Department of the Navy
IAT

INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS TEAM
ODASN (IS&A), 2221 South Clark Street, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22202

(703)-602-6500

DCN:5384

RP-0166
IAT/REV
7 July 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP (IEG)

Subj: REPORT OF IEG DELIBERATIONS OF 1 JULY 2004

Encl: (1) BRAC 2005 HSA IAT Capacity Analysis Brief of 1 July 2004
(2) Military Value Analysis of DON-Specific Headquarters and Support Activities Regional Support Function Brief of 1 July 2004
(3) IAT HSA DON-Specific Regional Support Activities Military Value Matrices
(4) DON/JCSG Alignment Brief of 1 July 2004
(5) Acting USD (AT&L) Memo of 21 June 2004

1. The eighteenth deliberative session of the Department of the Navy (DON) Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) convened at 1024 on 1 July 2004 in the Infrastructure Analysis Team (IAT) conference room located at Crystal Plaza 6, 9th floor. The following members of the IEG were present: Mr. H.T. Johnson, Chair; Ms. Anne R. Davis, Vice Chair; Ms. Ariane Whittemore, alternate for VADM Charles W. Moore, Jr., USN, Member; Mr. Mark H. Anthony, alternate for VADM Albert H. Konetzni Jr., USN, Member; RMDL Mark T. Emerson, USN, alternate for LtGen Michael A. Hough, USMC, Member; Dr. Michael F. McGrath, Member; Mr. Robert T. Cali, Member; Mr. Ronnie J. Booth, Navy Audit Service, Representative; and, Mr. Thomas N. Ledvina, Navy Office of General Counsel, Representative. The following members of the IAT were present when the deliberative session commenced: Mr. Dennis Biddick, Chief of Staff; Mr. David W. LaCroix; Col Walter B. Hamm, USMC; CAPT Jason A. Leaver, USN; CAPT Matthew R. Beebe, CEC, USN; Mr. Andrew S. Demott; CDR Robert S. Clarke, CEC, USN; CDR Carl Deputy, USN; CDR Jennifer R. Flather, SC, USN; CDR Robert. E. Vincent II, JAGC, USN; Ms. Cathy E. Oaxaca-Hoote; Mr. Michael D. Bowes, CNA; LCDR Robert A. Dews, USN; Capt James A. Noel, USMC; and, Ms. Sueann Henderson.

2. Ms. Davis and CAPT Beebe used enclosure (1) to provide an initial capacity analysis briefing for HSA DON-Specific Recruiting Districts/Stations Function. They reminded the IEG that the IEG previously determined that the optimal way to evaluate the military value of naval recruiting operations was

to conduct military value analysis of the recruiting activities that provide management and oversight over the "storefront" recruiting operations. Accordingly, the IAT proposed capacity methodology would evaluate the management of recruiting offices and recruiters.

3. The proposed capacity analysis methodology also contains assumptions necessary for ensuring that the capacity analysis accurately depicts capacity requirements. Ms. Davis explained to the IEG that the IAT HSA Team reviewed the 20-year Force Structure Plan in proportioning the out-year capacity to changes in active duty and reserve end strength. Additionally, the IAT HSA Team recommended an approach similar to Naval Operations concerning the evaluation of surge requirements. Specifically, the IAT Operations Team recommended that surge was not a platform issue since increases in operational tempo would not involve increases in the number of platforms. Thus, surge did not increase infrastructure requirements. Similarly, the IAT HSA Team recommended that contingency and operational requirements would not affect the infrastructure requirements of naval recruiting districts and stations.

4. The IAT HSA Team recommended that the optimal measure for determining capacity is to conduct a comparative efficiency evaluation. Under this approach, current and projected future number of recruiters and recruiting offices managed by each recruiting district and station would be compared with the maximum number of recruiters and recruiting offices managed by a district/station. The IEG directed the IAT to continue to refine the analysis as additional certified data is received.

5. Ms. Davis used enclosure (2) to synopsize the IEG's 29 June 2004 decisions concerning the HSA Regional Support Activities (RSA) military value scoring plan. She reminded the IEG that HSA RSA was divided into four categories. The IAT HSA Team prepared suggested assignment of the HSA RSA scoring statements, by category and attribute, to the four military value selection criteria. See enclosure (3). Assignment of a "1' indicated the scoring statement related to a particular military value selection criteria. Except as noted below, the IEG approved the IAT's recommendations:

Category A, Quality of Facilities. The IEG reviewed the Cost/Manpower Implications selection criteria and assigned scoring statement 13 (HRS-13) to it.

Subj: REPORT OF IEG DELIBERATIONS OF 1 JULY 2004

Category A, Personnel Support. The IEG determined that opportunities for dependent and off duty employment affect the readiness of Navy Installation Management Regions and assigned scoring statement 18 (PS-6a-b) to the Readiness selection criteria.

Category B, Quality of Facilities. The IEG reviewed the Cost/Manpower Implications selection criteria and assigned scoring statement 13 (HRS-13) to it.

Category B, Personnel Support. The IEG determined that opportunities for dependent and off duty employment affect the readiness of large service providers and assigned scoring statement 18 (PS-6a-b) to the Readiness selection criteria.

Category C, Quality of Facilities. The IEG reviewed the Cost/Manpower Implications selection criteria and assigned scoring statement 13 (HRS-13) to it.

Category C, Personnel Support. The IEG determined that opportunities for dependent and off duty employment affect the readiness of middle management activities and assigned scoring statement 18 (PS-6a-b) to the Readiness selection criteria. Additionally, the IEG determined that proximity to the nearest commercial airport also affects the readiness of middle management activities and assigned scoring statement 21 (PS-12) to the Readiness selection criteria.

Category D, Effectiveness of Operation. Since administrative service providers have limited direct contact with their customers, the IEG determined that proximity to customers does not affect readiness. Accordingly, the IEG decided not to assign scoring statement 1 (HRS-1a-c) to the Readiness selection criteria.

Category D, Efficiency of Operations. The IEG determined that proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands does not affect the readiness of administrative service providers. Accordingly, the IEG decided not to assign scoring statement 8 (HRS-8a-d) to the Readiness selection criteria.

Category D, Quality of Facilities. The IEG reviewed the Cost/Manpower Implications selection criteria and assigned scoring statement 13 (HRS-13) to it.

Category D, Personnel Support. The IEG determined that opportunities for dependent and off duty employment affect the

readiness of administrative service providers and assigned scoring statement 18 (PS-6a-b) to the Readiness selection criteria.

6. Mr. Andrew DeMott used enclosure (4) to brief the IEG on an IAT proposed integration process designed to align DON and JCSG BRAC efforts. After discussion, the IEG agreed to continue to explore implementation of measures that will help to ensure that the DON and JCSG BRAC efforts are complimentary and mutually reinforcing.

7. Ms. Davis provided enclosure (5) to the IEG. She informed the IEG that the ISG Chair reviewed transformational options provided to OSD by the Services last year and grouped the proposed transformational options into those that can and those that cannot be used in scenario development. The ISG Chair forwarded enclosure (5) to the ISG members and afforded them the opportunity to provide comment concerning these transformational options and suggest any new options. The ISG members must provide comment by 8 July 2004. Ms. Davis informed the IEG that the IAT requested the DON JCSG Principals to review enclosure (5) and provide comment. The IAT will consolidate the input from the DON JCSG Principals and provide a draft response to ASN (I&E), VCNO, and ACMC by 2 July 2004. ASN (I&E) will forward DON's response to the ISG by 8 July 2004.

8. The deliberative session adjourned at 1210.

ROBERT E. VINCENT II
CDR, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Recorder, IAT

TAB 1

Department of the Navy

Infrastructure Analysis Team

BRAC 2005

Headquarters and Support Activities IAT Capacity Analysis

01 July, 2004

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Recruiting

- **IAT HSA Activities :**
  - Navy Recruiting Districts (NavCruitDist)
  - Marine Corps Recruiting Stations (RS)

- **Capacity Metrics**
  - Management of recruiting offices / recruiters

Headquarters and Support Activities

Assumptions:

- Out-year capacity proportioned to changes in active duty and reserve end strength.
- OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO is not expected to result in facility surge requirements.

Capacity to sustain future forces

- **Recruiting:**
  - Based on active duty end strength now and in future (may change, if active and reserve recruiting merge)
- **Navy**
  - Active declines 4%; Reserves decline 9%
- **Marine Corps**
  - Active and reserves: no change

Recruiting Capacity

- **Navy Recruiting District/USMC Recruiting Station span of control:**
  - **Comparative efficiency**
    - **For each district/station:**
      - **Number of recruiters and recruiting offices (storefronts) managed as compared to maximum number of recruiters or recruiting offices managed by a district/station.**
      - **Average distance to recruiting stations**

- **Data on recruiters and storefronts managed has been provided by headquarters, but is currently uncertified**

Recruiting Analysis

	Caculation based on recruiters managed			Caculation based on stations managed		
DISTRICT	Recruiters Managed	Maximum number of recruiters any district manages	Capacity to manage more recruiters (excess capacity)	Stations Managed	Maximum number of stations any district manages	Capacity to manage more stations (excess capacity)
SanFranc	194	194	0	56	56	0
LosAngeles	190	194	4	50	56	6
NewYork	170	194	24	47	56	9
Philadelphia	167	194	27	48	56	8
Pittsburgh	147	194	47	49	56	7
Chicago	147	194	47	47	56	9
StLouis	146	194	48	45	56	11
SanAntonio	146	194	48	38	56	18
Atlanta	145	194	49	42	56	14
Seattle	142	194	52	46	56	10
Dallas	141	194	53	42	56	14
Nashville	137	194	57	41	56	15
SanDiego	137	194	57	38	56	18
Houston	136	194	58	37	56	19
Ohio	133	194	61	51	56	5
Michigan	132	194	62	48	56	8
Buffalo	130	194	64	42	56	14
Minneapolis	128	194	66	42	56	14
Indianapolis	125	194	69	40	56	16
Portland	125	194	69	38	56	18
Jacksonville	122	194	72	36	56	20
NewEngland	118	194	76	41	56	15
Raleigh	117	194	77	36	56	20
Richmond	117	194	77	38	56	18
Montgomery	112	194	82	33	56	23
Omaha	112	194	82	28	56	28
NewOrleans	107	194	87	36	56	20
Miami	105	194	89	30	56	26
Kansas City	102	194	92	31	56	25
Phoenix	101	194	93	29	56	27
Denver	79	194	115	22	56	34
	4110	6014	1904	1247	1736	489

PRELIMINARY

Recruiting Analysis

Calculated based on recruiters managed	Current Force**		Future Force***	
	Max	3rd Largest	Max	3rd Largest
Number of districts needed *	22	25	21	24
Current number of districts	31	31	31	31
Excess capacity	9	6	10	7
Percent excess capacity	29.0%	19.4%	32.3%	23.6%
*Maximum is based on 194 recruiters assigned to each district. The third largest is based on 170 recruiters assigned to each district	** Currently 4110 recuiters		*** Assume 3936 recruiters (4110*.96)	

Calculated based on offices managed	Current Force		Future Force	
	Max	3rd Largest	Max	3rd Largest
Number of districts needed *	23	25	22	24
Current number of districts	31	31	31	31
Excess capacity	8	6	9	7
Percent excess capacity	25.8%	19.4%	29.0%	23.6%
* Maximum is based on 56 recruiting offices assigned to each district. The 3rd largest is based on 51recruiting offices assigned to each district.				

PRELIMINARY

TAB 2

Department of the Navy

Infrastructure Analysis Team

Military Value Analysis

of

DoN Specific Headquarters and Support Activities Regional Support Function

1 July 2004

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Regional Support Analysis Assumptions

- **Scope of Analysis: Review administrative management staff of regional activities for opportunities of alignment and integration.**

- **Basic Assumptions:**
  - **Capacity will not be traditional, requirement not known**
  - **Each activity type will be analyzed independently**
  - **Opportunities for greater efficiency/synergy exist through alignment/locating at Force Concentration Areas**
  - **Force Concentration Areas to be defined by workforce population and plant value**
  - **Opportunities for efficiency gain will be bounded by span of control limitations (effectiveness)**
  - **Workload balance is needed across regions within each activity type**
  - **Geographic alignment will be maximized, cross boundary conflicts minimized**
  - **Alignment with other agencies (FEMA, EPA, USCG, Army Corps) preferred**
  - **Alignment of Navy and Marine Corps will be pursued even where specific regional commands do not exist**

Regional Support Activities (82)

- **Definition - Various geographic shore support activities not tied to a specific location or set of operational forces.**

– *Navy Installation Management Regions*	12	A
– Engineering Field Activities/Divisions/OICC	11	B
– Navy Public Works Centers	7	B
– *Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers* *	5	B
Navy Reserve Readiness Commands	7	C
Navy Legal Service Office	7	C
Marine Corps Districts (Recruiting)	6	C
– *Naval Reserve Recruiting Areas*	6	C
– Navy Trial Service Offices	5	C
Navy Recruiting Regions	4	C
– Marine Corps National Capital Region Command	1	C
– *Human Resource Service Centers* *	6	D
– *Health Care Support Organizations* *	3	D
– *Navy Personnel Support Activities* *	2	D

** Activities included in JCSG analysis for operational function*

Headquarters and Support Activities – Regional Support

COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVMARIANAS GU
COMNAVREG GULF COAST PENSACOLA FL
COMNAVREG HAWAII PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVREG MIDLANT NORFOLK VA
COMNAVREG MW GREAT LAKES IL
COMNAVREG NE GROTON CT
COMNAVREG NW SEATTLE WA
COMNAVREG SE JACKSONVILLE FL
COMNAVREG SOUTH CORPUS CHRISTI TX
COMNAVREG SW SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVRESFORCOM NEW ORLEANS LA*
ENGFLDACT MW GREAT LAKES IL
ENGFLDACT WEST SAN BRUNO CA
NAVFAC EFA CHESAPEAKE WASHINGTON DC
NAVFAC EFA NORTHEAST PHILADELPHIA PA
NAVFAC EFA NORTHWEST POULSBO WA
NAVFAC EFA SOUTHEAST JACKSONVILLE FL
NAVFAC EFD ATLANTIC NORFOLK VA
NAVFAC EFD PACIFIC PEARL HARBOR HI
NAVFAC EFD SOUTH CHARLESTON SC
NAVFAC EFD SOUTHWEST SAN DIEGO CA
NAVFAC OICC MARIANAS GU
PWC GREAT LAKES IL
PWC GU
PWC JACKSONVILLE FL
PWC NORFOLK VA
PWC PEARL HARBOR HI
PWC SAN DIEGO CA
PWC WASHINGTON DC

FISC SAN DIEGO CA*
FISC JACKSONVILLE FL*
FISC PEARL HARBOR HI*
FISC NORFOLK VA*
FISC PUGET SOUND WA*
NAVRESREDCOM MIDATLANTIC
NAVRESREDCOM MIDWEST
NAVRESREDCOM NORTHEAST
NAVRESREDCOM NORTHWEST
NAVRESREDCOM SOUTH
NAVRESREDCOM SOUTHEAST
NAVRESREDCOM SOUTHWEST
NAVLEGSVCOFF NORTHCENT WASHINGTON DC
NAVLEGSVCOFF NORTHWEST BREMERTON WA
NAVLEGSVCOFF PAC DET PEARL HARBOR HI
NAVLEGSVCOFF SE JACKSONVILLE FL
NAVLEGSVCOFF SOUTHWEST SAN DIEGO CA
NAVLEGSVCOFF CENTRAL PENSACOLA FL
NAVLEGSVCOFF MIDLANT NORFOLK VA
EIGHTH MCD NEW ORLEANS LA
FIRST MCD GARDEN CITY LI NY
FOURTH MCD CUMBERLAND PA
NINTH MCD KANSAS CITY MO
SIXTH MCD PARRIS ISLAND SC
TWELTH MCD SAN DIEGO CA
NAVRESCRUITAREA CENTRAL GREAT LAKESIL
NAVRESCRUITAREA NORTHEAST WASH DC
NAVRESCRUITAREA PACIFIC SAN DIEGO CA
NAVRESCRUITAREA SOUTH DALLAS TX

NAVRESCRUITAREA SOUTHEAST ORLANDO FL
NAVRESCRUITAREA WEST AURORA CO
TRISVCOFF EAST NORFOLK VA
TRISVCOFF NE WASHINGTON DC
TRISVCOFF PAC PEARL HARBOR HI
TRISVCOFF SE MAYPORT FL
TRISVCOFF WEST SAN DIEGO CA
NAVCRUITREG CENTRAL GREAT LAKES IL
NAVCRUITREG NORTH SCOTIA NY
NAVCRUITREG SOUTH MACON GA
NAVCRUITREG WEST OAKLAND CA
CG MCNCRC WASHINGTON DC
HRSC PEARL HARBOR HI*
HRSC PHILADELPHIA PA*
HRSC PORTSMOUTH VA*
HRSC SAN DIEGO CA*
HRSC SILVERDALE WA*
HRSC STENNIS, MS*
HLTHCARE SUPPO JACKSONVILLE FL*
HLTHCARE SUPPO NORFOLK VA*
HLTHCARE SUPPO SAN DIEGO CA*
PERSUPPACT LANT*
PERSUPPACT WEST*

*** Being looked at functionally by other teams/ JCSGs**

Backup

Regional Support Attributes/Components

- **Effectiveness of Operation**
  - Operational Proximity
  - Criticality of Location
  - Scope of Responsibility
- **Efficiency of Operations**
  - Co-location
  - Regional Alignment
  - Relative Productivity
- **Quality of Facilities**
  - Security
  - Facility Condition
  - Locality Cost
- **Personnel Support**
  - Medical
  - Housing
  - Employment
  - MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services
  - Metropolitan Area Characteristics

BRAC 1995
Military Value Weights

FUNCTION	READINESS	FACILITIES	MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY	COST AND MANPOWER
REDCOMS	50%	10%	30%	10%
EFDs	40%	20%	10%	30%

BRAC 2005 HSA JCSG
Military Value Weights

FUNCTION	SUB-FUNCTION	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	ATTRIBUTES MEASURED
Admin & HQ Activities	HQ Support Activities	35%	15%	5%	45%	Geographic Criticality Mission Profile Vacant Infrastructure Profile Accomodation Capacity Facility Management Profile Inter-Service Support Profile Workforce Efficiency Profile Workspace Efficiency Profile

BRAC 2005 DoN Specific HSA Military Value Weights

	CRITERIA			
FUNCTION	READINESS	FACILITIES	SURGE CAPABILITY	COST AND MANPOWER
Regional Support Activities	__%	__%	__%	__%
Recruiting	50	15	15	20
Reserves	55	25	5	15
OPS	50	20	15	15
E&T	40	30	15	15

TAB 3

IM REGIONS MILVAL						
						SC
MV Matrix #	Supporting Question(s)	Data Call	DC Quest(s)	IAT Band	Matrix Question	IEG Score
ATTRIBUTE - Attribute Weight						
Component						
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)						
Operational Proximity						
1	HRS-1a-c			1	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	8
Criticality of Current Location						
2	HRS-2a-b			1	Significant mission-related functions	8
3	HRS-3			2	Assessment of current location's statutory status	6
Current Scope of Responsibility						
4	HRS-4			2	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	7
5	HRS-5			3	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	4
6	HRS-6			3	Service provided to customers outside DoN	3
7	HRS-7			3	Singular focus on regional management mission	4
					Attribute Total	
EFFICENCY OF OPERATION (EF)						
Co-location						
8	HRS-8a-d			1	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands	9
9	HRS-9a-b			1	Proximity to Naval force concentration	9
Regional Alignment						
10	HRS-10a-e			2	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations	5
Relative Productivity						
11	HRS-11			2	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff	7
					Attribute Total	
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)						
Security						
12	HRS-12a-b			3	Relative security posture of the activity	4
Facility Condition						
13	HRS-13			3	Facility condition code	4
Locality Cost						
14	HRS-14a-b			3	Relative value of locality cost factors	4
15	HRS-15a-b			3	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities	4
					Attribute Total	
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)						
Medical						
16	PS-1			3	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.	3
Housing						
17	PS-3a-c			2	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.	7
Employment						
18	PS-6a-b			2	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.	7
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services						
19	PS-7			3	Relative availability of base services.	4
20	PS-8a-b			2	Relative availability of child development services	7
Metropolitan Area Characteristics						
21	PS-12			3	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.	4
22	PS-13			3	Relative local crime rate.	3
					Attribute Total	

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REGIONAL - LARGE SERVICE PROVIDERS - MILVAL						
						SC
MV Matrix #	Supporting Question(s)	Data Call	DC Quest(s)	IAT Band	Matrix Question	IEG Score
ATTRIBUTE - Attribute Weight						
Component						
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)						
Operational Proximity						
1	HRS-1a-c			1	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	8
Criticality of Current Location						
2	HRS-2a-b			1	Significant mission-related functions	8
3	HRS-3			2	Assessment of current location's statutory status	6
Current Scope of Responsibility						
4	HRS-4			2	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	7
5	HRS-5			3	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	4
6	HRS-6			3	Service provided to customers outside DoN	3
7	HRS-7			3	Singular focus on regional management mission	4
					Attribute Total	
EFFICENCY OF OPERATION (EF)						
Co-location						
8	HRS-8a-d			1	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands	9
9	HRS-9a-b			1	Proximity to Naval force concentration	9
Regional Alignment						
10	HRS-10a-e			3	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations	3
Relative Productivity						
11	HRS-11			2	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff	7
					Attribute Total	
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)						
Security						
12	HRS-12a-b			3	Relative security posture of the activity	4
Facility Condition						
13	HRS-13			3	Facility condition code	4
Locality Cost						
14	HRS-14a-b			3	Relative value of locality cost factors	4
15	HRS-15a-b			3	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities	4
					Attribute Total	
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REGIONAL - MIDDLE MANAGEMENT - MILVAL

MV Matrix #	Supporting Question(s)	Data Call	DC Quest(s)	IAT Band	Matrix Question	SC IEG Score
ATTRIBUTE - Attribute Weight						
Component						
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)						
Operational Proximity						
1	HRS-1a-c			1	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	9
Criticality of Current Location						
2	HRS-2a-b			1	Significant mission-related functions	8
3	HRS-3			2	Assessment of current location's statutory status	6
Current Scope of Responsibility						
4	HRS-4			2	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	7
5	HRS-5			2	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	7
6	HRS-6			3	Service provided to customers outside DoN	3
7	HRS-7			3	Singular focus on regional management mission	4
					Attribute Total	
EFFICENCY OF OPERATION (EF)						
Co-location						
8	HRS-8a-d			2	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands	7
9	HRS-9a-b			2	Proximity to Naval force concentration	7
Regional Alignment						
10	HRS-10a-e			3	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations	2
Regional Alignment						
11	HRS-11			2	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff	7
					Attribute Total	
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)						
Security						
12	HRS-12a-b			3	Relative security posture of the activity	4
Facility Condition						
13	HRS-13			3	Facility condition code	4
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REGIONAL - ADMIN SERVICE PROVIDERS - MILVAL

MV Matrix #	Supporting Question(s)	Data Call	DC Quest(s)	IAT Band	Matrix Question	SC IEG Score
ATTRIBUTE - Attribute Weight						
Component						
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Operational Proximity						
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EFFICENCY OF OPERATION (EF)						
Co-location						
8	HRS-8a-d			3	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands	3
9	HRS-9a-b			3	Proximity to Naval force concentration	3
Regional Alignment						
10	HRS-10a-e			3	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations	3
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11	HRS-11			2	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff	7
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Security						
12	HRS-12a-b			3	Relative security posture of the activity	4
Facility Condition						
13	HRS-13			3	Facility condition code	4
Locality Cost						
14	HRS-14a-b			3	Relative value of locality cost factors	4
15	HRS-15a-b			3	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities	4
					Attribute Total	
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)						
Medical						
16	PS-1			3	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.	3
Housing						
17	PS-3a-c			2	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.	7
Employment						
18	PS-6a-b			2	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.	7
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services						
19	PS-7			3	Relative availability of base services.	4
20	PS-8a-b			2	Relative availability of child development services	7
Metropolitan Area Characteristics						
21	PS-12			3	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.	4
22	PS-13			3	Relative local crime rate.	3
					Attribute Total	

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IM REGIONS
MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Operational Proximity																		
1	HRS-1a-c	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	1				1				1				1			
Criticality of Current Location																		
2	HRS-2a-b	Significant mission-related functions	1				1								1			
3	HRS-3	Assessment of current location's statutory status	1				1											
Current Scope of Responsibility																		
4	HRS-4	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	1												1			
5	HRS-5	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	1												1			
6	HRS-6	Service provided to customers outside DoN	1												1			
7	HRS-7	Singular focus on regional management mission	1												1			

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REGIONAL MANAGEMENT - LARGE SERVICE PROVIDERS
MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Operational Proximity																		
1	HRS-1a-c	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	1				1				1				1			
Criticality of Current Location																		
2	HRS-2a-b	Significant mission-related functions	1				1								1			
3	HRS-3	Assessment of current location's statutory status	1				1											
Current Scope of Responsibility																		
4	HRS-4	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	1												1			
5	HRS-5	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	1												1			
6	HRS-6	Service provided to customers outside DoN	1												1			
7	HRS-7	Singular focus on regional management mission	1												1			

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REGIONAL MANAGEMENT - MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Operational Proximity																		
1	HRS-1a-c	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed	1				1				1				1			
Criticality of Current Location																		
2	HRS-2a-b	Significant mission-related functions	1				1								1			
3	HRS-3	Assessment of current location's statutory status	1				1											
Current Scope of Responsibility																		
4	HRS-4	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	1												1			
5	HRS-5	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	1												1			
6	HRS-6	Service provided to customers outside DoN	1												1			
7	HRS-7	Singular focus on regional management mission	1												1			

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REGIONAL MANAGEMENT - ADMIN SERVICE PROVIDERS
MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
		EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION (OP)	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Operational Proximity																		
1	HRS-1a-c	Relative proximity to supported customers organizations or subsidiary organizations managed					1				1				1			
Criticality of Current Location																		
2	HRS-2a-b	Significant mission-related functions	1				1								1			
3	HRS-3	Assessment of current location's statutory status	1				1											
Current Scope of Responsibility																		
4	HRS-4	Number of customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently served	1												1			
5	HRS-5	Customers and/or subsidiary organizations currently supported beyond 100 miles	1												1			
6	HRS-6	Service provided to customers outside DoN	1												1			
7	HRS-7	Singular focus on regional management mission	1												1			

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION (EF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Co-location																		
8	HRS-8a-d	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands		1				1								1		
9	HRS-9a-b	Proximity to Naval force concentration		1				1				1				1		
Regional Alignment																		
10	HRS-10a-e	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations						1								1		
Relative Productivity																		
11	HRS-11	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff														1		

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION (EF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Co-location																		
8	HRS-8a-d	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands		1				1								1		
9	HRS-9a-b	Proximity to Naval force concentration		1				1				1				1		
Regional Alignment																		
10	HRS-10a-e	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations						1								1		
Relative Productivity																		
11	HRS-11	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff														1		

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION (EF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Co-location																		
8	HRS-8a-d	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands		1				1								1		
9	HRS-9a-b	Proximity to Naval force concentration		1				1				1				1		
Regional Alignment																		
10	HRS-10a-e	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations						1								1		
Relative Productivity																		
11	HRS-11	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff														1		

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION (EF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Co-location																		
8	HRS-8a-d	Proximity to regional headquarters and fleet commands						1								1		
9	HRS-9a-b	Proximity to Naval force concentration		1				1				1				1		
Regional Alignment																		
10	HRS-10a-e	Proximity to significant non-DoD regional organizations						1								1		
Relative Productivity																		
11	HRS-11	Ratio of workload managed to overhead staff														1		

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Security																		
12	HRS-12a-b	Relative security posture of the activity			1				1								1	
Facility Condition																		
13	HRS-13	Facility condition code							1								1	
Locality Cost																		
14	HRS-14a-b	Relative value of locality cost factors															1	
15	HRS-15a-b	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities							1								1	

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Security																		
12	HRS-12a-b	Relative security posture of the activity			1				1								1	
Facility Condition																		
13	HRS-13	Facility condition code							1								1	
Locality Cost																		
14	HRS-14a-b	Relative value of locality cost factors															1	
15	HRS-15a-b	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities							1								1	

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Security																		
12	HRS-12a-b	Relative security posture of the activity			1				1								1	
Facility Condition																		
13	HRS-13	Facility condition code							1								1	
Locality Cost																		
14	HRS-14a-b	Relative value of locality cost factors															1	
15	HRS-15a-b	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities							1								1	

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
QUALITY OF FACILITIES (QF)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Security																		
12	HRS-12a-b	Relative security posture of the activity			1				1								1	
Facility Condition																		
13	HRS-13	Facility condition code							1								1	
Locality Cost																		
14	HRS-14a-b	Relative value of locality cost factors															1	
15	HRS-15a-b	Relative value of leased versus owned facilities							1								1	

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Medical																		
16	PS-1	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.				1												1
Housing																		
17	PS-3a-c	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.				1												1
Employment																		
18	PS-6a-b	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.				1												1
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services																		
19	PS-7	Relative availability of base services.				1												1
20	PS-8a-b	Relative availability of child development services				1												1
Metropolitan Area Characteristics																		
21	PS-12	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.																1
22	PS-13	Relative local crime rate.																1

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MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Medical																		
16	PS-1	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.				1												1
Housing																		
17	PS-3a-c	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.				1												1
Employment																		
18	PS-6a-b	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.				1												1
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services																		
19	PS-7	Relative availability of base services.				1												1
20	PS-8a-b	Relative availability of child development services				1												1
Metropolitan Area Characteristics																		
21	PS-12	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.				1												1
22	PS-13	Relative local crime rate.																1

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Medical																		
16	PS-1	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.				1												1
Housing																		
17	PS-3a-c	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.				1												1
Employment																		
18	PS-6a-b	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.				1												1
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services																		
19	PS-7	Relative availability of base services.				1												1
20	PS-8a-b	Relative availability of child development services				1												1
Metropolitan Area Characteristics																		
21	PS-12	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.				1												1
22	PS-13	Relative local crime rate.																1

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MILITARY VALUE
MATRIX QUESTIONS

			Readiness				Facilities				Surge Capability				Cost/Manpower			
PERSONNEL SUPPORT/QOL (PS)			OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS	OP	EF	QF	PS
Medical																		
16	PS-1	Located within the medical catchment area of an in-patient military medical treatment facility.				1												1
Housing																		
17	PS-3a-c	Relative value of community housing availability, affordability and proximity.				1												1
Employment																		
18	PS-6a-b	Relative opportunity for dependent / off-duty employment.				1												1
MWR/MCCS/Fleet and Family Services																		
19	PS-7	Relative availability of base services.				1												1
20	PS-8a-b	Relative availability of child development services				1												1
Metropolitan Area Characteristics																		
21	PS-12	Relative proximity to a nearest commercial airport that offers regularly scheduled service by a major airline carrier.																1
22	PS-13	Relative local crime rate.																1

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TAB 4

- DON / JCSG Alignment -

Presented on
1 July 2004

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DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Outline**
  - **Objective**
  - **Proposed Process**
    - **Role and Relationships**
    - **Implementation Elements & Timetable**
  - **Summary**
  - **Back-up Material**
    - **Relationship to Policy Guidance**

DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Objectives**
  - **Align DON and JCSG BRAC Efforts Toward Complementary and Mutually Reinforcing Results**

  - **Enhance JCSG Scenarios with Non-Competing Improvements from DON Perspective**
    - **Spans All JCSG Functions**
    - **Incorporates Lay-Down of Operational Forces**

Likely Outcomes Without Alignment:
- ***Overcommitted Infrastructure***
- ***Sub-Optimal Use of Infrastructure***
- ***Mismatched Functions***
- ***Missed Opportunities for Better Solutions***

DON / JCSG Alignment

Without Alignment



- Missed opportunities (no closures)
- Incomplete analyses of DON activities

With Alignment



- Supplement JCSG analyses
- Better DON-unique options
- More opportunities for installation closures

Leverage Existing Roles and Relationships

- Deliberative Bodies for Initial Scenarios Are IEG (for DON) and JCSGs.
- DON JCSG Principals and the IEG Membership are the Key Links



DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Implementation Proposal**
  - Convene Combined IEG / FAB Sessions
    - Lay the Foundation – Exchange IEG/JCSG Perspectives
      - Capacity Analysis (July)
      - Military Value Analysis (August)
      - Functions/Activities Not Being Considered by the JCSGs
    - Scenario Development is the Critical Phase to Achieve Alignment – Influence Scenarios Early, Before They Solidify
    - Ongoing Frequent Engagement is Essential
  - IEG and JCSGs Make Appropriate Adjustments in Deliberations
  - Engage DON Leadership as Appropriate
    - Consistency of DON Approach Across IEC/ISG/IEG/JCSGs
    - Areas of High Importance and Significant Misalignment
  - Employ "Bulletin Board" for Keeping Participants Informed on Emergent Information and Status

DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Implementation Proposal (cont'd)**
  - Scenario Development Tracking and Analysis
    - Establish Database of Scenarios Under Consideration
      - DON Scenarios
      - JCSG Scenarios (As Communicated to IAT by JCSG Principals and Their Representatives)
      - Keep Current with Real Time Data
    - Notional Key Data
      - Source (JCSG or DON)
      - Activity
      - Fenceline
      - Puts and Takes
        - » Function
        - » # of People Affected
        - » Sq Ft of Facilities Affected
        - » Volume of Equipment
    - IAT Conduct Ongoing Analysis to Brief Combined IEG/FAB on Areas of Conflict or Potential Improvement

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DON / JCSG Alignment

2003			2004												2005				
O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M

[redacted]

Configuration Analysis/Scenario Development Sep – Oct 04

[redacted]

Scenario Data Calls Nov 04

Scenario Analysis / Recommendation Development Dec 04 – Jan 05

ISG Review / Approval Feb 05

IEC Review / Approval Mar 05

Report Writing Apr 05

[redacted]

Military Value Analysis Jul – Aug 04

[redacted]

IEG / FAB Alignment Activity

IEG / JCSG Initial Alignment
- IEG Brief on DON Functions
- JCSG Briefs on Functions

Capacity Analysis Alignment
- IEG & JCSG Principals Brief on Capacity Analysis Results

Military Value Analysis Alignment
- IEG & JCSG Principals Brief on Military Value Analysis Results

Scenario Development Alignment
- Frequent Coordination / Meetings
- Across JCSGs and DON

Bulletin Board Updates

DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Summary – Key Elements**
  - **Having IEG and JCSG Principals on the Same Page is Key to Success**
  - **Early and Active Involvement in Scenarios Is Essential for Achieving Alignment**
  - **Employ Scenario Database and Analytic Tools to Handle Volume and Dynamic Mix of Scenarios**

BACK-UP MATERIAL

DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Relationship to Policy Guidance**
  - **SECDEF Memo, 15 Nov 02**
    - **"The ISG ... will oversee joint cross-service analyses of common business oriented functions and ensure the integration of that process with the Military Department and Defense Agency specific analyses of all other functions."**
  - **SECNAV Policy Advisory One, 29 May 03**
    - **"The FAB reports directly to and coordinates with the IEG in order that the DON position on common business oriented functions is clearly articulated and understood."**
    - **"Further, the FAB will ensure that DON leadership is thoroughly briefed and prepared on JCSG matters that will ultimately be addressed to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC)."**
    - **"The FAB will provide a mechanism to ensure our Navy and Marine Corps vision of the future, based on the force structure plan, is clearly articulated, understood, and supported throughout the BRAC 2005 process."**

DON / JCSG Alignment

- **Relationship to Policy Guidance**
  - **SECNAVNOTE 11000, 9 Mar 04**
    - **FAB is responsible for:**
      - **Ensuring DON leadership is thoroughly briefed and prepared on JCSG matters that will ultimately be addressed to SECDEF's ISG and IEC;**
      - **Reporting directly to the IEG and coordinating with the IAT;**
      - **Coordinating with the IEG in order that the DON position on common business oriented support functions is clearly articulated and understood;**
      - **Providing a mechanism to ensure the Navy and Marine Corps vision of the future, based on the 20-year force structure plan, is clearly articulated, understood, and supported throughout the BRAC 2005 JCSG process.**
      - **Proposed timeline envisions periodic briefings of the IEG by the JCSG principals, i.e., May 04 - capacity analysis for JCSG functional areas, Sep 04 - JCSG military value analysis, and Oct 04 - JCSG scenario development.**
    - **IEG is responsible for:**
      - **Developing DON recommendations for installations and ensuring that factors of concern to the operational commanders are considered. In consultation with the CNO and CMC, the IEG will prepare recommendations for SECNAV approval.**

TAB 5

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

JUN 21 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS

Subject: Transformational Options for BRAC 2005

The Secretary of Defense, in his November 15, 2002, memorandum initiating the BRAC process, asked for a broad series of options for stationing and supporting forces and functions to increase efficiency and effectiveness. As the Secretary indicated in that memorandum, the enduring value of our BRAC effort rests largely on our ability to conduct an analysis that reaches beyond a mere capacity reduction in the status-quo configuration to one that "reconfigure[s] our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes both warfighting capability and efficiency."

As the Infrastructure Steering Group, we need to put together the very best suggestions to stimulate critical analysis by the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups in support of the most comprehensive and transformational analysis possible. You may recall that Pete Aldridge, my predecessor, asked each of you to provide recommendations for transformational options over a year ago. The suggestions received are helpful, but given your experiences to date in the BRAC 2005 process, it is appropriate to provide each of you an additional opportunity to suggest new transformational options and to review those previously submitted. To assist you in this effort, we have grouped the previously received inputs into two categories: those that readily lend themselves for use in scenario development because they can be translated into proposed closure and realignment scenarios (attachment 1), and those that do not readily lend themselves for use in scenario development because they either have minimal impact on installations or act more like principles (attachment 2). Those inputs in attachment 2 are not recommended for further consideration as transformational options. Based on this categorization scheme, please review these listings and suggest modifications, additions, or deletions to the OSD Base Realignment and Closure Directorate by July 8, 2004.

Once your responses and suggestions are received, they will be arrayed for review by the Infrastructure Steering Group and the Infrastructure Executive Council before being forwarded to the Secretary for approval. Once approved, these options will constitute minimum analytical frameworks upon which the Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups will conduct their respective BRAC analyses.

As a guideline for drafting your additional transformational options, please ensure that each option:

1. Is overarching and notional, without identifying specific installations for analysis;
2. Has a general and identifiable effect on infrastructure; and
3. Is actionable within the BRAC 2005 process.

I look forward to your contribution to shaping our BRAC 2005 effort. Should you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Mr. Peter Potochney, Director, Base Realignment and Closure, at (703) 614-5356.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachments:
As stated

Attachment 1 – Transformational Options That Can Be Translated Into Scenarios

1. Integrate Reserve Component elements with respective active and joint components. The value of locating Reserve facilities within the community must also be considered, given the role that Reserve activities play in strengthening the link between the armed forces and American society.

2. Examine optimizing and consolidating both advanced pilot training and maintenance training for similar platforms (e.g., joint training of the Joint Strike Fighter).

3. Explore consolidating aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same bases. By exploring this joint basing concept, the Services may be able to station their CONUS mobility units/assets closer to planned air and sea ports of embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization. Co-locating Service special operations units, especially overseas, could further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities.

4. Restructure and/or combine Service acquisition organizations. Significant gains in efficiency might be achieved by combining/merging/co-locating selected acquisition activities. Among these, consider transforming service-specific product centers into jointly-managed centers for items such as avionics, aeronautics and other weapons.

5. Restructure/combine Service training activities and organizations. There is a broad range of possible opportunities in this area. Explore consolidating/co-locating our commissioning sources or combining/co-locating Service professional military education (PME) schools at the intermediate and senior levels. Consider combining/merging Service specific test pilot schools. Combining the Services' range management offices into one joint management office could not only reduce overhead, but it could produce more efficient use of a precious DoD resource.

6. Examine the redistribution of strategic lift assets to facilitate rapid deployment to the war fight from both east and west coasts.

7. Co-locate federal, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services. Opportunities for co-location will most likely present themselves in municipal settings where federal installations already exist, and sufficient adjacent infrastructure is available. If no permanent installations exist then collocation could occur entirely through a leasing agreement. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) must remain a key consideration when evaluating alternatives to relocate/co-locate various facilities. It is imperative that we balance

the benefits and risks associated with any effort to transform DoD infrastructure/bases.

8. Consider outsourcing all graduate education, to include Service War Colleges to private colleges/ universities -- or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites. Leverage distance learning to reduce residential requirements.

9. Consolidate/privatize common specialty training. The Army Engineering School at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO may be a good model of multi-service training with contract instructors.

10. Establish Centers of Excellence with joint or inter-service training, i.e., combining common or similar instructional institutions (e.g., Judge Advocate General Schools) to form a "DoD University" with satellites training sites or provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions.

11. Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, basic flight training -- helo, prop, and jet). Similarly, aircraft type training for common airframes (e.g., Osprey, H-60, C-130, JSF, etc.) should be consolidated at a minimum number of joint sites -- or single joint site.

12. Consolidate Services' common functions: supply, medical, legal, religious programs.

13. Evaluate Joint Service Installation Management by Region vice Service.

14. Consolidate Base Installation Maintenance Requirements by geographic area.

15. Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Consider all seven elements of the RC structure. The focus of the analysis will be on the requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations supporting Reserve and National Guard administrative and headquarters functions, excluding state owned and/or controlled facilities of the National Guard. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

16. Identify alternative concepts for realigning mobilization facilities DoD-wide. This analysis should focus on requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard Components of all Services to mobilize, prepare, train, deploy, and sustain forces committed to combat operations, whether overseas or in the US. Alternatives to consider include:
    (1) Establishment and consolidation of mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, deploy, and train service members.

(2) Establishment of joint pre-deployment (e.g. personnel processing) centers.

17. Evaluate DoD headquarters and support activities in the National Capital Region (NCR). This analysis should focus on the OSD Staff and activities; Joint Staff and activities; service headquarters staffs and their field operating agencies; staff support activities; and direct supporting units, service commands, and Defense agencies and their missions, functions and facilities, owned or leased in the NCR. Analysis opportunities may include:
    (1) Assessment of the need for the presence of these activities in the NCR and options for realignment out of the NCR.
    (2) Elimination of all leased space in the NCR.
    (3) Examination of the potential for consolidation of joint and service activities in the NCR as a base cluster.

18. Eliminate all leased space occupied by DoD organizations within the United States. Growing concerns for force protection, in addition to lease costs, make this an emerging issue and important issue for review. Several types of agencies, i.e. recruiting offices, could be excluded from the analysis.

19. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) activities and locations. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Potential issues include:
    (1) Establishment of a single executive agent for military ATC.
    (2) Regionalization and/or consolidation of ATC.

20. Identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through inter-service agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series - Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Assess the potential for the increased sharing of bases on an inter-service or intra-service basis to maximize the use of available training ranges and other facilities.

    The analysis would determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches $1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function.

(GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

21. Examine DoD human resources management processes and locations. Potential issues include:
    (1) Consolidation of military personnel agencies at one location.
    (2) Consolidation of civilian personnel agencies at one or several locations.
    (3) Joint regionalization of civilian personnel agencies.

22. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP). While the Navy has a single inventory control point located at two sites, there is an opportunity for significant consolidation of ICPs by all Services. For example, the Air Force has three independent ICPs, each located at their Air Logistics Centers. Consolidating them to a single ICP would permit reduced overhead and headquarters staffing as well streamlining of business practices. However, such a course of action may also include some costs and loss of efficiencies, including union issues, loss of skilled workforce, and the loss of direct interface with customers located at/near ICPs that will no longer exist.

23. Realign Signals Intelligence Exploitation & Production Centers. This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and signals intelligence systems. Combatant Commanders require Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) as a key component of a multi-source intelligence picture. The joint Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs) and service airborne Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) systems represent two of the primary SIGINT assets that meet the Combatant Commander's varied intelligence needs. Under the current force alignment, the RSOCs and remoting-capable airborne ISR assets are not located together; the two asset types maintain completely independent exploitation & production centers, maintenance support, and management staff, even when remoting technologies would enable consolidation of such resources. By consolidating the ground systems and staff for the airborne ISR resources with the RSOCs, the Department of Defense can improve the intelligence support to the war fighter while achieving notable efficiencies in infrastructure and personnel resources. These changes will advance the Department toward the goals of achieving information superiority and providing integrated, globally available, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities, as directed in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint Vision 2020.

24. Realign Intelligence Support Capabilities. This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and airborne intelligence systems. Enabling decision superiority through timely intelligence relies on more than advanced reconnaissance technology. Skilled people are the secret ingredient. The collected data can only be transformed into meaningful intelligence when people with world-class linguistic and analytic skills have access to the reconnaissance systems. Accurate forecasts of

sensor deployments to different geographic regions are required if each ISR system must maintain an independent analysis and production center. Such forecasting has proven difficult. Furthermore, the current force alignment dilutes mission-critical skills between several geographic locations, creates potential operational discontinuities as intelligence support requirements change, and results in greater overall manpower needs and infrastructure costs. Consolidating ISR ground system operations for the U-2 and RC-12 platforms with the RSOCs not only mitigates these drawbacks of the current posture but also gains new capabilities in providing global, persistent surveillance.

25. Evaluate the Defense, Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) operations. This option seeks to leverage BRAC 2005 to recognize additional workload consolidation, infrastructure reduction, and reduction in the number of DFAS operating locations at which specific functions are performed. While A-76 competitive sourcing is one of the options currently under investigation and implementation is not directly affected by BRAC 2005, implementation of other options such as a High-Performing Organization or a Public-Private Partnership could benefit from the opportunities provided under BRAC 2005. Implementation of a High-Performing Organization, for example, could result in shifting workload and functions to a location that is currently performing significantly better than other locations and closing the poorer performing sites. Centralization of specific functions at a major site and embedding a small number of DFAS personnel at customer locations is another possibility that results in a reduced infrastructure and facility requirements.

26. Evaluate security and continuity of operations at Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) activities. The events of 9/11 highlight security and safety concerns for both DFAS personnel and the financial and accounting data. A number of DFAS' 26 current operating locations are not located on military installations. Safety and security are in most cases provided by public services (fire, police, etc). Security of each DFAS location should be evaluated and if significant risks are determined to exist and relocation to military installations or DFAS site consolidation considered. With the migration to fewer sites, provisions need to incorporate the requirement to have backup equipment systems, and facility plans that replicate functions in the event of an incident or disaster.

27. Consider expansion of Total Force Units - Blended/Reserve Associate/Active Associate/Sponsored Reserve. As we rely more on Guard and Reserve components to provide critical peacetime and wartime capabilities, it makes sense to allow some units the opportunity to live, work, and train together. This concept would allow each component to contribute its unique strengths to provide the capability, experience, stability, and continuity required to operate today's information and technology driven forces. It would also enable us to make better use of basing infrastructure and maximize the utilization of expensive weapon systems.

One way to implement this concept is to expand the integration of Active and Reserve Component units. Moving Guard and Reserve units with like assets to active bases or vice-versa could facilitate a leaner, more efficient operations, maintenance, and infrastructure. The Air Force has already established units using this concept. Examples are the merger of the Air National Guard's 116th Bomb Wing and Air Combat Command's 93rd Air Control Wing to form the 116th Air Control Wing (a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Blended Wing) at Robins AFB, GA; and the integration of Air Force Reserve Command's 8th Space Warning Squadron associated with Air Force Space Command's 2nd Space Warning Squadron at Buckley AFB, CO. There are currently a total of 11,000 Air Force reservists assigned to associate units, including 32 Reserve Associate flying units. The movement of the 126th Air Refueling Wing from Chicago to Scott AFB represents another example of the efficient use of available infrastructure by different components.

Another possible area for integration is to expand the blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce infrastructure, and improve readiness, while preserving home station control. One idea would be blending across Active/RC and service boundaries to provide regional entities more useful for homeland defense (e.g. one that includes air defense, Army Guard state responders, and interagency links in a single location)

28. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer secure DoD-owned locations in the region.

29. Centralize the systems management and operations of DoD combat support processing servers into enterprise systems management centers to prepare for the net-centric environment being pursued by the Department and to reduce costs and significantly improve the security and performance of server-based processing.

30. Consolidate the Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if practical, i.e. joint use facilities.

31. Assign the Army as the executive agent for rotary wing aircraft and the Air Force as the executive agent for all fixed wing aircraft. The Department should consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

32. Consolidate the Naval Facilities Engineering Command under the Army Corps of Engineers or completely do away with the Naval Facility Engineering Command.

33. Consolidate acquisition and logistics activities at the headquarters level (e.g., the Air Force Materiel Command model) to achieve support personnel and overhead reductions.

34. Designate lead services for common equipment and reduce physical plant and workforces to the minimum number required for the force structure.

35. Transfer the operations of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) back to the respective buying entity.

36. Establish a joint, central organization for all personnel management activities. Retain in each Service only those activities needed to build the force structure requirements, make assignments, and manage war fighting, and occupational skills development.

37. Employ distance learning and available educational resources in local communities to cut down on DoD owned/operated educational facility requirements.

38. Evaluate the Military Services' need for multiple initial entry training sites. The Navy and Air Force, each, conduct this primary training at a single installation. However, the Marine Corps operates two recruit training depots—one on the East Coast, one on the West. The Army operates five separate basic training sites.

Attachment 2 – Transformational Options That Can Not Be Translated Into Scenarios

Recommendations (1) that are likely to have no installation or infrastructure impact, (2) require federal legislation or significant DoD policy before scenario design, or (3) are non-specific.

1. There are a number of ongoing strategic and transformational initiatives in the Navy and Marine Corps that will contribute to the BRAC 2005 goals of sizing our infrastructure to the defense strategy and increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. These studies, including the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, Sea Power 21, and the Fleet Response Plan, will impact the future force structure and it is imperative that the conclusions be incorporated into BRAC deliberations and transformational analyses. The Navy will continue to work with Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure the twenty-year force structure plan is consistent with our ongoing initiatives.

2. Identify alternative concepts for realigning missions and functions among seven CONUS-based unified commands (USJFCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USSOCOM), component or supporting service commands, and Defense Agencies. Analysis opportunities may include:
   (1) Location of service component commands with unified commands.
   (2) Elimination of "stand alone" headquarters.
   (3) Integration of functions of appropriate Defense agencies and selected unified commands.
   (4) Elimination of service component commands.
   (5) Review and analysis of functions and business processes to identify BRAC implications for headquarters/command facilities.

3. Consider the full range of options for the Department of Defense's Science and Technology (S&T), Test and Evaluation (T&E), and system Development and Acquisition infrastructure and functions. Evaluate integration of individual Service and Defense Agency physical capabilities and functions. Consider consolidation of individual Service and/or Defense Agency physical capabilities and functions, using mechanisms such as: Executive Agency, regionalization, joint management, new entity, etc.

4. Consolidate/merge all Service personnel business functions and rating (MOS/FEC/NEC) structures, including: Service medical records, pay systems, and

performance appraisals, etc. Consolidation or merger would allow Services to eliminate separate support functions at various locations.

5. Discussions have suggested that the common business functions are currently being addressed through the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). The opportunities to examine potential synergies associated with the co-location of operational forces; however, seem less defined. Recommend a process be established to provide this cross—service analysis, especially in the area of aviation platform bed down.

6. Incorporate force protection vulnerability assessments into the BRAC evaluation process.

7. Incorporate a strategic business analysis into the BRAC process to align the business functions with Defense Strategy, and focus on aggregate vice isolated efficiencies. This would entail an examination of Department of Defense business functions and address infrastructure needs.

8. Consider "City-Basing". It may be possible some military bases could divest and privatize selected non-military/non-critical facilities and functions to reduce the DoD infrastructure. We should consider whether the Brooks City-Base pilot initiative sponsored by the Air Force and the Business Initiative Council may have potential elsewhere. Military installations for the most part are small cities that could be managed/operated by local governments, or for that matter a best-of-breed private sector activity, allowing military commanders to concentrate on military operations. However, great care must be taken to ensure that we do not divest functions that are needed for military wartime or contingency requirements, and that the troops retain access to the same or better services at the same or lower costs. Enabling legislation was required to implement Brooks City-Base, but this enabling legislation could he incorporated in the SecDef's BRAC 2005 recommendations to the Defense BRAC Commission.

9. Partner military depots' workload with industry. Opportunities might exist to partner with industry at government facilities, to further reduce infrastructure requirements. In addition, future opportunities may exist to combine certain depot functions across Services. A future partnership arrangement and joint depot function for the Joint Strike Fighter would be a good example.

10. Study the results of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy as a factor for BRAC considerations.

11. Assess the required infrastructure necessary to bed down forces returning to the United States as a result of potential change to US Defense strategy. For example, a

reduced requirement in forces needed to "deter forward" may increase infrastructure requirements within the United States.

12. Examine the realignment of Active/Reserve Component forces and associated infrastructure in order to meet short warning and compressed swiftly defeat the effort (SDTE) timelines required to execute the Defense strategy.

13. Evaluate the minimum force levels necessary to be forward-stationed and immediately available, and preserve the infrastructure needed to bed down the remaining forces within the United States.

14. Review the infrastructure requirements associated with mobilization of Reserve Forces to optimize their ability to meet short warning and compressed SUTE timelines.

15. Look at mobility plans to ensure overlapping en route infrastructures exist to provide more flexible expeditionary capabilities.

16. Establish additional multi-mission, multi-service CONUS-based installations. These multi-service installations could be used by more than one service for a variety of missions including equipment repair (aircraft, crew served and individual weapons, boats/ship repair, etc.), schooling of service members, multi-use joint training facilities, and joint installations where units that will fight together are based together. Cost savings will be created through elimination of redundancy and reduction of overhead. Throughout this consolidation, we must ensure that we maintain the capability to train and educate our partner nation counterparts in skills that they currently rely on the U.S. Armed Forces training centers to provide.

17. Lease commercially available facilities to eliminate costly permanent military installations. The costs to build, operate, and maintain permanent military installations could be greatly reduced through leasing of commercially available state-of-the-art facilities and, at the same time, create a favorable economic impact for our local community partners. Examples of leaseable services include: gyms, chapels, dining facilities, and child care facilities.

18. There is great value in creating and sustaining a global infrastructure of widely dispersed forward operating locations capable of supporting responsive extended range air, land, naval, and space operations. Priority should extend to bases and well-developed infrastructure in countries and regions that not only provide access to our most likely areas of engagement, but also in which the U.S. seeks to assure allies of a long-term U.S. military commitment in defense of shared interest. Importantly, basing options should anticipate potential host country restrictions that could limit unilateral U.S. force employment options.

19. Consider deliberations to balance the fiscal benefits of consolidation with the increased security provided by physical redundancy. Our current space operations infrastructure provides numerous examples in which funding decisions drove development of infrastructure that now contain potential single points of failure. A key tenet of our overall basing and force development posture should be that no critical infrastructure or capability is reliant upon a single base of operations. A possible strategy to implement this goal while also reducing overall defense infrastructure may be developing Joint Force Bases where geographical proximity and mission scope allow for the sharing of resources among individual services.

20. Use the Service-agreed upon criteria/standards established in the Inter-service Training Review Organization (ITRO) Procedures Manual as the baseline for consolidation of training programs/courses. Secondly, re-evaluate previous ITRO course reviews to determine if "disapproved" courses for joint consolidation meet the new standards outlined by the BRAC Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group (i.e. a focus on jointness, as well as efficiencies).

21. Partner with other than the Federal sector (e.g., State and local) for range and training resources.

22. Integrate distributed/networked virtual and constructive capabilities through the Joint National Training Capability initiative into regional or national centers.

23. Incorporate "space" into the analyses of ranges.

24. Establish a stronger joint basing policy — make it the rule vs. exception.

25. Design Bases around Core Missions — organize to support a capability vs. filling up bases.

26. Eliminate Controlled Humidity Storage of equipment.

27. Restructure the organization of the DoD executive departments at the seat of government (OSD and military department's headquarters' staffs) and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to eliminate administrative management overhead; reduce redundant layering in decision-making processes; modernize the operational chain of command; establish single oversight of business functions; and establish an enterprise architecture with a common operating environment. A reevaluation of Title X responsibilities would be required as part of this analysis process. A reexamination of duties would also be required to ensure headquarters focus on core, corporate-level tasks rather than program management and day-to-day management of subordinate activities; strengthened focus on long-

term strategic program and financial planning; and elimination of unnecessary overlap, complexity, and redundancy in tasks. (GAO/NSIAD-00-72, Defense Management, July 2002.) Execution of this alternative would result in significant reduction in facilities space requirements.

28. Examine best practices in commercial acquisition to determine if fewer people, organizations, and or facilities could be used in the DoD process. The GAO reported in February 2002 (GAO-02-469T Sourcing and Acquisition 19 March 2003) that it is important for DoD to adopt business practices that will enable it to acquire the systems and services to allow it to operate effectively in a resource constrained environment. One analysis area could be examining the feasibility of streamlining the acquisition process through DoD/Federal enterprise-wide contracting managed at the Centers of Excellence" level and executed at the local level. Execution of a streamlined acquisition process would result in a reduction in infrastructure requirements.

29. Consider BRAC implications for the divestiture of DoD-owned utility and energy systems. Frameworks that could be investigated include:
    (1) Establishment of a single subject matter expert and executive agent for all DoD utilities privatization efforts.
    (2) Establishment of a joint approach toward utilities privatization. Consideration that proposals including adjacent, related systems might prove attractive to industry.
    (3) Consideration of taking a regional (and Joint) approach to the provision of energy to installations in the State of Alaska. Implementation of recommendations could result in the closure of one of more central heat and power plants at Army and/or Air Force installations. Effort could capitalize on ongoing study being done by the Department of the Army.

30. Examine DoD's business management operations to include the complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management processes and information systems that are used to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management and decision-making. The processes and their supporting networks were not designed, but rather evolved into an overly complex operation including little standardization across DoD components; multiple systems performing the same tasks; the same data stored in multiple systems; manual data entry into multiple systems; and a large number of data translations and interfaces which combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. According to the GAO, the conditions that lead to previous attempts at reform remain largely unchanged today. (GAO-02-497T, DoD Financial Management, 6 March 2002.) A possible outcome would be a reduction in systems, data entry personnel, and facility support infrastructure as a result of establishing enterprise business rules for business processes that use a framework of DoD-wide common data standards.

31. Identify and Determine Alternatives for Providing Non-core Functions. This analysis would accelerate the efforts of the Senior Executive Council and the Business Initiative Council to identify non-core functions that DoD and the Services do not necessarily need to perform in-house. A range of alternatives for provision of functions may include function transfer, cross-servicing, consolidation, regionalization, privatization, or elimination. The recently revised OMB A-76 Circular would need to be evaluated to determine its impact to the effort.

32. Examine DoD Installation Management. Breaking down cultural resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, and setting forth a clear framework for a reduced defense infrastructure are key to avoiding waste and inefficiency. Infrastructure is defined as those activities that provide support services to mission programs, such as combat forces, and primarily operate from fixed positions. Therefore, this analysis would identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through interservice agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series — Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Possible areas of focus follow:

    (1) Each Service maintains its own facilities and capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a result, DoD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure. Significant reductions in excess infrastructure requirements in common support areas could come from consolidating workloads, sharing assets, and restructuring functions on a cross-service basis. An analysis would examine ways to consolidate functions; eliminate duplication of efforts; and recommend organizational reforms, reductions in management overhead, and streamlined business practices. It would be important to resolve the policy issues that have had limited cross-service consolidations in the past.

    (2) Determination of how much DoD medical infrastructure is needed to meet war-fighting requirements and what capacity exceeding those requirements will be retained for use by military dependents and retirees.

    (3) Determination of what extent OSD and JCS will emphasize joint basing in the future as they increase joint training and operations.

    (5) Determination, to the extent practical, whether (1) overseas basing is likely to continue at the current level or be reduced and (2) contingent capacity for

basing in the US needs to be retained. (GAO Report — Military Bases — Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds, July 1997.)

33. Evaluate a divestiture of mission involving support of active duty military contingencies, a reallocation of assets used in support of such missions to reserve or active duty units, and a reorganization based on mission as determined by the state governor.

34. Determine the feasibility of physical consolidation, functional consolidation, regionalization, and/or privatization of staff functions such as the Medical Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, chaplains, legislative liaisons, public affairs, and safety.

35. Evaluate military barracks policies. The military barracks footprint is large. Barracks are costly to build and maintain. All services continue to invest heavily in barracks. Several Services are considering looking at privatization as a feasible and cost-effective approach to permanent party single service member housing (PPSSMH). A collaborative, rather than independent service, approach could minimize duplication. (GAO Report — Military Housing — Opportunities that Should Be Explored to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Service Members — June 2003.) Other analyses that might be considered for PPSSMH as part of BRAC 05 include:

    (1) Elimination of single service member mandatory assignment to barracks/dormitories for all Services.

    (2) Establishment of consistent assignment policy across the four Services, e.g., Army's mandatory assignment policy is E-1 thru E-6, while the Navy's is E-1 thru E-4.

36. Review the efforts of the Business Management Modernization Program and all other information technology studies being conducted by OSD and the military departments with a goal of determining opportunities for transferring, consolidating, or privatizing all or part of information technology services and systems. Possible analytical frameworks include:

    (1) Establishment of a ubiquitous DoD enterprise network with regionalized management vice a network of networks owned and operated by the Services and Agencies. This approach could reduce installation footprint, redundancies and duplications of effort, and operational overhead. It would also enhance security and information assurance, as well as increase interoperability as a result of standardization and integration. Guard and

Reserve Component would also merge into the larger DoD enterprise enhancing interoperability and reducing redundancy.

(2) Establishment of a DoD or Joint level CIO responsible for providing the Services and Agencies with the strategic IT support required to operate and maintain a worldwide enterprise network for installations and that can be extended to the tactical networks supporting the war fighter. This framework treats information technology services like a utility at the installation level and allows the Services to focus on tactical extension of the DoD enterprise network service required to support war fighter missions.

(3) Consolidation of all DoD, Service and Agency email systems into regional web-based mail services similar to that provided by America On Line (AOL), and or Army Knowledge Online (AKO). The creation of a DoD enterprise portal supports the development of a global enterprise information service and taxonomy for the sharing and delivering of information across one network vice stove piped systems.

(4) Expedition of the merging of all voice, data, and video communications on to an Internet Protocol (IP) network to reduce infrastructure requirements and sustainment costs.

(5) Mandate the hosting of all applications and mainframe operations at centralized DoD processing centers, such as Defense Enterprise Computing Centers (DECO). he use of these facilities will reduce footprint requirements and implement economies of scale cost reduction. This centralized hosting and processing enhances the global enterprise information taxonomy.

37. Evaluate DoD human resources management policies. This analysis and reengineering effort would look at human resources management processes across DoD. Possible analytical frameworks include: Development of automated personnel profiles that capture complete employee history to include pay and benefits history, training, and medical records. This would alleviate fragmented records, multiple records and data entry points, and reduce supporting personnel requirements and facilities infrastructure. This effort might also consider privatization of components of the human resource management function, or of the function in entirety, as it pertains to civilian personnel.

38. Shift BRAC focus. The business strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) focuses almost exclusively on efficiency in the conduct of business operations. Almost no emphasis is given to devising effective business strategies. This drive to

the bottom line assumes DoD already has an effective strategy (i.e., the department is pursuing only the business functions that provide it with an advantage) and it merely needs to fine-tune operations. This is also the inherent assumption behind the traditional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

Incorporating a strategic business analysis into the BRAC process would provide the opportunity to examine what business functions DoD should be engaged in so that they align with Defense Strategy, rather than examining how to trim capacity on what is currently being done. This would also afford the department the opportunity to focus on aggregate efficiencies instead of isolated efficiencies and avoid potential adverse strategic outcomes that can arise from tactical pursuit of cost reductions at the business unit level.

In contrast to DoD, private firms seek first to gain a competitive advantage. Decisions of what to do internally and what to outsource are made in light of strategic objectives. While DoD emphasizes cost when making these decisions, business management literature emphasizes that lower costs should not be the primary or the only goal of business strategy and outsourcing. Michael Corbett [1995] lists the following goals in descending order of importance.

(1) Improving Business Focus
(2) Gaining Access to Superior Capabilities
(3) Accelerating Re-Engineering Efforts to Reduce Cycle Times and Improve Quality
(4) Sharing Risks
(5) Reducing Operating Costs
(6) Converting Capital Investments in Non-Core Functions into Operating Expense
(7) Gaining Better Control Over Functions That Are Not Meeting Performance Goals or Customer Expectations

While traditionally BRAC has only focused on item five, the process could be revised to take the other six elements into account. This would entail an examination not only of what infrastructure DoD needs to perform current business functions but also what business functions should DoD be doing in the first place.

39. Realign of Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Distribution Activities. DLA is currently realigning their distribution activities to support the Industrial Transformation Strategy of the Military Services; executing the National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS) to extend DoD Supply Chain of consumable items beyond the wholesale level; and implementing the "Hub and Spoke" distribution concept.

The NIMS promotes extending supply chain management of consumable items beyond the wholesale level in order to provide products and services to the point of consumption. This effort will merge distinct wholesale and retail inventories into a national inventory that can be managed in a more integrated and efficient manner. This will reduce redundant inventory levels and information systems thereby lowering overall DoD inventory costs.

The "hub and spoke" distribution process will use speed and responsiveness to move critical supplies under positive control from the source to the customer. Stock positioning decisions will be made to move critical parts closer to the customer, significantly increasing readiness, reducing order ship time and allowing Service owned retail level inventories to be further reduced.

They are also establishing a single Weapons Systems ICP with regional sites at Columbus, Richmond, and Philadelphia (this may provide a tie-in to the single Service ICP concept discussed above).

40. Establish an Integrated Common Identification System. Regardless of the end result of BRAC process, if the Supply and Storage infrastructure is "right sized' without having an integrated common tracking, marking, burning, interrogating, receipting and distributing process then infrastructure is reduced without gaining any effectiveness in our logistics business. An overarching Radio Frequency (RF) capability, interfaced with the Global Information Grid, integrated in the distribution pipeline that provides real time visibility from source of supply to the soldier at the end of the last tactical mile should be established. This capability should also be built into the redistribution/retrograde pipeline to ensure materiel flow is as effective moving out of theater as it will be moving forward.

    This overarching RF architecture must also be integrated into the financial community. Given that our working capital fund (WCF) structure is dependent on sales, the velocity of which we can move materiel has become faster than the soldiers ability to input receipts, creating not only backlog but the "loss of sales" jeopardizes the WCF. These disconnects across the logistics and financial community, particularly as we look at joint and combined operations, must be closed. To better facilitate this effort recommend that it be coordinated with the Industrial, Technical, and Headquarters and Support JCSGs.

41. Explore public/private partnership opportunities (i.e., Limited Liability Companies, Venture Capital, Lease to Buy, etc.) to optimize intellectual capital and maximize facility(s) utilization and capabilities.

42. Consider establishment of an S&T workforce educational program similar to the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS) to recruit, train, and

retain the unique science and engineering human capital required to ensure U.S. technological warfighting and full spectrum dominance throughout the 21st Century.

43. DoD's inventory of facilities, including CONUS and OCONUS, must be viewed as an integrated network - a system of systems. Facilities must be evaluated based on the service they provide to the system. The system being supported is a rapidly deployable, rapidly tailorable, joint, interagency, unilateral and or combined fighting system, with or without coalition support for basing (denied access). OCONUS bases must support initial operations and thru-put and staging of follow-on forces. CONUS bases must facilitate the rapid deployment of forces as well as support reachback operations where/when possible. The basing structure must support realistic, individual, unit collective, joint, and interagency, capabilities based training. Where possible, sustaining bases and facilities must readily/efficiently support the transition from sustaining/training bases to operational bases with minimal time, cost or effort.

44. Recommend that improvements to mission effectiveness (rather than a heavy emphasis on cost savings) become a significant variable in the BRAC equation reiterating that installations and facilities must be assessed by the contribution they make to the system of training, sustaining and deploying rapidly deployable and tailorable joint forces.

45. Use BRAC to support critical business process reforms under the Business Management Modernization Program to ensure that the goal of 25 percent cost reduction is achieved. For details see A Plan to Streamline DoD's Science and Technology, Engineering, and Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, Report of the Section 907 and 912(c) Senior Steering Group for Review of the RDT&E Infrastructure, July 1999.

46. Work with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) and retain outside experts to undertake a capabilities-based review of RDT&E infrastructure and projected requirements across the public and private sectors and across all Services. See Vision 21: The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluation Centers of the Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), May 1996.

47. Use the joint cross-servicing working group mechanism to vigorously pursue reductions in duplication and non-value added work in the military service and defense laboratories in accord with the study produced in 49.

48. Reinvigorate the T&E executive agent structure and engage those parties in the process of developing the joint plan for consolidation and streamlining.

49. Consult with outside experts in organizational realignment and use the IT tools made available via the Business Management Modernization Program, to restructure the acquisition organizations of OSD and the Services at the headquarters level to take advantage of improved business processes and IT-enabled information flows and increased use of contractor managed life-cycle support.

50. Support the Navy's creation of a "virtual" enterprise for its Systems Commands (NAVAIR, NAVSEA, NAVSUP, SPAWARS) as a means to streamline operations, reduce intra service duplication and cut overhead.

51. Use BRAC to create a consolidated, joint distribution system for DoD: Engage private sector experts to assist in assessing warehouse and distribution center requirements –
    (1) Appropriate performance/delivery standards of operation for DoD
    (2) Numbers, types and locations for large distribution centers (e.g. Susquehanna and San Joaquin in today's system) and regional distribution centers
    (3) Required inventory levels at each site
    (4) Volume of warehouse and distribution center space
    (5) Close all other warehouse and distribution centers
    (6) Use BMMP and ongoing IT integration solutions to create joint supply management system
    (7) Use BRAC funds to construct or automate/modernize remaining sites

52. Continue to implement current supply chain business process reforms.

53. Privatize-in-place the entire DoD maintenance depot system under similar conditions set down for the San Antonio and Sacramento Air Logistics Centers in 1995. Consider a public sector workload guarantee, at a level existing at the time of the decision to privatize, will continue for 3 years, with reduced guarantees in each of the succeeding 3 years. At the end of the period, the workload will opened to full and open competition.

    DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment will make up to $2 million available to each maintenance depot for transition planning. They may also apply for grants from the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce.
    The Department of Defense and the maintenance depots will enter into agreements with the local community's redevelopment authorities to plan for the transition of the depots to the private sector. At the end of 6 years, Department of Defense responsibility will terminate.

    The community redevelopment authority will select a master developer to implement its transition plan. The master developer can solicit and commence

commercial operations on the depot as soon as the transition plan is approved by its respective Service.

Continued Department of Defense access to depot-level services for its core requirements (as defined by the Defense Department) will be provided for in the transition agreements.

54. Make the private sector the preferred provider of services for back office functions.

55. With the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) as a guide, change the organizational structure of the Department's back office functions to align authority with responsibility.

56. Transfer all commodity management, information, and disposal activities of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), including the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), to private vendors or 3rd party logistics providers. Retain within DLA :
    (1) Planning and combat logistics support for combatant commanders
    (2) Oversight of prime vendor agreements
    (3) Direct management of DoD-unique and readiness items

57. Outsource management of long-haul communications in the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and pursue competitive sourcing until all remaining functions have been reviewed. Retain within DISA planning and management of "the last tactical mile" of support to the combatant commanders.

58. Identify the residual organizations in the military services that continue to perform similar activities to or exist to monitor or liaise with the aforementioned Defense Agencies and vigorously eliminate, rationalize or consolidate into joint cross-service use employing the Business Management Modernization Program as a guide.

59. Establish a single HR portal for all DoD military and civilian employees to enable each of them to manage their personnel actions electronically. Vigorously rationalize the military services existing physical HR infrastructure.

60. Expand outsourcing of recruiters and recruiting/induction functions for all military services.

61. Make the private sector the preferred provider of military family housing by continuing a compensation-based approach that enables the military member to make a financial decision on how to spend his or her housing allowance.

62. Continue the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI).

63. Convert barracks/transient facilities development, operation and management to a professional, largely civilian-run organization. Take private hotel/motel industry practices as the organizational standard. Compete where the local commercial market provides alternatives.

64. Continue to expand private sector participation in childcare and family support programs by either privatizing or using enhanced use lease authorities to move the infrastructure out of DoD ownership.

65. Compete, where feasible, infrastructure associated with MWR Category A activities. These activities include intramural and unit sports, libraries, physical fitness facilities, recreation centers and activities at unit level primarily oriented to unaccompanied personnel. These activities need to be preserved on military facilities and ships, but their operation does not require DoD personnel in many cases.

66. Evaluate MWR Category B activities against availability of same/similar services available in the local community (where military members could perhaps receive DoD-subsidized access/membership). These include auto hobby shops, arts & crafts centers, bowling centers, child development centers, entertainment, outdoor recreation, and youth services. Where no commercial market exists, preference should be to provide the service on the military facility, but to compete the development, operation and management where possible.

67. Develop and operate MWR Category C activities with private sector partners. These activities include amusement machines, Armed Forces Recreation Centers, entertainment/dinner clubs, and golf courses. Consider allowing local community use as away of leveraging operating costs.

68. Continue planning to consolidate the Service's three separate exchange systems in a way that is transparent to the military shopper.

69. Even though TRICARE's role in military readiness is critical, its infrastructure must be run like a business. Once the Force Health Protection requirement (e.g., personnel and medical capabilities to prevent casualties from occurring in the deployed environment and ability to provide high quality casualty care if it does occur) is adequately provided for, DoD should consolidate its remaining Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) structure.

70. Increasing partnerships with current managed care providers in the private sector sustains a strong medical support system in CONUS to care for retirees and families

of active duty deployed personnel. It also creates a pool of civilian providers to backfill MTF's when their medical staffs are deployed.

71. DoD must complete funding and fielding of the Composite Health Care System (CHCS II) to permit automated medical information on all eligible beneficiaries to be available worldwide. Like the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, CHCS II is a good candidate for outsourced operation and maintenance.

72. While we believe that it is within the charter of the Training and Education JCSG, analysis specifically directed at the viability of a Joint National Training Capability through BRAC should be considered, such as an integrated real, virtual and digital networked training environment that replicates in training in both CONUS and OCONUS the execution of joint, combined and interagency, warfighting in realistic accuracy.

73. Consolidate Service's management of quarters, housing, and public schools.

74. Consolidate or privatize base exchanges/commissaries.

75. Evaluate the impact of military joint construction projects. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended to DoD that use of joint construction projects will help improve conditions, reduce construction costs and reduce facilities footprint for Guard and Reserve facilities. (GAO-03-51 6, Defense Infrastructure-Changes in Funding Priorities and Management Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and Reserve Facilities, May 2003.) For example, a joint Armed Forces Reserve Center in Tennessee, which combined construction projects of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps Reserve into a single project, saved millions of MILCON dollars and lessened the need for additional infrastructure. This principle when used between the Services, as well as between the active force and RC, will give similar savings. This analysis would evaluate ways that BRAC 2005 might facilitate efficient planning, programming, and execution of joint construction projects. Focus may include facilitation of coordination among RC and Service counterparts, and between service components, to program identified military construction projects in the same fiscal year. The assessment should also examine ways to employ the DoD-established budget structure and/or BRAC resources to fund high priority joint construction projects.

76. Examine DoD lodging management. This analysis would look at BRAC implications for DoD lodging management. Lodging management is defined as the management of transient billeting provided for those on temporary duty, as well as arriving and departing personnel and their families. Possible analytical frameworks include:

(1) Elimination of transient lodging, which would result in dependence on the private sector.
(2) Consolidation of lodging operations between Services.
(3) Establishment of a single executive agent for military lodging operations and management.
(4) Transfer of ownership of lodging assets to the private sector for operation and management (privatization).

77. Review DoD Infrastructure — Unique Properties such as Prisons, Historic Properties, and Museums. This analysis would identify all DoD unique properties/facilities such as prisons, historic properties, and museums to determine which properties/facilities could be turned over to an appropriate agency, business, or foundation for continued operation.

78. Evaluate military barracks policy. The military barracks footprint is large. Barracks are costly to build and maintain. All services continue to invest heavily in barracks. Several Services are considering looking at privatization as a feasible and cost-effective approach to permanent party single service member housing (PPSSMH). A collaborative, rather than independent service, approach could minimize duplication. (GAO Report — Military Housing — Opportunities that Should Be Explored to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Service Members — June 2003.) Other analyses that might be considered for PPSSMH as part of BRAC 05 include consolidation of assets and effort; establishment of a single executive agent for PPSSMH.

79. Determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches $1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function. (GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

80. Establish and support of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), an integrated real, virtual and digital networked training environment that replicates in training in both CONUS and OCONUS the execution of joint, combined and interagency, warfighting in realistic accuracy.

81. Continue to exploit opportunities for privatization and public-private partnering in the laboratory structure as a mechanism for filling excess capacity, leveraging private sector investment, spreading overhead, and attracting top talent.

82. Use BRAC to create a consolidated, joint distribution system for DoD. Contract for operation of remaining warehouse and distribution centers – Where public sector operations remain, use Performance Agreements with performance levels/delivery standards arrived at by process above.

83. Establish a depot and industrial facility cross-servicing panel that has the goal of rationalizing and consolidating DoD's existing infrastructure into a configuration to support the repair and maintenance requirements of the 2011 force structure.

84. Outsource the services of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).

85. Continue to competitively source functions of the Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) until all have been reviewed.

86. Make the private sector the preferred provider of HR services: personnel management and recruitment, education and training for specialized—but not military unique—skills.

87. Compete remaining payroll functions (active duty/reserve/civilian) and those parts of the benefits system related to monetary transactions (e.g., insurance, thrift savings plan, etc.).

88. Continue to press for authority to move all background security investigation personnel and infrastructure out of DoD.

89. Move training and education for specialized skills to preferred providers in the private sector or public academic institutions.

90. Privatize the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), including its overseas operations, employing a business model that stipulates that the current level of benefit be maintained and that the number of stores not be reduced unless the benefit can be otherwise replaced. The plan should encourage a consortium of providers to team to provide the benefit.

91. Outsource DoD's Household Goods and Personal Property Shipping function to the commercial relocation services industry using the current Families First program as the operational standard.

92. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) functions. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Consider transfer of these functions to the Federal Aviation Administration.