	10	WADSWORTH	
FFG	12	GEORGE PHILIP	
FFG	14	SIDES	
FFG	19	JOHN A. MOORE	
FFG	23	LEWIS B. PULLER	
FFG	25	COPELAND	
FFG	27	MAHLON S. TISDALE	
LST	1184	FREDERICK	
LST	1186	CAYUGA (LONG BEACH) ?	
LST	1198	BRISTOL COUNTY	

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 9 (LONG BEACH; EVERETT EFF 30SEP94)

FFG	33	JARRETT (SAN DIEGO)	

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 13 (SAN DIEGO)

AD	42	ACADIA	
AD	43	CAPE COD	
AR	8	JASON	
DD	965	KINKAID	
DD	967	ELLIOT	
DD	986	HARRY W. HILL	
DDG	54	CURTIC WILBUR	
DDG	62	FITZGERALD	(PCO)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 33 (SAN DIEGO)

DD	972	OLDENDORF	
DD	973	JOHN YOUNG	
DD	976	MERRILL	
DDG	53	JOHN PAUL JONES	
DDG	63	STETHEM	(PCO)
DDG	994	CALLAGHAN	
DDG	996	CHANDLER	
FFG	30	REID	
FFG	46	RENTZ	
FFG	48	VANDEGRIFT	
FFG	51	GARY	

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON 9 (SAN DIEGO)

AGF	11	CORONADO	
LHA	1	TARAWA	
LHA	5	PELELIU	
LHD	2	ESSEX	
LHD	4	BOXER	(PCO)
LPD	5	OGDEN	
LPD	6	DULUTH	
LPD	7	CLEVELAND	
LPD	9	DENVER	
LPD	10	JUNEAU	
LPD	10	TRIPOLI	
LPD	11	NEW ORLEANS	
LSD	36	ANCHORAGE	
LSD	39	MOUNT VERNON	
LSD	40	FORT FISHER	
LSD	43	FORT MCHENRY	
LSD	45	COMSTOCK	
LSD	47	RUSHMORE	
LSD	49	HARPERS FERRY	(PCO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 3 (SAN DIEGO)

ARD	30	SAN ONOFRE

SAN DIEGO DOCKERS

11 FFG = 2255
6 DD = 2004
6 DDG = 1980
6 CG = 2184
7 LPD = 2975
7 LSD = 2394
3 LST = 759
1 AGF = 516
2 AD = 2734
1 AR = 842
1 AORM = 130
1 AFDM = 70

TOTAL 18,843

SAN DIEGO NONDOCKERS

CVN(ANG) = 3125
CV-63 = 2773
CV-64 = 3017
LHA-1 = ~~[illegible]~~ 940
LHA-5 = 940
LHD-2 = 1081
LHD-4 = 1081

TOTAL 12,957

EXCLUDING AIR WING AND TROOPS

DOCKERS 18,843
NONDOCKERS 12,957 = 40%
31,800

12,957 ~ 60% = 7774

NONDOCKER FAMILIES = 7774.2

AS	37	DIXON

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 11 (SAN DIEGO)

ARDM	5	ARCO
AS	41	MCKEE

CRUSIER DESTROYER GROUP ONE
CONSTELLATION CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP ONE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CV	64	CONSTELLATION (NORTH ISLAND)
CG	50	VALLEY FORGE (SAN DIEGO)

CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE
(VINSON CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUSIER DESTROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CG	49	VINCENNES (SAN DIEGO)
CG	54	ANTIETAM (LONG BEACH)

CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE
(KITTY HAWK BATTLE GROUP)
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP FIVE (SAN DIEGO) (ADDU)

CV	63	KITTY HAWK (NORTH ISLAND)
CG	62	CHANCELLORSVILLE (SAN DIEGO)
CG	63	COWPENS (SAN DIEGO)

CARRIER GROUP THREE
(LINCOLN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP THREE (ALAMEDA)

CG	59	PRINCETON
CG	67	SHILOH

CARRIER GROUP SEVEN
(NIMITZ CARRIER BATTLE GROUP)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND)

CG	57	LAKE CHAMPLAIN
AFDM	14	STEADFAST

NAVSURFPAC READINESS SUPPORT GROUP (SAN DIEGO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 3 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	647	POGY
SSN	652	PUFFER
SSN	662	GURNARD
SSN	677	DRUM
SSN	713	HOUSTON

SSN	716	SALT LAKE CITY

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 11 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	701	LA JOLLA
SSN	721	CHICAGO
SSN	724	LOUISVILLE
SSN	752	PASADENA
SSN	754	TOPEKA
SSN	758	ASHEVILLE
SSN	759	JEFFERSON CITY

COMMANDER SUBMARI8NE GROUP 5 (SAN DIEGO)

CHIEF OF STAFF
SUBMARINE BASE BANGOR
SUBMARINE BASE SAN DIEGO
NAVAL SUBMARINE TRAINING FACILITY

SSN	707	PORTSMOUTH

COMMANDER SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT GROUP 1 (SAN DIEGO)

COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET ALAMEDA
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET BRAVO
COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET UNMANNED VEHICLE
DEEP SUBMERGENCE UNIT SAN DIEGO

DSRV	1	MYSTIC	(SVC)
DSRV	2	AVALON	(SVC)
DSV	3	TURTLE	(SVC)
DSV	4	SEA CLIFF	(SVC)
AGSS	555	DOLPHIN	(SAN DIEGO)

COMSUBDEVGRU 1 DET SIERRA

PEARL HARBOR

COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE GROUP MIDPAC (PEARL HARBOR)

CHIEF OF STAFF
MOBILE DIVING AND SALVAGE UNIT ONE

AO	177	CIMARRON	
AO	180	WILLAMETTE	
ARS	42	RECLAIMER (NRF)	
ARS	50	SAFEGUARD	
ARS	52	SALVOR	
FFG	37	CROMMELIN REUBEN	
FFG	57	~~REUBIN~~ JAMES	
DD	984	LEFTWICH	
DD	985	CUSHING	
DD	990	INGERSOLL	
DD	992	FLETCHER	
DDG	56	JOHN S. MCCAIN	
DDG	59	RUSSELL	(PCO)
DDG	60	PAUL HAMILTON	(PCO)
MOTU	1	(PEARL HARBOR)	
SIMA		PEARL HARBOR	

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUPK SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND)

CG	73	PORT ROYAL (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESGROYER GROUP ONE (SAN DIEGO)

CG	65	CHOSIN (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESGROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO)

CG	70	LAKE ERIE (PEARL HARBOR)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 1 (PEARL HARBOR)

SSN	639	TAUTOG
SSN	642	KAMEHAMEHA
SSN	648	ASPRO
SSN	666	HAWKBILL
SSN	672	PINTADO
SSN	680	WILLIAM H. BATES
SSN	682	TUNNY
SSN	684	CAVALLA
SSN	715	BUFFALO
SSN	717	OLYMPIA

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 7 (PEARL HARBOR)

SSN	692	OMAHA
SSN	695	BIRMINGHAM
SSN	696	NEW YORK CITY
SSN	697	INDIANAPOLIS
SSN	698	BREMERTON
SSN	711	SAN FRANCISCO
SSN	718	HONOLULU
SSN	725	HELENA

OTHER THAN SAN DIEGO (WEST COAST)

COMMANDER COMBAT LOGISTICS GROUP 1 (OAKLAND)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AE	22	MAUNA KEA	(CONCORD)
AE	29	MOUNT HOOD	(CONCORD)
AE	32	FLINT	(CONCORD)
AE	33	SHASTA	(CONCORD)
AE	35	KISKA	(CONCORD)
AOE	1	SACRAMENTO	(BREMERTON)

AOE	2	CAMDEN	(BREMERTON)
AOE	7	RAINIER	(BREMERTON)
AOR	3	KANSAS CITY	(OAKLAND)
AOR	7	ROANOKE	(BREMERTON)
MOTU	9	(SAN FRANCISCO)	
SIMA (NMRF) SAN FRANCISCO			(ALAMEDA)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 9 (LONG BEACH; EVERETT 30 SEP 94)

DD	964	PAUL F. FOSTER	(EVERETT) — ?
DD	971	DAVID R. RAY	(EVERETT) — ?
FFG	54	FORD	(EVERETT)
FFG	61	INGRAHAM	(EVERETT)

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 13 (SAN DIEGO)

AD	37	SAMUEL GOMPERS	(ALAMEDA)

CARRIER GROUP THREE
LINCOLN CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP THREE (ALAMEDA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CVN	72	ABRAHAM LINCOLN	(ALAMEDA; TO BREMERTON '95)
CGN	36	CALIFORNIA	(BREMERTON)

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP THREE (SAN DIEGO)

CVN	70	CARL VINSON	(ALAMEDA; TO BREMERTON '96)
CGN	41	ARKANSAS	(ALAMEDA)

CARRIER GROUP SEVEN
NIMITZ CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP SEVEN (NORTH ISLAND) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CVN	68	NIMITZ	(BREMERTON) — Sched. to go to North Island
CGN	35	TRUXTON	(BREMERTON)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON 17 (BANGOR)

TRIDENT REFIT FACILITY, BANGOR
TRIDENT TRAINING FACILITY

SSBN	726	OHIO	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	727	MICHIGAN	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	728	FLORIDA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	729	GEORGIA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	730	HENRY M. JACKSON	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	731	ALABAMA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	732	ALASKA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)
SSBN	733	NEVADA	(GOLD CREW)
			(BLUE CREW)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP 5 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	688	LOS ANGELES	(MARE ISLAND)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT GROUP 1 (SAN DIEGO)

SSN	683	PARCHE	(MARE ISLAND)

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

COMMANDER MSC PACIFIC (ALAMEDA)

CO, MSC OFFICE	SEATTLE
CO, MSC OFFICE	SAN DIEGO
CO, TAGOS SUPPORT UNIT PACIFIC	
MASTER, USNS KILAUEA	TAE 26
MASTER, USNS MARS	TAFS 1
MASTER, USNS SAN JOSE	TAFS 7
MASTER, USNS SPICA	TAFS 9
MASTER, USNS OVSERVATION ISLAND	TAGM 23
MASTER, USNS ASSERTIVE	TAGOS 9
MASTER, USNS AUDACIOUS	TAGOS 11
MASTER, USNS TENACIOUS	TAGOS 17
MASTER, USNS EFFECTIVE	TAGOS 19
MASTER, USNS VICTORIOUS	TAGOS 21
MASTER, USNS WATERS	TAGS 45
MASTER, USNS MERCY	TAH 19
MASTER, USNS MERCURY	TAKR 10
MASTER, USNS HIGGINS	TAO 190
MASTER, USNS WALTER S. DIEHL	TAO 193
MASTER, USNS ERICCSON	TAO 194
MASTER, USNS TIPPECANOE	TAO 199
MASTER, USNS PECOS	TAO 197
MASTER, USNS GUADELUPE	TAO 200
MASTER, USNS YUKON	TAO 202
MASTER, USNS ALBERT J. MYER	TARC 6
MASTER, USNS ZEUS	TARC 7
MASTER, USNS NARRAGANSETT	TATF 167
MASTER, USNS CATAWBA	TATF 168
MASTER, USNS NAVAJO	TATF 169
MASTER, USNS SIOUX	TATF 177
MASTER, USNS CURTIS	TAVB 4

OVERSEAS

COMMANDER LOGISTICS GROUP WESTPAC (SINGAPORE)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AFS	3	NIAGARA FALLS	(GUAM)
AFS	4	WHITE PLAINS	(GUAM)
ATS	2	BEAUFORT	(SASEBO)
ATS	3	BRUNSWICK	(SASEBO)
MOTU	7	(YOKOSUKA)	

CARRIER GROUP FIVE
INDEPENDENCE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP FIVE (YOKOSUKA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

CV	62	INDEPENDENCE
CG	52	BUNKER HILL
CG	53	MOBILE BAY

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON 15 (YOKOSUKA)

DD	996	HEWITT
DD	975	OBRIEN
DD	991	FIFE
FFG	38	CURTS
FFG	41	MCCLUSKY
FFG	43	THACH
FFG	60	RODNEY M. DAVIS

AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE
(ADDU COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVSURFPAC)

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 1 (WHITE BEACH, OKINAWA) (ADDU)

CHIEF OF STAFF

LCC	19	BLUE RIDGE	(YOKOSUKA)

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON 11 (SASEBO)

LHA	3	BELLEAU WOOD	(SASEBO)
LPD	8	DUBUQUE	(SASEBO)
LSD	42	GERMANTOWN	(SASEBO)
LST	1189	SAN BERNADINO	(SASEBO)

COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP SEVEN (YOKOSUKA)

CHIEF OF STAFF

AS	32	HOLLAND	(GUAM)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-778-F17
BSAT/JS
29 March 1993

The Honorable Steve Horn
House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Horn

The responses to your query concerning the Department of the Navy's (DON) recommendation to the Base Closure Commission are addressed in the attachment to this letter. The data provided was extracted from the ninety cubic feet of certified DON BRAC-93 data that we have gathered as part of the deliberative process.

I hope the information provided in the attachment satisfactorily addresses your questions.

Sincerely,

Charles P. Nemfakos
Acting Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachment

NSY NUCLEAR WORK CAPACITY ANALYSIS

	Capacity Measure	Throughput (000 Mandays)			Percent	Portsmouth		Norfolk		Charleston	
		Predicted	Capacity	Excess	Excess	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
FY93	Atlantic Shipyards	1,817	2,307	490	21%	619	805	846	1134	352	368
	Pacific Shipyards	2,023	2,379	356	15%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	3,840	4,686	846	18%						
FY94	Atlantic Shipyards	1,571	2,410	839	35%	599	1046	684	891	288	473
	Pacific Shipyards	2,107	2,908	801	28%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	3,678	5,318	1,640	31%						
FY95	Atlantic Shipyards	1,883	2,574	691	27%	515	899	872	1084	496	591
	Pacific Shipyards	2,020	2,927	907	31%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	3,903	5,501	1,598	29%						
FY96	Atlantic Shipyards	2,137	3,004	867	29%	607	1046	924	1210	606	748
	Pacific Shipyards	1,977	2,900	923	32%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	4,114	5,904	1,790	30%						
FY97	Atlantic Shipyards	2,020	2,712	692	26%	572	943	903	1018	545	751
	Pacific Shipyards	2,280	3,415	1,135	33%						
	SRF Guam	0	0	0	0%						
	TOTAL	4,300	6,127	1,827	30%						

SHIPYARDS:

ATLANTIC
Portsmouth, NH
Norfolk, VA
Charleston, SC

PACIFIC
Puget Sound, WA
Mare Island, CA
Pearl Harbor, HI

Puget Sound		Mare Island		Long Beach		Pearl Harbor		Guam	
Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
1220	1325	470	614	0	0	333	440		
								0	0
1239	1565	654	895	0	0	214	448		
								0	0
1099	1441	624	954	0	0	297	532		
								0	0
1250	1505	447	955	0	0	280	440		
								0	0
1537	1760	652	1140	0	0	91	515		
								0	0

NSY NON-NUCLEAR WORK CAPACITY ANALYSIS

	Capacity Measure	Throughput (000 Mandays)			Percent	Portsmouth		Norfolk		Charleston	
		Predicted	Capacity	Excess	Excess	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
FY93	Atlantic Shipyards	1,259	1,757	498	28%	163	192	577	942	519	623
	Pacific Shipyards	1,738	2,504	766	31%						
	SRF Guam	140	254	114	45%						
	TOTAL	3,137	4,515	1,378	31%						
FY94	Atlantic Shipyards	1,117	1,887	770	41%	142	249	560	1068	415	570
	Pacific Shipyards	1,613	2,328	715	31%						
	SRF Guam	170	237	67	28%						
	TOTAL	2,900	4,452	1,552	35%						
FY95	Atlantic Shipyards	771	1,809	1,038	57%	141	332	333	972	297	505
	Pacific Shipyards	1,501	2,544	1,043	41%						
	SRF Guam	148	250	102	41%						
	TOTAL	2,420	4,603	2,183	47%						
FY96	Atlantic Shipyards	727	1,441	714	50%	121	249	431	851	175	341
	Pacific Shipyards	1,353	2,473	1,120	45%						
	SRF Guam	201	255	54	21%						
	TOTAL	2,281	4,169	1,888	45%						
FY97	Atlantic Shipyards	787	1,677	890	53%	121	313	489	1027	177	337
	Pacific Shipyards	1,592	2,610	1,018	39%						
	SRF Guam	255	275	20	7%						
	TOTAL	2,634	4,562	1,928	42%						

SHIPYARDS:

ATLANTIC
Portsmouth, NH
Norfolk, VA
Charleston, SC

PACIFIC
Puget Sound, WA
Mare Island, CA
Long Beach, CA
Pearl Harbor, HI

SRF GUAM

Puget Sound		Mare Island		Long Beach		Pearl Harbor		Guam	
Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential	Predicted	Potential
453	528	431	474	568	1058	286	444		
								140	254
409	494	308	366	536	1016	360	452		
								170	237
410	646	291	353	539	1015	261	530		
								148	250
421	639	292	361	454	1023	186	450		
								201	255
722	797	338	482	400	966	132	365		
								255	275

BRAC-95 M.V. MATRIX 10/31/94

1995 MATRIX W/COMMENTS

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Audit	Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	R (40)	F (25)	M (15)	C (20)	SCORE	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
						M.V. Criteria/Weights						RESPONSES					
					DRYDOCKS												
	1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV? YES												
	1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	1.64 0	1	1	1	1	0
	1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously? >10	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	1.640	1	1	1	0	0
	1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously? 5	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1.32 1	0	0	0	1	0
	2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	1.450	0	1	1	0	0
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1.15 1	1	0	0	1	0
	1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs? 5 or 4	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	.680	0	0	0	0	1
	2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	1.480	0	1	1	0	0
	1	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously? No	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	1.150	1	0	0	0	0
	2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	1.640	0	0	1	1	0
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1.150	1	0	0	0	0
	1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s? 4	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	.680	0	1	0	0	0
	2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s? 4	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	1.640	1	1	1	0	0
	3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1.150	0	0	0	1	0
	1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs? NO	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	.960	0	0	0	0	0
	2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD? NO	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	1.960	0	0	1	1	0
	1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s? NO	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	1.150	1	0	0	0	0
	2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688? NO	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	1.640	1	0	1	0	0
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously? 19	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1.150	0	0	0	1	0
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	1.150	1	1	1	0	0
	2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously? 8	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	.921	0	0	0	1	0
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	.921	1	1	1	1	0
	2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously? 4	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	.220	0	0	0	0	1
	3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1.150	0	1	1	0	0
					COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS												
	2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	10	0	0	10	0.47	14.08	5.08	7.60	4.02	6.03	4.88	7.75
	1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1
	2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0
	2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0
	2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0
	1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (O&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1
	1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1
	1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1
	1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1
	1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 O & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 23 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1
	2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 900 apprentices trained over the past 5 years? — 300 app. in '93 Location Fact	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1
	2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years? — 200 New Quest " Location "	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	.920	1	0	0	0	0
	3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years? " "	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	.671	0	0	1	0	0
	3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994? " "	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	.250	0	0	0	1	1
	3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1.150	0	0	1	1	0
	3	42	29	[illegible]	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	.800	0	1	0	0	1
	2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices? NEW QUEST 50% in '93, 30% were more than 100 app. trained over 5 yr	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	.111	1	0	0	0	0
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	1	0	1	1
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years? NEW QUEST	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	1	0	1	1
	2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 6 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	1	0	1	1
					STRATEGIC FACTORS	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	1	0	0
	2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY? Location Factor	10	10	10	20	100	10.07	6.11	7.11	9.80	9.80	9.22	9.96
	2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY. Location Factor/Δ from 4 to 2	1	0	0	1	6	0.92	.181	1	0	0	0	0
	1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept? NEW QUEST.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	.080	0	1	1	1	1
	2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location? — NEW QUEST	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0
	1	42	35	9.2	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby? Location Factor	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1
					OPERATING FACTORS	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1.691	1	1	1	1	0
	3	42	38	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	10	10	10	10	100	18.22	22.0	22.43	23.46	22.40	1.94	22.40
	2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years? 15 yrs in '93	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years? 20 yrs in '93 "0" for Pearl	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	.510	0	1	0	0	1
						0	1	0	0	7	0.51	.361	1	0	1	1	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

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NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Quest Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	R	F	M	C	SCORE	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
					M.V. Criteria/Weights						RESPONSES					
					40	25	15	20		MV						
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0
3	42	28	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0
3	42	36	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	1	1	0	2	0.25		1	1	0	1	0	1
ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT																
2	33	J16	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	33	14	6D	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1
1	33	10	5b•	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1
2	33	12	5g•	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	6	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1
2	33	16	7j	Site has no Installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	4	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	33	19	8 i/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	6	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0
CONTINGENCY																
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0
PRODUCTION WORKLOAD																
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	8	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload?	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSRA/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997s?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

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NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Audit	Ques Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	SCORE	TOTAL MV	'93 value PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
120	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on AST/ATSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0
129	3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1
130	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0
131	3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1
132	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0
133	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0
134	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0
135	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AFW/AE/AFS/AFF/AFSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1
136	3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0
137	2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0
138	2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0
139	2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0
140	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0
141	2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0
142	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0
143	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0
144	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0
145	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
146	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
147	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
148	3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AD/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0
149	1	42	23	2.1	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	1	1	0	1	1	0
150					The NSY has DON unique facilities, equipment, or skills. NEW QUESTION	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	1	0	0	0
151					QUALITY OF LIFE	100	100	100	100	100	11.33	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25
152	3	42	36	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0
153	3	65	3	1.b.1	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	.801	0	1	1	0	0
154	3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1
155	3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	.461	1	1	1	1	1
156	3	National Crime Statistics			Is the violent crime rate < 756/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1
157	3				Is the property crime rate < 4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1
158	3				Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1
159	3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing? No in '93 QUEST. where did NORFOLK live??	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1.151	1	0	1	1	1
160					CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	100	100	100	100	100	11.33	37.83	50.00	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25
161	1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1.661	0	1	1	0	0
162	1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)? DIFFERENT QUEST	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0
163	3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges? DIFFERENT QUEST	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0
164						102	56	63	42								
165											100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25
166																	
167																	

M.V. Criteria/Weights

ED NUMB

Average = 42.75

Check QUEST. especially C. Is this a hinderance since Q's aren't fully occupied.

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

03/02/95 THU 19:37 FAX

MILITARY VALUE MATRIX

Drydocks : See Attached Memo: Total Military Value factors have changed.

Cost and Manpower: Capital expenditures last seven years
exceed $200M---------- point factor 1.55
exceed $100M---------- point factor .93 ?(Can't read)

Hypothesis: If you have more modern facilities and therefore spent less on capital expenditures you are penalized for being a newer shipyard. Spend more money to upgrade older facility ?

Cost & Manpower Factors: Look at Table 6.2 D.C. #42 workforce Longevity and Experience.

------- Are level of experience of conventional engineers more than 14 years ? ---------Why 14 years ? LBNSY has 13 years. Pearl, Portsmouth and Guan only activities to score points.

------- Journeyman / Mechanic more than 12 years, LBNS experience in position is 8.7 years, but 13.4 years total longevity. These additional years could be as apprentices, helper ,or limited mechanic.

------- Quality Assurance Inspections more than 10 years?
LBNS experience is 4. 8 years in this position but 13.8 years in total longevity .
These additional years could be as journeyman, mechanic, or technician.

------- Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?
LBNS experience in the position is 6.4 years but the total longevity is 11.2 years at the shipyard.

STRATEGIC FACTORS

Notice wording of questions and point value have changed since '93.

OPERATING FACTORS

--------Are age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years ? 25 Years. In '93 this question was asked for 15 and 20 years. Note : Pearl in '93 nor any other shipyard per '95 matrix can make the 20 year claim.

--------LBNS is managing NAVSTA property so the last question concerning acreage suitable for industrial expansion may fall into this category. Undeveloped -- no it is already developed with utilities etc. However , if you have undeveloped land for industrial expansion isn't this activity having excess capacity ? Ports, Norfolk and Puget received points for this item.

ENVIRONMENT & ENCROACHMENT

No encroachments-------- question # 1---- we received credit for this item in '93

Base Ops-- question # 2 -- we received credit for this item in '93

Site ops orders. plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations- we are not aware of any restrictions that have encumbered site ops or dev. plans.

CONTINGENCY

Can CVN's be berthed at this SYD for surge berthing ? In '93 the question was for surge holiday berthing. We received credit in '93.

PRODUCTION WORKLOAD

DON unique facilities , equipment or skills.
Point factor 2.25

If the equipment is Battleship. Regunning Facility or the only west coast Gyrocompass Shop is not unique, how about HITCO!!! Navy has decided to retain HITCO at LB. HITCO facility is land-locked and would need cranes, wharf area, trucks etc. to move Sonar Domes manufacturing area at LB to final destination . HITCO only facility to make these dames for nuclear submarines.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Is there sufficient off base housing ? The answer to this question in '93 was no. However, with the closing of the Naval Station, and Naval Hospital and with the ships homeported at LBNSY gone, how come there isn't sufficient off Base housing ? The 1995 study conducted by a public accounting firm shows that over 27,000 housing units that meet the Navy's criteria are currently available in the Long Beach area. The study stressed that units in high-crime areas were not included in this total.

CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS

Not quite sure where these 3 questions are headed . I understand that they are cumulative, not high, middle & low point. Look at '93 questions. We received credit for all three. Would need clarification but believe we would score at least on the first and maybe the last question .

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Not quite sure where these 3 questions are headed . I understand that they are cumulative, not high, middle & low point. Look at '93 questions. We received credit for all three. Would need clarification but believe we would score at least on the first and maybe the last question .

Question 1. Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688, simultaneously?

Long Beach Naval Shipyard received a total Military Value of 1.32. In actuality LBNSY can drydock 10 SSN-688 simultaneously. Meeting the requirements of the question; Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688, simultaneously?, with a value of 1.64.

Question 2. Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DD, simultaneously?

LBNSY received a total Military Value of 1.15. LBNSY can drydock five (5) CG/DDG/DD simultaneously. Meeting the requirments of the question; Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DD, simultaneously?, with a value of 1.48.

Question 3. With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688 ?

LBNSY received a total value of 1.15. LBNSY can drydock four (4) SSN-688 with a carrier in drydock. Meeting the requirements of the question; With a carrier in drydock can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688 ?, with a value of 1.64.

Question 4. With 3 SSN-688 drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DD ? with a value of 1.64 also the question; With 3 SSN-688 drydocked, can the NSY drydock 1 CG/DDG/DD ? with a value of 1.15.

LBNSY received a Military Value of 0 on both questions. LBNSY could drydock 2 to 3 CG/DDG/DD with 3 SSN-688 in drydock. Meeting the requirements of both questions, qualifying LBNSY for a Military Value of **1.64.**

Question 5. Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637, simultaneously ?

LBNSY received a value of 0.82. LBNSY is capable of docking 17 SSN-637 simultaneously, meeting the requirements of the question; Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637, simultaneously?, with a value of 1.15.

Question 6. Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSD, simultaneously?

LBNSY received a value of 0.66. LBNSY can drydock four (4) LPH/LPD/LSD simultaneously. Meeting the requirements of the question; Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSD, simultaneously?, with a value of 1.15.

The total deficit that Long Beach Naval Shipyard received from the NAVAL SHIPYARD - Military Value Matrix (Dry-docks) was **3.60**. 193 info

SYNTEK

4301 N. Fairfax Drive, Suite 850
Arlington, VA 22203
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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

To: LAWRENCE JACKSON
SENIOR ANALYST - NAVY TEAM
DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGN. COMM.

Date: 05/02/95

Code:

From: VADM (RET) P. M. HEKMAN
SYNTEK, INC.

Page(s) to Follow: 3

FAX # (703) 696-0550

Message: LAWRENCE,

ATTACHED IS A MARCH 3 ARTICLE - SOMEWHAT DATED, BUT STILL RELEVANT, TO NAVY HOME PORT PLANS FOR SAN DIEGO. LONG BEACH HAS NO SIMILAR PROBLEM, AS ALL DREDGING IS DONE BY THE PORT AUTHORITY UNDER AN ALREADY EXISTING EIS, WHERE SPOILS GO DIRECTLY TO THE CONTAINER PORT DEVELOPMENT, AT ABOUT $4.00/CUBIC YARD.

BEST REGARDS

PETE HEKMAN

LOS ANGELES TIMES (WASH. ED.) March 3, 1995 Pg. B1

Navy Plan Hits Rough Waters

• Environment: Service's suggestion it might dredge San Diego Bay and bury toxic waste there draws protests.

By MICHAEL GRANBERRY
TIMES STAFF WRITER

SAN DIEGO—In an effort to accommodate up to three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers as part of its "Homeporting" project, the U.S. Navy is formulating plans for a massive dredging of San Diego Bay that may include digging a hole in the floor of the bay for burying contaminated soils laced with heavy metals, oils and PCBs, officials disclosed Thursday.

Environmentalists have reacted with alarm to the dredging plan alone—much less its toxic side effects.

If approved, the plan would mark the first time anywhere in the country that the Navy has disposed of such toxic material by storing it in massive quantities in one underwater site, said Dan Muslin, head of environmental planning for the Navy in its San Diego sector.

Muslin said the controversial disposal aspect of the plan is very preliminary. "But we have been looking at alternative disposal methods," he said.

Mark Delaplaine, federal consistency supervisor with the California Coastal Commission in San Francisco, said the Navy has consistently broached the disposal plan during its meetings with the agency.

"It keeps coming up as an option under study," Delaplaine said. "It doesn't mean they're going to do it, but they are informing the various agencies that this is an idea they wish to explore."

Navy officials expressed concern Thursday about potential risks to the California

Thursday.

Two conventionally powered aircraft carriers, the Kittyhawk and the Constellation, are currently moored here; the nuclear-powered carrier would be the first of its kind in San Diego. But pier construction to accommodate three such carriers is already under way at the North Island Naval Air Station on the Coronado peninsula, which forms the geographical centerpiece to the bay itself.

To accommodate the ships, the Navy would need to dredge the outer main channel of the bay to a depth of 58 feet, the inner channel to 47 feet and the turning basin just north of the San Diego-Coronado Bay Bridge to a depth of 50 feet, Neuhart said. All are presently 45 feet deep, which is too shallow for Nimitz-class carriers.

The dredging would begin in 1996 and would cost $70 million—the funds already have been earmarked by Congress—and would generate what Neuhart called up to 12 million cubic yards of "dredge material." About 11 million cubic yards—said to be uncontaminated—would be redistributed on area beaches, which have suffered significant sand erosion.

But at least 1 million cubic yards is thought to be laden with hazardous and contaminated materials that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency prohibits anyone from dumping in the open sea, Neuhart said. The need to dispose of such sediment is the reason Navy officials are talking of burying and "capping" such waste at an undisclosed site in the bay itself.

Environmentalists have lobbied for years to have tons of toxic sediment removed from the bay, which they contend has elevated counts of mercury, lead and other heavy metals.

"Underwater is exactly the wrong place to be putting that crap," said Laura Hunter, director of the Clean Bay Campaign of the Environmental Health Coalition of San Diego. "We are not in support of developing an underwater, in-bay, hazardous-waste landfill and would have serious concerns about that kind of proposal. I try not to have a reaction until I've seen all the facts, but I can't imagine how they could do that in a way that would be environmentally benign to the bay.

"To dredge it up means a lot of disturbance and re-suspension in the water. Then you have who knows how much accuracy in getting it in the hole. The cap may or may not last long enough, in which case you end up with a far more frightening problem than you ever had in the first place."

In a worst-case scenario, "fish from the bay just couldn't be eaten—ever," Hunter said, noting that the risk of such a procedure would be in "taking that stuff from one place and dumping it in a second place. That gives it a second opportunity to enter the water column and contaminate the food chain. So, in effect, you're doubling the recontamination by digging up the pollutants and putting them back in."

Although a formal proposal has yet to be made, Delaplaine said that, at first glance, coastal authorities also have environmental concerns.

"If you're a regulatory agency

DREDGE...

Pg. 16

BALTIMORE SUN March 3, 1995 Pg. 12

Cost of destroying chemical weapons underestimated, report says

Disposal of Army stockpiles could run up to $11.4 billion

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"It keeps coming up as an option under study," Delaplaine said. "It doesn't mean they're going to do it, but they are informing the various agencies that this is an idea they wish to explore."

Navy officials expressed concern Thursday about potential risks to the California least tern, migratory waterfowl and eelgrass. Environmentalists, meanwhile, reacted in decided stronger terms.

"I'm appalled at the idea," said Robert Simmons, an attorney who represents the Sierra Club in its federal lawsuit against the city of San Diego over sewage treatment. "We start with the bay waters as they presently stand. They've been identified by several investigative committees as the most contaminated bay waters connected with coastal waters on either coast. [San Diego Bay] is like an old septic tank that's never been cleaned out.

"The idea of potentially adding to those conditions by directly placing God knows what quantities of toxic, hazardous wastes. . . Well, it's utterly unthinkable."

But Muslin said the plan is necessary to accommodate a much larger fleet of Navy ships—including the three carriers—that may be deployed in San Diego as part of the Homeporting concept of military downsizing and consolidating.

Pending a federal environmental impact statement that should be finished by the end of the year, the Navy will definitely deploy at least one Nimitz-class nuclear carrier in San Diego by 1997, Capt. Mark Neuhart, a Navy spokesman, said

The dredging would begin in 1996 and would cost $70 million—the funds already have been earmarked by Congress—and would generate what Neuhart called up to 12 million cubic yards of "dredge material." About 11 million cubic yards—said to be uncontaminated—would be redis-

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that, at first glance, coastal authorities also have environmental concerns.

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DREDGE. . .

Pg. 16

BALTIMORE SUN March 3, 1995 Pg. 12

Cost of destroying chemical weapons underestimated, report says

Disposal of Army stockpiles could run up to $11.4 billion

By Bruce Reid
Sun Staff Writer

Congressional investigators say the Army is underestimating the cost of destroying its chemical weapons stockpiles at Aberdeen Proving Ground and seven other U.S. sites.

In a report made public yesterday by a multiracial citizens group with members in Maryland and elsewhere, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) said the program could cost taxpayers nearly $11.4 billion — nearly a sevenfold increase over the original estimate of $1.7 billion.

Two members of Congress, Democratic Rep. Glen Browder of Alabama and Republican Rep. James V. Hansen of Utah, also have introduced legislation requiring a strict financial review of the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, saying that there is little to show for the $200 million spent so far to protect communities near the stockpiles.

The disposal effort and the emergency program are run by an Army agency at Aberdeen.

The citizens group, which is fighting the Army's plan to build huge incinerators to destroy the weapons, said the GAO report documents the "runaway spending" of the disposal program.

"It's time to abandon incineration and get on with developing safer, more cost-effective alternatives," said Craig Williams of the Chemical Weapons Working Group.

The Army is operating a prototype incinerator on a remote Pacific island, and the first mainland incinerator is to start operation in September. Meanwhile, Army research ers at Aberdeen are studying chemical and biological means of destroying the stockpiles.

An Army spokeswoman acknowledged that the service is still learning the true cost of its chemical weapons disposal program.

Spokeswoman Marilyn Tischbin said the Army does not expect to find a cheaper way of destroying the stockpiles. And she said it is still a "reasonable assumption" that the Army can operate six U.S. incinerators, including one at Aberdeen, simultaneously.

WASHINGTON TIMES March 3, 1995 Pg. 2

ROTC law

Yesterday Rep. Richard Pombo, California Republican, introduced the "ROTC Campus Access Act," which addresses complaints of unfair treatment of ROTC cadets on college campuses.

This act would "prohibit any Federal grant or contract from being awarded to any institution of higher education that does not allow the Secretary of Defense to maintain or establish Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units at that institution."

Young America's Foundation, a conservative campus group, is thrilled about the proposed act.

Commenting on the bill, ROTC cadet and Young America's Foundation activist Flagg Youngblood explained, "No longer can America's colleges and universities greedily take the federal government's money with one hand and then protest its policies by slapping ROTC cadets around with the other."

2

05/02/1995 11:41 7035250833 SWITEI PAGE 01

DREDGE...from Pg. 4

naturally you're nervous about it, he said. "We'd want to see a lot of facts before we even considered it. It's hard to say how we'd feel before our commission sees it, but we're always concerned about contaminated materials."

Hunter said that San Diego Bay has the highest level of a series of banned chemicals known as polychlorinatedbiphenyls or PCBs, of any West Coast waterway.

Testing of San Diego Bay already reveals elevated counts of PCBs and mercury, she said, calling them "biocumulative, which means they readily enter the food chain. PCBs alone have a half-life of 250 years, meaning that, in 250 years, they'll only be half as toxic as they are at the moment."

In California, such materials can only be dumped in Class 1 or Class 2 landfills, such as those found at toxic-waste disposal sites, Delaplaine said. But Navy officials said it would be too expensive to transport such materials to a landfill.

Muslin said the Navy would be following the lead of other agencies, which have been dumping and then capping contaminated wastes under Puget Sound near Seattle and in areas of the East Coast for years "without a problem."

But Ken Moser, who directs the San Diego Baykeeper, part of a national alliance of river, sound and bay protective groups, and who formerly worked with the Puget Sound group, said that in the Pacific Northwest, capped dumping has more closely resembled an environmental quagmire.

"The precedent for it is in Puget Sound, on Elliott Bay," Moser said. "Years ago, the [U.S.] Army Corps of Engineers began dredging toxic sediment from the mouth of the Duwamish River. They dug a hole in the deepest place on the bottom of the river and filled it with contaminated sediment.

"They then took several feet of clean material and put it on top, the theory being the toxic material would never escape. But what they failed to reckon or predict is that what they had there—obviously—was a wet environment. So, the toxic stuff leaked into the shellfish beds off Magnolia Bluffs on the north side of Elliott Bay, an inland of Puget Sound.

"What happened was disastrous," Moser said. "Along some of the most desirable waterfront property in Seattle, people can no longer harvest shellfish ...

"You're essentially sweeping under the rug all sorts of toxic materials, and you don't know if the rug is going to hold."

The cap is usually between three and 10 feet thick and consists of sand or a mixture of sand and gravel, he said, noting that "the integrity of the cap" must be "rigorously maintained."

To win approval for the project, the Navy would have to complete the federal environmental impact statement, or EIS, then obtain permission from, among other agencies, the Corps of Engineers, the Coastal Commission, the EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, said David Zoutendyk, a biologist with the regulatory division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in San Diego.

"The burden on them is to convince reviewers and the public that it's safe," said Delaplaine of the Coastal Commission said. "They won't be able to do that without a lot of studies. They also have to weigh the public-relations concern of being a good neighbor to everybody in San Diego."

MASS...from Pg. 15

John F. Kerry had made a strong case for retaining the South Weymouth installation. He said he was sympa-

SPENDING...
from Pg. 13

At Presstime

U.S. Marines leave Somalia

By Aidan Hartley

MOGADISHU, March 3 (Reuter) - U.S. forces fired heavy bursts of gunfire and lit up the night sky with flares early on Friday as they abandoned Mogadishu's beaches at the end of two years of bloody foreign military intervention in Somalia.

Marines splashed into the Indian Ocean to board hovercraft and amphibious vehicles to take them to warships offshore. The last marines left the shores of the anarchic African country about 1 a.m. on Friday, witnesses said.

Flares lit up the war-damaged streets of the Somali capital. Somalis living in houses overlooking the sea said they could see the blinking red lights of the warships and thought the flares might have been launched from them.

They said there was no sign of any shooting from Somali gunmen positioned on hills overlooking Mogadishu's airport.

A ghostly silence spread across the capital as the U.S. forces and warships from six nations disappeared over the horizon.

"Spectre" AC-130 gunship aircraft and "Super Cobra" attack helicopters hummed overhead in the black night sky to cover the withdrawal but vanished as soon as it was complete.

"U.S. and Italian marines (have) completed the extraction of United Nations forces and their equipment from Somalia...," U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry said.

He said in a statement in Washington that the operation had gone [illegible] held.

Aideed, whose followers battled U.S.-led troops in 1993, said: "We are members of the U.N. What we needed was only humanitarian intervention, not military intervention, destruction of life and property."

Missing Soldier's Body Found

SAN ANGELO, Texas (AP) The body of a soldier abducted from a military base was found Thursday and a civilian base employee was arrested who authorities say confessed to kidnapping and killing her.

Goodfellow Air Force Base officials said the body of Army Pvt. Tracie McBride was discovered before dawn about 27 miles north of San Angelo. The suspect, 44-year-old Louis Jones, was charged with aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated sexual assault of another women. He was arrested Wednesday night and remained jailed Thursday on $200,000 bail.

Ms. McBride disappeared Feb. 18 from the base's coin-operated laundry where she was on guard duty. Witnesses said the 19-year-old soldier was abducted as she talked on the telephone.

Justice of the Peace Eddie Howard said similarities between Ms. McBride's case and the Feb. 16 aggravated sexual assault of another female soldier led investigators to Jones.

A criminal complaint, dated Thursday, says Jones told investigators that he abducted Ms. McBride, put her in a closet at his home and then took her to Coke County, where he killed her.

2 Soldiers Killed At Ft.

3

SYNTEK®

MEMORANDUM

To: LARRY JACKSON

From: VADM (RET) P. M. HEKMAN

Date: 9 MAY 1995

Subject: LONSY ISSUES

LARRY —

• TRIED TO CONTACT YOU, FOR DR JOHNSON, THIS MORNING. DR JOHNSON AT LOCKHEED-MARTIN; (703) 769-2828 IN EVENT YOU WANT TO TALK.

• BOB SENDS THE ENCLOSED MATERIAL PER YOUR REQUEST. REGARDING SAN DIEGO MILCON; ENCLOSED DIAGRAM IS IN THE RECENT (CINCPACFLT/NAVAIRPAC) STUDY COMPARING NORTH ISLAND AND LONG BEACH - THE ONE THAT GAO TOOK ISSUE WITH. I HAVE CONFIRMED THE NUMBERS WITH NAVFAC - REVEALING P-701 CHANGE. THIS CHART DOESN'T SHOW THE ADDITIONAL $ (EST) 137 MILLION IN DREDGING REQUIRED IN THE CHANNEL AND TURNING BASIN - THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES. NOR DOES IT INCLUDE ALL THE NAVSTA ADDITIONS AND UPGRADES THAT WILL BE NECESSARY. THEY ARE IN A SEPARATE PART OF THE STUDY: CALL IF YOU NEED ANYTHING FURTHER. I UNDERSTAND I AM TO BE A BACK-BENCHER AT THE WEDNESDAY PROCEEDINGS.

BEST REGARDS

PH

SUBMARINE SSN 688 REFUELING/DEFUELING DRYDOCKS



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DATE: 03/02/95 09:16:04

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

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

FOUO

FOUO
REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 03/02/95 09:16:55

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: PTSMH

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 03/02/95 09:17:12

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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DATE 02/28/95 10:23:19

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

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DATE: 03/02/95 09: 17: 46

NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD

NORVA TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: NORVA

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD

NORVA TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: NORVA

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 02/28/95 10:33:40

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TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: CHASN

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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REPORT WF-510
DATE 02/28/95 10:34:16

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TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: PUGET

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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DATE: 02/28/95 10:35:51

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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DATE: 02/28/95 10:36:44

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BUSINESS SENSITIVE



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REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 02/28/95 10:37:50

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TOTTDL (BASE WKLD) from BASEFormat: MARE

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

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DATE 02/28/95 10:40:45

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

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

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

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

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REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 03/02/95 09:21:48

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD

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

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REPORT: WF-510
DATE: 03/02/95 09:22:36

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD

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

FOUO

EAST COAST PUBLIC SHIPYARDS

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Philadelphia Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Norfolk Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Charleston Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Notes: 637 - Can dock only 637 subs
21 - Can dock SSN 21 cl
T - Can dock Trident SSBN 726 cl
51 - Can dock DDG 51 cl
963 - Can dock DD 963 cl
(F) = Floating Drydock

11/14/94

CLASS	LENGTH OVERALL	EXTREME BEAM	MAXIMUM DRAFT
DDG-51	466'	59'	31'
CG-47	567'	55'	31'
AOE-6	754'	107'	36'
AOE-1	706'	107'	41'
LHA-1	820'	106'	26'
LHD-1	844'	106'	27'
CV-63	1092'	295' (130' WL)	37'
CV-67	1078'	282' (130' WL)	36'
SSN 688	360'	33'	32'
FFG	445'	45'	26'

WEST COAST PUBLIC SHIPYARDS

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Mare Island Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Long Beach Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Drydocks



Notes: 637 - Can dock only 637 subs
21 - Can dock SSN 21 cl
T - Can dock Trident SSBN 726 cl
51 - Can dock DDG 51 cl
963 - Can dock DD 963 cl
(F) = Floating Drydock

11/14/94

CLASS	LENGTH OVERALL	EXTREME BEAM	MAXIMUM DRAFT
DDG-51	506'	66'	31'
CG-47	567'	55'	33'
AOE-6	754'	107'	36'
AOE-1	796'	107'	41'
LHA-1	820'	106'	26'
LHD-1	844'1	106'	27'
CV-63	1069'	296' (130' WL)	37'
CV-67	1076'	292' (130' WL)	36'
SSN 688	360'	33'	32'
FFG	445'	45'	26'

FLEET DRYDOCKS

East Coast



NEW LONDON, CT	GROTON, CT	NORFOLK, VA		KINGS BAY, GA	
L - 413'	L - 432'	L - 552'	L - 552'	L - 457'	L - 724'
W - 49'	W - 64'	W - 94'	W - 92'	W - 59'	W - 94'
D - 33'	D - 38'	D - 36'	D - 37'	D - 31'	D - 48'

West Coast



BANGOR, WA	SAN DIEGO, CA			OAHU, HI	GUAM
L - 716'	L - 432'	L - 402'	L - 528'	L - 687'	L - 552'	L - 552'
W - 77'	W - 64'	W - 57'	W - 87'	W - 92'	W - 92'	W - 92'
D - 53'	D - 38'	D - 29'	D - 33'	D - 36'	D - 35'	D - 37'

CLASS	LENGTH OVERALL	EXTREME BEAM	MAXIMUM DRAFT
DDG-51	506'	66'	31'
CG-47	567'	55'	33'
AOE-6	754'	107'	38'
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LHA-1	820'	106'	26'
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CV-67	1076'	282' (130' WL)	36'
SSN 688	360'	33'	32'
FFG	445'	45'	26'

Notes: 637 - Can dock only 637 subs
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11/14/94


#98M
#270M
P-702 NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE FAC II (FY-97)
Cost $25.6M BOD: Oct 1998
Follow-on maintenance facilities
to support CVN homeporting.
P-703 NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE FAC (FY98)
Cost: $17.1M BOD Jun 99
Follow-on maintenance facilities
to support CVN homeporting.
#42.5
P-701 NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE FAC I (FY95)
Cost: $28.3M BOD: July 98
Provides a Contained Industrial Facility to
support CVN availabilities. First availability
scheduled for 4th Quarter 1998.
#137M
ADDITIONAL
DREDGING
P-700A CVN BERTHING WHARF (FY99)
Cost $54.3M BOD: Jul 00
P-649 TURNING BASIN DREDGING (FY95)
Cost: $18.8M BOD: Oct 96
Dredges ship turning basin to permit
unrestricted harbor usage by CVN
P-700 CVN BERTHING WHARF (FY96)
Cost: $56.7M BOD: Jun 97
100'x1,500' Concrete Wharf. Will be first
permanent CVN homeport/maintenance berth
CVN 74 Slenn scheduled for arrival FY98.
phase I
NAVAL AIR STATION NORTH ISLAND
P-702
P-703
P-701
WHARF
WHARF
CV/CVN Berth
USS Coronado
NORTH ISLAND
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Figure 5-1

As background for the meeting in February, I am forwarding the Business Operating Center (BOC) Concept Development Plan. This document contains BOC planning, assumptions and expectations, including the Activity Based Costing functional breakdown which as you recall was used as the framework for the process. The plan was completed in December 1992, and included all eight shipyards. The subsequent downsizing has substantially changed these figures. To provide an order-of-magnitude estimate of what we are now dealing with, the Activity Based Costing breakdown has been scaled to the projected FY 1995 employment of the five remaining shipyards. These figures are presented in Attachment A. (NOW OBE)

Although the BOC concept is basically the same as when the Concept Development Plan was completed, the climate has changed significantly in the past year. BRAC 95, Fleet Maintenance Hub initiatives and rapid force level reductions make reduction of the support infrastructure critical.

As additional background information, in September and October 1993, the three Pacific shipyards reviewed the BOC plan and proposed expansion to a Hub concept. There would be one Pacific BOC supporting three waterfront industrial sites. The proposed phased implementation plan is shown in Attachment B. PACIFIC

I am also including a draft BOC Commanding Officer's training plan, the latest BOC White Paper and latest BOC briefing to FSQMB.

1. Get to 2 BOC's
   + 6 Industrial Sites.

   OR 2 Sydds
   + 3 Remote sites.

2 Key Sites Report to BOC (Sydd)
This keeps BOC (Sydd) Accountable

3.

There are Many Notes from some meeting

* NAUSEA -(SEA-07) HAS DETAILED DATA ON COST SAVINGS - WE (SYNTEK) HAVE BEEN PLACED "OFF LIMITS", THUS CANNOT OBTAIN. VERBAL SAYS $139M/YR FROM 37% REDUCTION IN FIXED OVERHEAD LOOKS

FIGURES ARE POST BRAC-93, PROBABLY EARLY 1994. NEED UPDATING.

ABC PROJECTIONS - FY 95

ATTACHMENT A

FIVE REMAINING SHIPYARDS

SUPPORT AREAS	PORTSMOUTH	NORFOLK	PUGET	LONG BEACH	PEARL HARBOR	TOTAL
MATL SUPPORT	256	301	558	154	205	1474
PLAN/ENG/ETC	286	428	1136	329	300	2480
ADMIN/GEN MGMT	233	271	560	216	205	1505
AIS	88	53	196	60	95	490
MANAGE WORK EXEC	1234	1091	1914	259	844	5342
SAFETY/ENV	119	117	362	70	75	763
FAC/EQUIP	309	303	774	331	156	1874
TRAINING	298	261	595	108	252	1515
TOTAL SUPPORT	2623	2825	6136	1527	2132	15442
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT	4714	5338	10241	3394	3590	27277

Note: MANAGE WORK EXECUTION definition includes preparing to execute, test preparation, QA planning, etc.. Half of the Full Time Equivalent effort is outside the production area and will be impacted by BOC operation.

BOTTOM LINE, >50% IS OVERHEAD, ON AVERAGE

ATTACHMENT B

PHASE I



Each shipyard splits functionally into:

→ Regional Industrial Site (RIS) which has waterfront production and residual BOC functions and

→ BSPO which has all "BOCable" functions

PHASE II



Establish lead BSPO (BOC) and link all BSPOs.
Determine COEs within BSPOs.
Determine sizing requirements.
Validate functions and residuals
Design final BOC.

COMMENCE DOWNSIZING

PHASE III

ATTACHMENT B

START JUL 94

COMPLETE IN 90 DAYS



BOC is independent activity reporting to SEA 07.
COEs perform BOC function at RIS, but report to BOC.
RIS provides on site support to COEs.
Refine BOC functional processes and organizational structure.
COMPLETE DOWNSIZING

PHASE IV

OCT 94



FULL IMPLEMENTATION

PHASE V

TBD



SYNTEK®

MEMORANDUM

5/10/95

TO: LARRY JACKSON

FR: VAUGHN HEKMAN

LARRY - THIS IS A 1993 BRIEF (SUBSEQUENT TO 93 BRAC RESULTS) ON INDUSTRIAL BASE/SHIPYARD RE-ALIGNMENT. INTERESTING POINTS MADE HERE. DONE BEFORE CHANGE TO 120 MONTH CYCLE FOR SSN-688'S, WHICH MAKES IT EVEN MORE RELEVANT. IN TRYING TO DETERMINE COSTS, (SAVINGS) IT APPEARS THE SHIPYARD FOLKS FIGURED THEY COULD SAVE ABOUT $1.0 - 1.3 BILLION BY RE-ALIGNMENT VICE CLOSURE, (AND THIS EXCLUDES COST OF CLOSURE). SINCE THIS WAS DRAFTED, THE CASE FOR PORTSMOUTH GROWS EVEN WEAKER, IN MY ANALYSIS.

RESPY

VH

WHAT CAPACITY IS REQUIRED?



10/19/93

file:SNSY896

WHAT CAPACITY IS REQUIRED?

ALL NAVAL SHIPYARDS



RESULTS

COST OF CAPACITY

CURRENT STRUCTURE VS BOC OPERATION



DOES NOT INCLUDE COST OF CLOSURE

★ KEY CHAR

THIS REQUIRED CAPACITY OF '93 NOT REQUIRED NOW DUE REDUCTION IN SUBMARINE WORK

93 VIEW BY NAVY

BOC OPERATION IS PREFERRABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CLOSURE

- → COST IS LESS
- → RETAINS IRREPLACEABLE WATERFRONT FACILITIES

BUSINESS OPERATING CENTER (BOC)

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION OF SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

CURRENT STRUCTURE

INDEPENDENT SHIPYARD ORGANIZATIONS
- Production/Work Execution
- Engineering and Planning Support
- Training Support
- Administrative/Financial Support
- Information System Support
- Material Support
- Facility/Equipment Management
- Safety and Environment

BOC STRUCTURE

WATERFRONT INDUSTRIAL SITES

BOC

THEY EXPECT 35-40% REDUCTION IN OVERHEAD (FIXED) COSTS IF REALIGNMENT IMPLEMENTED.

CORE WATERFRONT INDUSTRIAL SITES

- PEARL HARBOR
  - No Private Sector Capability
  - 1997 SUB NUCLEAR REFUELING CAPACITY
- PUGET SOUND
  - Only Nuclear Submarine Inactivation Site
  - Only Unrestricted Nuclear Carrier Drydock
  - Only West Coast Full Service Yard - INCLUDES SSN/CVN REFUELING CAPACITY -(ALSO CGN)
- LONG BEACH
  - Only Alternative to San Diego Private Sector
  - Only LHA, LHD and CV Capable Drydock South of Puget Sound
  - HOME PORT CAPABILITY FOR ALL TYPE SHIPS
- NORFOLK
  - Nuclear Carrier Capable (Newport News unable to Meet all CVN Requirements)
  - Only LHD and CVN Capable Drydock other than Newport News
  - Only East Coast Full Service Yard - INCLUDES SSN & CGN REFUELING
- PORTSMOUTH
  - Submarine Nuclear Refueling Capability (alternative to private sector)

NEWPORT NEWS CAN DO ALL SSN WORK; CHEAPER.

PHASE FOUR OF THE ONE NAVY MAINTENANCE OPERATION (REGIONALIZED MAINTENANCE CENTER)



ORGANIZATION CONCEPT

11/26/93



WHAT CAPACITY IS REQUIRED?



10/19/93

WHAT CAPACITY IS REQUIRED?

ALL NAVAL SHIPYARDS



RESULTS

COST OF CAPACITY

CURRENT STRUCTURE VS BOC OPERATION



- BASED ON LATE 1993 WORK REQUIREMENTS - NOW FURTHER REDUCED IN NUCLEAR AREA.

BOC OPERATION IS PREFERRABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CLOSURE

- → COST IS LESS
- → RETAINS IRREPLACEABLE WATERFRONT FACILITIES

BUSINESS OPERATING CENTER (BOC)

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION
OF SUPPORT FUNCTIONS



CORE WATERFRONT INDUSTRIAL SITES

- PEARL HARBOR
  - No Private Sector Capability ≡ KEEP YARD; EVEN THOUGH COSTLY.
- PUGET SOUND
  - Only Nuclear Submarine Inactivation Site – BASED ON PROXIMITY TO HANFORD
  - Only Unrestricted Nuclear Carrier Drydock – LB #1 NOT ABLE TO DO CVN REFUEL, OTHERWISE UNRESTRICTED.
  - Only West Coast Full Service Yard
- LONG BEACH
  - Only Alternative to San Diego Private Sector ≈ 70% OF PACIFIC FLEET.
  - Only LHA, LHD and CV Capable Drydock South of Puget Sound
- NORFOLK
  - Nuclear Carrier Capable (Newport News unable to Meet all CVN Requirements) - TRUE
  - Only LHD and CVN Capable Drydock other than Newport News
  - Only East Coast Full Service Yard
- PORTSMOUTH
  - Submarine Nuclear Refueling Capability (alternative to private sector) * — ONLY RATIONALE FOR RETENTION.

    PER PHONE CONVERSATION W/PRES. OF NN – NEWPORT NEWS CAN REFUEL TWO, POSSIBLY THREE 688'S IN SIMULTANEOUS FASHION, CHEAPER THAN PORTSMOUTH.

PHASE FOUR OF THE ONE NAVY MAINTENANCE OPERATION (REGIONALIZED MAINTENANCE CENTER)



ORGANIZATION CONCEPT

11/26/93



FMC = FLEET MAINT CENTER

RMC#1 = A REGIONAL MAINT CENTER

RE-ENGINEERING NAVAL SHIPYARDS FOR THE FUTURE

Presented to:

FLEET SUPPORT QMB

16 December 1993

Shipyard Business Operating Center Personnel and Cost Savings

The attached brief sheets were presented by RADM Claman to the Fleet Support Quality Management Board (senior admirals involved in ship maintenance) on 16 December 1993.

The purpose of the brief was to define the Business Operating Center (BOC) concept and present the savings that would be realized from implementation of the concept.

The numerical basis of the savings was five shipyards at a projected FY 1995 employment level of 32,000 (extremely close to the current employment level).

Savings were projected to be 4,445 personnel or $ 190 million.

> Note that this exceeds the savings that would be realized by closing Long Beach Naval Shipyard by over 1,000 people, while still maintaining Long Beach's irreplaceable drydocks and facilities.

SUPPORT FUNCTION MANNING

	5 NAVAL SHIPYARDS	BOC	5 WATERFRONT SITES
Engineering and Planning	2944	1242	517
Material Support	1736	485	690
Admin, AIS Mgt, Safety, Environmental	3163	548	1406
Facilities and Equipment	2144	199	1133
Training Support	1759	172	917
		2640	4663
		7203	
TOTAL	11943		

FULLY IMPLEMENTED ANNUAL SAVINGS = $190 MILLION

5/3/95 EDITION

REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

KEY: @ - True under any ownership scenario
- An original April 94 RMWG concept

The following Concept of Operations statements have been accepted by the Regional Maintenance Implementation Board (RMIB) and are forwarded to the MSQMB.

WORKFLOW RELATED

W1. A central point of work loading exists within the FMO for work originated external to the Fleet. (#)

W2. A central point of work assignment exists within each region. Regional work placement offices will be connected. Automated "workflow" should be maximized. (@; #)

W3. Manufacturing work is scheduled, accepted and tracked by a shop floor control system. Manufacturing work centers will be managed principally by the RMC. (@)

W4. For non pre-planned jobs, where core capacity exists, utilize public industrial resources within the region first. If public core capacity exists outside the region, consider its use before going private locally. (@; #)

TECHNICAL RELATED

T1. Technical authority resides with the SYSCOMS; it can be delegated. (@; #)

T2. Repair centers are trained to perform to multiple repair specifications as assigned. (@)

T3. Except as otherwise specified for certain availabilities, the FTSC provides initial technical assistance for those systems assigned. The FTSC requests assistance as needed using resources internal to the Fleet first. (@)

T4. In cooperation with System Commands and Life Cycle Managers, The FMO focuses on process improvement for optimum weapons system performance through analysis of maintenance feed back and improvement of maintenance plans and acquisition/modernization management. (@)

T5. Work will be assigned to activities qualified to perform the work. (@)

T6. Requirements of existing instructions, directives, or requirements concerning shipyard organization, personnel training, personnel selection for the conduct of nuclear work shall remain in effect unless agreed to by the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion.

ORGANIZATION

O1. Ashore I and D level maintenance are merged. (#)

O2. Repair centers may be staffed with both military and civilian workers. (@, #)

O3. Regional repair capacity and capability are sized to "core" (To Be Determined - Final definition is important) requirements. Repair centers are level loaded. Redundant public industrial capabilities are optimized within regions. (@, #)

O4. National Navy Repair Centers (single-sited repair facilities) may be designated by the Fleet Maintenance Officers with the concurrence of appropriate SYSCOMS. (@)

O5. The Regional Maintenance Commander and Fleet Maintenance Officer are responsible to the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion for the proper conduct of nuclear work.

O6. Matters affecting the utilization of nuclear trained enlisted personnel in regional maintenance centers shall be coordinated with BUPERS and OPNAV N00N.

O7. Supporting single ownership of the maintenance execution process, the fleet controls priorities and sizing of maintenance activities.

O8. FMO internal policies are established through a multi-disciplined Fleet Maintenance Executive Steering Committee reporting to respective Fleet N43's. Fleet N43's will coordinate their efforts with each other and CNO N43 to maintain common policy. (@)

BUSINESS SUPPORT

B1. Effective regional transportation exists and is utilized. It is coordinated by the regional FISC. (@)

B2. Regional maintenance centers may contract work to other RMCs or the private sector. (@)

B3. The FISC provides for tailored, integrated, responsive supply support in each region. This includes material prepositioned/stocked at regional maintenance centers and quick reaction contingency material contracts to be exercised by regional maintenance centers as needed. (@, #)

B4. Rotable equipment pools may be established by the RMC based on a business case analysis. The FISC in each region will manage rotable pool equipment within the region. Asset visibility will exist external to all regions. (@)

Other CONOPs statements remaining to be reviewed:

12. (W) Jobs are scheduled to meet requested need dates. Priority conflicts are identified to customers and are resolved at the lowest possible level. (@)

19.a (W) The Type Commander representative within each region identifies requirements and sets priorities with associated needed completion dates. The Type Commander (or resource sponsor in the case of aviation) budgets for projected maintenance needs; however, for work originated internal to the Fleet, The FMO retains funding responsibility. The TYCOM is responsible for initial work screening, overall upkeep planning and on-site upkeep coordination. (@)

21.a (W) Continuous job screening, planning and execution is accomplished in accordance with the IFMM for all work items. Execution planning is accomplished once for each job and utilizes pre-planned jobs to the maximum extent. (@, #)

19.b (O) The Tycom representative in each region serves on an RMC board of directors. (@)

21.b (O) Production Execution planning is accomplished by a synthesis of current planning organizations tailored to each region and associated supported platforms. (@)

8. (B) Maintenance data is shared and accessible, and is available on a timely basis. (@, #)

9. (B) Funding for work accomplishment is provided through the FMO. (@, #)

16. (B) Unique end items may be stocked collocated with regional repair centers. When turn-around-time is important, the shelf item is issued and the retrograde item repaired to replenish the shelf. (@)

17. (B) The FMO coordinates and sponsors industrial MILCON and IPE within regional maintenance activities. (#; Unique to Fleet Ownership)

Aviation proposals remaining:

Reword a CONOP to include the need for centralized workload planning (RMIB Action 95-33)

#19a. (W) Change the last sentence to read " The RMC production control" vice "The Tycom" is responsible for initial work screening, overall upkeep planning and on-site upkeep coordination for emergent workloads.
-Reason: The function needs to reside in the RMC. Tycom reps can work in production control and influence the outcome, but a production control will promote standard processes and knowledge -- moves decision making closer to the job.

#10b. (O) Change to read, "The Tycom representative in each region serves on an FMO board of directors."
-Reason: Prefer FMO to RMC.

#9. (B) Change to read, "Funding for work accomplishment is directed by the FMO."
-Reason. FMO not staffed to process funding documents. "Provided through" arrangement adds no value.

#17. (B) Change to read, "The FMO established requirements and sponsors industrial MILCON and IPE within the FMO's supporting region."
-Reason: Strengthens wording

Regional Maintenance as an Alternative to Closure of Irreplaceable Defense Assets

Background:

The Navy's Regional Maintenance Concept, under development over the last year by the Fleet is being undertaken to eliminate redundancy and unnecessary (excess) capacity within each naval base/depot. The Base Closure and Realignment Commission was established to reduce excess capacity in our defense infrastructure because of the cost associated with retaining all existing bases in a defense downsizing environment. Unfortunately, closure of entire bases demands relocation of certain critical functions that need to be retained somewhere in the defense industrial base. Additionally, closure of bases, which have unique geographic requirements to meet their specific missions, like shipyards, will not be easily reconstituted if needed in the future. Environmental and nuclear factors in addition to excessive cost and time necessary to construct such facilities make reconstruction difficult at best.

Consolidation of maintenance functions by geographic region, eliminates excess capacity by surgically extracting only duplicative functions vice the rusty ax elimination as characterized by the BRAC process. At its current stage of development, naval shipyards, due to their extensive industrial capabilities and capacities, are serving as a key to regional consolidations. Utilization of facilities and equipment is being increased at some facilities and totally eliminated at others. Such action is reducing aggregate excess capacity within the regions' naval industrial activities. Regional Maintenance consolidations are enabling the Navy to more effectively maintain its industrial infrastructure while maximizing facility and equipment utilization. This action also serves as a positive first step toward total interservicing.

Discussion:

Despite the fact that Regional Maintenance and BRAC have essentially the same objective of elimination of excess capacity, the Naval Sea Systems Command has not chosen to propose this program as an alternative to potential base (shipyard) closure. However, in the mid-Atlantic region, Navy Fleet Commanders have proposed that the Commander of Norfolk Naval Shipyard assume additional duties as the Regional Maintenance Director for all navy maintenance performed within the region. Given that the majority of the maintenance for the mid-Atlantic region will most likely be consolidated at the shipyard, the shipyard's position as a viable industrial facility will be greatly enhanced and its operating cost significantly reduced. Similar maintenance responsibilities could be extended to shipyards in other geographic regions and serve as the basis of their retention. Due to the late introduction of Regional Maintenance in the Northeast, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has not yet been established as extensively in the process as Norfolk Naval Shipyard has in the mid-Atlantic region. However, the parallel is obvious.

Shipyards fall into the category of irreplaceable defense assets that are not readily reconstituted. One is led to conclude that the movement of work to naval shipyards under the banner of regional maintenance is a sound decision. This is based on the fact that: 1. workload at shipyards is currently approaching minimum sustainable levels; 2. shipyards are capable of performing most other Navy industrial manufacturing and maintenance requirements and 3. such workload can be consolidated within the naval shipyard community. The bottom line is that Navy can reduce the cost of maintaining its irreplaceable industrial infrastructure without the irreversible consequences associated with BRAC closures.

Recommendation:

Establish Regional Maintenance initiatives as a viable and preferred alternative to base closure through the BRAC process especially in the case of naval shipyards which are truly irreplaceable defense assets.

SYNTEK/05/15\95

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE IN RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE MAY 8, 1995 LETTER TO THE HON. ALAN J. DIXON FROM THE MAINE AND NEW HAMPSHIRE DELEGATIONS REGARDING THE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD ISSUE. THE COMMENTS ARE IN THE ORDER OF THE ENCLOSURES TO THE LETTER, AND DO NOT REPEAT WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER.

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

Regarding drydocks; the Navy's military value figures regarding capabilities is essentially valid. The point made in the letter, using the words, "and perform work on", distorts the issue and is not a valid point. The fact is, work can be performed on every class of ship in the Navy's inventory in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, should such ships need a place to go. The shipyard need not be "certified" in the technical sense, since this term largely refers to personnel qualifications for working on nuclear components. The Navy routinely uses its inventory of qualified personnel to work on nuclear components outside of (so-called) nuclear certified yards. The Navy cannot send many types of ships to Portsmouth. Thus the difference in military value. Portsmouth finishes last in every scenario. The Long Beach score is not inflated.

Regarding production workload;

Portsmouth does not possess a surface ship overhaul experienced workforce, and their claim to direct transferability of skills (because they work on "more complicated" ships) is not true. Portsmouth does not possess the shop infrastructure to work on equipment normally carried by surface ships (missile launchers, guns, gas turbines, fire control and search radars, variable pitch propulsion systems, etc.). Nor is the Surface Force Type Commander anxious to expend his limited maintenance dollars in a yard with the very high manday rates characteristic of Portsmouth NSY when he can get the work done cheaper in Norfolk or in the private sector, where the workforce and the infrastructure already exists, as well as the capacity, in a very competitive environment. Portsmouth could never succeed in a public/private competitive world. (as Long beach can - and does).

Long Beach is correct in questioning the Portsmouth scores. The 500 mile rule, if used for both yards, should result in a much higher score for Long Beach because of that yard's ability to accept every class of ship in an emergency. Portsmouth simply cannot do that, because Portsmouth lacks the infrastructure for anything larger than a Frigate.

The Regional Maintenance Concept leadership resides in Atlantic Fleet Headquarters in Norfolk, VA; not in Portsmouth. Moreover, the Portsmouth/New London concept is similar to the Long Beach/San Diego concept in terms of quality of life, and is perhaps

worse, only the Navy doesn't discuss the quality of life impact of the former; only the later.

EXCESS NUCLEAR CAPACITY

The Finding discussion makes no rational sense. This is the same "we don't know the future of submarines" argument the Navy used before, when all else failed to produce the desired result. It is not possible to actually quantify excess capacity in the context of total possible capacity because the Navy has placed restrictions on the surge factors. There is no doubt however that there is very little surge capacity in Portsmouth. The Navy failed to consider private sector existing and surge capacity for submarine work as well. Yet, regardless of the existence or lack thereof of merit to the argument, there exists a recognized excess of nuclear capacity for any rationally foreseen nuclear work, exclusive of the private sector. And no single yard had an advantage over any other as the criteria was equally applied.

AGE AND MAINTENANCE OF PORTSMOUTH NSY DRYDOCKS

Drydock No. 2 was built in 1905, and still contains systems of that era. It was upgraded over the years, the last major upgrade occurring in 1992 - which essentially closed the shipyard to any meaningful work while in progress. This upgrade was directed by then Sen. Mitchell, who used his senatorial position to direct through law that all shipyard military construction funds for two years be spent only in Portsmouth. The upgrades went primarily into the construction of facilities and managerial offices at the head of the drydock, with lesser funds going into electrical and plumbing upgrades, along with the purchase of portable weather covers to be placed over the submarine while in dock; units already possessed by other yards. Regardless, this upgrade has done nothing to increase the military/strategic value of the yard. In actuality, such has been reduced because the upgrades further limited the ability to place a surface ship in the largest drydock. The improvements were for the purpose of improving efficiency, which was always low in this yard. An improvement in efficiency has occurred, but not to a level where Portsmouth could state they were any better than anyone else, save Pearl Harbor. Their manday rates and costs of overhaul remain among the highest in the nation. Their three docks are simply too small to accept the vast majority of the Navy's ships.

CAPACITY TO WORK ON NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

The Issue, as stated, is simply not true., No such contention was ever made by Long Beach. There is no attempt to accomplish submarine work at Long Beach. Such is neither necessary nor desirable, and the closure of Portsmouth would not change this.

The fact remains however, that work on all type ships could be accomplished at Long Beach, if necessary to do so; simply via the temporary assignment of personnel who are qualified to do the work. This is a facilities argument! Such claim cannot be made by Portsmouth, due to the very limited nature of the Portsmouth infrastructure.

Thus, these three pages can be set aside as not being relevant to the issue.

UNIQUENESS OF PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

Portsmouth is not unique in its ability to refuel 688 Class submarines. Such work can be accomplished at Norfolk, at Puget Sound, and (by 1997) at Pearl Harbor. In addition, Newport News can accept and accomplish this work with little preparation. This fact was confirmed in a 12 May 1995 phone conversation between VADM (Ret) P. M. Hekman, former Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, and the President and CEO of Newport News, Mr. Phillips. Mr Phillips confirms the ability for Newport News to refuel two and possibly three SSN-688's simultaneously, and is moreover completing a $300 million new nuclear refueling complex. Moreover, Newport News designed the 688's, is the Design and Planning Yard for the Class, and constructed about half the submarines. Their productivity and efficiency in this class is not exceeded.

The SUBMEPP argument carries no weight, as this is an organization totally independent of the shipyard. There is a consolidation decision to move SUBMEPP onto shipyard property, however there is no presently useable space for them. The move makes sense only if one considers it important to increase the parking problems in the shipyard. SUBMEPP is housed in bargain rate and perfectly adequate offices in a complex that could not make it, economically. Their presence where they are is a good deal for both the Navy and the local economy.

The "parallel refueling" claim has never been proven, and is considered to be infeasible. Moreover, it is not necessary, nor would it improve efficiency. In 1991, NAVSEA rejected this claim as infeasible from a space/volume standpoint. Moreover the weather covers could not be used were a parallel docking used. Lastly, NAVSEA (in 1990-1991) considered the concept to fail from a refueling safety standpoint. This idea has lain dormant since that time.

PORTSMOUTH NSY AS THE SSN688 CLASS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

The Navy has essentially abandoned the so-called "center of Excellence" concept as being incompatible with the BRAC process. Though there is merit in the idea, it doesn't fit the times.

Newport News is the Design and Planning Yard for the SSN688 Class. Electric Boat is a sub-contractor for part of this work. It is not a "sharing" arrangement. The Navy is scrapping all the SSN637's.

Portsmouth's claim concerning "688 experience" is coincidental, and only holds up because Mare Island is closing. The argument has nothing to do with capability or with capacity. The real issues that should be considered are (1) Military/strategic value, and (2) excess capacity, and this is where Portsmouth comes up short, with no way to stretch military/strategic value, and is in an obvious over-capacity position, even not counting the extensive capacity, capability, and experience in the private sector.

Mare Island actually had a much stronger case for survival that did Portsmouth in the last BRAC round, except on the basis of excess capacity. Charleston most certainly did, and led by light years in military value. There is nothing technical in Portsmouth that cannot be quite easily transferred to Norfolk or to Puget Sound, as is being done presently with the closures of Philadelphia, Charleston, and Mare Island.

PORTSMOUTH NSY PERFORMING NON-NUCLEAR SURFACE SHIP WORK

The discussion in the letter is based upon false premises. Long Beach never claimed to be a nuclear yard.

It would definitely be expensive to perform surface ship work in Portsmouth. One need only look at their manday rate, and the fact the yard is already subsidized by higher than actual manday rates in yards such as Long Beach. Portsmouth is now scrambling (and that's the correct word) to prove they also have a surface ship repair capability, simply because there is not enough work in their special field to justify their remaining open. Portsmouth is used reluctantly for Tiger Teams, and always has been, due to their high cost and narrow capability, this only now being driven with the closure of Charleston and particularly Philadelphia, which was the favored yard for this work - cheapest and best quality.

The NOTE on this page is simply a twisting of words to design a statement that was never made. Long Beach never claimed an ability to do nuclear work; only that nuclear work could be performed in Long Beach in similar manner to that now being performed in ports all over the world by qualified work crews from nuclear qualified yards, and similar to what was performed in the past when, for several years, nuclear surface ships were home-ported in Long Beach.

PEARL HARBOR REFUELING FACILITY

The fact Portsmouth doesn't like the facilitization of Pearl Harbor, and cannot stop it, does not change the fact such is occurring on schedule. Portsmouth didn't complain when congressional actions placed all the Navy's Military Construction funds into Portsmouth, to the detriment of other yards, in an attempt to "save Portsmouth".

SHORT TERM WORKLOAD FOR NAVAL SHIPYARDS

There is no basis to the statement that Naval shipyards will be fully loaded with nuclear work in the next century. This is pure speculation, not supported by today's facts, and could be said of anything. Moreover, once again the existance of private sector capacity is not considered in the discussion.

ASSESSMENT OF CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT

Not able to assess this area as have no access to the numbers used by the authors of the letter. I would expect the closure of Long Beach would have similar or even greater impact.

THICKSTEN GRIMM BURGUM, INC.

106 NORTH CAROLINA AVENUE, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003
(202) 546-3414
(202) 546-3419 fax

TO: ADM. HEKMAN

PHONE:

FAX: 703-525-0833

FROM: LARRY TAUB

DATE: 5 MAY 95

PAGES (including fax cover):

RE:

NOTES:

WILLIAM S. COHEN
MAINE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1901

May 8, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding C50501-9

Dear Chairman Dixon:

We are writing to emphasize further our strong support for Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and its important contribution to our national defense. We express our concern that information recently presented by Long Beach Naval Shipyard was both a flawed defense of Long Beach and an unwarranted attack on Portsmouth. The conclusions reached are based on a hollow analysis that provides no new information in important areas, is not backed up by certified data and puts forward proposals counter to the Defense Department decisions.

We are concerned that the information presented by Long Beach at the San Francisco regional hearing, will be given undue validity and distract the staff or commission from the true issues relevant to the Navy/Department of Defense decision to retain Portsmouth. The actions that would be required by their proposal have been greatly oversimplified as to cost, feasibility and effectiveness. The situation is clearly similar to BRAC 1993 where Charleston Naval Shipyard adopted a strategy of "close anyone else but us" and attacked both Norfolk and Portsmouth. The strategy did not succeed. However, our constituents were unnecessarily dragged through the review process, based on the unfounded proposals of Charleston. We do not want to repeat that experience due to another attack that lacks credibility.

Attached for your review are several issue papers that we believe address and clarify many of the issues raised regarding Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

In closing, we appreciate your attention to this important matter and trust that during the Commission's review of the Defense Department's closure recommendations, you will give full consideration to the unique capabilities, quality performance and economic importance of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. We believe the shipyard will continue to make as essential contribution to the Navy and our national defense as we all work to address the challenges of the future.

Sincerely,

Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senator

William S. Cohen
United States Senator

Robert C. Smith
United States Senator

Judd Gregg
United States Senator

James B. Longley, Jr.
Member of Congress

John E. Baldacci
Member of Congress

Charles F. Bass
Member of Congress

William H. Zeliff, Jr.
Member of Congress

Enclosure

MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT

ISSUE: The results of Navy's analysis of Military Value for naval shipyards and ship repair facilities recommended Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure. Long Beach had a military value rating 0.2 points higher than Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which was "removed from consideration for closure" by the BSEC.

FINDINGS: The Military Value Matrix assigns military value points based on the questions asked. Seemingly equivalent numerical scores can be derived from significantly different capabilities. Qualifiers and military judgment are appropriate and necessary to assess the true value to Navy. Statements made in Navy's Analysis and Recommendations (Volume IV) and verbal testimony provided at the 6 March 1995 hearing provided the qualifiers necessary to put the Military Value scores in proper perspective, and to use them as a component in the decision process not as the sole factor.

DISCUSSION: In testimony given on 6 March 1995, Admiral Boorda explained that the nature and complexity of work performed at each shipyard, i.e., Portsmouth works on nuclear submarines and Long Beach works on non-nuclear surface ships. Additionally, it was pointed out that a nuclear shipyard could work on non-nuclear ships, but that a non-nuclear shipyard was not certified (facilities and skills) to work on nuclear ships. Long Beach included arguments in their presentation to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to increase their Military Value score.

As part of the case presented by Long Beach, they cite specific questions where they think they should have received additional points. Portsmouth can make a similar argument, but sees no value in a numerical comparison. The significance of each shipyard's overall military value score is more accurately assessed by applying the differences noted above to the scores assigned to the questions within each Military Value matrix category. Qualifiers based on each shipyard's specific existing capabilities would modify the raw scores primarily in two military value categories:

Drydocks: The questions asked specifically "can the NSY drydock" certain classes and numbers of ships. The evaluation was purely based on the number of drydocks, their linear feet, and their depth. There was no qualifier as to whether or not the shipyard being evaluated was certified to perform work once the ship was docked. In the case of Long Beach, points were given based on three questions that dealt with drydocking nuclear submarines. While the questions were answered accurately based strictly on ship and drydock size, they did not take the next logical step and address the qualifying statement "and perform work on" these classes of ships. By giving Long Beach credit for drydocking ships it is not certified to work on, their Military Value score is inflated by 3.49 points. Long Beach asserts that there should be even more credit allowed for this work. Military judgment of this statistical quantification would temper the raw value.

Production Workload: Several questions revolved around "Did or will the NSY perform" work on certain classes of ships between FY1990-1997". Portsmouth Naval Shipyard did not receive credit for any surface ship classes noted because it neither has performed nor is it scheduled to perform work on these classes of ships. However, Portsmouth not being scheduled for this work is due to its "Mission" revolving around nuclear submarine maintenance, which is recognized as the most complex and demanding maintenance function within DoD. In reality, since Portsmouth's facilities, equipment, and skilled workforce are qualified to work on the most complex work within the Navy, it stands to reason they are more than equally capable and qualified to work on less complex work. The basic reason Portsmouth is Navy's nuclear submarine shipyard is due to the fact that Navy wants to capitalize on its assets and investment it has at that shipyard. To assign less complex shipwork to Portsmouth would not be taking full advantage of the highly skilled workforce and modern facilities. However, in so doing, it distorts the shipyard's military value as measured in this process, in a quantifiable sense, by not giving credit for "being capable" of performing such work. To varying degrees this applies to other naval shipyards. This represents an additional 4.25 points in military value over that currently displayed even if Portsmouth were given credit only for those surface ships for which Long Beach received credit.

Long Beach questioned two instances where Portsmouth was given points in the Strategic Factors section. In both cases, the questions were correctly scored: (1) The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY; and, (2) Portsmouth is participating actively in a leading role in implementing the Regional Maintenance Concept within the Northeast region.

EXCESS NUCLEAR CAPACITY

ISSUE: Long Beach used Navy's computed excess nuclear capacity as an argument to close either Portsmouth Naval Shipyard or Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard

FINDING: Using statistically derived excess nuclear capacity from shipyard provided maximum nuclear capacity is **not** an absolute value. The closure scenarios fail to consider the difference between true excess nuclear capacity that can be executed by shipyards and the statistical values produced using guidance that ignored cost and schedule as relevant factors. Without consideration of cost overruns and schedule slippage as constraints, capacity estimates assume unlimited capability and do not reflect the realism necessary to assure shipyard workloads can be successfully accomplished. The true excess nuclear capacity remaining is well below the 37% statistical value. Any scenarios involving closure of an additional nuclear shipyard will result in a significant true capacity deficit. Navy clearly recognized this difference in considering the margin of safety they felt was needed to ensure adequate shipyard capacity.

DISCUSSION: The maximum shipyard capacity developed by naval shipyards in June 94 which was based on Navy guidance to identify maximum, but realistic and executable, workload. Subsequent CNO guidance requested naval shipyards to disregard cost and schedule adherence in developing maximum capacity calculations. Realistic and executable workloads were set aside and shipyards were directed to add whatever workload they felt they could accommodate without resource constraints. "Phantom ships" (unscheduled ship availabilities) were allowed. This guidance was similar to that used in BRAC 91 and BRAC 93. Maximum capacity developed under this guidance compared to predicted (currently scheduled workload) generates maximum excess capacity that could never be successfully executed were it necessary to do so. Portsmouth's increase above realistic levels was approximately 15%. Other naval shipyard data indicate a similar or greater increase in maximum capacity above realistic levels based on CNO guidance. By complying with the latest guidance, realistic excess capacity is overstated and any decisions based on these numbers must be tempered with a true understanding of what is being measured. Specifically, in looking at the configuration analysis scenario that closes Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, a realistic excess capacity would place Navy in a negative excess capacity where maintenance requirements would exceed realistic capacity to perform such work. Under these conditions, closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would clearly not be justified.

AGE AND MAINTENANCE OF PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD DRYDOCKS

ISSUE: Long Beach stated "the three drydocks (at Portsmouth) are about 90 years old and expensive to maintain."

FINDING: Despite the allegation, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard's drydocks are among the most modern within Navy.

DISCUSSION: The age of Portsmouth NSY drydocks has little to do with the cost of their maintenance as implied by Long Beach's statement. In fact, well maintained drydocks regardless of their age and location have relatively the same annual costs. Specifically, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is approaching its 200th year. However, its drydocks are among the most modern in the Navy. Drydock No. 1, constructed in 1941 - 1942, has been continuously upgraded and maintained to Navy certification requirements. Drydock No. 2, completed in 1905, was completely rebuilt and modernized in 1992 at a cost of $58 million specifically to refuel SSN 688 Class submarines as well as accommodate the newer SSN 21 Class and is considered to be the Navy's most modern drydock complex. Drydock No. 3 was originally constructed in 1941 - 1942, and completely reconstructed in 1962. All three drydocks are continually upgraded and maintained to Navy certification requirements and are currently certified for docking nuclear powered ships.

CAPABILITY TO WORK ON NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

ISSUE: Long Beach contends that non-reactor plant work on nuclear powered vessels (submarines) is the same as work on conventionally powered ships (surface ships) and does not require special training.

FINDING: For nuclear powered vessels, non-reactor plant work cannot be equated to generic skills or capability which are readily available or transferable from surface ship work. Nuclear submarine workloads are correctly assessed as nuclear capacity requirements due to the high degree of control required in all aspects of work and the potentially severe consequences of equipment or system failure.

DISCUSSION: The capability to accomplish overhauls of nuclear powered vessels cannot be limited to only the capability needed for work performed directly on the reactor or reactor systems. Specific control requirements unique to nuclear submarines are required for work on non-reactor plant systems. These controls are mandatory and are in-place to ensure that shipyard work is performed in strict compliance with specifications in areas crucial to the submarines mission and survivability in both peacetime and under combat conditions.

Examples of specific areas of control are:

* Propulsion
* Hull Integrity
* Sea water system integrity
* Recoverability - (Ballast tanks/Air Systems)
* Ships atmosphere (breathing air)
* Ships battery
* Silencing/Noise Control
* Weight
* Space
* Ships testing and Waterborne Conditions

Each of these subject areas is rigidly controlled for submarines and requires capabilities over and above those for surface ships. This increased control is driven by the need for absolute assurance that work is properly performed. The consequences of failure in these areas, and others, are the reasons for the level of requirements. Compliance with these requirements demands increased skills and capabilities necessary to ensure success. The requirements cannot be treated as generic skills generally available in the workforce. Specific training and experience are necessary to establish the capability for this work.

Submarine control requirements also result in the accomplishment of specific actions, over and above performance of the job requirements, which are reflected in capacity data for nuclear submarines. Rigorous quality assurance/control actions are performed to review

and certify the accomplishment of work and testing. Specific concerns which drive this level of assurance are spelled out by the Navy as follows:
(excerpt from SUBSAFE Manual).

"Lack of Compliance

Forces Afloat, shipyards, and other repair activities have a basic obligation to effect repairs in full accordance with specifications and SUBSAFE requirements. There have been circumstances when all specifications or requirements have not been completely met, for reasons such as:

A misconception that specifications are only objective rather than minimum requirements for acceptability. As a result, departures from specification requirements may never be recorded and/or may not be reviewed and approved by proper authority.

A lack of adequate inspection, quality control, and management of the process for determining compliance with specifications.

A lack of understanding of specification requirements.

A lack of resources to enable permanent repairs, resulting in emergency temporary repairs.

A lack of training in the skills necessary to meet specifications.

A generally lax attitude toward non-operational aspects of ship's configuration (e.g., installation of lockers/stowage not included in, or in accordance with, ship's plan)."

The control and certification requirements for submarines are specifically intended to offset these factors. The annual cost to maintain these skills is in the millions of dollars These additional control requirements and the associated skills, capability and work items just described are not the only factors determining "nuclear capability" required for submarines. Additional factors reflected in submarines capacity data, over and above that of surface ship work, are as follows:

First, the specific design details of components for submarine applications are more complex. Sea water components are rated at higher pressures, hatch design is more complex, ships atmosphere systems, ships battery systems, and propulsion shaft vibration reducers are unique to submarines.

Secondly, The differences in design and the requirements for monitoring and certification of critical components result in work process differences which are reflected in nuclear submarine capacity data (e.g., special inspections of the mating surfaces between the hull and sea water valves to ensure watertight integrity at deep ocean depths).

Thirdly, the ship design requires increased control of work and testing evaluations both in-dock and pierside to assure safety of the ship and personnel while work is on-going. Specifically, test organizations and ship safety organizations are mandated to control the overhaul process.

UNIQUENESS OF PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

ISSUE: Long Beach stated that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is neither unique nor is its capability essential to the refueling overhauls of SSN 688 Class submarines. Justification is based on other naval shipyards developing the same capability over time.

FINDING: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is unique in its capability to perform refueling overhauls of SSN 688 Class submarines both in terms of its customized refueling facilities and experienced workforce. The ability of other shipyards to duplicate this unique capability does not exist now and would likely take an extensive and costly effort to develop.

DISCUSSION: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is now and will continue to be unique when it comes to performing SSN 688 Class submarine refueling overhauls. Portsmouth will soon be the only naval shipyard with first hand SSN 688 refueling experience i.e. 2 completed refuelings, by the end of 1995. Much of this experience can only be obtained by actually performing this critical type of work. It is the only naval shipyard that currently has submarine planning yard experience for a class of submarines. The Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning & Procurement (SUBMEPP) organization, which is a highly technical submarine engineering organization performing advance planning for all Navy submarines, will soon physically be a part of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard establishment.

Additionally, no other naval shipyard currently has or is planning to acquire a facility customized to perform SSN 688 Class submarine refueling overhauls. An additional unique aspect to this facility is that, by design, it can support the refueling of two SSN 688 submarines in parallel at a lower cost than two done sequentially. The fact that other naval shipyards are developing a capability to refuel SSN 688 Class submarines from recycled facilities does not negate the efficiencies gained through the use of customized facilities at Portsmouth.

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD AS THE SSN688 CLASS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

ISSUE: Long Beach stated that Electric Boat is the planning yard for SSN 688 Class submarines. Implied is that Portsmouth could not be the SSN 688 Class Center of Excellence because it does not perform SSN 688 Class planning yard responsibilities.

FINDING: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is the only shipyard Public or Private to have performed the full spectrum of SSN 688 Class maintenance. Portsmouth's most recent experience in refueling SSN 688 Class submarines combined with the fact that it is the only remaining public shipyard whose primary mission is to support submarine maintenance and modernization, serves as the basis for Navy selecting Portsmouth as its "Center of Excellence" for the SSN 688 Class.

DISCUSSION: In fact, both Electric Boat and Newport News share the SSN 688 planning yard function which principally deals with ship class modernization issues. Planning and execution of maintenance functions are left to individual naval shipyards. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has the broadest and most extensive submarine maintenance planning and engineering experience on SSN 688s of all naval shipyards. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is the planning yard for the SSN 637 Class submarines and the Navy's Deep Submergence Systems Programs and, therefore, also has experience in modernization engineering and planning for another submarine class and deep diving submersibles. Other naval shipyards have the bulk of their experience in surface ship planning yard functions.

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD PERFORMING NON-NUCLEAR SURFACE SHIP WORK

ISSUE: Long Beach stated "The assumption that nonnuclear work is (interchangeable between shipyards) demonstrates that the Navy's approach is flawed and requires review." Specifically:

a. "It would take many years for Portsmouth NSY to establish efficient processes and train its personnel to perform surface ship work in a cost-effective manner."

b. It would be "expensive and/or low quality" for Portsmouth to perform surface ship work.

FINDING: The ability of nuclear submarine capable shipyards to perform nonnuclear surface ship work is not a difficult transition and does not translate to inefficient or ineffective performance.

DISCUSSION: Personnel at Portsmouth are trained to perform far more technical work than that required for nonnuclear surface ships. Portsmouth has recently engaged in off-site surface ship tiger team work on FFG7 Class ships and is currently planning work on CG47 and DDG963 Classes of ships. Work performed so far has been viewed by Portsmouth's customers as quality work completed on schedule. The facts do not support Long Beach's allegations.

NOTE:
It is interesting that Long Beach finds it too difficult for a shipyard performing nuclear submarine work (Portsmouth) to perform non-nuclear surface ship work but argues that Long Beach, a non-nuclear surface ship shipyard, can perform more complex nuclear submarine work.

PEARL HARBOR REFUELING FACILITY

ISSUE: Long Beach stated "... it may not be necessary to facilitize Pearl Harbor NSY to perform refueling overhauls of SSN 688 submarines."

FINDING: Providing Pearl Harbor with the facilities to perform SSN 688 Class submarine refuelings was not a Navy decision and can not be terminated due to the statutory language that funded the facility.

DISCUSSION: Facilitizing Pearl Harbor NSY to perform refueling overhauls of SSN 688 Class submarines was not a Navy initiated action. A special appropriation initiated in Congress mandated that moneys would be spent to enable Pearl Harbor NSY to perform refueling overhauls on SSN 688 Class submarines even though sufficient capacity already existed at other naval shipyards to include Charleston and Mare Island which were subsequently closed by BRAC 93. The necessity to facilitize Pearl Harbor NSY was never identified by Navy and due to statutory language, can not be terminated.

SHORT TERM WORKLOAD FOR NAVAL SHIPYARDS

ISSUE: Long Beach portrayed a short term work underload condition as a typical future shipyard workload condition.

FINDING: The near term maintenance workload is budget driven and is not indicative of future nuclear workload requirements. This is especially the case for major SSN 688 Class maintenance.

DISCUSSION: All of Navy was adversely affected by budget cuts. The cancellation of the FY98 SSN 688 refueling overhaul directly affected Portsmouth's workload. The implementation of the 120 month operating cycle for later SSN 688 Class submarines resulted in a 30+ month delay in the start of most future SSN 688 refueling overhauls and Depot Modernization Periods at all nuclear naval shipyards. NAVSEA assisted naval shipyards at the Fleet Scheduling Conference by developing a plan to provide additional smaller availabilities in this short term time frame. In FY99 and later years when the typical number of major availabilities is again four to six per year, all naval nuclear shipyards should be well workloaded into the next decade. Elimination of nuclear naval shipyards in the short term will result in overloaded shipyards in the long term.

ASSESSMENT OF CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT

ISSUE: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a critical component of the area economy.

FINDING: Loss of the Shipyard would lead to a direct decline of 6 percent in the employment base of the three-county Seacoast region.

DISCUSSION: Maine and New Hampshire have suffered from significant defense cutbacks in recent years. Pease Air Force Base, just a few miles from the Shipyard, was closed in April of 1991 resulting in the loss of an estimated 7,600 jobs, $109.3 million in direct payroll and $35.2 million in annual purchases. Loring Air Force Base was closed in September 1994, eliminating 8,016 jobs, 89.6 million in direct payroll and $39.3 million in annual purchases.

Other losses related to defense cutbacks include 3,500 jobs at nearby Bath Iron Works, an estimated 3,800 job losses to smaller defense contractors, subcontractors and military facilities in the region, and a reduction of 2,800 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard jobs since 1989. These 10,000 defense jobs supported at least 6,500 indirect jobs around Maine and New Hampshire. Thus, Maine and New Hampshire have lost over 32,000 jobs to defense cuts since 1989. An estimate of recent defense-related job losses in Maine and New Hampshire are as follows:

PEASE AIR FORCE BASE	7,598
LORING AIR FORCE BASE	8,016
BATH IRON WORKS	5,845
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD	4,676
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	6,100
TOTAL	32,235

Total employment losses in the three-county region associated with a shipyard closure are estimated at more than 10 percent of all jobs in the region. Similarly, 5.3 percent of total region income would be lost from the Seacoast economy.

News from Stephen Horn

U.S. Congressman • 38th District, California
Bellflower, Downey, Lakewood, Long Beach, Paramount, San Pedro, Signal Hill

TO: Alex Yellin / Larry Jackson

FROM: Eric Swedlund

DATE: 15 May

TIME: ~~11:40~~ ~~12:00~~ ~~12:30~~ 1:00

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING COVER SHEET:

3

I will call you soon to explain.

129 Cannon House Office Building • Washington, D.C. 20515 • 202-225-6676

STEPHEN HORN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0538

COMMITTEE:
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE:
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE:
CHAIRMAN:
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

May 14, 1995

Response Tomorrow

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
1700 N. Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209-1903

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you will recall, during the Long Beach testimony at the Regional Hearing in San Francisco, several alternatives to the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard were presented. Realignment of Naval shipyards in Long Beach, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound, under a Regional Maintenance Center concept, was one of the ideas presented. This proposal would generate significant savings for the Navy, while retaining critical ship repair waterfront facilities, such as Drydock #1 at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. This concept is the logical extension of proposals developed by Fleet Commanders and the Naval Sea Systems Command. As described in an existing Naval Sea Systems Command study, the savings could be as high as $190 million per year.

I am concerned that the Navy, in its attempt to produce savings, is making an unconscionable mistake in doing away with irreplaceable National Defense assets. I would be pleased to discuss these issues in person in much greater detail.

If the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission believes that a Regional Maintenance Center concept has merit and should be further considered, there may be a technical problem under Public Law 101-510. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may not be able to affect necessary realignments at Pearl Harbor (and possibly Puget Sound) unless these installations are formally being considered for realignment.

I therefore respectfully request that you have your General Counsel determine whether these two shipyards must be on the list of installations considered for realignment in order for the Commission to recommend the above referenced Regional Maintenance Center concept. If a determination is made that they must formally be on the realignment list, I respectfully request

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that the Commission place Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound on the list of installations to be considered for realignment only. As you know, this action must be taken prior to the May 17, 1995, deadline. Therefore, time is of the essence.

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this very important request.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Stephen Horn

STEPHEN HORN
U. S. Representative

cc: Commissioner Al Cornella
Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner James B. Davis
Commissioner S. Lee Kling
Commissioner Benjamin F. Montoya
Commissioner Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.
Commissioner Wendi L. Steele

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

LARRY

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950515-13

FROM: HORN, STEPHEN	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (CA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING DBCRC GENERAL COUNSEL. DETERMINE IF PEARL HARBOR AND PUGENT SOUND MUST BE ADDED TO LIST BY MAY 17, FOR DBCRC TO CONSIDER. REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CENTER CONCEPT.

Due Date: 950517	Routing Date: 950515	Date Originated: 950514	Mail Date:

STEPHEN HORN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
129 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-6676

DISTRICT OFFICE:
4010 WATSON PLAZA DRIVE
SUITE 160
LAKEWOOD, CA 90712
(310) 425-1336

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0538

COMMITTEE:
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE:
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE:
CHAIRMAN:
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

May 14, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
1700 N. Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209-1903

Please refer to this number when responding 950515-13

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you will recall, during the Long Beach testimony at the Regional Hearing in San Francisco, several alternatives to the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard were presented. Realignment of Naval shipyards in Long Beach, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound, under a Regional Maintenance Center concept, was one of the ideas presented. This proposal would generate significant savings for the Navy, while retaining critical ship repair waterfront facilities, such as Drydock #1 at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. This concept is the logical extension of proposals developed by Fleet Commanders and the Naval Sea Systems Command. As described in an existing Naval Sea Systems Command study, the savings could be as high as $190 million per year.

I am concerned that the Navy, in its attempt to produce savings, is making an unconscionable mistake in doing away with irreplaceable National Defense assets. I would be pleased to discuss these issues in person in much greater detail.

If the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission believes that a Regional Maintenance Center concept has merit and should be further considered, there may be a technical problem under Public Law 101-510. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may not be able to affect necessary realignments at Pearl Harbor (and possibly Puget Sound) unless these installations are formally being considered for realignment.

I therefore respectfully request that you have your General Counsel determine whether these two shipyards must be on the list of installations considered for realignment in order for the Commission to recommend the above referenced Regional Maintenance Center concept. If a determination is made that they must formally be on the realignment list, I respectfully request

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that the Commission place Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound on the list of installations to be considered for realignment only. As you know, this action must be taken prior to the May 17, 1995, deadline. Therefore, time is of the essence.

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this very important request.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Stephen Horn

STEPHEN HORN
U. S. Representative

cc: Commissioner Al Cornella
Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox
Commissioner James B. Davis
Commissioner S. Lee Kling
Commissioner Benjamin F. Montoya
Commissioner Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.
Commissioner Wendi L. Steele

News from Stephen Horn

U.S. Congressman • 38th District, California
Bellflower, Downey, Lakewood, Long Beach, Paramount, San Pedro, Signal Hill

TO: Adm. Hekman / Dr. Johnson

FROM: Eric Swedlund

DATE: 15 May

TIME: 12:30

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING COVER SHEET:

3

Dr. Johnson,

Larry Taub suggested you call Larry Jackson about this letter and plug the RMC again. I have been trying to fax this to him and Alex Kellin for over an hour. A copy of this letter is being delivered to Dixon and each commissioner.

Eric

129 Cannon House Office Building • Washington, D.C. 20515 • 202-225-6676

STEPHEN HORN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

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Commissioner James B. Davis
Commissioner S. Lee Kling
Commissioner Benjamin F. Montoya
Commissioner Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.
Commissioner Wendi L. Steele

LARRY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD
300 SKIPJACK RD
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90822-5099

IN REPLY REFER TO:

7000
Ser 601/23
17 May 95

From: Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard
To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 07F)

Subj: FY96 BUDGET SUBMISSION

Encl: (1) Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget
(2) Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted as the Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget.

J. A. PICKERING

This budget proposal suggests that the Navy grossly under estimated the costs of closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The actual costs will be $433 Million and up.

EXHIBIT BC IV - 02
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
($000)

ACTIVITY: LONG BEACH NAVAL COMPLEX
UIC:

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	FUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	13,980	60,550					74,530
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP							
Other							
Total	13,980	60,550					74,530

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	UNFUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction	3,100	9,300					12,400
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental	15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	73,460	135,499	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	276,887
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP		36,363					36,363
Other							
Total	92,157	198,617	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	358,702

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	TOTAL REQUIREMENT FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction	3,100	9,300					12,400
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental	15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	87,440	196,049	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	351,417
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP		36,363					36,363
Other							
TOTAL	106,137	259,167	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	433,232

EXHIBIT BC IV - 02
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
($000)

ACTIVITY: LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD
UIC:

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	FUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance		46,255					46,255
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP							
Other							
Total		46,255					46,255

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	UNFUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction	3,100	9,300					12,400
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental	15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	71,324	135,499	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	274,751
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP		36,363					36,363
Other							
Total	90,021	198,617	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	356,566

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	TOTAL REQUIREMENT FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction	3,100	9,300					12,400
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental	15,597	17,455					33,052
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	71,324	181,754	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	321,006
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP		36,363					36,363
Other							
TOTAL	90,021	244,872	20,739	15,695	15,729	15,765	402,821

EXHIBIT BC IV - 02
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
($000)

ACTIVITY: TENANTS
UIC:

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	FUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	13,980	14,295					28,275
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP							
Other							
Total	13,980	14,295					28,275

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	UNFUNDED FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	2,136						2,136
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP							
Other							
Total	2,136						2,136

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	TOTAL REQUIREMENT FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	TOTAL
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies							
Compliance							
Restoration							
Operation & Maintenance	16,116	14,295					30,411
Military Personnel - PCS							
HAP							
Other							
TOTAL	16,116	14,295					30,411

THICKSTEN GRIMM BURGUM, INC.

106 NORTH CAROLINA AVENUE, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003
(202) 546-3414
(202) 546-3419 fax

TO: LARRY JACKSON

PHONE: 703 696 · 0504

FAX: 703 696 · 0550

FROM: LARRY TAUB

DATE: 25 MAY 95

PAGES (including fax cover): 9

RE: LBNSY

NOTES:

HERE IS SOME ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR ON THE WEST COAST

DISCUSSION ON THE COMPARISON OF REQUIRED DREDGING IN SAN DIEGO AND LONG BEACH

1. The most recent depth soundings of San Diego Bay, and the Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors, were obtained to determine which harbor is best suited for home-porting and repairing CVNs and other large-deck Navy ships, and to ascertain depths of the adjoining pier and dock facilities of private ship repair yards, to judge their capability regarding accessibility for Navy ships.

2. Nimitz-Class ships, CVNs-68 through -70, have a draft of 37'-0" at full load. CVNs-71 through -73 have a draft of 38'-5". It is projected that CVN-74 (USS John Stennis), through-76 will draw 39'-0" at full load, since they will be slightly heavier (99,050 tons). The navy requests a Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) of minus 50' for a harbor bay's internal channels, and requests minus 55' for its entrance channels.

3. Upon reviewing NOAA chart 18773, it is apparent that San Diego Bay is being maintained at an MLLW of minus 42'. This depth must be maintained, both initially, and regularly, at the Navy's expense. The distance from the channel entrance to the CV berthing at NAS North Island is 6.3 nautical miles. All 6.3 nautical miles must be dredged and maintained at Navy expense.

4. After examining NOAA chart 1875, it is apparent that Long Beach channel has already been dredged, and is being maintained at minus 75' MLLW, by the Port of Long Beach, at <u>no</u> expense to the Navy.

5. The adjoining Long Beach channel has a range of soundings of minus 82.9' through minus 75'-1" MLLW. This is a mean depth of minus 79'-0" MLLW, indicating that Long Beach channel is **<u>188%</u>** deeper than the San Diego channel, and that the Long Beach channel **<u>already</u>** meets all the requirements for entry to NSY Long Beach (LBNSY) of USS John Stennis, CVN-74.

6. The depths at the entrance to San Diego Naval Station's Restricted Area range from 31' to 39', while the range at the entrance to LBNSY is from 75'-1" to 82'-9", which reflects a mean difference of **<u>226%</u>** in greater depth at Long Beach. The distance from San Diego Naval Station (Mole Pier) to the channel entrance is 8.7 nautical miles, or 2.4 nautical miles beyond NAS North Island's CV berthing. This 2.4 nautical miles of channel is also dredged and maintained at U.S. Navy expense.

7. LBNSY has a turning basin located at its entrance in the middle harbor, between Pier T and the LBNSY Mole, between the West Basin and Long Beach channel, with depth soundings exceeding minus 50' through minus 77' (deeper and larger even than Los Angeles Harbor's officially-designated turning basin, where the largest ships in the world regularly navigate).

8. The entrances to private ship repair facilities in San Diego Bay are between the Coronado Bridge and Chollas Creek. The depths have a range of 21' to 29', restricting their access by US Navy ships. These shallow depths often require the private floating dry-dock **Pride of San Diego** to be cast off from its pier, taken into mid-channel at night, at times of little traffic, flooded, and the Navy ship docked within, without the floating dry-dock being satisfactorily moored. This is a most precarious practice, fraught with many dangers to ship, dock, and personnel.

9. According to Naval Training Manual "**Floating Dry-dock" Bureau of Yards and Docks, June 1953, "a floating dry-dock designed for Yard use, such as a YFD, has mooring spuds attached to her side, which are engaged by jaws on the pier, to enable her to operate in docking vessels, and to rise and fall with the tide while still well secured to the pier."** If San Diego is to be the principal Naval Base of the Pacific Fleet, rather than an "advanced base necessitating wartime requirements and methods" it should not allow offshore moorings of floating dry-docks by the private sector.

10. Berthing spaces at NAS North Island are 39' and only **7' to 11'** on the immediate West, where construction is proposed. A considerable amount of dredging will be required.

11. Actual berthing spaces at LBNSY Pier E, Pier 2, and Pier 6 range from minus 38' to minus 50', indicating that the only dredging required at LBNSY will be at a few isolated locations of actual berths.

12. In conclusion, San Diego would require **miles** of dredging in the main channel, turning basin, and entrances to public and private restricted areas, while LBNSY requires none. The private sector in San Diego requires some of their **floating dry-docks** to perform offshore docking while LBNSY has only **graving docks** that are deep enough to perform dockings anytime of day, regardless of tide, 365 days a year. Thus, the USS Stennis, CVN-74, can be homeported at LBNSY, virtually **immediately.**

WEST COAST PRIVATE SECTOR DRYDOCK CAPACITY

This paper will address the argument that San Diego homeported large deck ships (LHAs and LHDS) can be drydocked by the private sector shipyards on the West Coast.

Both LHAs and LHDs are approximately 840 feet in length. Light load of LHAs is 27,280 long tons. Light load of LHDs is approximately 27,500. "Light load" is defined as the ship being offloaded of all crew members, vehicles, fuel, ballast, feed water and fresh water. Full load of the ship under operating circumstances includes the total weight of the crew and their personal effects, ammunition, provisions and stores, general stores, lubricating oil, potable water supplies, reserve boiler feed water, automotive gasoline, JP5 aircraft fuel, aviation stores, aviation lubricating oil, aviation ammunition, vehicles, landing craft (LCUs), provisioning rations, and embarked troops, which is conservatively estimated to be approximately 13, 500 long tons.

When a floating drydock is certified, the drydock must be able to safely lift the ships which are at or less than the certified weight. Not only must the drydock lift and sustain the weight of the ship, it must be able to handle the weight of the docking blocks, and all of the equipment and supplies needed from time to time to perform needed work on the ship during the docking period. It must also maintain its draft (not sink) and lateral stability (not turn over) while fully loaded. Added considerations include the distribution of weight of the ship along the keel and the size of the ship, in length and breadth. Estimated weights of the additional equipment and crew involved in drydocking an LHA or LHD ship type are: 3,000 tons for docking blocks, 2,000 tons for assorted equipments, and 1,000 tons for blasting equipment and supplies, for a total of 6,000 tons. This means that the total lift weight for an LHA type ship is approximately 33,500 tons. Both LHA and LHD ships are strongly asymmetrically weight loaded along the keel, with a substantial load concentrated at the after end of the ship.

There are three private shipyard floating drydocks on the West Coast which are allegedly capable of drydocking LHA and LHD ship types. These are: Todd Pacific Shipyard in Seattle, Washington; San Francisco Dry Dock, Incorporated (used by Southwest Marine), in San Francisco, California; and the Port of Portland-owned drydock in Portland, Oregon. Docking large ships, such as LHA and LHD type ships, is considered to be much safer in graving (land-based) docks than in floating drydocks. Graving docks are inherently positionally stable. Floating drydocks must provide for ballasting and deballasting tanks, piping and pumps to compensate for weight changes and movement of weight loads both on the docked ship and on the working surface of the drydock itself, and are quickly affected by tidal surges and sea state (water roughness in storms) changes.

- The Todd Shipyard drydock is certified for lifts of 30,000 tons. It is 803 feet long, 136 feet wide, and has entry and body depth of 35 feet. Both LHA and LHD type ships lift weights exceed the certified capacity of this dock and their lengths notable exceed the length of this dock.

- The San Francisco Dry Dock, Inc., dock is certified for lifts of 59,000 tons. It is 800 feet long, 146 feet wide, and has entry and body depth of 42 feet. It is a two-piece drydock, and is believed to be constructed substantially identical in both segments. Keel loading of LHA and LHD ships is markedly asymmetric, as noted above, and weight distribution is an important consideration. Both LHA and LHD ships' lengths notably exceed the length of this dock.

- The Port of Portland dock is being used for tanker and cruise ship work. It is certified for lifts of 56,000 tons. It is 902 feet long, 185 feet wide, and has entry and body depth of 41 feet. We have not analyzed the effect of asymmetric weight distribution on this dock. According to an article from the May 1995 issue of *Pacific Maritime* (Copy enclosed), "The Port of Portland still has a debt of about $50 million to pay off covering the shipyard's Dry Dock #4 and improvements made to other shipyard facilities. For this reason, it needs an income of about #7 million annually, to cover the yard's overhead and keep it off regional tax rolls. Such an amount may no longer be within the realm of the Pacific Coast ship repair industry." In addition, there appears to be some navigational difficulties caused by the opening size of bridges across the water access route to the Portland shipyard. Also, the sandbars are located across the channel going to the drydock and transit of LHA and/or LHD ships may have to be coordinated with extreme high tides if they can be accommodated at all. These sandbars shift from time to time according to the amount of silt carried by the Columbia and Willamette Rivers, and the volume and speed of water flow.

In any scenario involving assignment of an LHA or LHD ship repair or overhaul availability to any of the above locations, the question of quality of life for the ship's crew must be considered. These ships are homeported in San Diego, and such assignments would require substantial periods of separation of the crew from their families. Additionally, if the docking period were associated with a regular overhaul availability lasting in excess of six months, families which leave the San Diego area to follow the service member will be in jeopardy of not being able to re-enter Navy housing in the San Diego area for approximately two years after their return to that homeport at the end of the overhaul.

DATE: 08/23/93

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
U.S. NAVAL DRY DOCK CERTIFICATION
FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS

FILE NO.	ACTIVITY	FACILITY	DOCK TYPE	CERTIFIED CAPACITY (LT)	LOCATION	CERTIFICATION STATUS	DOCK LENGTH (FT)	DOCK ENTRY WIDTH (FT)	DOCK BODY WIDTH (FT)	DOCK ENTRY DEPTH (FT)	DOCK BODY DEPTH (FT)
~~300~~	~~Peterson Builders Inc.~~	~~Launch Fee~~	~~LM~~	~~2000~~	~~Sturgeon Bay, WI~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 2	GR	16000	Philadelphia, PA	AC	728.58	87.00	87.53	30.08	33.92
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 3	GR	25000	Philadelphia, PA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	43.42	44.92
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 4	GR	72600	Philadelphia, PA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	150.00	40.00	40.00
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 5	GR	78000	Philadelphia, PA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	150.00	43.50	43.50
77	Port of Portland	DD 1	FL	12267	Portland, OR	AC	528.00	87.00	87.00	32.25	32.25
79	Port of Portland	DD 3	FL	17000	Portland, OR	AC	601.00	112.00	112.00	37.00	37.00
234	Port of Portland	DD 4	FL	56000	Portland, OR	AC	902.00	185.00	185.00	41.00	41.00
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 1	GR	8000	Kittery, ME	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	25.00	25.00
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 2	GR	38000	Kittery, ME	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	30.32	32.57
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 3	GR	13400	Kittery, ME	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	46.00	29.08	37.67
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 1	GR	19500	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	30.17	31.58
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 2	GR	58200	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	38.17	39.08
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 3	GR	13500	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	32.80	25.67	26.67
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 4	GR	38200	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	45.17	47.17
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 5	GR	58200	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	45.17	47.37
[redacted]	[redacted]	DD 6	GR	95000	Bremerton, WA	AC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	53.17	53.37
231	RESOLUTE	AFDM-10	FL	10000	Norfolk, VA	AC	552.00	93.67	93.67	35.92	35.92
47	RICHLAND SRF GUAM	AFDM-8	FL	16000	Agana, GUAM	AC	552.00	91.67	91.67	37.08	37.08
~~283~~	~~Runyan Machine & Boiler Works~~	~~MR 3~~	~~MR~~	~~550~~	~~Pensacola, FL~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~
230	San Francisco Dry Dock, Inc.	DD 2	FL	59000	San Francisco, CA	AC	800.00	146.00	146.00	42.00	42.00
55	SAN ONOFRE	ARD-30	FL	4500	San Diego, CA	AC	402.00	57.00	57.00	29.25	32.50
98	SHIPPI&GPORT	ARDM-4	FL	7800	Groton, CT	AC	432.00	64.00	64.00	38.00	38.00
166	Southwest Marine Inc., San Pedro	DD 1	FL	11000	San Pedro, CA	AC	542.00	98.00	98.00	33.67	33.67
254	Southwest Marine Inc., San Diego	DD 3	FL	17500	San Diego, CA	AC	528.25	105.92	105.92	44.00	44.00
~~208~~	~~Southwest Marine Inc., San Diego~~	~~MR 2~~	~~MR~~	~~900~~	~~San Diego, CA~~	~~AC~~	~~138.50~~	~~33.00~~	~~33.00~~	~~13.17~~	~~13.17~~
~~209~~	~~Southwest Marine Inc., San Diego~~	~~MR 3~~	~~MR~~	~~700~~	~~San Diego, CA~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~
318	SRF Yokosuka (Det. Sasebo)	DD 2	GR	51000	Sasebo, JAPN	AC	726.82	97.75	133.08	42.08	43.08
323	SRF Yokosuka	DD 2	GR	29500	Yokosuka, JAPN	AC	497.63	83.17	75.00	25.33	30.75
324	SRF Yokosuka (Det. Sasebo)	DD 3	GR	150000	Sasebo, JAPN	AC	1213.92	229.66	229.66	42.00	44.00
306	SRF Yokosuka	DD 4	GR	38400	Yokosuka, JAPN	AC	809.08	89.00	90.00	33.17	37.42
307	SRF Yokosuka	DD 5	GR	80300	Yokosuka, JAPN	AC	1068.33	123.87	123.87	40.75	43.25
282	SRF Yokosuka	DD 6	GR	94600	Yokosuka, JAPN	AC	1102.42	148.80	156.28	46.08	51.58

DATE: 08/23/93

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
U.S. NAVAL DRY DOCK CERTIFICATION
FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS

FILE NO.	ACTIVITY	FACILITY	DOCK TYPE	CERTIFIED CAPACITY (LT)	LOCATION	CERTIFICATION STATUS	DOCK LENGTH (FT)	DOCK ENTRY WIDTH (FT)	DOCK BODY WIDTH (FT)	DOCK ENTRY DEPTH (FT)	DOCK BODY DEPTH (FT)
251	STEADFAST	AFDM-14	FL	9700	San Diego, CA	AC	528.00	86.50	86.50	33.00	33.00
57	SUSTAIN	AFDM-7	FL	13500	Norfolk, VA	AC	552.00	91.67	91.67	36.67	36.67
~~304~~	~~Tacoma Boatbldg Company, Yard 1~~	~~LW 1 & 2~~	~~LW~~	~~2100~~	~~Tacoma, WA~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~
[illegible]	[illegible]	DD 2	GR	121600	Tampa, FL	AC	987.00	150.00	150.00	25.83	29.33
[illegible]	[illegible] Shipyards Inc.	DD 3	GR	45360	Tampa, FL	AC	745.00	110.25	124.75	31.00	31.00
287	Tampa Shipyards Inc.	DD 4	GR	48360	Tampa, FL	AC	745.00	110.25	110.25	31.00	31.00
65	Todd Shipyards Corporation	DD 1	FL	14000	Seattle, WA	AC	528.00	87.00	87.00	32.75	32.75
64	Todd Shipyards Corporation	DD 2	FL	4205	Seattle, WA	AC	352.00	64.58	64.58	23.33	23.33
192	Todd Shipyards Corporation	MRV-1	FL	30000	Seattle, WA	AC	803.00	136.00	136.00	35.00	35.00
48	TRIREFFAC, Bangor	DD 1	GR	16560	Bangor, WA	AC	715.50	77.25	90.00	53.00	53.00
308	TRIREFFAC, Kings Bay	DD 1	GR	20000	Kings Bay, GA	AC	724.00	93.67	98.00	48.33	56.42
52	WATERFORD	ARD-5	FL	4500	New London, CT	AC	412.50	48.58	48.58	33.00	33.00
~~927~~	~~Wilmington Syd~~	~~NR~~	~~NR~~	~~500~~	~~Wilmington, NC~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~
~~930~~	~~Yacht Maintenance~~	~~NR~~	~~NR~~	~~160~~	~~Cambridge, MD~~	~~AC~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~	~~0.00~~

WEST COAST DRYDOCKING MATRIX OF SELECTED SHIP CLASSES VS CERTIFIED DRY DOCKS WITH CAPACITY OVER 2,500 LT

9 JUNE 1993

| SHIP CLASS | NAVAL SHIPYARDS | | |

Crowley's aircraft carrier: Twenty Navy T-38 training/fighter jets were loaded aboard Crowley Marine Service's 388-foot house barge Alaska, *early this spring for a 40-day voyage from San Diego to Hualien, Taiwan. Alaska has a 272-foot by 70-foot steel house that can afford protection for the aircraft on the long tow. The T-38s were lifted by crane onto the barge's 50-foot by 60-foot after deck, then towed into the house, and secured with specially designed tie-down straps attached to D rings, welded to the deck. The* Alaska *is being towed by Crowley's 4,300-horsepower tug/supply vessel* Fig Engineer, *skippered by Capt. Richard Quinn.*

Port of Portland Shipyard Contractors Narrowed To Three

Portland-based Cascade General officials hope that the recent change in ownership will persuade Port of Portland commissioners to designate it as the Portland Ship Yard's (PSY) sole contractor.

Cascade was recently purchased in its entirety by Frank J. Foti, president of Global Marine Services, from Tore Steen, who had formerly been involved with bankrupt West State Inc. Cascade was one of nine marine businesses worldwide that expressed interest in operating the Portland shipyard, earlier this year. The list has now been shortened to just three bidders: Cascade, San Diego-based NASSCO and Seattle-based Todd Pacific.

Of the three, NASSCO is currently in the best financial shape, with government newbuilding and conversion contracts almost overwhelming the San Diego yard. Although NASSCO executives have not disclosed a business plan for the Portland shipyard, it is likely they will use the facility to broaden the San Diego yard's commercial base, to survive beyond military contracts.

Seattle's Todd, recently saved by a ferry order from the State of Washington that was limited to in-state facilities, would be hard pressed to keep two shipyards active, and Todd's chief operating officer, Rollie Webb, admitted that Todd would prefer a "phased-in" agreement spaced over a multi-year period.

Cascade's Foti is adamant that his company can best meet Portland's needs, although the firm has drawn in little new business to date. Cascade recently finished work on the tanker *Chevron Colorado*, and is scheduled to start a six-day drydocking and overhaul of the Holland America cruise liner *Noordam*, on May 17.

The Port of Portland still has a debt of about $50 million to pay off covering the shipyard's Dry Dock #4 and improvements made to other shipyard facilities. For this reason, it needs an income of about $7 million annually, to cover the yard's overhead and keep it off regional tax rolls. Such an amount may no longer be within the realm of the Pacific Coast shiprepair industry.■

New Shipyard Planned At Port Of Astoria

With an $18-million contract for 20 new 100-foot fishing vessels to operate in French Polynesia in hand, executives of San Diego's Pacific Marine and Steel Inc. (PMSI) announced, in mid-April, that they would open a shipyard at Tongue Point, near Astoria.

David Webb, vice president of corporate communications for the year-old company, said that work will begin immediately to install metal fabrication equipment at the 4.5-acre site which includes a 100,000-square-foot manufacturing building. Construction on the new vessels will begin in about 90 days, he said.

PMSI claims to have more than $100 million in backlog orders, including the fishing vessels, five jackup service vessels for Panamanian interests, and 116 prefabricated, two-story housing modules which will also be built at the Tongue Point site, for Peru.

Initially, the new yard will create about 150 new jobs in the Astoria area. When production of the 20 fishing vessels is on line, one vessel will be delivered every three weeks, with six under construction at one time. The fishing boats were "designed by the client," Webb said, but the new yard is also working with domestic naval architects.

The Tahitian fishing boat contract includes nine options, each for twenty vessels, for a total of 200 boats that could be built in Astoria.

PMSI is a Delaware corporation headed by Arthur L. Power, CEO, who also serves as president of Indo-American Oil Company, which he founded in 1988 to negotiate natural gas and petroleum contracts with utility companies in Southern California, and across the United States. He has also been involved in both the finance and construction industries.

Chief Operating Officer of the new firm is Michael R. Reed, a retired Captain in the US Navy, where he was an engineering duty officer, and more recently manager of advanced programs with the Trinity Marine Group. Reed also holds a Master of Science degree in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from MIT.■

THICKSTEN GRIMM BURGUM, INC.

106 NORTH CAROLINA AVENUE, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003
(202) 546-3414
(202) 546-3419 fax

TO: LARRY JACKSON

PHONE:

FAX: 703 696 0550

FROM: LARRY TAUB

DATE: 31 MAY 95

PAGES (including fax cover): 4

RE: LBNSY

NOTES:

per our phoncom, here is hard copy of war games summary. Any questions please call me.

larry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAL LOGISTICS 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREWORD

Naval Logistics 2001 was the first game to evaluate the logistical capability to support the new national strategy. The game was jointly hosted by the Navy and Marine Corps and included participants from all of the services as well as representatives from the Unified Commanders, Defense Agencies, other government departments and civilian industry.

Our objectives for Naval Logistics 2001 were:

a. to assess naval logistics capabilities as defined in the 1995 Department of the Navy Program Review to support the FY 2001 force structure that would be used to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) and

b. to evaluate our national industrial preparedness to regenerate forces to pre-MRC levels and reconstitute our forces' to a level necessary to meet a resurgent global threat.

The game revealed that our logistics capabilities will support the operating forces through two MRCs with certain serious limitations. It is our intention to use the results of Naval Logistics 2001 to reshape our investment strategy and to build a logistics capability that is tailored to the operating forces requirements.

The game could not have been successful without the enthusiastic support of all of the participants, and their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

ROBERT A. TIEBOUT
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Installations and Logistics
(Marine Corps)

STEPHEN F. LOFTUS
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations
(Logistics)

Theater Logistics Command and Control (C2)

Theater logistics C2 is the ability of the theater commander to manage critical assets from their origin to their ultimate destination. Assessment of logistics C2 revealed that:

- *Inaccessibility to logistics data impaired the theater commander's tactical decision-making process.* A joint theater logistics C2 system which provides total asset visibility was essential to support the commander's decision-making process. Logistics upgrades as part of Commander Joint Task Force platform modifications and the inclusion of Logistics Information Exchange System (LOGIX) within the Copernicus Architecture was required to assure access to transmission media and survivability of logistics C2 nodes.

Force Regeneration

Force regeneration is the replacement of manpower, equipment and supplies to pre-MRC levels within two years. The assessment of force regeneration capability revealed that regeneration was not possible for the following reasons:

- *Replacement of Major Weapon Systems and Ordnance.* The two year regeneration requirement was jeopardized by an industrial base inability to accelerate production output and restart "cold" production lines. This applied to new ship construction, aircraft manufacture and ordnance production.

- *Inadequate USMC Recruit Training Capacity.* A single recruit training depot proved inadequate to regenerate Marine Corps manpower losses in the two MRCs.

- *Inadequate Organic Maintenance Depot Capacity.*

  - Three CVN-capable shipyards were needed to support the maintenance cycle of 12 carriers after the conflicts.

  - Depot capacity to regenerate Marine Corps ground combat systems was inadequate. Ground combat equipment could not be regenerated without opening a second public facility or expanding private sector capability.

Force Reconstitution

Force reconstitution is rearmament of naval forces to a 450 ship Navy by the year 2009 in response to a resurgent global threat. Assessment of reconstitution capability revealed that:

- *Reconstitution was not possible within the seven year period without developing additional shipbuilding and ordnance production capabilities.*

Document Separator

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PITTSBURGH

April 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR **MR. LARRY JACKSON**

FROM: GEORGE R. SCHLOSSBERG
JENNIFER L. PEPER

SUBJECT: SAN DIEGO PRIVATE SHIPYARD CAPACITY

Pursuant to our earlier conversations, please find attached the relevant private shipyard capacity information regarding West Coast shipyards, specifically those in San Diego. The first attachment is a shipyard matrix which includes responses that reflect a compilation of the entire San Diego private shipyard sector, as well as resources available for use by the private sector at the San Diego Naval Station, (North Island and Ballest Point) and the NTC San Diego (for housing). Thereafter, each document is an individual shipyard matrix completed independently by each of five private shipyards in San Diego, California.

In addition, we have enclosed a copy of a legal memorandum to Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon, General Counsel and Mr. Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, addressing the legal authority of the Commission to consider private sector shipyard capacity during its deliberations.

If you have any questions with regards to this information, or require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact either George Schlossberg at (202) 828-2418 or Jennifer Peper at (202) 828-2319.

Enclosures: as stated.

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

CHARTER MEMBERS
A & E Industries, Inc.
Campbell Marine Industries
Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc.
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc.
Southwest Marine, Inc.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Arco Instrument Corp.
Action Cleaning Corp.
American Rigging & Supply, Inc.
Arise Scaffolding & Equipment
Astro-Pak Corp.
Atlantic Ordnance & Gyro, Inc.
C & W Diving Services, Inc.
California Marine Cleaning, Inc.
Controls Engineering Maintenance Corp.
Cook Bros. Manufacturing & Supply Co.
Engineering Visions, Inc.
Fraser's Boiler Service, Inc.
Fryer-Knowles, Inc.
Marine Equipment Service, Inc.
Marine Services Commercial Diving Co.
Miller Marine
Naval Coatings, Inc.
Norva Marine Service, Inc.
P.D.S., Inc.
Pacific Marine Propeller, Inc.
Pacific Marine Sheetmetal, Inc.
PACORD, Inc.
Performance Contracting, Inc.
Propulsion Controls Engineering
Sedgwick James of California, Inc.
R. Slayen, Inc.
South Western Engineering Co.
Technology Application & Service Co.
United Defense (FMC/BMY)
Up-N-Down Scaffold, Inc.
Walashek Industries
Western Hose & Supply Co.
Western Industrial & Marine Service
YYK Enterprises, Inc.
York Manufacturing, Inc.

AFFILIATE MEMBERS
Dana Point Shipyard
Driscoll, Inc.
Knight & Carver, Inc.
Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
Oceanside Marine Centre, Inc.
Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

TO: SDSRA Charter Members

FROM: R.A. McKay

DATE: March 27, 1995

SUBJECT: Data Call

Enclosure: Military Value Matrix

The San Diego Chamber of Commerce has requested that our Association complete the enclosed Data Call as soon as possible so that the information may be sent to the BRAC Commission in Wahington, DC.

The Association has been asked to answer yes or no to each item listed on the Military Value Matrix. Please place your yes or no answer on the right-hand margin. I would like to have this information back by this Thursday, March 30.

Please direct all questions regarding the above to the following telephone number: 238-1000, Ext. 2800.

RAM:be

SAN DIEGO MEGA PORT.
- SAN DIEGO PVT SECTOR
- SAN DIEGO NAVAL [illegible]
- NORTH ISLAND
- BALLEST POINT.
- NTC SAN DIEGO FOR HOUSING

3-27-92
NBC

SD MEAA Point Put Pooling

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	SD PUB/ SD YES	PUT NO
				DRYDOCKS						31.48	4.47	15.35	9.33	18.07	13.80	1.17	//	//
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0		NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1	YES	
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	YES	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0		NO
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0		NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0		NO
1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0		NO
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0		NO
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0		NO
* 2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0		NO
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0		NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0	YES	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	1	YES	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	14.08	5.98	7.60	14.02	8.03	4.88	7.75	//	//
2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1		—
1	9/42	102/30	34 1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
2	9/42	102/32	34 1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0		
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1		
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (G&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1	—	—
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 23 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES	
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 900 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES	
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0		NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1	YES	
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0	YES	
				STRATEGIC FACTORS	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6.07	4.11	4.11	3.80	0.80	3.22	0.96	//	//
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	6	0.92	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES	
1	42	35	9.2	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0	YES	

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVY'S TRANSFER OF DRYDOCK MAINTENANCE FROM HANSON
* ALLOWS DOCKING OF THE 21ST CV/CVN

SD MEGA Pwr PVT. & Public

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight: R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	SD	DOB
				OPERATING FACTORS	0	0	0	0	0	0.22	2.49	2.33	2.48	2.49	1.94	2.40	YES	NO
3	42	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1	//	//
2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	0	0	1	0	0	1	YES	
2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	28	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES	
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0		NO
3	42	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1	YES	
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0.20	6.95	6.95	5.22	7.30	6.48	6.05	//	//
2	39	J16	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	33	14	6D	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1		NO
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
2	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1		NO
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1	YES	
1	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1		NO
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	6	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1		NO
2	33	16	7j	Site has no Installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	4	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
2	33	19	8 f/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	6	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	YES	
				CONTINGENCY	0	0	0	0	0	0.78	0.56	0.66	0.56	0.21	0.43	0.35		
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0	YES	
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1	YES	
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	0	0	0	0	0	29.61	9.03	16.18	9.27	11.37	10.48	2.59	//	//
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0		
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0		
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0		
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1	YES	
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workloa	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1		NO
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSR/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0		No
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0		No
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0		
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0		No
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

RM

SD Negotiation Put to Public

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Qus Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights: R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	SD PRV	SD CVC
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997s?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on ASR/ATSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AD/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1	YES	
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has DON unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
				QUALITY OF LIFE	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	3.32	2.70	1.08	1.89	2.70	2.01	2.09	//	//
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3	65	3	1 b.1.	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	National Crime Statistics			Is the violent crime rate < 758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1		
3				Is the property crime rate < 4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1		
3				Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1		
3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES	
				CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	13.863	1.86	20.00	1.85	2.65	1.70	0.00	//	//
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0		NO
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
					102	56	63	42		100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25		

Average = 42.75

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

P 01

FAX TO: R. A. McKAY
234-3083

FROM: R. F. ALLEN
CAMPBELL

RESPONSE TO BELOW:
(4 PGS)

MAR 27 1995

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

CHARTER MEMBERS
A & E Industries, Inc.
Campbell Marine Industries
Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc.
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc.
Southwest Marine, Inc.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Arco Instrument Corp.
Action Cleaning Corp.
American Rigging & Supply, Inc.
Arise Scaffolding & Equipment
Astro-Pak Corp.
Atlantic Ordnance & Gyro, Inc.
C & W Diving Services, Inc.
California Marine Cleaning, Inc.
Controls Engineering Maintenance Corp.
Cook Bros. Manufacturing & Supply Co.
Engineering Visions, Inc.
Fraser's Boiler Service, Inc.
Fryer-Knowles, Inc.
Marine Equipment Service, Inc.
Marine Services Commercial Diving Co.
Miller Marine
Naval Coatings, Inc.
Norva Marine Service, Inc.
P.D.S., Inc.
Pacific Marine Propeller, Inc.
Pacific Marine Sheetmetal, Inc.
PACORD, Inc.
Performance Contracting, Inc.
Propulsion Controls Engineering
Sedgwick James of California, Inc.
R. Slayen, Inc.
South Western Engineering Co.
Technology Application & Service Co.
United Defense (FMC/BMY)
Up-N-Down Scaffold, Inc.
Walashek Industries
Western Hose & Supply Co.
Western Industrial & Marine Service
YYK Enterprises, Inc.
York Manufacturing, Inc.

AFFILIATE MEMBERS
Dana Point Shipyard
Drisoll, Inc.
Knight & Carver, Inc.
Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
Oceanside Marine Centre, Inc.
Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

TO: SDSRA Charter Members

FROM: R.A. McKay

DATE: March 27, 1995

SUBJECT: Data Call

Enclosure: Military Value Matrix

The San Diego Chamber of Commerce has requested that our Association complete the enclosed Data Call as soon as possible so that the information may be sent to the BRAC Commission in Wahington, DC.

The Association has been asked to answer yes or no to each item listed on the Military Value Matrix. Please place your yes or no answer on the right-hand margin. I would like to have this information back by this Thursday, March 30.

Please direct all questions regarding the above to the following telephone number: 238-1000, Ext. 2800.

RAM:be

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service. CAMPBELL SHIPYARD

Qus Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	A 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
				DRYDOCKS													
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0	
1	9H	thru	3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0	
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs?	1	1	1	0	8	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0	
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	1	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	1	0	1	0	
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS													
2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1	
1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0	
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0	
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0	
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (G&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	0	0	1	10	0.62	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.62	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $58/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.62	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1	NO
2	42	29	6.1	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 22 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 800 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0	YES
				STRATEGIC FACTORS													
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	6	0.92	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0	YES
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES
1	42	35	9.2	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0	YES

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight A 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
				OPERATING FACTORS	FOM	FOM	FOM	FOM	HOM	59.82	42.49	52.99	48.48	37.49	41.84	32.40	
3	42	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	0	0	1	0	0	1	NO
2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	NO
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0	NO
3	42	28	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES
3	42	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1	NO
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT	FOM	FOM	FOM	FOM	HOM	59.20	26.93	45.84	25.22	41.50	46.48	26.95	
2	39	116	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES
2	33	14	6D	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
3	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
1	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1	YES
2	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1	
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	6	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES
2	33	16	7j	Site has no installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	4	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	38	8 f/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	6	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
3	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	NO
				CONTINGENCY	FOM	FOM	FOM	FOM	HOM	10.78	10.66	10.66	10.66	10.81	10.43	10.35	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0	
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1	
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0	
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0	
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	FOM	FOM	FOM	FOM	HOM	20.41	10.01	10.78	10.27	11.37	10.46	11.09	
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0	
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0	
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0	
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0	
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0	
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0	
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1	
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workloa	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1	
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSR/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0	
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0	
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0	
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0	
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0	
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0	
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0	

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight: A 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES: PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997s?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1	YES
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AD/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0	
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has DOH unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	1	1	0	1	1	0	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	QUALITY OF LIFE	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3	65	3	1.b.1.	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
3	National			Is the violent crime rate < 758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1	?
3	Crime			Is the property crime rate < 4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1	?
3	Statistics			Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1	?
3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	CREW OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0	?
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0	YES
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	102	56	83	42									
										100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25	

Average = 42.75

A=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

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FROM: R. GROTHEN
NASSCO
3/30/95

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

CHARTER MEMBERS
A & E Industries, Inc.
Campbell Marine Industries
Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc.
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc.
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ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Arco Instrument Corp.
Action Cleaning Corp.
American Rigging & Supply, Inc.
Arise Scaffolding & Equipment
Astro-Pak Corp.
Atlantic Ordnance & Gyro, Inc.
C & W Diving Services, Inc.
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Pacific Marine Sheetmetal, Inc.
PACORD, Inc.
Performance Contracting, Inc.
Propulsion Controls Engineering
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R. Slayen, Inc.
South Western Engineering Co.
Technology Application & Service Co.
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Up-N-Down Scaffold, Inc.
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Western Hose & Supply Co.
Western Industrial & Marine Service
YYK Enterprises, Inc.
York Manufacturing, Inc.

AFFILIATE MEMBERS
Dana Point Shipyard
Driscoll, Inc.
Knight & Carver, Inc.
Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
Oceanside Marine Centre, Inc.
Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

TO: SDSRA Charter Members

FROM: R.A. McKay

DATE: March 27, 1995

SUBJECT: Data Call

Enclosure: Military Value Matrix

The San Diego Chamber of Commerce has requested that our Association complete the enclosed Data Call as soon as possible so that the information may be sent to the BRAC Commission in Wahington, DC.

The Association has been asked to answer yes or no to each item listed on the Military Value Matrix. Please place your yes or no answer on the right-hand margin. I would like to have this information back by this Thursday, March 30.

Please direct all questions regarding the above to the following telephone number: 238-1000, Ext. 2800.

RAM:be

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Question No	DC No	Pg No	Qsl No	QUESTIONS	R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
				DRYDOCKS												
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?												
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHOs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHOs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHO?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHOs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHO?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHO drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHO drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	1
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS												
2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1
1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC Investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC Investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.06	1	1	1	0	0	0
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (GAA + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 23 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 900 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 80 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of HAOCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0
				STRATEGIC FACTORS												
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	6	0.92	1	1	0	0	0	0
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1
1	42	35	8.2	Are there Interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Qua Imp	OC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights A 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
				OPERATING FACTORS	0%	10%	70%	20%	100%	0.726	2.48	2.35	2.18	2.40	2.04	2.40	
3	42	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	0	0	1	0	0	1	Y
2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	Y
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0	Y
3	42	28	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1	Y
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0	Y
3	42	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1	Y
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENTS	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0.20	0.95	0.95	0.77	0.89	0.48	0.94	
2	39	316	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1	Y
2	33	14	6.0	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1	Y
2	33	3	2a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
2	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1	Y
1	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1	Y
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	6	0.66	1	1	0	1	1	1	Y
2	33	16	7j	Site has no Installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
2	33	19	8 f/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	6	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	Y
				CONTINGENCY	10%	0%	0%	0%	90%	0.787	0.56	0.66	0.66	0.81	0.43	0.35	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0	Y
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1	Y
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1	Y
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0	Y
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1	Y
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0	Y
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	0%	10%	70%	20%	100%	29.91	9.03	10.75	9.27	11.37	10.46	12.32	
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0	Y
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0	Y
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937 4M	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	Y
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937 2M	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0	Y
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937 1M	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0	Y
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937 1.5M	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937 .5M	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0	Y
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-19937	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0	Y
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0	Y
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1	Y
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0	Y
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workloa	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1	Y
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	Y
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN ACOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 19977	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	Y
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EOSH/ESRA/OPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	Y
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0	Y
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0	Y
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0	Y
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0	Y
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0	Y
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0	Y

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

MY 2000

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.65	0	1	1	0	0	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	Z
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.65	0	0	1	0	0	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	Z
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.65	0	1	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	Z
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/OPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1	Z
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/OPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform OPMA/PMAs on AO/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	Z
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1	Z
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	Z
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0	Z
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	Z
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AO/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	Z
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has OON unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0	Z
				QUALITY OF LIFE	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	0	1	1	0	Y
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	80%	20%	80%	80%	80%	80.00	62.70	71.81	71.80	62.70	62.61	62.63	
3	65	3	1.b.1.	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0	Z
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0	Z
3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	Z
3	National Crime Statistics			Is the violent crime rate < 758/100,000?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	Z
3				Is the property crime rate < 4002/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1	Z
3				Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1	Z
3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1	Z
				CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1	Y
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	40%	60%	60%	60%	60%	55.57	44.16	50.00	44.35	57.63	44.70	50.00	
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0	Z
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0	Z
					0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0	Z
					102	56	63	42									
										100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25	

Average = 42.75

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

CMSD

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From: Kim Ferrell, CMSD

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight R 10	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL M.V.	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	YES	NO	N/A
				DRYDOCKS															
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?						1.40	1.47	1.33	1.23	1.07	1.00	1.17			
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0			
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0			
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0			
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0			
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1			
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0			
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0			
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0			
1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0			
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0			
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0			
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0			
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0			
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0			
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0			
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0			
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.38	0	0	0	0	0	1			
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0			
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS															
2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1			
1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0			
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0			
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0			
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1			
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (G&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1			
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1			
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1			
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1			
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 20 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1			
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 800 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0			
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0			
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1			
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0			
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1			
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0			
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	1	1	0	0			
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0			
				STRATEGIC FACTORS															
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	6	0.82	1	1	0	0	0	0			
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1			
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0			
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1			
1	42	35	9.2	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0			

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight R	F	M	C	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
				OPERATING FACTORS	10	25	15	20								
3	12	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	12	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	12	26	3.1	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	0	0	1	0	0	1
2	12	26	3.1	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0
3	12	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0
3	12	28	5.7	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1
3	12	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0
3	12	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT	10	10	10	20		10.20	20.35	16.05	15.22	16.50	16.46	16.05
2	39	J16	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	33	11	6.0	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	8	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1
1	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	8	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1
2	33	16	7j	Site has no installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	1	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	33	19	8 f/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	8	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0
				CONTINGENCY	10	05	05	05	10	0.78	0.66	0.88	0.66	0.82	0.43	0.35
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSGN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	1	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	05	05	05	05	10	20.41	19.09	18.16	20.27	11.87	10.46	12.59
1	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	13	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 600 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	42	13	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	13	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 60 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSRA/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN OMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LXA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on ASR/ATSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCDs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate local fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AD/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	1	1	0	1	1	0
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has DOH unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	0	0	0	0
				QUALITY OF LIFE	40	10	20	20	100	13.23	26.70	31.00	31.00	24.70	22.00	22.00
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	65	3	1.b.1.	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	42	48	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	National Crime Statistics			Is the violent crime rate < 750/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1
3				Is the property crime rate < 4000/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1
3				Is the drug crime rate < 400/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1
3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1
				CREWS OF CUSTOMERS	100	30	40	40	100	13.57	26.00	24.00	31.00	22.00	22.00	10.00
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0
					102	50	63	42								
										100	37.83	54.07	38.94	57.61	44.71	24.35

Average = 42.75

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

3/29/95
SWM DATA

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

CHARTER MEMBERS
A & E Industries, Inc.
Campbell Marine Industries
Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc.
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc.
Southwest Marine, Inc.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Arco Instrument Corp.
Action Cleaning Corp.
American Rigging & Supply, Inc.
Arise Scaffolding & Equipment
Astro-Pak Corp.
Atlantic Ordnance & Gyro, Inc.
C & W Diving Services, Inc.
California Marine Cleaning, Inc.
Controls Engineering Maintenance Corp.
Cook Bros. Manufacturing & Supply Co.
Engineering Visions, Inc.
Fraser's Boiler Service, Inc.
Fryer-Knowles, Inc.
Marine Equipment Service, Inc.
Marine Services Commercial Diving Co.
Miller Marine
Naval Coatings, Inc.
Norva Marine Service, Inc.
P.D.S., Inc.
Pacific Marine Propeller, Inc.
Pacific Marine Sheetmetal, Inc.
PACOND, Inc.
Performance Contracting, Inc.
Propulsion Controls Engineering
Sedgwick James of California, Inc.
R. Slayen, Inc.
South Western Engineering Co.
Technology Application & Service Co.
United Defense (FMC/BMY)
Up-N-Down Scaffold, Inc.
Walashek Industries
Western Hose & Supply Co.
Western Industrial & Marine Service
YYK Enterprises, Inc.
York Manufacturing, Inc.

AFFILIATE MEMBERS
Dana Point Shipyard
Driscoll, Inc.
Knight & Carver, Inc.
Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
Oceanside Marine Centre, Inc.
Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

TO: SDSRA Charter Members

FROM: R.A. McKay

DATE: March 27, 1995

SUBJECT: Data Call

Enclosure: Military Value Matrix

The San Diego Chamber of Commerce has requested that our Association complete the enclosed Data Call as soon as possible so that the information may be sent to the BRAC Commission in Wahington, DC.

The Association has been asked to answer yes or no to each item listed on the Military Value Matrix. Please place your yes or no answer on the right-hand margin. I would like to have this information back by this Thursday, March 30.

Please direct all questions regarding the above to the following telephone number: 238-1000, Ext. 2800.

RAM:be

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weight R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	SWM
				DRYDOCKS						31.46	4.47	16.95	9.33	18.07	13.80	1.17	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1	
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0	
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0	
1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0	
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	1	0	1	0	
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS						14.08	5.06	17.60	14.02	18.03	14.68	7.75	
2	9	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 5 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1	
1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0	
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Did capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0	
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0	
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (G&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than $31/hr?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1	
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 23 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1	
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 000 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0	
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1	
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0	
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1	
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0	
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0	
				STRATEGIC FACTORS						6.07	4.11	4.11	3.80	0.80	3.22	0.98	
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	6	0.92	1	1	0	0	0	0	
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1	
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	1	0	
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1	
1	42	35	9.2	Are there Interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0	

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	SUM YES	SUM NO
				OPERATING FACTORS	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3.22	2.49	2.39	2.48	2.49	1.94	2.40	//	//
3	42	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	0.72	0	0	1	0	0	1	YES	
2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0	YES	
3	42	28	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES	
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1	YES	
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9.20	6.95	6.05	5.22	8.30	8.48	6.65		
2	39	316	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES	
2	33	14	6D	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES	
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1	YES	
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1		
2	33	16	7j	Site has no Installation Restoration Issues that restrict ops or development plans.	1	1	0	0	6	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES	
2	33	19	8 f/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	0	1	0	0	4	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	6	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
				CONTINGENCY	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.78	0.56	0.66	0.66	0.21	0.43	0.35	//	//
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0		NO
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1	YES	
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	1		NO
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	29.61	9.09	10.18	9.27	11.37	10.46	2.59	//	//
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	1	0		NO
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0		NO
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-	1	0	1	0	9	1.10	0	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 80 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1	YES	
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workloa	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1		NO
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSR/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0		NO
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0		NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0		NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES	

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	JDM YES	JDM NO
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-1997s?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-1997?(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on ASR/ATSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES	
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1		NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0		NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0		NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AD/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0		NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES	
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has DON unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	YES	
1				**QUALITY OF LIFE**	40%	0%	0%	0%	10%	3.32	2.70	1.02	1.83	2.70	2.01	2.08		
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3	65	3	1.6.1	Do > 50 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES	
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES	
3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1		NO
3	National			Is the violent crime rate < 758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1		
3	Crime			Is the property crime rate < 4002/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1		
3	Statistics			Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1		
3	42	42	15.5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1		YES
				CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	20%	0%	20%	20%	20%	13.57	4.00	20.00	2.83	2.63	1.70	0.00		
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEO/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0		
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0		
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0		
					102	58	63	42										
										100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25		

Average = 42.75

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

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

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NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Question	DC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES PORTS	NORVA	CONOB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on LHD/LHA/LKA/AGFs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	4	0.48	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on LCC/LKA/LPD/LPH/LSD/LSTs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform COH/ROHs on CVs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	0	1	0	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CVs from FY 1990-19976?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	0	0	YES
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROHs on CGs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	0	1	1	0	1	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on CGs (POST NTU) from FY 1990-19977(NTU)	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on CGs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	4	0.49	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES
2	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on DDG-993/DDG-51s from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DPMA/PMA/DSRA/SRAs on DDs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	2	0.37	0	1	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform ROH/DSRA/SRAs on ASR/ATSs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SCOs on floating drydocks such as ARD/ARDM/AFDB/AFDL/AFDMs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	1	0.12	0	1	1	0	1	1	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform depot level nuclear shipwork on tenders or moored training ships from FY 1990-19977	1	1	0	0	4	0.57	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	19	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate fossil fueled ships from FY 1990-19977	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	1	1	0	1	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AVT/AOE/AORs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	0	0	NO
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRA/DPMA/PMAs on FF/FFG/FFTs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	0	1	0	1	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on MCM/MSOs from FY 1990 though FY 19977	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DPMA/PMAs on AD/AS/AR/AE/AFS/ATF/ARSs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	1	YES
3	42	6 - 17	1	Did or will the NSY perform DSRA/SRAs on MHCs from FY 1990-19977	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	0	0	0	YES
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSBNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to SSNs?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	1	0	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CGNs?	1	0	0	0	1	0.07	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to Aegis surface combatant ships?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to CVs?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to large assault ships?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other surface combatant and patrol ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	1	0	1	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other assault ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mine warfare ships?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to combat logistic ships(AOE/AFS/AO/AE/AOR)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to mobile logistic ships (AO/AS)?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
3	42	23	2.2	Does the NSY provide planning yard support to other auxiliary ships/craft/docks?	1	0	1	0	2	0.24	1	1	0	1	1	0	NO
1	42	23	2.1	The NSY has DON unique facilities, equipment, or skills.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	NO
				QUALITY OF LIFE	QOL	QOL	QOL	QOL	QOL		42.70	31.91	31.15	32.70	32.07	32.00	
3	42	38	17.1	Does the site have >90 per cent of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
3	65	3	1.b.1.	Do > 60 per cent of site military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES
3	42	48	24.2	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius (off base)?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
3	42	49	24.3	Are college education courses available on the base?	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
3	National Crime Statistics			Is the violent crime rate < 756/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	1	1	1	
3				Is the property crime rate < 4302/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	0	1	
3				Is the drug crime rate < 402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	0	0	1	1	1	
3	42	42	15.6	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	1	1	0	1	1	1	YES
				CREWS OF CUSTOMER SHIPS	NOS	NOS	NOS	NOS	NOS		44.16	30.00	35.35	43.33	41.20	50.00	
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 40 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed in the BEQ/BOQ?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	0	1	1	0	0	NO
1	42	39	14.2	Are more than 20 per cent of crews of customer ships berthed ashore (homeport/own quarters)?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
3	42	39	14.2	Are more than 10 per cent crews of customer ships berthed on barges?	0	1	0	1	4	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
					102	56	63	42									
										100	37.83	54.07	38.04	57.61	44.71	24.25	

Average = 42.75

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

SENT BY:

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Qu Imp	QC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	PORTS	NORVA	LONGB	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
					M.V. Criteria/Weight						RESPONSES						
				OPERATING FACTORS													
3	42	36	10.2	Has impact to schedule due to natural inhibitors to operations at this NSY been less than 5 per cent monthly average?	1	0	1	1	1	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
2	42	24	3.1	Are less than 10 per cent of the NSY's facilities classified as inadequate?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
1	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 20 years?	0	1	0	0	10	1.72	0	0	1	0	0	1	YES
2	42	26	3.4	Is the average age of Industrial Plant Equipment less than 25 years?	0	1	0	0	7	0.51	1	1	0	1	1	0	YES
3	42	27	4.3	The NSY provides utility and other services to other DOD/DON activities or the community?	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	1	0	NO
3	42	29	5.2	The NSY provides tugs, pilots, barges, or other harbor services to other activities.	0	1	0	0	2	0.14	1	1	1	1	0	1	NO
3	42	42	5.3	Additional costs will not accrue for harbor services if the nearby Naval station or base is closed.	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	1	0	1	1	0	0	YES
3	42	38	12.2	Is there undeveloped acreage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	2	0.25	1	1	0	1	0	1	NO
				ENVIRONMENT AND ENCROACHMENT													
2	39	316	5.2	Are there no encroachments at the NSY that restrict current operations?	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES
2	33	14	6D	Base Ops or development plans have not been impacted due to environmental compliance issues/requirements.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	0	1	1	1	NO
2	33	3	1a/b/e	Site has no endangered/threatened species and biological habitats that restrict current ops.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
2	33	5	2c	Site has no jurisdictional wetlands that currently restrict base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	6	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
3	33	6	3b	Site has no National Register cultural resources that constrain base ops or development plans.	0	1	0	1	3	0.46	1	1	1	0	0	1	NO
1	33	10	5b	Site is in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM-10.	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	0	0	0	1	1	1	NO
2	33	12	5g	Site ops or development plans have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	1	1	0	0	6	0.86	1	1	0	1	1	1	NO
2	33	16	7j	Site has no Installation Restoration issues that restrict ops or development plans.	0	1	0	0	4	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
2	33	19	8 b/g/h	Site has no significant maintenance dredging restrictions.	1	1	0	1	8	1.35	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
1	42	38	12.3	Does this NSY have any specific capabilities for handling/disposing of hazardous waste/material?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	YES
				CONTINGENCY													
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	0	0	1	0.10	0.68	0.68	0.56	0.82	0.63	0.35	
3	9	110	37.7	Can CVs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	9	110	37.7	Can SSBN/SSNs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0	NO
3	9	110	37.7	Can CG/LPD/FFGs be berthed at this NSY for surge berthing?	0	0	1	0	1	0.05	1	1	0	1	1	1	NO
3	42	37	11.1	Is there underutilized storage at the NSY suitable for industrial expansion?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	1	1	1	NO
3	42	37	11.1	The NSY has surplus covered industrial space.	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	1	1	1	0	0	1	NO
3	42	37	11.2	With the completion of MILCON projects, will there be excess storage available?	0	1	1	0	1	0.12	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
2	42	37	11.3	Is there commercial industrial space within a 1 hour drive of the NSY?	0	0	1	0	4	0.21	1	1	1	0	1	0	NO
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD													
1	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 3000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES
2	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	0	0	0	0	0	NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
1	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 2000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	9	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 1000 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	0	1	1	0	0	0	NO
3	42	19	1.2	Did the level of effort of non-nuclear shipwork exceed 500 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
2	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 750 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	19	1.2	Did the total of other productive work exceed 250 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	1	0	1	0	1	0	NO
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 50 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	10	1.22	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 10 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1993?	1	0	1	0	7	0.85	1	0	0	0	1	0	NO
1	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 130 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-	1	0	1	0	8	1.18	0	1	0	1	1	0	YES
2	42	22	1.3	Did the level of effort of nonnuclear shipboard emergent repair exceed 80 DLMYs on the average, annually from FY 1990-1	1	0	1	0	6	0.73	1	0	1	0	0	1	YES
1	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	10	1.53	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
2	42	23	2.4	Did the work performed in support of other DON industrial facilities in FY 1993 exceed 2.5 per cent of total FY 1993 workload	1	0	0	1	7	1.07	1	1	1	0	0	1	NO
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN ROH/COHs from FY 1990 through FY 1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN DSRA/SRA/EDSR/ESRA/DPIA/PIAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES
1	42	23	2.3	Did or will the NSY remove reactor compartments from inactive nuclear powered vessels from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSBN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	0	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate SSBNs/SSNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	1	1	0	1	1	0	NO
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN ROH/EOH/RFOH/EROs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	10	0.71	1	1	0	1	1	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DMPs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	6	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	0	NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform SSN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	1	1	0	1	1	0	NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN COH/RCOHs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	3	0.21	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY inactivate CGNs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	7	0.49	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CGN DSRA/SRAs from FY 1990-1997?	1	0	0	0	2	0.14	0	1	0	1	0	0	YES

R=Readiness F=Facilities M=Mobilization C=Cost

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Note: This matrix reflects corrections of discrepancies identified by Naval Audit Service.

Que Imp	QC No	Pg No	Qst No	QUESTIONS	R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV	PORTS	KORV	LONGE	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM	
				DRYDOCKS													
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more CG/DDG/DDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	1	1	1	0	1	0	NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	1	YES
1	9H		3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 CG/DDG/DDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
2	9H	Pgs	3.1	With 3 SSN-688s drydocked, can the NSY drydock a CG/DDG/DD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	9H	31	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	1	0	0	0	NO
1	9H	thru	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	1	0	1	0	NO
3	9H	34	3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock 2 or more LHA/LHDs?	1	1	1	0	9	1.75	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV in drydock can the NSY drydock at least 1 LHA/LHD?	1	1	1	0	6	1.17	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock 2 or more SSN-688s?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	9H		3.1	With a CVN/CV and an LHD drydocked, can the NSY drydock at least 1 SSN-688?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	0	1	0	NO
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	0	1	0	0	NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-637s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	3	0.58	1	0	1	0	1	0	NO
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more FF/FFGs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	5	0.97	1	1	1	1	1	0	NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 1 or more FF/FFG, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	2	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	1	YES
2	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	7	1.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 2 or more LPH/LPD/LSDs, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	4	0.78	0	1	1	0	1	0	NO
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS													
2	8	102	34.1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years (FY 1991-1993) >2 per cent of the average CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	1	NO
1	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $200 million?	0	1	0	1	10	1.55	1	1	0	1	0	0	NO
2	9/42	102/30	34.1/7.1	Old capital improvements and MRP expenditures over the last seven years exceed $100 million?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	1	0	1	0	NO
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 15 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	1.08	1	1	1	0	0	0	YES
2	9/42	102/32	34.1/7.5	Are non-BRAC investments, planned for FY 1995-2001, less than 30 per cent of the FY 1994 CPV?	0	1	0	1	6	0.93	0	0	0	1	1	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 overhead (G&A + PE) cost rate applied to direct labor less than 131/hr?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 Production Expense (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 30 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	0	1	1	0	1	YES
1	42	34	8.2	Is the 1997 G & A (overhead)/fully burdened rate ratio less than 23 per cent?	0	0	0	1	8	0.66	0	1	0	1	0	1	YES
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 600 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	6	0.49	0	1	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Were more than 100 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	2	0.16	0	0	0	0	1	1	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 90 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 70 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	3	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	1	NO
3	42	29	6.1	Does the retention rate of trained apprentices exceed 20 percent over the period of FY 1990-1994?	0	0	0	1	1	0.08	1	1	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	29	6.1	Is the NSY currently training over 100 apprentices?	0	0	0	1	5	0.41	0	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Nuclear Engineers more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	5	0.42	1	0	0	1	1	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Conventional Engineers more than 14 years?	1	0	0	0	5	0.42	1	0	0	0	1	1	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Journeyman/Mechanics more than 12 years?	1	0	0	0	5	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of RADCON Technicians more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	5	0.42	1	1	0	0	0	0	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of Quality Assurance Inspectors more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	5	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	YES
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 10 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.42	1	1	0	0	1	1	NO
2	42	29	6.2	Is the average experience level of all NSY employees more than 5 years?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28	0	0	1	1	0	0	YES
				STRATEGIC FACTORS													
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 500 miles from the NSY?	1	0	0	1	8	0.92	1	1	0	0	0	0	YES
2	42	39	14.1	The two closest fleet homeport concentrations average less than 1500 miles from the NSY.	1	0	0	1	4	0.61	0	0	1	1	1	1	YES
1	42	35	9.4	Is the NSY participating in the Regional Maintenance Concept?	1	1	0	1	10	2.25	1	1	1	0	1	0	NO
2	42	35	9.1	Is there special strategic importance for the NSY accruing from its geographical location?	1	0	0	0	5	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	1	YES
1	42	35	8.2	Are there interstate highways, air ports, sea ports and rail heads nearby?	0	0	1	1	7	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0	YES

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April 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR **MS. MADELYN R. CREEDON, GENERAL COUNSEL, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**
MR. S. ALEXANDER YELLIN, NAVY TEAM LEADER, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

FROM: GEORGE R. SCHLOSSBERG

SUBJECT: LEGAL AUTHORITY OF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO CONSIDER PRIVATE SECTOR SHIPYARD CAPACITY

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (the "Act"), as implemented and interpreted previously by the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission ("Commission") in 1991 and 1993, provides this Commission with the authority, if not the duty, to consider, among other things, private sector shipyard capacity in its review of the Department of Defense's 1995 Base Closure Recommendations. Moreover, during the deliberations leading to the 1995 round of base closure recommendations, the Military Departments, the Joint Working Groups, and the Department of Defense used private sector capacity in fashioning their final recommendations to the Commission.

A. Statutory construction of the Act favors consideration of private capacity by the Commission in its closure and realignment recommendations.

To accomplish its statutory goals, the Act established a specific procedure for making recommendations for base closures and realignments. The Secretary is given the responsibility to develop a force structure plan and final criteria to be used in making closure recommendations, and the Commission is given the responsibility to review and make changes to the Secretary's closure recommendations if it determines that the Secretary "deviated substantially" from the force structure plan and final criteria.

Significantly, however, the statute does not delineate either the final criteria themselves, or the factors that are to be encompassed within the final criteria. Rather, the statute is silent as to any of the details of the final criteria. Similarly, the legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress made no attempt to define the final criteria with any greater precision.

Given the complexity of the issues underlying base closures and the specialized nature of the Military Departments, this lack of specific statutory detail is hardly surprising. To the contrary, by declining to set forth the final criteria or the issues to be considered thereunder, Congress followed the frequently employed practice of deliberately casting statutory language in broad terms, and then entrusting an administrative agency with great experience in the field to "fill in the gaps" in the legislation by regulation and then to apply such regulations in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977). Ultimately, the authority is given to the Commission to send to the President a final list of recommendations according to their own analysis of the issues and selection criteria.

Under similar broadly written statutory schemes, situations frequently arose where a specific issue in controversy was not addressed directly by the Congress, either in the language of the statute itself or in the legislative history. Under general principles of statutory construction and administrative law, when Congress has not spoken to the precise question at issue, the agency's interpretation of the statute is then consulted. If the agency's interpretation is consistent with the statute's intent and is rationally supported, the agency's interpretation generally is given great deference and is usually deemed to be controlling. See, e.g., Chevron, USA, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990); Illinois E.P.A. v. U.S. E.P.A., 947 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1991); Difford v. of Health and Human Services, 910 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir. 1990).

These principles are appropriately applied to the issue of the consideration of private capacity in base closure recommendations. The Act is broadly written, is silent on the issue of private capacity as well as on any other factor that is to be considered under the final criteria, and the Secretary is the "expert agency" charged with "filling in the gaps."

An inquiry as to whether private capacity must be considered by the Commission in making its base closure recommendations therefore must now turn to the final selection criteria themselves as adopted by the Secretary. Significantly, however, the Secretary also deliberately left the final criteria somewhat broad and general in nature. The final selection criteria to be used by the Department of Defense to make recommendations to be reviewed by the 1995

Commission are unchanged from the original selection criteria adopted for the 1991 Commission and used also in their entirety by the 1993 Commission. See 59 Fed. Reg. 63769 (1994). For the original criteria, as adopted for the 1995 round of closures, the Secretary of Defense stated that,

> The inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria, or objective measures or factors that could be applied to all bases within a Military Department or Defense Agency. See 56 FR 6374 (1991), appended hereto at **Tab A.**

In its adoption of the final criteria in 1991, its published 1991 policy guidance addressing those criteria, and its reaffirmation of those criteria in their entirety in 1993 and 1995, the Secretary established the "regulations" pursuant to which closure recommendations are to be made. Therefore, with respect to any particular issue not specifically addressed in the statute, such as whether private capacity must be considered under the final criteria, general principles of statutory construction as set forth in the Chevron line of cases require that the Secretary's interpretations are to apply, as long as they are consistent with the intent of the statute.

Therefore, that the express language of the final selection criteria does not explicitly mention private capacity is of little importance, because clearly the intent of the Secretary in adopting the final criteria was not to specify each and every factor that is to be considered under those criteria. To the contrary, such specificity was deliberately avoided.

However, in response to concerns voiced by commenting parties on the need for more detailed information as to how the criteria were to be applied, the Secretary published in the Federal Register a "policy guidance" that had been issued to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies on the base closure process. Id. at 6375. In that policy guidance, the Secretary explicitly specifies, in response to comments recommending that the capacity of the private sector to support or perform military missions be considered, that such availability is "already included" in Final Criteria Number One and Four. Id. at 6376.

Because the Secretary, acting as the expert agency in filling in the gaps of a general statute, has specified in a formal policy notice that consideration of private capacity is included in the final selection criteria,[1] the Commission is charged clearly with the duty to review private sector shipyard capacity during its deliberations.

However, even in the absence of this express policy guidance, private capacity still must be considered logically by the Secretary and the Commission under Criteria Number 1, in order for the agency's application of the guidelines to be consistent with the overall policies and objectives of the Act. The second clause of Criteria No. 1 ("the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defenses's total force"), by its terms, requires that the Secretary consider available private capacity when assessing the impact of a base closure on the readiness of the force, or else the goals of saving money, achieving an efficient military force, eliminating unnecessary facilities, and streamlining the defense infrastructure will not be able to be achievable.

In other words, in order for the closure process to be able to further the efficiency of the military, save money, and still meet the needs of the force, adequate private repair and maintenance facilities available in a particular area--for example, the West Coast or Southern California--must be considered. To the extent that adequate private repair and maintenance facilities are available in a particular area that can satisfy the military's need for operational readiness, the closing of a public facility in that area can be recommended for closure under this criteria. In fact, closing a public facility under such circumstances would further the legislative intent of the statute, in that military funds could instead be used more efficiently on operational activities and keeping open public repair and maintenance facilities in those areas where adequate private capacity is <u>not</u> already present; Criteria number 1 can therefore be satisfied through a combination of public and private facilities.

Thus, the consideration of the availability of private facilities by the Commission in the final criteria is proper, therefore making it appropriate for the Commission to consider the private capacity issue at this time. Most importantly, in a recent Supreme Court review of the Act, the Court concluded that the past actions of the Secretary and the Commission were both

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[1] As stated above, the 1991 final criteria were adopted <u>unchanged</u> by the Secretary for use as the final selection criteria in the 1993 and 1995 closure process. <u>See</u> 57 Fed. Reg. 59335 (1992).

legitimate and proper. Dalton v. Specter 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994), 128 L.Ed. 2d 497 (1994). Accordingly, the Commission should continue to act as it has in previous rounds and review private sector capacity during its deliberations.

B. Private capacity must be considered if the goals and policy objectives of the Act are to be achieved.

The overall purposes and objectives of the Act must be a primary consideration underlying base closure recommendations. It is a general principle of statutory construction that in interpreting statutory language, the aims, principles, and policies that underlie the statute are to provide guidance. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States. 494 U.S. 152 (1990), citing Kmart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281(1988), and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51(1987); Aulston v. U.S., 915 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2011(1991). With respect to the Act, its clear language and legislative history identify the purposes and goals to be achieved through the base closure process.

The purpose of the Act, as set forth in § 2901 (b), is to "provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." Another purpose of the Act is to save money. The legislative history of the Act provides useful background as to the purpose of the closure and realignment procedures.

The overall goal of the base closure process was succinctly stated by Congresswoman Schroeder during the floor debate on the base closure proposals of the House Armed Services Committee, as follows:

> *[w]e need to close bases to save money. We need to close bases as the size of the force comes down. We need to close bases because the current base structure is inefficient." 126 Cong. Rec. 7462 (daily ed. September 12, 1990).*[2]

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[2] Congresswoman Schroeder was one of the co-authors of the House Armed Services Committee's base closure proposals. Her debate in support of the Committee's proposal repeatedly emphasized that "the Committee proposal guarantees that bases will be closed and the taxpayers will save money." 126 Cong. Rec. 7463 (daily ed. September 12,1990). The report of this Committee similarly "recognizes the need to close bases" because "[t]he size of the American military will likely decline by 25 percent over the next few years. Fewer troops means fewer bases will be required." H.R. Rep. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 383. The Committee Report also stresses that the process for the

An examination of the legislative history of the 1988 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, P.L. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, the predecessor to the 1990 Act and which originated a base closure procedure similar in purpose and effect to that adopted in the 1990 Act, also is instructive.[3] For example, the House Armed Services Committee Report on H.R. 4481, on which much of the text of the bill that eventually was passed by Congress in 1988 was based, states that one of the issues that would have to be considered before a base could be closed or realigned is the extent and timing of potential cost savings. H.R. Rep. No. 735(I), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 8,11,13. In this regard, the report quotes from testimony by the Secretary before the committee that stated that "savings from closing a base are significant and perpetual." Id. at 8. Similarly, the committee report of the Government Operations Committee on the same bill expressed its support of the "goal of effecting savings by expediting the closure of unneeded military facilities." H.R. Rep. No. 735(II), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10.

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closure of military installations must be based on "economy and utility" pursuant to objective criteria designed to achieve, "effectively and efficiently," the military plans of the department as reflected in a force structure plan. Id. at 383, 61990 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3076. The Senate Armed Services Committee also recognized that reductions in military personnel and the need for deficit reduction would trigger a significant number of base closures. S. Rep. No. 384,101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 295.

[3] This statute created a base closure process which, like the procedure adopted in the 1990 statute, established a Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The 1988 Commission's statutory task was to transmit a report to the Secretary and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives recommending military installations for closure or realignment; expedited procedures for approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations by the President and Congress were also established, and closures or realignments approved pursuant to the expedited procedures would be implemented by the Secretary according to a timetable. Defense Base Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, Title II --Closure and Realignment of Military installations (codified at 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

That the overall goals of the base closure statutes are to effect cost savings in an efficient and expeditious manner in order to implement defense budgetary cuts is echoed in this Commission's 1991 and 1993 Reports to the President. In its 1993 Recommendations, the Commission notes in its opening letter to the President that continuing budget constraints, along with changing national security requirements compel the United States to reduce and realign its military forces. See 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at vi. In its introductory sections in the 1991 Report, the Commission states that because of DoD's plans to decrease the military by 25%, there is a need to eliminate unnecessary facilities so that the more limited military dollars may go to vital military needs. See 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at vi.

The government cannot accomplish the goal of saving money if the Secretary makes base closure recommendations on the premise that Navy shipyards will perform virtually all of the Navy's ship repair and overhaul requirements, thereby ignoring the reality that private shipyards perform approximately 35 percent of those requirements. In fact, the Congress has acknowledged the important role the private sector plays in providing support to the Services as well as the need to maintain a commercial industrial mobilization base by providing that up to 40 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract for that performance with the private sector. 10 U.S.C. § 2466.

Thus, the goal of achieving cost savings must include consideration of private sector capacity and capabilities. As set forth in the Government Accounting Office's March 1988 Report on Navy Maintenance, the Navy policy set forth in DoD Directive No. 4151.1 (originally adopted in 1974 and repealed in the wake of the enactment of section 2466 of title 10, United States Code), is in accord with Congress' intent to permit 40 percent of all Navy ship repair, overhaul and alteration work to go to private shipyards. GAO/NSIAD-88-109, dated March 25, 1988, Navy Maintenance, Competing Vessel Overhauls and Repairs Between Public and Private Shipyards at 18. For many years, Department of Defense Appropriation Acts directed a specified dollar amount be applied to private sector contractors that roughly equated to the then 70/30 split. Id. Because that congressional intent was well established at the time of enactment of the 1990 Base Closure Act and its predecessor 1988 Act, those Acts by necessity contemplated that the capacity of the private sector must be included for the purpose of achieving cost savings in determining which military bases to close.

C. Prior private capacity consideration by the Commission is appropriate and proper and this practice should be continued by the Commission in their 1995 recommendations for closure and realignment.

That the availability of private capacity is an appropriate and necessary factor to be considered in an evaluation of base closure recommendations under the final criteria is highlighted by the fact that private capacity was considered by this Commission in making its 1991 and 1993 closure and realignment recommendations.

In 1993 the Base Closure Commission wrote in its final recommendation to the President to close Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California:

> *When relocating a function from a closing shipyard, the Navy should determine the availability of the required capability from another DoD entity or the private sector prior to the expenditure of resources to recreate the capability at another shipyard.*
> See 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at 1-16.

Similarly, a significant factor in the 1991 recommendations by the Commission concerning the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard was the availability of suitable private shipyard alternatives on the East Coast. For example, in evaluating options for Philadelphia, the Commission concluded that although the need for contingency capability for carrier drydocking on the East coast existed, that need could be met sufficiently through a combination of mothballing at Philadelphia and the use of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (a public facility), and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (a private facility.)

Moreover, the use of private capacity is further underscored by the deliberations of the Military Departments and the Joint Working Groups that led to the 1995 DoD recommendations to the Commission. For example, during the March 7, 1995 Commission hearing, Secretary of the Army Togo West testified that "civilian capacity was a player" in the Army's analysis of its hospital medical capacity and its determination as to which facilities to close and realign. Secretary West stated:

> *It was one of the ways in which we were able to decide that we could dispense with a center here or downgrade a hospital to a clinic there.*

> *And so, at least at the level at which I reviewed it, excess civilian capacity did not influence me so much as the certainty that with civilian capacity, we could be sure that that where we were making an adjustment there were still going to be proper medical care and treatment for those who depend on the Army.* [sic] [March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 90-91]

The Army also considered private capacity in the area of military ports in the United States. Secretary West testified further before the Commission that with regard to the Army's 1995 recommendation to close Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne, New Jersey:

> *...we in the Army are fairly comfortable with using commercial ports in most cases. There are greater assurances of commercial port availability on the East Coast than the West. So just as a matter of prudent planning, we elected to keep Oakland open, while we felt very comfortable that we could close Bayonne and realize the savings from that action.* [See March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 101-102]

In addition, all three Military Departments considered the availability of housing in the private sector in their 1995 evaluations of their military installations. Specifically, the Department of the Navy, in its Community Infrastructure Impact Analysis, included information on the ability of existing infrastructure in the local community, to absorb additional Navy personnel and missions. Installations were asked to assess the impact of increases in base personnel on off-base housing availability, public and private school, health care facilities and other off-base private recreational activities. See page 33 of the Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV), March 1995. The Air Force, in its installation evaluation criteria considered off-base housing affordability and its suitability in its evaluation of community infrastructure, as well as, off-base recreational and hospital facilities. See page 69 of the Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations (Volume V), February 1995. Similarly, the Department of the Army used off-base housing for soldiers and families in its overall evaluation of Land Facilities as provided for by the DoD. See page 24 of the Department of the Army Analyses and Recommendation (Volume II).

Private capacity was also evaluated and considered by the Joint Cross Service Groups. In particular, during the March 7, 1995 Commission hearing on recommendations by the Army, Brigadier General Shane of the Department of the Army testified that excess civilian capacity was considered in the hospital Joint Cross Service process. In response to Commissioner

Steele's question with regard to the Army's recommended closure of Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center and the continued ability of the Services to meet the military need in the area, the General responded:

> *...it goes back to the question that Commissioner Robles asked in regards to excess capacity -- civilian capacity that exists. It is my understanding that the Joint Cross Servicing Group looked at that real hard and supported this recommendation from the Army, and determined that there was capacity and that there would not be a major problem with the diversion of that tri-care service throughout the area.*
> [March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 95-96]

That the Commission relied upon the availability of private capacity in making closure and realignment recommendations in 1993 and 1991, and that the Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Working Groups evaluated the capacity of the private sector when making their 1995 recommendations, is clearly dispositive as to whether private capacity may be considered by the Commission at this time as well.

D. Conclusion

One of the primary purposes of the Act is to avoid wasting money on public facilities that are excess to meeting the military's requirements. That purpose can be accomplished only if the Secretary and the Commission base their Navy shipyard closure recommendations on the Nation's entire ship repair and maintenance capability. Accordingly, we believe it is appropriate and proper for the Commission to consider private sector shipyard capacity when deciding which shipyards to recommend for closure or realignment.

Enclosure: as stated.

cc. w/ enclosure: Mr. Larry Jackson

Federal Government under 41 U.S.C. 46–48c and 41 CFR 51–2.6.

I certify that the following actions will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors considered for this certification were:

a. The action will not result in any additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance requirements.

b. The action will not have a serious economic impact on any contractors for the service listed.

c. The action will result in authorizing small entities to provide the service procured by the Government.

Accordingly, the following service is hereby added to the Procurement List: Commissary Shelf Stocking & Custodial, Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Denver, Colorado.

This action does not affect contracts awarded prior to the effective date of this addition or options exercised under those contracts.

E.R. Alley, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 91–3704 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820–33–M

Procurement List Proposed Additions

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped.

ACTION: Proposed additions to procurement list.

SUMMARY: The Committee has received proposals to add to the Procurement List commodities to be produced and services to be provided by workshops for the blind or other severely handicapped.

COMMENTS MUST BE RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE: March 18, 1991.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, Crystal Square 5, suite 1107, 1755 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202–3509.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Beverly Milkman, (703) 557–1145.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 47(a)(2) and 41 CFR 51–2.6. Its purpose is to provide interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the possible impact of the proposed actions.

If the Committee approves the proposed additions, all entities of the Federal Government will be required to procure the commodities and services listed below from workshops for the blind or other severely handicapped. It is proposed to add the following commodities and services to the Procurement List:

Commodities

Case, Ear Plug

6515–01–212–9452.

(Remaining 20 percent of Government's Requirement)

Wash Kit, Personal

7360–00–139–1063

Bag, Parts

8105–LL–B00–0208
8105–LL–B00–0209
8105–LL–B00–0210
8105–LL–B00–9974
8105–LL–B00–9975

(Requirements of Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA)

Services

Janitorial/Custodial, Department of the Army, Coralville Reservoir, Coralville Lake, Iowa.

Janitorial/Custodial, Internal Revenue Service Center, 3651 South Interregional Highway 35, Austin, Texas

Sending and Oiling Picnic Tables, Deschutes National Forest, Bend Ranger District, Bend, Oregon.

E.R. Alley, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 91–3705 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820–33–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Department of Defense Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military Installations Inside the United States

AGENCY: Department of Defense (DoD).

ACTION: Final selection criteria.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with section 2903(b), title XXIX, part A of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, is required to publish the proposed selection criteria to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations insikde the United States.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 15, 1991.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Jim Whittaker or Ms. Patricia Walker, Base Closure and Utilization, OASD(P&L), (703) 614–5356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Final Selection Criteria

The final criteria to be used by the Department of Defense to make recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under title XXIX, part A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 as follows:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requriements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

B. Analysis of Public Comments

The Department of Defense (DoD) received 169 public comments in response to the proposed DoD selection criteria for closing and realigning military installations inside the United States. The public's comments can be grouped into four topics: General, military value, costs and "payback", and impacts. The following is an analysis of these comments.

(1) General Comments

(a) A substantial number of commentors expressed concern over the proposed criteria's broad nature and similiarity to the 1988 Defense Secretary's Base Realignment and Closure Commission criteria. Many of the comments noted a need for objective measures or factors for the criteria. Some commentors also suggested various standard measures or factors for

the criteria. The inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies (DoD Components) makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria, or objective measures or factors that could be applied to all bases within a Military Department or Defense Agency. We have provided the commentors' letters to each Military Department for their consideration. The similarity to the 1988 Base Closure Commission criteria is acknowledged. After reviewing the public comments we concluded that using similar criteria is appropriate.

(b) Many commentors noted that a correlation between force structure and the criteria was not present. The base closure and realignment procedures mandated by title XXIX, part A, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (the Act) require that the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for closure and realignment be founded on the force structure plan and the final criteria required by the Act. DoD's analytical and decision processes for applying the final criteria will be based on the force structure plan. The military value criteria provide the connection to the force structure plan.

(c) Many commentors noted the need for more detailed information on how DoD would implement the base closure procedures required by the Act. A recurrent suggestion was to group like bases into categories for analysis. In response to this comment and suggestion, and to respond to the general comments (a) and (b) above, we have issued policy guidance to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies on the base closure process. This guidance requires them to:

• Treat all bases equally: They must consider all bases equally in selecting bases for closure or realignment under the Act, without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department. This policy does not appply to closures or realignments that fall below the thresholds established by the Act or to the 86 bases closed under Public Law 100-526;

• Categorize bases: They must categorize bases with like missions, capabilities and/or attributes for analysis and review, to ensure that like bases are fairly compared with each other; and

• Perform a capacity analysis: They must link force structure changes described in the force structure plan with the existing force and bases structure, to determine if a potential for closure or realignment exists. In the event a determination is made that no excess capacity exists in a category, then there will be no need to continue the analysis of that category, unless there is a military value or other reason to continue the analysis;

• Develop and Use Objective Measures/Factors: They must develop and use objective measures or factors within categories for each criterion, whenever feasible. We recognize that it will not always be possible to develop appropriate objective measures or factors, and that measures/factors (whether they be objective or subjective) may vary for different categories of bases.

(d) A number of commentors recommended assigning specific weights to individual criteria. It would be impossible for DoD to specify weights for each criterion that could be applied across the board to all bases, again due to the mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. It appears from the comments that numbering the criteria may have been mistaken as an order of precedence associated with individual criteria. We do not intend to assign an order of precedence to an individual criterion, other than to give priority to the first four.

(e) Several commenters gave various reasons why a particular installation should be eliminated from any closure or realignment evaluation. Public Law 101-510 directs DoD to evaluate all installations equally, exclusive of those covered under Public Law 100-526 or those falling below the threshold of section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code. Public Law 100-526 implemented the recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. We have issued guidance to the DoD Components instructing them to consider all bases equally, this includes those previously nominated for study in the Defense Secretary's January 29, 1990, base realignment and closure announcement that are above the thresholds established in the Act. Conversely, we did not receive any requests that a particular installation be closed or realigned pursuant to section 2924 of Public Law 101-510.

(f) A number of commentors noted a need for more management controls over data collection to ensure accuracy of data. We agree with this recommendation and have issued guidance that requires the DoD Components to develop and implement internal controls, consistent with their organizational and program structure, to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses being performed. This guidance incorporates the lessons learned from the General Accounting Office's review of the 1988 Base Closure Commission's work.

(g) After detailed consideration of all comments, we have determined that some of the criteria may have been unclear. We have revised the criteria for additional clarity.

(h) Some of the early comments we received recommended extending the original December 31, 1990, public comment deadline. We agreed and extended the public comment period to January 24, 1991. In addition, we accepted for consideration 19 public comments received after the January 24, 1991, deadline.

(2) Military Value Comments

(a) A majority of comments received supported DoD's decision to give priority consideration to the military value criteria. In the aggregate, military value refers to the collection of attributes that describe how well a base supports its assigned force structure and missions.

(b) Several commentors recommended that National Guard and Reserve Component forces be included as part of DoD's base closure analysis. The Department's total force concept includes National Guard and Reserve Component forces, and these forces will be reflected in the force structure plan required by the Act for this base closure process. To clarify that point, criteria number one and three were amended.

(c) Some commentors recommended DoD apply the military value criteria without regard to the DoD component currently operating or receiving the services of the base. The commentors noted that this would maximize utilization of Defense assets and therefore improve the national security. We agree with this comment. DoD must retain its best bases and where there is a potential to consolidate, share or exchange assets, that potential will be pursued. We also recognize that this potential does not exist among all categories of bases and that the initial determination of the military value of bases must be made by the DoD Component currently operating the base. Consequently, we have left the military value criteria general in nature and therefore applicable DoD-wide, where appropriate. We have also issued guidance to the DoD Components that encourages inter-service and multi-service asset sharing and exchange. Finally, we will institute procedures to ensure each DoD Component has the opportunity to improve the military value of its base structure through

analysis of potential exchanges of bases with other DoD Components.

(d) Some commentors recommended we include the availability of airspace in our considerations of military value. We agree and have revised criterion number two accordingly.

(e) Several commentors requested a geographic balance be maintained when considering installations for realignment or closure. DoD is required by Public Law 101-510 to evaluate all installations equally, exclusive of those covered under Public Law 100-526 or those falling below the thresholds of section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code. However, some measures of military value do have a geographic component and therefore military mission requirements can drive geographic location considerations.

(f) Some commentors recommended that the availability of trained civil service employees be considered as well as the capacity of the private sector to support or perform military missions. DoD's civil service employees are an integral part of successful accomplishment of defense missions, as are defense contractors whether they be nationally or locally based. To the extent that the availability of trained civilian or contractor work forces influences our ability to accomplish the mission, it is already included in criteria number one and four.

(g) Several commentors recommended that mobilization potential of bases be considered and that those bases required for mobilization be retained. Contingency and mobilization requirements are an important military value consideration and were already included in criterion number three. The potential to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements is a factor at both existing and potential receiving locations, and we have amended criterion number three accordingly.

(h) One commentor recommended retaining all bases supporting operation Desert Shield/Storm and another recommended including overseas bases. DoD must balance its future base structure with the forces described in the force structure plan, and not on the current basing situation. Some forces currently supporting Operation Desert Storm are scheduled for drawdown between 1991 and 1997. DoD must adjust its base structure accordingly. Overseas bases will also be closed in the future as we drawdown DoD's overseas forces. However, Congress specifically left overseas base closures out of the base closure procedures established by the Act.

(3) Cost and "Payback" Comments

(a) Some commentors recommended calculating total federal government costs in DoD's cost and "payback" calculations. A number of such comments gave as examples of federal government costs, health care and unemployment costs. The DoD Components annually budget for health care and unemployment costs. We have instructed the DoD Components to include DoD costs for health care and unemployment, associated with closures or realignments, in the cost calculations.

(b) Several commentors noted the absence of a "payback" period and some felt that perhaps eight or ten years should be specified. We decided not to do this; we did not want to rule out making changes that were beneficial to the national security that would have longer returns on investment. The 1988 Base Closure Commission felt that a six-year "payback" unnecessarily constrained their choices. The DoD Componentes have been directed to calculate return on investment for each closure or realignment recommendation, to consider it in their deliberations, and to report it in their justifications. Criterion number five has been amended accordingly.

(c) Some commentors recommended including environmental clean-up costs in base closure cost and payback calculations. Some also noted that the cost of environmental clean-up at a particular base could be so great that the Department should remove the base from further closure consideration.

The DoD is required by law to address two distinctly different types of environmental costs.

The first cost involves the clean-up and disposal of environmental hazards in order to correct past practices and return the site to a safe condition. This is commonly referred to as environmental restoration. DoD has a legal obligation under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act for environmental restoration at sites, regardless of a decision to close a base. Therefore, these costs will not be considered in DoD's cost calculations. Where installations have unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be identified as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

The second cost involves ensuring existing practices are in compliance with the Clean Air, Clean Water, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and other environmental acts, in order to control current and futur pollution. This is commonly referre as environmental compliance. Environmental compliance costs can potentially be avoided by ceasing the existing practice through the closure or realignment of a base. On the other hand, environmental compliance costs may be a factor in determining appropriate closure, realignment, or receiving location options. In either case, the environmental compliance costs or cost avoidances may be a factor considered in the cost and return on investment calculations. The Department has issued guidance to the DoD Components on this issue.

(d) Some commentors recommended DoD change the cost and "payback" criteria to include uniform guidelines for calculating costs and savings. We agree that costs and savings must be calculated uniformly. We have improved the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission and have provided it to the DoD Components for calculations of costs, savings, and return on investment.

(4) Impacts Comments

(a) Many commentors were concerned about social and economic impacts on communities and how they would be factored into the decision process. We have issued instructions to the DoD Components to calculate economic impact by measuring the effects on direct and indirest employment for each recommended closure or realignment. These effects will be determined by using statisical information obtained from the Departments of Labor and Commerce. This is consistent with the methodology used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission to measure economic impact. We incorporated the General Accounting Office's suggested improvements for calculation of economic impact. DoD will also determine the direct and indirect employment impacts on receiving bases. We have amended criterion number six to reflect this decision.

(b) The meaning of criterion number seven, "the community support at the receiving locations" was not clear to several commentors. Some wondered if that meant popular support. Others recognized that this criterion referred to a community's infrastructure such as roads, water and sewer treatment plans, schools and the like. To clarify this criterion, we have completely re-written it, while also recognizing that a comparison must be made for both the existing and potential receiving communities.

(c) Many commentors asked how environmental impacts would be considered. As we stated in topic 3(c),) will consider certain environmental ..ts. In addition, we have instructed the DoD Components to consider, at a minimum, the following elements when analyzing environmental consequences of a closure or realignment action:

- Threatened and endangered species
- Wetlands
- Historic and Archeological sites
- Pollution Control
- Hazardous Materials/Wastes
- Land and Air uses
- Programmed environmental costs/cost avoidances

(d) A number of commenters questioned the meaning of criterion number nine. "The implementation process involved". The intent of this criterion was to describe the implementation plan, its milestones, and the DoD military and civilian employee adjustments (Increases and decreases) at each base, that would result through implementation of the closure or realignment. After further consideration, we have determined that developing the implementation plan is a necessary requirement and conclusion of applying the other eight criteria. A description of implementation plan, while .portant to the understanding the recommended closure or realignment, is not in itself a specific criterion for decisionmaking. Consequently, we have deleted criterion number nine. We have instructed the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to include a description of their implementation plans for each recommended closure or realignment, as part of the justification to be submitted to the Commission.

C. Previous Federal Register References

(1) 55 FR49679, November 30, 1990: Proposed selection criteria and request for comments.

(2) 55 FR53536, December 31, 1990: Extend comment period on proposed selection criteria.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub. L. 96–511) does not apply.

Dated: February 11, 1991.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register, Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 91–3845 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

NG CODE 3810–01–M

Department of the Army

Environmental Assessment; Exoatmospheric Discrimination Experiment (EDX) Program

AGENCY: U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC); DOD.

COOPERATING AGENCY: Strategy Defense Initiative Organization, DOD U.S. Department of the Navy, DOD.

ACTION: Notice of Availability of finding of no significant impact.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (40 CFR parts 1500–1508), Army Regulation 200–2, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5090.1, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 6050.1 on Environmental Effects in the United States of DOD actions, the USASDC has conducted an assessment of the potential environmental consequences of conducting EDX program activities for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. The Environmental Assessment considered all potential impacts of the proposed action alone and in conjunction with ongoing activities. The finding of no significant impact summarizes the results of the evaluations of EDX activities at the proposed installations. The discussion focuses on those locations where there was a potential for significant impacts and mitigation measures that would reduce the potential impact to a level of no significance. Alternatives to the EDX launch facility were examined early in the siting process but were eliminated as unreasonable. A no-action alternative was also considered. The Environmental Assessment resulted in a finding of no significant impact. Construction will proceed as scheduled, however, due to budgetary constraints, the flight program implementation has been delayed. When the flight schedule becomes firm, this document will be reviewed and revised, as necessary, in light of any changes to the program.

DATES: Written comments are required by March 18, 1991.

POINT OF CONTACT: Mr. D.R. Gallien, Address: U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, CSSD–EN, Post Office Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35807–3801, Fax (205) 955–3958.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The USASDC was assigned the mission of acquiring critical mid-course data on ballistic missile re-entry vehicles and decoys; EDX would accomplish this mission. The EDX program would use the ARIES booster to launch a suborbital sensor into space to observe a target ballistic missile re-entry complex during the mid-course phase of its flight. The proposed EDX program would involve nine flights over three years from two different launch sites after October 1993: The target complex would be released from a MINUTEMAN I missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and the EDX booster and sensor payload vehicle would be launched from the Kauai Test Facility (KTF), located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Kauai, Hawaii. Current launch use activities would continue, however, pubic access through these areas would be limited for a total of less than 1 day over a three year period.

The EDX program would include a number of activities to be conducted at seven different sites. These activities are categorized as design, fabrication/assembly/testing, construction, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection, payload recovery, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, data analysis, and site maintenance/disposition. The locations and types of EDX activities are: Vandenberg Air Force Base, California/Western Test Range, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection; Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, construction, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection, payload recovery, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, site maintenance/disposition; Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, design, fabrication/assembly/testing; U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection; Hill Air Force Base, Utah, fabrication/assembly/testing; Space Dynamics Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, design, fabrication/assembly/testing, data analysis; and Boeing Aerospace and Electronics, Kent Space Center, Kent, Washington, design, fabrication/assembly/testing, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, data analysis.

To determine the potential for significant environmental impacts as a result of the EDX program, the magnitude and frequency of the tests that would be conducted at the proposed locations were compared to the current activities and existing conditions at those locations. To assess possible impacts, each activity was evaluated in the context of the following environmental components: Air quality, biological resources, cultural resources, hazardous materials/waste, infrastructure, land use, noise, public

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SOUTHWEST MARINE INC.

Subject: **Southwest Marines Aegis Program Management Team**

History: With the award of the USS Fife DD-991 ROH in 1986, Southwest Marine put together a unique team of management personnel dedicated to developing management systems that would allow us to successfully accomplish large complex contracts. Being the first ship on the west coast to receive VLS and other major electronic alterations, this ship was politically important to Southwest Marine, SupShip San Diego, and the Navy. The ability to control complexity was the driving force in designing our Management Information System. To avoid the pit falls of crisis management, SWM Senior Management delegated authority for the contract to the Program Management Team, a concept new to the San Diego Yard. Although challenging, this contract was successful for all parties involved.

When SWM was awarded the USS O'Brien DD-975 ROH in 1988, the decision was made to maximize our lessons learned by using as many of the key management and production personnel from the Fife ROH as possible. The intent was to polish and/or build upon our current management systems and design new management tools to maintain better schedule and budget control. The Program Management Team has stayed together for the past six years and has accomplished the following successful contracts;

O'Brien DD-975 (11-88 through 10-89)
Scope: Install VLS, Lamps Mk III, V-lines, and SQQ-89B(V)1
57% Growth
$33 million (800,000 manhours) contract.
Accomplished certification of all systems during the ROH.
First and only Spruance Class ROH to finish ahead of schedule.
May be the least expensive Spruance Class ROH contract to date.
Received all "A"s for each of the four performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 94.6%)
No Claim at end of ROH

USS Gridley CG-21 "NTU" ROH (2-90 through 3-91)
Scope: New Threat Upgrade (reconfigure all electronic spaces & equipment),
Major machinery repair work, Boiler repairs,
Installation of thousands of connectors and over 50 miles of cable, .
90% Growth
$50 million (1 million manhours) contract
First "NTU" ROH to go to sea as originally scheduled.
Received all "A"s for each of the five performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 94.58%)
No Claim at end of ROH

USS Sterett CG-31 "NTU" ROH (8-91 through 10-92)

Scope: New Threat Upgrade (reconfigure all electronic spaces & equipment),
Complete rebuild of all boilers, Major machinery repair work, Major steel repairs, Replacement of all waveguide, Installation of thousands of connectors and over 50 miles of cables.
122% Growth
$70 million (1.3million manhours) contract
Received all "A"s for each of the five performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 92.92%)
No claim at end of ROH

USS Shiloh CG-67 PSA (2-93 through 4-93)

Scope: First of package of three Aegis ships to go through PSAs at SWM.
PFB comment; "*The planning, scheduling and fast start on Shiloh's PSA, Southwest Marine's (SWM) first Aegis PSA, is comparable to the best Aegis Cruiser PSAs conducted by the building yards.*"
Received all "A"s for each of the three performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 96.51%)
53% Growth during the Availability
$10 million (206,000 manhours) contract.
Delivered on time.
No claim at end of PSA

USS Valley Forge CG-50 ROH (8-93 through 4-94)

Scope: Aegis modifications, repair work
65% Growth
$20 million (473,000 manhours) contract.
First Aegis Class ROH to be delivered on the original date.
Least expensive Aegis Class ROH to date.
Accomplished ALO one month early.
Had cleanest LOE in recent history according to PEB.
Had extremely small exception list after redelivery.
Received all "A"s for each of the four performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 97.63%)
No claim at end of ROH
Received 100% performance rating on last performance evaluation.
Received the Aegis Award of Excellence.

John Paul Jones DDG-53 Shock Test and PSA (1-94 through 9-94)

Scope: Second of three Aegis ships to go through PSAs at SWM.
First Arleigh Burke Class DDG to be worked on the West Coast.
Prior to the PSA the ship was shock tested with SWM supplying pre-shock installation of test equipment, between shock test repairs, and post shock repairs to shock damaged areas.
SWM successfully supported this extremely flexibile contract despite the endless changes to schedule caused by environmentalists, bad weather, and shock test damage.
PFB comment: "*The advance planning phase and start-up of John Paul Jones' PSA were comparable to that demonstrated on USS Shiloh(CG-67).*"
Received 100% performance rating on the first evaluation period.
Received all "A"s for each of the two performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 98.23%)
64% Growth during the Availability
$11.8 million contract
Delivered on time.

USS Curtis Wilbur DDG-54 PSA (9-94 through 12-94)

Scope: Third of three Aegis ships to go through PSAs at SWM.
First Women at Sea installation on a DDG.
This contract was very similar to the John Paul Jones PSA
in both size and growth but without the shock testing.
Received all "A"s for each of the two performance evaluations. (Weighted ave. of 95.67%)
$11.3 Million contract
Delivered on time.

USS Boxer LHD-4 FOA (4-95 through 6-95)

Scope: First of two availabilties, FOA and RAV, after commissioning.
Many small items throughout the ship
that add up to approx. 200,000 man-hours of work.
Contract is currently ongoing.
Received all "A"s in the first performance evaluation. (Numeric rating not defined yet.)
$11 Million contract
On schedule redelivery is expected.

Sam San Diego — PMO-work

4-13-95 Rom

AWARD FE ER LOG

DATE	SHIP	HULL	CONTRACT	EVALUATION PERIOD	AMOUNT	OVERALL RATING	SCHEDULE	TECHNICAL	MANAGEMENT	COST	QUALITY
2/9/95	JOHN PAUL JONES	DDG-53	N00024-92-C-2802	2ND PERIOD ENDING 09/26/94	$ 467,193	96.45%	97.25%	94.50%	96.75%	96.75%	
2/9/95	CURTIS WILBUR	DDG-54	N00024-92-C-2802	PSA 1ST PERIOD ENDING 10/3/94	$ 229,963	93.15%	89.25%	95.00%	94.25%	95.50%	
2/7/95	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0036		94.51%	94.80%	96.80%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0037		98.82%	99.40%	99.40%	COMB W/TECH	91.80%	
	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 002AU		97.78%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	95.60%	
	JUNEAU	LPD-10	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AS		96.88%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	97.80%	
	JUNEAU	LPD-10	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AT		98.18%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	96.40%	
	JUNEAU	LPD-10	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AU		98.58%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	97.20%	
	CORONADO	AGF-11	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AP		98.49%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	97.00%	
	CORONADO	AGF-11	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AQ		98.06%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	96.20%	
2/7/95	COMSTOCK	LSD-45	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002BT		98.50%		99.00%	COMB W/TECH	98.00%	
	COMSTOCK	LSD-45	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002BV		98.59%		100.00%	COMB W/TECH	97.20%	
12/3/93	CORONADO	AGF-11	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AJ/AH	$ 88,223	94.60%		97.20%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
	CLEVELAND	LPD-7	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AL				97.20%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
	JUNEAU	LPD-10	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AJ/AK				97.20%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
	DULUTH	LPD-6	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AE/AD/AC				97.20%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AT/AR/AP/AO/AM/AL/AN/AS				97.20%	COMB W/TECH	92.00%	
11/8/93	HORNE	CG-30	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0023AB		96.40%	96.40%	96.40%	COMB W/SKED	96.40%	
	JOUETT	CG-29	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0022AB			96.40%	96.40%	COMB W/SKED	96.40%	
	JOUETT	CG-29	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0031AB			96.40%	96.40%	COMB W/SKED	93.60%	
	HALSEY	CG-23	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0024A/0024D				97.20%		94.60%	
	FOX	CG-33	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0024C, 0024D, 0024F				97.20%		94.60%	
	HORNE	CG-30	N00024-90-C-8502	CLIN 0024F				97.20%		94.60%	
11/4/93	FT MCHENRY	LSD-43	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002AS/AZ				97.60%	COMB W/TECH	92.80%	
	RUSHMORE	LSD-47	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002AW/BA				97.60%	COMB W/TECH	92.80%	
	COMSTOCK	LSD-45	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002AT/AU/AV/AK/AY/BB/BC/BD/BE				97.60%	COMB W/TECH	92.80%	
10/15/93	GUADALUPE	T-AO 200	N62383-93-C-3138	PSA							
10/12/93	KILAUEA	T-AE 26	N62383-92-C-3073	ROH							
6/1/93	CLEVELAND	LPD-7	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AJ		95.23%		97.50%	COMB W/TECH	93.00%	
6/1/93	CORONADO	AGF-11	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AF		95.60%		97.50%	COMB W/TECH	93.75%	
6/1/93	JUNEAU	LPD-10	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0002AH		95.24%		96.25%	COMB W/TECH	94.25%	
6/1/93	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0024 (0022/25)		94.02%	93.50%	93.50%	COMB W/TECH	95.00%	
	DENVER	LPD-9	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0026		91.52%	92.75%	89.50%	COMB W/TECH	92.25%	
6/1/93	DULUTH	LPD-6	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0024		91.22%	92.75%	93.50%	COMB W/TECH	87.50%	
	DULUTH	LPD-6	N00024-89-C-8507	CLIN 0030		92.77%	91.50%	92.75%	COMB W/TECH	94.00%	
3/18/93	SHILOH	CG-67	N00024-92-C-2802	1ST PERIOD ENDING 2/28/93	$ 264,527	96.31%	99.00%	94.50%	93.75%	98.00%	
3/10/93	STERETT	CG-31	N00024-85-8221/EH-68	5TH PERIOD 10/16/92-01/14/93	$ 339,326	98.00%	98.00%	99.00%	98.00%		98.00%
3/5/93	SHILOH	CG-67	N00024-92-C-2802	1ST PERIOD 08/26/92-02/28/93		96.33%	99.00%	94.50%	93.75%	98.00%	
11/16/92	STERETT	CG-31	N00024-85-8221/EH-68	4TH PERIOD 05/01/92-10/15/92		89.00%	89.00%	88.00%	97.00%		84.00%
3/24/92	STERETT	CG-31	N00024-85-8221/EH-68	2ND PERIOD 11/01/91-01/31/92		94.60%	97.00%	97.00%	97.00%		90.00%
11/15/91	COMSTOCK	LSD-45	N00024-90-C-8504	CLIN 0002		96.69%		96.80%	COMB W/TECH	96.60%	
4/16/91	GRIDLEY	CG-21	N00024-85-H-8221/EH-56	4TH PERIOD 11/01/90-03/31/91		92.85%	93.00%	92.00%	91.00%		94.00%
3/28/91	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	2ND PERIOD CLIN 0002	$ 43,671	91.40%					
	FRESNO A/P	LST-1182	N00024-89-C-8503	2ND PERIOD CLIN 0009	$ 20,895	87.90%	92.50%	82.00%	COMB W/TECH	90.25%	
	CAYUGA A/P	LST-1186	N00024-89-C-8503	2ND PERIOD CLIN 0010	$ 14,316	87.90%	92.50%	82.00%	COMB W/TECH	90.25%	
	FRESNO PMA	LST-1182	N00024-89-C-8503	2ND PERIOD CLIN 0013	$ 179,118	78.90%	84.30%	75.50%	COMB W/TECH	75.00%	
	CAYUGA A/P	LST-1186	N00024-89-C-8503	2ND PERIOD CLIN 0014	$ 48,321	87.90%	92.50%	82.00%	COMB W/TECH	90.25%	
12/24/90	GRIDLEY	CG-21	N00024-85-H-8221/EH-56	3RD PERIOD 08/01/90-10/31/90		97.30%	97.00%	98.00%	98.00%		97.00%
10/4/90	GRIDLEY	CG-21	N00024-85-H-8221/EH-56	2ND PERIOD 05/01/90-07/31/90	$ 290,793	95.00%	95.00%	93.00%	93.00%		91.00%
NO DATE	FT MCHENRY	LSD-43	N00024-90-C-8504	FY91 PMA CLIN 0008			86.25%	92.25%	COMB W/TECH	93.00%	

AWARD FE ER LOG

DATE	SHIP	HULL	CONTRACT	EVALUATION PERIOD	AMOUNT	OVERALL RATING	SCHEDULE	TECHNICAL	MANAGEMENT	COST	QUALITY
6/28/90	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0001	$ 11,915	76.20%					
	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0002	$ 8,868	93.90%					
	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0007	$ 33,620	78.80%					
	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0008	$ 176,857	88.70%					
	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0009	$ 10,885	83.30%					
	LST PMA		N00024-89-C-8503	1ST PERIOD CLIN 0010	$ 5,285	83.00%					
6/14/90	GRIDLEY	CG-21	N00024-85-H-6221/EH-56	1ST PERIOD AWARD-04/30/90		90.90%	91.00%	89.00%	88.00%		93.00%

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

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South Western Engineering Co.
Technology Application & Service Co.
United Defense (FMC/BMY)
Up-N-Down Scaffold, Inc.
Walashek Industries
Western Hose & Supply Co.
Western Industrial & Marine Service
YYK Enterprises, Inc.
York Manufacturing, Inc.

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South Bay Boat Yard

Position Paper on the San Diego Ship Repair Industry

25 Jan. 1995

Purpose: To provide information on the military value of the San Diego Ship Repair Industry to the U. S. Navy, in preparation for the final rounds of the BRAC-95 process. The information included will focus on three major issues, **capability and capacity**; **cost**; and **quality of life** for our sailors. When the facts surrounding each of these issues are carefully considered, they invariably lead to the conclusion that as the U. S. Navy quickly "downsizes" to a fleet of 320 ships, the continued operation of Long Beach Naval Shipyard is no longer militarily or economically viable.

Background: The San Diego Ship Repair Industry, consisting of five major privately owned shipyards, over thirty - five major sub-contractors, as well as numerous vendors and suppliers, are an integral part of the Navy's West Coast Megaport concept. The Ship Repair Industry provides jobs for over 6000 people, with annual wages exceeding $200 million. The workforce has high minority representation, including 38% Hispanic, 11% Afro American, and 10% Asian. The total economic impact on the San Diego community is estimated to exceed $500 million.

Discussion: One of the major shortcomings of the BRAC process regarding U. S. Navy ship repair capabilities has been the failure to take into account private sector capabilities when making recommendations for closure of Naval Shipyards. The SDSRA contends that with the downsizing of the Navy Fleet, the San Diego Ship Repair Industry can provide all the required capacity and capability necessary to support the U. S. Navy's West Coast "Mega-Port" concept. In addition, the San Diego Ship Repair Industry can also provide that capacity and capability more economically, while at the same time significantly increasing the "Quality of Life" of our seagoing sailors. The following points serve to indicate that the San Diego Ship Repair Industry provides considerably more "military value" than Long Beach Naval Shipyard:

- An indepth analysis conducted by Galland, Kharasch, Morse & Garfinkle, P.C. (GKMG) and BDM International Inc, during the BRAC-93 process and recently verified indicates that San Diego Private Sector shipyards have demonstrated the physical capacity and technical capability to repair all types of Navy ships including Aegis class Cruisers and Destroyers, as well as the newest classes of Amphibious Assault Ships. For the two previous calendar years of 1993, and 1994 an average of 160 availabilities per year were completed by San Diego's private sector shipyards.

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association

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American Rigging & Supply, Inc.
Arise Scaffolding & Equipment
Astro-Pak Corp.
Atlantic Ordnance & Gyro, Inc.
C & W Diving Services, Inc.
California Marine Cleaning, Inc.
Controls Engineering Maintenance Corp.
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Engineering Visions, Inc.
Fraser's Boiler Service, Inc.
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Miller Marine
Naval Coatings, Inc.
Norva Marine Service, Inc.
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Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

The peak capacity of the San Diego Private Sector is approximately 18 ships in planned availabilities simultaneously. A review of two year data indicates that the expected number of simultaneous planned availabilities in San Diego is less than10. Since this is approximately one half of the peak number of simultaneous availabilities, there is clearly enough capacity to absorb the 2-3 planned availabilities working simultaneously that would become available through the closure of LBNSY.

- Labor Costs and overhead costs are considerably higher in public shipyards than private shipyards. While it is difficult to compare public and private sector shipyard costs, a 1993 GAO study of the cost structures of public and private sector shipyards concluded that labor costs at Long Beach Naval Shipyard were at least 47% higher than at West Coast private sector shipyards. Recent information indicates that the average manday rate for a San Diego Private Sector Shipyard is in the vicinity of $300, while that of LBNSY exceeds $600. Neither the U. S. Taxpayers nor the U. S. Navy maintenance budget should be required to tolerate this excessive cost differential.

- The continued downsizing of the fleet has not been accompanied by a similar downsizing of Navy commitments in support of national policy. This situation has negatively impacted the "Quality Of Life" of our sailors and their families. Scheduled deployments as well as short notice responses to contingencies such as Haiti, Somalia, and the more recent Iraqi buildup, have all contributed to increased time away from homeport for our sailors. Time away from homeport should not be further exacerbated by scheduling overhauls and availabilities outside of homeport, particularly when they can be accomplished as efficiently and economically in San Diego. Even when overhauls are accompanied by a change of homeport, it does not alleviate the disruption to family life. We are all aware that in the vast majority of cases, personnel based on San Diego ships assigned to overhaul in LBNSY choose not to move their families for a variety of economic and personal reasons, such as schools, adequate housing, and Navy support facilities. This additional separation although "voluntary", adversely affects morale, professional performance, and reenlistment rates.

Dry-dock Capacity. San Diego shipyards have the capacity to dry-dock all classes of U.S. Navy ships with the exception of CV/CVN and LHA/LHD. However, there are several alternatives which can more than adequately handle these exceptions. As an example, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard are also available for the CV/CVN contingencies. With regard to LHA/LHD class ships, the U. S. Navy presently has in its inventory a dry-dock of sufficient capacity to handle this class of ship.

Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association
P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

CHARTER MEMBERS
A & E Industries, Inc.
Campbell Marine Industries
Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc.
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc.
Southwest Marine, Inc.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
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Action Cleaning Corp.
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Pacific Marine Propeller, Inc.
Pacific Marine Sheetmetal, Inc.
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Shelter Island Boatyard
South Bay Boat Yard

Transferring this dry-dock to San Diego would solve this problem, and the one time costs associated with this effort would certainly be more cost effective than the continued operation of Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Utilizing other west coast dry-dock assets to complete the drydocking portion of scheduled availabilities for these ships is another option that is available. The San Diego Ship Repair Industry stands ready to assist the U. S. Navy in any way possible to solve the docking problem.

Summary. The San Diego Ship Repair Industry as represented by the SDSRA is a vital part of the San Diego "Mega-Port" concept. Private sector shipyards in San Diego have clearly demonstrated over the course of many years that they can provide less costly, more flexible, and equal if not better quality services than LBNSY. Furthermore, because they are co-located in the same homeport as the ships they serve, the "Quality of Life" of our sailors is maintained at the highest level possible.

CIRCULATE TO ALL NAVY TOPS

ECONOMIC SECURITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

April 10, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950308-1R1

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on March 1, 1995, regarding the Department's closure and realignment recommendations and process. In response to your request, enclosed are answers to your questions for the record.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Joshua Gotbaum

Enclosure

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 1: What is the annual cost of the excess infrastructure in the Joint Cross-Service areas remaining after the 1995 round?

Answer: I have asked the Comptroller to gather the data necessary to estimate the cost of maintaining excess infrastructure remaining after BRAC 95. I will forward a response as soon as we have been able to assimilate the data.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 2: The Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995 through 1999. According to a senior DoD official, these cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction in these personnel by the turn of the century.

How much of a reduction in DoD laboratory infrastructure is contained in your recommendations?

How and when is DoD going to eliminate the excess infrastructure?

Answer: Most laboratory reductions -- the 35 percent you mention -- will come from the allocation of workload reductions rather than from BRAC actions.

The DoD recommendations for laboratory closures and realignments eliminate a relatively small amount of our excess capacity. However, there were noteworthy laboratory reductions including Naval Air Warfare Center Divisions at Lakehurst, NJ, and Indianapolis, IN, among others.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 3: The Joint Cross-Service Review Team provided two options, both resulting in the closure of 8 depots. These options would eliminate between 30 million to 35 million excess hours from a total excess capacity of about 40 million hours.

The final DoD recommendation would close 3 depots and realign 7 others. How many hours of excess capacity will be eliminated if these recommendations are approved?

Answer: If the DoD recommendations are adopted, excess capacity will be reduced by just over 20 million direct labor hours, or by about 50 percent of the total excess capacity. The Department believes this to be a significant accomplishment.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 4: What are the bases that were not recommended for closure by the Navy to the Secretary of Defense for economic reasons?

Which, if any, installations were substituted for these omitted closures?

Answer: Because of a concern over total job losses in the State of California and Territory of Guam, the Department of the Navy did not close the following activities, even though it otherwise, through its analytical process, could have arrived at a conclusion to recommend closure:

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland, CA

Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San Bruno, CA

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Construction and Repair, San Francisco, CA

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA, and Public Works Center, Guam

These actions reflect stand-alone decisions; there were no substitutions for these activities.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 5: What do your recommendations do to merge medical facilities across the Services in each region?

What possibilities were analyzed (cover by region)?

Answer: The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group looked at overlapping catchment areas in their analysis of the Medical Health Services System infrastructure. The group aggressively sought out opportunities for consolidation of inpatient services. Six of sixteen of the alternatives were based on the evaluation of potential mergers across the Services. These included Fort Meade and Fort Belvoir in the National Capital Region, USAF Academy Hospital in the Academy/Fort Carson area, Shaw AFB Hospital in the Shaw/Fort Jackson area, Langley AFB Hospital in the Tidewater area, and Wilford Hall Medical Center in the San Antonio area.

Of these alternatives, the hospital at Ft. Meade was recommended for downsizing by the Secretary of the Army, as was the hospital at Ft. Lee, Virginia. The Army also recommended the closure of Fitzsimmons Medical Center in Colorado, and both the Army and Air Force have agreed to realign their respective hospitals at Ft. Carson and the Air Force Academy to ensure adequate and cost efficient health care services remain to serve beneficiaries in the area. The Ft. Carson and Air Force Academy actions, along with the elimination of duplicate health care services in the San Antonio, Texas, Shaw AFB/Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, and the Virginia Tidewater areas will take place outside of the BRAC process. The Department s also implementing TRICARE, a congressionally-mandated regional health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries. TRICARE will also serve as an incentive to further reduce duplicate services and share resources across Service lines.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 6: How did DoD view the benefits of regional (medical) complexes?

Answer: The Department believes there are significant benefits to pursuing and evaluating consolidation of medical services and training. Through the base closure and Defense Health Program processes, the Department will continue to aggressively pursue these benefits. At the same time, the Department is implementing TRICARE, our congressionally-mandated regional managed health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 7: NAS Meridian received two looks -- one at the service level and the second look at the joint level. If the joint ranking was higher, why didn't DoD take action based on the joint ranking, rather than accepting the Service recommendation?

Answer: The two "looks" are not the same. The Joint Cross-Service Groups were established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide a DoD-wide evaluation of their respective areas - undergraduate pilot training (UPT) in this case. They were further empowered to provide alternatives for subsequent analysis by the Military Departments which would reduce capacity and associated functional infrastructure. While the analyses conducted by the JCSG on UPT established a site value for each function (e.g., strike, helicopter, airlift/tanker, etc.), it did not rank sites by an overall average functional value. In producing its alternatives, the JCSG analyses utilized military values, functional values, and capacity resources. The Military Departments looked at the military value of installations based on all of their missions. Therefore, the evaluation conducted by the JCSGs was not a substitute for, but rather a component of, the Military Department analysis. In the case of Meridian, the Navy decided, and the Secretary of Defense agreed, that it did not need the training capability at NAS Meridian.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 8: If implemented, will the Department's recommendations to the Commission reduce a major portion of the excess capacity in any or all of the five cross-service functional areas? Please discuss those areas in detail where large amounts of excess capacity remain?

Answer: With the exception of Laboratories and Test & Evaluation, the DoD recommendations contain significant cross-service actions which generally achieve overall cross-service and excess capacity goals. In the Laboratories and Test & Evaluation areas, we will continue programmatic efforts to deal with remaining excess capacity, such as downsizing in place.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 9: In May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "Core is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements...Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the ***minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary*** to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence." (emphasis added)

If DoD's recommendations are implemented, will any of the Services retain capacity above their core level?

If so, what are the reasons for retaining this capacity?

Answer: Although we have achieved a substantial depot maintenance capacity reduction all of the Services will retain some capacity above the core level. Further reductions will require developing a better sense of cross-service and private sector capabilities.

Question: Will DoD's base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

Answer: No. The goal is to reduce capacity, not merely the number of facilities. With regard to depots, the goal was to reduce excess capacity in a cost effective manner while retaining sufficient capability to meet critical readiness capabilities and requirements.

Question: If not, what means will the Department use to implement the Deputy Secretary's direction?

Answer: The definition and quantification of core requirements must be separated from the sizing of the infrastructure to support those requirements. It is impossible and undesirable to attempt to exactly match capacity and requirements. With that in mind, the Department believes that the proposed closure and realignments achieve the objectives set forth by the Deputy Secretary.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 10: In 1993, the Defense Base Closure Commission realigned part of the Defense Information Service Agency (DISA) into 16 information processing megacenters. At that time, all officials concluded there would be excess capacity even within these megacenters. Some have suggested that DISA actually requires only 5 megacenters. To realign, DISA would have to come to the Commission to change the 1993 recommendation.

Given that there is excess capacity within DISA, why are there not recommendations for further consolidation?

Answer: The current megacenter migration resulting from BRAC 93 began in FY 94 and is scheduled for completion through FY 98. Due to the ongoing establishment of these megacenters and their changing workload, meaningful capacity requirements are extremely difficult if not impossible to determine at this time. Before major changes can be made, the operating environment of this relatively new organization needs to stabilize.

SYNTEK

4301 N. Fairfax Drive, Suite 850
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Phone: (703) 525-3403
Fax: (703) 525-0833

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

To: LAWRENCE E. JACKSON
SR. ANALYST - NAVY TEAM
BRAC

Date: 17 APRIL 1995

Code:

From: SYNTEK, INC. VARN HEKMAN
VICE PRESIDENT

Page(s) to Follow: 7

FAX # (703) 696-0550

Message: LARRY, THIS MATERIAL IS THE LEE & RO, INC UPDATE TO THEIR 1985 REPORT; REFERENCED HEREIN. BOTH THE ORIGINAL REPORT, AND THIS UPDATE, ARE QUITE PROFESSIONAL. A VERY REPUTABLE FIRM.

I HOPE YOU FIND THIS USEFUL. I WILL PROVIDE THE BASIC REPORT TO YOU VIA FEDEX/UPS ASAP IF YOU NEED A COPY. ITS ABOUT 100 PAGES, AND VERY THOROUGH. BOTTOM LINE IN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY QUOTED AS FOLLOWS: "AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF COSTS, BERTHING REQUIREMENTS, AND FACILITIES AT LBNS IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CONCEPT OF HOMEPORTING CV/CVN AT PIER E IS FEASIBLE."

RESPY,

P. HEKMAN.

December 7, 1994

Southern California Committee
to SAVE OUR SHIPYARD (SOS)
200 Pine Avenue, Suite 400
Long Beach, California 90802

Attention: William R. Gurzi, Chairman

Subject: Cost Updating Addendum to Concept Study for Homeporting CV/CVN at Pier E

File: 200-44

Dear Mr. Gurzi:

In accordance with our proposal of November 4, 1994, this letter is provided as an addendum to the August, 1985 report "Concept Study for Homeporting Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVN) at Naval Station Long Beach (NSLB) Pier E" prepared by LEE & RO under Navy Contract No. N62474-84-C-2146. The purpose of this letter addendum is to update the cost data presented in the original report to the 1994 cost level, with some consideration given to organizational changes recently made at the NSLB and Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNSY). This addendum provides general cost information and should not be used for the purposes of planning or budgeting for specific capital improvements. The scope of this update did not include reevaluating the condition of existing utilities and other equipment; therefore, changes in the condition of such facilities since 1985 are not reflected in this cost update. Additionally, it has been assumed that the requirements for homeporting a CV or CVN have remained unchanged since completion of the original study.

The 1985 Concept Study was commissioned by the Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command for the purpose of determining the feasibility of homeporting an aircraft carrier vessel (CV) or carrier vessel-nuclear (CVN) at NSLB Pier E. The report presented the requirements for homeporting either a CV or a CVN, evaluated the existing facilities that would be used, identified the infrastructure improvements needed to meet the requirements and developed opinions of probable costs for these improvements. Cost data were included for both capital improvements and recurring annual improvements based upon berthing one CV or CVN along the west side of Pier E for a maximum of 6 months out of the year. There is also sufficient space to dock a CV or CVN along the south side of Pier E; however, a separate study would need to be completed to identify the required improvements and estimate the costs associated with homeporting a second carrier at that location. The scope of the Concept Study also did not include addressing costs associated with separate improvements required to provide maintenance services for CV/CVNs.

Since the requirements are more extensive for berthing a CVN than for a CV, the total costs were higher to accommodate the CVN. Therefore this addendum updates the cost estimates for the improvements needed to meet the requirements for a CVN.

The basis used for updating the cost estimates differed for the various categories of facilities described below and is identified in the discussion under each item. In those instances when cost indices were used to update the costs, the Engineering News-Record (ENR) Construction Cost Index (CCI) for the Los Angeles area from October, 1994 of 6551 was compared to the ENR CCI from February, 1985 of 5264 to develop a cost factor of 1.25. Given the limited scope of this addendum, the cost data presented herein are considered to be "Order-of-Magnitude" estimates or opinions of cost, with an accuracy within +50 to -30 percent, in accordance with the definition provided by the American Association of Cost Estimating Engineers.

The following paragraphs list the facilities for which the Concept Study identified conditions that needed upgrading to meet the requirements for homeporting a CVN. Along with the updated cost data, brief discussions are presented on the recommended improvements and the method used to update the cost data. Those additional facilities evaluated in the report for which no improvements were found to be necessary are not listed here. The Concept Study should be referred to for descriptions of the facilities and discussions of the CV/CVN homeporting requirements.

A. UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS

1. *Potable Water*

To meet the maximum flow and pressure requirements, the Concept Study recommended that a water tank, three booster pumps, and the associated piping, valves and electrical service be installed at Pier E. The updated costs for the water tank and pumps have been estimated using Means Facilities Construction Cost Data (R. S. Means Co., Inc.; 1994). The other costs have been updated using the ENR CCI. The updated cost for the potable water improvements is estimated to be $450,000.

2. *Cable TV Antenna*

The Concept Study included the cost for a cable TV antenna. This cost has been updated using the ENR CCI to $40,000.

3. *Telephone/Communications*

To provide the required telephone cables, the installation of an additional 40 pairs of twisted wire was recommended. Using Means Cost Data, the updated cost for this item is estimated at $75,000.

4. Electricity

The original report recommended the use of Mobile Utility Support Equipment (MUSE), in lieu of permanently installed equipment, to provide the necessary 4160V electrical service for a CVN. However, SOS has supplied a cost estimate recently developed by the Navy for the installation of permanent power service at the LBNSY for a CVN. The cost estimate for permanent electrical service includes the installation of a 20MVA transformer and the associated electrical equipment and duct work. Lee & Ro reviewed this estimate and revised the costs in accordance with recent experience on projects involving this type of work. The updated cost for the electrical service is estimated to be approximately $2,500,000.

B. BERTHING FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS - DREDGING

A recently prepared Navy document provided by SOS estimated the quantity of dredging required to facilitate the docking of a CVN to be 1,000,000 cubic yards. It is not clear, however, whether this estimate is based on the use of Pier E only or whether this dredging would accommodate other piers. The original Concept Study estimated that approximately 300,000 cubic yards of dredging would be needed to meet the depth requirements for docking a CVN at Pier E. The discrepancy between these estimates may indicate that the larger amount would apply to additional docking locations; however, to be conservative an intermediate quantity of 700,000 cubic yards has been used here. A more detailed study would need to be performed to better define the extent of dredging required for homeporting at Pier E.

Based upon recent dredging work completed by the Port of Los Angeles and past experience, the unit cost of the dredging is estimated to be $20 per cubic yard. As a result the updated cost estimate for dredging is $14,000,000.

C. INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS

1. Supply Storage

The Concept Study identified the need for an 18,500 square foot (sf) metal building to provide storage space. Based on Means Cost Data, an updated unit cost of $60/sf has been used to place the estimated the cost of this facility at $1,110,000. It must be pointed out, however, that at the time the original study was prepared space was at a premium on Pier E, whereas currently many of the facilities, including building 303, are not utilized to their capacity. Therefore, it may be appropriate to further investigate the use of existing storage space for this purpose.

2. Ships Force Overhaul Management Systems (SFOMS) Area

To meet the requirements for SFOMS operations it was recommended that a 20,000 sf metal building be constructed. Based on the updated unit cost of $60/sf, the updated cost estimate for this building is $1,200,000. As indicated above, an investigation into the use

of existing building space for these operations may be warranted due to the reduction in activities since the original study was completed.

D. PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES

1. Parking

It was estimated in the Concept Study that 16 acres would be required to provide sufficient parking space for homeporting a CVN. Due to the lack of available parking on and near Pier E in 1985, the study recommended leasing land for parking. Currently, however, the existing parking lots on and near Pier E are not used to capacity due to the reduction in personnel working at the shipyard. The LBNSY has also obtained additional space as a result of the transfer of NSLB land. Consequently, it appears that sufficient parking space should be available to facilitate the homeporting of a CVN without leasing additional land.

2. Housing

The original Concept Study identified a need for 387 officer's family housing units; 1,228 Enlisted Personnel family housing units; 109 Bachelor Officer's units; and 1,676 Bachelor Enlisted Personnel units. Recommendations and a cost estimate for meeting the housing requirements were beyond the scope of the Concept Study; therefore, no updated cost can be provided within the scope of this addendum. It should be pointed out, however, that the NSLB facilities that have been transferred to the LBNSY include bachelor quarters with the capacity for 159 Officers and 1621 Enlisted Personnel. Additionally, the availability of affordable housing in Long Beach has increased significantly in the last several years due to the recent economic downturn.

3. Rental Vehicles

It was recommended that 12 vehicles be leased or rented to meet the vehicle requirements. Based upon renting 12 vehicles for 6 months out of the year, the Concept Study estimated that this requirement would result in an annual cost of $18,000. To account for inflation, this cost has been updated to $25,000.

3. Shuttle Bus

The Concept Study included the cost of purchasing two shuttle buses, each with a capacity of 50 people. Discussions with SOS have indicated that it may be feasible to obtain the use of buses from the City of Long Beach for shuttle service. Additionally, the City has indicated a willingness to modify existing bus routes to the shipyard to provide increased service. Because of the potential for obtaining these services from the City, the cost for purchasing these shuttle buses has not been included here.

E. SAFETY AND ADMINISTRATION - FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

The Concept Study included $100,000 for high pressure fire fighting apparatus. Using the ENR CCI, this cost has been updated to $125,000.

F. NUCLEAR SUPPORT FACILITIES

1. Grade "A" Pure Water

To meet the requirement for deionized, demineralized water for a CVN, the concept study recommended that trailer mounted water treatment equipment be leased from a supplier. Based on updated budget cost information provided by an equipment supplier, it is estimated that the updated cost for this service would be $0.08/gallon. At 100,000 gallons per month for 6 months, the annual cost is estimated at $48,000.

OPTAR

2. Radioactive Waste Facility

This service would have to be provided by a contractor licensed to process the contaminated water and dispose of the residue. The company identified in the Concept Study for this service is apparently no longer in business in Southern California. To provide a conservative estimate for this item, the original $0.06/gallon cost estimate for handling the waste has been updated to a unit cost of $0.15/gallon. Based on processing 200,000 gallons per month for 6 months, the estimated annual cost for this item would be approximately $180,000.

OPTAR

3. Nitrogen Gas System

This service would be provided by leasing equipment from a supplier. Based on budget cost information provided by an equipment supplier, it is estimated that the updated cost for this item would be $0.20/cf. At 80,000 cf per month for 6 months, the annual cost is estimated at $96,000.

OPTAR

A summary of the updated cost estimates is presented in Table 1 (see Attachment A). The cost data have been separated into capital and annually recurring costs. The capital costs have in turn been separated into those associated with primary facilities and those representing secondary facilities. Primary facilities are required for docking a CVN; whereas secondary facilities provide support for activities associated with homeporting a CVN. The capital costs are estimates of installed costs and include a 15 percent allowance for overhead and profit. A 20 percent contingency has been added to the estimated total capital cost to provide an allowance for the limitations of a preliminary "Order-of-Magnitude" estimate.

We hope the information presented in this addendum to the 1985 CV/CVN Homeporting Concept Study is of value to SOS in its continuing efforts on behalf of the LBNSY and the surrounding communities. We appreciate having the opportunity to provide our services to your organization. If you should have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

LEE & RO Consulting Engineers, Inc.

M. Steve Ro, P.E.
President

Attachment

MSR:KC:es

ATTACHMENT A
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF UPDATED COST DATA FOR CVN HOMEPORTING AT LENSY PIER E

I. Capital Costs-Primary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost
Utility Improvements:	
Potable Water	$450,000
TV Antenna	40,000
Telephone	75,000
Electricity	2,500,000
Berthing Improvements:	
Dredging	$14,000,000

II. Capital Costs-Secondary Facilities

Item Description	Item Cost	
Ind. Support Improvements:		
Supply Storage Bldg.	$1,110,000	(Available)
SFOMS Operations Bldg.	$1,200,000	
Safety Improvements:		
Fire Fighting Apparatus	$125,000	

III. Total Capital Costs

Primary Facilities	$17,065,000	
Secondary Facilities	$2,435,000	125,000
Subtotal	$19,500,000	
Contingencies (@20%)	$3,900,000	
Total Capital Cost =	**$23,400,000**	

IV. Annual Costs **

Item Description	Item Cost
Personnel Support:	
Vehicle Rental	$25,000
Nuclear Support:	
Grade "A" Pure Water	$48,000
Radioactive Waste Processing	$180,000
Nitrogen Gas	$96,000
Total Annual Costs =	**$349,000**

** Annual costs are based on homeporting one CVN for 6 months per year

Document Separator

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April 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR **MS. MADELYN R. CREEDON, GENERAL COUNSEL, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**
MR. S. ALEXANDER YELLIN, NAVY TEAM LEADER, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

FROM: GEORGE R. SCHLOSSBERG

SUBJECT: LEGAL AUTHORITY OF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO CONSIDER PRIVATE SECTOR SHIPYARD CAPACITY

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (the "Act"), as implemented and interpreted previously by the Secretary of Defense ("Secretary") and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission ("Commission") in 1991 and 1993, provides this Commission with the authority, if not the duty, to consider, among other things, private sector shipyard capacity in its review of the Department of Defense's 1995 Base Closure Recommendations. Moreover, during the deliberations leading to the 1995 round of base closure recommendations, the Military Departments, the Joint Working Groups, and the Department of Defense used private sector capacity in fashioning their final recommendations to the Commission.

A. Statutory construction of the Act favors consideration of private capacity by the Commission in its closure and realignment recommendations.

To accomplish its statutory goals, the Act established a specific procedure for making recommendations for base closures and realignments. The Secretary is given the responsibility to develop a force structure plan and final criteria to be used in making closure recommendations, and the Commission is given the responsibility to review and make changes to the Secretary's closure recommendations if it determines that the Secretary "deviated substantially" from the force structure plan and final criteria.

Significantly, however, the statute does not delineate either the final criteria themselves, or the factors that are to be encompassed within the final criteria. Rather, the statute is silent as to any of the details of the final criteria. Similarly, the legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress made no attempt to define the final criteria with any greater precision.

Given the complexity of the issues underlying base closures and the specialized nature of the Military Departments, this lack of specific statutory detail is hardly surprising. To the contrary, by declining to set forth the final criteria or the issues to be considered thereunder, Congress followed the frequently employed practice of deliberately casting statutory language in broad terms, and then entrusting an administrative agency with great experience in the field to "fill in the gaps" in the legislation by regulation and then to apply such regulations in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977). Ultimately, the authority is given to the Commission to send to the President a final list of recommendations according to their own analysis of the issues and selection criteria.

Under similar broadly written statutory schemes, situations frequently arose where a specific issue in controversy was not addressed directly by the Congress, either in the language of the statute itself or in the legislative history. Under general principles of statutory construction and administrative law, when Congress has not spoken to the precise question at issue, the agency's interpretation of the statute is then consulted. If the agency's interpretation is consistent with the statute's intent and is rationally supported, the agency's interpretation generally is given great deference and is usually deemed to be controlling. See, e.g., Chevron, USA, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990); Illinois E.P.A. v. U.S. E.P.A., 947 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1991); Difford v. of Health and Human Services, 910 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir. 1990).

These principles are appropriately applied to the issue of the consideration of private capacity in base closure recommendations. The Act is broadly written, is silent on the issue of private capacity as well as on any other factor that is to be considered under the final criteria, and the Secretary is the "expert agency" charged with "filling in the gaps."

An inquiry as to whether private capacity must be considered by the Commission in making its base closure recommendations therefore must now turn to the final selection criteria themselves as adopted by the Secretary. Significantly, however, the Secretary also deliberately left the final criteria somewhat broad and general in nature. The final selection criteria to be used by the Department of Defense to make recommendations to be reviewed by the 1995

Commission are unchanged from the original selection criteria adopted for the 1991 Commission and used also in their entirety by the 1993 Commission. See 59 Fed. Reg. 63769 (1994). For the original criteria, as adopted for the 1995 round of closures, the Secretary of Defense stated that,

> The inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria, or objective measures or factors that could be applied to all bases within a Military Department or Defense Agency. See 56 FR 6374 (1991), appended hereto at **Tab A.**

In its adoption of the final criteria in 1991, its published 1991 policy guidance addressing those criteria, and its reaffirmation of those criteria in their entirety in 1993 and 1995, the Secretary established the "regulations" pursuant to which closure recommendations are to be made. Therefore, with respect to any particular issue not specifically addressed in the statute, such as whether private capacity must be considered under the final criteria, general principles of statutory construction as set forth in the Chevron line of cases require that the Secretary's interpretations are to apply, as long as they are consistent with the intent of the statute.

Therefore, that the express language of the final selection criteria does not explicitly mention private capacity is of little importance, because clearly the intent of the Secretary in adopting the final criteria was not to specify each and every factor that is to be considered under those criteria. To the contrary, such specificity was deliberately avoided.

However, in response to concerns voiced by commenting parties on the need for more detailed information as to how the criteria were to be applied, the Secretary published in the Federal Register a "policy guidance" that had been issued to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies on the base closure process. Id. at 6375. In that policy guidance, the Secretary explicitly specifies, in response to comments recommending that the capacity of the private sector to support or perform military missions be considered, that such availability is "already included" in Final Criteria Number One and Four. Id. at 6376.

Because the Secretary, acting as the expert agency in filling in the gaps of a general statute, has specified in a formal policy notice that consideration of private capacity is included in the final selection criteria,[1] the Commission is charged clearly with the duty to review private sector shipyard capacity during its deliberations.

However, even in the absence of this express policy guidance, private capacity still must be considered logically by the Secretary and the Commission under Criteria Number 1, in order for the agency's application of the guidelines to be consistent with the overall policies and objectives of the Act. The second clause of Criteria No. 1 ("the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defenses's total force"), by its terms, requires that the Secretary consider available private capacity when assessing the impact of a base closure on the readiness of the force, or else the goals of saving money, achieving an efficient military force, eliminating unnecessary facilities, and streamlining the defense infrastructure will not be able to be achievable.

In other words, in order for the closure process to be able to further the efficiency of the military, save money, and still meet the needs of the force, adequate private repair and maintenance facilities available in a particular area--for example, the West Coast or Southern California--must be considered. To the extent that adequate private repair and maintenance facilities are available in a particular area that can satisfy the military's need for operational readiness, the closing of a public facility in that area can be recommended for closure under this criteria. In fact, closing a public facility under such circumstances would further the legislative intent of the statute, in that military funds could instead be used more efficiently on operational activities and keeping open public repair and maintenance facilities in those areas where adequate private capacity is <u>not</u> already present; Criteria number 1 can therefore be satisfied through a combination of public and private facilities.

Thus, the consideration of the availability of private facilities by the Commission in the final criteria is proper, therefore making it appropriate for the Commission to consider the private capacity issue at this time. Most importantly, in a recent Supreme Court review of the Act, the Court concluded that the past actions of the Secretary and the Commission were both

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[1] As stated above, the 1991 final criteria were adopted <u>unchanged</u> by the Secretary for use as the final selection criteria in the 1993 and 1995 closure process. <u>See</u> 57 Fed. Reg. 59335 (1992).

legitimate and proper. Dalton v. Specter 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994), 128 L.Ed. 2d 497 (1994). Accordingly, the Commission should continue to act as it has in previous rounds and review private sector capacity during its deliberations.

B. Private capacity must be considered if the goals and policy objectives of the Act are to be achieved.

The overall purposes and objectives of the Act must be a primary consideration underlying base closure recommendations. It is a general principle of statutory construction that in interpreting statutory language, the aims, principles, and policies that underlie the statute are to provide guidance. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States. 494 U.S. 152 (1990), citing Kmart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281(1988), and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51(1987); Aulston v. U.S., 915 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2011(1991). With respect to the Act, its clear language and legislative history identify the purposes and goals to be achieved through the base closure process.

The purpose of the Act, as set forth in § 2901 (b), is to "provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." Another purpose of the Act is to save money. The legislative history of the Act provides useful background as to the purpose of the closure and realignment procedures.

The overall goal of the base closure process was succinctly stated by Congresswoman Schroeder during the floor debate on the base closure proposals of the House Armed Services Committee, as follows:

> *[w]e need to close bases to save money. We need to close bases as the size of the force comes down. We need to close bases because the current base structure is inefficient." 126 Cong. Rec. 7462 (daily ed. September 12, 1990).*[2]

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[2] Congresswoman Schroeder was one of the co-authors of the House Armed Services Committee's base closure proposals. Her debate in support of the Committee's proposal repeatedly emphasized that "the Committee proposal guarantees that bases will be closed and the taxpayers will save money." 126 Cong. Rec. 7463 (daily ed. September 12,1990). The report of this Committee similarly "recognizes the need to close bases" because "[t]he size of the American military will likely decline by 25 percent over the next few years. Fewer troops means fewer bases will be required." H.R. Rep. No. 665, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 383. The Committee Report also stresses that the process for the

An examination of the legislative history of the 1988 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, P.L. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, the predecessor to the 1990 Act and which originated a base closure procedure similar in purpose and effect to that adopted in the 1990 Act, also is instructive.[3] For example, the House Armed Services Committee Report on H.R. 4481, on which much of the text of the bill that eventually was passed by Congress in 1988 was based, states that one of the issues that would have to be considered before a base could be closed or realigned is the extent and timing of potential cost savings. H.R. Rep. No. 735(I), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 8,11,13. In this regard, the report quotes from testimony by the Secretary before the committee that stated that "savings from closing a base are significant and perpetual." Id. at 8. Similarly, the committee report of the Government Operations Committee on the same bill expressed its support of the "goal of effecting savings by expediting the closure of unneeded military facilities." H.R. Rep. No. 735(II), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10.

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closure of military installations must be based on "economy and utility" pursuant to objective criteria designed to achieve, "effectively and efficiently," the military plans of the department as reflected in a force structure plan. Id. at 383, 61990 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3076. The Senate Armed Services Committee also recognized that reductions in military personnel and the need for deficit reduction would trigger a significant number of base closures. S. Rep. No. 384,101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 295.

[3] This statute created a base closure process which, like the procedure adopted in the 1990 statute, established a Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The 1988 Commission's statutory task was to transmit a report to the Secretary and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives recommending military installations for closure or realignment; expedited procedures for approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations by the President and Congress were also established, and closures or realignments approved pursuant to the expedited procedures would be implemented by the Secretary according to a timetable. Defense Base Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, Title II --Closure and Realignment of Military installations (codified at 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

That the overall goals of the base closure statutes are to effect cost savings in an efficient and expeditious manner in order to implement defense budgetary cuts is echoed in this Commission's 1991 and 1993 Reports to the President. In its 1993 Recommendations, the Commission notes in its opening letter to the President that continuing budget constraints, along with changing national security requirements compel the United States to reduce and realign its military forces. See 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at vi. In its introductory sections in the 1991 Report, the Commission states that because of DoD's plans to decrease the military by 25%, there is a need to eliminate unnecessary facilities so that the more limited military dollars may go to vital military needs. See 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at vi.

The government cannot accomplish the goal of saving money if the Secretary makes base closure recommendations on the premise that Navy shipyards will perform virtually all of the Navy's ship repair and overhaul requirements, thereby ignoring the reality that private shipyards perform approximately 35 percent of those requirements. In fact, the Congress has acknowledged the important role the private sector plays in providing support to the Services as well as the need to maintain a commercial industrial mobilization base by providing that up to 40 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract for that performance with the private sector. 10 U.S.C. § 2466.

Thus, the goal of achieving cost savings must include consideration of private sector capacity and capabilities. As set forth in the Government Accounting Office's March 1988 Report on Navy Maintenance, the Navy policy set forth in DoD Directive No. 4151.1 (originally adopted in 1974 and repealed in the wake of the enactment of section 2466 of title 10, United States Code), is in accord with Congress' intent to permit 40 percent of all Navy ship repair, overhaul and alteration work to go to private shipyards. GAO/NSIAD-88-109, dated March 25, 1988, Navy Maintenance, Competing Vessel Overhauls and Repairs Between Public and Private Shipyards at 18. For many years, Department of Defense Appropriation Acts directed a specified dollar amount be applied to private sector contractors that roughly equated to the then 70/30 split. Id. Because that congressional intent was well established at the time of enactment of the 1990 Base Closure Act and its predecessor 1988 Act, those Acts by necessity contemplated that the capacity of the private sector must be included for the purpose of achieving cost savings in determining which military bases to close.

C. Prior private capacity consideration by the Commission is appropriate and proper and this practice should be continued by the Commission in their 1995 recommendations for closure and realignment.

That the availability of private capacity is an appropriate and necessary factor to be considered in an evaluation of base closure recommendations under the final criteria is highlighted by the fact that private capacity was considered by this Commission in making its 1991 and 1993 closure and realignment recommendations.

In 1993 the Base Closure Commission wrote in its final recommendation to the President to close Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California:

> *When relocating a function from a closing shipyard, the Navy should determine the availability of the required capability from another DoD entity or the private sector prior to the expenditure of resources to recreate the capability at another shipyard.*
> See 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President at 1-16.

Similarly, a significant factor in the 1991 recommendations by the Commission concerning the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard was the availability of suitable private shipyard alternatives on the East Coast. For example, in evaluating options for Philadelphia, the Commission concluded that although the need for contingency capability for carrier drydocking on the East coast existed, that need could be met sufficiently through a combination of mothballing at Philadelphia and the use of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (a public facility), and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (a private facility.)

Moreover, the use of private capacity is further underscored by the deliberations of the Military Departments and the Joint Working Groups that led to the 1995 DoD recommendations to the Commission. For example, during the March 7, 1995 Commission hearing, Secretary of the Army Togo West testified that "civilian capacity was a player" in the Army's analysis of its hospital medical capacity and its determination as to which facilities to close and realign. Secretary West stated:

> *It was one of the ways in which we were able to decide that we could dispense with a center here or downgrade a hospital to a clinic there.*

. . .

> *And so, at least at the level at which I reviewed it, excess civilian capacity did not influence me so much as the certainty that with civilian capacity, we could be sure that that where we were making an adjustment there were still going to be proper medical care and treatment for those who depend on the Army.* [sic] [March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 90-91]

The Army also considered private capacity in the area of military ports in the United States. Secretary West testified further before the Commission that with regard to the Army's 1995 recommendation to close Military Ocean Terminal Bayonne, New Jersey:

> *...we in the Army are fairly comfortable with using commercial ports in most cases. There are greater assurances of commercial port availability on the East Coast than the West. So just as a matter of prudent planning, we elected to keep Oakland open, while we felt very comfortable that we could close Bayonne and realize the savings from that action.* [See March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 101-102]

In addition, all three Military Departments considered the availability of housing in the private sector in their 1995 evaluations of their military installations. Specifically, the Department of the Navy, in its Community Infrastructure Impact Analysis, included information on the ability of existing infrastructure in the local community, to absorb additional Navy personnel and missions. Installations were asked to assess the impact of increases in base personnel on off-base housing availability, public and private school, health care facilities and other off-base private recreational activities. See page 33 of the Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV), March 1995. The Air Force, in its installation evaluation criteria considered off-base housing affordability and its suitability in its evaluation of community infrastructure, as well as, off-base recreational and hospital facilities. See page 69 of the Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations (Volume V), February 1995. Similarly, the Department of the Army used off-base housing for soldiers and families in its overall evaluation of Land Facilities as provided for by the DoD. See page 24 of the Department of the Army Analyses and Recommendation (Volume II).

Private capacity was also evaluated and considered by the Joint Cross Service Groups. In particular, during the March 7, 1995 Commission hearing on recommendations by the Army, Brigadier General Shane of the Department of the Army testified that excess civilian capacity was considered in the hospital Joint Cross Service process. In response to Commissioner

Steele's question with regard to the Army's recommended closure of Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center and the continued ability of the Services to meet the military need in the area, the General responded:

> *...it goes back to the question that Commissioner Robles asked in regards to excess capacity -- civilian capacity that exists. It is my understanding that the Joint Cross Servicing Group looked at that real hard and supported this recommendation from the Army, and determined that there was capacity and that there would not be a major problem with the diversion of that tri-care service throughout the area.*
> [March 7, 1995 Transcript pp. 95-96]

That the Commission relied upon the availability of private capacity in making closure and realignment recommendations in 1993 and 1991, and that the Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Working Groups evaluated the capacity of the private sector when making their 1995 recommendations, is clearly dispositive as to whether private capacity may be considered by the Commission at this time as well.

D. Conclusion

One of the primary purposes of the Act is to avoid wasting money on public facilities that are excess to meeting the military's requirements. That purpose can be accomplished only if the Secretary and the Commission base their Navy shipyard closure recommendations on the Nation's entire ship repair and maintenance capability. Accordingly, we believe it is appropriate and proper for the Commission to consider private sector shipyard capacity when deciding which shipyards to recommend for closure or realignment.

Enclosure: as stated.

cc. w/ enclosure: Mr. Larry Jackson

Document Separator

Federal Government under 41 U.S.C. 46–48c and 41 CFR 51–2.8.

I certify that the following actions will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors considered for this certification were:

a. The action will not result in any additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance requirements.

b. The action will not have a serious economic impact on any contractors for the service listed.

c. The action will result in authorizing small entities to provide the service procured by the Government.

Accordingly, the following service is hereby added to the Procurement List: Commissary Shelf Stocking & Custodial, Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Denver, Colorado.

This action does not affect contracts awarded prior to the effective date of this addition or options exercised under those contracts.

E.R. Alley, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 91–3704 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820–33–M

Procurement List Proposed Additions

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped.

ACTION: Proposed additions to procurement list.

SUMMARY: The Committee has received proposals to add to the Procurement List commodities to be produced and services to be provided by workshops for the blind or other severely handicapped.

COMMENTS MUST BE RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE: March 18, 1991.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, Crystal Square 5, suite 1107, 1755 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202–3509.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Beverly Milkman, (703) 557–1145.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 47(a)(2) and 41 CFR 51–2.6. Its purpose is to provide interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the possible impact of the proposed actions.

If the Committee approves the proposed additions, all entities of the Federal Government will be required to procure the commodities and services listed below from workshops for the blind or other severely handicapped. It is proposed to add the following commodities and services to the Procurement List:

Commodities

Case, Ear Plug

6515–01–212–9452.

(Remaining 20 percent of Government's Requirement)

Wash Kit, Personal

7360–00–139–1063

Bag, Parts

8105–LL–B00–0208
8105–LL–B00–0209
8105–LL–B00–0210
8105–LL–B00–9974
8105–LL–B00–9975
(Requirements of Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA)

Services

Janitorial/Custodial: Department of the Army, Coralville Reservoir, Coralville Lake, Iowa.

Janitorial/Custodial, Internal Revenue Service Center, 3651 South Interregional Highway 35, Austin, Texas

Sending and Oiling Picnic Tables, Deschutes National Forest, Bend Ranger District, Bend, Oregon.

E.R. Alley, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 91–3705 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820–33–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Department of Defense Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military Installations Inside the United States

AGENCY: Department of Defense (DoD).

ACTION: Final selection criteria.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with section 2903(b), title XXIX, part A of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, is required to publish the proposed selection criteria to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations insikde the United States.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 15, 1991.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Jim Whittaker or Ms. Patricia Walker, Base Closure and Utilization, OASD(P&L), (703) 614–5356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Final Selection Criteria

The final criteria to be used by the Department of Defense to make recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under title XXIX, part A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 as follows:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requriements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.

B. Analysis of Public Comments

The Department of Defense (DoD) received 169 public comments in response to the proposed DoD selection criteria for closing and realigning military installations inside the United States. The public's comments can be grouped into four topics: General, military value, costs and "payback", and impacts. The following is an analysis of these comments.

(1) General Comments

(a) A substantial number of commentors expressed concern over the proposed criteria's broad nature and similiarity to the 1988 Defense Secretary's Base Realignment and Closure Commission criteria. Many of the comments noted a need for objective measures or factors for the criteria. Some commentors also suggested various standard measures or factors for

the criteria. The inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies (DoD Components) makes it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria, or objective measures or factors that could be applied to all bases within a Military Department or Defense Agency. We have provided the commentors' letters to each Military Department for their consideration. The similarity to the 1988 Base Closure Commission criteria is acknowledged. After reviewing the public comments we concluded that using similar criteria is appropriate.

(b) Many commentors noted that a correlation between force structure and the criteria was not present. The base closure and realignment procedures mandated by title XXIX, part A, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (the Act) require that the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for closure and realignment be founded on the force structure plan and the final criteria required by the Act. DoD's analytical and decision processes for applying the final criteria will be based on the force structure plan. The military value criteria provide the connection to the force structure plan.

(c) Many commentors noted the need for more detailed information on how DoD would implement the base closure procedures required by the Act. A recurrent suggestion was to group like bases into categories for analysis. In response to this comment and suggestion, and to respond to the general comments (a) and (b) above, we have issued policy guidance to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies on the base closure process. This guidance requires them to:

• Treat all bases equally: They must consider all bases equally in selecting bases for closure or realignment under the Act, without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department. This policy does not appply to closures or realignments that fall below the thresholds established by the Act or to the 86 bases closed under Public Law 100-526;

• Categorize bases: They must categorize bases with like missions, capabilities and/or attributes for analysis and review, to ensure that like bases are fairly compared with each other; and

• Perform a capacity analysis: They must link force structure changes described in the force structure plan with the existing force and bases structure, to determine if a potential for closure or realignment exists. In the event a determination is made that no excess capacity exists in a category, then there will be no need to continue the analysis of that category, unless there is a military value or other reason to continue the analysis;

• Develop and Use Objective Measures/Factors: They must develop and use objective measures or factors within categories for each criterion, whenever feasible. We recognize that it will not always be possible to develop appropriate objective measures or factors, and that measures/factors (whether they be objective or subjective) may vary for different categories of bases.

(d) A number of commentors recommended assigning specific weights to individual criteria. It would be impossible for DoD to specify weights for each criterion that could be applied across the board to all bases, again due to the mission diversity of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. It appears from the comments that numbering the criteria may have been mistaken as an order of precedence associated with individual criteria. We do not intend to assign an order of precedence to an individual criterion, other than to give priority to the first four.

(e) Several commentors gave various reasons why a particular installation should be eliminated from any closure or realignment evaluation. Public Law 101-510 directs DoD to evaluate all installations equally, exclusive of those covered under Public Law 100-526 or those falling below the threshold of section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code. Public Law 100-526 implemented the recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. We have issued guidance to the DoD Components instructing them to consider all bases equally, this includes those previously nominated for study in the Defense Secretary's January 29, 1990, base realignment and closure announcement that are above the thresholds established in the Act. Conversely, we did not receive any requests that a particular installation be closed or realigned pursuant to section 2924 of Public Law 101-510.

(f) A number of commentors noted a need for more management controls over data collection to ensure accuracy of data. We agree with this recommendation and have issued guidance that requires the DoD Components to develop and implement internal controls, consistent with their organizational and program structure, to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses being performed. This guidance incorporates the lessons learned from the General Accounting Office's review of the 1988 Base Closure Commission's work.

(g) After detailed consideration of all comments, we have determined that some of the criteria may have been unclear. We have revised the criteria for additional clarity.

(h) Some of the early comments we received recommended extending the original December 31, 1990, public comment deadline. We agreed and extended the public comment period to January 24, 1991. In addition, we accepted for consideration 19 public comments received after the January 24, 1991, deadline.

(2) Military Value Comments

(a) A majority of comments received supported DoD's decision to give priority consideration to the military value criteria. In the aggregate, military value refers to the collection of attributes that describe how well a base supports its assigned force structure and missions.

(b) Several commentors recommended that National Guard and Reserve Component forces be included as part of DoD's base closure analysis. The Department's total force concept includes National Guard and Reserve Component forces, and these forces will be reflected in the force structure plan required by the Act for this base closure process. To clarify that point, criteria number one and three were amended.

(c) Some commentors recommended DoD apply the military value criteria without regard to the DoD component currently operating or receiving the services of the base. The commentors noted that this would maximize utilization of Defense assets and therefore improve the national security. We agree with this comment. DoD must retain its best bases and where there is a potential to consolidate, share or exchange assets, that potential will be pursued. We also recognize that this potential does not exist among all categories of bases and that the initial determination of the military value of bases must be made by the DoD Component currently operating the base. Consequently, we have left the military value criteria general in nature and therefore applicable DoD-wide, where appropriate. We have also issued guidance to the DoD Components that encourages inter-service and multi-service asset sharing and exchange. Finally, we will institute procedures to ensure each DoD Component has the opportunity to improve the military value of its base structure through

analysis of potential exchanges of bases with other DoD Components.

(d) Some commentors recommended we include the availability of airspace in our considerations of military value. We agree and have revised criterion number two accordingly.

(e) Several commentors requested a geographic balance be maintained when considering installations for realignment or closure. DoD is required by Public Law 101-510 to evaluate all installations equally, exclusive of those covered under Public Law 100-526 or those falling below the thresholds of section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code. However, some measures of military value do have a geographic component and therefore military mission requirements can drive geographic location considerations.

(f) Some commentors recommended that the availability of trained civil service employees be considered as well as the capacity of the private sector to support or perform military missions. DoD's civil service employees are an integral part of successful accomplishment of defense missions, as are defense contractors whether they be nationally or locally based. To the extent that the availability of trained civilian or contractor work forces influences our ability to accomplish the mission, it is already included in criteria number one and four.

(g) Several commentors recommended that mobilization potential of bases be considered and that those bases required for mobilization be retained. Contingency and mobilization requirements are an important military value consideration and were already included in criterion number three. The potential to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements is a factor at both existing and potential receiving locations, and we have amended criterion number three accordingly.

(h) One commentor recommended retaining all bases supporting operation Desert Shield/Storm and another recommended including overseas bases. DoD must balance its future base structure with the forces described in the force structure plan, and not on the current basing situation. Some forces currently supporting Operation Desert Storm are scheduled for drawdown between 1991 and 1997. DoD must adjust its base structure accordingly. Overseas bases will also be closed in the future as we drawdown DoD's overseas forces. However, Congress specifically left overseas base closures out of the base closure procedures established by the Act.

(3) Cost and "Payback" Comments

(a) Some commentors recommended calculating total federal government costs in DoD's cost and "payback" calculations. A number of such comments gave as examples of federal government costs, health care and unemployment costs. The DoD Components annually budget for health care and unemployment costs. We have instructed the DoD Components to include DoD costs for health care and unemployment, associated with closures or realignments, in the cost calculations.

(b) Several commentors noted the absence of a "payback" period and some felt that perhaps eight or ten years should be specified. We decided not to do this; we did not want to rule out making changes that were beneficial to the national security that would have longer returns on investment. The 1988 Base Closure Commission felt that a six-year "payback" unnecessarily constrained their choices. The DoD Componentes have been directed to calculate return on investment for each closure or realignment recommendation, to consider it in their deliberations, and to report it in their justifications. Criterion number five has been amended accordingly.

(c) Some commentors recommended including environmental clean-up costs in base closure cost and payback calculations. Some also noted that the cost of environmental clean-up at a particular base could be so great that the Department should remove the base from further closure consideration.

The DoD is required by law to address two distinctly different types of environmental costs.

The first cost involves the clean-up and disposal of environmental hazards in order to correct past practices and return the site to a safe condition. This is commonly referred to as environmental restoration. DoD has a legal obligation under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act for environmental restoration at sites, regardless of a decision to close a base. Therefore, these costs will not be considered in DoD's cost calculations. Where installations have unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be identified as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

The second cost involves ensuring existing practices are in compliance with the Clean Air, Clean Water, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and other environmental acts, in order to control current and future pollution. This is commonly referred to as environmental compliance. Environmental compliance costs can potentially be avoided by ceasing the existing practice through the closure or realignment of a base. On the other hand, environmental compliance costs may be a factor in determining appropriate closure, realignment, or receiving location options. In either case, the environmental compliance costs or cost avoidances may be a factor considered in the cost and return on investment calculations. The Department has issued guidance to the DoD Components on this issue.

(d) Some commentors recommended DoD change the cost and "payback" criteria to include uniform guidelines for calculating costs and savings. We agree that costs and savings must be calculated uniformly. We have improved the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission and have provided it to the DoD Components for calculations of costs, savings, and return on investment.

(4) Impacts Comments

(a) Many commentors were concerned about social and economic impacts on communities and how they would be factored into the decision process. We have issued instructions to the DoD Components to calculate economic impact by measuring the effects on direct and indirest employment for each recommended closure or realignment. These effects will be determined by using statisical information obtained from the Departments of Labor and Commerce. This is consistent with the methodology used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission to measure economic impact. We incorporated the General Accounting Office's suggested improvements for calculation of economic impact. DoD will also determine the direct and indirect employment impacts on receiving bases. We have amended criterion number six to reflect this decision.

(b) The meaning of criterion number seven, "the community support at the receiving locations" was not clear to several commentors. Some wondered if that meant popular support. Others recognized that this criterion referred to a community's infrastructure such as roads, water and sewer treatment plans, schools and the like. To clarify this criterion, we have completely re-written it, while also recognizing that a comparison must be made for both the existing and potential receiving communities.

(c) Many commentors asked how environmental impacts would be considered. As we stated in topic 3(c),) will consider certain environmental ..ts. In addition, we have instructed the DoD Components to consider, at a minimum, the following elements when analyzing environmental consequences of a closure or realignment action:

- Threatened and endangered species
- Wetlands
- Historic and Archeological sites
- Pollution Control
- Hazardous Materials/Wastes
- Land and Air uses
- Programmed environmental costs/cost avoidances

(d) A number of commenters questioned the meaning of criterion number nine. "The implementation process involved". The intent of this criterion was to describe the implementation plan, its milestones, and the DoD military and civilian employee adjustments (Increases and decreases) at each base, that would result through implementation of the closure or realignment. After further consideration, we have determined that developing the implementation plan is a necessary requirement and conclusion of applying the other eight criteria. A description of implementation plan, while .portant to the understanding the recommended closure or realignment, is not in itself a specific criterion for decisionmaking. Consequently, we have deleted criterion number nine. We have instructed the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to include a description of their implementation plans for each recommended closure or realignment, as part of the justification to be submitted to the Commission.

C. Previous Federal Register References

(1) 55 FR49679, November 30, 1990: Proposed selection criteria and request for comments.

(2) 55 FR53536, December 31, 1990: Extend comment period on proposed selection criteria.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub. L. 96–511) does not apply.

Dated: February 11, 1991.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register, Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 91–3645 Filed 2–14–91; 8:45 am]

NG CODE 3810–01–M

Department of the Army

Environmental Assessment; Exoatmospheric Discrimination Experiment (EDX) Program

AGENCY: U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC); DOD.

COOPERATING AGENCY: Strategy Defense Initiative Organization, DOD U.S. Department of the Navy, DOD.

ACTION: Notice of Availability of finding of no significant impact.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (40 CFR parts 1500–1508), Army Regulation 200–2, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5090.1, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 6050.1 on Environmental Effects in the United States of DOD actions, the USASDC has conducted an assessment of the potential environmental consequences of conducting EDX program activities for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. The Environmental Assessment considered all potential impacts of the proposed action alone and in conjunction with ongoing activities. The finding of no significant impact summarizes the results of the evaluations of EDX activities at the proposed installations. The discussion focuses on those locations where there was a potential for significant impacts and mitigation measures that would reduce the potential impact to a level of no significance. Alternatives to the EDX launch facility were examined early in the siting process but were eliminated as unreasonable. A no-action alternative was also considered. The Environmental Assessment resulted in a finding of no significant impact. Construction will proceed as scheduled, however, due to budgetary constraints, the flight program implementation has been delayed. When the flight schedule becomes firm, this document will be reviewed and revised, as necessary, in light of any changes to the program.

DATES: Written comments are required by March 18, 1991.

POINT OF CONTACT: Mr. D.R. Gallien, Address: U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, CSSD–EN, Post Office Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35807–3801, Fax (205) 955–3958.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The USASDC was assigned the mission of acquiring critical mid-course data on ballistic missile re-entry vehicles and decoys; EDX would accomplish this mission. The EDX program would use the ARIES booster to launch a suborbital sensor into space to observe a target ballistic missile re-entry complex during the mid-course phase of its flight. The proposed EDX program would involve nine flights over three years from two different launch sites after October 1993: The target complex would be released from a MINUTEMAN I missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and the EDX booster and sensor payload vehicle would be launched from the Kauai Test Facility (KTF), located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Kauai, Hawaii. Current launch use activities would continue, however, pubic access through these areas would be limited for a total of less than 1 day over a three year period.

The EDX program would include a number of activities to be conducted at seven different sites. These activities are categorized as design, fabrication/assembly/testing, construction, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection, payload recovery, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, data analysis, and site maintenance/disposition. The locations and types of EDX activities are: Vandenberg Air Force Base, California/Western Test Range, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection; Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, construction, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection, payload recovery, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, site maintenance/disposition; Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, design, fabrication/assembly/testing; U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands, flight preparation, launch/flight/data collection; Hill Air Force Base, Utah, fabrication/assembly/testing; Space Dynamics Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, design, fabrication/assembly/testing, data analysis; and Boeing Aerospace and Electronics, Kent Space Center, Kent, Washington, design, fabrication/assembly/testing, sensor payload vehicle refurbishment, data analysis.

To determine the potential for significant environmental impacts as a result of the EDX program, the magnitude and frequency of the tests that would be conducted at the proposed locations were compared to the current activities and existing conditions at those locations. To assess possible impacts, each activity was evaluated in the context of the following environmental components: Air quality, biological resources, cultural resources, hazardous materials/waste, infrastructure, land use, noise, public

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P.O. Box 131068 • San Diego, CA 92170-1068

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- POINT PAPER -

ISSUES TO CONSIDER REGARDING THE CLOSURE OF LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

- Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNSY) is more of an industrial center than a typical military base. While the closure of large military bases can result in the collapse of all related infrastructure, this is not the case where only one industrial center of an industry is closed. The remaining industrial centers will continue to perform the work and support the ship repair infrastructure.

- LBNSY's closure will not result in California losing any of the funding for repair and overhaul work. Rather, all future Navy work allocated to the State of California will continue to be accomplished in California. The work will, however, be accomplished by the private sector, not the public.

- The private sector ship repair industry is competing in the national and international commercial ship repair market. The ability to expand in this market brings additional jobs and revenue to California. LBNSY does not and cannot compete in the commerical market.

- Forcing Naval personnel and their families to relocate to Long Beach from San Diego for repair work after long periods at sea is not consistent with the Navy's quality of life objectives.

LBNSY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & FMA CHAPTER-10
4-18-95

CORE WORK FACTS

THE WORK that the NAVY has designated AS CORE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IS NOT All ASSIGNED TO LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD.

LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD WOULD HAVE to hire 500 TO 600 Additional WORKERS IF IT WAS ASSIGNED ALL OF The CORE WORK IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. Which supports the CLAIM that LBNSY does Not have EXCESS CAPACITY.

LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD MAINTAINS ITS FACILITIES utilizing revenue earned FROM CURRENT OPERATIONS to support A mobilization BASE IN Southern CALIFORNIA.

THIS Mobilization BASE INCLUDES DRY DOCK NO. 1 Which is technically AND physically CAPABLE OF docking CVNs for routine MAINTENANCE. LOCATION OF CV-63 FY 97 AND CV-64 FY 98 dockings.

THE NAVY SAYS IT WILL ASSIGN WORK CURRENTLY SLATED FOR LBNSY TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

HOW CAN THE dept. OF NAVY Comply with TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE IF They ARE going TO depend SO STRONGLY ON the PRIVATE SECTOR-? (ENCL-2)

J B Jenkins

ENCL 1

LBNSY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION & F.M.A. CH. 10
JB LARKINS AND DAVID GRAYSON
APRIL 17, 1995

TALKING POINTS

1 EXCESS CAPACITY

ENCLOSURE I "STATEMENT"

ENCLOSURE 2 "TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE" ??

ENCLOSURE 3 1995 FLEET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE MAJOR DRIVERS: (EXCESS CAPACITY)

ENCLOSURE 4 INSIDE THE NAVY ARTICLE: LBNSY CLOSURE DRIVEN BY ECONOMICS.

ENCLOSURE 5 PACIFIC FLEET MAINTENANCE STRATEGIC PLAN 1995

ENCLOSURE 6 RADM. ROGER B. HORNE JR (P-4-DD) (P-5) STATEMENT BEFORE BRAC 1988

ENCLOSURE 7 MACHINIST: FLOATING DRY DOCK

MISC: PROPOSED DRY DOCK FOR NAS NORTH ISLAND

$200 M to build drydock in 88.

Inside the Pentagon's

Inside the Navy

an exclusive weekly report on Navy programs, procurement and policymaking

ENCL-4

Vol. 8, No. 9, March 6, 1995

Placed on '95 BRAC 'hit list'

NAVY PLANS WORK AT LONG BEACH ALTHOUGH SHIPYARD PEGGED FOR CLOSURE

Although the Navy is recommending closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the 1995 round of base closings, the service has assigned a considerable amount of ship repair and overhaul work to the shipyard through 2003, according to a copy of the Navy's ship overhaul schedule request compiled in early December. A copy of the schedule was obtained by *Inside the Navy* and shows 31 work assignments for the Long Beach yard with the first job starting this month and the last job beginning in June 2002.

Sources within the shipbuilding industry and on Capitol Hill said the work slated for Long Beach may help in the city's fight to reverse the Navy's decision.

continued on page 22

Less expensive in most cases. . .

MARINE CORPS GENERAL CLAIMS DUPLICATION IS NOT ONLY GOOD, BUT VITAL

While the Commission on Roles and Missions is engaged in an uphill battle to identify redundancies and duplications among the services, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Thomas Wilkerson admits that "duplication is not only good . . . it is absolutely vital." Wilkerson told *Inside the Navy* last week that in many instances, "it is almost cheaper to have a redundant system with dual means than it is to pursue a single technology."

Wilkerson, the director of the Marine Corps' plans division, explained "If you cannot predict what is going to happen in the future and you roll the dice and go in a single direction and it turns out to be the wrong direction, you are dead in the water." He added: "You [the military] cannot rely on just a space-based sensor or system, for example:

continued on page 22

NAVY SHIP REPAIR WORK MAY UNDERGO DRASTIC CONTRACTING CHANGE

The Naval Sea Systems Command is considering making a major change to its Master Ship Repair Agreement/ Agreement for Boat Repair philosophy that would shift a greater amount of ship repair work away from large shipyards and toward small waterfront repair shops. According to a NAVSEA memorandum, the change is driven by a smaller fleet size (translating into fewer ships needing repair), the Navy's move to more continuous maintenance of ships, and a reduced level of modernization.

But representatives from major shipyards and ship repair facilities contend the move is driven almost solely by economics. By making changes to the current agreement, the Navy will be opening up bidding on jobs traditionally handled by private shipyards that have their own docking facilities. By shifting more of the ship repair work to the

continued on page 23

Services to provide input

ARMY WILL PLAY IN NAVY'S 21ST CENTURY SURFACE COMBATANT ARENA

At the Navy's request, the Army is gearing up to discuss how the Navy's newest surface combatant ship will work with Army forces in future joint operations, according to service sources. The Army plans to address future sealift requirements, protection and control of sea lines of communications, and the potential fire support needed for the Navy to protect the Army, one Pentagon source said. The Army will take part in a one-year SC-21 study with the Navy.

Rear Adm. Thomas Marflak kicked off the collaborative effort through a Jan. 31 letter sent to Army Maj. Gen. Edward Anderson. Marflak asked for strong cooperation between the services to better understand how the SC-21 will

Bye Bye Denman

Gary Denman, the director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, said farewell to the troops last Friday. A spokeswoman in Denman's office said he was moving on but that no immediate successor had been named. Denman leaves on the heels of a move by Congress to cut a large chunk of funding for ARPA's Technology Reinvestment Program, one of the cornerstones of the Clinton administration's reinventing government plan.

Special Report: Navy's Ship Overhaul and Repair Schedule

LONG BEACH REPAIR WORK WILL GO ELSEWHERE . . . begins page one

Interestingly, the overhaul schedule shows only one work assignment for the Portsmouth Shipyard at Kittering, ME, a facility that many industry and Capitol hill sources said they expected to be on the base closing list. But when the Navy's list of base closing recommendations was made public last week, these sources said Portsmouth was saved based on politics.

"The Clinton administration did not want to close Portsmouth because of the upcoming New Hampshire presidential primary," one congressional source attached to the Southern California delegation said. Portsmouth lies on the Maine/New Hampshire border and employs many New Hampshire residents.

A Navy spokesman said the work assigned to Long Beach -- and the other facilities slated to close -- will be reassigned. The spokesman said the Navy will begin reassigning the work assignments two years after the closing process begins. "It is up to the particular base [or shipyard] to reassign the work," he said.

According to the Defense Department's report on the base closing recommendations, the Long Beach decision was based almost purely on economics. "Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated," the Navy's justification for closing Long Beach states.

It will cost the Navy $74.5 million to close Long Beach, but the service believes the return on that investment warrants the shipyard's closure. "The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $725.6 million," the Navy said. "Annual recurring savings after implementation are $130.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $1,948.6 million."

On Feb. 22, eight House members from Southern California wrote Defense Secretary William Perry pleading the case for keeping the Long Beach shipyard open. In addition to the fact that losing Long Beach would cut into the Navy's West Coast ship repair capacity, the members questioned whether the Navy would be able to retain a legally mandated 60 percent/40 percent split of depot work respectively between public and private facilities.

The Navy's overhaul schedule request was put together last December, just eight weeks before the base closing announcements were made. Among the work assignments slated for Long Beach are several regular overhauls to Ticonderoga class Aegis guided missile cruisers and a complex overhaul to the carrier Kitty Hawk. -- *Thomas Duffy*

'DUPLICATION' GIVES SERVICES FALL BACK POSITION . . . begins page one

you want an alternative land, sea, or air system or sensor to fall back on in a conflict.

"This is one of the reasons we [the services] have separate systems -- so we have solutions to similar problems from different viewpoints." Wilkerson pointed out that, "As Americans, we thrive on competition to fuel innovation."

And it is just that type of innovation that Wilkerson says is the solution to the military's problems. "The answer is how you [the Marine Corps] make use of the technology [and innovation] to get the most for your money because in this time of fiscal hostility we cannot afford to have all of these magic mousetraps," he said. For example, Wilkerson professed that space is one of the big problems the Marine Corps is scrambling to come to grips with within the technological revolution. The technology explosion is "happening outside of the control of the military." The challenge is, "We have to look more and more outside of our house to find the cheapest and most effective ways to do things," Wilkerson said.

Making use of scarce defense dollars demands that the Marine Corps "harness technology and bend it in our direction," according to Wilkerson. He said this is especially prudent when the technology itself is available on the world market to "virtually anyone who can pay the price."

Allocating resources has to be accomplished in the name of efficiency, a senior-level Marine Corps official said. Right now there is a tendency for the Department of Defense to "build tall pyramids," according to the high-ranking source, but this only adds more bureaucracy. Parallel to DOD building pyramids, the commercial sector is flattening out their hierarchy to survive "because if they did not do it they would not be cost effective and they would gamble losing out to the competition," a source illustrated. "There is a message there somewhere [for the Marine Corps] and I am not sure we are getting it," the official admitted.

And that message might be, "Give us a bunch of money -- big or small [amounts] and say look, you guys need to be able to do some things -- can you not buy more effectively on the commercial market?" In addition, the source said that the size of the investment must contribute ultimately to a force that is vigilant.

For example, when the price of technology is being considered the military must recognize that "the enemy" is always on the "lookout". "We [the United States] have the most powerful fleet in the world . . . yet there are little countries who can grab technology available on the open market and put mines in the water and possibly damage or sink our ships and put missiles into the air that can possibly down our aircraft," Wilkerson said. A Marine Corps official added, "They [potential adversaries] are playing in the mediums where we have a huge preponderance of

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PACIFIC FLEET MAINTENANCE

ENCL-6

Strategic Plan
1995

FLEET MAINTENANCE OFFICER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
250 MAKALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-7000

1 March 1995

The Pacific Fleet Maintenance Strategic Plan has its roots in the CINCPACFLT Maintenance Division Strategic Plan, where Regional Maintenance was identified as a vital issue for the Pacific Fleet. In it we recognized the need to closely involve the Pacific Fleet Type Commanders in planning and executing the implementation of Regional Maintenance. Indeed, without the full support of the Type Commanders and the Fleet Technical Support Center, little progress could be made in realizing our vision of re-engineering maintenance for the Navy of the 21st Century.

During the past six months the Pacific Fleet Maintenance Executive Steering Committee put forth a significant effort in developing this plan, but the hard work is just beginning. As we implement Regional Maintenance, we will face unprecedented leadership, fiscal and technical challenges. The Mission, Vision, Guiding Principles and Vital Issues contained within this plan chart our course to the future and will provide us with the tools we will need to overcome these challenges.

A good strategic plan is a dynamic document. As we work through our goals and objectives, we will receive new information. We will therefore need to review and modify our plan from time to time. I encourage our customers and stake holders to share their comments and recommendations for our improvement.

Lastly, our strategic plan has no value if it sits on the shelf. It is easy to become focused on near term events and lose sight of the "big picture". To achieve our vision we need to integrate our strategies, goals and objectives into our daily routines and, from time to time, assess our progress. We will be doing this regularly over the coming months.

I wish to thank each member of the Executive Steering Committee and especially our customers who have participated through surveys and feedback. Your dedication to the continuous improvement of maintenance practices within the Pacific Fleet is vital to our success.

M.T. Coyle
M. T. COYLE
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE, THE PACIFIC FLEET MAINTENANCE EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC PLAN.

THE PACIFIC FLEET MAINTENANCE EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE

RADM M. T. COYLE
CPF N43

CAPT D. BAUGH
CNAP N43

CAPT W. R. WHEELER
CNSP N43

CAPT J.P. CROCIATA
CSP N4/43

CAPT D. F. HARGRAVE
CPF DIRECTOR OF RM

CAPT J. H. ALDRICH
CNAP N42

CAPT R. L. BRENNON
FTSCPAC

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MISSION

The mission of the PACIFIC FLEET Maintenance ESC is to support CINCPACFLT in developing plans, policies and processes to ensure the material condition of PACIFIC FLEET ships, submarines and aircraft will support fleet operational requirements.

In support of our mission, our principle functions include:

- Implement regional maintenance within CINCPACFLT

- Facilitate incremental implementation of automated information systems (AIS) supporting regional maintenance and, ultimately, an integrated fleet maintenance model (IFMM).

- Use measures of effectiveness to assess objectives.

VISION

By 1999, we will have a regionalized maintenance structure, technically competent and sized to requirements, delivering quality products & services to our customers in a responsive and cost effective manner.

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS:

- Continued budget reductions
- Shrinking industrial base
- More technically complex platforms
- Increased emphasis on environmental protection
- Fleet will have to fund critical functions no longer supported by syscoms
- Continued demand for maintenance infrastructure reductions
- Political resistance to force level and infrastructure changes
- Continued force level reductions
- Greater demand for predictive and condition based maintenance execution
- Mean age of ships will decrease
- Mean age of aircraft will increase
- Increasing restrictions on overseas maintenance
- One level of maintenance ashore
- Consolidation of maintenance activities, training, and support programs
- Increased shore facilities specialization

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS (cont):

- Depot Maintenance Facility to be built in San Diego

- Greater demand for navy maintenance work from the private sector

- High level of interest in readiness measurement

- Demand for CINCS to identify requirements for regional maintenance

- BRAC will continue to influence homeporting and regional maintenance.

- Common support systems will be developed

- Increased pressure to single site by platform type

- Increased requirement for auditable data to support maintenance budget requirements

- Increased use of alteration installation teams

- PACFLT will reduce to two tenders

- Reliance on afloat maintenance interoperability via Battle Force Intermediate Maintenance Activity (BFIMA)

- Increased pressure for staff reductions

- We will need to cope with force and infrastructure reductions that may result in loss of flexibility to respond to emergent requirements.

- Increased integration of maintenance and logistics

- Regional maintenance will apply to ships, submarines and aircraft

- Increased consolidation of engineering, planning and technical support

- Syscoms will retain technical authority

- Single ownership of maintenance activities ashore or dual reporting by maintenance commanders

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

In executing our mission we will be guided by the following Guiding Principles:

WE WILL...

- Amplify performance by effective teamwork

- Encourage innovation through continuous improvement that can be measured and compared

- Empower our people to do their jobs

- Ensure adequate staffing for work undertaken

- Treat all individuals with respect and dignity

- Use principles of TQL to establish facts and provide recommendations

- Make decisions at lowest possible position

- Delegate authority along with responsibility

- Promote standardization

- Make decisions in the best interests of our mission, putting aside parochialism and old habits

- Provide professional, quality service to all

- Provide adequate sea/shore rotation and meaningful shore duty for maintenance personnel

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

WE ARE COMMITTED TO...

- Organizational efficiency and open communications
- Honesty, integrity and the highest standards of professional excellence
- Being good stewards of the taxpayers' resources
- Customer service and satisfaction
- Quality of communications
- Teamwork
- Quality and continuous improvement
- Decisions based upon data and knowledge
- Maintaining the chain of command
- Maintaining fleet material readiness
- Protecting the environment

WE...

- Believe that sharing information improves efficiency and increases the quality of our work
- Strive towards technical excellence
- Encourage and embrace innovative improvement

VITAL ISSUE #1

By 1999, the RMC's will be sized, organized and equipped to provide quality responsive and cost effective maintenance to the Fleet assets; having resolved fiscal, functional (roles and responsibilities) and technical capability issues.

STRATEGY

Definition of maintenance related boundary conditions will provide the essential guidance critical to RMC development. These include:

- BRAC results
- Chain of Command issues
- CNO Policy
- Implementation of regional maintenance initiatives (AIS, IFMM, etc.)
- Maintenance Strategy
- Public vs. private split

GOAL 1

Define the key Pacific Fleet strategies for accomplishing maintenance.

Objective 1.1 By October 30, 1995, develop aviation maintenance strategy relative to regional maintenance.

Manager: Captain Aldrich, CNAP N42

Objective 1.2 By March 30, 1995, implement strategy for accomplishment of nuclear maintenance.

Manager: Captain Crociata, CSP N4/43

Objective 1.3 By October 30, 1995, define the Pacific Fleet dry-dock plan.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 1.4 By October 30,1995 finalize the platform homeporting plan.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 1.5 By February 28,1995, define the tender utilization plan.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

GOAL 2

By December 30, 1995, we will determine the organic maintenance workload requirements for each region based on the most efficient public/private workload ratio, sea/shore rotation, unique regional conditions, maximum level loading, and requirements for maintaining core competencies.

Managers: CINCPACFLT - Captain Hargrave, CPF N430
Northwest - Captain Dunn, RMC-NW
Southwest - Captain Wheeler, CNSP N43/Capt Baugh, CNAP N43
Hawaii - Captain Crociata, CSP N4
Western Pacific - Captain Pierpont, CLWP, N43

GOAL 3

Establish ability to identify the "real" cost of maintenance to enable the most effective (maintaining core) sourcing of work.

Objective 3.1 By June 30, 1995, Quantify and collect DBOF vs. mission funding fleet maintenance costs.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 3.2 By August 30, 1995, develop measures of effectiveness for regional maintenance initiatives.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 3.3 By August 30, 1995, develop a business case analysis approach to evaluating Regional Maintenance initiatives.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

GOAL 4

Establish the functional relationship between the FMO, TYCOMs and RMC with respect to responsibility for material readiness.

Objective 4.1 By October 1995, the Fleet Maintenance ESC develop proposal for Fleet ESC.

Manager: Capt Hargrave, CPF N430

GOAL 5

Integrated Fleet Maintenance Model (IFMM)

Objective 5.1 By February 28, 1995, educate the Fleet Maintenance ESC on the IFMM and its significance to regional maintenance.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 5.2 By April 28,1995, develop position on PACFLT role in IFMM development.

Manager : Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

VITAL ISSUE #2

By 1999, the methodology will be implemented to size maintenance activities to support maintenance requirements and the fleet will recognize actual savings.

Strategy

To preserve fleet readiness, it is critical to size shore maintenance infrastructure to match the requirements of a smaller Navy. Capacity above core is not affordable and must be eliminated in each region of fleet concentration. A methodology to do this will be developed as follows:

- Recognize and overcome the barriers to implementation
    - Different I and D financial systems
    - Concern that quality and responsiveness will be degraded
    - Different processes between platform types
    - Resistance to change
- Determine regional organic maintenance workload requirements based on projected force structure, most efficient public/private workload ratio, and critical competencies (CVN dry-docks, nuclear refueling, etc.).
- Develop a deterministic process to size maintenance facilities to match regional workload requirements.
- Implement regional maintenance support systems.

GOAL 1

By October 1996, we will have overcome the significant barriers to regional maintenance implementation by elimination or compensation.

Objective 1.1 By October 1995, we will implement a pilot financial system that facilitates the formation of I-D Regional Repair Centers (RRC).

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 1.2 By October 1996, we will have developed and/or implemented sufficient common maintenance processes so that all maintenance resources in each region are acceptable by the regional maintenance center.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

GOAL 2

By June 1995, we will have developed a deterministic process to size organic maintenance activities to match the regional workload requirements and estimate cost and manpower savings.

Objective 2.1 By June 1995, we will have developed a process to accurately assess regional capacity and capabilities.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 2.2 By June 1995, we will have developed a process to develop regional repair centers such that required workload can be accomplished in the most efficient, minimum sized and most cost effective activity. The manpower, facilities and equipment to operate the activity will be determined by an objective process which is based primarily on the data provided.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 2.3 By June 1995, we will have developed a process to accurately estimate the true cost and manpower savings achieved by regional maintenance initiatives.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

GOAL 3

By October 1997, we will have developed and implemented the support systems required to facilitate regional maintenance. These include, but are not limited to AIS/IFMM, regional transportation, contracting services, training, technical support, common Maintenance/QA manuals and regional inventory control.

Objective 3.1 By March 1995, we will have identified the minimum support systems required for Phase Two implementation of regional maintenance.

Manager: Captain Dunn, RMC Northwest

Objective 3.2 By October 1995, we will have implemented the minimum support systems required to enter Phase Two in the Northwest region.

Manager: Captain Dunn, RMC Northwest

Objective 3.3 By October 1995, we will have identified the support systems required to fully implement regional maintenance.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Objective 3.4 By April 1996, we will have sufficient data from pilot RRCs to evaluate quality, responsiveness and cost.

Manager: Captain Hargrave, CPF N430

Document Separator

GAO

United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division

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703 696-0504
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B-261075

April 21, 1995

The Honorable Stephen Horn
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Horn:

On December 30, 1994, and in subsequent meetings, you requested that we provide information related to the possible homeporting of up to three Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carriers at the North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, California; the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, California; or both. On April 6, 1995, we briefed you on the information we had gathered. You asked us to provide a summary of our briefing, even though some aspects of our work had not been completed, and update our information where possible to present the most recent data available. This letter responds to your request.

Enclosure 1 provides information on the Navy's homeporting plans and policies for aircraft carriers and their relation to ship maintenance requirements and quality-of-life issues. Enclosure 2 discusses the inclusion of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in the San Diego homeport area. Enclosure 3 presents the Navy's cost estimates for the various homeporting options. Enclosure 4 discusses major cost items and the assumptions on which the cost estimates were based. Enclosure 5 identifies the advantages and disadvantages associated with homeporting carriers in San Diego or Long Beach. Enclosure 6 discusses the Navy's draft environmental impact statement relating to the relocation of one nuclear aircraft carrier from the Alameda Naval Air Station, California, to North Island. Enclosure 7 discusses the need for a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier-capable drydock at North Island and the status of the Navy's plans to move a floating drydock capable of accommodating big-deck amphibious ships to San Diego.

To obtain this information, we interviewed officials from the Chief of Naval Operations, Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for

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Research, Development, and Acquisition. We also met with officials from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, city of Long Beach, and port authority of Long Beach.

In addition, at our request, the Navy conducted studies on the (1) infrastructure and recurring annual costs for facilities needed to homeport the three Nimitz-class carriers and (2) the advantages and disadvantages of homeporting the carriers at North Island versus Long Beach. We used the information in these studies in our work; however, we were not able to verify the accuracy of the information because the studies were only recently received.

- - - -

If you have any questions, please contact me on (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this letter are George Jahnigen, Edwin Soniat, Willie Cheely, and Patricia Blowe.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren
Director, Defense Management
and NASA Issues

Enclosures - 7

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THE NAVY'S HOMEPORTING PLANS AND POLICIES FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

PLANS

The Navy has designated San Diego as a major homeport and plans to concentrate a major portion of its Pacific Fleet ships in that area. As of November 1994, San Diego was the homeport to 70 of the 101 Navy ships located on the West Coast. Two of the 70 ships were conventional aircraft carriers. Long Beach was the homeport to five ships at that time, but none of them were carriers. As a result of a 1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission decision to close the Long Beach Naval Station, Long Beach will no longer be a Navy homeport after the three ships currently assigned to the homeport leave.

The Chief of Naval Operations approved a proposal in May 1994 that called for the retention of six aircraft carriers in the Pacific. Three of the carriers were to be homeported at the North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, California; one in Everett, Washington; one in Bremerton, Washington; and one in Yokosuka, Japan. By the year 2005 all of these carriers--except for the one homeported in Japan--will be Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carriers. According to the Navy, the approved carrier homeporting plan considers ship deployment schedules, facility modernization plans, ship maintenance requirements, and quality-of-life issues.

POLICIES

To minimize the amount of time military personnel are separated from their homes and families, the Navy started a program in 1985 to eliminate excessive operating tempo, as well as achieve long-standing personnel tempo of operations (PERSTEMPO) limits. To accomplish this, the Navy established three PERSTEMPO goals:

-- The length of any deployment, including transit time, will not exceed 6 months (180 days).

-- Before beginning a new deployment, ship personnel will spend a minimum of 2 months in their homeport for every month the ship is deployed.

-- A ship and its crew will spend a minimum of 50 percent of the time over a 5-year period in their homeport.

A ship is considered in violation of the PERSTEMPO goals when these criteria are not met.

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The Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets assign ships to a homeport, subject to approval by the Chief of Naval Operations, and establish homeport clusters (i.e., a grouping of ports where proximity permits an individual to be at home overnight rather than aboard a ship). Any ship away from its designated homeport or homeport cluster for more than 8 weeks is considered deployed.

To meet the PERSTEMPO requirements, the Navy has a policy to perform maintenance on ships in the ship's designated homeport, if a ship's planned maintenance period is for 6 months or less. If the maintenance period is planned for more than 6 months, the ship will be assigned to a naval shipyard or private sector yard. If a ship's maintenance is performed at a ship maintenance or repair activity other than the ship's homeport, the new shipyard or activity becomes the ship's new homeport while the maintenance is being performed. About every 6 years, aircraft carriers homeported in San Diego would be homeported (on a staggered basis) at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington, for about 10-1/2 months for major maintenance action, called a "drydocking phased incremental availability."

Naming a new homeport when ships are repaired out of their normal homeport conforms with the Navy's PERSTEMPO instruction, but for sailors with families this practice is inconsistent with the program's goals. In these cases, sailors go to a new homeport while their families may still remain at the old homeport in anticipation of the ship's return. Quality-of-life improvements would be derived if a ship were repaired at a facility closer to the original homeport. For example, if a San Diego based-carrier were repaired at the Long Beach rather than the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, crew members could go home more easily.

Another difficulty in complying with the PERSTEMPO program goals was created during the 1980s when the Secretary of the Navy directed the expansion of three homeport areas--Norfolk, Virginia; New York, New York; and Seattle, Washington--for short-term maintenance actions (i.e., less than 6 months). The Navy said this action was taken to ensure adequate competition among ship repair activities in the private sector. Under this arrangement, Norfolk was to include all repair activities up to and including Baltimore, Maryland; New York was to include all activities down to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Seattle was to include all activities down to Portland, Oregon. Expansion of the San Diego homeport area to include Long Beach was not considered because the Navy believed private sector competition in the San Diego area was adequate.

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The Navy recognizes that, under the expanded homeport policy, it cannot always meet the PERSTEMPO policy goals when maintenance work is being done at shipyards within the clusters. For example, in 1994, the Secretary of the Navy proposed a new policy called the "sequential bid area" that would make the definition of a homeport area consistent throughout the Navy. Under this new proposed policy, the expanded homeport areas would be abolished, and the definition of homeport bidding areas would be aligned with the fleet commander's definition for homeport areas for PERSTEMPO requirements. This proposal is being reviewed within the Navy.

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LONG BEACH COULD BE INCLUDED IN SAN DIEGO'S HOMEPORT AREA

The Navy could decide to expand San Diego's homeport area to include Long Beach. However, it has not chosen to do so. The fleet commanders have determined that the primary factor that should be considered when determining a homeport area or cluster is a sailor's ability to spend the night at home. However, they have not established specific criteria, such as distance or commute time, for doing so. However, fleet officials have informally made such determinations. They believe that a commuting time of about 1 hour each way is reasonable and consistent with the spirit of the Navy's PERSTEMPO goals. Since the average commute time between San Diego and Long Beach is about 2 hours each way, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet has declined to include Long Beach in the San Diego homeport area or cluster.

On April 17, 1995, the Navy provided us with a document that stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had recently approved a new policy that "homeport clusters shall be established for ports that are within a 75-mile radius and less than 1-1/2 hours one-way travel time using normal modes of travel for the region." We are uncertain whether the policy is currently in effect.

The document also showed that, in March 1992, the Commander of the Naval Surface Forces in the Pacific requested specifically that Long Beach and San Diego be in the same homeport cluster, but the request was disapproved by Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The Commander believed such an action would have an adverse impact on the quality-of-life of the ships' crews. The Secretary of the Navy supported the Commander's decision. A similar request had previously been made by the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission in its report to the President that recommended the closure of the Long Beach Naval Station.

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COST COMPARISON OF HOMEPORTING OPTIONS FOR NIMITZ-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

To respond to your request, we asked the Navy to conduct a study that developed and compared infrastructure and recurring costs for facilities needed to homeport up to three Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carriers at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the North Island Naval Air Station or both. To accomplish this, facility and other requirements for homeporting the nuclear carriers were defined. Cost estimates were developed by comparing baseline facility standards, as set forth in various Navy documents, to what currently exists or would be required at each installation. Costs associated with ship maintenance and fleet operations were not addressed.

According to the study, the Navy's current plan to homeport all three nuclear carriers at North Island is the lowest cost option, and homeporting three nuclear carriers at Long Beach is the highest cost option. The costs associated with each option, expressed in terms of infrastructure and recurring annual operating costs, as well as the cost difference from the lowest cost option, are shown in table 3.1. Annual operating costs include shore support staffing, crew training and lost time, and base operating support costs.

Table 3.1: Costs of Homeporting Options

Dollars in millions

Number of carriers		Infra-structure cost	Difference from baseline	Recurring annual costs	Difference from baseline
Long Beach	North Island				
0	3	$546.1	0	$0.3	0
1	2	706.2	$160.1	25.4	$25.1
2	1	739.2	193.1	27.7	27.4
3	0	828.6	282.5	29.7	29.4

Source: Navy

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COST ISSUES

There are a number of assumptions made in the Navy's study that affect the associated cost results. For a number of these areas, we have not seen sufficient support to enable us to make a judgment on their reasonableness or validity. We focused our analysis on the hypothetical three carrier option at Long Beach, because this was the option where we had the greatest number of unresolved questions.

TRANSIENT SHIP/INTERIM HOMEPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The Navy estimated it would cost about $137 million for dredging, upgrading an existing transient aircraft carrier berth, and constructing a new berth capable of accommodating Nimitz-class aircraft carriers at San Diego, even if all three nuclear carriers were homeported in Long Beach. The Navy believes that these actions are necessary because, after closure of the Naval Air Station Alameda, California, North Island will be the only West Coast aircraft carrier homeport with a collocated airfield which, it believes, is necessary to offload disabled aircraft. The Navy also believes that the same facilities will be needed on an interim basis to homeport the U.S.S. Stennis when it arrives on the West Coast in 1998, because appropriate carrier berthing facilities at Long Beach will not likely be ready at that time.

We asked the Navy for any studies and/or statistics that supported their position. While the Navy provided us with a document that highlighted the benefits of having a port with a collocated airfield, it could not provide any statistics on the number of disabled aircraft offloaded over the last few years. In lieu of such information, we held discussions with Pacific and Atlantic Fleet officials. These officials said that, typically, very few disabled planes were offloaded after deployments. One Atlantic Fleet official estimated that, on the average, one plane was offloaded over three deployments. Furthermore, we were told that there are other alternatives for getting disabled aircraft to an aircraft maintenance depot. For example, a disabled aircraft could be trucked (with the wings folded up), airlifted by helicopter, or barged to the maintenance depot.

Regarding the interim homeporting requirement, the Navy identified two possible options: the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard or San Diego. The Navy rejected the shipyard option based on projected port loading at the shipyard during and after the arrival of the U.S.S. Stennis and the likelihood that new base support facilities would have to be constructed. The Navy stated that a more detailed study would be required to firm up the basis for the rejection.

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We asked the Navy for details supporting its reasoning that the facilities at Long Beach could not be made ready in time to support the homeporting of the U.S.S. Stennis and that the Puget Sound Shipyard option was not likely to be viable. The Navy has not yet provided the requested information.

FAMILY HOUSING REQUIREMENTS

The Navy study estimated an additional 1,708 units would have to be constructed at a total estimated cost of about $258 million to meet housing needs at Long Beach. Other information suggests that some of these costs could be avoided. According to the Navy study, the homeporting of three Nimitz-class aircraft carriers would increase the housing demand in Long Beach by the year 2000 by an estimated 7,500 units--from a projected total of about 1,250 units to 8,750 units. Available housing for the Long Beach area was estimated to be 7,042 units, of which 1,042 units are currently controlled by the Long Beach Shipyard. The Navy's expected share of private sector housing for rent within a one hour commuting distance that was assumed to be adequate and affordable, was projected to be about 6,000 units based on 1988 data.

A 1995 study conducted by a public accounting firm shows that over 27,000 housing units that meet the Navy's criteria are currently available in the Long Beach area. The study stressed that units in high-crime areas were not included in this total.

Also, as a result of a 1993 base closure decision, military family housing at the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station could possibly be made available to satisfy the projected Long Beach housing shortfall. However, use of the El Toro housing units would require a reversal of the prior Base Closure and Realignment Commission decision as well as an adjustment of any projected savings associated with the decision. El Toro is located about 30 miles south of Long Beach and, based on our own driving tests, within a one-hour drive from the shipyard during rush hour. Data we obtained show that there are currently 1,188 units of housing at the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station. At present most of these units are occupied, but with the closure of the Air Station the units should become available for other uses beginning in July 1998.
Two hundred and sixteen of the units are classified as substandard because they do not contain the required number of square feet. An additional 119 units are being screened for lead paint and asbestos contamination.

BASE SUPPORT COSTS OTHER THAN FAMILY HOUSING

According to the Navy, adequate supporting facilities are required to maintain a reasonable level of service to the nuclear carriers and their crews. Facilities required range from cafeterias and

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officers clubs to theaters, child care centers, and parking facilities. For the homeporting options considered, total costs ranged from a low of about $167 million for the North Island option to a high of about $224 million for the Long Beach option.

Documents provided by the Navy raised certain questions about the reasonableness of these costs.

-- The Navy study states a need for a $38 million, 4,000 vehicle parking structure to satisfy parking needs associated with the three Long Beach homeported carrier option. However, information provided by the shipyard shows that there are currently over 4,500 empty parking spaces in the yard, primarily because of major reductions in the number of ships and military and civilian personnel since 1991. At that time, there were 35 ships and over 22,800 military and civilian personnel assigned to the shipyard. Currently, there are three ships homeported in Long Beach and the number of military and civilian personnel assigned is about 5,800. We have not verified the shipyard's number, however, based on our observations there is a large amount of unused parking space at the shipyard.

-- The Navy study estimated it would take about $52 million to construct new facilities or upgrade existing facilities up to standards mainly in four base support areas--medical and dental space; administrative office space; enlisted dining space; and enlisted bachelor quarters. We have not validated the Long Beach data or the data in the cost comparison study. According to shipyard data, the cost to bring these facilities up to standard, however, would be only about $3.6 million. Most of this amount is to bring the administrative space up to compliance with current seismic codes. The remaining cost is for installing fire sprinkler systems in the affected buildings.

DISPOSAL OF DREDGED MATERIAL

Dredging costs may be overstated to some extent. According to the Navy study, about 2.5 million cubic yards of dredging would be required at Long Beach to deepen the berthing area and create an acceptable turning basin for NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers. The Navy, based on experience at other Naval activities in Southern California, assumed that about 702,000 cubic yards of that total would be unsuitable for off-shore disposal and that the cost of inland disposal would be about $100 per cubic yard. The normal off-shore disposal cost is $5 per cubic yard. Using these estimates, the additional cost of dredging disposal would be about $67 million. The Navy study states, however, that this cost may not have to be incurred if the unsuitable material could be safely used in nearby projects.

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We discussed the reasonableness of the Navy's disposal cost figures with officials from the Long Beach Port Authority and the Army Corps of Engineers. They told us that it would be highly unusual for unsuitable dredge material to be disposed of inland. They stated that, when they faced similar situations, they made every effort to dispose of such material in nearby contained fill areas. Such fill areas are often available due to periodic dredging and fill projects by the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles.

INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY

The study states that a new 6,000 square feet valve repair facility would have to be constructed to support any aircraft carriers homeported in Long Beach. This is because of the closure of a shore intermediate maintenance activity as part of the closure of the Long Beach Naval Station. Total cost of the facility is estimated at about $7.4 million. The North Island option does not incur this cost, it has such a facility on a barge that is moored adjacent to the ships.

Under the three carrier option for Long Beach, there appears to be no need for the valve repair facility at North Island. It seems reasonable that the barge could be moved to Long Beach and, therefore, no costs for such a facility would have to be incurred.

OTHER COST ISSUES

The Navy's desire to do as much maintenance as possible in the homeport has led to a proposal to establish new depot maintenance capacity at the North Island in San Diego, while drawing down excess capacity in shipyards.

Data we obtained showed that the Navy is planning three military construction projects valued at about $112 million over a 3-year period starting in fiscal year 1996. These projects involve constructing and equipping depot maintenance facilities for the repair and maintenance of nuclear and non-nuclear propulsion plant systems and components. The Navy projects to accomplish the maintenance work with up to 900 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard workers on temporary duty. The Navy is also studying the feasibility of placing similar facilities at other nuclear carrier homeports in Mayport, Florida, and Everett, Washington.

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HOMEPORTING IN SAN DIEGO VERSUS LONG BEACH

We asked the Navy to provide us with the pros and cons of homeporting in San Diego versus Long Beach. The information provided is summarized below.

ADVANTAGES OF SAN DIEGO

The Navy sees three major advantages of homeporting carriers at the North Island Naval Air Station: the existence of San Diego as a "megaport," maintenance advantages, and quality of life considerations. Regarding the first, the Navy cites the significant infrastructure at San Diego that provides (1) ready access to a nearby fleet training center; (2) cross-training opportunities for sailors while in North Island; and (3) coordinated, centralized logistics support. In addition, the Navy said that North Island is a proven homeport for Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers; has an operational airfield that can support air wing logistics and aircraft on- and offloadings; contains an extensive and efficient transportation network; and is adjacent to the southern California training area.

Regarding the maintenance advantage, the Navy believes the San Diego area offers great opportunities for implementation of its proposed regional maintenance initiative. The proposed depot maintenance facility for nuclear carriers' propulsion systems and components will be ready to service the U.S.S. Stennis when it arrives in 1998; and extensive ship and aircraft intermediate maintenance capability is available at North Island.

Finally, the Navy believes that the quality of life for the sailors is excellent in the San Diego area because of its extensive infrastructure--hospitals, commissaries, exchanges, recreational facilities, and family service centers. Also, the Navy believes there is plenty of affordable housing in good neighborhoods.

DISADVANTAGES OF SAN DIEGO

The Navy recognized two disadvantages of homeporting at San Diego. First, it noted that ships would need to be homeported at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, located about 1,300 miles away, for about 10.5 months every 6 years for maintenance that requires a drydock. This would have an adverse impact on the quality-of-life of the sailors, since they would be unable to return very often to San Diego. Second, although the Navy states that the San Diego area offers affordable housing in good areas, it also states that there is a long waiting list for government-furnished housing.

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ADVANTAGES OF LONG BEACH

The Navy states that it would have easy access to the open ocean from Long Beach. Also, Long Beach has an existing industrial infrastructure that can support Nimitz-class carrier maintenance. Furthermore, the Navy states that carriers could be drydocked at Long Beach, which would eliminate the need for a homeport change every 6 years as would be the case if the carriers were homeported at North Island. Using available Navy budget data, we determined that the Navy could save $20 million in permanent change of station costs for each carrier drydocking.

DISADVANTAGES OF LONG BEACH

The Navy pointed out three problems to homeporting the carriers at Long Beach. First, several prior Base Closure and Realignment Commission decisions would have to be reversed, and some or all of the cost savings associated with these decisions would not be realized. These cost savings are significant. For example, projected annual cost savings amounting to about $266 million could be lost if the proposed and prior Commission actions involving Long Beach are not implemented. In addition, revising these decisions would create excess carrier berthing capacity that would be difficult to support in an era of reduced defense budgets.

Second, the Navy believes that the dredging work and radiological maintenance facilities needed to support carrier homeporting would not be ready in time to support the U.S.S. Stennis if it arrives as scheduled in 1998, necessitating temporary homeporting elsewhere. The Navy states that Long Beach does not provide easy access to training facilities.

Third, the Navy does not believe a shipyard industrial environment is a desirable atmosphere for homeporting a ship and its crew because of noise, dirt, poor air quality, and traffic congestion. One quality-of-life factor cited by the Navy for Long Beach was not consistent with other data we obtained. To illustrate, the Navy states that it costs more for housing in Long Beach than in San Diego. However, according to a national cost-of-living index, housing costs in Long Beach are 48 percent above the national average, and in San Diego they are 71 percent above the national average.

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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

You also asked our view on whether the Navy's draft Environmental Impact Statement is in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Under this act, the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must address the foreseeable environmental impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the Navy's actions. The Navy's draft EIS, which is subject to future modifications, addresses the impact caused by the relocation of one nuclear carrier (CVN) to North Island and the cumulative impact of homeporting two additional carriers at that same location. As to the two additional carriers, the draft EIS notes that "if the Navy makes a proposal to homeport CVNs at North Island (Naval Air Station), the appropriate NEPA analysis will be prepared. Modification to existing facilities and infrastructure would be needed to accommodate the additional two CVNs."

This statement suggests a "tiering" of EISs regarding the stationing of additional carriers at North Island. Tiering is encouraged by the Council on Environmental Quality regulation 40 C.F.R. 1502.20 and is authorized by OPNAVINST 5090.1B. for Navy use in situations involving "the planning for the use of long-term staged construction for the establishment of a new installation to homeport and operate a class of vessels with a subsequent tiered analysis as each stage is programmed and proposed...."

In summary, because the draft EIS does address the cumulative impact of homeporting two additional carriers at North Island, there seems to be no basis for concluding that the NEPA impact statement requirement is not being properly addressed.

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NEED FOR LARGE DRYDOCK IN SAN DIEGO

According to the official position of the Navy, it does not need to construct a nuclear carrier-capable drydock at San Diego. Further, the Navy did not need to construct one in the past and will not need to in the foreseeable future. Navy officials state that the planned carrier maintenance periods that require drydocking will be conducted at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

In early 1994, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet received an unsolicited proposal from Pacific Shipbuilding and the San Diego Chamber of Commerce Proactive Stance Committee officials to build carrier-capable drydock at the North Island Naval Air Station. The proposal indicated that private sector sources would provide the upfront financing for the project and that the government would be expected to lease back the facility.

Although fleet officials believed at that time that a carrier-capable drydock would be desirable and possibly even essential if Long Beach closed and drydock 1 were no longer available, they were concerned about the cost of the proposed drydock. They questioned whether the Navy could pay the estimated $25 million to $50 million annual cost of the proposed lease-back arrangement. We have not yet determined the ultimate disposition of the proposal.

The Commander of the Pacific Fleet also studied the possibility of moving a floating drydock, capable of handling big-deck amphibious ships, from Pearl Harbor to San Diego. The reason for the study was the fleet's concern about the possible closure of the Long Beach Shipyard and its large drydock. The cost to move the drydock (called the Machinist), renovate it, and install it in San Diego was estimated at over $60 million. The Fleet decided not to proceed with the project because of this cost and instead, to rely on available private and public sector facilities to drydock these ships.

(709126)

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April 27, 1991

From: SOS
To: ALCON

Subj: REPORT WRITTEN BY PUGET SOUND NSY, AS TO CONDITION OF DRYDOCK No. 1, PIER 2 EAST SIDE, PIER 6, AND PIER E, TO FACILITATE BERTHING OF THREE CVNs AT NSY LONG BEACH

Encl: (1) Questions posed by CNO to be answered by subject report.

(2) PSNS eleven-page report on Structural, Mechanical, and Electrical.

(3) Point-of-Contact signature sheet

1. Drydock No. 1 needs only $43,500 in maintenance (Report indicates $63,500, but sub-totals add to only $43,500). $43,500 is just .0087 percent of the half-billion dollar value of Drydock No. 1, and is all that is required to make it absolutely perfect.

2. Pier 2 requires only $30,000 in minor maintenance.

3. Pier 6 will require a $230,000 expenditure in wood fender maintenance.

4. Pier E requires only $24,000 in fender pile maintenance for both South berths 123 and 124, and West berths 125, 126, and 127.

5. The estimate of train rail installation for $500,000 is due to a questionable Navy requirement that train rails within Naval shipyards carrying nuclear waste must be welded, rather than butted, to eliminate electro-magnetic sparking. The fault with this argument is that no train rails outside a Naval shipyard are welded. Thus, the train will be traveling 99.9+ percent of its trip on butted rails.

6. Wherever a question posed in Encl. (1) is not answered in Encl. (2) report, it is because the requirements have already been met at Long Beach NSY.

7. Encl. (3) contains the personal signatures and business telephone numbers of the three men who conducted the inspection for CNO and wrote the Encl. (2) report. Should a Congressional hearing ever be held, perhaps these men might be considered for subpoena. Their verbal comments were extremely positive regarding Long Beach NSY, but they may have been apprehensive about documenting their enthusiasm.

ENCL. 1

To	From PHIL SPILSER
Cc	Co. PSNS c/9924
Dept	Phone# (206) 476-8393
Fax # (310)	Fax# (206) 476-0477

13 FEB 1995

INFORMATION NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE LBNSY/NASNI COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS

1. Security- Need cost for upgrade/new fencing, turnstiles to bring new CIA boundary on line. Also need annual cost for any new billets required to support the LBNSY CIA. Proposed security boundary can be obtained from Code 3910N. Proposed LBNSY CIA boundary FAXed to NAVSEA 08 on 13 Feb.

ACTION: Code 3910N.3 (PSNS) Identify, SWDIV Cost Estimate

2. BOS Equipment- Need cost of all BOS equipment needed to berth 3 CVNs at LBNSY. This includes camels, shore power cables, brows, beach balls, CHT lines, air lines, etc.

ACTION: Code 340(PSNS) Identify, Code 248 Cost Estimate

3. Pier 2E Upgrade- Need cost to make any necessary structural upgrades to Pier 2 to allow it to take a CVN.

ACTION: Code 992 (PSNS) Identify, SWDIV Cost Estimate

4. Drydock 1 Upgrade- Need cost to make Drydock 1 a "legitimate" CVN drydock. Previous (1991) study provided some costs necessary to make Drydock 1 acceptable for "emergency use" drydock.

ACTION: Code 992 (PSNS) Identify, SWDIV Cost Estimate

5. Rubber tired stock- Need cost for additional forklifts, trucks, etc., needed at LBNSY to support CVN propulsion plant maintenance. List of MHE from LBNSY

ACTION: Code 952 (PSNS) Identify & Cost Estimate

6. Cranes- Need cost of additional cranes needed at LBNSY to support CVN propulsion plant maintenance. Sell & Potts

ACTION: Code 980 (PSNS) Identify & Cost Estimate with input from LBNSY.

7. Crane Tracks- Need cost to install crane tracks along Pier E ,southern face. PSNS Team to evaluate during visit.

ACTION: Code 992 (PSNS) Identify & Cost Estimate

8. Railroad tracks- Need cost to upgrade or install train tracks to Pier E. Use Pier E South for terminus. PSNS Team to evaluate during LBNSY visit.

ACTION: Code 992 (PSNS) Identify & Cost Estimate

9 LBNSY Drydock 1 Annual Maintenance Cost - Need annual cost to maintain Drydock 1 as a certified drydock. Also need current LBNSY Drydock 1 maintenance cost to determine additional funds for drydock maintenance. Provide annual maintenance cost of PSNS Drydock 6 for comparison.

ACTION: Code 953 (PSNS) Identify & Cost Estimate with input from LBNSY

Berths Pier 6E Primary HP Pier E, S Prim Maint
Pier 2E Sec " Pier 2E Sec "

ENCL. 2
1 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT FY 95 #1 (3-88)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-003 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

K

☐ DBIS ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. M/C	7. DATE	8. MOB. INSPECTION BR.	
						SCHED: JAN95	INT. IAL	DATE
DD #1					A	ACCT. 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

DRY DOCK #1 AT LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	16	1 OF 4

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

GENERAL COMMENTS

Dry Dock #1 at Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California was inspected on 14 to 16 February 1995. The structural condition of this drydock is satisfactory. This inspection included the adjacent streets and crane tracks.

TOP SIDE

The top side of Dry Dock #1 including the adjacent street is in satisfactory structural condition. The following deficiencies were noted:

(1) The stanchions and chain that make the safety rail need upgrading. The chain should be replaced with shackles. Two stanchion sockets need to be broken out and set in new concrete. — $8,000

(2) Various spalling and concrete cracking around the top and outer side at the north end of Dry Dock #1 need repair and epoxy injecting. A lot of epoxy injection work was completed in the past year that appears to be a very effective repair. The cracks and spalls do not indicate any displacement or movement of concrete.

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▶ 11

To	From TERRY SONNABEND
Dept./Agency	Phone # (360) 476-8389
	Fax # (360) 476-0477

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

ENCL. 2
2 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT PW OP 31 (9.88)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-008 3402

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. 1

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☐ DBIS ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. PAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. SAC	7. DATE	8. MOB. INSPECTION DR.	
						SCHED. JAN95	INITIAL	DATE
DD #1					A	ACCT. 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

DRY DOCK #1 AT LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	16	2 OF 4

SAFETY STANCHION SOCKET EAST SIDE DRY DOCK 1, LONG BEACH, CA.



SPALLED AREA AT NORTH EAST CORNER DRY DOCK 1, LONG BEACH SHIPYARD. SPALL IS ABOUT 3' WIDE BY 7' HIGH, 6" DEEP

SPALL ON NORTHEAST STEPS DRY DOCK 1, LONG BEACH SHIPYARD

ENCL. 2
3 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT PW OP #1 (3-88)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-003 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

☐ DEBI ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. PAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. PUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR. INITIAL	DATE
DD #1					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT: 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

DRY DOCK #1 AT LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	16	3 OF 4

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

	MOORING FITTINGS	
	The bollards, cleats and capstans were inspected and found to be in satisfactory structural condition. Some minor cracks in the concrete around some cleats and bollard bases are included in deficiency (2) for repair by epoxy injection. No other deficiencies were noted.	
	SIDES AND ALTERS	
	The sides and alters of this drydock are in satisfactory condition. The following deficiencies were noted:	
	(3) About 20 to 30 minor spalls exist in the walls along the alters.	$20,000
	FLOOR	
	The floor of this drydock is in satisfactory condition.	$10,000
	(4) About 10 of the concrete structures for the drainage doors and the 6 inch berms at the bottom of the doors are spalled.	
	CAISSON 1	
	Caisson 1 was inspected while seated in the outer seat; port side in. The gasket and seals were not inspected, but the port side sealed showed no sign of leaking at the seat. Caisson 1 is in satisfactory structural condition. The following deficiencies were noted:	

ENCL. 2
4 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT PW OP #1 (3-83)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-003 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. 1

☐ DEIS ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR. INITIAL	DATE
DD #1					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT. 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

DRY DOCK #1 AT LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	16	4 OF 4

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

	(5) Three porthole glass are broken.	$1,000
	(6) The top nonskid coating is in need of spot replacement.	
	(7) Some small areas in the operator space need paint touch up.	$500
	(8) The zincs on the port side are gone and should be replaced when the caisson is seated starboard side in next.	$4,000
	ROUGH ESTIMATE	
	The total structural repairs for Dry Dock #1 is $63,500.	

ENCL. 2
5 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT (W OF #1 (3-68))
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-003 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. 1

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. LMC	7. DATE	8. M/R INSPECTION NR.	
							INITIAL	DATE
PIER 2					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT. 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER 2 EAST SIDE, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	1 OF 2

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

GENERAL COMMENTS

Pier 2 east side was inspected and found to be in satisfactory structural condition. It has the utilities on top of the deck with a walkway over them. The mooring fittings are installed on top of the walkway with a concrete base extending to the bent below.

MOORING SIDES

The mooring sides are in satisfactory condition. Many of the wood fender piles have been replaced with steel "I" beam piles.

(1) About 10 wood fender piles are broken. — $30,000

MOORING FITTINGS

All mooring fittings are in satisfactory condition. No deficiencies were noted.

TOP SIDE

The top side of Pier 2 is in satisfactory condition. No deficiencies were noted.

ROUGH ESTIMATE

Fender piles — $30,000

ENCL. 2
6 OF 11

INSPECTOR'S REPORT
NAVFAC 1101A/30 (REV. 9-72)
S/N 0106-LF-003-7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

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1. FACILITY NO.	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. F.A.C.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. L.M.C.	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR.	
PIER 2 LONGBEACH NSY						SCHED. ____ ACT. 16 FEB 95	INITIAL	DATE

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION
PIER 2 EAST SIDE, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
T S STRUCTURAL	8	2 OF 2

PIER 2 LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD, SOUTHEAST CORNER OF PIER

EAST SIDE PIER 2 LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

2E LOOKING NORTH

PIER 2 EAST TYPICAL

ENCL. 2
7 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT FW OF 21 (3-68)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-083 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

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☐ DEIS ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MOB. INSPECTION DR. INITIAL	DATE
PIER 6					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER 6, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	1 OF 2

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

	GENERAL COMMENTS The east side of Pier 6 was inspected from the top side and from a boat. The structural condition of Pier 6 is satisfactory. This pier has 30 gauge crane tracks and standard train tracks full length. The top deck is a deck built above the original deck due to the area sinking during heavy oil pumping in the 1930's and 1940's. The utilities have been installed on the top side with a walkway over them.	
	MOORING SIDES The mooring sides are in satisfactory structural condition.	
	(1) A section of about 20 wood fender piles, with chock blocks and wale timbers has been damaged.	$200,000
	(2) About 10 additional wood fender piles are damaged.	$30,000
	MOORING FITTINGS The mooring fittings are fastened in large concrete bases set over the bents. The fittings and bases are in satisfactory condition. No deficiencies were noted.	
	TOP SIDE The top side is in satisfactory condition. No deficiencies were noted.	

ENCL. 2

8 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT FW OF #1 (3-80)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-083 7802

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. LMC	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR. INITIAL	DATE
PIER 6					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT. 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER 6, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	2 OF 2

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

ROUGH ESTIMATE

Mooring side repairs $230,000

PIER 6 EAST SIDE, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

PIER 6 EAST SIDE, LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

ENCL. 2
9 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT PW OF #1 (3-68)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LP-013 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. 1

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☐ DBIS ☒ CONTROL INSPECTION

1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR. INITIAL	DATE
PIER "E"					A	SCHED: JAN95 ACCT 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	1 OF 3

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

GENERAL COMMENTS

Pier "E" is a landfill type with sheet piling. The west side has concrete support and batter piles; the south side has a cantilever deck with an elevated utility duct inside the mooring side. The ships are moored to double steel piles with a one inch fender plate supporting a rolling rubber camel.

The structural condition of this pier is satisfactory.

MOORING SIDES

The mooring sides are in satisfactory structural condition.
(1) About eight wood fender piles need replaced. $24,000

MOORING FITTINGS

The mooring fittings are in satisfactory condition. No deficiencies were noted.

TOP SIDE

The top side of this pier is in satisfactory structural condition. It has no train track and it would be very difficult to install one through the shipyard due to extreme elevation differences. However, train rail to serve this pier could be installed by extending a port of Long Beach train rail to the north of the east side of Pier "E". This improvement is estimated at $500,000. No other deficiencies were noted.

ENCL. 2
10 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT PW or n (3-80)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-083 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. FAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ACCT. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MOR. INSPECTION BR.	
						SCHED: JAN95	INITIAL	DATE
PIER "E"					A	ACCT 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	2 OF 3



PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD - TYPICAL FENDERING OF MOORING SIDES

PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD - FENDERING SOUTH SIDE

TOP SIDE, SOUTH, PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD - SHEET PILING, SOUTH SIDE

ENCL. 2

11 OF 11

INSPECTORS REPORT FW OF #1 (3-60)
NAVFAC 11014/38 (REV.9-72)
S/N 0105-LF-003 7002

Instructions for completing form are contained in NAVFAC MO-322, Vol. I

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1. FACILITY NO	2. COST ACCOUNT NO.	3. PAC.	4. CATEGORY CODE	5. FUNCT. ASST. NO.	6. MC	7. DATE	8. MGR. INSPECTION BR.	
						SCHED: JAN95	INITIAL	DATE
PIER "E"					A	ACCT 16 FEB 95		

9. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION

PIER "E" LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD

10. INSPECTOR	11. INSPECTION TIME USED	12. SHEET NO.
TS STRUCTURAL	8	3 OF 3

13. DESCRIPTION OF ITEM AND DEFICIENCY

ROUGH ESTIMATE

Fender pile repairs	$ 24,000
Train rail installation	$500,000
TOTAL	$524,000

GLENN CARDEN C/992.6 FACILITIES & MAINTENANCE
(206) 476-8385

ENCL. 3

JOHN HOLDERBACH
206-476 8388

TERRY SONNASEND
(360) 476-8389

C/992.6TS
PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD
BREMERTON, WA 98314

Document Separator

CCIG "Power study"

DRAFT

10/5/94

I INTRODUCTION

The NAVY is currently planning to homeport NIMITZ class carriers at NAS North Island. In conjunction with this homeporting plan, depot level maintenance also needs to be accomplished as envisioned by the Incremental Maintenance Plan (IMP). The IMP requires that non-docking availabilities for approximately 6 month durations be accomplished once every two years for two cycles, followed by a docking availability of 12 months. The concept to this point has been to perform the non-docking availability work for the carriers homeported at NAS North Island at the depot maintenance facilities being considered for the North Island site. As a result of inquiries from budget personnel from the Office of Secretary of Defense, a order of magnitude review was performed to determine the cost to establish the necessary facilities at Long Beach Naval Shipyard to perform this carrier maintenance work.

SCOPE: An "order of magnitude" cost estimate is being provided for several scenarios. These scenarios are:

1. Berthing capabilities for two CVNs. One carrier would be berthed at Pier E - west and one carrier berthed at Pier E - South. No drydock 1 upgrades are considered in this scenerio. (Backup for overlap, overlap not expected to occur routinely)
2. Berthing capabilities for two CVNs at the same pier locations of scenario 1 plus drydock 1 upgrades.

ASSUMPTIONS

II DREDGING

Some dredging at the Shipyard will be required to support the moorage of carriers. The water depth (based on a MLLW datum) is as follows for each of the potential berths:

Pier E West	45 feet
Pier E South	43 feet
Pier 2 West	38 to 48 feet
Pier 2 East	42 to 48 feet

SUPERSEDED

Pier E west is the most likely CVN berth. Dredging to 50 feet is recommended for the berthing basin. This equates to approximately 40,000 cubic yards.

The turning basin depth averages about 45 feet MLLW. The harbor channel depth is maintained at 60 feet and serves commercial shipping access as well as Navy access.

The Port of Los Angeles is constructing a major port expansion approximately 4 miles west of Long Beach Naval Shipyard. An extensive dredging and fill project has just been

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NIMITZ CLASS MAINTENANCE

LBNSY COST ESTIMATE - MAJOR ITEMS

(Scenario 1 - no upgrade of Drydock 1)

2 ships max

2 CVNS - Overlapping PIAs

PIERS - UPGRADE (utilizing only 2 faces of Pier E quaywall)

Structural	$
Steam	$
Electrical	$
4160V	$ 6M (2 @ $3M)
Indus	$
Comp Air	$
Fresh water	$
Telephones	$ 84K
Salt Water	$ 280K
Oxygen	$
Pure Water	$ 515K
CHT	$
Fire Alarm	$
DI Water	$
Total	$ 6.879M

NEW SYSTEMS

Pure Water Generation Plant	$ 500K
Pump /Valve Test Facility	$ 250K(bring systems back up)

BUILDINGS -UPGRADE

Building #303	$ 3M (demolition/upgrade)
Building add ECC	$ 300K

BUILDINGS - NEW

P-701 Equivalent (include eqpt)	$54 M
P-702 Equivalent	$ 0
P-703 Equivalent (main bldg)	$ 0
Mixed Waste	$ 234K
RLW Tank Storage	$ 575K
Security	$ 156K

ROADS/PARKING

New egress - ingress	$ 0
New parking	$ 0
Revised parking	$ 0

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10/5/94

CRANES

Upgrade # PC-15 $ 250K

CRANE TRACKS

New tracks $ 0
Modifications $ 0

ENVIRONMENTAL

Oily Waste Water $ 0 (existing)
Industrial Waste Water $ 0 (existing)

EIS PREPARATION

Cost to get EIS to where it is now for NASNI $ 672K

DREDGING

Dredge Pier E (West) 45000 cubic yards $ 675K

Dredge Pier E (South) 55000 cubic yards $ 825K

Dredge Turning Basin 680000 cubic yards $ 10.2M

Disposal of (x) cubic yards of dredge spoils $ included in above

GENERAL UTILITIES UPGRADE

Electrical Substation(Navy 1) $ 1M
Compressed Air $
Steam (Plant upgrade) $ 1M
Telephones $
Sanitary Sewer $
CHT $
Fire Alarm $
DI Water $

OTHER

RA/TA Facilities at NASNI $1.3

GRAND TOTAL FOR SCENARIO 1: $ 81.816M

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10/5/94

NIMITZ CLASS MAINTENANCE

LBNSY COST ESTIMATE - MAJOR ITEMS

(Scenario 2 - includes upgrade of Drydock 1)

2 CVNS - Overlapping PIAs

PIERS - UPGRADE (utilizing only 2 faces of Pier E quaywall)

Structural	$
Steam	$
Electrical	$
4160V	$ 6M (2 @ $3M)
Indus	$
Comp Air	$
Fresh water	$
Telephones	$ 84K
Salt Water	$ 280K
Oxygen	$
Pure Water	$ 515K
CHT	$
Fire Alarm	$
DI Water	$
Total	$ 6.879M

NEW SYSTEMS

Pure Water Generation Plant	$ 500K
Pump /Valve Test Facility	$ 250K(bring systems back up)

BUILDINGS -UPGRADE

Building #303	$ 3M (demolition/upgrade)
Building ECC	$ 300K
Building #	$

BUILDINGS - NEW

P-701 Equivalent (include eqpt)	$54 M
P-702 Equivalent	$ 0
P-703 Equivalent (main bldg)	$ 0
Mixed Waste	$ 234K
RLW Tank Storage	$ 575K
Security	$ 156K

ROADS/PARKING

New egress - ingress	$ 0
New parking	$ 0

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10/5/94

Revised parking $ 0

CRANES

Upgrade # PC-15 $ 250K
Upgrade # $ 0
Upgrade # $ 0

CRANE TRACKS

New tracks $ 0
Modifications $ 0

ENVIRONMENTAL

Oily Waste Water $ 0
Hazardous Waste Water $ 0

EIS PREPARATION

Cost to get EIS to where it is now for NASNI $ 672K

DREDGING

Dredge Pier E (West) 45000 cubic yards $ 675K

Dredge Pier E (South) 55000 cubic yards $ 825K

Dredge Turning Basin 680000 cubic yards $ 10.2M

Disposal of (x) cubic yards of dredge spoils $ included in above

GENERAL UTILITIES UPGRADE

Electrical Substation(Navy 1) $ 1M
Compressed Air $
Steam (Plant upgrade) $ 1M
Telephones $
Sanitary Sewer $

UPGRADE DRYDOCK 1

Structural $
Steam $
Electrical $
4160V $ 3M
Indus $
Comp Air $
Fresh water $

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10/5/94

Telephones	$ 75K
Salt Water	$
Oxygen	$
Pure Water	$ 300K
CHT	$
Fire Alarm	$
DI Water	$
Total for DD 1	$ 3.375M

OTHER

RA/TA Facilities at NASNI $1.3

GRAND TOTAL FOR SCENARIO 2: $ 85.191M

DRAFT 10/5/94

UTILITIES SUMMARY

ELECTRICAL

REQUIREMENTS:

Electrical ship service requirements for a CVN are 18MVA, 4160V with redundant power sources, assuming use of ship's EDG as backup. Double ended or loop fed substations are preferred.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

LBNS receives commercial power from Southern California Edison (SCE) at 66KV. Two independent lines from SCE feed LBNS at Navy Substation 1 and at Commodore substation. SCE has a standby power plant on Terminal Island in the event of power grid failure. LBNS has experienced no power outages of any significance. Power at both subs is transformed to 12KV by a 28MVA transformer owned by SCE. 28MVA at each substation is not adequate to support the power requirements of two CVNs. A third 28 MVA transformer is available from a substation located on the Mole. 12KV is then distributed to various substations.

At drydock 1, two transformer pads are installed on the west side to supply 4160V power for an emergency CVN docking. 12KV power is provided from Substation 2. It is intended to use two 5MVA MUSE transformers should the need arise. The location ~~is~~ of these transformer sites is on the port side of the docked CVN, requiring portable cables to be run across the hangar bay to the ship's starboard side shore power connections. LBNS has sufficient portable 5KV cables to accomplish. The total 10MVA provided by the MUSE transformers does not meet the requirements for shore power capacity. The substation 12KV feeder is not double ended or loop fed.

RECOMMENDATION:

Upgrade Navy Substation 1 by relocating the 28MVA transformer from the substation on the Mole. Provide additional 12KV switchgear including bus tie and feeder breakers.

Install a double ended 20MVA, 4160V portable substation at each of the carrier berthing sites.

DRAFT 10/5/94

SALTWATER

REQUIREMENTS:

A maximum 4900 gpm at 150 psig with backup of 2200 gpm at 140 psig available in 10-13 seconds.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

LBNSY is presently replacing all salt water pumps with 2000 gpm electric drive pumps. A backup diesel generator is installed at each salt water pit to be on line within the required 10-13 seconds after loss of power. Pumps will restart automatically. New pumps will provide the required 150 psig.

Drydock 1 distribution piping is adequate and will deliver 8000 gpm.

Pier E west distribution piping is adequate and will deliver 8000 gpm.

Pier E south has no salt water piping installed.

The system does have a fire boat connection. No barge mounted fire pump is available. Port of Long Beach has fire boats available.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Extend the existing Pier E west salt water line along the south end of the pier using a 12" line. Approximately 1500 feet.

TELEPHONES.

REQUIRED:

A CVN requires 100 telephone lines.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

Each of the berthing locations at Drydock 1, Pier E west, and Pier E south have 50 telephones available.

RECOMMENDATION:

Install an additional 50 telephones lines at each of the berthing locations at Drydock 1, Pier E west, and Pier E south.

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PURE/DEMINERALIZED WATER

REQUIRED:

10,000 gpd.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

The boiler plant has an installed demineralizer plant owned and operated by contractor. Contract guaranteed capacity is 300 gpm. Present production rate is 100 gpm. Storage capacity is 200,000 gallons. No pure water production equipment is installed. No pure water distribution piping is installed. Demineralized water production capabilities are more than adequate to provide requirements for pure water if equipment is installed.

RECOMMENDATION:

Install a pure water production facility at the at the boiler plant utilizing the existing demineralizer facility as a water source.

Install a pure water distribution system to each of the berthing locations at Drydock 1, Pier E west, and Pier E south.

COMPRESSED AIR

REQUIRED:

2400 SCFM at 125 psig.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

Eight air compressors on the system, all new installed in '86-'87. Five of the compressors are in the vicinity of Drydock 1 and Pier E. The compressors are fed from different power sources. The compressors have CO monitors and are oil-free, good for breathing air.

Drydock 1 has 6000 SCFM at 105 psig at the outlets.

Pier E has 6000 SCFM at 105 psig at the outlets.

The compressed air system is adequate.

RECOMMENDATION:

None

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STEAM

REQUIRED:

50,000 lbm/hr maximum. 21,000 lbm/hr typical

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

Steam system is 200 psi. Three 68,000 lbm/hr gas fired boilers produce the steam. Peak load has been 138,000 lbm/hr. This value is expected to decrease with the base downsizing. Considering only two of the three boilers available and the peak load, boiler capacity is not sufficient.

Backup fuel is fuel oil. Seven days backup capacity is required. LBNS has the seven day storage.

Drydock 1 has 37,500 lbm/hr at 150 psig capacity. Based on CVN68 load of approximately 15,000 lbm/hr at PSNS, this is adequate.

Pier E has 90,000 lbm/hr at 150 psig capacity. This is adequate.

RECOMMENDATION:

Install a fourth 68,000 lbm/hr boiler at the existing boiler plant. Will require extending the existing building.

OXYGEN

REQUIREMENT:

No fixed requirement, production support only.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

A distribution system is in place at Drydock 1 and Pier E with two leased tanks. Capacity of tanks is more than adequate to support production.

Drydock 1 capacity is 200 SCFM at 100 psig.

Pier E capacity is 200 SCFM at 100 psig.

RECOMMENDATION:

None

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OILY WASTE WATER COLLECTION/PROCESSING

REQUIRED:

Collection and processing is required.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

An oily waste processing facility is installed and will process 150 gpm. Located at head of Pier 1 and 2. Collection is by barge if ship is waterborne or to Baker tank and tanker truck if drydocked. Barge or tanks must be transported to processing facility. No hard pipe system is installed. Capacity of processing facility is adequate.

RECOMMENDATION:

Install double walled oily waste water piping from Drydock 1 to the processing facility. Continue use of barges for waterborne ships.

SANITARY SEWER

REQUIRED:

Two 4" hose connections at each berthing location.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

The sanitary sewer system consists of gravity and pressure sewer with lift stations throughout the base. All lift stations were recently rebuilt. Contract with City of Los Angeles guarantees a capacity of 1.6 million gallons per day. Actual load is 620,000 GPD which is expected to decrease with base downsizing. Total sewage capacity is adequate.

Drydock 1 capacity is 1200 gpm.

Pier E capacity is 2500 gpm.

FUEL OIL

REQUIRED:

Not required.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

LBNS Mole has a fueling pier and tank farm. Fuel is transported to the shipyard using barges. Barge capacity is adequate. No distribution exists in the shipyard.

RECOMMENDATION:

None

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FRESH WATER

REQUIRED:

80,000 gpd 40-80 psig. Three day on-site storage capacity is required for emergency use.

EXISTING CONDITIONS:

Two sources of water from City of Long Beach and City of Los Angeles. Two storage tanks with total capacity of 750,000 gallons.

Drydock 1 capacity is 850 gpm at 45 psig.

Pier E capacity is 3000 gpm at 45 psig.

Booster pumps can raise pressure to 100 psig.

Fresh water capacity is adequate. Storage capacity does not meet three day requirement. This may be waiverable by NAVSEA.

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I INTRODUCTION

SCOPE
ASSUMPTIONS

II DREDGING

Dredging at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard will be required for berthing a nuclear carrier. Nuclear carriers have routinely visited the Shipyard and berthed at Pier E, which has a depth of water of about 45 feet at MLLW. However, the standard for acceptable long term carrier berthing is 50 feet at MLLW.

The channel into the Long Beach harbor is shared with commercial shipping and is dredged to 60 feet. A channel turning basin for the commercial ships extends into the harbor due south of Pier E, and is dredged to approximately 58 feet.

The existing aircraft carrier turning basin south and west of Pier E is dredged to about 45 feet. The need for dredging this basin to 50 feet is predicated on the carrier berthing mission. If the carrier is arriving / departing Long Beach Naval Shipyard for maintenance, the ship is without air wing, JP5, armament and other operational support and is in a low draft condition. Further dredging of the basin may not be required. If the ship is in a homeport condition similar to that of North Island, dredging of the turning basin to 50 feet may be required.

The turning basin requirement, as developed for North Island, is a length of twice a carrier length, or 2184 feet. A total of 680,000 cubic yards of dredging would be required to develop this turning basin to the south and west of Pier E.

The depth of water at Pier E west is 45 feet MLLW. The depth of water at Pier E south ranges from 43 feet to 55 feet. Approximately 45,000 cubic yards of dredging will be required to develop a 50 foot deep berth at Pier E west and approximately 55,000 will be required to develop a similar berth at Pier E south. These quantities could be reduced somewhat if dredging is limited to only the area under the carrier's sea chest basin.

The dredging costs are difficult to determine. An awarded FY 94 dredging effort at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard involving 105,000 cubic yards, half of which requires disposal in an upland sanitary landfill, is costing $50 per cubic yard (note: All costs referenced here refer to contract costs without SIOH and contingency factors). The North Island FY 9?? dredging projects involving a total of 1,897,000 cubic yards, a small amount of which is contaminated, is costing $11 per cubic yard, including special mitigation and near shore disposal costs.

The Port of Los Angeles is constructing a major port expansion approximately 2 miles west of Long Beach Naval Shipyard. An extensive dredging and fill project has just been

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awarded which allows for economical in water disposal by constructing land areas. The potential for economical disposal of dredged material at this location exists if dredging were accomplished in the near future. Even if dredging were accomplished within the next 5 years, the possibility for disposal at this land buildup area exists. Under this type scenario, the cost would be similar to the North Island costs; ie, about $11 per cubic yard.

For the purposes of this study, assume a cost of $15 per cubic yard for dredging, which includes escalation, contingency and SIOH. Therefore, dredging costs are as follows:

Pier E West	$ 675,000
Pier E South	825,000
Turning Basin	10,200,000

III BERTHING/PIERS

IV DRY DOCK
UTILITIES / CRANES / WORK LIMITATIONS

V WORK FACILITIES / BUILDING
CIF / RAD FACILITIES
NON RAD FACILITIES
SECURITY

VI ENVIRONMENTAL
IR SITES
HW / MW
AIR PERMITTING

VII SEISMIC

Two major fault lines are located within the vicinity of the Long Beach Naval Complex as shown on enclosure (?). The closest fault is the Newport - Inglewood Fault that extends from Newport Beach on the southeast to the base of the Santa Monica Mountains on the northwest, passing approximately four miles to the northeast of Long Beach. The San Andreas Fault lies 54 miles to the northeast of Long Beach.

Seismic facility design criteria utilized by the Port of Long Beach are based on a Richter magnitude of 6.5 to 7.0 on the order of 0.32g with bedrock accelerations of 0.45g.

The hydraulic fill used to construct the Terminal Island Complex (Long Beach Complex) may tend to liquefy under seismic activity; however, most structures are built on pile foundations which extend beneath the hydraulic fill.