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
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subj: POLICY IMPERATIVES

Ref: (a) Department of Navy Objectives for 2004 dtd 16 Jan 04  
(b) SECNAVNOTICE 11000 dtd 9 Mar 04

The Department of the Navy needs to articulate a comprehensive strategy to realize the Secretary of Defense's goal of "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)," the subject of his November 15, 2002 BRAC 2005 Kick-off memorandum. We need clear Department guidance on the policy issues and basic principles that either directly, or in a substantial manner indirectly, dictate Department basing and infrastructure requirements for our BRAC Infrastructure Evaluation Group, Infrastructure Analysis Team, and our members on the Joint Cross Service Groups and Infrastructure Steering Group.

To that end, and in accordance with references (a) and (b), please submit your service policy imperatives by March 24, 2004. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis) will work with your staffs to synthesize and consolidate your imperatives into overarching Departmental imperatives to inform the BRAC 2005 process.

  
Gordon R. England  
Secretary of the Navy



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

24 Mar 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS)

Subj: NAVY POLICY IMPERATIVES

Ref: (a) SECNAV Memo of 16 Mar 04

Encl: (1) Draft BRAC 2005 U.S. Navy Strategic Vision and Policy  
Imperatives

1. In response to reference (a), draft of enclosure (1) is forwarded.
2. Development of BRAC 2005 Policy Imperatives is critical to support and align Navy transformational initiatives and foster joint opportunities while respecting and maintaining service unique capabilities. BRAC 2005 presents a singular opportunity to transform business initiatives, integrate new warfare platforms, and accelerate development of joint doctrine and technologies. An approach that devotes the appropriate level of attention, scrutiny, deliberations and opportunities for review, is clearly warranted.
3. We look forward to working with your staff in developing a final version of DoN imperatives that fully support the BRAC process and service requirements.

  
M. G. MULLEN

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## BRAC 2005

### U.S. Navy Strategic Vision and Policy Imperatives

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#### *Purpose*

10 The Secretary of Defense has determined that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process will play a major role in transformation, by rationalizing defense infrastructure with strategy.

- 15 • This document provides senior policy makers in the Department of the Navy with a summary of the Service's strategic vision, how that vision relates to BRAC 2005, and the policy imperatives that will guide Navy leadership in their BRAC 2005 preparations.
- 20 • Winning organizations never rest. They are always moving forward, constantly seeking to improve and posture themselves better for the future. The 2005 BRAC provides the Navy with a unique opportunity to make long-term changes to its infrastructure that will result in substantial contributions to future operational, war-winning readiness.

#### *Strategic Setting*

25 Today's strategic environment is characterized by uncertainty and danger, and presents the United States with complex security challenges. This environment consists of new alliances, states that pose traditional military challenges, rogue regimes that flout international law or seek to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorist groups that seek to acquire WMD that could be used to threaten the United States and its friends and allies.

- 30 • BRAC 2005 will be conducted against the backdrop of the nation's ongoing global war on terrorism.
- 35 • U.S. forces must be postured differently than in the past. Successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism requires the U.S. military be able to operate in a more dispersed manner, while able to surge forces rapidly across strategic distances into any region of the world.
- 40 • BRAC 2005 will be fundamentally different from the BRAC rounds of the 1990s. In past BRACs, a main objective was to divest of excess capacity following the end of the Cold War. For the 2005 BRAC, the Navy is operating in a different environment,

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<sup>1</sup> The BRAC legislation covers the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and other commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.

45 fighting a long-term war, and implementing a new force employment construct.  
Capacity or infrastructure that may have been considered *excess* in 1995 may be  
*necessary* in 2005 and beyond in order to meet the requirements of the Defense  
Strategy.

### 50 *Naval Operations*

*Sea Power 21* is Navy's vision of a globally distributed force that leverages revolutionary  
information superiority and networked capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive  
power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint force commanders.  
55 *Sea Power 21* was developed in response to the demands of the new strategic  
environment and the global war on terrorism that require U.S. Naval forces that can  
rapidly deliver persistent, credible combat power. The U.S. Navy must also be postured  
differently to meet these demands: forward stationed, forward deployed and capable of  
surging decisive combat power in a timely manner.

- 60 • The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) incorporates new and revised operations,  
maintenance, manning and training processes to ensure that the Navy can provide  
ready combat forces when and where they are needed. The FRP also requires a  
cultural change ashore, one that will impact Navy installations and workforces as  
much as it does the Sailors in the Fleet.
- 65 • The Navy should utilize the 2005 BRAC process to help align its infrastructure to  
sustain and support a more responsive and ready fleet.
- 70 • In the present and for the foreseeable future, the Navy should not depend on access to  
important overseas support facilities to meet National Security requirements. BRAC  
2005 should help ensure that adequate facilities are available in the United States or  
its territories and possessions to mitigate this factor during potential contingencies.
- 75 • Anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) is a greater concern than in the past. BRAC  
2005 should be another tool by which to ensure that the Navy's AT/FP requirements  
can be effectively and efficiently defined and realized.

### 80 *Sea Enterprise and the BRAC Process*

Accomplishment of Navy missions in the Joint environment will be challenged by fiscal  
realities. The resources required for transformation will also be needed to replace aging  
or misaligned fleet support shore infrastructure while also prosecuting the Global War on  
Terrorism. Fiscal opportunities must be created by promoting greater efficiencies, not by  
expecting increases in the Navy budget.

- 85 • This realization led to the founding of Navy's Sea Enterprise program, one of the  
three enabling processes of *Sea Power 21*. Its goal is to reduce operating costs by  
reducing overhead, streamlining organizations, eliminating underperforming,  
unnecessary or redundant capabilities, and divesting of non-core functions. Some

90 early successes include integration of Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air, transforming  
the Naval Supply Systems Command, and establishment of Commander Navy  
Installations.

95 • The Navy's Sea Enterprise efforts should be complemented by BRAC 2005. In the  
effort to find greater efficiency, as well as improve overall combat effectiveness,  
Navy must embrace the BRAC process as an opportunity to realign infrastructure  
with the evolving defense strategy, and achieve cost-savings through Joint  
integration.

100 ○ One of the primary objectives of BRAC 2005 will be to find opportunities for  
alignment and consolidation among the common business-orientated support  
functions currently performed independently by the Services.

105 ○ Resistance to such innovation can be expected when it challenges long-held  
beliefs or threatens career tracks. These boundaries must be breached if  
redundancy is to be eliminated and overhead reduced.

### *Navy Priorities*

110 As the Navy pursues transformation and infrastructure realignment through BRAC 2005,  
it must embrace CNO's Top Five Priorities. Commitment to these priorities-- manpower,  
current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and alignment-- will ensure that the  
Navy continues to focus on those issues most critical to sustained success.

115 • **Manpower.** Navy must create a more competitive and effective force to meet the  
innovative ship manning, educational and technological demands of the future. The  
Navy's infrastructure must be in alignment with this new work force. To provide a  
combat ready fleet, the Navy must be able to:

120 ○ Retain, recruit, and train high performing active duty, reserve, and civilian  
personnel

○ Restructure and reduce the size of the total force, in order to leverage the nexus of  
quality Sailors with innovative leadership

125 ○ Capitalize on current and evolving technologies to improve total force readiness

○ Facilitate worldwide deployable Sailors through fleet personnel, force health  
protection initiatives, legal, religious, and other programs designed to improve  
130 readiness.

• **Current Readiness.** While the impact of BRAC 2005 decisions will not be felt for  
several years, it is imperative that the Navy carefully balances long-term  
infrastructure and support planning with short-term operational readiness. As the  
135 Navy learns lessons from OIF and OEF and reconfigures to meet the challenges of the

twenty-first century, it must maintain a ready fleet to meet the Nation's national security needs. The Navy must not waver from its obligation to deploy combat-credible forces that are ready to go in harm's way at a moment's notice. Bottom line: the Fleet must always be ready to fight and win.

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- **Future Readiness.** The uncertain strategic environment of the twenty-first century requires forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. In order to sustain its position of overwhelming military advantage, the Navy must continue to transform. A fundamental aspect of this transformation is BRAC 2005. It has potential to release financial resources to fund this transformation, and provide the properly sized and positioned infrastructure needed to support a transformational force.
- **Quality of Service.** Central to BRAC transformation efforts is the Navy's continued emphasis on ensuring an environment where Sailors have confidence in themselves, each other, their equipment and weapons, and the lifestyle of service itself. In concert with BRAC, qualitative improvement programs such as Sea Warrior, Revolution in Training, '1+1' Bachelor Housing, and Homeport Ashore will align service opportunities, training, housing and medical facilities to better prepare Sailors for future operational commitments and by ensuring families are fully supported. People are the Navy's most important resource; infrastructure must align with fleet operations in support of Sailors.
- **Alignment.** Alignment is one important BRAC-related priority. The Navy must ensure that its organizations, systems, and processes are best aligned to deliver what they are intended to produce—a combat ready Navy. The Navy must maximize its opportunities for Joint integration and eliminate redundant, unnecessary or poorly performing administrative and operational support functions.

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### ***Joint Cross Service Groups***

The Defense Department's BRAC preparations include analyses of common business-oriented support functions across the Services. These functions have been organized into Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs) that align with the Navy's broader objectives for BRAC 2005. Accordingly, the Navy's BRAC imperatives have been developed in alignment with the JCSGs, with the addition of a separate operational imperatives section. The JCSGs are Industrial, Technical, Education and Training, Intelligence, Supply and Storage, Headquarters and Support, and Medical.

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### ***The Way Ahead***

When considering future infrastructure requirements, new and transformational naval capabilities that are already underway under *Sea Power 21* will require equally transformational infrastructure to support them. Present facilities that can be shown to support such requirements are considered to have high military value. In the future, despite transformational goals, encroachments and environmental regulations will

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185 continue to impact naval operations, training, or routine support activities. Potential  
constraints unable to be resolved with available resources should be considered and  
avoided during BRAC 2005. Similarly, Navy must ensure that service infrastructure is  
postured to comply with changes in environmental standards and regulations.

190 The Navy must seize the opportunity afforded by BRAC to shape its infrastructure so that  
it can make a greater contribution to the Fleet's operational availability and combat  
readiness. Those responsible for preparing the Navy for BRAC 2005 must remember to  
keep the Fleet at the center of their efforts. They can make an invaluable contribution to  
fostering the Navy's long-term culture of readiness, promoting the objectives of *Sea  
Power 21*, further transformation, and guaranteeing combat success to the Navy of the  
future.

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DRAFT

## BRAC 2005 - Navy Policy Imperatives

### 1. Operational

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*The Defense Strategy and the ongoing global war on terrorism dictates that Navy be postured to operate differently than in the past. Selected naval forces must be forward stationed, other forces positioned forward on rotational deployments and still other forces ready to surge substantial capability to meet emerging national security requirements. Consideration should be given to dispersing homeport locations of operating forces to allow strategic flexibility and to preclude potential limitations on operations in time of crisis.*

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*New, transformational ship designs in the program of record which leverage optimized manning concepts, will require innovative shore support facilities in order to meet capability requirements. The BRAC process affords Navy the opportunity to shape infrastructure in order to mold a fleet that is more responsive and ready. This may dictate the requirement to maintain adequate home basing infrastructure for two forward-based CSGs (including one FDNF carrier in Japan).*

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1.1 Navy requires adequate infrastructure for the basing of its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in order to deliver the strategic agility described in the Fleet Response Plan, meet Combatant Commander requirements, and ensure adequate force protection.

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1.2 Navy must maintain suitably located installations to support carrier home porting. Infrastructure currently supports a total of 12 carriers (including FDNF) to meet FRP.

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- As an adjunct to the global war on terrorism, the availability of an additional East coast deep-water (a) homeport or (b) port capable of supporting a CVN provides Navy with the flexibility for force positioning relative to contingencies.
- East and West coasts each require a minimum of two CVN-capable ports.

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1.3 Navy must explore the availability and conduct cost/benefit analysis of additional sites, particularly those forward in the Pacific, for the possible basing of a nuclear carrier, the associated air wing and additional ships as dictated by the Defense Strategy.

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1.4 To ensure full mission capability in support of Combatant Commander requirements, DON requires the capability to meet emergent repair requirements in U.S. facilities for ships, submarines, and aircraft surged to forward operating areas in times of crisis, when partner nation support may not be feasible.

1.5 Navy requires sufficient shore infrastructure to support the shift of naval forces between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets to meet potential future strategic requirements.

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1.6 Realignment proposals will consider anti-terrorism/force protection measures and their implementation as part of military value analysis. Navy must maintain and further

245 develop the ability to deter, detect, disrupt, and mitigate terrorist threats to ships, installations, port shipping, and support infrastructure by aligning requirements with threats, leveraging Joint and Service anti-terrorism/force protection technology and procedures, conducting RDT&E, providing appropriately trained and equipped security

245 manning, ensuring C4ISR interoperability, and engaging civilian maritime, other DOD, and police agencies, while streamlining intelligence dissemination and response.

250 1.7 Navy must leverage existing fleet concentration areas to capitalize on existing resources and to maximize future improvements through technology.

255 1.8 Navy must provide adequate shore infrastructure to support the transformational capabilities associated with future platforms. This infrastructure must accommodate Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and its associated mission module system, and DD(X) with the developing optimized crewing concept.

1.9 Navy requires two shore facilities, one on each coast, to support SSBN forces, associated nuclear weapons infrastructure, and nuclear weapons security requirements in accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review.

260 1.10 Navy requires two shore facilities on each coast, plus an FDNF location in the Western Pacific, to support SSN forces. Additionally, SSGN forces should be co-located with SSBN forces on each coast. Both intermediate maintenance and weapons handling facilities must be co-located with respective SSN and SSBN/SSGN berthing.

265 1.11 The level of existing air activity at airfields must permit unrestricted fleet operations to facilitate execution of surge. Outlying landing fields are required if fixed-wing carrier landing pattern interferes with routine flight operations.

270 1.12 Aviation squadrons that deploy as part of a carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group should be located within one un-refueled leg of the carrier/ship operating area.

275 1.13 Navy must ensure its basing for future aircraft optimizes manpower and technical efficiencies between the Navy and Marine Corps in operations, training, maintenance, and logistics. Basing decisions must include the Integrated Training Center (ITC) and first fleet base for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to support both the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) and carrier variant (CV) and to provide support for other Services.

280 1.14 Navy must have infrastructure capable of supporting Joint ISR capabilities. Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) basing requirements include unrestricted access on airways from inland bases to and from the coast. Additionally, Navy requires shore infrastructure to support routine maintenance, testing, and training requirements for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surface unmanned vehicles (SUVs), and underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs).

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1.15 Navy must operationally employ Joint and National space-based systems and influence the design, acquisition and operation of space-based systems in support of sea and land operations.

290 1.16 Navy requires a shore communications infrastructure in each ocean area,  
preferably on U.S. owned soil, that guarantees reliable communications with ships,  
submarines, aircraft, land mobile, and fixed sites. The availability of DOD-owned/leased  
295 media (e.g. DISN, TELEPORT, Defense Satellite Communications System) to receive  
and relay communications and sensor information; improve physical and information  
security; and reduce reliance upon Host Nation Agreements should be considered and  
used whenever possible. 1.17 Navy must ensure all fleet concentration areas have ready  
access to small arms ranges in support of operational and anti-terrorism/force protection  
training requirements.

300 1.18 Navy requires warfare centers of excellence to support Joint and fleet  
experimentation and tactics development for current and future capabilities (i.e., Joint  
Strike Fighter, Virginia-class SSN, and LCS) and associated special equipment. These  
centers further provide critical interaction with deploying naval forces, fostering a more  
305 jointly interoperable, credible, and innovative organic tactical warfare capability.

## 2. Industrial

310 *The keys to equipping and sustaining the Nation's maritime military forces are a robust*  
*industrial base comprising a skilled, experienced workforce; and modern, capable*  
*facilities. When configured for efficient operation, and properly directed and managed,*  
*the combination of people and resources will result in ships, aircraft and other naval*  
*systems that provide the Joint operational commander the maximum operational*  
315 *availability of the Navy's capital warfighting assets in ways that are effective and*  
*affordable.*

*The required industrial base is a combination of activities owned and operated by the*  
*government (e.g., DOD, DON, Navy), the commercial sector, or government*  
*owned/contractor operated (GO/CO) facilities. Navy must maintain intermediate and*  
320 *depot capabilities, with a sufficient quantity of work to provide an assured/ready source*  
*of repair; to support unique work not readily available in the private sector (such as*  
*nuclear submarine refueling); or to provide a mobilization base/surge capability. These*  
*capabilities (e.g., dry docks, piers, airfields, government personnel, etc.) comprise the*  
*essential ability to reprioritize work without contractual impediment and provide a*  
325 *mobile, ready workforce that can support voyage repairs wherever the ships and*  
*airplanes are located, including combat zones.*

*Overall cost efficiency dictates that most organic industrial maintenance activities be*  
*in/near Navy homeports with due consideration given for the risk that a single event,*  
330 *such as a natural disaster or terrorist act, would significantly reduce overall capabilities,*  
*or eliminate a unique capability. As a minimum, industrial facilities are needed on both*  
*coasts and in the central Pacific, and access to critical waterfront property and airfields*  
*associated with these activities must be assured. Finally, Navy must maintain sufficient*  
*organic/intellectual knowledge and practical experience so as to drive innovation in the*  
335 *construction, maintenance and repair areas and be a "smart buyer" for industrial*  
*services.*

2.1 To ensure that the government properly exercises its cradle to grave  
responsibilities for safe and effective naval platforms and weapons systems, DOD/Navy  
340 must have sufficient organic intellectual knowledge, technical support, and expertise for  
these systems, particularly for capabilities associated with maritime operating  
environments. This includes maritime weapons systems, naval ordnance, and Navy-  
unique command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and  
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and their integration into the Joint Battlespace.

2.2 To provide an assured/ready source of repair, a surge capability, and the ability to  
rapidly reconfigure priorities to support forward deployed, sustained combat operations,  
there must be sufficient government industrial capability (shipyards, depots, and other  
facilities) to overhaul, repair, modify, modernize and otherwise sustain naval ships and  
350 unique naval aircraft, and their associated propulsion and weapons systems (including  
aircraft launch and recovery systems). In particular, DON capability is needed in the

following areas to ensure that unique Navy requirements can be met and to support fleet operations:

- 355 a. Dry dock large complex ships and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific
- b. Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear powered ships
- 360 c. Dispose of inactivated nuclear powered ship reactor compartments
- d. Provide facilities and personnel to engineer, produce, maintain, handle, and dispose of ordnance and other energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment
- 365 e. Provide ocean engineering, diving and salvage, and underwater construction to support dispersed fleet operations.

370 2.3 An industrial organic capability that is flexible and responsive to fleet requirements must include a highly skilled workforce capable of performing intermediate and depot level maintenance to meet national priorities under any market conditions, at any time, anywhere in the world including under combat conditions. DON facilities must have a sufficient level of work to make them viable and affordable. They must continue to develop and maintain government personnel (both military and civilian) with the  
375 required engineering and trade skills for the production, maintenance, and repair of complex ships/aircraft, ship systems, aircraft systems, and other weapons systems.

380 2.4 To the extent possible, industrial facilities (organic, Joint, and commercial) should be located near fleet concentration areas to capitalize on synergies from collocation with operational forces and training facilities. In addition, maintaining appropriate geographic dispersal of these facilities protects against undue harm to the Navy from a single event, such as natural disasters or a terrorist act.

385 2.5 The industrial capability needs to be efficient as well as effective. Maintaining a proper balance between DON, Joint, and commercial industrial maintenance activities and services promotes efficiency by providing competitive market forces. DON capability should be positioned to derive maximum benefit from the seamless integration and alignment of key support functions, such as engineering, logistics, and supply, and consolidation/integration of organizational, intermediate, and depot maintenance  
390 capabilities to optimize operational availability ( $A_0$ ) of a lean force structure and produce required readiness at best cost, particularly in conjunction with surge operations. Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) arrangements between DON and industry should be implemented when required readiness and efficiency are achieved.

### 3. Technical

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*To ensure the Joint operational commander's dominance in the maritime arena, Navy must nurture intellectual capital and assure there is adequate infrastructure and work across the spectrum of science and technology (S&T), research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E), systems development, procurement, and in-service engineering.*

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*This includes specific knowledge and experience in the maritime environment, which is highly corrosive, tightly constrained in its shipboard footprint (physical, acoustic, and electromagnetic), and possesses specific shock and vibration requirements. Adapting systems to function well in the marine environment while supporting them from within shipboard lifelines is a significant challenge.*

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*In order to reduce system development and ownership costs, and increase Joint and coalition integration, Navy must leverage commercial, international, academic, Joint and other government technology efforts. Navy must maintain organic capabilities when industry or academia is not likely to show interest, or when Navy has been designated as the Joint provider. Where the Navy relies on non-organic facilities or capabilities development, it must actively collaborate on prioritization of assignment for facilities and work.*

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3.1 The acquisition of effective aircraft, ships, C4ISR, and weapons systems, and their lifecycle support throughout the entire product life from concept to disposal requires the Navy to be a "smart buyer" with the intellectual capital and technical infrastructure needed to:

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- Translate its military requirements in the maritime environment into systems performance and technical specifications
- Analyze the cost of acquisition and readiness
- Ensure suppliers perform to contract requirements
- Execute the inherently governmental functions of program management, contracting, and financial management

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3.2 For fielded systems to function safely and effectively, Navy must be able to provide the perspective on the maritime requirements for platforms, weapon systems, C4ISR systems, and space-based systems—including their design, development, procurement, test and evaluation, maintenance, materiel support, and operation. This perspective includes unique technical and operational knowledge, engineering, and integration, especially where the Navy is the sole provider of capability to the Joint operational commander or in limited-commercial applications. These include:

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- Elements unique to Naval Aviation and shipboard interface (e.g., aircraft launch and recovery)
- Elements unique to surface and submarine warfare (e.g., propulsion and SUBSAFE)
- National security systems (including C4ISR) and space-based systems that must support open-ocean, littoral, and naval land operations (e.g., acoustics and electromagnetic compatibility)
- Ordnance and energetics unique to the Navy or used in a maritime environment

440 3.3 DON must have the people, facilities, and work needed to sustain competence in  
exercising technical authority for systems used in the maritime environment—to provide  
decision makers with technically sound options, independent of market, programmatic, or  
political pressures. In the end, DON is accountable for the safety and effectiveness of its  
fielded products.

445 3.4 Maintaining technological superiority for maritime weapons systems requires  
DOD to possess a synergistic S&T/RDT&E capability with intellectual capital and  
associated infrastructure, including the ability to rapidly develop, prototype and deploy  
warfare capabilities in a maritime environment. This synergy is critical to understanding  
450 the early life cycle of a product.

455 3.5 The development and high fidelity test and evaluation of maritime weapons  
systems and emerging technologies requires DOD possess co-located full-spectrum air,  
land, and sea (including subsurface, sea-level and sea-air interface) test facilities and  
ranges. These test facilities and ranges must collectively provide accurate model and *in  
situ* test and evaluation environments.

460 3.6 Command and control and battlespace space sensing and characterization  
capabilities required to support maritime forces engaged in Joint and combined  
operations must be integrated with Joint, National, and coalition activities. Navy-unique  
command and control and battlespace sensing and characterization requirements (e.g.  
undersea warfare, mine warfare).

## 465 4. Education & Training

470 *Navy is making major transformational changes in education and training through aggressive implementation of its Revolution in Training (RIT). In-resident training will continue to be a key part of the training education system, but there will be less reliance in the future on brick and mortar solutions as alternative delivery methods are sought that deliver training and education directly to Sailors. Navy must leverage Joint and commercial opportunities to reduce costs and provide capabilities that it does not possess within its current training system.*

475 4.1 Composite naval forces must have unimpeded access to a range complex (or an integrated group of complexes) suitable to conduct Joint, integrated and sustainment training.

- 480 • The OPAREA boundaries for these facilities should be within three underway days from a homeport/station, although aviation forces may deploy to an integrated training site.
- These facilities must have training assessment and feedback capability, and offer challenging threat representations and multiple targets, including live fire and time-sensitive-strike targets.

485 These range complexes must be large enough to provide adequate air, sea, and ground space (including over-the-shore maneuver space) for an expeditionary strike force to conduct realistic training in conjunction with both combined/Joint forces and OPFOR.

490 4.2 All ships and aircraft must have unimpeded access to ranges and operating areas in order to support Fleet Response Plan training requirements. These facilities, which should include training performance feedback capability, should be located in close proximity to homeports and stations, defined as six underway hours for a surface ship, 12 underway hours for a submarine, and a single, un-refueled sortie for aircraft.

495 4.3 The Fleet Response Plan/Flexible Deployment Concept will generate surge-training requirements that necessitate access to training/test and evaluation ranges and associated operating areas. Multiple carrier strike groups preparing to surge cannot be delayed by lack of access to critical training facilities. Similarly, naval forces pulsed or surged to forward operating areas will require ready access to ranges and range operating areas while on station in order to complete their training and maintain their combat readiness.

500 4.4 Navy requires access to ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields, and over water training space maintained by the other Services to avoid the possibility of a single point failure degrading combat readiness.

505 4.5 Naval forces must have unimpeded access to range complexes configured to participate in the Joint National Training Capability, with connectivity supporting combined live-virtual-constructive training opportunities.

510 4.6 Navy must maintain sufficient data and voice communications infrastructure  
ashore in fleet concentration areas to enable inport and underway simulated training  
architectures for naval forces. This capability must allow for direct participation by  
surface, subsurface, and air naval forces in battle group inport exercises (BGIEs) utilizing  
515 the synthetic warfare connectivity system (SWCS) and battle force tactical trainer  
(BFTT), as well as facilitate integration with Joint commands through the Joint National  
Training Capability.

4.7 Navy must execute its training responsibilities under USC Title 10 to ensure all  
520 personnel are prepared for Navy and Joint assignments in support of the Defense Strategy  
and included Navy-unique maritime missions, to include determining training and  
education requirements.

4.8 Sufficient capacity is required within Navy training and education establishment  
525 to accommodate cyclical surges, resulting either from recruitment of an all-volunteer  
force or operational requirements.

4.9 Curriculum control and approval authority is required by Navy for all courses  
530 attended by Navy personnel. For Joint courses, collaboration oversight in all stages of  
curriculum development meets the intent of this requirement.

4.10 DON requires that organizations responsible for developing modeling and  
535 simulation and training and educational research and development be strategically located  
to promote alliances with universities, commercial businesses and other U.S. military  
services and government agencies.

4.11 Enlisted accession training requires a rigorous, in-resident, naval service  
540 indoctrination program conducted by Navy personnel in a properly sized, controlled,  
DOD-owned environment equipped with Navy-specific training devices.

4.12 DON requires a balanced mix among the existing officer accession sources.

4.13 Initial skills training ("A" school) must support continuation of the naval  
545 militarization process and shall be collocated either with accessions training to minimize  
student moves or with skills progression courses ("C" school) to allow cross-utilization of  
instructors, facilities and equipment.

4.14 Skills progression training ("C" school) and functional skills training ("F" school)  
550 shall be located (when possible) near fleet concentration areas to facilitate relevancy of  
curriculum, minimize the time a non-deployed Sailor or Marine spends away from home  
for training, and provide meaningful opportunities for sea/shore rotation.

4.15 Initial and advanced officer training in support of warfare skills and  
qualifications, leadership, and professional skills shall be located (when possible) with

555 other skills training in fleet concentration areas or near operational fleet units to facilitate relevancy and allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities and equipment.

560 4.16 DON undergraduate flight training requires facilities located near large volumes of DOD-controlled airspace over both open water and land, free of encroachment and other-use inhibitors, with predominantly good weather conditions. For safety reasons, these facilities should not be located in close proximity to operational aircraft squadrons.

4.17 Navy must, whenever feasible, co-locate fleet replacement squadrons with the majority of their respective fleet squadrons.

565 4.18 DON graduate flight training requires facilities located near large volumes of DOD-controlled airspace, ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields, over-water training airspace and ready access to aircraft carrier support.

570 4.19 Navy requires specialized training facilities (e.g., operational reactor training platforms) for all aspects of the operation, maintenance, repair, and radiological controls of naval nuclear propulsion plants for enlisted, officers, and civilians.

575 4.20 DON requires ready access to world-class academic institutions that conduct graduate-level education and supporting research in technical and defense-related fields. Such institutions must prepare the leaders of tomorrow's Navy, who hail from a wide range of educational backgrounds, in a variety of special and technical curricula while positively enhancing careers and fleet readiness.

580 4.21 DON requires a world-class academic institution, accessible by members of other services and foreign military officers, that provides a naval-oriented center for research in support of the Defense Strategy, war gaming in the maritime environment, and a thorough understanding of the relationships between sea power, technology and the national and international politico-military environment. The institution must provide graduates a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art, and instill an appreciation for the criticality of Joint attitudes and perspectives.

585

## 5. Intelligence

590 *Navy will continue to actively integrate intelligence and cryptologic capabilities with Joint and National intelligence activities, while enhancing those unique capabilities necessary to support U.S. Naval Forces engaged in Joint, and combined operations. Capability to access, assess and feed appropriate all-source intelligence and analysis to naval forces is critical to fostering operational success and Joint force integration.*

595 5.1 Navy must maintain capability to generate, analyze and distribute global maritime awareness of high-interest civil maritime activities required to counter emerging threats in support of anti-terrorism, homeland defense and counter-proliferation requirements.

600 5.2 Navy must maintain as well as create new capability to collect and analyze current and future foreign naval capabilities in support of Navy and Defense acquisition programs.

605 5.3 Navy must maintain maritime surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities linked to the network-centric architecture to support Fleet and National requirements.

5.4 Navy must maintain intelligence and cryptologic capabilities to support naval, Joint, and National requirements by ensuring facilities are geographically located to provide the required access to targets, sensors, systems, and communications.

610 5.5 Navy intelligence collection facilities and capabilities (including support infrastructure) whose location or mode of operation provides unique access or is a primary feed to the nation's Joint intelligence architecture should be retained. Particular care should be taken in preventing disclosure of facility locations, intelligence sources or collection activities without thorough scrutiny.

615

## 6. Supply & Storage

620 *DON requires access to a dedicated, strategically located total logistics force, including ordnance and port facilities infrastructure that is capable of preparing, processing, distributing and maintaining materiel in support of naval forces. There are many Joint and transformational opportunities in the supply and storage area that should be exploited to provide logistical support to fleet, expeditionary and organic industrial activities.*

625 6.1 Naval forces require access to CONUS logistics bases, strategically located overseas intermediate staging bases (ISB), and advanced logistics support sites (ALSS) in support of the Joint Sea Basing concept of operations.

- 630
- Joint logistics bases, with tailored offload, stage, store and load capabilities to sustain normal, contingency and surge operations for naval and Joint forces should be employed.
  - These facilities must ensure the safe, secure, timely and efficient onload/offload of combat logistics forces (CLFs), amphibious forces, and mission modules associated with future transformational platforms (LCS).
  - Fleet concentration area synergies and exercising second echelon management control and oversight of the performance of management support program and functions areas of the immediate staff and subordinate commands should be leveraged.
  - Co-location and lead-follow consolidation will enable the appropriate control over the employment, deployment, and assignment of total claimancy resources and forces.
  - The capabilities of subordinate and supporting commands should be leveraged with other agencies and activities to develop interoperable force packages and schedules in support of combatant commander tasking.
- 635
- 640

645 6.2 Navy requires access to a globally integrated supply system with the ability to introduce and represent Navy requirements in Defense supply management systems; determine the appropriate supply chain structure for secondary and legacy end item inventory levels for Navy-unique/design unstable items; maintain access to safely receive, store, maintain and issue materiel; and authorize and oversee procurement actions for other than systems commands' (SYSCOM) major acquisition programs.

650 6.3 DON requires an ordnance infrastructure that is responsive, flexible and capable of meeting maritime ordnance requirements (operational forces, CLF, MPF) during surge and contingency scenarios, that optimizes ordnance storage and throughput; accommodates new weapons systems; minimizes explosive safety risks; and embraces the containerized and break-bulk handling capability required to support naval expeditionary forces and the Joint Sea Base.

655

660 6.4 DON must ensure all ammunition-laden ships have continued access to mission-essential piers at strategically located installations with sufficient explosive safety capacity.

6.5 Navy must ensure access to a transportation infrastructure aligned with key Defense and industry logistics nodes in order to optimize support for expeditionary logistics strategies.

665

6.6 Navy must ensure access to adequate fuel capability and capacity at locations that directly support training, readiness, and operational requirements.

670

6.7 DON must maintain the responsibility for integrating logistics support for maritime forces. This requirement equates to holding technical authority for logistics support integration in ensuring the various methods through which logistics support are ultimately provided are properly configured and coordinated to support maritime force war fighting requirements.

DRAFT

## 675 **7. Headquarters and Support Activities**

*Navy support infrastructure will be properly sized and aligned to best serve the Fleet and the Services' various shore commands.*

680 *Navy will continue to reduce the number of uniformed personnel performing shore-based functions that could otherwise be civilianized, contracted, privatized or eliminated. Navy will actively pursue Joint solutions to organizational and base support functions in fleet and headquarters concentration areas.*

685 *The Naval Reserve will become fully integrated with active duty forces, co-located whenever possible, to leverage on pooled equipment and training facilities.*

690 7.1 Commander Pacific Fleet and lead type commanders will be aligned with Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command as the responsible Navy component for overall establishment, coordination and implementation of Joint and integrated requirements and policies for manning, equipping, and training Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units. This alignment will be accomplished by capitalizing on fleet concentration area synergies, and by exercising second echelon oversight of management support program and subordinate command function area performance.

- 695
- Co-location and lead-follow consolidation will enable the appropriate control over the employment, deployment, and assignment of total claimancy resources and forces. This will integrate the capabilities of subordinate and supporting commands with other agencies and activities to develop interoperable force packages and schedules in support of combatant commander tasking.
  - 700 • In support of the Revolution In Training (RIT) and to ensure the validity of training and education requirements Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) must maintain a major organizational element located with CFFC.

705 7.2 Navy should streamline management of ashore infrastructure commands and align support infrastructure into fleet concentration areas to improve overall quality of service standards and enhance geographic stability for Sailors and families throughout their careers.

- 710
- Navy should pursue Sea Enterprise objectives and consolidate Headquarters and Support Activity organizations, processes and infrastructure in fleet concentration areas to reduce redundancies and overhead, and increase effectiveness and efficiency. Navy will streamline management of the ashore infrastructure commands in CONUS by reducing the number of geographical Regions and aligning with other Federal agency areas of responsibility. Activities such as Personnel Support, Housing Assignment, Medical Care, Administration, Installation Management, Acquisition and Facilities Services contracting, MWR services, Child Care, Security, Education, 715 shore activity supply, food services and family support services will continue to be consolidated into Regional Service Centers, and to the extent possible, Regional DOD Installation and Personnel Service Centers, without adversely impacting access or service to service members and dependents.

720

7.3 Navy will support "1+1" Bachelor Housing Standard, Sailor Ashore Program, and Public Private Venture (PPV) recapitalization initiatives.

725

7.4 Navy will provide a regional management structure to deliver proper oversight and leadership to recruiting districts.

730

7.5 Navy will ensure that all recruiting stations are located in optimum locations with full access to the public. Joint Service recruiting facilities may be employed provided that each Service is provided opportunity to control its respective enlistment criteria.

735

7.6 Navy must have an active or reserve presence in every state. Naval Reserve Center presence should be aligned with reserve demographics. In support of Active Reserve Integration, reserve presence priority is:

- 1) Active-duty commands, either Joint or Navy, without separate reserve infrastructure required
- 2) Joint Reserve Facilities—armed forces reserve centers or Joint reserve bases
- 3) Naval Reserve Activity—stand-alone Naval Reserve infrastructure

740

7.7 Navy requires the capability to mobilize, outfit and transport major components of the Naval Reserve on a compressed time schedule in order to meet requirements of the Combatant Commander operations and contingency plans.

- Until pay and personnel systems are standardized DOD-wide through the Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resources System (DIMHRS), DON will continue to utilize Navy mobilization processing sites (NMPS).

745

The number of mobilization sites must be sufficient to allow for the mobilization of unique operational requirements at one location per coast (for construction battalions), as well as ensuring adequate throughput under surge conditions for all other mobilization requirements.

750 **8. Medical**

*Naval Medicine is prepared to pursue far-reaching Joint and commercial initiatives to achieve the most effective and efficient healthcare delivery system in support of naval forces. Naval Medicine will assure placement of the right skills, in the right place, at the right time with Joint assets.*

755

8.1 DON must provide a capable wartime and operational healthcare system with skilled uniformed providers capable of deploying from fixed medical treatment facilities to support naval, Joint, and combined operations. In order to gain economic efficiencies, Naval Medicine must be aligned with Navy and Marine Corps concentration areas. Naval Medicine will ensure that it provides reasonable access to healthcare benefits as mandated under USC Title 10.

760

8.2 Naval Medicine requires an adequate number of qualified healthcare providers through recruitment, training, and undergraduate and graduate medical education to meet Combatant Commander requirements.

765

8.3 To ensure Joint forces have the necessary health care protections, Naval Medicine must provide unique Joint medical research and development capabilities and maintain investment in emerging medical technologies.

770

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

11000

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29 MAR 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

Subj: MARINE CORPS EQUITIES/IMPERATIVES FOR BRAC 2005

Ref: (a) SECNAV Memo of March 16, 2004

Encl: (1) DRAFT USMC Equities/Imperatives for BRAC 2005  
(Consolidated)

1. As requested by the reference, the enclosure is forwarded. Please note it is being submitted in draft, and represents a consolidation of equities/imperatives developed within each Joint Cross Service Group functional area as well as those base structure equity/imperative considerations based on the Marine Corps' Installations 2020 document. A complete set of equities/imperatives is being still being vetted through senior leadership within the Marine Corps and will be forwarded when complete.
2. My point of contact regarding this subject is Mr. Paul Hubbell on (703) 695-6824.

  
W.J. WILLIAMS  
Assistant Deputy Commandant  
Installations and Logistics (Facilities)

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**USMC EQUITIES/IMPERATIVES FOR BRAC 2005  
(CONSOLIDATED)**

**Background/Assumptions:**

- For purposes of this review, the following definitions apply:
  - o Imperatives – Strategic capabilities that must be achieved in BRAC for transforming DoD.
  - o Equities – Infrastructure /processes which must be retained/maintained/improved to sustain inherent core Service capabilities.
- The following infrastructure and process equities/imperatives were derived using input from Installations 2020 and Marine Corps membership from each of the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs) respectively.
- These Marine Corps Strategic Equities/Imperatives are a compilation of the inputs received and focus on retaining/acquiring infrastructure deemed essential for Marine Corps core capabilities, and relying on other Service infrastructure to support non-core requirements (e.g. administrative, maintenance, storage, etc) to the maximum extent possible.

**Marine Corps Strategic Equities/Imperatives (Infrastructure):**

- Base structure reconfiguration must support an expeditionary culture by demonstrating continuing improvements to the traits of speed, flexibility and adaptability of naval expeditionary forces.
- Infrastructure realignment or closure must be linked to increasing the capability to support seabasing.
- Base structure footprint must be geographically designed to support the training, maintenance and deployment (sea and air ports of embarkation) of Marine Forces as MAGTFs. Sufficient sea access, air space and maneuver space capacities with rail access, explosives safety arcs, and staging areas must be preserved.
- Air assets must be geographically located to efficiently support the other MAGTF elements and utilize aviation and ground (particularly air-to-ground and combined arms) training ranges.
- While redundancy should be minimized, sufficient infrastructure must be retained to support mobilization, and conduct core roles and missions (sea-based ops, combined arms, etc) – never sacrifice effectiveness for efficiency (e.g. self encroachment) and avoid potential for single points of failure.
- Preserve training infrastructure capabilities to support future weapons platforms, advances in technology, anticipated developments in doctrine and tactics (especially in the areas of live fire and combined arms training), and maintain sufficient buffer areas to minimize future encroachment pressures. Ensure adequate capacity to train in different environments (e.g. mountain, desert, cold weather, etc).

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- Preserve sufficient organic core maintenance capabilities and infrastructure for mission essential equipment, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, and supply/maintenance reach back support for sea-based logistics.
- Medical capabilities (manning, logistics, training, and facilities) must be integral with the MAGTF and must retain sufficient reach back infrastructure to ensure the continuum of care for the operating forces and sufficient additional organic capacity for the supporting establishment and Service member families.
- Ensure USMC intelligence infrastructure and capabilities are sustained.
- Reserve infrastructure must reflect demographics necessary to achieve recruiting requirements/presence, but should minimize facility ownership to the maximum extent practicable.

**Marine Corps Strategic Equities/Imperatives (Processes):**

- Marine Corps must maintain ownership/scheduling authority for training ranges/maneuver areas deemed essential for meeting MAGTF, unit and individual training standard requirements. In establishing the appropriate acreage and type of training areas for retention, consider the additional costs associated with training on Test/Evaluation ranges.
- Marine Corps must maintain ownership of accredited educational institutions to develop its officer and enlisted Marines, in addition to developing associated doctrinal concepts and wargaming/simulation experimentation.
- Preserve inherent capabilities where Marine Corps concepts of operations differ from other Services (e.g. MALS support to the FR 3s differs from Navy IMAs).
- Entry-level training will always remain a Marine Corps core competency.
- Maintain sufficient Marine Corps acquisition capacity to ensure retention of capability to define/validate/acquire Service-unique requirements and provide for these in joint systems acquisition processes.
- Where they can provide best value, maximize utilization of DLA for provision of non-organic supply, storage and distribution requirements.
- Retain sufficient organic maintenance, supply and distribution capability to support developing sea-basing concepts.
- Consider opportunities to minimize ownership, management and support chains of command (e.g. intermediate headquarters for specific functions such as installations management, supply chains, etc.).
- Ensure Marine Corps equities are maintained in all efforts to generate efficiencies through combining functions/processes across services.
- Retain focus on retention of a sufficient medical personnel pipeline to ensure full medical capabilities integral to the MAGTF.
- Where functions/processes are being considered for joint cross-service integration, ensure effective/proven IT support can be achieved within the six year BRAC decision implementation window.
- Maintain sufficient capability to provide sea-shore rotation where functions are being considered for joint-cross service consolidation.
- Consider force protection in all realignment/closure recommendations.

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