



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000
DCN:5477

MN-0177
IAT/REV
22 July 2004

MEMORANDUM

Subj: MINUTES OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP (IEG)
MEETING OF 15 JULY 2004

Encl: (1) 15 July 2004 IEG Meeting Agenda
(2) ASN (I&E) Memo of 8 July 2004
(3) DASN (IS&A) Memo of 9 July 2004
(4) ASN (I&E) Memo of 8 July 2004
(5) DASN (IS&A) Memo of 23 June 2004
(6) SECNAV Memo of 14 July 2004
(7) Recording Secretary's Report of IEG Deliberations
on 15 July 2004

1. The thirty-sixth meeting of the Department of the Navy (DON) Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) was convened at 0934 on 15 July 2004 in the Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) conference room located at Crystal Plaza 6, 9th floor. The following members of the IEG were present: Mr. H. T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment (ASN(I&E)), Chair; Ms. Anne R. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis (DASN(IS&A)), Vice Chair; Ms. Ariane Whittemore, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4), serving as alternate for VADM Charles W. Moore, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4), Member; Mr. Thomas R. Crabtree, Director Fleet Training (N7A), U.S. Fleet Forces Command, serving as alternate for VADM Albert H. Konetzni Jr., USN, Deputy and Chief of Staff, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Member; Ms. Carla Liberatore, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (I&L), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, serving as alternate for LtGen Richard L. Kelly, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (I&L), Member; RMDL Mark T. Emerson, USN, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation (AVN), serving as alternate for LtGen Michael A. Hough, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation (AVN), Member; Mr. Nicholas J. Kunesh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Logistics, serving as alternate for Dr. Michael F. McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development Test & Evaluation (DASN(RDT&E)), Member; Mr. Robert T. Cali, Assistant General

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Counsel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA), Member; Mr. Ronnie J. Booth, Navy Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC), Representative; Mr. Thomas N. Ledvina, Navy Office of General Counsel (OGC), Representative; Mr. David W. LaCroix, Senior Counsel, Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis; CDR Robert E. Vincent II, JAGC, USN, Recorder; and, Capt James A. Noel, USMC, Recorder.

2. The following members of the IAT were also present: Mr. Dennis Biddick, Chief of Staff; CAPT Christopher T. Nichols, USN; CAPT Jason A. Leaver, USN; CAPT Gene A. Summerlin II, USN; Col Joseph R. Kennedy, USMCR; LtCol Terri E. Erdag, USMC; CDR Joseph E. Arleth, USN; CDR Margaret M. Carlson, JAGC, USN; CDR Jennifer R. Flather, SC, USN; Ms. Cathy E. Oaxaca-Hoote; and Ms. Sueann Henderson. All attendees were provided enclosures (1) through (6). Ms. Davis presented the minutes from the 8 July 2004 IEG meeting for review and they were approved.

3. Ms. Davis provided updates on the following matters:

a. BRAC Principles. On 8 July 2004, ASN (I&E) forwarded DON concurrence on the revised BRAC Principles to OSD. Enclosure (2) pertains. OSD plans to forward the draft BRAC Principles to the IEC for coordination within the next two weeks.

b. BRAC Imperatives. Enclosure (3) contains DON's consolidated comments concerning draft BRAC Imperatives. DON comments included recommendations to (1) reword some draft imperatives in order to cast them as a positive goal, rather than a negative prohibition; (2) insert draft imperatives that would appropriately limit JCSG analysis in order to ensure Services' requirements and responsibilities are maintained; and, (3) delete draft imperatives that would establish unnecessary constraints or are so overly broad that the draft imperative would prohibit almost any action. After reviewing the comments and recommendations submitted by the JCSGs and the Services, OSD met with the Services on 14 July 2004 in order to reconcile differences and prepare a final draft. OSD plans to review the final draft BRAC Imperatives with the Services on 16 July 2004. The ISG will review the final draft BRAC Imperatives at its 23 July 2004 meeting.

c. BRAC Transformational Options (TOs). As enclosure (4) indicates, DON submitted consolidated comments concerning the proposed TOs. DON provided comments concerning the draft TOs, provided additional TOs for consideration, and recommended that

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the JCSGs and Services discuss the TOs prior to submission to the ISG.

d. Naval Audit Service Review. Mr. Ronnie Booth, NAVAUDSVC Representative, used enclosure (5) to brief the IEG concerning NAVAUDSVC's initial review of the BRAC 2005 Data Call #1 responses for 61 naval activities. Mr. Booth noted that the field auditors were primarily concerned that field activities did not always retain supporting records in order to document the source of Data Call #1 responses. Mr. Booth explained that NAVAUDSVC is providing a list of concerns to local field activity command personnel without issuing a formal audit report. Mr. Booth informed the IEG that the Joint Audit Planning Group (JAPG) met on 14 July 2004 and expressed its satisfaction with the DON BRAC process to date.

e. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Ms. Davis informed the IEG that she met with Government Accountability Office, formerly known as General Accounting Office, personnel on 13 July 2004. The GAO representatives indicated that they are satisfied with their access to naval records concerning the BRAC 2005 process.

4. Mr. Johnson informed the IEG that his resignation as ASN (I&E) was effective 16 July 2004 and, accordingly, this was his final IEG meeting. He provided enclosure (6) to the IEG and noted that SECNAV appointed Ms. Davis as Special Assistant to SECNAV for all matters associated with BRAC 2005. In that capacity, she will serve as the replacement for ASN (I&E) on the ISG, with the same authorities and responsibilities. Additionally, SECNAV reconstructed the membership of the IEG and established the DON Analysis Group (DAG), a decision-making body subordinate to the IEG. Ms. Davis informed the IEG that she and Dave LaCroix would review DON BRAC policy documentation and prepare appropriate implementation documentation for SECNAV's signature.

5. The IEG moved into deliberative session at 1006. See enclosure (7). The next meeting of the IEG is scheduled for Thursday, 22 July 2004. The meeting adjourned at 1144.


Anne Rathmell Davis
Vice-Chair, IEG

TAB 1



Infrastructure Evaluation Group

15 July 2004
0930-1230
Crystal Plaza 6, 9th Floor

Meeting called by: Chairman Recorder: CDR Vincent

----- Agenda Topics -----

Review and approve minutes of IEG Meeting of Ms. Davis
8 July 04

Status Updates : Ms Davis

- Principles
- Imperatives
- Transformational Options
- Audit Report Corrective Action Ron Booth

Deliberative Session: All

- Criterion 8 (Environmental Impact)
Methodology
- Ground Ops Training Follow-up
- DON specific HSA
 - Regional Support Military Value
Follow-up
- DON specific E&T Capacity
 - Officer Accessions
 - Professional Military Education (PME)
 - Issues/Decision Points
 - Surge

Administrative Ms. Davis

- Next meeting 22 July 04, 0930-1230

Other Information

Draft minutes of 8 July 04 IEG meeting provided.
Read ahead for deliberative discussions.

TAB 2



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

08 Jul 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

Subj: MILITARY VALUE PRINCIPLES

Ref: (a) USD(AT&L) memo of 30 Jun 04

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I have reviewed the Proposed BRAC Principles as provided in the attachment to reference (a) and formally concur with them as written.

I appreciate the opportunity to finalize this important step in the BRAC process.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "HT Johnson", is positioned above the printed name.

H. T. Johnson



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JUN 30, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS

Subject: Military Value Principles

At our June 25th meeting, we agreed to coordinate in writing on the draft principles which were the subject of this meeting. These principles are provided at the attachment. I would appreciate receiving your formal concurrence and comments by July 9, 2004, so that we can expeditiously provide them to the Infrastructure Executive Council for its deliberation.

I appreciate the attention you and your staff have given this effort.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael W. Wynne".

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment:
As stated



Proposed BRAC Principles
(As of June 25, 2004 after the ISG Meeting)

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel that are highly skilled and educated and have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place, that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

TAB 3



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

9 July 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, OSD BRAC OFFICE

Subj: REVIEW OF DRAFT BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)
IMPERATIVES

Encl: (1) DON Comments on Proposed Draft Imperatives

Attached is the Department of the Navy (DON) additional input on the draft BRAC Imperatives forwarded to the Chairmen of the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) by the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) memo dated 2 July 2004. I thoroughly reviewed these imperatives at a meeting this morning attended by DON Infrastructure Steering Groups (ISG) and JCSG representatives, and the input represents the Department's position. To the extent this input conflicts with comments received from the JCSG Chairmen or other Military Departments, our ISG members request those items be specifically discussed at the next ISG meeting.

In several cases, we have recommended rewording imperatives to cast them as a positive goal, rather than as a negative prohibition. We recommend all of the imperatives be reviewed to see if they can be so written, since the meaning of some appears to be lost by the reverse drafting. We recognize that, as modeling constraints, the imperatives may need to be cast as prohibitions on inclusion or exclusion of certain activities, but do not think it generally clear or helpful to write the entire set of imperatives in the negative.

We also are including in the attachment some imperatives that could act as limits on the JCSG analysis. While we fully support the JCSG process as a means to ensure thorough analysis, and thus understand the need for an imperative criterion that seeks to preserve joint cross service analysis, we also believe parameters should be set to ensure that analysis will fully consider the Services' requirements and responsibilities. Imperatives are one way to establish such boundaries. If there is a perceived over-limitation in our suggested imperatives, our ISG members request those items be specifically discussed at the next ISG meeting.

Finally, there are a number of imperatives we have recommended deleting. In some cases, the recommendation is based on a view that an explicit imperative (at least as currently written) just is not a necessary constraint. In other cases, we have recommended deletion because the imperative as written appears so broad that it could be construed to prohibit almost any action. We suggest that, if those imperatives suggested for deletion are revised to state them as a positive goal, they be re-reviewed to see whether they are necessary imperatives.

Subj: REVIEW OF DRAFT BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)
IMPERATIVES

The Department of the Navy appreciates the opportunity to review these draft Imperatives and provide input. I look forward to working with your office to compile a final package for ISG review.



Anne Rathmell Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy
(Infrastructure Strategy & Analysis)

Copy to:
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics)

Principles and Corresponding Imperatives

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel that are highly skilled and educated and that have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support the Army's Leader Development and Assessment Course and Leader's Training Course.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to meet both peacetime and wartime aviation training requirements, including undergraduate and graduate pilot training.

DON Comment: Delete - statement of inherent mission.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that fails to preserve additional training areas in CONUS where operational units can conduct company or higher-level training when home station training areas are not available due to the training load or environmental concerns.

DON Comment: Concur

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the only remaining training environments designed to support airborne, air assault, urban operations, cold weather training, Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) training in the United States, combat formations for full spectrum operations to include obscurant training and electro-magnetic operations, MAGTFs, live fire and combined arms training, and chemical live agent training.

DON Comment: This needs to be written in the "positive." Idea necessary to capture is not to just have "one each" but to maintain sufficient capacity to ensure access to all required training environments when needed. Just having "one each" doesn't necessarily provide the required capacity.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to conduct graduate medical/dental education (GME/GDE) and clinical training for uniformed medics.

DON Comment: Delete.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates Navy or Marine Corps Fleet Replacement Squadrons and Operational Squadrons outside operationally efficient proximity (e.g., for the Department of the Navy, farther than one un-refueled sortie) from DoD-scheduled airspace, ranges, targets, lowlevel routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.

DON Comment: Make an exception for Reserve Squadrons because they operate differently. Change “sortie” to “leg” which allows ability to base some aircraft further from coast. Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates Navy or Marine Corps Fleet Replacement Squadrons and Operational Squadrons (with the exception of Reserve Squadrons) outside operationally efficient proximity (e.g., for the Department of the Navy, farther than one un-refueled leg) from DoD-scheduled airspace, ranges, targets, low level routes, outlying fields and over-water training airspace with access to aircraft carrier support.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the organic capability for Service specific Strategic Thought and Joint and Coalition Security Policy Innovation.

DON Comment: Keep as is.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates undergraduate flight training with operational squadrons or within high air traffic areas.

DON Comment: Delete “high traffic areas.” Definition problematic and JCSG includes distance from major airports in MilVal analysis, therefore safety

concerns will be addressed as part of military value, which includes military judgment. Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates undergraduate flight training with operational squadrons.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the organizational independence of training units from combat units.

DON Comment: Delete or reword to make Service specific (Air Force) Imperative, i.e. "... organizational independence of AF training units from combat units."

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates undergraduate Navy or Marine Corps flight training without access to DoD-scheduled airspace over open water and land with access to aircraft carrier support.

DON Comment: Delete - considered too restrictive.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates major CSG / ESG level exercises, ranges / OPAREAs more than 3 underway days from air, sea and over the shore maneuver space or that locates individual operational ships and aircraft more than 6 underway hours for ships, 12 underway hours for submarines, and 1 un-refueled sortie for aircraft, from unimpeded access to ranges and operating areas.

DON Comment: Change "more than" to "outside operationally efficient proximity, considering..." Follows wording of above Imperative on aviation basing and allows more flexibility. Delete specific time requirements. Add "MPG" to "CSG/ESG." Spell acronyms. Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that locates Carrier Strike Groups / Expeditionary Strike Groups / Maritime Pre-positioning Groups outside operationally efficient proximity from ranges and OPAREAs with air, sea and over the shore maneuver space for major level exercises, measured in underway days, while individual operational ships and aircraft will need unimpeded access to ranges and operating areas considering

underway hours for ships and submarines, and an un-refueled sortie for aircraft.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates a Service's ability to provide timely responses to military contingencies or support RC mobilization, institutional training, and collective training because of insufficient infrastructure, maneuver space, and ranges.

DON Comment: Too broad. Needs to be made Service specific (not joint), combine with below or delete.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that fails to retain access to sufficient training area (air, land, and sea) and facilities across a wide variety of topography and climatic conditions (e.g., cold weather, swamps, mountains, desert, etc.) with operationally efficient access and proximity to meet current and future Service and Joint training requirements for both Active and Reserve Component forces and weapons systems.

DON Comment: Include adding, "capacity", "scheduling" and "wargaming/simulation/experimentation." Recommendation:

The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that fails to retain access to sufficient training area capacity (air, land, and sea) and facilities (to include wargaming/simulation/experimentation) across a wide variety of topography and climatic conditions (e.g., cold weather, swamps, mountains, desert, etc.) with operationally efficient access and proximity to meet current and future Service and Joint training scheduling requirements for both Active and Reserve Component forces and weapons systems.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates access to educational programs which include specific focus on those areas which are uniquely related to distinctive Service capabilities (e.g., maritime, land warfare).

DON Comment: Add "expeditionary deployment/employment" to examples of distinctive Service capabilities. Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that

eliminates access to educational programs which include specific focus on those areas which are uniquely related to distinctive Service capabilities (e.g., maritime, expeditionary deployment/employment, land warfare).

- Fleet concentration areas will provide Navy skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms whenever possible.

DON Comment: Make read Navy “specific” skills and delete “whenever possible.” Recommendation:

Navy specific skills progression training and functional skills training relevant to homeported platforms will be located in Fleet concentration areas.

- Navy initial skills training will be located with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements.

DON Comment: Make Navy “specific” skills. Recommendation:

Navy specific initial skills training will be located with accessions training to minimize student moves or with skills progression training to allow cross-utilization of instructors, facilities and equipment, and support future training and efficiency improvements.

The following is a recommended addition to the list of imperatives to be considered. This imperative was originally submitted and considered for deletion because it was thought to be captured elsewhere. We are submitting a revised version for inclusion.

DON adds: Marine Corps had following Imperative which was not fully captured in Army Imperatives that became Joint:

Geographically position infrastructure and all elements of the MAGTF to enhance training, maintenance and deployment of Marine Forces as MAGTFs. This necessitates retaining/acquiring sufficient and dispersed sea access, air space, air-to-ground training ranges and maneuver areas, for training and deployment purposes; preserving necessary rail access, explosives safety arcs, and staging areas.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, to include quality of work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates access to housing, medical, career progression services, child development services, spousal employment services, MWR services, or education.

DON Comment: Delete as written. Turning this into a positive statement may warrant inclusion.

- Maintain sufficient capacity to provide operational-non-operational (sea-shore) rotation.

DON Comment: Delete. Internal Service implementation concern.

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that take advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that removes the Headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy (including the Commandant of the Marine Corps), or the Department of the Air Force from the National Capital Region.

DON Comment: Add, “ core elements of” or some other phrase that isn’t all inclusive. Best defined in a positive way. As originally stated this limits the ability of H&SA JCSG to evaluate HQ elements in Washington area.

Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that removes core elements of the Headquarters of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy (including the Commandant of the Marine Corps), or the Department of the Air Force from the National Capital Region.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to station existing Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters, Major Army Command (MACOM) headquarters, and United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) headquarters in the United States.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the last remaining Navy presence (excluding recruiters) in a state.

DON Comment: Make reserve specific and add Marine Corps so as comparable with Army/Air Force Guard. Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the last remaining Navy and/or Marine Corps Reserve presence in a state.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment that prohibits fulfilling the air sovereignty protection site and response criteria requirements stipulated by COMNORTHCOM and COMPACOM.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates START Treaty land-based strategic deterrent.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support the Army's modular force initiative, the Navy's Global Concept of Operations force initiative, the USMC's expeditionary maneuver warfare initiatives, and the USAF's 10 fully- and equally-capable AEFs.

DON Comment: Delete. Too broad.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to support surge, mobilization, continuity of operations, evacuations for natural disasters, or conduct core roles and missions (e.g., sea-based operations, combined arms, etc.).

DON Comment: Needs to be written in the positive.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment involving joint basing unless it increases average military value or decreases the cost for the same military value, when compared to the status quo.

DON Comment: Delete - determine in analysis.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and netcentric warfare.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army's single headquarters organizational structure that combines responsibility for developmental and operational test and evaluation.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that does not provide RDT&E infrastructure and laboratory capabilities to attract, train, and retain talent in emerging science and engineering fields.

DON Comment: Concur.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army, Navy, and Air Force RDT&E capability necessary to support technologies and systems integral to the conduct of Land, Maritime, and Air warfare, respectively.

DON Comment: Rewritten to capture content of original DON input:

The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment that does not preserve the minimum required non-renewable infrastructure (i.e. air, land, sea, and space ranges and frequency spectrum) sufficient to ensure: successful RDTE&A and life-cycle support of emerging and existing technologies; capabilities for expeditionary, maritime, air and land operating environments; and individual, team, and unit training.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates ship maintenance capabilities to:

- Dry dock CVNs and submarines on both coasts and in the central Pacific.
- Refuel/de-fuel/inactivate nuclear-powered ships.
- Dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor compartments.

DON Comment: Concur.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Department of the Navy lead for engineering, producing, maintaining, and handling ordnance and energetic materials designed specifically for the maritime environment.

DON Comment: Concur.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability of a Service to define its requirements (all classes of supply), integrate its logistics support, and acquire appropriate support for its unique material.

DON Comment: Concur.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates inherent Service capabilities where concepts of operations differ from other Services (e.g. MALS support to the FRSSs, deployable intermediate maintenance support for MPS equipment, Navy IMAs, reach back support for sea-based logistics, etc).

DON Comment: Concur.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that creates a single point of failure in logistics operations.

DON Comment: Concur, but needs discussion.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the last remaining strategic distribution platforms on the east and west coast.

DON Comment: Delete this as covered in previous Imperative.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates distribution support services at Component depot maintenance activities.

DON Comment: Delete - analysis should determine.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates logistics information management and oversight capabilities:

- Data standardization
- Information routing
- Supply chain efficiency information capture

DON Comment: Rewrite in the positive.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates needed organic industrial capabilities to produce, sustain, surge, and reconstitute if those capabilities are not commercially available or capable of being privatized.

DON Comment: Delete or be specific.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that

eliminates access to ammunition storage facilities which will not complete planned chemical demilitarization before 2011.

DON Comment: Shouldn't this be written specific for Army?

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army lead for life cycle materiel management of systems integral to the conduct of Joint expeditionary land warfare.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to move hazardous and/or sensitive cargos (e.g., ammunition).

DON Comment: Delete or make Service specific (Army). Not clearly understood.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates critical production capabilities that cannot be readily rebuilt or expanded during mobilization and reconstitution or commercially duplicated, as well as capabilities to replenish stockpiles.

DON Comment: Delete. Don't understand how to analyze.

- DON requires a depot maintenance industrial complex that delivers best value cradle-to-grave results in cost-efficiency (total unit cost), responsiveness (schedule compliance and flexibility), and quality (compliance with specifications).

DON Comment: This could be made joint. Needs some more work/discussion to determine how to apply.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

- The Military Departments and JCSGs will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the Army's ability to simultaneously deploy, support, and rotate forces from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts in support of operational plans due to reduced quantities of, or reduced access to port facilities, local/national transportation assets (highways and railroad), and airfields or lack of information infrastructure reach back capabilities.

DON Comment: The following statement should be included in the above or captured as a separate imperative:

Preserve pre-positioning logistics support capabilities (port, industrial and staging facilities) to enable support of current and planned expansions in pre-positioning functions (both maritime and geo-positioning).

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to absorb overseas forces within the United States.

DON Comment: Delete

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to surge in support of mobilization requirements (e.g., National Defense contingency situations, national disasters, and other emergency requirements).

DON Comment: Delete

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that prohibits:

- Fleet basing that supports the Fleet Response Plan.

DON Comment: Add "Sea-basing."

Fleet basing that supports the Fleet Response Plan and Sea-basing concepts.

- CVN capability: 2 East Coast ports, 2 West Coast ports, and 2 forward-based in the Pacific.
- SSBN basing: 1 East Coast port, 1 West Coast port.
- MPA and rotary wings located within one un-refueled sortie from over water training areas.
- OLF capability to permit unrestricted fleet operations, including flight training, if home base does not allow.
- CLF capability: 1 East Coast and 1 West Coast base that minimize explosive safety risks and eliminate waiver requirements.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates unimpeded access to space (polar, equatorial, and inclined launch).
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that does not preserve:
 - two air mobility bases and one wide-body capable base on each coast to ensure mobility flow without adverse weather, capacity, or airfield incapacitation impacts; and
 - sufficient OCONUS mobility bases along the deployment routes to potential crisis areas to afford deployment of mobility aircraft.
- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to respond to reach back requests from forward deployed forces and forces at overseas main operating bases engaged in or in support of combatant commander contingency operations.

DON Comment: Delete or rewrite in the positive.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates the capability to provide missile warning and defense in the 2025 force.

- Align Naval Medicine's Military Treatment Facilities with Navy and Marine Corps force concentration for maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and to maximize operational medical support to the Fleet and Marine Corps.

DON Comment: Delete and combine with below imperative.

- Maintain sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training and facilities) integral to the MAGTF as well as reach back infrastructure to ensure the continuum of care for the operating forces and additional organic capacity for the supporting establishment and Service member families.

DON Comment: Delete and combine with above and replace these two imperatives with the following recommendation (applies to all, joint):

Maintain and align sufficient medical capacity (manning, logistics, training, and facilities) integral to the operational forces; as well as an efficient reach back system to ensure the continuum of care for those operating forces and their families.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

- The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates sufficient organic ISR/analytic capability to meet warfighting and acquisition requirements while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.

DON Comment: Change “capability” to “infrastructure.” Recommendation:

The Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups will not recommend to the Secretary any closure or realignment recommendation that eliminates sufficient organic ISR/analytic infrastructure to meet warfighting and acquisition requirements while effectively leveraging Joint and National intelligence capabilities.

TAB 4



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000 08 July 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BRAC 2005

Ref: (a) USD(AT&L) memo of 21 Jun 04

Encl: (1) DON Comments on Proposed Transformational Options
(2) DON Proposed Additional Transformational Options

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I have reviewed the proposed Transformational Options provided in the attachments to reference (a). We concur with the recommendation to eliminate from further consideration all of the inputs contained in Attachment 2 to the reference, since they are all either beyond the scope of the BRAC process or insufficiently defined to be effective as scenarios. Specific comments on the Transformational Options in Attachment 1 to the reference are contained in enclosure (1). However, we would like to offer the following general comments.

We understand that the intent of these Transformational Options is to ensure the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) thoroughly analyze options for reconfiguring our infrastructure, beyond mere capacity reductions. We also believe at least some Transformational Options should provide a forcing function to impel the search for innovative alternatives and consideration of options that lie beyond those that are easiest or most obvious. However, given the broad language used in some of the proposed Transformational Options, we are concerned that there is no apparent boundary to the number of options/scenarios that could result. Accordingly, recommend that, prior to SECDEF promulgation of the Transformational Options for analysis, each option be clearly defined as to scope and assignment. This will likely mean that each is translated into specific scenario taskers and assigned to specific Military Departments and/or JCSGs for analysis. In that way, we can satisfy ourselves, the Commission, and the public that we, in fact, did the analysis SECDEF has committed to do.

A number of the Transformational Options submitted last year appear to be restatements of the charter and scope of analysis that is currently underway within one or more of the JCSGs. We suggest that this analysis, with Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) oversight, is sufficient to meet SECDEF's stated intent, and that there is no need to separately publish a Transformational Option. The real concern is that the published Option may inadvertently exceed the scope of analysis ultimately conducted by a JCSG and approved by the ISG. This could put us in the position of having to explain to the Commission why we were unable to meet a SECDEF tasking, when the real mechanism to accomplish this is the entire ISG/JCSG process.

Additionally, we need to carefully review each of the Transformational Options to ensure we are collecting the data to be able to conduct the analysis required. Each of the JCSGs and the Military Departments has established its own scope of analysis, and built its data collection on that scope. While we are very supportive of ensuring a broad set of options is analyzed, we must be careful not to require analysis for which we have not captured the necessary data elements.

Finally, if we assume that each Transformational Option represents mandatory analysis of one or more scenarios, we should discuss what is the optimum number of Transformational Options we should recommend to SECDEF. We should expect each JCSG and Military Department to generate numerous scenarios arising from their own analysis. While we want to ensure thorough review of various alternatives, an unbounded number of scenarios resulting from the Transformational Options could result in more analytical work than the process can sustain.

As you have requested, we are taking this opportunity to provide additional Transformational Options for consideration. They are included in enclosure (2). We will be prepared to discuss in detail at the appropriate time.

Since the result of this review and input will be the development of a new set of Transformational Options, we suggest it could be useful to have that new product reviewed and discussed by the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the Joint Cross-Service Groups before it is provided to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) for review. As we have seen with the original Transformational Options, we may well get input at varying levels of detail and approach. A consolidated product that seeks to frame the Transformational Options in the same language could greatly facilitate the ISG's review.



H. T. Johnson

DON Comments on Proposed Transformational Options

Attachment 1 – Transformational Options That Can Be Translated Into Scenarios

1. Integrate Reserve Component elements with respective active and joint components. The value of locating Reserve facilities within the community must also be considered, given the role that Reserve activities play in strengthening the link between the armed forces and American society.

Recommendation: Delete. Use #30.

2. Examine optimizing and consolidating both advanced pilot training and maintenance training for similar platforms (e.g., joint training of the Joint Strike Fighter).

Recommendation: Too broad. Focus should be on specific joint platform, JSF. Replace with:

Examine co-location of graduate flight training and maintenance training for the Joint Strike Fighter at the same site forming an Integrated Training Center, versus co-locating multiple maintenance training functions at the same site.

3. Explore consolidating aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same bases. By exploring this joint basing concept, the Services may be able to station their CONUS mobility units/assets closer to planned air and sea ports of embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization. Co-locating Service special operations units, especially overseas, could further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities.

Recommendation: Although already being pursued in the JAST process, agree to formalizing inter-service efforts as follows (split into three different options):

Explore consolidating aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same base.

Explore the capability of the Services to station their CONUS mobility units/assets closer to planned air and seaports of embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization.

Co-location of Service special operations units could further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities

This could also foster the need to look at combining logistic support elements associated with the operational units.

4. Restructure and/or combine Service acquisition organizations. Significant gains in efficiency might be achieved by combining/merging/co-locating selected acquisition activities. Among

these, consider transforming service-specific product centers into jointly-managed centers for items such as avionics, aeronautics and other weapons.

Recommendation: Do not consider Service acquisition organizations in total. Refocus and replace this option as follows:

Restructure and/or combine Service RDT&E acquisition organizations.

5. Restructure/combine Service training activities and organizations. There is a broad range of possible opportunities in this area. Explore consolidating/co-locating our commissioning sources or combining/co-locating Service professional military education (PME) schools at the intermediate and senior levels. Consider combining/merging Service specific test pilot schools. Combining the Services' range management offices into one joint management office could not only reduce overhead, but it could produce more efficient use of a precious DoD resource.

Recommendation: Needs to be rewritten and divided into separate TO's. Some of the language is already basic to the charter of the E&T JCSG. Do not recommend including consolidation and/or co-location of commissioning source programs – cultural issue that should be preserved. The two options that can be explored are:

Combine/co-locate Service professional military education at intermediate and senior levels.

Combine/merge Service specific test pilot schools.

6. Examine the redistribution of strategic lift assets to facilitate rapid deployment to the war fight from both east and west coasts.

Recommendation: Insert the following:

“... strategic air lift...”

7. Co-locate federal, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services. Opportunities for co-location will most likely present themselves in municipal settings where federal installations already exist, and sufficient adjacent infrastructure is available. If no permanent installations exist then collocation could occur entirely through a leasing agreement. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) must remain a key consideration when evaluating alternatives to relocate/co-locate various facilities. It is imperative that we balance the benefits and risks associated with any effort to transform DoD infrastructure/bases.

Recommendation: Change to include only the following:

Co-locate Defense Agencies, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services.

8. Consider outsourcing all graduate education, to include Service War Colleges to private colleges/ universities -- or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites. Leverage distance learning to reduce residential requirements.

Recommendation: Change to; “Consider providing graduate education, except Service War Colleges, at private colleges/universities or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites.”

9. Consolidate/privatize common specialty training. The Army Engineering School at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO may be a good model of multi-service training with contract instructors.

Recommendation: Delete. Consolidation review is already an action for the E&T JCSG. Do not recommend including privatization initiatives as part of BRAC for common specialty training.

10. Establish Centers of Excellence with joint or inter-service training, i.e., combining common or similar instructional institutions (e.g., Judge Advocate General Schools) to form a “DoD University” with satellites training sites or provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions.

Recommendation: Probably already included in E&T, focus on professional development analysis. May be written as follows:

Establish Joint Centers of Excellence for common professional training schools (e.g Judge Advocate General School) to form a “DoD University.”

11. Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, basic flight training -- helo, prop, and jet). Similarly, aircraft type training for common airframes (e.g., Osprey, H-60, C-130, JSF, etc.) should be consolidated at a minimum number of joint sites -- or single joint site.

Recommendation: Delete. Part of the basic charter of the E&T JCSG. If included, change to; “Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, undergraduate flight training including UAVs). Similarly, graduate level training for the Joint Strike Fighter should be considered for consolidation. Other aircraft with similar training requirements common to two or more Services either are scheduled for decommissioning or are already subject to joint training agreements.”

12. Consolidate Services’ common functions: supply, medical, legal, religious programs.

Recommendation: Delete, too broad as stated. Legal and religious programs already excluded from review. Supply and Storage JCSG already looking at the supply function, Medical JCSG also to some extent doing the same according to their charter.

13. Evaluate Joint Service Installation Management by Region vice Service.

Recommendation: Delete. To extent practical under this BRAC round, H&SA JCSG already is reviewing.

14. Consolidate Base Installation Maintenance Requirements by geographic area.

Recommendation: Delete. To extent practical under this BRAC round, H&SA already is reviewing.

15. Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Consider all seven elements of the RC structure. The focus of the analysis will be on the requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations supporting Reserve and National Guard administrative and headquarters functions, excluding state owned and/or controlled facilities of the National Guard. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

Recommendation: Change to:

Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

16. Identify alternative concepts for realigning mobilization facilities DoD-wide. This analysis should focus on requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard Components of all Services to mobilize, prepare, train, deploy, and sustain forces committed to combat operations, whether overseas or in the US.

Alternatives to consider include:

- (1) Establishment and consolidation of mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, deploy, and train service members.
- (2) Establishment of joint pre-deployment (e.g. personnel processing) centers.

Recommendation: Change to:

(1) Establish and consolidate mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, train and deploy service members.

(2) Establish of joint pre-deployment/re-deployment processing sites.

17. Evaluate DoD headquarters and support activities in the National Capital Region (NCR).

This analysis should focus on the OSD Staff and activities; Joint Staff and activities; service

headquarters staffs and their field operating agencies; staff support activities; and direct supporting units, service commands, and Defense agencies and their missions, functions and facilities, owned or leased in the NCR. Analysis opportunities may include:

- (1) Assessment of the need for the presence of these activities in the NCR and options for realignment out of the NCR.
- (2) Elimination of all leased space in the NCR.
- (3) Examination of the potential for consolidation of joint and service activities in the NCR as a base cluster.

Recommendation: Change to:

Assess the need for headquarters, commands and activities to be located within 100 miles of the Pentagon. Evaluation will include analysis of realignment of those organizations found to be eligible to move to DoD-owned space outside of the 100-miles radius.

18. Eliminate all leased space occupied by DoD organizations within the United States. Growing concerns for force protection, in addition to lease costs, make this an emerging issue and important issue for review. Several types of agencies, i.e. recruiting offices, could be excluded from the analysis.

Recommendation: Change to:

Minimize need for leased space, excluding those functions that need to operate in non-federal facilities, e.g. recruiting storefronts

19. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) activities and locations. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Potential issues include:
 - (1) Establishment of a single executive agent for military ATC.
 - (2) Regionalization and/or consolidation of ATC.

Recommendation: Delete. Not sure this is a BRAC action to realign function without a clear understanding of it facility component or savings potential

20. Identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through inter-service agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series - Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Assess the potential for the increased sharing of bases on an inter-service or intra-service basis to maximize the use of available training ranges and other facilities.

The analysis would determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches \$1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide

view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function. (GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

Recommendation: Delete (consolidation of service contracts not a BRAC issue). H&SA JCSG already looking at the practicality of consolidation of installation management in select areas.

21. Examine DoD human resources management processes and locations. Potential issues include:

- (1) Consolidation of military personnel agencies at one location.
- (2) Consolidation of civilian personnel agencies at one or several locations.
- (3) Joint regionalization of civilian personnel agencies.

Recommendation: OK. Add:

(4) Consolidation of military/civilian personnel agencies within Services

22. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP). While the Navy has a single inventory control point located at two sites, there is an opportunity for significant consolidation of ICPs by all Services. For example, the Air Force has three independent ICPs, each located at their Air Logistics Centers. Consolidating them to a single ICP would permit reduced overhead and headquarters staffing as well streamlining of business practices. However, such a course of action may also include some costs and loss of efficiencies, including union issues, loss of skilled workforce, and the loss of direct interface with customers located at/near ICPs that will no longer exist.

Recommendation: Change and view as two options:

- Evaluate the consolidation of ICP into a single ICP within each Service
- Evaluate the opportunity to consolidate and make joint ICP's

23. Realign Signals Intelligence Exploitation & Production Centers. This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and signals intelligence systems. Combatant Commanders require Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) as a key component of a multi-source intelligence picture. The joint Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs) and service airborne Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) systems represent two of the primary SIGINT assets that meet the Combatant Commander's varied intelligence needs. Under the current force alignment, the RSOCs and remoting-capable airborne ISR assets are not located together; the two asset types maintain completely independent exploitation & production centers, maintenance support, and management staff, even when remoting technologies would enable consolidation of such resources. By consolidating the ground systems and staff for the airborne ISR resources with the RSOCs, the Department of Defense can improve the intelligence support to the war fighter while achieving notable efficiencies in infrastructure and personnel resources. These changes will advance the Department toward the goals of

achieving information superiority and providing integrated, globally available, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities, as directed in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint Vision 2020.

Recommendation: Delete.

24. **Realign Intelligence Support Capabilities.** This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and airborne intelligence systems. Enabling decision superiority through timely intelligence relies on more than advanced reconnaissance technology. Skilled people are the secret ingredient. The collected data can only be transformed into meaningful intelligence when people with world-class linguistic and analytic skills have access to the reconnaissance systems. Accurate forecasts of sensor deployments to different geographic regions are required if each ISR system must maintain an independent analysis and production center. Such forecasting has proven difficult. Furthermore, the current force alignment dilutes mission-critical skills between several geographic locations, creates potential operational discontinuities as intelligence support requirements change, and results in greater overall manpower needs and infrastructure costs. Consolidating ISR ground system operations for the U-2 and RC-12 platforms with the RSOCs not only mitigates these drawbacks of the current posture but also gains new capabilities in providing global, persistent surveillance.

Recommendation: Delete.

25. **Evaluate the Defense, Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) operations.** This option seeks to leverage BRAC 2005 to recognize additional workload consolidation, infrastructure reduction, and reduction in the number of DFAS operating locations at which specific functions are performed. While A-76 competitive sourcing is one of the options currently under investigation and implementation is not directly affected by BRAC 2005, implementation of other options such as a High-Performing Organization or a Public-Private Partnership could benefit from the opportunities provided under BRAC 2005. Implementation of a High-Performing Organization, for example, could result in shifting workload and functions to a location that is currently performing significantly better than other locations and closing the poorer performing sites. Centralization of specific functions at a major site and embedding a small number of DFAS personnel at customer locations is another possibility that results in a reduced infrastructure and facility requirements.

Recommendation: Change to:

Consolidate DFAS business line workload and administrative/staff functions and locations.

26. **Evaluate security and continuity of operations at Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) activities.** The events of 9/11 highlight security and safety concerns for both DFAS personnel and the financial and accounting data. A number of DFAS' 26 current operating locations are not located on military installations. Safety and security are in most cases provided by public services (fire, police, etc). Security of each DFAS location should be evaluated and if significant risks are determined to exist and relocation to military installations or DFAS site consolidation considered. With the migration to fewer sites,

provisions need to incorporate the requirement to have backup equipment systems, and facility plans that replicate functions in the event of an incident or disaster.

Recommendation: Delete, part of change to #25 above.

27. Consider expansion of Total Force Units - Blended/Reserve Associate/Active Associate/Sponsored Reserve. As we rely more on Guard and Reserve components to provide critical peacetime and wartime capabilities, it makes sense to allow some units the opportunity to live, work, and train together. This concept would allow each component to contribute its unique strengths to provide the capability, experience, stability, and continuity required to operate today's information and technology driven forces. It would also enable us to make better use of basing infrastructure and maximize the utilization of expensive weapon systems.

One way to implement this concept is to expand the integration of Active and Reserve Component units. Moving Guard and Reserve units with like assets to active bases or vice-versa could facilitate a leaner, more efficient operations, maintenance, and infrastructure. The Air Force has already established units using this concept. Examples are the merger of the Air National Guard's 116th Bomb Wing and Air Combat Command's 93rd Air Control Wing to form the 116th Air Control Wing (a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Blended Wing) at Robins AFB, GA; and the integration of Air Force Reserve Command's 8th Space Warning Squadron associated with Air Force Space Command's 2nd Space Warning Squadron at Buckley AFB, CO. There are currently a total of 11,000 Air Force reservists assigned to associate units, including 32 Reserve Associate flying units. The movement of the 126th Air Refueling Wing from Chicago to Scott AFB represents another example of the efficient use of available infrastructure by different components.

Another possible area for integration is to expand the blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce infrastructure, and improve readiness, while preserving home station control. One idea would be blending across Active/RC and service boundaries to provide regional entities more useful for homeland defense (e.g. one that includes air defense, Army Guard state responders, and interagency links in a single location)

Recommendation: AF only.

28. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer secure DoD-owned locations in the region.

Recommendation: OK, not included currently in the H &SA JCSG Washington area analysis.

29. Centralize the systems management and operations of DoD combat support processing servers into enterprise systems management centers to prepare for the net-centric environment being pursued by the Department and to reduce costs and significantly improve the security and performance of server-based processing.

Recommendation: Delete

30. Consolidate the Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if practical, i.e. joint use facilities.

Recommendation: OK, replaces #1.

31. Assign the Army as the executive agent for rotary wing aircraft and the Air Force as the executive agent for all fixed wing aircraft. The Department should consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

Recommendation: Delete. BRAC process not used to identify Executive Agency. Consolidation of pilot training with maintenance already part of previous option.

32. Consolidate the Naval Facilities Engineering Command under the Army Corps of Engineers or completely do away with the Naval Facility Engineering Command.

Recommendation: Delete. Data not available to perform analysis necessary.

33. Consolidate acquisition and logistics activities at the headquarters level (e.g., the Air Force Materiel Command model) to achieve support personnel and overhead reductions.

Recommendation: Delete, not focused. If this option is attempting to get at the consolidation of functions within HQ organizations then it may be in the too hard category for BRAC

34. Designate lead services for common equipment and reduce physical plant and workforces to the minimum number required for the force structure.

Recommendation: Delete. This needs to be better written to focus on specific “common equipment” otherwise too broad.

35. Transfer the operations of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) back to the respective buying entity.

Recommendation: Delete. Don't understand the analysis that would be required to redistribute a consolidated operation.

36. Establish a joint, central organization for all personnel management activities. Retain in each Service only those activities needed to build the force structure requirements, make assignments, and manage war fighting, and occupational skills development.

Recommendation: Delete – see option #21

37. Employ distance learning and available educational resources in local communities to cut down on DoD owned/operated educational facility requirements.

Recommendation: Delete. Too broad. Do we apply distance learning to everything?

38. Evaluate the Military Services' need for multiple initial entry training sites. The Navy and Air Force, each, conduct this primary training at a single installation. However, the Marine Corps operates two recruit training depots—one on the East Coast, one on the West. The Army operates five separate basic training sites.

Recommendation: OK.

DON Proposed Additional Transformational Options

Background. In order to serve as forcing functions to the analysis process, Transformational Options should take the form of specific direction to the JCSGs to develop and examine scenarios designed to ensure evaluation of alternatives that may be difficult to conceive or accept. Consideration of joint solutions could be achieved by directing that, for each function or sub-function examined, the JCSG must evaluate a scenario that flows from optimizing without any consideration for Service-specific constraints. That is, the scenario would stem from an optimization that allows functions to flow to the sites with best military value without regard to the Service that owns the site. Similarly, capacity reduction stretches goals could be identified that require, for each function or sub-function examined, the JCSG to evaluate a scenario that reduces capacity by specified fraction. The goal is expressed in terms of a percentage capacity reduction from known current capacity (as developed in certified data), or in terms of an additional percentage capacity reduction over excess capacity. The role of the stretch goal is to impel the analysis to reach for innovative solutions that otherwise might not be considered. The size of the stretch goal must be ambitious to provoke innovation, but not so ambitious as to make it easy to demonstrate that resulting scenarios are not feasible. For both joint solutions and capacity stretch goals, if a JCSG determines that the alternative examined is not feasible, they should be required to report the reasons that led them to that conclusion.

Proposed Transformational Options:

- Each JCSG and Military Department will consider, at a minimum, one joint basing solution for each function analyzed without regard to the Service that owns the sites being evaluated (analysis to eliminate any Service bias). Joint basing is defined as a co-location of another Service asset employing the traditional host-tenant relationship.
- Each Military Department and Joint Cross Service Group will look at the effects of either reducing their functions by 20%, 30%, and 40% from the current baseline, or reducing excess capacity by an additional 5% beyond the analyzed excess capacity, whichever is greater. The objective of this analysis is to uncover ways in which additional gains could be achieved, rather reasons why they could not.

TAB 5



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

23 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

Subj: CONCERNS NOTED IN PRELIMINARY NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE REVIEW

- Ref: (a) SECNAV Memo of 27 Jun 03; Subj: Internal Control Plan (ICP) for Management of the Department of the Navy 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process Policy Advisory Two.
(b) SECNAV Notice 11000 of 9 March 04; Subj: Base Closure and Realignment

The Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) has completed its initial review of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Data Call # 1 responses prepared at the Department of the Navy (DON) field activity level. Based on their initial review, NAVAUDSVC has identified several concerns that must be addressed to ensure that the BRAC 2005 process is properly documented and that the DON basing recommendations forwarded to the Secretary of Defense are supported with accurate and reliable data.

The concern most frequently cited by the auditors was that supporting records were not always retained by field activities to document the source of the responses prepared for the Data Call. For example, in some cases tenant activities did not provide documentation to host activities responding to the data call. In other cases, e-mails and telephone conversations were used as the basis for responses, and there is no indication that the originating offices retained source documentation. Guidance concerning retention of supporting documentation was provided in reference (a) and reemphasized in reference (b). Source documentation is important, not only to show the basis for data call answers, but also to have available to respond to inquiries we can expect to receive next summer when our final recommendations will be undergoing scrutiny by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Field activity commanders are to be reminded to verify that their DON BRAC 2005 records are complete and contain documentation supporting all Data Call responses. BRAC 2005 records must be centrally managed at all activities that submit responses to data calls and retained until otherwise directed.

As a means of facilitating the BRAC 2005 process, the NAVAUDSVC is providing a list of their concerns to local field activity command personnel without issuing an audit report. In effect, NAVAUDSVC is briefing local field commanders of the concerns identified and recommending the corrective action needed to ensure compliance with the certification and record keeping rules promulgated in references (a) and (b). Local commanders should promptly respond to exit memos and work closely with the auditors to address concerns associated with lack of source documentation and other non-data related concerns and inform the NAVAUDSVC and the IAT of the corrective actions taken.

The auditors also identified certain data discrepancies, e.g., incorrect numbers. NAVAUDSVC has provided the DON Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) with a list of these discrepancies. The IAT will address these data discrepancies through the Data Call Issue Resolution process (a description of which is posted in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 Information Transfer System (DONBITS) BRAC Reference Library). The IAT has already contacted, or will soon be contacting, activities concerning these data discrepancies.

The independent validation of the DON BRAC 2005 data collection and certification process by the NAVAUDSVC is critical. Following through on and correcting the concerns noted by the auditors is an important step in ensuring the integrity of our data. I would appreciate your communicating the contents of this memo to your field activities that are responding to data calls. Your continued commitment to the BRAC 2005 process is vital and very much appreciated.



Anne Rathmell Davis
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Infrastructure Strategy & Analysis)

TAB 6



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS)

Subj: APPOINTMENT AS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Per this memorandum, you are hereby appointed as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for all matters associated with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). As such, you will be designated as the replacement for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) in his role as a member of the BRAC Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), with the same authorities and responsibilities.

You will also serve as Co-Chair of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. This body is responsible for developing recommendations for closure and realignment of Department of the Navy (DON) installations ensuring that operational factors of concern to the operational commanders are considered. The IEG will be the decision-making body for issues developed by the DON Analysis Group (DAG) and the Functional Advisory Board (FAB).

The DAG will be formulated as a decision-making body subordinate to the IEG and will be responsible for analyzing DON unique functions. Each member of the IEG shall appoint an individual as his/her representative on the DAG. You will serve as the Chair of the DAG.

The FAB reports directly to the IEG to ensure the DON leadership is thoroughly briefed and prepared on Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) matters that will ultimately be addressed to the ISG and the BRAC Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC). The Navy and Marine Corps members of the seven JCSGs are assigned additional duties as members of the FAB. You will facilitate raising issues from the FAB to the IEG.

The Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) will be responsible for developing analytical methodologies, developing joint and cross-servicing opportunities, collecting data and performing analysis, and presenting analytical results to the DAG for evaluation. The IAT will also provide working level support to the JCSGs and coordinate data development with the FAB. As the Special Assistant for BRAC, you will continue to serve as the Director of the IAT.

This appointment and the organizational changes outlined above will necessitate changes to existing BRAC policy guidance. I direct you to prepare appropriate documentation for my signature.


14 July 04

Subj: APPOINTMENT AS SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Copy to:
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TAB 7

Department of the Navy



INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS TEAM

ODASN (IS&A), 2221 South Clark Street, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22202

(703)-602-6500

RP-0178

IAT/REV

21 July 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP (IEG)

Subj: REPORT OF IEG DELIBERATIONS OF 15 JULY 2004

- Encl: (1) Criteria 8 Analysis Brief of 30 June 2004
w/appendices
- (2) Capacity Analysis Issues for Ground Operations
Function Brief of 15 July 2004
- (3) IAT HSA DON-Specific Regional Support Activities
Attribute - Selection Criteria Weighting and Ranking
of Attribute Components by Weight for the four RSA
Categories
- (4) Initial Capacity Analysis of DON-Specific Education
and Training Functions Brief of 15 July 2004

1. The twentieth deliberative session of the Department of the Navy (DON) Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) convened at 1006 on 15 July 2004 in the Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) conference room located at Crystal Plaza 6, 9th floor. The following members of the IEG were present: Mr. H.T. Johnson, Chair; Ms. Anne R. Davis, Vice Chair; Ms. Ariane Whittemore, alternate for VADM Charles W. Moore, Jr., USN, Member; Mr. Thomas R. Crabtree, alternate for VADM Albert H. Konetzni Jr., USN, Member; Ms. Carla Liberatore, alternate for LtGen Richard L. Kelly, USMC, Member; RMDL Mark T. Emerson, USN, alternate for LtGen Michael A. Hough, USMC, Member; Mr. Nicholas J. Kunesh, alternate for Dr. Michael F. McGrath, Member; Mr. Robert T. Cali, Member; Mr. Ronnie J. Booth, Navy Audit Service, Representative; and, Mr. Thomas N. Ledvina, Navy Office of General Counsel, Representative. The following members of the IAT were present when the deliberative session commenced: Mr. Dennis Biddick, Chief of Staff; Mr. David W. LaCroix; CAPT Christopher T. Nichols, USN; CAPT Jason A. Leaver, USN; CAPT Gene A. Summerlin II, USN; Col Joseph R. Kennedy, USMCR; LtCol Terri E. Erdag, USMC; CDR Joseph E. Arleth, USN; CDR Margaret M. Carlson, JAGC, USN; CDR Jennifer R. Flather, SC, USN; CDR Robert E. Vincent II, JAGC, USN; Ms. Cathy E. Oaxaca-Hoote; Capt James A. Noel, USMC; and, Ms. Sueann Henderson.

Subj: REPORT OF IEG DELIBERATIONS OF 15 JULY 2004

2. CDR Carlson used enclosure (1) to brief the IEG on the methodology being used to assess the environmental impact of proposed scenarios. She reminded the IEG that Criterion 8 requires a consideration of the "environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities." She informed the IEG that OSD assigned DON as the lead Military Department for the development and implementation of a uniform Criterion 8 methodology. CDR Carlson chairs the Criterion 8 Joint Process Action Team (JPAT), which consists of representatives from the Military Departments, OSD BRAC Office, and Department of Defense Agencies. The JPAT has developed a uniform methodology and OSD will promulgate an implementation policy memorandum in the near future.

3. CDR Carlson explained that the Criterion 8 policy is to assess scenarios for environmental impact in 10 Resource Areas, and analyze the impact of costs for environmental restoration, waste management and environmental compliance. Environmental restoration will be evaluated by considering existing Installation Restoration (IR) sites. Waste management and environmental compliance will be evaluated by considering the recurring/non-recurring environmental compliance and waste management costs captured in COBRA and gathered through scenario data calls.

4. CDR Carlson provided a synopsis of the Criterion 8 proposed methodology. The Military Departments will compile installation environmental profiles from the raw environmental data collected during Data Call #1. An installation's environmental profile consists of the 10 Resource Areas contained in Appendix 1 to enclosure (1). During the scenario development process, the deliberative bodies for the Services and JCSGs will consult the environmental profiles and raw data. Upon request of the JCSGs or IEG, scenario environmental impacts summaries will be developed for those scenarios the decision making bodies determine need full criteria consideration. See Appendix 2 of enclosure (1). Finally, cumulative environmental impact summaries will be prepared in order to analyze the total impact of final scenarios on gaging installations. See Appendix 3 of enclosure (1). CDR Carlson departed the deliberative session at 1021.

5. CAPT Nichols used enclosure (2) to provide an update concerning capacity analysis for the Ground Operations Functions. As the IEG directed in its 8 July 2004 deliberative session, the IAT Ground Operations Team consulted with the

Subj: REPORT OF IEG DELIBERATIONS OF 15 JULY 2004

Department of the Army (Army) and determined that the Army has promulgated written training requirements for each brigade, which will be included in its capacity analysis. Additionally, the IAT Ground Operations Team reviewed the E&T JCSG Range Subgroup capacity analysis methodology for analyzing range training requirements. The E&T JCSG is basing training requirements on historical usage data since there are no delineated written requirements. CAPT Nichols informed the IEG that TECOM is in the process of creating a training metric in order to standardize training requirements. However, the training metric will not be finalized until next year at the earliest.

6. The IEG concurred with the IAT Ground Operations Team's recommendation to base the Ground Operations capacity analysis on a battalion-equivalent concept for all naval ground forces. This concept will capture administrative, maintenance, and covered storage spaces, but will not include a training metric. Rather, training requirements will be addressed during the military value analysis. Additionally, specific training requirements of unit types will be addressed in scenario development and analysis in order to ensure ground forces units have access to necessary training as a result of any proposed scenario.

7. Mr. Kunesh departed the deliberative session at 1029. LtCol Erdag and CDR Arleth departed the deliberative session at 1037.

8. The IAT HSA Team provided enclosure (3) to the IEG. Enclosure (3) contained the HSA RSA Military Value Attribute - Selection Criteria Weighting, by category, which the IEG previously approved at the last deliberative session. Additionally, enclosure (3) contained the ranking of attribute components by weight by category. The IEG noted that the ranking of attribute components by weight was appropriate for each category.

9. CDR Flather departed the deliberative session at 1040.

10. Ms. Davis reminded the IEG that the IAT E&T Team provided an initial capacity analysis briefing for DON-Specific E&T Functions at the 29 June 2004 IEG deliberative session. The prior briefing included an overview of the proposed capacity analysis methodology for DON Specific E&T Functions and a detailed discussion concerning capacity analysis for the DON Recruit Training functional area. Ms. Davis also noted that at the 29 June 2004 deliberative session, the IEG directed the IAT

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to ascertain how the Army was addressing surge capacity and review historical DON data in order to determine if current infrastructure could handle surge requirements.

11. Ms. Davis and CAPT Summerlin, IAT E&T Team Lead, used enclosure (4) to provide a supplemental capacity analysis briefing. Enclosure (4) included an update of capacity analysis methodology for DON-Specific E&T Functions, a detailed discussion of capacity analysis for the DON Officer Accession Training and DON-Specific Professional Military Educations (PME) functional areas and an update concerning surge capacity.

12. Initially, CAPT Summerlin informed the IEG that the IAT E&T Team was continuing to analyze Data Call #1 responses. During this review, the IAT E&T Team has determined that some activities have provided incorrect, inconsistent, incomplete, or unexpected data. Using the Data Call #1 Issue Resolution Process, the IAT E&T Team is actively requesting data correction from specific activities.

13. CAPT Nichols departed the deliberative session at 1055. The IEG recessed at 1103 and reconvened at 1113. All IEG members present when the IEG recessed were again present.

14. The IEG concurred with the IAT E&T Team's recommendation to concentrate on the measures that are the best indicators or limiters of capacity for each functional area. The IEG agreed that the appropriate measures for all activities within the Recruit Training Function are classroom square footage, billeting and messing. The IEG determined that classroom square footage was an appropriate measure for all activities within the Officer Accession Training and PME Functions. However, billeting and messing did not appear to be appropriate measures for these two functional areas, except for the two exceptions noted below. The IEG concurred with the IAT E&T Team's rationale that billeting and messing are provided to many activities on board the installations where most of the Officer Accession Training and PME Functions are located and these services are commercially available. Thus, billeting and messing do not truly measure the capacity of these activities for these functional areas. The IEG opined that billeting might be an appropriate measure for the United States Naval Academy (USNA), an activity within the Officer Accession Training Function. The IEG directed the IAT to analyze the Data Call #1 response for USNA and provide the results to the IEG. The IEG will then determine if billeting is an appropriate capacity measure. The IEG determined that billeting and messing are

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appropriate measures for the Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA), an activity within the PME Function, since specific messing and billeting facilities are devoted to the activity.

15. CAPT Summerlin reminded the IEG that at the 29 June 2004 deliberative session, the IAT E&T Team apprised the IEG that it could evaluate capacity requirements on a 12-month average (level loading) usage basis, a three-month average peak usage basis, or a peak usage basis. He informed the IEG that based upon initial analysis of the Data Call #1 responses, the IAT E&T Team recommended that the IEG use the peak usage basis for all activities within the DON-Specific E&T functional areas, except for SEA and USNA. The IAT E&T Team noted that since most of these activities experience significant seasonal variation in student population, peak usage basis was the most appropriate usage level to determine capacity. CAPT Summerlin noted that a 12-month average (level loading) was the most appropriate usage level for SEA and USNA since they have stable student levels. The IEG concurred with the IAT E&T Team's recommendations.

16. The IEG directed the IAT to continue to analyze the Data Call #1 responses, implement the proposed capacity analysis methodology, and report its findings to the IEG. The IEG will then determine if the proposed capacity analysis methodology is the proper method for evaluating the capacity of the DON-Specific E&T Functions.

17. CAPT Summerlin used enclosure (4) to provide an update concerning surge capacity for DON-Specific E&T Functions. He apprised the IEG that the IAT E&T Team consulted with the Army and researched both DOD and DON regulatory guidance and determined that there is not a clear definition of surge. He noted that some regulations provided definitions of components of surge, such as mobilization. The IEG concurred with the IAT E&T Team's recommendation that current infrastructure was sufficient to support any likely scenario. As such, there is no need to retain additional training infrastructure above our current capacity requirement, which incorporates requirements for the Fleet Response Plan and complies with Defense planning guidance. Additional student production can be met by adding instructors, adding training days, or by accelerating, truncating, or canceling courses. Moreover, since capacity level will be determined on a peak usage basis, the activities within the DON-Specific E&T Functions will have unused capacity during significant portions of the year. The IEG also determined that the 20-year Force Structure Plan does not

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contain any increases in planned personnel end strength that would necessitate a training infrastructure increase.

18. The deliberative session adjourned at 1144.



ROBERT E. VINCENT II
CDR, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Recorder, IAT