

DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 600
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
(703) 699-2950

Memorandum of Conference Call with Ventura County Representatives

DATE: August 15, 2005

TIME: 3:00 pm

DISCUSSION WITH: Rep. Elton Gallegly, Ventura County
Rep. Lois Capps, Santa Barbara County
RADM Dana McKinney (Ret.)
RADM George Strohsahl (Ret.)
CAPT Jack Dodd (Ret.)
Kathy Long, Supv., Ventura County, BRAC Task Force
Co-Chair
Lynette R. Jacquez, Copeland Lowery Jacquez Denton
White

OBJECTIVE: To discuss BRAC recommendations affecting
Point Mugu

JCSG STAFF: Les Farrington
Glenn Knoephle

OTHER COMMISSION PARTICIPANTS:

David Epstein, Navy Group

MEETING RESULTS:

The telephone conversation was set up by Ventura County representatives. They wanted to provide Commission staff with updated information in support of Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC-Point Mugu). Officials discussed and provided us electronically the following 3 documents, all of which were dated August 12, 2005:

1. The Problems with DOD BRAC Recommendation Tech-9 (Maritime C4ISR)
2. The Problems with DOD BRAC Recommendation Tech-18 (Weapons & Armaments)

3. The Problems with DOD BRAC Recommendation Tech-54 (Electronic Warfare)

Overall, the community believes that DOD's Technical Joint Cross-Service Group did an extremely poor job of analyzing the missions and military value of the technical activities at NBVC. According to the community, there were gross errors in analyzing certified data in assessing the negative impact of its recommendations on the warfighter and in failing to realize past downsizing and consolidation between Point Mugu and China Lake to eliminate duplication and redundancy. They believe that a number of actions in the proposed realignment cost rather than save money.

BRAC 2005 - Ventura County Task Force

Preserving Our Bases, Homeland Security and the Economy

Co-Chairs

Kathy Long,
County Supervisor
Edward Summers,
Affinity Bank

Elected Officials

U.S. Congress
Lois Capps/Sharon Siegel
Eton Gallegly/Brian Miller
Brad Sherman/Larry Horner
Robert Lagomarsino (Ret.)

State Senator
Sheila Kuehl
Tom McClintock

California Assembly
Fran Pavley/Robin Squier
Audra Strickland/Darin Henry

County Supervisor
Judy Mikels

City Council Members

Neal Andrews, Ventura
Charlotte Craven, Camarillo
Andres Herrera, Oxnard
Keith Millhouse, Moorpark
Tony Volante, Pt. Hueneme
John Zaragoza, Oxnard

Members

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Bill Cunneen
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Marty De Los Cobos
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Bob Quinn, Jr.
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Roseanne Satterfield
Robert Scudder
Bill Simmons
George Strohsahl
Carol Taylor
Joyce Taylor
Al Vines

August 12, 2005

Mr. Anthony Principi, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202


Dear Chairman Principi,

The Department of Defense (DoD) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 report recommends realignment of several functions which will significantly impact Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). These functions include Electronic Warfare, Sea Range, Targets, Range Support Aircraft and Weapons work moving to China Lake, CA and Shipboard Command and Control moving to Pt. Loma, CA.

We believe the DoD Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) did an extremely poor job of analyzing the missions and military value of the technical activities at NBVC. There were gross errors in analyzing the certified data, in assessing the negative impact of its recommendations on the warfighter and in failing to recognize how the past 14 years of streamlining, downsizing and consolidation activities between Pt. Mugu and China Lake have eliminated all duplication and redundancy. As they stand now, a number of the actions in the proposed realignment cost, rather than save, taxpayers' money and simply do not make sense. As a result, we urge the Commission to reject the DOD recommendations.

Attached are summary results of the analysis performed by the Ventura County Task Force. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require additional information.

Sincerely,



Kathy Long
Supervisor, County of Ventura
BRAC Task Force Co - Chair



Edward Summers
Affinity Bank
BRAC Task Force Co-Chair

Cc: BRAC Commissioners

1601 Carmen Drive, Suite 215 Camarillo, California 93010
(805) 320-1328 (805) 388-9972 Fax

The Problems with DoD BRAC Recommendation Tech 9

Proposed Realignment of Maritime C4ISR RDAT&E to Naval Base Point Loma

Introduction

- DoD recommended that all Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC), Maritime Information Systems Research, Development, Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation activities be realigned to Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, San Diego, CA.

Discussion

- The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommended realigning Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Port Hueneme Division (PHD) maritime C4ISR functions to Point Loma in spite of the following facts: (1) The proposed realignment included relocating Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Interior Communications (IC) Switchboard activities, although neither of these is a Navy/Joint C4ISR system; (2) CEC and IC Switchboards are essential components on the entire Detect-Control-Engage sequence performed within integrated shipboard combat systems; (3) Combat/Weapon System Integration, a core mission of NSWC PHD, is not being realigned; (4) The proposed realignments would result in the inability of NSWC PHD to perform combat system-wide engineering, integration and support; and (5) As a result of the proposed realignment, Navy ships would deploy with degraded combat systems and our warfighters would be placed in harm's way.
- The TJCSG processes were significantly flawed. As corroborated by inside sources, the TJCSG: (1) Went into their deliberations with preconceived solutions and worked the process backwards; (2) Used faulty military value metrics; (3) Disregarded certified data; (4) Used incorrect numbers in their COBRA analysis; (5) Did not enhance jointness; and (6) Did not facilitate transformation.

Conclusions

- DoD's realignment recommendations degrade, vice enhance, military value.
- The internal analysis and decision-making processes of the TJCSG were fatally flawed.

Recommendation

- The proposed realignment of Cooperative Engagement Capability and Interior Communications Switchboard functions from NBVC to Point Loma should be rejected.

The Problems with DoD BRAC Recommendation Tech 18

Proposed Realignment of Weapons & Armaments RDAT&E to China Lake

Introduction

- DoD recommended that all Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC), Point Mugu Weapons and Armaments (W&A) Research, Development, Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) activities be relocated to Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) China Lake.
- DoD also recommended that all NBVC Port Hueneme W&A RDAT&E activities, except weapon system integration, be relocated to NAWS China Lake.

Discussion

- The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommended realigning the Pt. Mugu Sea Range, Targets and Range Support Aircraft (RSA) to China Lake in spite of the following facts: (1) All three of the above activities support a broad range of test, training and experimentation customers besides weapons and armaments; (2) 92% of aerial target and 80% of RSA operations are performed on the Sea Range; (3) Significant unnecessary up-front and recurring costs would be incurred; and (4) Operational effectiveness and efficiency would be lost by operating Sea Range support functions 150 miles away from the range.
- The TJCSG recommended realigning Port Hueneme Vertical Launch System (VLS), NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (NSSM) and Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launching systems to China Lake in spite of the following facts: (1) These functions are integral parts of the Detect-Control-Engage combat systems remaining under the purview of NSWC Port Hueneme; (2) VLS, NSSM and RAM launching systems are not weapons or armaments; and (3) realigning these functions to China Lake would degrade the Navy's ability to integrate and deploy fully operational combat systems.
- The TJCSG COBRA analysis showed a payback period of 7 years and a 20 year savings of \$433,404K. However, the TJCSG failed to include the costs to move the range support functions, the required MILCONs, the recurring annual operating costs and the costs of additional Base Operating Support personnel. Additionally, the TJCSG included an arbitrary 15% savings which, due to the single Pt. Mugu / China Lake organizational structure, would not exist. By adding the required costs and eliminating the erroneous 15% savings, the correct payback period would be in excess of 100 years and the 20 year loss would be \$422,185K.
- The TJCSG processes were significantly flawed. As corroborated by inside sources, the TJCSG: (1) Went into their deliberations with preconceived solutions and worked the process backwards; (2) Used faulty military value metrics; (3) Disregarded certified data; (4) Used incorrect numbers in their COBRA analysis; (5) Did not enhance jointness; and (6) Did not facilitate transformation.

Conclusions

- DoD's realignment recommendations degrade, vice enhance, military value.
- DoD's realignment recommendations cost, vice save, taxpayers' dollars.
- The internal analysis and decision-making processes of the TJCSG were fatally flawed.

Recommendation

- The proposed realignment of Weapons and Armaments functions from NBVC to China Lake should be rejected.

The Problems with DoD BRAC Recommendation Tech 54

Proposed Realignment of Electronic Warfare RDAT&E to China Lake

Introduction

- DoD recommended that all Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC), Point Mugu Electronic Warfare (EW) Research, Development, Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) activities be relocated to Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) China Lake.

Discussion

- The Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommended realigning the Pt. Mugu EW functions to China Lake in spite of the following facts: (1) Pt. Mugu is the current recognized joint Center of Excellence for EW, which includes Airborne Electronic Attack, Defensive Electronic Countermeasures and EW Support Equipment for 20 joint platforms; (2) Pt. Mugu outranks China Lake in EW Development and Acquisition Military Value; (3) 369 personnel support EW at Pt. Mugu; only 12 perform similar functions at China Lake; (4) A combined Pt. Mugu / China Lake team proposed that the EA-18G EW suite be identical to the EA-6B ICAP-III and development be performed at Pt. Mugu. This proposal was accepted by Navy program management, and has been in effect for three years; (5) The proposed realignment would not result in increased synergy with China Lake activities; (6) The proposed realignment would result in significant loss of intellectual capital; (7) Highly specialized facilities at NBVC would be mothballed / demolished and duplicate facilities would be created at China Lake; and (8) Because Pt. Mugu's real-time EW support is being provided to our troops at war, both now and well into the future, any disruption in that support would put our warfighters in harm's way.
- The Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, the EW systems and EW air platform Program Managers and the Fleet EA-6B Wing Commander (the people with the most at stake) were not consulted by the TJCSG and are not in favor of the proposed realignment.
- The TJCSG COBRA analysis showed a payback period of 12 years and a 20 year savings of \$16,888K. However, the TJCSG failed to include the costs of additional required Base Operating Support (BOS) personnel, but did include an arbitrary \$3,010K/year recurring savings. By adding the required BOS costs and eliminating the erroneous recurring savings, the correct payback period would be 95 years and the 20 year loss would be \$42,210K.
- The TJCSG processes were significantly flawed. As corroborated by inside sources, the TJCSG: (1) Went into their deliberations with preconceived solutions and worked the process backwards; (2) Used faulty military value metrics; (3) Disregarded certified data; (4) Used incorrect numbers in their COBRA analysis; (5) Did not enhance jointness; and (6) Did not facilitate transformation.

Conclusions

- DoD's realignment recommendations degrade, vice enhance, military value.
- DoD's realignment recommendations cost, vice save, taxpayers' dollars.
- The internal analysis and decision-making processes of the TJCSG were fatally flawed.

Recommendation

- The proposed realignment of Electronic Warfare functions from NBVC to China Lake should be rejected.

Farrington, Lester, CIV, WSO-BRAC

From: Jacquez, Lynn [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 10:58 AM
To: Dave Van Saun (E-mail)
Cc: David Epstein (E-mail); Lester Farrington (E-mail)
Subject: Admiral Strohsahl response to 8-5-05 TJCSG memo

Following are a few thoughts on the One University, Two Campuses paper in the hands of the BRAC commission attributed to the OSD TJCSG.

Background

- When NAWC was established there were several commands that, from the outset, were slated for closure/realignment. NWEF at Albuquerque and the White Sands detachment were just two. Recall that PMRF was also realigned to PACFLT. NAWCWD oversaw these actions and provided a home, mostly at China Lake, for the work that needed to continue. There was never a construct of Four Campuses, just two with the other sites rapidly closing and realigning.
- While the daily air shuttle service was needed at the outset of NAWCWD operations, improvements in electronic communications, better personal familiarity by workers at both sides, and the decrease in workload have reduced the reliance on the air shuttle. In terms of travel, the vast majority of travel from both sites is not the inter-NAWCWD travel but is to other locations where industry or customers are located, almost all of which is via LAX. Travel costs to and from LAX are considerably less from Pt. Mugu than China Lake.
- The flag location at China Lake after initially being at Pt. Mugu simply acknowledged that there was a somewhat greater workload at China Lake and the Admiral ended up spending more time there than at Pt. Mugu. The intent was to alternate that location but since this would also affect a large number of staff positions, that idea was dropped in the interest of economy. The flag is the leader of NAWCWD which is a two site organization. He is no more in charge of China Lake than he is Pt. Mugu. He maintains an office at Pt. Mugu and spends significant time there.
- While there are offices for some support functions at both sites, they function together as a single office with a single lead manager. The size of the offices and the number of positions in those offices reflects the amount of work and workers at each site. Moving all the work from Pt. Mugu would simply result in increasing the size of the those offices at China Lake.
- As the paper indicated, technical areas have been effectively streamlined between the two sites. In most cases, either the size of each site's workforce in a complimentary area requires deputy managers, or the deputy job is additional duty for a technical worker. There are very few savings to be had in this area with a move to China Lake. Senior management can take measures to ensure that all available electronic communications means are utilized before unnecessary travel is made.

Current State

- There is excess capacity at both sites due to the workload decrease. This capacity exists mainly in the form of facilities and equipment and not workforce. All the people at both sites are fully employed and most are industrially funded. Without work, the positions are eliminated. The work proposed to move from Pt. Mugu to China Lake would not, in most cases, be suitable for placing in excess China Lake facilities such as the largely unused huge and expensive MESA facility.

- The future vector is only pointing to China Lake in the eyes of those who wish that were so. If this BRAC recommendation is allowed to become law, clearly there will be an increase in the workforce, and work in progress, at China Lake. If the BRAC Commission overturns the recommendation due to the numerous fatal flaws in analysis and logic, the vector for the future will be toward the NAWCWD organization, not just the China Lake site.
- China Lake is the site for the WSSA for all models of the F/A-18. However the EA-18G is, by COMNAVAIR decision and strongly supported by the Program Manager and the operational AEA Wing Commander supported at both China Lake and Pt. Mugu. The aircraft has, with two seats, functionally two separate software and electronic systems. The front seat pilot controls the airplane, navigation and those routine F/A-18 functions, the back seat NFO controls the EW system which is a replication of the EA-6B system supported for many years at Pt. Mugu. The two labs are linked by fiber optics and can simulate the entire aircraft at either location or function together in real time simulating actual mission conditions. This allocation of resources was made primarily on the basis of where the technical expertise resides. Modern communications technology makes this not only possible but the best possible solution to a very advanced and technical challenge. A support site for JSF has not been chosen, and if the trend of better utilization of industry to deliver to a performance specification continues, no government site will have that primary support function. Should a NAWCWD site be desired to support JSF, it is just as likely that the expertise at Pt. Mugu would be chosen as that at China Lake.

Conclusion

- The combining of two technically superior facilities into a single operating site was not an experiment. The operation of NAWCWD with it's two site construct has been anything but Virtual. The study work that lead to its implementation preceded BRAC 91 by at least two decades. It has worked wonderfully for 13 years. No large high tech company today thinks in terms of achieving greater capability by co-locating work. Technology and management practices have made that construct obsolete. It is anything but transformational.
- The TJCSG indeed proposed a vision of mega centers at China Lake. That vision, unfortunately neglects the long ongoing trend in industry and government of distributed work, ignores the terrible impact of loss of intellectual capital when skilled workers jobs are moved to a less desirable location, overlooks certified data to achieve a predetermined outcome, and sadly appears to be the creation largely of individuals who have or are executive managers at China Lake.
-