DCN 85

On the right track ...
THE PARTNERSHIP
... developing the mid-Mississippi corridor

Jim,

Doyle requested this at site visit. Am sending you a copy.

Bill C

March 28, 1995

Memorandum

From: LtCol J.R. Brubaker

To: Capt Terry Pudos

Subj.: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)

Sir, the following personnel from the DBCRC will be attending the NAS Meridian base visit scheduled for Monday 3 April 1995:

Alex Yellin	Navy Team Leader	Arrive 1300, 2 Apr 95
LtCol James R. Brubaker	DoD Analyst/USMC	Arrive 1300, 2 Apr 95
LtCol Merrill Beyer	DoD Analyst/USAF	Arrive 1800, 2 Apr 95
Mark Pross	Senior Analyst/GAO	Arrive 1800, 2 Apr 95
Elizabeth King	Legal Counsel	Arrive 1800, 31 Mar 95

This information is current as of 8:00AM on this date and will be updated as information becomes available.

April 14, 1995

Major Edwin L. Koehler
Commanding Officer
Marine Aviation Training Support Group
740 Fletcher Rd., Suite 209
Meridian, MS 39309-5054

Dear Major Koehler:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Naval Air Station Meridian. The briefings and discussions with you and your staff provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the capabilities of the Naval Technical Training Center and the Marine Aviation Training Support Group. This information will be very helpful to the Commission in our assessment of the recommendations provided by the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to your staff for a job well done. Your briefings and tour were professionally done and extremely informative. The information will be utilized in our assessment of Naval Aviation's future basing requirements. Again, thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA(Ret.)
Commissioner

April 14, 1995

Commander Melinda L. Moran
Commanding Officer
Naval Technical Training Center
740 Fletcher Rd., Suite 100
Meridian, MS 39309-5040

Dear Commander Moran:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Naval Air Station Meridian. The briefings and discussions with you and your staff provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the capabilities of the Naval Technical Training Center. This information will be very helpful to the Commission in our assessment of the recommendations provided by the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to your staff for a job well done. Your briefings and tours were professionally done and extremely informative. The information provided will help in our assessment of Naval Aviation's future basing requirements. Again, thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA(Ret.)
Commissioner

April 14, 1995

Colonel Stephen L. Goff
Director
Regional Counterdrug Training Academy
3000 Fuller Road
Meridian, MS 39309-5020

Dear Colonel Goff:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Naval Air Station Meridian. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff and the community officials provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy at Meridian. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to your staff for a job well done. The briefings and tour you led were both professionally done and extremely informative. This information will be utilized in our assessment of Naval Aviation's future basing requirements. Again, thank you for a job extremely well done.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA(Ret.)
Commissioner

April 14, 1995

Captain Robert L. Leitzel
Commanding Officer
Naval Air Station Meridian
1155 Rosenbaum Ave., Suite 13
Meridian, MS 39309-5003

Dear Captain Leitzel:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Naval Air Station Meridian. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff and the community officials provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the operations at NAS Meridian. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to your staff, especially the Public Affairs Officer, Ms. Susan Junkins, for a job well done. The briefings and tours led by yourself and Captain Terry J. Pudas were both professionally done and extremely informative. The information presented will help in our assessment of Naval Aviation's future basing requirements. Again, thank you for a job extremely well done.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA(Ret.)
Commissioner

April 14, 1995

Captain Terry J. Pudas
Commander, Training Air Wing One
101 Fuller Road, Suite 250
Meridian, MS 39039-5403

Dear Captain Pudas:

I want to thank you for all of your assistance during my recent visit to Naval Air Station Meridian. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff, and the community officials provided me with a great deal of valuable information about the operations at Meridian. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to your staff, especially Mrs. Beverly Heimann, for a job well done. The briefings and tours led by yourself, Colonel Stephen L. Goff of the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy and Commander Melinda L. Moran of the Naval Technical Training Center were both professionally done and extremely informative. The information presented will be utilized by the Commission in our review and analysis process and will help in our assessment of Naval Aviation's basing requirements. Again, thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA(Ret.)
Commissioner

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

MEMORANDUM

TO: Doyle Reedy
FROM: Bill Crawford
SUBJECT: Data Requested at June16, 1995, Site Visit
DATE: June 16, 1995

All data in the BSAT column is from the data submitted to the Commission by the Navy BSAT (see pages 17 and 18 of the Undergraduate Pilot Training Items for Inclusion in the Record from UPT - Joint Cross Service Group hearing; and BSAT COBRA file TNAS4DMM.CBR). The following identifies the source of each item in the Community column.

1. Noise/Safety Hazards at Corpus Christi = YES. SOURCE: May 1995 "Assessment of Future Noise and Safety Compliance at NAS Corpus Christi" prepared by Samis & Hamilton; and June 12, 1995, Samis & Hamilton letter to Cong. G.V. Montgomery with attachments.

2. PTR Requirement = 382. SOURCE: 25 MAY 95 CNO letter to Cong. G.V. Montgomery; and 10 MAY 95 CNO letter 1542 "Pilot and Naval Flight Officer Aviation Training Requirements, Joint USN/USAF Training Rates."

3. Operating Buffer = 15%. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see last paragraph, page 12 (15% is conservative; Navy said 18% to 20%).

4. TOTAL PTR CAPACITY NEEDED = 439. SOURCE: PTR requirement of 382 plus 15% buffer equals 439.

5. Kingsville Operations Capacity = 229,416. SOURCE: Navy BSAT data.

6. OLF Alice Operations Capacity = 148,457. SOURCE: Navy BSAT data.

7. OLF Corpus Christi Operations Capacity = 129,260. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Page 8, Figure 9 facing Page 8, and Appendix E.

8. TOTAL OPERATIONS CAPACITY = 507,133. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Figure 9 facing Page 8 (sum of 5,6, &7).

9. T2/T45 Operations per PTR = 1887. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Page 6, Figure 6 facing Page 6; also 1993 Certified Data and Commission capacity calculations; and Navy Meridian Team 1995 BSAT Calculation of PTR Capacity pages 8 and 9.

10. T45TS Operations per PTR = 1756. SOURCE: Navy Meridian Team 1995 Navy BSAT Calculation of PTR Capacity -- see bottom of Page 6 and top of Page 7.

11. AVERAGE = 1822. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Figure 9 facing Page 8; and Navy Meridian Team 1995 Navy BSAT Calculation of PTR Capacity -- see Page 9.

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12. PTR CAPACITY AVAILABLE = 278. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Figure 9 facing Page 8 (Total Operations Capacity divided by Average Operations per PTR).

13. EXCESS(SHORTFALL) = (161). SOURCE: Item 12 minus Item 4.

14. 20 Year NPV Cost Savings ($millions) = <$182.3. SOURCE: Community brief at 8 June 95 site visit to NAS Meridian -- see COBRA summary sheet.

15. One Time Costs = >$107.4. SOURCE: Community brief at 8 MAY 95 site visit to NAS Meridian -- see COBRA summary sheet.

16. No savings to close NTTC if NAS stays open = YES. SOURCE: 3 JUNE 95 Navy Meridian Team letter to LCDR Eric Lindenbaum -- see COBRA summary sheet.

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FINDINGS

	CATEGORY	BSAT	COMMUNITY	R&A
1	Noise/Safety Hazards at Corpus Christi	NO	YES	
2	PTR Requirement	336	382	
3	Operating Buffer	18%	15%	
4	TOTAL PTR CAPACITY NEEDED	396	439	
5	Kingsville Operations Capacity	229,416	229,416	229,416
6	OLF Alice Operations Capacity	148,457	148,457	148,457
7	OLF Corpus Christi Operations Capacity	219,936	129,260	
8	TOTAL OPERATIONS CAPACITY	597,809	507,133	
9	T2/T45 Operations per PTR	1629	1887*	
10	T45TS Operations per PTR	1393	1756	
11	AVERAGE	1511	1822	
12	PTR CAPACITY AVAILABLE	396	278	
13	EXCESS(SHORTFALL)	0	(161)	
14	20 Year NPV Cost Savings ($ millions)	$345.5	<$182.3	
15	One Time Costs	$70.4	>$107.4	
16	No savings to close NTTC if NAS stays open	?	YES	

*Same as 1993 Commission Finding

RRP DCA, Inc.
2171 Crystal Drive
Two Crystal Park Arcade
Arlington, Virginia 22202

TELEFAX

Date: 6-16-95

Phone: Ray Powell: 703-769-5005
Jim Seely: 703-769-5007
FAX: 703-553-7231

The attached transmission consists of this cover plus 12 pages.

TO: LCOL JIM BRUBAKER

Company: _____

Info: _____

From: JIM SEELY

MESSAGE: Hope this helps as a start. Whether or not they can make the required PTR is the basic issue. The following is pertinent to that issue. Gen Davis asked for and was given the "findings" chart. The last 3 pages were overnighted to you by the Meridian Team (sent today).

I'll either be here 703 769 5887 or at home 703 971 3695 over the weekend. I can come in also.

Best regards
Jim.

DATA PROVIDED BY CVATRA N334

~~FIGURE 6~~

Attachment B

DAY

STAGE	NO. OF FLIGHTS	OPS/FLIGHT	TOTAL
BI	4 (5,7,4,4)	Varies	20
RI	7 (5,5,5,5,5,6,5)	Varies	36
AN	10	5	50
IR	5	5	25
FAM	15	18	270
OCF	3	3	9
FORM	17	7	119
CQ (I)	8	16	128
ON	9	8	72
WEP	11	8	88
TACT	4	(6/SORTIE DURING 8/SORTIE SAT)	26
GUN	8	8	64
ACM	13	8	104
CQ (II)	6	(16/SORTIE FOR FCLP AND 22 OPS FOR SHIP)	102
		what it ought to be 1091 × 51.4% = 1652 + 35%	1113 / 1503
	16		32
	12		74
	17		65
	16		64
			185

To get 1393 the BSAT SUBTRACTED 110 from 1503.

Actually they should take 1113 - 22 (CV ops) = 1091 × .514 = 561 + 1091 = 1652. Averaged with $\frac{1790}{3442} \div 2 = 1721$

Enclosure (1)

DATA PROVIDED BY CNATRA N334

1. Enclosure (1) is the original calculations provided in NAS Kingsville Data Call 2. Because th is no historical average for T-45 overhead opera the T-2/TA-4 average of 35% of flight ops was used to calculate the overhead figures. (Note: A mistake was made in calculating the total ni operations per student. The number should read 252 vice 455.)

math error should be 51.4 %

2. Enclosure (1) provides the estimated data used to calculate the flight operations per student.

3. 1393 total day operations was calculated in the following manner:

1503 - 110 = 1393

110 = 88 WEPS ops + 22 CQ ops

Note: WEPS and the final CQ qualification sorti are typically completed on detachments.

94 15:31 NO.032 P002

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) 0 21 July 9

CURRICULUM: ADVANCED T45(W2) TRAWING 2 SERVICE: ALL SERVICE

TYPE ACFT: T-45 PROCEDURES TRAINER: 2F137 FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F13

		ACFT HRS/STUD T-45		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD T-45	2F137	2F138	SIM HRS/STUD 2F137	2F13
STUDENT SYLLABUS		175.60		123.30	0.00	0.00	30.30	6
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
T-45 ACFT = 10.6%	/10.6%	18.61		13.06	----	----	----	
2F137 CPT = 5.90%		----		----	0.00	----	1.78	
2F138 FSIM = 5.90%		----		----	----	0.00	----	3.91
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		26.50		30.70	----	----	----	
CHASE OVERHEAD	10.6%	2.80		3.25	----	----	----	
SUBTOTAL		223.52		170.32	0.00	0.00	32.08	71.37
STUDENT ATTRITION	8.0%	9.71		7.40	0.00	0.00	1.39	3.10
SUBTOTAL		233.24		177.72	0.00	0.00	33.48	74.47
IUT OVERHEAD								
T-45 .40353*.522*73.5/69.9		15.47		14.71	----	----	----	
2F137 .40353*.522* 0.0/12.0		----		----	0.00	----	2.52	
2F138 .40353*.622* 0.0/18.0		----		----	----	0.00	----	3.78
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .40363		6.05	x2	12.10	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
4.5 HRS * .40353		1.81	x2	3.63	----	----	----	----
SUBTOTAL		266.58		208.18	0.00	0.00	36.00	78.26
OVERHEAD	1.00%	2.65		2.65	----	----	----	
G...STIC OVERHEAD	2.00%	6.31		5.31	----	----	----	
FERRY OVERHEAD	0.60%	1.32		1.32	----	----	----	
TOTALS		266.89		217.48	0.00	0.00	36.00	78
ROUNDED		265.90		217.60	0.00	0.00	36.00	78
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		241.7		106.20	0.00	0.00	33.50	74.1

IT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT T-45	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT T-45	2F137	2F138	SIM HRS/IUT 2F137	2F138
IGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	73.50	69.90	0.00	0.00	12.00	18.00

IT OVHD HRS/STUD=[INS/STUD RAT 0]*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

STRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HRS/(SL + SCT) * SL * AVAIL * WX * EI * DAYS

T-45 = 8HRS/(1.33 + 2.00) * 1.33 * 0.800 * 0.89 * 1.00 * 237 = 539 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
STRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(217.6 / 839)			= .40353
RCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(265.9 / 732)			= .36325
IC TRNR/STUD RATIO		(36.0 /2779)		= .01295
ULATOR/STUD RATIO			(78.3 /2719)	= .02880

UAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HR/(SL + TAT) * SL * AVAIL * EI * WX * DAYS

T UTIL	= 10/(1.33 + 1.40)	* 1.33	* 0.760	* 0.95	* 0.89	* 237	= 732
..PT UTIL	= 16/(1.60 + 0.25)	* 1.50	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237	= 2779
8 FL SIM UTIL	= 16/(1.50 + 0.25)	* 1.30	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237	= 2719

(.40882 from D.C. .35724)

4 OVHD FACTOR = 51.4%

NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND PRODUCTION
TOTAL PILOT

FY	NAVY QUOTA	NAVY OUTPUT	USMC QUOTA	USMC OUTPUT	USCG/FMS/NOAA QUOTA	USCG/FMS/NOAA OUTPUT	TOTAL QUOTA	TOTAL OUTPUT	MARINE USA/USAF QUOTA	MARINE USA/USAF OUTPUT
60	1325	1108	475	418	100	76	1900	1602		
61	1219	1034	381	402	100	42	1700	1478		
62	1325	1000	475	336	100	77	1900	1413		
63	1100	1156	500	490	100	55	1700	1701		
64	1104	1104	496	526	100	71	1700	1701		
65	1150	1195	450	478	100	42	1700	1715		
66	1300	1322	400	514	100	71	1800	1907		
67	1345	1385	543	573	100	88	1988	2046		
68	1575	1578	525	650	100	106	2200	2334	15	15
69	1800	1811	625	625	100	123	2525	2559	325	260
70	1850	1850	560	530	100	70	2510	2450	425	370
71	1550	1475	295	279	100	55	1945	1809	425	353
72	1417	1364	482	429	71	60	1970	1853		
73	1440	1121	460	473	100	56	2000	1650		
74	953	975	426	402	72	70	1451	1447		
75	976	924	450	356	100	57	1526	1337		
76	920	904	360	343	155	103	1435	1350		
77T	225	217	75	74	30	17	330	308		
77	900	744	360	351	105	101	1365	1196		
78	800	597	382	269	97	68	1279	934		
79	885	532	470	253	131	86	1486	871		
80	885	891	450	495	131	85	1466	1471		
81	897	893	500	504	131	85	1528	1482		
82	957	945	500	482	121	88	1578	1515		
83	924	900	480	441	86	83	1490	1424		
84	869	860	400	400	135	110	1404	1370		
85	859	859	385	385	135	99	1379	1343		
86	989	989	335	335	135	113	1459	1437		
87	1040	1046	328	322	135	112	1503	1480		
88	1047	1022*	328	318*	155	112	1530	1452		
89	1091	1091	328	328	163	109	1582	1528		
90	1018	1018	345	345	163	111	1526	1474		
91	808	809	349	347	186	153	1343	1309		
92**	766	783	431	450	196	146	1393	1379		

* CAUSED BY MIDYEAR BUDGET CUTS

** FY-91,92 accessions 705, 760 lowered to get rid of pools and delays in training. Management decisions artificially lowered requirements for same reason. Return to real requirements FY-95 for 11 CVW's and 18 VP Sqn's. Mandated accessions limit FY-93 (unplanned) could cause shortfalls if force structure remains stable.

Findings

Category	BSAT	COMMUNITY
PTR requirement see slide	336	382
Operating buffer	18%	15%

Navy/BSAT guidelines establish 20% as required buffer or surge capability.

TOTAL PTR Capacity needed	396	439

OPERATIONS CAPACITY

KINGSVILLE	229,416	same
OLF ALICE	148,457	same
OLF Corpus Christi	219,936	129,260

Corpus should be used as an OLF since T-45 not planned to homebase there.
Therefore TOTAL OPERATIONS CAPACITY should be 507,133 vice the BSAT total of 597,809.

Operations per PTR (daylight)

T2/T45 (1999 on)	1629	1887 *
T-45 IS (after 2003)	1393	1756
Average	1511	1822

* 1887 was 1993 Commission finding see slide

PTR Capacity (Kingsville, OLF Alice + Corpus)	396	278

see slide

PTR REQUIREMENT	NAVY	COMMUNITY
	336	382

- Since Navy computed PTR req at 336 several changes have occurred:
  - Navy decided to buy back 6 F/A-18 sqdns
    -- 3 sqdns requested in FY 97 budget request
  - DoD directed that Navy (EA-6B) assume the Air Force EF-111 mission.
    -- 4 EA-6B sqdns to be added for a total of 13. Funding in FY-96 budget
  - Navy established new PTR of 360 to accommodate new sqdns.
  - Navy decided to move E2/C2 training to Strike adding the equivalent of 22 PTR to requirement (CNO LTR to Congressman G.V. Montgomery, dtd ____) - hence, actual req PTR = 382
- DUE TO significant current and projected pilot shortage in the Fleet, PTR requirement will be 360 or more for the foreseeable future whether or not new squadrons actually stand-up.

OPERATIONS PER PTR (daylight)

	BSAT	COMMUNITY
T2/T-45 SYLLABUS	1629	1887 (1993 COMMISSION)
T-45 TS	1393	1756
AVERAGE	1511	1822

WHY THE DIFFERENCES ?

- Navy did not count all weapons (88) and some CQ (22) deployment operations in their OPS/PTR calculations. (110 OPS total)
  - double counts capacity because deployed aircraft, instructors and maintenance personnel are not available to sustain homefield ops.
  - CNATRA has since agreed that weapons ops (88) should be counted.

- Navy used a factor of 35% of Student operations for overhead in their calculations for OPS/PTR. Their own detailed planning factors for the T-45 syllabus indicated a factor of 51.4% for overhead.

- CNATRA has revised their OPS/PTR for the T-2/T-45 from 1629 to 1790. Correcting the T-45 figure of 1393 for the above errors results in a T-45 OPS/PTR of 1652. The average then becomes 1721 vice 1511.

PTR CAPACITY (KINGSVILLE + OLF ALICE O.G. & CORPUS CHRISTI)

$$\frac{\text{OPERATIONS CAPACITY}}{\text{OPS/PTR}} = \text{PTR CAPACITY}$$

	BSAT	COMMUNITY
NAS KINGSVILLE	229,416	229,416
OLF ALICE ORANGE GROVE	148,457	148,457
OLF CORPUS CHRISTI	219,936	129,260
	597,809	507,133

COMMUNITY OPS CAPACITY ÷ CORRECTED AVG. OPS/PTR = $\frac{507,133}{1721}$ = 295 PTR CAP.

BSAT OPS CAPACITY ÷ CORRECTED AVG. OPS/PTR = $\frac{597,809}{1721}$ = 347 PTR CAP.

THEREFORE: 347 PTR CAPACITY IS WELL SHORT OF 382 (ACTUAL PTR RQMT)
360 (OFFICIAL NAVY PTR RQMT)
ONLY 3% BUFFER FOR 336 (OLD NAVY PTR RQMT)

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

MEMORANDUM

TO: Doyle Reedy
FROM: Bill Crawford
SUBJECT: Data Requested at June16, 1995, Site Visit
DATE: June 16, 1995

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11. AVERAGE = 1822. SOURCE: Community brief at Birmingham Regional Hearing -- see Figure 9 facing Page 8; and Navy Meridian Team 1995 Navy BSAT Calculation of PTR Capacity -- see Page 9.

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NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

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13. EXCESS(SHORTFALL) = (161). SOURCE: Item 12 minus Item 4.

14. 20 Year NPV Cost Savings ($millions) = <$182.3. SOURCE: Community brief at 8 June 95 site visit to NAS Meridian -- see COBRA summary sheet.

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16. No savings to close NTTC if NAS stays open = YES. SOURCE: 3 JUNE 95 Navy Meridian Team letter to LCDR Eric Lindenbaum -- see COBRA summary sheet.

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601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET, SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 696-0504

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

DATE: March 23, 1995

TIME: 1:00

MEETING WITH: Meridian, MS Community Group

SUBJECT: Meridian Naval Air Station

PARTICIPANTS:

Name/Title/Phone Number:

Community Representatives

Bill Crawford
Jack Douglas
Ken Storms
Brian Dabbs
John Carrier
David Stevens
Allison Crews
Randy Leddy

Congressional Staff

Al Bemis
Bo Maske
Mitch Kugler
Sam Adcock

Consultants

Barry Rhoads
Jackie Arends

Commission Staff:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Cece Carman, Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison
Jim Schufreider; Manager, House Liaison
Ben Borden, Director, Review & Analysis
Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Jim Brubaker, Navy Team
Mark Pross, AF Team

MEETING PURPOSE:

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

MEETING REQUEST

Now that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has been provided with the recommended list of closures and realignments by the Secretary of Defense, the Commission is analyzing the data used by the Secretary in making his decisions. In order to ensure that your meeting with Commission members and/or staff is as productive as possible in the limited time available, please respond to the following items and return to your Commission contact by fax as soon as possible. Also, prior to the meeting, please provide the Commission with the data and other facts you intend to use in presenting your case to the meeting participants. This will allow the Commission member and/or staff to be prepared to address the specific points you plan to make and answer your questions as fully as possible during the meeting.

- **ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED:** Meridian NAS

- **COMMUNITY SPOKESPERSON:** Bill Crawford

- **PROPOSED AGENDA:** Discuss initial review of Navy and DoD's closure recommendation, including flight ops per PTR, Navy out year PTR, and joint recommendations or lack thereof.

- **OTHER ITEMS**

  This is to confirm meeting set for 1300 hours Thursday 23 March 1995. If possible we would like to receive 2 hours of time to cover all issues in detail.

Please return by fax to (703) 696-0550:

Attention:
Cece Carman, Director of Intergovernmental Affairs X
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison ____
Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison ____
Sylvia Davis-Thompson, Manger, Re-use issues ____

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950502-6 JIM

FROM: RHOADS, BARRY D.	**TO:** CARR, CECE
TITLE:	**TITLE:** CONG. LIAISON
ORGANIZATION: VERNER, LIIPFERT	**ORGANIZATION:** DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAS MERIDIAN, CORPUS CHRISTI	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INFORMING THAT MERIDIAN NAVY TEAM WOULD LIKE TO BRIEF MR. YELLIN REGARDING NOISE STUDY JUST COMPLETED ON CORPUS CHRISTI.

Due Date:	**Routing Date:** 950502	**Date Originated:** 950501	**Mail Date:**

VERNER, LIIPFERT, BERNHARD, MCPHERSON AND HAND
CHARTERED
901-15TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-2301
(202) 371-6000
TELECOPIER (202) 371-6279

Please refer to this number when responding 950502-6

(202) 371-6277

May 1, 1995

Cece Carman
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Cece:

The Meridian Navy team would like to brief Mr. Yellin and LTC Brubaker on 8 or 9 May regarding a new noise study just completed on Corpus Christi, and to provide further information on the Navy's capacity analysis.

Please advise whether such a briefing would be possible. As always, thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Very truly yours,

Barry D. Rhoads

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

8th or 9th May

MEETING REQUEST

Now that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has been provided with the recommended list of closures and realignments by the Secretary of Defense, the Commission is analyzing the data used by the Secretary in making his decisions. In order to ensure that your meeting with Commission members and/or staff is as productive as possible in the limited time available, please respond to the following items and return to your Commission contact by fax as soon as possible. Also, prior to the meeting, please provide the Commission with the data and other facts you intend to use in presenting your case to the meeting participants. This will allow the Commission member and/or staff to be prepared to address the specific points you plan to make and answer your questions as fully as possible during the meeting.

- **ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED:** STAFF LEVEL BRIEFING RE MALMSTROM
- **COMMUNITY SPOKESPERSON:** FRANK GAFFNEY
- **PROPOSED AGENDA:**

- **OTHER ITEMS** DICAMILLO, ARICO, OLSEN

ATTENDING: TIM RYAN, JOHN LAWTON, BARRY EDWARDS
JACQUELINE ARENDS

Please return by fax to (703) 696-0550:

Attention:
Cece Carman, Director of Intergovernmental Affairs X
Chip Walgren, Manager, State and Local Liaison ___
Jim Schufreider, Manager, House Liaison ___
Sylvia Davis-Thompson, Manger, Re-use issues ___

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950607-25

FROM: HAYSLETT, FRED	TO: BEYER, MERRILL
TITLE:	TITLE: AIR FORCE DOD ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: CAFB 2000	ORGANIZATION: OBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: COLUMBUS AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		(✓)	
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
COMMISSIONER COX			
COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
COMMISSIONER KLING			
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
COMMISSIONER STEELE			
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER			
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

(✓)	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

STATING AIRFORCE DID NOT INCLUDE THE MERIDIAN 1 EAST MOA INTO COLUMBUS AIR SPACE EVEN THOUGH THE BASE MANAGES IT.

Due Date: 950614	Routing Date: 950607	Date Originated: 950601	Mail Date:

CAFB 2000
P. O. BOX 1111
Columbus, MS 39703-1111
(601) 328-0301 Fax (601) 328-0880

950607-25

June 1, 1995

LTC Merrill Beyer
Air Force DOD Analyst
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Monroe Street Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Re: Staff Analysis II - UPT Bases - Airspace

Dear Colonel Beyer:

After an indepth analysis of the data used to accumulate "airspace" totals, it was evident that the Meridian 1 East MOA was not included.

Although not owned by Columbus Air Force Base, by letter of agreement, this airspace has been scheduled and manager by Columbus Air Force Base for a number of years. This would add 1,773.9 cubic miles to the CAFB total which you utilized. This is a primary T-37 training area.

A copy of the letter of agreement is attached. We would appreciate an update to this vital category.

Sincerely,

Fred Hayslett

FH/sh
Enclosure

MEMPHIS ARTC CENTER,MERIDIAN RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY
COLUMBUS APPROACH CONTROL,
TRAINING AIR WING ONE AND THE 14TH FLYING TRAINING WING
LETTER OF AGREEMENT

Effective: January 9, 1989

SUBJECT: MERIDIAN ONE EAST AND WEST MILITARY OPERATIONS AREAS (MOA's) AND ATC ASSIGNED AIRSPACE (ATCAA)

1. PURPOSE. This agreement establishes procedures between the following facilities for control and use of the subject areas:

Memphis ARTC Center (CENTER) - the controlling agency,

Meridian Radar Air Traffic Facility (RATCF),

Columbus Approach Control (RAPCON),

Training Air Wing One (TRAWING ONE) - the scheduling/using agency for the Meridian One West MOA, and

14th Flying Training Wing (14th FTW) the scheduling/using agency for the Meridian One East MOA.

2. CANCELLATION. Memphis ARTC Center, Meridian RATCF, Columbus Approach Control, Training Air Wing One, and 14th Flying Training Wing Letter of Agreement, dated March 7,1983, Subject: Meridian East and West Military Operations Areas and ATCAA is canceled.

3. AREA. The Meridian One East and West MOA's include airspace as defined in Attachments 1 and 2 from 8,000 feet up to, but not including, FL180. The Meridian ATCAA includes that airspace from FL180 through FL230 overlying the Meridian One East and Meridian One West MOA's.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. The Commander of TRAWING ONE is responsible for:

(1) TRAWING ONE aircraft remain within assigned airspace.

(2) Proper notification is made concerning activation/deactivation of subject airspace.

(3) Aircraft shall not depart enroute to/enter the subject airspace without prior coordination with the controlling agency.

(4) Military assumes responsibility for separation of aircraft (MARSA) for all aircraft under the jurisdiction of TRAWING ONE.

(5) All other military aircraft as prescribed in FAA Handbook 7610.4 Special Military Operations, Part 5, Section 2, Paragraph 5-14.

b. The Commander of 14th FTW is responsible for:

(1) 14th FTW aircraft remain within assigned airspace.

(2) Proper notification is made concerning activation/deactivation of subject airspace.

(3) Aircraft shall not depart enroute to/enter the subject airspace without prior coordination with the controlling agency.

(4) All other military aircraft as prescribed in FAA Handbook 7610.4 Special Military Operations, Part 5, Section 2, Paragraph 5-14.

c. CENTER shall execute appropriate NOTAM actions required by activation/deactivation of the subject areas.

d. The Controlling Agency for each of the areas shall restrict MOA/ATCAA activities as necessary in order to accommodate SAFI (FAA Semi-Automatic Flight Inspection flights when such flights cannot accept alternatives due to mission derrogation. Normally SAFI flights will be assigned FL240 to avoid MOA/ATCAA activity interruption.

5. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. CENTER hereby delegates to RAPCON its authority as the Controlling Agency of the Meridian One East MOA/ATCAA, as defined in Attachment 1 and 2 of this letter.

6. MOA/ATCAA ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION.

a. Meridian One West areas will normally be activated within the published hours as indicated below, but may also be scheduled active for Saturdays/Sundays.

(1) Meridian One West MOA/ATCAA (80-FL230) intermittent Sunday through Friday, Sunrise to Sunset.

(2) Meridian One West MOA (80 to, but not including, FL180) intermittent Sunday through Friday, Sunset to 0500Z.

b. Meridian One East MOA/ATCAA will normally be activated within the published operational times, daylight hours, Monday through Friday. Other times by NOTAM.

7. NOTIFICATION.

a. FOR MEI 1 WEST MOA/ATCAA TRAWING ONE shall:

(1) Furnish CENTER Mission Coordinator/Watch Supervisor and RATCF Supervisor by noon each Friday, a realistic activity schedule in ZULU time, covering Sunday through Saturday of the following week. Make the same notification when any part of a scheduled period is canceled and 2 1/2 hours' notice for changes contrary to schedule.

(2) Notify RATCF Supervisor and CENTER Sector Controller when activity will be interrupted for a period of one hour or more, and of reactivation request.

b. RAPCON/RATCF Supervisors and appropriate Sector Controllers shall coordinate directly with each other concerning requirements in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

8. ALTIMETER SETTINGS.

a. All aircraft operating in the areas shall use local altimeter settings; Columbus AFB for the Meridian One East MOA and NAS Meridian for all others.

b. Navy UPT aircraft and RAPCON shall adjust altitude assigments when a change in atmospheric pressure affects the lowest usable flight level, in accordance with the following:

Local Altimeter Setting	Highest Available Altitude
29.92" or higher	FL230
29.91" to 28.92"	FL220
28.91" to 27.92"	FL210

9. ATTACHMENTS.

a. Attachment 1 - Depicts Meridian One East and West MOA/ATCAA.

b. Attachment 2 - Narrative description of Meridian One East and West MOA/ATCAA.

Air Traffic Manager
Memphis ARTCC

Air Traffic Manager
Meridian RATCF

Air Traffic Representative
Columbus AFB, MS

Commander, 1948 Communications Squadron
Columbus AFB, MS

Commander
Training Air Wing One

Commander
14th Flying Training Wing

ATTACHMENT 1

MEMPHIS ARTC CENTER, MERIDIAN RATCF,
COLUMBUS RAPCON, TRAINING AIR WING ONE,
AND THE 14TH FLYING TRAINING WING
LETTER OF AGREEMENT

SUBJECT: MERIDIAN ONE EAST AND WEST MOA/ATCAA



REV 1: 11/11/93

Memphis ARTCC, Meridian NATCF, Columbus RAPCON,
TRAWING ONE and 14th FTW Letter of Agreement
Subj: Meridian One East and West MOA and ATCCA

ATTACHMENT 2

1. Narrative description of Meridian One East MOA/ATCAA:

From	33-18-30/87-49-00	to
	33-11-00/87-48-30	to
	33-07-30/87-53-30	to
	33-03-35/87-59-10	to
	32-51-12/88-17-11	thence via TCL 45 DME arc north to
	33-23-48/88-25-04	to
	33-25-00/88-00-00	to Point of Beginning

2. Narrative description of Meridian One West MOA/ATCAA:

From	33-23-48/88-25-04	thence via TCL 45 DME arc south to
	32-51-12/88-17-11	to
	32-34-00/88-42-00	to
	32-34-00/88-54-05	to
	32-32-00/89-06-10	to
	32-34-30/89-56-00	to
	32-53-00/90-01-00	to
	33-00-10/89-59-15	to
	33-05-35/90-01-40	to
	33-23-00/89-59-30	to
	33-23-30/88-31-00	to Point of Beginning

T-45 ANALOG INVENTORY PROFILE

13-Jun-95

INCLUDES T03

								8.024						
								PREDICTED ATTRITION		ATTRITION AIRCRAFT		END OF YEAR PAA		
FY	DELIVERIES YEAR	DELIVERIES TOTAL	MOD LINE	CP-21 RETROFIT	AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT	BAA	PAA	CUM	YEARLY	YEARLY	TOTAL	TOTAL	AVERAGE	
88-91	2	2			2		2					2		88-91
1992	4	6			6		6			0	0	6	4	1992
1993	18	24			24		24	0.36	0.360	0	0	24	15	1993
1994	20	44	3		41		41	1.12	0.756	2	2	39	31.5	1994
1995	15	59	4		55		55	2.22	1.104	0	2	53	46	1995
1996	12	71	4		67		67	3.62	1.404	1	3	64	58.5	1996
1997	12	83			83	3	80	5.29	1.668	2	5	75	69.5	1997
1998		83			83	8	75	7.01	1.716	2	7	68	71.5	1998
1999		83			83	8	75	8.63	1.620	1	8	67	67.5	1999
2000		83			83	8	75	10.21	1.584	2	10	65	66	2000
2001		83	2	16	65	7	58	11.56	1.344	1	11	47	56	2001
2002		83	2	16	49	5	44	12.50	0.948	1	12	32	39.5	2002
2003		83	2	16	33	4	29	13.08	0.576	1	13	16	24	2003
2004		83	2	15	18	2	16	13.30	0.216	1	14	2	9	2004
2005		83	2	2	16		16	13.34	0.048		14	2	2	2005
2006		83		4	14		14	13.37	0.024		14	0	1	2006
2007		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2007
2008		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2008
2009		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2009
2010		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2010
2011		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2011
2012		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2012
2013		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2013
2014		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2014
2015		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2015
2016		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2016
2017		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2017
2018		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2018
2019		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2019
2020		83			14		14	13.37	0.000		14	0	0	2020

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages ▸ 7

To LCDR ERIC BAKER	From CDR DONOVAN
Dept./Agency BRAC	Phone # 224-6013
Fax # 696-0550	Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

T-45 DIGITAL INVENTORY PROFILE

13-Jun-95

DOES NOT INCLUDE T03

0.024

	DELIVERIES		MOD	CP-21	AVAILABLE	SAA	PAA	PREDICTED ATTRITION		ATTRITION AIRCRAFT		END OF YEAR PAA			BANS PRESSURIZE	
FY	YEAR	TOTAL	LINE	RETROFIT	AIRCRAFT			CUM	YEARLY	YEARLY	TOTAL	TOTAL	AVERAGE		TOTAL PAA REQD	ANALOG PAA
88-91		0			0		0					0		88-91		
1992		0			0		0			0	0	0	0	1992		
1993		0			0		0	0.00	0.000	0	0	0	0	1993	0	0
1994	1	1			1		1	0.00	0.000	0	0	1	0.5	1994	0	0
1995		1			1		1	0.00	0.000	0	0	1	1	1995	46	46
1996		1			1		1	0.00	0.000	0	0	1	1	1996	59	59
1997		1			1		1	0.00	0.000	0	0	1	1	1997	70	70
1998	12	13			13		13	0.17	0.168	0	0	13	7	1998	79	72
1999	12	25			25		25	0.62	0.456	0	0	25	19	1999	87	68
2000	12	37			37		37	1.30	0.672	1	1	36	30.5	2000	95	67
2001	12	49		16	65		65	2.50	1.200	1	2	63	49.5	2001	106	56
2002	12	61		16	93		93	4.27	1.776	1	3	90	76.5	2002	114	40
2003	12	73		16	121	3	118	6.46	2.184	3	6	112	101	2003	111	20
2004	12	85		15	148	6	142	9.05	2.592	2	8	134	123	2004	109	1
2005	7	92		6	161	9	152	11.64	2.592	3	11	141	137.5	2005	109	1
2006		92			161	11	150	14.21	2.568	2	13	137	139	2006	108	1
2007		92			161	11	150	16.75	2.544	3	16	134	135.5	2007	106	0
2008		92			161	11	150	19.27	2.520	2	18	132	133	2008	105	0
2009		92			161	11	150	21.77	2.496	3	21	129	130.5	2009	104	0
2010		92			161	11	150	24.26	2.496	2	23	127	128	2010	104	0
2011		92			161	11	150	26.76	2.496	3	26	124	125.5	2011	104	0
2012		92			161	11	150	29.23	2.472	2	28	122	123	2012	103	0
2013		92			161	11	150	31.70	2.472	3	31	119	120.5	2013	103	0
2014		92			161	11	150	34.18	2.472	2	33	117	118	2014	103	0
2015		92			161	11	150	36.65	2.472	3	36	114	115.5	2015	103	0
2016		92			161	11	150	39.12	2.472	2	38	112	113	2016	103	0
2017		92			161	11	150	41.58	2.472	3	41	109	110.5	2017	103	0
2018		92			161	11	150	44.06	2.472	2	43	107	108	2018	103	0
2019		92			161	11	150	46.54	2.472	3	46	104	105.5	2019	103	0
2020		92			161	11	150	49.01	2.472	2	48	102	103	2020	103	0

ANALOG PTR PLAN

13-Jun-95

		STRIKE SYLLABUS						E2/C2		NON-	TOTAL	MAX	EXCESS						
(PAA)		WITHOUT JPATS				WITH JPATS				PRODUCTION		CAPABLE							
AVERAGE		T-45TS		ADVANCED		T-45TS													
AIRCRAFT		231.1		178		217.0			116.3			720		REQ					
AVAILABLE		HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	PAA		ANALOG PTR OUTPUT			
	88-91														88-91	T45TS	ADVANCED	WINGS	E2/C2
4	1992														1992				
15	1993														1993				
31.5	1994	5546	24	15308	86			0	0		20854	22680	1826	29	1994	24	86	110	0
46	1995	14327	62	18690	105			0	0	103	33120	33120	0	46	1995	62	105	167	0
58.5	1996	31657	137	10324	58			0	0	139	42120	42120	0	59	1996	137	58	195	0
69.5	1997	23338	101	26700	150			0	0	2	50040	50040	0	70	1997	101	150	251	0
71.5	1998	17562	76	33820	190			0	0	98	51480	51480	0	72	1998	76	190	266	0
67.5	1999	12478	54	35600	200			0	0	522	48600	48600	0	68	1999	54	200	254	0
66	2000	16868	73	30616	172			0	0	36	47520	47520	0	67	2000	73	172	245	0
56	2001	36047	156	3560	20			0	0	700	40307	40320	13	56	2001	156	20	176	0
39.5	2002	23338	101	0	0			4187	36	700	28225	28440	215	40	2002	101	0	101	36
24	2003	9243	40	0	0	0	0	4187	36	700	14130	17280	3150	20	2003	40	0	40	36
9	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	700	6480	5780	1	2004	0	0	0	0
2	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	700	1440	740	1	2005	0	0	0	0
1	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	700	720	20	1	2006	0	0	0	0
0	2007														2007	0	0	0	0
0	2008														2008	0	0	0	0
0	2009														2009	0	0	0	0
0	2010														2010	0	0	0	0
0	2011														2011	0	0	0	0
0	2012														2012	0	0	0	0
0	2013														2013	0	0	0	0
0	2014														2014	0	0	0	0
0	2015														2015	0	0	0	0
0	2016														2016	0	0	0	0
0	2017														2017	0	0	0	0
0	2018														2018	0	0	0	0
0	2019														2019	0	0	0	0
0	2020														2020	0	0	0	0

DIGITAL PTR PLAN

13-Jun-95

		STRIKE SYLLABUS						E2/C2		NON-	TOTAL	MAX	EXCESS						
PAA		WITHOUT JPATS				WITH JPATS				PRODUCTION		CAPABLE						
AVERAGE		T45TS		ADVANCED		T45TS												
AIRCRAFT		231.1		178		217.0			116.3			720		REQ				
AVAILABLE		HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	PTR	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	HOURS	PAA		DIGITAL PTR OUTPUT			
	88-91														88-91	T45TS	ADVANCED	WINGS	E2/C2
0	1992														1992				
0	1993														1993				
0.5	1994										0	360	360	0	1994	0	0	0	0
1	1995										0	720	720	0	1995	0	0	0	0
1	1996										0	720	720	0	1996	0	0	0	0
1	1997										0	720	720	0	1997	0	0	0	0
7	1998	0	0	0	0			0	0	5040	5040	5040	0	7	1998	0	0	0	0
19	1999	13633	59	0	0			0	0	0	13633	13680	47	19	1999	59	0	59	0
30.5	2000	19641	85	0	0			0	0	500	20141	21960	1819	28	2000	85	0	85	0
49.5	2001	35585	154	0	0			0	0	55	35640	35640	0	50	2001	154	0	154	0
76.5	2002	52222	226	0	0			0	0	783	53005	55080	2075	74	2002	226	0	226	0
101	2003	57999	251	0	0	6075	26	0	0	783	64857	72720	7863	91	2003	279	0	279	0
123	2004	61696	267	0	0	10414	45	4187	36	783	77080	88560	11480	108	2004	315	0	315	36
137.5	2005	51991	225	0	0	19526	84	4187	36	1483	77187	99000	21813	106	2005	315	0	315	36
139	2006	41593	180			29289	126	4187	36	1483	76552	100080	23528	107	2006	315	0	315	36
135.5	2007	32350	140			37967	164	4187	36	1483	75987	97560	21573	106	2007	315	0	315	36
133	2008	24494	106			45344	196	4187	36	1483	75507	95760	20253	105	2008	315	0	315	36
130.5	2009	13402	58			55758	241	4187	36	1483	74830	93960	19130	104	2009	315	0	315	36
128	2010	9012	39			59880	259	4187	36	1483	74562	92160	17598	104	2010	315	0	315	36
125.5	2011	4159	18			64436	279	4187	36	1483	74265	90360	16095	104	2011	315	0	315	36
123	2012	2311	10			66172	286	4187	36	1483	74152	88560	14408	103	2012	315	0	315	36
120.5	2013	0	0			68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	86760	12749	103	2013	315	0	315	36
118	2014	0	0			68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	84960	10949	103	2014	315	0	315	36
115.5	2015					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	83160	9149	103	2015	315	0	315	36
113	2016					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	81360	7349	103	2016	315	0	315	36
110.5	2017					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	79560	5549	103	2017	315	0	315	36
108	2018					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	77760	3749	103	2018	315	0	315	36
105.5	2019					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	75960	1949	103	2019	315	0	315	36
103	2020					68341	295	4187	36	1483	74011	74160	149	103	2020	315	0	315	36

13-Jun-95									
	HOURS/AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH JPATS)								
	NQI	PTR	HRS/PTR	HOURS	PAA		PAA UTE RATE		1.486
	STRIKE	315	217.0	68341	94.92		720	155.5	231.1
	E2C2	36	116.3	4187	5.82			146	217.0
	SURGE	0	217.0	0	0.00		HOURS=		
	NON-PRODUCTION			1483	2.06		NO SURGE	74011	
	TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED			74011	102.79	103	SURGE	0	9.64
							TOTAL REQ	74011	
	NMM	PTR	HRS/PTR	HOURS	PAA				
	STRIKE	0	217.0	0	0.00		PAA=	103	
	FMS	0	217.0	0	0.00		BAA=	11	
	SURGE	0	217.0	0	0.00		ATTRITION	62	
	NON-PRODUCTION			0	0.00		TOTAL	176	
	TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED			0	0.00	0			
	HOURS/AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (NO JPATS)								
			NO SURGE						
	NQI STRIKE		315	231.1	72788	101.1			
	NMM STRIKE		0	231.1	0	0.0			
	E2C2		36	116.3	4187	5.8			
	SURGE/FMS		0	231.1	0	0			
	NON-PRODUCTION				1883	2.6			
					78858	109.5	110		
					SURGE	9.9			



OFT/AFT SIMULATOR REQUIREMENTS

13-Jun-95

NAS KINGSVILLE								5 1/2 DAYS		6 DAYS	
OFT	PTR	SYLLABUS	OVERHEAD	TOTAL HOURS	UTE RATE						
STRIKE (T45TS)	315	66.6	1.162	24378	2751	8.86		2984	8.17	3216	7.58
STRIKE (ADVNCD)	0	51.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00		2984	0	3216	0
FMS	0	66.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00		2984	0	3216	0
SURGE	32	66.6	1.162	2478	2751	0.90		2984	0.83	3216	0.77
E2/C2	36	50	1.162	2092	2751	0.76		2984	0.70	3216	0.65
					OFT TOTAL =	10.52	11		9.70		9.00
IFT											
STRIKE	315	30.3	1.189	11348	2857	3.97		3125	3.63	3393	3.34
STRIKE (ADVNCD)	0	23.4	1.189	0	2857	0.00		3125	0.00	3393	0.00
FMS	0	30.3	1.189	0	2857	0.00		3125	0.00	3393	0.00
SURGE	32	30.3	1.189	1153	2857	0.40		3125	0.37	3393	0.34
E2/C2	36	30.3	1.189	1297	2857	0.45		3125	0.42	3393	0.38
					IFT TOTAL =	4.83	5		4.42		4.07
NAS MERIDIAN											
OFT	PTR	SYLLABUS	OVERHEAD	TOTAL HOURS	UTE RATE						
STRIKE (T45TS)	0	66.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00					
STRIKE (ADVNCD)	0	51.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00					
FMS	0	66.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00					
SURGE	0	66.6	1.162	0	2751	0.00					
					OFT TOTAL =	0.00	0				
IFT											
STRIKE (T45TS)	0	30.3	1.189	0	2857	0.00					
STRIKE (ADVNCD)	0	23.4	1.189	0	2857	0.00					
FMS	0	30.3	1.189	0	2857	0.00					
SURGE	0	30.3	1.189	0	2857	0.00					
					IFT TOTAL =	0.00	0				

T-45 SIMULATOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

		HR	SL	TAT	SL	AVAIL	B	WX	DAYS	TOTAL
IFT	2F137	16	1.5	0.25	1.5	0.95	0.94	1	237	2903
OFT	2F138	16	1.3	0.25	1.3	0.95	0.94	1	237	2840

IFT				9	1.5	0.95	0.94	1	237	2857
OFT				10	1.3	0.95	0.94	1	237	2751

ROUND DOWN

		16	1.5	0.25		9.143				
		16	1.3	0.25		10.32				
				FLYING SATURDAYS						
	IFT			5	1.5	0.95	0.94	1	40	267.9 3125
	OFT			5	1.3	0.95	0.94	1	40	232.18 2984
				FLYING SAT & SUN						
	IFT			10	1.5	0.95	0.94	1	40	535.8 3393
	OFT			10	1.3	0.95	0.94	1	40	464.36 3216

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION JM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950306-3

OM: MONTGOMERY, SONNY	TO: GENERAL
[redacted]LE: REP (MS)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
[redacted]UTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
COMMISSIONER COX			
COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
COMMISSIONER KLING			
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
COMMISSIONER STEELE			
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

QUESTIONS FOR OSD WITNESSES.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950306-	Date Originated:	Mail Date:

Please refer to this number
when responding 950306-3

QUESTIONS FOR CHAIRMAN DIXON TO ASK OSD WITNESSES FROM CONGRESSMAN G. V. SONNY MONTGOMERY

Q: How did DoD handle the obvious benefits of regional complexes?

Q: I understand that in the process, NAS Meridian received two looks, one at the service level and the second look at the joint level. If the joint ranking was higher, why didn't DOD take action based on the joint ranking rather than leave the Service unique lists in place? After all aren't we trying to save by consolidation and joint functions?

Q: If you did look at regional synergisms, why didn't DOD create a ranking based on these synergisms and regional complexes and then direct closure actions based on these new rankings?

Goldbaum

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION JIM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950324-7

FROM: BRUBAKER, ROBERT C.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: CITIZEN	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: MERIDIAN, MS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAS MERIDIAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR		✓		COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman s Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR NAS/MERIDIAN.

Due Date: 950331	Routing Date: 950324	Date Originated: 950313	Mail Date:

121 38th Street
Meridian, MS 39301
(601) 482-4731

March 13, 1995

Senator Alan Dixon
7535 Claymont Court
Belleville, IL 62223

Please refer to this number when responding 950324-7

Dear Senator Dixon:

As a follow-up to my letter to you of February 27, 1995, I wanted to add some additional comments with respect to the future of NAS Meridian, MS. I feel that the Navy's decision to recommend closing the base was in error and was motivated primarily by political considerations rather than objective criteria.

The dark side of the base realignment and closure procedings is the polarizing effect it has on the major services and the individual communities that may be effected. It almost appears that battle lines have been drawn between the Navy and the Air Force and between Mississippi and Texas. Example #1: The Air Force refuses to consider the possibility of joint training training between Columbus AFB and NAS Meridian. Example #2: NAS Meridian was added to the BRAC list in 1991 following a petition from a group in Beeville, TX. The only commissioner to vote against NAS Meridian was Jim Smith, a Texan who worked for a company that had business interests in Beeville. (Mr. Smith had previously visited Meridian along with Mr. Courter and other commissioners. He said that the NAS was a "jewel" compared to other installations. He still voted against us.) In 1993, NAS Meridian was on the original hit list. In this case the Navy's plan was to centralize strike training in Texas and included reopening NAS Beeville. The strategy was formulated in Corpus Christi, TX. The BRAC `93 commission was able to prove this plan unworkable and subsequently voted 7 to 0 to keep NAS Meridian open. In the current BRAC, NAS Meridian was selected for closure, as I alluded to in my previous letter, by Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, another Texan. Our information is that we were recommended by the CNO to Secretary Dalton for realignment only, and NOT for closure.

I was able to see part of a taped replay of the BRAC hearing held on Monday, March 6. I was particularly interested in listening to Secretary Dalton's response to a series of questions asked by Commissioner Cox regarding Meridian. He said that our base was an excellent facility (The Meridian Star qucted him as saying that he "regretted" putting us on the list.) and that recommending us for closure was his hardest decision. When ask by MS. Cox if the Navy would be able to retain a surge capacity for future contingencies and where that surge capacity would be located, Sectretary Dalton said that there would be a surge capacity but he did not indicate where it would be situated.

I believe Sectretary Dalton has erred in his estimation of the Navy being able to conduct all of its strike training at a single facility. This view is supported by the following:

1. Sectretary Dalton says that the Navy can produce 350 strike pilots per year at one base. The Air Force says that they need three bases to produce 850 strike pilots per year. Navy strike training includes air combat maneuvering, weapons, and aircraft carrier qualification training. The Air Force defers that training until after graduation.

2. Secretary Dalton is assuming that the Navy will [redacted] retain only 12 aircraft carriers. The CNO, Admiral Jeremy Boorda, emphasized in a January, 1995, letter to Senator John McCain that the current 12-carrier force is "the *minimum*" the Navy needs, and added that "a strong case" could be made for "more than 12". (SEA POWER, March, 1995) In an article in the March 13, 1995, issue of Navy Times it is reported that a study by four distinguished retired flag and general officers, including former CNO Carlisle Trost, concluded that "... the Navy's 12 carriers would probably be enough to prevail in two regional wars, but the number is insufficient to carry out the Navy's missions of today - primary forward presence - without wearing out sailors. The Navy cannot continue to maintain a carrier battle group in each of its three traditional theatres - Mediterranean, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean - even 90 percent of the time and be ready to surge for crises such as Haiti or North Korea without another carrier." Incidently, the majority of aircraft needed for an additional air wing would be manufactured in St. Louis by McDonnell Douglas Corp.

3. Secretary Dalton does not, I believe, fully appreciate the the problems that the Navy (and Air Force) will have retaining pilots on active duty during the next several years. The pressure will come from the commercial airlines which are expected to hire away pilots at increasing rates. One estimate is that nearly 50% of the commercial pilots will reach the mandatory retirement age of 60 by the year 2000. The International Civil Aviation Organization estimates that global air travel will triple by the year 2015. Federal Aviation Administration chief David Hinson thinks the ICAO estimate is "modest". (Flying, February, 1995) To underscore this point, a short article in The Meridian Star on Sunday, March 5, 1995, said that the Air Force ROTC is expecting to increase their contribution to pilot training by 600 percent next few years.

4. Secretary Dalton says that the Navy's share of the defense budget does not include enough funds to operate two strike training bases. I think the jury is still out with respect to exactly what the budget will be. President Clinton is requesting a $5.7 billion reduction in defense spending in FY 1996. The Congress has several influencial members that

are advocating freezing the defense budget at FY 1995 level of $263.5. These members include Senators McCain and John Warner and Congressman Floyd Spence. Senator Strom Thurmond has even indicated that he would support increasing the budget to $270 billion. Although the Navy classifies NAS Meridian as a major installation it is relative small and inexpensive to operate when compared to other Navy and Air Force bases. As you know, there are two ways to spend tax payers money: efficiently and inefficiently. NAS Meridian is an efficient, blue-collar operation. You won't find any VIP aircraft on our line, polished oak desks in our offices, or ceremonial honor guards. We don't even have an Officer's Club. There are no Admirals or Generals assigned to NAS Meridian. Our top officers can usually be found wearing flight suits and pulling their weight (often six days a week) just like everyone else. Per-hour pay rates for civilian employees are lower than anywhere else in the Navy. In short, NAS Meridian is the best bargain in defense spending.

Again, Senator Dixon, thank you for taking the time to consider this letter. I am confident that as the Commission continues its deliberations the true facts concerning NAS Meridian will come out and that you and your fellow Commissioners will vote to remove us from your final list.

Very sincerely,

Robert C. Brubaker

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

March 24, 1995

Lt. Col. Jim Brubaker
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Col. Brubaker:

Attached you will find our proposed questions for the NAVY BSAT. If you have any questions please call us at 601-693-1306.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill Crawford
Chairman

P. O. BOX 790 • MERIDIAN, MS 39302
601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

QUESTIONS FOR NAVY BRAC

1. The Navy proposal for Air Training Stations realigns Corpus Christi as a strike training OLF of Kingsville. Using the formula for Daytime Runway Ops per Year, please show the calculation by which a strike training capacity for OLF Corpus Christi was calculated.

Runway Ops / Yr = Flying Days / Yr X Daylight Hours / Day X Runway Ops / Hr

_____ = _____ X _____ X _____

2. Please provide the same calculation as above for Kingsville's other OLF, Alice Orange Grove.

Runway Ops / Yr = Flying Days / Yr X Daylight Hours / Day X Runway Ops / Hr

_____ = _____ X _____ X _____

3. If there is a difference between the results for question 1 and question 2, please explain.

4. The Training Air Station Military Value Matrix under the subheading Airfield Facilities includes two questions regarding Martime Training: Can you conduct all levels of Maritime Training at your main airfield? Can you conduct all levels of Maritime Training at one DOD owned OLF? The summary matrix shows NAS Meridian with a "0" score for these two questions. However, your summary data in the Training Air Stations Configuration Modeling Specifications shows "YES" by NAS Meridian for Maritime Training. A review of the Data Calls does not reveal any certified data on this question. Please provide a copy of the certified data showing NAS Meridian cannot conduct Maritime Training as shown on the Military Value Matrix.

5. In regard to the above question, please provide an explanation of how Meridian received a "0" score for its ability to do Maritime Training, yet one of the Navy's recommendations to the Joint Cross Service UPT Group was to located Maritime Training as NAS Meridian.

6. NAS Meridian also received "0" Military Value Matrix points for the question "Deployments/detachments to other air stations are not required to satisfy training shortfalls." The Capacity Data call shows a "YES" answer to this question which should result in score of "1". Why was no point scored for NAS Meridian?

7. NAS Kingsville and NAS Whiting received "1" scores in the Military Value Matrix for the question "Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordinances?". Data calls for both bases show encoded AICUZ for main airfields, but no encoded AICUZ for OLFs. Please explain why these bases received "1" scores.

8. "Given projected training requirements for FY 2001, does your air station currently have all required flight/training simulators?" is a Military Value Matrix question. NAS Kingsville received a "1" score. A review of the Data Call, however, shows Kingsville did not state its current number of simulators, but stated a future capacity. How many simulators did Kingsville have in place at the time the Data Call was completed? Were they sufficient to do all FY 2001 projected training?

EXPECTED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

1. 229,416 = 237 X 12.1 X 80
We expect this answer because BSAT calculated Corpus Christi's capacity as if it were still going to be a main airfield. Both the 12.1 hours and 80 ops/hr are incorrect for an OLF.

2. 148,456 = 237 X 11.6 X 54
This is the correct calculation for OLF Alice Orange Grove's maximum formula daytime runway capacity. However, historically the hours of operation have been limited to 10. Ten hours per day for OLFs was used in 1993.

3. We do not know how they will answer this question.

4. The BSEC minutes shows NAS Meridian initially got a "1". The BSEC changed the answer the "0" in August 1994. The reason given to us was BSAT called CNATRA and was told an overwater flight would have to refuel at Pensacola. There is no certified data for you to receive, but you should get the above answer. The real answer is the flight could be performed out of Meridian. Another answer is it would be combined with a cross country flight like many other are.

5. Same as #4.

6. We do not know how they will answer this.

7. A possible answer is that AICUZ studies have not been done at the OLFs. Meridian and Corpus Christi have OLF AICUZ encoded.

8. There is no good answer to this except to correct the answer.

...BASE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950530 JM-9

FROM: MONGOMERY, SONNY	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP (MS)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAS MERIDIAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓	
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING LETTER FROM AD. BOORDA TO CONG MONTGOMERY DISCUSSING PTR.

Due Date 950601	Routing Date: 950530	Date Originated: 950530	Mail Date:

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2184 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2403
(202) 225-5031

COMMITTEES:
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

DISTRICT OFFICES
2100 NINTH ST. ROOM 302
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(601) 693-6681

2080 AIRPORT ROAD, SUITE D
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
(601) 327-2766

110-D AIRPORT ROAD
PEARL, MS 39208
(601) 932-2410

May 30, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman,
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Navy BSAT's claim that strike training can be single sited at NAS Kingsville, thereby allowing NAS Meridian to be closed, is flawed. Our team analyzed the BSAT's original data, showed you the errors therein at our regional hearing, and provided your staff with evidence supporting our findings.

Now, in the attached letter discussing the consequences of increasing PTR, Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledges the high risks in closing NAS Meridian. And this analysis is still based on the BSAT's flawed capacity "estimates."

In 1993, the Commission determined our team's analysis correct and found two strike bases necessary to achieve 384 strike PTR. Strike PTR is returning to the same level at 382 -- 360 strike PTR plus 22 strike equivalent E2/C2 (see letter). And our team's analysis, based on actual performance data -- not estimates, continues to show two strike bases necessary.

As the supporting data promised by the CNO is made available, I will forward it to you. I encourage you to please read the attached CNO letter. Thank you for your serious and sincere consideration of our case.

Sincerely,

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

GVM:jgm
Enclosure

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 May 1995

Dear Sonny,

In response to your letter of 18 May regarding NAS Meridian, let me say up front that there is a sizable amount of data that has to be re-certified given the matters you pointed out that prevents me from answering all of your specific questions at this time. Let me answer what I can now and we'll continue to work the data as it is developed.

First, you are correct that several events have occurred since DoN's analysis and DoD's recommendation were made regarding Meridian. As you know, DoN's analysis of training air stations was based on the FY 01 force structure with an annual Strike PTR of 336. Based on this requirement, DoN recommended Strike training be single-sited at NAS Kingsville which incorporated NAF Corpus Christi as an outlying field. Since that analysis, two events have occurred that change the underlying assumptions:

- Navy was given the requirement to fulfill the USAF EF-111 mission which requires us to buy 4 additional EA-6B squadrons and our own needs require us to buy back 6 additional F/A-18 squadrons across the FYDP. This plus up - provided we can successfully buy the 10 squadrons - is a 5 percent increase in Strike PTR (336 to 360).

- CNATRA has recommended accelerating the relocation of E-2/C-2 training (36 PTR) from NAS Pensacola to NAS Kingsville. Because the requirements for E-2/C-2 training are about half that of Strike, this would equate to roughly 22 additional Strike PTR.

Compounding these is the fact that procurement rate for T-45 aircraft of 12 per year, concomitant with the end of service life of TA-4J trainers, slows the transition to an all T-45 training syllabus which is significant because the alternative split of T-2/T-45 syllabus would require about 20 percent more flights per student.

If all of these are considered together, the requirements at NAS Kingsville will increase by about 18 percent. Based on the calculated capacity for Kingsville/Corpus Christi, this will require operating at near 100 percent capacity from FY 01 through FY 04, assuming Meridian closes in FY 01 (vice FY 99 as recommended). Operating this close to maximum capacity would be difficult and uncomfortable - and unsatisfactory if we had to increase PTR for a significant operational surge requirement. But I'd be less than honest if I didn't acknowledge that Navy has the ability to absorb some increased capacity with managed alternatives such as increased workdays, increased night flying,

detachments, and shifting some Strike related training into the JPATS aircraft when it comes on line. Again, this is recognizing the risk associated with additional unknowns like aircraft groundings, bad weather in excess of planned figures, and missed carrier quals due to CV/CVN operational commitments or weather.

With regards to the Samis and Hamilton report, the Naval Facilities Command has been directed to provide an assessment - and I will forward that on to you when it's done - but for the moment, I can't give you a good response on that.

In summary, if both NAS Kingsville and Meridian were to remain open - even at a PTR of 360 - we would be operating each base at well below capacity. The combination of increased Strike PTR and a single Strike training base makes successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and reduces our capacity for surge operations - and that could be unacceptable. But the trade off remains the degree of difficulty or risks versus costs to operate 2 Strike training bases.

Sonny, I will continue to look hard at everything I can to give you the best answer possible and I will keep you informed as new developments arise.

Sincerely and very respectfully,

Mike

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 9506024 JIM

FROM: CRAWFORD, BILL	TO: BRUBAKER, JIM
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: NAVY DOD ANALYST
ORGANIZATION: NAVY MERIDIAN TEAM	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INFORMATION REGARDING OPERATION PER HOUR AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950602	Date Originated: 950601	Mail Date:

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

June 1, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950602-4

Lt. Col. Jim Brubaker
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Arlington, VA

Dear Colonel Brubaker:

Because there continues to be a question regarding the BSAT's ops per hour factor for NAS Corpus Christi realigned as a jet training OLF, we ran the FAA Advisory Circular 150/5060-5 model. This model is the one used for all ops per hour factors by both the Navy and the JSCG. It shows a 56 ops per hour factor for NAF Corpus Christi, due in large part to the VFR availability of the parallel runways.

Consider, also, the model assumes sufficient aircraft are available at the airfield to utilize the parallel launch runway continuously. Not so for NAF Corpus Christi. As an OLF, the bulk of the flight activity will be touch and go pattern flights which originate and terminate at NAS Kingsville. There will be no training aircraft stationed on base, they will be at the NAS Kingsville homefield. The only aircraft available will be trainers that land to refuel plus the very limited (4% of the daily mix) other-tenant aircraft on base. So, NAF Corpus Christi will not have enough aircraft on board to maintain continuous use of the launch runway. Thus, the actual ops per hour factor will be even less than the FAA model calculates.

If you have any questions about the enclosed data, please call.

Sincerely,

Bill Crawford
Chairman

P. O. BOX 790 • MERIDIAN, MS 39302
601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

Average Daylight Service Volume

For NAS Corpus Christi

This spreadsheet will calculate the annual service volume when per cent of year hourly capacity, per cent maximum capacity and weighting factor are provided. It uses FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5060-5.

Weather	Mix Index	% of Year	Hourly Capacity	% Max Cap	Weighting Factor
VFR	96	74.6%	105	100%	1
IFR	96	8.5%	59	56%	20
VFR	96	14.1%	51	49%	25
IFR	96	0.9%	55	52%	20
Below Min		1.9%	0	0%	25

Ops per Hr 56

Service Volume **159,340** 12.1 Hrs/day, 237 Days/Yr

Air Station NAS Corpus Christ

Remarks chart 3-9 vfr, 3-44 ifr, 3-3 vfr single runway, 3-43 ifr single runway and below min

Date Run

This portion of the spreadhsheet calculates hourly capacity if the hourly capacity base, t & g factor and exit factor are given.

Hrly Cap Base	T&G Factor	Exit Factor	Hourly Capacity	Chart
105	1	1	105	3-9
59	1	1	59	3-44
56	1	0.91	51	3-3
55	1	1	55	3-43

		Ops/Day	Days	Total Ops
Service Volume				159,340
Category "C" other activity	30	79.461	237	(18,832)
Category "A" other activity		30	237	(7,110)
Total				**133,397**

Sources: NAS Corpus Christi BSAT Data Call #2
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5060-5

NAS Corpus Christi Capacity Calculation

The following data and FAA Advisory Circular Processes were used to compute Corpus Christi capacity as proposed by the BSEC:

Runway Configuration: 8000' and 6000' parallel primary runways
6000' crosswind runway

Weather criterion (runway use): as provided in BRAC Data Call #2

74.6%	VFR Primary Runways
8.5%	IFR Primary Runways
14.1%	VFR Crosswind Runway
0.9%	IFT Crosswind Runway
1.9%	Below Minimums all runways

Aircraft Mix Index:

Aircraft Mix was considered to be All T-45A (Category C aircraft) less 37,920 Annual Operations for Miscellaneous types (all other tenant/transient aircraft, as stated by the South Texas Military Facilities Task Force). While the tenant/transient aircraft may be all types (C-5's are Category D), a best case (most capacity) scenario assumes all are Category A.

Aircraft Mix Index = (Total Ops Category C + 3 x's Total Ops Category D) / Total Ops

96(%) = 152,229 / 159,340

Mix index was solved iteratively, as Total Ops capacity varied, Mix index was recomputed and the capacity calculation recomputed. This was done until Mix Index stabilized.

Touch and Go Factor:

The appropriate chart (Enclosure 1) was entered with the final mix index. A touch and go factor (T, enclosure 1), was determined from the chart. Note: High mix indices limit the touch and go factor regardless of the percentage of touch and go traffic anticipated for the runway under analysis.

Exit Factor:

Exit factors (E, enclosure 1) were changed to reflect the lengthened primary and crosswind runway configuration.

Hourly Capacity Calculation:

"Hrly Cap Base" (C^*, enclosure 1) was determined from the appropriate charts for the mix factor of 77%. This base was multiplied by the touch and go factor and the exit factor to determine the **Hourly Capacity** for each runway pair or runway.

Weighting Factor:

The weighting factor was determined from a chart (Enclosure 2). Each runway's hourly capacity is compared to the highest runway capacity to determine its percentage of maximum capacity. The weighting factor is determined from the chart based on this percentage, VFR operations, or IFR operations for the calculated mix index.

Determination of Ops / Hr for Airfield and Annual Daytime Service Volume:

Each runway/pair is evaluated for capacity thus:

Wx Factor ("% of Year") x's Hrly Capacity x's Weighting Factor

```
74.6% * 105 *  1 =  78.33
 8.5% *  59 * 20 = 100.30
14.1% *  56 * 25 = 179.63
 0.9% *  55 * 20 =   9.90
 1.9% *   0 * 25 =   0.00
```

The Weighting Factors are "weatherized" for each runway/pair:

Wx Factor x's Weighting Factor

```
74.6% *  1 = 0.746
 8.5% * 20 = 1.700
14.1% * 25 = 3.525
 0.9% * 20 = 0.180
 1.9% * 25 = 0.475
```

The capacities are summed and this is divided by sum of the weatherized weighting factors:

Airport Hourly Capacity = $\sum$ Capacities / $\sum$ Weatherized Weighting Factors

56 = (78.33 + 100.30 + 179.63 + 9.9 + 0) / (0.746 + 1.700 + 3.525 + 0.180 + 0.475)

Annual Capacity = Hourly Capacity x's 12.1 Hours/Day x's 237 Days/Yr

159,340 = 56 * 12.1 * 237

ANNUAL DAYLIGHT SERVICE VOLUME
(ASV.WK1)

This spreadsheet will calculate the annual service volume when per cent of year hourly capacity, per cent maximum capacity and weighting factor are provided. It uses FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5060-5.

Weather	mix index	% of yr	hrly cap	% max cap	Weighting Factor (w)
vfr	14	74.6	193	100%	1
ifr	14	8.5	59	31%	4
vfr	0	14.1	99	51%	20
ifr	0	0.9	55	29%	4
below min	0	1.9	0	0%	4

Ops per hour: 111
Service volume: 317,007
Air station: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI
Remarks: chart 3-9 vfr, 3-44 ifr, 3-3 vfr single rwy, 3-43 ifr single and below min
Date run: 9 February 1994

This portion of the spreadsheet calculates hourly capacity if the hourly capacity base, t & g factor and exit factor are given.

hrly cap base	t & go factor	exit factor	hourly cap	chart
160	1.4	0.86	193	3-9
59	1	1	59	3-44
82	1.4	0.86	99	3-3
58	1	0.95	55	3-43

Notes:

NESBITT
A.P.N
26 APR 94
CNET N-353

ENCLOSURE 2.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR T

Percent Touch & Go	Mix Index--Percent (C+3D)	TOUCH & GO FACTOR T
0	0 to 180	1.00
1 to 10	0 to 70	1.04
11 to 20	0 to 70	1.10
21 to 30	0 to 40	1.20
31 to 40	0 to 10	1.31
41 to 50	0 to 10	1.40

C• x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR E

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent (C+3D)	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.72	0.87	0.94	0.70	0.86	0.94	0.67	0.84	0.92
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.79	0.86	0.94	0.76	0.84	0.93	0.72	0.81	0.90
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.79	0.86	0.92	0.76	0.83	0.91	0.73	0.81	0.90
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.83	0.89	0.93	0.80	0.87	0.94	0.77	0.86	0.93
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.85	0.93	0.98	0.81	0.91	0.97	0.78	0.89	0.97

FIGURE 3-9. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 9,66,68 FOR VFR CONDITIONS.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR T

Percent Touch & Go	Mix Index--Percent (C+3D)	TOUCH & GO FACTOR T
0	0 to 180	1.00
1 to 10	0 to 70	1.04
11 to 20	0 to 70	1.10
21 to 30	0 to 40	1.20
31 to 40	0 to 10	1.31
41 to 50	0 to 10	1.40

C• x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR E

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent (C+3D)	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.72	0.87	0.94	0.70	0.86	0.94	0.67	0.84	0.92
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.79	0.86	0.94	0.76	0.84	0.93	0.72	0.81	0.90
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.79	0.86	0.92	0.76	0.83	0.91	0.73	0.81	0.90
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.82	0.89	0.93	0.80	0.88	0.94	0.77	0.86	0.93
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.86	0.94	0.98	0.82	0.91	0.96	0.79	0.91	0.97

FIGURE 3-10. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 10-12,69-71 FOR VFR CONDITIONS.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR T

Percent Touch & Go	Mix Index--Percent(C+3D)	TOUCH & GO FACTOR T
0	0 to 180	1.00
1 to 10	0 to 70	1.04
11 to 20	0 to 70	1.10
21 to 30	0 to 40	1.20
31 to 40	0 to 10	1.31
41 to 50	0 to 10	1.40

C* x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR E

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent(C+3D)	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.72	0.87	0.94	0.70	0.86	0.94	0.67	0.84	0.92
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.79	0.86	0.94	0.76	0.84	0.93	0.72	0.81	0.90
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.79	0.86	0.92	0.76	0.83	0.91	0.73	0.81	0.90
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.82	0.89	0.95	0.80	0.88	0.94	0.77	0.86	0.93
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.86	0.93	0.98	0.82	0.91	0.96	0.79	0.91	0.97

FIGURE 3-3. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 1,54 FOR VFR CONDITIONS.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR T

T = 1.00

C* x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR E

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent(C+3D)	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.62	0.79	0.90	0.62	0.79	0.90	0.62	0.79	0.90
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.72	0.83	0.93	0.72	0.83	0.93	0.72	0.83	0.93
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.75	0.84	0.92	0.75	0.84	0.92	0.75	0.84	0.92
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.80	0.87	0.94	0.80	0.87	0.94	0.80	0.87	0.94
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.94	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.93	0.97	0.83	0.93	0.97

FIGURE 3-4. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 2,72,73,87,88 FOR VFR CONDITIONS.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR **T**

T = 1.00

C• x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR **E**

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent(C+3D) 2-43,2-50	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.81	0.91	0.96	0.83	0.95	0.99	0.92	1.00	1.00
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.79	0.86	0.92	0.77	0.85	0.92	0.89	0.98	1.00
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.81	0.87	0.93	0.77	0.83	0.91	0.90	0.98	1.00
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.83	0.89	0.94	0.80	0.86	0.92	0.83	0.91	0.97
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.86	0.94	0.98	0.83	0.91	0.96	0.79	0.89	0.95

FIGURE 3-43. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 1,54 FOR IFR CONDITIONS.



TOUCH & GO FACTOR **T**

T = 1.00

C• x T x E = Hourly Capacity

EXIT FACTOR **E**

To determine Exit Factor E:

1. Determine exit range for appropriate mix index from table below
2. For arrival runways, determine the average number of exits(N) which are: (a) within appropriate exit range, and (b) separated by at least 750 feet
3. If N is 4 or more, Exit Factor = 1.00
4. If N is less than 4, determine Exit Factor from table below for appropriate mix index and percent arrivals

Mix Index--Percent(C+3D)	Exit Range (Feet from threshold)	EXIT FACTOR E								
		40% Arrivals			50% Arrivals			60% Arrivals		
		N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3	N=0	N=1	N=2 or 3
0 to 20	2000 to 4000	0.98	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.00	1.00
21 to 50	3000 to 5500	0.90	0.96	0.98	0.90	0.96	0.98	0.90	0.96	0.98
51 to 80	3500 to 6500	0.91	0.97	1.00	0.91	0.97	1.00	0.91	0.97	1.00
81 to 120	5000 to 7000	0.91	0.98	1.00	0.91	0.98	1.00	0.91	0.98	1.00
121 to 180	5500 to 7500	0.92	0.97	1.00	0.90	0.97	1.00	0.90	0.97	1.00

FIGURE 3-44. HOURLY CAPACITY OF RUNWAY-USE DIAGRAM NOS.: 2,3,9,51-68,72-74,76,77,79,80, 82-85,87-89,91,92,94,95,97-100,102 FOR IFR CONDITIONS.

c. Calculate the component quotients by dividing each components capacity by its demand ratio.

d. Identify the airport hourly capacity, i.e., the lowest quotient calculated in c above.

3-6. ANNUAL SERVICE VOLUME (ASV). Calculate the ASV as follows:

a. Calculate the weighted hourly capacity (C_w) for the runway component as follows:

(1) Identify the different runway-use configurations used over the course of a year.

(2) Determine the percent of time each runway-use configuration is in use (P_1 through P_n). Include those times when the hourly capacity is zero, i.e., the weather conditions are below airport minimums or the airport is closed for other reasons. If a runway-use configuration is used less than 2 percent of the time, that time may be credited to another runway-use configuration.

(3) Calculate the hourly capacity for each runway-use configuration (C_1 through C_n).

(4) Identify the runway-use configuration that provides the maximum capacity. Generally, this configuration is also the configuration most frequently used.

(5) Divide the hourly capacity of each runway-use configuration by the hourly capacity of the runway-use configuration that provides the maximum capacity.

(6) Determine the ASV weighting factor (W_1 through W_n) for each runway-use configuration from Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. ASV Weighting Factors

Percent of Maximum Capacity	Weighting Factors			
	VFR	IFR		
		Mix Index (0-20)	Mix Index (21-50)	Mix Index (51-180)
91+	1	1	1	1
81-90	5	1	3	5
66-80	15	2	8	15
51-65	20	3	12	20
0-50	25	4	16	25

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JIM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950614-19

FROM: DAWSON, JIM	TO: CORNELLA, AL
TITLE:	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: LAUDERDALE CO. DEPT OF ARCHIVES	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAS MERIDIAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓	
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
COMMISSIONER COX			
COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
COMMISSIONER KLING			
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
COMMISSIONER STEELE			
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	✓	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT — ALSO, FORWARDING BOOK PATHS TO THE PAST - AN OVERVIEW · HISTORY OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MS

Due Date: 950621	Routing Date: 950614	Date Originated: 950609	Mail Date:

LCDA&H

Courthouse Annex
Second Floor
410 Constitution Avenue
Call ahead to fax

P.O. Box 5511
Meridian MS
39302-5511

LAUDERDALE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES & HISTORY, INC.

(601) 482-9752 Jim Dawson, Executive Director

9 June, 1995

Mr. Al Cornella
Commissioner
Base Closure Commission
1700 N. Moore St.
Arlington VA 22209

95614-19

Dear Commissioner Cornella

I was unable to attend your meeting at NAS Meridian, 8 June, owing to physical problems, but I would like very much to present you a copy of our county history, *Paths to the Past.*

Ours is the only county I know of in the state, and possibly in the South, that has a certified County Department of Archives & History. The effort commenced with volunteers in 1984.

I am a retired U.S. Navy warrant officer, and served here as a Naval recruiter, when ground was broken for the base, McCain Field as it was then called.

The base occupies land first settled by pioneers brought in by the notable Sam Dale, who grazed sheep and raised cotton where Naval aviators have now been training for decades.

Just south of the base is the site of the old Coosa Choctaw Indian village, and running to the side of that is a short length of the Tennessee Trace, which ran from Nashville to Mobile, the road Abraham Lincoln used when he stopped by to visit Sam Dale. The area was known as Daleville after the (Choctaw Indian) Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Crreek, 1830. Later Daleville moved to a site north of the base and the area to the south is now known as Lizelia.

Today the area is mostly a quiet one. Local veterans organizations joined the Hon. Sonny Montgomery in his (successful) efforts to keep the base access road free of the blight of beer joints and the like.

When the first service personnel arrived on the scene I worked closely with the officer in charge. The men were then allowed to wear civilian clothes as they were living in Meridian, but one complaint from the base commander was that local girls were keeping their distance from the young sailors. My advice to their commander was to put his men in uniform off base as well as on, and apparently that worked. Heard no more about the matter after they spruced up.

One base program that has been of spectacular help to us has been the SHIPMATE program. These young people gave their free time to help us renovate the County Archives spaces (which take up the whole mezzanine of what has become a beautifully restored and revitalized hotel building), and the old Whynot High School building, now a thriving community center, both in tip-top shape. Photo enclosure shows the lobby of the former hotel, now the courthouse annex.

My only regret about this is that many of the young men and women who worked will such energy will probably never see the end results of their labors.

Sometimes while the work at Whynot was in progress, the ladies of the community would bring lunch, and older residents would gather at break times to talk to the young sailors. In fact, sometimes there would be no further work after lunch, because everyone was having such a good time socializing. Many of the oldtimers who had not had much contact with service personnel before were highly impressed with the young people.

It is my hope that you will enjoy this book. Lauderdale County is marching ahead with the preservation of its history. I'm an historian; hope I've not bored you.

Sorry to have missed your visit. I hope if you should visit again I can show you the archives.

Whynot, by the way, derives it name from an ancestor — the old Why Not village — of Randolph County, North Carolina.

If you ever do visit, I'll be happy to tell you more stories, ok?

I know you will do your best to render the best decision as regards the fate of our good neighbor, NAS Meridian.

Kind regards and best wishes.

Sincerely

Jim Dawson

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION JM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950614-6

FROM: MONTGOMERY, G. V.	TO: CORNELLA, AL
TLE: REP. (MS)	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: COLUMBUS AFB, NAS MERIDIAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA ✓	✓		
COMMISSIONER COX			
COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
COMMISSIONER KLING			
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA ✓	✓		
COMMISSIONER ROBLES ✓	✓		
COMMISSIONER STEELE ✓	✓		
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR VISITING BASES

ate:	Routing Date:	Date Originated:	Mail Date:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
THIRD DISTRICT
MISSISSIPPI

June 9, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 95061H-6

Dear Al:

Thank you for taking time to come to Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station. There is no better way to judge our facilities than to see them in person. I appreciate your willingness to spend time with us and to allow our community leaders to make their presentations.

Please let me know if I can provide any additional information on Meridian or Columbus in these final two weeks.

Thanks again for coming.

Sincerely,

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

Hon. Al Cornella
Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Jon and my buddy — I enjoyed being with you & Thanks for taking the time to look at Meridian & Columbus

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950620-72

FROM: LEHMAN, J.F.	TO: DIXON
TITLE:	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: J.F. LEHMAN & COMPANY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: MERIDIAN, REESE, CORPUS CHRISTI	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓	
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
COMMISSIONER COX			
COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
COMMISSIONER KLING			
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
COMMISSIONER STEELE			
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

Urge to reject proposals to close pilot training bases; cannot be reconstituted once closed.

* RECOMMEND PHONE RESPONSE *

Due Date: 950627	Routing Date: 950620	Date Originated: 950619	Mail Date:

J. F. LEHMAN & COMPANY
535 MADISON AVENUE, 19TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10022

Please refer to this number when responding 950620-72

June 19, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Closing and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Alan

Recently a number of congressmen have asked my views on the issue of pilot training. I have given them based on my experience as Secretary of the Navy and as a bombardier and pilot in the naval reserve. As a courtesy I would like to share them with you. Since World War II there have been recurring proposals to consolidate flight training under one service at a few centralized bases. They have failed not only because each service has uniquely different specializations but because by its nature, flight training requires dispersal and decentralization. Traffic patterns and airspace cannot be overloaded without disastrous safety results. Thus bases operating in peacetime have finite surge capacity in emergencies.

Even in peaceful times there is always volatility in pilot training rates. Retention rates are lower in peacetime and vary unpredictably with airline pilot hiring. To some extent we were able to stem the loss of pilots with specialized bonuses which were funded by Congress, but the ability to stem pilot losses in the post-cold war era will remain limited.

The Aviation industry has recently published estimates of the demand for pilots within the airline industry and it is projected that there will be a huge increase in pilot hiring in the next decade. At the same time, moral and retention have been declining in recent years as each of our armed services continues to downsize. Defense spending has declined for eleven years straight and the effects of this

decline are becoming more and more evident. We are headed for a period of reduced retention and higher than predicted pilot production requirements.

During my tenure in the Pentagon, the services were not constrained by their pilot training capacity. We had a sufficient surge capacity in our training bases to accommodate swings in pilot training requirements. Since that time, both the Navy and the Air Force have reduced pilot training to a point that is very near the margin with only a very modest surge capability to meet pilot training requirements if those requirements increase significantly.

Once a flight training based is closed it becomes virtually impossible to reestablish its training mission even if it continues operating as a civil airfield. Normally the restricted training airspace is the first to go, but Civilian encroachment and development is almost immediate and irreversible..

I urge you to reject proposals to close pilot training bases like Meridian, Reese and Corpus Christi. Pilot training is vital to U.S. military readiness and should not be trifled with on the basis of math models and systems analysis. Unlike much of the mobilization base, once these bases are closed, they cannot be reconstituted.

Best regards

J. L.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION JIM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950620-57

FROM: McGOWEN, WILLIAM R.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: RADM, U.S. NAVY (RET.)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: PRIVATE CITIZEN	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: NAS MERIDIAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		(✓)		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

(✓)	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

IN SUPPORT OF MERIDIAN TEAM; COMMENT ON "ASSUMPTIONS AND FLAWS;" STRESS DEMAND FOR SOUND TRAINING.

Due Date: 950627	Routing Date: 950620	Date Originated: 950620	Mail Date:

2000 Mary Street
Roesch Taylor Center
Suite 417
Pittsburgh, PA 15203

950620-57

June 20, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As you know, I have assisted the Navy Meridian Team with their technical review of Navy training capabilities, capacities and requirements. I elected to assist the Team in this effort to ensure that Navy strike pilot production is not threatened in the future.

The Navy Meridian Team has shared with me internal Navy "Working Papers" which have been utilized by the Naval Air Training Command to calculate, and further update, the impacts to strike training should a single site strike scenario be implemented. As the former Chief of Naval Air Training, I would like to comment regarding these important documents.

First, it is essential that the Commission understand the assumptions in these most recently projected capacity utilization figures.

1. **Assumption:** No aircraft attrition

   Flaw: Zero attrition is a goal, but in the "real world" data has shown that a minimum attrition factor of 2% should be utilized. T-45's do not have a zero attrition rate.

2. **Assumption:** 100% instructor manning

   Flaw: With the manning situation the Navy does not fill all the instructor billets. They have not in the past and can not afford to in the future. They consciously plan and execute manning levels around 85 to 90% to fit the budget. This will not change. Further, even with proper manning, there are not enough instructors qualified in all the required phases and

available to schedule each day, every week, throughout the year, to maintain the ops per hour at all fields on a continuous basis. The same can be stated for student flow. The students are not waiting in line for their next sortie in order to keep the landing pattern full all day, every day. The instructors and students are not free assets. They must be scheduled efficiently.

3. **Assumption:** Carrier availability [every two months]

Flaw: World events increasingly dictate that carriers will not be available to the demands of the Naval Air Training. The CNO, JCS and the CINCs know that carrier demand is, and will remain, high for both 2MRC and major contingency support. Further, even with a two month availability, it interrupts student flow for those who are waiting to "go to the boat." It also destroys the ops per hour requirement when many of the aircraft are gone from the home fields on the carrier detachment for a week or more.

4. **Assumption:** 1.4 hour aircraft turnaround time

Flaw: Present turnaround times exceed 3 hours. A 1.4 hour turnaround time for all aircraft is not sustainable all day every day. In my opinion, even with T-45's, this ambitious assumption cannot be met. This, also, does not take into account the lengthened turnaround times resulting from vigorous OLF activity; this factor must be considered. Aircraft are harder to support away from home field.

5. **Assumption:** NAF Corpus Christi will have an ops per hour capacity of 80.

Flaw: No strike aircraft are stationed at NAF Corpus Christi. It is not a home field! It is a grave mistake to calculate an OLF capacity as if it is a home field operation. It is not a second strike base. Also, the ops per hour does not allow for an initial (morning) buildup and (afternoon/evening) drawdown of operations. The 80 ops per hour capacity projected for OLF NAF Corpus Christi cannot be achieved and in my opinion even the 54 ops per hour NALF Orange Grove and at NAF Corpus Christi is not possible all day every day!

The most alarming items remain the conclusions. Under a best case scenario, NAS Kingsville will operate in a deficit in 2002 and 2003 (in 2000 and 2001 as well, if Meridian would close in FY 99 as originally recommended) and at an unacceptable 96% capacity into the future! The assets, in terms of aircraft, instructors, students and contract maintenance, do not (and will not) exist that will permit a tempo which sustains 96% to 100+ % of a full 80/80/54 ops per hour every minute the fields are operating. You can not get there. A sustainable capability of approximately 80 - 85% of the field's ops per hour capacity is the best one can do.

Sound training planning and sound military planning would never support such a scenario. All flexibility to meet needs or address "real world" operating constraints have been removed. I firmly believe endorsing such a recommendation will seriously jeopardize the Navy's ability to continue safely training the strike aviators demanded in the foreseeable future.

Sincerely yours,

William R. McGowen

William R. McGowen
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret)

Sir:
I believe we need 2 Strike Bases. It can not all be done at one.

ASSUMPTIONS

* AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY
  - T-2 61.7%
  - A-4 52.6%
  - T-45 76.8%

* T45 BUY REMAINS 12 PER YEAR

* NO AIRCRAFT ATTRITION

* 46 YEAR WEATHER AVERAGE

* CLOSED NALF GOLIAD NOT AVAILABLE

WORKING PAPERS

WORKING PAPERS

* 100 PERCENT INSTRUCTOR MANNING

* AIRCRAFT CARRIER AVAILABLE EVERY TWO MONTHS

* TA4 OPERATIONS END
  - FY98 WITH 336/36 PTR
  - FY99 WITH 360/36 PTR

* JOINT TRAINING (NFO/WSO) AND T44 MOVE TO NAS PENSACOLA DICTATES E2/C2 TRAINING RELOCATE TO A STRIKE BASE BEGINNING IN FY97.

* PEACETIME PLANNING FACTORS
  - 237 TRAINING DAYS PER YEAR
  - FIVE OPERATING DAYS PER WEEK
  - NO DETACHMENTS
  - 1.4 HOUR AIRCRAFT TURNAROUND TIME (FINAL LANDING TO NEXT TAKEOFF)

* AVERAGE DAYLIGHT HOURS AVAILABLE
  - 12.1 NAS KINGSVILLE
  - 11.6 NALF ORANGE GROVE, NAF CORPUS CHRISTI

* AIRFIELD OPERATIONS PER HOUR
  - NAS KINGSVILLE - 80
  - NAF CORPUS CHRISTI - 80 (EXTEND 13L AND 17)
  - NALF ORANGE GROVE - 54

* 11016 DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS IN KINGSVILLE COMPLEX NOT CONTRIBUTING TO PTR (NALO, COAST GUARD, MCM MH-53, CUSTOMS)

* OPERATIONS PER PTR
  - T2 - 900
  - T45ADV - 890
  - T45TS - 1481
  - E2/C2 - 875

* NO CAPACITY RESTRICTIONS AT DETACHMENT SITE

KINGSVILLE CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS
IF MERIDIAN CLOSES IN FY99 AND FY01

Meridian closes in FY99

PTR stk/E2-C2	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05
336/36	48%	93%	106%	100%	100%	99%	90%	90%
360/36	76%	93%	111%	108%	106%	101%	97%	96%

Meridian closes in FY01

336/36	48%	71%	80%	90%	101%	95%	90%	90%
360/36	49%	73%	86%	97%	106%	101%	97%	96%

Capacity is defined as:

Capacity requirement (or usage) is the total airfield operations required to complete the given PTR divided by the total airfield capacity of the complex (expressed as a percentage of available capacity).



STRIKE GRADUATE DISTRIBUTION
at 360 strike/36 E2-C2 PTR
If NAS Meridian closes in FY01

	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05
TA-4J	57	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
T-45 ADVANCED	298	325	312	283	224	190	80	0
T-45 TS	5	10	48	77	136	170	280	360
T-2 INTERMEDIATE								
KINGSVILLE	0	111	152	165	184	104	21	0
MERIDIAN	366	225	152	85	0	0	0	0
E-2/C-2	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36

WORKING PAPERS

WORKING PAPERS

JUN-20-1995 19:21 P.01 07

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2184 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2403
(202) 225-5031

COMMITTEES:
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2100 NINTH ST., ROOM 302
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(601) 693-6681

2080 AIRPORT ROAD, SUITE D
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
(601) 327-7766

110-D AIRPORT ROAD
PEARL, MS 39208
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DATE: 20 Jun 95

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NUMBER OF PAGES: 6
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FROM: Bo Maske

COMMENTS:

Per our telecon

Thanks for making sure

each copy gets to the

Commissioners.

Bo

PLEASE CALL (202)225-5031 IF ALL PAGES WERE NOT RECEIVED.

Post-it™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671	# of pages ▸ 8
To HON ALAN J. DIXON	From LEDDY
Co BRAC COMMISSION	Co CAPT USN RET
Dept CHAIRMAN	Phone # 904 932 5568
Fax # 703-696-0050	Fax # 904 934 6912

William R. Leddy
410 Deer Point Circle
Gulf Breeze, Fl. 32561

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St. Suite 1425
Arlington, Va. 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing this letter in behalf of Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi. As the former Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations on the Chief of Naval Air Training Staff from September 91 until January 94, I am concerned that pilot training rate can not be achieved. A combination of prior attempts to close Meridian, excursions of capacity analyses, overstated savings, and a politics will preclude Navy and Marine strike training from maintaining our carrier based force structure at a time with increasing world wide carrier presence requirements. I will discuss some of my concerns and provide the attached examples of the complexity of aviation training to emphasize that single citing Navy strike training simply does not work nor is it in consonance with Public Law 101-510, Title XXIX Defense Base Closures and realignments.

Prior attempts to close Navy Meridian were valid assessments of training requirements until Navy Chase Field in Beeville, Texas closed. Subsequent to Chase closure, Meridian closure seemed to take on a pure budget aspect without regard to training requirements. Meridian's removal from the closure list in BRAC 93 seemed to establish a former budget challenge as now an even greater challenge to close. The systematic decline in military values for Meridian from one of the best bases in 91 to its low ranking in 95 indicates to me increased effort to target this base rather than to treat all bases the same regardless of previous BRAC recommendations.

Capacity analyses does not substantiate maintenance of force level. In my former capacity as Assistant Chief of Staff, Training and Operations, Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA N3), I reported to the staff in time to close Chase Field. Subsequently, I provided capacity analyses, planning factors, and requirements for both day to day work with the CNO's staff and BRAC 93 decisions. Prior to detaching from CNATRA staff in January 94, I co authored the Joint Fixed Wing flight training report in response to Rolls and Missions Study and completed preliminary detailed capacity analyses for BRAC 95 which is the basis for current Navy capacity. Associated with the BRAC 95 analyses was a Joint capacity analyses with the Air Force which confirmed both my preliminary Navy capacity and methodology and the Air Force training capacity.

Honorable Alan J. Dixon continued

Although Air Force methodology was slightly different, pilot training capacity using either methodology was statistically insignificant.
My capacity findings from both BRAC 93 and BRAC 95 actual baseline data were:
CAPACITY WAS NOT AT ANY ONE NAVAL AIR TRAINING STATION TO DO ALL STRIKE AND E2/C2 TRAINING WITH THE ARTIFICIALLY LOWERED PTR (A CORRECTION FOR FRS POOLS). The recent increase in the pilot training rate only increases and already identified shortfall in training capacity for any one Naval Air Station. Fluctuations in pilot training rate or carrier air wing composition will exacerbate an already unsolvable problem for safely and efficiently training Navy/Marine carrier based pilots. In an effort to balance the budget, we are creating a foreign policy deficit which can not be balanced. We will have a permanently increasing shortage of carrier pilots, the only truly unique training to the Navy flight training. To say we have a definitive pilot training rate forever ignores significant historical changes in PTR. Complexity of flight training is discussed in attachment 1. The simple statement that we absorb some increased capacity when we already are short in capacity indicates actual capacity data has not been openly evaluated, personnel who calculated the data have not come forewardto speak, or the naivete of the decision makers who will not have to try to achieve pilot training rates without the assets. Both the Navy and the Air Force have said some excess capacity is necessary. We are ignoring operational common sense proposing to operate at an operational tempo in excess of our highest Vietnam training rate at a single strike base during peacetime (and not make required training rate) , under contract maintenance cost and limitations, and positive air traffic control procedures.

The cost saving associated with closing Meridian is likely overstated. Recent newspaper articles indicated twenty year savings of $350-370M. My recollection of Base Operation and Support (BOS) cost for our strike bases was about $9.0M per year each. Twenty year savings would be about $180M from closing one since the only savings is in BOS. The functional transfer of flight training cost moves to the other base. Although there is complex COBRA modelling for detailed analyses, the concept that savings is limited to the base infrastructure provides a reality check when cost and risk are evaluated against the consequence of not maintaining force structure. Total savings over the twenty year period will be less than half of the construction to move Memphis to Pensacola. Is closing Meridian a good buy assessed against future risk?

There are politics in all decisions and BRAC is no exception. The Navy capacity requirements have gone from 600 PTR at three bases to 450 PTR at two bases and now proposes nearly 400 at one base.

Honorable Alan J. Dixon continued:

I do not envy your task of trying to separate the factual, operational, emotional, budget, and political aspects of the mountainous data you have been provided. I am sure your Commission will reach an informed correct decision meeting the precepts of the BRAC law and your conscience of what is right.

I wish you and the Commission every success as you complete your difficult deliberations and trust you will preserve the force.

Sincerely

William R Leddy

William R. Leddy

I have spent over 10 years directly associated with Naval Aviator training. Single acting stuko as proposed absolutely will not work.

ATTTACHMENT ONE

OPERATING AT ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CAPACITY

The concept of operating at 100% capacity and efficiency for 100% of the time is simply not achieveable due to the comlexity and variables in flight training. No business would or could operate on the precept that 100% operations would not be affected by numerous variables many outside local control

Flight training has a unique environment and set of variables which preclude precise programming and management. They have been oversimplified in an attempt to show operational capacity at 100% and greater.

Some of those variables which preclude 100% capacity are:

1. Individual performance will be optimal and maximum without affecting student attrition.

2. Weather factors will be uniformly distributed all year round and affect specific training phases evenly regardless of season.

3. Aircraft availability/one time inspections/mods pipeline factors and attrition will be constant and predictable.

4. On board students/loading/phasing/PTR changes will include lead time for ROTC/ACADEMY accessions since about 90% of officers are accessed in June of each year and the optimum student training load can be maintained year round.

5. DOD budget process will always provide a budget prior to 1 OCT of each year and fully fund flight training.

Some amount of excess capacity at Naval Air Training Stations is necessary to accommodate variances in the above.

A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THESE FACTORS IS IN THE ACCOMPANYING PAGES

Operating at 100% capacity continued:

In the proposed Navy position to single site all strike training at one base, significant variables must be assumed as solved for constants. Those assumptions are:

1. Individual performance will be such that all on board students can be programmed at the master curriculum guide maximum events per day without changing attrition.

2. Weather factors will be evenly spread all year long rather than winter having greater lost sorties than summer at the single strike base.

3. The fleet of aircraft will not undergo any substantial grounding for all aircraft. All aircraft modifications will be allowed to be incorporated during normal inspections and field teams will be in place to incorporate without contract maintenance changes.

4. Student loading will remain optimum for all phases and on-board count will not be above optimum creating delays as a result local weather, detachment incompletes, carrier qualification cancellation due to weather/ deck availability. Sufficient lead time to respond to PTR changes precedes academy and ROTC accession plans since 91% of PTR comes from academy and ROTC.

5. The DOD budget process will not result in a Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) from failure of the Congress to pass a budget prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year. This single part of the democratic process has the potential to hold pilot training at a single strike training base operating at maximum capacity hostage for the following reasons:

1. Maximum capacity assumes no significant surge capacity other than week-ends.

2. Weather will affect training equally all year regardless of winter, seasonal, and geographic differences. That is; weather effect on raining will not be cumulative during the year due to perfect student loading and flow.

3. A signed effective federal budget will be in place before October 1, 19xx every year. Without an approved budget, some level of holdown on execution of the budget will be required of all federal agencies. The level of budget restriction routinely is 10% below prior year execution until a federal budget is passed. In the event there is a Continuing Resolution Authority(CRA) and 10% reduction in execution for the first quarter of the fiscal year, the result would preclude PTR achievement. The training command is resourced for even flow so assets would not be available to go on detachment and maintain capacity at home field. Home field would not have the internal capacity to surge and make up the shortfall other than increasing the workweek to 6 or 7 days.The weekend work would be of marginal operational benefit since it would curtail already efficient weekend instrument/cross country training at the cost of unit morale.

Operating at 100% capacity continued:

SOME EFFECTS OF THE ABOVE FACTORS ON PTR AND CAPACITY

Previous discussion of CRA remains valid and is additive to the budget and operational factors presented below:

BUDGET: In addition to beginning year CRA, the flying hour commitment to the contractor is promulgated 60 days prior to the operating quarter. This means early August, first quarter of the next FY flying hours are on contract before there is a budget. CRA implications are significant and can affect the rest of the year. If the 2% budget withhold is not restored at midyear review the end of the flight hours are impacted, particularly when the last quarter hours are promulgated in early May shortly after midyear review. Two other factors which may cause significant perturbations in PTR is a contract claim from prior year execution and Dept of Labor wage adjustments increasing contract cost without the Navy having control in current year budget execution. If a claim is awarded to a contractor from a prior year claim, the claim is paid from current year operations resulting in in-year unfunded requirements at the expense of PTR. The previous CRA discussion and the above can be showstoppers in a perfect 100% efficient, 100% capacity operation the Navy is proposing for the single site strike base.

OPERATIONS: Several factors have been oversimplified in efforts to single site strike. Those are; phasing, on board students load, hours per x, and the capacity effect of having to stand up an entire T-2 infrastructure including contract site stand up, AIMD, and instructors for four years. Pre load is ignored.

1. The move of all T-2s to Kingsville along with contract, instructors, and students in FY97 to begin FY98 operations without affecting capacity at both bases for T-45 or T-2s is a gross simplification of the complexity of the entire aviation training program. IT SIMPLY CAN NOT BE DONE!

2. The hours per X in the monthly production report is a measure of efficiency and directly correlates to the budget. The hours per X also is a true measure of real time overhead. For example the T-45 planned hours per X is 1.933 and includes all overhead. The hour per X in the production report would confirm actual overhead and is proportional to hours: 266.21* hours per completer with student hours of 175.6* equates to 51% overhead at 1.933 hours per X. A 2.1 hr/x would be equivalent to 55% overhead. Current hours/x likely exceed planning factors and reflect less than planning factor efficiency.

* = the approved 93 planning factors prior to reduction to one CQ for strike training wile still retaining FCLP in intermediate/phase 1 strike.

Operating at 100% capacity continued:

3. Phasing factor corrects resourced (or equivalent) PTR in years when there are changes in PTR by using a weighted average of the current year PTR and the following year PTR. The weight applied is proportional to the published curriculum length.

T-45 curriculum	=	40 wks
current yr + 1 weight	=	40 wks * .01
	=	.40
current yr weight	=	1 - (CY+1 percent)
	=	.60

In FY 97 (PTR=336) the T-45 resourced PTR with a FY 98 (PTR=364) is:

.60 * 336	= 201
+ .40 * 364	= 146
	= 347

The resourced PTR could be analyzed according to ops/ptr if capacity analyses is required. For example the ptr above in FY97 is only 336 but 364 in FY98. Accordingly, the ops required for FY97 is:

Resourced PTR * OPS per PTR		
	347 * 1511	= 524,317 OPS
OR	347 * 1822	= 632,234 OPS

4. The number of on board students affects efficiency, time to train, and overhead. Phasing also affects student loading however, I will only discuss the effect on overhead/ time to train here. Student loading is established one syllabus time length prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. Changes to the load can occur due to cancellation of a CQ available ship, weather delays, aircraft availability (aircraft down for mods or inspections), or any combination of the above. If the onboard count is too much excess warm-ups are required since extra resources including runways and airspace are not available to increase optempo. The average on board students to ensure smooth training flow is simplified to;

((Input + Output)/2) * (Syllabus length in wks/52) * 1.05

1.05 is the factor to adjust to 50 wk yr instead of 52 wks

The effect on time to train and subsequently overhead resulting from an incomplete CQ is warm ups and extra flying hours without being able to increase base capacity.

TIME TO TRAIN = (ON BOARD ENDING/ SYL LENGTH TR) * (1-1/2 ATTR% TRAIN) * WKS IN FY REMAINING

A cancelled CQ likely would affect 30 students, increase onboard count by 9% which would ripple effect the entire resource distribution and create a CQ det of 60 students with requisite affect on other ongoing training flow.

Operating at 100% capacity continued:

The overload in asset with limited runway ops use when coupled with phasing effects for next year ptr mean operating at 100% capacity could preclude making ptr every time there is a ptr change, CRA, cancelled CQ det, or aircraft grounding.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0620-F12
BSAT/TG
2 March 1995

The Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Montgomery:

This is in response to a request from Mr. Bo Maske of your staff, for documents concerning Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian, Mississippi, used during the 1995 base realignment and closure process.

To be as responsive as possible I am enclosing copies of documents used to request capacity, military value, and COBRA scenario data from NAS Meridian pertaining to its undergraduate pilot training (UPT) function and the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), their replies to those data calls, Training Air Station and Training Center Military Value Matrices, and COBRA analyses conducted for our Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC). The information provided was extracted from the 136 cubic feet of certified data we have collected as part of the deliberative process for the 1995 round of base realignment and closure.

We are in the process of copying the BSEC's deliberative record and will send it to your office as soon as possible. If we can be of further assistance in the interim, please let me know.

Sincerely,

C. P. NEMFAKOS
Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments:
(1) BRAC-95 Training Air Station & Training Center Capacity Data Calls and Replies
(2) BRAC-95 Training Air Station & Training Center Military Value Data Calls and Replies
(3) BRAC-95 Training Air Station and Training Center Military Value Matrices
(4) BRAC-95 COBRA Scenario Data Calls and Replies
(5) BRAC-95 COBRA Analyses

Training Air Station Capacity Analysis - Methodology

- **Issue: Is there excess capacity within the Training Air Station subcategory?**

- **Approach:**
  - Capacity measure: number of pilots and NFOs trained per year (i.e., PTR/NFOTR)
  - Analytical approach: compare historic PTR/NFOTR (FY88-89) against future PTR/NFOTR requirements (FY95-FY2001)
  - Recommend using maritime aviation training (i.e., USN, USMC, CG, and FMS) to show excess capacity in subcategory
  - Other aviation training requirements (i.e., USAF, IMT) will be accounted for in the configuration analysis

Primary Pilot Training



Primary Pilot Training



Maritime Multi-Engine Pilot Training



Maritime Multi-Engine Pilot Training



E2/C2 Pilot Training



Rotary Wing Pilot Training



Primary NFO Training



Primary NFO Training



Advanced NFO Training



Advanced NFO Training



Strike Pilot Training



Training Air Station Capacity Analysis - Results

- **Based on maritime aviation training requirements, excess capacity exists in**
  - Primary Pilot (34%)
  - Maritime (36%)
  - E2/C2 (19%)
  - Rotary (24%)
  - Primary NFO (42%)
  - Advanced NFO (36%)

- **Approach not valid for Strike because of Chase Field (i.e., strike training conducted at Chase until FY93)**

Runway Capacity

- Capacity Measure -- annual number of daylight runway operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and touch-and-goes)
- Formula

  Runway ops/yr = Flying days/yr x Daylight hours/day x Runway ops/hr
- Data
  - Annual number of training days - 237 days
  - Average number of daylight hours/day - 12.1 hours
  - Runway hourly capacity (ops/hour)
    - Based on FAA model
    - Depends on mix of light and heavy aircraft

Runway Capacities
Annual Daylight Runway Operations

Air Station	*Operations*
Corpus Christi	817,548
Kingsville	377,873
Meridian	377,991
Pensacola	340,356
Whiting Field	4,470,460

** Includes capacities of assigned out-lying fields

Daylight Runway Ops Requirements

Type Training	*Runway Ops/Grad**
Primary Pilot	684
Int Maritime/Helo	65
Int E2/C2	400
Adv E2/C2	866
Adv Maritme	496
Adv Helo	1157
Strike	1511
Primary NFO	121
Int NFO	111
Adv NFO	90

* *Includes overhead (i.e., IUT, NATOPS, attrition, & maintenance)*

Runway Capacity Scaling Factors

Training	Corp	King	Mrdn	Pens	Whit
Primary Pilot	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int E2/C2	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv E2/C2	1.38	1	1	1	0
Int Maritime	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv Maritime	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int Helo	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv Helo	.66	.5	.5	.5	1
Strike	1.38	1	1	1	0
Primary NFO	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int NFO	1.38	1	1	1	0
Advance NFO	1.38	1	1	1	0

Special Use Airspace Requirements

- Measure
  - Amount (sq. nmi.) of SUA required to accommodate training throughput
- Data elements (for each type of UPT)
  - Flight syllabus for each type of UPT
  - # Flights per stage
  - Time in airspace per flight per stage
  - Size of airspace block required per stage
  - Percent of overhead
  - Number of students trained per flight

Airspace Requirements Calculation

- Step 1. Compute daily number of flights per student for each stage of syllabus

  #Flights = #Flights per stage / 237days per yr x % Overhead

- Step 2. Compute daily block hours required per stage

  Block hours = #Flights per Student x Hours per Flight x PTR

- Step 3 Compute # blocks required per stage

  #Blocks = Daily block hours / 10 hrs per day

- Step 4 Compute amount (sq. n.mi.) of SUA required

  *Airspace = Sum over all stages {#Block * Block size}*

- Step 5 Compute amount of airspace required to accommodate training throughput

  Airspace per Grad = Airspace / PTR

Special Use Airspace Requirements
(MOAs, AAs, and WAs)

Type Training	*Airspace/PTR (sq. nmi.)*
Primary Pilot	2
Int Maritime/Helo	2
Int E2/C2	6
Adv E2/C2	17
Adv Maritme	4
Adv Helo	0
Strike	16
Primary NFO	1
Int NFO	1
Adv NFO	10

Airspace Availability - Guiding Principles

- If airspace is used by more than one military department, the scheduling department has priority (i.e., all airspace counts toward their capacity)
  - Example: FACFAS Pensacola schedules W-155, therefore all airspace allocated to NAS Pensacola
- Availability of airspace shared by more than one Naval Air Stations is based on percent usage
  - Example: A-292 (4500 sq. nmi.) is used 80% by NAS Whiting and 20% by NAS Pensacola
    - 3600 sq. nmi. allocated to NAS Whiting
    - 900 sq. nmi. allocated to NAS Pensacola

Special Use Airspace Capacity

Air Station	*Airspace (sq. n.mi.)*
Corpus Christi	11,141
Kingsville	9670
Meridian	7648
Pensacola	7571
Whiting Field	5400

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
		FLIGHT TRAINING AREAS/AIRSPACE							37.79					
1	A1	Are there warning areas within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	0	1	1
2	A2	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
2	A3	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	0	1	1
2	A4	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	0	1	1
1	A5	Are there Military Operating Areas (MOA)/Alert areas within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		1	1	1	1	1
2	A6	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2	A7	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
2	A8	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	A9	Is there restricted airspace within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
2	A10	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2	A11	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
2	A12	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	A13	Are there military training routes (MTRs) within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	0	1	10	2.06		1	1	1	1	1
2	A14	-Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	1	1
2	A15	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
2	A16	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	0	4	0.55		1	1	1	1	1
1	A17	Does your air station control an air to ground training range?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		0	1	1	0	0
2	A18	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	1	0	0
2	A19	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		0	1	1	0	0
2	A20	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
1	A21	Is there sufficient SUA/air space for special use within 50 nm. to support Advanced Strike Training?	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		1	1	1	1	1
1	A22	Does current airspace configuration permit helicopter training?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
1	A23	Is overwater air space required for aviation training conducted at your air station?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		1	1	1	1	1
1	A24	Deployments/detachments to other air stations are not required to satisfy training shortfalls?	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		1	0	0	0	1
1	A25	The current system of air traffic control (ATC) routes does not limit the amount of flights between the air station and the training airspace.	1	1	1	0	9	1.49		1	1	1	1	1
1	A26	Does the air station normally operate without ATC delays?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
1	A27	Does the current airspace configuration allow for jet aircraft training?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	1	1	1
3	A28	Do squadrons/units from other installations come to this air station to train?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	1	0	1	0
1	A29	Is the training airspace free of encroachment by civil aviation infrastructure elements?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
3	A30	Are air station operations currently not affected by the major air traffic structures within 50 nm of each air to ground range, airspace or airfield?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49		1	1	1	1	1
		ENCROACHMENT & EXPANSION							9.31					
1	B1	Are air station flight operations presently unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	B2	Is it projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region in the future?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
1	B3	Is Air Station in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, or PM-10?	1	0	1	0	10	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1	B4	Air station has no environmental issues that restrict operations or development plans?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	B5	Air station low level training routes have not been modified within the last 3 years to accomodate noise complaints and construction?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	0	1	0	1
1	B6	Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordnances?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	0	1
1	B7	Is the air stations present or future mission unaffected by current estimates of population growth and area development?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
1	B8	There are no land and/or air encroachment issues which endanger long-term availability of any training area?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	1	1	1	1
1	B9	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support an additional workload?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
2	B10	Is there >500 unrestricted acres available for development?	0	1	1	0	5	0.35		0	0	1	1	1
2	B11	Does the current operational infrastructure (e.g., parking aprons, hangar space, etc.) allow for future expansion or change in mission?	0	1	1	0	6	0.42		1	1	1	1	1
2	B12	Can the current installation's infrastructure (i.e., utilities, water, sewerage, etc.) accommodate future expansion?	0	1	1	0	7	0.49		1	1	1	1	1
3	B13	Is there off base acreage available for future air station development?	0	0	1	1	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
		WEATHER							1.53					
3	C1	Do weather conditions having a ceiling <500' and visibility <one mile occur <10% of the time?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	1	1	1
3	C2	Are <15% of undergraduate pilot fixed wing training sorties cancelled due to weather?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	0	1	0

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
		AIRFIELD FACILITIES	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	17.01					
1	D1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years >2% of the CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
1	D2	Does the air station have more than one runway complex that can conduct independent (i.e., concurrent) flight operations?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		0	0	0	0	1
1	D3	Does the air station have dual operating runways?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	0
1	D4	Are there >2 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm. of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	0	0
1	D5	Are there >6 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm. of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		0	0	0	1	1
1	D6	Is at least 90 percent of the runways and landing pads in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	9	1.85		1	1	1	1	0
2	D7	Is at least 90 percent of the parking and access aprons in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	7	1.44		0	1	1	0	0
1	D8	Is at least 90 percent of the fuel storage facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	8	1.64		1	1	1	1	1
1	D9	Can the airfield's capacity be increased (i.e., no limiting factors)?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	0	0	0	0
1	D10	There are no constraints on the number of flying hours per day (e.g., AICUZ agreements) at the air station's homefield?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	1
3	D11	Can you conduct night flight operations at one of your OLFs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	D12	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at your main airfield?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	1	0
1	D13	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at one DOD owned OLF?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	0	1	0
		TRAINING	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	9.47	0	0	0	0	0
1	E1	Is there a type of flight training (NFO or Pilot) conducted at the air station that is not presently conducted anywhere else?	1	0	0	0	7	0.66		1	0	0	1	1
1	E2	Is jet pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	9	1.11		0	1	1	1	0
1	E3	Is officer pre-flight (basic) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		0	0	0	1	0
1	E4	Is helicopter pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		0	0	0	0	1
1	E5	Is prop plane pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	0	0	1	1
1	E6	Is Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	0	0	1	0
2	E7	Are aviation support units stationed at the air station?	1	0	0	0	5	0.47		1	1	1	1	1
3	E8	Do ground combat units train at the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	0	0	1
2	E9	Does the air station support enlisted training with an AOB >250 students?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	0	1	1	0
3	E10	Does the air station support other officer training not related to undergraduate pilot/NFO training?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	0	1	1	0
		MAINTENANCE & UNIQUE FACILITIES	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	3.83					
3	F1	Does the air station have ship berthing facilities?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	0	0	1	0
3	F2	-Can air station pier facilities berth ships >12 ft. draft?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		0	0	0	1	0
2	F3	Does your air station have a dedicated corrosion control facility?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	1	1	0	0
1	F4	Is at least 90 percent of the hangar/maintenance facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	8	1.10		1	0	1	1	1
2	F5	Are there weapons storage and handling facilities at the air station?	1	1	0	0	6	0.82		1	1	1	1	1
3	F6	Are ship maintenance facilities located at the air station?	1	1	0	0	1	0.14		0	0	0	1	0
2	F7	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports aircraft assigned to your training mission?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	0	0	0	0
3	F8	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports other than your assigned training aircraft ?	1	1	0	1	1	0.21		1	0	0	0	0
		GROUND TRAINING FACILITIES	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	3.48					
1	G1	Given projected training requirements for FY 2001, does your air station currently have all required flight/training simulators?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
1	G2	Is at least 90% of the ground training facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	0	1
1	G3	Given the present equipment and physical plant configuration, can ground training be significantly increased?	1	1	1	0	6	0.99		1	1	1	1	1
2	G4	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) any unique DOD or non DOD training facility?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	1	1	1	0
		LOCATION	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	1.20	0	0	0	0	0
1	H1	Is your air station <50nm. from an aircraft carrier operating area?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		1	0	0	1	1
3	H2	Does the air station's location permit training with other operational units (e.g., Battle Groups or Joint forces)?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
2	H3	Does the air station play a role in military and civilian regional transportation/logistics plans?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	1	1	1	1
		MILITARY/GENERAL SUPPORT MISSIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	4.26	0	0	0	0	0
3	I1	Does this air station currently support counter-drug flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	1	0	1
3	I2	Does the air station currently support U S Customs Service flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	0	0	1
3	I3	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
3	I4	Will the air station directly support a military or civilian area control and surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC) through FY 2001?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
3	I5	Does the air station play a role in the Logistics Support Mobilization Plan (LSMP)?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	0	0	0	0
2	I6	Does the air station support other military missions (e.g., port of embarkation for MC personnel)?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	0	0	0	0
2	I7	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	1	1	0
3	I8	Are new civilian or non-DoD missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		0	1	0	0	0
3	I9	Do active reserve or guard units train at your air station?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	1	1	1	1
2	I10	Does the air station or its tenants have requirements to support training of other Navy or Marine Corps forces?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	1	0
3	I11	Does the air station have support agreements with other DoD services?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
2	I12	Does the air station provide meteorological, SAR, and/or disaster assistance support to the local area?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	1	1	1	1
3	I13	Does the air station have support agreements with the non-DoD government or civilian activities?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
3	I14	Are there non-DOD aircraft stationed at your air station?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	0	0	0	1

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
		BASE LOADING	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.90	0	0	0	0	0
3	J1	Are operational active, reserve or special squadrons based at your air station?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	0	0	1	0
1	J2	Are there any major Navy tenant activities at the air station (e.g., NATTC, AOCS)?	1	0	0	0	6	0.57		1	0	1	1	0
2	J3	Are there any major Army or Air Force tenant activities at the air station (e.g., Army Helicopter Depot)?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	0	0
		QUALITY OF LIFE	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	15.31	0	0	0	0	0
3	K1	Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
1	K2	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0	0	0	1	10	0.68		0	0	1	0	1
1	K3	Does the air station have >90% of the listed Family Support Facilities and programs?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	1	0
2	K4	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >100 children?	0	1	0	1	5	0.55		0	0	0	1	0
2	K5	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >50 children?	0	1	0	1	3	0.33		1	1	0	0	0
2	K6	Is child care waiting list <100 children?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		0	1	0	1	0
2	K7	Is child care waiting list <50 children?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	1
2	K8	Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care <180 days?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	0
3	K9	Are >90% of stations child care facilities adequate?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		1	1	1	1	0
3	K10	Are there certified home care providers?	0	1	0	0	4	0.17		1	1	1	1	1
2	K11	Does the air station have >90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	1	1	1
2	K12	Does the air station have >200 units of adequate officer family housing?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
1	K13	Does the air station have >300 units of adequate enlisted family housing?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	0	1	1	0
2	K14	Is the average wait for housing three months or less?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	1
1	K15	Is the average wait for housing six months or less?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
3	K16	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0	0	0	1	4	0.27		1	1	1	1	1
3	K17	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30-mile radius?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
3	K18	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	0	0	0
3	K19	Do >50% of air station military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.65		1	1	1	1	1
1	K20	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	0	0
1	K21	Is the BOQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	K22	Are 90% of BOQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	0	1	1
1	K23	Is the BEQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
1	K24	Are 90% of BEQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
1	K25	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	1	1
1	K26	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	1	0	0	1	6	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	K27	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	0	0	0	1	6	0.41		1	1	1	1	1
3	K28	Is the violent crime rate <758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	1	1	0	0
3	K29	Is the property crime rate <4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	0
3	K30	Is the drug crime rate <402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	1
3	K31	Are college education courses available on the base?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
								100.00	100.00	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

	CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
Airspace	32.41	36.16	31.08	30.77	32.24
Encroachment	8.60	8.60	9.81	8.09	9.81
Weather	1.53	1.53	0.76	1.53	0.76
Airfield Facilities	9.93	12.52	8.06	10.75	6.10
Training	2.31	1.67	2.05	5.30	3.20
Maintenance Facilities	2.29	1.44	2.54	2.39	1.92
Ground Training Facilities	3.11	3.49	2.33	2.53	3.11
Location	1.20	0.46	0.46	1.20	1.20
Military/Support Missions	2.16	1.16	1.30	1.55	1.10
Base Loading	0.90	0.00	0.57	0.61	0.00
Quality of Life	9.66	8.62	12.09	10.32	9.52
	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

TRAINING AIR STATIONS





Configuration Modeling Specifications

Approach

- Objective function:
  - Minimize excess student throughput capacity
- Parameters:
  - Training requirements
    - FY 2001 student throughput (i.e., PTR/NFOTR)
    - Daylight runway operations per graduate
    - Special Use Airspace required to accommodate training throughput
  - Air station capacity
    - Annual daylight runway operations
    - Available Special Use Airspace

Permissible Training-Site Combinations

(What training is allowed at each air station)

Training	Corp	King	Mrdn	Pens	Whit
Primary Pilot	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int Helo/Mar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adv Helo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int E2/C2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adv E2/C2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Adv Mar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strike	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Primary NFO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int NFO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Adv NFO	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No

Initial Configuration Model Rules

- Maintain average military value
- Restrict certain types of training to one base
  - All T-44 training (Int E2/C2 and Adv Mar)
  - All NFO training (Primary, Intermediate, and Advance)
  - Advance Helicopter training
  - Advance E2/C2 training
- Restrict certain types of training to at most two bases
  - Strike training
  - Primary pilot training

Generation of Alternatives

Model allows the generation of three solution sets

- Best solution-for a given set of constraints and data
- Next best-obtained by excluding the first solution
- Third best-obtained by excluding the first two solutions

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analyses can accommodate

- Surges in training requirements of +10 and +20 percent
- Decline in training requirements of 10 percent
- Check feasibility of aircraft basing at each air station

FY 2001 PTR/NFOTR Requirements

Training	DON	USCG/FMS	USAF*	Total
Primary Pilot	1004	204	(100)	1208
Int E2/C2	40	0	0	40
Adv E2/C2	36	0	0	36
Int Maritime	179	57	0	236
Adv Maritime	149*	59	150	358
Int Helo	390	103	0	493
Adv Helo	376	103	0	479
Strike	306	30	0	336
Primary NFO	408	57	369	834
Int NFO	252	42	150	444
Advance NFO	173	40	92	305

** Reflects consolidation of fixed-wing flight training i.a.w., OSD Memo 24 October 1994*

TRAINING AIR STATIONS





Configuration Modeling
Initial Results

ENCL (3)

TRAINING AIR STATION MODELING RESULTS

First Run (14 Nov 1994)

Option	Activity					Average Mil Val	Excess Capacity	
	CORP	KING	MRDN	PENS	WHIT		Annual Runway Ops	Airspace (sq nmi.)
Military Value	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97	72.96		
FY 2001 Req								
-Best	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.22	2,879,586	6,779
-Second	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.44	3,835,398	17,920
-Tertiary	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	4,373,884	25,569
10% More								
-Best	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.43	3,312,029	16,315
-Second	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	3,961,074	23,963
-Tertiary	No additional feasible solutions					N/A	N/A	N/A
10% Less								
-Best	Open	Open	Open	Open	Closed	73.96	165,296	21,763
-Second	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.22	3,110,515	8,374
-Tertiary	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.44	4,003,069	19,515
20% More								
-Best	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.43	3,132,762	14,751
-Second	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	3,574,220	22,399
-Tertiary	No additional feasible solutions					N/A	N/A	N/A

Rules Applied to the Model

1. Average Military Value is maintained

2. Restrict certain types of training to one base
   - All T-44
   - All NFO
   - Advance Helicopter
   - Advance E2/C2

3. Restrict certain types of training to at most two bases
   - Strike
   - Primary Pilot

JIM

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0628-F13
BSAT/TG
7 March 1995

The Honorable Don Nickles
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Nickles:

This is in response to your letter of March 2, 1995, to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting documents used during the 1995 base realignment and closure process.

As you requested, enclosed are two copies of the Department of the Navy's DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, March 1995, and copies of documents concerning Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, and the other naval air stations in the same category with which it was evaluated.

The information provided was extracted from the Department of the Navy's 1995 Base Structure Data Base (BSDB) that consists of 136 cubic feet of certified data we collected as part of our process for the 1995 round of base realignment and closure. For your convenience, a complete copy of the BSDB is available in the Senate Reading Room.

I want to point out that only information obtained through the data collection process the Secretary of the Navy established, certified for accuracy and completeness, was allowed entry into the BSDB. Additionally, throughout the process, the BSDB data was available for independent validation by the Naval Audit Service and the General Accounting Office.

Detailed discussions of the analytical methodology used to develop the Department's base realignment and closure recommendations generally, and those for the training air stations in particular, are contained in Chapter 4 and Attachment F of the Department of the Navy's Report, respectively.

If we can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

C. P. NEMFAKOS
Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments:

(1) DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, March 1995 (two copies)
(2) BRAC-95 Training Air Stations Capacity Data Call Responses
(3) BRAC-95 Training Air Stations Military Value Data Call Responses

FAX

Date 22 April 1995

Number of pages including cover sheet 5

TO: MR. CHARLES NEMFAKOS

Executive Director, BSAT

Phone 703-681-0450

Fax Phone 703-756-2174

FROM: Alex Yellin

Review and Analysis-Navy Team

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425

Arlington, VA 22209

Phone 703-696-0504

Fax Phone 703-696-0550

CC:

REMARKS: ☐ Urgent ☐ For your review ☐ Reply ASAP ☒ Please Comment

SUBJ: TRAINING AIR STATIONS, STRIKE TRAINING CAPACITY

Mr. Nemfakos,

Please show how the advanced E-2/C-2 syllabus numbers are included into the calculations in terms of capacity and how that impacts the PTR. Our assumptions have been that the PTR rates for E-2/C-2 have been factored in at something less than 36 per year.(ie. only the advanced portion of the E-2/C-2 syllabus utilizes a T-2/T-45 aircraft, the intermediate phase utilizes the T-44).

In your testimony on April 17 you stated that the Navy's capacity analysis for UPT used PTR plus 20% to determine the ability of a scenario to meet requirements. Please provide a copy of your analysis for strike PTR that demonstrates that the proposed scenario can meet a strike PTR of 425 (354 + 20%). (Assumption: 354 is derived by taking the strike PTR of 336 plus one half of the E-2/C-2 PTR of 36. Is this correct?)

Attached you'll find a copy of our source for PTR for the FYDP.

Alex Yellin

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889JG/4U661666
20 Jul 1994

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889J6/3U658748 of 20 Sep 1993

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 94-99
(2) Naval Flight Officer Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 94-99

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect planned production goals for FY 94-99. These goals are intended to resolve current pool excesses, balance ongoing transitions and new production with FRS output and return to steady state force mix of 10 CVWs, 12 VP Squadrons and appropriate force support for 330 ships in FY 97.

2. Significant changes include:

-Increase VFA pilot manning from 17 to 19/squadron
-Reduction from 15 to 12 VP squadrons
-Decom of VAW 122
-Realignment of E2/C2 pilot career paths
-Adjustment for Helo pools
-WSO curriculum approved/20 to 40 plus up of FMS NFOTR

3. OPNAV point of contact is Captain Scott Krajnik, N889G/J, A/V 224-6010/6013, commercial 703-614-6010/3.

J.S. MOBLEY
By direction

Distribution:
CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
CMC (A, T, M, ASM-31, MPP-33, MMOA-2)
CG MCCDC (TE32A)
COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-2/7)
CHNAVPERS (211V, 43, 432, 433)
CNET (OOL/T25)
CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)
NAVDEPNOAA
NETSAFA
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

20 JUL 94

JT TRAINING RATES

FY-94	STRIKE	MARITIME	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
USN	173	120	43	214	550
USMC	118	32	0	188	338
COGARD	0	15	0	35	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	321	214	43	502	1080

FY-95					
USN	163	140	36	184	523
USMC	110	31	0	181	322
COGARD	0	10	0	45	55
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	303	228	36	475	1042

FY-96					
USN	183	140	36	184	543
USMC	106	29	0	181	316
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	319	228	36	468	1051

FY-97					
USN	203	146	36	184	569
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	463	1068

FY-98					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084

FY-99					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084

ENCLOSURE (1)

AL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES

20 Jul 1994

	F-14 RIO	F-18 WSO	A-6 TN	S-3 OJN	T-2 ATDS	P-3 NAV	TOTAL
FY-94							
USN	29	0	48	37	35	102	251
USMC	0	17	14	0	0	0	31
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	29	17	62	37	35	118	298
FY-95							
USN	39	0	38	37	35	122	271
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	20	0	0	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	38	50	37	35	138	337
FY-96							
USN	39	0	38	57	35	128	297
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	58	50	57	35	144	383
FY-97							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-98							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-99							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397

ENCLOSURE (2)

PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

W. A. EARNER	A. F. Earner
NAME (Please type or print)	Signature
	11/21/94
Title	Date

CIRCULATE TO ALL NAVY FOR

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

April 10, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding 950308-1R1

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on March 1, 1995, regarding the Department's closure and realignment recommendations and process. In response to your request, enclosed are answers to your questions for the record.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Josh Gotbaum

Joshua Gotbaum

Enclosure

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 1: What is the annual cost of the excess infrastructure in the Joint Cross-Service areas remaining after the 1995 round?

Answer: I have asked the Comptroller to gather the data necessary to estimate the cost of maintaining excess infrastructure remaining after BRAC 95. I will forward a response as soon as we have been able to assimilate the data.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 2: The Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended a 20 percent cut in the laboratories' Civil Service personnel, in addition to the 4 percent per annum cut directed by Defense Policy Guidance 1995 through 1999. According to a senior DoD official, these cuts will result in a 35 percent reduction in these personnel by the turn of the century.

How much of a reduction in DoD laboratory infrastructure is contained in your recommendations?

How and when is DoD going to eliminate the excess infrastructure?

Answer: Most laboratory reductions -- the 35 percent you mention -- will come from the allocation of workload reductions rather than from BRAC actions.

The DoD recommendations for laboratory closures and realignments eliminate a relatively small amount of our excess capacity. However, there were noteworthy laboratory reductions including Naval Air Warfare Center Divisions at Lakehurst, NJ, and Indianapolis, IN, among others.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 3: The Joint Cross-Service Review Team provided two options, both resulting in the closure of 8 depots. These options would eliminate between 30 million to 35 million excess hours from a total excess capacity of about 40 million hours.

The final DoD recommendation would close 3 depots and realign 7 others. How many hours of excess capacity will be eliminated if these recommendations are approved?

Answer: If the DoD recommendations are adopted, excess capacity will be reduced by just over 20 million direct labor hours, or by about 50 percent of the total excess capacity. The Department believes this to be a significant accomplishment.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 4: What are the bases that were not recommended for closure by the Navy to the Secretary of Defense for economic reasons?

Which, if any, installations were substituted for these omitted closures?

Answer: Because of a concern over total job losses in the State of California and Territory of Guam, the Department of the Navy did not close the following activities, even though it otherwise, through its analytical process, could have arrived at a conclusion to recommend closure:

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland, CA

Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
San Bruno, CA

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Construction and Repair,
San Francisco, CA

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA, and
Public Works Center, Guam

These actions reflect stand-alone decisions; there were no substitutions for these activities.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 5: What do your recommendations do to merge medical facilities across the Services in each region?

What possibilities were analyzed (cover by region)?

Answer: The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group looked at overlapping catchment areas in their analysis of the Medical Health Services System infrastructure. The group aggressively sought out opportunities for consolidation of inpatient services. Six of sixteen of the alternatives were based on the evaluation of potential mergers across the Services. These included Fort Meade and Fort Belvoir in the National Capital Region, USAF Academy Hospital in the Academy/Fort Carson area, Shaw AFB Hospital in the Shaw/Fort Jackson area, Langley AFB Hospital in the Tidewater area, and Wilford Hall Medical Center in the San Antonio area.

Of these alternatives, the hospital at Ft. Meade was recommended for downsizing by the Secretary of the Army, as was the hospital at Ft. Lee, Virginia. The Army also recommended the closure of Fitzsimmons Medical Center in Colorado, and both the Army and Air Force have agreed to realign their respective hospitals at Ft. Carson and the Air Force Academy to ensure adequate and cost efficient health care services remain to serve beneficiaries in the area. The Ft. Carson and Air Force Academy actions, along with the elimination of duplicate health care services in the San Antonio, Texas, Shaw AFB/Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, and the Virginia Tidewater areas will take place outside of the BRAC process. The Department is also implementing TRICARE, a congressionally-mandated regional health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries. TRICARE will also serve as an incentive to further reduce duplicate services and share resources across Service lines.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 6: How did DoD view the benefits of regional (medical) complexes?

Answer: The Department believes there are significant benefits to pursuing and evaluating consolidation of medical services and training. Through the base closure and Defense Health Program processes, the Department will continue to aggressively pursue these benefits. At the same time, the Department is implementing TRICARE, our congressionally-mandated regional managed health care program. TRICARE is designed to increase access, improve quality and curb the rising cost of health care, while providing a uniform benefit for eligible beneficiaries.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 7: NAS Meridian received two looks -- one at the service level and the second look at the joint level. If the joint ranking was higher, why didn't DoD take action based on the joint ranking, rather than accepting the Service recommendation?

Answer: The two "looks" are not the same. The Joint Cross-Service Groups were established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide a DoD-wide evaluation of their respective areas - undergraduate pilot training (UPT) in this case. They were further empowered to provide alternatives for subsequent analysis by the Military Departments which would reduce capacity and associated functional infrastructure. While the analyses conducted by the JCSG on UPT established a site value for each function (e.g., strike, helicopter, airlift/tanker, etc.), it did not rank sites by an overall average functional value. In producing its alternatives, the JCSG analyses utilized military values, functional values, and capacity resources. The Military Departments looked at the military value of installations based on all of their missions. Therefore, the evaluation conducted by the JCSGs was not a substitute for, but rather a component of, the Military Department analysis. In the case of Meridian, the Navy decided, and the Secretary of Defense agreed, that it did not need the training capability at NAS Meridian.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 8: If implemented, will the Department's recommendations to the Commission reduce a major portion of the excess capacity in any or all of the five cross-service functional areas? Please discuss those areas in detail where large amounts of excess capacity remain?

Answer: With the exception of Laboratories and Test & Evaluation, the DoD recommendations contain significant cross-service actions which generally achieve overall cross-service and excess capacity goals. In the Laboratories and Test & Evaluation areas, we will continue programmatic efforts to deal with remaining excess capacity, such as downsizing in place.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 9: In May 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "Core is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements...Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the ***minimum facilities, equipment and skilled personnel necessary*** to ensure a ready and controlled source of required competence." (emphasis added)

If DoD's recommendations are implemented, will any of the Services retain capacity above their core level?

If so, what are the reasons for retaining this capacity?

Answer: Although we have achieved a substantial depot maintenance capacity reduction all of the Services will retain some capacity above the core level. Further reductions will require developing a better sense of cross-service and private sector capabilities.

Question: Will DoD's base closure list result in the minimum number of facilities to ensure readiness and sustainability?

Answer: No. The goal is to reduce capacity, not merely the number of facilities. With regard to depots, the goal was to reduce excess capacity in a cost effective manner while retaining sufficient capability to meet critical readiness capabilities and requirements.

Question: If not, what means will the Department use to implement the Deputy Secretary's direction?

Answer: The definition and quantification of core requirements must be separated from the sizing of the infrastructure to support those requirements. It is impossible and undesirable to attempt to exactly match capacity and requirements. With that in mind, the Department believes that the proposed closure and realignments achieve the objectives set forth by the Deputy Secretary.

COMMISSION QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Joshua Gotbaum

Question 10: In 1993, the Defense Base Closure Commission realigned part of the Defense Information Service Agency (DISA) into 16 information processing megacenters. At that time, all officials concluded there would be excess capacity even within these megacenters. Some have suggested that DISA actually requires only 5 megacenters. To realign, DISA would have to come to the Commission to change the 1993 recommendation.

Given that there is excess capacity within DISA, why are there not recommendations for further consolidation?

Answer: The current megacenter migration resulting from BRAC 93 began in FY 94 and is scheduled for completion through FY 98. Due to the ongoing establishment of these megacenters and their changing workload, meaningful capacity requirements are extremely difficult if not impossible to determine at this time. Before major changes can be made, the operating environment of this relatively new organization needs to stabilize.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0716-F14
BSAT/TG
26 April 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

The response to questions asked by Mr. Alex Yellin of your staff, on April 22, 1995, concerning the capacity analysis the Department of the Navy conducted on undergraduate pilot training, is attached. In accordance with Section 2903(c)(5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, I certify the information provided to you in this transmittal is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I trust the information provided satisfactorily addresses your concerns. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

C. P. NEMHAKOS
Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachment

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION QUESTIONS
CONCERNING UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

Q1. Please show how the advanced E-2/C-2 syllabus numbers are included into the calculations in terms of capacity and how that impacts the PTR. Our assumptions have been that the PTR rates for E-2/C-2 have been factored in at something less than 36 per year (ie. only the advanced portion of the E-2/C-2 syllabus utilizes a T-2/T-45 aircraft, the intermediate phase utilizes the T-44.)

A1. In its analysis of training air stations, the Navy treated E2/C2 training as an individual training pipeline consisting of two phases. The intermediate phase is conducted in the T-44 aircraft (currently at Naval Air Station (NAS) Corpus Christi) and requires, on average, 400 flight operations and 6 sq. n.mi. of special-use airspace (SUA) per graduate. The FY 2001 training rate for this phase is 40 pilots. The advanced stage is conducted in the T-2 aircraft (currently at NAS Pensacola) and requires, on average, 866 runway operations and 17 sq. n.mi. of SUA per graduate. The FY 2001 training rate for this phase is 36 pilots. The configuration analysis accounted for these requirements directly in deriving its solution sets.

Q2. In your testimony on April 17 you stated that the Navy's capacity analysis for UPT used PTR plus 20% to determine the ability of a scenario to meet requirements. Please provide a copy of your analysis for strike PTR that demonstrates that the proposed scenario can meet a strike PTR of 425 (354 + 20%). (Assumption: 354 is derived by taking the strike PTR of 336 plus one half of the E-2/C-2 PTR of 36. Is this correct?)

A2. In developing its recommendations for training air stations, the DON analyzed in its configuration analysis a scenario where all the FY 2001 pilot and NFO training rates were increased by 10 and 20 percent (see enclosure 1). The optimal solution for the scenario in which the PTR requirements were increased by 20 percent closed NAS Meridian. As enclosure 1 indicates, this was the only feasible solution that closed a base. The fact that the model closed NAS Meridian indicates that the DON has enough capacity at its other four training air stations to handle a 20 increase in pilot training rates.

While the DON's sensitivity analysis focused on the total capacity across all bases, the BSEC in developing its specific scenarios (i.e., which training goes to which bases) analyzed the capacity of each air station to handle its assigned training. The analysis supporting the recommendation to consolidate Strike training at NAS Kingsville is shown below.

Because daylight runway operations is the capacity limiter at training air station, we will show the capacity of the Navy's recommendation to handle Strike training in these terms. The FY 2001 pilot training rate for Strike is 336 pilots. The certified data showed that the daylight runway operations per pilot training rate (PTR) for Strike training is 1511 operations. The annual runway ops required to support a 336 PTR is:

336 PTR x 1511 ops/PTR = 507,696 annual ops

The capacity at NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi (after the proposed runway

extensions) is as follows:

NAS Kingsville ---------- 229,416 annual ops
OLF Orange Grove ---- 148,457 annual ops
NAS Corpus Christi --- 219,936 annual ops
Total: --- 597,806 annual ops

Comparing the requirement against the capacity shows an excess capacity of

597,806 - 507,696 = 90,113 ops

which equates to about an 18% surge capability under planned and budgeted operations.

The numbers in your question imply that E2/C2 training is part of Strike training. It is not. The Navy will continue to train the small number of E2/C2 pilots in the T-2 (at NAS Pensacola) until the end of the service life of that aircraft which is beyond year 2001.

TRAINING AIR STATION MODELING RESULTS

First Run (14 Nov 1994)

Option	Activity					Average Mil Val	Excess Capacity	
	CORP	KING	MRDN	PENS	WHIT		Annual Runway Ops	Airspace (sq nmi.)
Military Value	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97	72.96		
FY 2001 Req								
-Best	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.22	2,879,586	6,779
-Second	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.44	3,835,398	17,920
-Tariary	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	4,373,884	25,569
10% More								
-Best	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.43	3,312,029	16,315
-Second	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	3,961,074	23,963
-Tertiary	No additional feasible solutions					N/A	N/A	N/A
10% Less								
-Best	Open	Open	Open	Open	Closed	73.96	165,296	21,763
-Second	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.22	3,110,515	8,374
-Tertiary	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.44	4,003,069	19,515
20% More								
-Best	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Open	73.43	3,132,762	14,751
-Second	Open	Open	Open	Open	Open	72.96	3,574,220	22,399
-Tertiary	No additional feasible solutions					N/A	N/A	N/A

Rules Applied to the Model

1. Average Military Value is maintained

2. Restrict certain types of training to one base
   - All T-44
   - All NFO
   - Advance Helicopter
   - Advance E2/C2

3. Restrict certain types of training to at most two bases
   - Strike
   - Primary Pilot

Enclosure (1)

> 131200Z APR 95 ZYB

FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N889//

TO CMC WASHINGTON DC//MMOA-2/MMOA-3/ASM/MPP-33/APP//
BUMED WASHINGTON DC//23/231//
CNET PENSACOLA FL//OOL//
CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//TE31A/TE32A//
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//35//
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N01/N8/N80/N83/N84
COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT CECIL FIELD FL//N00//
COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPAC LEMOORE CA//N00//
STRKFITRON ONE ZERO SIX//00//
STRKFITRON ONE TWO FIVE//N00//
VMFAT ONE ZERO ONE EL TORO CA//N00//
NAMTRAGRUDET CECIL FIELD FL //N00//
NAMTRAGRUDET LEMOORE CA //N00//
NAMTRAGRU MILLINGTON TN//00//
COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA//N00//
TACELRON ONE TWO NINE//N00//
CHNAVPERS WASHINGTON DC//122/211V/222/404/432/433//
CNATRA CORPUS CHRISTI TX//N-3/N-32//
COMNAVCRUITCOM WASHINGTON DC//21C/311//
NAVAVSCOLSCOM PENSACOLA FL//00/92//

UNCLAS //N03502//

MSGID/GENADMIN/N889J6//

SUBJ/PILOT/NFO AND MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION ALIGNMENT CONFERENCE//
POC/TOM DONOVAN/CDR/PRIPHN:DSN224-6013/-/-/SECPHN:703-614-6010//

RMKS/1. A PILOT/NFO AND MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION ALIGNMENT CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED FOR 20-21 APRIL IN WASHINGTON D.C. MULTIPLE DYNAMICS MAKES MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION OF ALL ADDRESSEES ESSENTIAL. REGRET SHORT LEAD TIME. UNIFORM FOR CONFERENCE IS SDB OR SERVICE/CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT.

2. PURPOSE OF THIS CONFERENCE IS TO DISCUSS ALL IMPACTS ON RECRUITING THROUGH FRS, INCLUDING ENLISTED MANNING, TO SUPPORT THE STAND-UP OF FOUR VAQ SQUADRONS AND A POTENTIAL RETENTION (BUILD) OF 3-6 SIX TACTICAL SQUADRONS. CONFERENCE GOAL IS TO PRODUCE, BY COB 21 APR, A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WHICH CAN BE FULLY SUPPORTED AND EXECUTED FROM CRUITCOM THROUGH FRS PRODUCTION.

3. ISO OF PLAN LISTED IN PARA 2, ALL PLANNERS MUST CLEARLY IDENTIFY

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING FUNDING, MANNING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORT (MAINTENANCE, SCHOOL HOUSE, AIRCRAFT ETC.). FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED IOT ID POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND COSTS OF DOING BUSINESS:

A. CNATRA
ADDRESS ISSUES BASED ON FOLLOWING STRIKE (NAVY/USMC/FMS) PTR:

FY-95	FY-96	FY-97	FY-98	FY-99	FY-00	FY-01
303	319	360	360	360	360	360

ADDITIONAL AREAS TO ADDRESS ARE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF BRAC 95 REDUCTION TO A SINGLE STRIKE TRAINING BASE, JOINT TRAINING AND T-2 SDLM ISSUES.

B. TYCOMS
CAT 1 NUMBERS REFLECT NAVY ONLY ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN 50 STRIKE/FIGHTER COMPLEMENT WITH AN INCREASE OF FORCE STRUCTURE. NUMBERS DO NOT INCLUDE FLEET TRANSITION.

	FY-95	FY-96	FY-97	FY-98	FY-99	FY-00	FY-01
F-14 (PILOT/NFO)							
CAT-1	52	52	49	49	49	43	40
F/A-18							
NOTE: 1							
CAT-1	88	98	106	108	114	118	122
EA-6B (PILOT/NFO)							
CAT-1	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56

NOTE: 1 F/A-18 NUMBERS ALSO ACCOUNT FOR F/A-18E/F FIT AND FRS INSTRUCTOR REQUIREMENTS.
ADDITIONALLY, EMPHASIS ON ENLISTED MANNING ISSUES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF BRAC MOVES ON FRS/FRAMP THRU-PUT MUST BE CONSIDERED. FRS REPS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS/UPDATE ALCON ON INITIATIVES TO INCREASE F/A-18 FRS AND FRAMP THRU-PUT.

C. BUPERS
IDENTIFY OFFICER AND ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT PLANS LISTED IN PARA 2. ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON ACCURATE ACCOUNTING OF PERSONNEL, OFFICER AND ENLISTED, ALREADY IDENTIFIED ISO EA-6B SQDN PLUS UP AND AIRCREW ALREADY ID'D FOR F-14 AND F/A-18 TRANSITION. ACCURACY IN THIS AREA IS CRITICAL IOT PROVIDE AN ACCURATE BASELINE FROM WHICH ADDITIONAL AIRCREW CAN BE DRAWN TO SUPPORT ANY AND ALL PLANS PRESENTLY UNDER STUDY.

4. A DETAILED CONFERENCE AGENDA WILL BE PROVIDED VIA SEPARATE MSG.

5. CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN AT 0900 AT THE NAVY ANNEX (BUPERS) RM 2828 LOCATED ON THE SECOND DECK, WING 8, RM 28.

6. N889 PHONE: DSN 224-6013 COMM: (703) 614 -6013. N889 FAX: DSN 223-9795, COMM (703) 695-9795. MAKE ALL FAXS ATTN CDR DONOVAN.//

BT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

OMIC SECURITY

25 MAY 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your April 27, 1995, letter requesting that the Department of Defense provide responses to questions for the record resulting from the April 17, 1995 hearing. On May 9, 1995, we forwarded an interim response to these questions. Enclosed is the final set of answers.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Enclosure

cc: Senate and House Reading Rooms

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR NEMFAKOS FOR THE RECORD

1. Did the Navy consider consolidating platting operations at Louisville's new $36 million modern platting facility?

ANSWER: No specific scenario was run that consolidated plating operations at NSWC Louisville. Although it is recognized that Louisville has a modern plating facility, the DON analysis focused on entire capability of an installation. It is the goal of DON to reduce excess capacity/infrastructure primarily by the total closure of installations. The plating process is only one of the many depot maintenance functions performed by NSWC Louisville. The final scenario adopted by DON for the closure of Louisville, not only transfers all other depot work to other depot activities, but allows for the plating work currently accomplished at Louisville to be performed at other existing DoD installations. This not only equates to greater savings in operational costs, but provides a significantly more positive environmental impact.

2. Regarding the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, could you explain why the Navy gave this installation a 0 in the Military Value category for integrated capabilities?

ANSWER: Within the "Mission Statement" section of the Technical Centers military value matrix, NAWC Indianapolis received a "0" for question #4, "Includes systems integration responsibility", and question #5, "Includes component integration responsibility". Questions within this section of the matrix were based on the activity's literal/official mission statement, as reported in the Military Value data call #5. Since the mission statement for NAWC Indianapolis did not assign responsibility for systems integration or component integration, both of these questions were scored "0".

3. During the Commission's recent visit to the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, we were shown the systems design facility for the EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft. We were told by the Naval Air Warfare Center that the cost to relocate those facilities to China Lake would be $30 million. Could you please explain why the Navy only provided $1.17 million for Military Construction at China Lake to accommodate these facilities?

ANSWER: In COBRA analysis, the Navy included $1.17M for military construction at NAWC China Lake precisely as submitted by NAWC Indianapolis in the certified Scenario Development data call.

4. The Navy says that "continuing decreases in force structure eliminates the need to retain the capacity to dry-dock large naval vessels for emergent requirements." How many large-decked ships (CV, CVN, LHA & LHD) are in the Pacific Fleet now? How many less are expected to be in the Pacific Fleet in 2001?

ANSWER: The continuing decrease in force structure describes the fleet's requirement for drydock capacity as it relates to the force structure used as a basis for BRAC-91. Since the '91 round, and through 2001, the number of large-decked ships in the Pacific Fleet will decrease from 14 to 12, including a reduction of 2 CVN/CVs. The Navy has retained two U.S. Navy shipyards in the Pacific theater, capable of handling any of the 12 large-deck ships homeported in that area.

5. How many positions has the Navy historically saved with the closure of a Naval Aviation Depot or comparable industrial activity?

ANSWER: The following represents the positions/billets eliminated based on the closure of 3 Naval Aviation Depots during BRAC-93:

Activity	Positions/Billets Eliminated
NADEP Alameda	764
NADEP Pensacola	1,000
NADEP Norfolk	1,464

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

ANSWER: In addition to the "Site/Function Constraint Matrix" which limited potential site/functions combinations from the outset of the modeling process, constraints were imposed as the JCSG proceeded with its Optimization Model process. These constraints which were applied in an additive manner are as follows:

1. Flight screening would not be performed/collocated with any other function - based on JCSG military judgment.
2. Primary and advanced NAV/NFO, advanced NFO Strike, and advanced NFO Panel functions would be joint and single-sited - based on DEPSECDEF memo of October 24, 1994.
3. No function would be "spread" or fractionalized smaller than a "notionalized" or smallest squadron (approximately 100 annual production) - JCSG military judgment.
4. Flight screening function limited to the Air Force Academy and Hondo, TX sites - JCSG military judgment.
5. Primary function limited to four sites - JCSG military judgment. (This constraint was later dropped.)
6. Three site closure results (MIN PRIME model run) used as baseline for follow-on Optimization Model runs.
7. Air space and outlying airfield operations capacity from sites closed in MIN PRIME model run were transferred to remaining sites in close proximity for all additional modeling efforts.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

ANSWER: The JCSG defined its category scope to include: DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings." Post-"Wings" flying missions such a IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct analysis. Non-flying missions at the bases (such as technical training at Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

3. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Davis asked how much surge capacity exists in each service. Please respond to this question in terms of capacity to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather, and also in terms of capacity to accommodate an increase in the Pilot Training Rate in the event of a long-term increase in pilot requirements.

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume. If Reese AFB closes as recommended by DoD, the Air Force will retain approximately 12 percent surge capacity to recover from temporary situations at the Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training bases. In addition, bases will have the capability to respond to temporary requirements by lengthening the duty day, increasing sortie density, flying on the weekend, etc. Increases such as these are not sustainable over a sufficient period of time to generate net increases in production. For extended operations such as an increase in the pilot training rate, the Air Force will retain between 7 and 12 percent surge capacity.

Mr. Nemfakos. To ensure the DON has capacity to support future unforeseen increases in pilot/NFO training rates, as part of its configuration analysis the BSEC looked at scenarios where all the FY 2001 pilot and NFO training rates were increased by 10 and 20 percent. (This includes increases in the Air Force training scheduled for Naval air stations.) The results showed that even with the its closure recommendations, the DON could support a 20 percent increase in PTR requirements and still have some excess capacity.

In addition, the capacity analysis was based on a 237-day work year and accounted for down time due to bad weather. If need be, training capacity could be increased at each air station by increasing the operating schedule (e.g., pilots could train on weekends to make up for lost flying time during the week days).

Brig Gen Shane. The ability to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather is excellent. Because our flight training facilities are underutilized, our capability to surge is only constrained on the availability of instructor pilots, aircraft, and OMA funding. USAAVNC has the capability to support long term training increases. According to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group certified data, the Pilot Training Rate could be increased to 2,056 annually with no additional MILCON.

4. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Robles requested that each Service provide data summarizing the costs to train pilots. Please include in this information the fixed costs for Base Operating Support (BOS), Real Property Management Account (RPMA), Overhead and Personnel at each UPT base, and the variable costs which vary by the number of students and flight hours/sorties flown. These costs should reflect only the portion attributable to UPT for the installations that also host other tenant units.

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.

COST ESTIMATE BASED ON FY94 DATA

	Mission Fixed Costs (in $M)	RPM Fixed Costs (in $M)	BOS Fixed Costs (in $M)	Medical* Fixed Costs (in $M)	Total Fixed Costs (in $M)	SUPT Variable Cost Per Graduate
Columbus	$33.5	$4.9	$27.9	$8.5	$74.8	$237,507
Laughlin	$35.3	$5.7	$32.2	$11.0	$84.2	$245,039
Reese	$32.1	$5.5	$31.0	$9.9	$78.5	$244,619
Vance	$33.8	$5.7	$25.4	$4.9	$69.8	$232,394

* Although not specifically asked for, medical fixed costs are also provided. These costs are not included in any other of the fixed costs provided.

Definitions:

Mission Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student. Includes Instructors, school overhead, and maintenance.

RPM Fixed Costs: The upkeep on the facilities that is required whether or not you have students in training (e.g., utilities).

BOS Fixed Costs: Base operating support costs that are required to support the fixed personnel (e.g., transportation, supply, grounds maintenance, chaplains, comptroller).

Medical Fixed Costs: Open-the-door costs to enter one student (e.g., supplies, and equipment to support fixed population).

Variable Cost Per Graduate: The cost of sending one additional student through SUPT. It does not include any fixed costs.

Mr. Nemfakos. The Navy has issued a data call to collect these data. We will forward a response as soon as possible.

Brig Gen Shane.

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training
Undergraduate Pilot Training fixed-cost: $45,611,784
Undergraduate Pilot Training variable-cost: $30,599 per student
Undergraduate Pilot Training flying hour variable-cost: $322 per flying hour
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual total cost: $114,745,433 (FY 94)
Undergraduate Pilot Training actual civilian salary proportion: $9,150,860 (8.0%)

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training Share of Base Operations
Base Operations fixed cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $2,926,,412
Base Operations fixed variable for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $1,009 per student
Base Operations total cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: $4,985,370
[Base Operations civilian salary proportion: $3,300,315 (66.2%)]
Note: RPMA, overhead and personnel are included in above calculations.

5. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated that in order to achieve uniformity when making comparisons between the services, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group drafted rules used by the FAA to measure airfield operations capacity at each UPT base. Please provide the formula that the FAA uses and how these rules were applied by your group.

ANSWER: In collecting runway capacity data, the JCSG data call asked for the sustainable capacity of the air station's main field and each outlying field in terms of the number of flight operations per hour each runway complex can support. To ensure consistency in the responses, the question instructed the air stations to base their capacity calculations on the methodology in the FAA Advisory Circular 150/5060-5 entitled "Airport Capacity and Delay." This methodology accounts for the type and mix of aircraft, the runway and taxiway configurations, and reductions in operations due to weather and times the airfield is closed to flying operations for other reasons. The attached pages at **TAB 5** excerpted from the Circular describe the procedure for determining the weighted hourly capacity for each runway.

6. General Blume, during your testimony, you stated you would provide answers to several questions relating to weather. Please respond to the following questions:

ANSWER: These questions pertain to Joint Cross-Service Group analysis and data and should therefore be directed to the Joint Cross-Service Group.

Why was the percent of time at which the ceiling and visibility are better than 1000 feet and 3 miles given any weight in the analysis when it is 1500 feet and 3 miles that represents a key weather decision factor in conducting Air Force flight training operations?

Mr. Finch: The measures and criterion reflected the JCSG developed consensus decision. The 1000/3 ceiling visibility cutoff represents a key Navy decision factor. Missions were analyzed based on the users. For example, both Military Departments will conduct primary training, so both 1000/3 and 1500/3 were used. In Air Force unique bomber-fighter training, on the other hand, 1500/3 was used while 1000/3 was not.

In tracking weather attrition, factors such as actual attrition experience, cancellations due to forecast icing conditions, and the occurrence of crosswinds out of limits can be used. Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds rather than some of these other factors in the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group functional value analysis?

Mr. Finch: All weather factors (icing, crosswinds, etc.) were captured by weather attrition inputs. The extra weight given to crosswinds represents a measurement of the frequency of crosswinds, not a measure of "lost sorties." While some crosswind exposure is useful, frequent crosswinds complicate the learning process and can cause last-minute scheduling changes.

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

Mr. Finch: In computing the T-1 attrition planning factors, the JCSG used the reported value for Reese AFB and a surrogate, based on existing aircraft, for the other sites. In the final analysis, no Air Force site received points for the T-1 planning factor in the JCSG model. Based on T-37/T-38 attrition planning factor comparisons across sites, there is no reason to believe that Reese AFB would gain an advantage from a T-1 planning factor comparison.

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

ANSWER: Yes, the analysis used 1511 daylight flight operations per Strike PTR

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

ANSWER: NAS Kingsville's data call reported a daylight flight operations requirement for an all T-45 syllabus of 1393 ops. The 1511 ops used in the analysis was derived as follows. Because in FY 2001 not all strike training will be done in T-45 aircraft, we assumed 50 percent of the Strike pilots would go through an all T-45 syllabus and 50 percent would go through a split syllabus consisting of an Intermediate phase in the T-2 aircraft and an Advanced phase in the T-45 aircraft. Based on certified data, the flight ops requirement for this split syllabus was calculated as follows:

Intermediate Phase in T-2 -- 741 (from NAS Meridian' data call)
Advanced Phase in T-45 -- 888 (from NAS Kingsville's data call)
Total: 1,629

Taking a weighted average, this gives

(1393 x .5) + (1629 x .5) = 1511 daylight flight ops per Strike PTR

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate/advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

ANSWER: Under the recommended scenario, the main airfield at NAS Corpus Christi is needed to support the single-siting of Strike training at NAS Kingsville.

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

ANSWER: Because daylight runway operations is the capacity limiter at training air station, we will show the capacity of this complex to support Strike training in these terms. As explained in response question 6b, the certified data showed that the daylight runway operations per pilot training rate (PTR) for Strike training is 1511 operations. The capacity at NAS Kingsville, OLF Orange Grove, and NAS Corpus Christi (after the proposed runway extensions) is as follows:

NAS Kingsville ------- 237 days x 12.1 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 229,416 annual flight ops
OLF Orange Grove -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 54 ops/hr =148,457 annual flight ops
NAS Corpus Christi -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 219,936 annual flight ops
Total: 597,806 annual flight ops

Dividing the total annual flight ops by the flight ops required per PTR gives a strike PTR capacity of

597,806/1511 = 396 PTR

The FY 2001 pilot training rate for Strike is 336 pilots. Thus, the recommended scenario provides an excess capacity of

396 - 336 = 60 PTR

which equates to about an 18% surge capability under planned and budgeted operations. Note that the Strike training capacity at this complex will increase as the Navy completes its transition to an all T-45 training syllabus. Once this transition is completed, the capacity at this complex will be

597,806/1393 = 427 PTR

which increases the surge capability to about 28%

To what extent would the strike training capacity of NAS Kingsville be impacted if NAS Corpus Christi was not available?

ANSWER: Without the use of NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville would need another outlying field to support all Strike training.

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

ANSWER: Sites have value both with respect to their ability to accommodate activities involving specific functions (e.g., those associated with flight training) and the more general military missions of the Military Departments. For the former, the initial means of representing value for flight training functions was to consider the capacity of sites collectively to carry out all the functions associated with flight training. This was done by introducing a set of constraints that ensured that there was sufficient capacity in the collection of sites that remained open to handle all flight training functions.

Beyond ensuring there was sufficient capacity to perform flight training functions, the Group's methods next considered military value, maximizing the inherent military value of all sites that remained open to carry out general military missions of the Military Departments.

Finally, the Group's method considered the value of sites that remained open to perform flight training functions. Since functional value was already considered implicitly by setting constraints that guaranteed sufficient capacity to carry out all functions, this additional consideration of functional value was given lower priority.

To allow functional value to drive the model is relevant only if we assume functions can be easily moved and are completely interoperable. In practice, this led to nonsensical results during the early, "unconstrained" model runs. For example, Navy Strike training with its attendant costly T-45 infrastructure was spread to four sites. Other functions were swapped between Air Force and Navy sites. Site functional value was also a more narrow look at installation value, as it did not consider collateral missions such as technical training. The Military Departments' inputs encompassed all functions and potential alternative uses of the installation.

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

ANSWER: Functional and military values are not independent. SECDEF guidelines define the first four BRAC criteria as military value. Criterion one is "mission requirements." This indicates functional value is a significant element of military value. There is also no single

functional value for each base. The JCSG generally analyzed each site for all UPT missions, regardless of whether the site currently supported those missions. The JCSG did not analyze non-UPT missions. Functional value is only a subset of military value.

10. General Blume, since the Air Force relied so heavily on the results of the Joint Cross-Service Group's computer model, did you analyze the model for calculation errors?

ANSWER: The Air Force had representatives on the Joint Cross-Service Group and its Study Team to continuously monitor the process and its output. The Base Closure Executive Group also did an independent capacity analysis to confirm the required infrastructure level.

11. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos, your Service recommendations used your own BRAC process as well as non-BRAC policy decisions to choose which UPT bases to close or realign. Why didn't your recommendations necessarily reflect the high functional value scores from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group?

ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume. The Air Force recommendations do reflect the high functional value scores. The recommendation to close Reese AFB is consistent with the fact Reese had the lowest average functional value.

Mr. Nemfakos: The DON's process did not consider functional value. It used its own documented method for evaluating the military value of its installations.

12. Gen Blume, the average functional value for each Air Force UPT base is shown (the Reese score is adjusted based on your recent memo to us).

Columbus AFB	6.74
Vance AFB	6.67
Randolph AFB	6.53
Laughlin AFB	6.50
Reese AFB	6.22

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) apparently used the functional values from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group. These averages were used to find military value by performing a standard deviation analysis to assign a color "Stop Light" code to Criteria I, "Flying Mission Evaluation." All eight criteria were then considered to derive an overall Air Force ranking: the result was Tier I for Columbus, Laughlin, Randolph, and Vance, and Tier III for Reese.

Why didn't the Air Force simply use the functional value for the training that is actually accomplished at each specific UPT base to determine its score? Would the result have been different?

ANSWER: Functional value is an important part of military value, but is not necessarily the only indicator. For example, Randolph AFB houses a Major Command Headquarters, a Numbered Air Force Headquarters, and the Air Force Military Personnel Center besides having a

flying mission. In the case of UPT bases, average functional value scores, the BCEG "Stop Light" analysis, and professional judgment all indicated Reese AFB is the correct base to close. The Air Force does not believe the results would have been different if functional value were used as an exclusive measure. However, using only functional value would be a narrow analysis and would not comply with Secretary of Defense guidelines. In addition, the Air Force made a conscious effort to fully integrate, where possible, the Joint Group process into its entire 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

It should be noted that the average functional values were not used to find "military value," but were instead used to determine the Criterion I grade. Military value, under the criteria, consists of the first four criteria.

Finally, the BCEG examined the functional values derived by JCSG-UPT. After discussion, the BCEG agreed to include all activities pertaining to Air Force operations as the basis for the average functional value. Including all potential flying training activities rather than the training actually accomplished provides a better analysis of both current and potential training value.

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

a. Examining only Air Force Bases
b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
c. Excluding flight screening
d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace.

ANSWER: The Group was sensitive to the potential issue of adjusting the model after the data had been collected. Excursions to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to movement of new functions to new sites given differing minimum site levels was performed. Service specific excursions were not performed, given the joint perspective of the Group's efforts.

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

ANSWER: It would be inappropriate to speculate as to potential results without running the model.

14. Mr. Finch, what were the options you considered for measuring capacity, and why did you choose the methods you did?

ANSWER: Factors of capacity and the methods to measure them were developed over time by the JCSG. The process started with development of the Data Call followed by construction of the Capacity Analysis Matrix and the questions utilized in point distribution for the Measures of Merit. As the process evolved, the JCSG refined its methods of measurement in the framework of sound operational experience and military judgment.

15. Mr. Finch, a separate functional value for the Air Force's post-UPT Introduction to Fighter Fundaments (IFF) training was not included among the 10 functional areas selected for assessing the overall functional value of each UPT-category base.

Even though it is conducted after "Wings" are awarded, IFF is conducted at a UPT base, consumes capacity, and is similar in content to training events contained within the latter stages of the Navy's Strike Training syllabus.

Why didn't the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group include IFF as an additional functional area?

ANSWER: Post-"Wing" flying missions such as IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct JCSG analysis. Non-flying missions collocated at the UPT sites (such a technical training a Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

16. General Blume, did the Air Force consider transferring the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training from Columbus AFB to another location such as Luke AFB in order to increase the capacity to do other training at Columbus?

ANSWER: No. The Air Force collocated Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training on the UPT bases in 1993 when it stood up Air Education and Training Command during a major reorganization. This allowed a more seamless training continuum for fighter-bound students, particularly as the Air Force converted from generalized UPT to specialized UPT. Luke AFB also does not have the capacity to absorb this training. Even if Luke could absorb IFF, this would require an additional move for many fighter-bound students whose final formal training units were located elsewhere. To return to a different basing structure would be expensive and counterproductive.

17. Mr. Finch, in the consideration of training airspace for both capacity analysis and functional value, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group methodology permitted a base to claim credit for large sectors of airspace so long as any portion of it was within 100 nautical miles of the base. For bases near the Gulf of Mexico, this meant credit for huge over-water sectors.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low-level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

ANSWER: Over-water airspace has intrinsic value to the Navy and the consensus of the JCSG was to consider it equally with over-land airspace.

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG charter was to help size infrastructure, not to make policy decisions.

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

ANSWER: Yes. The closure of one Air Force UPT base leaves sufficient capacity to provide for surge capability. However, there is not enough excess capacity to close more than one Air Force UPT base.

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

ANSWER: No. The JCSG was not established to consider policy issues related to undergraduate pilot training. Therefore, its approach was to use existing policies that were applicable to the various functions considered by the Group. In the case of helicopter training, existing policy was, and is, not to consolidate such training for the Army and Navy. Therefore, only alternatives that involved collocating or not collocating this function were considered.

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

ANSWER: Given the resource requirements, site capacities and functional values, and site military values, the Optimization Model consistently moved the helicopter function to Fort Rucker and closed NAS Whiting Field. The Group did not look at additional variations.

22. Mr. Nemfakos, would moving helicopter training out of Whiting Field help the Navy meet its requirement for outlying fields for primary training?

Does your answer change when considering the transition to any of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft?

ANSWER: No, the OLFs used for helicopter training are not configured to support fixed-wing training. JPATS does not change this situation.

23. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) record states that the reason for rejecting the movement of helicopter training to Fort Rucker is the high one-time cost and long return on investment.

Did operational concerns also enter into this decision or was it strictly an economic decision?

ANSWER: The decision not to co-locate helicopter training at Fort Rucker was strictly an economic decision -- high one-time costs and a poor return on investment. Operational considerations, however, lead the DON to evaluate a co-location scenario as opposed to a consolidation scenario.

24. General Blume, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) choose Reese AFB to close?

ANSWER: When all eight criteria were applied to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranked lowest relative to the other bases in the Undergraduate Flying Training category. In addition, Reese AFB was recommended for closure in each alternative recommended by the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group for UPT.

25. Mr. Nemfakos, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) chose NAS Meridian to close?

ANSWER: First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at NAS Meridian is similar to that conducted at NAS Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Lastly, the net of all costs and savings associated with this recommendation is a savings of $158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected.

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

ANSWER: The Group evaluated three alternatives for the NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex: 1) A JPATS Primary "Master" site, 2) a Strike/Bomber-Fighter complex with Strike at NAS Meridian and Bomber-Fighter at Columbus AFB, and 3) moving Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV to NAS Meridian to allow creation of a JPATS Primary "Master" site at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. The first alternative's up-front costs - building five outlying fields and relocating Columbus AFB's Bomber Fighter function to Laughlin AFB were considered excessive. The second alternative was dropped because it did not result in the net increase of a "base complex," would waste significant investment in the T-45 training system at NAS Kingsville, and it would also require high, up-front cost at NAS Meridian. The third alternative, while not as costly to implement as alternative one, was discounted as the Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV functions could be readily accommodated by those flight training bases not recommended for closure. (JCSG Meeting Minutes of February 23, 1995).

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

ANSWER: None.

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

ANSWER: The JCSG considered potential savings in shared or combined facilities from a JPATS site consolidation or formation of a JPATS base complex, but found they could not readily be identified. The Group also agreed that savings, if any, would be well in the future. In reviewing the base complex issue, the Group found no clear or compelling rationale to change the Military Departments' recommendations.

27. Mr. Nemfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

ANSWER: Operating mine warfare helicopters out of NAS Corpus Christi would have a negligible effect on the runway operations available for pilot training. All other flight operations at NAS Corpus Christi, to include the proposed mine warfare helicopter operations, require less than 5 percent of NAS Corpus Christi's pilot training capacity.

28. Mr. Finch, will Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) increase or decrease the number of bases required for UPT training?

ANSWER: The answer will depend on the aircraft selected and the evolution of the JPATS training syllabus. For example, some contenders may require longer runways than others. On the other hand, these same aircraft may be able to absorb some flying time from the more costly and more infrastructure-intensive advanced training tracks (i.e., T-45 Strike training).

29. Mr. Finch, what was the impact of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues on the group's assessment of functional value?

What specific facility and airspace requirements were used to determine Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) functional values?

ANSWER: For purposes of the analyses, the Measures of Merit utilized the maximum requirements identified in the source selection process for JPATS (i.e., 5,000 ft runway).

CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

Questions submitted by Congressman Smith:

1. Since the Navy has recommended relocating the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Lakehurst, NJ, to Pensacola, do you envision recreating the Carrier Aircraft Launch and Recovery System (COLASSES) at Pensacola or do you expect to disassemble, package, ship and reinstall those devices that are critical to training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers?

ANSWER: The mission of NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not include training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers. The NATTC Lakehurst Detachment personnel and equipment support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems. The personnel and equipment necessary to continue supporting this training will be relocated to NAS Pensacola.

2. At what cost do you envision recreating the unique aircraft flight training facility in Pensacola?

ANSWER: NATTC Lakehurst Detachment is not a unique aircraft flight training facility and therefore will not be recreated as such. However, all appropriate costs to relocate NATTC Lakehurst Detachment necessary personnel and equipment that support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems were included in the COBRA analysis for Lakehurst. These costs are calculated automatically by COBRA algorithms from various input data and appear as part of the

aggregate one-time costs for NAWC AC Lakehurst, NJ plus the one-time costs for NAS Pensacola, FL. The exact cost will be determined as part of the implementation planning and budgeting process; however, it would be expected that the final cost would be of a similar magnitude.

3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?

ANSWER: Yes. BRAC 93 moved average onboard of 5004 students to NAS Pensacola. BRAC 95 adds the relocation of aviation students from both NTTC Meridian and Lakehurst, a total of 162 additional students. Barracks space was sized under BRAC 93 to accommodate the planned force structure through the end of the century. The FY 2001 average onboard for aviation students, including Meridian and Lakehurst, is 4226. The Navy is under contract to build BEQ space for 4924 beds. This number includes planned onboard, transient students and a surge capability. In view of this, the BSEC made a determination that no additional BEQ construction was required.

4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

ANSWER: NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not train aircraft carrier student pilots.

Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in there entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed-wing training at Whiting NAS.

a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Ft. Rucker was not adopted?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. While the recommendations forwarded by the UPT Joint Cross-Service Group called for moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker, they said nothing about consolidating UHPT. Because of operational differences in training Navy and Army helicopter pilots, in evaluating these proposals, the DON only considered the co-location of UHPT.

b. Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed-wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. Moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker would free-up space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training. However, because there is no issue of limited space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training, this additional space would be of little value.

c. From an efficiency standpoint, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary-wing training dedicated at one location?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. It would make sense to have all initial rotary wing training at one location if both the Navy and Army had the same training syllabi, same trainers, and identical aircraft. They do not. The DON has unique training requirements which are driven by its operational missions (i.e., a sea-based environment). Because of this, a consolidation of UHPT training would still require separate training tracks for Navy and Army pilots, and therefore, only create costs.

2. On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than $18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least $79 million dollars over 5 years.

a. Is this savings estimate still valid today?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. It should be noted that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Department of the Navy nonconcurred with the portion of the 1992 DoD IG audit report in which were presented the savings estimate cited above, believing that the audit analysis attempted to compare dissimilar programs and also questioning the estimated monetary benefits from relocation.

In considering the UPT JCSG alternatives during the 1995 base realignment and closure process, the BSEC used only data, certified to be accurate and complete, contained in our 1995 Base Structure Data Base, and information provided and verified by the other Military Departments. Based on our analysis of this certified data, the total estimated one-time cost to implement the "non-JPATS' alternative is $155.7 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of $13 million and a return on investment expected in 14 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of $9 million. The total estimated one-time cost to implement the "JPATS' alternative is $159 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of $13 million and a return on investment expected in 15

years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of $7 million.

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary-wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary-wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. There is a fundamental difference in how the Army and the naval services desire to train their pilots from an operational perspective; each has its own set of validated requirements that drive its training program, the location for the training, and efficiencies derived. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard training requirements include fixed-wing training for all students, emphasis on basic and radio instrument training, situational awareness/unusual attitude/aerobatic training and shipboard landing training. We use aircraft systems as well as simulators and ground support systems that are different from those used by the Army in support of this specialized training. Then too, we believe that the operational environment in which our helicopter pilots will eventually be required to fly validates and mandates our current approach to UHPT. For example, the absolute necessity for aviator competence in over water flight, where aircraft performance and navigational techniques employed differ significantly from those over land, carries unique training demands. And, especially for Marine helicopter pilots, replacement of the aging CH-46 fleet with V-22 aircraft that feature in-flight transitions between rotary and fixed-wing modes will spawn a completely different dynamic for which they must be trained. In contrast, Army requirements and training are oriented toward the day/night VMC, ground contact environment that supports the Army mission in the field.

What makes the most sense for all the Services is to adhere to training programs that best prepare pilots to function in the respective operational environments in which they will be employed. Different requirements produce efficiencies unique to the specific training program at each base (NAS Whiting Field and Fort Rucker). It should be noted that intent of the Secretary of Defense in establishing a JCSG for UPT was not for it to examine the UPT programs of the Services with an eye toward consolidation, but to assist the Military Departments in identifying asset sharing opportunities. To what extent "jointness" is served by consolidation of UHPT, whether it should be, and which Service ought to conduct consolidated UHPT for all are issues more appropriately addressed outside the base realignment and closure process.

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

a. Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The Department of the Navy does not endorse Army UHPT for Marine pilots, because it does not meet the training requirements for service with the Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces. During the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps experienced a severe shortage of pilots, and following the direction of the Secretary of Defense, accepted helicopter pilots who had been trained by the Army. To meet Marine Corps requirements those Army-trained pilots, whose training was complete by Army requirements, required an additional 70 to 75 hours of flight training that was provided in Marine Corps helicopter training groups. General Mundy's comment during the Commission's hearing on March 6, 1995, did not indicate his willingness to change the training syllabus for Marine Corps helicopter pilots, but was offered in rebuttal to suggestions that our current resistance to UHPT consolidation is fueled in whole or in part by interservice rivalry.

5. In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

a. Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed-wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary-wing training ignored?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The 1992 JCS Report on Roles & Missions, signed by General Colin Powell in February 1993, did not recommend consolidation of primary helicopter training. Instead, it stated *"If it is cost effective, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard helicopter training will be moved from Pensacola to Ft Rucker."* A joint working group, led by the Navy with assistance from the Army, recommended *"retaining existing Navy helicopter training at Whiting Field and continuing use of the T-34C for primary training and track selection at least through JPATS introduction. This proven training format is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots that meet service requirements."* The study further recommended that *"All services reevaluate each of the options presented in this study shortly after the following events occur: JPATS source selection is complete and acquisition/operating costs are identified. Final force levels are established and this flight training requirements determined. Army receives TH-67 deliveries and actual inventory and operating costs are identified."* The study was forwarded with concurrence from the Army.

Rotary-wing training was considered on an equal basis with all other types of UPT in both the Department of the Navy's analysis and that conducted by the UPT JCSG. The rationale for the Department of the Navy's rejection of the UPT JCSG alternative to close NAS Whiting Field is explained in response to question 1.

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury
*Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60's, OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

1987: Operation Prime Chance
*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti
*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
*OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
*UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-I's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. As mentioned in response to question 1, training for Army helicopter pilots and naval aviators is designed to prepare them for two significantly different operational environments. The record of employment of Army helicopters shows that the Army does operate from Navy ships on certain occasions and under visual meteorological (VMC) weather conditions. However, Army helicopter pilots are not trained for, and do not operate during, degraded weather conditions. In contrast, every Navy pilot is trained to operate from large and small deck ships under all weather conditions. In each of the cases cited above, Army helicopters were required due to unique mission circumstances and operated under favorable weather conditions as directed by senior Defense Department officials.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.

a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?

b. Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. The Navy practice of using fixed-wing aircraft in rotary-wing pilot track selection and training was validated by a 1994 Center for Naval Analysis study which concluded that *"Splitting the current Navy primary into two separate tracks, rotary primary and fixed-wing primary, could increase attrition if current standards are maintained. Attrition would be higher in each track than in the present unified primary and thus would be higher overall."* Increasing attrition will increase the cost of training and require increased accessions. In addition, the study forwards the following training considerations:

"The motor skills and learned responses needed to fly helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes in forward flight are almost exactly the same... These skills are transferable."

"Flying helicopters in hover mode is different from flying them in forward flight mode. From a training standpoint, it is sensible to first teach rotary-wing pilots forward flight in a fixed-wing trainer. Student pilots can then move to helicopters where they acquire specialized flight skills."

"Some flight training, particularly navigation and instrument flying, involves skills that are not specific to a particular type of aircraft."

The Air Force also supports the concept of undergraduate, primary fixed-wing training for its helicopter pilots. In December 1992 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated *"...fixed-wing training before rotary-wing training produces a better trained helicopter pilot for less money."*

Based on the benefits of fixed-wing primary training, using the Army's curriculum would not meet Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard requirements.

8. According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."

a. Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free-up space at Whiting Field?

b. How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

c. Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos. There is no ground or air congestion at NAS Whiting Field. As previously stated, fixed wing (T-34C) aircraft normally conduct training operations at altitudes above 1500 feet and rotary wing (TH-57B/C) training aircraft operate in the airspace structure

below 1500 feet. Commercial airliners overfly training airspace at altitudes above 24,000 feet. Navy fixed-wing aircraft conduct landing operations at exclusive fixed-wing airfields, which are specifically designed to train naval aviators to land day or night, in fair or foul weather, and aboard the confined landing areas of our ships at sea. These airfields are located within ten miles of home field, enhancing training efficiency and lowering cost per completed student sortie. NAS Whiting, in effect, is two airfields for the price of one. There are no course rule conflicts between fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating at these two fields. Operations in joint-use areas are normally conducted using air traffic control procedures and/or radar monitoring. Additionally, helicopters, by design, can operate at very slow airspeeds. As a result, near mid-air collisions involving Navy helicopters are virtually non-existent. In contrast, increased congestion at Fort Rucker would result from consolidating training there.

Fort Rucker is larger than NAS Whiting Field. However, NAS Whiting Field meets all present and future Navy requirements for primary and helicopter training and includes sufficient maritime operating areas for the Helicopter Landing Trainer ship. Additionally, the area around Fort Rucker has a much greater concentration of noise sensitive areas than does NAS Whiting Field.

Fort Rucker requires significant facilities MILCON, extensive rehabilitation and upgrade of existing structures and, equally important, extensive quality of life improvements to support consolidated training. Facilities meeting the Navy's requirements for both mission and quality of life are currently available and in use at NAS Whiting Field.

Brig Gen Shane. Yes. According to Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross- Service Group certified data, the total DoD throughput in the near future is 1,481. This training rate would only engage 72% of Fort Rucker's present capacity for undergraduate helicopter pilot training.

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Congress of the United States
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Washington, DC 20515-2403

May 30, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman,
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Navy BSAT's claim that strike training can be single sited at NAS Kingsville, thereby allowing NAS Meridian to be closed, is flawed. Our team analyzed the BSAT's original data, showed you the errors therein at our regional hearing, and provided your staff with evidence supporting our findings.

Now, in the attached letter discussing the consequences of increasing PTR, Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledges the high risks in closing NAS Meridian. And this analysis is still based on the BSAT's flawed capacity "estimates."

In 1993, the Commission determined our team's analysis correct and found two strike bases necessary to achieve 384 strike PTR. Strike PTR is returning to the same level at 382 -- 360 strike PTR plus 22 strike equivalent E2/C2 (see letter). And our team's analysis, based on actual performance data -- not estimates, continues to show two strike bases necessary.

As the supporting data promised by the CNO is made available, I will forward it to you. I encourage you to please read the attached CNO letter. Thank you for your serious and sincere consideration of our case.

Sincerely,

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

GVM:jgm
Enclosure

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 May 1995

Dear Sonny,

In response to your letter of 18 May regarding NAS Meridian, let me say up front that there is a sizable amount of data that has to be re-certified given the matters you pointed out that prevents me from answering all of your specific questions at this time. Let me answer what I can now and we'll continue to work the data as it is developed.

First, you are correct that several events have occurred since DoN's analysis and DoD's recommendation were made regarding Meridian. As you know, DoN's analysis of training air stations was based on the FY 01 force structure with an annual Strike PTR of 336. Based on this requirement, DoN recommended Strike training be single-sited at NAS Kingsville which incorporated NAF Corpus Christi as an outlying field. Since that analysis, two events have occurred that change the underlying assumptions:

- Navy was given the requirement to fulfill the USAF EF-111 mission which requires us to buy 4 additional EA-6B squadrons and our own needs require us to buy back 6 additional F/A-18 squadrons across the FYDP. This plus up - provided we can successfully buy the 10 squadrons - is a 5 percent increase in Strike PTR (336 to 360).

- CNATRA has recommended accelerating the relocation of E-2/C-2 training (36 PTR) from NAS Pensacola to NAS Kingsville. Because the requirements for E-2/C-2 training are about half that of Strike, this would equate to roughly 22 additional Strike PTR.

Compounding these is the fact that procurement rate for T-45 aircraft of 12 per year, concomitant with the end of service life of TA-4J trainers, slows the transition to an all T-45 training syllabus which is significant because the alternative split of T-2/T-45 syllabus would require about 20 percent more flights per student.

If all of these are considered together, the requirements at NAS Kingsville will increase by about 18 percent. Based on the calculated capacity for Kingsville/Corpus Christi, this will require operating at near 100 percent capacity from FY 01 through FY 04, assuming Meridian closes in FY 01 (vice FY 99 as recommended). Operating this close to maximum capacity would be difficult and uncomfortable - and unsatisfactory if we had to increase PTR for a significant operational surge requirement. But I'd be less than honest if I didn't acknowledge that Navy has the ability to absorb some increased capacity with managed alternatives such as increased workdays, increased night flying,

detachments, and shifting some Strike related training into the JPATS aircraft when it comes on line. Again, this is recognizing the risk associated with additional unknowns like aircraft groundings, bad weather in excess of planned figures, and missed carrier quals due to CV/CVN operational commitments or weather.

With regards to the Samis and Hamilton report, the Naval Facilities Command has been directed to provide an assessment - and I will forward that on to you when it's done - but for the moment, I can't give you a good response on that.

In summary, if both NAS Kingsville and Meridian were to remain open - even at a PTR of 360 - we would be operating each base at well below capacity. The combination of increased Strike PTR and a single Strike training base makes successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and reduces our capacity for surge operations - and that could be unacceptable. But the trade off remains the degree of difficulty or risks versus costs to operate 2 Strike training bases.

Sonny, I will continue to look hard at everything I can to give you the best answer possible and I will keep you informed as new developments arise.

Sincerely and very respectfully,

Mike

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 950530-R1

June 5, 1995

The Honorable Sonny Montgomery
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Sonny:

Thank you for providing the Commission with a copy of a letter you received from Admiral Michael Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, concerning the Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. I appreciate your strong interest in the future of NAS Meridian and welcome your input.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information contained in Admiral Boorda's letter will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on NAS Meridian.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

9 June 1995

Dear Sonny,

As promised in my letter of 25 May, I had the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) review the Samis and Hamilton report on aircraft noise and safety impacts at Naval Air Station (NAS) Corpus Christi. NAVFACENGCOM was already familiar with Samis and Hamilton's work, as they provided the most recent noise data for NAS Kingsville, NAS Meridian, and NAS Corpus Christi to assist them in preparing their report.

NAVFACENGCOM's analysis of the Kingsville airfield and airspace complex reveals that Samis and Hamilton assumed strike training operational levels for Corpus Christi that are unsubstantiated. For example, they did not take into account the continued use of Naval Auxiliary Landing Field Orange Grove. As the primary outlying field for Kingsville, Orange Grove will continue to support significant amount of touch and go, field carrier landing practice, and ground controlled approach (GCA) training. Continuing to use Orange Grove will significantly decrease the number of aircraft events at Corpus Christi.

Concerning safety to the community, the Samis and Hamilton report relies on Air Force Installations Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) policy rather than Navy guidelines. Accordingly, the clear zone dimensions and the application of accident potential zones around the airfield used in the report are incorrect. We have a long-standing and successful AICUZ program in South Texas. The communities of Kingsville and Corpus Christi support the Navy's program and have addressed aircraft noise and safety concerns in their comprehensive land use planning. not for T-H accident potential

In summary, NAVFACENGCOM's analysis of the Samis and Hamilton report indicates that it overstates the projected impacts at Corpus Christi.

Sonny, I continue to be ready to address your and your staff's questions as they arise.

I would be as helpful as I can within the bounds of this particular case. Have to be accurate reporting of facts. Thank you very much.

Sincerely and very respectfully,

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

TOTAL P.02

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

Since the 6th of March, when I last had an opportunity to discuss with you the BRAC recommendations affecting Air Force installations, I know that you and your staff have been very busy with your review. The Air Force has also been working steadily to refine the cost and savings analysis associated with our BRAC 95 recommendations, and has provided you with updated COBRA products and additional information. This further consideration has reconfirmed my view that, with one exception that I will discuss later, the Secretary of Defense's recommendations represent the best choices for reduction of excess Air Force infrastructure considering current and future operational and fiscal requirements.

This morning, I would like to focus on some of the issues that have been raised by communities and your staff regarding our recommendations. Because the Commission added all five Air Force depot installations for consideration for closure or further realignment, and because of the very significant potential impact of that action, I will spend the majority of my time discussing depots. Let me state at the beginning, I strongly support the depot downsizing recommendation as the best, and indeed the only really viable course for reducing Air Force depot infrastructure and excess logistics capacity.

manpower. Due to past workload consolidation efforts at our depots, there is very little redundant execution of workload at the different depots. As a result, most manpower positions and related equipment will have to be transferred to the depots receiving workload from a closed facility. There would be some manpower savings related to overhead and management functions, but they are already properly reflected in the Air Force analysis. Although the suggested use of higher assumed manpower savings may be appropriate for small, single-use depot maintenance facilities, this approach is not accurate or realistic for the very large, multi-faceted missions supported on Air Force logistics center installations. When measured properly against the depot-related manpower authorizations, Air Force scenarios eliminate between twelve and fifteen percent of the total ALC positions, including twenty percent of the overhead and over half of the Base Operating Support positions dedicated to running the installations.

More importantly, even assuming greater manpower savings does not alleviate the fundamental concern the Air Force faces in contemplating depot installation closures - that is, the cost to close. As I have previously discussed, the one-time costs associated with the closure of a depot, even for the various scenarios provided by your staff, are enormous -- indeed, the least expensive scenario is priced at over $560 million. To understand the full impact of these costs, it is important also to consider their distribution by year. The nature of BRAC actions requires that expenses related to relocating missions and workload such as military construction be incurred early, to accommodate the necessary mission relocation before a closure can take place. Our current estimate of costs across Fiscal Years 1996 to 2001, compared to available budget resources, indicates considerable budget shortfalls in some years if the Commission approves all our original recommendations except the Kirtland AFB realignment. Although we have sufficient

funds to cover the one-time costs associated with these closure and realignment actions across the entire period, we have a shortfall in FYs 96 and 97 ranging from $50 million to almost $250 million in each year. We will likely deal with this short-term problem by delaying closure dates on certain actions, and thus moving expenses into later years, where funds remain.

We will not be able to do this if we have to close a depot. If, for example, a depot installation is closed, we will have a shortfall across the entire period in excess of $317 million. There will be no reserve in the later years to solve the large shortfalls in the first several years. This problem would be further exacerbated if your staff's suggestion of earlier closures were followed, since more costs would be required in those earlier years. In either event, the closure of a depot would have dramatic adverse impacts on our budget and necessarily draw essential funds from other, top priority programs. We would have to draw from readiness, modernization and quality of life initiatives that are so critical to our future Air Force.

Quite simply, the methods suggested to increase savings and make a closure more attractive do not resolve our difficulties and do not make closure a fiscally viable alternative. The Air Force considered these very issues during its deliberations earlier this year and in reaching the difficult decision to downsize rather than close our depot installations. I continue to believe that a dispassionate review of the proposed reductions in capacity, square footage, and personnel, as well as the necessary constraints imposed by the operational and fiscal realities, will lead to the conclusion that the Air Force recommendation is prudent, cost effective, and the only responsible alternative. I strongly support it and urge you to do the same.

I would also like to address some of the recommendations concerning our Laboratory bases. We have devoted considerable attention to the closure of Rome Laboratory and the attendant costs. The refined costs presented to you as a result of our site survey are reliable estimates for implementing this recommendation. Splitting the functions of Rome Lab between Fort Monmouth and Hanscom Air Force Base has provided considerable efficiencies compared to a relocation to either site alone. We have also examined the costs of transferring the technical equipment involved and have included appropriate calibration and installation costs. This action is cost effective and operationally sound with a reasonable payback of the investment within six years. Of course, this action is also a significant step toward the broader goal of implementing cross-service consolidation of laboratory assets.

The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base is likewise sound and should be approved. In our subsequent review process, we have identified additional efficiencies, such as the School of Aerospace Medicine's use of lecture halls and other facilities currently used by the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. I am concerned, however, that the Commission may view the low costs for the cantonment option proposed by the San Antonio Community representatives as attractive. From my perspective, cantonment is not a viable option. The proposed cantonment would retain a substantial installation without its own support establishment, requiring cumbersome scheduling and travel for routine maintenance, personnel services, and other normal, day-to-day requirements. The large number of personnel who would remain at Brooks would not receive adequate support under the bare bones concept required by the cantonment. The recommendation to close Brooks Air Force Base, with the

majority of its activities relocating to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, will achieve the long-term reduction in Laboratory capacity and infrastructure we need for a reasonable investment.

As the Secretary of Defense has communicated to you, the recommendation regarding the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base no longer represents a cost effective measure. With this one exception, I strongly urge the Commission to approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to close or realign Air Force installations.

I would like to turn to General Fogleman now to provide additional comments on various operational considerations related to the recommendations.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF

BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

JUNE 14, 1995

Like the Secretary, I appreciate this opportunity to address you once again on the Air Force recommendations for closure or realignment, as well as the installations added by you for consideration. The nature of my testimony today has to do with some very real operational concerns that I have about these additions.

First and foremost, in the large aircraft base category, I am strongly opposed to the closure of Grand Forks Air Force Base. I want to spend a few minutes on this subject so as to leave no doubt on where I stand on this important operational question. I believe we must retain the core tanker wing at Grand Forks. While I recognize the financial attractiveness of a full closure, I cannot overemphasize the need to place operational considerations ahead of potential savings in this instance.

Those operational considerations arise from the very nature of post-Cold War military operations. I say military, not Air Force, because all U.S. military components must shape their capabilities around the reality we face. That reality includes fewer forward-deployed forces, greater emphasis on short-notice contingencies and various operations other than war. The common need in all these actions is greater mobility. As you know, actions in the 1993 BRAC round firmly established Air Mobility Wings on each coast to concentrate resources for rapid

response and deployment support. During that same period, as AMC Commander I formed three core tanker wings, at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.

At that time I firmly believed that the organizational improvements, operational capabilities, and fiscal efficiencies of a core tanker wing were essential to our ability to respond quickly to the critical refueling requirements of the mobility mission. I am even more convinced today that the three core tanker wings was the right way to go. Grand Forks Air Force Base is positioned well to support not only these missions, but also requirements under the Single Integrated Operations Plan, or SIOP. I should note that, although we have indicated an abundance of tankers in this region, this measurement is based on a comparison of tanker resources to training requirements, not SIOP requirements or operational contingencies. The movement of Malmstrom Air Force Base tanker assets to MacDill Air Force Base, under the Air Force recommendation, will bring resources and requirements into a reasonable balance.

I've written you a letter that provides my rationale in some detail. The operational concerns have also been endorsed by the senior war fighters, CINC STRATCOM and CINC TRANSCOM, who share my thoughts and resolve for the Grand Forks tanker wing.

Let me offer some remarks on the Undergraduate Flying Training bases and our recommendation to close Reese Air Force Base. I understand and agree with the Commission's belief that the flying training bases are all excellent bases that effectively support their important

mission. It will not be easy to see Reese close, just as it has been difficult for every excellent installation closed in previous rounds. It is clear to me, however, that if the Air Force must close a UPT base, Reese is the right choice. The conclusion is reinforced by the fact that every analysis performed by the Air Staff, the Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training, and your staff has supported the closure of Reese Air Force Base.

There has been some question of the need to close a flying training base. The conclusion of Air Education and Training Command is that we have an excess capacity of one base. I understand that some would argue we will need more pilot production beyond the period analyzed in the BRAC process. At this point we are comfortable that we will be able to meet our foreseeable production requirements after the closure of Reese Air Force Base, if the joint initiatives that are beginning to mature reach full productivity.

Since the Commission added additional bases for consideration in the Air Force Reserve category, I want to make several comments on the alternatives. Let me begin by stating that our Air Reserve Component forces are critical as an integral part of the variety of post-Cold War operations that I referred to earlier. Our ability to continue to rely on our reserve forces requires that we recognize the need to support the unique recruiting and training requirements of those units. After careful review of the bases in these categories, we concluded that we could accommodate the reduction of one F-16 and one C-130 unit. Those reductions match the force reductions experienced as we drew down to a 20 fighter wing force. While further closures are

perhaps possible from an "iron-on-the-ramp" perspective, closure of additional units would mean the removal of units from prime recruiting and retention locations.

It would also mean a reduction in presence in a number of communities. There is no better way to communicate to the American public the reality of military actions than when co-workers and neighbors see their friends don uniforms and serve as pilots, crew chiefs, and countless other critical positions. These various factors, unique to reserve and guard units, make it clear that no more than the recommended reductions should be acted upon.

Beyond these general statements, I wholeheartedly support the Secretary's initiative on the potential inactivation of the Reserve C-130 unit at O'Hare International Airport. Selecting this unit as the C-130 unit to inactivate and providing an opportunity for the City of Chicago to relocate the Air National Guard activity at their expense provides a reasonable solution to our need to inactivate a reserve unit and their desire to obtain the entire property.

On the issue of Reserve F-16 bases, I cannot agree with any action considered by the Commission that would result in the inactivation of the unit at NAS Fort Worth Carswell Field. The collocation of Navy and Air Force reserve operations at that location, recommended by the 1993 BRAC Commission, has proven to be a real success story. For the Air Force Reserve, it represents a cost-effective tenant operation in a location that is superb for recruiting and retention. Because of its location on a military installation, few savings to the Department of Defense will result from its closure. Disrupting this model installation is simply unjustified.

I have emphasized the operational aspects of the various actions under consideration, because my job is to ensure that we can carry out the missions we are assigned. I want however, also to add a word on the issue of depot closure. I understand very well those who call for the closure of an Air Force depot in BRAC. It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in the manner that best serves the total operational mission of the Air Force. To do otherwise, to force the Air Force to absorb the enormous costs associated with a depot closure, would directly and adversely impact modernization, readiness and the quality of life initiatives that are so important to our people.

As the Secretary discussed, reducing excess capacity by closing a depot would severely harm the very programs that we are committed to protecting -- programs that ensure an effective Air Force of the future. And it is unnecessary. The downsizing initiative presents a very attractive and viable alternative to achieve the necessary reductions without crippling our budget. Does it go as far as closure? No, but it does achieve comparable reductions that will ease the pressure that excess capacity places on our budget. I believe it is the only responsible approach to this issue, and wholeheartedly support it.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1542
Ser N889JG/4U661666
20 Jul 1994

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889J6/3U658748 of 20 Sep 1993

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 94-99
(2) Naval Flight Officer Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 94-99

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect planned production goals for FY 94-99. These goals are intended to resolve current pool excesses, balance ongoing transitions and new production with FRS output and return to steady state force mix of 10 CVWs, 12 VP Squadrons and appropriate force support for 330 ships in FY 97.

2. Significant changes include:

-Increase VFA pilot manning from 17 to 19/squadron
-Reduction from 15 to 12 VP squadrons
-Decom of VAW 122
-Realignment of E2/C2 pilot career paths
-Adjustment for Helo pools
-WSO curriculum approved/20 to 40 plus up of FMS NFOTR

3. OPNAV point of contact is Captain Scott Krajnik, N889G/J, A/V 224-6010/6013, commercial 703-614-6010/3.

S.S. MOBLEY
By direction

Distribution:
CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
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PILOT TRAINING RATES

20 JUL 94

FY-94	STRIKE	MARITIME	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
USN	173	120	43	214	550
USMC	118	32	0	188	338
COGARD	0	15	0	35	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	321	214	43	502	1080

FY-95					
USN	163	140	36	184	523
USMC	110	31	0	181	322
COGARD	0	10	0	45	55
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	303	228	36	475	1042

FY-96					
USN	183	140	36	184	543
USMC	106	29	0	181	316
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	319	228	36	468	1051

FY-97					
USN	203	146	36	184	569
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	463	1068

FY-98					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084

FY-99			
USN	203	146	36
USMC	103	28	0
COGARD	0	12	0
FMS	30	45	0
NOAA	0	2	0
TOTAL	336	233	36

NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES

20 Jul 1994

	F-14 RIO	F-18 WSO	A-6 TN	S-3 OJN	T-2 ATDS	P-3 NAV	TOTAL
FY-94							
USN	29	0	48	37	35	102	251
USMC	0	17	14	0	0	0	31
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	29	17	62	37	35	118	298
FY-95							
USN	39	0	38	37	35	122	271
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	20	0	0	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	38	50	37	35	138	337
FY-96							
USN	39	0	38	57	35	128	297
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	58	50	57	35	144	383
FY-97							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-98							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-99							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397

ENCLOSURE (2)

PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

W. A. EARNER	A. F. Earner
NAME (Please type or print)	Signature
	11/21/94
Title	Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889J6/5U665128
10 May 95

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER AVIATION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, JOINT USN/USAF TRAINING RATES

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889JG/4U661666 of 20 Jul 1994

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 95-00
(2) NFO Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 95-00

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect training requirements to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements.

2. USN PTR beginning in FY-98 and NFOTR beginning in FY-97 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four(4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) TACAIR squadrons to F/A-18 squadrons across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). F/A-18E/F fleet introduction team (FIT) and fleet replacement squadron (FRS) requirements are also included.

3. PTR in FY-96/97 and NFOTR in FY-96 could not be increased over levels published in ref (a) to match an ideal production schedule to meet para. 2 force changes. Compounding this situation, PTR/NFOTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. PTR/NFOTR listed in enclosures (1) and (2) is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

4. This letter also represents the first publication of joint USAF requirement numbers that will be produced by CNATRA.

5. OPNAV point on contact is CDR Tom Donovan, N889J6, A/V 224-6013, commercial (703) 614-6013 Fax (703) 693-9795.

H. T. RITTENOUR
By direction

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NAVMAC (CODE 3)

PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	STRIKE	MARITIME	E-6A TAC	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
FY-95						
USN	163	118	22	36	184	523
USMC	110	31		0	181	322
CG	0	10		0	45	55
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	22		0	0	22
TOTAL	303	228	22	36	475	1064
FY-96						
USN	183	118	22	36	184	543
USMC	106	29		0	181	316
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	35		0	0	35
TOTAL	319	229	22	36	480	1086
FY-97						
USN	203	124	22	36	184	569
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	113		0	0	113
TOTAL	336	312	22	36	475	1181
FY-98						
USN	227	128	22	36	220	633
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	511	1279
FY-99						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291
FY-00						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291

NFO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

FY-95	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	75	0	0	35	122	271
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
IMT	0	0	10	10	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	57	87	19	10	35	138	346

FY-96	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	95	0	0	35	128	297
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	29	38	21	0	88
IMT	25	0	40	11	0	15	91
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	82	107	69	49	56	144	507

FY-97	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	139	0	0	40	128	355
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	151	77	77	99	343	838

FY-98	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	118	0	0	35	128	329
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	130	77	77	94	343	812

FY-99	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

FY-00	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

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KING MINORITY MEMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

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(601) 932-2410

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–2403

May 30, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman,
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Navy BSAT's claim that strike training can be single sited at NAS Kingsville, thereby allowing NAS Meridian to be closed, is flawed. Our team analyzed the BSAT's original data, showed you the errors therein at our regional hearing, and provided your staff with evidence supporting our findings.

Now, in the attached letter discussing the consequences of increasing PTR, Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledges the high risks in closing NAS Meridian. And this analysis is still based on the BSAT's flawed capacity "estimates."

In 1993, the Commission determined our team's analysis correct and found two strike bases necessary to achieve 384 strike PTR. Strike PTR is returning to the same level at 382 -- 360 strike PTR plus 22 strike equivalent E2/C2 (see letter). And our team's analysis, based on actual performance data -- not estimates, continues to show two strike bases necessary.

As the supporting data promised by the CNO is made available, I will forward it to you. I encourage you to please read the attached CNO letter. Thank you for your serious and sincere consideration of our case.

Sincerely,

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

GVM:jgm
Enclosure

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 May 1995

Dear Sonny,

In response to your letter of 18 May regarding NAS Meridian, let me say up front that there is a sizable amount of data that has to be re-certified given the matters you pointed out that prevents me from answering all of your specific questions at this time. Let me answer what I can now and we'll continue to work the data as it is developed.

First, you are correct that several events have occurred since DoN's analysis and DoD's recommendation were made regarding Meridian. As you know, DoN's analysis of training air stations was based on the FY 01 force structure with an annual Strike PTR of 336. Based on this requirement, DoN recommended Strike training be single-sited at NAS Kingsville which incorporated NAF Corpus Christi as an outlying field. Since that analysis, two events have occurred that change the underlying assumptions:

- Navy was given the requirement to fulfill the USAF EF-111 mission which requires us to buy 4 additional EA-6B squadrons and our own needs require us to buy back 6 additional F/A-18 squadrons across the FYDP. This plus up - provided we can successfully buy the 10 squadrons - is a 5 percent increase in Strike PTR (336 to 360).

- CNATRA has recommended accelerating the relocation of E-2/C-2 training (36 PTR) from NAS Pensacola to NAS Kingsville. Because the requirements for E-2/C-2 training are about half that of Strike, this would equate to roughly 22 additional Strike PTR.

Compounding these is the fact that procurement rate for T-45 aircraft of 12 per year, concomitant with the end of service life of TA-4J trainers, slows the transition to an all T-45 training syllabus which is significant because the alternative split of T-2/T-45 syllabus would require about 20 percent more flights per student.

If all of these are considered together, the requirements at NAS Kingsville will increase by about 18 percent. Based on the calculated capacity for Kingsville/Corpus Christi, this will require operating at near 100 percent capacity from FY 01 through FY 04, assuming Meridian closes in FY 01 (vice FY 99 as recommended). Operating this close to maximum capacity would be difficult and uncomfortable - and unsatisfactory if we had to increase PTR for a significant operational surge requirement. But I'd be less than honest if I didn't acknowledge that Navy has the ability to absorb some increased capacity with managed alternatives such as increased workdays, increased night flying,

detachments, and shifting some Strike related training into the JPATS aircraft when it comes on line. Again, this is recognizing the risk associated with additional unknowns like aircraft groundings, bad weather in excess of planned figures, and missed carrier quals due to CV/CVN operational commitments or weather.

With regards to the Samis and Hamilton report, the Naval Facilities Command has been directed to provide an assessment - and I will forward that on to you when it's done - but for the moment, I can't give you a good response on that.

In summary, if both NAS Kingsville and Meridian were to remain open - even at a PTR of 360 - we would be operating each base at well below capacity. The combination of increased Strike PTR and a single Strike training base makes successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and reduces our capacity for surge operations - and that could be unacceptable. But the trade off remains the degree of difficulty or risks versus costs to operate 2 Strike training bases.

Sonny, I will continue to look hard at everything I can to give you the best answer possible and I will keep you informed as new developments arise.

Sincerely and very respectfully,

Mike

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 950530-AR1

June 5, 1995

The Honorable Sonny Montgomery
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Sonny:

Thank you for providing the Commission with a copy of a letter you received from Admiral Michael Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, concerning the Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. I appreciate your strong interest in the future of NAS Meridian and welcome your input.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information contained in Admiral Boorda's letter will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on NAS Meridian.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION JIM

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950620-23

FROM: DALTON, JOHN H.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SEC OF NAVY	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: DEPT OF NAVY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
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CHAIRMAN DIXON			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES			

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COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
ARMY TEAM LEADER			
NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

STATING NAVY STILL SUPPORTS RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE NAS MERIDIAN AND REALIGN NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950620	Date Originated: 950620	Mail Date:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

20 June 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Thank you for the opportunity to reiterate the Department of the Navy's position on the infrastructure capacity required to accomplish the undergraduate pilot training (UPT) mission. I stand by my original recommendation to close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian and realign NAS Corpus Christi in order to consolidate all Navy Strike training in the Kingsville-Corpus Christi complex. I take this step reluctantly because NAS Meridian is a fine base in good condition and has enjoyed superb community support. Nevertheless, we cannot forego the savings from this closure in this time of declining budgets.

At your request, we carefully reviewed our assessment of the infrastructure we need to support current pilot training requirements and to accommodate a potential increase in UPT in the event force sizing initiatives recently proposed were to be adopted. It is our opinion that through careful management of aircraft assets, personnel, and resources, the risk we face by single siting our T-45 training assets is acceptable.

I trust the foregoing clearly articulates to the Commission the Department of the Navy's position regarding this base realignment and closure action. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

John H. Dalton

John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy

NAVY MERIDIAN TEAM PRESENTATION

AT THE

BIRMINGHAM REGIONAL HEARING

(APRIL 4, 1995)

CONTENTS

NAVY MERIDIAN TEAM
BRIEFING
BIRMINGHAN REGIONAL HEARING
APRIL 4, 1995

17

Chairman Dixon, Commissioners, this is the third time the Navy Meridian Team has had the opportunity to address the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. It has become sort of a biennial celebration for us.

We appreciate this Commission and this process. It is difficult and consuming, but we have found it fair and reliable. Thank you for this opportunity to present our case.

Let me introduce the team behind me who will help answer your questions.

Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, retired, former Deputy CNO (Air Warfare);

Rear Admiral William McGowen, retired, immediate past Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA);

Captain Randy Leddy, retired, former Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations at CNATRA;

and former NAS Meridian officers: Captain Ken Storms, retired, former Commander of Training Air Wing One; and

Lt. Commander Jack Douglass, retired, former Wing Operations Officer.

Our case, today, will show you (Figure 1):

NTTC Meridian Stands Alone.

"Mississippi Complex": Unique Cross Service Opportunity.

NAS Meridian: Excellent Functional and Military Values.

Major Errors Corrupt Navy Capacity Estimate.

Sustainable Capacity Requires Two Strike Bases

NAS Meridian Required to Meet Force Structure

Governor Fordice has already made our case on NTTC, so let's check it off

(Check #1 CHART A).

A major benefit of the "Mississippi complex", as the Governor noted, is its joint use of assets. Proximity allows these bases to shift capacity from one to the other at need.

The functional value analysis of 11 Air Force, Navy and Army training air stations, developed by the DOD's Joint UPT Study Group, ranks Meridian among the top four bases cumulatively. (Figure 2)

Yet, the Defense Department, apparently, has not considered, and fails to appreciate the joint training potential of the Mississippi complex, especially the role played by Meridian.

The Navy has recommended a joint scenario (and our analysis has identified others) that better utilizes bases, reduces excess

capacity, and saves dollars. The DOD's Joint Study Group chose not to pursue such alternatives.

Is the nation going to move strongly in the joint arena or not? If so, this Commission will have to take the lead.

If not, then we agree with Chairman Dixon and the Secretary of Defense that joint training must be revisited before the end of the century.

In either case, the useful evidence from the joint arena is perfectly clear -- NAS Meridian and the Mississippi complex would be, and should be, strong contenders.

(Check off #2 Figure 1).

Mixed signals are being sent about Meridian's military value.

As noted, the DOD's Joint Study Group gives the base high functional military value. The Secretary of the Navy and CNO testified that Meridian, looked at from a joint service perspective, has high value and should remain open.

On the other hand, the Navy's Base Structure and Analysis Team (BSAT) has seriously underestimated Meridian's Military Value.

Take the overwater airspace issue, a repeat from 1993. Certified data shows over water airspace required or preferred for 4% of pilot training (96% for over land). Yet, the Navy's military value matrix weights it at 40% of airspace values, 10 times its actual usage. (Figure 3)

Here's another example. The Base Structure Evaluation Committee questioned how Meridian could perform all levels of maritime aviation training with their inland location, saying "If carrier qualifications were conducted in the Gulf of Mexico, all

stations other than Meridian could perform all maritime training," (BSAT minutes Sept, 19, 1994. See Appendix A).

Well, Meridian can conduct carrier landings to the Gulf, but it's a moot point. There is no training carrier. All carrier landings are done on active carriers off the East and West Coasts.

Yes, the Navy and the sea are intrinsically linked. But, as fact after fact shows, the Gulf of Mexico and undergraduate pilot training are not. DOD's Joint Study Group recognized this reality. But the BSAT consistently undervalues Meridian because of its inland location, when its rural, unencroached location is actually an advantage.

We have presented data to staff regarding these and other problems with the Military Value scores.

Military value drives both Navy and Joint configuration models. These models are geared to choose lower ranked bases for closure. With a proper Military Value, Meridian could not have fallen out as a closure recommendation.

When only obvious corrections are made, Meridian is the top rated Naval Air Training Station, as the Navy's newest, most modern base ought to be. (See Figure 4)

(Check #3, Figure 1).

In 1993, the Navy wanted to put strike training at Kingsville and Pensacola. Lack of adequate operating CAPACITY caused the Commission to find a "substantial deviation" and vote unanimously to keep Meridian open.

Lack of CAPACITY is still the real issue in 1995.

The Navy's new closure proposal is different. It single sites strike training at Kingsville with Corpus Christi realigned as an outlying field.

There are two other changes since 1993 that affect capacity. New T-45 jet trainers are in use. As T-45s come on-line, the buy is one a month, both the T-2 and TA-4 jet trainers will be retired. Strike training will migrate complete to T-45s at the earliest in 2003. So it will be almost a decade before promised T-45 efficiencies will be realized.

Advanced early warning and carrier delivery aircraft training, E2/C2, will move to the T-45 since it will be the only carrier capable trainer. The DOD's Joint Study Group consolidated strike and E2/C2 pilot training rate (PTR) for outlying years. The Navy is planning for the change, but did not consolidate requirements.

PTR requirements themselves are another change. Force structure reductions caused strike PTR to decrease from 384 to 336. When you consolidate advanced E2/C2, you get a net PTR of 355, a decline of just 7.5%.

Let's look at capacity (Figure 5). Capacity is limited by daytime runway operations -- the number of aircraft each airfield launch and recover per hour, each day.

The capacity formula takes working days, hours per day, and a weather corrected operations per hour figure to get daytime operations available. You use the daytime operations it takes to produce a student pilot, or ops per PTR, to get the annual pilot training rate, or PTR capacity.

In 1993, the Commission relied on staff to validate the figures resulting from this formula. It is doubtful that any figures have been scrubbed as thoroughly as the strike training capacity figures for 1993.

Here's what they looked like. Note the different hours per day and ops per hour between homefields and outlying fields.

This 1887 ops per PTR number is the critical figure in these calculations. So, let's look at where it came from.

The Naval Air Training Command collected actual flight operations and student PTR for Kingsville, Meridian and Chase field from 1989 through 1991. These were averaged to get 2210. (Figure 6).

Using actual experience, 2210 was separated into day and night figures. 1887 is the daytime figure.

As you see, these figures were based on real performance. Notice also that Kingsville's averages are high. In other words, it takes Kingsville more operations to produce a pilot than average.

Using the performance based 1887 figure, PTR capacity for Kingsville was 210, for Meridian 195.

This capacity was further validated. During the Vietnam War, bases operated at full capacity, flying 18 to 24 hours per day, six to seven days a week. In 1993, Meridian's Wing Commander took the top wartime operations for each base, scaled them to peacetime, and calculated PTR rates of 208 for Kingsville and 193 for Meridian -- right on top of the formula figures of 210 and 195. (Figure 7)

To recap, the 1993 capacity figures were calculated using real performance numbers, then validated by Vietnam War maximum output figures.

Now, it's time for the 1995 figures. (See Appendix G)

Daytime runway ops pretty well match the 1993 figures for Kingsville and OLF Alice Orange Grove. It was in calculating a jet OLF capacity for Corpus Christi that the first major error occurred.

Can you even do intensive jet training at Corpus Christi? Flying student jets over a major metropolitan area increases noise and safety hazards, particularly at night. The closure plan calls for intensive field carrier landing practice at night in Corpus Christi. No jet AICUZ (Air Installation Compatible Use Zone) study has been done, so the Navy doesn't know if Corpus can serve as a jet OLF or not.

Then there are environmental problems. Corpus Christi has one jet runway. Its crosswind runways are to be extended to 6000 feet. However, there are wetlands issues to address. Until an Environmental Impact Statement is prepared, the Navy doesn't know if required runway extensions can occur or not.

We suspect AICUZ, environmental, and operational problems (FOD, air traffic, etc.) are likely to make Corpus Christi unsuitable as a jet OLF. Without Corpus Christi, the single site closure scenario falls on its face.

But, even with Corpus Christi, the scenario doesn't work. So, if it is a viable jet OLF, what is its capacity?

The BSAT gave it a homefield capacity for maritime and primary training (Figure 8). Its short parallel runway can handle T-44 and T-34 trainers. It cannot handle jets. When changing Corpus Christi to a jet OLF, the BSAT failed to change its capacity. At best it would be equivalent to OLF Alice Orange Grove. In fact, it is less.

Alice Orange Grove is a dedicated jet OLF. Corpus Christi will be joint use with Coast Guard, Customs Service, and CCAD C5 flights. A 1991 Aircraft Noise Survey (by Harris Miller Miller & Hanson Inc. See Appendix E) showed non-training average daily ops totaled 108, over 90% daytime. This kind of flight activity

reduces daytime availability by at least two hours, and that's the figure we used. Increased drug interdiction, Coast Guard rescue, or border patrol efforts will reduce it more. Introduction of mine warfare helicopters, including the MH53E, the world's largest, can only worsen the problem.

The difference between what the BSAT used and a realistic jet OLF capacity is significant. 129,260 daytime operations is the correct. When added to Kingsville and Alice Orange Grove, the correct total available operations figure is 507,133. (Figure 9)

Now that we have operations available, how do we get the ops per PTR figure? This is the other key to the 1995 capacity issue.

Remember, we have confidence in the 1887 figure from 1993. But, now, the BSAT says 1511 is a good figure. Why is there such a difference?

The simple answer is two additional major errors and one ill considered decision. Let me explain.

Data for the T-45 is still being developed and no statistically sound data base exists. So, unlike 1993's performance based figures, 1995s figures are estimates.(Figure 10)

Kingsville is the T-45 base, so it did the estimate. It listed required student flights. Then, ops per flight were estimated. That gets you total student operations. Here, the first major error occurred. Kingsville failed to count all student ops. (By request, CNATRA has provided us documentation of this error. See Appendix B)

Total student ops is an incomplete number. Overhead must be added. Overhead consists of extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, etc. Overhead figures come from CNATRA planning factors. These are annual, CNO approved

estimates. The approved overhead factor for the T-45 was 51.4% . Kingsville used 35%, the second major error. (See Appendix B)

The two major errors you have seen were compounded by an ill considered decision that corrupts the formula.

Ops per PTR is a key figure in the formula. The rule for ops per PTR was set in 1993: "Since training air stations are not set up to deploy squadrons for training, it is important to be able to do all training at or near the air station."

1993 and the original 1995 data calls obeyed this provision.

With no mention in its minutes, BSAT changed the rule in August 1994. Its revised data call stated: "Do not include flight ops required by the syllabus but conducted at other sites." (See Appendix C)

The revision corrupts the formula and double counts capacity. By eliminating potential deployment ops, a base can increase its capacity to any number. But, where are the aircraft, instructors and maintenance team to sustain the homefield operations? They are gone.

Kingsville eliminated 110 deployment ops, including 100% of its weapons ops, effectively eliminating the need for its own target range (See Appendix B, page 2). Yet, "Control of an air-to-ground training range is important" for strike training (BSAT minutes August 16, 1994).

CNATRA closed the permanent weapons detachment at El Centro, California in 1992. Will El Centro be reopened for Kingsville? At what cost? There's nothing in the COBRA to pay for it.

In 1993, bases weren't set up to deploy. Are they set up to do so now?

Answers to these questions are not in the COBRA, BSAT minutes, or certified data. It's clear this decision was ill considered. It certainly has the appearance of an attempt to manipulate the formula.

Taking these errors into account, the 1511 figure corrects to 1822. A reality check supports these corrections.

1822 is clearly more in line with the 1887 ops per PTR figure based on real performance, scrubbed by staff, and validated by Vietnam War data.

Now, let's go to the bottom line. The PTR capacity estimate for the Kingsville/Corpus Christi scenario is 278 -- far below the 336 strike PTR and the 355 strike -E2/C2 PTR requirements.

The capacity simply is not available to single site strike training -- this constitutes a substantial deviation from Base Closure Criteria One.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, we are once again dependent upon this Commission and your staff to scrub the numbers. When you do, you will find, just as the 1993 Commission did, that the Navy Meridian Team has been rigorous in its analysis and is on target. You will also find that the BSAT has once again allowed significant errors into certified data that became critical errors in key calculations.

(Check #4 Figure 1)

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, we want to lay this capacity issue to rest once and for all. So let us show you the reality of the Navy's single site scenario.

We ran the runway capacity numbers using the Navy's figures and got a PTR capacity of 336. (Figure 11). That's exactly equal to future strike PTR, but not enough to cover the 355 strike-E2/C2 requirement. In other words, using the Navy's own figures, Kingsville, Alice Orange Grove, and Corpus Christi would have to operate at 100% or more of capacity.

There would be no room for any PTR bumps. The Navy has projected PTR flat from 1997 through 2001, but actual PTR is never flat.

You can take the CNO's word for that. Admiral Mike Boorda (BSAT minutes of Jan. 13, 1995), said: training air stations are "a good place to retain some excess capacity because the number of pilots DON will need fluctuates depending on factors outside its control." (Figure 12)

But there is no excess capacity at all in the Navy's single site scenario.

Then there's the difference between formula and real capacity. Is a formula generated runway capacity estimate a sustainable capacity? Can you continuously operate a training base at 100% of formula capacity?

Here's an analogy. The estimated RPM capacity of most car engines is 6000 revolutions per minute. You could try to run your car at that rate all day, everyday. But would you? Should you? Would you count on it?

You can use a formula to estimate runway capacity for a strike training base. And you could try to run it at 100% capacity all day, everyday. But would you? Should you? Would you count on it?

We asked the experienced aviators sitting behind me what it would be like to operate at 100% of capacity: 22 aircraft takeoff every

hour, one every 2.7 minutes, from the launch runway; six jets are in the landing pattern at the homefield arrival runway, four in the pattern at each OLF, continuously, every hour, all day long. (See Appendix D)

That's an op tempo similar to O'Hare, Atlanta Hartsfield, and Los Angeles International. Can a training base sustain this level? Should you put inexperienced student pilots in this environment?

We asked these questions of our experienced aviators. And the emphatic answer was no. You can't run a training base safely at 100% of formula capacity. There are too many variables for this to happen.

The first variable is the students themselves. They are students, not experienced naval aviators.

The second is your assets. Will you have the right number of instructors, aircraft, and students all the time? Experience says no. Aircraft will go down, student flow is uneven. Instructor shortfalls are frequent and the ability to increase instructors under training is non-existent. Can you maintain your aircraft safely to fly at max ops for max hours everyday in a peacetime environment? Will the Navy pay for the extra maintenance support to do so? Experience says no.

The third variable is contingencies. For example, Corpus Christi and Kingsville have both been impacted by hurricanes in the last 7 years. Can you afford to put all your eggs in one basket with no capacity buffer? Experience, again, says no. Homestead AFB certainly suggests no.

Our experienced aviators, after reviewing the variables and constraints not included in the runway capacity formula, say sustainable capacity is at best 85% of formula capacity.

There is only one strike training scenario that allows bases to be loaded at sustainable capacity -- Meridian and Kingsville. Their sustainable capacity is 353 PTR, right on the 355 strike/E2/C2 PTR requirement (Figure 13). This scenario allows for student inexperience, for asset problems, for contingencies. It provides the modest excess capacity sought by Admiral Boorda.

The Air Force concurs with the CNO on this issue (Base Closure Executive Group minutes, Dec. 1, 1994):

"Even under the best of conditions, we recommend a capacity buffer. For the foreseeable future, UPT will undergo the turmoil of multiple base closures and the fielding of new aircraft including the Air Force T-1, the Navy T-45, and both services' JPATS. A. sufficient buffer is critical." (Figure 14)

"A sufficient buffer is critical."

The only strike training scenario that provides any capacity buffer, that loads bases at sustainable capacities, is the two strike base setup we have right now -- the one the 1993 Commission voted to keep -- NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville.

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, facts, experience and common sense tell you Navall Air Station Meridian is needed -- no it's essential -- for the Navy is to achieve its required mission under the Force Structure Plan of the United States.

(Check # 5 and #6 CHART A)

Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief closing statement to make after the Q&A period.

Thank you.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY VALUE MATRIX

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Que Seq	QUESTIC	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES COL	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
???	FLIGHT TRAINING AREAS/AIRSPACE												
1 A1	Are there warning areas within 100 nm. of the air station?												
2 A2	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	0	1	1
2 A3	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
2 A4	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	0	1	1
1 A5	Are there Military Operating Areas (MOA)/Alert areas within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	0	1	1
2 A6	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		1	1	1	1	1
2 A7	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2 A8	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1 A9	Is there restricted airspace within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
2 A10	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
2 A11	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2 A12	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1 A13	Are there military training routes (MTRs) within 100 nm. of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
2 A14	-Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1	1	0	1	10	2.06		1	1	1	1	1
2 A15	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	1	1
2 A16	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1 A17	Does your air station control an air to ground training range?	1	1	0	0	4	0.55		1	1	1	1	1
2 A18	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		0	1	1	0	0
2 A19	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	1	0	0
2 A20	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		0	1	1	0	0
1 A21	Is there sufficient SUA/air space for special use within 50 nm. to support Advanced Strike Training?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
1 A22	Does current airspace configuration permit helicopter training?	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		1	1	1	1	1
1 A23	Is overwater air space required for aviation training conducted at your air station?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
1 A24	Deployments/detachments to other air stations are not required to satisfy training shortfalls?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		1	1	1	1	1
1 A25	The current system of air traffic control (ATC) routes does not limit the amount of flights between the air station and the training airspace.	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		1	0	0	0	1
1 A26	Does the air station normally operate without ATC delays?	1	1	1	0	9	1.49		1	1	1	1	1
1 A27	Does the current airspace configuration allow for jet aircraft training?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
3 A28	Do squadrons/units from other installations come to this air station to train?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	1	1	1
1 A29	Is the training airspace free of encroachment by civil aviation infrastructure elements?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	1	0	1	0
3 A30	Are air station operations currently not affected by the major air traffic structures within 50 nm of each air to ground range, airspace or airfield?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
???	ENCROACHMENT & EXPANSION								1	1	1	1	1
1 B1	Are air station flight operations presently unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1 B2	Is it projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region in the future?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
1 B3	Is Air Station in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, or PM-10?	1	0	1	0	10	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1 B4	Air station has no environmental issues that restrict operations or development plans?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1 B5	Air station low level training routes have not been modified within the last 3 years to accomodate noise complaints and construction?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	0	1	0	1
1 B6	Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordnances?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	0	1
1 B7	Is the air stations present or future mission unaffected by current estimates of population growth and area development?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
1 B8	There are no land and/or air encroachment issues which endanger long-term availability of any training area?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	1	1	1	1
1 B9	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support an additional workload?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
2 B10	Is there >500 unrestricted acres available for development?	0	1	1	0	5	0.35		0	0	1	1	1
2 B11	Does the current operational infrastructure (e.g., parking aprons, hangar space, etc.) allow for future expansion or change in mission?	0	1	1	0	6	0.42		1	1	1	1	1
2 B12	Can the current installation's infrastructure (i.e., utilities, water, sewerage, etc.) accommodate future expansion?	0	1	1	0	7	0.49		1	1	1	1	1
3 B13	Is there off base acreage available for future air station development?	0	0	1	1	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
???	WEATHER												
3 C1	Do weather conditions having a ceiling <500' and visibility <one mile occur <10% of the time?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	1	1	1
3 C2	Are <15% of undergraduate pilot fixed wing training sorties cancelled due to weather?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	0	1	0

TRAINING AIR STATI

Que Seq	QUESTIC	M V Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGH	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
	AIRFIELD FACILITIES												
D1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years >2% of the CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
D2	Does the air station have more than one runway complex that can conduct independent (i.e., concurrent) flight operations?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		0	0	0	0	1
D3	Does the air station have dual operating runways?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	0
D4	Are there >2 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm. of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	0	0
D5	Are there >6 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm. of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		0	0	0	1	1
D6	Is at least 90 percent of the runways and landing pads in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	9	1.85		1	1	1	1	0
D7	Is at least 90 percent of the parking and access aprons in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	7	1.44		0	1	1	0	0
D8	Is at least 90 percent of the fuel storage facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	8	1.64		1	1	1	1	1
D9	Can the airfield's capacity be increased (i.e., no limiting factors)?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	0	0	0	0
D10	There are no constraints on the number of flying hours per day (e.g., AICUZ agreements) at the air station's homefield?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	1
D11	Can you conduct night flight operations at one of your OLFs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
D12	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at your main airfield?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	1	0
D13	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at one DOD owned OLF?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	0	1	0
	TRAINING												
E1	Is there a type of flight training (NFO or Pilot) conducted at the air station that is not presently conducted anywhere else?	1	0	0	0	7	0.66		1	0	0	1	1
E2	Is jet pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	9	1.11		0	1	1	1	0
E3	Is officer pre-flight (basic) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		0	0	0	1	0
E4	Is helicopter pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		0	0	0	0	1
E5	Is prop plane pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	0	0	1	1
E6	Is Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	0	0	1	0
E7	Are aviation support units stationed at the air station?	1	0	0	0	5	0.47		1	1	1	1	1
E8	Do ground combat units train at the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	0	0	1
E9	Does the air station support enlisted training with an AOB >250 students?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	0	1	1	0
E10	Does the air station support other officer training not related to undergraduate pilot/NFO training?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	0	1	1	0
	MAINTENANCE & UNIQUE FACILITIES												
F1	Does the air station have ship berthing facilities?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	0	0	1	0
F2	Can air station pier facilities berth ships >12 ft. draft?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		0	0	0	1	0
F3	Does your air station have a dedicated corrosion control facility?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	1	1	0	0
F4	Is at least 90 percent of the hangar/maintenance facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	8	1.10		1	0	1	1	1
F5	Are there weapons storage and handling facilities at the air station?	1	1	0	0	6	0.82		1	1	1	1	1
F6	Are ship maintenance facilities located at the air station?	1	1	0	0	1	0.1		0	0	0	1	0
F7	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports aircraft assigned to your training mission?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	0	0	0	0
F8	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports other than your assigned training aircraft ?	1	1	0	1	1	0.21		1	0	0	0	0
	GROUND TRAINING FACILITIES												
G1	Given projected training requirements for FY 2001, does your air station currently have all required flight/training simulators?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
G2	Is at least 90% of the ground training facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	0	1
G3	Given the present equipment and physical plant configuration, can ground training be significantly increased?	1	1	1	0	6	0.99		1	1	1	1	1
G4	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) any unique DOD or non DOD training facility?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	1	1	1	0
	LOCATION												
H1	Is your air station <50nm. from an aircraft carrier operating area?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		1	0	0	1	1
H2	Does the air station's location permit training with other operational units (e.g., Battle Groups or Joint forces)?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
H3	Does the air station play a role in military and civilian regional transportation/logistics plans?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	1	1	1	1
	MILITARY/GENERAL SUPPORT MISSIONS												
I1	Does this air station currently support counter-drug flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	1	0	1
I2	Does the air station currently support U S Customs Service flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	0	0	1
I3	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
I4	Will the air station directly support a military or civilian area control and surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC) through FY 2001?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
I5	Does the air station play a role in the Logistics Support Mobilization Plan (LSMP)?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	0	0	0	0
I5	Does the air station support other military missions (e.g., port of embarkation for MC personnel)?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	0	0	0	0
I7	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	1	1	0
I8	Are new civilian or non-DoD missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		0	1	0	0	0
I9	Do active reserve or guard units train at your air station?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	1	1	1	1
I10	Does the air station or its tenants have requirements to support training of other Navy or Marine Corps forces?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	1	0
I11	Does the air station have support agreements with other DoD services?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
I12	Does the air station provide meteorological, SAR, and/or disaster assistance support to the local area?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	1	1	1	1
I13	Does the air station have support agreements with the non-DoD government or civilian activities?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
I14	Are there non-DOD aircraft stationed at your air station?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	0	0	0	1

TRAINING AIR STA[illegible]NS

ue	QUESTIO...	M V Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
eq													
	BASE LOADING												
	Are operational active, reserve or special squadrons based at your air station?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	0	0	1	0
	Are there any major Navy tenant activities at the air station (e.g., NATTC, AOCS)?	1	0	0	0	6	0.57		1	0	1	1	0
	Are there any major Army or Air Force tenant activities at the air station (e.g., Army Helicopter Depot)?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	0	0
	QUALITY OF LIFE												
1	Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
2	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0	0	0	1	10	0.68		0	0	1	0	1
3	Does the air station have >90% of the listed Family Support Facilities and programs?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	1	0
4	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >100 children?	0	1	0	1	5	0.55		0	0	0	1	0
5	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >50 children?	0	1	0	1	3	0.33		1	1	0	0	0
K6	Is child care waiting list <100 children?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		0	1	0	1	0
K7	Is child care waiting list <50 children?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	1
K8	Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care <180 days?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	0
K9	Are >90% of stations child care facilities adequate?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		1	1	1	1	0
K10	Are there certified home care providers?	0	1	0	0	4	0.17		1	1	1	1	1
K11	Does the air station have >90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	1	1	1
K12	Does the air station have >200 units of adequate officer family housing?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
K13	Does the air station have >300 units of adequate enlisted family housing?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	0	1	1	0
K14	Is the average wait for housing three months or less?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	1
K15	Is the average wait for housing six months or less?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
K16	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0	0	0	1	4	0.27		1	1	1	1	1
K17	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30-mile radius?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
K18	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	0	0	0
K19	Do >50% of air station military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.65		1	1	1	1	1
K20	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	0	0
K21	Is the BOQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
K22	Are 90% of BOQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	0	1	1
K23	Is the BEQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
K24	Are 90% of BEQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
K25	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	1	1
K26	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	1	0	0	1	6	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
K27	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	0	0	0	1	6	0.41		1	1	1	1	1
K28	Is the violent crime rate <758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	1	1	0	0
K29	Is the property crime rate <4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	0
K30	Is the drug crime rate <402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	1
K31	Are college education courses available on the base?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
							100.00	100.00	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

FIRST RUN

CORP	KING	MERI	PENS	WHITI
32.41	36.16	31.08	30.77	32.24
8.60	8.60	9.81	8.09	9.81
1.53	1.53	0.76	1.53	0.76
9.93	12.52	12.03	11.91	6.10
2.31	1.67	2.05	5.30	3.20
2.29	1.44	2.54	2.39	1.92
3.11	3.49	2.33	2.53	3.11
1.20	0.46	0.46	1.20	1.20
2.16	1.16	1.30	1.64	1.10
0.90	0.00	0.57	0.61	0.00
10.53	7.26	11.89	11.12	10.19
74.96	74.29	74.83	77.09	69.63

FINAL RUN

	CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
Airspace	32.41	36.16	31.08	30.77	32.24
Encroachment	8.60	8.60	9.81	8.09	9.81
Weather	1.53	1.53	0.76	1.53	0.76
Airfield Facilities	9.93	12.52	8.06	10.75	6.10
Training	2.31	1.67	2.05	5.30	3.20
Maintenance Facilities	2.29	1.44	2.54	2.39	1.92
Ground Training Facilities	3.11	3.49	2.33	2.53	3.11
Location	1.20	0.46	0.46	1.20	1.20
Military/Support Missions	2.16	1.16	1.30	1.55	1.10
Base Loading	0.90	0.00	0.57	0.61	0.00
Quality of Life	9.66	8.62	12.09	10.32	9.52
	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

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Location

B. Proximity to Training Areas

1. Does the location of the air station permit any specialized training with other operational units (e.g. Battle Groups or Joint forces)? If so, provide details.

Yes. Air Station provides temporary support for air assets of JTF-6.

2. Describe the plan for conducting carrier and helicopter landing trainer qualifications. Will ship deploy to training squadron site or will squadrons deploy?

Due to lack of a training carrier in the Gulf of Mexico, TW-2 deploys to the east or west coast to utilize fleet carriers for carrier qualifications.

3. How far (nmi.) is the air station from a designated naval operations area where an aircraft carrier would conceivably operate ?

~~40 nm~~ 78 Nautical miles to the designated Naval Operations Area

CNATRA N3

4. If the aircraft carrier deploys to an area within operating range of training air squadrons, would CQ training usually conducted directly from the air station or on a detachment basis?

Directly from the station.

Facilities

A. Air Space and Flight Training Areas (cont.)

8. Are there any air traffic control constraints/procedures listed in the current Air Ops manual/AICUZ study that currently, or may in the future, limit air station operations?

No.

9. Does the current airspace which you schedule/control permit Advanced Strike training? If not, explain why.

Yes.

10. Is there airspace within 50 NM which permits Advanced Strike training?

Yes.

11. Does the current airspace configuration permit helicopter training? If not, explain why.

Yes. Some general use airspace would need to be designated "ALERT AREAS" if flight operations exceeded 250,000 operations per year.

12. Does the airspace configuration prohibit other types of undergraduate pilot training? If so, explain why.

No. To complete NFO training, 4 surface search (over-water) sorties are required per student. Those sorties, when conducted in conjunction with airway navigation sorties, could be flown out of NAS Meridian to NAS Pensacola, re-fuel, then to W-155 and vice versa. All air intercept sorties required for NFO training can be conducted at NAS Meridian.

APPENDIX B

KINGSVILLE
OPS/PTR CALCULATIONS

EXPLANATION: The following is a Kingsville worksheet provided the Navy-Meridian Team by CNATRA upon request for data supporting data call information.

Where you see odd numbers in columns titled "Ops/Flight" and "Totals," a major error has occurred. By definition you cannot have an odd number of operations. Each take-off and each landing is one operation. Each approach and each departure is one operation. You will always have an even number of operations. Kingsville left out take-offs for a number of flights.

You will also see the overhead added at "35%." The correct add should have been "51.4%."

The second page shows where deployment ops were subtracted. Note 88 weapons ops were deducted. Go back to the first page and note that 88 weapons ops is 100% of those listed.

Page 3 is the CNATRA Planning Factor report for the T-45. The highlighted 175.60 is student only. The difference of 90.30 is overhead. 90.30 overhead divided by 175.60 student equals 51.4%. (Kingsville apparently divided 90.30 by 265.90 to get its 35% factor. The math was wrong.)

DATA PROVIDED BY CNATRA N334

1. Enclosure (1) is the original calculations provided in NAS Kingsville Data Call 2. Because th is no historical average for T-45 overhead operat the T-2/TA-4 average of 35% of flight ops was used to calculate the overhead figures. (Note: A mistake was made in calculating the total nu operations per student. The number should read 252 vice 455.)

2. Enclosure (1) provides the estimated data used to calculate the flight operations per student.

3. 1393 total day operations was calculated in the following manner:

1503 - 110 = 1393

110 = 88 WEPS ops + 22 CQ ops

Note: WEPS and the final CQ qualification sorties are typically completed on detachments.

DATA PROVIDED BY CNATRA N334

~~FIGURE 6~~

Attachment B

DAY

STAGE	NO. OF FLIGHTS	OPS/FLIGHT	TOTAL
BI	4 (5,7,4,4)	Varies	20
RI	7 (5,5,5,5,5,6,5)	Varies	36
AN	10	5	50
IR	5	5	25
FAM	15	18	270
OCF	3	3	9
FORM	17	7	119
CQ (I)	8	16	128
ON	9	8	72
WEP	11	8	88
TACF	4	(6/SORTIE DURING + 8/SORTIE END)	24
GUN	8	8	64
ACM	13	8	104
CQ (II)	6	(16/SORTIE FOR LEAD AND 22 OPS FOR SHIP)	102
			1113
			+ 35%
			1503

NIGHT

CQ (I)	2	16	32
NFAM	2	12	24
NFORM	4	17	68
CQ (II)	4	16	64
			188

Enclosure (1)

7/94 15:31 NO.032 P002

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) 0 21 July 9
CURRICULUM: ADVANCED T45(W2) TRAWING 2 SERVICE: ALL SERVICE
TYPE ACFT: T-45 PROCEDURES TRAINER: 2F137 FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F13

132 X.8

		ACFT HRS/STUD		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD			SIM HRS/STU	
		T-45		T-45	2F137	2F138	2F137	2F13
STUDENT SYLLABUS		175.60		123.30	0.00	0.00	30.30	6 .4
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
T-45 ACFT = 10.6% /10.6%		18.61		13.06	----	----	----	----
2F137 CPT = 5.90%		----		----	0.00	----	1.78	----
2F138 FSIM = 5.90%		----		----	----	0.00	----	3.97
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		26.50		30.70	----	----	----	----
CHASE OVERHEAD	10.6%	2.80		3.25	----	----	----	----
SUBTOTAL		223.52		170.32	0.00	0.00	32.08	71.37
STUDENT ATTRITION	8.0%	9.71		7.40	0.00	0.00	1.39	3.10
SUBTOTAL		233.24		177.72	0.00	0.00	33.48	74.47
IUT OVERHEAD								
T-45 .40353*.522*73.5/69.9		15.47		14.71	----	----	----	----
2F137 .40353*.522* 0.0/12.0		----		----	0.00	----	2.52	----
2F138 .40353*.622* 0.0/18.0		----		----	----	0.00	----	3.78
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .40363		6.05	x2	12.10	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
4.5 HRS * .40353		1.81	x2	3.63	----	----	----	----
SUBTOTAL		266.58		208.18	0.00	0.00	36.00	78.26
OVERHEAD	1.00%	2.65		2.65	----	----	----	----
OGISTIC OVERHEAD	2.00%	6.31		6.31	----	----	----	----
ERRY OVERHEAD	0.60%	1.32		1.32	----	----	----	
TOTALS		265.89		217.48	0.00	0.00	36.00	78
ROUNDED		265.90		217.60	0.00	0.00	36.00	78.
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		241.7		186.20	0.00	0.00	33.50	74.

IT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT			SIM HRS/IUT	
	T-45	T-45	2F137	2F138	2F137	2F138
IGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	73.50	69.90	0.00	0.00	12.00	18.00

17

IT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RAT .0)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

STRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HRS/(SL + SCT) * SL * AVAIL * WX * EI * DAYS

T-45 = 8HRS/(1.33 + 2.00) * 1.33 * 0.800 * 0.89 * 1.00 * 237 = 559 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
STRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(217.6 / 839)			= .40353
RCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(265.9 / 732)			= .36325
DC TRNR/STUD RATIO		(36.0 /2779)		= .01295
MULATOR/STUD RATIO			(78.3 /2719)	= .02880

UAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HR/(SL + TAT) * SL * AVAIL * EI * WX * DAYS

ACFT UTIL	= 10/(1.33 + 1.40)	* 1.33	* 0.760	* 0.95	* 0.89	* 237 =	732
37 CPT UTIL	= 16/(1.60 + 0.25)	* 1.50	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237 =	2779
38 FL SIM UTIL	= 16/(1.30 + 0.25)	* 1.30	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237 =	2719

.40882
from D.C. .35724)

OVHD FACTOR = 51.4%

APPENDIX C

BRAC-93 & BRAC-95 DATA CALLS ON FLIGHT OPS/PTR

Appendix C

1995 DC-2 KINGSVILLE Beechcraft-jet

ORIGINAL QUESTION

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training (cont.)

3. Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per student for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Give the historical average for day and night (1) flight operations required by the syllabus for each student, (2) overhead[1] flight operations per student, and (3) total flight operations attributed to each student. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary.

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per Student					
			Student		Overhead[1]		Total	
			Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night
General N/A	Primary	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
Strike	Intermediate NA	T-2						
	Advanced NA	TA-4J						
	Intermediate/ Advanced	T-45[2]	~~1115~~ 1160	187	~~390~~ 445	~~65~~ 268	~~1585~~ 1605	455
E2/C2 N/A	Intermediate	T-44						
	Advanced	T-2						
		T-45[2]						
Maritime N/A	Intermediate	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
	Advanced	T-44						
Rotary N/A	Intermediate	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
	Advanced	TH-57						

[1]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, incomplete flights, instructor training, flights, warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

[2]If requirements are still being derived, give best estimate.

1995 DC2 KINGSVILLE Revised pg

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training (cont.)

3. Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per graduate for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Include only those flight operations that are conducted at your air station and outlying auxillary fields. Do not include flight ops required by the syllabus but conducted at other sites (e.g. on detachment to other air stations or on a carrier). To complete the below table, give the historical average for day and night (1) flight operations required per graduate at the air station and OLFs, (2) overhead[1] flight operations per graduate, and (3) total flight operations at the air station and OLFs attributed to each graduate. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary.

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per Student					
			Student		Overhead[1]		Total	
			Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night
General	Primary	T-34C	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		JPATS[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Strike	Intermediate	T-2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Advanced	TA-4J	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Intermediate & Advanced (TS Syllabus)	T-45	906	213	487	81	1393	294
	Advanced	T-45[2]	599	204	289	70	888	274
E2/C2	Intermediate	T-44	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Advanced	T-2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		T-45[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Maritime	Intermediate	T-34C	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		JPATS[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

[1]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, incomplete flights, instructor training, flights, warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

[2]If requirements are still being derived, give best estimate.

Revised pg.

1993 OC34 MERIDIAN

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training

Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per PTR for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Include all overhead[2]. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary.

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per PTR	
			Total	Night
General	Primary	T-34J		
Strike	Intermediate	T-2C	884	57
		T-45[a]	951	121.5
	Advanced	TA-4J	1326	86
		T-45[a]	951	121.5
E2/C2	Intermediate	T-2C		
		T-45[a]		
	Advanced	T-44		
Maritime	Intermediate	T-34C		
	Advanced	T-44		

FLIGHT OPERATIONS PER FLIGHT CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:
2210 TOTAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS PER PTR x .4 FOR T-2'S = 884,
x .6 FOR TA-4'S = 1326
NIGHT FLIGHT OPERATIONS CALCULATED BY SYLLABUS SORTIES:
4 FOR INT/6 FOR ADV x 14.3

a. Estimate requirements for the T-45.
T-45 DATA ESTIMATE FROM LATEST CNATRA PLANNING FACTORS DOCUMENT AND DRAFT MASTER CURRICULUM GUIDE.

[2]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, instructor training flights, flights canceled due to weather (i.e., incomplete flights), warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

APPENDIX D

KEN STORMS ANALYSIS TO BRAC COMMISSION STAFF 23 MAR 95

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

KEN STORMS' BRIEF
to BRAC Commission Staff
23 MAR 95

In my 31 years of active duty, I have spent a total of 8 years in a flight instructor billet. One year was in Navy Primary Flight Training, two years in a Replacement Air Group (FRS now) and five years in the Strike Training pipeline as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of an Advanced Squadron and later as a Training Air Wing Commander. I have also served as the Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Safety Coordinator at what was then called Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) now N88.

My loyalty to the United States Navy and Naval Aviation has never been questioned. While working in the Pentagon, I adopted the belief that when a decision was made which I thought was incorrect or unwise, I owed it to myself and Naval Aviation to find out why. Either the senior decision maker had more information than I, or I had more information than the decision maker. Either way we needed to talk. Most times, that senior person had more information than I and when I heard it I could fully support the decision. Sometimes I possessed more information, and the decision was reversed or modified.

When I heard that using Runway Capacity was the theory to determine a military base's ability to produce a PTR, I needed to further investigate the theory.

I found that the Runway Capacity Theory works well for some major civilian commercial airfields. At these large facilities the number of aircrews, aircraft and maintenance personnel exceed the capacity of the runways and departure/arrival controllers to physically launch and recover the aircraft.

At military Training Air Stations there are factors that act to constrain the ability to ever reach runway capacity. These constraints are number of aircraft, instructors, students and weather criteria.

In order to operate a Naval Air Training base at maximum runway capacity, we would have to place a student aviator in the same traffic density as experienced at Hartsfield, O'Hare, Los Angeles International, etc. By utilizing

the outlying airfields to maximum capacity, it would be similar to a La Guardia, JFK and Newark complex. Flying into these kinds of traffic densities is hard enough on experienced aviators armed with a co-pilot and a navigator. It would be overwhelming, unsafe and unnecessary to place a student aviator in that arena.

I know of no production system whether it be manufacturing, industrial, educational or performance (such as race cars, aircraft, etc.) that are designed for operating at maximum performance. In our Naval aircraft, we utilize maximum range speeds, maximum endurance speeds, as well as terminal (maximum) speed. While the capability of achieving maximum performance when needed must be preserved, to intentionally plan to operate at maximum performance levels invites catastrophic failure.

If a home field were my aircraft and 80 ops per hour was my maximum speed, I would fly it at 60-65 ops per hour (max range speed) or the most cost effective production speed. I could produce the maximum number of Naval Aviators and still maintain those I have already trained. I would still have a realistic surge capability. That would allow me to increase speed if required but allow me to endure for a long period of time.

As a squadron Executive Officer in 1980, my Training Squadron was working seven days per week, twelve hour shifts. In that year we had 18 instructors come upon their end of obligated service. Sixteen left the Naval service and two accepted follow on tours. During my Commanding Officer tour, my Wing Commander allowed me to go to eight hour shifts, five days per week. Our production went down for two months then in one month it returned to the old production rate. At the end of my tour, production was increased 11% above the old rate while the individual working hours were reduced by 33%. Exactly 18 instructors reached their end of obligated service with 16 taking follow on tours with the fleet, and two opting for civilian careers.

You simply cannot work people and machines for extended periods of time at 100% of their capacity. Naval Aviators filling the roles of Strike flight instructors are not shore duty sailors. They are sea duty carrier aviators who happen to be on shore duty.

ASSET REQUIREMENTS BASED ON PTR

336 PTR

1511 OPS/PTR

968 OPS/DAY	HOMEFIELD	80 OPS/HR	12.1 HRS/DAY
626 OPS/DAY	1 OLF	54 OPS/HR	11.6 HRS/DAY
545 OPS/DAY	1 OLF	54 OPS/HR	10.1 HRS/DAY
2139 OPS/DAY		188 OPS/HR	

2139 OPS/DAY X 237 DAYS/YR = 506,943 OPS/YR ÷ 1511 OPS/PTR = 336 PTR

FLIGHTS SCHEDULED/DAY	= 312	
FLIGHTS COMPLETED/DAY	= 283	
STUDENT COMPLETED FLIGHTS/DAY	= 187	
AIRCRAFT NEEDED IN "A" STATUS	= 121	(.359 AIRCRAFT PER 1 PTR)
INSTRUCTORS NEEDED	= 138	(.4088 INSTRUCTORS PER 1 PTR)
STUDENTS NEEDED	= 311	(.925 STUDENTS PER 1 PTR)

DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULE PARAMETERS:

1. LAUNCH 22 AIRCRAFT/HR AT HOMEFIELD FOR 12.1 HRS.
2. AIRCRAFT MUST LAUNCH AT 2.7 MINUTE INTERVALS.
3. 4 AIRCRAFT GO TO OLF #1 AND GET 13 MORE OPERATIONS EACH.
4. 4 AIRCRAFT GO TO OLF #2 AND GET 13 MORE OPERATIONS EACH.
5. 6 AIRCRAFT STAY AT HOMEFIELD FOR 13 MORE OPERATIONS EACH.
6. 8 AIRCRAFT GO TO AREA AND DO HIGH WORK THEN FILL IN AT OLF'S FOR 13 MORE OPERATIONS EACH WHILE ORIGINAL OLF AIRCRAFT ARE TURNING AROUND ON DECK.

APPENDIX E

CORPUS CHRISTI NOISE SURVEY

TABLE 3
OPERATIONS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Unit	Aircraft	Percent Of Total Ops.	Daily Operations
TW4	T-34C	39.25	346.422
	T-44A	48.34	426.608
NAS	UC-12B	0.72	6.332
	UH-1N	0.54	4.794
Customs	P-3A/B	0.98	8.666
	C-500	0.07	0.588
	SC-7	0.04	0.380
USCG	HU-25	2.42	21.381
	HH-65	1.22	10.774
CCAD	UH-1N	0.11	0.996
	U-21G	0.20	1.629
	Misc. Helo	0.51	4.522
Transients		5.60	49.422
GRAND TOTAL		100.00	882.514

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An analysis of the contribution of each aircraft type to total noise exposure indicated that only the transient A-4 aircraft, in addition to the based aircraft, would contribute significantly to Ldn. Consequently, of the 49.422 daily transient operations, 38.846 were modelled, giving total modelled operations of 871.938. By modelling only the A-4 transient aircraft, as well as all based aircraft, the total Ldn was computed to be within 0.1 dB of the total, had all transient operations been modelled.

The breakdown of all aircraft types and operations, as modelled, are presented in Table 4. The percentage of aircraft operations by arrival, departure and patterns are based on the information as provided in the squadron data packages.

TABLE 6 (continued)
MODELLED AVERAGE BUSY DAY OPERATIONS BY FLIGHT TRACK
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Large Transport Aircraft
(P-3)

Runway	Flight Track Description	Name	P-3 Day	P-3 Night
13R	Departure	13RD1	1.733	0.433
	Arrival	13RA2	0.624	0.156
	Arrival	13RA3	0.313	0.078
	Arrival	13RA4	0.624	0.156
31L	Departure	31LD3	1.733	0.433
	Arrival	31LA3	0.936	0.234
	Arrival	31LA4	0.624	0.156
17	Arrival	17A3	0.173	0.043
35	Arrival	35A3	0.147	0.037
	Arrival	35A4	0.026	0.007
	Total:		6.933	1.733
	GRAND TOTAL:		8.666	

TABLE 6 (continued)
MODELLED AVERAGE BUSY DAY OPERATIONS BY FLIGHT TRACK
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Jet Aircraft
(A-4,HU-25,C-500)

Runway	Flight Track Description	Name	A-4 Day	A-4 Night	HU-25 Day	HU-25 Night	C-500 Day	C-500 Night
13R	Departure	13RD1	2.638	0.139	1.831	0.019	0.146	0.002
	GCA Box Departure	13RD1	--	--	0.129	0.001	--	--
	GCA Box Arrival	13RA3	--	--	0.129	0.001	--	--
	Arrival	13RA4	0.132	0.007	0.549	0.006	0.044	0.000
	Arrival	13RA5	2.507	0.132	1.099	0.011	0.087	0.001
	Touch & Go	13RT3	--	--	6.478	0.066	--	--
	Touch & Go	13RT4	13.174	0.694	--	--	--	--
13L	GCA Box Departure	13LD1	--	--	0.160	0.001	--	--
	GCA Box Arrival	13LA3	--	--	0.160	0.001	--	--
31L	Departure	31LD3	2.638	0.139	1.831	0.019	0.146	0.002
	GCA Box Departure	31LD2	--	--	0.062	0.001	--	--
	Arrival	31LA3	--	--	0.989	0.010	0.077	0.001
	GCA Box Arrival	31LA3	--	--	0.062	0.001	--	--
	Arrival	31LA4	0.132	0.007	0.659	0.007	0.052	0.001
	Arrival	31LA5	2.507	0.132	--	--	--	--
	Touch & Go	31LT3	--	--	6.475	0.066	--	--
	Touch & Go	31LT4	13.174	0.694	--	--	--	--
31R	GCA Box Departure	31RD2	--	--	0.093	0.001	--	--
	GCA Box Arrival	31RA1	--	--	0.093	0.001	--	--
17	Arrival	17A3	--	--	0.183	0.002	0.015	0.000
35	Arrival	35A3	--	--	0.156	0.002	0.012	0.000
	Arrival	35A4	--	--	0.027	0.000	0.002	0.000
	Total:		36.902	1.944	21.165	0.216	0.581	0.007
	GRAND TOTAL:		38.846		21.381		0.588	

TABLE 6 (continued)
MODELLED AVERAGE BUSY DAY OPERATIONS BY FLIGHT TRACK
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Helicopters
(HH-65,UH-1)

Pad	Flight Track Description	Name	HH-65 Day	HH-65 Night	UH-1 Day	UH-1 Night
USCG	Departure	USCGD1	5.333	0.054	--	--
	Arrival	USCGA1	5.333	0.054	--	--
CCAD	Departure	CCADD1	--	--	1.380	0.000
	Departure	CCADD2	--	--	1.380	0.000
	Arrival	CCADA1	--	--	1.380	0.000
	Arrival	CCADA2	--	--	1.380	0.000
NAS	Departure	NASD1	--	--	0.263	0.003
	Departure	NASD2	--	--	0.262	0.003
	Departure	NASD3	--	--	0.262	0.003
	Departure	NASD4	--	--	1.583	0.016
	Arrival	NASA1	--	--	0.629	0.006
	Arrival	NASA2	--	--	0.629	0.006
	Arrival	NASA3	--	--	0.973	0.010
	Arrival	NASA4	--	--	0.071	0.001
	Arrival	NASA5	--	--	0.071	0.001
	Total:		10.666	0.108	10.263	0.049
	GRAND TOTAL:		10.774		10.312	

APPENDIX F

NTTC COBRA

Realign NAS Meridian COBRA Analysis

The analysis was based on the Navy's close NAS Meridian COBRA file "TNAS6DA.CBR." The close Meridian scenario was modified by deleting the transfer of NTTC Meridian personnel and equipment to NETC in Newport, Rhode Island, and the Supply Corps Officer School in Athens Georgia. All facilities at Meridian would close except the NTTC compound (training and headquarter buildings , and enlisted barracks), the medical and dental clinic, the Counter Drug Training Academy, the Consolidated bachelor quarters, the galley, Navy Exchange facilities, the Enlisted Club, morale, welfare and recreation facilities, the freshwater and waste water treatment plants. One hundred enlisted and fifty civilian employees were added from the positions being eliminated to perform base operating and security functions.

The "realign NAS Meridian" scenario resulted in an **increase in the net present value of savings** by 2015 of **$16.5 millions** over the "close Meridian" option and a **reduction of one time costs of $37.5 million**. This is because the $30 millions dollars in new construction at Athens, Georgia and Newport, Rhode Island, is never paid for by the small reduction in recurring costs resulting from the relocation of the schools.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 10:22 11/19/1994, Report Created 15:33 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : ALT 3 - TRAINING NAS
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\TNAS6D4A.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1999
ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015($K): -464,499
1-Time Cost($K): 81,434

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	19,512	-24,461	27,140	-16,250	-12,000	-3,900	-9,958	0
Person	-198	-1,782	-9,076	-20,656	-25,980	-25,980	-83,672	-25,980
Overhd	3,354	1,778	-930	-1,387	-6,868	-6,868	-10,921	-6,868
Moving	2,485	1,617	3,525	2,256	0	0	9,883	0
Missio	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-168	-28
Other	-14,097	-2,362	-3,250	-17,406	-17,500	-7,500	-62,115	0
TOTAL	11,028	-25,237	17,381	-53,471	-62,376	-44,276	-156,951	-32,876

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	1	7	41	12	0	0	61
Enlisted	16	58	182	71	0	0	327
Civilians	2	9	84	125	0	0	220
TOTAL	19	74	307	208	0	0	608
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Officers	129	82	98	10	0	0	319
Enlisted	31	87	81	168	0	0	367
Students	251	178	137	716	0	0	1,282
Civilians	81	7	65	17	0	0	170
TOTAL	492	354	381	911	0	0	2,138

Summary:

Close NAS Meridian SCENARIO 016D
- Consol Strike Trng at NAS Kingsville
- Relocate NTTC to NavSCScol, Athens & NETC, Newport, RI

Realign NAS Corpus Christi
- Relocate UPT to NAS Pensacola & NAS Whiting Field
- NAS Corpus Christi remains open as a NAF under NAS Kingsville

Mine Helo assets placed in Mine Warfare Ctr of Excellence, saving costs assoc w/ BRAC-93 placement of helos at NAS North Island

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1999
ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015($K): -481,021
1-Time Cost($K): 45,704

Net Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	17,031	-24,882	0	-16,250	-12,000	-3,900	-40,000	0
Person	-434	-2,078	-10,126	-20,614	-25,690	-25,690	-84,634	-25,690
Overhd	2,424	1,044	-2,175	-4,750	-5,337	-5,337	-14,130	-5,337
Moving	2,519	1,633	3,434	1,080	0	0	8,666	0
Missio	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-168	-28
Other	-14,997	-2,589	-3,250	-17,406	-17,500	-7,500	-63,242	0
TOTAL	6,515	-26,900	-12,146	-57,968	-60,555	-42,455	-193,508	-31,055

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Officers	1	7	41	12	0	0	61
Enlisted	16	58	182	71	0	0	327
Civilians	2	9	84	125	0	0	220
TOTAL	19	74	307	208	0	0	608
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Officers	129	82	98	0	0	0	309
Enlisted	31	87	72	0	0	0	190
Students	251	178	137	0	0	0	566
Civilians	81	7	60	0	0	0	148
TOTAL	492	354	367	0	0	0	1,213

Summary:

Realign NAS Meridian
- Consol Strike Trng at NAS Kingsville
- NTTC Meridian remains open

Realign NAS Corpus Christi
- Relocate UPT to NAS Pensacola & NAS Whiting Field
- NAS Corpus Christi remains open as a NAF under NAS Kingsville

Mine Helo assets placed in Mine Warfare Ctr of Excellence, saving costs assoc w/ BRAC-93 placement of helos at NAS North Island

APPENDIX G

NAVY BSAT
CAPACITY FORMULA DATA

TRAINING AIR STATIONS





Configuration Modeling
Initial Results

FNCI (3)

FY 2001 PTR/NFOTR Requirements

Training	DON	USCG/FMS	USAF*	Total
Primary Pilot	1004	204	(100)	1208
Int E2/C2	40	0	0	40
Adv E2/C2	36	0	0	36
Int Maritime	179	57	0	236
Adv Maritime	149*	59	150	358
Int Helo	390	103	0	493
Adv Helo	376	103	0	479
Strike	306	30	0	336
Primary NFO	408	57	369	834
Int NFO	252	42	150	444
Advance NFO	173	40	92	305

** Reflects consolidation of fixed-wing flight training i.a.w., OSD Memo 24 October 1994*

Runway Capacity

- Capacity Measure -- annual number of daylight runway operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and touch-and-goes)
- Formula

  Runway ops/yr = Flying days/yr x Daylight hours/day x Runway ops/hr

- Data
  - Annual number of training days - 237 days
  - Average number of daylight hours/day - 12.1 hours
  - Runway hourly capacity (ops/hour)
    - Based on FAA model
    - Depends on mix of light and heavy aircraft

Runway Capacities
Annual Daylight Runway Operations

Air Station	Operations
Corpus Christi	817,548
Kingsville	377,873
Meridian	377,991
Pensacola	340,356
Whiting Field	4,470,460

** Includes capacities of assigned out-lying fields

Daylight Runway Ops Requirements

Type Training	*Runway Ops/Grad**
Primary Pilot	684
Int Maritime/Helo	65
Int E2/C2	400
Adv E2/C2	866
Adv Maritme	496
Adv Helo	1157
Strike	1511
Primary NFO	121
Int NFO	111
Adv NFO	90

* *Includes overhead (i.e., IUT, NATOPS, attrition, & maintenance)*

APPENDIX H

NAVY-MERIDIAN TEAM PRESENTERS

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

PRESENTERS

Honorable Kirk Fordice, Governor
State of Mississippi

Bill Crawford
Director, Navy-Meridian Team
BRAC-91, 93, 95

Robert F. Dunn, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)

William McGowan, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Immediate Past Chief of Naval Air Training

Randy Leddy, Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Training and Operations
Chief of Naval Air Training

Ken Storms, Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Commander,
Training Air Wing ONE, Meridian

Jack Douglass, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Former Operations Officer,
Training Air Wing ONE, Meridian

P. O. BOX 790 • MERIDIAN, MS 39302
601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

AICUZ	**Air Incompatible Use Zone**
BASH	**Bird Air Strike Hazard**
BCEG	**Base Closure Executive Group**
BSAT	**Base Structure Analysis Team**
BSEC	**Base Structure Evaluation Committee**
CNATRA	**Chief of Naval Air Training**
CNO	**Chief of Naval Operations**
COBRA	**Costs of Base Realignment Action**
DOD	**Department of Defense**
DON	**Department of the Navy**
FOD	**Foreign Object Damage**
JPATS	**Joint Primary Aviation Training System**
NAS	**Naval Air Station**
NFO	**Naval Flight Officer**
NTTC	**Naval Technical Training Center**
OLF	**Outlying Field**
OPS/PTR	**Operations per Pilot Training Rate**
PTR	**Pilot Training Rate**
STRIKE	**Navy Carrier Jet Pilot Training**
UPT	**Undergraduate Pilot Training**

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

May 1, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Governor of the State of Mississippi presented our argument concerning the Naval Technical Training Center at NAS Meridian during the Birmingham Regional Hearing. The Navy Meridian Team, the official community authority, respectfully submits the attached information to support his argument that the Navy recommendation to close NTTCM is flawed.

In summary, Navy data shows NTTCM should remain open and COBRA cost analysis shows NTTCM should stay open, whether NAS Meridian is closed or not.

The NTTCM closure is a separate recommendation from the closure of NAS Meridian. We respectfully request that NTTCM be reviewed and considered on a stand alone basis.

We appreciate the awesome task you and your fellow commissioners are undertaking. Thank you for the fair consideration you are giving our case.

Sincerely,

Bill Crawford
Chairman

P. O. BOX 790 • MERIDIAN, MS 39302
601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

Realign NAS Meridian COBRA Analysis

The analysis was based on the Navy's close NAS Meridian COBRA file "TNAS6DA.CBR." The close Meridian scenario was modified by deleting the transfer of NTTC Meridian personnel and equipment to NETC in Newport, Rhode Island, and the Supply Corps Officer School in Athens Georgia. All facilities at Meridian would close except the NTTC compound (training and headquarter buildings , and enlisted barracks), the medical and dental clinic, the Counter Drug Training Academy, the Consolidated bachelor quarters, the galley, Navy Exchange facilities, the Enlisted Club, morale, welfare and recreation facilities, the freshwater and waste water treatment plants. One hundred enlisted and fifty civilian employees were added from the positions being eliminated to perform base operating and security functions.

The "realign NAS Meridian" scenario resulted in an **increase in the net present value of savings** by 2015 of **$16.5 millions** over the "close Meridian" option and a **reduction of one time costs of $37.5 million**. This is because the $30 millions dollars in new construction at Athens, Georgia and Newport, Rhode Island, is never paid for by the small reduction in recurring costs resulting from the relocation of the schools.

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
Final Year : 1999
ROI Year : Immediate

NPV in 2015($K): -481,021
1-Time Cost($K): 45,704

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	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	17,031	-24,882	0	-16,250	-12,000	-3,900	-40,000	0
Person	-434	-2,078	-10,126	-20,614	-25,690	-25,690	-84,634	-25,690
Overhd	2,424	1,044	-2,175	-4,750	-5,337	-5,337	-14,130	-5,337
Moving	2,519	1,633	3,434	1,080	0	0	8,666	0
Missio	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-28	-168	-28
Other	-14,997	-2,589	-3,250	-17,406	-17,500	-7,500	-63,242	0
TOTAL	6,515	-26,900	-12,146	-57,968	-60,555	-42,455	-193,508	-31,055

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
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Enlisted	16	58	182	71	0	0	327
Civilians	2	9	84	125	0	0	220
TOTAL	19	74	307	208	0	0	608
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
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Civilians	81	7	60	0	0	0	148
TOTAL	492	354	367	0	0	0	1,213

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- Consol Strike Trng at NAS Kingsville
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Realign NAS Corpus Christi
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Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Costs ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	17,110	11,873	0	0	0	0	28,984	0
Person	346	667	1,530	1,721	1,232	1,232	6,729	1,232
Overhd	3,015	3,816	4,791	3,929	3,578	3,578	22,708	3,578
Moving	2,663	1,785	3,587	1,080	0	0	9,116	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	937	791	130	94	0	0	1,952	0
TOTAL	24,072	18,933	10,039	6,825	4,810	4,810	69,490	4,810

Savings ($K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
MilCon	79	36,755	0	16,250	12,000	3,900	68,984	0
Person	781	2,745	11,657	22,335	26,922	26,922	91,363	26,922
Overhd	591	2,772	6,967	8,680	8,915	8,915	36,838	8,915
Moving	144	152	153	0	0	0	450	0
Missio	28	28	28	28	28	28	168	28
Other	15,934	3,380	3,380	17,500	17,500	7,500	65,194	0
TOTAL	17,557	45,833	22,185	64,793	65,365	47,265	262,998	35,865

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Year	Cost($)	Adjusted Cost($)	NPV($)
1996	6,515,583	6,427,800	6,427,800
1997	-26,899,796	-25,827,136	-19,399,336
1998	-12,145,835	-11,349,397	-30,748,733
1999	-57,968,242	-52,717,369	-83,466,102
2000	-60,554,931	-53,595,864	-137,061,966
2001	-42,454,931	-36,570,262	-173,632,228
2002	-31,054,931	-26,034,466	-199,666,694
2003	-31,054,931	-25,337,680	-225,004,374
2004	-31,054,931	-24,659,542	-249,663,916
2005	-31,054,931	-23,999,555	-273,663,471
2006	-31,054,931	-23,357,231	-297,020,702
2007	-31,054,931	-22,732,098	-319,752,800
2008	-31,054,931	-22,123,696	-341,876,496
2009	-31,054,931	-21,531,578	-363,408,074
2010	-31,054,931	-20,955,307	-384,363,381
2011	-31,054,931	-20,394,459	-404,757,841
2012	-31,054,931	-19,848,622	-424,606,463
2013	-31,054,931	-19,317,394	-443,923,857
2014	-31,054,931	-18,800,383	-462,724,240
2015	-31,054,931	-18,297,210	-481,021,451

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OH.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	28,983,744	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		28,983,744
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	396,451	
Civilian Early Retirement	164,679	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	734,928	
Unemployment	62,640	
Total - Personnel		1,358,698
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	3,282,301	
Mothball / Shutdown	1,011,250	
Total - Overhead		4,293,551
Moving		
Civilian Moving	2,778,116	
Civilian PPS	1,900,800	
Military Moving	2,484,520	
Freight	324,905	
One-Time Moving Costs	1,628,000	
Total - Moving		9,116,342
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	700,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	1,252,000	
Total - Other		1,952,000
Total One-Time Costs		45,704,335
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	68,984,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	450,297	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	65,194,000	
Total One-Time Savings		134,628,297
Total Net One-Time Costs		-88,923,961

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS MERIDIAN, MS
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	277,515	
Civilian Early Retirement	114,361	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	628,244	
Unemployment	43,848	
Total - Personnel		1,063,968
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	1,182,444	
Mothball / Shutdown	792,500	
Total - Overhead		1,974,944
Moving		
Civilian Moving	865,110	
Civilian PPS	1,742,400	
Military Moving	1,213,897	
Freight	226,179	
One-Time Moving Costs	460,000	
Total - Moving		4,507,585
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	94,000	
Total - Other		94,000
Total One-Time Costs		7,640,498
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	15,479,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	224,697	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	65,194,000	
Total One-Time Savings		80,897,697
Total Net One-Time Costs		-73,257,199

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	7,415,305	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		7,415,305
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	118,935	
Civilian Early Retirement	50,319	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	106,684	
Unemployment	18,792	
Total - Personnel		294,730
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	2,099,857	
Mothball / Shutdown	218,750	
Total - Overhead		2,318,607
Moving		
Civilian Moving	1,913,006	
Civilian PPS	158,400	
Military Moving	1,270,624	
Freight	98,726	
One-Time Moving Costs	1,168,000	
Total - Moving		4,608,756
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	718,000	
Total - Other		718,000
Total One-Time Costs		15,355,399
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	53,505,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	225,599	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		53,730,599
Total Net One-Time Costs		-38,375,201

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OH.SFF

Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	17,641,439	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		17,641,439
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	550,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		550,000
Total One-Time Costs		18,191,439
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		18,191,439

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS PENSACOLA, FL
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	3,927,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		3,927,000
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	150,000	
One-Time Unique Costs	440,000	
Total - Other		590,000
Total One-Time Costs		4,517,000
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		4,517,000

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OH.SFF

Base: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL
(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
Total One-Time Costs		0
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		0

TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

All Costs in $K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
NAS MERIDIAN	0	0	0	-15,479	-15,479
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	7,415	0	0	-53,505	-46,090
NAS KINGSVILLE	17,641	0	0	0	17,641
NAS PENSACOLA	3,927	0	0	0	3,927
NAS WHITING FIELD	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	28,984	0	0	-68,984	-40,000

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

All Costs in $K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*

Total Construction Cost:	0
+ Info Management Account:	0
+ Land Purchases:	0
- Construction Cost Avoid:	15,479
TOTAL:	-15,479

* MilCon Costs include Site Preparation Costs, Design Costs, Contingency Planning Costs and SIOH Costs where applicable

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

All Costs in $K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Horizontal (SY)	HORIZ	0	0	70,000	6,283	6,283
Extend RWs 17-35 & 04-22 by 1,000 ft ea. and taxiways 3,000 ft at NAS CC						
R/W lighting	OTHER	0	n/a	0	n/a	264
NAF Corpus Christi improvements						
Taxiway Lighting	OTHER	0	n/a	0	n/a	168
NAF Corpus Christi improvements						
Arresting Gear (4)	OTHER	0	n/a	0	n/a	200
NAF Corpus Christi improvements						
Wheel/Waveoff	OTHER	0	n/a	0	n/a	500
NAF Corpus Christi improvements						

Total Construction Cost:	7,415
+ Info Management Account:	0
+ Land Purchases:	0
- Construction Cost Avoid:	53,505
TOTAL:	-46,090

* MilCon Costs include Site Preparation Costs, Design Costs, Contingency Planning Costs and SIOH Costs where applicable

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

All Costs in $K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Horizontal (SY)	HORIZ	0	0	17,500	1,658	1,658
Additional Parking Aprons at NALF Orange Grove						
Air Maintenance (SF)	AIROP	87,800	12,478	0	0	12,478
Hangar and other facilities						
Supply/Storage(SF)	STORA	0	n/a	20,400	n/a	1,400
Warehousing reqt for T2 aircraft parts NAS Kingsville						
Administrative (SF)	ADMIN	25,900	n/a	0	n/a	1,925
TRAWING Two Headquarters						
Training (SF)	SCHLB	4,000	n/a	0	n/a	180
Classrooms and operational trainers (8)						

Total Construction Cost:	17,641
+ Info Management Account:	0
+ Land Purchases:	0
- Construction Cost Avoid:	0
TOTAL:	17,641

* MilCon Costs include Site Preparation Costs, Design Costs, Contingency Planning Costs and SIOH Costs where applicable

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

MilCon for Base: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

All Costs in $K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Air Maintenance(SF)	AIROP	0	n/a	16,380	n/a	400
Construct two wash racks for add'l aircraft						
Administrative (SF)	ADMIN	15,750	n/a	14,100	n/a	3,192
Rehab Bldg 3221; spaces for CNATRA staff & HRO personnel from NAS Meridian						
Training (SF)	SCHLB	6,100	n/a	0	n/a	335
Bldg 3813 (for UPT)						

Total Construction Cost:	3,927
+ Info Management Account:	0
+ Land Purchases:	0
- Construction Cost Avoid:	0
TOTAL:	3,927

* MilCon Costs include Site Preparation Costs, Design Costs, Contingency Planning Costs and SIOH Costs where applicable

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
n Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
rio File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
208	687	1,179	331

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	-8	0	0	0	0	0	-8
Enlisted	-19	0	0	0	0	0	-19
Students	-313	0	0	0	0	0	-313
Civilians	-16	0	0	0	0	0	-16
TOTAL	-356	0	0	0	0	0	-356

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
200	668	866	315

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
To Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	45	14	79	0	0	0	138
Enlisted	15	46	50	0	0	0	111
Students	75	0	75	0	0	0	150
Civilians	4	2	36	0	0	0	42
TOTAL	139	62	240	0	0	0	441

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of NAS MERIDIAN, MS):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	45	14	79	0	0	0	138
Enlisted	15	46	50	0	0	0	111
Students	75	0	75	0	0	0	150
Civilians	4	2	36	0	0	0	42
TOTAL	139	62	240	0	0	0	441

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-5	-35	-12	0	0	-52
Enlisted	0	-40	-169	-71	0	0	-280
Civilians	-1	-5	-70	-125	0	0	-201
TOTAL	-1	-50	-274	-208	0	0	-533

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
10	277	716	72

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
342	860	416	931

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	19	0	0	0	0	0	19
listed	329	0	0	0	0	0	329
dents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
vilians	-170	0	0	0	0	0	-170
TOTAL	178	0	0	0	0	0	178

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
361	1,189	416	761

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
To Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	3	1	0	0	0	4
Enlisted	0	9	6	0	0	0	15
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	6	0	2	0	0	0	8
TOTAL	6	12	9	0	0	0	27

To Base: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	20	18	0	0	0	80
Enlisted	16	25	14	0	0	0	55
Students	61	62	62	0	0	0	185
Civilians	71	2	20	0	0	0	93
TOTAL	190	109	114	0	0	0	413

To Base: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	45	0	0	0	0	87
Enlisted	0	7	2	0	0	0	9
Students	115	116	0	0	0	0	231
Civilians	0	3	2	0	0	0	5
TOTAL	157	171	4	0	0	0	332

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	84	68	19	0	0	0	171
Enlisted	16	41	22	0	0	0	79
Students	176	178	62	0	0	0	416
Civilians	77	5	24	0	0	0	106
TOTAL	353	292	127	0	0	0	772

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	-1	-2	-6	0	0	0	-9
Enlisted	-16	-18	-13	0	0	0	-47
Civilians	-1	-4	-14	0	0	0	-19
TOTAL	-18	-24	-33	0	0	0	-75

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
181	1,063	0	636

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
151	511	317	329

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
From Base: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	45	14	79	0	0	0	138
Enlisted	15	46	50	0	0	0	111
Students	75	0	75	0	0	0	150
Civilians	4	2	36	0	0	0	42
TOTAL	139	62	240	0	0	0	441

From Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	3	1	0	0	0	4
Enlisted	0	9	6	0	0	0	15
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	6	0	2	0	0	0	8
TOTAL	6	12	9	0	0	0	27

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAS KINGSVILLE, TX):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	45	17	80	0	0	0	142
Enlisted	15	55	56	0	0	0	126
Students	75	0	75	0	0	0	150
Civilians	10	2	38	0	0	0	50
TOTAL	145	74	249	0	0	0	468

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
293	637	467	379

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
708	1,627	1,943	2,052

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
From Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	20	18	0	0	0	80
Enlisted	16	25	14	0	0	0	55
Students	61	62	62	0	0	0	185
Civilians	71	2	20	0	0	0	93
TOTAL	190	109	114	0	0	0	413

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAS PENSACOLA, FL):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	20	18	0	0	0	80
Enlisted	16	25	14	0	0	0	55
Students	61	62	62	0	0	0	185
Civilians	71	2	20	0	0	0	93
TOTAL	190	109	114	0	0	0	413

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
788	1,682	2,128	2,145

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
262	673	123	214

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:
From Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	45	0	0	0	0	87
Enlisted	0	7	2	0	0	0	9
Students	115	116	0	0	0	0	231
Civilians	0	3	2	0	0	0	5
TOTAL	157	171	4	0	0	0	332

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into NAS WHITING FIELD, FL):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	42	45	0	0	0	0	87
Enlisted	0	7	2	0	0	0	9
Students	115	116	0	0	0	0	231
Civilians	0	3	2	0	0	0	5
TOTAL	157	171	4	0	0	0	332

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
349	682	354	219

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		81	7	60	0	0	0	148
Early Retirement*	10.00%	8	0	6	0	0	0	14
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	4	0	3	0	0	0	7
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	13	0	8	0	0	0	21
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		4	0	3	0	0	0	7
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		52	7	40	0	0	0	99
Civilian Positions Available		29	0	20	0	0	0	49
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		2	9	84	125	0	0	220
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	1	8	13	0	0	22
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	5	6	0	0	11
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	2	13	19	0	0	34
Priority Placement#	60.00%	2	5	50	75	0	0	132
Civilians Available to Move		0	1	8	12	0	0	21
Civilians Moving		0	0	8	0	0	0	8
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	1	0	12	0	0	13
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		81	7	60	0	0	0	148
Civilians Moving		52	7	48	0	0	0	107
New Civilians Hired		29	0	12	0	0	0	41
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		8	1	14	13	0	0	36
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		4	1	3	12	0	0	20
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		2	5	50	75	0	0	132
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		29	0	12	0	0	0	41

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Moving (Voluntary RIFs) varies by base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS MERIDIAN, MS	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		4	2	36	0	0	0	42
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	1	0	5	0	0	0	6
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		3	2	23	0	0	0	28
Civilian Positions Available		1	0	13	0	0	0	14
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		1	5	70	125	0	0	201
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	1	7	13	0	0	21
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	4	6	0	0	10
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	1	11	19	0	0	31
Priority Placement#	60.00%	1	3	42	75	0	0	121
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	6	12	0	0	18
Civilians Moving		0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	12	0	0	12
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	1	11	13	0	0	25
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	2	12	0	0	14
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		1	3	42	75	0	0	121
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		77	5	24	0	0	0	106
Early Retirement*	10.00%	8	0	2	0	0	0	10
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	12	0	3	0	0	0	15
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		49	5	17	0	0	0	71
Civilian Positions Available		28	0	7	0	0	0	35
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		1	4	14	0	0	0	19
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
Priority Placement#	60.00%	1	2	8	0	0	0	11
Civilians Available to Move		0	1	2	0	0	0	3
Civilians Moving		0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		8	0	3	0	0	0	11
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		4	1	1	0	0	0	6
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		1	2	8	0	0	0	11
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OMA.SFF

Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		10	2	38	0	0	0	50
Civilians Moving		7	2	31	0	0	0	40
New Civilians Hired		3	0	7	0	0	0	10
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		3	0	7	0	0	0	10

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : NAVY
ion Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
nario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
d Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS PENSACOLA, FL	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		71	2	20	0	0	0	93
Civilians Moving		45	2	15	0	0	0	62
New Civilians Hired		26	0	5	0	0	0	31
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		26	0	5	0	0	0	31

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	3	2	0	0	0	5
Civilians Moving		0	3	2	0	0	0	5
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

Year	Moving In Total	Moving In Percent	MilCon TimPhas	Move Out/Elim Total	Move Out/Elim Percent	ShutDn TimPhas
1996	0	0.00%	50.00%	140	14.37%	14.37%
1997	0	0.00%	25.00%	112	11.50%	11.50%
1998	0	0.00%	25.00%	514	52.77%	52.77%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	208	21.36%	21.36%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	974	100.00%	100.00%

Base: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

Year	Moving In Total	Moving In Percent	MilCon TimPhas	Move Out/Elim Total	Move Out/Elim Percent	ShutDn TimPhas
1996	0	0.00%	66.67%	371	43.80%	43.80%
1997	0	0.00%	33.33%	316	37.31%	37.31%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	160	18.89%	18.89%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	847	100.00%	100.00%

Base: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

Year	Moving In Total	Moving In Percent	MilCon TimPhas	Move Out/Elim Total	Move Out/Elim Percent	ShutDn TimPhas
1996	145	30.98%	46.79%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	74	15.81%	53.21%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	249	53.21%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	468	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

	Moving In		MilCon	Move Out/Elim		ShutDn
Year	Total	Percent	TimPhas	Total	Percent	TimPhas
1996	190	46.00%	72.40%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	109	26.39%	27.60%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	114	27.60%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	413	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

	Moving In		MilCon	Move Out/Elim		ShutDn
Year	Total	Percent	TimPhas	Total	Percent	TimPhas
1996	157	47.29%	98.80%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	171	51.51%	1.20%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	4	1.20%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	332	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Base	Personnel Change	Personnel %Change	SF Change	SF %Change	SF Chg/Per
NAS MERIDIAN	-974	-48%	-634,000	-49%	651
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	-847	-31%	-175,000	-9%	207
NAS KINGSVILLE	468	36%	20,400	2%	43
NAS PENSACOLA	413	7%	30,480	1%	74
NAS WHITING FIELD	332	26%	0	0%	0

Base	RPMA($) Change	RPMA($) %Change	RPMA($) Chg/Per	BOS($) Change	BOS($) %Change	BOS($) Chg/Per
NAS MERIDIAN	-1,523,052	-47%	1,564	-1,288,769	-29%	1,323
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	-816,214	-8%	964	-1,161,566	-18%	1,371
NAS KINGSVILLE	157,023	2%	335	762,359	18%	1,629
NAS PENSACOLA	111,701	1%	270	952,673	3%	2,307
NAS WHITING FIELD	0	0%	0	1,594,125	13%	4,801

Base	RPMABOS($) Change	RPMABOS($) %Change	RPMABOS($) Chg/Per
NAS MERIDIAN	-2,811,821	-39%	2,887
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	-1,977,780	-12%	2,335
NAS KINGSVILLE	919,381	7%	1,964
NAS PENSACOLA	1,064,374	3%	2,577
NAS WHITING FIELD	1,594,125	10%	4,801

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

Net Change($K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	-286	-810	-1,257	-1,904	-2,070	-2,070	-8,398	-2,070
BOS Change	1,441	1,897	1,687	859	859	859	7,601	859
Housing Change	-46	-129	-335	-573	-642	-642	-2,368	-642
TOTAL CHANGES	1,109	957	94	-1,619	-1,854	-1,854	-3,166	-1,854

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.01)
Data As Of 21:59 03/27/1995, Report Created 15:29 03/29/1995

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
NAS MERIDIAN, MS	Realignment
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	Realignment
NAS KINGSVILLE, TX	Realignment
NAS PENSACOLA, FL	Realignment
NAS WHITING FIELD, FL	Realignment

Summary:

Realign NAS Meridian
- Consol Strike Trng at NAS Kingsville
- NTTC Meridian remains open

Realign NAS Corpus Christi
- Relocate UPT to NAS Pensacola & NAS Whiting Field
- NAS Corpus Christi remains open as a NAF under NAS Kingsville

Mine Helo assets placed in Mine Warfare Ctr of Excellence, saving costs assoc w/ BRAC-93 placement of helos at NAS North Island

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
NAS MERIDIAN, MS	NAS KINGSVILLE, TX	771 mi
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	NAS KINGSVILLE, TX	52 mi
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	NAS PENSACOLA, FL	766 mi
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	NAS WHITING FIELD, FL	766 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from NAS MERIDIAN, MS to NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	45	14	79	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	15	46	50	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	4	2	36	0	0	0
Student Positions:	75	0	75	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	17	21	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	70	45	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	1	13	13	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	10	10	0	0	0

Transfers from NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX to NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	0	3	1	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	9	6	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	6	0	2	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	2	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX to NAS PENSACOLA, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	42	20	18	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	16	25	14	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	71	2	20	0	0	0
Student Positions:	61	62	62	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	4	0	1	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX to NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	42	45	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	7	2	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	3	2	0	0	0
Student Positions:	115	116	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	1	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

Total Officer Employees:	208	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	3,260
Total Enlisted Employees:	687	Communications ($K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	1,179	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,143
Total Civilian Employees:	331	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	18,440
Mil Families Living On Base:	78.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	642
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.86
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,289	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	0	Activity Code:	63043
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	82	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

Total Officer Employees:	342	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	9,788
Total Enlisted Employees:	860	Communications ($K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	416	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	5,967
Total Civilian Employees:	931	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	24,015
Mil Families Living On Base:	20.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	506
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.90
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,958	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	151	Activity Code:	00216
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	92		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	94	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

Total Officer Employees:	151	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	8,539
Total Enlisted Employees:	511	Communications ($K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	317	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	4,245
Total Civilian Employees:	329	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	14,778
Mil Families Living On Base:	41.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	363
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.95
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,031	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	42	Activity Code:	60241
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	20		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	67	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

Total Officer Employees:	708	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	13,946
Total Enlisted Employees:	1,627	Communications ($K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	1,943	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	27,439
Total Civilian Employees:	2,052	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	36,326
Mil Families Living On Base:	31.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	452
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.80
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	3,538	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	50	Activity Code:	00204
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	28		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	87	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Name: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

Total Officer Employees:	262	RPMA Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	4,827
Total Enlisted Employees:	673	Communications ($K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	123	BOS Non-Payroll ($K/Year):	11,949
Total Civilian Employees:	214	BOS Payroll ($K/Year):	15,791
Mil Families Living On Base:	34.0%	Family Housing ($K/Year):	282
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.80
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat ($/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	1,116	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA ($/Month):	50	Activity Code:	60508
Enlisted VHA ($/Month):	28		
Per Diem Rate ($/Day):	87	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost ($/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OH.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	94	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	15,934	3,380	3,380	17,500	17,500	7,500
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	50	50	360	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	450	450	450	450	450
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	79	0	0	0	11,500	3,900
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	634	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

Name: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	37	671	10	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	292	554	322	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	28	28	28	28	28	28
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	235	641	3,033	3,033	3,033	3,033
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	36,755	0	16,250	500	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	175	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	550	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	200	120	120	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	150	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: NAS WHITING FIELD, FL

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) ($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc($K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NAS MERIDIAN, MS

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	-8	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	-19	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	-16	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	-313	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	-5	-35	-12	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	-40	-169	-71	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	-1	-5	-70	-125	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	19	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	329	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	-170	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	-1	-2	-6	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	-16	-18	-13	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	-1	-4	-14	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
Horizontal (SY)	HORIZ	70,000	0	0
Extend RWs 17-35 & 04-22 by 1,000 ft ea. and taxiways 3,000 ft at NAS CC				
R/W lighting	OTHER	0	0	264
NAF Corpus Christi improvements				
Taxiway Lighting	OTHER	0	0	168
NAF Corpus Christi improvements				
Arresting Gear (4)	OTHER	0	0	200
NAF Corpus Christi improvements				
Wheel/Waveoff	OTHER	0	0	500
NAF Corpus Christi improvements				

Name: NAS KINGSVILLE, TX

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
Horizontal (SY)	HORIZ	17,500	0	0
Additional Parking Aprons at NALF Orange Grove				
Air Maintenance (SF)	AIROP	0	87,800	0
Hangar and other facilities				
Supply/Storage(SF)	STORA	20,400	0	1,400
Warehousing reqt for T2 aircraft parts NAS Kingsville				
Administrative (SF)	ADMIN	0	25,900	1,925
TRAWING Two Headquarters				
Training (SF)	SCHLB	0	4,000	180
Classrooms and operational trainers (8)				

Name: NAS PENSACOLA, FL

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost($K)
Air Maintenance(SF)	AIROP	16,380	0	400
Construct two wash racks for add'l aircraft				
Administrative (SF)	ADMIN	14,100	15,750	3,192
Rehab Bldg 3221; spaces for CNATRA staff & HRO personnel from NAS Meridian				
Training (SF)	SCHLB	0	6,100	335
Bldg 3813 (for UPT)				

Department : NAVY
Option Package : NTTC-OPEN NAS-CLOSE
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\NTTC_OPN.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\N95OM.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	71.70%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	60.10%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	98.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary($/Year):	76,781.00	Civilian PCS Costs ($):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents($):	7,925.00	Civilian New Hire Cost($):	0.00
Enlisted Salary($/Year):	33,178.00	Nat Median Home Price($):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents($):	5,251.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost($/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs($):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary($/Year):	50,827.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs($):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	NAVY O&M,N BRAC95	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	75.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	9.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	5.00%
Mothball Cost ($/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	39.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	294.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%

APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00% 1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate($/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle($/Mile):	0.31
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle($/Mile):	3.38
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement($/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.17
Total HHG Cost ($/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS($/Pers/Tour):	3,763.00
Air Transport ($/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost($):	4,527.00
Misc Exp ($/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost($):	1,403.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	$/UM	Category	UM	$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	61	Optional Category A	( )	0
Waterfront	(LF)	10,350	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	122	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	111	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	123	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	108	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	102	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	96	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	78,750	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	94	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	165	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	120	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	165	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	129	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	160	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	12	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	160	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	168	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

The Navy Meridian Team ran a COBRA analysis to evaluate the economic soundness of the BSEC recommendation. This analysis was based on the Navy's "Close NAS Meridian" COBRA file (TNAS6DA.CBR). To assess NTTCM on a stand alone basis, the original "Close Meridian" scenario was modified. The transfer of NTTCM personnel and equipment to NETC, Newport Rhode Island and the Supply Corps School in Athens Georgia was deleted. All facilities at Meridian were closed except the NTTCM compound (training, enlisted barracks, and headquarters buildings), the medical and dental clinic, the Counter Drug Training Academy, the Consolidated Bachelor Quarters, the galley, Navy Exchange facilities, the Enlisted Club, morale, welfare and recreation facilities, and the freshwater and wastewater treatment plants. One hundred enlisted and fifty civilian employees were added to perform base operating and security functions.

The "Realign NAS Meridian" scenario increased the net present value of savings for 2015 by $16.5 million over the "Close Meridian" option. It reduced one time costs by $37.5 million.

CLEARLY, KEEPING NTTCM OPEN IS THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE OPTION FOR THE NAVY. (SEE APPENDIX A.)

A decision to keep the Stennis Center open becomes even more appropriate when the quality of the facility is considered. NTTCM is one of the most modern training facilities in the Navy. Built in the early 1970s, the training environment is more like a college campus than a military base. The facility consists of two large training facilities totaling 135,000 square feet, one large administrative building with 21,000 square feet, 10 barracks with a surge capacity for 941 students, and several other supporting facilities which are located on 60 acres with ample space for expansion. The facilities are equipped with state of the art computers with a newly upgraded electrical system which can operate at a full capacity of 1800 computers simultaneously.

WE KNOW OF NO OTHER LOCATION IN THE NAVY WITH THIS CAPABILITY.

The complex is specifically designed with the training facilities conveniently located close to berthing, messing, exchange, and recreational facilities.

The City of Meridian and the State of Mississippi are in the midst of a $362,000 project to provide bus service from the City to the Base to serve The Stennis Center. This service was cited by the Base as its major MWR (morale, welfare, and recreation) need.

WITHOUT STRONG JUSTIFICATION TO THE CONTRARY – THERE IS NONE IN THE BSAT MINUTES OR CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION – THE STENNIS CENTER SHOULD REMAIN OPEN.

The Stennis Center
NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER, MERIDIAN

THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

COBRA analysis shows The Stennis Center -- Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, named for the late Sen. John Stennis, is cost justified on a stand alone basis, even if NAS Meridian is closed. Yet, even though The Stennis Center (NTTCM) is a separate closure recommendation, the Navy did not analyze, consider or review NTTCM on a stand alone basis.

THE COST DISCREPANCY CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM BASE CLOSURE CRITERIA FIVE.

Results of the first configuration modeling of naval training centers were presented to the Navy's Base Structure Executive Committee (BSEC) on November 18, 1994. The model's best solution for "Non-Fleet Concentration Activities" proposed the closure of only one activity...the Naval Supply Corps School (Athens, Georgia). The secondary solution proposed no closures. (See Figure 1.)

On November 22, 1995, the BSEC was briefed that data errors had been identified in initial run. These were corrected and the model rerun. The best, secondary and tertiary solutions for "Pipeline Schools," the revised name for the category which includes NTTCM, proposed a variety of closures -- IN ALL OF THESE SOLUTIONS, NTTCM REMAINED OPEN. (See Figure 2.)

The BSEC noted that for Pipeline Schools, none of the configuration solutions would accommodate a 10% surge in training requirements for 2001. Similar "no surge" findings were identified for both Degree Granting Activities and Fleet Training Centers. Because of the lack of surge capacity, the BSEC declined to make recommendations for closure or realignment. (See Figure 3.)

Not so with Pipeline Schools however, the BSEC recommended NTTCM for closure. And did so solely on the basis that "...NTTCM was a tenant of an activity that is being considered for closure (NAS Meridian)." (See Figure 3.)

NAVY ★ MERIDIAN ★ TEAM

April 28, 1995

Mr. Alex Yellin
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Alex:

Since we made our initial presentation to you in early April, we have completed our review of the Navy BSAT's capacity calculations. The attached summarizes our findings.

Please read our presentation. We would like to meet with you after you have had time to review it. We believe this is the most time efficient method of providing detailed data to you.

For your information, we have briefed this data to the Chief of Naval Air Training. To date, we have received no information from CNATRA contradicting our position.

Sincerely,

Bill Crawford
Team Leader

P.S. We have forwarded a separate copy to Lt. Col. Brubaker.

Alex,
The extra copy is for the file.
BC

P. O. BOX 790 • MERIDIAN, MS 39302
601-693-1306 (VOICE) • 601-693-5638 (FAX)

Navy★Meridian Team

1995 Navy BSAT
Calculation of PTR Capacity

A Detailed Analysis

The Navy Base Structure and Analysis Team (BSAT) made major errors in calculating capacity for strike training bases in 1995. This paper examines in detail the capacity calculation and the BSAT errors.

Strike training requires airspace, runways, ground facilities, air-to-ground target ranges, military training routes, students, instructors, and aircraft. Any one of these can, and does, limit capacity. However, the capacity calculation assumes facility assets and the number of instructors, students and aircraft are always available. Earlier analyses have shown airspace is ample. Thus, runways are the limiter.

In 1995, the BSAT used the FAA Capacity and Delay Manual to calculate the runway operations per hour capacity for each airfield (this calculation takes into account weather). Since 85% of the strike training syllabus is conducted during daylight hours, daytime runway operations per hour (Ops/Hr) is the key capacity limiter.

The daytime Ops/Hr figure is used to calculate maximum daytime operations available per airfield. The runway capacity formula is:

Annual Flying Days X Daylight Hours X Runway Ops/Hr = Runway Ops/Year

The 1995 BSAT used the following factors:

Annual Flying Days	= 237 Days
Daylight Hours (Homefield)	= 12.1 Hours
Daylight Hours (Outlying Field)	= 11.6 Hours

Here is the first major change from 1993. OLF daylight hours were 10 hours, not 11.6 hours. OLFs have historically operated using one FAA controller shift. The maximum time for one shift is 10 hours. The 11.6 figure is the maximum daylight time available, but requires a significant, and costly, change in operating procedures. It also bumps capacity up 5%.

The BSAT applied the formula to its two strike training bases, NAS Kingsville and NAS Meridian. Their Ops/Hr figures per the FAA manual are

approximately equal. Meridian's homefield rated at 81 Ops/Hr and Kingsville's at 80 Ops/Hr. Meridian's outlying field (OLF) Joe Williams Field, 19 miles northwest of NAS Meridian, rated at 53 Ops/Hr. Kingsville's OLF Alice Orange Grove, 25 miles northwest of Kingsville, rated at 54 Ops/Hr.

Applying the formula, the BSAT calculated the following maximum daytime operations available:

NAS Kingsville:

Homefield	*237 X 12.1 X 80 =*	*229,416 Ops/Yr*
OLF Alice O.G.	*237 X 11.6 X 54 =*	*148,457 Ops/Yr*
	TOTAL	*377,873 Ops/Yr*

The 1995 BSAT recommended closing NAS Meridian and single siting strike training at NAS Kingsville. Also, NAS Corpus Christi is to be realigned to a Naval Air Facility with its main function to serve as a strike OLF for NAS Kingsville

NAS Corpus Christi currently provides primary and maritime training in light aircraft. However, serious questions arise as to the suitability of Corpus Christi as a strike OLF.

- Extensive jet operations have never been conducted at Corpus Christi. The current AICUZ (Air Installation Compatible Use Zone) is based on propeller aircraft. An expanded jet footprint will likely place Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi and residential areas in incompatible 65 decibel noise zones.
- There is only one jet capable runway. The closure scenario calls for two runways to be extended to handle jet trainers. Adjacent wetland areas require an Environmental Impact Statement which has not been done.
- Corpus Christi has the highest incidence of bird strikes in the Naval Air Training Command and a bird strike in a single engine jet aircraft such as the T-45 jet trainer can be catastrophic.

These problems may prohibit extensive jet training at Corpus Christi and must be examined.

BULLETIN: THESE PROBLEMS DO PROHIBIT EXTENSIVE JET TRAINING: ***"Adverse and incompatible safety and noise impacts" would result from using Corpus Christi as a jet OLF, according to a 1995 study by Samis & Hamilton***

commissioned by the Navy Meridian Team. "Projected sound levels with the transfer of the T-45 would result in severe noise impacts (> 80 LDN) on portions of the Flour Bluff community and adverse incompatible impacts encompassing the entire campus of Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi. Student classrooms, residences, library and religious centers are all within the clearly unacceptable range, some subject to noise levels above 75 LDN." *(See Appendix A.)*

The BSAT not only ignored the above problems, it miscalculated Corpus Christi's maximum daytime operations available as a jet OLF.

Here is the first major error: The BSAT gave NAF Corpus Christi a homefield operating capacity. At best, it should have no more jet training capacity than Kingsville's dedicated OLF Alice Orange Grove.

An OLF is primarily a touch and go bounce field. A homefield achieves higher Ops/Hr by launching aircraft off one runway while conducting touch-and-gos on its other parallel runway. Even if Corpus Christi's parallel runway is extended, it would not have the aircraft to launch to achieve a homefield capacity. Also, its parallel runways are only available about 65% of the time due to crosswinds. (Note: the official recommendation is to extend Corpus Christi's two crosswind runways to 6,000 feet. Corpus Christi at its regional hearing testified the plan is to extend one crosswind and the short parallel to 6,000 feet. No official notice of this change has been received. Also, while CNATRA has said a 6,000 foot runway length is adequate for T-45 usage, 7,500 feet is the critical length for a fully fueled T-45 on a hot day -- hot days are plentiful in South Texas (See FIGURE 1 at right)). Finally, because of normal wind direction and the runway configuration, the inboard parallel runway would have to serve as the touch and go pattern runway (the Navy flies left-hand patterns), forcing aircraft launching off the parallel to taxi through the pattern -- significantly slowing the operations tempo.

So, at best, NAF Corpus Christi would have the same capacity as OLF Alice Orange Grove; in reality, it has less.

NAF Corpus Christi will be a joint usage airfield, with Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, Mine Warfare and CCAD helicopters and transient aircraft. A 1991 study (based on then current aircraft) showed this traffic averaging 108

operations/day, almost all in daytime. This traffic load is at least equal to two hours per day. Therefore Corpus Christ could be available for strike training at most 10.1 hours per day (probably less). The calculated maximum runway capacity for NAF Corpus Christi is:

OLF Corpus Christi	*237 X 10.1 X 54 =*	*129,259 Ops/Yr*
Total Kingsville/Alice OG/Corpus Christi capacity is		*507,133 Ops/Yr*

Once maximum runway operations available are known, it is relatively easy to calculate annual Pilot Training Rate (PTR) using the following formula:

$$\frac{\textit{Runway Ops Available/Year}}{\textit{Day Ops /PTR}}$$

The denominator of the formula is a new item for discussion, and is the crux of the capacity problem for BRAC 95. Day Ops/PTR stands for the daytime operations required to graduate a strike training pilot. In BRAC 93, there was one strike training syllabus and both training air stations along with the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) agreed upon 1887 as the correct Day Ops/PTR (see FIGURE 2). The figure was derived by CNATRA from actual flight 1989 - 1991 operations data, and then scrubbed vigorously by the Commission staff, the BSAT, and the Navy Meridian Team.

The resulting PTR capacities were 210 for Kingsville and 195 for Meridian (see FIGURE 3). These figures were validated by a historical Vietnam War performance study prepared by Commander Training Air Wing ONE (CTW-1). The study showed PTR capacity for Kingsville was 208 and 193 for Meridian, right on top of the formula figures (see Appendix B).

In fact, the 1993 figures are the only ones validated by Vietnam War maximum output figures.

Very little has changed in the past two years. Out year strike PTR has been reduced from 384 to 336 due to changes in force structure. However, as the TA-4

advanced jet trainer is retired in 1998 and the T-2 intermediate jet trainer starts to phase out in 1999, the new T-45 jet trainer will be the only carrier capable aircraft in the Navy training command. These changes affect not only the training syllabus, but also where other types of training must be conducted.

The E2/C2 production of 36 students will have to be assimilated into strike training since they also require carrier qualification. E2/C2 PTR does not directly add to strike PTR because of syllabus length, but 36 E2/C2 provides an equivalent strike PTR of 19. This increases strike PTR to 355, a modest 7.5% decrease from BRAC 93.

BULLETIN: THE CNO IS CONSIDERING AN INCREASE IN PTR: ***Recent recommendations by the CNO would increase outlying year strike training PTR to 360 from 336. (See Appendix C.) With the 19 E2/C2 PTR, the total requirement will be 379, hardly different from the 384 in 1993 when the Commission found two strike training bases were required.***

To date less than 50 students have completed the syllabus, therefore no meaningful statistical database exists for the T-45 syllabus.

As a result BRAC 95 PTR capacities are only estimates, not performance based data that has been thoroughly verified like the 1993 figures.

The T-45 syllabus provides for an 8% reduction in syllabus flight hours, therefore it is reasonable to assume that Ops/PTR would decrease in a similar manner. Yet, Kingsville, CNATRA and BSAT have produced questionable Ops/PTR estimates that range from 15% to 26% below the performance based BRAC 93 values.

The 1995 process began with Kingsville estimating the Day Ops/PTR for the T-45 syllabus. The original estimate used 1113 Student Ops/PTR plus "the historical T2/TA4 overhead factor of 35%" to arrive at 1503 day operations/PTR (see FIGURE 4). CNATRA adjusted the 1503 to 1605 when it certified Kingsville's data call submission (see FIGURE 5).

Here is the second major error: CNATRA's estimate worksheet showed Kingsville underestimated ops per student flight -- 1113 should have been 1160 (see FIGURE 6).

Overhead consists of flight operations required to produce a student graduate, but which do not contribute directly to that production. Student attrition, reflies, instructor training flights, maintenance flights, etc., are part of Overhead.

Here is the third major error: The CNO approved CNATRA planning factor overhead figure is 51.4%, not the 35% stated by Kingsville (see FIGURE 7).

The 1160 Student Ops/PTR T-45 syllabus number used by CNATRA to correct the first Kingsville submission is a reasonable estimate. If the proper overhead factor had been applied, a Day Ops/PTR of 1756 would have resulted. This is a 7% reduction from the T2/A4 syllabus 1887 figure used in 1995, and is in-line with expectations.

According to BSAT officials, when the initial data call submission of 1605 Day Ops/PTR arrived, the BSAT ran its capacity calculations. Remember, the BSAT incorrectly gave Corpus Christi homefield capacity, not OLF values. This yielded a maximum daytime operations available of 607,289 and the following PTR calculation:

$$PTR=\frac{607,289}{1605}=378$$

The PTR of 378 exceeded the required strike PTR of 336 and passed the 10% sensitivity test. However, the BSAT was committed to retaining a 20% excess capacity as measured by its sensitivity analysis, and the 1605 figure failed the 20% test.

Here is an important point to note: The Navy expected its recommendations to maintain a 20% capacity buffer.

In late August, 1994, after the 1605 figure failed the 20% sensitivity test, the BSAT revised its data call and sent it out for resubmission. The revision instructed training air stations to deduct all operations not conducted at homefield, such as detachments (see FIGURE 8). This was contrary to the rule: "Since training air stations are not set up to deploy squadrons for training, it is important to be able to

do all training at or near the air station". The 1993 and original 1995 data calls obeyed the rule. With no mention in its minutes, BSAT changed the rule to: "Do not include flight ops required by the syllabus but conducted at other sites." Kingsville eliminated 110 deployment ops...including 100% of weapons ops...eliminating the need for its own target range. Yet, "Control of an air-to-ground training range is important" for strike training (BSAT minutes 8/16/94).

This was the fourth major error.

CNATRA closed the permanent weapons detachment at El Centro, CA in 1992...will El Centro reopen for Kingsville? In 1993, bases were not set up to deploy...are they set up to now? Answers to these questions are not in the COBRA...BSAT minutes...or certified data. It was an ill considered revision that has the appearance of an attempt to manipulate the formula.

CNATRA forwarded the new data call request to Kingsville for update. Ignoring the earlier CNATRA correction to their initial Day Ops/PTR submission, Kingsville subtracted 110 operations (all weapons operations and carrier qualifications) from the original, incorrect 1503 estimate and submitted 1393 to CNATRA (see FIGURE 9). Inexplicably, CNATRA did not catch the error and certified the revised number. The 1393 figure is 26% less than 1993's figure of 1887.

The revised figure used the wrong ops/flight, wrong overhead, and incorrectly subtracted deployment ops.

Kingsville also added a new calculation for "Advanced T-45" (see FIGURE 8). During the transition to the T-45, students will fly a T2/T45 intermediate/advanced syllabus identical to the T2/A4 syllabus. Kingsville's Advanced T-45 Day Ops/PTR figure allowed the BSAT to compute Day Ops/PTR for the T2/T45 syllabus. However, Kingsville's Advanced T-45 figure included one of the major errors cited above -- wrong overhead.

Their Advanced T-45 figure truly clarifies the errors. The number of flight hours for Advanced T-45 is the same as for the A-4. Overhead is within 1/1000th of a point.

So the Advanced T-45 figure should have matched the A-4 figure. It did not.

CNATRA certified 888 as the Advanced T-45 Day Ops/PTR figure for Kingsville (see FIGURE 8). CNATRA also certified 1220 as the advanced A-4 Day Ops/PTR figure for Meridian (see FIGURE 10).

A 27.2% delta for two figures that should be about the same cannot be explained.

The BSAT correctly reasoned that in the year 2001 CNATRA would not yet be flying the total T-45 syllabus, but rather a 50% split between the T2/T45 Advanced and the complete T45TS syllabus. The BSAT took Meridian's T-2 Day Ops/PTR of 741 (see FIGURE 10) and combined it with the Kingsville Advanced T-45 Day Ops/PTR number of 888 (see FIGURE 8) and got a 1629 Day Ops/PTR estimate for the T2/T45 Advanced syllabus.

Again, there is no reason why this figure should be significantly different from the T2/A4 figure of 1887.

The BSAT then averaged the questionable 1629 and 1393 figures to account for the 50% split projected for 2001. The result was average Day Ops/PTR of 1511 (see FIGURE 11). The resulting PTR calculation is:

$$PTR=\frac{607,289}{1511}=402$$

Using the "revised" Ops/PTR figure of 1511, the calculation satisfied the 20% sensitivity test and established the basis for recommending Kingsville as the single site for strike PTR. Only by using incorrect "revised" figures can the test be passed.

The original 1503 Ops/PTR corrects to 1756 with all operations and overhead added correctly. Since the T2/T45 advanced and T2/A-4 flight hours and planning factors are the same, the 1887 Ops/PTR figure from 1993 remains valid. The proper average, then, is (1756 + 1887)/2 = 1822. The following formula uses the correct 507,133 operations and the correct 1822 Ops/PTR:

$$PTR=\frac{507,133}{1822}=278$$

The corrected 278 figure is a far cry from the BSAT's erroneous 402 figure.

A 278 PTR capacity is clearly a substantial deviation from the required 336 strike PTR and 355 strike-E2/C2 PTR, and from base closure criteria number one.

After the Navy Meridian Team submitted evidence of the errors to CNATRA, Kingsville questioned the validity of applying flight hour based Overhead planning factors to operations, although an early CNATRA analysis said the two were similar (see FIGURE 12). Now, Kingsville contends multiplying operations by overhead percentages overstate them.

Kingsville in April 1995 submitted to CNATRA a brand new Day Ops/PTR calculation which "estimates" overhead rather than using historic planning factors. The new "estimate" is even lower than the error filled 1393 figure, and is said by Kingsville to validate that figure. (See Appendix D)

Based on Kingsville's new assertions, the Navy Meridian Team used the overhead planning factors to calculate T2/A4 Ops/PTR, then compared the results to actual performance at both Kingsville and Meridian (see FIGURE 13).

The basis for the analysis was a CNATRA compiled spreadsheet of 27,000 student aviator training forms plus instructor logbooks (see Appendix E). Overhead planning factors were applied to the actual student operations from the spreadsheet to calculate Ops/PTR. The result for Kingsville was 2473 total Ops/PTR. Over the same period (92-93), actual flight operations per student graduate at Kingsville averaged 2590.

For Meridian the spreadsheet calculation was 2161 while the actual flight operations per student averaged 2262.

In both cases, the calculated figure was about 4% less than the actual figure, i.e., the calculated figure was a conservative estimate of actual performance.

This analysis clearly shows Overhead Planning Factors apply linearly to flight operations and can be used to calculate overhead. Kingsville's assertion was wrong.

Remember that all T-45 figures are based on "estimates". In no case has the BSAT or Kingsville made any attempt to tie their estimates to actual performance.

The Navy Meridian Team, on the other hand, consistently uses actual performance as the "reality check" for all of its analyses.

Capacity figures based on proven performance are the only reliable figures available. Estimates, not validated by performance, are not reliable.

Even using Navy figures, single siting does not work...capacity is 336 PTR...exactly equal to the strike requirement...but under the 355 strike-E2/C2 requirement. Such a scenario would make Kingsville, Alice Orange Grove, Corpus Christi operate at 100% plus of "estimated" capacity. There is no room for PTR bumps. The Navy projected PTR to be flat, but actual PTR is never flat. CNO ADM Mike Boorda (BSAT minutes 1/13/95) said: training air stations are "a good place to retain some excess capacity because the number of pilots DON will need fluctuates depending on factors outside its control."

Now, the CNO has recommended changes in force structure which push strike PTR up from 336 to 360, making the single site scenario that much less doable.

Can you continuously operate a training base at 100% of formula capacity? Is formula capacity a sustainable capacity? An airfield operating at 100% of capacity would require 22 takeoffs every hour, one every 2.7 minutes, from the launch runway...six jets in the landing pattern at the arrival runway...four in pattern at each OLF...60 minutes every hour...all day long...all week long...all year long.

This is an op tempo similar to O'Hare, Atlanta Hartsfield, and Los Angeles International...can a training base sustain this level?

Should you put inexperienced students in this environment?

Experienced aviators said an emphatic "no". There are too many variables. First, students...they are students, not experienced naval aviators.

Second, assets...will you have the right number of instructors, aircraft, and students all the time? Experience says no...aircraft go down, student flow is uneven, instructor shortfalls are frequent. Can you maintain aircraft safely at max ops for max hours everyday in peacetime environment? Will the Navy pay for extra maintenance to do so? Experience says no.

Third, contingencies...Corpus Christi and Kingsville have both been hit by hurricanes (Meridian is an inland Hurrevac site for Gulf Coast bases). Can you afford to put all your eggs in one basket with no capacity buffer? Experience says no. Homestead AFB says no.

Experienced aviators...allowing for student inexperience, asset problems, and contingencies... say sustainable capacity is at best 85% of formula capacity.

This provides for modest excess capacity sought by Admiral Boorda. The Air Force concurs (Base Closure Executive Group minutes, 12/1/94): "Even under the best of conditions, we recommend a capacity buffer. For the foreseeable future, UPT will undergo the turmoil of multiple base closures and the fielding of new aircraft including the Air Force T-1, the Navy T-45, and both services' JPATS. A sufficient buffer is critical."

Remember, the BSAT sought a 20% capacity buffer in its sensitivity analysis.

NAS Meridian plus NAS Kingsville is the only strike training scenario that provides any capacity buffer and loads bases at sustainable capacities. The two strike base setup in existence right now -- the one the 1993 Commission voted to keep -- has sustainable capacity of 353 PTR...right on top of the 355 strike-E2/C2 requirement (see FIGURE 14).

Facts, experience and common sense show Naval Air Station Meridian is needed...no it's essential...for the Navy to achieve its required mission under the Force Structure Plan of the United States.

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ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE NOISE AND SAFETY COMPLIANCE AT NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

Prepared for:
Navy Meridian Team

Prepared by:
Samis & Hamilton

APPENDIX A

Executive Summary

The consolidation of all T-45 strike training at Kingsville NAS by 1998 coupled with the use of Corpus Christi NAS (NASCC) as the outlying field would result in adverse and incompatible safety and noise impacts on the community immediately surrounding NASCC. The Navy would be violating both the spirit and letter of its own standards for safety and noise impacts on the civilian community. Civilian land uses which would be affected include Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi on Ward Island and the neighborhood of Flour Bluff which contains significant residential as well as industrial and business land uses. Current aircraft operational noise levels are estimated to be compatible with the surrounding community land uses with the maximum sound levels below 65 LDN. Projected sound levels with the transfer of the T-45 would result in severe noise impacts (> 80 LDN) on portions of the Flour Bluff community and adverse incompatible impacts encompassing the entire campus of Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi. Student classrooms, residences, library and religious centers are all within the clearly unacceptable range, some subject to noise levels above 75 LDN.

Furthermore, no analysis was undertaken by the Navy of the proposed base realignment impacts on airport safety and noise zones at Corpus Christi or Kingsville prior to its recommendations for closure and realignment.

STRIKE BASE TR CAPACITY
T-2/TA-4 TRAINING SYLLABUS

	1993 BRAC Findings	1993 Community Findings	1993 CTW-1 Findings
NAS KINGSVILLE	210**	212	208
NAS MERIDIAN	195**	196	193

1. SCRUBBED BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION STAFF FINDINGS

2. MATCHED BY DETAILED COMMUNITY ANALYSIS (BOTH BASED ON CAPACITY LIMITED BY DAYTIME RUNWAY OPERATIONS)

VALIDATED BY COMMANDER TRAINING AIR WING ONE USING MAX TOTAL AIRFIELD OPS DURING VIETNAM WAR (MAX PROVEN OUTPUT), SCALED TO PEACETIME (5/6), DIVIDED BY TOTAL OPS PER PTR (2210)

** ONLY CAPACITY FIGURES IN BRAC PROCESS VALIDATED BY HISTORIC OUTPUT

NAVAL AIR TRAINING

STRIKE PIPELINE

INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY

ANALYSIS

HISTORIC AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
(VIETNAM WAR ERA) [1]

MERIDIAN

Year	McCain	OLF Bravo	OLF Alpha	TOTAL
68	350,658	73,122	-	423,780
69	353,336	164,700	-	518,036
70	352,185	144,463	1,302	497,950
71	312,037	89,478	70,364	471,889
72	297,667	57,100	65,088	419,855

KINGSVILLE

Year	Main	Alice Orange Grove	TOTAL
68	369,844	181,319	551,163
69	272,610	132,339	404,949
70	266,090	96,981	363,071
71	260,048	97,870	357,918
72		Not Available	

NOTES: [1]DATA SOURCE - COMMAND HISTORIES ON FILE AT NAVAL AVIATION HISTORICAL CENTER, WASHINGTON NAVY YARD

PEACETIME CAPACITY

T-2/TA-4 SYLLABUS:

	Demonstrated Wartime Peak	Scaled Peacetime(1)
Meridian	234	193
Kingsville	249	208
Total	483	401

T-45 SYLLABUS:

Meridian	262	218
Kingsville	279	233
Total	541	451

NOTE: (1) 6 days per week scaled to 5 days per week

P 131200Z APR 95 ZYB

FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N889//

[redacted]MC WASHINGTON DC//MMOA-2/MMOA-3/ASM/MPP-33/APP//
BUMED WASHINGTON DC//23/231//
CNET PENSACOLA FL//OOL//
CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//TE31A/TE32A//
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//3S//
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N01/N8/N80/N83/N84
COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT CECIL FIELD FL//N00//
COMSTRKFIGHTWINGPAC LEMOORE CA//N00//
STRKFITRON ONE ZERO SIX//00//
STRKFITRON ONE TWO FIVE//N00//
VMFAT ONE ZERO ONE EL TORO CA//N00//
NAMTRAGRUDET CECIL FIELD FL //N00//
NAMTRAGRUDET LEMOORE CA //N00//
NAMTRAGRU MILLINGTON TN//00//
COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA//N00//
TACELRON ONE TWO NINE//N00//
CHNAVPERS WASHINGTON DC//122/211V/222/404/432/433//
CNATRA CORPUS CHRISTI TX//N-3/N-32//
COMNAVCRUITCOM WASHINGTON DC//21C/311//
NAVAVSCOLSCOM PENSACOLA FL//00/92//

UNCLAS //N03502//

MSGID/GENADMIN/N889J6//

SUBJ/PILOT/NFO AND MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION ALIGNMENT CONFERENCE//
[redacted]TOM DONOVAN/CDR/PRIPHN:DSN224-6013/-/-/SECPHN:703-614-6010//

RMKS/1. A PILOT/NFO AND MAINTENANCE PRODUCTION ALIGNMENT CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED FOR 20-21 APRIL IN WASHINGTON D.C. MULTIPLE DYNAMICS MAKES MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION OF ALL ADDRESSEES ESSENTIAL. REGRET SHORT LEAD TIME. UNIFORM FOR CONFERENCE IS SDB OR SERVICE/CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT.

2. PURPOSE OF THIS CONFERENCE IS TO DISCUSS ALL IMPACTS ON RECRUITING THROUGH FRS, INCLUDING ENLISTED MANNING, TO SUPPORT THE STAND-UP OF FOUR VAQ SQUADRONS AND A POTENTIAL RETENTION (BUILD) OF 3-6 SIX TACTICAL SQUADRONS. CONFERENCE GOAL IS TO PRODUCE, BY COB 21 APR, A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WHICH CAN BE FULLY SUPPORTED AND EXECUTED FROM CRUITCOM THROUGH FRS PRODUCTION.

3. ISO OF PLAN LISTED IN PARA 2, ALL PLANNERS MUST CLEARLY IDENTIFY

[redacted]

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING FUNDING, MANNING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORT (MAINTENANCE, SCHOOL HOUSE, AIRCRAFT ETC.). FOLLOWING DATA PROVIDED IOT ID POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND COSTS OF DOING BUSINESS:

A. CNATRA
ADDRESS ISSUES BASED ON FOLLOWING STRIKE (NAVY/USMC/FMS) PTR:

FY-95	FY-96	FY-97	FY-98	FY-99	FY-00	FY-01
303	319	360	360	360	360	360

ADDITIONAL AREAS TO ADDRESS ARE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF BRAC 95 REDUCTION TO A SINGLE STRIKE TRAINING BASE, JOINT TRAINING AND T-2 SDLM ISSUES.

B. TYCOMS
CAT 1 NUMBERS REFLECT NAVY ONLY ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENTS TO SUSTAIN 50 STRIKE/FIGHTER COMPLEMENT WITH AN INCREASE OF FORCE STRUCTURE. NUMBERS DO NOT INCLUDE FLEET TRANSITION.

	FY-95	FY-96	FY-97	FY-98	FY-99	FY-00	FY-01
F-14 (PILOT/NFO)							
CAT-1	52	52	49	49	49	43	40
F/A-18							
NOTE: 1							
CAT-1	88	98	106	108	114	118	122
EA-6B (PILOT/NFO)							
CAT-1	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56	21/56

NOTE: 1 F/A-18 NUMBERS ALSO ACCOUNT FOR F/A-18E/F FIT AND FRS INSTRUCTOR REQUIREMENTS.
ADDITIONALLY, EMPHASIS ON ENLISTED MANNING ISSUES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF BRAC MOVES ON FRS/FRAMP THRU-PUT MUST BE CONSIDERED. FRS REPS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS/UPDATE ALCON ON INITIATIVES TO INCREASE F/A-18 FRS AND FRAMP THRU-PUT.

C. BUPERS
IDENTIFY OFFICER AND ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT PLANS LISTED IN PARA 2. ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON ACCURATE ACCOUNTING OF PERSONNEL, OFFICER AND ENLISTED, ALREADY IDENTIFIED ISO EA-6B SQDN PLUS UP AND AIRCREW ALREADY ID'D FOR F-14 AND F/A-18 TRANSITION. ACCURACY IN THIS AREA IS CRITICAL IOT PROVIDE AN ACCURATE BASELINE FROM WHICH ADDITIONAL AIRCREW CAN BE DRAWN TO SUPPORT ANY AND ALL PLANS PRESENTLY UNDER STUDY.

4. A DETAILED CONFERENCE AGENDA WILL BE PROVIDED VIA SEPARATE MSG.

5. CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN AT 0900 AT THE NAVY ANNEX (BUPERS) RM 2828 LOCATED ON THE SECOND DECK, WING 8, RM 28.

6. N889 PHONE: DSN 224-6013 COMM: (703) 614 -6013. N889 FAX: DSN 223-9795, COMM (703) 695-9795. MAKE ALL FAXS ATTN CDR DONOVAN.//

BT

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CNATRA CORPUS CHRISTI, TX
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TO:	FROM:
AGENCY [redacted] Navy Hemisphere Team	AGENCY CNATRA
NAME Jack Douglas	NAME LCDR Veler
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REMARKS SIR, In order to validate our NAS Kingsville data call 2 page 7R dtd 19 Aug 94, [redacted]

LCDR Veler

CNATRA Form 2320/1 (1-78)

APPENDIX D

T-45 TS

DAY OPERATIONS PER PTR

PF = CNATRA PLANNING FACTORS

** STUDENT SYLLABUS = 1122

** STUDENT OVERHEAD

18.61 PF HOURS
1.46 HRS/SORTIE = 12.75 SORTIES

13 SORTIES X 9.3 OPS PER SORTIE = 118.6

** INSTRUCTOR CHASE

26.5 PF HOURS
.76 HRS/SORTIE = 34.9 SORTIES

SORTIES X 1.4 OPS/SORTIE = 48.9

CHASE OVERHEAD

2.8 PF HOURS
.76 HRS/SORTIE = 3.7 SORTIES

3.7 SORTIES X 1.4 OPS/SORTIE = 5.2

** STUDENT ATTRITION

PF HOURS
HRS/SORTIE = 6.6 SORTIES

6.6 SORTIES X 9.3 OPS/SORTIE = 61.4

** IUT OVERHEAD

BASIC QUAL = 69% ADV QUAL = 31%

16.47 TOTAL PF HOURS = 11.36 (BASIC) + 5.11 (ADV)

11.36 PF HOURS
1.44 HRS/SORTIE = 7.9 SORTIES

7.9 SORTIES X 9.1 OPS/SORTIE = 71.9

5.11 PF HOURS
1.23 HRS/SORTIE = 4.2 SORTIES

4.2 SORTIES X 4.4 OPS/SORTIE = 18.5

** NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL

6.05 PF HOURS
1.2 HRS/SORTIE = 5 SORTIES

5 SORTIES X 8 OPS/SORTIE = 40

** STANDARDIZATION

1.81 PF HOURS
1.2 HRS/SORTIE = 1.5 SORTIES

1.5 SORTIES X 1.4 OPS/SORTIES = 2.1

** MAINTENANCE OVERHEAD

2.65 PF HOURS
.9 HRS/SORTIE = 2.9 SORTIES

2.9 SORTIES X 2 OPS/SORTIE = 5.8

** LOGISTICS OVERHEAD

6.31 PF HOURS
1.3 HRS/SORTIE = 4.9 SORTIES

4.9 SORTIES X 2 OPS/SORTIE = 9.8

** FERRY OVERHEAD

1.32 PF HOURS
1.3 HRS/SORTIE = 1 SORTIE

1 SORTIE X 2 OPS/SORTIE = 2

** TOTAL DAY OPERATIONS PER PTR = 1506

** SORTIES REQUIRED TO BE COMPLETED OUTSIDE THE KINGSVILLE AREA

1 AIRNAV SOLO = 5 OPERATIONS

FINAL CQ SORTIE = 28 OPERATIONS

** TOTAL OPERATIONS COMPLETED OUTSIDE KINGSVILLE AREA = 33

1506 - 33 = 1473

NOTE: FAM AND INSTRUMENT CHECKS ARE FLOWN IN CONJUNCTION WITH FAM AND INSTRUMENT STANDARDIZATION CHECKS.

DAY STUDENT SYLLABUS

STAGE	NO. FLIGHTS	OPS/FLIGHT	
BI	4 (5,7,4,4)	VARIES	20
RI	7 (5,5,5,5,5,6,5)	VARIES	36
AN	10	5	50
IR	5	5	25
FAM	15	18	270
[illegible]	3	2	6
FORM	17	7	119
[illegible](I)	8	16	128
ON	9	8	72
DEP	11	8	88
ACF	4	8	32
GUN	8	8	64
ACM	13	8	104
[illegible](II)	6 (16,16,16,16,16,28)	VARIES	108
			1122

IUT

BASIC QUALL = 34.5 HOURS (69%) PF HRS = 11.3(
ADV QUALL = 16.8 HOURS (31%) PF HRS = 5.1(

* ADV QUALL BASED ON 33% OF IPS (88 TOTAL) RECEIVING 2 ADV QUALLS PER YEAR

STAGE	FLIGHTS	OPS	HOURS
NA	8	99	12
FAM	3	53	4.5
BI	2	10	3.0
RI	2	10	3.0
IN	2	10	3.0
FORM	4	32	6.0
OCF	3	6	3.0
	24	220	34.5

BASIC OPS/SORTIE = 9.1
HOURS/SORTIE = 1.44

DAY INSTRUCTOR CHASE

STAGE	NO. FLIGHTS	HRS PER SORTIE/PIR (TOTAL) =	OPS/PI
FORM (2P)	12	1.2 (14.4)	34.5
FORM (4P)	5	46 (1.8)	
WEPS	11	.33 (3.63)	7.7
TACF	4	1.2 (4.8)	8
ON (3P)	1	.6 (.6)	2
IN	8	.3 (2.4)	4
ACM (2P)	9	1.2 (10.8)	18
ACM (3P)	4	.6 (2.4)	4
	54	~~40.83~~	78.2

HRS/SORTIE = .76
OPS/SORTIE = 1.4

ADV IUT QUALL

STAGE	FLIGHTS	OPS	HOURS
DN	4	8	5.2
WEP	4	8	5.2
GUN	10	20	12
TOW	5	10	5
TACF	4	8	5.6
ACM	10	20	11.7
CQ	8	126	10.7
	45	200	55.4

HOURS / SORTIE = 1.23
OPS / SORTIE = 4.4

NATOPS / INST REQUAL

$\frac{16 \text{ OPS}}{2 \text{ SORTIES}} = 8 \text{ OPS/SORTIE}$

$\frac{2.4 \text{ HRS}}{2 \text{ SORTIES}} = 1.2 \text{ HRS/SORTIE}$

STANDARDIZATION

1.2 HRS/SORTIE
OPS/SORTIE = SAME AS CHASE

MAINTENANCE

OPS/SORTIE = 2
HRS/SORTIE = .9 (DATA FROM TW-2 DATA ANALYS

LOGISTICS / FERRY

OPS/SORTIE = 2
HRS/SORTIE = 1.3 (DATA FROM TW-2 DATA ANALYSI

COMPARISON OF ACTUAL THROUGHPUT DATA WITH CNATRA SPREADSHEET DATA USING PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD.

The CNATRA developed spreadsheet which compiled data (hours and operations) from 27,000 student aviatio training forms plus instructor logbooks was used as the base data. According to discussions with CNATRA stat this data reflects actual student flight operations for surveyed students who began training in 1992 and completed in 1993 (by definition, student overhead is included within these operations.)

The Navy Meridian Team took the base data and added CNO Planning Factor Overhead (excluding student overhead). Then, actual throughput data was compiled, averaging homefield and OLF training operations for 1992 and 1993 -- the years these students were flying, and dividing by 1993 PTR -- the year the students graduated, and compared to the above. The results are as follows:

NAS KINGSVILLE BASE DATA PLUS CNO PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD

	Daytime	Nighttime	Total
Spreadsheet T2 Ops/PTR	824	100	924
Non-Student Overhead	216	26	242
Total T2 Ops/PTR	1040	126	1166
Spreadsheet A4 Ops/PTR	641	196	836
Non-Student Overhead	360	110	471
Total A4 Ops/PTR	1001	306	1307
Total T2/A4 Ops/PTR	2041	432	**2473**

KINGSVILLE	ACTUAL DATA
Average Homefield and OLF Training Ops 1992 and 1993*	365133
Total 1993 Student Graduates	141
Average Homefield and OLF Operations per Strike Student	**2590**

NAS MERIDIAN BASE DATA PLUS CNO PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD

	Daytime	Nighttime	Total
Spreadsheet T2 Ops/PTR	660	96	756
Non-Student Overhead	184	26	210
Total T2 Ops/PTR	844	122	966
Non-Student Overhead	589	152	740
Non-Student Overhead	361	93	455
Total A4 Ops/PTR	950	245	1195
Total T2/A4 Ops/PTR	1794	367	**2161**

MERIDIAN	ACTUAL DATA
Average Homefield and OLF Training Ops 1992 and 1993	264702
Total 1993 Student Graduates	117
Average Homefield and OLF Operations per Strike Student	**2262**

CONCLUSION: Planning Factors conservatively approximate ops overhead (understates it).

* *Airfield ops for Kingsville in 1993 were reduced by 26,292 to account for T-45 start-up hops.*

L14 / BK 846
PTR

14 March 1995

MEMORANDUM

FROM: RADM W.B. Hayden
TO: CAPT Brian Buzzell

SUBJECT: Determination of Operations per PTR for Strike Bases

1. The methodology used during BRAC '91 for determining operations per PTR was relatively simple. A five year historical count of all airfield operations at the main airfield and its OLF's for Training Air Wings ONE, TWO and THREE was conducted. This total figure was divided by the total number of strike graduates at all three wings. A figure of 2210 operations per PTR was derived. This figure of 2210 operations is for the T-2/TA-4 syllabus only and includes both day and night operations. CNATRA used the same methodology for BRAC '93 and 2210 operations per PTR was used as the base figure.

2. In BRAC '95, only daytime use of the airfields and their associated OLF's was used, since that is the limiting factor for airfield capacity. [redacted] Operations that were conducted at other than the home field complex (cross-countries/out-and-ins) were eliminated as were night operations. With above data, a figure reflecting day operations conducted by a graduating student was reached. To this figure, overhead per student was added along with student attrite operations, instructor check flights and maintenance flights. From this data collection, daytime operations per PTR was calculated as the limiting operations factor for an air station.

3. Training Air Wing ONE and TWO used different methods of calculating operations per PTR for BRAC '95 data calls.

a. Wing ONE used 2210 operations per PTR as the starting point for their calculations. They then proportioned the operations to either day or night, and also to either the T-2 or TA-4, and reached a number of 1961 for day operations per PTR. The CNATRA spreadsheet calculated 1730 operations per PTR for the T-2/TA-4.

b. Wing TWO studied the T-45 curriculum, made operational judgments on the number of operations it took per student to complete the syllabus, added overhead and reached a number of 1393 operations per PTR. The CNATRA spreadsheet calculated 1433 operations per PTR for the T-45.

4. Using each wing's methodology, the data submitted by each wing was validated and subsequently certified and forwarded.

WILLIAM B. HAYDEN
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Naval Air Training

NAS Kingsville

Intermediate Strike Total Ops Calculation

*Completed Day Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Day Ops*

824.2 / (1+.117) = 738 * (1+.410) = 1040

*Completed Night Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Night Ops*

99.6 / (1+.117) = 89 * (1+.410) = 126

Advanced Strike Total Ops Calculation

*Completed Day Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Day Ops*

640.6 / (1+.097) = 586 * (1+.710) = 1001

*Completed Night Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Night Ops*

195.6 / (1+.097) = 179 * (1+.710) = 306

	Day	Night	Total
T-2	1040	126	1166
TA-4	1001	306	1307
Total	2041	432	2473

NAS KINGSVILLE

ADVANCED STRIKE

VT-22 TOTALS BASED ON 26 STUDENTS

Name	Dates Start	End	Loggd Durtn	Loggd Night	Loggd Appra	Adjst Landg	Comptd Dy Ops	Comptd Nt Ops
ADAMS, A.	06/08/92	02/05/93	124.9	19.3	56.0	391.0	650.0	190.0
ARTETA, D.	10/13/92	06/08/93	123.3	17.9	61.0	352.0	626.0	144.0
BACHMANN, P.	05/11/92	03/04/93	117.0	17.9	63.0	355.0	574.0	198.0
BAYER, A.	07/13/92	02/03/93	113.8	12.5	64.0	391.0	662.0	182.0
BECERRA, R.	10/13/92	06/17/93	115.5	19.8	58.0	367.0	628.0	172.0
BULFORD, M.	08/24/92	03/18/93	115.9	17.7	62.0	362.0	596.0	182.0
CZEREWKO, J.	05/26/92	02/02/93	129.2	21.2	68.0	513.0	824.0	284.0
DEVAUX, M.	08/24/92	05/25/93	117.9	15.0	62.0	380.0	664.0	158.0
DEWHIRST, D.	08/24/92	03/18/93	117.0	23.2	65.0	323.0	498.0	214.0
DORAN, J.	06/29/92	03/04/93	120.6	20.3	58.0	371.0	652.0	152.0
DUNAI, C.	11/23/92	06/21/93	115.8	18.9	51.0	366.0	624.0	160.0
FARRELL, K.	08/24/92	03/18/93	110.9	22.3	60.0	350.0	514.0	246.0
HARRELSON, B	07/13/92	03/17/93	113.8	21.1	62.0	394.0	638.0	208.0
HARRIES, R.	09/14/92	05/25/93	125.4	22.6	56.0	389.0	638.0	194.0
HENDERSON, J	08/24/92	03/18/93	114.2	19.1	62.0	352.0	588.0	184.0
KING, B.	05/11/92	02/12/93	119.3	16.9	59.0	376.0	644.0	168.0
KIRALY, W.	09/14/92	05/26/93	120.3	19.6	57.0	376.0	666.0	152.0
MANGIAPANE,	06/29/92	02/16/93	115.7	22.0	59.0	401.0	614.0	238.0
MILLER, J.	06/29/92	03/02/93	112.5	20.9	55.0	346.0	566.0	186.0
NELSON, C.	06/08/92	02/02/93	120.7	16.9	62.0	437.0	754.0	186.0
SEWELL, G.	07/13/92	05/23/93	120.8	17.8	71.0	395.0	678.0	188.0
SHERREL, J.	10/26/92	06/24/93	115.4	16.2	57.0	372.0	624.0	182.0
SOPKO, R.	06/29/92	03/02/93	116.5	16.0	68.0	354.0	624.0	164.0
SPAHR, J.	05/26/92	01/27/93	134.9	19.9	59.0	565.0	854.0	334.0
WAGNER, B.	06/08/92	02/24/93	125.7	20.3	65.0	398.0	648.0	210.0
WELCH, C.	06/29/92	04/02/93	112.1	19.3	61.0	373.0	608.0	210.0
AVERAGES:			118.8	19.0	60.8	386.5	640.6	195.6

NAS KINGSVILLE

ADVANCED STRIKE

VT-22 TOTALS BASED ON 26 STUDENTS

Name	Dates Start	End	Loggd Durtn	Loggd Night	Loggd Appr	Adjst Lands	Comptd Dy Ops	Comptd Nt Ops
ADAMS, A.	06/08/92	02/05/93	124.9	19.3	56.0	391.0	650.0	190.0
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BULFORD, M.	08/24/92	03/18/93	115.9	17.7	62.0	362.0	596.0	182.0
CZEREWKO, J.	05/26/92	02/02/93	129.2	21.2	68.0	513.0	824.0	284.0
DEVAUX, M.	08/24/92	05/25/93	117.9	15.0	62.0	380.0	664.0	158.0
DEWHIRST, D.	08/24/92	03/18/93	117.0	23.2	65.0	323.0	498.0	214.0
DORAN, J.	06/29/92	03/04/93	120.6	20.3	58.0	371.0	652.0	152.0
DUNAI, C.	11/23/92	06/21/93	115.8	18.9	51.0	366.0	624.0	160.0
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HARRIES, R.	09/14/92	05/25/93	125.4	22.6	56.0	389.0	638.0	194.0
HENDERSON, J	08/24/92	03/18/93	114.2	19.1	62.0	352.0	588.0	184.0
KING, S.	05/11/92	02/12/93	119.3	16.9	59.0	376.0	644.0	168.0
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NELSON, C.	06/08/92	02/02/93	120.7	16.9	62.0	437.0	754.0	186.0
SEWELL, G.	07/13/92	05/23/93	120.8	17.8	71.0	395.0	678.0	188.0
SHERREL, J.	10/26/92	06/24/93	115.4	16.2	57.0	372.0	624.0	182.0
SOPKO, R.	06/29/92	03/02/93	116.5	16.0	68.0	354.0	624.0	164.0
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WAGNER, B.	06/08/92	02/24/93	125.7	20.3	65.0	398.0	648.0	210.0
WELCH, C.	06/29/92	04/02/93	112.1	19.3	61.0	373.0	608.0	210.0
AVERAGES:			118.8	19.0	60.8	386.5	640.6	195.6

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) — E 25 May 93
CURRICULUM: ADVANCED STRIKE TRAWING 2 — SERVICE: ALL SERVICES
TYPE ACFT: TA-4J — PROCEDURES TRAINER: NONE — FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F90

		ACFT HRS/STUD		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD			SIM HRS/STUD	
		TA-4J		TA-4J	NONE	2F90	NONE	2F90
STUDENT SYLLABUS		102.70		68.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	67.50
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
TA-4J ACFT = 9.4% / 9.4%		9.65		6.42	----	----	----	----
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		32.10		33.20	----	----	----	----
CHASE OVERHEAD	9.4%	3.01		3.12	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	147.47		111.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	67.50
STUDENT ATTRITION	7.0%	5.54		4.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.54
	SUBTOTAL	153.02		115.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	70.04
IUT OVERHEAD								
TA-4J .29401*.558*65.9/60.2		10.81		9.87	----	----	----	----
2F90 .29401*.558* 0.0/12.0		----		----	----	0.00	----	1.96
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .29401		4.41	x2	8.82	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
3.0 HRS * .29401		0.88	x2	1.76	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	169.12		135.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	72.00
MAINT OVERHEAD	1.40%	2.45		2.45	----	----	----	----
LOGISTIC OVERHEAD	1.00%	1.75		1.75	----	----	----	----
FERRY OVERHEAD	1.30%	2.28		2.28	----	----	----	----
TOTALS		175.62		142.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	72.00
ROUNDED		175.60		142.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	72.00
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		158.90		121.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	70.00

IUT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT			SIM HRS/IUT	
	TA-4J	TA-4J	NONE	2F90	NONE	2F90
WEIGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	65.90	60.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.00

IUT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RATIO)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

INSTRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

	HRS/(SL + SCT)	* SL	* AVAIL	* WX	* EI	* DAYS	
IN TA-4J =	8HRS/(1.21 + 2.20)	* 1.21	* 0.800	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237 =	484 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
INSTRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(142.3 / 484)			= .29401
AIRCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(175.6 / 520)			= .33769
SIMULATOR/STUD RATIO			(72.0 /2535)	= .02840

ANNUAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

	HR/(SL + TAT)	* SL	* AVAIL	* EI	* WX	* DAYS	
TA-4J ACFT UTIL =	10/(1.21 + 1.40)	* 1.21	* 0.526	* 1.00	* 0.90	* 237 =	520
2F90 FL SIM UTIL =	16/(2.00 + 0.25)	* 2.00	* 0.800	* 0.94	* 1.00	* 237 =	2535

OUTD 71

INTERMEDIATE STRIKE

VT-23 TOTALS BASED ON 26 STUDENTS

Name	Dates Start	End	Loggd Durtn	Loggd Night	Loggd Appr8	Adjst Lands	Comptd Dy Ops	Comptd Nt Ops
ADAMS, A.	09/03/91	05/20/92	115.0	10.5	41.0	601.0	1122.0	124.0
ARTETA, D.	02/18/92	09/17/92	92.2	9.6	32.0	435.0	826.0	84.0
BACHMANN, P.	09/16/91	04/14/92	94.5	10.2	33.0	457.0	838.0	116.0
BAYER, A.	11/25/91	06/16/92	98.7	8.0	31.0	489.0	904.0	110.0
BECERRA, R.	01/21/92	09/16/92	103.6	10.1	27.0	464.0	872.0	88.0
BULFORD, M.	10/28/91	07/25/92	100.6	6.1	32.0	553.0	1044.0	84.0
CZEREWKO, J.	11/12/91	04/28/92	91.1	7.6	32.0	406.0	742.0	100.0
DEVAUX, M.	12/09/91	07/26/92	96.1	12.5	34.0	453.0	840.0	110.0
DEWHIRST, D.	11/25/91	07/26/92	98.6	9.1	26.0	446.0	804.0	112.0
DORAN, J.	11/12/91	05/20/92	101.3	10.9	33.0	454.0	822.0	126.0
DUNAI, C.	03/16/92	11/07/92	100.9	10.1	28.0	446.0	820.0	106.0
FARRELL, K.	12/09/91	07/26/92	93.0	5.3	31.0	416.0	790.0	76.0
HARRELSON, B	11/25/91	06/23/92	97.2	9.1	29.0	408.0	758.0	88.0
HARRIES, R.	01/06/92	07/27/93	95.1	8.1	38.0	469.0	866.0	114.0
HENDERSON, J	12/09/91	07/24/92	95.4	8.2	27.0	430.0	784.0	100.0
KING, B.	10/28/91	04/28/92	92.6	10.1	30.0	396.0	708.0	114.0
KIRALY, W.	12/09/91	07/26/92	93.2	9.2	19.0	470.0	848.0	104.0
MANGIAPANE,	11/25/91	06/16/92	92.4	7.0	33.0	441.0	828.0	92.0
MILLER, J.	08/19/91	06/16/92	103.3	7.5	31.0	496.0	948.0	72.0
NELSON, C.	11/12/91	05/21/92	92.2	9.4	26.0	422.0	762.0	108.0
SEWELL, G.	11/25/91	06/19/92	103.2	7.2	32.0	417.0	802.0	70.0
SHERREL, J.	02/18/92	09/16/92	95.4	11.9	31.0	402.0	760.0	82.0
SOPKO, R.	08/05/91	06/15/92	91.3	7.7	30.0	425.0	758.0	124.0
SPAHR, J.	11/12/91	05/01/92	98.7	8.2	30.0	410.0	728.0	124.0
WAGNER, B.	11/12/91	05/21/92	90.2	9.0	36.0	365.0	674.0	88.0
WELCH, C.	08/19/91	05/20/92	102.5	5.7	35.0	407.0	782.0	76.0
AVERAGES:			97.2	8.7	31.0	445.3	824.2	99.6

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) — E 25 May 93
CURRICULUM: INTERMEDIATE STRIKE TRAWING 2 — SERVICE: ALL SERVICES
TYPE ACFT: T-2C — PROCEDURES TRAINER: NONE — FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F101

		ACFT HRS/STUD		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD			SIM HRS/STUD	
		T-2C		T-2C	NONE	2F101	NONE	2F101
STUDENT SYLLABUS		89.30		69.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	44.50
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
T-2C ACFT = 11.7% /11.7%		10.44		8.14	----	----	----	----
2F101 FSIM = 5.90%		----		----	----	0.00	----	2.62
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		7.30		8.50	----	----	----	----
CHASE OVERHEAD	11.7%	0.85		0.99	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	107.90		87.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	47.12
STUDENT ATTRITION	5.0%	2.83		2.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.24
	SUBTOTAL	110.74		89.53	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.36
IUT OVERHEAD								
T-2C .20263*.522*63.6/60.6		6.72		6.40	----	----	----	----
2F101 .20263*.522* 0.0/ 7.5		----		----	----	0.00	----	0.79
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .20263		3.03	x2	6.07	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
3.0 HRS * .20263		0.60	x2	1.21	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	121.11		103.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.15
MAINT OVERHEAD	1.63%	2.05		2.05	----	----	----	----
LOGISTIC OVERHEAD	0.50%	0.62		0.62	----	----	----	----
FERRY OVERHEAD	1.65%	2.07		2.07	----	----	----	----
TOTALS		125.87		107.99	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.15
ROUNDED		125.90		108.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.20
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		115.10		93.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.40

IUT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT			SIM HRS/IUT	
	T-2C	T-2C	NONE	2F101	NONE	2F101
WEIGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	63.60	60.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.50

IUT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RATIO)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

INSTRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HRS/(SL + SCT) * SL * AVAIL * WX * EI * DAYS

IN T-2C = 8HRS/(1.33 + 2.00) * 1.33 * 0.800 * 0.88 * 1.00 * 237 = 533 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
INSTRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(108.0 / 533)			= .20263
AIRCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(125.9 / 613)			= .20538
SIMULATOR/STUD RATIO			(49.2 /2525)	= .01949

ANNUAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HR/(SL + TAT) * SL * AVAIL * EI * WX * DAYS

T-2C ACFT UTIL = 10/(1.33 + 1.46) * 1.33 * 0.617 * 1.00 * 0.88 * 237 = 613

2F101 FL SIM UTIL = 16/(1.50 + 0.30) * 1.50 * 0.850 * 0.94 * 1.00 * 237 = 2525

OVHD → 41.0

NAS Meridian

Intermediate Strike Total Ops Calculation

*Completed Day Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Day Ops*

660.1 / (1+.077) = 613 * (1+.377) = 844

*Completed Night Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Night Ops*

95.7 / (1+.077) = 89 * (1+.377) = 122

Advanced Strike Total Ops Calculation

*Completed Day Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Day Ops*

588.7 / (1+.128) = 522 * (1+.821) = 950

*Completed Night Ops / Student Ovhd = Student Ops * (1 + Ovhd) = Total Night Ops*

151.7 / (1+.128) = 134 * (1+.821) = 245

	Day	Night	Total
T-2	844	122	966
TA-4	950	245	1195
Total	1794	367	2161

NAS MERIDIAN

ADVANCED STRIKE

VT-7 TOTALS BASED ON 33 STUDENTS

Name	Dates Start	Dates End	Loggd Durtn	Loggd Night	Loggd Apprs	Adjst Lands	Comptd Dy Ops	Comptd Nt Ops
BECKWITH, P.	10/13/92	06/01/93	115.4	16.6	62.0	361.0	606.0	180.0
BENT, J.	11/19/92	05/27/93	116.6	16.6	51.0	310.0	540.0	140.0
BURGESS, M.	09/28/92	05/14/93	110.7	19.5	55.0	353.0	614.0	152.0
BURPEE, J.	11/09/92	05/19/93	122.6	16.2	54.0	269.0	480.0	116.0
COURTEMANCHE	11/19/92	06/04/93	112.6	12.7	55.0	319.0	592.0	100.0
DAILL, K.	04/27/92	10/21/92	114.6	14.9	65.0	327.0	588.0	136.0
DEVINE, A.	07/06/92	05/15/93	128.3	17.8	60.0	441.0	720.0	228.0
DOLAN, T.	10/13/92	05/13/93	113.9	12.6	67.0	366.0	658.0	158.0
FAGEN, S.	08/31/92	05/13/93	129.5	24.1	62.0	385.0	666.0	178.0
GREEN, R.	11/09/92	05/14/93	116.7	19.1	60.0	350.0	610.0	154.0
GUIDRY, M.	06/08/92	01/25/93	113.5	13.4	63.0	335.0	628.0	120.0
GUILFORD, C.	08/31/92	02/24/93	121.7	15.6	62.0	304.0	518.0	152.0
HALL, M.	06/22/92	01/25/93	114.2	17.7	58.0	330.0	574.0	152.0
HANSON, G.	09/28/92	06/04/93	117.8	16.7	55.0	328.0	544.0	168.0
HARRIS, G.	12/07/92	06/11/93	118.1	13.7	56.0	364.0	686.0	100.0
HOBBS, M.	10/26/92	06/01/93	118.9	16.5	59.0	346.0	608.0	146.0
HOBSON, H.	08/31/92	05/16/93	132.5	13.8	58.0	429.0	794.0	122.0
LARRETT, R.	10/26/92	05/16/93	111.5	18.9	54.0	286.0	498.0	138.0
LINEBARGER,J	07/06/92	02/03/93	119.5	17.9	61.0	350.0	566.0	194.0
MCDOWELL, G	08/03/92	02/22/93	122.4	20.2	57.0	299.0	484.0	176.0
O'TOOLE, T.	06/08/92	01/23/93	116.2	15.4	59.0	308.0	534.0	144.0
OBRIEN, J.	12/07/92	06/10/93	118.1	18.2	56.0	365.0	618.0	166.0
OLANDER, G.	07/06/92	01/25/93	115.8	19.1	54.0	327.0	530.0	182.0
OLSTEIN, E.	06/22/92	02/11/93	129.3	14.7	70.0	297.0	522.0	150.0
REINHOLD, S.	07/20/92	02/10/93	117.2	18.2	67.0	291.0	494.0	154.0
ROMAN, M.	11/19/92	06/15/93	117.5	15.9	58.0	310.0	588.0	94.0
ROSARIO, R.	08/03/92	05/14/93	131.1	18.8	61.0	438.0	678.0	266.0
SCHAGER, L.	11/09/92	05/15/93	114.5	13.7	62.0	337.0	630.0	116.0
SILEBI, F.	10/26/92	05/19/93	117.6	16.0	62.0	326.0	604.0	110.0
SIMS, T.	11/19/92	05/27/93	116.4	16.3	63.0	359.0	650.0	138.0
SMEETON, T.	12/07/92	06/14/93	120.5	17.8	61.0	302.0	518.0	148.0
WADDOUPS, M.	11/19/92	06/11/93	116.7	17.4	60.0	337.0	584.0	160.0
WIKOFF, G.	08/31/92	02/11/93	118.5	19.5	59.0	306.0	504.0	168.0
AVERAGES:			118.8	16.8	59.5	338.0	588.7	151.7

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) — E 15 April 94
CURRICULUM: ADVANCED STRIKE TRAWING 1 — SERVICE: ALL SERVICES
TYPE ACFT: TA-4J — PROCEDURES TRAINER: NONE — FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F90

		ACFT HRS/STUD		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD			SIM HRS/STUD	
		TA-4J		TA-4J	NONE	2F90	NONE	2F90
STUDENT SYLLABUS		102.70		68.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	67.50
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
TA-4J ACFT = 12.8% /12.8%		13.20		8.79	----	----	----	----
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		32.10		33.20	----	----	----	----
CHASE OVERHEAD	9.4%	3.01		3.12	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	151.02		113.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	67.50
STUDENT ATTRITION	5.0%	3.97		2.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.77
	SUBTOTAL	154.99		116.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	69.27
IUT OVERHEAD								
TA-4J .34362*.558*65.9/60.2		12.63		11.54	----	----	----	----
2F90 .34362*.558* 0.0/12.0		----		----	----	0.00	----	2.30
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .34362		5.15	x2	10.30	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
3.0 HRS * .34362		1.03	x2	2.06	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	173.82		140.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	71.57
MAINT OVERHEAD	2.00%	3.74		3.74	----	----	----	----
LOGISTIC OVERHEAD	2.00%	3.74		3.74	----	----	----	----
FERRY OVERHEAD	3.06%	5.72		5.72	----	----	----	----
TOTALS		187.02		153.62	0.00	0.00	0.00	71.57
ROUNDED		187.00		153.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	71.60
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		166.80		128.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	69.30

IUT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT			SIM HRS/IUT	
	TA-4J	TA-4J	NONE	2F90	NONE	2F90
WEIGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	65.90	60.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.00

IUT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RATIO)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

INSTRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HRS/(SL + SCT) * SL * AVAIL * WX * EI * DAYS

IN TA-4J = 8HRS/(1.21 + 2.20) * 1.21 * 0.800 * 0.83 * 1.00 * 237 = 447 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
INSTRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(153.6 / 447)			= .34362
AIRCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(187.0 / 480)			= .38958
SIMULATOR/STUD RATIO			(71.6 /2535)	= .02824

ANNUAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HR/(SL + TAT) * SL * AVAIL * EI * WX * DAYS

TA-4J ACFT UTIL = 10/(1.21 + 1.40) * 1.21 * 0.526 * 1.00 * 0.83 * 237 = 480

2F90 FL SIM UTIL = 16/(2.00 + 0.25) * 2.00 * 0.800 * 0.94 * 1.00 * 237 = 2535

OVHD FACTOR = 82.1%

INTERMEDIATE STRIKE

VT-19 TOTALS BASED ON 33 STUDENTS

Name	Dates Start	Dates End	Loggd Durtn	Loggd Night	Loggd Apprs	Adjst Lands	Comptd Dy Ops	Comptd Nt Ops
BECKWITH, P.	03/02/92	08/21/92	94.8	10.9	36.0	357.0	654.0	104.0
BENT, J.	03/16/92	11/12/92	109.2	6.1	26.0	407.0	760.0	80.0
BURGESS, M.	02/03/92	07/27/92	96.0	13.2	31.0	343.0	608.0	112.0
BURPEE, J.	03/16/92	09/18/92	105.3	10.6	32.0	369.0	672.0	108.0
COURTEMANCHE	04/27/92	11/12/92	97.5	10.6	30.0	346.0	650.0	78.0
DAILL, K.	09/03/92	04/15/92	104.9	11.7	27.0	411.0	738.0	110.0
DEVINE, A.	12/09/91	05/26/92	89.3	13.0	26.0	327.0	586.0	96.0
DOLAN, T.	03/16/92	09/02/92	92.1	11.0	31.0	342.0	624.0	94.0
FAGEN, S.	01/06/92	07/27/92	104.4	9.2	35.0	369.0	698.0	82.0
GREEN, R.	04/13/92	10/07/92	92.1	10.1	29.0	346.0	626.0	96.0
GUIDRY, M.	11/25/91	05/26/92	100.3	11.9	30.0	353.0	640.0	100.0
GUILFORD, C.	02/03/92	07/27/92	104.5	13.0	32.0	371.0	682.0	96.0
HALL, M.	01/06/92	05/26/92	94.5	8.5	30.0	345.0	650.0	70.0
HANSON, G.	01/21/92	07/27/92	94.9	9.0	30.0	329.0	602.0	90.0
HARRIS, G.	05/18/92	11/12/92	95.7	13.6	38.0	405.0	744.0	104.0
HOBBS, M.	03/16/92	10/06/92	100.9	10.1	34.0	366.0	660.0	108.0
HOBSON, H.	01/06/92	07/27/92	99.1	9.6	30.0	392.0	696.0	120.0
LARRETT, R.	03/16/92	09/01/92	101.8	10.1	31.0	338.0	614.0	92.0
LINEBARGER,J	12/09/91	05/26/92	90.8	9.2	29.0	351.0	636.0	96.0
MCDOWELL, G.	12/09/91	06/26/92	106.4	12.2	32.0	387.0	718.0	94.0
O'TOOLE, T.	11/12/91	05/26/92	97.3	12.1	31.0	374.0	666.0	116.0
OBRIEN, J.	05/18/92	11/12/92	97.5	13.4	35.0	390.0	724.0	92.0
OLANDER, G.	01/21/92	05/26/92	92.7	10.7	32.0	378.0	694.0	98.0
OLSTEIN, E.	11/25/91	05/26/92	93.2	12.4	30.0	309.0	572.0	82.0
REINHOLD, S.	01/21/92	06/26/92	95.0	12.9	31.0	338.0	626.0	88.0
ROMAN, M.	04/27/92	11/12/92	94.1	14.6	35.0	359.0	648.0	108.0
ROSARIO, R.	12/09/91	06/26/92	100.0	10.3	31.0	365.0	692.0	72.0
SCHAGER, L.	04/13/92	10/06/92	97.9	13.1	30.0	337.0	580.0	128.0
SILEBI, F.	03/30/92	09/18/92	95.6	8.3	25.0	369.0	680.0	80.0
SIMS, T.	03/30/92	11/12/92	95.1	11.3	33.0	375.0	662.0	120.0
SMEETON, T.	05/18/92	11/12/92	95.8	9.9	27.0	368.0	674.0	90
WADDOUPS, M.	04/13/92	11/12/92	93.0	12.3	30.0	362.0	674.0	80
WIKOFF, G.	02/18/92	07/27/92	93.6	9.6	31.0	336.0	634.0	74
AVERAGES:			97.4	11.0	30.9	361.0	660.1	95

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) — E 15 April 94
CURRICULUM: INTERMEDIATE STRIKE TRAWING 1 — SERVICE: ALL SERVICES
TYPE ACFT: T-2C — PROCEDURES TRAINER: NONE — FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F101

		ACFT HRS/STUD		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD			SIM HRS/STUD	
		T-2C		T-2C	NONE	2F101	NONE	2F101
STUDENT SYLLABUS		88.60		69.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	44.50
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
T-2C ACFT = 7.7% / 7.7%		6.82		5.35	----	----	----	----
2F101 FSIM = 5.90%		----		----	----	0.00	----	2.62
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		7.30		8.50	----	----	----	----
CHASE OVERHEAD	11.7%	0.85		0.99	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	103.57		84.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	47.12
STUDENT ATTRITION	5.0%	2.72		2.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.24
	SUBTOTAL	106.30		86.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.36
IUT OVERHEAD								
T-2C .21308*.522*63.6/60.6		7.07		6.73	----	----	----	----
2F101 .21308*.522* 0.0/ 7.5		----		----	----	0.00	----	0.83
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .21308		3.19	x2	6.39	----	----	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
3.0 HRS * .21308		0.63	x2	1.27	----	----	----	----
	SUBTOTAL	117.20		101.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.19
MAINT OVERHEAD	2.00%	2.44		2.44	----	----	----	----
LOGISTIC OVERHEAD	1.50%	1.83		1.83	----	----	----	----
FERRY OVERHEAD	0.45%	0.54		0.54	----	----	----	----
TOTALS		122.02		105.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.19
ROUNDED		122.00		105.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.20
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		110.70		91.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.40

IUT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT			SIM HRS/IUT	
	T-2C	T-2C	NONE	2F101	NONE	2F101
WEIGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	63.60	60.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.50

IUT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RATIO)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

INSTRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HRS/(SL + SCT) * SL * AVAIL * WX * EI * DAYS

IN T-2C = 8HRS/(1.33 + 2.00) * 1.33 * 0.800 * 0.82 * 1.00 * 237 = 497 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
INSTRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(105.9 / 497)			= .21308
AIRCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(122.0 / 572)			= .21329
SIMULATOR/STUD RATIO			(49.2 /2525)	= .01949

ANNUAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

HR/(SL + TAT) * SL * AVAIL * EI * WX * DAYS

T-2C ACFT UTIL = 10/(1.33 + 1.46) * 1.33 * 0.617 * 1.00 * 0.82 * 237 = 572

2F101 FL SIM UTIL = 16/(1.50 + 0.30) * 1.50 * 0.850 * 0.94 * 1.00 * 237 = 2525

OVHD = 37.7%

Facilities

a. Airfield

Provide the following information for the home field and each OLF currently used to support undergraduate flight training (18 questions).

1. **Airfield Name:** NAS KINGSVILLE **Location:**KINGSVILLE,TX

Type and Level of Training Supported: INTERMEDIATE/ADVANCED STRIKE

Ownership:NAVY____ **(Air Force/Army/Navy/Civilian)**

For OLF: Distance from home field N/A

2. Complete the table below to describe the airfield's annual operations.

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Operational Events	Student Training	252,613	267,998	273,176
	Instructor Training	47,365	50,250	51,221
	Maintenance Flights	9,473	10,050	10,244
	Station Hops	0	0	0
	Proficiency Flights	0	0	0
	NATOPS	6,315	6,700	6,829
	Transient	1905	3858	3070

3. Complete the table below to describe the hours the airfield was closed for flight operations.

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Non-Operational Hours	Standdowns	4	5	4
	Maintenance[5]	~~30,300~~ 0	~~30,300~~ 0	~~32,960~~ 0
	Other Events[6]	6	6	6

9
CNATRA N3

List below the "other events" included in the table above:FOD WALKDOWNS

[5]Total hours dedicated to facilities maintenance.

[6]Do not include hours lost due to weather restrictions.

Facilities

a. Airfield

Provide the following information for the home field and each OLF currently used to support undergraduate flight training (18 questions).

1. **Airfield Name:** NOLF ORANGE GROVE **Location:**26 NM NW KGVL

Type and Level of Training Supported: INTERMEDIATE/ADVANCED STRIKE

Ownership:NAVY **(Air Force/Army/Navy/Civilian)**

For OLF: Distance from home field 26 NM

2. Complete the table below to describe the airfield's annual operations.

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Operational Events	Student Training	39,421	~~72,951~~ 48,230	37,858
	Instructor Training	8,870	16,414	8,518
	Maintenance Flights	0	0	0
	Station Hops	0	0	0
	Proficiency Flights	0	0	0
	NATOPS	986	1,824	946
	Transient	58	56	78

a/ CNATRA

3. Complete the table below to describe the hours the airfield was closed for flight operations.

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Non-Operational Hours	Standdowns	5	6	5
	Maintenance[8]	~~1,983~~ 0	~~1,983~~ 0	~~1,983~~ 0
	Other Events[9]	~~118~~ 0	~~118~~ 0	~~118~~ 0

a/ CNAT

List below the "other events" included in the table above: ~~Daily FOD walkdowns.~~

[8]Total hours dedicated to facilities maintenance.

[9]Do not include hours lost due to weather restrictions.

2. Complete the table below to describe the airfield's **annual operations.**

NAS MERIDIAN, MCCAIN FIELD

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Operational Events	Student Training	162,014	151,551	197,967
	Instructor Training	14,695	13,746	17,957
	Maintenance Flights	6,570	6,180	8,033
	Station Hops	218	370	344
	Proficiency Flights	2,726	2,448	3,095
	NATOPS	1,186	1,108	1,430
	Transient	1,486	1,920	1,802

OLF JOE WILLIAMS FIELD (BRAVO)

		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Operational Events	Student Training	41,982	59,962	63,658
	Instructor Training	424	606	643
	Maintenance Flights	0	0	0
	Station Hops	157	144	162
	Proficiency Flights	0	0	0
	NATOPS	0	0	0
	Transient	0	0	0

CRITICAL FIELD LENGTH

25 Degree Flaps
Acceleration With Max Thrust



FIGURE 1-6. T-45A TAKEOFF/LANDING DISTANCE (SHEET 3 OF 3)

FIGURE 2

1989-1991 Operations, PTR & Ops/PTR

		1989	1990	1991	3-Yr Average
Kingsville	Annual Ops	513,393	373,450	379,552	
	PTR	157	170	140	
	Ops/PTR	3270	2197	2711	2726
Meridian	Annual Ops	267,198	263,990	231,468	
	PTR	139	122	121	
	Ops/PTR	1922	2164	1913	2000
Chase	Annual Ops	366,864	274,017	230,107	
	PTR	158	165	140	
	Ops/PTR	2322	1661	1644	1875

OVERALL AVERAGE 2210

NIGHT OPS—323

DAY OPS—1887

1993 Pilot Training Rate PTR Capacity

FIGURE 3

	Days	X	Hours	X	Weather Corrected Ops/Hr	=	Daytime Ops Available	Daytime Ops Available / Daytime Ops/PTR = PTR
KINGSVILLE								
HOMEFIELD	237	x	13	x	88.0	=	271,128	
OLF ALICE O.G.	237	x	10	x	52.8	=	125,136	
					Total		396,264	396,264 / 1887 = 210
MERIDIAN								
HOMEFIELD	237	x	13	x	82.0	=	252,642	
OLF BRAVO	237	x	10	x	49.2	=	116,604	
					Total		369,246	369,246 / 1887 = 195

DAY

STAGE	NO. OF FLIGHTS	OPS/FLIGHT	TOTALS
BI	4 (5,7,4,4)	Varies	20
RI	7 (5,5,5,5,5,6,5)	Varies	36
AN	10	5	50
IR	5	5	25
FAM	15	18	270
OCF	3	3	9
FORM	17	7	119
CQ (I)	8	16	128
ON	9	8	72
DEP	11	8	88
TACF	4	(6/SORTIE DUAL + 8/SORTIE SOLO)	26
GUN	8	8	64
ACM	13	8	104
CQ (II)	6	(16/SORTIE FOR FCLP AND 22 OPS FOR SHIP)	102

NIGHT

CQ (I)	2	16	32
FAM	2	12	24
FORM	4	17	68
CQ (II)	4	16	64
			188

Enclosure (1)

Figure 4

DC 2 RFP ISSUE Benchmark pg

ORIGINAL QUESTION

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training (cont.)

3. Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per student for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Give the historical average for day and night (1) flight operations required by the syllabus for each student, (2) overhead[1] flight operations per student, and (3) total flight operations attributed to each student. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary.

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per Student					
			Student		Overhead[1]		Total	
			Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night
General N/A	Primary	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
Strike	Intermediate NA	T-2						
	Advanced NA	TA-4J						
	Intermediate/ Advanced	T-45[2]	~~1115~~ 1160	187	~~390~~ ~~445~~	~~65~~ 268	[redacted]	455
E2/C2 N/A	Intermediate	T-44						
	Advanced	T-2						
		T-45[2]						
Maritime N/A	Intermediate	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
	Advanced	T-44						
Rotary N/A	Intermediate	T-34C						
		JPATS[2]						
	Advanced	TH-57						

[1]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, incomplete flights, instructor training, flights, warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

[2]If requirements are still being derived, [redacted]te.

Figure 5

MAT Discussion

17 DEPTS

Syllabus has 1756

T-45 UJPT DATA BRAC

		FLTS	TOT. LNDGS.	TOT. APPR.	ATC OPS.
day/local	FAM	15	165		330 ~~345~~
day/local	OCF	3	~~18~~ 6		12 ~~21~~
—	BI	4	4	13	34 30
night	RI	7	7	21	56 49
—	AN	10	20	30	100 90
day/local	FORM	17	102	10	~~324~~ 207
night	NFAM	2	22		44 42
daytime	IR	5	15	15	60 55
day/night	CQ 1	10	80		160 150
day/local/x-country	NAV	9	36		72 63
day	WEP	11	18		36 25
(	TACF	4	8		16 12
day	NFORM	4	26	4	60 ~~820~~
day	GUN	8	12		24 16
day/local	ACM	13	13		26 13
day/local	CQ 2	10	80		160 150
	TOTAL	~~1464~~ 1414			102

TOTAL ATC OPS ~~1464~~ 1414

NFAM - ~~4244~~

NFORM - ~~2260~~

XC - ~~4850~~

MISC - ~~8800~~

GRAND TOTAL ~~1069~~ [redacted]

NOW 1160

ADDITIONAL NIGHT 1029

Figure 6

COMPUTATION OF PLANNING FACTORS (PEACETIME) — 0 21 July 9
CURRICULUM: ADVANCED T45(W2) TRAWING 2 — SERVICE: ALL SERVICE
TYPE ACFT: T-45 — PROCEDURES TRAINER: 2F137 — FLIGHT SIMULATOR: 2F13

132 X .6

		ACFT HRS/STUD T-45		INSTRUCTOR HRS/STUD T-45	2F137	2F138	SIM HRS/STUD 2F137	2F13
STUDENT SYLLABUS		175.60		123.30	0.00	0.00	30.30	6 .4
STUDENT OVERHEAD								
T-45 ACFT = 10.6% /10.6%		18.61		13.06	----	----	----	---
2F137 CPT = 5.90%		----		----	0.00	----	1.78	---
2F138 FSIM = 5.90%		----		----	----	0.00	----	3.97
INSTRUCTOR CHASE		26.50		30.70	----	----	----	---
CHASE OVERHEAD	10.6%	2.80		3.25	----	----	----	---
	SUBTOTAL	223.52		170.32	0.00	0.00	32.08	71.37
STUDENT ATTRITION	8.0%	9.71		7.40	0.00	0.00	1.39	3.10
	SUBTOTAL	233.24		177.72	0.00	0.00	33.48	74.47
IUT OVERHEAD								
T-45 .40353*.522*73.5/69.9		15.47		14.71	T45		----	---
2F137 .40353*.522* 0.0/12.0		----		----	175.6	66.0%	2.52	---
2F138 .40353*.622* 0.0/18.0		----		----	90.3	34.0%	----	3.78
NATOPS/INSTRUMENT REQUAL								
15.0 HRS * .40363		6.05	x2	12.10	265.9	100.0%	----	----
STANDARDIZATION FLTS								
4.5 HRS * .40353		1.81	x2	3.63			----	----
	SUBTOTAL	266.58		208.18	90.3/175.6=	51.4%	36.00	78.26
MAINT OVERHEAD	1.00%	2.65		2.65	----	----	----	---
STIC OVERHEAD	2.00%	6.31		6.31	----	----	----	---
Y OVERHEAD	0.60%	1.32		1.32	----	----	----	
TOTALS		266.89		217.48	0.00	0.00	36.00	78
ROUNDED		266.90		217.60	0.00	0.00	36.00	78.
W/O IUT/INSTRUCT OVRHD		241.7		186.20	0.00	0.00	33.50	74.4

IUT OVERHEAD	ACFT HRS/IUT T-45	INSTRUCTOR HRS/IUT T-45	2F137	2F138	SIM HRS/IUT 2F137	2F138
WEIGHTED IUT SYLLABUS	73.50	69.90	0.00	0.00	12.00	18.00

IUT OVHD HRS/STUD=(INS/STUD RATIO)*(12 MO/INS AVG TOUR)*(WEIGHTED IUT SYL HRS)

INSTRUCTOR UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

	HRS/(SL + SCT)	* SL	* AVAIL	* WX	* EI	* DAYS	
IN T-45 =	8HRS/(1.33 + 2.00)	* 1.33	* 0.800	* 0.89	* 1.00	* 237 =	539 HRS/YR

	AIRCRAFT HOURS	CPT HOURS	SIMULATOR HOURS	
INSTRUCTOR/STUD RATIO	(217.6 / 539)			= .40353
AIRCRAFT/STUDENT RATIO	(265.9 / 732)			= .36325
PROC TRNR/STUD RATIO		(36.0 /2779)		= .01295
SIMULATOR/STUD RATIO			(78.3 /2719)	= .02880

ANNUAL UTILIZATION COMPUTATIONS

	HR/(SL + TAT)	* SL	* AVAIL	* EI	* WX	* DAYS	
T-45 ACFT UTIL =	10/(1.33 + 1.40)	* 1.33	* 0.760	* 0.95	* 0.89	* 237 =	732
2F137 CPT UTIL =	16/(1.50 + 0.25)	* 1.50	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237 =	2779
2F138 FL SIM UTIL =	16/(1.30 + 0.25)	* 1.30	* 0.950	* 0.90	* 1.00	* 237 =	2719

OVHD FACTOR = 51.4%

from D.C. .40882
.35724

Figure 7

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training (cont.)

3. Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per graduate for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Include only those flight operations that are conducted at your air station and outlying auxillary fields. [redacted] To complete the below table, give the historical average for d and night (1) flight operations required per graduate at the air station and OLFs, (2) overhead[1] flight operations per graduate, and (3) total flight operations at the air station an OLFs attributed to each graduate. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary.

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per Student					
			Student		Overhead[1]		Total	
			Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night
General	Primary	T-34C	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		JPATS[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Strike	Intermediate	T-2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Advanced	TA-4J	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Intermediate & Advanced (TS Syllabus)	T-45	906	213	487	81	[redacted]	294
	Advanced	T-45[2]	599	204	289	70	[redacted]	274
E2/C2	Intermediate	T-44	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Advanced	T-2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		T-45[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Maritime	Intermediate	T-34C	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		JPATS[2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

[1]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, incomplete flights, instructor training, flights, warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

[2]If requirements are still being derived, [redacted]

Figure 8

Enclosure (1) is the original calculations provided in NAS Kingsville Data Call 2. Because the is no historical average for T-45 overhead operatic the T-2/TA-4 average of 35% of flight ops was used to calculate the overhead figures. (Note: A mistake was made in calculating the total nig operations per student. The number should read 252 vice 455.)

2. Enclosure (1) provides the estimated data used to calculate the flight operations per student.

3. 1393 total day operations was calculated in the following manner:

[redacted]

110 = 88 WEPS ops + 22 CQ ops

Note: WEPS and the final CQ qualification sortie are typically completed on detachments.

Figure 9

Mission Requirements

b. Flight Training (cont.)

3. Give the total number of flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and approaches without landings) and the minimum number of night flight operations required per student for each type and level of pilot training (and trainer aircraft). Include only those flight operations that are conducted at your air station and outlying/auxiliary fields. Do not include flight ops required by the syllabus but conducted at other sites (e.g., on detachments to other air stations or on a carrier). To complete the below table, give the historical average for day and night (1) flight operations required per graduate at the air station and OLFs, (2) overhead[1] flight operations per student, and (3) total flight operations at the air station and OLFs attributed to each student. Also verify the type(s) of trainer aircraft for each type and level of training, and make corrections where necessary. R

Type of Pilot Training	Level of Pilot Training	Trainer Aircraft	Flight Operations per Student					
			Student		Overhead[1]		Total	
			Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night
Strike	Intermediate	T-2	638	70	103	11	[redacted]	81
	Advanced	TA-4J	1063	146	157	22	[redacted]	168
	Intermediate/ Advanced	T-45[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

NOTE: Overhead air operations derived using CNO planning factors.

[1]Overhead includes extra flights due to unsatisfactory performance, maintenance flights, incomplete flights, instructor training, flights, warm-up flights, and instrument check flights.

Figure 10

Daylight Runway Ops Requirements

Type Training	Runway Ops/Grad*
Primary Pilot	684
Int Maritime/Helo	65
Int E2/C2	400
Adv E2/C2	866
Adv Maritme	496
Adv Helo	1157
[redacted]	[redacted]
Primary NFO	121
Int NFO	111
Adv NFO	90

* *Includes overhead (i.e., IUT, NATOPS, attrition, & maintenance)*

FIGURE 11

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Airport Operations Count (AOC) will be defined as: the number of arrivals and departures from the airport at which the airport traffic control tower is located. Specifically, an airport operation is each takeoff or landing; two operations are accrued for each low approach below traffic pattern altitude, stop and go, or touch and go. (FAA Handbook 7210.35 "Facility Operation and Administration").

2. Roughly 30 student training jackets were reviewed for each pipeline at each training wing. "Flight duration," "night hours," "landings" and "approaches" recorded on each aviation training form (ATF) were transferred to a data base. The data collected represents the compilation of the information contained on approximately 27,000 ATF's.

3. The following assumptions were made to simplify and standardize the data collection and data manipulations:

a. Each logged approach requires 2 operations (1 approach, 1 missed approach).

b. Each logged landing, "adjusted" to be never less than "1" for every event, requires 2 operations (1 takeoff, 1 landing).

c. For a given event, all logged landings can be flown in conjunction with logged approaches.

d. For a given event, if the total logged night hours are greater than one third of the duration, all of the operations for that event are considered to be "night" operations. The rest are considered "day" operations.

METHODOLOGY

1. Data was sorted by squadron, and all repeated events (ie. incompletes, ET's, etc.) for any given student were condensed into a single event. This produced an accurate reflection of the total time required for that particular student to get that one "X."

Figure 12

COMPARISON OF ACTUAL THROUGHPUT DATA WITH CNATRA SPREADSHEET DATA USING PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD.

The CNATRA developed spreadsheet which compiled data (hours and operations) from 27,000 student aviatior training forms plus instructor logbooks was used as the base data. According to discussions with CNATRA staff this data reflects actual student flight operations for surveyed students who began training in 1992 and completed in 1993 (by definition, student overhead is included within these operations.)

The Navy Meridian Team took the base data and added CNO Planning Factor Overhead (excluding student overhead). Then, actual throughput data was compiled, averaging homefield and OLF training operations for 1992 and 1993 -- the years these students were flying, and dividing by 1993 PTR -- the year the students graduated, and compared to the above. The results are as follows:

NAS KINGSVILLE BASE DATA PLUS CNO PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD

	Daytime	Nighttime	Total
Spreadsheet T2 Ops/PTR	824	100	924
Non-Student Overhead	216	26	242
Total T2 Ops/PTR	1040	126	1166
Spreadsheet A4 Ops/PTR	641	196	836
Non-Student Overhead	360	110	471
Total A4 Ops/PTR	1001	306	1307
Total T2/A4 Ops/PTR	2041	432	**2473**

KINGSVILLE	ACTUAL DATA
Average Homefield and OLF Training Ops 1992 and 1993*	365133
Total 1993 Student Graduates	141
Average Homefield and OLF Operations per Strike Student	**2590**

NAS MERIDIAN BASE DATA PLUS CNO PLANNING FACTOR OVERHEAD

	Daytime	Nighttime	Total
Spreadsheet T2 Ops/PTR	660	96	756
Non-Student Overhead	184	26	210
Total T2 Ops/PTR	844	122	966
Non-Student Overhead	589	152	740
Non-Student Overhead	361	93	455
Total A4 Ops/PTR	950	245	1195
Total T2/A4 Ops/PTR	1794	367	**2161**

MERIDIAN	ACTUAL DATA
Average Homefield and OLF Training Ops 1992 and 1993	264702
Total 1993 Student Graduates	117
Average Homefield and OLF Operations per Strike Student	**2262**

CONCLUSION: Planning Factors conservatively approximate ops overhead (understates it).

* Airfield ops for Kingsville in 1993 were reduced by 26,292 to account for T-45 start-up hops.

Figure 13

1995 Meridian/Kingsville Sustainable PTR Capacity

FIGURE 14

	Days	X	Hours	X	Weather Corrected Ops/Hr	X	Sustainable Capacity Factor	=	Daytime Ops Available
KINGSVILLE									
HOMEFIELD	237	x	12.1	x	80.0	x	.85	=	195,004
OLF ALICE O.G.	237	x	11.6	x	54.0	x	.85	=	126,188
MERIDIAN									
HOMEFIELD	237	x	12.1	x	81.0	x	.85	=	197,441
OLF BRAVO	237	x	11.6	x	53.0	x	.85	=	123,851
						Total			642,484

$$\frac{\text{Daytime Ops Available}}{\text{Daytime Ops/PTR}} = \text{PTR}$$

$$\frac{642{,}484}{1822} = 353$$

7-Nov-94

T-45 INVENTORY PROFILE TO 2013

FY	T45 DEL	T45 CUM	PIPE (FAA)	MOD LOSS	OTHER LOSSES	ACFT AVAILABLE	PREDICTED ATTRITION			ATTRITION A/C YEAR	ATTRITION A/C TOTAL	(PAA) END OF YEAR TRAINING ACFT REQ	(PAA) AVERAGE TRAINING ACFT REQ	
88-91	2	2	0						0	0	0	2		88-91
1992	4	6	0						0	0	0	5	3.5	1992
1993	18	24	0		1	1			0	0	0	23	14	1993
1994	21	45	0			1			0	0	0	38	30.5	1994
1995	15	60	0	3	1	5			2	2	2	50	44	1995
1996	12	72	0	1		6			1.584	2	4	60	55	1996
1997	12	84	0			6	0.036	11	1.98	2	6	68	64	1997
1998	12	96	3		-1	8			2.304	2	8	74	71	1998
1999	12	108	3			8			2.376	3	11	80	77	1999
2000	12	120	1	4	-1	11			1.848	2	13	91	85.5	2000
2001	12	132	0	-1		15			2.052	2	15	100	95.5	2001
2002	12	144	2	-1		14	0.034	12	2.292	2	17	113	106.5	2002
2003	12	156	1	-5		15			2.376	3	20	122	117.5	2003
2004	12	168	1	-1		11			2.82	3	23	130	126	2004
2005	12	180	1			11			3.024	3	26	138	134	2005
2006	12	192	0			12			3.144	3	29	147	142.5	2006
2007	1	193	0			13		16	3.072	3	32	144	145.5	2007
2008		193	0			13			3.024	4	36	141	142.5	2008
2009		193	0			13			3.024	3	39	138	139.5	2009
2010		193	0			13			3.024	3	42	135	136.5	2010
2011		193	0			13			3.024	3	45	131	133	2011
2012		193	0			13			3.024	3	48	128	129.5	2012
2013		193	0			13		16	3.024	4	52	125	126.5	2013
2014		193	0			13			3.024	3	55	122	123.5	2014
2015	-3	190	0			13	66		3.024	3	58	116	119	2015
2016	-20	170	-2			13			2.964	3	61	95	105.5	2016
2017	-8	162	-2			11			2.856	3	64	88	90.5	2017
2018	-6	156	-1			9		13	2.532	3	67	78	82	2018
2019	-6	150	-1			8			2.172	3	70	70	74	2019
2020	-6	144	0			7			1.968	3	73	62	66	2020
						7			1.776	3	75			
							4		1.584	2				
							72							

HOURS/AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH JPATS)

NOI	PTR	HRS/PTR	HOURS	PAA
STRIKE	164	221.3	36289	50.41
E2C2	36	131.8	4738	6.58
SURGE	17	221.3	3762	5.23
NON-PRODUCTION			1400	1.94
TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED			46188	65

NMM	PTR	HRS/PTR	HOURS	PAA
STRIKE	142	222.9	31652	43.96
FMS	30	222.9	6687	9.29
SURGE	17	222.9	3789	5.26
NON-PRODUCTION			483	0.67
TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED			42611	60

PAA UTE RATE
728
741
695

PAA=	125
BAA=	13
ATTRITION	55
TOTAL	193

T-2
86 hr Car/Qual

FY-2002 2003

* 20 Hrs - JPATS

175.6 T-45
- 19.5 T-45
150 hrs - T-45
146 hr / Qual by JPATS

w/ PTR 6th
360 → 345

w/ JPATS Delivery

" Recovery operations
unusual circumstance
for a period of time
- Surge is different -
equal #

no # w/ 2

JIM

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 OCT 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Fixed-Wing Flight Training

In April 1993 the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Air Force, assisted by the Secretary of the Navy, to:

1. Consolidate initial fixed-wing aircraft training for all Services and transition to a common primary training aircraft; and

2. Combine follow-on flight training into four common pipelines (Navy fighter attack, Air Force fighter/bomber, Navy and Air Force tanker/transport/maritime patrol, and helicopter).

In response, the Navy and the Air Force are in the process of implementing joint fixed-wing flight training initiatives that carry out the Secretary's directive. A common pipeline for helicopter training is still under review. A schematic description of their approach is in Attachment 1.

In addition, the Navy and Air Force have proposed other joint flight training initiatives for the functions of navigator, weapon system officer, and electronic warfare officer, as illustrated in Attachment 2.

I am encouraged by the cooperation and progress we have made in bringing jointness to flight training and hope that it serves as a model in other areas where the Department might benefit from increasing "jointness." This memorandum, therefore, provides my approval for Air Force/Navy plans to implement these joint fixed-wing flight training programs, as well as for their additional joint training initiatives. The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, and others that may be involved, should take actions to implement these programs as soon as possible.

John Deutch

21146

JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING



Attachment 1

JOINT NAVIGATOR TRAINING



JOINT ENTRY LEVEL EWO TRAINING



AIR FORCE UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING



LT COL LEN JARMAN
HQ USAF/XOOT
28 FEB 95

OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- *JOINT PRIMARY AIRCRAFT TRAINING SYSTEM (JPATS) UPDATE*

CURRENT USAF FLYING TRAINING LOCATIONS

REESE AFB
FIXED-WING SUPT

VANCE AFB
FIXED-WING UPT
(SUPT SEP 95)

SHEPPARD AFB
ENJJPT

COLUMBUS AFB
FIXED-WING UPT
(SUPT SEP 96)



RANDOLPH AFB
AF NAV/PIT

LAUGHLIN AFB
FIXED-WING SUPT

TYPICAL USAF PILOT TRAINING BASE

BASE PROPER



FEATURES:
1. ONE RUNWAY APPROXIMATELY 5000-6500 FEET.

2. TWO RUNWAYS OVER 8000 FEET.

3. ONE OUTLYING FIELD APPROXIMATELY 5000-7000 FEET.



NOTES:
1. SOME AIRFIELDS HAVE CROSSWIND RUNWAYS.

2. RANDOLPH AFB HAS DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION.

OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- *JPATS UPDATE*

PRIMARY TRAINER (T-37)



- *FIRST AIRCRAFT FLOWN IN UPT*
- *TWIN-ENGINE JET*
- *SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING*
- *UNPRESSURIZED*
- *TO BE REPLACED BY JPATS*

ADVANCED TRAINERS

T-38

- BOMBER-FIGHTER TRAINER
- TWIN-ENGINE SUPERSONIC JET
- TANDEM SEATING



REESE
LAUGHLIN

T-1

- AIRLIFT-TANKER TRAINER
- TWIN-ENGINE JET
- FLIGHT DECK WITH SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING AND JUMP SEAT

NAVY AIRCRAFT IN WHICH USAF STUDENTS TRAIN



T-34

- ***PRIMARY TRAINER***
- ***SINGLE-ENGINE TURBOPROP***
- ***TANDEM SEATING***
- ***UNPRESSURIZED***
- ***TO BE REPLACED BY JPATS***



T-44

- ***ADVANCED MARITIME PATROL TRAINER***
- ***TWIN-ENGINE TURBOPROP***
- ***FLIGHT DECK WITH SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING***

OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- ***USAF PILOT TRAINING***
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- *JPATS UPDATE*

GENERALIZED UPT

PRIMARY - T-37



T-37
80.9 HRS

ADVANCED - T-38

T-38
108.8 HRS

WINGS
UNIVERSALLY ASSIGNABLE PILOT

NOTES:

- ***ALL TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED AT ONE BASE***
- ***BEING REPLACED BY SPECIALIZED UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (SUPT)***

EURO-NATO JOINT JET PILOT TRAINING (ENJJPT)--SHEPPARD AFB

PRIMARY - T-37



ADVANCED - T-38



NOTES:

- *FIGHTER-ORIENTED TRAINING (WILL NOT INCORPORATE T-1)*
- *INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM--NOT FOREIGN MILITARY SALES*
- *MEMBER COUNTRIES PAY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE*
- *MEMBER COUNTRIES OWN SOME AIRCRAFT*

SPECIALIZED UPT



OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- ***JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING***
- *JPATS UPDATE*

UFT BASES--ALL SERVICES



REESE AFB
AF FIXED-WING

VANCE AFB
AF FIXED-WING

SHEPPARD AFB
ENJJPT

COLUMBUS AFB
AF FIXED-WING

FORT RUCKER
ARMY HELO

RANDOLPH AFB
AF NAV/PIT

LAUGHLIN AFB
AF FIXED-WING

NAS WHITING
NAVY PRIMARY/HELO

NAS PENSACOLA
NAVY PRIMARY/NFO

NAS KINGSVILLE
NAVY STRIKE

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI
NAVY MARITIME

NAS MERIDIAN
NAVY STRIKE

JOINT TRAINING: BACKGROUND

- *APR 93: SECDEF TASKED SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ASSISTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, TO "CONSOLIDATE INITIAL FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT TRAINING FOR ALL SERVICES AND TRANSITION TO A COMMON PRIMARY TRAINING AIRCRAFT."*
  - *GENERAL OFFICER/FLAG OFFICER GROUP DEVELOPED JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING PLAN*
  - *EXPANDED TASKING TO INCLUDE ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING AND NAVIGATOR/NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (NFO) TRAINING*
  - *SERVICE SECRETARIES APPROVED IN JUL 93*
- *OPERATORS CONTINUED TO REFINE PLAN*
  - *MODIFIED NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
  - *SERVICE SECRETARIES APPROVED*
- *DEPUTY SECDEF APPROVED FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING PLANS IN OCT 95*

JOINT PILOT TRAINING

- *PRIMARY:*
  - *35th FTS AT REESE AFB TEXAS AND VT-3 AT NAS WHITING FIELD FL BECAME PROTOTYPE JOINT TRAINING SQUADRONS*
  - *ROTATING SQUADRON COMMAND*
  - *BY FY 98: 100 STUDENTS CROSSFLOW ANNUALLY, 24 EXCHANGE INSTRUCTORS*
  - *OTHER SQUADRONS BECOME JOINT AS THEY TRANSITION TO JPATS*

- *AIRLIFT/TANKER/MARITIME PATROL:*
  - *STUDENT/INSTRUCTOR EXCHANGE*
  - *NAVY EVENTUALLY TRAINS USAF TURBOPROP-BOUND STUDENTS (C-130)*
  - *USAF EVENTUALLY TRAINS NAVY JET-BOUND STUDENTS (E-6)*

JOINT UPT--END GAME



JOINT UPT--CURRENT STATUS



JOINT NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING-- END GAME



JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER (EWO) TRAINING--END GAME



OVERVIEW



- *UFT LOCATIONS/TYPICAL BASE*
- *FIXED-WING PILOT TRAINING AIRCRAFT*
- *USAF PILOT TRAINING*
- *JOINT PILOT AND NAVIGATOR/NFO TRAINING*
- ***JPATS UPDATE***

JPATS CONTENDERS (T-37/T-34 REPLACEMENT)

	NORTHROP/ EMBRAER SUPER TUCANO BRAZIL	BEECH/ PILATUS PC-9 MK II SWITZERLAND	GRUMMAN/ AGUSTA S.211A ITALY	ROCKWELL/ MBB RANGER 2000 GERMANY	VOUGHT/ FMA PAMPA 2000 ARGENTINA	LOCKHEED/ AERMACCHI MB 339 ITALY	CESSNA CITATIONJET USA
PLANFORM							
	AIRCRAFT DRAWN TO SCALE						
TAKEOFF WEIGHT (lb)	7,040	6,789	6,393	7,900	8,168	10,420	7,400
MAXIMUM SPEED	285	278	375	380	400	475	420
ENGINE(S)	P&W TURBOPROP	P&W TURBOPROP	P&W TURBOFAN	P&W TURBOFAN	GARRETT TURBOFAN	ROLLS-ROYCE TURBOJET	2 WILLIAMS TURBOFANS
MODEL IN PRODUCTION	EMB-312A/F	PC-9	S.211A (LIMITED)	(PROTO)	PAMPA (LOW RATE)	MB 339 (LIMITED)	(PROTO)
APPROX NO. BUILT	570	160	85	2	18	182	2

POTENTIAL GBTS CONTRACTORS: BRITISH AEROSPACE, CAE-LINK, HUGHES TRAINING SYSTEMS, LORAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, McDONNELL DOUGLAS TRAINING SYSTEMS

JPATS ACQUISITION SCHEDULE



NOTES:

- *711 AIRCRAFT BUY: DOESN'T INCLUDE ALL OF ENJJPT AIRCRAFT*
- *SERIES OF FIRM FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS EXTENDING 4-5 YEARS EACH*
- *FIRST ORDER WILL BE FOR APPROXIMATELY 140 AIRCRAFT*

USAF UPT CHANGES SINCE 1973

- *CLOSED OR REALIGNED FIVE UPT BASES*
- *STOPPED TRAINING IRANIANS*
- *ENJJPT TRAINING BEGUN*
- *TWO GENERATIONS OF FLIGHT SIMULATION CHANGES*
- *IFF TRAINING ABSORBED INTO UPT BASES*
- *T-46 TO REPLACE T-37 PURCHASED/CANCELLED*
- *SUPT AND T-1 ACQUISITION*
- *JOINT TRAINING*
- *ROTARY-WING TRAINING CHANGED MULTIPLE TIMES*
- *NAV TRAINING BASE CLOSED*
  - *NAV TRAINING "REALIGNED" THREE TIMES*

JOINT UPT--INTERMEDIATE STATUS WITH JPATS



SUMMARY



- ***JOINT TRAINING IS CENTERPIECE OF UFT***
- ***JPATS IS KEY TO CONSOLIDATED PRIMARY PILOT TRAINING***
- ***TRAINING "VISION" IS STILL GROWING AND DEVELOPING***

NAVY UNDERGRADUATE FLIGHT TRAINING OVERVIEW

CDR TOM DONOVAN
LCDR DAVE WALKER
OPNAV N889

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- USAF
  - ONE BASE SUPPORTS MULTIPLE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
  - BUILDING BLOCK/LOCK STEP APPROACH
  - FLIGHT SCREENING

GROUP TRAINING in 60 in → 60 out

- USN
  - PIPELINE SPECIFIC TRAINING BASES
  - FLEXIBLE PROGRESSION
  - PREFLIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE SCREENING

USN TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE - VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR) PROCEDURES
- AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:
  - VFR DEPARTURES
  - SPLIT RUNWAY OPERATIONS
  - BOX PATTERNS/CARRIER OPERATIONS
- EMPHASIS ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING
- NIGHT TRAINING - GEARED FOR SEA OPERATIONS

USAF TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR) PROCEDURES
- AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:
  - IFR DEPARTURES
  - STANDARD OVERHEAD PROCEDURES
- EMPHASIS ON CONTACT AND FORMATION
- EMPHASIS ON DAYTIME OPERATIONS

JOINT TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE/AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
  - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES
- EMPHASIS ON:
  - NIGHT
  - INSTRUMENT TRAINING
- AVERAGE SORTIE DURATION: 1.38 HRS

1.7 HRS in T-34C JPATS

JPATS

AIR FORCE AND NAVY JPATS LOCATIONS



STUDENT FLOW PLAN
(PER SQUADRON)



JOINT FIXED-WING TRAINING

SECDEF GUIDANCE:

- CONSOLIDATE INITIAL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT TRAINING AND TRANSITION TO A COMMON PRIMARY TRAINING AIRCRAFT

- ESTABLISH 4-TRACK FOLLOW-ON TRAINING (OPR: SECAF / OCR: SECNAV)

USN PILOT TRAINING



PRIMARY 2.1 yrs FLEET

JOINT TRAINING PROJECTION
JPATS



JOINT NAVIGATOR TRAINING



JOINT ENTRY LEVEL EWO TRAINING




THE ROAD TO WINGS
FT RUCKER

FLIGHT TRAINING FLOW
DUAL TRACK (TH-67 CORE)



UHPT COMMON CORE



UHPT TRACK

- CBT SKILLS 49HRS
- TACTICAL NAV
- TACTICAL FLT PROCEDURES
- VIP
- SLING LOADS
- NVG/DLC/FCF


ALABAMA
LOCAL FLYING AREA

FORT RUCKER AND THE WIREGRASS



JOINT TRAINING WITH AIR FORCE



PRIMARY
12 WKS/60 HRS

INST
20 HRS, 30 SIM

WINGS

QUAL/CBT SKILLS
8 WKS, 49 HRS

NVG
4 WKS, 20 HRS

RWQC
11 WKS/42 HRS,24 SIM

FIXED WING PRIMARY

DOD CONSOLIDATION

UNDERGRADUATE HELICOPTER PILOT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TRAINING

CONSOLIDATION

DoD COMMON	ARMY
	NAVY
	USCG
	USMC
	USAF

LONG TERM SAVINGS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT ONETIME COSTS

ROTARY WING CONSOLIDATION

USAAVNC MISSION

PRODUCE MISSION READY COMBINED ARMS AND JOINT WARFIGHTERS

U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER
AND
FORT RUCKER, ALABAMA

RECENT
FLYING HR MAGNITUDE

YR	HRS
91	383K+
92	291K+
93	248K+
94	245K+

RECENT
FEDERAL MAGNITUDE

GRADUATE

YR	IERW	LEVEL	TOTAL
91	1548	+ 3030	= 4578
92	1227	+ 2772	= 3999
93	957	+ 2621	= 3578
94	1024	+ 2969	= 3993

- 32,000 SQ MILES IN OUTER AREA
- 9,000 SQ MILES = MAJORITY OF FLIGHT TRAINING
- 118 REMOTE TRAINING SITES

FT RUCKER FLIES 25% OF THE ARMY'S FHP WITH LESS THAN 10% OF THE ARMY'S AIRCRAFT

- PEAK IN FY 90 WITH 4.3M
- FY 93 = 2.9M
- TOT SCHOOL ACFT = 495
- OTHER ACFT = 124

UHPT JOINT CURRICULUM



BRAC 95

Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training

GOALS

- Retain Capacity to Meet Quality Air Crew Training Requirements
- Ensure Function Compatibility at Remaining Sites
- Minimize Costs
  - Long term
  - Transitional
- Retain Sites with Inherent Military and Functional Value

METHODOLOGY - PHASE 1

DATA COLLECTION / PREPARATION

- Determine Scope and Sites in Category
- Collect Data - Standardized and Certified
- Develop Functional Values
- Compute Capacities
- Integrate Appropriate Policy
- Obtain Site Military Values

METHODOLOGY - PHASE 2

Modeling, Analyses, Alternatives, "Wrap-Up"

- Analyze Phase 1 Results using Optimization Model
- Develop and evaluate Alternatives
- Provide Alternatives to Military Departments
- Evaluate Military Department Recommendations
- Review Base "Complex" Potential

Category Scope Rationale

Installations in the UPT category include all DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings."

Installations in Category

• Columbus	AFB	MS
• Corpus Christi	NAS	TX
• Fort Rucker	AATC	AL
• Kingsville	NAS	TX
• Laughlin	AFB	TX
• Meridian	NAS	MS
• Pensacola	NAS	FL
• Randolph*	AFB	TX
• Reese	AFB	TX
• Sheppard	AFB	TX
• Vance	AFB	OK
• Whiting Field	NAS	FL

* Includes Enhanced Flight Screening sites and Hondo, TX and the Air Force Academy

TEN UPT FUNCTIONS

1. Flight Screening
2. Primary
3. Bomber/fighter
4. Strike/Advanced E-2/C-2
5. Airlift/Tanker
6. Maritime/Inter. E-2/C-2
7. Pri./Inter. NFO/NAV
8. WSO Strike
9. Panel NAV
10. Helo

CAPACITIES

- Airfield Ops
- Air Space
- Ground Training
  - Classroom
  - Simulators
- Ramps, Aprons, Taxi-ways
- Hangars
- Maintenance
- Supply/Storage
- Housing

[redacted]

SITE / FUNCTION CONSTRAINT MATRIX

FUNCTION	SERVICE	A/C	RUCKER	WHITING	CORPUS	P-COLA	MERIDIAN	KING	RAN	SHEP	VANCE	REESE	LAU	COL
FLT SCREENING	USAF	T-3												
PRIMARY PILOT	USN USAF	T-34 T-37 JPATS	X (2)											
AIRLIFT/TANKER	USAF	T-1	X (1)	X (1)										
MARITIME/ INT E-2/C-2	USN USAF	T-44	X (2)											
STRIKE/ ADV E-2/C-2	USN	T-2 TA-4 T-45	X (1)	X (1)										
BOMBER/ FIGHTER	USAF	T-38	X (1)	X (1)	X (1)									
HELO	USN USAF USA	TH-57 UH-1 TH-67 OH-58			X (2)		X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)	X (2)
PRIM & INT NAV/NFO	USN USAF	T-34 T-39	X (2)											
WSO STRIKE	USN USAF	T-39 T-2								X (3)	X (3)	X (3)	X (3)	
PANEL NAV	USN USAF	T-43	X (1)	X (1)										

(1) Runway length constraints based on model design series of training aircraft (FY 2001 requirements)
(2) Lack of suitable outlying fields (one or more for indicated fixed-wing programs, two or more for helo)
(3) Too far from water (greater than 200 NM to working area)

[redacted]

TO BE VERIFIED UPON RECEIPT OF CERTIFIED DATA

MEASURES OF MERIT FOR:
PRIMARY

MEASURES OF MERIT	WEIGHT	RATIONALE
Managed Training Areas	5	The questions addressed in this area are focused toward ownership of special use airspace, air-to ground ranges, and outlying fields. In this analysis, *accessibility* to these facilities was considered more important than ownership.
Weather	14	This weight was used because students in primary flight training need better weather than students in the advanced tracks.
Airspace and Flight Training Areas	22	This area was weighted heavily due to the direct impact it has on primary flight training. Much of the training takes place in special use airspace; therefore, this area plays a large role in determining the training effectiveness of an installation.
Airfields	24	This area is weighted the heaviest due to the emphasis primary training places on pattern activities. This area plays a big role in evaluating the effectiveness of a training installation.
Ground Training Facilities	10	This weight is commensurate with the role classrooms, simulators, and other facilities play in flight training.
Aircraft Maintenance Facilities	5	Training aircraft are not difficult to maintain and do not require an extensive training infrastructure.
Special Military Facilities	0	N/A
Proximity to Training Areas	0	N/A
Proximity to Other Support Facilities	2	This area looks at the local area to determine what other facilities are available The overall training infrastructure is already established and in use at each base so the impact to this area should be minimal.
Unique Features	0	N/A
Air Quality	5	This has been baselined due to like aircraft.
Encroachment	5	Encroachment plays a role in determining installation compatibility with the training mission; however, training aircraft do not have a large impact on encroachment issues.
Services	8	Quality of life plays a significant role in determining installation compatibility with the training mission and this weight will be applied to the other training functions.

Questions for Assessing the Functional Quality of *Primary* Pilot Training

Managed Training Areas (5 points)

1. The # of outlying/auxiliary fields that are controlled/owned by the installation and support primary training. (2.5 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 6 (0 pt for 0 fields, 2.5 pts for 6 fields)
   Rationale: Owning airfields and airspace have equal impact on training.
2. The number and type of special use airspace that is controlled/owned by the installation and supports primary training. (2.5 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: 1.5 pt for MOA, 0.5 pt for MTR, 0.5 for AA
   Rationale: Owning airfields and airspace have equal impact on training.

Weather (14 points)

1. Percent of time weather is better than 1500/3. (4 pt or 29%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 80% and 100% (1 pt for 80% and 4 pt for 95%)
   Rationale: USAF weather requirements to conduct training. Higher % is better.
2. Percent of time weather is better than 1000/3. (3 pt or 21%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 80% and 100% (1 pt for 80% and 3 pt for 95%)
   Rationale: USN weather requirements to conduct training. Higher % is better.
3. Percent of time crosswinds are less than 15 knots. (3 pt or 21%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between min% and max% (0 pt for min% and 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: Max crosswinds for majority of student training. Higher % is better.
4. Percent of time crosswinds are greater than 25 knots. (1 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between min% and max% (1 pt for min% and 0 pt for max%)
   Rationale: Max aircraft crosswind limits. Lower % is better.
5. Percent of sorties canceled/rescheduled. (1 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5% and 20% (1 pt for 5% and 0 pt for 20%)
   Rationale: This area captures weather attrition not covered by questions 1-4.
6. Official Planning factor for lost sorties due to weather. (2 pt or 14%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5% and 20% (2 pt for 5% and 1 pt for 20%)
   Rationale: This area captures weather attrition not covered by questions 1-4.

Airspace and Flight Training Areas (22 points)

1. Amount of airspace (MOA and AA) in nm^3 (12 pt or 64%).
   Scoring: Linear scale of weighted airspace from 0 to max airspace (MOA and .8 AA) (0 pt for 0 nm^3 and 12 pt for max nm^3). Weighted airspace for each site = amount of MOA airspace + .8(amount of AA airspace)
   Rationale: More airspace is better, MOA is slightly better than AA.
2. Average distance to airspace (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max weighted average airspace size times distance (0 pt for min and 2 pt for max). Weighted average airspace size times distance for each site = Sum (airspace size in nm^3 times distance to airspace in nm) for all MOA or AA divided by the Sum of all airspace size.
   Rationale: Closer airspace is better.
3. Number of MTR's available (3 pt or 14%).
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0 pt for 0 MTR's and 3 pt for max MTR's)
   Rationale: MTRs are required for training...more is better.
4. Percent of flight ops experiencing ATC delays of 15 minutes or greater. (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (2 pt for 0 % delays and 0 pts for max % delay)
   Rationale: Fewer ATC delays is better.
   nned commercial hub within 100 miles. (1 pt or 4%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for no and 0 pt for yes.
   Rationale: Commercial hub will impact training. No hub is better.
6. Number of bisecting airways. (2 pt or 9%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (2 pts for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: Bisecting airways reduce training effectiveness in areas.

Airfields (24 points)

1. The # of outlying/auxiliary fields usable for primary pilot training (4 pt or 17%) Definition of usable field will be based on runway length (preliminary cutoff – 5000 ft)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (0 pt for 0 fields, 4 pt for max # fields)
   Rationale: More outlying fields improve capacity and quality of training.
2. The # of usable outlying/auxiliary fields with IFR or night? capability. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and some max (0 pt for 0 fields, 2 pt for max # fields)
   Rationale: This capability will help reduce congestion at the home field.
3. Median distance to outlying/auxiliary fields. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between some min and max (2 pt for min distance, 1 pt for max)
   Rationale: Closer airfields are better.
4. Runway length of longest runway at main airfield. (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 5000 and 8000 ft (1 pt for 5000 ft runway , 2 points for 8000 ft runway)
   Rationale: Longer runway is better for safety reasons
5. Number of primary runways that can support concurrent ops and crosswind runways at main field. (7 pt or 29%)
   Scoring:
   With 0 crosswind runways: 2 pts for first runway, 4 pts for 2 parallel runways, 6 pts for 3 parallel runways without crosswind runways.
   With 1 crosswind runway: 3 pts for first primary runway, 5 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   With 2 non-parallel crosswind runways: 3.5 pts for first primary runway, 5.5 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   With 2 parallel crosswind runways: 4 pts for first primary runway, 6 pts for 2 parallel runways, 7 pts for 3 parallel runways.
   Rationale: More runways improve quality of training for safety reasons and flexibility
6. Condition of runways – % of runway sq ft in adequate condition (2 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 2 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the runway. Higher quality is better.
7. Condition of taxiways/aprons – % of taxiways/aprons sq ft in adequate condition (1.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the taxiways. Higher quality is better.
8. Condition of utilities – ave % of facilities in adequate condition (1.75 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.75 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the utilities. Higher quality is better.
9. Condition of other facilities (e.g., term, admin) – ave % of facilities in adeq cond (1.75 pt or 7%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1.75 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This indicates the quality of the facilities. Higher quality is better.

Ground Training Facilities (10 points)

1. Amount of training facilities (classrooms) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (3 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
2. Condition of training facilities (classrooms) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (1 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
3. Amount of training facilities (trainers) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (3 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 3 pt for max%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
4. Condition of training facilities (trainers) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (1 pt or 10%)

[redacted]

Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.
nount of training facilities (other) rated "adequate" in sq ft. (1.5 pt or 15%)
Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for max%)
Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.

6. Condition of training facilities (other) - % of "adequate" sq ft. (.5 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This measures the amount and quality of the training facilities. More quality is better.

Aircraft Maintenance Facilities (5 points)

1. Level of maintenance operations at site (3 pt or 60%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for O-level, 2 pt for I-level, 2.5 pt for Depot level, 3 pt for Depot level for aircraft type (TMS)
   Rationale: Higher level of maintenance is better.
2. Amount of hangars rated "adequate" in sq ft (1.5 pt or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 1.5 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" hangar space is better.
3. Condition of hangars - % of hangars in "adequate" condition (.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .5 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: This is another measure of installation quality. Higher % is better.

Proximity to Other Support Facilities (2 points)

1. Number of other airfields in the area that could support primary pilot training (1 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: .5 pt for 1 field, 1 pt for 2 or more fields)
   Rationale: More available airfields are better.
   stance to other airfields. (1 pt or 50%)
   Scoring: .5 pt for 1 field less than 30 miles, 1 pt for 2 or more fields less than 30 miles
   Rationale: Closer airfields are better.

Air Quality (5 points)

1. Is the air station in an attainment or maintenance area for CO, ozone, and PM-10? (3 pt or 60%)
   Scoring: 3 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Attainment and maintenance areas are best.
2. Is the air station in a moderate non-attainment area or better area for CO, ozone, and PM-10? (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Moderate and marginal non-attainment (as well as attainment and maintenance) are better than Serious, Severe, and Extreme non-attainment.
3. There have been no restrictions or delays due to air quality considerations (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Fewer restrictions are better..

Encroachment (5 points)

1. Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordinances? (1 pts or 20%)
   Scoring: 1 pts for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Having an existing AICUZ study in the zoning ordinance is best.
2. What is the percent incompatible land use for clear zones? (1.5 pts or 30%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (1.5 pts for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
3. What is the percent incompatible land use for APZ I? (1 pt or 20%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (1 pt for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
   at is the percent incompatible land use for APZ II? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pts for max).
   Rationale: The lower amount of incompatible land use is better.
5. Are real estate disclosures required by local communities? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: 0.5 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: Real estate disclosures are best.
6. Has all clear zone acquisition been completed? (0.5 pt or 10%)
   Scoring: 0.5 pt for yes, 0 pt for no
   Rationale: It is best if all clear zones have been acquired.

Services (8 points)

1. Amount of BOQ rooms rated "adequate" (2 pt or 25%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, 2 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
2. Condition of BOQ rooms - % of "adequate" (1 pt or 12%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, 1 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
3. Amount of BEQ rooms rated "adequate" (.6 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, .6 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
4. Condition of BEQ rooms - % of "adequate" (.4 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .4 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" billeting space is better.
5. What percent of the listed MWR and support facilities/programs are available? (2 pt or 25%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to 100 (0 pt for 0 and 2 pt for 100).
   Rationale: More MWR facilities are better to enhance quality of life.
6. Amount of military housing rated "adequate" (.6 pt or 8%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and max (0 pt for 0 %, .6 pt for max%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" housing is better.
7. Condition of military housing - % of "adequate" (.4 pt or 5%)
   Scoring: Linear scale between 0 and 100 (0 pt for 0 %, .4 pt for 100%)
   Rationale: More "adequate" housing is better.
8. Number of children on the waiting list. (0.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pt for max).
   Rationale: Fewer children on waiting list is better.
9. Average wait for children on the waiting list. (0.5 pt or 6%)
   Scoring: Linear scale from 0 to max (0.5 pt for 0 and 0 pt for max).
   Rationale: Less waiting time for child care is better.

[redacted]

2H

CAPACITY ANALYSIS

FACTORS	HISTORICAL	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED TRAINING (SYLLABI) (A)	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED GRADS (B)	REQUIRED CAPACITY (AxB)	MAX AVAILABLE CAPACITY (C)	EXCESS CAPACITY (C-(AxB))
TRAINING SORTIES	SORTIES/ GRAD SYLLABUS +OVERHEAD	SORTIES/ GRAD +MAJCOM	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	SORTIES/ YEAR	SORTIES/ YEAR	SORTIES/ YEAR
AIRFIELD OPS	OPS/SORTIE +TRAFFIC CNT +TOT # SORTIES	OPS/GRAD +MAJCOM	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	OPS/YEAR	OPS/YEAR	OPS/YEAR
AIRSPACE	SYLLABUS +OVERHEAD +MX	GRAD +MAJCOM	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	YEAR	YEAR	YEAR
GROUND TRAINING	+ATTRIT +CLASSROOMS +SIMULATORS	GRAD +MAJCOM	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	YEAR	YEAR	YEAR

CAPACITY ANALYSIS (CONT)

FACILITY FACTORS	HISTORICAL	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED TRAINING (SYLLABI) (A)	REQUIREMENTS: PROG'MED GRADS (B)	REQUIRED CAPACITY (AxB)	MAX AVAILABLE CAPACITY (C)	EXCESS CAPACITY (C-(AxB))
RAMPS/ APRONS/ TAXIWAYS	TOT FP USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED FP / AIRCRAFT REQ	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	AIRCRAFT	TOT FP AVAIL FP / AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT	AIRCRAFT
HANGARS	HANGARS USED MX DOCKS/HANGAR AIRCRAFT/MX DOCK	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	AIRCRAFT	AC X X AIRCRAFT	AIRCRAFT
MAINTENANCE	FACILITIES USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED AIRCRAFT / FACILITY REQ	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	AIRCRAFT	AC X AIRCRAFT	AIRCRAFT
SUPPLY/ STORAGE	TOT FP USED # OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORTED FP / AIRCRAFT REQ	AIRCRAFT (GRAD/YEAR)	GRADS/YEAR +PGL +PTR	AIRCRAFT	TOT FP AVAIL FP / AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT	AIRCRAFT
HOUSING	CAPACITY USED STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY		STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY
MESSING	CAPACITY USED STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY		STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY	STUDENTS/DAY

	Columbus	Corpus Christi	Ft Rucker	Kingsville	Laughlin	Meridian	Pensacola	Randolph	Reese	Sheppard	Vance	Whiting Field	Hondo	USAFA	
Site Military Value															
Functions for UPT	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	FV	DoD Requirements
Flight Screening	6.6	6.4	6.9	6.7	6.8	6.5	6.1	5.7	6.2	6.2	6.6	6.6	5.4	3.9	2,073
Primary Pilot	6.8	6.7	X2	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.4	6.7	6.0	6.3	6.8	6.6	0.0	0.0	2,493
Airlift/Tanker	6.3	6.5	X1	7.7	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.5	5.9	6.5	6.7	X1	0.0	0.0	752
Inter E2/C2, Adv Maritime	6.7	7.5	X2	7.6	6.5	6.6	7.5	6.4	5.9	6.5	6.8	7.4	0.0	0.0	273
Adv E2/C2, Strike	6.0	6.2	X1	7.3	5.4	6.3	7.6	6.0	5.7	6.2	5.3	X1	0.0	0.0	372
Adv Bomber/Fighter	6.4	X1	X1	7.3	5.5	6.8	7.8	6.8	5.6	6.3	5.5	X1	0.0	0.0	619
Helicopter	X2	X2	8.9	X2	X2	X2	6.5	X2	X2	X2	X2	7.2	0.0	0.0	1,481
Primary NFO, Inter NFO	6.9	6.7	X2	7.0	7.1	6.8	6.4	7.1	6.2	6.2	6.8	6.4	0.0	0.0	718
Adv NFO Strike	6.6	6.9	6.7	7.4	X3	6.5	7.6	6.1	X3	X3	X3	7.0	0.0	0.0	312
Adv NFO Panel	7.6	5.9	X1	7.2	6.8	7.0	7.6	6.9	7.2	7.7	7.5	X1	0.0	0.0	222

X1 - Runway length constraints X2 - Lack of outlying fields X3 - Too far from water

Resources	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap	Cap
Airfield Ops	784,371	752,136	7,441,016	389,136	787,572	389,136	270,072	619,768	686,547	646,988	685,390	865,392	554,664	651,630
Airspace	116,973	315,810	0	253,418	218,889	128,879	181,790	49,494	106,925	166,922	114,708	147,888	43,560	49,368
Ground Training Classroom	542,080	464,640	5,523,408	859,584	193,600	406,560	3,915,544	696,960	696,960	348,480	373,648	554,400	116,160	77,440
Ground Training Simulators	77,440	46,464	212,960	61,952	61,952	54,208	135,520	92,928	61,952	92,928	61,952	104,544	0	0
Aprons	209,840	540,367	392,726	240,614	217,378	241,166	299,395	501,946	282,496	394,125	223,645	366,667	251,200	46,122
* Normalized Airfield Ops	—	—	—	537,008	—	539,008	326,549	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Resources per student	Flight Screening	Primary Pilot	Airlift/Tanker	Inter E2/C2, Adv Maritime	Adv E2/C2, Strike	Adv Bomber/Fighter	Helicopter	Primary NFO, Inter NFO	Adv NFO Strike	Adv NFO Panel
Training Sorties	24	94	88	44	166	132	137	33	70	13
Airfield Ops	526	1,156	405	496	1,393	926	1,288	248	280	39
Airspace	6	32	61	21	97	75	N/A	37	53	0
Ground Training Classroom	14	213	186	202	196	156	955	371	144	304
Ground Training Simulators	0	27	42	30	98	29	32	44	53	80
Aprons	18.81	181.92	357.60	190.01	303.45	357.35	190.62	60.31	239.59	201.00
* Normalized Airfield Ops	—	—	—	—	1922	—	—	—	396	54

Maximum requirements where duplicate training

-
-
-
-
-

SA/aircraft/student	0.0555	0.2274	0.2364	0.2088	0.3617	0.5105	0.2681	0.1058	0.1346	0.0402
SQ YDS/Aircraft	339	800	1,500	910	795	700	711	570	1,780	5,000
# Aircraft Required	113	567	179	57	142	316	397	76	42	9

* Normalized Light/Heavy aircraft → Airfield Ops

POLICY INTEGRATION

Joint Fixed-Wing:

1. Primary (JPATS)
2. Primary/Intermediate NFO & Navigator
3. WSO Strike
4. Panel Navigator
5. Multi-Engine:
    a. Jet - Air Force
    b. Prop - Navy

2K

MILITARY DEPARTMENT MILITARY VALUES

(Scale 1 to 3 with 3 = High)

• Columbus	3
• Corpus Christi	3
• Fort Rucker	3
• Kingsville	3
• Laughlin	3
• Meridian	2
• Pensacola	3
• Randolph	3
• Reese	1
• Sheppard	3
• Vance	3
• Whiting	2

OPTIMIZATION MODEL

- MAXFV - Maximize Functional Value
- MINSITE - Minimum Site (5% FV & 3 "Rules")
  - Flt Screening Separate
  - Joint Fixed-Wing Policy
  - Notional Squadron > 100 Students
- MINNMV - Minimum Sites with Maximum Military Value - "Best" with 4th "Rule": Flt Screening at Hondo and Air Force Academy
- "MIN PRIME" - 3 Sites Closed

OPTIMIZATION MODEL (Cont.)

- "MIN PRIME 2" - 4 Sites Closed

  Added Air Space and OLF capacity from closed sites back into system.
- Analytical Excursion: Used Air Space and OLF capacity from Corpus Christi to maximize Kingsville capacity. Closed 5th Site.
- "Scenarios" developed with additional efforts to consolidate functions and minimize moves of new functions to new sites.

ALTERNATIVES

3-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, & Whiting
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 9.9%

4-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, Whiting, & Vance
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 1.3%

5-Site

- Close Meridian, Reese, Whiting, Vance, & Corpus Christi
- Excess Capacity Remaining - 2.3%

Military Department Recommendations

Navy - Close Meridian and Realign Corpus Christi. Whiting not closed based on $'s:

1). High costs to move helicopter UPT to Fort Rucker and primary UPT to Pensacola.

2). Small savings for collocating helicopter UPT.

Air Force - Close Reese. Vance not closed based on capacity concerns.

1). Added capacity needed for Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals course.

2). Required flexibility for new training systems.

3). Capacity "buffer" for uncertainties associated with Base Closure and fielding new aircraft.

Bottom Line: Not inconsistent with JCSG work

3/21/95

BASE "COMPLEXES"

- Issue Raised by SECNAV and JCSG Reviewed
- Three Base "Pairs" or Complexes in UPT Category:
  1) Corpus Christi & Kingsville - Compatible with Military Department Recommendations
  2) Pensacola & Whiting - Compatible with Military Department Recommendations
  3) Columbus & Meridian - Not Compatible with Military Department Recommendations. No Clear and Compelling Rationale to Change the Recommendations

Training Air Station ConfigurationModel Specifications





ENCL(2), 9NOV 1994

Approach

- Objective function:
  - Minimize excess student throughput capacity
- Parameters:
  - Training requirements
    - FY 2001 student throughput (i.e., PTR/NFOTR)
    - Daylight runway operations per graduate
    - Special Use Airspace (sq. nmi.) per graduate
  - Air station capacity
    - Annual daylight runway operations
    - Available Special Use Airspace

Permissible Training-Site Combinations

(What training is allowed at each air station)

Training	Corp	King	Mrdn	Pens	Whit
Primary Pilot	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int Helo/Mar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adv Helo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int E2/C2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adv E2/C2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Adv Mar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strike	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Primary NFO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Int NFO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Adv NFO	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No

Initial Configuration Model Rules

- Maintain average military value
- Restrict certain types of training to one base
  - All T-44 training (Int E2/C2 and Adv Mar)
  - All NFO training (Primary, Intermediate, and Advance)
  - Advance Helicopter training
- Restrict certain types of training to at most two bases
  - Strike
  - Primary Pilot

Generation of Alternatives

Model allows the generation of three solution sets

- Best solution-for a given set of constraints and data
- Next best-obtained by excluding the first solution
- Third best-obtained by excluding the first two solutions

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analyses can accommodate

- Surges in training requirements of +10 and +20 percent
- Decline in training requirements of 10 percent
- Check feasibility of aircraft basing at each air station

FY 2001 PTR/NFOTR Requirements

Training	DON	USCG/FMS	USAF*	Total
Primary Pilot	1004	204	(100)	1208
Int E2/C2	40	0	0	40
Adv E2/C2	36	0	0	36
Int Maritime	179	0	0	179
Adv Maritime	174	59	150	383
Int Helo	390	0	0	390
Adv Helo	376	103	0	479
Strike	306	30	0	336
Primary NFO	398	57	369	834
Int NFO	252	42	150	444
Advance NFO	173	40	96	309

** Reflects consolidation of fixed-wing flight training i.a.w., OSD Memo 24 October 1994*

Runway Capacity

- Capacity Measure -- annual number of daylight flight operations (i.e., take-offs, landings, and touch-and-goes)
- Formula

  Flight ops/yr = Flying days/yr x Daylight hours/day x Flight ops/hr

- Data
  - Annual number of training days - 237 days
  - Average number of daylight hours/day - 12.1 hours
  - Runway hourly capacity (ops/hour)
    - Based on FAA model
    - Depends on mix of light and heavy aircraft

Runway Capacities
Annual Daylight Runway Operations

Air Station	*Operations*
Corpus Christi	817,548
Kingsville	377,873
Meridian	377,991
Pensacola	340,356
Whiting Field	4,470,460

** Includes capacities of assigned out-lying fields

Daylight Runway Ops Requirements

Type Training	*Runway Ops/Grad*
Primary Pilot	684
Int Maritime/Helo	65
Int E2/C2	400
Adv E2/C2	866
Adv Maritme	496
Adv Helo	1157
Strike	1514
Primary NFO	121
Int NFO	111
Adv NFO	90

* *Includes overhead (i.e., IUT, NATOPS, attrition, & maintenance)*

Runway Capacity Scaling Factors

Training	Corp	King	Mrdn	Pens	Whit
Primary Pilot	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int E2/C2	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv E2/C2	1.38	1	1	1	0
Int Maritime	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv Maritime	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int Helo	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Adv Helo	2	2	2	2	1
Strike	1.38	1	1	1	0
Primary NFO	1	.73	.73	.73	1
Int NFO	1.38	1	1	1	0
Advance NFO	1.38	1	1	1	0

Special Use Airspace Requirements

- Measure
  - Amount (sq. nmi.) of SUA required per graduate
- Data elements (for each type of UPT)
  - Flight syllabus for each type of UPT
  - # Flights per stage
  - Time in airspace per flight per stage
  - Size of airspace block required per stage
  - Percent of overhead
  - Number of students trained per flight

Airspace Requirements Calculation

- Step 1. Compute daily number of flights per student for each stage of syllabus

  #Flights = #Flights per stage / 237days per yr x % Overhead

- Step 2. Compute daily block hours required per stage

  Block hours = #Flights per Student x Hours per Flight x PTR

- Step 3 Compute # blocks required per stage

  #Blocks = Daily block hours / 10 hrs per day

- Step 4 Compute amount (sq. n.mi.) of SUA required

  *Airspace = Sum over all stages {#Block * Block size}*

- Step 5 Compute amount of airspace required per graduate

  Airspace per Grad = Airspace / PTR

Special Use Airspace Requirements
(MOAs, AA, and WAs)

Type Training	*Airspace/PTR (sq. nmi.)*
Primary Pilot	2
Int Maritime/Helo	2
Int E2/C2	6
Adv E2/C2	17
Adv Maritme	4
Adv Helo	0
Strike	16
Primary NFO	1
Int NFO	1
Adv NFO	10

Airspace Availability - Guiding Principles

- If airspace used by more than one service, the scheduling service has priority (i.e., all airspace counts toward their capacity)
  - Example: FACFAS Pensacola schedules W-155, therefore all airspace allocated to NAS Pensacola
- Availability of airspace shared by more than one Naval Air Stations is based on percent usage
  - Example: A-292 (4500 sq. nmi.) is used 80% by NAS Whiting and 20% by NAS Pensacola
    - 3600 sq. nmi. allocated to NAS Whiting
    - 900 sq. nmi. allocated to NAS Pensacola

Special Use Airspace Capacity

Air Station	Airspace (sq. n.mi.)
Corpus Christi	11,141
Kingsville	9670
Meridian	7648
Pensacola	7571
Whiting Field	5400

Question	MV Weight	Activity	Old Score	New Score	Rationale
F4	1.1	Kingsville	1	0	Originally recieved credit for having only 88.73% Adequate Maintenance Facilities
G2	0.96	Pensacola	1	0	Originally recieved credit for having only 88.92% Adequate Ground Training Facilities
I8	0.09	Pensacola	1	0	Recieved certified change on 7 Nov. Juvenile Boot camp canx.
K15	0.66	Corpus	1	0	NAVAUD found math error
K15	0.66	Whiting	1	0	Cascaded question, Whiting inadvertantly given credit for both.
K20	0.66	Pensacola	1	0	Recieved certified change on 7 Nov. % Amenities dropped to 82%.
K24	0.89	Kingsville	0	1	95 BEQ data was used instead of 97 data
K28	0.07	Corpus	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Kingsville	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Whiting	0	0	No change
K29	0.07	Corpus	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Kingsville	0	0	No change
		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	0	0	No change
		Whiting	0	0	No change
K30	0.07	Corpus	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Kingsville	0	0	No change
		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Whiting	1	1	No change

ENCLOSURE (8), 9 NOV 1999

Question	MV Weight	Activity	Old Score	New Score	Rationale
F4	1.1	Kingsville	1	0	Originally recieved credit for having only 88.73% Adequate Maintenance Facilities
G2	0.96	Pensacola	1	0	Originally recieved credit for having only 88.92% Adequate Ground Training Facilities
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		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Whiting	0	0	No change
K29	0.07	Corpus	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Kingsville	0	0	No change
		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	0	0	No change
		Whiting	0	0	No change
K30	0.07	Corpus	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Kingsville	0	0	No change
		Meridian	0	1	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Pensacola	1	0	Originally scored from certified data and changed to FBI crime statistics
		Whiting	1	1	No change

TAS Military Value Matrix Change

	Corpus	Kingsville	Meridian	Pensacola	Whiting
New Score	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97
Old Score	74.96	75.79	70.86	76.90	69.63
Change	-0.87	-0.14	0.21	-1.86	-0.66
Old Ranking	3	2	4	1	5
New Ranking	3	1	4	2	5

ENCL (8), 9 NOV 1994

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	MV Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
		[illegible] AIRSPACE												
1	A1	Are there warning areas within 100 nm of the air station?							37.79					
2	A2	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	0	1	1
2	A3	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
2	A4	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	0	1	1
1	A5	Are there Military Operating Areas (MOA)/Alert areas within 100 nm of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	0	1	1
2	A6	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		1	1	1	1	1
2	A7	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2	A8	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1	A9	Is there restricted airspace within 100 nm of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
2	A10	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
2	A11	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
2	A12	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1	A13	Are there military training routes (MTRs) within 100 nm of the air station?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
2	A14	-Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1	1	0	1	10	2.06		1	1	1	1	1
2	A15	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	1	1
2	A16	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1	A17	Does your air station control an air to ground training range?	1	1	0	0	4	0.55		1	1	1	1	1
2	A18	-Is this airspace managed, scheduled or controlled by DoD?	1	1	1	1	10	2.33		1	1	1	1	1
2	A19	-Is the flying time to and from this airspace <30 minutes?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	1	0	0
2	A20	-Is this airspace under radar and/or communications coverage control?	1	1	0	1	6	1.23		0	1	1	0	0
1	A21	Is there sufficient SUA/air space for special use within 50 nm to support Advanced Strike Training?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
1	A22	Does current airspace configuration permit helicopter training?	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		0	1	1	0	0
1	A23	Is overwater air space required for aviation training conducted at your air station?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	1	1	1
1	A24	Deployments/detachments to other air stations are not required to satisfy training shortfalls?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		1	1	1	1	1
1	A25	The current system of air traffic control (ATC) routes does not limit the amount of flights between the air station and the training airspace	1	1	1	1	7	1.63		1	1	1	1	1
1	A26	Does the air station normally operate without ATC delays?	1	1	1	0	9	1.49		1	0	0	0	1
1	A27	Does the current airspace configuration allow for jet aircraft training?	1	1	1	1	8	1.87		1	1	1	1	1
3	A28	Do squadrons/units from other installations come to this air station to train?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	1	1	1
1	A29	Is the training airspace free of encroachment by civil aviation infrastructure elements?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	1	1	1	1
3	A30	Are air station operations currently not affected by the major air traffic structures within 50 nm of each air to ground range, airspace or airfield?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	0	1	0
		[illegible] ENCROACHMENT								1	1	1	1	1
1	B1	Are air station flight operations presently unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region?	1	0	1	0	4	0.49		1	1	1	1	1
1	B2	Is it projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by the major civilian air traffic structure in the region in the future?							9.81					
1	B3	Is Air Station in an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, or PM-10?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	B4	Air station has no environmental issues that restrict operations or development plans?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
1	B5	Air station low level training routes have not been modified within the last 3 years to accomodate noise complaints and construction?	1	0	1	0	10	1.23		1	1	1	1	1
1	B6	Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordnances?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	B7	Is the air stations present or future mission unaffected by current estimates of population growth and area development?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	0	1	0	1
1	B8	There are no land and/or air encroachment issues which endanger long-term availability of any training area?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	0	1
1	B9	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support an additional workload?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		1	1	1	1	1
2	B10	Is there >500 unrestricted acres available for development?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	1	1	1	1
2	B11	Does the current operational infrastructure (e.g., parking aprons, hangar space, etc.) allow for future expansion or change in mission?	0	1	1	0	5	0.35		1	1	1	1	1
			0	1	1	0	6	0.42		0	0	1	1	1
										1	1	1	1	1

ENCL(8), 18 NOV 1994

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
2	B12	Can the current installation's infrastructure (i.e., utilities, water, sewerage, etc.) accommodate future expansion?	0	1	1	0	7	0.49		1	1	1	1	1
3	B13	Is there off base acreage available for future air station development?	0	0	1	1	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
		WEATHER							1.53					
3	C1	Do weather conditions having a ceiling <500' and visibility <one mile occur <10% of the time?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	1	1	1
3	C2	Are <15% of undergraduate pilot fixed wing training sorties cancelled due to weather?	1	0	1	1	4	0.76		1	1	0	1	0
		AIRFIELD FACILITIES							17.01					
1	D1	Is the average MRP expenditures for the past 3 years >2% of the CPV?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
1	D2	Does the air station have more than one runway complex that can conduct independent (i.e., concurrent) flight operations?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		0	0	0	0	1
1	D3	Does the air station have dual operating runways?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	0
1	D4	Are there >2 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	0	0
1	D5	Are there >6 auxiliary landing fields within 50 nm of the air station owned by the DOD?	1	1	1	0	8	1.32		0	0	0	1	1
1	D6	Is at least 90 percent of the runways and landing pads in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	9	1.85		1	1	1	1	0
2	D7	Is at least 90 percent of the parking and access aprons in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	7	1.44		0	1	1	0	0
1	D8	Is at least 90 percent of the fuel storage facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	1	8	1.64		1	1	1	1	1
1	D9	Can the airfield's capacity be increased (i.e., no limiting factors)?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	0	0	0	0
1	D10	There are no constraints on the number of flying hours per day (e.g., AICUZ agreements) at the air station's homefield?	1	1	0	0	9	1.24		1	1	1	1	1
3	D11	Can you conduct night flight operations at one of your OLFs?	1	1	1	0	4	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	D12	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at your main airfield?	1	1	1	0	10	1.65		1	1	0	1	0
1	D13	Can you conduct all levels of maritime aviation training at one DOD owned OLF?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		0	1	0	1	0
		TRAINING							6.37					
1	E1	Is there a type of flight training (NFO or Pilot) conducted at the air station that is not presently conducted anywhere else?	1	0	0	0	7	0.66		1	0	0	1	1
1	E2	Is jet pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	9	1.11		0	1	1	1	0
1	E3	Is officer pre-flight (basic) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		0	0	0	1	0
1	E4	Is helicopter pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		0	0	0	0	1
1	E5	Is prop plane pilot training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	8	0.98		1	0	0	1	1
1	E6	Is Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training conducted at the air station?	1	0	1	0	7	0.86		0	0	0	1	0
1	E7	Are aviation support units stationed at the air station?	1	0	0	0	5	0.47		1	1	1	1	1
3	E8	Do ground combat units train at the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	0	0	1
2	E9	Does the air station support enlisted training with an AOB >250 students?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	0	1	1	0
3	E10	Does the air station support other officer training not related to undergraduate pilot/NFO training?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	0	1	1	0
		MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY FACILITIES							3.83					
3	F1	Does the air station have ship berthing facilities?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		1	0	0	1	0
3	F2	Can air station pier facilities berth ships >12 ft draft?	1	1	1	0	1	0.17		0	0	0	1	0
2	F3	Does your air station have a dedicated corrosion control facility?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	1	1	0	0
1	F4	Is at least 90 percent of the hangar/maintenance facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	8	1.10		1	0	1	1	1
2	F5	Are there weapons storage and handling facilities at the air station?	1	1	0	0	6	0.82		1	1	1	1	1
3	F6	Are ship maintenance facilities located at the air station?	1	1	0	0	1	0.14		0	0	0	1	0
2	F7	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports aircraft assigned to your training mission?	1	1	0	1	3	0.62		0	0	0	0	0
3	F8	Does your air station have a DOD depot level maintenance facility that supports other than your assigned training aircraft ?	1	1	0	1	1	0.21		1	0	0	0	0
		GROUND TRAINING FACILITIES							3.49					
1	G1	Given projected training requirements for FY 2001, does your air station currently have all required flight/training simulators?	1	1	1	0	7	1.16		1	1	0	1	1
1	G2	Is at least 90% of the ground training facilities in adequate condition?	1	1	0	0	7	0.96		1	1	1	0	1
1	G3	Given the present equipment and physical plant configuration, can ground training be significantly increased?	1	1	1	0	6	0.99		1	1	1	1	1

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 50	F 20	M 10	C 20	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
2	G4	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) any unique DOD or non DOD training facility?	1	0	0	0	4	0.38		0	1	1	1	0
		[illegible]							1.20					
1	H1	Is your air station <50nm from an aircraft carrier operating area?	1	0	1	0	6	0.74		1	0	0	1	1
3	H2	Does the air station's location permit training with other operational units (e.g., Battle Groups or Joint forces)?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
2	H3	Does the air station play a role in military and civilian regional transportation/logistics plans?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	1	1	1	1
	I	MILITARY/GENERAL SUPPORT MISSIONS							2.26					
3	I1	Does this air station currently support counter-drug flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	1	0	1
3	I2	Does the air station currently support U S Customs Service flight operations?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	1	0	0	1
3	I3	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
3	I4	Will the air station directly support a military or civilian area control and surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC) through FY 2001?	1	0	0	0	2	0.19		1	1	1	1	1
3	I5	Does the air station play a role in the Logistics Support Mobilization Plan (LSMP)?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	0	0	0	0
2	I6	Does the air station support other military missions (e.g., port of embarkation for MC personnel)?	1	0	1	0	3	0.37		1	0	0	0	0
2	I7	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	1	1	0
3	I8	Are new civilian or non-DoD missions planned for the air station?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		0	1	0	0	0
3	I9	Do active reserve or guard units train at your air station?	1	0	1	0	1	0.12		1	1	1	1	1
2	I10	Does the air station or its tenants have requirements to support training of other Navy or Marine Corps forces?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	1	0
3	I11	Does the air station have support agreements with other DoD services?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
2	I12	Does the air station provide meteorological, SAR, and/or disaster assistance support to the local area?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	1	0
3	I13	Does the air station have support agreements with the non-DoD government or civilian activities?	1	0	0	0	1	0.09		1	1	1	1	1
3	I14	Are there non-DOD aircraft stationed at your air station?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	1	1	1	1
	J	BASE LOADING							0.90					
3	J1	Are operational active reserve or special squadrons based at your air station?	0	1	0	0	1	0.04		1	0	0	1	0
1	J2	Are there any major Navy tenant activities at the air station (e.g., NATTC, AOCS)?	1	0	0	0	6	0.57		1	0	1	1	0
2	J3	Are there any major Army or Air Force tenant activities at the air station (e.g., Army Helicopter Depot)?	1	0	0	0	3	0.28		1	0	0	0	0
	K	QUALITY OF LIFE							15.81					
3	K1	Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
1	K2	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0	0	0	1	10	0.68		0	0	1	0	1
1	K3	Does the air station have >90% of the listed Family Support Facilities and programs?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	1	0
2	K4	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >100 children?	0	1	0	1	5	0.55		0	0	0	1	0
2	K5	Do air station child care facilities accomodate >50 children?	0	1	0	1	3	0.33		1	1	0	0	0
2	K6	Is child care waiting list <100 children?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		0	1	0	1	0
2	K7	Is child care waiting list <50 children?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	1
2	K8	Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care <180 days?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	0	0
3	K9	Are >90% of stations child care facilities acequate?	0	1	0	1	4	0.44		1	1	1	1	0
3	K10	Are there certified home care providers?	0	1	0	0	4	0.17		1	1	1	1	1
2	K11	Does the air station have >90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	1	1	1
2	K12	Does the air station have >200 units of adequate officer family housing?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	0
1	K13	Does the air station have >300 units of adequate enlisted family housing?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	0	1	1	0
2	K14	Is the average wait for housing three months or less?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		0	0	0	0	1
1	K15	Is the average wait for housing six months or less?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	1	1	0	0
3	K16	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0	1	0	1	4	0.27		1	1	1	1	1
3	K17	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30-mile radius?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
3	K18	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	0	0	0

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Quest Import	Que Seq	QUESTIONS	M V Criteria/Weights R	F	M	C	MV SCORE	MV WEIGHT	MV WEIGHT	RESPONSES CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
			50	20	10	20								
3	K19	Do >50% of air station military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	1	0	0	1	4	0.65		1	1	1	1	1
1	K20	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	0	1	0	0
1	K21	Is the BOQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		1	1	1	1	1
1	K22	Are 90% of BOQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	7	0.77		1	1	0	1	1
1	K23	Is the BEQ occupancy rate <90%?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
1	K24	Are 90% of BEQ rooms adequate?	0	1	0	1	8	0.89		1	1	1	1	1
1	K25	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0	1	0	1	6	0.66		0	0	1	1	1
1	K26	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	1	0	0	1	6	0.98		1	1	1	1	1
1	K27	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental facilities?	0	0	0	1	6	0.41		1	1	1	1	1
3	K28	Is the violent crime rate <758/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	1	1	0	0
3	K29	Is the property crime rate <4902/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	0
3	K30	Is the drug crime rate <402/100,000?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		0	0	1	0	1
3	K31	Are college education courses available on the base?	0	0	0	1	1	0.07		1	1	1	1	1
								100.00	100.00	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

	CORP	KINGS	MERI	PENS	WHITI
Airspace	32.41	36.16	31.08	30.77	32.24
Encroachment	8.60	8.60	9.81	8.09	9.81
Weather	1.53	1.53	0.76	1.53	0.76
Airfield Facilities	9.93	12.52	8.06	10.75	6.10
Training	2.31	1.67	2.05	5.30	3.20
Maintenance Facilities	2.29	1.44	2.54	2.39	1.92
Ground Training Facilities	3.11	3.49	2.33	2.53	3.11
Location	1.20	0.46	0.46	1.20	1.20
Military/Support Missions	2.16	1.16	1.30	1.55	1.10
Base Loading	0.90	0.00	0.57	0.61	0.00
Quality of Life	9.66	8.62	12.09	10.32	9.52
	74.09	75.65	71.07	75.04	68.97

	Corpu	Kings	Meridi	Pens	Whiti
Old	74.96	75.79	70.86	76.90	69.63

NAS/MCAS -- changes/clarifications since last brief to BSEC

Line 23 (2.17) -- access to bombing range for live ordnance
Key West now a 0 so lost 2.17
Brunswick now a 0 so lost 2.17
Whidbey now a 1 so gained 2.17

Line 36 (0.18) -- activity ops or development plans have not been restricted due to Installation Restoration considerations
Norfolk now a 1 so gained 0.18
Yuma now a 0 so lost 0.18

Line 37 (0.25) -- National Register cultural resources have not restricted ops/development
Norfolk now a 1 so gained 0.25
Pendleton now a 0 so lost 0.25

Line 38 (0.27) -- Endangered/threatened species and/or biological habitats have not restricted ops/development
Mayport now a 0 so lost 0.27

Line 63 (1.42) -- air station manages outlying field with runway at least 8000 feet long
Jacksonville now a 0 so lost 1.42

Line 64 (1.24) -- air station manages outlying field
Jacksonville now a 0 so lost 1.24

Line 86 (0.42) -- BEQ has space for 40% of enlisted population
Oceana now a 0 so lost 0.42

Line 99 (0.11) -- air station or tenants have NCA or NATC desig
Jacksonville now a 0 so lost 0.11
Manatee Bay now a 1 so lost 0.11

Line 101 (0.99) -- ground combat and or spec forces in area
~~Norfolk now a 1 so gained 0.99~~
Jacksonville now a 1 so gained 0.99
~~Pendleton now a 1 so gained 0.99~~

Line 119 (0.67) -- BEQ occupancy rate less than 90%
Brunswick now a 0 so lost 0.67

Line 121 (0.50) -- BOQ occupancy rate less than 90%
Cherry Point now a 0 so lost 0.50
North Island now a 0 so lost 0.50

Line 132 (0.39) -- off base housing rental/purchase affordable
Brunswick now a 0 so lost 0.39
Beaufort now a 0 so lost 0.39
New River now a 0 so lost 0.39
Lemoore now a 0 so lost 0.39

ENCL (9), 9NOV94

NAS/MCAS Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) – FINAL 11/9/94

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK
1					NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVWEST	
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	HOSY	BRUN	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	N ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNT	ADAK	
124	38		Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of listed MWR facilities, including library, p	0.33	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	
125	38		Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care facilities < 180 days?	0.50	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
126	38	50a	Is the average wait for child care 6 months or less	0.58	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
127	38	50a	Is the average wait for child care between 6 & 12 months	0.33	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
128	38		Are > 90% of the air station's child care facilities adequate?	0.33	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	
129	38	44d	Are there certified home care providers?	0.18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	
130	38	45	Does the air station have >90% of the listed family support facilities?	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
131	38	45	Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of listed family support facilities, including c	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
132	38	48b d	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0.39	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
133	38	41a5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0.50	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	
134	38	55	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0.39	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	
135	38	56	Do >50% of base military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	0.58	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
136	38	57b-c	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0.16	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
137	38	57b-c	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	
138	38	58	Are college education courses available on the base?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	
139	38		Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
140	38	60	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.87	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	
141	38	61	Is the violent crime rate less than 758 per 100,000	0.04	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
142	38	61	Is the drug crime rate less than 402 per 100,000	0.04	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	
143	38	61	Is the property crime rate less than 4902 per 100000	0.04	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	

NAS/MCAS Military Value Matrix Ranking – FINAL 11/9/94

CALCS	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
154	Military Value Area	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYPT	KEY	ROSYP	BRUNS	CHPT	NBAY	YUMA	BEAUF	NWRVI	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOR	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		Mean
155	Flight Training Areas/Airspace	31.2	29.9	28.2	31.2	30.6	10.1	22.2	21.0	31.2	28.7	23.5	28.8	28.7	27.0	30.1	28.7	31.2	29.7	23.5	21.0	2.4		25.4
156	Flight Training Areas/Airspace rank		8	12	1	4	19	16	18	1	9	14	8	9	13	5	9	1	7	14	17	20		
157	Flight Training Areas/Airspace difference from mean		4.6	2.9	5.8	5.2	-15.3	-3.1	-4.4	5.6	3.9	-1.9	3.5	3.3	1.6	4.7	3.3	5.8	4.3	-1.9	-4.4	-23.0		
158	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure	21.8	10.6	12.8	16.9	10.0	11.2	11.1	11.6	15.3	7.9	13.3	12.1	9.8	7.8	14.2	14.8	14.1	14.4	12.5	11.7	6.8		12.0
159	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure rank		15	8	1	18	13	14	12	4	16	7	10	17	19	5	3	6	4	9	11	20		
160	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure difference from mean		-1.4	0.9	4.9	-2.0	-0.7	-0.8	-0.4	3.4	4.1	1.4	0.1	-2.2	-4.2	2.3	2.9	2.2	2.5	0.5	-0.2	-5.2		
161	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment	12.43	5.99	8.45	9.65	7.38	9.42	8.80	8.72	9.17	9.61	7.97	11.13	7.74	5.14	6.40	3.23	11.49	8.54	11.23	8.81	9.77		8.4
162	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment rank		18	13	5	16	7	10	11	8	6	14	3	15	19	17	20	1	12	2	9	4		
163	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment difference from mean		-2.4	0.0	1.2	-1.1	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.2	-0.5	2.7	-0.7	-3.3	-2.0	-5.2	3.1	0.1	2.8	0.4	1.3		
164	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities	10.10	7.53	5.63	5.73	6.55	7.27	4.15	7.53	5.61	7.27	5.76	6.63	5.30	6.63	6.48	7.48	6.60	5.73	6.19	2.17	3.10		6.0
165	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities rank		1	15	13	9	4	18	1	15	4	12	7	17	7	10	3	6	13	11	20	19		
166	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities difference from mean		1.5	-0.4	-0.2	0.6	1.3	-1.8	1.5	0.4	1.3	0.2	0.7	-0.7	0.7	0.5	1.5	0.8	-0.2	0.2	-3.8	-2.9		
167	Quality of Life	10.72	6.51	6.60	7.01	7.96	5.78	3.62	4.89	6.91	5.74	5.88	5.42	6.62	6.46	4.62	5.03	6.32	5.28	5.74	7.15	6.56		6.0
168	Quality of Life rank		8	6	3	1	12	20	18	4	13	11	15	5	9	19	17	10	16	14	2	7		
169	Quality of Life difference from mean		0.5	0.6	1.0	2.0	-0.2	-2.4	-1.1	0.9	-0.3	0.1	-0.6	0.6	0.5	-1.4	-1.0	0.3	-0.7	-0.3	1.1	0.6		
170	Training	6.24	6.24	5.66	6.24	6.24	1.03	1.62	5.30	5.30	2.58	3.78	3.78	3.78	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	1.62	0.58	0.58		4.3
171	Training rank		1	9	1	1	18	16	10	10	15	12	12	12	1	1	1	1	1	16	19	19		
172	Training difference from mean		2.0	1.4	2.0	2.0	-3.2	-2.7	1.0	1.0	1.7	-0.5	0.5	-0.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	-2.7	-3.7	-3.7		
173	Military/General and Support Missions	4.21	2.16	3.33	3.43	1.27	2.78	2.87	2.11	3.66	3.60	2.31	1.79	2.84	2.84	3.07	3.03	1.47	1.27	1.54	1.04	1.18		2.4
174	Military/General and Support Missions rank		12	4	3	17	10	7	13	2	1	11	14	8	8	5	6	16	17	15	20	19		
175	Military/General and Support Missions difference from mean		-0.2	0.9	1.0	-1.1	0.4	0.5	-0.3	1.3	1.4	-0.1	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.6	-0.9	-1.1	-0.9	-1.4	-1.2		
176	Baseloading	3.31	1.42	1.53	2.78	0.82	0.40	0.13	0.00	0.98	0.71	2.38	1.42	0.58	2.11	2.38	2.09	1.11	1.69	0.13	0.13	0.00		1.2
177	Baseloading rank		8	7	1	13	15	16	19	11	14	2	8	11	4	2	5	10	8	16	16	19		
178	Baseloading difference from mean		0.3	0.4	1.6	-0.3	-0.8	-1.0	-1.2	0.2	0.4	1.2	0.3	-0.2	1.0	1.2	0.9	-0.0	0.5	-1.0	-1.0	-1.2		
179	Total Military Value	100	70.35	72.26	82.90	70.77	47.99	54.56	61.08	78.15	66.24	64.89	71.07	65.70	64.21	73.48	70.61	78.75	72.82	62.42	52.61	30.36		65.6
180	Overall Rank		10	6	1	8	19	17	16	3	11	13	7	12	14	4	9	2	5	15	18	20		
181	Military Value Differential		4.8	6.7	17.3	5.2	-17.6	-11.0	-4.5	12.6	0.7	-0.7	5.5	0.1	-1.4	7.9	5.1	13.2	7.3	-3.1	-12.9	-35.2		
182			NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYPT	KEY	ROSYP	BRUNS	CHPT	NBAY	YUMA	BEAUF	NWRVI	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOR	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) – FINAL 11/9/94

11/9/94

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK
1					NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	EST
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	HOST	BRDG	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	N ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNT	ADAK	
4			**Flight Training Areas/Airspace**	31.16	29.92	28.24	31.16	30.56	10.08	22.23	20.96	31.16	29.68	23.47	29.84	28.66	28.99	30.08	28.68	31.16	29.66	23.47	20.96	2.38	
5	16	12b	Are there warning areas within 100 mi. of the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
6	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
7	38	12 d	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
8	38	12 i	Is this airspace under communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
9	38	12h	Is this airspace under radar control?	0.90	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
10	36	12 r	Training within the warning areas is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	
11	16	12b	Are there Military Operating Areas within 100 mi. of the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
12	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
13	38	12 d	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
14	38	12 h	Is this airspace under radar control?	0.90	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
15	38	12i	Is this airspace under communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
16	38	12 r	Training within the military operating areas is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
17	16	12b	Is there restricted airspace for hazardous flight training within 100 mi?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
18	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
19	38	13c	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
20	38	13g&	Is this airspace under radar or communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
21	38	13q	Training within the restricted airspace is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
22	38	13d	The air station or a local DON activity controls an air-ground range.	1.95	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	
23	16	12b s	There is access to a bombing range for live ordnance within 200 miles?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
24	38	12a	There is an area for supersonic training within 100 n.m.?	1.30	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
25	38	35a	Does the air station operate without ATC delays?	1.08	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
26	16	2a	This air station can accommodate 45 flight operations per hour IMC?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	
27	16	2a	This air station can accommodate 135 flight operations per hour VMC?	1.24	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	
28			**Expansion, Encroachment and Environment**	12.43	5.99	8.45	9.65	7.38	9.42	8.60	8.72	9.17	9.61	7.97	11.13	7.74	5.14	6.40	3.23	11.49	8.54	11.23	8.81	9.77	
29	16 38	17,37	Does current operational infrastructure, geographic location, climatological conditions suppo	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	
30	38	14	Are there no encroachments at the base that restrict current operations?	0.27	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	
31	38	36a	Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordinances?	0.93	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	
32	38	34a	Is the air station's present or future mission unaffected by current estimates of population grd	0.93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	
33	33	5b	Activity is an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM10?	1.89	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	

NAS/MCAS Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/9/94

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK
1																									
2					NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVWEST	
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
34	33	5g&h	Activity operations or development have not been restricted due to air quality considerations	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYP	KEY				KBAY	YUMA	BEAUF	NWRV	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOF	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK	
35	33	4	Base ops or development are not constrained by laws applying to environmental facilities/NR	0.90	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
36	33	7j	Activity operations or development plans have not been restricted due to Installation Restorat	0.27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
37	33	3b	National Register cultural resources have not restricted operations/development	0.18	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	
38	33	1b e	Endangered/threatened species and/or biological habitats have not restricted operations/dev	0.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	
39	33	1b e&	Jurisdictional wetlands have not restricted operations/development	0.27	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	
40	38	36e	Any on-going environmental or airspace litigation is not directed towards base operations	0.27	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
41	16	29a	Unrestricted developable land exceeds 1000 acres	0.58	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
42	16	29a	Unrestricted developable land is between 100 and 1000 acres	0.58	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
43	16	12(h)	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support addit	0.36	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	
44	16	2h	It is projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by major civilian air traffic structur	0.93	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
45	16	1e	No unusual flight pattern or approach restrictions exist at this air station?	0.93	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
46	38	6	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	0.80	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	
47	38	33a	Sortie cancellation rate for weather is never 5% or greater per month	0.32	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
48	38	33a	Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) rate is never 20% or greater per month.	0.69	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
49			**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	0.67	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
50	16	30a	Air station has weapons storage/handling facilities/magazines?	10.10	7.53	5.63	5.73	6.56	7.27	4.15	7.53	5.63	7.27	5.76	6.63	5.30	6.63	6.48	7.48	6.80	5.73	6.19	2.17	3.10	
51	16	30c	No ESQD waivers exist at this air station?	1.73	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
52	16	30e	Air station performs intermediate or organizational level maintenance on ordnance?	0.90	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
53	16	19a	The AIMD/MALS supports all T/M/S aircraft stationed at your air station?	0.43	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
54	16	18	This air station has an Aircraft Accoustical Enclosure (CCN 211-01)?	1.95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	
55	16	18	This air station has a Corrosion Control Hangar (CCN 211-03)?	0.75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
56	16	18	This air station has an Engine Test Cell (CCN 211-81)?	0.90	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
57	38	24a	Is there a NADEP located at the air station?	1.32	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
58	38	33c	Weather does not have a significant impact on maintenance schedules?	0.76	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
59	16	15c	Can the air station berth CVNs in a cold iron status?	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	
60	16	15c	Can the air station berth CVs but not CVNs, in a cold iron status?	0.53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
61	16	15a&b	Can the air station berth air capable combatant ships, including transients, in a cold iron stat	0.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
62			**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	0.18	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
63	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) outlying landing fields with a runway at le	21.82	10.58	12.82	16.90	9.98	11.24	11.14	11.57	15.34	7.87	13.35	12.06	9.76	7.80	14.21	14.84	14.14	14.41	12.50	11.75	6.77	
				1.42	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	

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CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK
1					NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	EST
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	HOST	BRUN	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	N ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNT	ADAK	
64	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) an outlying landing field?	1.24	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	
65	16	24	Is average MRP more than 1.7 % of CPV over the past 7 years (88-94)	0.50	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
66	38	19	Capital improvements from 88-94 exceeded 48M $	0.25	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
67	38	19	Capital improvements from 88-94 exceeded 101M $	0.50	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	
68	38	20a	Planned non-BRAC capital improvements from 94-97 < 10% of CPV	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	
69	38	22	Do current administrative support facilities provide capability for future expansion?	0.07	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	
70	16	23a	Does available PW, gas, electric and sewer supply exceed peak demand?	0.50	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	
71	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is less than 0.9	0.42	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
72	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is between 0.9 and 1.0	0.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
73	16	2	Can this air station operate 24 hours a day?	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
74	38	16	1.1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all DON aircraft?	1.42	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
75	38	16	1.1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all MAC aircraft?	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
76	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 14 modules?	1.24	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	
77	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 23 modules?	1.78	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	
78	16	17a	Less than 10% of the hangar/maintenance facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.58	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
79	16	20e	Less than 10% of the fuel storage facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.58	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
80	16	4	The air station has more than one NAVAID used by USN/USMC aircraft?	0.18	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	
81	38	17d	The air station has parallel or dual offset runways	1.60	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
82	38	17	d.f	Air station's parallel or dual offset runways permit dual IFR flight operations	0.80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	
83	38	17e	The air station has full-length taxiways?	1.78	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
84	16	1a	The air station has one runway at least 8000 feet long	1.78	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
85	38	17g	The air station has a crosswind runway?	0.93	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	
86	16	25b	The BEQ has space for 40% of enlisted population	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	
87	16	21d	Use of off base storage at this air station is not required?	0.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
88	16	2c	There is at least 1 runway you control which has CLZ lighting (FCLP)?	1.24	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	
89			**Military/General and Support Missions**	4.21	2.16	3.33	3.43	1.27	2.78	2.87	2.11	3.66	3.80	2.31	1.79	2.84	2.84	3.07	3.03	1.47	1.27	1.54	1.04	1.18	
90	38	10a	Does air station or tenants have any non-DOD support missions?	0.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
91	38	30a	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	0.15	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	
92	38	3a	Air station directly supports area control/surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC)?	0.15	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	
93	16	8	Air station is home station to other DOD components?	0.57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	

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CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK
1					NAVA	NAVA	NAVA	NAVA	NAVA	NAVA	NAVA	USAF	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	ROST	BRUN	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRI	PEND	MIRA	N ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK	
94	38	28	Air station or tenants have significant agreements to support other DoD, gov't or civilian activ	0.11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	
95	38	9e	Does the air station provide aircraft SAR support to the civilian community?	0.11	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	
96	38	53	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.87	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
97	1	1	Is the air station's location of strategic military value?	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
98	38	31a	Another military airport with 8000 feet of usable runway is within 100 miles?	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	
99			Does the air station or tenants have National Command Authority missions or NATO designa	0.11	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
100	1	38	12 7a Are ground combat and/or special operation forces located in the area?	0.93	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	
101	38	7a	Do ground combat and/or special operation forces train at this air station?	0.27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	
102			**Baseloading**	3.31	1.42	1.53	2.78	0.82	0.40	0.13	0.00	0.98	0.71	2.38	1.42	0.98	2.11	2.38	2.09	1.11	1.69	0.13	0.13	0.00	
103	16	2b	The air station has 50,000 but less than 150,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.13	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	
104	16	2b	The air station has 150,000 but less than 250,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.40	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	
105	16	2b	The air station has more than 250,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.80	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
106	16	6a	Are reserve squadrons scheduled to be homebased at the air station in 2001	0.71	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
107	16	6b	Is aggregate Navy/USMC SELRES manning above 90% for FY93?	0.69	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
108	16	9a &	Significant deployable aviation support or surface units are supported here?	0.58	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	
109			**Training**	6.24	6.24	5.66	6.24	6.24	1.03	1.62	5.30	5.30	2.56	3.78	3.78	3.78	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	1.62	0.58	0.58	
110	38	23a/b	Major flight simulators for assigned T/M/S aircraft are located at the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
111	16	13a	There is an aviation flight physiology training facility in the local area?	1.52	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
112	38	30b	Air station's location permits training with other operational units (e.g., Battle Groups or Joint	1.03	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
113	16	14e	Less than 10% of the training facilities are in inadequate condition.	0.58	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
114	16	13	Is there a shipboard aircraft fire fighting trainer in the local area?	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	
115			**Quality of Life**	10.72	8.51	6.60	7.01	7.96	5.78	3.62	4.89	6.91	5.74	5.88	5.42	6.82	6.46	4.62	5.03	6.32	5.28	5.74	7.15	6.56	
116	38	47a4	Is officer FH waiting list <6 months	0.50	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	
117	38	47a4	Is enlisted FH waiting list < 6 months	0.58	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	
118	38	47a6	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0.50	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
119	38	47b1	Is the BEQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.67	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	
120	16	25a	Are 90% of the BEQ rooms adequate?	0.67	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	
121	38	41c	Is the BOQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.50	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
122	16	25a	Are 90% of the BOQ rooms adequate?	0.58	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
123	38	48	Does the air station have >90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0.58	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

NAS/MCAS Military Value Ranking – FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
154	Military Value Area	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYPT	KEY	ROSYR	BRUNS	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAUR	NWRV	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOR	FALN	LGNTR	ADAK		Mean
155	**Flight Training Areas/Airspace**	31.2	29.9	28.2	31.2	30.6	10.1	22.2	21.0	31.2	26.7	23.5	28.8	28.7	27.0	30.1	28.7	31.2	29.7	23.5	21.0	2.4		25.4
156	Flight Training Areas/Airspace rank		6	12	1	4	19	16	18	1	9	14	8	9	13	5	9	1	7	14	17	20		
157	Flight Training Areas/Airspace difference from mean		4.6	2.9	5.8	5.2	-15.3	-3.1	-4.4	5.8	3.3	-1.9	3.5	3.3	1.6	4.7	3.3	5.8	4.3	-1.9	-4.4	-23.0		
158	**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	21.8	10.6	12.8	16.9	10.0	11.2	11.1	11.6	15.3	7.9	13.3	12.1	9.8	7.8	14.2	14.8	14.1	14.4	12.5	11.7	6.8		12.0
159	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure rank		15	8	1	16	13	14	12	2	16	7	10	17	19	5	3	6	4	9	11	20		
160	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure difference from mean		-1.4	0.9	4.9	-2.0	-0.7	-0.8	0.4	3.4	4.1	1.4	0.1	-2.2	-4.2	2.3	2.9	2.2	2.5	0.5	-0.2	-5.2		
161	**Expansion, Encroachment and Environment**	12.43	5.99	8.45	9.65	7.38	9.42	[illegible]		17	9.61	7.97	11.13	7.74	5.14	6.40	3.23	11.49	8.54	11.23	8.81	9.77		8.4
162	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment rank		18	13	5	10					6	14	3	15	19	17	20	1	12	2	8	4		
163	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment difference from mean		-2.4	0.0							1.2	-0.5	2.7	-0.7	-3.3	-2.0	-5.2	3.1	0.1	2.8	0.4	1.3		
164	**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	10.10	7.53	5.63	5						27	5.76	6.63	5.30	6.63	6.48	7.48	6.80	5.73	6.19	2.17	3.10		6.0
165	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities rank		1	15	1						6	12	7	17	7	10	3	8	13	11	20	19		
166	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities difference from mean		1.5	-0.4	-0.2						1.3	0.2	0.7	-0.7	0.7	0.5	1.5	0.8	-0.2	0.2	-3.8	-2.9		
167	**Quality of Life**	10.72	6.51	6.60	7.01																			
168	Quality of Life rank		8	8	3			20	18	4	13	11	15	5	9	19	17	10	16	14	2	7		
169	Quality of Life difference from mean		0.5	0.6	1.0	2.0	-0.2	2.4	-1.1	0.9	0.3	-0.1	0.6	0.6	0.5	-1.4	-1.0	0.3	-0.7	-0.3	1.1	0.6		
170	**Training**	6.24	6.24	5.66	6.24	6.24	1.03	1.62	5.30	5.30	2.56	3.78	3.78	3.78	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	1.62	0.58	0.58		4.3
171	Training rank		1	9	1	1	18	16	10	10	15	12	12	12	1	1	1	1	1	16	19	19		
172	Training difference from mean		2.0	1.4	2.0	2.0	-3.2	-2.7	1.0	1.0	1.7	0.5	-0.5	-0.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	-2.7	-3.7	-3.7		
173	**Military/General and Support Missions**	4.21	1.23	3.33	3.43	1.27	2.78	2.87	2.11	3.60	3.60	2.31	1.79	2.84	2.84	3.07	3.03	1.47	1.27	0.81	1.04	1.18		2.3
174	Military/General and Support Missions rank		17	4	3	15	10	7	12	2	1	11	13	8	8	5	6	14	15	20	19	18		
175	Military/General and Support Missions difference from mean		-1.1	1.0	1.1	-1.0	0.5	0.6	-0.2	1.4	1.5	0.0	-0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	-0.8	-1.0	-1.7	-1.3	-1.1		
176	**Baseloading**	3.31	1.42	1.53	2.78	0.62	0.40	0.13	0.00	0.58	0.71	2.38	1.42	0.98	2.11	2.38	2.09	1.11	1.69	0.13	0.13	0.00		1.2
177	Baseloading rank		8	7	1	13	15	16	19	11	14	2	8	11	4	2	5	10	6	16	18	19		
178	Baseloading difference from mean		0.3	0.4	1.6	-0.3	-0.8	-1.0	-1.2	0.2	0.4	1.2	0.3	-0.2	1.0	1.2	0.9	-0.0	0.5	-1.0	-1.0	-1.2		
179	**Total Military Value**	100	69.41	72.26	82.90	70.77	47.99	54.56	61.08	78.15	64.24	64.89	71.07	65.70	64.21	73.48	70.61	78.75	72.82	61.49	52.61	30.36		65.5
180	Overall Rank		10	6	1	8	19	17	16	3	11	13	7	12	14	4	9	2	5	15	18	20		
181	Military Value Differential		3.9	6.8	17.4	5.3	-17.5	-10.9	-4.4	1.7	0.4	0.6	5.6	0.2	-1.3	8.0	5.1	13.3	7.4	-4.0	-12.9	-35.1		
182			NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYPT	KEY	ROSYR	BRUNS	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAUR	NWRV	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOR	FALN	LGNTR	ADAK		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
1					NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVWEST		
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	ROST	BHRS	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAUF	NWRV	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOR	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		Mean
4			**Flight Training Areas/Airspace**	31.16	29.92	28.24	31.16	30.56	10.08	22.23	20.66	31.16	28.68	23.47	28.84	28.68	26.99	30.08	28.68	31.16	29.66	23.47	20.98	2.36		25.37
5	16	12b	Are there warning areas within 100 mi of the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
6	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
7	38	12 d	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
8	38	12 i	Is this airspace under communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
9	38	12h	Is this airspace under radar control?	0.90	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
10	38	12 r	Training within the warning areas is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
11	16	12b	Are there Military Operating Areas within 100 mi of the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
12	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
13	38	12 d	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
14	38	12 h	Is this airspace under radar control?	0.90	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
15	38	12i	Is this airspace under communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
16	38	12 r	Training within the military operating areas is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
17	16	12b	Is there restricted airspace for hazardous flight training within 100 mi?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
18	16	12b	Is this airspace managed (i.e., scheduled or controlled) by DoD?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
19	38	13c	Is the flying time to this airspace less than 30 minutes?	1.73	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
20	38	13gAI	Is this airspace under radar or communications control?	1.05	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
21	38	13q	Training within the restricted airspace is not affected by environmental issues.	0.60	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0		
22	38	13d	The air station or a local DON activity controls an air-ground range.	1.95	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
23	16	12b s	There is access to a bombing range for live ordnance within 200 miles?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
24	38	12a	There is an area for supersonic training within 100 n m.?	1.30	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
25	38	35a	Does the air station operate without ATC delays?	1.08	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1		
26	16	2a	This air station can accommodate 45 flight operations per hour IMC?	1.24	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0		
27	16	2a	This air station can accommodate 135 flight operations per hour VMC?	1.24	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0		
28			**Expansion, Encroachment and Environment**	12.43	5.99	8.45	9.65	7.38	9.42	8.60	8.72	9.17	9.61	7.97	11.13	7.74	5.14	6.40	3.23	11.49	8.54	11.23	8.81	9.77		8.43
29	16	38 17 37	Does current operational infrastructure, geographic location, climatological conditions sup	0.43	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1		
30	38	14	Are there no encroachments at the base that restrict current operations?	0.27	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1		
31	38	36a	Is the existing AICUZ study encoded in local zoning ordinances?	0.93	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1		
32	38	34a	Is the air station's present or future mission unaffected by current estimates of population	0.93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1		
33	33	5b	Activity is an "attainment" or "maintenance" air quality control area for CO, Ozone, PM10?	1.89	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
1					NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW		
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEAN	MAYP	KEY	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	KBAY	YUMA	BEAUF	NWRVI	PEND	MIRAM	N ISL	WHDIS	LEMOF	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		Mean
34	33	5g&h	Activity operations or development have not been restricted due to air quality considerati	0.90	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
35	33	4	Base ops or development are not constrained by laws applying to environmental facilities	0.27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
36	33	7j	Activity operations or development plans have not been restricted due to installation Rest	0.18	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1		
37	33	3b	National Register cultural resources have not restricted operations/development.	0.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0		
38	33	1b e,i	Endangered/threatened species and/or biological habitats have not restricted operations/d	0.27	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
39	33	1b e&	Jurisdictional wetlands have not restricted operations/development.	0.27	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
40	38	36e	Any on-going environmental or airspace litigation is not directed towards base operations	0.58	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1		
41	16	25a	Unrestricted developable land exceeds 1000 acres	0.58	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1		
42	16	25a	Unrestricted developable land is between 100 and 1000 acres	0.36	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1		
43	16	12(h)	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support ad	0.93	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
44	16	2h	It is projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by major civilian air traffic struc	0.93	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
45	16	1a	No unusual flight pattern or approach restrictions exist at this air station?	0.80	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0		
46	38	6	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	0.32	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
47	38	33a	Some cancellation rate for weather is never 5% or greater per month.	0.69	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
48	38	33a	Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) rate is never 20% or greater per month.	0.67	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0		
49			**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	10.10	7.53	5.63	5.73	6.56	7.27	4.16	7.51	5.63	7.27	5.78	6.63	5.30	6.63	6.48	7.48	6.80	5.73	6.18	2.17	3.10		5.98
50	16	30a	Air station has weapons storage/handling facilities/magazines?	1.73	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
51	16	30c	No ESQD waivers exist at this air station?	0.90	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1		
52	16	30e	Air station performs intermediate or organizational level maintenance on ordnance?	0.43	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0		
53	16	19a	The AIMD/MALS supports all T/M/S aircraft stationed at your air station?	1.95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
54	16	18	This air station has an Aircraft Accoustical Enclosure (CCN 211-01)?	0.75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		
55	16	18	This air station has a Corrosion Control Hangar (CCN 211-03)?	0.90	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
56	16	18	This air station has an Engine Test Cell (CCN 211-81)?	1.32	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
57	38	24a	Is there a NADEP located at the air station?	0.76	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
58	38	33c	Weather does not have a significant impact on maintenance schedules?	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1		
59	16	15c	Can the air station berth CVNs in a cold iron status?	0.53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
60	16	15c	Can the air station berth CVs, but not CVNs, in a cold iron status?	0.36	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
61	16	15a&l	Can the air station berth air capable combatant ships, including transients, in a cold iron s	0.18	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1		
62			**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	21.82	10.58	12.82	16.90	8.98	11.24	11.14	11.57	15.34	7.87	13.35	12.08	9.76	7.80	14.21	14.84	14.14	14.41	12.50	11.75	6.77		11.95
63	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) outlying landing fields with a runway	1.42	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
1					NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	NAVE	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	ST	
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
3	DC #	C #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	HOST	BIRM	TIPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	MN ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNT	ADAK		Mean
64	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) an outlying landing field?	1.24	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		
65	16	24	Is average MRP more than 1.7 % of CPV over the past 7 years (88-94)	0.50	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		
66	38	19	Capital Improvements from 88-94 exceeded 48M $	0.25	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1		
67	38	19	Capital Improvements from 88-94 exceeded 101M $	0.50	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		
68	38	20a	Planned non-BRAC capital improvements from 94-97 < 10% of CPV	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1		
69	38	22	Do current administrative support facilities provide capability for future expansion?	0.07	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1		
70	16	23a	Does available PW gas, electric and sewer supply exceed peak demand?	0.50	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0		
71	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is less than 0.9	0.42	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
72	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is between 0.9 and 1.0	0.25	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
73	16	2j	Can this air station operate 24 hours a day?	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
74	38	16.1.1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all DON aircraft?	1.42	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
75	38	16.1.1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all MAC aircraft?	1.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
76	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 14 modules?	1.24	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		
77	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 23 modules?	1.78	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		
78	16	17a	Less than 10% of the hangar/maintenance facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.58	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
79	16	20a	Less than 10% of the fuel storage facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.58	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
80	16	4	The air station has more than one NAVAID used by USN/USMC aircraft?	0.18	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1		
81	38	17d	The air station has parallel or dual offset runways.	1.60	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		
82	38	17.d.1	Air station's parallel or dual offset runways permit dual IFR flight operations	0.80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		
83	38	17e	The air station has full-length taxiways?	1.78	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
84	16	1a	The air station has one runway at least 8000 feet long	1.78	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
85	38	17g	The air station has a crosswind runway?	0.93	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1		
86	16	25b	The BEQ has space for 40% of enlisted population	0.42	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1		
87	16	21d	Use of off base storage at this air station is not required?	0.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1		
88	16	2c	There is at least 1 runway you control which has CLZ lighting (FCLP)?	1.24	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1		
89			**Military/General and Support Missions**	4.21	1.23	3.33	3.43	1.27	2.78	2.67	2.11	3.60	3.80	2.31	1.79	2.84	2.84	3.07	3.03	1.47	1.27	0.61	1.04	1.18		
90	38	10a	Does air station or tenants have any non-DOD support missions?	0.08	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		2.30
91	38	30a	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	0.15	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		
92	38	3a	Air station directly supports area control/surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC)?	0.15	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
93	16	8	Air station is home station to other DOD components?	0.57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Responses (1's & 0's) – FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
1					NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVWEST		
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	ROSY	BRUN	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	N.ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		Mean
94	38	28	Air station or tenants have significant agreements to support other DoD, gov't or civilian a	0.11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1		
95	38	9a	Does the air station provide aircraft SAR support to the civilian community?	0.11	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0		
96	38	53	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.87	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1		
97	1	1	Is the air station's location of strategic military value?	0.21	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		
98	38	31a	Another military airport with 8000 feet of usable runway is within 100 miles?	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1		
99			Does the air station or tenants have National Command Authority missions or NATO desi	0.11	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
100	1.38	12.7a	Are ground combat and/or special operation forces located in the area?	0.93	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
101	38	7a	Do ground combat and/or special operation forces train at this air station?	0.27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
102			**Baseloading**	3.31	1.42	1.53	2.78	0.82	0.40	0.13	0.00	0.98	0.71	2.38	1.42	0.98	2.11	2.38	2.09	1.11	1.69	0.13	0.13	0.00		1.16
103	16	2b	The air station has 50,000 but less than 150,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.13	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		
104	16	2b	The air station has 150,000 but less than 250,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.40	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0		
105	16	2b	The air station has more than 250,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.80	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
106	16	6a	Are reserve squadrons scheduled to be homebased at the air station in 2001	0.71	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
107	16	6b	Is aggregate Navy/USMC SELRES manning above 90% for FY93?	0.69	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
108	16	9a & I	Significant deployable aviation support or surface units are supported here?	0.58	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		
109			**Training**	6.24	6.24	5.66	6.24	6.24	1.03	1.82	5.30	5.30	2.56	3.78	3.78	3.78	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.24	1.82	0.58	0.58		4.28
110	38	23a,b	Major flight simulators for assigned T/M/S aircraft are located at the air station?	2.17	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
111	16	13a	There is an aviation flight physiology training facility in the local area?	1.52	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
112	38	30b	Air station's location permits training with other operational units (e.g., Battle Groups or Ju	1.03	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
113	16	14e	Less than 10% of the training facilities are in inadequate condition.	0.58	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
114	16	13	Is there a shipboard aircraft fire fighting trainer in the local area?	0.94	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
115			**Quality of Life**	10.72	6.51	6.60	7.01	7.96	5.78	3.62	4.89	6.91	5.74	5.88	5.42	6.62	6.48	4.62	5.03	6.32	5.28	5.74	7.15	6.58		6.00
116	38	47a4	Is officer FH waiting list <6 months	0.50	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1		
117	38	47a4	Is enlisted FH waiting list < 6 months	0.58	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1		
118	38	47a6	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0.50	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1		
119	38	47b1	Is the BEQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.67	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		
120	16	25a	Are 90% of the BEQ rooms adequate?	0.67	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1		
121	38	41c	Is the BOQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.50	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1		
122	16	25a	Are 90% of the BOQ rooms adequate?	0.58	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
123	38	48	Does the air station have >90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0.58	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1		

NAS/MCAS Military Value Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/9/94 (post BSEC)

CALCS	D	F	G	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL
1					NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	NAVEA	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	USMC	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVW	NAVWEST		
2					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	NORF	JAX	OCEA	MAYP	KEY	ROSY	BRUN	CHPT	KBAY	YUMA	BEAU	NWRV	PEND	MIRA	N.ISL	WHDI	LEMO	FALN	LCNTR	ADAK		Mean
124	38		Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of listed MWR facilities, including librar	0.33	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0		
125	38		Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care facilities < 180 days?	0.50	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
126	38	50a	Is the average wait for child care 6 months or less	0.58	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		
127	38	50a	Is the average wait for child care between 6 & 12 months	0.33	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		
128	38		Are > 90% of the air station's child care facilities adequate?	0.33	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1		
129	38	44d	Are there certified home care providers?	0.18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0		
130	38	45	Does the air station have >90% of the listed family support facilities?	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
131	38	45	Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of listed family support facilities, includir	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		
132	38	48b d	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0.39	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
133	38	41a5	Is there sufficient off base housing?	0.50	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0		
134	38	55	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0.39	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0		
135	38	56	Do >50% of base military and civilian personnel live within a 30 minute commute?	0.58	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
136	38	57b-c	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0.16	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
137	38	57b-c	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mile radius?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1		
138	38	58	Are college education courses available on the base?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1		
139	38		Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
140	38	60	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.87	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1		
141	38	61	Is the violent crime rate less than 758 per 100,000	0.04	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
142	38	61	Is the drug crime rate less than 402 per 100,000	0.04	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1		
143	38	61	Is the property crime rate less than 4902 per 100000	0.04	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		

Reserve Air Stations -- changes/clarifications since last brief to BSEC

Line 23 (2.34) -- access to bombing range for live ordnance
Atlanta now a 1 so gained 2.34
Washington now a 0 so lost 2.34

Line 39 (0.30) -- jurisdictional wetlands have not restricted ops/development
Willow Grove now a 0 so lost 0.30
New Orleans now a 0 so lost 0.30

Line 105 (1.47) -- air station has in excess of 3000 SELRES
Washington now a 1 so gained 1.47

Line 108 (1.83) -- more than 90% of Resforon SELRES enlisted billets were filled in FY93
Ft Worth now a 1 so gained 1.83

Line 135 (0.38) -- off base housing rental/purchase affordable
Willow Grove now a 1 so gained 0.38

Line 136 (0.53) -- sufficient off base housing
Ft Worth now a 1 so gained 0.53

Line 137 (0.38) -- opportunity for consecutive follow on tours
Ft Worth now a 1 so gained 0.38

Line 142 (0.04) -- air station has active spouse employ program
Washington now a 0 so lost 0.04

ENCL (4), 4 NOV 94

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	B	C	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
1												
2					RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE		
3	OC #	Q #	Matrix Question		21	22	23	24	25	26		
34				Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
35	33	5g	Activity operations or development have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	0.83	1	1	1	1	1	1		
36	33	4k,m	Base ops or development are not constrained by laws applying to environmental facilities/NPDES.	0.30	1	1	1	1	1	1		
37	33	7j	Activity operations or development plans have not been restricted due to Installation Restoration considerations.	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	0		
38	33	3b	National Register cultural resources have not restricted operations/development.	0.26	1	1	1	1	1	0		
39	33	1b,e,2	Endangered/threatened species and/or biological habitats have not restricted operations/development.	0.30	1	1	1	1	1	1		
40	38	2c	Jurisdictional wetlands have not restricted operations/development.	0.30	0	1	0	1	1	1		
41	16	36e	Any on-going environmental or airspace litigation is not directed towards base operations.	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1		
42	16	29a	Unrestricted developable land exceeds 100 acres	0.86	0	1	1	0	0	0		
43	16	12(b)	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support additional workload?	1.02	1	1	0	1	1	1		
44	16	2h	It is projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by major civilian air traffic structure in the region in th	1.02	0	0	0	1	0	1		
45	38	1e	No unusual flight pattern or approach restrictions exist at this air station?	0.87	0	0	1	0	1	1		
46	38	6	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	0.27	0	0	0	0	0	0		
47	38	33a	Sortie cancellation rate for weather is never 5% or greater per month.	0.73	0	1	0	1	0	0		
48			Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) rate is never 20% or greater per month.	0.73	1	0	0	0	1	0		
49			**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	6.95	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.29	5.52		3.91
50	16	30a	Air station has weapons storage/handling facilities/magazines?	1.17	1	1	1	1	1	1		
51	16	30c	No ESQD waivers exist at this air station?	0.83	1	1	1	1	0	0		
52	16	30e	Air station performs intermediate or organizational level maintenance on ordnance?	0.47	0	0	0	0	1	1		
53	16	19a	The AIMD/MALS supports all T/M/S aircraft stationed at your air station?	1.40	1	1	1	1	1	1		
54	16	18	This air station has an Aircraft Accoustical Enclosure (CCN 211-01)?	0.70	0	0	0	0	0	1		
55	16	18	This air station has a Corrosion Control Hangar (CCN 211-03)?	0.83	0	0	0	0	0	1		
56	38	33c	This air station has an Engine Test Cell (CCN 211-81)?	0.71	0	0	0	0	0	1		
57	16	15c	Weather does not have a significant impact on maintenance schedules?	0.25	1	1	1	1	1	1		
58	16	15a&b	Can the air station berth CVs/CVNs in a cold iron status?	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	0		
59			Can the air station berth air capable combatant ships, including transients, in a cold iron status?	0.20	0	0	0	0	0	0		
60			**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	18.64	11.36	6.73	10.65	10.34	11.04	10.27		10.07
61	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) an outlying landing field?	0.98	0	0	0	0	0	0		
62	16	24	Is average MRP more than 1.7 % of CPV over the past 7 years (88-94)	1.37	1	0	0	1	1	0		
63	38	19	Capital improvements from 88-94 exceeded $11.5M.	0.26	0	0	1	1	0	0		
	38	19	Capital improvements from 88-94 exceeded $19M.	0.53	1	0	0	0	0	0		

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	B	C	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
1					RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE		
2					21	22	23	24	25	26		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
34	33	5g	Activity operations or development have not been restricted due to air quality considerations.	0.83	1	1	1	1	1	1		
35	33	4k,m	Base ops or development are not constrained by laws applying to environmental facilities/NPDES.	0.30	1	1	1	1	1	1		
36	33	7j	Activity operations or development plans have not been restricted due to Installation Restoration considerations.	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	0		
37	33	3b	National Register cultural resources have not restricted operations/development.	0.26	1	1	1	1	1	0		
38	33	1b,e,2	Endangered/threatened species and/or biological habitats have not restricted operations/development.	0.30	1	1	1	1	1	1		
39	33	2c	Jurisdictional wetlands have not restricted operations/development.	0.30	0	1	0	1	1	1		
40	38	36e	Any on-going environmental or airspace litigation is not directed towards base operations.	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1		
41	16	29a	Unrestricted developable land exceeds 100 acres	0.86	0	1	1	0	0	0		
42	16	12(b)	Does the airspace overlying and adjacent to the air station have the capacity to support additional workload?	1.02	1	1	0	1	1	1		
43	16	2h	It is projected that flight operations will remain unaffected by major civilian air traffic structure in the region in th	1.02	0	0	0	1	0	1		
44	16	1e	No unusual flight pattern or approach restrictions exist at this air station?	0.87	0	0	1	0	1	1		
45	38	6	Are new military missions planned for the air station?	0.27	0	0	0	0	0	0		
46	38	33a	Sortie cancellation rate for weather is never 5% or greater per month.	0.73	0	1	0	1	0	0		
47	38	33a	Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) rate is never 20% or greater per month.	0.73	1	0	0	0	1	0		
48			**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	6.95	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.29	5.52		3.91
49	16	30a	Air station has weapons storage/handling facilities/magazines?	1.17	1	1	1	1	1	1		
50	16	30c	No ESQD waivers exist at this air station?	0.83	1	1	1	1	0	0		
51	16	30e	Air station performs intermediate or organizational level maintenance on ordnance?	0.47	0	0	0	0	1	1		
52	16	19a	The AIMD/MALS supports all T/M/S aircraft stationed at your air station?	1.40	1	1	1	1	1	1		
53	16	18	This air station has an Aircraft Accoustical Enclosure (CCN 211-01)?	0.70	0	0	0	0	0	1		
54	16	18	This air station has a Corrosion Control Hangar (CCN 211-03)?	0.83	0	0	0	0	0	1		
55	16	18	This air station has an Engine Test Cell (CCN 211-81)?	0.71	0	0	0	0	0	1		
56	38	33c	Weather does not have a significant impact on maintenance schedules?	0.25	1	1	1	1	1	1		
57	16	15c	Can the air station berth CVs/CVNs in a cold iron status?	0.39	0	0	0	0	0	0		
58	16	15a&	Can the air station berth air capable combatant ships, including transients, in a cold iron status?	0.20	0	0	0	0	0	0		
59			**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	18.64	11.36	6.73	10.65	10.34	11.04	10.27		10.07
60	16	1a	Does the air station manage (schedule and control) an outlying landing field?	0.98	0	0	0	0	0	0		
61	16	24	Is average MRP more than 1.7 % of CPV over the past 7 years (88-94)	1.37	1	0	0	1	1	0		
62	38	19	Capital Improvements from 88-94 exceeded $11.5M.	0.26	0	0	1	1	0	0		
63	38	19	Capital Improvements from 88-94 exceeded $19M.	0.53	1	0	0	0	0	0		

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	B	C	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
1					RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE		
2					21	22	23	24	25	26		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
64	38	20a	Planned non-BRAC capital improvements from 94-97 < 10% of CPV	0.53	1	1	0	1	0	1		
65	38	22	Do current administrative support facilities provide capability for future expansion?	0.11	0	1	0	0	0	1		
66	16	23a	Does available PW, gas, electric and sewer supply exceed peak demand?	0.53	1	1	1	1	1	1		
67	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is less than 0.9	0.44	0	0	0	0	0	0		
68	67	ENCL	Area cost factor is between 0.9 and 1.0	0.26	0	0	0	1	0	1		
69	16	2j	Can this air station operate 24 hours a day?	0.29	1	1	1	1	1	1		
70	38,16	1,1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all DON aircraft?	0.98	1	1	1	1	1	1		
71	38,16	1,1b	Runway, taxiway and ramp weight- bearing capacity accommodates all MAC aircraft?	0.47	1	1	1	1	1	1		
72	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 5 modules?	1.37	1	0	1	0	0	1		
73	16	17	Hangar Capacity at this air station is at least 8 modules?	1.96	0	0	0	0	1	0		
74	16	17a	Less than 10% of the hangar/maintenance facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.62	1	1	1	1	1	1		
75	16	20a	Less than 10% of the fuel storage facilities are in inadequate condition?	0.62	1	1	1	1	1	1		
76	16	4	The air station has more than one NAVAID used by USN/USMC aircraft?	0.20	1	1	1	1	1	1		
77	38	17 d &	Air station's parallel or dual offset runways permit dual IFR flight operations	0.15	0	0	0	0	1	0		
78	38	17e	The air station has full length taxiways?	1.37	1	1	1	1	1	1		
79	16	1a	The air station has one runway at least 8000 feet long.	1.96	1	0	1	1	1	1		
80	38	17g	The air station has a crosswind runway?	1.02	0	1	1	0	0	0		
81	16	25b	The BEQ has space for 40% of enlisted population	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	0		
82	16	21d	Use of off base storage at this air station is not required?	0.09	1	0	1	1	1	1		
83	16	1a	There is at least 1 runway you control which has CLZ lighting (FCLP)?	0.78	0	0	0	1	0	0		
84	16	2b	The air station has 50,000 but less than 90,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.44	1	0	0	0	0	0		
85	16	2b	The air station has more than 90,000 flight evolutions per year?	0.87	0	0	1	0	0	1		
86			**Military/General and Support Missions**	6.77	4.54	4.37	2.57	2.72	3.14	5.58		3.82
87	38	10a	Does air station or tenants have any non-DOD support missions?	0.09	1	1	1	0	1	1		
88	38	3a	Are military surveillance operations conducted from the air station?	0.14	1	1	1	0	1	0		
89	38	3a	Air station directly supports area control/surveillance mission (e.g., FACSFAC)?	0.14	0	0	0	0	0	0		
90	16	8	Air station is home station to other DOD components?	0.53	1	0	1	1	1	1		
91	38	28	Air station or tenants have significant agreements to support other DoD, govt or civilian activities?	0.09	1	1	1	1	0	1		
92	38	9a	Does the air station provide aircraft SAR support to the civilian community?	0.09	0	0	1	0	0	1		
93	38	53	Do active duty personnel have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.38	1	0	0	0	1	0		

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	B	C	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
1												
2					RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question		21	22	23	24	25	26		
94	1	1	Is the air station's location of strategic military value?	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
95	38	31a	Another military airport with 8000 feet of usable runway is within 100 miles?	0.18	0	0	0	0	0	0		
96	1,16	12,2f	Does the air station or tenants have National Command Authority missions or NATO designation?	0.73	1	1	0	1	1	1		
97	1,16	12,1(	Are ground combat and/or special operation forces located in the area?	0.09	0	0	1	0	0	0		
98	16,38	9a,7a	Do ground combat and/or special operation forces train at this air station?	1.02	1	1	0	0	0	1		
99	1	12	Air station is home station to a DON non aviation surface reserve combat	0.29	1	1	0	0	0	1		
100	16	10	Air station is home station to an active or reserve construction battalion?	0.73	0	1	0	0	0	1		
101	16	8	Air station is home station to non-DOD flying units?	0.73	0	0	0	0	0	1		
102	1	12	Air station is home station to non-DOD components?	0.18	0	0	1	0	0	0		
103	1	12	Air station is home station to a USMC reserve support unit?	0.09	0	0	1	1	0	0		
104			**Demographics**	1.28	1	1	1	1	1	1		
105	1	10	The air station has in excess of 3000 SELRES billets.	9.89	4.58	7.87	4.40	3.85	5.13	6.96		5.46
106	16	11	Personnel on reserve unit waiting lists are >= 10% of aggregate authorized unit strength for FY1993.	1.47	0	1	1	0	1	1		
107	16	6b	More than 90% of the Resforon SELRES officer billets were filled in FY93	0.92	0	0	0	1	0	0		
108	16	6a	More than 90% of the Resforon SELRES enlisted billets were filled in FY93	1.65	1	1	0	0	1	1		
109	16	10b	More than 90% of the non-squadron SELRES officer billets were filled in FY93	1.83	0	1	0	0	0	1		
110	16	10b	More than 90% of the non-squadron SELRES enlisted billets were filled in FY93	0.92	1	1	1	1	1	1		
111	38	39	SELRES officer participation has been 97.4 or greater for the last three fiscal years	1.10	0	1	0	0	1	1		
112	38	39	SELRES enlisted participation has been 94.5 or greater for the last three fiscal years.	0.92	1	1	1	1	0	0		
113			**Training**	1.10	1	0	1	1	0	0		
114	38	23a/b	Required major flight/training simulators located at or near the air station?	3.54	2.25	0.62	0.62	0.62	2.25	2.25		1.43
115	16	13a	There is an aviation flight physiology training facility in the local area?	1.64	1	0	0	0	1	1		
116	16	14a	Less than 10% of the training facilities are in inadequate condition	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	0		
117	16	13	Is there a shipboard aircraft fire fighting trainer in the local area?	0.62	1	1	1	1	1	1		
118			**Quality of Life**	0.35	0	0	0	0	0	0		
119	38	41a4	Is officer FH waiting list <6 months	10.42	4.86	4.23	4.03	4.26	6.80	5.23		4.90
120	38	41a4	Is enlisted FH waiting list < 6 months	0.53	0	1	0	0	1	0		
121	38	41a6	Do 90% or more of the housing units have all the required amenities?	0.62	0	1	0	0	1	0		
122	38	41b1	Is the BEQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.53	1	1	1	1	1	0		
123	16	25a	Are 90% of the BEQ rooms adequate?	0.70	0	0	0	0	0	1		
				0.70	1	0	1	0	0	1		

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (1's & 0's) -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	B	C	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
1					RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE	RESRVE		
2					21	22	23	24	25	26		
3	DC #	Q #	Matrix Question	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
124	38	41c1	Is the BOQ occupancy rate < 90%?	0.53	1	0	0	1	0	1		
125	16	25b	Are 90% of the BOQ rooms adequate?	0.62	0	0	0	0	1	1		
126	38	45	Does the air station have more than 90% of the listed MWR facilities?	0.62	0	0	0	0	0	0		
127	38	45	Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of the listed MWR facilities, including library, pool, gym/fitness	0.35	0	0	0	0	1	0		
128	38	44	Is the average wait for 0-12 month child care facilities < 180 days?	0.53	0	0	0	1	1	0		
129	38	44	Is the average wait for child care 6 months or less	0.62	0	0	0	1	1	0		
130	38	44	Is the average wait for child care between 6 & 12 months	0.35	1	1	1	0	0	1		
131	38	44	Are > 90% of the air station's child care facilities adequate?	0.35	1	0	1	1	1	1		
132	38	44	Are there certified home care providers?	0.20	1	1	1	0	1	0		
133	38	45	Does the air station have more than 90% of the listed family support facilities and programs?	0.53	0	0	0	0	1	0		
134	38	45	Does the air station have between 70% and 90% of listed family support facilities, including commissary and ex	0.26	0	0	0	0	0	1		
135	38	48d	Is off base housing rental and purchase affordable?	0.38	1	0	0	0	0	0		
136			Is there sufficient off base housing?	0.53	1	1	1	1	1	1		
137	38	49	Are there opportunities for consecutive follow on tours in the commuting area?	0.38	1	1	1	1	1	1		
138	38	50	Do >50% of employees live within 30 minutes of the base	0.50	1	1	1	1	1	1		
139	38	51b,c	Are local area educational institution programs adequate for military family members?	0.15	0	1	1	1	1	1		
140	34-35	51b-c	Are there educational opportunities at all college levels within a 30 mi radius?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1		
141	36	51c	Are college education courses available on the base?	0.04	1	1	1	1	1	1		
142	38	52	Does the air station have an active FSC spouse employment program?	0.04	1	1	1	1	0	1		
143	38	54	Do military family members have reasonable access to medical/dental care?	0.23	1	1	1	0	1	0		
144	37-42	61	Is the violent crime rate less than 758 per 100,000	0.04	1	1	0	1	0	0		
145	37-42	61	Is the drug crime rate less than 402 per 100,000	0.04	0	1	0	0	1	1		
146	37-42	61	Is the property Crime rate less than 4902 per 100000	0.04	1	1	0	0	1	0		

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Ranking -- FINAL 11/8/94

Calcs	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
159	Military Value Area	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
160	**Flight Training Areas/Airspace**	30.66	26.98	26.19	28.55	17.47	25.05	20.12		24.06
161	Flight Training Areas/Airspace rank		2	3	1	6	4	5		
162	Flight Training Areas/Airspace difference from mean		2.92	2.13	4.49	-6.59	0.99	-3.94		
163	**Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure**	18.64	11.36	6.73	10.65	10.34	11.04	10.27		10.07
164	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure rank		1	6	3	4	2	5		
165	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure difference from mean		1.30	-3.34	0.59	0.27	0.98	0.20		
166	**Expansion, Encroachment and Environment**	12.97	6.13	8.31	7.88	7.45	8.32	7.13		7.54
167	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment rank		6	2	3	4	1	5		
168	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment difference from me		-1.41	0.78	0.34	-0.08	0.79	-0.41		
169	**Quality of Life**	10.42	4.86	4.23	4.03	4.26	6.80	5.23		4.90
170	Quality of Life rank		3	5	6	4	1	2		
171	Quality of Life difference from mean		-0.04	-0.67	-0.87	-0.64	1.90	0.33		
172	**Demographics**	9.89	4.58	7.87	4.40	3.85	5.13	6.96		5.46
173	Demographics rank		4	1	5	6	3	2		
174	Demographics difference from mean		-0.89	2.41	-1.07	-1.62	-0.34	1.50		
175	**Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities**	6.95	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.29	5.52		3.91
176	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities rank		2	2	2	2	6	1		
177	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities difference from mean		-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.62	1.62		
178	**Military/General and Support Missions**	6.77	4.54	4.37	2.57	2.72	3.14	5.58		3.82
179	Military/General and Support Missions rank		2	3	6	5	4	1		
180	Military/General and Support Missions difference from mean		0.72	0.55	-1.25	-1.10	-0.68	1.76		
181	**Training**	3.54	2.25	0.62	0.62	0.62	2.25	2.25		1.43
182	Training rank		1	4	4	4	1	1		
183	Training difference from mean		0.82	-0.82	-0.82	-0.82	0.82	0.82		
184	**Total Military Value**	100.00	64.36	61.99	62.35	50.35	65.03	63.06		61.19
185	**Overall Rank**		2	5	4	6	1	3		
186	Military Value Differential		3.17	0.80	1.16	-10.84	3.84	1.87		
187			WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		

June 21, 1995

To: Commissioner Steele
From: LtCol Jim Brubaker

Subj: Increased Pilot Training Rates (PTR) for the Navy

The increased Navy PTR beginning in FY-98 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four (4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) Tactical Aircraft squadrons to the F/A-18 across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). The requirements also include the fleet introduction team for the new F/A-18E/F and the fleet replacement squadron (FRS).

The PTR in FY-96/97 could not be increased over levels published previously to match an ideal production schedule to meet the above mentioned force levels. Compounding this situation, the PTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. The PTR increase is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

Respectfully,

Runway
Capacity Calculations

237 days/yr. **x** hours/day **x** runway ops/hr = OPS/YR.

NAS Kingsville	229,416 annual ops
OLF Orange Grove	148,457 annual ops
NAS Corpus Christi	219,936 annual ops
Total	597,809

Joint Cross Service Group Testimony

Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

ANSWER: Yes, the analysis used 1511 daylight flight operations per Strike PTR.

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

ANSWER: NAS Kingsville's data call reported a daylight flight operations requirement for an all T-45 syllabus of 1393 ops. the 1511 ops used in the analysis was derived as follows. Because in FY 2001 not all strike training will be done in T-45 aircraft, we assumed 50 percent of the Strike pilots would go through an all T-45 syllabus and 50 percent would go through a split syllabus consisting of an Intermediate phase in the T-2 aircraft and an Advanced phase in the T-45 aircraft. Based on certified data, the flight ops requirement for this split syllabus was calculated as follows:

Intermediate Phase in T-2 -- 741 (from NAS Meridian's data call)
Advanced Phase in T-45 - 888 (from NAS Kingsville's data call)
Total: 1,629

Taking a weighted average, this gives,

(139 x .5) + (1629 x .5) = 1511 daylight flight ops per Strike PTR.

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate / advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

ANSWER: Under the recommended scenario, the main airfield an NAS Corpus Christi is needed to support the single-citing of Strike training at NAS Kingsville.

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

ANSWER: Because daylight runway operations is the capacity limiter at training air stations, we will show the capacity of this complex to support Strike training in these terms. The certified

Capacity Determinations

Scenaro A (PTR 336)		Scenario B (PTR 360)	
507,696 ops required		543,960 ops required	
336 + 20% = 403 PTR		360 + 20% = 432 PTR	
403PTR x 1511ops/PTR=608,933 ops		432PTR x 1511ops/PTR=652,752ops	
Capacity @ Kingsville(229,416)+ OLF Orange Grove(148,457) = 377,873			
Operations Required	608,933	Operations Required	652,752
Operations Available	-377,873	Operations Available	-377,873
Additional Ops Req.	**231,060**	Additional Ops Req.	**274,879**
Corpus Christi Capacity	219,936	Corpus Christi Capacity	219,936
Shortage	(11,124)	Shortage	(54,943)

FUNDING

2 F/A-18 in BUDGET 9 on HILL

2 F/A-18 in 97 BUDGET @ OSD

(more than)

A:\wpwin\capacity.doc

1) The capacity for NAS Corpus Christi was calculated using certified data. As we discussed, the runway capacity depends on the type and mix of aircraft operating at that field. In short, there are two types of training aircraft: light and heavy. The Navy's jet aircraft are all heavy aircraft.

the certified data for NAS Corpus Christi reflects all light aircraft operations. Based on this, it's capacity was calculated as follows.

Main Field:

237 days/yr x 12.1 hrs/day x 111 runway ops/hr = 318,315 ops/yr

In the configuration analysis, runway capacity was normalized so that all air stations were competing on a level playing field. In Corpus Christi's case, because strike training was heavy aircraft and Corpus's capacity was based on light aircraft, we scaled Corpus's capacity by .73, which represents the ratio between heavy and light runway operations. Therefore in the configuration analysis, NAS corpus was credited with a capacity of 318,315 x .73 = 232,370 for strike training.

2) The capacity for strike training at OLF was calculated directly from certified data which was based on heavy aircraft operations.

237 days/yr x 11.6 hrs/day x 54 ops/hr = 148,457

Additional Info: To consolidate strike training at NAS Kingsville our analysis showed that NAS Kingsville was about 130,000 operations short.

Strike requirement:

336 PTR x 1511 Ops/PTR = 507,696

capacity at NAS Kingsville:

Mainfield: 229,416
OLF Orange Grove: 148,457

Additional Capacity Required:

507,696 - (229,416 + 148,457) = 129,823

these numbers show that by using NAS Corpus Christi's main field as an outlying field, all strike training could be done at NAS Kingsville.

CNATRA CORPUS CHRISTI, TX
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

DATE:	NO. OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE)
5 June 95	2

TO:	FROM:
AGENCY BRAC '95	AGENCY CNATRA
NAME LCOL DRUBAKAR	NAME LCDR "J.V." Velez
CODE	CODE N33Y
EXTENSION DSN 226-0504	EXTENSION DSN 861-3862
TELECOPIER NO. 703 696-0550	TELECOPIER NO. (512) 939-2913 (AUTOVON) 861-2913 DUTY OFFICE ASSISTANCE (512) 939-2284 (AUTOVON) 861-2284

REMARKS

Colonel, CNATRA Sr. Leadership would like to extend to you the opportunity to serve on the Corpus Christi Base Realignment and Closure Committee. Please contact me at your earliest convenience to discuss this matter further.

VR,

J. V.

[23] From: CNATRA N3 5/31/95 4:47PM (629 bytes: 31 ln)
To: CNATRA N3
Subject: LTCOL BRUBAKER REQUEST
---------- Message Contents ----------

31 MAY 95

LTCOL BRUBAKER, BELOW ARE THE NUMBERS FOR PAA REQUIRED AT NAS PENSACOLA BEGINNING FY97/4 (VT COMMANDS). FOR NON-VT COMMANDS, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED IS PROVIDED.

VT10
T34 - 72
T1 - 10

VT86
T39 - 17
T2 - 13

VT4 (IF AT PENSACOLA)
T2 - 8

VT31
T44 - 57

BLUE ANGELS
FA18 - 12
C130 - 1

NAS PENSACOLA
C12 - 2
H3 - 3

R/MILT

QUESTIONS FOR MAJOR GENERAL PROFFIT

1. Please discuss the 10 Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) functional areas (flight screening, primary pilot, airlift/tanker, advanced bomber/fighter, strike/advanced E-2/C-2, advanced maritime/intermediate E-2/C-2, helicopter, primary and intermediate NFO, advanced NFO strike, and advanced NFO panel). How were they determined? How were they weighted?

2. Did you agree fully with the Joint Cross-Service Group's (JCSG) selection of functional areas? If not, why not?

3. How did the JCSG build and use these factors?

4. How did the JCSG use the Linear Programming Optimization Model as a tool to limit the number of feasible base closure alternatives?

5. In the JCSG/UPT Student Resource Calculation, the average functional value for the Air Force UPT bases resulted in the following tiering:

Columbus AFB	6.65
Vance AFB	6.50
Randolph AFB	6.46
Laughlin AFB	6.36
Reese AFB	6.08

The Air Force color coded Criteria I in its evaluation based on a standard deviation analysis of those averages. The Department of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations, Vol. V, on the other hand, ranks Columbus AFB, Laughlin AFB, Randolph AFB, and Vance AFB in Tier I. Do the functional scores represent your perception of the mission capability of the UPT bases?

6. The functional average of the highest Air Force UPT base was equivalent to the lowest ranking UPT base. What are the implications?

7. What did the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training (JCSG/UPT) do right? In your view, what, if anything, should the JCSG/UPT have done differently?

8. To your knowledge, how did the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) use the JCSG alternatives?

9. To your knowledge, what did the Base Support Analysis Team (BSAT) do differently in its analysis compared with the Air Force's analysis?

10. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission staff plans to conduct some excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model. Do you have any suggestions regarding what the Commission staff should examine? What are your views on

- examining only Air Force bases,
- excluding flight screening,
- separating "flying training" factors from other factors, such as a 300 foot-wide runway, and
- excluding Navy-unique functional areas?

11. In our excursions, do you recommend that we consider any other factors or relative weighting?

12. In your view, how far should the Commission go in defining base closure and realignment options in terms of base selections only or function?

13. The Lubbock, Texas, community offered to purchase and then lease back to the Air Force some housing units at Reese AFB as well as a 40,000 sq. ft. hangar at Lubbock International Airport that the FAA returned to Lubbock after only two years. What is the status of these offers? [NOTE: The BCEG representative might want to discuss this issue.]

14. Please discuss the various ways to describe the capacity of UPT bases, such as

    - operations per hour,
    - the high-water peak pilot training rate (PTR),
    - FAA-normalized operations (an FAA formula or procedure that measures airport capacity, taking into account such factors as weather conditions, runway configuration, traffic mix (takeoffs/landings versus touch/go), and runway availability (i.e., night/day runways), and
    - differences in Navy versus Air Force operations.

15. How can capacity analysis best account for factors that influence capacity historical data, but are not readily apparent, such as aircraft shortage (maintenance), instructor pilot, primary student graduates feeding into airlift/tanker and bomber/fighter paths, weather, and the operational savvy of one base's operational group commander versus another base's operational group commander?

16. Joint primary training is just a beginning in the process of "jointness." Where is the Air Force going in terms of joint curriculum development and training? How far can the Air Force and the other services go in

    - consolidating similar functions on one base or base complex, such as moving strike and bomber/fighter training to Columbus AFB or a NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex,
    - placing a Navy TA-4 squadron on an Air Force base using the Navy philosophy of joint basing type model series aircraft,

- consolidating all joint primary training in the western United States (e.g., at NAS Kingsville, Laughlin AFB, Reese AFB, and Vance AFB) to exploit favorable weather and airspace condition, and
- consolidating all joint primary training in the eastern United States (e.g., at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting--if all helicopter training is consolidated at Ft. Rucker, which would free up NAS Whiting to receive fixed-wing aircraft) to exploit outlying fields and airspace?

17. It appears the actual UPT bases selected for realignment or closure were service-specific selections not related to joint training or syllabus. Please discuss this selection process.

18. In your view, what is the best way to judge the quality of a base's airspace, e.g.,

    - by functional area (primary versus strike and bomber/fighter),
    - by use versus control, or
    - by potential versus actual use?

19. What changed since BRAC 1993 that resulted in the Air Force rating Reese AFB so low (Tier III) compared with other bases in the Undergraduate Flying Training category, especially considering that the Air Force (1) rated Reese AFB so high in previous rounds, (2) selected Reese AFB as its first Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) site, (3) introduced the T-1 training aircraft at Reese AFB, and (4) initiated the consolidation of UPT with the Navy in a joint program at Reese AFB?

20. What is the Air Force's rationale for closing Reese AFB and transferring all of its aircraft, particularly the newly introduced T-1 training aircraft, along with the joint training program to Vance AFB, Laughlin AFB, and Columbus AFB when these bases have yet to transition to these programs? Could the Air Force avoid significant military construction costs by not transferring these programs?

21. Is the Air Force ignoring a key quality of life indicator that (1) Reese AFB is the number one choice of assignment by student and instructor pilots in AETC, (2) Reese AFB's accessibility is enhanced by its proximity to a large international airport, and (3) Reese AFB offers clearly superior higher education opportunities?

22. Other UPT bases own or control more airspace than Reese AFB, but much of this airspace is unusable for UPT activities. Is Reese AFB down-graded because it lacks actual ownership and control of required airspace--even though access to the airspace it uses for UPT training activities is unimpeded and despite of the lack of an encroachment problem?

23. What are your views on transferring Columbus AFB from the Air Force to the Navy as part of a NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex and placing the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training at Luke AFB while closing NAS Kingsville and NAS Corpus Christi?

24. What are your views on (1) establishing a NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex as a multi-engine prop and multi-engine jet training facility by moving the T-44 to NAS Meridian for C-130 training and T-1A to NAS Meridian for E-6A, KC-10, and KC-135 training and (2) establishing joint navigator training by moving that function from NAS Pensacola to NAS Meridian?

M E M O R A N D U M

DATE: April 8, 1995

TO: Attendees at 8 April UPT Discussion

FROM: Frank Cirillo, Air Force Team Leader

RE: UPT Discussion Questions

We have attached a list of questions which should be considered as a point of departure for today's discussion. The main thrust of the discussion, I would imagine, is to go over the Air Force input into the UPT JCSG and to cover the functional analysis factors/ weighting and use - not only by the JCSG but by the BCEG - and in particular if the method is sound from an Air Force perspective.

The attached questions will more than likely be modified and used during the 17 April Hearing. Additionally the DBCRC intends to do some independent analysis excursions and today's discussions should facilitate that effort.

fc

AIR FORCE UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING QUESTIONS

1. Please discuss the 10 Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) functional areas (flight screening, primary pilot, airlift/tanker, advanced bomber/fighter, strike/advanced E-2/C-2, advanced maritime/intermediate E-2/C-2, helicopter, primary and intermediate Naval Flight Officer (NFO), advanced NFO strike, and advanced NFO panel). How were they determined? How were they weighted?

2. Did you agree fully with the Joint Cross-Service Group's (JCSG) selection of functional areas? If not, why not?

3. How did the JCSG build and use these factors?

4. How did the JCSG use the Linear Programming Optimization Model as a tool to limit the number of feasible base closure alternatives?

5. In the JCSG/UPT Student Resource Calculation, the average functional value for the Air Force UPT bases resulted in the following tiering:

Columbus AFB	6.65
Vance AFB	6.50
Randolph AFB	6.46
Laughlin AFB	6.36
Reese AFB	6.08

The Air Force color coded Criteria I in its evaluation based on a standard deviation analysis of those averages. The Department of the Air Force's Analyses and Recommendations, Vol. V, on the other hand, ranks Columbus AFB, Laughlin AFB, Randolph AFB, and Vance AFB in Tier I. Do the functional scores represent your perception of the mission capability of the UPT bases?

6. The functional average of the highest Air Force UPT base was equivalent to the lowest ranking Navy UPT base. What are the implications?

7. What did the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training (JCSG/UPT) do right? In your view, what, if anything, should the JCSG/UPT have done differently?

8. What is your view of how the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) used the JCSG alternatives to develop its closure recommendations?

9. To your knowledge, what did the Base Support Analysis Team (BSAT) do differently in its analysis compared with the Air Force's analysis?

10. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission staff plans to conduct some excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model. Do you have any

suggestions regarding what the Commission staff should examine? What are your views on the following options:

- examining only Air Force bases;
- excluding flight screening;
- separating "flying training" factors from other factors, such as a 300 foot-wide runway; and
- excluding Navy-unique functional areas?

11. In our excursions, do you recommend that we consider any other factors or change the relative weights in a way that more accurately reflects Air Force requirements?

12. In your view, how far should the Commission go in defining base closure and realignment options in terms of selecting bases for closure and realignment of base functions?

13. The Lubbock, Texas, community offered to purchase and then lease back to the Air Force Reese AFB family housing as well as a 40,000 square foot hangar at Lubbock International Airport. What is the status of these offers? [NOTE: The BCEG representative might want to discuss this issue.]

14. The JCSG/UPT described UPT capacity in a certain way. Please compare the relative merits of various ways to describe the capacity of UPT bases, such as:

    - operations per hour;
    - the high-water peak pilot training rate (PTR);
    - FAA-normalized operations (an FAA formula or procedure that measures airport capacity, taking into account such factors as weather conditions, runway configuration, traffic mix (takeoffs/landings versus touch/go), and runway availability (i.e., night/day runways); and
    - differences in Navy versus Air Force operations.

15. How can capacity analysis best account for factors that influence capacity historical data, but are not readily apparent, such as shortages in the following areas:

    - aircraft maintenance;
    - instructor pilots;
    - primary student graduates feeding into the next level; and
    - weather?

    How do you account for the operational savvy of one base's operations group commander versus another base's commander?

16. Joint primary training is just a beginning in the process of "jointness." How far can the Air Force and the other Services go in the following areas:

- consolidating similar functions on one base or base complex, such as conducting strike and bomber/fighter training at Columbus AFB or a NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex;
- operating a Navy TA-4 squadron on an Air Force base;
- consolidating all joint primary training in such western bases as NAS Kingsville, Laughlin AFB, Reese AFB, and Vance AFB to exploit favorable weather and airspace; and
- consolidating all joint primary training in such eastern bases as at NAS Meridian, NAS Pensacola, NAS Whiting, and Columbus AFB to permit all helicopter training to be consolidated at Ft. Rucker, thus freeing up NAS Whiting to receive fixed-wing aircraft to exploit available auxiliary fields and airspace?

17. It appears the actual UPT bases selected for realignment or closure were service-specific selections not related to joint training or syllabus. Please discuss this selection process.

18. In your view, what is the best way to judge the quality of a base's airspace, for example:

    - by functional area (primary versus strike and bomber/fighter);
    - by use versus control; or
    - by potential versus actual use?

19. Other UPT bases own or control more airspace than Reese AFB, but much of this airspace is unusable for UPT activities. Is Reese AFB down-graded because it lacks actual ownership and control of required airspace--even though access to the airspace it uses for UPT training activities is unimpeded and despite of the lack of an encroachment problem?

20. If we find, after correcting for factual errors, that Reese AFB scores improve placing it into the yellow/green areas, then how would you recommend the Commission proceed in selecting a UPT base for closure?

21. Is the Air Force ignoring a key quality of life indicator that (1) Reese AFB is the number one choice of assignment by student and instructor pilots in AETC, (2) Reese AFB's accessibility is enhanced by its proximity to a large international airport, and (3) Reese AFB offers clearly superior higher education opportunities?

22. Please discuss, in detail, the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

    - What alternatives or "strawmen" did the JCSG/UPT consider?
    - What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS/Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

- What cost advantages, if any, were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

23. Should the Air Force transfer Columbus AFB to the Navy and move the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training to Luke AFB?

24. Did the JCSG/UPT consider NAS Meridian a potential transfer to the Air Force, which would allow the Air Force to close another UPT base?

25. If Reese AFB is closed, then where is the Air Force planning to transfer joint Air Force and Navy primary training?

26. A lot has been learned about conducting joint primary training at Reese AFB. How was this experience factored, weighted, or considered in the analysis to close a UPT base?

27. What was the impact, if any, on Criterion I grading of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues?

Merrill Beyer and Mark Pross/Air Force Team and Jim Brubaker/Navy Team/April 7, 1995

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300

ECONOMIC SECURITY

18 APR 1995

Mr. Frank Cirillo
Air Force Team Leader
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

Attached are responses from the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training regarding questions for the record which were submitted to the Air Force by the Commission.

I trust this information is useful.

Sincerely,

R. L. Meyer
Director
Base Closure

Attachment

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

March 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, BASE CLOSURE AND UTILIZATION

SUBJECT: Commission Questions for the Record

The response to your request for answers to the BRAC Commission questions for the record regarding the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional analyses is provided as Attachment One.

Louis C. Finch
Chairman
Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group

Attachment:
1. Qs & As

1. QUESTION: In evaluating the airspace available at each Undergraduate Training Base, did you concentrate on measuring only the volume of airspace owned or controlled by the base or did you take into consideration the usability of all the airspace available to the base for training?

ANSWER: The analysis did not restrict airspace credit to the volume a base owned or controlled.

2. QUESTION: Isn't usable or useful airspace a more valid measure than total airspace?

ANSWER: Usable or useful airspace is a key ingredient to the training mission. The existence of other special use airspace can add flexibility or the ability to accommodate expansion and/or mission changes.

3. QUESTION: Isn't it true that in the Joint Cross-Service Group, the Air Force argued with the Navy that heavily weighting total available airspace was an improper measure of capacity?

ANSWER: Assigning weights in the model was one of the Groups biggest challenges. All members agreed that airspace should be heavily weighted, so the discussion centered on what types of airspace to credit. In the end, the Group reached and implemented a consensus.

Attachment 1

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1670

Office of the Secretary of the Navy
1051 Navy Pentagon
Washington DC 20350-1051

9 July 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Joint Fixed-Wing Training (Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 15 April 1993) - ACTION MEMORANDUM

This memorandum and the attached plan respond to your 15 April 1993 memorandum directing the Secretary of the Air Force, assisted by the Secretary of the Navy, to consolidate initial fixed-wing aircraft training. The plan also addresses related issues of airlift/tanker/maritime training, and navigator/Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training.

In primary training, the services will begin an instructor exchange in Fiscal Year 1993, and a student exchange in Fiscal Year 1994. The 35th Flying Training Squadron at Reese Air Force Base, Texas, and Training Squadron 3 at Naval Air Station Whiting, Florida, will be the prototype joint training squadrons. They fly the T-37 and T-34 aircraft respectively. Other squadrons will become joint not later than the point at which they convert to the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft and a common syllabus.

The services will test joint airlift/tanker/maritime training and systems officer training. Pilots in the airlift/tanker/maritime track will complete either Air Force T-1A or Navy T-44 training. Air Force systems officers will attend initial training at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, and then cross flow into the Navy program at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida.

Two post-graduate programs will be affected. In Fiscal Year 1995, Navy electronic warfare officers will attend joint training at Randolph Air Force Base. The Army indicates efficiencies may be possible by aligning their fixed-wing transition training with existing Navy programs.

Most cost avoidance has already accrued by closing four training bases. Additional cost avoidance will occur through acquiring a common JPATS. A small recurring cost will grow to approximately $500 thousand annually. The services agree joint training is worth the cost.

Michael B. Donley
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

Frank B. Kelso II
Frank B. Kelso, II
Acting Secretary of the Navy

Attachment:
Joint Fixed-Wing Aircraft Training Plan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This plan responds to the 15 April 1993 Secretary of Defense memo on the "Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the US." The plan will consolidate joint fixed-wing aircraft training for Air Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard students. Three distinct areas for training future combat aircrews can be immediately exploited as joint training: fixed-wing primary, advanced airlift/tanker/maritime patrol training, and advanced training for Naval Flight Officers/systems officers/electronic warfare officers.

As the services studied joint training options, several observations were apparent. First, the services, in conjunction with the U.S. Congress have closed several training bases--the cost avoidance associated with these base closure initiatives will account for the preponderance of cost reductions associated with military flying training. One Navy base, Chase, and two Air Force bases, Mather and Williams, have closed in FY93. One other Navy base, Meridian, has been nominated for closure in BRAC Round III. As a result of these closures, DoD will realize an annual recurring savings of $189M per year with only $324M required up front to close all four bases.

Moreover, Secretary Aspin's direction to continue with the acquisition of a common Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS), will avoid additional costs. More than $575M in redundant development and production costs are avoided by conducting a single aircraft procurement for both services. Additional savings will be realized with one depot overseeing a reduced number of sources for parts and support, and training management staff responsibilities that are jointly shared.

Training capacity and infrastructure were also examined as part of this joint study. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy has the remaining aircraft or base capacity to train all DoD primary students projected for FY99 and beyond. Both services have retired substantial numbers of obsolete training aircraft as projected student loads have been

modified to reflect force structure drawdowns. It was determined that any reduction to post-BRAC III basing structure would preclude expected FY99 mission accomplishment due to the excessive base and airspace loading which would result. Both service training infrastructures are sized appropriately to the force structure supported by existing budgets. Whereas the on-going DoD Bottom-Up Review may produce additional force structure changes that in time further reduce the required numbers of aviation graduates, both services are prepared to respond to these adjustments as they are finalized.

In response to Deputy SECDEF Perry's 28 May 1993 memo on fixed-wing training for helicopter bound student pilots, the helo study group, led by the Secretary of the Navy, will separately address alternatives to the present method of training to include the practice of using fixed-wing training to select and train students enroute to follow-on rotary wing training. Their report will outline the impacts on fixed-wing training force structure associated with these alternatives. Based on their recommendations, fixed-wing training plans could change accordingly. As with the results of the Bottom-Up Review, both services will respond to any policy changes in this regard by resizing the numbers of primary aircraft and instructors, and reevaluating the base infrastructure needed to accommodate modified training loads.

The services will test other joint training programs as well. Prototype airlift/ tanker/maritime patrol advanced pilot training will occur at Reese AFB in the T-1A and at NAS Corpus Christi in the T-44. The Air Force will also train systems officers in the Navy NFO program at NAS Pensacola. Navy electronic warfare officers will attend Air Force electronic warfare training at Randolph AFB after they complete their initial training at NAS Pensacola. While incurring slight additional costs, these initiatives allow us to exploit existing hardware and programs to provide the best training possible to students of all services.

In summary, joint training has enormous potential. Our approach will be to start this year, build the program year by year, learn as we go, and produce the world's best

joint pilot and systems officer training programs. Young aviators will be exposed to the joint service environment, while field grade officers will earn joint duty credit, thus promoting future joint operations. Services will gain from each others' training strengths, resulting in better training overall. Economies of scale will be attainable in every joint training venture, especially with a common aircraft, ground training system, and logistics system. The services are prepared to step smartly into joint training and take full advantage of common training systems like JPATS. The remainder of this report outlines the details of our plan and schedule, and offers a first look at costs and cost avoidance. As we train together, we will continue to improve the quality of our graduates and work toward further efficiencies.

JOINT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT TRAINING ANALYSIS

OBSERVATIONS

There have been three base closures of military flying training bases as a result of the Base Realignment and Closure process--Mather and Williams Air Force bases, and Chase Naval Air Station. NAS Meridian has been nominated for potential closure in the BRAC Round III (See Figure 1). The remaining infrastructure appears to be sized appropriately for steady state outyear needs.



FIGURE 1

The USN capacity for primary student production at their two locations is 1253 per year. Seventy four excess T-34 aircraft are being retired, resulting in 255 used to meet this requirement. There is no excess capacity when compared to the projected FY99 production of 1253 (See Figure 2).



FIGURE 2

The Air Force possesses 307 T-37 aircraft that have been modified via a service life extension program (SLEP) and are located at their four remaining undergraduate pilot training bases. Maximum student production capacity of these assigned aircraft is 1404 per year. The reduced Air Force requirement due to force downsizing in the steady state by FY99 is 1212. This leaves an excess capability to produce only 212 USN pilots at Air Force bases (See Figure 3).



FIGURE 3

JOINT FIXED-WING PRIMARY

The USAF and USN pilot training programs have evolved over the years into similar training philosophies. Basic military flying skills are taught in the primary training phases, followed by service specific training taught in advanced phases. The USAF pilot training program as shown in Figure 4 is transitioning to Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT), where the advanced track splits into the bomber/fighter track and the airlift/tanker track. Reese AFB is the first USAF base transitioning to SUPT, and will be the first USAF base to host and participate in joint primary training.



FIGURE 4

The present USN Pilot Training Program consists of a four pipeline system as shown in Figure 5 providing training in four aircraft communities: Strike, Maritime, E-2/C-2, and Helo. [Note: the terms "USN," "Navy," and "Naval" indicate USN, USMC, and USCG students and training.] Each pipeline is divided into three building block levels of training: primary, intermediate, and advanced. The primary phase of all four pipelines is a common syllabus in the T-34 aircraft. Upon completion of primary, student aviators 'pipeline select' and proceed through the pipeline-specific training curriculum. NAS Whiting provides the largest volume of student pilots through the primary phase, and was selected to be the first USN base to host and participate in joint primary training.



FIGURE 5

In compliance with the Secretary of Defense memo, the following describes the plan to move away from the service-specific training programs outlined above and consolidate primary fixed-wing aircraft training for Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and perhaps Army flight students. This will be achieved using JPATS as shown in Figure 6 and a common syllabus that will be jointly developed as the services begin to train jointly in 1993 and expand the program through subsequent years.

JOINT TRAINING PROJECTION - JPATS



FIGURE 6

Near term instructor and student exchanges will gradually build to two prototype squadrons with alternating USAF and USN/USMC commanders by September 1994. Each squadron is expected to have 30 exchange instructor pilots, and train an annual exchange student load of 100 students by 1998. As directed in the Secretary of Defense memo, advanced training will consist of four pipelines: Navy fighter/attack, Air Force fighter/bomber, Joint airlift/tanker/maritime patrol, and Joint helicopter.

Two interim joint training arrangements will allow immediate joint training and enhance a smooth transition to the fully joint JPATS posture illustrated by Figure 6 .

The USAF-hosted interim joint training at Reese AFB is shown in Figure 7. It will use the current 89 hour T-37 primary curriculum, modified to facilitate Naval pipeline selection at 66 hours. At that point, Naval students selected for the fighter/attack and E2/C-2 pipelines will return to Naval training. Naval students selected for the Maritime and Helicopter pipelines continue with their Air Force counterparts to complete the USAF T-37 curriculum, where Air Force student track selection occurs for the advanced pipelines. Upon completion of T-37 training, both Naval and Air Force students proceed to their advanced training aircraft.



FIGURE 7

The USN-hosted interim joint training flow at NAS Whiting Field is shown in Figure 8. It will use the current 66 hour T-34 primary syllabus. Upon completion of primary training, Naval students pipeline select. Student Naval Aviators selected to the Strike and E-2/C-2 pipelines proceed to their respective intermediate training locations and aircraft. Naval students selected to fly Maritime or Helo pipeline and all Air Force students will continue through the current T-34 intermediate syllabus (26 hours). Upon completion of the intermediate syllabus, Naval students will progress to an advanced pipeline training phase. Air Force students track select upon completion of the T-34 intermediate syllabus and then proceed to advanced training.



FIGURE 8

The initial prototype joint training squadrons will be established by September 1994. Joint squadron leadership will alternate between USAF and USN/USMC. The 35th Flying Training Squadron (35 FTS) at Reese AFB and Training Squadron 3 (VT-3) at NAS Whiting Field will be the prototype joint primary flight training sites.

Beginning in September 1993, the first instructor pilot exchange will occur. Six experienced USAF instructors will report to VT-3. Six experienced USN instructors will report to 35 FTS. By March 1994, 4 more instructors will exchange, with a continuous exchange rate of 3 instructors each quarter thereafter until 2 full joint prototype squadrons are manned with 30 exchange instructors.

In September 1994, two exchange students from each service will begin training, with gradual growth until September 1998, when 100 exchange student entries will occur annually in prototype squadrons (Figure 9). Additional joint squadrons will ramp up leading to total joint primary training with JPATS full training capability.



FIGURE 9

The overall plan for initiating joint fixed-wing training will use a three phase approach. The first phase will be the "foot in the door" stage where the instructor/student

exchange begins (FY93 - 94). The second phase will be the "learning as we go" stage where the primary USN and USAF syllabi are modified to accommodate current hardware (FY95 - 96). Finally the last phase will be "full up operation" where the services transition to a common aircraft and syllabus (FY97 - 98). Then based on lessons learned during the growth period, other squadrons will become joint not later than the point at which the JPATS aircraft arrives.

The services have an opportunity to accelerate joint squadrons by modifying the currently programmed beddown sequence to alternate JPATS deliveries to USAF and USN squadrons as shown in Figure 10. This should not change the current acquisition schedule, but would require some funding shifts in both services since the funding is currently front-loaded for USAF deliveries.



FIGURE 10

JOINT AIRLIFT/TANKER/MARITIME PATROL TRAINING

Undergraduate flight training for airlift/tanker/maritime patrol pilots requires one Navy T-44 squadron and four Air Force T-1A squadrons. SECDEF tasking directs a pipeline for Navy and Air Force airlift/tanker/maritime patrol flight training. Neither service has the capacity to meet the total training requirement. The prototype program will use aircraft and training programs from both the Air Force and Navy in a joint training evaluation. In addition, a review of Army initial fixed-wing transition training requirements was performed. It may be possible to improve quality and cost effectiveness by having the Navy provide fixed-wing multi-engine transition training for Army rotary wing pilots.

Advanced joint fixed-wing training is predicated on turboprop bound students training in T-44 turboprop aircraft and jet bound students training in T-1A jet aircraft. Figures 11 and 12 reflect Air Force and Naval multi-engine tracks. Following a test program in FY94, and assuming that apparent potential for improved turboprop training is realized, Air Force pilots selected for C-130 training could complete advanced undergraduate training at VT-31, NAS Corpus Christi in the T-44 aircraft. Navy pilots selected for E-6 training could complete advanced undergraduate training at 52 FTS, Reese AFB in the T-1A aircraft. Advanced turboprop training, including approximately 50 Air Force C-130 bound students, could be conducted by the Navy. Advanced jet airlift/tanker training, including 25 Navy E-6 bound students, could be conducted by the USAF. Both programs, when fully implemented will also involve a joint instructor force.

USAF C-130/USN E-6 TRACK SELECT



FIGURE 11

USN E-6/USAF C-130 TRACK SELECT



FIGURE 12

The number of exchange instructors within the multi-engine training squadrons will be proportional to the number of exchange students. Three experienced training instructor exchanges will be completed by December 1993. Subsequent instructor exchanges will come from fleet/operational units starting in June 1995.

After the instructor pilot exchanges are in place at 52 FTS and VT-31, syllabi will be evaluated and refined, if necessary, to meet service specific requirements. Further refinement of the syllabi will follow by tracking graduate performance with feedback from follow-on training managers in the C-130 and E-6 prior to full exchange of instructors and students.

Initial student exchanges will start in 1994. As the quality of this initiative is substantiated through graduate evaluation, exchanges will continue until the number of exchange students on board each track/pipeline supports total service requirements in the affected aircraft. The ramp-up of USAF and USN exchange students would be complete by September 1995, barring unforeseen problems.

JOINT NFO/SYSTEMS OFFICER/EWO TRAINING

Like their pilot training counterparts, the USAF and USN navigator training programs mirror the overall pilot training philosophy. Basic military navigation skills are taught in a core or primary phase, followed by service specific training in the intermediate and advanced phases. The current USAF Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training (SUNT) program is depicted in Figure 13.



FIGURE 13

The current USN NFO training program at NAS Pensacola is depicted in Figure 14.



FIGURE 14

The proposed joint Naval Flight Officer (NFO)/systems officer (SO)/electronic warfare officer (EWO) training (Figure 15) would combine undergraduate specialized training to maximize the quality of training and optimize the use of resources. Under the proposal all Air Force SOs and Navy NFOs assigned to strike aircraft could be trained at NAS Pensacola, following a prototype exchange of instructors and students in 1993/4. All USN/USMC navigators and NFOs assigned to transport and land based maritime patrol will continue to train in the Interservice Undergraduate Navigator Training program at Randolph AFB. This joint NFO/SO/EWO training would substantially change USAF SO training. USN NFO training at Pensacola will not significantly change. USN NFO track selection will occur at the same point and advanced NFO graduates will report to their respective Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) for aircraft specific training. Refer to Figure 14. Assuming the prototype validates the postulated benefits, the revised program would provide the services with better quality strike and multi-purpose combat navigators for fewer resources expended.



FIGURE 15

In the joint program USAF SO officers would complete core training and receive basic aviation indoctrination and fundamental navigation training at Randolph. After this 22-week course, track selection occurs to determine the location of the USAF students' advanced training. USAF officers selected for training at Pensacola would receive additional training in the T-37 aircraft at Randolph to hone the aircraft skills required at Pensacola. USAF SO students reporting to Pensacola would enter with USN students in the NFO intermediate phase in the T-39 aircraft. From the intermediate phase until graduation, USAF and USN students would receive the same training. Upon completion of the program, USAF and USN students would be assigned to their specific follow-on combat aircraft training.

An additional opportunity to combine electronic warfare training for all USAF SOs/EWOs and USN NFOs occurs with delivery of the USAF's Simulator for Electronic Combat Training in 1995. USN NFOs requiring EW training would complete training at Randolph after their training at Pensacola. This training would take place enroute to the FRS during time currently spent in the USN EW School at Corry Station. USAF officers destined for EW duty in tactical aircraft would receive this same EW training at Randolph prior to going to Pensacola.

There will be an incremental transition to joint NFO/SO/EWO training. This transition will occur with the implementation of a revised USAF SO/EWO syllabus scheduled to begin in July 1994. Some students commencing training after July 1994 will enter the revised course and complete the joint NFO/SO training program at Pensacola. After the program is validated, a full exchange of students will occur.

Joint instructor exchange will begin in September 1993. Initially, two USN NFO instructors will be assigned to the SUNT program at Randolph and two USAF instructors will be assigned to Pensacola. USAF instructor manning at Pensacola will continue to increase until the final number of nine USAF instructors is reached in December 1994.

All land based Navy NFOs are currently trained at Randolph in the Interservice Undergraduate Navigator Training program. The instructor and student ratios of USAF to USN are sufficient to establish this squadron as a joint squadron in October 1994.

Conducting joint NFO/SO training at Pensacola results in significant benefits for both the USAF and USN. The training uses an in-place, proven training system (T-39/T-2 aircraft) which better replicates operational USAF systems officer avionics suites and more effectively meets USAF training requirements in those radar, visual, and instrument navigation skills needed in strike and multi-purpose combat aircraft.

ESTIMATED COSTS AND SAVINGS

This analysis provides a first look at the cost issues for joint training. Analysis shows clearly that cost savings and cost avoidance will primarily accrue as a result of base closures associated with BRAC, and the JPATS single aircraft procurement program. Both additional costs and savings are associated with the following joint flying training areas: primary fixed-wing, airlift/tanker/maritime patrol, and navigator/NFO. All of the cost data in this document are rough order of magnitude (ROM); if this plan meets with SECDEF approval, all costs will be subjected to a more detailed financial analysis.

Both services are in the process of closing a total of three training bases. The Air Force has closed Mather AFB, CA, and Williams AFB, AZ, and the Navy has closed NAS Chase, TX. In addition, NAS Meridian, MS has been nominated for closure. The up front, non-recurring cost to close these bases will be approximately $322M, and the recurring annual savings will be $189M.

Cost savings associated with the JPATS single aircraft procurement program occur in these areas: development, acquisition, the limiting of support facility requirements to one depot and one source of parts/support, and joint management. A one-time savings in development and acquisition cost avoidance would amount to approximately $577M. Operating only one depot for JPATS could save as much as $500K per year. In addition, there are savings for having one source of parts/support, and for the consolidation of operations and logistics services management responsibilities.

Primary fixed-wing training has a mixture of additional costs and savings. There is an additional cost of approximately $430K per year for PCS costs to send USAF students from USN primary training to USAF advanced training. This PCS cost would only apply to USAF students who attend training at NAS Whiting or NAS Corpus Christi. A flying hour savings of $47K per year accrues for USAF students as a result of flying the T-34

aircraft instead of the T-37. These are the only two areas in primary fixed-wing training where the joint initiatives outlined herein had an impact on cost.

Airlift/tanker/maritime patrol training initiatives will also produce both costs and savings. The TDY cost to send USAF students, selected to fly C-130 aircraft, to NAS Corpus Christi for advanced training in the T-44 would amount to approximately $298K per year. There would be a reduced requirement for T-1A aircraft if the USAF were to send its entire C-130 student pilot flow to NAS Corpus Christi for training in the T-44. This reduced requirement would provide a one-time savings of approximately $20M. Flying hour savings that are a result of the differences between the T-44 and the T-1A training programs and the differential in flying hour costs, amount to approximately $1.2M per year.

In the navigator/NFO training program there were five areas that had an impact on costs and savings: the PCS cost of USAF students to Pensacola to complete their SO training; the additional flying hours for USAF students in the T-37, T-39, and T-2 aircraft; the flying hour savings for not flying the T-43 and T-38; the cost of three additional electronic warfare simulator seats at Randolph AFB; and the TDY cost of USN students to Randolph AFB for EWO training. The PCS cost of USAF SO students to Pensacola would be $139K per year. The flying hour cost for flying the T-37, T-39, and T-2 aircraft would amount to approximately $1.2M per year. The flying hour savings for USAF students not flying the T-43 and T-38 aircraft in the SO track at Randolph AFB, TX would amount to $421K per year. The addition of three simulator seats at Randolph AFB, to accommodate USN EWO students, would cost approximately $3.4M, and the TDY cost of USN students to Randolph AFB for EWO training would be $103K per year.

The possible overall savings/costs for this plan would include a one time cost avoidance of approximately $16.6M, with an annual recurring additional cost of $551K Again, these are "first-look" figures. A more rigorous cost scrub will follow Mr. Aspin's

decision on these initiatives, and could be incorporated in subsequent POM development and budget submissions..

SUMMARY

The foregoing plan responds to Secretary of Defense tasking. It reflects interservice agreement toward meeting training objectives, exploitation of best available training, and an aggressive joint focus.

Our commitment to start immediately, learning as we go, will ensure a seamless and effective transition to joint training. Imbedded in this transition is an equally strong commitment to produce more than just pilots and navigators/NFOs. The services will continue to produce the best combat aircrews in the world. The joint training initiatives described will provide new synergistic combat capability built upon the strengths of each services' training systems. This plan confirms the requirement for JPATS as the avenue to true jointness in initial flying training. This study uncovered no roadblocks as to the course described.

The services agree -- joint training is worth the cost.

Memorandum

From: Air Traffic Control Facility Officer
To: Commander, CTW-1

Via: Operations Officer, CTW-1

Subj: AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS VFR/IFR RUNWAY OPERATIONS.

Encl: (1) Copy FAA 7110.65H, chapter 3, section 8
(2) Copy FAA 7110.65H, chapter 5, section 8

1. The basic runway configuration at NAS Meridian allows an amount of flexibility few other military or civilian airports can offer. Navy Meridian's three separate runways are ideal for handling the large volume of traffic associated with training commands.

2. The perfect configuration for a training environment would allow for departures on one runway with arrivals on a separate non-intersecting runway. Navy Meridian meets all FAA runway distance criteria to allow for simultaneous operations. In addition, the east/west runway is available to handle landings on runway 28 and departures on runway 10 when the wind conditions do not necessarily favor a straight north or south operation. NAS Meridian has the capability to safely handle the complex operational requirements a training command dictates.

3. Air Traffic Control regulations are very specific regarding the use and operation of runways. FAA Handbook 7110.65(series) is the primary source of information that addresses air traffic control procedures. Enclosures (1) and (2) are copies of the applicable pages that cover Navy Meridian's unique runway configuration and the rules that apply. McCain airfield was not designed by accident, it was a well conceived airport able to handle an exceptionally large volume of air traffic coupled with the best in aviation safety.

for D. J. Jensen ACCS(AW)

MIN ℄ Displacement 2500'
NASM 3900'

MIN THRESHOLD
DISPLACEMENT 5000'
NASM 12000'

Section 8. SPACING AND SEQUENCING

3–90 SEQUENCE/SPACING APPLICATION

Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight or ground operation as necessary to achieve proper spacing.

Phraseology:

CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF.

CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF OR HOLD SHORT/HOLD IN POSITION/TAXI OFF THE RUNWAY (traffic).

EXTEND DOWNWIND.

MAKE SHORT APPROACH.

NUMBER (landing sequence number).

FOLLOW (description and location of traffic),

or if traffic is utilizing another runway,

TRAFFIC (description and location) LANDING RUNWAY (number of runway being used).

CIRCLE THE AIRPORT.

MAKE LEFT/RIGHT THREE-SIXTY/TWO SEVENTY.

GO AROUND.

CLEARED TO LAND.

CLEARED:

TOUCH-AND-GO,

or

STOP-AND-GO,

or

LOW APPROACH.

CLEARED FOR THE OPTION,

or

OPTION APPROVED,

or

UNABLE OPTION, (alternate instructions).

or

UNABLE (type of option), OTHER OPTIONS APPROVED.

3–90 Note 1.—The "Cleared for the Option" procedure will permit an instructor pilot/flight examiner/pilot the option to make a touch-and-go, low approach, missed approach, stop-and-go, or full stop landing. This procedure will only be used at those locations with an operational control tower and will be subject to ATC approval.

3–90 Note 2.—For proper helicopter spacing, speed adjustments may be more practical than course changes.

3–90 Note 3.– Read back of hold short instructions apply when hold instructions are issued to a pilot in lieu of a takeoff clearance.

3–90 Reference.—Expeditious Compliance, paragraph 2–5. Taxi and Ground Movement Operation, paragraph 3–81

3–91 TOUCH-AND-GO OR STOP-AND-GO OR LOW APPROACH

Consider an aircraft cleared for touch-and-go, stop-and-go, or low approach as an arriving aircraft until it touches down (for touch-and-go), or makes a complete stop (for stop-and-go), or crosses the landing threshold (for low approach), and thereafter as a departing aircraft.

3–91 Reference.—Vehicles/Equipment/Personnel on Runways, paragraph 3–5. Intersection Departure, paragraph 3–106.

3–92 SIMULTANEOUS SAME DIRECTION OPERATION

Authorize simultaneous, same direction operations on parallel runways, on parallel landing strips, or on a runway and a parallel landing strip only when the following conditions are met:

a. Operations are conducted in VFR conditions unless visual separation is applied.

b. Two-way radio communication is maintained with the aircraft involved and pertinent traffic information is issued.

c. The distance between the runways or landing strips is in accordance with the minima in Table 3–92[1] (use the greater minimum if two categories are involved).

Table 3–92[1]
Same Direction Distance Minima

Aircraft category	*Minimum distance (feet) between parallel*	
	Runway centerlines	*Edges of adjacent strips or runway and strip*
Lightweight, single engine, propeller driven	300	200
Twin-engine, propeller driven	500	400
All others	700	600

3–93 SIMULTANEOUS OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPERATION

Authorize simultaneous opposite direction operations on parallel runways, on parallel landing strips, or on a runway and a parallel landing strip only when the following conditions are met:

a. Operations are conducted in VFR conditions.

b. Two-way radio communication is maintained with the aircraft involved and pertinent traffic information is issued.

Phraseology:

TRAFFIC (description) ARRIVING/DEPARTING/LOW APPROACH, OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON PARALLEL RUNWAY/LANDING STRIP.

c. The distance between the runways or landing strips is in accordance with the minima in Table 3–93[1].

Section 8. RADAR DEPARTURES

5–110 PROCEDURES

Use standard departure routes and channelized altitudes whenever practical to reduce coordination. Do not, however, assign these routes solely to provide for possible radar or communication failure.

5–111 INITIAL HEADING

Before departure, assign the initial heading to be flown if a departing aircraft is to be vectored immediately after takeoff.

Phraseology:

FLY RUNWAY HEADING.

TURN LEFT/RIGHT, HEADING (degrees).

5–111 Note.—*TERMINAL:* A purpose for the heading is not necessary, since pilots operating in a radar environment associate assigned headings with vectors to their planned route of flight.

5–111 Reference.—Departure Clearances, paragraph 4–31; Vectors Below Minimum Altitude, paragraph 5–92. .

5–112 VECTORS BELOW MINIMUM ALTITUDE

Except in en route automated environments in areas where more than 3 miles separation minima is required, you may vector a departing IFR aircraft, or one executing a missed approach, within 40 miles of the antenna and before it reaches the minimum altitude for IFR operations if separation from prominent obstructions shown on the radar scope is applied in accordance with the following:

a. If the flight path is 3 miles or more from the obstruction and the aircraft is climbing to an altitude at least 1,000 feet above the obstruction, vector the aircraft to maintain at least 3 miles separation from the obstruction until the aircraft reports leaving an altitude above the obstruction.

b. If the flight path is less than 3 miles from the obstruction, and the aircraft is climbing to an altitude at least 1,000 feet above the obstruction, vector the aircraft to increase lateral separation from the obstruction until the 3–mile minimum is achieved or until the aircraft reports leaving an altitude above the obstruction.

c. At those locations where diverse vector areas (DVA) have been established, terminal radar facilities may vector aircraft below the MVA/MIA within those areas and along those routes described in facility directives.

5–112c Reference.—FAA Order 7210.3, Establishing Diverse Vector Area/s (DVA), paragraph 3–104.

5–113 SUCCESSIVE OR SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURES

TERMINAL

Separate aircraft departing from the same airport/heliport or adjacent airports/heliports in accordance with the following minima provided radar identification with the aircraft will be established within 1 mile of the takeoff runway end/helipad and courses will diverge by 15 degrees or more.

5–113 Note 1.—Flight Procedures and Airspace FAA Order 8260.19, establishes guidelines for IFR departure turning procedures which assumes a climb to 400 feet above the airport elevation before a turn is commenced. FAA Order 8260.3, TERPS, the ILS missed approach criteria, requires a straight climb of 400 feet be specified where turns greater than 15 degrees are required.

5–113 Note 2.—Consider known aircraft performance characteristics when applying initial separation to successive departing aircraft.

5–113 Note 3.—When one or both of the departure surfaces is a helipad, use the takeoff course of the helicopter as a reference, comparable to the centerline of a runway and the helipad center as the threshold.

a. Between aircraft departing the same runway/helipad or parallel runways/helicopter takeoff courses separated by less than 2,500 feet—*1 mile* if courses diverge immediately after departure. (See Figure 5–113[1], Figure 5–113[2], and Figure 5–113[3]).



Figure 5–113[1]



Figure 5–113[2]



Figure 5–113[8]

5–114 DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL

TERMINAL

Except as provided in paragraph 5–115, separate a departing aircraft from an arriving aircraft on final approach by a minimum of *2 miles* if separation will increase to a minimum of 3 miles (5 miles when 40 miles or more from the antenna) within 1 minute after takeoff.

5–114 Note 1.—This procedure permits a departing aircraft to be released so long as an arriving aircraft is no closer than 2 miles from the runway at the time. This separation is determined at the time the departing aircraft commences takeoff roll.

5–114 Note 2.—Consider the effect surface conditions, such as ice, snow, and other precipitation may have on known aircraft performance characteristics, and the influence these conditions may have on the pilot's ability to commence takeoff roll in a timely manner.

5–115 DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS ON PARALLEL OR NONINTERSECTING DIVERGING RUNWAYS

TERMINAL

Authorize simultaneous operations between an aircraft departing on a runway and an aircraft on final approach to another parallel or nonintersecting diverging runway if the departure course diverges immediately by at least 30 degrees from the missed approach course until separation is applied and provided one of the following conditions are met:

5–115 Note.—When one or both of the takeoff/landing surfaces is a helipad, consider the helicopter takeoff course as the runway centerline and the helipad center as the threshold.

a. When parallel runway thresholds are even, the runway centerlines are at least 2,500 feet apart. (See Figure 5–115[1] and Figure 5–115[2]).



Figure 5–115[1]



Figure 5–115[2]

b. When parallel runway thresholds are staggered and:

1. The arriving aircraft is approaching the nearer runway—The centerlines are at least 1,000 feet apart and the landing thresholds are staggered at least 500 feet for each 100 feet less than 2,500 the centerlines are separated. (See Figure 5–115[3] and Figure 5–115[4]).



Figure 5–115[3]



Figure 5–115[4]

5–115b1 Note.—In the event of a missed approach by a heavy jet, apply the procedures in paragraph 3–108 or ensure that the heavy jet does not overtake an aircraft departing from the adjacent parallel runway.

2. The arriving aircraft is approaching the farther runway—The runway centerlines separation exceeds 2,500 feet by at least 100 feet for each 500 feet the landing thresholds are staggered. (See Figure 5–115[5]).

Memorandum

From: Air Traffic Control Facility Officer
To: Commander, CTW-1

Via: Operations Officer, CTW-1

Subj: AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS VFR/IFR RUNWAY OPERATIONS.

Encl: (1) Copy FAA 7110.65H, chapter 3, section 8
(2) Copy FAA 7110.65H, chapter 5, section 8

1. The basic runway configuration at NAS Meridian allows an amount of flexibility few other military or civilian airports can offer. Navy Meridian's three separate runways are ideal for handling the large volume of traffic associated with training commands.

2. The perfect configuration for a training environment would allow for departures on one runway with arrivals on a separate non-intersecting runway. Navy Meridian meets all FAA runway distance criteria to allow for simultaneous operations. In addition, the east/west runway is available to handle landings on runway 28 and departures on runway 10 when the wind conditions do not necessarily favor a straight north or south operation. NAS Meridian has the capability to safely handle the complex operational requirements a training command dictates.

3. Air Traffic Control regulations are very specific regarding the use and operation of runways. FAA Handbook 7110.65(series) is the primary source of information that addresses air traffic control procedures. Enclosures (1) and (2) are copies of the applicable pages that cover Navy Meridian's unique runway configuration and the rules that apply. McCain airfield was not designed by accident, it was a well conceived airport able to handle an exceptionally large volume of air traffic coupled with the best in aviation safety.

for D. J. Jensen ACCS(AW)

Section 8. SPACING AND SEQUENCING

3–90 SEQUENCE/SPACING APPLICATION

Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight or ground operation as necessary to achieve proper spacing.

Phraseology:

CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF.

CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF OR HOLD SHORT/HOLD IN POSITION/TAXI OFF THE RUNWAY (traffic).

EXTEND DOWNWIND.

MAKE SHORT APPROACH.

NUMBER (landing sequence number).

FOLLOW (description and location of traffic),

or if traffic is utilizing another runway,

TRAFFIC (description and location) LANDING RUNWAY (number of runway being used).

CIRCLE THE AIRPORT.

MAKE LEFT/RIGHT THREE-SIXTY/TWO SEVENTY.

GO AROUND.

CLEARED TO LAND.

CLEARED:

TOUCH-AND-GO,

or

STOP-AND-GO,

or

LOW APPROACH.

CLEARED FOR THE OPTION,

or

OPTION APPROVED,

or

UNABLE OPTION, (alternate instructions).

or

UNABLE (type of option), OTHER OPTIONS APPROVED.

3–90 Note 1.—The "Cleared for the Option" procedure will permit an instructor pilot/flight examiner/pilot the option to make a touch-and-go, low approach, missed approach, stop-and-go, or full stop landing. This procedure will only be used at those locations with an operational control tower and will be subject to ATC approval.

3–90 Note 2.—For proper helicopter spacing, speed adjustments may be more practical than course changes.

3–90 Note 3.– Read back of hold short instructions apply when hold instructions are issued to a pilot in lieu of a takeoff clearance.

3–90 Reference.—Expeditious Compliance, paragraph 2–5. Taxi and Ground Movement Operation, paragraph 3–81

3–91 TOUCH-AND-GO OR STOP-AND-GO OR LOW APPROACH

Consider an aircraft cleared for touch-and-go, stop-and-go, or low approach as an arriving aircraft until it touches down (for touch-and-go), or makes a complete stop (for stop-and-go), or crosses the landing threshold (for low approach), and thereafter as a departing aircraft.

3–91 Reference.—Vehicles/Equipment/Personnel on Runways, paragraph 3–5. Intersection Departure, paragraph 3–106.

3–92 SIMULTANEOUS SAME DIRECTION OPERATION

Authorize simultaneous, same direction operations on parallel runways, on parallel landing strips, or on a runway and a parallel landing strip only when the following conditions are met:

a. Operations are conducted in VFR conditions unless visual separation is applied.

b. Two-way radio communication is maintained with the aircraft involved and pertinent traffic information is issued.

c. The distance between the runways or landing strips is in accordance with the minima in Table 3–92[1] (use the greater minimum if two categories are involved).

Table 3–92[1]
Same Direction Distance Minima

Aircraft category	*Minimum distance (feet) between parallel*	
	Runway centerlines	*Edges of adjacent strips or runway and strip*
Lightweight, single engine, propeller driven	300	200
Twin-engine, propeller driven	500	400
All others	700	600

3–93 SIMULTANEOUS OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPERATION

Authorize simultaneous opposite direction operations on parallel runways, on parallel landing strips, or on a runway and a parallel landing strip only when the following conditions are met:

a. Operations are conducted in VFR conditions.

b. Two-way radio communication is maintained with the aircraft involved and pertinent traffic information is issued.

Phraseology:

TRAFFIC (description) ARRIVING/DEPARTING/LOW APPROACH, OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON PARALLEL RUNWAY/LANDING STRIP.

c. The distance between the runways or landing strips is in accordance with the minima in Table 3–93[1].

Section 8. RADAR DEPARTURES

5–110 PROCEDURES

Use standard departure routes and channelized altitudes whenever practical to reduce coordination. Do not, however, assign these routes solely to provide for possible radar or communication failure.

5–111 INITIAL HEADING

Before departure, assign the initial heading to be flown if a departing aircraft is to be vectored immediately after takeoff.

Phraseology:

FLY RUNWAY HEADING.

TURN LEFT/RIGHT, HEADING (degrees).

5–111 Note.—*TERMINAL:* A purpose for the heading is not necessary, since pilots operating in a radar environment associate assigned headings with vectors to their planned route of flight.

5–111 Reference.—Departure Clearances, paragraph 4–31; Vectors Below Minimum Altitude, paragraph 5–92. .

5–112 VECTORS BELOW MINIMUM ALTITUDE

Except in en route automated environments in areas where more than 3 miles separation minima is required, you may vector a departing IFR aircraft, or one executing a missed approach, within 40 miles of the antenna and before it reaches the minimum altitude for IFR operations if separation from prominent obstructions shown on the radar scope is applied in accordance with the following:

a. If the flight path is 3 miles or more from the obstruction and the aircraft is climbing to an altitude at least 1,000 feet above the obstruction, vector the aircraft to maintain at least 3 miles separation from the obstruction until the aircraft reports leaving an altitude above the obstruction.

b. If the flight path is less than 3 miles from the obstruction, and the aircraft is climbing to an altitude at least 1,000 feet above the obstruction, vector the aircraft to increase lateral separation from the obstruction until the 3–mile minimum is achieved or until the aircraft reports leaving an altitude above the obstruction.

c. At those locations where diverse vector areas (DVA) have been established, terminal radar facilities may vector aircraft below the MVA/MIA within those areas and along those routes described in facility directives.

5–112c Reference.—FAA Order 7210.3, Establishing Diverse Vector Area/s (DVA), paragraph 3–104.

5–113 SUCCESSIVE OR SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURES

TERMINAL

Separate aircraft departing from the same airport/heliport or adjacent airports/heliports in accordance with the following minima provided radar identification with the aircraft will be established within 1 mile of the takeoff runway end/helipad and courses will diverge by 15 degrees or more.

5–113 Note 1.—Flight Procedures and Airspace FAA Order 8260.19, establishes guidelines for IFR departure turning procedures which assumes a climb to 400 feet above the airport elevation before a turn is commenced. FAA Order 8260.3, TERPS, the ILS missed approach criteria, requires a straight climb of 400 feet be specified where turns greater than 15 degrees are required.

5–113 Note 2.—Consider known aircraft performance characteristics when applying initial separation to successive departing aircraft.

5–113 Note 3.—When one or both of the departure surfaces is a helipad, use the takeoff course of the helicopter as a reference, comparable to the centerline of a runway and the helipad center as the threshold.

a. Between aircraft departing the same runway/helipad or parallel runways/helicopter takeoff courses separated by less than 2,500 feet—*1 mile* if courses diverge immediately after departure. (See Figure 5–113[1], Figure 5–113[2], and Figure 5–113[3]).



Figure 5–113[1]



Figure 5–113[2]



Figure 5–113[8]

5–114 DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL

TERMINAL

Except as provided in paragraph 5–115, separate a departing aircraft from an arriving aircraft on final approach by a minimum of *2 miles* if separation will increase to a minimum of 3 miles (5 miles when 40 miles or more from the antenna) within 1 minute after takeoff.

5–114 Note 1.—This procedure permits a departing aircraft to be released so long as an arriving aircraft is no closer than 2 miles from the runway at the time. This separation is determined at the time the departing aircraft commences takeoff roll.

5–114 Note 2.—Consider the effect surface conditions, such as ice, snow, and other precipitation may have on known aircraft performance characteristics, and the influence these conditions may have on the pilot's ability to commence takeoff roll in a timely manner.

5–115 DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS ON PARALLEL OR NONINTERSECTING DIVERGING RUNWAYS

TERMINAL

Authorize simultaneous operations between an aircraft departing on a runway and an aircraft on final approach to another parallel or nonintersecting diverging runway if the departure course diverges immediately by at least 30 degrees from the missed approach course until separation is applied and provided one of the following conditions are met:

5–115 Note.—When one or both of the takeoff/landing surfaces is a helipad, consider the helicopter takeoff course as the runway centerline and the helipad center as the threshold.

a. When parallel runway thresholds are even, the runway centerlines are at least 2,500 feet apart. (See Figure 5–115[1] and Figure 5–115[2]).



Figure 5–115[1]



Figure 5–115[2]

b. When parallel runway thresholds are staggered and:

1. The arriving aircraft is approaching the nearer runway—The centerlines are at least 1,000 feet apart and the landing thresholds are staggered at least 500 feet for each 100 feet less than 2,500 the centerlines are separated. (See Figure 5–115[3] and Figure 5–115[4]).



Figure 5–115[3]



Figure 5–115[4]

5–115b1 Note.—In the event of a missed approach by a heavy jet, apply the procedures in paragraph 3–108 or ensure that the heavy jet does not overtake an aircraft departing from the adjacent parallel runway.

2. The arriving aircraft is approaching the farther runway—The runway centerlines separation exceeds 2,500 feet by at least 100 feet for each 500 feet the landing thresholds are staggered. (See Figure 5–115[5]).

Commander Training Air Wing One

DATE: 21 MAR 95

FROM: CAPT Terry Pudas

NUMBER OF PAGES: 2

OFFICE CODE: 00

TO: LTCOL JIM BRUBAKER

FAX PHONE #: COM 601-679-2967 DSN 637-2967

OFFICE CODE:

OFFICE PHONE: 601-679-2148 DSN 637-2148

FAX PHONE #: 703-696-0550

VOICE PHONE #: 703-696-0504

Offic (X2498)

MRS. HYMAN

READINESS FOR VICTORY AT SEA

1

TRAINING

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Jim,

Here is proposed visit itinerary for General Robles.

CAPT Pudas

PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR BRAC COMMISSIONER VISIT 3 APRIL 1995

1100	ARRIVE NAS MERIDIAN
1105-1115	MEDIA AVAILABILITY (BASE OPS LOBBY)
1120-1200	COMMAND BRIEF/PRESENTATION
	COMTRAWING ONE CONFERENCE ROOM (HANGAR)
1205-1230	WINDSHIELD TOUR EN ROUTE LAKESIDE CLUB FOR LUNCH
1230-1330	WORKING LUNCH/15 MINUTE COMMUNITY PRESENTATION
1335-1400	WINDSHIELD TOUR EN ROUTE NTTC (HOUSING AREA/MAINSIDE)
1400-1430	OVERVIEW/TOUR NTTC
1435-1505	OVERVIEW/TOUR RCTA
1505-1515	EN ROUTE CENTROID
1515-1600	AERIAL TOUR OF NAS OUTLYING FACILITIES
1615	DEPART

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: MARCH 27, 1995

TO: CAPT TERRY PUDOS

FAX #: (601) 679-2967

FROM: Navy Team, LTCOL J.R. BRUBAKER
DSN: 226-0504
comm 703-696-0504 ext #188 FAX (703) 696-055

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover):

COMMENTS: SIR,

WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK OVER THE ATTACHED FACT SHEET FOR MERIDIAN. I REALIZE THAT ALL THE NUMBERS ~~KNOWN~~ MAY NOT BE 100% ACCURATE. THIS IS INTENDED AS A SNAPSHOT OF MERIDIAN FOR GEN. ROBLES. ANYTHING THAT YOU THINK COULD BE ADDED? ANY OTHER KEY PEOPLE BESIDES YOURSELF, ie LOCAL OFFICIALS THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE MERIDIAN PRESENTATION.

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE RECEIVING THIS FAX PLEASE CALL 703-696-0504.

RESPECTFULLY,

BRU

USAF BASE FACT SHEET
BERGSTROM AIR RESERVE STATION, TEXAS

MAJCOM/LOCATION/SIZE: AFR station seven miles southeast of Austin with 4,073 acres

MAJOR UNITS/FORCE STRUCTURE:

- 10th Air Force
- 924th Fighter Wing
  -- 15 F-16C/D

USAF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS: (As of FY 95/2)

MILITARY--ACTIVE	13
RESERVE	1,189
CIVILIAN	334
TOTAL	**1,536**

ANNOUNCED ACTIONS:

- The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission directed that 924th Fighter Wing and its F-16 aircraft to remain at Bergstrom ARS until at least the end of 1996.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM ($000):

FISCAL YEAR 94:

Alter Administrative Facility for Cantonment (Base Closure)*	800
Alter Liquid Oxygen/Paint Booth (Base Closure)*	550
TOTAL	**1,350**

FISCAL YEAR 95:

Munitions Complex (Base Closure)*	2,100
Alter Base Operations (Base Closure)*	580
Add/Alter Base Engineering Complex (Base Closure)*	2,000
Add/Alter Maintenance Shops (Base Closure)*	2,900
TOTAL	**7,580**

* Projects forecast for funding by the Base Closure Account. Associated with the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommendation to realign Bergstrom AFB.

SIGNIFICANT INSTALLATION ISSUES/PROBLEMS: None

Basing Manager: Mr DiCamillo/XOOB/53019
Editor: Ms Wright/XOOBD/46675/1 Mar 95

IS THERE A TYPE OF FLIGHT TRAINING CONDUCTED AT THE AIR STATION THAT IS NOT PRESENTLY CONDUCTED ANYWHERE ELSE.

7. MISSION: Do not simply report the standard mission statement. Instead, describe important functions in a bulletized format. Include anticipated mission changes and brief narrative explanation of change; also indicate if any current/projected mission changes are a result of previous BRAC-88, -91,-93 action(s).

Current Missions

- **Maintain and operate facilities.**

- **Provide services and material to support operations of aviation activities of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.**

- **Major aviation training commands supported include:**

  - Commander, Training Air Wing ONE (CTW-1)

    Administers, coordinates, and supervises flight and associated academic training and support programs conducted by NAS Meridian, Training Squadron NINETEEN and Training Squadron SEVEN.

    Trains Navy, Marine Corps and international student aviators in Intermediate and Advanced Strike curriculum employing the T-2C Buckeye and TA-4J Skyhawk aircraft.

    Foreign Military Pilot Training includes strike students from Argentina, France, Italy, Kuwait, Singapore and Spain.

  - Training Squadron NINETEEN (VT-19)

    Intermediate Strike Pilot Training

    Curriculum stages include: basic instruments, radio instruments, airways navigation, familiarization, out of control, formation, night familiarization, air-to-air gunnery and carrier qualification.

  - Training Squadron SEVEN (VT-7)

    Advanced Strike Pilot Training

    Curriculum stages include: basic instruments, radio instruments, airways navigation, familiarization, basic formation, night familiarization/formation, tactical formation, operational navigation, air-to-ground weapons, air combat maneuvering and carrier qualifications.

NASMER IS THE ONLY AIR STATION PROVIDING FOREIGN MILITARY STRIKE TRAINING. ALSO ONLY BASE PROVIDING TA-4 TRAINING

March 28, 1995

Memorandum

From: LtCol J.R. Brubaker

To: Capt Terry Pudos

Subj.: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)

Sir, the following personnel from the DBCRC will be attending the NAS Meridian base visit scheduled for Monday 3 April 1995:

Alex Yellin	Navy Team Leader	Arrive 1300, 2 Apr 95
LtCol James R. Brubaker	DoD Analyst/USMC	Arrive 1300, 2 Apr 95
LtCol Merrill Beyer	DoD Analyst/USAF	Arrive 1800, 2 Apr 95
Mark Pross	Senior Analyst/GAO	Arrive 1800, 2 Apr 95
Elizabeth King	Legal Counsel	Arrive 1800, 31 Mar 95

This information is current as of 8:00AM on this date and will be updated as information becomes available.

BRU

Commander Training Air Wing One

DATE: 28 MAR 95

FROM: CAPT PUDAS
NUMBER OF PAGES: 4

OFFICE CODE:
TO: LtCol BRUBAKER

FAX PHONE #: 601-679-2967
OFFICE CODE:

OFFICE PHONE: 601-679-2148
FAX PHONE #: 703-696-0550

VOICE PHONE #: 703-696-0504

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
ADDT'L
POCs: CDR CRAMER
BEV HEIMANN

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI (MCCAIN FIELD)

Mission:

* To maintain and operate facilities and to provide services and material to support operations of aviation activities and units of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities and units designated by the CNO. Designed specifically for jet pilot training, contains two staggered 8000 foot runways and one 6400 foot crosswind runway. Includes NOLF Joe Williams Field, 19 miles northwest of NAS Meridian which is also 8000 feet long and SEARAY air-to-ground target complex 31 miles to the north. Under an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), CTW-1 and 14th FTW Columbus AFB jointly use OLF GUNSHY located 20 miles northeast.

Where:

* 14 miles northeast of the City of Meridian (population 50,000) on Highway 39N. Meridian, MS is 165 miles southeast of Memphis, TN and 125 miles north of Mobile, AL.

Major Units:

* Training Air Wing 1 (CTW-1); Training Squadrons 7, 19 and 23 (VT-7, VT-19, VT-23); Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC); Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG); and Regional Counterdrug Training Academy.
    * CTW-1: Immediate superior in command to the Commanding Officer of the naval air station, training squadrons, and other facilities as may be placed under his cognizance. Administers, coordinates, and supervises flight and academic training and support conducted by three subordinate squadrons as directed by the Chief of Naval Air Training.
    * VT-7: Advanced Strike Training flying the TA-4J Skyhawk (74 aircraft).
    * VT-19/VT-23: Intermediate Strike Training flying the T-2C Buckeye (83 aircraft).
    * NTTC: Navy's primary training facility for enlisted administrative and supply class "A" schools, which are for personnel enroute to their first command after completing recruit training. Advanced schools include Yeoman "C" Flagwriter and Religious Program Specialist.
    * MATSG: Provides all similar Marine Corps training in supply, administrative, and related ratings.

Environmental/Encroachment Issues:

* Meridian has no major environmental issues. Evaluated sites have not been listed on the National Priorities List. There are no existing or anticipated encroachment issues. There are existing AICUZ ordnances in place at both the main installation and the Navy owned outlying field.

Population:

* 1,800 active duty; 1,200 family members; 1,400 civilians, which include both DON employees and civilian contract aircraft maintenance employees.

Housing:

* 144 officer family units; 376 enlisted family units; 121 BOQ spaces; 2056 BEQ spaces.

Temporary Lodging:

* 6 distinguished visitor units; 49 visiting officer units; 34 visiting enlisted units; 28 temporary lodging facilities.

Commissary/Exchange Mall Complex:

* Contains separate Navy Exchange Retail Store, Commissary, Laundry/Dry Cleaners, Uniform Store, Banking Facility, Barber/Beauty Shop, McDonald's Restaurant, Movie Theater and Bowling Alley.

Schools:

* In Meridian and Lauderdale County school districts. Enrollment currently below capacity. Five institutions of higher learning. Undergraduate and Graduate courses are available on-site and in the local community.

Health Care:

* Clinic only. Closet naval hospital is Pensacola Naval Hospital (150 air miles). The community of Meridian serves as a regional medical hub for eastern Mississippi and western Alabama. There are 3 major hospitals located in the City of Meridian.

Community Support:

* NAS Meridian is Lauderdale County's largest employer.

Key Personnel and Phone Numbers:

* Mayor of Meridian:
  John Robert Smith 601-485-1927

* President, Meridian City Council:
  Dr. George Thomas 601-483-8502

* President, Lauderdale County Board of Supervisors:
  Dr. Hobert Kornegay 601-482-9746

* Meridian/Lauderdale County Partnership:
  R. Tucson Roberts 601-693-1306

* Navy Meridian Team Leader:
  Bill Crawford 601-484-7725

* Meridian Area Navy League President:
  C. D. Smith 601-693-8917

Military Personnel and Phone Numbers:

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
SUSAN JUNKINS

* Commander Training Air Wing ONE
  Captain Terry J. Pudas 601-679-2148/2193

* Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Meridian
  Captain Robert L. Leitzel 601-679-2111/2112

* Commanding Officer, Naval Technical Training Center
  Commander Melinda L. Moran 601-679-2161

740 FLETCHER RD, SUITE 100 MERIDIAN MS. 39309-5040

* Commanding Officer, Marine Aviation Training Support Group
  Major Edwin L. Koehler 601-679-2190

* Commandant Regional Counterdrug Training Academy
  Colonel Stephen L. Goff 601-679-2063

DIRECTOR
RCDTA
3000 FALCON RD
MERIDIAN, MS. 39309-5020

740 FLETCHER RD
SUITE 209
MERIDIAN, MS. 39309-5054

Commander Training Air Wing One

DATE: 10 APR 95

FROM: CAPT. PODAS

NUMBER OF PAGES: 2 WITH COVER

OFFICE CODE: 00

TO: LTCOL BRUBAKER

FAX PHONE #: AV. 637-2967

OFFICE CODE: _____

OFFICE PHONE: _____

FAX PHONE #: 1-703-696-0550

VOICE PHONE #: _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

ADDRESS FOR CAPT. PUDAS

COMMANDER
TRAINING AIR WING ONE
101 FULLER, RD. SUITE 250
MERIDIAN, MS. 39039-5403

ADDRESS FOR CAPT. LEITZEL

COMMANDING OFFICER
NAVAL AIR STATION
1155 ROSENBAUM, AVE. SUITE 13
MERIDIAN, MS. 39309-5003

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER TRAINING AIR WING ONE
101 FULLER ROAD SUITE 250
MERIDIAN MS 39309-5403

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5050
00000
7 Jun 95
Rev #1

MEMORANDUM

From: Commander, Training Air Wing ONE
To: Distribution

Subj: DISTINGUISHED GUEST VISIT

Ref: (a) COMTRAWINGONEINST 5050.1C

Encl: (1) Schedule of Events/Attendees
(2) VIP Staff Personnel
(3) CTW-1 Aerial Tour C-12
(4) Ground Transportation Plan
(5) Luncheon Attendees/Seating

1. Per reference (a), the following information is promulgated:

a. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)
Al Cornella, Commissioner
Wendi L. Steele, Commissioner
Charles C. Smith

The Honorable Kirk Fordice
Governor, State of Mississippi

The Honorable G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Congressman
State of Mississippi, 3rd Congressional District

Rear Admiral W. B. Hayden
Chief of Naval Air Training

The Honorable Eddie Briggs
Lieutenant Governor, State of Mississippi

b. Date of visit: 8 Jun 95

c. Method, place, and time of arrival:

Commissioners, Mr. Charles C. Smith, Congressman Montgomery, CAPT Pudas, LtCol Brubaker: C-12, Base Ops, 1200

Governor Fordice, Lt Governor Briggs & Staff: Lear Jet, Base Ops, 1130

RADM Hayden: T-45, Base Ops, 1030

d. Method, place, and time of departure:

Commissioners and staff: C-26, Base Ops, 1630

Governor Fordice, Lt Governor Briggs & Staff: Lear Jet, Base Ops, 1445

Congressman Montgomery: POV, Base Ops, 1630

RADM Hayden: T-45, Base Ops, 1700

e. Purpose of visit: Defense Base Closure and Realignment

f. Itinerary: See enclosure (1)
Additional staff visitors are listed in enclosure (2)

g. Visit coordinator/host and phone number:

CDR Cramer, DSN 637-2193, Commercial (601) 679-2193
CDR Ingram, DSN 637-2112, Commercial (601) 679-2112

h. Plan of the Day: Normal work day

i. Request NAS Meridian provide the following services:

(1) Welcome Aboard Announcement:

(a) Main Gate: Yes

(b) Air Operations: Yes

(2) Parking/Crowd Control: Coordinate with Partnership

- Security plan
- Designated parking areas
- Overflow designated parking areas

(3) Transportation:

Vans: 3 minivans/1 maxivans (all with VIP plates)
Sedan: 1 sedan with one star plate
Courtesy Cars: Coordinate with Partnership
Pre stage at South end of Hangar

Subj: DISTINGUISHED GUEST VISIT

(4) Lakeside Club:

(a) CTW-1 Briefing - fruit/cookies, coffee/ice tea with setups by 1130
Number attending: 20 (CTW-1 Conf Rm)

(b) Luncheon: See enclosure (5)

(5) Uniform: Summer White

(6) PAO:

(a) Coordinate press coverage of Commissioner's arrival

(b) Coordinate press conferences (Lobby of Base Operations)

2. Other specific guidance: On 8 June, all activities minimize shipment arrivals/travel on station during the hours of 1145-1330.

T. J. PUDAS

Distribution:
COMTRAWING ONE
CO, NAS Meridian
CO, TRARON SEVEN
CO, TRARON NINETEEN
CO, TRARON TWENTY-THREE
CO, NTTC
CO, RCTA
Wing CMC
Wing OPS
Wing Maintenance
Wing Administration
NAS CDO
NAS PWO
NAS Security
NAS PAO
NAS MWR/Lakeside Club
NAS OPS

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS/ATTENDEES
8 JUN 95

1130	**DEPART COLUMBUS AFB VIA C-12 FOR AERIAL TOUR EN ROUTE NAS MERIDIAN** (SEE ENCLOSURE (3)) COMMISSIONERS, MR. CHARLES SMITH, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, CAPT PUDAS (COMTRAWING ONE), LTCOL BRUBAKER
1200	**ARRIVE NAS MERIDIAN** MET BY CAPTAIN LEITZEL (CO NASMER), STATE/LOCAL LEADERS, OTHERS TBD (PRESS COVERAGE ONLY) DEPART VIA GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO COMTRAWING ONE CONFERENCE ROOM (SEE ENCLOSURE (4))
1210	**COMMAND BRIEF/PRESENTATION** COMTRAWING ONE CONFERENCE ROOM (HANGAR) COMMISSIONERS, MR. CHARLES SMITH, GOVERNOR FORDICE, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, RADM HAYDEN, LT GOVERNOR BRIGGS, CTW-1, CO NASMER, MR. KUGLER, LTCOL BRUBAKER, OTHERS TBD
	TOUR OF BASE OPERATIONS/SIMULATOR FACILITY AVAILABLE FOR OTHER DIGNITARIES AND STAFF MEMBERS (POC LCDR GONZALES)
1220	**COMMUNITY SUPPORTERS IN PLACE ALONG MOTORCADE ROUTE**
1250	**WINDSHIELD TOUR CENTROID AREA EN ROUTE LAKESIDE CLUB** (SEE ENCLOSURE (4)) MOTORCADE ALONG ROUTE LINED WITH SUPPORTERS
1330	**LUNCH AT LAKESIDE CLUB** (SEE ENCLOSURE (5))
1420	**DEPART LAKESIDE CLUB/WINDSHIELD TOUR OF MAINSIDE AND BASE HOUSING EN ROUTE NTTC** (SEE ENCLOSURE (4))
	**GOVERNOR FORDICE, LT GOVERNOR BRIGGS AND PARTY DEPART EN ROUTE BASE OPERATIONS. 1430 PRESS CONFERENCE AT BASE OPERATIONS WITH GOVERNOR FORDICE AND LT GOVERNOR BRIGGS. DEPART VIA LEAR JET AT 1445.
1435	**NTTC BRIEF/TOUR** COMMISSIONERS, MR. CHARLES C. SMITH, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, RADM HAYDEN, CDR MORAN, CTW-1, CO NASMER, MR. KUGLER, LTCOL BRUBAKER, OTHERS TBD

1455	**DEPART NTTC EN ROUTE RCTA** (SEE ENCLOSURE (4))
1500	**REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG TRAINING ACADEMY BRIEF/TOUR** COMMISSIONERS, MR. CHARLES SMITH, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, RADM HAYDEN, COLONEL GOFF, CTW-1, CO NASMER, MR. KUGLER, LTCOL BRUBAKER, OTHERS TBD
1525	**DEPART RCTA EN ROUTE CTW-1** (SEE ENCLOSURE (4))
1530	**COMMUNITY PRESENTATION (CTW-1 COMMAND SUITE)** COMMISSIONERS, MR. CHARLES C. SMITH, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, RADM HAYDEN, CTW-1, CO NASMER, MR. KUGLER, LTCOL BRUBAKER, COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TBD
1615	**MEDIA AVAILABILITY (BASE OPERATIONS)** COMMISSIONER STEELE, COMMISSIONER CORNELLA AND CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
1630	**COMMISSIONERS DEPART BASE OPERATIONS VIA C-26**

VIP STAFF PERSONNEL

DBCRC STAFF

			ARRIVAL	DEPARTURE
8 JUN	LTCOL BRUBAKER	DOD ANALYST/USMC	PM, 7 JUN	1630, 8 JUN

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

TBD	SENATOR LOTT'S OFFICE
MR. MITCH KUGLER	SENATOR COCHRAN'S OFFICE
MR. KYLE STEWARD	CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY'S OFFICE

*GOVERNOR, LT GOVERNOR AND STAFF WILL ARRIVE BASE OPERATIONS 8 JUN 1150 BY KING AIR AIRCRAFT/DEPART BASE OPERATIONS 8 JUN 1400 BY KING AIR

GOVERNOR KIRK FORDICE	STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
LT GOVERNOR EDDIE BRIGGS	STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
MR. JIMMY HEIDEL	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (DECD)
COL NICK ARDILLO (RET)	DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
MR. JODY TIDWELL	LT GOVERNOR'S STAFF
TBD	STATE PILOT
TBD	SECURITY

CTW-1 AERIAL TOUR - C-12



ENCLOSURE (3)

GROUND TRANSPORTATION PLAN

1210 **DEPART BASE OPERATIONS FOR COMTRAWING ONE BRIEFING**

MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- CAPT PUDAS
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- COMMISSIONER STEELE
		- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
		- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
		- RADM HAYDEN
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- GOVERNOR FORDICE
		- LT GOVERNOR BRIGGS
		- MR. KUGLER
		- OTHERS TBD
MINIVAN#2	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
	PASSENGERS	- TBD
		-
		-
		-
		-

TOUR OF BASE OPERATIONS/SIMULATOR FACILITY AVAILABLE
(POC LCDR GONZALES)

1250 **DEPART CENTROID AREA TO LAKESIDE CLUB**
VEHICLES POSITIONED AT SOUTH END OF HANGAR (MOTORCADE)

VEHICLE #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
		- RADM HAYDEN
VEHICLE #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- COMMISSIONER STEELE
		- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
		- GOVERNOR FORDICE
		- LT GOVERNOR BRIGGS
MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. KUGLER
		- MR. STEWARD
		- MR. HEIDEL
		- MR. ARDILLO
		- MR. TIDWELL
		- STATE SECURITY

	VEHICLE #3	DRIVER	- LCDR KAY
		PASSENGERS	- MAYOR SMITH
			- DR. KORNEGAY
			- MR. VANDEVENDER
			-
	MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
		PASSENGERS	- MRS. NORMA BOURDEAUX
			- MR. AL ROSENBAUM
			- MR. C. D. SMITH
			- MR. GREG ROBINSON
	MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- LCDR DOWTY
		PASSENGERS	- MR. BILL CRAWFORD
			- MS. BARBARA HENSON
			- MR. HARDY GRAHAM
			-
1420	**DEPART LAKESIDE CLUB/WINDSHIELD EN ROUTE TO NTTC**		
	MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
		PASSENGERS	- CAPT PUDAS
			- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
			- COMMISSIONER STEELE
			- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
			- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
			- RADM HAYDEN
			- LTCOL BRUBAKER
	MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
		PASSENGERS	- MR. KUGLER
			- MR. STEWARD
			- OTHERS TBD
	MINIVAN#2	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
		PASSENGERS	- OTHERS TBD
			-
			-
			-
			-
1455	**DEPART NTTC EN ROUTE RCTA**		
	MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
		PASSENGERS	- CAPT PUDAS
			- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
			- COMMISSIONER STEELE
			- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
			- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
			- RADM HAYDEN
			- LTCOL BRUBAKER

	MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
		PASSENGERS	- MR. KUGLER
			- MR. STEWARD
			- OTHERS TBD
	MINIVAN#2	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
		PASSENGERS	- OTHERS TBD
			-
			-
			-
			-

1525 DEPART RCTA EN ROUTE CTW-1 COMMAND SUITE

MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- CAPT PUDAS
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- COMMISSIONER STEELE
		- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
		- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
		- RADM HAYDEN
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- MR. KUGLER
		- MR. STEWARD
		- OTHERS TBD
		-
MINIVAN#2	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
	PASSENGERS	- OTHERS TBD
		-
		-
		-
		-

1610 DEPART CTW-1 FOR BASE OPERATIONS

MAXIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- CAPT PUDAS
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- COMMISSIONER STEELE
		- COMMISSIONER CORNELLA
		- MR. CHARLES C. SMITH
		- RADM HAYDEN
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- MR. KUGLER
		- MR. STEWARD
		- OTHERS TBD
		-

MINIVAN#2	DRIVER	-	MAJOR MACDOUGALL
	PASSENGERS	-	OTHERS TBD
		-	
		-	
		-	
		-	

DBCRC LUNCHEON 08 JUN 95 (CHANGE 2)

MR
CHARLES
SMITH

MAYOR
JOHN ROBERT
SMITH

REPRESENTATIVE
NORMA
BOURDEAUX

COMMISSIONER
WENDI
STEELE

CONGRESSMAN
SONNY
MONTGOMERY

COMMISSIONER
AL
CORNELLA

MR.
HARDY
GRAHAM

MR.
JIMMY
HEIDEL

MR.
AL
ROSENBAUM

DR
HOBERT
KORNEGAY



MR.
C. D.
SMITH

MR.
BILL
CRAWFORD

MR.
ROY
VANDEVENDER

CAPT
ROBERT
LEITZEL

MR.
MITCH
KUGLER

GOV
KIRK
FORDICE

CAPT
TERRY
PUDAS

LT GOV
EDDIE
BRIGGS

RADM
BILL
HAYDEN

LT COL
JIM
BRUBAKER

WEST WINDOW VIEW

ENCLOSURE (5)

JUNE 1995

Navy has enough capacity in the West Florida complex (NAS Pensacola + NAS Whiting Field) to support the following training

FY 2001 Flight Ops requirement (fixed wing training)

- Adv Maritime	177,568
- Adv E2/C2	24,624
- Primary, Int, Adv NFO	176,438
- Primary Pilot	826,272
- Int Maritime	15,340
- Int Helo	32,045
- [redacted] Total	1,252,287
+20% surge	250,457
Total	1,502,744

Capacity for fixed-wing training

NAS Pensacola	186,401
NAS Whiting Field	283,902
Fixed-wing OLFs	1,737,491
Total:	2,207,794

JUNE 1995

PILOT TRAINING RATE (PTR) AND THE BUDGET

The requirement for student pilots depends on force levels in the fleet and is also impacted by numerous variables (student attrition rate, weather delays, availability of a CV for carquals, number of aircraft and instructors assigned, are just some examples).

Planning for the PTR starts in the POM more than two years prior to the execution year and once the POM leaves Navy for OSD the PTR for the first year in the POM cannot be changed. When the planned and budgeted PTR finally reaches the execution point the required number will have probably changed. Then, PTR changes and management decisions are made to correct for the requirement changes, and, again, these are incorporated in the PTR plan for the POM two years hence.

N889 determines the PTR (by CNO direction) for each POM and for each program review (PR) year (the odd years). They use a computer model and methodology which is universally accepted and their PTR is validated by N80, N81, N82 (NAVCOMPT), the Navy Audit Service, and OSD.

The PTR for next year, 1996, was planned in 1994 as POM 96. At that time there still were pools of students waiting to start training at every stage of the flight training program. These pools were caused by downsizing from 15 to 10 carrier air wings and to a lesser extent by variables such as mentioned above. N889, which had been setting the PTR artificially low each year to correct for the pools of students, decided to set 336 as the strike PTR for 1996 and out years, matching the planned force levels known at that time.

The 1996 budget for 336 PTR is now in the Congress and the '97 program review, also for 336, is in the OSD for approval. Neither can be changed by the Navy.

On 10 May a new PTR of 360 was established by N889 and approved by CNO for 1998 and out. It was based on the following changes:

4 additional EA-6B squadrons to assume the Air Force EF-111 mission. To be funded in 1996 by reprogramming.

6 additional F/A-18 squadrons to meet force level requirements (3 squadrons funded in PR 97 and the rest in POM 98)

The strike PTR of 360 was established based upon the new squadrons, but it was also decided to move E-2/C-2 training from Pensacola to Kingsville and therefore into the strike phase. The E-2/C-2 syllabus will add 36 pilots per year to the strike phase, but they will fly a syllabus only about one half the size of the regular strike phase. Therefore, they will add the equivalent of 18-22 PTR.

That equates to a total strike PTR of 378-382, however, a management decision to hold the PTR at 360 was made to avoid having to buy more simulators and other supporting equipment. In addition the RAGs are capable of processing only about 360 students per year. Therefore, 360 seemed to be the right number. It should be noted that there is a pilot shortage in the fleet today, especially in the F/A-18 community (which is building up not downsizing). Therefore, even is some of the planned new squadrons do not materialize the required PTR will not drop below 360.

I hope the above is helpful in understanding the difficulty of setting an accurate PTR two years ahead of the execution year and why it is impossible for the PTR of 360 in 1998 and out years to be funded in this years budget.

FROM 1993 ROUND
JR Burleigh

Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters, and Budget Branch (APP)

TO: Col Brinkley

OFFICE/CODE: _____

PHONE: FAX: 696-0550

FROM: Capt French

OFFICE/CODE: APP-41

PHONE: DSN: 224-2187

Number of Pages: 5
(including cover sheet)

Base Comparative Analysis
Category - Training Air Stations

MAJOR ISSUES	MERIDIAN	KINGSVILLE	PENSACOLA	WHITING	CORPUS
Military Value (Community)	(76.70)	82.41	77.03	72.64	76.85
Mission	Strike	Strike	NFO/E2/C2	Helo Primary	Maritime Primary
Capacity (Students/yr)	195 (CORRECTED 175) (WP) 405	210 (313) 528	102 (Strike) 110 (E2/C2)	456	1550 (1291)
Training Requirement (PTR)	384 Strike (1998) 95% (76%)		110 52% PILOT	517 33%	866 56% (67%)
Expansion Potential	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Minimal
Encroachment	No	No	No	Military Airspace	No
Airspace/Range Availability	Good	Excellent	Good	Excellent	Excellent
WEATHER	17.8% LOST	7%			16% LOST

FUNDED PTR 414

W/O CHASE 5%

W/ CHASE 24%

HP = 24 DM = 3

520

574 + 292 MAR

40% PR

- FOCUS ON MER/KINGS - STRIKE
  CORPUS - MAR + PRIM

BUT 2 ARE TRNG BASES NEEDED

Use all available training

TRAINING AIR STATION COBRA COMPARISON

($ million)

Scenario	One Time Costs	Steady State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
DoD Recommendation: CLOSE MERIDIAN/MEMPHIS.	28.81	8.22	2 Years	46.16
1. CLOSE MERIDIAN ONLY.	39.01	3.23	Immediate	24.73
2. OPEN MERIDIAN. • Close Corpus (depot stays).	50.07	2.18	Immediate	20.89

MERIDIAN - NOT TRNG A.S.
RES AIR-CARS
NTTC - NAS

PILOT TRAINING RATE CAPACITY AND REQUIREMENTS

CAPACITY	STRIKE	E2/C2	MARITIME	HELO	PILOT PRIMARY
CORPUS CHRISTI			791		759 (500)[1]
KINGSVILLE	210 (313)[1] 405				
MERIDIAN	508 195 (251)[2]				1600
PENSACOLA	102[3] 353	110			
WHITING					
1998 CNO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS	384	57	292	520	1435

NOTES

[1]Estimated capacity assuming Chase Field is used as an OLF.
[2]Estimated capacity assuming OLF Alpha (Air Force owned) is used 7.5 hours per day throughout the year.
[3]CNATRA estimate.

PILOT TRAINING RATES (Funded)

Bush budget draft

YEAR	PRIMARY	STRIKE	MARITIME	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
1993	1251	330 (259)	270 (234)	43 (43)	534 (486)	1177 (1022)
1994	1143	321 (309)	271 (261)	43 (42)	502 (480)	1137 (1092)
1995	1171	313 (356)	270 (264)	43 (49)	495 (497)	1121 (1166)
1996	1293	309 (357)	268 (275)	43 (52)	495 (510)	1115 (1194)
1997	1319	384 (241)	292 (209)	57 (34)	520 (374)	1253 (858)
1998	1435	384 (372)	292 (286)	57 (56)	520 (544)	1253 (1258)

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2184 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2403
(202) 225-5031

COMMITTEES:
ETERANS' AFFAIRS
JKING MINORITY MEMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

DISTRICT OFFICES
2100 NINTH ST. ROOM 3C2
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(601) 693-6681

2080 AIRPORT ROAD, SUITE D
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
(601) 327-2766

110-D AIRPORT ROAD
PEARL, MS 39208
(601) 932-2410

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

May 30, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman,
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Navy BSAT's claim that strike training can be single sited at NAS Kingsville, thereby allowing NAS Meridian to be closed, is flawed. Our team analyzed the BSAT's original data, showed you the errors therein at our regional hearing, and provided your staff with evidence supporting our findings.

Now, in the attached letter discussing the consequences of increasing PTR, Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledges the high risks in closing NAS Meridian. And this analysis is still based on the BSAT's flawed capacity "estimates."

In 1993, the Commission determined our team's analysis correct and found two strike bases necessary to achieve 384 strike PTR. Strike PTR is returning to the same level at 382 -- 360 strike PTR plus 22 strike equivalent E2/C2 (see letter). And our team's analysis, based on actual performance data -- not estimates, continues to show two strike bases necessary.

As the supporting data promised by the CNO is made available, I will forward it to you. I encourage you to please read the attached CNO letter. Thank you for your serious and sincere consideration of our case.

Sincerely,

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

GVM:jgm
Enclosure

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

25 May 1995

Dear Sonny,

In response to your letter of 18 May regarding NAS Meridian, let me say up front that there is a sizable amount of data that has to be re-certified given the matters you pointed out that prevents me from answering all of your specific questions at this time. Let me answer what I can now and we'll continue to work the data as it is developed.

First, you are correct that several events have occurred since DoN's analysis and DoD's recommendation were made regarding Meridian. As you know, DoN's analysis of training air stations was based on the FY 01 force structure with an annual Strike PTR of 336. Based on this requirement, DoN recommended Strike training be single-sited at NAS Kingsville which incorporated NAF Corpus Christi as an outlying field. Since that analysis, two events have occurred that change the underlying assumptions:

- Navy was given the requirement to fulfill the USAF EF-111 mission which requires us to buy 4 additional EA-6B squadrons and our own needs require us to buy back 6 additional F/A-18 squadrons across the FYDP. This plus up - provided we can successfully buy the 10 squadrons - is a 5 percent increase in Strike PTR (336 to 360).

- CNATRA has recommended accelerating the relocation of E-2/C-2 training (36 PTR) from NAS Pensacola to NAS Kingsville. Because the requirements for E-2/C-2 training are about half that of Strike, this would equate to roughly 22 additional Strike PTR.

Compounding these is the fact that procurement rate for T-45 aircraft of 12 per year, concomitant with the end of service life of TA-4J trainers, slows the transition to an all T-45 training syllabus which is significant because the alternative split of T-2/T-45 syllabus would require about 20 percent more flights per student.

If all of these are considered together, the requirements at NAS Kingsville will increase by about 18 percent. Based on the calculated capacity for Kingsville/Corpus Christi, this will require operating at near 100 percent capacity from FY 01 through FY 04, assuming Meridian closes in FY 01 (vice FY 99 as recommended). Operating this close to maximum capacity would be difficult and uncomfortable - and unsatisfactory if we had to increase PTR for a significant operational surge requirement. But I'd be less than honest if I didn't acknowledge that Navy has the ability to absorb some increased capacity with managed alternatives such as increased workdays, increased night flying,

detachments, and shifting some Strike related training into the JPATS aircraft when it comes on line. Again, this is recognizing the risk associated with additional unknowns like aircraft groundings, bad weather in excess of planned figures, and missed carrier quals due to CV/CVN operational commitments or weather.

With regards to the Samis and Hamilton report, the Naval Facilities Command has been directed to provide an assessment - and I will forward that on to you when it's done - but for the moment, I can't give you a good response on that.

In summary, if both NAS Kingsville and Meridian were to remain open - even at a PTR of 360 - we would be operating each base at well below capacity. The combination of increased Strike PTR and a single Strike training base makes successful completion of our projected PTR more difficult and reduces our capacity for surge operations - and that could be unacceptable. But the trade off remains the degree of difficulty or risks versus costs to operate 2 Strike training bases.

Sonny, I will continue to look hard at everything I can to give you the best answer possible and I will keep you informed as new developments arise.

Sincerely and very respectfully,

Mike

J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2403

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number when responding 950530-R1

June 5, 1995

The Honorable Sonny Montgomery
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Sonny:

Thank you for providing the Commission with a copy of a letter you received from Admiral Michael Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, concerning the Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. I appreciate your strong interest in the future of NAS Meridian and welcome your input.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information contained in Admiral Boorda's letter will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on NAS Meridian.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1542
Ser N889J6/5U665128
10 May 95

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER AVIATION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, JOINT USN/USAF TRAINING RATES

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889JG/4U661666 of 20 Jul 1994

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 95-00
(2) NFO Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 95-00

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect training requirements to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements.

2. USN PTR beginning in FY-98 and NFOTR beginning in FY-97 reflect a phased increase in production to address the outfitting of four(4) EA-6B squadrons to take over the USAF EF-111 mission and the transition of six (6) TACAIR squadrons to F/A-18 squadrons across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). F/A-18E/F fleet introduction team (FIT) and fleet replacement squadron (FRS) requirements are also included.

3. PTR in FY-96/97 and NFOTR in FY-96 could not be increased over levels published in ref (a) to match an ideal production schedule to meet para. 2 force changes. Compounding this situation, PTR/NFOTR from FY 92-94 was artificially reduced below "fleet requirements" in order to shrink student pools. PTR/NFOTR listed in enclosures (1) and (2) is designed to reestablish production rates to meet and sustain fleet requirements by FY-98 and out.

4. This letter also represents the first publication of joint USAF requirement numbers that will be produced by CNATRA.

5. OPNAV point on contac is CDR Tom Donovan, N889J6, A/V 224-6013, commercial (703) 614-6013 Fax (703) 693-9795.

H. T. RITTENOUR
By direction

Distribution:
CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
CMC (A, T, M, ASM-31, MPP-33, MMOA-2)
CG MCCDC (TE32A)
COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-7/7)
CHNAVPERS (211V, 43, 432, 433)
CNET (00L/T25)
CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)
NAVDEPNOAA
NETSAFA
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	STRIKE	MARITIME	E-6A TAC	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
FY-95						
USN	163	118	22	36	184	523
USMC	110	31		0	181	322
CG	0	10		0	45	55
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	22		0	0	22
TOTAL	303	228	22	36	475	1064
FY-96						
USN	183	118	22	36	184	543
USMC	106	29		0	181	316
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	35		0	0	35
TOTAL	319	229	22	36	480	1086
FY-97						
USN	203	124	22	36	184	569
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	113		0	0	113
TOTAL	336	312	22	36	475	1181
FY-98						
USN	227	128	22	36	220	633
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	511	1279
FY-99						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291
FY-00						
USN	227	128	22	36	232	645
USMC	103	28		0	176	307
CG	0	0		0	50	50
FMS(IMT)	30	45		0	65	140
NOAA	0	2		0	0	2
USAF	0	147		0	0	147
TOTAL	360	350	22	36	523	1291

NFO TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

FY-95	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	75	0	0	35	122	271
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
IMT	0	0	10	10	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	57	87	19	10	35	138	346

FY-96	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	39	95	0	0	35	128	297
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	29	38	21	0	88
IMT	25	0	40	11	0	15	91
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	82	107	69	49	56	144	507

FY-97	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	139	0	0	40	128	355
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	151	77	77	99	343	838

FY-98	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	118	0	0	35	128	329
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	189	347
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	130	77	77	94	343	812

FY-99	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

FY-00	STRK/FTR	STK	WSO	TN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
	F-14	S/ES-3 EA-6			E-2	P/EP-3 E-6	
USN	48	109	0	0	35	128	320
USMC	18	12	0	0	0	0	30
USAF	0	0	37	62	59	191	349
IMT	25	0	40	15	0	25	105
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	91	121	77	77	94	345	805

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1542
Ser N889JG/4U661666
20 Jul 1994

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889J6/3U658748 of 20 Sep 1993

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 94-99
(2) Naval Flight Officer Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 94-99

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect planned production goals for FY 94-99. These goals are intended to resolve current pool excesses, balance ongoing transitions and new production with FRS output and return to steady state force mix of 10 CVWs, 12 VP Squadrons and appropriate force support for 330 ships in FY 97.

2. Significant changes include:

-Increase VFA pilot manning from 17 to 19/squadron
-Reduction from 15 to 12 VP squadrons
-Decom of VAW 122
-Realignment of E2/C2 pilot career paths
-Adjustment for Helo pools
-WSO curriculum approved/20 to 40 plus up of FMS NFOTR

3. OPNAV point of contact is Captain Scott Krajnik, N889G/J, A/V 224-6010/6013, commercial 703-614-6010/3.

S.S. MOBLEY
By direction

Distribution:
CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
CMC (A, T, M, ASM-31, MPP-33, MMOA-2)
CG MCCDC (TE32A)
COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-2/7)
CHNAVPERS (211V, 43, 432, 433)
CNET (OOL/T25)
CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)
NAVDEPNOAA
NETSAFA
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

PILOT TRAINING RATES

20 JUL 94

FY-94	STRIKE	MARITIME	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
USN	173	120	43	214	550
USMC	118	32	0	188	338
COGARD	0	15	0	35	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	321	214	43	502	1080
FY-95					
USN	163	140	36	184	523
USMC	110	31	0	181	322
COGARD	0	10	0	45	55
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	303	228	36	475	1042
FY-96					
USN	183	140	36	184	543
USMC	106	29	0	181	316
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	319	228	36	468	1051
FY-97					
USN	203	146	36	184	569
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	463	1068
FY-98					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084
FY-99					
USN	203	146	36		
USMC	103	28	0		
COGARD	0	12	0		
FMS	30	45	0		
NOAA	0	2	0		
TOTAL	336	233	36		

NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES

20 Jul 1994

	F-14	F-18	A-6	S-3	E-2	P-3	
FY-94	RIO	WSO	TN	OJN	ATDS	NAV	TOTAL
USN	29	0	48	37	35	102	251
USMC	0	17	14	0	0	0	31
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	29	17	62	37	35	118	298
FY-95							
USN	39	0	38	37	35	122	271
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	20	0	0	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	38	50	37	35	138	337
FY-96							
USN	39	0	38	57	35	128	297
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	58	50	57	35	144	383
FY-97							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-98							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-99							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397

ENCLOSURE (2)

PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

W. A. EARNER	W. A. Earner
NAME (Please type or print)	Signature
	11/21/94
Title	Date

FROM 1993 ROUND
JRBrulak

JUSTIFICATION FOR BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION

NAS MERIDIAN, MS

ACTION OFFICER: LtCol Rich Richardella, USMC, Navy Team.

RECOMMENDATION: Close NAS Meridian. Relocate advanced strike training to NAS Kingsville, TX. Relocate intermediate strike training and Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) to NAS Pensacola, FL.

JUSTIFICATION:

-DoD force structure reduction will require a substantial reduction in training air station capacity. Currently, there is about twice the capacity required to perform the mission;

-Training conducted at Meridian can be consolidated with similar training conducted at Kingsville and Pensacola:

--This enhances the military value of the training;

--It places training aircraft near over-water airspace and potential berthing sites for carriers used in training (pilots must now fly to Pensacola for carrier landing practice);

-The closure of both Meridian and Memphis results in centralized aviation training functions at bases with a higher military value than before closure;

-Both Pensacola and Kingsville have a higher military value than Meridian;

-The consolidation of NTTC with its parent command will provide improved management and efficiency and consequently improved military value to the Navy.

RETURN ON INVESTMENT: One-time closure costs for Meridian and Memphis are $274.1M. Annual recurring savings are $82.2M with an ROI of 2 years. The net present value of costs and savings over a 20 year period is $481.1M.

IMPACTS:

-The projected employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 12.8% of the local employment base in Lauderdale County, assumimg no economic recovery.

-No significant environmental impact at NAS Meridian.

Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. Relocate advanced strike training to Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas. Relocate intermediate strike training and Naval Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida.

Justification: Projected reductions contained in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training air station capacity. When considering air space and facilities of all types of support aviation training, there is about twice the capacity required to perform the mission. The training conducted at the Naval Air Station, Meridian can be consolidated with similar training at the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. This results in an economy and efficiency of operations which enhances the military value of the training and places training aircraft in proximity to over-water air space and potential berthing sites for carriers being used in training evolutions. Currently, for example, pilots training in Meridian fly to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola in order to do carrier landing training. The closure of Meridian and the accompanying closure of the Naval Air Station, Memphis, results in centralized aviation training functions at bases with a higher average military value than that possessed by the training air stations before closure. Both the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola have higher military value than the Naval Air Station, Meridian. The consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center with its parent command, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, will provide for improvement in the management and efficiency of the training establishment and enhance its military value to the Navy.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for both NAS Meridian and NAS Memphis recommendations are $274.1M. Annual recurring savings for both actions are $82.2M with a return on investment in two years. The Net Present Value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is $481.1M.

Impact: The closure of NAS Meridian will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 12.8 percent of the local employment base in Lauderdale County, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant environmental impact at NAS Meridian as a result of this closure. Environmental cleanup will continue until complete. Relocation of advanced strike training to NAS Kingsville will result in additional noise impacts in the direction of the city of Kingsville. This may require adoption of noise abatement procedures until the ultimate transition of the TA-4 aircraft to the new T-45 which will significantly reduce noise impacts. Noise impacts will also be increased by relocation of intermediate strike training to NAS Pensacola and will require prudent management of aircraft operations to mitigate this impact on the local community.

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI
(McCain Field)

MISSION: To maintain and operate facilities and to provide services and material to support operations of aviation activities and units of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities and units designated by the CNO. Designed specifically for jet pilot training, and contains two staggered 8000 foot runways and one 6400 foot crosswind runway. Includes NOLF Joe Williams Field, 19 miles northwest (8000 feet).

WHERE: 14 miles northeast of Meridian (population 50,000) on Highway 39N. (Meridian, MS is 165 miles SE of Memphis, TN, and 125 miles north of Mobile, AL.)

MAJOR UNITS: Training Air Wing 1 (CTW-1); Training Squadrons 7 and 19 (VT-7, VT-19); Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC); Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG).

-CTW-1: Administers, coordinates, and supervises flight and academic training conducted by two subordinate squadrons.

-VT-7*: Advanced Strike Training. Flies TA-4J Skyhawk.

-VT-19*: Intermediate Strike Training. Flies T-2C Buckeye.

-NTTC: Navy's primary training facility for enlisted administrative and supply class "A" schools, which are for personnel enroute to their first command after completing recruit training.

-MATSG: Provides all similar Marine Corps training in supply, administrative, and related ratings.

* Will expand due to 1991 recommended closure of NAS Chase Field.

WEATHER: Flying hours lost due to weather:

-FY90 9071 (42,780 total hours flown)

-FY91 9581 (33,649 total hours flown)

-FY92 6880 (36,776 total hours flown)

ENVIRONMENTAL/ENCROACHMENT ISSUES: Meridian has no major environmental issues. Evaluated sites have not been listed on the National Priorities List. There are no existing or anticipated encroachment issues.

AIRPORT DIAGRAM

AL-5079.01(USN)

MERIDIAN NAS (MC CAIN FIELD) (KNMM)
MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI



AIRPORT DIAGRAM

MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI
MERIDIAN NAS (MC CAIN FIELD) (KNMM)

Enclosure (1)


Tupelo Muni-C.D. Lemans
Marion Co
Fletcher Fld
Grider Fld
Billy Free Muni
Grenada Muni
BIGBEE
116.2 IGB (L) 109
Columbus AFB
GREENWOOD
114.7 GRW 94
Monticello Muni
Greenwood-Leflore
George M Bryan
Golden Triangle Regional
HUGGS
Greenville Muni
Indianola Muni
122.55
GREENWOOD GWO
South Arkansas Regional at Goodwin Fld
Z M Jack Stell Fld
Columbus AFB Aux Fld
NOLF Joe Williams
EL DORADO
115.5 ELD 102
Yazoo Co
122.65
JACKSON
112.6 JAN 73
122.6
MERIDIAN
117.0 MEI 117
NAS Meridian
MEA-24000
MEA-22000
Monroe Regional
Vicksburg Muni
Hawkins Fld
Jackson Intl
Key
Vaiden Fld
Craig Fld
MONTGOMERY
112.1 MGM
Tuscaloosa Muni
DELBE
MORRO
Bessemer
(North Pickens)
Folsom Fld
ESLER
117.9 ESF 126
ALEXANDRIA
116.1 AEX 108
Alexandria Esler Regional
England AFB
DE RIDDER 122.55
Hardy-Anders/ Natchez Adams Co
122.4
MC COMB
116.7 MCB 114
MEMPHIS
HOUSTON
Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional
Hesler-Noble Fld
Bobby L Chain Muni
Hagler AAF
R-4401B,C
Monroe Co
113.2 MSY 79
NEW ORLEANS
115.9 CEW 106
CRESTVIEW
115.3 SJI 100
SEMMES
1" = 30 NM
St Louis
Atlanta
Fort Collins

H-4

Encl (3)

MAP NO. 25

MISSISSIPPI



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

DON BRAC-95
CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS



6 March 1995

DON BRAC TARGET

Reduce excess infrastructure and generate responsible savings for use in recapitalization while we:

- Maintain capability for flexible operational response
- Provide sustained fleet industrial support capability
- Retain technological base critical to naval operations
- Continue rationalization of complementary training / administrative infrastructure
- Ensure remaining reserve establishment is demographically sound

A continuation of the strong beginning from prior BRAC rounds

Results support the development and sustainment of a premier combat-ready naval force, able to execute the roles of forward presence and power projection, and ensuring battlespace dominance with a fully integrated warfighting capability

Major Closures and Realignments

NSYD Long Beach
NAWC Indianapolis
NUWC New London
NAED Lakehurst
NSWC White Oak
NSWC Louisville
SPAWAR Headquarters
NAVSEA Headquarters

NAS Key West
NAS South Weymouth
NAS Adak
NAVACT Guam
SRF Guam
NAS Meridian
NAS Corpus Christi
NAS Lemoore
MCAS Cherry Point

- **62 total activities to close or realign**


Navy/Marine Corps Downsizing
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
BRAC 88
BRAC 91
BRAC 93
BRAC 95
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Budget (constant 94 dollars)
Number of Installations
Military & Civilian Personnel

DON BRAC-95 Organization

- **SECNAV Charter establishes DON organization:**
  - UNDER SECNAV oversees process for SECNAV
  - Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) conducts analysis and deliberations required by law
  - Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) collects data and performs analysis for consideration by the BSEC
  - Office of General Counsel and Navy Audit Service provide senior level support to both BSEC and BSAT

BASE STRUCTURE EVALUATION COMMITTEE

ASN (I&E) - Chair

- Hon. Robert B. Pirie, Jr.

Executive Director, BSAT - Vice Chair

- Charles P. Nemfakos (DASN, FBIRA)

Two Navy Flag Officers

- VADM Richard C. Allen (COMNAVAIRANT)
- VADM William A. Earner (DCNO Logistics)

Two USMC General Officers

- LtGen Harry W. Blot (DCS, Aviation)
- LtGen J. A. Brabham (DCS, I & L)

Two DON Senior Executive Service

- Mrs. Genie McBurnett (Deputy SPAWAR)
- Ms. Elsie Munsell (DASN, Environment & Safety)

BASE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS TEAM

- **Executive Director (SES)**
- **Broad Based Composition**
  - Senior Line and Staff Officers from Navy and Marine Corps with operational Experience
  - Senior Career DON Civilian managers
  - CNA Analysts
  - Broad spectrum of expertise and capability
- **Judge Advocate (O-5/6) (BSEC Recorders)**
- **Naval Audit Service / General Counsel representation**

Department of the Navy Imperatives

- **16 Owner/Operators identified 260+ issues, distilled into 37 Policy Imperatives**
- **Themes developed:**
  - Retain ability to pursue/sustain essential technological effort;
  - Provide appropriate maintenance support to fleet assets;
  - Structure flexible response into operational homeports; and
  - Position of forces, training and support functions IAW the total force concept.
- **Imperatives consistent with DON targets**

BRAC-95 INSTALLATION CATEGORIES

Operational Support
Operational Air Stations
Reserve Air Stations
Naval Bases
Marine Corps Bases
Fleet & Ind. Supply Centers
Telecom & Computers
Security Group
Int. Undersea Surv. Systems
Ocean & Meteorological
Military Sealift Command
Construction Battalion Centers
NAVFAC (EFDs)

Industrial Support
WPNSTA/SWF/NAVMAG
Aviation Depots
Shipyards/SRF
Public Works Centers
Marine Corps Log. Bases
Supervisor of Shipbuilding
Inventory Control Points
SIMA/TRF/NRMF

Tech Ctrs/Labs
Technical Centers/Labs

Educational/Training
Training Air Stations
Training/Educational Centers

Personnel Support/Other
Medical
Dental
Admin. Activities
Reserve Centers

Data Call Development

- **Capacity Data Calls:**
  - Identify and quantify measures of capacity
    - Emphasize throughput measures
    - Capture all facility requirements
    - Measurement must relate to force structure
    - Historic Performance or Derived Capacity
- **Military Value Data Calls:**
  - Broad-based questions to capture all facets of installation that relate to military value
  - Emphasis on four areas from DoD selection criteria
  - Common questions for common military value areas

Capacity Analysis

- **Identify quantitative measures of capacity**
  - Ensure all facility requirements captured
- **Determine capacity of sub-category**
  - Individual installation capacities summed
- **Determine required capacity based on FY 2001 force structure**
  - Evaluate each measure against requirement to determine excess

Capacity Analysis Results

- **Excess capacity would allow:**
  - Berthing of 4 CVBGs extra
  - Parking of 5 Air Wings extra
  - Maintenance of 33 additional ships annually
  - Maintenance on 132 airframes and 1500 engines annually
  - Training of 1390 pilots and 216,000 additional students annually
  - Performance of $1.1 Billion of extra R&D work annually
- **Excess capacity is gross measure**
  - Not evenly segmented

Shipyard/Ship Repair Facility Capacity Analysis

- **Throughput measure is Direct Labor Man Years (DLMY) for specific work packages**
  - Capacity calculated for nuclear and non-nuclear work
- **Excess capacity in FY 2001 is:**
  - Nuclear: 37.5% (6.0 K DLMYs)
  - Non-nuclear: 15.6% (1.5 K DLMYs)
  - Total: 29.4% (7.5 K DLMYs)

Military Value Analysis

- **Military Value analysis conducted on 19 sub-categories that demonstrated excess capacity**
- **Approach:**
  - Generate military value scores within each sub-category using non-subjective methods
    - Series of yes / no questions
    - Question weights reflect relative importance
    - Questions assigned to each of the four DoD mandated criteria
- **Output:**
  - Relative measure of military value within a given sub-category
    - Not a quantitative difference (10% difference does not mean one installation is 10% more valuable)
    - Highest possible score may not be 100

Military Value Analysis

- **Process:**
  - Develop questions to cover all areas of military value, grouped into subject areas
  - Approve questions and assign weight to DoD criteria for each question
  - Assign score to each question
  - Calculate military value weight of each question and subject area
  - Review & approve question and subject weights
  - Answer questions for specific activities and calculate activity scores
  - Review question answers and activity scores for consistency and counter-intuitive results

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

DC #	Pg #	Qst #	QUESTIONS
			DRYDOCKS
9H	Pages	3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?
9H	31-34	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?
9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?
			. . .
			COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS
42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?
42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?
			. . .
42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?
			. . .
			PRODUCTION WORKLOAD
			. . .
42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?
42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 thro

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Ques Impo	DC #	Pg #	Qst #	QUESTIONS
				DRYDOCKS
1	9H	Pages	3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?
1	9H	31-34	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?
				. . .
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS
1	42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?
1	42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?
				. . .
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?
				. . .
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD
				. . .
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 thro

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Ques Impo	DC #	Pg #	Qst #	QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20
				DRYDOCKS				
1	9H	Pages	3.1	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0
1	9H	31-34	3.1	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0
1	9H		3.1	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0
				. . .				
				COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS				
1	42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1
1	42	34	8.1	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1
				. . .				
2	42	29	6.1	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1
				. . .				
				PRODUCTION WORKLOAD				
				. . .				
3	42	23	2.5	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0
1	42	18	1.2	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 thro	1	0	0	0

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Ques Impo		QUESTIONS	M.V. Criteria/Weights R 40	F 25	M 15	C 20	Score	TOTAL MV
		DRYDOCKS						31.48
1	...	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94
1	...	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	10	1.94
1	...	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	1	1	1	0	8	1.55
		. . .						
		COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS						14.08
1	...	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82
1	...	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	0	0	0	1	10	0.82
		. . .						
2	...	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	0	0	0	1	4	0.33
		. . .						
		PRODUCTION WORKLOAD						29.61
		. . .						
3	...	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	1	0	0	0	4	0.28
1	...	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 thro	1	0	0	0	10	0.71

NAVAL SHIPYARDS - Military Value Matrix

Ques Impo		QUESTIONS		Score	TOTAL MV	RESPONSES					
						PTSM	NORVA	LGBCH	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
		DRYDOCKS			31.48	4.47	15.35	9.33	18.07	13.60	1.17
1	...	Can the NSY drydock a CVN/CV?	...	10	1.94	0	1	1	1	1	0
1	...	Can the NSY drydock 4 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	...	10	1.94	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	...	Can the NSY drydock 3 or more SSN-688s, simultaneously?	...	8	1.55	1	0	1	0	1	0
		...									
		COST AND MANPOWER FACTORS			14.08	5.98	7.60	4.02	8.03	4.88	7.75
1	...	Is the FY 1997 hourly direct labor cost less than $29/hour?	...	10	0.82	1	1	1	1	0	1
1	...	Is the FY 1997 hourly fully burdened rate less than $59/hour?	...	10	0.82	0	1	0	1	0	1
		...									
2	...	Were more than 500 apprentices trained over the past 5 years?	...	4	0.33	1	0	0	1	0	0
		...									
		PRODUCTION WORKLOAD			29.61	9.03	15.15	9.27	11.58	9.27	2.46
		...									
3	...	Did the NSY perform work in support of non-DON customers?	...	4	0.28	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	...	Did or will the NSY perform CVN RCOH/COHs from FY 1990 thr	...	10	0.71	0	0	0	1	0	0

Shipyard/ SRF Military Value Results

	% of Total MilVal	Activity					
		PTSM	NORVA	LGBCH	PUGET	PEARL	GUAM
Drydocks	31.5	4.5	15.5	9.3	18.1	13.6	1.2
Production Workload	29.6	9.0	15.2	9.3	11.4	10.5	2.6
Costs & Manpower	14.1	6.0	7.6	4.0	8.0	4.9	7.8
Envirn. & Encrchmt.	9.2	7.0	7.0	5.2	8.3	6.5	7.0
Strategic Factors	5.1	4.1	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.2	1.0
Crews of Cust. Ships	3.3	1.6	0.0	1.6	2.6	1.7	0.0
Quality of Life	3.3	2.7	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.0	2.1
Operating Factors	3.2	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	1.9	2.4
Contingency	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4
TOTAL Military Value	100.0	37.8	54.1	38.0	57.6	44.7	24.3

Configuration Analysis

- **Tool used to identify set of installations that best meet needs of Navy and Marine Corps**
- **"Optimum" solution minimizes excess capacity while maintaining average military value**
  - Additional rules for sub-category unique requirements may be added to model
- **Allows sensitivity analysis**
- **Results are the starting point for BSEC deliberations**


VROOSH
TAKE ME TO YOUR LEADER..
SPEAKING.

Scenario Development

- Configuration Analysis output/BSEC deliberations resulted in development of closure/realignment alternatives
- BSEC reviewed multiple options for eliminating excess capacity
  - Scenario development an iterative process
  - Included input from senior DON leadership and owners/operators
- 174 scenarios involving 119 activities evaluated by BSEC

Return on Investment Analysis

- **Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA)** algorithms used by all DoD Components to evaluate costs, savings and return on investment associated with closure or realignment scenarios
- **Major Claimants/chains of command** provided certified data used to conduct COBRA analyses
- **BSEC aggressively challenged cost estimates** to ensure reasonableness and consistency with policy/procedures
- **COBRA used as a tool** to ensure recommendations are relatively cost effective

Shipyard/ SRF Configuration Analysis

- **Configuration model rules:**
  - Minimize excess capacity
  - Maintain average military value
  - Nuclear work accomplished only at nuclear capable shipyards
  - Nuclear capacity can be used to meet nuclear and non-nuclear work requirements
- **"Optimum" solution set:**
  - Close Long Beach NSYD, Portsmouth NSYD, SRF Guam
  - Both secondary and tertiary solution sets contained Long Beach NSYD. No other yard appeared in all three solutions.
- **BSEC deliberations resulted in scenario data calls for all three activities listed in optimum solution**

NSYDs / SRF CONFIGURATION MODELING RESULTS

Option	Activity						% Excess	Average MilVal
	Portsmth	Norfolk	Puget Snd	Long Bch	Pearl Hrb	Guam		
PRIMARY							1	52.13
SECONDARY							2	49.84
TERTIARY							4	45.16
10% More							14	48.61
2nd							14	46.87
3rd							16	43.74
10% Less							-6	49.91
2nd							-6	44.55
3rd							-3	43.49
20% Less							-22	45.31
2nd							-22	43.31
3rd							-12	45.54

Note : Per cent excess is based on constant (FY 2001) requirement.

= Closed

Initial Average MilVal: 42.75

Naval Shipyards & Depot Repair Facilities

- **4 Activities recommended for closure/realignment:**

Activity	Cost	Save	ROI Yr.	SS Savings	20 Yr Savings
SRF Guam	$8.4M	$7.8M	Immed.	$37.8M	$529.0M
Long Beach NSYD	$74.5M	$0.2M	Immed.	$130.6M	$1948.6M
Phila. Docks	$0	$8.1M	Immed.	$8.8M	$134.7M
Realign NUWC Keyport	$2.1M	$3.0M	1 Yr.	$2.1M	$29.7M
Total	**$85.0M**	**$19.0M**		**$179.2M**	**$2.6 B**

Economic Impact Analysis

- **DoD Economic Impact Data Base:**
  - **Employment-Based Analysis** - Direct and Indirect impacts included.
  - **Dual Impact Measures** - Absolute and percentage change in area employment calculated.
  - **Historical Data Trends** - Employment, unemployment and personal income reviewed.
  - **Conservative Approach** - Impact typically overstated; potential recovery/reuse not considered.
- **BRAC-95 total job change (over 6 years) = 33,000 jobs**

Los Angeles - Long Beach, CA PMSA

Actions	Direct Jobs	Indirect Jobs	Total Jobs	% of Employment
Close NSY Long Beach	-4,029	-9,232	-13,261	-0.3%
Close SUPSHIP Long Beach	-19	-11	-30	0.0%
Close NMCRC Pomona	-10	-5	-15	0.0%
	-4,058	-9,248	-13,306	-0.3%

Employment (1993): 4,989,503

Average Per Capita Income (1992): $21,434





Unemployment Rates for Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA and the US (1984 - 1993):

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Local	7.9%	7.0%	6.7%	5.9%	4.9%	4.6%	5.8%	8.0%	9.6%	9.7%
U.S.	7.5%	7.2%	7.0%	6.2%	5.5%	5.3%	5.5%	6.7%	7.4%	6.8%

- **1500 Direct Workyears to be shifted to private sector**

Local Community Infrastructure Impacts

- **Evaluated ability to absorb additional DON personnel & missions:**
  - Off base housing
  - Schools
  - Public transportation
  - Fire & Police
  - Health Care
  - Utilities (water & energy supply, sewage & waste disposal)
  - Recreational facilities
- **No significant community infrastructure impacts identified for any scenario**

BRAC-95 Economic Impact
San Diego CA

Activity	Military	Students	Civilian	Contractors	Total
Jobs Out:					
NAS Miramar	552	279	0	0	831
NAS North Island	423	0	0	0	423
NCCOSC RDT&E	34	0	222	118	374
NISE West	0	0	58	0	58
Total:	1009	279	280	118	1686
Jobs In:					
FISC San Diego	0	0	18	0	18
NAS North Island	1415	120	267	0	1802
NAVMEDCEN	102	0	35	0	137
NAVSTA San Diego	48	127	22	0	197
NCCOSC RDT&E	154	0	666	0	820
Total:	1719	247	1008	0	2947
Net Job Change	**710**	**-32**	**728**	**-118**	**1288**

- **Total MILCON: $62.2M New Construction; $16.9M Rehab**
- **No community infrastructure impact**

Environmental Impact Analysis

- **Issues reviewed:**
  - Environmental management efforts
  - Air quality impacts/conformity requirements
  - Installation restoration (IR) cleanups
  - Adequate utilities/infrastructure
  - Available undeveloped, unrestricted property
  - Natural/cultural resources
- **No significant environmental impacts identified for any scenario**

Capacity Elimination Summary

- **Scenarios would reduce excess capacity by:**
  - Almost $1 Billion of R&D Work per year
  - Overhaul of about 12 major combatants per year
  - Training of over 800 Naval Aviators per year
  - Parking of about 2 Carrier Air Wings
  - Berthing of 2 CVBGs

DON BRAC Summary

	BRAC 1988	BRAC 1991	BRAC 1993	BRAC 1995	Total BRAC
Major Closures	4	9	20	10	43
Other Closures & Realignments	8	25	71	52	156
Steady State Savings	--	$397M	$1.4 B	$605M	
20 Year Return	--	$1.7B	$9.7B	$8.5B	

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AIR STATION, MERIDIAN, MS

16 JUNE 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner J. B. Davis

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Doyle Reedy

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Governor Fordice
Captian Pudas

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

The air station trains Naval aviators for their assignments with the active forces as strike attack pilots.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close NAS Meridian, retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy Facilities at the base; relocate the undergraduate strike pilot training function to Kingsville, Texas; and move the Naval Technical Training Center to Athens, Georgia and Newport, Rhode Island.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

The 1993 Commission recommended that NAS Meridian remain open because it found that the then-current and future pilot training rate (PTR) required that there be two full-strike training bases, Kingsville and Meridian. In the period between 1993 and the present Commission, two factors emerged that required the Navy again to review the requirement for two strike training bases. First, the current Force Structure Plan showed a continuing decline in the PTR requirement due to a decrease in the number of air wings from 11 to 10. Second, the Navy believed that consolidating was in the spirit of DOD policy which required that functional pilot training be consolidated.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- The Commissioner visited all of the base facilities.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- Since the Navy's (1995) recommendation to close NAS Meridian, the Navy revised (increased) it's strike training requirements because the Navy plans to : (1) buy more aircraft than originally planned; (2) accelerate the move of aircraft from Pensacola to Kingsville; and (3) slow the transisition to a new strike training aircraft.
- The Navy's second reason for closing NAS Meridian was to comply with DOD's intent to consolidate pilot training. That approach, however, does not consider: (1) the impact of basing a new trainer at Naval air stations; and (2) available capacity at Air Force bases should the trainer be a joint-service buy.
- Some of the data used to make the decision to close NAS Meridian may have resulted in some areas being overstated while others were understated. Yet other factors may not have been given adequate consideration at all. For example, the rates used for estimating the number of airfield operations may be overstated because the rates were established using experienced commercial pilots rather than inexperienced student pilots. The military value for NAS Meridian may have been understated because too much weight was given to whether or not the air station was located near water. The fact is that only two flights in the entire strike training curiculum are over water. (Student pilots do not spend much of their flight time in areas that do not have visual ground references.) Finally, NAS Meridian could operate beyond 80 percent capacity if they had more instructor pilots. Therefore, if more pilots were available NAS Meridian would have less excess capacity. Excess capacity however, is determined by looking at a snapshot of the base operations without considering qualifying remarks.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- None at this time.

DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION ROUTE SHEET
(AvnForm R-89)

Admin Ctrl No. Date: 30 MAY 95

MACG-48 GLENVIEW,IL BRIEF TO MS. LEE

Action Officer/Code/Ph Ext/IC/ACID

LTCOL WAGNER/APP-34/2261

Rtg	Code	Action	Date	Initial
2	A	FI		
	AA			
	AP			
1	A-1	GI	6-1	
	AP-1			
	AC			
	AAB			
X	APP		5/31/95	
	APW			
	ASL			
	ASM			
	APC		5/31/95	concur

Due Date:

A - APPROPRIATE ACTION
B - GUIDANCE
C - SIGNATURE
D - COMMENT
S - RECOMMENDATION
F - CONCUR
G - INFORMATION
H - RETURN TO: APP-34
I - INITIAL
J - DISPOSITION
K - DECISION
L - RETAIN
X - ORIGIN

Remarks/Signature

SIR

1. PROBLEM Green Tab 1 is Point Paper provided to ASD (Reserve Affairs) and given to APP for action.

2. ANALYSIS. The Point Paper is essentially accurate Green Tab 2 is a copy of a Talking Paper produced by MARFORRES for briefing of the BSEC. Moving Glenview to Damneck is costly in MILCON ($15-20mil), Recruiting/retraining ($3.5mil)and reduced readiness (for 3-5 years). The City of Glenview will lease adequate facilities for $1 a year adjacent to the current location in a Federal Enclave area.

3. RECOMMENDATION. Request for redirect to remain at Glenview by BRAC Commission.

Req for redirect should be initiated by MARFORRES. We can assist.

Dep

TALKING PAPER

SCENARIO - Close NAS Glenview, Il (Navy Host) BRAC-93 Redirect

UNIT(s) - Marine Air Control Group 48 (MACG-48 HQ)
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 48 (MTACS-48)
HQ, Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48 (MWCS-48)
Marine Wing Communications Squdron 48, Detachment Alpha (MWCS-48, Det A)

PERSONNEL T/O	OFFICER	ENLISTED	TOTAL
Active	13	81	94
Reserve	30	237	267
TOTAL	43	318	361

MANNING (O/H)			
Active	15	107	123
Reserve	38	406	444
TOTAL	53	513	567

O/H exceeds T/O because its KC-130/HML/MWSS transferred to Dallas/Fort Worth/Atlanta

EQUIPMENT - 42 Heavy Vehicles
62 Major Navigational End Items
22 Generators
Weight of Equipment - 425 TONS

PROPOSED RELOCATION - Damneck, VA (BRAC-93) Requires new MILCON and land purchases of $15.2M plus

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED - MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL
Homestead AFB, Tampa, Fl

RECRUITING FACTORS - Retain 100% manpower at existing site. Lose almost 100% manpower/operational capability for 3-5 years by move

RECRUITING/RETRAINING - $3.5M one time unique costs

MILCON/REHAB SYNOPSIS - 40,498 SF
$15.2M

FUTURE LEASE - City of Chicago; $1 - year

CURRENT LEASE - Navy Host $0 lease

COSTS TO RELOCATE (onetime unique)

Comm Cost:	101K
Moving:	17K
Recruiting:	500K
Training/Retraining:	3.0M
MILCON/Rehav estimated:	15.2M

RECOMMENDATION: - USMC units remain at Chicago, IL
move to Glenview Federal Enclave-90 acres

for Act.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

1000 NAVY PENTAGON RM 4E765
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

PHONE: (703)693-4527
FAX: (703)693-2734
AUTOVON: 223-4527

TELECOPY/FACSIMILE

FROM: Ltco Johnson MA/ASN(I+E) PAGES: Three (INCLUDING COVERSHEET)

TO: LtGen Blot 614-1035 DATE: 25 May 95
LtGen Grabham 696-1034

MESSAGE

Gentlemen,

Mr Pirie asked me to share the two attached pages, concerning MACG-48 / Glenview, IL, with you.

Very respectfully,
Toby G. Johnson



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

22 MAY 1995

ASN R&A 5/25
Copy to: Mr. Naughton
CR
EA
MA 23 May

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

SUBJECT: Marine Corps Reserve MACG-48 at NAS Glenview, IL

I would like to bring to your attention some information presented to me by Colonel Rayfel Bachiller, Commander of Marine Air Control Groups-48 at NAS Glenview, IL. The Colonel's attached point paper indicates some economies may be available if the unit remained at Glenview in a Reserve enclave and not move to Dam Neck, VA. as directed in BRAC 93. I want to make sure that the Navy Secretariat considered all available information on this unit in formulating their BRAC 95 recommendations on changing BRAC 93 decisions.

Please review and assure that the unit readiness and best interest of the Total Force are met by moving MACG-48, and that in the haste to close NAS Glenview the accommodation of this Marine Reserve unit in a Reserve enclave wasn't overlooked.

Deborah R. Lee

Deborah R. Lee

Attachment:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED

5000
04
2 May 95

POINT PAPER

For use by Ms. Lee

Requested during briefing by Col. Bachiller USMC of 1 May 95

BRAC-93 included language that directed MACG-48 to relocate from Glenview, IL to Dam Neck VA. Discussions with the Public Works Officer at Dam Neck indicated that no facilities were available. Construction of a Marine Corps Reserve Center is estimated at $15.1 million.

The reserve units at Glenview are currently at 100% of authorized strength. A poll of reservists showed that fewer than 10% of the trained and qualified personnel currently assigned would drill at a remote location (over 100 miles). Over 80% live within 50 miles of the Glenview Reserve Center. Should MACG-48 relocate, it will take 4 to 6 years before the units are capable of performing their assigned missions. That is, 25% of the Marine Corps' Air Combat Element command, control and communication capability will be unavailable until two squadrons of personnel can be recruited and trained to required skill levels. These units provide real time augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces as seen in numerous exercises. Without them, the Marine Corps' ability to participate in two Major Regional Conflicts will be degraded.

The City of Glenview was asked to consider a request to retain the Marines within the City. That request was formally approved as part of the City's Land Reuse Plan by a vote of the City of Glenview Reuse Planning Group on December 7, 1994. Facilities currently occupied by the Army Reserve were offered at a nominal cost of $1 per year. Additionally, Marine ownership of the facilities was also supported provided the property immediately and unconditionally reverts to the City upon any future departure of the Marines. Acceptance of the offer is contingent on obtaining relief from the direction to relocate to Dam Neck.

Costs avoided by remaining in the Chicago/Glenview area:

$15.1 Million	Reserve Center Construction
$ 5.5 Million	Facilities rental pending Reserve Center being built (estimated $1.85 Million per year based on market rental rates for 3 years)
$ .3 Million	Shipment of unit equipment (varies by location)

Undefined costs in loss of combat capability while recruiting and training.

The Village of Glenview

Office of the President
(708) 724-1700 extension 200
(708) 724-1518 fax

May 4, 1995

Senator Alan Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number when responding: 950505-3

RE: MACG-48 staying at Glenview Naval Air Station with Village ownership of property

Dear Senator Dixon:

The Village of Glenview is the Local Redevelopment Authority for the soon to be closed Glenview Naval Air Station. For the past year and one half, the local community has been working diligently to generate a consensus oriented, real estate market driven redevelopment plan that meets the needs of both the local community and the Federal Government. This plan has been forwarded to the Navy for consideration as the Preferred Alternative Reuse Plan for completion of the Environmental Impact Statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act. A major component of the reuse plan was the establishment of a "federal enclave." This area of the base represents land set aside for federal users, including the Marine Reserve Air Control Group (MACG-48). The federal enclave was established under the absolute condition that the Village of Glenview as the Local Redevelopment Authority for the property would receive title to the property, and lease it back to the specifically identified federal agencies for $1 per year, for as long as the agency needed to use the property.

The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance and support regarding the Marine ground unit's remaining at the Glenview Naval Air Station. The Village of Glenview would support a redirect which would allow the Marine unit to stay only if the Village would retain ownership of the property. The Marine Reserve MACG-48 has been accommodated in the GNAS reuse plan.

As always, thank you for your efforts in dealing with the difficult task of reducing military infrastructure. If I can provide further information that would help you and the BRAC Commission achieve this important goal, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Nancy L. Firfer

Nancy L. Firfer
Village President
Village of Glenview

cc Congressman John Porter
Senator Paul Simon
Senator Carol Mosely Braun
Captain James C. Schultz, GNAS Commanding Officer
Paul T. McCarthy, Village Manager

BSEC

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

D2745

APR 7 1995

The Honorable Sidney R. Yates
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Yates:

Thank you for your letter of March 21, 1995 to the Secretary of Defense, concerning the relocation of Marine Corps Reserve Marine Air Control Group-48 (MACG-48) to Dam Neck, Virginia. I am responding on behalf of Secretary Perry.

We share your concern about maintaining an effective and efficient defense and appreciate the proposal for retention of MACG-48 in Glenview. However, provisions of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, compel us to proceed with the relocation of MACG-48 to Dam Neck, Virginia, and implementation is well underway.

The Department of the Navy's recommendations for the 1993 round of base realignment and closure were developed following a careful, in-depth, and objective review based on criteria established by the Secretary of Defense and consistent with a smaller force structure. Relocation of MACG-48 was included in the 1993 Commission's recommendation to close Naval Air Station (NAS) Glenview, which was accepted by the President and ultimately approved by the Congress.

The Department's recommendations contained in the Secretary of Defense's report to the 1995 Commission, like those for the 1993 round, also resulted from a detailed, comprehensive, and consistent analytical process applied to all installations. They represent our best judgment as to the infrastructure alignment most suitable to meet the future requirements of our operational forces. Our process allowed consideration of changes to previously approved designated receiving bases if significant revisions to cost or mission effectiveness had occurred since the relevant Commission recommendation was made. In our analysis of reserve air stations we did not find this to be the case regarding the relocation actions attendant to the 1993 NAS Glenview closure decision.

I trust the foregoing information satisfactorily addresses your concerns. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR.

95U128040948

CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN
ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
FINANCE
SPECIAL AGING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1303

May 5, 1995

Please refer to this number when responding 950508-6

Senator Alan Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Senator Dixon:

We are writing to ask you to review the BRAC-93 ruling that requires the Marine Corps Reserve Marine Air Control Group-48 unit currently based at Glenview Naval Air Station to relocate to Dam Neck, Virginia.

The Glenview NAS will close this September on the recommendation of BRAC 1993, which also requires the MACG-48 unit to move to Dam Neck Virginia. This move is projected to cost $22 million, with $15 million needed to build entirely new facilities.

We are recommending instead that MACG-48 be moved into the Federal Enclave that the Village of Glenview is creating as part of their approved reuse plan for the Glenview NAS. The purpose of the enclave is to create a single area to locate military tenant commands. This federal enclave did not exist during the BRAC 93 round, and its development dramatically changes the variables that the Marine Corps took into account during that earlier base closing round. This Federal Enclave was created with the understanding that the Local Redevelopment Authority, the Village of Glenview, would be the sole landowner and subsequently lease it back to the approved federal tenants for $1.00 per year, for as long as there is a need.

The value of maintaining MACG-48 at Glenview is clear. Moving the unit to the Federal Enclave will save the taxpayers almost all of the $22 million cost of the move to Dam Neck, as there are no construction requirements to move the unit down the road to the Federal Enclave. Moreover, the Chicago metropolitan area clearly has a tremendous demographic edge on Virginia in maintaining the future readiness of this unit, which is combat-experienced and at a high state of readiness. Moving this unit to Dam Neck, Virginia, therefore, both increases the costs to the taxpayers and diminishes the readiness of the Marine Corps. Finally, there is widespread support in the Glenview community for redirecting the MACG 48 unit to the Federal Enclave.

This win-win proposal can only become a reality if an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC) is granted to Glenview. The Department of Defense and the taxpayers both stand to benefit.

We are attaching a letter in support of this redirect recommendation from Mayor Nancy L. Firfer, Village President of Glenview and Chairman of the Glenview NAS Local Redevelopment Authority.

We urge you to review the BRAC-93 decision and recommend that MACG-48 be redirected to the Federal Enclave in Glenview as part of an Economic Development Conveyance.

Sincerely,

Carol Moseley-Braun
United States Senator

Paul Simon
United States Senator

John Porter
United States Representative

The Village of Glenview

Office of the President
(708) 724-1700 extension 250
(708) 724-1516 fax

May 4, 1995

Senator Alan Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 N. Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

RE: MACG-48 staying at Glenview Naval Air Station with Village ownership of property

Dear Senator Dixon:

The Village of Glenview is the Local Redevelopment Authority for the soon to be closed Glenview Naval Air Station. For the past year and one half, the local community has been working diligently to generate a consensus oriented, real estate market driven redevelopment plan that meets the needs of both the local community and the Federal Government. This plan has been forwarded to the Navy for consideration as the Preferred Alternative Reuse Plan for completion of the Environmental Impact Statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act. A major component of the reuse plan was the establishment of a "federal enclave". This area of the base represents land set aside for federal users, including the Marine Reserve Air Control Group (MACG-48). The federal enclave was established under the absolute condition that the Village of Glenview as the Local Redevelopment Authority for the property would receive title to the property, and lease it back to the specifically identified federal agencies for $1 per year, for as long as the agency needed to use the property.

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As always, thank you for your efforts in dealing with the difficult task of reducing military infrastructure. If I can provide further information that would help you and the BRAC Commission achieve this important goal, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Nancy L. Firfer

Nancy L. Firfer
Village President
Village of Glenview

cc Congressman John Porter
Senator Paul Simon
Senator Carol Mosely Braun
Captain James C. Schultz, GNAS Commanding Officer
Paul T. McCarthy, Village Manager

NAS- MERIDIAN BASE VISIT
APRIL 3, 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMISSION BASE VISIT
NAS-MERIDIAN, MS
Monday, April 3, 1995

COMMISSIONERS ATTENDING:
Joe Robles

STAFF ATTENDING:
Merril Beyer
Jim Brubaker
Elizabeth King
Mark Pross
Alex Yellin

ITINERARY

Saturday, April 1

8:08AM CT Elizabeth King departs Dallas/Ft. Worth en route Meridian, MS (via Atlanta): Delta flight 995.

12:37PM CT Elizabeth King arrives at Meridian, MS airport from Atlanta.
* Rental car: Avis Confirmation # 14747482US1

RON: **NAS Meridian Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) - VIP Suite**
601/679-2386

Sunday, April 2

9:05AM ET Jim Brubaker and Alex Yellin depart DC National en route Meridian, MS (via Atlanta):
Delta flight 2035.

12:37PM CT Jim Brubaker and Alex Yellin arrive at Meridian, MS airport and depart en route NAS Meridian.
* Rental car (Brubaker): Hertz Confirmation # 92170616F49

2:00PM to 4:00PM CT Jim Brubaker and Alex Yellin advance NAS Meridian.

FINAL as of 3/31/95 at 11:22 AM

6:15PM Merrill Beyer and Mark Pross depart DC National en route Meridian, MS (via Atlanta):
Delta flight 1799.

9:45PM Merrill Beyer and Mark Pross arrive at Meridian, MS airport from Atlanta:
Delta flight 7234.
* Picked up at airport by Elizabeth King and brought to RON.

RON: **NAS Meridian VIP BOQ**
601/679-2386

Monday, April 3

7:00AM CT Joe Robles departs San Antonio, TX en route Birmingham, AL:
MILAIR C-26.
* MILAIR will depart San Antonio International Airport at the Gen-Aero Fixed Base Operator Facility.

9:00AM CT Joe Robles arrives at NAS Meridian from San Antonio, TX.
* Met by CTW-1, Capt. Terry Pudas, CO NAS Meridian Capt. Robert Leitzel, LtCol Jim Brubaker, Senator Thad Cochran, Senator Trent Lott and Congressman Sonny Montgomery.

9:10AM to 3:30PM CT **NAS Meridian base visit and working lunch.**

3:45PM CT Commissioner and staff depart NAS Meridian en route Birmingham, AL:
MILAIR C-26:
Joe Robles
Elizabeth King
Alex Yellin

4:15PM CT Commissioner and staff arrive in Birmingham, AL at the 117th Air Refueling Wing, Alabama Air National Guard:
Joe Robles
Elizabeth King
Alex Yellin
* Picked up at airport by Paul Hegarty and escorted to RON.

Meridian RON: **NAS Meridian VIP BOQ**
601/679-2386
Merril Beyer
Jim Brubaker
Mark Pross

Birmingham RON: **Radisson Hotel Birmingham**
808 S. 20th Street
Birmingham, Alabama
205/933-9000
Confirmation# is the traveler's last name.
Joe Robles
Alex Yellin
Elizabeth King

Tuesday, April 4

6:30AM CT Merrill Beyer, Jim Brubaker and Mark Pross depart Meridian, MS en route Lubbock, TX (via Memphis and Dallas/FT. Worth):
Northwest flight 5139.

12:50pm CT Merrill Beyer, Jim Brubaker and Mark Pross arrive at Lubbock, TX airport.
* Rental car (Brubaker): National Confirmation # 1045883962
* Rental car (Beyer): National Confirmation # 1046321541

Lubbock RON: **Reese AFB Officer Quarters**
806/885-3155
Jim Brubaker
Merrill Beyer
Mark Pross

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

INSTALLATION MISSION

To provide facilities and services in support of aviation activities of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities as directed. Intermediate and advanced strike training conducted (jet carrier aircraft).

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Meridian, Mississippi. Relocate undergraduate strike pilot training to NAS Kingsville.
- Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) to close and its training functions relocated to other activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.
- Retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy and transfer facilities to the Academy.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the Pilot Training Rate (PTR) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base.
- The consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated.
- The Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of NAS Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect.

- One-Time Cost: $83.4 million
- Net Costs and Savings During Implementation: $158.8 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: $33.4 million
- Break-Even Year: immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: $471.2 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	Military	Civilian	Students
Baseline	768	265	866
Reductions	388	220	0
Realignments	686	170	1282
Total	1074	390	1282

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
1643	947	0	0	(1643)	(947)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Generally Positive

REPRESENTATION

Governor:	Kirk Fordice
Senators:	Thad Cochran
	Trent Lott
Representative:	G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 3324 jobs (2581 direct and 743 indirect)
- Lauderdale Co. MS MSA Job Base: 41,583 jobs
- Percentage: 8.0% percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1996-2001): 8.0% percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- The Navy reluctantly recommended NAS Meridian for closure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Navy may have miscalculated their capacity analysis including flight operations per Pilot Training Rate (PTR).
- Safety concerns around single site PTR, specifically at an airfield near 100% capacity yet trying to train student naval aviators.
- Navy out year PTR and joint recommendations or lack thereof.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- None

James R. Brubaker/Navy/03/29/95 2:22 PM

REGIONAL HEARING ISSUE SUMMARY

NAS MERIDIAN, MS

BIRMINGHAM, AL/APRIL 4, 1995

- Two strike training bases are needed to meet the Navy's future requirements. The Navy has overstated the capacity of NAS Kingsville to meet the full strike pilot training rate.

- NAS Meridian received high functional value scores from the UPT Joint Cross Service Group. The Navy understated its military value by overvaluing the importance of being within 100 miles of over -water training areas. Only 4% of the training time for strike training is preferred for over-water training. In 1991 the base was given the highest ranking for a training air station.

- The Navy's capacity measurements used historical figures for Meridian using T-2/TA-4 planes and optimistic estimates for Kingsville using the new T-45 plane.

- The use of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field is critical to meeting the Navy's requirements at Kingsville. However, the Navy has not considered the implications of using the base for this use. Corpus Christi does not have a jet AICUZ; added noise from intensive jet operations will be a significant problem in a metropolitan area; other competing uses for airfield operations will reduce time available for strike training.

- The intensity of training projected at Kingsville is not sustainable. Training bases should not be planned for a level of operations that does not provide a buffer. The use of detachments is an expensive option that may not expand capacity because of equipment limitations.

- A combination of NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB has great potential as a joint training complex. This option was not adequately addressed.

- Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) Meridian should not be evaluated as a follower which must move if the air station closes. It should be evaluated separately because it is economical to retain it at Meridian as a free standing training facility.

- Economic impact of a closure on the community is very great. Meridian is a small community and the air station is the largest employer.

- In 1993 the Commission rejected the Navy's proposed closure of Meridian. A review of the 1995 recommendation will also show that the Navy cannot meet its strike training requirements without Meridian.

Alex Yellin/Navy/04/15/95 10:10 AM

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Suite 1425
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: APRIL 11, 1995

TO: COMMISSIONER ROBLES

FAX #: (210) 498-0385

FROM: Navy Team, LTCOL BRUBAKER TEL# (703) 696-0504 ext # 188

NUMBER OF PAGES (including cover): 4

COMMENTS: SIR,

ATTACHED YOU'LL FIND THE DRAFT BASE VISIT REPORT FOR NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN. PLEASE REVIEW AT YOUR CONUENIENCE AND COMMENT AS NECESSARY. ONCE I INCORPORATE YOUR CHANGES I'LL PRINT A SMOOTH FOR PUBLICATION.

IF CHANGES (YOURS) ARE INCORPORATED DO YOU WISH TO SEE THE VISIT REPORT AGAIN BEFORE PUBLICATION ?

V/R, JR Brubaker

IF YOU HAVE TROUBLE RECEIVING THIS FAX PLEASE CALL 703-696-0504.

P.S. HOPE YOU FOUND YOUR VISIT TO MERIDIAN SATISFACTORY!

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

APRIL 3, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None.

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader.
LtCol. J.R. Brubaker, DOD Analyst/USMC.
LtCol. M. Beyer, DOD Analyst/USAF.
Elizabeth King, Legal Counsel.
Mark Pross, Senior Analyst/GAO.

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

The Honorable Kirk Fordice, Governor, State of Mississippi.
The Honorable Thad Cochran, United States Senator, State of Mississippi.
The Honorable Trent Lott, United States Senator, State of Mississippi.
The Honorable G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, State of Mississippi.
Major General James H. Garner, USAR, Adjutant General, State of Mississippi.
Mr. John Robert Smith, Mayor of Meridian.
Dr. George Thomas, President, Meridian City Council.
Dr. Hobert Kornegay, President, Lauderdale County Board of Supervisors.
Mr. R. Tucson Roberts, Meridian/Lauderdale County Partnership.
Mr. Bill Crawford, Navy Meridian Team Leader.
Mr. C.D. Smith, Meridian Area Navy League President.
Captain Terry J. Pudas, Commander Training Air Wing ONE.
Captain Robert L. Leitzel, Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Meridian.
Commander Melinda L. Moran, Commanding Officer, Naval Technical Training Center.
Colonel Stephen L. Goff, Commandant Regional Counterdrug Training Academy.

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

To provide facilities and services in support of aviation activities of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities as directed. Intermediate and advanced strike training conducted (jet aircraft).

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi, except retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy facilities which are transferred to the Academy. Relocate the undergraduate strike pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to NAS Kingsville, Texas. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, will close, and its training functions will be relocated to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

The 1993 Commission recommended that Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian remain open because it found that the then-current and future Pilot Training Rate (PTR) required that there be two full-strike training bases, NAS Kingsville, Texas, and NAS Meridian. In the period between 1993 and the present, two factors emerged that required the Department of the Navy again to review the requirement for two such installations. First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the Pilot Training Rate (PTR) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, this consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. Also the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of NAS Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi.
Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC).
Regional Counterdrug Training Academy (RCTA).

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

The Navy reluctantly recommended NAS Meridian for closure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

The Meridian Community obviously is concerned with the impact of losing the Naval Air Station. The local community has assembled a group of individuals, including a former wing commander, to help in their defense of the Air Station and its function of training Student Naval Aviators. They cite concern that the Navy may have miscalculated their capacity analysis including flight operations per Pilot Training Rate and that the Military Value ranking for NAS Meridian, was lower because of a lack of over water airspace in which to conduct flight operations. Obvious concerns around a single site for intermediate and advanced strike training are that the Navy will be potentially operating an airfield at or near 100% capacity with additional safety of flight concerns in that students are heavily involved in flying operations. The operations per PTR that the Meridian Team used were based upon historical T-2/TA-4J operations and the operations per PTR rates for NAS Kingsville were based upon T-45 estimates. The Navy said as a result of the 1995 DOD recommendations, the utilization of NAS Corpus

Christi as an additional Outlying Field for NAS Kingsville, allows the Navy to conduct intermediate/advanced strike training at a single base.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

None, other than those addressed above.

James R. Brubaker/ Navy Team/4-8-95

Draft

DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

ANALYSES

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

(Volume IV)

March 1995

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT F-2

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVAL AIR STATION, MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi, except retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy facilities which are transferred to the Academy. Relocate the undergraduate strike pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, will close, and its training functions will be relocated to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

Justification: The 1993 Commission recommended that Naval Air Station, Meridian remain open because it found that the then-current and future pilot training rate (PTR) required that there be two full-strike training bases, Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas and Naval Air Station, Meridian. In the period between 1993 and the present, two factors emerged that required the Department of the Navy again to review the requirement for two such installations. First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at Naval Air Station, Meridian is similar to that conducted at Naval Air Station, Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Also, the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of Naval Air Station, Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives. The separate recommendation for the consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is being provided to officers.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, the closure of NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect. The total estimated one-time cost to implement these recommendations is $83.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are $33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of $471.2 million.

NAVY INSTALLATION LIST -- BRAC 95

NAVAL BASES

Naval Air Station, North Island, CA
Naval Station, San Diego, CA
Submarine Base, San Diego, CA
Submarine Base, New London, CT
Submarine Base, Kings Bay, GA
(r) Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, HI
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR
Naval Station, Ingleside, TX
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA
Naval Station, Norfolk, VA
Submarine Base, Bangor, WA
Naval Station, Everett, WA

MARINE CORPS BASES

Marine Corps Base, Hawaii, Kaneohe, HI
Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, NC
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA

OPERATIONAL AIR STATIONS

(c) Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK
Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, AZ
(rd)Naval Air Station, Alameda, CA
Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Pendleton, CA
Naval Air Facility, El Centro, CA
(rd)Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA
Naval Air Station, Lemoore, CA
Naval/Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, San Diego, CA
Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, CA
(rd)Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA
(rd)Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL
Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL
(c) Naval Air Station, Key West, FL
Naval Station, Mayport, FL
(rd)Naval Air Station, Agana, GU
(rd)Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe, HI
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, ME
Naval Air Station, Fallon, NV
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC
Marine Corps Air Station, New River, Jacksonville, NC
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR
Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, SC
Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA
Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, WA

RESERVE AIR STATIONS

Naval Air Station, Atlanta, GA
Naval Air Station, New Orleans, LA
(c) Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA
(rd)Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI
Naval Air Station, Willow Grove, PA
Naval Air Station, Fort Worth, TX
Naval Air Facility, Washington, DC

RESERVE ACTIVITIES

286 Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Centers/Commands
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Huntsville, AL
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Pomona, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Santa Ana, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Stockton, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Cadillac, MI
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Staten Island, NY
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Laredo, TX
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Sheboygan, WI
(c) Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, KS
(c) Region Seven, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Charleston, SC
(c) Region Ten, Naval Reserve Readiness Command New Orleans, LA

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Naval Air Station, Whiting Field, Milton, FL
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL
(ce)Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS
(r) Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Air Station, Kingsville, TX

TRAINING/EDUCATIONAL CENTERS

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA
Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, IL
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC
Naval Amphibious School Pacific, Coronado, CA
Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center Pacific, San Diego, CA
Fleet Combat Training Center Pacific, San Diego, CA
Fleet Training Center, San Diego, CA
(rd)Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA
Fleet Training Center, Mayport, FL
(rd)Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Orlando, FL
(rd)Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL
Trident Training Facility, Kings Bay, GA
Fleet Mine Warfare Training Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Amphibious School Atlantic, Little Creek, VA
Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center Atlantic, Norfolk, VA
Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA
Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Virginia Beach, VA
Trident Training Facility, Bangor, WA
Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, CA
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA
Naval Submarine School, New London, CT
Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, FL
Naval Supply Corps School, Athens, GA
(c) Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI
Naval Air Technical Training Center, Millington, TN
AEGIS Training Center, Dahlgren, VA
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD
Naval War College, Newport, RI

NAVAL AVIATION DEPOTS

Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA
Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL
(rd)Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL
Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC

NAVAL SHIPYARDS

(ce)Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
(ce)Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, NH
(rd)Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA
Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA

(c) Closure candidate **(ce) Closure-except candidate**
(r) Realignment candidate **(rd) Redirect candidate**

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI
(McCAIN FIELD)

INSTALLATION REVIEW

Mission:

- To maintain and operate facilities and to provide services and material to support operations of aviation activities and units of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities and units designated by the CNO. Designed specifically for jet pilot training, contains two staggered 8000 foot runways and one 6400 foot crosswind runway. Includes NOLF Joe Williams Field, 19 miles northwest of NAS Meridian which is also 8000 feet long and SEARAY air-to-ground target complex 31 miles to the north. Under an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), CTW-1 and 14th FTW Columbus AFB jointly use OLF GUNSHY located 20 miles northeast.

Where:

- 14 miles northeast of the city of Meridian (population 50,000) on Highway 39N. Meridian, MS is 165 miles southeast of Memphis, TN, and 125 Miles north of Mobile, AL.

Major Units:

- Training Air Wing 1 (CTW-1); Training Squadrons 7 and 19 and 23 (VT-7, VT-19, VT-23); Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC); Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG); and Regional Counterdrug Training Academy.

    - CTW-1: Immediate superior in command to the Commanding Officer of the naval air station, training squadrons, and other facilities as may be placed under his cognizance. Administers, coordinates, and supervises flight and academic training and support conducted by three subordinate squadrons as directed by the Chief of Naval Air Training.
    - VT-7: Advanced Strike Training flying the TA-4J Skyhawk (74 aircraft).
    - VT-19/VT-23 Intermediate Strike Training flying the T-2C Buckeye. (83 aircraft).
    - NTTC: Navy's primary training facility for enlisted administrative and supply class "A" schools, which are for personnel enroute to their first command after completing recruit training. Advanced schools include Yeoman "C" Flagwriter and Religious Program Specialist.

    MATSG: Provides all similar Marine Corps training in supply, administrative, and related ratings.

Environmental/Encroachment Issues:

- Meridian has no major environmental issues. Evaluated sites have not been listed on the National Priorities List. There are no existing or anticipated encroachment issues. There are existing AICUZ ordnance's in place at both the main installation and the Navy owned outlying field.

Population:

- 1,800 active duty; 1,200 family members; 1,400 civilians, which include both DON employees and civilian contract aircraft maintenance employees.

Housing:

- 144 officer family units; 376 enlisted family units; 121 BOQ spaces; 2056 BEQ spaces.

Temporary Lodging:

- 6 distinguished visitor units; 49 visiting officer units; 34 visiting enlisted units; 28 temporary lodging facilities.

Commissary/Exchange Mall Complex:

- Contains separate Navy Exchange Retail Store, Commissary. Laundry/Dry Cleaners, Uniform Store, Banking Facility, Barber/Beauty Shop. McDonald's Restaurant, Movie Theater and Bowling Alley.

Schools:

- In Meridian and Lauderdale County school districts. Enrollment currently below capacity. Five institutions of higher learning. Undergraduate and Graduate courses are available on-site and in the local community.

Health Care:

- Clinic only. Closest naval hospital is Pensacola Naval Hospital (150 air miles). The community of Meridian serves as a regional medical hub for eastern Mississippi and western Alabama. There are 3 major hospitals located in the City of Meridian.

Community Support:

- NAS Meridian is Lauderdale County's largest employer.

Key Personnel and Phone Numbers:

- Mayor of Meridian:
  John Robert Smith 601-485-1927

- President, Meridian City Council:
  Dr. George Thomas 601-483-8502

- President, Lauderdale County Board of Supervisors:
  Dr. Hobert Kornegay 601-482-9746

- Meridian/Lauderdale County Partnership:
  R. Tucson Roberts 601-693-1306

- Navy Meridian Team Leader:
  Bill Crawford 601-484-7725

- Meridian Area Navy League President:
  C.D. Smith 601-693-8917

Military Personnel and Phone Numbers:

- Commander Training Air Wing ONE
  Captain Terry J. Pudas 601-679-2148/2193

- Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Meridian
  Captain Robert L. Leitzel 601-679-2111/2112

- Commanding Officer, Naval Technical Training Center
  Commander Melinda L. Moran 601-679-2161

- Commanding Officer, Marine Aviation Training Support Group
  Major Edwin L. Koehler 601-679-2190

- Commandant Regional Counterdrug Training Academy
  Colonel Stephen L. Goff 601-679-2063

MAP NO. 25

MISSISSIPPI



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

MISSISSIPPI

FISCAL YEAR 1994 (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

Personnel/Expenditures	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
I. Personnel - Total	51,283	24,692	8,742	17,383	466
Active Duty Military	12,648	432	3,083	9,133	0
Civilian	10,881	4,511	2,810	3,094	466
Reserve & National Guard	27,754	19,749	2,849	5,156	0
II. Expenditures - Total	$3,101,375	$563,217	$1,820,939	$581,518	$135,701
A. Payroll Outlays - Total	1,246,254	341,386	419,737	471,178	13,953
Active Duty Military Pay	444,683	16,173	217,152	211,358	0
Civilian Pay	385,165	162,356	116,731	92,125	13,953
Reserve & National Guard Pay	113,715	86,365	2,046	25,304	0
Retired Military Pay	302,691	76,492	83,808	142,391	0
B. Prime Contracts Over $25,000 Total	1,855,121	221,831	1,401,202	110,340	121,748
Supply and Equipment Contracts	1,395,771	7,200	1,262,441	6,415	119,715
RDT&E Contracts	18,000	3,307	13,776	917	0
Service Contracts	326,760	104,478	117,400	102,849	2,033
Construction Contracts	16,160	8,416	7,585	159	0
Civil Function Contracts	98,430	98,430	0	0	0

Major Locations of Expenditures	Expenditures			Major Locations of Personnel	Military and Civilian Personnel		
	Total	Payroll Outlays	Prime Contracts		Total	Active Duty Military	Civilian
Pascagoula	$1,324,136	$106,549	$1,217,587	Keesler AFB	9,862	7,466	2,396
Biloxi	343,905	290,841	53,064	Vicksburg	3,065	69	2,996
Gulfport	240,798	146,103	94,695	Meridian	2,342	1,690	652
Madison	151,778	1,865	149,913	Columbus AFB	1,795	1,377	418
Vicksburg	150,496	121,921	28,575	Gulfport	1,600	839	761
Meridian	101,447	87,602	13,845	Bay St. Louis	1,399	84	1,315
Columbus AFB	86,032	46,804	39,228	Pascagoula	1,007	396	611
Bay St. Louis	76,289	74,864	1,425	Jackson	415	181	234
Jackson	53,452	38,402	15,050	Flowood	356	0	356
Terza	42,434	0	42,434	Biloxi	303	268	35

Prime Contracts Over $25,000 (Prior Three Years)	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
Fiscal Year 1993	$1,575,387	$254,365	$1,000,151	$116,783	$204,088
Fiscal Year 1992	2,566,969	295,282	2,062,956	103,875	104,856
Fiscal Year 1991	1,792,342	247,054	1,304,972	108,981	131,335

Top Five Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards in this State	Total Amount	Major Area of Work	
		FSC or Service Code Description	Amount
1. LITTON INDUSTRIES INC	$1,189,519	Amphibious Assault Ships	$744,485
2. RAYTHEON COMPANY	166,686	Maint & Repair of Eq/Miscellaneous Equipme	95,798
3. TRINITY INDUSTRIES INC	80,281	Special Service Vessels	79,130
4. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION	39,870	Torpedo Inert Components	39,870
5. BARRETT REFINING CORPORATION	38,358	Liquid Propellants & Fuel, Petroleum Base	36,489
Total of Above	$1,514,714	(81.7% of total awards over $25,000)	

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Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI

28-Mar-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A						
	MISSISSIPPI ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	90	PRESS	COMPLETE	LAYAWAY	1990 PRESS: Layaway; completed FY 92.
AF						
	ALLEN C THOMPSON FIELD AGS					
	COLUMBUS AFB					
	GULFPORT/BILOXI MAP AGS					
	KEESLER AFB	88/91	REFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	1988 DEFBRAC: Directed realigning 22 courses (including avionics and weather equipment maintenance, weather-satellite system , and photo-interpretation training) from Closing Chanute AFB, IL to Keesler AFB. Other courses to Sheppard (52), Goodfellow (25), and Lowry (45) AFBs. (See 1991 DBCRC). 1991 DBCRC: Directed all technical training from Closing Lowry AFB, CO be redistributed to the remaining technical training centers or relocated to other locations.
	KEY FIELD AGS					
N						
	NAS MERIDIAN	93	DBCRC	CANCELLED	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Rejected OSD's recommendation to close NAS Meridian and relocate the advanced strike training t NAS Kingsville, TX.
	NAV CONST BN CTR, GULFPORT					
	NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE					
	NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA					

33RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

GANNETT NEWS SERVICE

February 17, 1995, Friday

LENGTH: 745 words

HEADLINE: MONTGOMERY 'LESS OPTIMISTIC' ABOUT MERIDIAN'S FUTURE

BYLINE: DENNIS CAMIRE; Gannett News Service

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Rep. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, D-Miss., said Friday he was "not as optimistic" as he was three weeks ago about keeping Meridian Naval Air Station off the Pentagon's list of military bases it will recommend for closing.

"There were indications only recently that Meridian would be secure because it is the most modern training base, the top Navy officials who visited Meridian were impressed, and he importance of the counter-drug school," said Montgomery, a senior member of the House National Security Committee.

"However, due to a shortage of money, overcapacity for pilot training and overall downsizing of the military, the Navy, Air Force and Army have been told to reassess the military value of the base."

Visitors to the base have included Navy Secretary John Dalton; Adm. Jeremy Boorda, chief of naval operations; and Charles Fakos, vice chairman of the Navy's base structure and evaluation committee.

Several praised Meridian, which has 3,662 military and civilian personnel, after their visits, leading supporters to believe Meridian could stay off the base closing list.

But despite that, Montgomery is concerned Meridian will be on the list that Defense Secretary William Perry will send to the federal base closing commission Feb. 28.

The list - Navy, Army and Air Force recommendations to Perry for his final decision - is expected to include some 60 major domestic military bases and 100 smaller facilities.

Public hearings will begin March 1. The commission will make its recommendations to President Clinton by June 30. he commission can add to or subtract from the Pentagon list.

This will be the third and final round of base closings under the current law.

The importance of the Pentagon's list was underscored earlier this month when

the commission's staff director, David Lyles, said the best way to stay off the commission's final list of recommended closings was to stay off the Defense Department list in the first place.

Lyles said commissioners are likely to approve most, but not all, the Pentagon recommendations this year. During the previous rounds, the commission approved about 80 percent of Pentagon recommendations.

"In both cases, a large percentage of the recommendations by the Department of Defense have, in fact, been endorsed by the commission and forwarded on to the president," Lyles said.

Montgomery said the list is being finalized this week and the services were being told to take another look at their recommendations "and scrub a little more."

"I was hoping that what we had done and all would keep us off the list," he said. "I'm not sure that it's going to do that. They're looking to close more training bases - this overcapacity. We picked that up, and that is what has me worried."

Meridian was put on the recommended closing list in 1991 by the base closing commission and in 1993 by the Pentagon. Both times, the base's supporters managed to persuade the commission to keep the base open.

Since 1993, Montgomery, Republican Sens. Thad Cochran and Trent Lott and local supporters in the Navy Meridian Team have been working to keep the base off the Pentagon's 1995 list.

"We've been working to educate people in the Navy about the value of the base," said Bill Crawford, who heads up the Navy Meridian Team.

The team - backed by Meridian, the Lauderdale County Board of Suprvisors, the Meridian-Lauderdale County Partnership and the Meridian Area Navy Leaue - also has hired a Washington-based consultant and is planning to spend up to $ 250,000 to fight for the base this year.

"We pretty much operate from here from a worst case scenerio," Crawford said. "We've been attacked in 1991. We've been listed in 1993, so we're ging into 1995 expecting the worst. Anything better than that will just be fantastic."

Crawford said rumors have been flying about Meridian.

"Indications ebb and flow and change directions so fast we don't pay any attention to them," he said. "You take it all with a grain of salt and just keep on keeping on."

The group already has traveled to Washington to visit with the base closing commission staff and plans to come back up after new commissioners are confirmed by the Senate.

Crawford said the team's argument will be about the same as the last time - Meridian is one of the best bases.

"We think the facts will show that," he said. "All we ask is that final

decisions be based on objective, fair consideration of the facts. We'll live with that."

23RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

The Commercial Appeal (Memphis)

February 26, 1995, Sunday, First Edition

SECTION: METRO, Pg. 1B

LENGTH: 842 words

HEADLINE: Miss., Ark. leaders to fight base closings

BYLINE: The Associated Press

BODY:
Leaders in Meridian, Miss., and Fort Smith, Ark., say they plan to fight plans for closing military posts near their towns.

A draft version of the Pentagon's base closure list to be issued Tuesday targets Fort Chaffee, a 72,000-acre Army training facility near Fort Smith with about 1,000 jobs, and the Meridian Naval Air Station, which employs about 3,200.

The Pentagon's recommendations go before the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which can alter the list. Then the entire list must be accepted or rejected by the president and Congress.

Political and economic pressures kept the draft list shorter than many expected, sparing facilities in politically important states while recommending more realignments (shifts in duties) than outright closures.

The Mississippi and Arkansas posts have been on the closure list before.

Fort Chaffee, on the original list in 1991, was realigned in 1993, losing the Joint Readiness Training Command to Fort Polk, La., in 1993. Meridian, considered for the 1991 list, was placed on the 1993 list but escaped closure.

''Meridian is ready to mount the fight to stay open,'' said Meridian Mayor John Robert Smith. ''We'll hit the ground running March 1.''

Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce President Billy Dooly said Saturday that the Army has been ''less than direct'' on plans for the post, which trains active duty, reserve and National Guard personel.

''It's kind of old and new news, the same old story.'' Dooly said. ''It's reason for concern, but not over-reaction. That's kind of the approach we're taking.''

Staff Sgt. David Melancon, a Fort Chaffee spokesman, said base officials consider closure talk rumor now.

''It was just people in Washington flapping their gums,'' Melancon said Saturday.

The chamber and other local officials have actively lobbied the Pentagon on Chaffee's behalf, he said.

[redacted]ooly has met with three different secretaries of the Army over the ye[redacted]s.

''We've taken our case there. We do have our congressional delegation fully behind'' the post, he said.

About 60,000 active and reserve Army and National Guard soldiers will train at Fort Chaffee during fiscal 1995.

''It's like another manufacturer,'' Dooly said.

Meridian, a city of about 41,000 residents, plans to use its community-based group, Navy Meridian Team, to help avoid closure, Smith said.

U.S. Rep. G. V. ''Sonny'' Montgomery (D-Miss.), former chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, said the community will look at the Navy's justification for closing the base, then present arguments of its own.

Montgomery said the group will point out that bases ranked lower than Meridian were not recommended for closure. They also plan to show the potential for a joint air training program with other bases, including the Columbus Air Force Base in Columbus, Miss.

[redacted]ssissippi's four other bases have been spared so far. In addition to t[redacted]olumbus facility, the other bases are Gulfport Naval Construction Battalion Center, Pascagoula Naval Station, and Keesler Air Force Base.

Navy Meridian Team member Bill Crawford said closing the base would devastate the community since the base is responsible for more than $ 50 million in payrolls per year.

''You take $ 50 million out of a small economy like ours . . . it's going to impact businesses significantly. Those dollars don't flow through the economy. It ultimately affects the entire economy.''

Smith said the base is the area's single largest employer.

''Certainly there will be the initial hit of job loss plus the multiplier effect from those jobs,'' he said. ''But there is a greater loss for us than just the economic loss.

''We'll lose the opportunity to . . . have those people return to Meridian in their retirement years. The economic loss we'll recover from faster than that loss.''

The proposed shutdowns awaiting approval by Defense Secretary William Perry include none of the huge bases that formed the bulk of earlier cuts.

[redacted]his year's draft list spares Senate Mrity Leader Bob Dole's home-s[redacted] Army post, Fort Riley, Kan., and protects facilities in the all-important presidential election states of New Hampshire and California.

The economics of base closing also worked against a longer hit list. Shutting down bases carries high up-front costs. Typically, the break-even p[illegible]t comes seven or eight years after a base is ordered closed.

Texas appears to be one of the hardest-hit states in this round.

On the closure list are the Red River Army Depot at Texarkana, with about 3,500 jobs, Reese Air Force Base near Lubbock, with 1,700 jobs, and Brooks Air Force Base, in San Antonio, with more than 4,500 jobs.

The Pentagon is also proposing to relocate the Navy's air station at Corpus Christi to Pensacola, Fla., at a cost of about 700 jobs.

LOAD-DATE-MDC: February 28, 1995

102ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

GANNETT NEWS SERVICE

February 28, 1995, Tuesday

LENGTH: 811 words

HEADLINE: MERIDIAN AGAIN LANDS ON BASE-CLOSING LIST

BYLINE: DENNIS CAMIRE; Gannett News Service

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:
The Pentagon recommended Tuesday that Meridian Naval Air Station be closed, with a loss of 2,581 military and civilian jobs - the third time in four years the base's future has been threatened.

But Meridian was the only one of Mississippi's defense establishments targeted on the Defense Department's list of rmmended base closings and realignments.

On the up side, the list, which now goes to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, also calls for sending another 155 military and 201 civilian jobs to Columbus Air Force Base and 36 civilian jobs to the Naval Oceanographic Office in Bay St. Louis.

[redacted] have mixed emotions about the 1995 base closure list," said Rep. G.V. "S[redacted]y" Montgomery, D-Miss., who led the fight to save Meridian in 1991 and 1993 base closing battles.

"I am obviously pleased that Columbus Air Force Base is not on it and disappointed that Meridian Naval Air Station is on it."

Montgomery isn't alone. The state's whole congressional delegation is gearing up again to fight the Meridian recommendation.

Sen. Thad Cochran, R-Miss., said having Meridian on the list again "feels like this is double jeopardy to me."

"We've tried this case on two different occasions ... and we've won it both times," he said. "We've got to try the case again. We think it's a very important national security asset, and the facts will prove it."

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., said he was "obviously happy" that South Mississippi military bases didn't take any hits.

But "I hate to see any installation in Mississippi closed," he said. "Sonny has performed a near miracle twice in getting it off the list. For my part, I will do what I can to help."

Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., said he talked to Navy Secretary John Dalton about th[redacted]eridian issue Tuesday.

GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, February 28, 1995

"He made it very clear the Navy really does not want to do that (close Meridian)," Lott said. "They are continuing to look at the possibility of some d[redacted] or cross-training between the Air Force and the Navy."

[redacted]Under that concept, Meridian would score higher than several Air Force bases, Lott said.

"We're going to continue to pursue that possibility," Lott said. "We certainly would prefer that Meridian Naval Air Station not be on the list, but we've been through this twice before, and we should prepare to make our case for Meridian once again."

The list recommends 146 shutdowns and realignments for the fourth and final round of base closings since 1988.

The eight-member commission will have until July 1 to send its recommendations to President Clinton. The commission has the power to add to the list or delete bases from it.

The report accompanying the Pentagon list noted the 1993 base closing commission kept Meridian open because the future pilot training rate required two full-strike training bases - Meridian and the Naval Air Station at Kingsville, Texas.

But the current military force structure plan shows a declining need for pilot training, particularly since aircraft carrier air wings have declined from 1[redacted] 10, the report said. That means a single base could handle training.

[redacted]efense policy also calls for consolidating pilot training, the report said.

Kingsville, which performs similar training, has a higher military value, presently modern T-45 primary strike training aircraft and access to larger amounts of - and over-water - air space, the report said.

Meridian also showed up in each of the alternatives developed by a special group studying cross-service undergraduate pilot training, the report said.

Another recommendation calls for consolidating the Naval Technical Training Center from Meridian to the Navy Supply School at Athens, Ga., and the Naval Education and Training Center in Newport, R.I.

The $ 83.4 million cost of closing Meridian includes two other actions involving naval air stations at Corpus Christi, Texas, and Alameda, Calif.

That will produce a total savings of $ 158.8 million over the next six years and $ 33.4 million annually afterward.

Meridian's closing means the direct loss of 1,643 military and 947 civilian jobs and an indirect loss of another 743 jobs. That's an 8 percent loss of employment in the Lauderdale County area.

On the other hand, the station's closing would have a "generally positive ef[redacted]t on the environment," the report said.

[redacted]

Montgomery said that in the fight to save Meridian, "we are going to be stressing the concept of joint training" by combining Air Force and Navy operations.

Meridian might be joined with Pensacola Naval Air Station or with Whiting Field near Pensacola, Montgomery said. Another possibility is joining Meridian with Columbus Air Force Base, he said.

"It makes a lot of sense if the goal is to save money," he said. "They use the same bombing range and some of the same airspace. The services didn't give this as much consideration as they should have."

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 2, 1995

33RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

GANNETT NEWS SERVICE

March 6, 1995, Monday

LENGTH: 624 words

HEADLINE: NAVY SECRETARY SEEKING NEW ROLE FOR MERIDIAN NAS

BYLINE: DENNIS CAMIRE; Gannett News Service

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:
Navy Secretary John Dalton said Monday the Navy wants to find another use for Meridian Naval Air Station even while recommending the base be closed in the latest round of base closings.

Dalton and other Navy officials said they asked the defense secretary to consider the possibility of joint pilot training by combining Meridian's operations with those at Columbus Air Force Base or some other military installations in the region.

That option is "still under review" by the Defense Department, although the department has moved ahead with the Navy's recommendation that Meridian be closed, Dalton said.

"It's a tough decision we made and one that I regretted because I have great admiration for Meridian Miss., and the people there and the naval air station there," said Dalton after a base closing commission hearing Monday.

"But we do have the problem of having to reduce our infrastructure and eliminate things that are not needed and not necessary. Unfortunately, Meridian Naval Air Station falls in that category."

Rep. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, D-Miss., whose district includes Meridian, said the Navy believed the joint training idea had merit and the Defense Department needs to be prodded into making it happen.

The Air Force turned it down, Montgomery said, and the Defense Department didn't get any facts or figures to push it with, Montgomery said.

The Pentagon recommended last week that Meridian be closed with a loss of 2,581 military and civilian jobs - the third time in four years the base's future has been threatened. It is the only Mississippi facility on the base closing list, which recommends 146 shutdowns and realignments across the country.

Base Closing Commissioner Rebecca Cox, a member of the 1993 base closing commission, asked Dalton why Meridian was being recommended for closure after the 1993 commission had left it open - despite a Pentagon request to shut it down - along with the Naval Air Station at Kingsville, Texas.

Both stations carry out undergraduate pilot training.

Dalton said the Navy recommended Meridian's closing because "there is no longer a need for a second strike training air station."

[redacted]lton said continued downsizing of the Navy, including a reduction to 10 fr[redacted]11 air wings, and smaller number of aircraft were the main reasons behind the recommendation.

When asked why Kingsville was better, Dalton said it was a question of air space, both over land and water, and the availability of more modern T-45 training aircraft and their support equipment.

"It's a combination of factors that lead the military value decisions that we made," he said. "The military value was higher at Kingsville than Meridian."

Charles Nemfakos, vice chairman of the Navy's base structure evaluation committee, said that in the 1993 base closing round, the Navy looked at installations in the context of regional military complexes, such as the one in south Texas that includes Kingsville.

"As we went through this time, one of the things that became obvious was that in essence central Mississippi is a regional complex," he said. "But central Mississippi isn't a Navy regional complex. It's a Department of Defense regional complex."

That's why Dalton suggested the Defense Department look at the joint operations option before signing off on the final base closing recommendations sent to the commission, Nemfakos said.

[redacted] think the office of the secretary of defense looked at it, and they felt there was not an overwhelming case to be made for keeping that regional complex," he said.

The eight-member base closing commission has until July 1 to send its recommendations to President Clinton. The commission has the power to add to the list or delete bases from it.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 8, 1995

[redacted]

Commander Training Air Wing One

DATE: 31 MAR 95

FROM: CAPT PUDAS
NUMBER OF PAGES: 14
OFFICE CODE: 00
TO: Lt Col BRUBAKER
FAX PHONE #: 601-679-2967
OFFICE CODE:
OFFICE PHONE: 601-679-2148
FAX PHONE #: 703-696-0550
VOICE PHONE #: 703-696-0504

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Revision As of 1400 31 MAR 95
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VR, Bev

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER TRAINING AIR WING ONE
101 FULLER ROAD SUITE 250
MERIDIAN MS 39309-5403

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5050
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31 Mar 95
Rev #1

MEMORANDUM

From: Commander Training Air Wing ONE
To: Distribution

Subj: DISTINGUISHED GUEST VISIT

Ref: (a) COMTRAWINGONEINST 5050.1C

Encl: (1) Schedule of Events/Attendees
(2) VIP Staff Personnel
(3) Ground Transportation Plan
(4) CTW-1 Aerial Tour C-12
(5) MG Robles Luncheon/Schedule of Events

1. Per reference (a), the following information is promulgated:

a. Major General Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr. USA (Ret)
Commissioner, Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission (DBCRC)

The Honorable Kirk Fordice
Governor, State of Mississippi

The Honorable Thad Cochran, United States Senator
State of Mississippi

The Honorable Trent Lott, United States Senator
State of Mississippi

The Honorable G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Congressman
State of Mississippi, 3rd Congressional District

Major General James H. Garner, USAR
The Adjutant General State of Mississippi

b. Date of visit: 3 April 95

c. Method, place, and time of arrival: 3 April 95

General Robles: C-26, Base Ops, 0900

Governor Fordice & MG Garner: King Air, Base Ops, 1200

Senator Cochran: POV, Base Ops, 0845

Senator Lott: POV, Base Ops, 0845

Congressman Montgomery: POV, Base Ops, 0845

Subj: DISTINGUISHED GUEST VISIT

d. Method, place, and time of departure: 3 April 95

General Robles: C-26, Base Ops, 1545

Governor Fordice & MG Garner: King Air, Base Ops, 1430

Senator Cochran: C-20, Base Ops, 1430

Senator Lott: C-20, Base Ops, 1430

Congressman Montgomery: C-20, Base Ops, 1430

e. Purpose of visit: Defense Base Closure and Realignment

f. Itinerary: See enclosure (1)
Additional staff visitors are listed in enclosure (2)

g. Visit coordinator/host and phone number:
CDR Cramer, DSN 637-2193, Commercial (601) 679-2193
CDR Ingram, DSN 637-2112, Commercial (601) 679-2112

h. Plan of the Day: Normal work day

i. Request NAS Meridian provide the following services:

(1) Welcome Aboard Announcement:

(a) Main Gate: Yes
(b) Air Operations: Yes

(2) Parking/Crowd Control: Coordinate with Partnership

- Security plan
- Designated parking areas
- Overflow designated parking areas

(3) Transportation:

Vans: 3 minivans/1 maxivan (all with VIP plates)
C12: For aerial tour of outlying facilities
HH-1N: Backup for C12
Courtesy Cars: Coordinate with Partnership
Pre stage at Base Operations

(4) Lakeside Club:

(a) CTW-1 Briefing - fruit/danish platter, coffee/juice/ice tea with setups by 0815
Number attending: 20 (CTW-1 Conf Rm)

(b) Luncheon Number attending: 150

Subj: DISTINGUISHED GUEST VISIT

(5) Uniform: Summer Whites

(6) PAO:

(a) Coordinate press coverage of Commissioner's arrival

(b) Coordinate press coverage of luncheon

(c) Prepare press availability area (Lobby of Base Operations)

(7) BOQ: 5 VIP suites for DBCRC staff

2. Other specific guidance: On 3 April, all activities minimize shipment arrivals/travel on station during the hours of 0900-1300.

T. J. PUDAS

Distribution:
COMTRAWING ONE
CO, NAS Meridian
CO, TRARON SEVEN
CO, TRARON NINETEEN
CO, TRARON TWENTY-THREE
CO, NTTC
CO, RCTA
Wing CMC
Wing OPS
Wing Maintenance
Wing Administration
NAS CDO
NAS PWO
NAS Security
NAS PAO
NAS MWR/Lakeside Club
NAS OPS

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS/ATTENDEES

3 APRIL 95

0900	MAJOR GENERAL ROBLES ARRIVES NAS MERIDIAN BASE OPERATIONS MET BY CTW-1, CO NASMER, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT (PRESS COVERAGE ONLY) VAN TRANSPORTATION TO HANGAR SEE ENCLOSURE (3)
0910-1000	COMMAND BRIEF/PRESENTATION COMTRAWINGONE CONFERENCE ROOM (HANGAR) MG ROBLES, CTW-1, CO NASMER, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT, DBCRC STAFF, OLA STAFF, OTHERS TBD
1005-1050	AERIAL TOUR OF NAS OUTLYING FACILITIES MG ROBLES, CTW-1, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, LTCOL BRUBAKER, MR. YELLIN, LTCOL BEYER (SEE ENCLOSURE (4))
	SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT, AND VIP STAFF SIMULATOR/TRAINING BUILDING TOUR WITH CO NASMER AND OTHERS TBD (SEE ENCLOSURE (3))
1030	COMMUNITY SUPPORTERS IN PLACE ALONG MOTORCADE ROUTE
1055-1110	WINDSHIELD TOUR CENTROID AREA (SEE ENCLOSURE (3))
1110-1140	WINDSHIELD TOUR MAINSIDE/HOUSING (SEE ENCLOSURE (3)) (MOTORCADE ALONG ROUTE LINED WITH COMMUNITY SUPPORTERS)
1200	GOVERNOR FORDICE AND MG GARNER ARRIVE BASE OPERATIONS MET BY CTW-1 CHIEF STAFF OFFICER/ESCORTED TO LUNCHEON VIA MISSISSIPPI STATE TROOPER VEHICLE
1145-1215	REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG TRAINING ACADEMY BRIEF/TOUR MG ROBLES, COLONEL GOFF, CTW-1, CO NASMER, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT, DBCRC STAFF, OLA STAFF, OTHERS TBD
1220-1320	LUNCH AT LAKESIDE CLUB (150 GUESTS) (PRESS COVERAGE ONLY) SEATING ARRANGEMENTS/SCHEDULE OF EVENTS (SEE ENCLOSURE (5))

Duty Car

Stennis Center

1325-1355	NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER BRIEF/TOUR MG ROBLES, CDR MORAN, CTW-1, CO NASMER, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT, GOVERNOR FORDICE, DBCRC STAFF, OLA STAFF, GOVERNOR'S STAFF
1400-1415	PRE-DEPARTURE WRAP-UP DISCUSSIONS (BASE OPERATIONS VIP LOUNGE) MG ROBLES, CTW-1, CO NASMER, CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY, SENATOR COCHRAN, SENATOR LOTT, GOVERNOR FORDICE, OTHERS TBD
1415-1430	MEDIA AVAILABILITY (BASE OPERATIONS LOBBY)
1430	CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION DEPARTS
1435	GOVERNOR FORDICE AND MG GARNER DEPARTS
1445-1515	COMMUNITY PRESENTATION (CTW-1 COMMAND SUITE) MG ROBLES, CTW-1, MR. YELLIN, LTCOL BRUBAKER, MR. BILL CRAWFORD, PLUS 3 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES, OTHERS TBD
1530	MAJOR GENERAL ROBLES DEPARTS FOR BIRMINGHAM

VIP STAFF PERSONNEL

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

		ARRIVAL	DEPARTURE
MR. YELLIN	NAVY TEAM LEADER	1300, 2 APR	1545, 3 APR
LTCOL BRUBAKER	DOD ANALYST/USMC	1300, 2 APR	TBD, 4 APR
LTCOL BEYER	DOD ANALYST/USAF	1800, 2 APR	TBD, 4 APR
MR. PROSS	SENIOR ANALYST/GAO	1800, 2 APR	TBD, 4 APR
MS. KING	LEGAL COUNSEL	1800, 1 APR	1545, 3 APR

*CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION AND OLA STAFF WILL ARRIVE 3 APR C-20 0830 AT BASE OPERATIONS/DEPART C-20 AT 1430

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

MR. SAM ADCOCK	SENATOR LOTT'S OFFICE
~~MR. MITCH RUGLER~~ TBD	~~SENATOR COCHRAN'S OFFICE~~
MR. KYLE STEWARD	CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY'S OFFICE

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
Captain Bill Lewis
CDR SEAN FOGARTY
CDR DILLARD GEORGE

*GOVERNOR, MG GARNER AND STAFF WILL ARRIVE BASE OPERATIONS 3 APR 1200 BY KING AIR AIRCRAFT/DEPART BASE OPERATIONS 3 APR 1435 BY KING AIR

GOVERNOR KIRK FORDICE	STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
MG JAMES H. GARNER, USAR	THE ADJUTANT GENERAL STATE OF MS
MR. JIMMY HEIDEL	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (DECD)
COL NICK ARDILLO (RET)	DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
COL FLO YOSTE (RET)	DECD
MS. JOHNNA VAN	PRESS SECRETARY
MR. RICHARD KALDON	STATE PILOT
TBD	SECURITY

GROUND TRANSPORTATION PLAN

0900 BASE OPERATIONS TO HANGAR

MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. YELLIN
MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- SENATOR COCHRAN
		- SENATOR LOTT
		- MR. ADCOCK
		- ~~MR. KUGLER~~ Capt Lewis
MAXIVAN	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- LTCOL BEYER
		- MR. PROSS
		- MS. KING
		- CDR FOGARTY
		- CDR GEORGE
		- MR. STEWARD

1000 HANGAR TO BASE OPERATIONS FOR C-12 AERIAL TOUR

MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. YELLIN

1000 HANGAR TO SIMULATOR BUILDING FOR TOUR

MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- SENATOR COCHRAN
		- SENATOR LOTT
		- MR. ADCOCK
		- ~~MR. KUGLER~~ Capt Lewis
MAXIVAN	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- LTCOL BEYER (C-12 TOUR)
		- MR. PROSS
		- MS. KING
		- CDR FOGARTY
		- CDR GEORGE
		- MR. STEWARD

1055 WINDSHIELD TOUR CENTROID/MAINSIDE/HOUSING
DEPART BASE OPERATIONS (MOTORCADE)

VEHICLE #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- SENATOR COCHRAN
		- SENATOR LOTT
VEHICLE #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
	PASSENGERS	- MAYOR SMITH
		- SUPERVISOR KORNEGAY
		- SUPERVISOR VANDEVENDER
MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
	PASSENGERS	- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. YELLIN
		- LTCOL BEYER
MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- LCDR DOWTY
	PASSENGERS	- MR. PROSS
		- MS. KING
MAXIVAN	DRIVER	- MAJOR MACDOUGALL
	PASSENGERS	- MR. ADCOCK
		- ~~MR. KUGLER~~ Capt Lewis
		- CDR FOGARTY
		- CDR GEORGE
		- MR. STEWARD

1200 GOVERNOR FORDICE AND MG GARNER MET BY CDR CRAMER (CTW-1 CSO) ESCORTED TO LUNCHEON VIA MISSISSIPPI STATE TROOPER VEHICLE WITH COL ARDILLO AND MR. HEIDEL

MINIVAN #3	DRIVER	- LCDR KAY
	PASSENGERS	- COL YOSTE
		- MR. KALDON
		- MS. VAN
		- GOV SECURITY

1320 LAKESIDE CLUB TO NTTC

MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
		- GOVERNOR FORDICE
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER

	MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
		PASSENGERS	- SENATOR COCHRAN
			- SENATOR LOTT
			- MR. ADCOCK
			- ~~MR. KUGLER~~ Capt Lewis
	MINIVAN #3	DRIVER	- LCDR KAY
		PASSENGERS	- MR. HEIDEL
			- COL ARDILLO
			- COL YOSTE
			- MS. VAN
	MAXIVAN	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
		PASSENGERS	- MR. YELLIN
			- LTCOL BEYER
			- MR. PROSS
			- MS. KING
			- CDR FOGARTY
			- CDR GEORGE
			- MR. STEWARD
			- MR. KALDON
			- GOV SECURITY
1355	NTTC TO BASE OPERATIONS		
	MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
		PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
			- CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY
			- GOVERNOR FORDICE
			- LTCOL BRUBAKER
	MINIVAN #2	DRIVER	- CAPT LEITZEL
		PASSENGERS	- SENATOR COCHRAN
			- SENATOR LOTT
			- MR. ADCOCK
			- ~~MR. KUGLER~~ Capt Lewis
	MINIVAN #3	DRIVER	- LCDR KAY
		PASSENGERS	- MR. HEIDEL
			- COL ARDILLO
			- COL YOSTE
			- MS. VAN
	MAXIVAN	DRIVER	- CDR MOORE
		PASSENGERS	- MR. YELLIN
			- LTCOL BEYER
			- MR. PROSS
			- MS. KING
			- CDR FOGARTY
			- CDR GEORGE
			- MR. STEWARD
			- MR. KALDON
			- GOV SECURITY

1435 BASE OPERATIONS TO HANGAR

MINIVAN #1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. YELLIN

1520 HANGAR TO BASE OPERATIONS

MINIVAN#1	DRIVER	- CAPT PUDAS
	PASSENGERS	- MG ROBLES
		- LTCOL BRUBAKER
		- MR. YELLIN

CTW-1 AERIAL TOUR - C-12 (03APR95)



ENCLOSURE (4)

MG ROBLES LUNCHEON 03 APR 95



FRONT

LUNCHEON HEAD TABLE

PRESIDENT KEMPER COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS	MERIDIAN MAYOR	CTW-1	SENATOR	CONGRESSMAN	DBCRC COMMISSIONER	GOVERNOR	SENATOR	CO NASMER	PRESIDENT LAUDERDALE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
ROY VANDEVENDER	JOHN ROBERT SMITH	CAPT TERRY PUDAS	THAD COCHRAN	G. V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY	MG ROBLES	KIRK FORDICE	TRENT LOTT	CAPT ROBERT LEITZEL	DOCTOR HOBERT KORNEGAY

ENCLOSURE (5)

LUNCHEON SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

1200-1215	GUESTS ARRIVE AND ARE SEATED
1220	OFFICIAL PARTY ARRIVES MET IN LOBBY BY MISSISSIPPI GOVERNOR KIRK FORDICE; MERIDIAN MAYOR JOHN ROBERT SMITH; PRESIDENT OF THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, DR. HOBERT KORNEGAY; AND PRESIDENT OF THE KEMPER COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, ROY VANDEVENDER
	PROCEED TO HEAD TABLE
	WELCOME - CAPTAIN PUDAS
	BLESSING - CDR JOHN SAUNDERS, NAS CHAPLAIN
TIME TBD	CAPT PUDAS RECOGNIZE CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY FOR REMARKS AND INTRODUCTION OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS
1320	CLOSING REMARKS CAPT LEITZEL, CO NAS MERIDIAN

Commander Training Air Wing One

FROM: Bev Heimann
OFFICE CODE: 005
FAX PHONE #: 601-679-2967
OFFICE PHONE: 601-679-2498

DATE: 31 MAR 95
NUMBER OF PAGES: 2
TO: Lt Col BRUBAKER
OFFICE CODE:
FAX PHONE #: 703-696-0550
VOICE PHONE #: 703-696-0504

READINESS FOR VICTORY AT SEA

1

TRAINING

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DBCRC STAFF BILLETING

	ROOM	PHONE NUMBER
MR. YELLIN	#1003	SUITE 601-679-2420 AUTOVON 637-2420
LTCOL BRUBAKER	#1001	SUITE 601-679-2116 AUTOVON 637-2116
LTCOL BEYER	#1005	SUITE 601-679-2897 AUTOVON 637-2897
MR. PROSS	#1007	
MS. KING	#1009	

PHONES LOCATED IN BEDROOMS:

COMMERCIAL 601-679-2186 - AT TONE ENTER 4-DIGIT ROOM NUMBER

AUTOVON 637-2186 - AT TONE ENTER 4-DIGIT ROOM NUMBER

MEMORANDUM
27 MAR 95

TO: WAYNE PURSER

FROM: BO MASKE (OFFICE OF CONG. MONTGOMERY)

SUBJECT: FLIGHT ITINERARY FOR COMMISSIONER ROBLES 3 APRIL VISIT TO NAS MERIDIAN

MISSISSIPPI AIR NATIONAL GUARD C-26 IS ARRIVING SAN ANTONIO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO DROP OFF TWO C-26 PILOTS WHO ARE SCHEDULED FOR REFRESHER TRAINING AT FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL ON 3 APRIL.

COMMISSIONER ROBLES WILL NEED TO MEET THE AIRCRAFT AT THE GEN-AERO FIXED BASE OPERATOR FACILITY AT THE SAN ANTONIO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

THE ADDRESS IS 9623 W. TERMINAL DRIVE, TELEPHONE NUMBER (210) 824-2313. (2)

THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTS: 7:00 AM
ARRIVES NAS MERIDIAN: 9:00 AM
DEPARTS NAS MERIDIAN: 2:25 PM
ARRIVE 117TH AIR REFUELING WING, ALABAMA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, BIRMINGHAM ALABAMA: 3:00 PM

BO

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1542
Ser N889JG/4U661666
20 Jul 1994

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1542 Ser N889J6/3U658748 of 20 Sep 1993

Encl: (1) Pilot Training Rates (PTR), FY 94-99
(2) Naval Flight Officer Training Rates (NFOTR), FY 94-99

1. This letter modifies and supersedes reference (a). Enclosures are effective on receipt and reflect planned production goals for FY 94-99. These goals are intended to resolve current pool excesses, balance ongoing transitions and new production with FRS output and return to steady state force mix of 10 CVWs, 12 VP Squadrons and appropriate force support for 330 ships in FY 97.

2. Significant changes include:

-Increase VFA pilot manning from 17 to 19/squadron
-Reduction from 15 to 12 VP squadrons
-Decom of VAW 122
-Realignment of E2/C2 pilot career paths
-Adjustment for Helo pools
-WSO curriculum approved/20 to 40 plus up of FMS NFOTR

3. OPNAV point of contact is Captain Scott Krajnik, N889G/J, A/V 224-6010/6013, commercial 703-614-6010/3.

J.S. MOBLEY
By direction

Distribution:
CNO (N1, 11, 12, N88C, N88R, N889C, N889F, N095, N821E)
CMC (A, T, M, ASM-31, MPP-33, MMOA-2)
CG MCCDC (TE32A)
COMDT COGARD (G-PO-2/23, TO-2/7)
CHNAVPERS (211V, 43, 432, 433)
CNET (OOL/T25)
CNATRA (OO, N019, N-1, N-2, N-3, N-32, N-34, N-7)
COMNAVAIRESFOR (CODE 51)
COMNAVCRUITCOM (CODE 311)
NAVDEPNOAA
NETSAFA
NAVMAC (CODE 3)

PILOT TRAINING RATES 20 JUL 94

FY-94	STRIKE	MARITIME	E2/C2	ROTARY	TOTAL
USN	173	120	43	214	550
USMC	118	32	0	188	338
COGARD	0	15	0	35	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	321	214	43	502	1080
FY-95					
USN	163	140	36	184	523
USMC	110	31	0	181	322
COGARD	0	10	0	45	55
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	303	228	36	475	1042
FY-96					
USN	183	140	36	184	543
USMC	106	29	0	181	316
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	319	228	36	468	1051
FY-97					
USN	203	146	36	184	569
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	463	1068
FY-98					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084
FY-99					
USN	203	146	36	200	585
USMC	103	28	0	176	307
COGARD	0	12	0	38	50
FMS	30	45	0	65	140
NOAA	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	336	233	36	479	1084

ENCLOSURE (1)

NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES

20 Jul 1994

	F-14 RIO	F-18 WSO	A-6 TN	S-3 OJN	T-2 ATDS	P-3 NAV	TOTAL
FY-94							
USN	29	0	48	37	35	102	251
USMC	0	17	14	0	0	0	31
FMS	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	29	17	62	37	35	118	298
FY-95							
USN	39	0	38	37	35	122	271
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	20	0	0	0	15	35
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	38	50	37	35	138	337
FY-96							
USN	39	0	38	57	35	128	297
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	39	58	50	57	35	144	383
FY-97							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-98							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397
FY-99							
USN	48	0	38	57	40	128	311
USMC	0	18	12	0	0	0	30
FMS	0	40	0	0	0	15	55
NOAA	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	48	58	50	57	40	144	397

ENCLOSURE (2)

PILOT AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER TRAINING RATES, FY 94-99

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

W. A. EARNER	W. A. Earner
NAME (Please type or print)	Signature
	11/21/94
Title	Date

1988	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
STRIKE	315	105		4
MARITIME	282	26	30	27
ROTARY	357	193	14	15
E2/C2	58			
PRIMARY PILOT	1187	349	45	47
PRIMARY NFO	539	51	2	9

1989	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
STRIKE	341	109		4
MARITIME	279	26	25	31
ROTARY	402	193	25	21
E2/C2	63			
PRIMARY PILOT	1073	330	59	49
PRIMARY NFO	614	48	2	13

1990	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
STRIKE	315	126		16
MARITIME	283	26	20	32
ROTARY	357	193	23	26
E2/C2	63			
PRIMARY PILOT	1074	364	49	51
PRIMARY NFO	543	55	3	13

1991	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
STRIKE	259	129		13
MARITIME	220	25	42	34
ROTARY	287	193	25	39
E2/C2	43			
PRIMARY PILOT	633	407	68	69
PRIMARY NFO	380	55	2	9

NOTE 1: Weapons Systems Operator Curriculum did not exist FY-88 to FY-91.

2. The FY 88-FY 91 NFO curriculum utililized a different syllabus than the current NFO curriculum.

SUBJ: PIPELINE COMPLETION TOTALS FOR FY88 TO FY91

1. The pipeline completions totals are as follows:

1988	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
RIO	60			
TN	107	32		
OJN	76		2	
ATDS	61			
NAV	190			

1989	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
RIO	68	2		
TN	114	38		
OJN	74			
ATDS	61		1	
NAV	199			4

1990	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
RIO	65	6		
TN	130	49		
OJN	75			
ATDS	63		1	
NAV	203			16

1991	USN	MARINE	CG	FMS
RIO	64	8		
TN	95	34		
OJN	56			
ATDS	54		4	
NAV	93			6

NOTE 1: Weapons Systems Operator Curriculum did not exist FY-88 to FY-91.

2. The FY88-FY91 NFO curriculum utilized a different syllabus than the current NFO curriculum.

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

NEXT ECHELON LEVEL (if applicable)

W. B. HAYDEN, RADM, USN
NAME (Please type or print)

W B Hayden
Signature

Chief of Naval Air Training
Title

3 June 94
Date

Naval Air Training Command
Activity

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

MAJOR CLAIMANT LEVEL

NAME (Please type or print)

Signature

Title

Date

Activity

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

NAME (Please type or print)

Signature

Title

Date

Command: **CNATRA**

Data Call Number Three Amendment Two

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

MAJOR CLAIMANT LEVEL

T. L. McCLELLAND
NAME

Signature

Acting
Title

3 JUNE 94
Date

CNET
Activity

I certify that the information contained herein is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)

J. B. GREENE, JR.
NAME (Please type or print)

Signature

ACTING
Title

6 JUNE 94
Date

March 31, 1995

MGEN Robles,

Sir, I've included some additional information in the following pages that I thought might be helpful for your upcoming trip to NAS Meridian, MS:

Tab-A: A shortened version of the Agenda for your visit to the base and I've highlighted the areas I thought you might be interested in.

Tab-B: A map of Meridian and the surrounding area including NAS Meridian. Behind this map you'll find a quick overview of USN Pilot Training. I've annotated the types of aircraft that will ultimately be flown by individuals proceeding along a particular type of training after Pipeline Select. All the students at Meridian have been selected for strike training and will ultimately be assigned to fly tactical jet aircraft such as (F-14's, F-18's, EA-6B's etc.) . The other thing I've annotated in blue ink is the Pilot Training Rate or PTR for each of the pipelines for FY-95.

Tab-C: A Draft copy of the Base Visit Report that I'll draft for your concurrence after the Base Visit. As your going through the Base visit you might make a mental note of things you'd specifically like to include, along the lines of New Issues Identified, Community Concerns raised and Request's for Staff as a result of visit.

You'll need to meet your aircraft at the GEN-AERO Fixed base operating facility at the San Antonio International Airport on Monday, April 3, 1995. The address is 9623 W. Terminal Drive and their Tel # is (210)824-2313 . I've called the number and it's manned 24hr/day you'll just select "2" at the query. The aircraft is scheduled to depart San Antonio at 0700 and arrive at NAS Meridian around 0900.

Myself and Alex Yellin will be arriving at NAS Meridian Sunday April 2, 1995 and will meet you at your aircraft when you arrive at NAS Meridian on April 3, 1995.

Emergency Telephone Numbers:

LtCol James R Brubaker (W) 703-696-0504 ext. # 188 anytime. Virginia
(H) 703-660-6884 Virginia

Capt (USN) Terry Pudas (H) 601-679-1135 (Wing Commander at NAS Meridian)
(W) 601-679-2498 Anytime

If there are any problems Monday April 3, 1995, on your day of departure, I can be reached through Capt Pudas's work phone.

Sir, please don't hesitate to call me this weekend should you have any questions or concerns of your base visit to NAS Meridian.

USN PILOT TRAINING



UFT BASES--ALL SERVICES



USN TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- AIRSPACE USE - VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR) PROCEDURES
- AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:
  - VFR DEPARTURES
  - SPLIT RUNWAY OPERATIONS
  - BOX PATTERNS/CARRIER OPERATIONS
- EMPHASIS ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING
- NIGHT TRAINING - GEARED FOR SEA OPERATIONS

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

- USAF
  - ONE BASE SUPPORTS MULTIPLE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
  - BUILDING BLOCK/LOCK STEP APPROACH
  - FLIGHT SCREENING
- USN
  - PIPELINE SPECIFIC TRAINING BASES
  - FLEXIBLE PROGRESSION
  - PREFLIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE SCREENING

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

APRIL 3, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Alex Yellin, LtCol J.R. Brubaker, LtCol M. Beyer, Elizabeth King, Greg Pross

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

To provide facilities and services in support of aviation activities of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities as directed. Intermediate and advanced strike training conducted (jet aircraft).

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close NAS Meridian, Mississippi and relocate undergraduate strike pilot training to NAS Kingsville.
- Close the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) to close and its training functions relocated to other activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.
- Retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy and transfer facilities to the Academy.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

- The current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base.
- The consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated.
- The Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of NAS Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Meridian, Mississippi



1) The capacity for NAS Corpus Christi was calculated using certified data. As we discussed, the runway capacity depends on the type and mix of aircraft operating at that field. In short, there are two types of training aircraft: light and heavy. The Navy's jet aircraft are all heavy aircraft.

The certified data for NAS Corpus Christi reflects all light aircraft operations. Based on this, it's capacity was calculated as follows.

Main Field:

237 days/yr x 12.1 hrs/day x 111 runway ops/hr = 318,315 ops/yr

In the configuration analysis, runway capacity was normalized so that all air stations were competing on a level playing field. In Corpus Christi's case, because strike training was heavy aircraft and Corpus's capacity was based on light aircraft, we scaled Corpus's capacity by .73, which represents the ratio between heavy and light runway operations. Therefore in the configuration analysis, NAS Corpus was credited with a capacity of 318,315 x .73 = 232,370 for strike training.

2) The capacity for strike training at an OLF was calculated directly from certified data which was based on heavy aircraft operations.

237 days/yr x 11.6 hrs/day x 54 ops/hr = 148,457

Additional Info: To consolidate strike training at NAS Kingsville our analysis showed that NAS Kingsville was about 130,000 operations short.

Strike requirement:

336 PTR x 1511 Ops/PTR = 507,696

Capacity at NAS Kingsville:

Mainfield: 229,416
OLF Orange Grove: 148,457

Additional Capacity Required:

507,696 - (229,416 + 148,457) = 129,823

These numbers show that by using NAS Corpus Christi's main field as an outlying field, all strike training could be done at NAS Kingsville.

Naval Air Station Meridian Complex



COLUMBUS AFB, MS
NAS MERIDAIN, MS
BASE VISIT
JUNE 8, 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMISSION BASE VISIT
COLUMBUS AFB, MS
MERIDIAN BASE VISIT
Thursday, June 8, 1995

COMMISSIONERS ATTENDING:
Al Cornella (Columbus and Meridian)
Ben Montoya (Columbus)
Joe Robles (Columbus)
Wendi Steele (Columbus and Meridian)

STAFF ATTENDING:
Merrill Beyer (Columbus)
Mark Pross (Columbus)
Charlie Smith (Columbus and Meridian)
Jim Brubaker (Meridian)

Wednesday, June 7

10:15AM ET Jim Brubaker departs DC National en route New Orleans, LA (via Philadelphia): USAir 671.

1:26PM CT Jim Brubaker arrives New Orleans from DC National (via Philadelphia).
*Picks up rental car and drives to NAS Meridian, MS.
Hertz: Conf.# 92741C22485

5:30PM ET Mark Pross departs San Antonio, TX en route Columbus, MS (via Memphis): Northwest flight 1166.

5:59PM ET Charlie Smith departs DC National en route Columbus AFB, MS (via Memphis): Northwest 555.

6:00PM CT Commissioners and staff depart Vance AFB, OK en route Columbus AFB, MS: Via MilAir.

Al Cornella
Ben Montoya
Joe Robles
Wendi Steele
Frank Cirillo
Merrill Beyer

7:30PM CT Commissioners and staff arrive Columbus AFB, MS from Vance AFB, OK:
Via MilAir.

Al Cornella
Ben Montoya
Joe Robles
Wendi Steele
Frank Cirillo
Merrill Beyer

*Met by base personnel and escorted to RON.

8:45PM CT Charles Smith and Mark Pross arrive Columbus, MS from DC National/ San Antonio, TX (via Memphis):
Northwest flight 5642
*Mark Pross picks up rental car and transports Charlie Smith to RON.

9:30PM CT Charlie Smith and Mark Pross arrive RON.

COLUMBUS RON: **COLUMBUS AFB BOQ**

Al Cornella
Ben Montoya
Joe Robles
Wendi Steele
Frank Cirillo
Merrill Beyer
Charlie Smith
Mark Pross

MERIDIAN RON: **NAS MERIDIAN BOQ**

Jim Brubaker

Thursday, June 8

6:00AM CT Joe Robles departs San Antonio, TX en route Columbus, MS:
Corporate plane.

7:30AM to 11:30AM CT **COLUMBUS AFB, MS WORKING BREAKFAST AND BASE VISIT**

11:30 PM CT Commissioners and staff depart Columbus AFB, MS en route Meridian, MS:
MilAir (C-12 Commissioners and Jim Brubaker, C-26 Commission baggage and additional passengers).

Al Cornella
Wendi Steele
Charlie Smith

11:30PM CT Ben Montoya departs Columbus AFB, MS en route Texarkana Municipal Airport: MilAir.

11:30PM CT Joe Robles departs Columbus, AFB, MS en route San Antonio, TX: Corporate plane.

12:30PM CT Commissioners and staff arrive Meridian from Columbus AFB, MS.
*Met by base personnel.
Al Cornella
Wendi Steele
Charlie Smith

12:30PM CT Ben Montoya arrives Texarkana Municipal Airport from Columbus, AFB, MS. MilAir.
*Met by base personnel and taken to base visit.

1:00PM to 5:00PM CT **NAS MERIDIAN WORKING LUNCH AND BASE VISIT.**

1:00PM CT Joe Robles arrives San Antonio, TX from Columbus AFB, MS. Corporate plane.

2:02PM CT Mark Pross and Merrill Beyer depart Columbus, MS en route Atlanta, GA: Delta 7093.

4:12PM CT Mark Pross and Merrill Beyer arrive Atlanta from Columbus, MS.
*Rental Car Hertz Conf.# 928315A72B4

5:00PM ET Mark Pross and Merrill Beyer arrive RON:

5:00PM CT Commissisoners and staff depart NAS Meridian en route Atlanta, GA: MilAir.
Al Cornella
Wendi Steele
Charlie Smith

5:45PM CT Frank Cirillo departs Columbus, MS en route DC National (via Memphis): Northwest 5641.

7:00PM CT Commissioners and staff arrive Atlanta, GA from NAS Meridian, MS:
*Picked by Mark Pross and transported to RON.
Al Cornella
Wendi Steele
Charlie Smith

Atlanta RON: **The Wyndham Midtown**
125 10th Street
404-873-4800
Al Cornella
Wendi Steele
Charlie Smith
Merrill Beyer
Mark Pross

Meridian RON: **NAS MERIDIAN**
Jim Brubaker

11:08PM ET Frank Cirillo arrives DC National from Columbus, MS (via Memphis).

Friday, June 9

8:00AM CT Jim Brubaker departs Meridain, MS en route New Orleans, LA: (via auto).

12:00PM CT Jim Brubaker arrives New Orleans, LA from Meridian, MS.
*Jim Brubaker goes on leave.

Saturday, June 10

4:00PM CT Jim Brubaker departs New Orleans, LA en route DC National: USAir 2194.

7:21PM CT Jim Brubaker arrives DC Natioanl from New Orleans, LA.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

INSTALLATION MISSION

An Air Education and Training Command (AETC) base. The base is included in the Undergraduate Flying Training category. The major unit is the 14th Flying Training Wing, which provides undergraduate pilot training (UPT) and Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals in 45 T-37B, 57 T-38A, and 21 AT-38B aircraft. The base was activated in 1941 for pilot training.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

None.

COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE

The Commission added Columbus AFB for consideration for closure or realignment.

STAFF COMMENTS

- The Air Force has one more Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT)--Pilot and Navigator--base than necessary to support Air Force pilot training requirements consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan.
- Columbus AFB ranked second overall when compared with other UFT bases (Reese AFB, Laughlin AFB, Randolph AFB, and Vance AFB) when evaluated on various measures of merit using staff-revised weighting.
  - Columbus AFB ranked in the middle in such factors as weather (crosswinds and density altitude) and airspace availability (volume and distance to training areas). It ranked relatively high in encroachment, airfields, and maintenance facilities. It ranked relatively low in ground training facilities.
- Columbus AFB also ranked second overall when compared with other UFT bases (Reese AFB, Laughlin AFB, Randolph AFB, and Vance AFB) when evaluated on various measures of merit using corrected Air Force data.
  - Columbus AFB ranked relatively high in such factors as encroachment, airfields, and maintenance facilities. It ranked in the middle in weather (crosswinds and density altitude). It ranked relatively low in airspace availability (volume and distance to training areas) and ground training facilities.
- Columbus AFB is characterized as the best UPT base for bomber/fighter training.
  - It has low-pressure altitude.
  - It has a long runway.
  - It has ready access to an air-to-ground gunnery range.

- Its advanced students have their instrument rating.
- It has mission flexibility as a former Strategic Air Command base.

COST CONSIDERATIONS (Level)

- One-Time Costs: $ 18.2 million
- Net Costs (Savings) During Implementation: $ 86.2 million savings
- Annual Recurring Savings: $ 25.3 million
- Return on Investment Year: 1998 (1 Year)
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: $327.1 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	Military	Civilian	Students
Baseline	**913**	**221**	**152**
Reductions	315	31 (additional)	0
Realignments	598	252	152
Total:	913	221	152

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

	Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
Recommendation	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
Close Laughlin AFB	(1,065)	(463)	0	0	(1,065)	(463)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Environmental cleanup action was initiated on several sites and investigation is on-going at remaining sites.

REPRESENTATION

Governor:	Kirk Fordice
Senators:	Thad Cochran
	Trent Lott
Representative:	G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (3)

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss (1996-2001): 2,012 jobs (1,528 direct/484 indirect)
- Lowndes and Monroe Counties, MS, MSA Job Base: 48,953 jobs
- Percentage: 4.1 percent decrease

- Cumulative Economic Impact (1994-2001): 4.1 percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- $1.2 million in Military Construction Cost Avoidance at Columbus AFB listed in COBRA.
- Air Force Air Education and Training Command Capacity Analysis assumes four UPT bases only:
  - Excludes Randolph AFB: performs no UPT, only Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) and Pilot Instructor Training (PIT).
  - Excludes Sheppard AFB: performs some UPT, mainly Euro-NATO Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT).
  - Excludes Hondo Municipal Airport and USAF Academy Airfields: perform Flight Screening only.
  - Assumes Specialized UPT at each base, i.e., all three training aircraft types present (T-1, T-37/JPATS, and T-38) to train pilots for Primary, Bomber/Fighter, and Airlift/Tanker.
- Air Force UPT Capacity Analysis:
  - Based analysis on meeting Air Force Pilot Training Requirements (PTR) only.
  - Assumes 5-day work week to allow recovery capacity for unforeseen impacts.
  - Capacity expressed in "UPT graduate equivalents."

CAPACITY	
COLUMBUS	408
LAUGHLIN	424
REESE	392
VANCE	396
SUBTOTAL	1,620
CLOSE LOWEST	- 392
TOTAL	1,228

REQUIREMENT	
BOMBER/FIGHTER	394
AIRLIFT/TANKER	592
FIXED-WING UPGRADE	4
FMS	31
SUBTOTAL	1,021
INTRO, FTR FUND	57
TOTAL	1,078

CAPACITY	1,228
PTR	- 1,078
	150 (12 percent EXCESS)

- Need for Excess
  - JPATS Transition 100
  - Instructor Crossflow (T-37 to T-38): 39
  - Operations beyond 95 percent capacity will be compromised

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- The community stressed that the Joint Cross-Service Group on UPT and the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group rated Columbus AFB as the highest ranking UPT base in Criterion I (flying training mission).
- Columbus AFB received the highest rating on Criterion II (facilities and infrastructure).

- Columbus AFB has the infrastructure to support increased pilot production as demonstrated by past graduation rates, without an additional expenditure on facilities. An increase in pilot production at Columbus AFB would reduce greatly the cost-per-graduate for the Air Force.
- Columbus AFB offers several attributes, such as excellent airspace, no crosswind problems, and hydrant fueling system pits, which offer mission flexibility.
- Columbus AFB is the only UPT base that is well suited to support any of the five Air Force flying missions: primary training, fighter, bomber, tanker, or transport (airlift).
- Housing at Columbus AFB is being upgraded with $2.5 million invested in improvements since 1993.
- The City of Columbus responded to Columbus AFB's request to provide municipal-level water and sewer services. Planned completion is mid-1997.
- The student/teacher ratio in Columbus Municipal Schools is lower than required by the State Department of Education.
- Graduate degrees are offered at two universities in the local area.
- Improvements at Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle are set to begin June 1, 1995, and will involve a $44 million renovation/expansion.
- The community questions the "Icing in Area Days" figures used during the Adds Hearings in UPT Staff Analysis II. They believe icing data has been doubly counted. The community suggests the correct figure should be 42 days--and not the 144 days used in Staff Analysis II.
- The real issue concerning weather should be "sorties canceled or rescheduled" as a result of weather. (Icing, ceiling, and visibility are included in this category of the base questionnaire and thus doubly counted by receiving far more weighted value than deserved.)

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- Since the Air Force configures each of its UPT bases nearly the same, the Joint Cross-Service Group on UPT analysis could be suspect, since it showed the functional value of Reese AFB substantially inferior to the other bases.

Mark A. Pross/Air Force Team/June 1, 1995

UNDERGRADUATE FLYING TRAINING

OVERVIEW: The Undergraduate Flying Training category consists of bases which provide an extensive, specialized ground and flight training for Air Force pilots and navigators. Bases in this category are:

Columbus AFB, Mississippi
Laughlin AFB, Texas
Randolph AFB, Texas
Reese AFB, Texas
Vance AFB, Oklahoma

ATTRIBUTES: Important attributes of undergraduate flying training bases:

- Adequate Flight Training Areas
- Adequate runways (Length and Number)
- Minimal weather-associated flight cancellations
- Ground Training Facilities

SPECIAL ANALYSIS METHOD: Although the Undergraduate Flying Training subcategory analysis reflected the same method for Criteria II - VIII as the overall Air Force process, a tailored Criterion I analysis was developed for this subcategory. This tailored approach was necessary because of the DoD establishment of an Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG-UPT) to take advantage of available cross-service asset sharing opportunities. As chartered by OSD, the JCSGs were to develop guidelines, standards, assumptions, measures of merit, data elements and milestone schedules for DoD Component conduct of cross-service analyses of common support functions. In addition, the JCSGs were to develop closure or realignment alternatives and numerical excess capacity reduction targets.

As a result of this effort, and seeking to integrate the cross-service analysis into the Air Force process to the maximum extent possible, the Air Force decided to forego evaluation of the Undergraduate Flying Training activities for Criterion I grading. In addition to the data collected via the Air Force Questionnaire, the Air Force collected data on behalf of and under the direction of the JCSG-UPT relating to the functional capabilities of Undergraduate Flying Training activities. The Air Force decided to use the analytical results of the JCSG-UPT to measure the relative ability of the Undergraduate Flying Training activities to accomplish these functions.

The JCSG-UPT provided its calculations of the functional value of the Undergraduate Flying Training bases to the Air Force by function. Each base evaluated by the JCSG-UPT was given a rating from 1 to 10 in up to fifteen functional areas (e.g., Flight Screening, Primary Pilot, Airlift/Tanker, Intermediate & Advanced Strike, Bomber/Fighter, and Helicopter). Bases were not rated for a function if they did not participate in that training, such as Helicopter training, or if they failed to meet certain core requirements, such as proximity to open water.

To incorporate the functional values into a product useful in the Air Force analysis system, the Air Force discarded some functions as inappropriate for an Air Force-only analysis. After discarding these functions, scores remained for Primary Pilot, Airlift/Tanker, Maritime/E2C2, Bomber/Fighter, Primary/Intermediate Navigator/NFO, Panel Navigation, and Flight Screening. In addition, two bases received grades for the WSO Strike function. The sum of the values for all functions were then divided by the number of applicable functions, providing an average value. These values were then assigned color grades using the standard deviation scoring method. This color grade served as the Criterion I grade for the analysis.

USAF BASE FACT SHEET
COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE, MISSISSIPPI

MAJCOM/LOCATION/SIZE: AETC base ten miles north-northwest of Columbus with 4,935 acres

MAJOR UNIT/FORCE STRUCTURE:

- 14th Flying Training Wing
  -- Provides undergraduate pilot and basic fighter training
  -- 45 T-37B, 57 T-38A, and 21 AT-38B

USAF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS: (As of FY 95/2)

MILITARY--ACTIVE	1,116
CIVILIAN	338
TOTAL	**1,454**

ANNOUNCED ACTIONS: None

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM ($000):

FISCAL YEAR 94:	
Upgrade Airfield Lighting	2,900
FISCAL YEAR 95:	
Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (Congress Insert)	10,000
T-1A Maintenance Support Facility (Congress Insert)	3,200
TOTAL	**13,200**

SIGNIFICANT INSTALLATION ISSUES/PROBLEMS: None

Basing Manager: Maj Wall/XOOB/75967
Editor: Ms Wright/XOOB/46675/16 Feb 95

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI

INSTALLATION MISSION

To provide facilities and services in support of aviation activities of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities as directed. Intermediate and advanced strike training conducted (jet carrier aircraft).

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Meridian, Mississippi. Relocate undergraduate strike pilot training to NAS Kingsville.
- Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) to close and its training functions relocated to other activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.
- Retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy on site.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the Pilot Training Rate (PTR) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base.
- The consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated.
- The Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of NAS Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAS Meridian, NTTC Meridian, the realignment of NAS Corpus Christi to an NAF, and the NAS Alameda redirect.

• One-Time Cost:	$83.4 million
• Net Savings During Implementation:	$158.8 million
• Annual Recurring Savings:	$33.4 million
• Break-Even Year:	Immediate
• Net Present Value Over 20 Years:	$471.2 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	Military	Civilian	Students
Baseline	768	265	866
Reductions	388	220	0
Realignments	686	170	1282
Total	1074	390	1282

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian
1643	947	0	0	(1643)	(947)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- No significant environmental problems.

REPRESENTATION

Governor:	Kirk Fordice
Senators:	Thad Cochran
	Trent Lott
Representative:	G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 3324 jobs (2581 direct and 743 indirect)
- Lauderdale Co., MS MSA Job Base: 41,583 jobs
- Percentage: 8.0% percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1996-2001): 8.0% percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- The Navy reluctantly recommended NAS Meridian for closure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Navy may have miscalculated their capacity analysis including flight operations per Pilot Training Rate (PTR).
- Safety concerns around single site PTR, specifically at an airfield near 100% capacity yet trying to train student naval aviators.
- Navy out year PTR and joint recommendations or lack thereof.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- On 10 May 1995 the Navy officially increased their Pilot and Naval Flight Officer training rates to support fleet, Joint USN/USAF, USCG, FMS, and NOAA requirements, (CNO ltr. N889J6 dtd 10 May 1995). Specifically the Intermediate/Advanced Strike PTR increased from a PTR of 336 in FY-97 to a PTR of 360 in FY-98.

James R. Brubaker/Navy/05/30/95 11:24 AM

NAVY INSTALLATION LIST -- BRAC 95

NAVAL BASES

Naval Air Station, North Island, CA
Naval Station, San Diego, CA
Submarine Base, San Diego, CA
Submarine Base, New London, CT
Submarine Base, Kings Bay, GA
(r) Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, HI
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR
Naval Station, Ingleside, TX
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA
Naval Station, Norfolk, VA
Submarine Base, Bangor, WA
Naval Station, Everett, WA

MARINE CORPS BASES

Marine Corps Base, Hawaii, Kaneohe, HI
Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, NC
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA

OPERATIONAL AIR STATIONS

(c) Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK
Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, AZ
(rd)Naval Air Station, Alameda, CA
Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Pendleton, CA
Naval Air Facility, El Centro, CA
(rd)Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA
Naval Air Station, Lemoore, CA
Naval/Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, San Diego, CA
Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, CA
(rd)Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA
(rd)Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL
Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL
(c) Naval Air Station, Key West, FL
Naval Station, Mayport, FL
(rd)Naval Air Station, Agana, GU
(rd)Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe, HI
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, ME
Naval Air Station, Fallon, NV
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC
Marine Corps Air Station, New River, Jacksonville, NC
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR
Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, SC
Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA
Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, WA

RESERVE AIR STATIONS

(a) Naval Air Station, Atlanta, GA
Naval Air Station, New Orleans, LA
(c) Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA
(rd)Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI
Naval Air Station, Willow Grove, PA
Naval Air Station, Fort Worth, TX
Naval Air Facility, Washington, DC

RESERVE ACTIVITIES

286 Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Centers/Commands
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Huntsville, AL
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Pomona, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Santa Ana, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Stockton, CA
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Cadillac, MI
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Staten Island, NY
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Laredo, TX
(c) Naval Reserve Center, Sheboygan, WI
(c) Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, KS
(c) Region Seven, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Charleston, SC
(c) Region Ten, Naval Reserve Readiness Command New Orleans, LA

TRAINING AIR STATIONS

Naval Air Station, Whiting Field, Milton, FL
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL
(ce)Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS
(r) Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Air Station, Kingsville, TX

TRAINING/EDUCATIONAL CENTERS

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA
Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, IL
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC
Naval Amphibious School Pacific, Coronado, CA
Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center Pacific, San Diego, CA
Fleet Combat Training Center Pacific, San Diego, CA
Fleet Training Center, San Diego, CA
(rd)Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA
Fleet Training Center, Mayport, FL
(rd)Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Orlando, FL
(rd)Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL
Trident Training Facility, Kings Bay, GA
Fleet Mine Warfare Training Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Amphibious School Atlantic, Little Creek, VA
Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center Atlantic, Norfolk, VA
Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA
Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Virginia Beach, VA
Trident Training Facility, Bangor, WA
Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, CA
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA
Naval Submarine School, New London, CT
Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, FL
Naval Supply Corps School, Athens, GA
(c) Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, RI
Naval Air Technical Training Center, Millington, TN
AEGIS Training Center, Dahlgren, VA
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD
Naval War College, Newport, RI

NAVAL AVIATION DEPOTS

Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA
Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL
(rd)Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL
Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC

NAVAL SHIPYARDS

(ce)Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
(ce)Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, HI
(a) Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, ME
(rd)Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA
Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA

(c) Closure candidate **(ce) Closure-except candidate**
(r) Realignment candidate **(rd) Redirect candidate**
(a) Commission addition for further consideration

NAVAL AIR STATION MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI
(McCAIN FIELD)

INSTALLATION REVIEW

Mission:

- To maintain and operate facilities and to provide services and material to support operations of aviation activities and units of the Naval Air Training Command and other activities and units designated by the CNO. Designed specifically for jet pilot training, contains two staggered 8000 foot runways and one 6400 foot crosswind runway. Includes NOLF Joe Williams Field, 19 miles northwest of NAS Meridian which is also 8000 feet long and SEARAY air-to-ground target complex 31 miles to the north. Under an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), CTW-1 and 14th FTW Columbus AFB jointly use OLF GUNSHY located 20 miles northeast.

Where:

- 14 miles northeast of the city of Meridian (population 50,000) on Highway 39N. Meridian, MS is 165 miles southeast of Memphis, TN, and 125 Miles north of Mobile, AL.

Major Units:

- Training Air Wing 1 (CTW-1); Training Squadrons 7 and 19 and 23 (VT-7, VT-19, VT-23); Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC); Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG); and Regional Counterdrug Training Academy.

    - CTW-1: Immediate superior in command to the Commanding Officer of the naval air station, training squadrons, and other facilities as may be placed under his cognizance. Administers, coordinates, and supervises flight and academic training and support conducted by three subordinate squadrons as directed by the Chief of Naval Air Training.
    - VT-7: Advanced Strike Training flying the TA-4J Skyhawk (74 aircraft).
    - VT-19/VT-23 Intermediate Strike Training flying the T-2C Buckeye. (83 aircraft).
    - NTTC: Navy's primary training facility for enlisted administrative and supply class "A" schools, which are for personnel enroute to their first command after completing recruit training. Advanced schools include Yeoman "C" Flagwriter and Religious Program Specialist.

    MATSG: Provides all similar Marine Corps training in supply, administrative, and related ratings.

Environmental/Encroachment Issues:

- Meridian has no major environmental issues. Evaluated sites have not been listed on the National Priorities List. There are no existing or anticipated encroachment issues. There are existing AICUZ ordnance's in place at both the main installation and the Navy owned outlying field.

Population:

- 1,800 active duty; 1,200 family members; 1,400 civilians, which include both DON employees and civilian contract aircraft maintenance employees.

Housing:

- 144 officer family units; 376 enlisted family units; 121 BOQ spaces; 2056 BEQ spaces.

Temporary Lodging:

- 6 distinguished visitor units; 49 visiting officer units; 34 visiting enlisted units; 28 temporary lodging facilities.

Commissary/Exchange Mall Complex:

- Contains separate Navy Exchange Retail Store, Commissary. Laundry/Dry Cleaners, Uniform Store, Banking Facility, Barber/Beauty Shop. McDonald's Restaurant, Movie Theater and Bowling Alley.

Schools:

- In Meridian and Lauderdale County school districts. Enrollment currently below capacity. Five institutions of higher learning. Undergraduate and Graduate courses are available on-site and in the local community.

Health Care:

- Clinic only. Closest naval hospital is Pensacola Naval Hospital (150 air miles). The community of Meridian serves as a regional medical hub for eastern Mississippi and western Alabama. There are 3 major hospitals located in the City of Meridian.

Community Support:

- NAS Meridian is Lauderdale County's largest employer.

MAP NO. 25

MISSISSIPPI



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MISSISSIPPI

FISCAL YEAR 1994 (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

Personnel/Expenditures	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
I. Personnel - Total	51,283	24,692	8,742	17,383	466
Active Duty Military	12,648	432	3,083	9,133	0
Civilian	10,881	4,511	2,810	3,094	466
Reserve & National Guard	27,754	19,749	2,849	5,156	0
II. Expenditures - Total	$3,101,375	$563,217	$1,820,939	$581,518	$135,701
A. Payroll Outlays - Total	1,246,254	341,386	419,737	471,178	13,953
Active Duty Military Pay	444,683	16,173	217,152	211,358	0
Civilian Pay	385,165	162,356	116,731	92,125	13,953
Reserve & National Guard Pay	113,715	86,365	2,046	25,304	0
Retired Military Pay	302,691	76,492	83,808	142,391	0
B. Prime Contracts Over $25,000 Total	1,855,121	221,831	1,401,202	110,340	121,748
Supply and Equipment Contracts	1,395,771	7,200	1,262,441	6,415	119,715
RDT&E Contracts	18,000	3,307	13,776	917	0
Service Contracts	326,760	104,478	117,400	102,849	2,033
Construction Contracts	16,160	8,416	7,585	159	0
Civil Function Contracts	98,430	98,430	0	0	0

Major Locations of Expenditures	Expenditures			Major Locations of Personnel	Military and Civilian Personnel		
	Total	Payroll Outlays	Prime Contracts		Total	Active Duty Military	Civilian
Pascagoula	$1,324,136	$106,549	$1,217,587	Keesler AFB	9,862	7,466	2,396
Biloxi	343,905	290,841	53,064	Vicksburg	3,065	69	2,996
Gulfport	240,798	146,103	94,695	Meridian	2,342	1,690	652
Madison	151,778	1,865	149,913	Columbus AFB	1,795	1,377	418
Vicksburg	150,496	121,921	28,575	Gulfport	1,600	839	761
Meridian	101,447	87,602	13,845	Bay St. Louis	1,399	84	1,315
Columbus AFB	86,032	46,804	39,228	Pascagoula	1,007	396	611
Bay St. Louis	76,289	74,864	1,425	Jackson	415	181	234
Jackson	53,452	38,402	15,050	Flowood	356	0	356
Terza	42,434	0	42,434	Biloxi	303	268	35

Prime Contracts Over $25,000 (Prior Three Years)	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
Fiscal Year 1993	$1,575,387	$254,365	$1,000,151	$116,783	$204,088
Fiscal Year 1992	2,566,969	295,282	2,062,956	103,875	104,856
Fiscal Year 1991	1,792,342	247,054	1,304,972	108,981	131,335

Top Five Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards in this State	Total Amount	Major Area of Work	
		FSC or Service Code Description	Amount
1. LITTON INDUSTRIES INC	$1,189,519	Amphibious Assault Ships	$744,485
2. RAYTHEON COMPANY	166,686	Maint & Repair of Eq/Miscellaneous Equipme	95,798
3. TRINITY INDUSTRIES INC	80,281	Special Service Vessels	79,130
4. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION	39,870	Torpedo Inert Components	39,870
5. BARRETT REFINING CORPORATION	38,358	Liquid Propellants & Fuel, Petroleum Base	36,489
Total of Above	$1,514,714	(81.7% of total awards over $25,000)	

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CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI

16-May-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A						
	MISSISSIPPI ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	90	PRESS	COMPLETE	LAYAWAY	1990 PRESS: Layaway; completed FY 92.
AF						
	ALLEN C THOMPSON FIELD AGS					
	COLUMBUS AFB					
	GULFPORT/BILOXI MAP AGS					
	KEESLER AFB	88/91	REFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	1988 DEFBRAC: Directed realigning 22 courses (including avionics and weather equipment maintenance, weather-satellite system , and photo-interpretation training) from Closing Chanute AFB, IL to Keesler AFB. Other courses to Sheppard (52), Goodfellow (25), and Lowry (45) AFBs. (See 1991 DBCRC). 1991 DBCRC: Directed all technical training from Closing Lowry AFB, CO be redistributed to the remaining technical training centers or relocated to other locations.
	KEY FIELD AGS					
N						
	NAS MERIDIAN	93	DBCRC	CANCELLED	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Rejected OSD's recommendation to close NAS Meridian and relocate the advanced strike training to NAS Kingsville, TX.
	NAV CONSTRUCTION BN CENTER, GULFPORT					
	NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE					
	NAVAL STATION PASCAGOULA					
	NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER MERIDIA					