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From: Co-Chairs, Infrastructure Evaluation Group  
To: Distribution

Subj: DON CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BRAC 2005 PROCESS

Ref: (a) SECNAVNOTE 11000 dtd 9 Mar 04  
(b) SECNAV Memo dtd 16 Mar 04  
(c) USD (AT&L) Memo dtd 20 Apr 04

Encl: (1) DON Basing and Infrastructure Considerations

1. The Secretary of the Navy's policy guidance regarding the conduct of the BRAC 2005 process within the Department of the Navy (reference (a)) incorporated the development of policy imperatives within the proposed timeline and plan of action. To that end, the Secretary requested the Navy and Marine Corps to submit service imperatives that would be synthesized and consolidated into overarching Departmental imperatives and used to inform the key DON personnel participating in the BRAC 2005 process (reference (b)).

2. This effort within the Department was subsumed within the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) initiative to develop overarching principles and imperatives (reference (c)). That ISG initiative culminated in a decision that the BRAC principles sufficiently enumerate essential elements of military judgment, and that mandating use of imperatives as absolute limitations on results was unnecessary and potentially too constraining.

3. Notwithstanding this decision by the ISG, the SECNAV guidance still contains a requirement for the Navy and Marine Corps to articulate policy issues and basic principles that either directly, or in a substantial manner indirectly, dictate Department basing and infrastructure requirements. The process used to respond to the ISG principles and imperatives initiative allowed us to focus on important issues regarding the infrastructure required to support current and future Department needs. As such, we have determined it is most appropriate to use the work product from the ISG initiative to begin to satisfy the Department's internal tasking.

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Attached is a compilation of the key considerations deemed important by the Navy and Marine Corps leadership that should guide and inform your efforts as you continue internal and external BRAC discussions and deliberations.



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## **DON Basing and Infrastructure Considerations**

- Strive to preserve access to air, land, and sea areas and facilities (to include wargaming/simulation/experimentation) in the following environments: cold weather, tropical weather, swamps, littoral, mountainous, and desert conditions with operationally efficient access and proximity to meet current and future Service and Joint training/test/operational requirements for both Active and Reserve Component forces and weapons systems.
- For major Carrier Strike Group/ Expeditionary Strike Group/Maritime Prepositioning Group level exercises, ranges/OPAREAs with air, sea and over the shore maneuver space should be within operationally efficient proximity, generally defined as within 3 underway days for the Groups. For individual unit training, ranges and operating areas should be within an approximate distance of 6 underway hours for ships, 12 underway hours for submarines, and 1 un-refueled sortie for aircraft.
- Fleet Replacement and Operational Squadrons (with the exception of Reserve Squadrons) should not be located outside operationally efficient proximity (e.g. farther than one un-refueled leg) from DoD-scheduled airspace, ranges, targets, low-level routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.
- Undergraduate flight training should be located separately from operational squadrons.
- DON specific initial skills training should be located with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities, and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements.
- DON specific skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms should be located in Fleet concentration areas.
- DON requires a center for Naval strategic thought, and joint and coalition maritime security policy innovation.
- DON requires access to relevant educational programs that include specific focus on those areas that are uniquely maritime, and reflect concepts of expeditionary deployment/employment. Military student admission requirements should complement military personnel management practices.
- Infrastructure and all elements of the MAGTF should be geographically positioned to enhance training, maintenance and deployment of Marine Forces as MAGTFs. This necessitates considerations of retaining/acquiring sufficient sea access, air space, air-

to-ground training ranges and maneuver areas, for training and deployment purposes; preserving necessary rail access, explosives safety arcs, and staging areas.

- Consider needs of operational/non-operational (sea-shore) rotation in assessing sufficient capacity.
- Where practicable, organizations in leased space should be moved into available space on DoD installations, exclusive of recruiting activities.
- DON will maintain reserve component presence in every state.
- The Navy Reserve should become fully integrated with active forces, located to leverage pooled equipment and training facilities. Reserve presence priority is: 1) active duty commands, 2) joint reserve facilities, 3) naval reserve activity.
- DON should maintain the minimum required corporate science and technology capability, consisting of intellectual capital and facilities, to explore new and emerging technologies for naval warfare across the air, land, and maritime operating environment.
- DON should preserve the minimum required non-renewable infrastructure (i.e. air, land, sea, and space ranges and frequency spectrum) sufficient to ensure the successful RDTE&A, life-cycle support of emerging and existing technologies and capabilities for maritime operating environments and individual, team, and unit training.
- To minimize family disruption, strive to place ship maintenance capabilities close to the Fleet to:
  - Dry dock CVNs and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific.
  - Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear-powered ships.
  - Dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor compartments.
- DON should seek to preserve minimum organic maintenance, supply and distribution capability to represent Naval requirements (all classes of supply), integrate logistics support for Naval forces, acquire appropriate support for Navy and Marine Corps unique material, and preserve service-specific capabilities (e.g. MALS support to the FRSS, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, Navy IMAs, reach back support for sea-based logistics, etc).
- DON seeks a depot maintenance industrial complex that delivers best value cradle-to-grave results in cost-efficiency (total unit cost), responsiveness (schedule compliance and flexibility), and quality (compliance with specifications).

- DON needs continued capability to engineer, produce, maintain, and handle ordnance and energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment.
- Fleet basing capabilities should be dispersed to preclude a single major debilitating, attack within the Global War on Terror and support the Fleet Response Plan and Sea-basing concepts. This means retaining at a minimum:
  - CVN (Nuclear Carrier) capability: 2 East Coast ports, 2 West Coast ports, and 2 forward-based in the Pacific.
  - SSBN (Nuclear Submarine Ballistic Missile) basing: 1 East Coast port, 1 West Coast port.
  - MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) and rotary wing aircraft located within one unrefueled sortie from overwater training areas.
  - CLF (Combat Logistics Force) capability: 1 East Coast and 1 West Coast base that minimize explosive safety risks and eliminate waiver requirements.
- Seek to preserve and align sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training and facilities) integral to the operational forces, as well as an efficient reach back system to ensure the continuum of care for those operating forces and their families.
- Seek to maintain sufficient organic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/analytic infrastructure to meet warfighting and acquisition requirements, while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.