


# **New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**

NJ D

## **BRAC Commission Regional Hearing**

kehurst

**Friday, July 8, 2005  
Baltimore, MD**



BRAC Commission Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD

**New Jersey**

Schedule of Witnesses  
120 Minutes (allotted)

- |      |   |        |
|------|---|--------|
| I.   | <u>Opening Remarks</u> (3 min)                          |        |
|      | Setting the Agenda                                      |        |
|      | Senator Jon Corzine                                     | 3 min  |
| II.  | <u>Importance of New Jersey to the Military</u> (8 min) |        |
|      | Senator Frank Lautenberg                                | 5 min  |
|      | Mayor's Coalition                                       |        |
|      | Eatontown Mayor Gerald Tarantolo                        | 3 min  |
| III. | <u>Lakehurst / Joint Basing</u> (5 min)                 |        |
|      | Congressman Christopher Smith                           | 5 min  |
| IV.  | <u>Fort Monmouth Presentation</u> (49 min)              |        |
|      | Fort Monmouth and Previous BRAC Rounds                  |        |
|      | Congressman Frank Pallone                               | 5 min  |
|      | Fort Monmouth Briefing                                  |        |
|      | VADM (ret) Paul Gaffney                                 |        |
|      | ARDEC Director (ret). Robert Giordano                   | 40 min |
|      | Importance of Fort Monmouth's Mission                   |        |
|      | Major General (ret) William Russ                        | 2 min  |
|      | Summation - Congressman Rush Holt                       | 5 min  |

- V. NJ ANG - 108<sup>th</sup> Refueling Wing (22 min)  
Congressman James Saxton 22 min
- VI. NJ ANG - 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing (5 min)  
Congressman Frank LoBiondo 5 min
- VII. Conclusions (5 min)  
Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen 5 min
- VIII. Summation (3 min)  
Senator Jon Corzine 3 min

Time: 105

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**Opening Remarks – Senator Jon S. Corzine**

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Chairman Principi, Commissioners Coyle, Newton and Turner

On behalf of the people of New Jersey, I thank you for this opportunity to speak about New Jersey's long military tradition.

From the dawning of our nation – when New Jersey was the cross-roads of the American Revolution -- New Jersey has always played a crucial role in our military.

When General George Washington needed ammunition for the Continental Army he looked to Picatinny Arsenal.

Innovations like the submarine and the telegraph...

Edison's research into torpedo mechanisms and antisubmarine devices for the Navy during WWI...

Roy Plunkett's development of Teflon polymers....

The development of communication electronics at Sarnoff and RCA.....

Bell Labs with advanced telecommunication networking...

And contributions from Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies....

All of that ground-breaking research and innovation have transformed our Armed Services.

And all were developed in New Jersey.  
The list can go longer.

But it's clear that today our long military tradition is as critical to the defense community and our soldiers in the field as it was in 1776.

Each one of the seven military installations in New Jersey is a vital component of the current war on terrorism and key to the future transformation of our armed services.

We applaud DoD for recommending mission enhancements at Picatinny Arsenal, the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, and the Joint Installation, or Mega-Base, of Fort Dix, McGuire Air Force Base, and Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station.

And we commend the department on recognizing the strategic importance of Earle Naval Weapons Station.

But when it comes to Fort Monmouth and the Air National Guard's 108<sup>th</sup> Refueling Wing.

To be blunt: The Pentagon is wrong.

And today's testimony will show you why.

We will go beyond the economic and emotional disruption that thousands of New Jerseyans face today.

We will go to the core of the vital role that Fort Monmouth and our six other military installations play in our nation's defense and national security.

We will go to the core of the intellectual capital of New Jersey residents who have devoted lifetimes to making our country strong and free.

Their scientific ingenuity, energy, innovation and excellence are second to none.

We're proud that they are New Jerseyans, and we want to keep them home in New Jersey.

I have seen first hand the technology they have developed being utilized, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, by units such as the Stryker Brigade. Fort Monmouth's C4ISR technology is the key to keeping our Armed Forces safe and increasing their lethality.

For New Jerseyans, the global war on terror is not fought far afield.

Seven hundred New Jerseyans died on that battlefield of global terror on September 11, 2001.

And I can tell you from first hand experience that the men and women I have met in the service and the men and women I have

met out our military installations carry that pain with them in their hearts.

They understand that their mission to keep America secure starts here at home as they provide vital support services and research for the men and women risking their lives overseas each and every day.

As we proceed this morning, you will hear why we think the Defense Department erred in reaching its conclusions.

We have concerns about methodology.

We have concerns that the value of our intellectual capital was never considered. And DoD never reviewed its own “brain drain” in previous BRAC rounds.

We have concerns that homeland security considerations were minimized or considered not at all.

We have concerns that cross service integration of our installations was not properly weighed.

We question how the Air Force can recommend removing the tankers at New Jersey’s Air National Guard 108<sup>th</sup> Refueling Wing without consulting the Governor or the National Guard.

You will here about the vital missions at Fort Monmouth, the Mega-Base of Lakehurst, McGuire, Fort Dix, the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, the 108<sup>th</sup> Refueling Wing and Picatinny Arsenal.

But most of all you will hear how proud we are of the great job that the men and women serving at our state's military installations have accomplished.

They are serving America and they make us all proud.

(Introduce Gov. Codey.)



STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
PO BOX 001  
TRENTON  
08625

RICHARD J. CODEY  
ACTING GOVERNOR

July 8, 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi, Chairman  
Base Realignment and Closure Commission  
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600  
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear Chairman Principi:

I regret that I will not be able to be with you today for this Public Hearing. I did appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense recommendations with you and General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret) during your visit to Fort Monmouth on June 3<sup>rd</sup>. My June 28, 2005 letter to you and the Commission emphasized that New Jersey has a long and proud tradition of being a military-friendly state. Let me assure the Commission of New Jersey's continuing commitment to support the military and provide for the quality of life for our military families.

We appreciate that the Department of Defense has acknowledged New Jersey's military friendly climate by its recommendation to grow Fort Dix, Picatinny Arsenal, McGuire Air Force Base, and the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing in Atlantic City.

However, I have serious concerns that the Department of Defense's Recommendations to close Fort Monmouth and to retire the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing's aircraft ignore the significant contributions that Fort Monmouth and the 108<sup>th</sup> make to national defense and homeland security.

I am convinced that the decision to close Fort Monmouth is a mistake in this time of a hot war overseas and the clear and present threat from terrorists in our Homeland. Fort Monmouth's scientists and engineers create the IT systems that are the backbone of our nation's military.

Closing Fort Monmouth is the wrong decision at the wrong time. Why fix something that is not broken? Why disrupt the flow of life saving technologies and services for the war fighter?

I believe that after today's testimony, you will understand that the Department of Defense deviated substantially from BRAC criteria on its recommendation to close Fort Monmouth. No one believes that the critical C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) mission at Fort Monmouth is excess or unneeded. The issue before the Commission is where this vital C4ISR mission should take place.

Ready access to skilled workers and contractors is key to the U.S. military's capacity to create the technology needed to equip our Armed Forces and defend America. As this Commission proceeds with your deliberations, you must consider which states offer advantages in these areas.

I present to you today certified facts – not opinion. I have provided the Commission a Report prepared by the Heldrich Center at Rutgers University that documents the fact that Fort Monmouth has unique access to a highly concentrated and skilled science and engineering workforce as compared to other states and the nation as a whole.

New Jersey has a large base of scientific and technical firms that serve as contractors and/or supply skilled workers to military bases. In addition, New Jersey's educational infrastructure maintains a robust pipeline of future scientific and engineering workers. Closing Fort Monmouth will cost the military the loss of most of this valuable human capital at this critical time of war and terror. Closing Fort Monmouth will disrupt transformation of the Army for years to come. How many years will it take to rebuild the expert workforce that closure of Fort Monmouth would throw away?

Clearly, the military's greatest asset in C4ISR is the brainpower of the civilian and military employees coupled with the contractor and the university communities. That asset – the people, the firms and the universities - is tied to New Jersey. History and current Polls show that almost all of the most talented C4ISR workers will not move from Monmouth to Aberdeen. The A Team will stay in New Jersey and a very small B Team will move to Aberdeen. Our war fighters' C4ISR needs deserve more than a B Team.

In addition, the synergies achieved by Fort Monmouth professionals working with area contractors, institutions of higher learning, and the overall technical community in New Jersey would be lost. This additional loss will impair future Army research and development activities.


You will hear today from Members of Congress, and members of the community affected by this decision, all of whom I believe make a compelling case as to the military value of Fort Monmouth's people and mission.

I also have concerns about the Department of Defense's decision to retire planes from the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard located at McGuire Air Force Base. Neither the Adjutant General nor I were consulted about this issue despite the fact that I have come to rely on the Air National Guard, specifically the 108<sup>th</sup>, for homeland security response with up to 65% of the New Jersey Army National Guard deployed in the past year. Given the central location and unsurpassed facilities of the 108<sup>th</sup>, I am at a loss to understand how any rational application of military value scoring could result in the disestablishment of this unit.

Today you will hear from Representative Jim Saxton regarding DoD's substantial deviation from the selection criteria with this 108<sup>th</sup> recommendation. As you will hear, McGuire is the premier tanker base in the Northeast.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, thank you for your service to our country, and your attention to our concerns.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard J. Cooney". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Richard J. Cooney  
Acting Governor

c. Members of the Base Realignment Commission

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
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**The Importance of New Jersey to the Military – Governor Richard Codey**

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Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

I want to emphasize to you that New Jersey has a long and proud tradition of being a military-friendly state. Our support for the military was highlighted this past year when our legislature passed, and we signed into law, an array of programs to support military installations in New Jersey and to protect the quality of life of our troops and their families, including:

- 1) Expanding the definition of resident for the purposes of State tuition aid grant eligibility to include a dependent child whose parent or guardian has been transferred to a military base in New Jersey. This law grants those dependents immediate residency status so that they can be eligible for in-state tuition grants to New Jersey's many outstanding educational institutions.
- 2) Providing college scholarships for the children and spouses of our men and women killed in the War in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 3) Requiring local municipalities to consult with base commanders on any land use decisions near a military facility, such as zoning changes or development decisions. This critical piece of legislation will ensure that all of New Jersey's bases continue to remain unencroached and retain the ability to handle current and expanded missions for the twenty-first century.

We appreciate that the Department of Defense has acknowledged New Jersey's military friendly climate by its recommendation to grow Fort Dix, Picatinny Arsenal, McGuire Air Force Base, and the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing in Atlantic City.

However, I have two serious concerns with the Department of Defense's BRAC Recommendations.

I am convinced that the decision to close Fort Monmouth — the home of many mission critical scientists and engineers who create the IT systems that are the backbone of our nation's military — is a mistake.

I stand strongly against this action in every way possible, and believe that you will understand after today's testimony, that the DoD deviated substantially from the selection criteria on its recommendation to close Fort Monmouth.

No one believes that the critical C4ISR mission at Fort Monmouth is excess or unneeded. The issue before the Commission is where this vital mission should take place.

Ready access to skilled workers and contractors is key to the U.S. military's capacity to create the technology needed to equip our Armed Forces and defend America. As this Commission proceeds with your deliberations, you must consider which states offer advantages in these areas.

I speak to you today about certified facts – not opinion. I have provided the Commission a Report prepared by the Heldrich Center at Rutgers University that documents the fact that Fort Monmouth has unique access to a highly concentrated and skilled science and engineering workforce as compared to other states and the nation as a whole.

New Jersey has a large base of scientific and technical firms that serve as contractors and/or supply skilled workers to military bases. In addition, New Jersey's educational infrastructure maintains a robust pipeline of future scientific and engineering workers. For example, at Fort Monmouth, approximately 33% of the Civilian Workforce are engineers and scientists. Closing Fort Monmouth will cost the military the loss of most of this valuable human capital at this critical time would disrupt transformation of the Army for years to come.

In addition, the synergies achieved by Fort Monmouth professionals working with area contractors, institutions of higher learning, and the overall technical community in New Jersey would be lost, impairing future Army research and development activities.

You will hear today from Members of Congress, and members of the community affected by this decision, all of whom I believe make a compelling case as to the military value of Fort Monmouth's people and mission.

I also have concerns about the DoD's decision to retire planes from the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard located at McGuire Air Force Base. Neither the Adjutant General nor I were consulted about this issue despite the fact that I have come to rely on the Air National Guard, specifically the 108<sup>th</sup>, for homeland security response with up to 65% of the New Jersey Army National Guard deployed in the past year.

Today you will hear from Representative Jim Saxton regarding DoD's substantial deviation from the selection criteria with this recommendation. As you will hear, McGuire is the premier tanker base in the Northeast.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, thank you for your service to our country, and your attention to our concerns.



# JOHN J. HELDRICH CENTER FOR WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

## **Fort Monmouth's Unique Access to a Highly Skilled Workforce is Critical to the Success of Army Communications R&D**

Findings from an Analysis of the Proposed Move of  
Army Field Communications (C4ISR) from  
Fort Monmouth, NJ to  
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD

Report prepared for the Governor's Commission to  
Support and Enhance New Jersey's  
Military and Coast Guard Installations

June 2005

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This principal author of this report is Jennifer Cleary. Aaron Fichtner, Bonny Fraser, Kathryn Krepcio, Scott Reynolds, Neil Ridley, Robb C. Sewell, and Carl Van Horn also made significant contributions to the writing of the report. Robb C. Sewell was the lead editor, supported by Robin Gwathney, Laurie Harrington, and Jeff Stoller. Christine VanCleaf designed and managed production of this report. John Reiser provided support for Geographic Information Systems mapping and James Markel provided research support.

The preparation of this report in a compressed time frame required contributions from many individuals and state agencies. Pat Brannigan with the New Jersey Office of the Governor was instrumental in coordinating the flow of information from various agencies and providing input on the report. Admiral Paul Gaffney and the Governor's Commission to Support and Enhance New Jersey's Military and Coast Guard Installations also provided invaluable assistance. The following state agencies provided important data and evidence that was incorporated within the report and appendices:

- New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development
- New Jersey Department of Education
- New Jersey Commerce, Economic Growth, and Tourism Commission
- New Jersey Commission on Higher Education
- New Jersey State Employment and Training Commission

In particular, the Heldrich Center would like to thank the following individuals at these agencies for their significant contributions: David Crane and Bill Saley from the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development provided critical assistance with accessing and preparing United States Census and other data; John Ehret and Dung Nugyen of the New Jersey Commerce, Economic Growth, and Tourism Commission also provided needed assistance in a variety of areas. Henry Plotkin and Diane Zompa of the New Jersey State Employment and Training Commission, as well as Jeanne Oswald and Kris Krishnan of the New Jersey Commission on Higher Education; Janet Share-Zatz of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development; Joe Grossi of the New Jersey Commerce, Economic Growth, and Tourism Commission; Lori Thompson of the New Jersey Department of Education; and Michael Breton of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey all provided important contributions to this effort.

# Access to a Highly Skilled Workforce is Critical to Successful Army Communications R&D

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Without Fort Monmouth's unique access to skilled workers, it would not be the powerhouse of technological innovation in Army field communications that it has become. The Fort performs much of the U.S. Army's Command and Control Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Sensors, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technology research and development. Its location in a densely populated area with highly educated and highly skilled scientific workers and contractors has allowed the base to attract "the best and the brightest" to its civilian workforce. Maintaining this access is vital to preserving and improving the U.S. military's high-tech communications research and development operations, especially as many military employees approach retirement age.

Compared to Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG), where Pentagon officials have proposed to move C4ISR operations, the Fort Monmouth area has the following key advantages:<sup>1</sup>

- It is home to more than **3 times** the number of highly educated persons and **up to 5 times** as many skilled workers in some specialized categories as the APG area.
- It offers much better access to skilled contractors and specialized equipment through a large number of specialized firms. Compared to the APG area, the counties closest to Fort Monmouth contain more than **6.5 times** the number of telecommunications firms and more than **19 times** the number of

professional, scientific, and technical industry firms, including nearly **15 times** the number of computer systems design firms.

Moving C4ISR operations to Aberdeen, Maryland **is likely to harm C4ISR operations** as a result of limited access to skilled workers and contractors because:

- The Department of Defense (DoD) estimates of the number of workers willing to move may be grossly inflated. DoD calculations, which estimate that 75-80% of civilian workers will move, are based on flawed calculations that are standardized for all bases included in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, regardless of their function or location. Experts estimate that the actual percentage for the Fort Monmouth workforce willing to relocate could be 25% or fewer.
- As contractors compose nearly 40% of C4ISR workers at Fort Monmouth, DoD may be seriously underestimating the total number of skilled workers needed to implement these activities by not counting contractors in its calculations.
- At the same time, DoD estimates of the number of people who will retire may be much lower than many experts predict.
- Even if the number of current workers and contractors lost through a move is relatively low, the potential loss of institutional knowledge from even a few highly skilled, longtime workers could negatively affect C4ISR operations for years to come.

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<sup>1</sup> For additional information on workforce and demographics, including analyses at various geographic levels, see Appendix A.

Due primarily to the reasons stated above, the costs to re-establish existing levels of C4ISR productivity at APG, in terms of both time and dollars, are likely to be much higher than DoD projected. In order to fill a large number of the nearly 4,000 skilled job openings that will be created by moving C4ISR operations to APG, the DoD will need to invest significantly in recruiting, hiring, and retaining new skilled workers from distant areas. In addition, training new workers in advanced technical skills, and obtaining the security clearances and acquisition certifications that are required for many workers, is likely to take anywhere from many months to many years. Finally, DoD estimates of other costs, such as utilities costs and the cost to move laboratory equipment, may not be accurate.

Even if Maryland builds additional roads, offers more training, and provides other benefits, it will take decades of continuous development for the Aberdeen area to offer similar levels of access to skilled workers and contractor firms, or to offer workers the amenities that are key to attracting and preserving the well-educated and highly specialized workforce that C4ISR operations require. As Aberdeen works to “catch up” in these areas, both America’s troops, who depend on the high efficiency operations at Fort Monmouth to equip them with needed technology, and America itself, will suffer the consequences.

In addition to the built-in workforce advantages that New Jersey offers for supporting effective C4ISR operations, the state is offering a variety of incentives to lower the current cost to DoD for operating the Fort Monmouth base, including:

- The development of an array of higher education and workforce development programs targeted to the unique skill needs of Fort Monmouth.
- An aggressive customized training and consulting program aimed at lowering the cost to Fort Monmouth of doing business with local contractors. The program would provide training to qualified base contractors and their employees, and provide firms with technical assistance on how to improve processes and lower the cost of doing business.

- Transportation improvements in areas surrounding Fort Monmouth to ensure continued access to the base.

For a full listing of incentives offered by New Jersey that are specifically designed to support Fort Monmouth, see Appendix B.

New Jersey also offers a robust array of educational programs, including unique educational partnerships with the base, that help to create a strong pipeline preparing skilled workers for jobs at Fort Monmouth. In addition, a variety of existing tax, utility, and other incentives can help to limit costs to the base either directly, or indirectly by reducing costs for firms that supply Fort Monmouth.

At a time when C4ISR technology is needed to fight the War on Terrorism and when scholars predict that other nations are making fast and steady gains in similar technology areas (Adams, 2004), the United States cannot afford to lose time, productivity, or efficiency by moving these sensitive operations to Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

## II. BACKGROUND ON FORT MONMOUTH AND C4ISR ACTIVITIES

The skilled scientists and engineers that compose “Team C4ISR” perform R&D on high-tech tools that can locate enemy artillery and help prevent casualties from friendly fire; airborne radar imaging sensors that allow soldiers to track a variety of targets, including moving targets; electronic jamming devices that prevent roadside bombs from detonating; and a host of other tools that are needed on the battlefield. These tools, and the workforce that develops them, are critical to keeping soldiers safe and in helping America win the War on Terrorism.

While C4ISR activities form the core of operations at Fort Monmouth, the Fort also hosts other important military units and facilities that provide services to nearby military bases and the community at large. These units include

the 754th Explosive Ordnance Disposal, which provides emergency response to military and federal installations in the Northeast; the Defense Information Systems Agency; two organizations that foster cooperation among different military services; the United States Military Academy Preparatory School; and services such as a health clinic, a post office, and a commissary that serve several other military bases in New Jersey.

### III. KEY FINDINGS

The largest proposed disruption to Fort Monmouth's operations will occur in the area of C4ISR operations. Therefore, this analysis focuses on the relative advantages of the Fort Monmouth area in comparison to the area surrounding Aberdeen Proving Grounds, where C4ISR operations are proposed to move. Important findings include:

#### 1. Due to its unique access to a large number of highly skilled workers and contractors, Fort Monmouth is much better positioned than Aberdeen to handle C4ISR operations.

- **Access to a highly skilled and well-educated civilian workforce and contractor base is critical to successful C4ISR operations.**

Of the over 4,700 civilian C4ISR workers (4,212) and other tenant employees (521) at Fort Monmouth, 59% have at least a Bachelor's degree, while nearly 18% hold a graduate or professional degree. The largest portion of civilian workers at Fort Monmouth is composed of scientists and engineers (34%), nearly one-third of whom have a graduate degree (32%). In addition, almost one-quarter (23%) of civilian base employees are skilled logistics, equipment, or information technology specialists and nearly one-third (29%) are analysts. Finally, the base employs over 2,400 skilled contractors, most of whom are highly

educated scientists and engineers who are vital to C4ISR operations. Without these workers—both employees and contractors—the work of Team C4ISR will be severely compromised, ultimately affecting soldiers in the field.

In addition, as the points below demonstrate, the labor market area surrounding Fort Monmouth is much better equipped to fill the vital scientific and technical positions that maintaining and expanding C4ISR operations demands, especially when compared to the Aberdeen area. At Fort Monmouth, skilled workers are already in place, and the area provides abundant access to additional workers who may be needed to expand operations or to replace retiring workers.

Where possible, the remaining data in this section are derived from a 20-mile radius around each base,<sup>2</sup> as this best represents the roughly 30-40 minute commuting distance most residents in both areas are likely to travel to work according to the United States Census Bureau. Where 20-mile radius data are not available, researchers used data for the two-county area cited in DoD calculations, which represents where most current base employees live. Appendix A also includes analyses of all relevant data at the two-county level, as well as a wider area that includes counties from which at least 1% of the workforce in the target county commutes. However, the major trends remain consistent with those identified below even when wider labor market areas are considered.

- **The Fort Monmouth area is home to more than 3 times the number of adults who have a four-year college degree or higher as the APG area.**

As shown in Figure 1 and Map 1, nearly 191,000 adults aged 25 or older in the 20-mile area surrounding Fort Monmouth have at least a Bachelor's degree, compared to fewer than 61,000 in the 20-mile area surrounding APG. Similarly, nearly 68,000 people over 25 in the Fort Monmouth area have a graduate or professional degree, compared to only 21,000 in the APG region.

<sup>2</sup> The New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development prepared the 20-mile radius analysis using current U.S. Decennial Census data.


Figure 1. Number of Individuals Aged 25 or Older with a Four-Year Degree or Higher within a 20-mile Radius of the Bases




Source: United States Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census

Map 1. Number of Individuals Aged 25 or Older with a Four-Year Degree or Higher within a 20-mile Radius of the Bases

**Aberdeen Proving Grounds**



**Fort Monmouth**



Source: United States Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census

**Population 25 Years and Over with Bachelors Degrees or Above**




- **The Fort Monmouth area has up to 5 times more skilled workers available in some specialized categories than the APG region.**

The 20-mile area around Fort Monmouth has **more than 3 times** the number of professional, scientific, and technical industry workers than the same area around the base in Aberdeen (over 35,499 near Fort Monmouth vs. 11,129 near APG). In addition, the Fort Monmouth area has **more than 5 times** the number of information industry<sup>3</sup> workers as the APG area (21,055 near Fort Monmouth vs. 4,139

near Aberdeen). Within these and other industries, the Fort Monmouth area has **more than 3.5 times** the number of computer and mathematical workers (17,531 near Fort Monmouth vs. 4,804 near Aberdeen), and **nearly twice** the number of architecture and engineering workers (9,611 near Fort Monmouth vs. 5,373 near Aberdeen). (See Figure 2 and Maps 2 and 3.)

As an indicator of the health of the recent science and engineering economy, Local Employment Dynamics data from the United States Census

Figure 2. Employed Civilian Population (16 Years and Over) in Specialized Industries and Occupations within a 20-mile Radius of the Bases




Source: United States Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census


<sup>3</sup>The information industry composes the telecommunications sector, as well as other types of information and communication-related sectors. However, specific data on workers in the telecommunications sector were not available from the United States Census Bureau.

## Map 2. Employed Civilian Population (16 Years and Over) in Specialized Industries within a 20-mile Radius of the Bases

### Aberdeen Proving Grounds




### Fort Monmouth



Source: United States Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census

### Employed Civilian Population 16 Years and Over

#### Population in Specialized Industries<sup>4</sup>



**1 inch equals 13.5 miles**

Bureau indicate that there were more than **20 times** the number of workers hired in 2003-2004 in the telecommunications sector and **more than twice** as many new hires in the same period in other relevant science and engineering sectors in Monmouth and Ocean Counties in New Jersey than in Harford and Cecil Counties in Maryland. In the telecommunications sector, Monmouth and Ocean Counties hired nearly 400 new workers, compared to fewer than 20 hires in this sector in Harford and Cecil Counties. Employers in Monmouth and Ocean Counties hired over 1,100 employees in 2004 in the Computer Systems Design and Related Services, Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services and Scientific Research and Development

Services sectors combined, compared to just over 500 new hires in these sectors in Harford and Cecil Counties (United States Census Bureau, 2005).

- **Fort Monmouth has much better access to the specialized firms that provide needed contractors, employees, and goods for C4ISR operations, including access to more than 19 times the number of professional, scientific, and technical industry firms than the APG area.**


The two-county area<sup>5</sup> surrounding Fort Monmouth contains significantly more specialized scientific, technical, and communications-oriented firms that can provide a vital source for base employees,

<sup>4</sup> Specialized industries include the professional, scientific, and technical industry and the Information industry.


<sup>5</sup> Information on firms was not available within a 20-mile radius of the two bases as the Maryland Department of Labor did not release the relevant data in time for the printing of this report.

Map 3. Employed Civilian Population (16 Years and Over) in Specialized Occupations within a 20-mile Radius of the Bases

**Aberdeen Proving Grounds**



**Fort Monmouth**



Source: United States Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census

**Employed Civilian Population  
16 Years and Over**

**Population in Specialized Occupations<sup>6</sup>**

- less than 75
- 75 - 150
- 151 - 300
- 301 - 600
- greater than 600
- 20mi Radius
- Major Highways
- State Boundary
- County Boundary

**1 inch equals 13.5 miles**

contractors, and consultants. These firms can also supply needed goods and equipment to the base in a quick timeframe. The increased competition spurred by the high concentration of firms in a small area may also serve to lower the costs of goods provided to the base.


Monmouth and Ocean Counties have nearly 4,000 professional, scientific, and technical industry firms compared to under 200 in Harford and Cecil Counties, or only 5% of the number of firms in Monmouth and Ocean Counties.

Within this larger industry category, Monmouth and Ocean Counties have **over 15 times** the total number of computer systems design firms (841 vs. 55), **5 times** the total number of engineering services companies (251 vs. 50), and **over 3.5 times** the total number of scientific research and development firms (68 vs. 19) than Harford and Cecil Counties.<sup>7</sup> When relevant firms in the information industry are considered, Monmouth and Ocean Counties offer access to **over 6.5 times** the total number of telecommunications firms as Harford and Cecil Counties (205 vs. 31). (See Figure 3.)

<sup>6</sup> Specialized industries include computer and mathematical occupations, and architecture and engineering occupations.

<sup>7</sup> Because Monmouth and Ocean Counties cover a larger land area than Harford and Cecil Counties (1,108 square miles vs. 788 square miles), some might argue that New Jersey simply has more firms because the area has more total available space. As a result, the Heldrich Center performed an analysis of the density of firms per square mile in the two areas. The results can be found in Appendix A. However, it is clear from this analysis that the trends between the two areas remain similar.

Figure 3. Total Number of Specialized Firms in Counties Surrounding Bases



Source: United States Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census

## 2. Successful C4ISR operations are likely to be harmed by moving to APG due to a lack of access to skilled workers and contractors, as evidenced by the following:

- **The Department of Defense grossly overestimated the number of workers willing to move from Fort Monmouth to APG.**

If Fort Monmouth closes, nearly 4,000 new civilian jobs, many of them for skilled scientists and engineers, will need to be filled to staff C4ISR operations in Aberdeen, MD (United States Department of Defense, 2004). However, a much smaller percentage of the civilian workforce at Fort Monmouth is likely to move to APG than DoD has projected, making it much more likely that

operations will be negatively affected by the move to Aberdeen.

DoD (2004) has estimated that 75% to 80% of civilian workers will be willing to move to APG. However, this estimate is based on faulty formulas that make standard assumptions about how many workers will move and retire, regardless of the specifics of each base (Marshall, 2004). Such a broad-brush approach overlooks key variations that drastically affect the willingness of base workers to move to a new location. In the case of Fort Monmouth, the DoD's estimates are grossly flawed.

*Some experts estimate that only about 25% of scientists and engineers moved during the previous BRAC round.*

A study authored by a Naval laboratory expert and cited by the National Defense University estimated that, on average, only about 25% of scientists and engineers moved to a new location following the last BRAC process (Marshall, 2000). Among those who did move, many did not remain with the military, but moved into private sector jobs. One study of a site that attempted to move over 1,600 civilians from a Naval base in Pennsylvania to one in Maryland found that only 38% of those offered a transfer chose to move (Government Accounting Office, 1998).

***Other research suggests that the percentage willing to move may be even lower.***

Research demonstrates that highly skilled technical workers are less likely to move from suburban metropolitan areas to more rural settings than other types of workers (Herzog and Schlottman, 1991; Herzog, Schlottman, and Johnson, 1986; Malecki and Bradbury, 1992). Workers who have more job alternatives available in their present locations are also less likely to move (Arnold and Feldman, 1995), as are those who do not find the new locations to be attractive from a services and infrastructure perspective (Noe and Barber, 1993). In addition, about 35% of private sector employees who move with their companies leave the firms within three years (Oltman and Marinack, 1998).

One study of a government defense agency that moved from a northeastern metropolitan area to a rural area south of Washington, D.C. found that older workers—even those with long tenure at the agency—were less likely to move and many were willing to take early retirement or give up retirement benefits rather than move to a new location (Feldman and Bolino, 1998). The same study also found that workers who chose not to move cited reasons such as their attachments to their current locations and greater job availability in their present areas.

Other studies on corporate relocation have also found that older workers who have strong ties to their communities (Dunn, 1979), as well as married workers and those with children, are less likely to relocate with a company (Brett and Reilly, 1988; Munton, 1990). These data are significant

given that the average age of civilian workers at Fort Monmouth is 47 and the average tenure is over 19 years. While the number of base workers with children is unknown, it is certain that many have children, and even grandchildren, in the Fort Monmouth area that would keep them attached to their communities.

***Fewer job opportunities in the APG area for employed spouses may further reduce base employees' willingness to move.***

There will be an estimated total of 177,000 job openings in Monmouth and Ocean Counties alone over the 2002-2012 period (New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2004). This is nearly **4 times** the Maryland Department of Labor's (2004) estimate of approximately 48,000 total job openings expected over the same period in Harford and Cecil Counties. In addition, average annualized salaries are nearly \$3,000 higher in Monmouth and Ocean Counties compared to Harford and Cecil Counties (\$38,792 in Monmouth and Ocean vs. \$35,900 in Harford and Cecil).

Given the importance of job opportunities in workers' willingness to relocate, many Fort Monmouth workers whose spouses have lucrative jobs in the area and who feel that their job prospects would be more limited in the APG area, may be particularly unwilling to move. In fact, researchers found that a spouse's career has a large impact on a worker's willingness to relocate (Brett and Reilly, 1988).

These workers would stand to lose not only a portion of their own salaries, which would be lowered to adjust for a lower military pay scale in Maryland (United States Office of Personnel Management, 2005), but they would also lose a portion of their spouses' incomes as they look for new jobs in an area with lower salaries and fewer job prospects. In many cases, the salaries of base workers' spouses may be higher than their own, so any cut resulting from a move could drastically affect base workers' household income and their standard of living. Even if workers would otherwise consider a move, the negative impact on their spouses and overall income could tip the scales toward a decision not to relocate.

*The abundance of high-quality education and transportation in the Fort Monmouth area make it a more attractive place to live than the APG area.*

The primary and secondary educational programs offered in Monmouth County showed significantly higher test scores, high school graduation rates, and curriculum standards than those in Harford County. Similar patterns were observed statewide. Additionally, many high schools in the Fort Monmouth area offer competitive career academies and other special programs. New Jersey's higher education institutions are also competitive with Maryland's and families near Fort Monmouth now have close-range access to degree programs at the state's premier academic institutions through the newly formed New Jersey Coastal Communiversities, an alliance of eight leading New Jersey colleges and universities, including Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, the New Jersey Institute of Technology, and others.

Since many highly educated parents choose where to live based on school quality, these data are important to understanding the willingness of the Fort Monmouth workforce to move to APG. Additional data on how New Jersey grade schools and high schools compare to Maryland's schools can be found in Appendix C.

New Jersey also offers its citizens access to more airports than Maryland, as well as better road, bus, and rail access that enable base workers and their families to travel effectively and easily for work, school, and pleasure, as well as help to reduce traffic, congestion, and pollution. A recent article in the *Baltimore Sun* highlighted the lack of adequate mass transit available in the Aberdeen area, as well as how an influx of new workers will add to pollution levels and already clogged roads and trains (Wheeler, 2005).

Monmouth and Ocean Counties offer convenient access to the Garden State Parkway, which extends from the resort community of Cape May in the southern part of the state to the New York State Thruway in the north, and provides access to major roadways, including Interstate 95 (the New Jersey Turnpike), and Interstates 78 and 80. While base workers residing near APG have similar north-

south access to metropolitan areas like Baltimore and Washington, D.C., Maryland does not provide as much access to major roads and transportation infrastructure for people who live west and east of the base. By contrast, Monmouth County contains several major highways, such as Route 18 and Interstate 195, that offer quick access between Fort Monmouth and western and northwestern parts of the state. For more information on how New Jersey's transportation infrastructure compares to Maryland's, see Appendix D.

- **Contractors compose nearly 40% of C4ISR workers at Fort Monmouth, yet DoD's calculations do not take contractors into account. Therefore, DoD may be seriously underestimating the total number of skilled workers needed to adequately staff C4ISR operations.**

The DoD does not count contractors in its BRAC calculations because the number of these workers is difficult to estimate systematically for all bases (Marshall, 2004). However, Fort Monmouth employs more than 2,400 on-base contractors, many of whom are skilled scientists and engineers who perform vital C4ISR research and development (New Jersey Economics, 2005). Since this number amounts to approximately 40% of the over 6,600 C4ISR workers at Fort Monmouth (4,200 civilian employees plus 2,400 on-base contractors), and because only civilian **employees** are counted when calculating the number of people needed to staff base operations, DoD may be seriously underestimating the total number of people required to carry out C4ISR operations effectively. Additionally, many other local contractors provide goods and services to the base that are critical to C4ISR activities.

While the military plans to maintain current contracts with many contractor firms in New Jersey, many of these firms may be unwilling or unable to move significant portions of their businesses and employees to Aberdeen (Diamond and Willis, 2005). Among those that are willing to move, many will lose valuable skilled employees who have worked at Fort Monmouth for years, but who are unwilling to uproot their families and move to APG.

■ **Many more workers than DoD estimated may retire within the next 5 to 10 years.**

In addition to recruiting workers to replace individuals who remain in New Jersey, APG will likely need to recruit and hire a large number of new workers to replace retirees in the near to mid-term future. DoD estimates that only 6% of workers will retire rather than move to a receiving installation (United States Department of Defense, 2004). However, the Government Accounting Office (2001) estimates that about one-third of the current civilian defense workforce will be eligible to retire by 2006. At the same time, a report prepared for DoD predicts that more than half of the civilian workforce would be eligible to retire by 2005 (Acquisition 2005 Task Force, 2000). With the average age of the civilian workforce at Fort Monmouth being 47 years, it is possible that a significant portion of the workforce that does choose to move to Maryland could retire within the next 5 to 10 years.

■ **The loss of even a few key employees who do not move to APG can have damaging effects on C4ISR operations due to the loss of important institutional knowledge and informal networks that spur innovation.**

Losing key employees disrupts the informal ties that spur employee creativity and drive organizational outcomes. One key finding from the research literature is that informal collaborative networks, which are built among workers over long periods of time, are absolutely key to producing innovative R&D solutions (Kreiner and Schultz, 1993), a key component of successful C4ISR operations. Other indispensable components of innovation in R&D organizations are institution-specific knowledge and skills, also known as “tacit knowledge”, which build up over years of experience and are slow to disseminate to new employees (Rhyne et al., 1997).

Given that older workers with more tenure are less likely to move during a relocation and that the average age of Fort Monmouth’s civilian employees is 47 and the mean tenure is over 19 years, DoD is likely to lose a relatively high number of employees who have large amounts of tacit knowledge and who are key to the informal networks that make innovative R&D work possible. However, even if

these numbers are low, the literature is clear that loss of even a few important employees can cause disastrous disruptions in R&D productivity and innovation.

### **3. DoD cost and time estimates to relocate C4ISR operations to APG are likely too low.**

■ **Because the workforce and firms are less specialized and concentrated in Maryland, the time and cost of recruiting and training the nearly 4,000 C4ISR employees and 2,400 contractors that may be needed at the new base is likely to be higher than DoD expects.**

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University has warned that DoD planning estimates do not accurately reflect the amount of time, effort, and cost that is needed to replace the highly skilled workers who staff the nation’s defense laboratories (Marshall, 2004). Although specific estimates are difficult to determine, it is certain that the costs of recruitment are likely to be substantial, especially for the highly skilled jobs performed by scientists and engineers.

Most human resource experts believe that the cost of replacing workers rises dramatically as the level and complexity of the job increase. Cost factors that need to be considered include direct expenditures, such as advertising job openings, processing applications, conducting interviews and background checks, and orienting and training new employees. Other costs include disruptions and delays in completing projects as well as increased workloads for remaining employees.

Recruitment is likely to be complicated by the APG area’s limited access to skilled workers and contractors, as well as the expected retirement crunch affecting the federal workforce. Researchers at the RAND Corporation have stated that the large number of expected retirements among civilian defense workers over the next 5 to 10 years, coupled with bureaucratic federal hiring practices, is likely to make it more difficult and costly to find and hire qualified workers in a short time span (Asch, 2003). If many fewer employees move than DoD

expects, or more retire, the agency's severance, unemployment, and retirement costs are also likely to increase dramatically.

The need for nearly all C4ISR workers to gain security clearances and other types of certifications will add not only cost, but also time, to recruitment and hiring efforts. According to the Government Accounting Office (2004), by 2003, it took DoD an average of 375 days to process security clearances, a figure that rose significantly between 2001 and 2003. Recent reports suggest that a continued backlog of investigations results in waits of one to two years for workers seeking clearances. Such delays increase costs to the federal government and the time needed to complete sensitive, national security-related projects. In addition, several sources have noted a crisis shortage of military acquisition workers, who currently make up a large percentage of Fort Monmouth's civilian workforce and who require special certifications before they can begin working (Cahlink, 2001; Farrell, 2002; Gill, 2001).

- **DoD may have overestimated savings on reduced utilities costs, as the gap in rates has narrowed recently.**

While utility costs are currently higher in New Jersey than in Maryland, DoD estimates of total savings in this area may be inflated. A recent report compiled by the New Jersey Commerce, Economic Growth, and Tourism Commission (2005) that analyzed utility rates found that, in 2004, New Jersey narrowed the gap in commercial utility rates to just over .5 cents per kilowatt hour (9.02 cents in Maryland vs. 9.60 cents in New Jersey). The same report found that, depending upon the type of product usage, New Jersey's 2004 rate in two out of the three gas utility product categories were considerably less than Maryland's. In addition, DoD estimates may no longer be valid given recent volatility in the energy market. Other indicators also demonstrate that the gap in utility costs between New Jersey and Maryland are narrowing. For a detailed comparison of utility costs in New Jersey and Maryland, see Appendix D.

- **However, DoD may have underestimated costs for communications networking, renovating facilities, and moving laboratory equipment and supplies.**

A Government Accounting Office (1998) study found that the costs for communications networking, renovating facilities, and moving laboratory equipment and supplies were at least \$100 million greater than expected in a relocation of Naval Air Development Center operations from Warminster, Pennsylvania. This increase in costs drove up the estimated payback period from 9 years to 33 years.

#### **4. New Jersey offers a variety of incentives and education advantages that make continued operation of the Fort Monmouth base a better choice for DoD.**

- **Incentives offered by New Jersey will help the base to lower costs, as well as benefit base contractors and thus drive down their costs.**

Building on its proud and successful history of meeting the workforce needs of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey proposes to take the following steps that will reduce the labor costs of the base and base contractors:

- To ensure that Fort Monmouth continues to have a skilled civilian workforce, the New Jersey State Employment and Training Commission will undertake a Demand-side Skill Assessment Project to determine and then respond to the critical and emerging R&D skills that civilian workers at the base need to be successful. The state's research staff and content experts, together with a consortium of New Jersey's colleges and universities and representatives from the state's businesses that are home to world-class R&D programs, would partner with Fort Monmouth's technical, management, and human resources staff to fully explore the R&D function and skill requirements of the base.

This collaborative partnership would assess and monitor continually the current and emerging knowledge and skill needs of Fort Monmouth, guide the development of customized training programs, and facilitate the modification and development of related college courses and program curricula to meet the workforce needs of R&D business functions statewide and in particular those of Fort Monmouth.

- In an effort to reduce costs for contractors and other businesses that currently support Fort Monmouth, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (NJLWD) will implement an aggressive skills training program to improve worker productivity and enhance the competitiveness of existing contractors. Working in conjunction with the local community college, NJLWD will perform a worker skills assessment to determine what additional training will result in lowering the costs of contractors doing defense-related business at the base.

Training for this incentive program will be provided by the local community college and the New Jersey Manufacturing Extension Program (NJMEP). In addition, NJMEP will provide consulting to all approved contractors, not just manufacturing businesses, to help them find ways to eliminate waste in their business processing. Such services frequently result in productivity increases, improved processing and delivery time, better cash flow, reduced costs, and higher employee morale at the targeted firms.

In addition, the New Jersey Department of Transportation and its county/municipal partners have committed over \$325 million to support transportation improvements in areas surrounding military installations throughout the state, including Fort Monmouth. Another \$600 million is planned for military host counties, including Monmouth County, in 2005 and 2006.

For a full listing and more detailed explanation of the specific incentives that New Jersey is offering to support Fort Monmouth and its contractors, see

Appendix B. In addition to these incentives, New Jersey offers an array of standard tax and other incentives that many base contractors can use to help reduce their costs, which may reduce costs for Fort Monmouth. For a full listing of these tax and business incentives, see Appendix E.

■ **New Jersey offers a robust educational pipeline to supply and support skilled workers at Fort Monmouth.**

From grade school through graduate education, New Jersey, and especially the institutions around Fort Monmouth, offer strong academic curricula, specialized programs, and unique partnerships with the base that serve to prepare new workers for the technical and scientific jobs at Fort Monmouth and support current base workers.

Grade schools and high schools near Fort Monmouth posted higher mathematics and language arts test scores for all grades tested, as well as higher high school graduation rates (88% in New Jersey vs. 82.6% in Maryland in 2000-2001). In addition, New Jersey schools cover a wider range of content than Maryland's schools, requiring students to show proficiency in nine core content areas compared to only four in Maryland. For more information on how New Jersey's elementary and secondary schools compare to Maryland's, see Appendix C.

New Jersey also has more public two-year colleges (19 vs. 16 in Maryland), as well as more non-degree institutions that offer postsecondary education (152 vs. 82) to support base employees and their families. Degree and certificate programs at colleges and universities such as Rutgers University, the New Jersey Institute of Technology, and the Stevens Institute of Technology offer a variety of special programs and research centers and many are accessible to residents in the Fort Monmouth area through the newly formed Coastal Communiiversity.

In addition, Monmouth University and Fort Monmouth collaborate on numerous programs, including science symposia for high school students.

- **Prestigious higher education institutions provide specialized resources that can support R&D at Fort Monmouth, as well as train new scientists and engineers.**

Several of the state’s most prestigious colleges and universities partner with Fort Monmouth to help foster a skilled workforce for the base and to provide vital R&D support. New Jersey is home to state-of-the-art research centers and specialized labs including the Princeton Institute for the Science and Technology of Materials (PRISM) and the Program in Integrative Information Computer and Application Sciences at Princeton University, the Center for Communications and Signal Processing Research at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, and the Center for Operations Research and the Logistics Initiative at Rutgers University. Many of these centers and labs are or have partnered with the military. For example, PRISM, a multidisciplinary research center at Princeton University in the general field of materials science through photonics, has provided Fort Monmouth with invaluable assistance in solving difficult technical issues. For additional information on the unique secondary and higher education programs that help to prepare future workers for Fort Monmouth and that support R&D work at the base, see Appendix C.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Fort Monmouth offers the unique access to skilled workers and contractor firms that is needed to effectively carry out C4ISR operations. The 20-mile area surrounding Fort Monmouth is home to more

individuals with higher educational attainment than the comparable area surrounding APG. The Fort Monmouth area also boasts more professional, scientific, technical, information, computer, mathematics, architecture, and engineering workers and contractor firms than the APG region. Such resources allow Fort Monmouth to produce cutting-edge communications tools on demand as needed during a “hot” war, such as the War on Terrorism. Such access will also be instrumental to maintaining and enhancing C4ISR operations as new individuals replace retiring workers or the DoD needs to increase C4ISR capacity.

New Jersey’s wealth of amenities; primary, secondary, and postsecondary educational opportunities; and mass transit options make the area a place for workers to build their lives and secure a prosperous future for themselves and their families. It also provides the best location for C4ISR operations to not only continue but to be nurtured and to evolve in response to the nation’s ever-changing needs.

Clearly, the Department of Defense has overlooked key facts in its analysis regarding a move of C4ISR operations to Maryland. The DoD is likely to have a much more difficult time finding and replacing skilled workers than it expects, a fact that will have a significant effect on the cost and time to re-establish current levels of productivity.

America cannot afford such costs to its future security. America’s citizens—the individuals who have helped build and sustain this nation’s military strength, and the troops who risk their lives daily to protect the homeland—are best served by preserving the investment they have made in Fort Monmouth.

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**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**The Importance of New Jersey to the Military – Senator Frank R. Lautenberg**

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Mr. Chairman, fellow commissioners, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify on the need to keep Fort Monmouth, in New Jersey, open as a vital military installation. This is a personal, as well as policy, issue for me, as Fort Monmouth played a role in my service in the Army during World War II. When I first arrived at Fort Monmouth, I was young and green. I'll admit that I was apprehensive about what lay ahead for me. But at Fort Monmouth, I learned what I needed to know, and when I got into the field, I knew what I had to do. Fort Monmouth has changed a lot since I was there. But one thing hasn't changed – it is still critical to our national security.

Monmouth boasts one of the most technologically sophisticated communications networks in the world. It has supported a one billion dollar information technology (IT) upgrade at the Pentagon. Fort Monmouth is a modern facility that has the capacity to see projects through from beginning to end – from R&D to deployment, where the rubber meets the road. Most importantly, it develops equipment that makes soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan safer.

Our military's greatest advantage is the real-time use of battlefield information to improve coordination, target selection, lethality, and speed. I believe the Pentagon has profoundly failed to recognize that Fort Monmouth is the epicenter of the research and development programs that produce the software, sensors, and communications equipment our soldiers rely on everyday. Closing Fort Monmouth would have negative affects on our war fighters in the field right now. Period. Our soldiers rely on the timely innovations of Fort Monmouth that improve intelligence and combat support systems, which ultimately make our troops safer and more effective.

There are more 20 life-saving technologies that have been developed at Fort Monmouth. I would like to mention three specifically. For example, Fort Monmouth developed the high-profile system called "Warlock Jammers," which give off radio frequencies that interfere with the signals used to detonate improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. IEDs are among the most difficult weapons for our troops to fight against. This year, they are responsible for over half of all combat casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to U.S. Army figures, IEDs are now the number one killer of American troops. There are currently 80 engineers at Fort Monmouth's Communications-Electronics Command working to develop and hone the technologies necessary for U.S. troops to neutralize, defeat, predict and prevent harm from IEDs.

Fort Monmouth has also developed systems to prevent friendly fire. “Blue Force Tracking” uses satellite links to show on computer screens inside vehicles and command posts where friendly and enemy positions are located. The touch sensitive screen plots friendly units, enemy units, and battlefield graphics against a map or a satellite imagery background. According to Army officials, this is one of the most important Battle Command systems used by tactical Army and Marine Corps units in Iraq and Afghanistan today. This situational understanding information has saved countless lives by enabling our soldiers to fight on the move, know where members of their own unit are, and react quicker than the opposing forces.

Fort Monmouth has developed a special radar technology that automatically notifies helicopter pilots when they have been targeted by enemy radar, and instantly releases flares to confuse the missile’s heat-seeking guidance. This “jamming technology” blocks and confuses guidance systems on enemy missiles headed toward U.S. helicopters. Given that our helicopters are frequently brought down by hostile fire in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we need this technology. Just last week in Afghanistan, one of our twin-rotor Chinook helicopters that carried 17 young men, crashed. Military reports stated that the aircraft was taking direct fire from elements on the ground.

Fort Monmouth has contributed extensively to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the war on terrorism in other ways as well. For example, 549 military and civilian personnel have been deployed to support our troops in Iraq. Additionally, Fort Monmouth has filled requisitions for almost one million items to meet urgent battlefield needs.

In addition to all of these compelling facts, Fort Monmouth already has a lot going for it: It can accept 3,700 additional personnel without new construction. It has access to nearby range areas for joint experimentation. It is surrounded by industrial giants like Lucent, AT&T, and Telecordia. Last, but certainly not least, Fort Monmouth has a highly-talented, highly-skilled workforce. In past BRAC rounds, only a small percentage of a base’s workforce followed their jobs to other parts of the country. New Jersey has one of the highest concentrations of scientific brainpower in the U.S. and accounts for ten percent of all research and development in our nation. According to multiple studies, it would take decades to replicate the unique capacity of professional and technical civilian personnel currently at Fort Monmouth.

These are some of the reasons why Fort Monmouth is so important to our national defense. The closure of this facility will harm our nation, the state of New Jersey, and most importantly, our troops on the battlefield.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.

BRAC Commission Regional Hearings  
July 8, 2005  
Goucher College – Baltimore, Maryland  
Prepared Statement of Gerald J. Tarantolo  
Mayor of Eatontown Borough, New Jersey

Chairman Principi, members of the BRAC Commission, I recognize that the Commission has a difficult job in evaluating the Secretary's proposed list of base closures, and want to personally thank you for the work you are doing on behalf of our country. Thank you for affording me the opportunity to address the commission on behalf of the Fort Monmouth host communities of Eatontown, Oceanport, Tinton Falls, Shrewsbury Borough and Little Silver. I am here as spokesperson for the mayors of each of these communities. Naturally we are deeply concerned for the adverse impact that the closing of Fort Monmouth will have on our municipalities and my presence here today is to express that concern and present data supporting that concern. Each of the mayors are active members of the Save Our Fort Committee, and our presentation focuses on item 6 of the "Final Selection Criteria \_ Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment" namely, "The

economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.” Our counterparts on the Save Our Fort Committee, the Patriots Alliance, will address the military value component of the final selection criteria in a few minutes.

First it is appropriate that I define for you what I mean by host community. The five host communities either immediately border Fort Monmouth, such as Little Silver and Shrewsbury (which make up the northern border of Fort Monmouth’s main post) or have portions of Fort Monmouth within our geographic boundaries such as Eatontown (approximately 500 acres), Oceanport (approximately 500 acres), and Tinton Falls (approximately 200 acres). The presence of Fort Monmouth has played an integral part of our communities’ historical, cultural and economical makeup. Time prevents me from addressing the historical and cultural aspects of our relationship over the past 80 plus years but I assure you that relationship was extremely positive and an integral element in our community fabric.

Again the time allotment prevents me from articulating the economic detail that I would like the BRAC Commission to consider as criteria for removing Fort Monmouth from the closure list. This detail is outlined in a report commissioned by the five host communities, which was prepared by Jeffrey Donohoe Associates. Recognizing that the time element might prevent us from presenting the study details, we arranged in advance to discuss our report with BRAC Commission staff members earlier this week. Our thanks to Gary Dinsick, Army Team Leader and members of his staff, Wesley Wood and Elizabeth Bieri, for taking the time to allow us to provide the economic impact data that clearly shows closing Fort Monmouth would have a devastating impact on our communities, our county and our state. The analysis of the data presented in the report indicates:

- Loss of jobs for our residents – 1325 Fort Monmouth employees live in the 5 host communities and an additional 787 employees live in the surrounding area.
- Estimates indicate that Fort Monmouth employees pump \$260M annually into the local, county and state economy.

- Residential and non-residential property tax revenues are at risk and if lost the burden will fall on the remaining residents to make up the void. Taxes will increase.
- Unemployment in the host communities could increase to 9.5 % double what it currently stands at.
- Loss of military contracts could make this problem substantially worse since data indicates that \$925M was awarded in FY 03 to area contractors, including \$325M awarded by Fort Monmouth.
- Potential direct loss of \$75M in retail goods and services locally and an additional \$45M in the region.

These are some of the highlights noted in the report and we will continue to pursue our data gathering and provide the commission with our findings if they are germane to our case. Mr. Dinsick suggested this at our meeting on Tuesday when he described our effort as an extension of the BRAC Commission's analysis. We accept that responsibility and will be diligent in that effort.

In closing, we feel that some aspects of the DoD's BRAC evaluation of Fort Monmouth were blatantly flawed and

should be reviewed by the commission's analysts. These areas of concern are:

- The Secretary deviated on Criteria 1 where Fort Monmouth was rated significantly higher than Aberdeen Proving Ground on 4 of the 5 benchmarks.
- There are some questions regarding the 8.5 million square feet of Aberdeen vacant space.
- DoD's data error resulted in Fort Monmouth being unfairly evaluated on medical-related issues.

We are confident that the Commission will evaluate the data that clearly supports removing Fort Monmouth from the closure list. That conclusion was reached on two prior occasions and we hope the Commission will maintain their 1000 batting average by going 3 for 3. On behalf of the five Fort Monmouth host communities thank you for this opportunity to present our case.

# Why the Secretary's Recommendation to Close Fort Monmouth Should Be Reversed

Fort Monmouth Host Communities

*Gerald Tarantolo, Mayor of Eatontown*

*on behalf of*

*Maria Gatta, Mayor of Oceanport*

*Peter Maclearie, Mayor of Tinton Falls*

*Emelia Siciliano, Mayor of Shrewsbury*

*Suzanne Castleman, Mayor of Little Silver*

# Impacts on the Communities

- Loss of jobs for residents
  - 1,325 residents in the five host communities work at the Fort, an additional 787 employees live in the impacted area
- Fort employees pump more than \$260 million annually into the regional economy
- Residential and non-residential property tax revenues at-risk
  - Closure could put \$430 million of assessed valuation at-risk in the Host Communities, and an additional \$260 million in the Impacted Communities
- Unemployment in the Host Communities could increase to 9.5%
- Loss of military contract could make this problem substantially worse
  - Monmouth County contractors received more than \$925 million in contracts in FY 03
  - 25% of all NJ contracts
  - Potential for significant vacancy increases in office space (up to 425,000 SF)
- Potential direct loss of \$75 million in retail goods and services locally, and an additional \$45 million in the region
  - Up to 500,000 SF of retail space could become vacant

# Concerns with DoD's BRAC Evaluation of Fort Monmouth

- The Secretary deviated on Criteria 1
  - Fort Monmouth was rated significantly higher than Aberdeen Proving Ground on 4 of 5 benchmarks
- Aberdeen reports more than 8.5 million square feet of vacant space
  - Is the Army trying to make Aberdeen more efficient at the expense of others, without justification?
  - Have Aberdeen's operating costs been accurately portrayed and fairly evaluated, and was this consistent with Criteria 4?
  - Despite high vacancy, Aberdeen would require substantial investments in MilCon to construct facilities to accommodate Fort Monmouth's missions
- DoD's data error resulted in Fort Monmouth being unfairly evaluated on medical-related issues
  - Were other evaluations impacted? Child care, employment, education?

**CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH**

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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

**Testimony of Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ)**  
**Base Realignment and Closure Commission Hearing**  
**Baltimore, Maryland — July 8, 2005**

COMMITTEES:

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
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**OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**  
CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND**  
**COOPERATION IN EUROPE**  
CO-CHAIRMAN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:

Ten years ago, the Pentagon recommended that Navy Lakehurst be closed - "radically realigned" (to almost nothingness) was the euphemism used at the time.

However, citing deep concern over brain drain in the niche realm of aircraft launch and recovery as well as the erroneous cost savings that melted like butter under scrutiny, BRAC 95 agreed with us, by a vote of 7-1, that Navy Lakehurst was of high military value and that its closure could be catastrophic to naval aviation.

Today, with more than 3,000 highly skilled employees - artisans, engineers, and the like - and with more than \$82 million in milcon and warfighter enhancing projects that we've poured into the base over the last decade, Navy Lakehurst stands out as a world class, one-of-a-kind facility.

In the last three years, for example, Naval Aviation has not experienced one launch and recovery mishap resulting from Lakehurst product failure. This success rate over more than ½ million launches and landings would be substantially different if the Lakehurst Mission had relocated and the skilled staff diluted. The cost of losses would have been substantial considering today's aircraft cost at a typical \$50M and the human capital loss of a crew. As a result of our Navy efforts at Lakehurst, we have come to fully understand that having credentials to do the job is one thing, but having the experience is what counts, especially when lives are at stake.

Aircraft carriers exist for one essential purpose: to safely and effectively launch and recover mission capable aircraft in order to project power, win battles, or assist in humanitarian crises as we saw in Aceh when action by the sailors aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln saved countless lives.

Mr. Chairman, one of my older brothers was an A-7 carrier pilot on the Enterprise. Every time the steam catapult launched his jet, every time the tailhook on his corsair snagged the wire rope on deck stopping tons of steel and fuel at high speed, instantly, Navy Lakehurst was responsible for the complicated engineering feat that ensured that all of this got done, hundreds of thousands of times, safely.

The long and distinguished record of Navy Lakehurst in technology development, evaluation and verification, engineering, systems integration, prototyping and manufacturing of Air Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) and Support Equipment (SE) is nothing short of breathtaking.

Navy Lakehurst is on the cutting edge of new products and designs like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS)-the successor to steam catapults-and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) that will reduce airframe stress, lengthen aircraft service life, and improve safety. EMALS and AAG are critical components of the CVN-21 next generation carrier program.

The ADMACS, Aviation Data Management and Control System which Lakehurst is developing will increase Carrier fighting power while further reducing operating cost. This system is intended to transform the method of operating carrier flight decks, of the existing and next generation Carriers, to increase their value while reducing cost. This project fully illustrates where long term corporate knowledge pays a return in positioning our military for the future.

DoD's recommendation to merge Navy Lakehurst with two other contiguous installations, Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base - is enthusiastically welcomed and embraced and reflects the concept of jointness some of us have been aggressively pursuing for years.

With your imprimatur, New Jersey's new mega-base is poised to become the first—and only—triservice joint base in the United States...and you can make it even stronger.

The next panel will make a compelling case as to why a modestly scaled down, almost contiguous Ft. Monmouth would attach neatly and seamlessly to the proposed new joint base. Ft. Monmouth and its unique mission, if moved to Aberdeen, is likely to experience serious brain drain, not unlike that which we averted at Lakehurst.

Fort Monmouth is already using the Joint facilities of the mega-base on its instrumented ranges at Fort Dix and for over thirty years as an aviation C4ISR tenant at Lakehurst. Here, you have a chance to do something good, save Fort Monmouth and promote jointness. Moving Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen could undo a “going Joint concern.”

The 42,000-acre New Jersey mega-base is an unencroached facility surrounded by over 60,000 acres of protected land that has the further advantage of built-in either restricted or controlled airspace.

It will be an incubator of best joint practices, not unlike what you, Secretary Principi, and I, accomplished in the DOD/VA medical sharing agreements.

The New Jersey mega-base supports a variety of military research, testing and evaluation missions; it contains 2 airfields, a 12,000 ft long test runway and has the transportation capability to deploy en-masse the troops and their equipment to any destination.

For Homeland Security purposes, the joint mega-base is within 300 miles of 25% of the US population and provides a venue for co-location of assets to defend against attacks. Today, 25

cost-reducing tenants, including the National Guard, Emergency Reponse Team, DOJ and the Coast Guard all call Lakehurst, McGuire, or Ft. Dix home.

Finally, let me say a brief word concerning the DoD recommendation to retire two flying squadrons of the 108th Air Refueling Wing from McGuire—a patently absurd suggestion that flies in the face of good management and military value. My colleague, Jim Saxton, will elaborate on this later, but the New Jersey mega-base offers far more--not less--operational and training synergies. Moreover, the recommendation fails to appreciate the \$70 million tanker wing infrastructure that would be abandoned and the difficulty receiving stations will have in recruiting the personnel to support the mission.

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**Fort Monmouth – Congressman Frank Pallone (NJ-6)**

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**Overview of Defense Departments Recommendation Regarding Fort  
Monmouth Army Garrison Eatontown, NJ**

**Opening:**

Good morning commissioners and thank you for holding this hearing. I would like to thank the elected officials as well as the concerned New Jersey citizens who traveled here today. We are all opposed to the Pentagon's recommendation to close Fort Monmouth. Our reasons are primarily based on the military value of Fort Monmouth to the war effort and the negative impact on the war that would result from moving Fort Monmouth.

**BRAC History:**

I have been a member of Congress for 17 years and during every round of BRAC the Department of Defense always fails to understand the significance of R&D facilities. This is not just moving troops from one base to another; we are talking about a highly advanced degreed civilian work force. These people have worked to create a synergy in their field that is second to none most will simply not move to. The cost reconstructing lab facilities and reconstituting a high tech workforce will be tremendous.

I believe that the Pentagon violated the BRAC criteria in recommending that Fort Monmouth be closed. They ignored the "Brain Drain" that would make impossible to perform the Fort's functions. They paid no attention to jointness, which cannot be accomplished by moving the Fort's Land C4ISR capability to another base - Aberdeen Proving Ground, while similar

communications and electronics functions for the Navy and Air force remain at other locations. They severely underestimated cost, and the inability of accomplishing their goal in a 6 year period. Their testing rationale is completely flawed because it ignored the specialized testing that cannot be performed at Aberdeen.

**Brain Drain:**

I believe the Pentagon's assumption that a substantial number of the Fort Monmouth work force will move to a new location is wrong. A serious loss of intellectual capital will constitute a "brain drain" that will negatively affect the United States armed forces. Secretary of Army, Dr. Francis Harvey, voiced his concern at a BRAC hearing on May 18th, in which he stated, "there is a concern and a risk", in moving Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen, Maryland.

It seems to me that the risk is simply too great for the Department of Defense to take. At a time when terrorists in Iraq are adapting their improvised explosive device (IED) technology to get around US "Jammer" systems, we cannot afford an interruption in the services the Fort provides today's war fighters. According to a Harris poll, Fort Mon would lose a significant majority of the current workforce, and would therefore be unable to complete its missions, leading to a substantial deviation from the military value criteria.

**Centers of Excellence:**

One of the Department of Defense's goals during this BRAC round is to create centers of excellence. The Army already has a Land C4ISR center at Fort Monmouth. The Pentagon's recommendation would destroy an already very effective center of excellence.

The DoD recommendation did not consider Jointness, moreover they did not consider the Joint access Fort Monmouth already enjoys nearby at Dix/Lake/McGuire. The Pentagon is simply

moving one army base - Fort Monmouth to another army base - Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Therefore this closure is unnecessary and inappropriate.

No synergy will result by moving the Fort Monmouth mission to the Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Because they do no R&D or testing that is related to the C4ISR mission.

**Cost Analysis/Time Frame:**

The Defense Department cost analysis numbers are wrong because they are expecting a majority of the current workforce will move to Aberdeen proving Ground. The defense Department does not assume the recruitment of lost civilian employees, and training of the new employees. That will add a significant amount to the cost. One should also add in costs in lost time while a new employee is being trained to a level of average productivity, which takes about three years to complete. These costs are not included in the original BRAC report. Costs in terms of time or security clearances were also not included the Pentagon's report.

The Defense Department has also underestimated the cost to reconstruct the laboratory facilities. I visited Aberdeen Proving ground on Friday, July 1st, and I asked, point blank, "Do you have any available lab facilities to house Fort Monmouth type missions". And the response I got was, "No". Since there is no lab space available, Aberdeen will have to refurbish existing facilities or completely build from scratch, either way this is not going to be an inexpensive process.

Let me give you an example of how difficult it will be to reconstitute the facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground. When we last toured Fort Monmouth we were at the Satellite Command Center (SATCOM) and the program manger explained to us that her facility could not be rebuilt, it is not replaceable, therefore it will have to be moved and rebuilt piece by piece at Aberdeen. That

could take years and cost millions, not to mention the risk you take in damaging essential functions. None of that cost was included in the Pentagon's estimate.

According to BRAC criteria the closure and move would have to be completed within six years from start to finish. No facilities are currently at Aberdeen Proving Ground to receive Fort Monmouth functions. Highly specialized labs, R&D facilities would have to be constructed and in some cases literally moved from one base to the other. Combine this with the "brain drain", and the inability to recruit and train new employees, there no possibility of accomplishing this move within the BRAC timeline

**Testing:**

The Defense Department's only stated rational for its recommendation was that Fort Monmouth could not provide the sufficient testing of the technology it develops. This is simply inaccurate Fort Monmouth currently does most of the testing on base. Additional specialized testing of the equipment developed at Fort Monmouth is done at other locations, much of which is unsuitable for Aberdeen Proving Ground. For example, when I visited Aberdeen Proving Ground last Friday, officials there admitted that they do not have enough space or the desert like environment to handle the kind of specialized testing for Fort Monmouth equipment currently conducted at Fort Hauchuca and Yuma Proving Ground. There is no indication that any incremental testing can be done at Aberdeen Proving Ground that is currently being done at Fort Monmouth.

**Closing:**

And, in the end, it all comes back to what the Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis Harvey said on May 18 2005, **"There is a concern and a risk"** in moving Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen, Maryland. Our mission is to protect the soldier in the field, and we are obligated to ensure that our soldiers have the best equipment to protect them. Just think of a scenario three years from

now, there is a commander in the field, he calls Fort Monmouth to quickly develop a new technology for immediate use in the field and the DoD tells that commander, "We can't right now, we're still reconstituting the Land C4ISR work force." This is a risk we should not be willing to take. Thank you if you have any questions I am more than happy to answer.

**Introduction of Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney:**

With that said, I present Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (Ret.).

## **New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**

BRAC Regional Hearing

Baltimore, MD

Friday, July 8, 2005

### **Fort Monmouth – Vice Admiral (ret) Paul Gaffney and Mr. Robert Giordano representing the Patriot's Alliance and the Governor's Commission to Support and Enhance New Jersey Military and Coast Guard Installations**

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Mr. Chairman and Commissioners on the 2005 US Base Realignment and Closure Commission, we are pleased to appear before you. We represent both local contractors who do business with Fort Monmouth and the Governor of the State of New Jersey. We like to believe that we are a complementary team: a recently retired naval officer with R&D command and policy experience and a retired Senior Executive who directed research, development and engineering at Fort Monmouth.

We will present several slides and speak to them, without script, today.

Our presentation will cover several points:

- We will assert and provide rationale that the Secretary of defense deviated substantially from 5 of the 8 selection criteria in recommending the closure of Fort Monmouth, the movement of Fort Monmouth's subordinate element from Fort Belvoir and the attempt to re-create the same capability at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland.

- We will recommend that the DOD recommendation be overturned and in its place the Commission propose that Fort Monmouth/Fort Belvoir not close/move and that Fort Monmouth become an organizational part of the new Dix, Lakehurst, McGuire (DLM) Joint Base in the interest of Jointness and reduced cost.

We intend to show the Commission that the DOD recommendation failed to consider:

- Impact on current and future missions (Criterion 1)
  - Due to the expected loss of 80% of the technical and acquisition certified workforce ( ~3000), near term support for the war and critical support to large programs in the 2007-2011 timeframe will be unacceptably damaged.

- Jointness (Criterion 1)
  - DOD BRAC deliberators never visited, discussed or considered Fort Monmouth's long involvement with its nearby partners at the Joint Base
  - DOD also did not consider that there were no existing or planned Joint opportunities at Aberdeen

- Air and other maneuver space (Criterion 2)

-- DOD did not consider the air and other maneuver space available to and used by Fort Monmouth at the nearby Joint Base or how that compares with space available at Aberdeen.

- Costs and timing of costs and savings ( Criteria 4 and 5)

-- Data will be submitted to the BRAC Commission staff and examples will be given in our presentation that show that the DOD significantly underestimated costs, overestimated annual saving, and too optimistically calculated a payback period.

- Manpower implications (Criterion 4)

-- The potential loss of 3000 employees was not mentioned or considered by the DOD. History shows that less than 20% of a technical civilian workforce moves; a Harris Poll conducted in June 2005 indicates that only 19% will move from Fort Monmouth and only 9% of the supporting contractor force will move. DOD used a standard of 75% as its estimate of those who would move. Costs to reconstitute such a large workforce (\$300M) were not calculated by DOD and the ability to reconstitute such a workforce at any price was not considered in view of DOD's own statements about the current technical workforce supply crisis in America. This situation drives a violation of criterion #1, as well.

- Ability of the receiving site to support mission and personnel ( Criterion 7)

- Facilities, on-base connectivity, range capability and access, airspace, Joint opportunity, and an ability to generate a government and contractor workforce in short order are not as good at Aberdeen as they are at Fort Monmouth today. DOD did not consider several of these comparative advantages.

We note that Criterion 3, which has to do with the ability to handle more forces, is not applicable to this DOD BRAC recommendation or to Fort Monmouth.

We note that Criterion 8, which relates to environmental concerns for closing bases, does not directly apply. But, we are concerned that a corollary principle should be considered. Aberdeen has a long and well known reputation as a base that has significantly large polluted areas. One must be concerned that such pollution could affect employees and their ability to carry out their duties, especially if such duties take the employees, outside, onto Proving Ground ranges.

Criterion 6 deals with economic impact on communities. Statements from the Mayor of Eatontown and the Governor of New Jersey will be most useful. Here, we simply remind the Commission that 15000 lives will be effected and the New Jersey economy will need to adjust to a loss of approximately a \$3B annual contribution to the State GDP. New Jersey already gets the lowest return on the Federal income tax dollar of any state in the Union; Maryland one of the highest. A closure of Fort Monmouth will further injure New Jersey's position.

We will tell the Commission about New Jersey and what it brings to a largely technical workforce and mission. Statistics derived from Federal, national and State data indicate the New Jersey is one of the strongest science and engineering states in the US.

We will point out the deliberations of the DOD BRAC units involved in this recommendation (Army and T-JCSG), lost their way, used flawed logic and did not consider several overwhelmingly important issues:

- Impact of moving a high scoring technical military value to organization to an area with the lowest technical value
- Impact of disengaging Land C4ISR from established access to Joint opportunities
- Loss of a large technical workforce
- Impact of that loss on wartime support and on high priority scheduled Army and Joint development/acquisition programs
- Impact on Homeland Security
- Impact on non-DOD tenant activities

Our conclusion is that the DOD:

- did not achieve what the DOD (Army and T-JCSG) stated was its goal;
  - failed to achieve greater C4ISR consolidation;
  - mis-stepped in claiming synergistic combinations of RDA with T&E;
  - merely moved the biggest and highest military value C4ISR organization to a place with virtually no C4ISR capability, and
  - disengaged Army C4ISR from an existing Joint access situation
- all for over \$1B (considerably more than was estimated) to re-create what currently exists, and it proposes conducting this experiment by risking a several thousand person technical workforce and risking many multi-billion dollar programs.

Our recommendation will be to:

- reject the DOD recommendation
- retain current C4ISR activities in their current locations
- organizationally transfer Fort Monmouth to the nearby Joint Base
- assign Fort Monmouth's garrison to the Joint Base Commander
- deliberately and over time shed Fort Monmouth off any unneeded land and facilities
- retain the West Point Prep School due to large apparent change in costs to move it

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**The Importance of Fort Monmouth's Mission – Major General (ret) William Russ**

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**Introductory observations -**

My name is William Russ and I served as the Commander of the C-E LCMC from 2001 through my retirement in June 2004. In my role as the Commander at Fort Monmouth, I certified the accuracy of approximately 2/3 of the data that was provided to The Army Basing Study Group.

In my judgment, and based on my 32 years of service in the Army, I am *certain* that a re-location of the magnitude contemplated in this case, will have a direct, immediate and catastrophic impact upon the mission performed by Team C4ISR and the Warfighter.

Throughout my career, I have had the opportunity to work with and command many outstanding military and civilian personnel, however, I found the people at Fort Monmouth to be the most dedicated, talented and creative workforce that I have ever been associated with. It was not, however, until I was actually assigned as Commander of CECOM that I recognized the integrated nature of C4ISR, as well as the associated value and impact of the work that was being done at the Fort in support of both the current force and the force of the future.

Previously, I served as the Commander of the Army Signal Command and was responsible for every signal brigade in the Army and the Army's portion of the Global Information Grid. My mission was directly enabled by CECOM/Fort Monmouth with engineering and logistics support. Additionally, acquisition and sustainment for Army ISR are done at Fort Monmouth. It is this unique and irreplaceable expertise (combined C4 and ISR) resident within this Team that facilitates the rapid development, acquisition, deployment and sustainment of every piece of C4ISR equipment used by the Army and, in many instances, other services and our allies.

I am sure that the Government team on Fort Monmouth has briefed you on the numerous operations, acquisitions, and rapid deployments that have been enabled by Team C4ISR, as well as their ongoing support of the war in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). If this extraordinary capability were to be lost through a re-location to Aberdeen, the impact upon the survivability of our Warfighters as well as their ability to effectively perform their missions, would be devastating. Whether that organizational capability can ever be reconstructed completely is questionable.

The extremists who pose the greatest threat that our Forces are facing will not permit an operational pause to allow time to rebuild the C4ISR capability and expertise that already exist at Fort Monmouth; an organizational structure that is achieving the transformational objectives of Network Centric Warfare, and simultaneously supporting critical immediate requirements of the fighting force. Therefore, what I find most distressing about the recommendation to close

Fort Monmouth is the fact that DoD has not identified the alleged shortcomings with the existing C4ISR structure at Fort Monmouth, nor adequately addressed or even acknowledged the dire consequences and profound ramifications of the move on the Army's ability to support and protect the Warfighter throughout the GWOT in the C4ISR arena. Additionally, I am not aware of any available plan regarding how this potentially catastrophic risk will be mitigated. Without the Commission's intervention, a world-class organization that plays a critical role in meeting the C4ISR needs of the Warfighter *every day* is going to be arbitrarily and unjustifiably dismantled.

It is my understanding that this BRAC round was supposed to be an opportunity to achieve inter-service jointness within DoD. That objective was identified in the statute, yet DoD has missed that opportunity. The proposed re-location of Team C4ISR to Aberdeen does nothing in this regard and, in fact, completely severs that organization's connections with nearby Fort Dix/Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Center/McGuire AFB. This Joint Base, with its three contiguous service installations, is the home to many C4ISR test and evaluation activities and near the Army's center for C4ISR expertise at Fort Monmouth. Accordingly, it would have been an ideal location for a truly joint DoD C4ISR Command structured as a Unified Command, and reporting to the Commander, Joint Forces Command. I briefed this concept to Army, Air Force and Navy leadership during my last year in command. Such an organization would ensure that from concept through fielding and sustainment, C4ISR systems would integrate each service's capabilities, requirements and doctrine and go further than ever before towards achieving real defense transformation. Although DoD appears to have missed this chance, it presents an unparalleled opportunity for the Commission to build upon this existing joint service relationship that is strategically positioned to be the DoD C4ISR Center of Excellence for the future.

I believe that if the Army fully understood the role performed by the Team at Fort Monmouth, that it would never have put Fort Monmouth on the BRAC List and it is my sincere hope that the Commission is able to rectify this situation. The lives of countless Warfighters depend upon it.

### **Main Points -**

#### ***1. Team C4ISR performs both a strategic and tactical mission with implications for both future Army Transformation and immediate impacts on current operations.***

- More than 1/2 of the Army's NSN inventory in the field is supported here.
- Billions of dollars in critically needed materiel has been provided to the field on an urgency basis since the GWOT commenced.
- Thus, the Secretary's assumption, expressed in his statement to the Commission, that the organization is exclusively "strategic and R&D" in nature (implying that the loss of intellectual capital will have no immediate impact) is wrong.

#### ***2. A loss of 75% to 80% of Team C4ISR personnel will cause mission failure, threatening both the Army's future transformation, and the immediate ability of Warfighters in the field to accomplish their tactical missions and survive.***

- The Secretary noted that DA expected to lose 74% of Team C4ISR's personnel as a result of the proposed re-location to Aberdeen. Our real world experience, based on the

Electronic Test and Devices Laboratory re-location to Maryland in a previous BRAC, indicates that the figure will be closer to 80%.

- After decades of downsizing, Team C4ISR cannot sustain a personnel reduction of any size, much less one as catastrophic as 74% to 80%. The personnel lost will be the most experienced, highly trained personnel in the C4ISR field, and replacing them with “smart young guys” lacking in experience, as the Secretary suggested, is not a viable option. It will take many years to re-construct the organization effectively (if it can ever be really re-constructed) during which time there will be catastrophic mission failure.

**3. *The DoD recommendation claims that it will establish a Land C4ISR Life Cycle Management Command to address the challenges of Network Centric Warfare. In fact, that command already exists and is meeting those challenges every day at Fort Monmouth, both in achieving the transformational objective of Network Centric Warfare, and in supporting the critical immediate needs of the military in the field. The recommendation merely seeks to move that highly functioning and efficient organization to an underutilized distant location where virtually no Team C4ISR mission is performed***

**4. *This BRAC round was an opportunity to achieve inter-service jointness within DoD. That objective was identified in the statute, yet DoD missed that opportunity.***

- The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the FY05 Authorization Act, Section 2913, as well as the vision articulated by Secretary Rumsfeld, speak to the emphasis that must be placed upon *joint warfighting*. In his Memorandum of 15 November 2002, the Secretary directed that, unlike previous BRAC considerations, a primary objective of BRAC 2005, “... is to examine and implement opportunities for *greater joint activity*...While some unique functions may exist, those functions that are common across the services *must be analyzed on a joint basis.*” (emphasis added)
- The proposed re-location of Team C4ISR to Aberdeen does nothing in this regard and, in fact severs the organization’s connections to nearby Dix/Lakehurst/McGuire. This area, with three contiguous service installations (unique in CONUS), home to many C4ISR test and evaluation activities, and near the Army’s center for C4ISR expertise at Fort Monmouth, would have been an ideal location for a truly joint DoD C4ISR Command.
- Structured in much the same way as Central Command, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, such a command would ensure that, from concept through fielding and sustainment, C4ISR systems would truly integrate each service’s capabilities, requirements and doctrine and go further than ever before towards achieving real defense transformation. Although DoD missed this golden opportunity, the Commission should not allow this mistake to be compounded by a move that would obliterate the Army’s premier C4ISR organization and sever its connections with the location that is the most promising for joint inter-service operations.

**5. *A stated objective of the DoD recommendation is the perceived advantage of co-locating Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) activities with their related Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities. However, Team C4ISR has never conducted a significant amount of its test and evaluation activities at Aberdeen, and re-locating it to Aberdeen would actually sever its connection to its test facilities.***

- The underlying flaw in this rationale is that *Team C4ISR does not conduct a significant amount of its testing efforts at Aberdeen*. Conversely, there *are* extensive C4ISR test ranges/laboratories located on Fort Monmouth, and at nearby Dix/McGuire/Lakehurst. The move would actually have the effect of taking Team C4ISR away from its primary test ranges.
- The extensive test facilities utilized by the C4ISR organizations at Fort Monmouth currently exist on that installation itself, or are resident at nearby Lakehurst (where the organization's airborne electronic warfare/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) facilities are located) and on Fort Dix, which is home to a 1600 square kilometer test range for C4ISR "on the move" demonstrations. When maneuver testing above the Brigade level is required, it is conducted as part of major field exercises at Forces Command installations such as Fort Hood or Fort Irwin. (Testing requiring unique climatic conditions is conducted at the C4ISR test facilities at Fort Huachuca or Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona.)
- Aberdeen has *never* been a site where a significant amount of Team C4ISR testing has been conducted, and accordingly, re-locating these RDA activities to that location would not achieve the recommendation's stated objective. Even if Team C4ISR were re-located to Aberdeen, the maneuver exercises alluded to by the Secretary would continue to be conducted at installations such as Fort Hood or Fort Irwin, and *not* at Aberdeen.
- Thus, notwithstanding the DoD recommendation's reference to the existence of test ranges at Aberdeen, the proposed move to Aberdeen would eliminate this long standing joint inter-service use of a DoD engineering facility, and negate Team C4ISR's ready access to its existing high tech test ranges and facilities at Fort Dix and Lakehurst.

### **Concluding Observations -**

In closing, I have no personnel equity in the final BRAC decision; I am a resident of Northern VA. Yet as a citizen and taxpayer, I do want to ensure the facts are adequately evaluated that will result in the right/best decision for the well being of our nation. That is the reason that I have elected to share my concerns.

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**Summation Fort Monmouth – Congressman Rush Holt (NJ-12)**

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Good morning. I am Rush Holt, and I represent the 12<sup>th</sup> District of New Jersey, which includes Fort Monmouth. Because time is short, I will get right to the presentation. Let me summarize what you have heard about Fort Monmouth today:

- 1) Moving Ft. Monmouth's workforce would diminish US capability in military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and therefore poses unacceptable risk.
- 2) The Pentagon's cost estimates are not credible.
- 3) The Testing & Evaluation issue is a red herring.
- 4) Finally, we present to you a more strategic approach.

**POINT ONE: Moving Ft. Monmouth's Workforce Poses Unacceptable Risk**  
**(MV#1, MV#4, OC #7)**

The heart of the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth deviates substantially from several criteria for BRAC decisions. There is substantial deviation from Military Value Criteria Numbers One and Four, as well as "Other Consideration" Number Seven. The error that runs through these deviations is that the Pentagon did not recognize, nor did it evaluate, the fact that an RDAT&E installation's military value is its intellectual capital. R&D facilities are different from submarine bases or air fields. The civilian workforce is central to the RDAT&E mission, and it cannot easily be moved or recreated.

Loss of this workforce would result in unacceptable risk. I'll give you an example. Every day, Fort Monmouth is developing and fielding technologies that are making our soldiers more effective, more efficient, and safer. It is the top-performing installation of its kind. In the categories relevant to Fort Monmouth -- Information Systems Technology & Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare -- the Army ranked it first in three out of four categories. The work of Fort Monmouth is not only future-oriented research, but development and acquisition activities of immediate relevance. And yet, the Pentagon failed to account for the impact on current and future mission capabilities, operational readiness, and joint war fighting.

R&D is a highly collaborative effort done by an experienced, well-educated, and marketable civilian workforce. Past history and a recent professional poll give us substantial reason to believe that only 20% of Fort employees would move. Those who do would be the less experienced, and they will be moving to a place with no pre-existing C4ISR capability or workforce to mentor them. How much diminishment in C4ISR capability in the short term and long term is the BRAC Commission willing to see the

military sustain? By way of comparison, would you move a major air base if it meant losing 80% of the planes? Why move the center of land-based for C4ISR if it means losing 80% of the people that make up its military value?

Specificity helps when we talk about the workforce. Taking only the 2055 scientists and engineers – just a portion of the intellectual capital at Fort Monmouth – we are talking about losing the vast majority of:

- 1) 355 Command and Control Engineers, who develop new systems to provide control of fighting forces such as maneuver control system, Blue Force tracking, & FBCB2
- 2) 372 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Engineers, who develop systems such as FireFinder Missile Radar, the Warlock counter-IED System, Trojan, Profit, and support to Intelligence Agencies.
- 3) 461 Space and Terrestrial Communication Engineers, who develop state of the art communications such as WIN-T, Soldier Slice Radio, Near-Term digital radio, and the Joint Network Node, which went to Iraq with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division.
- 4) 517 Engineers who work on night vision at Ft. Belvoir
- 5) 244 Computer Scientists & Software Engineers, who support 215 million lines of code operating these systems; update and reprogram software used in the field; and create new data loads ship them into field via classified e-mail.
- 6) And all of the above are joined by 1600 embedded private contractors, 2400 private contractors outside the gate, and 2480 other C4ISR experts, most of whom are acquisition certified.

It is worth thinking about the degree of disruption that would result from such a move. In the short-term, critical capacity would be lost. Servicing C4ISR equipment that is in the field would take longer; reacting to the next generation of IED's would happen over months instead of weeks; and programs that are near completion will not go to field as expected. The result: our soldiers would experience more danger and higher casualties.

The long-term impact would also be substantial. To cite relevant example, when the Electronic Technology and Devices Laboratory moved from Fort Monmouth to Maryland following the 1995 BRAC, only 40 of the 300 employees relocated. The result was a two-thirds reduction in the number of patents produced by the Lab in the ensuing years. Now transformation is a priority, and the stakes are even higher. Fort Monmouth's R&D Center provides more than half of the advanced technology necessary to make the future combat system a reality. This system is totally dependent on the 19 Fort Monmouth C4ISR programs. If the Fort's workforce is lost, transformation will be disrupted.

Let me now address the issue of reconstitution. Military Value Criteria Number Four requires the Pentagon to evaluate the manpower implications of the move. It did not. Even if qualified workers were immediately available in and around Aberdeen, reconstitution of a Fort Monmouth-caliber workforce would take approximately ten years. The reason for this is that it takes time to recruit, screen, and hire even a small number of workers, particularly scientists and engineers. Security clearances take 12-18 months. The average C4ISR expert requires 2-3 years of formal training, and an additional 4-6 years of continued learning before he or she achieves systems level

expertise in Defense-specific domains, such as information warfare. It would take time – years – to attain the same degree of expertise. The Pentagon did not account for that.

As I said, this would be the case even if an equivalent, high caliber workforce were immediately available. But as it happens, the facts do not bear that out. You have heard already the comparison of central New Jersey’s workforce to Maryland’s, so I will not go into great depth again. Suffice it to say that the Pentagon substantially deviated from “Other Consideration” #7 when it failed to account for a rocky move from central New Jersey to Aberdeen, MD.

**POINT TWO: Cost Estimates Are Not Credible (OC#5)**

The Pentagon also breached “Other Consideration” Number Five 5. Simply put, its estimates on the extent and timing of potential costs and savings are not credible. In almost every category pertaining to closing Fort Monmouth, costs were ignored or low-balled. For example the DoD failed to consider:

- The financial and programmatic costs associated with losing the vast majority of Fort Monmouth’s highly skilled R&D workforce.
- The cost of replacing this highly skilled workforce.
- The cost of training a new workforce of 3000 people.
- The costs associated with delayed and disrupted programs.
- And lastly, the Pentagon seriously low-balled military construction. Our analysis shows that re-creating Fort Monmouth’s highly specialized laboratories, testing facilities, and workspace would require massive investment.

Overall, the DoD underestimates the cost of this BRAC recommendation by about a factor of two – almost a billion dollars.

**POINT THREE: T&E Issue Is a Red Herring (MV#2)**

The Pentagon also failed to correctly assess Fort Monmouth according to the second criterion for Military Value, which ostensibly measures the availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace. This is important because one of the main arguments for moving Fort Monmouth’s mission to Aberdeen is greater synergy between R&D and T&E. This argument ignores reality.

- 1) First, much C4ISR Testing and Evaluation takes place in labs, computers, and anechoic chambers – not on open fields.
- 2) Aberdeen’s primary feature is that it has lots of open space, and the DoD presumably wants to use that space for field testing C4ISR. Unfortunately, this recommendation was born out of the Pentagon’s failure to consider that Ft. Monmouth *already does* land and air T&E at the Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire Joint Base. Fort Monmouth’s mission does not need to move to Aberdeen in order gain T&E maneuver space. In fact, testing at Aberdeen would require re-creating facilities, transporting soldiers, and moving equipment already at Ft. Monmouth and Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire.
- 3) And lastly, some T&E cannot be done at Dix/Lakehurst or Aberdeen. This T&E will continue to take place at places like Yuma Proving Ground and Fort Huachuca (where there are radio quiet conditions), or Forts Irwin, Hood, and Bliss (where there are large numbers of soldiers).

It is worth noting at this point that the Pentagon's recommendation does nothing to enhance jointness, and in fact, detracts from it. It rips Fort Monmouth away from its network of joint operations with Dix-Lakehurst-McGuire, and places it at Aberdeen – an Army-to-Army move. We believe we can do better on that score and others.

We offer a more strategic approach:

- 1) Maintain and enhance C4ISR capacity by keeping highly-expert workforce at Fort Monmouth.
- 2) Formally make Fort Monmouth a sub-installation of the “Joint Mega-Base” at Lakehurst/Dix/McGuire. All responsibility for Garrison management and operation would be transferred to the Joint Base Headquarters, providing some efficiencies. This would institutionalize opportunities for greater joint DoD C4ISR programs, and perhaps,
- 3) Permit establishment of a Joint C4ISR Command to improve battlefield cross-service operability.
- 4) Cede excess portions of the installation from Federal jurisdiction. This will realize some financial savings, and permit non-DoD activities present on the installation (e.g., the VA, FEMA, FBI, etc.) to continue operating with little or no impact.

I could go on to discuss more, but I will stop here. If you have any questions or seek additional materials, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank you.

# The Future of Fort Dix, McGuire AFB, and NAES Lakehurst



By:


Congressman Jim Saxton (NJ-03)

# Agenda

- Introduction
- Situational Awareness
- Modern Infrastructure
- Air and Land Considerations
- 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing and Navy Plans
- Conclusion

# Premier Location

- Located 70 miles from New York
- Located 37 miles from Philadelphia
- Located 150 miles from Washington DC



# America's Only Three-Service Joint Installation

- 42,000 Acres of Contiguous DoD land
- Supports Active, Guard, and Reserve Units
- Close working relationship



# Modern Installations

Close to \$750M of investment enhanced the military value of the installations

- New Facilities
- Fiber Optic Network
- Postured for current and future training

# No Significant Air Traffic Congestion

- Mr. Ed Spring, former FAA executive, who worked as Chief Controller (Air Traffic Manager) of Philadelphia Int'l Airport and Manager of the FAA Eastern Region's air traffic division studied the air traffic issues relating to McGuire.
  - The high volume of air traffic does not adversely impact the mission
  - The current air traffic could be tripled without additional staffing or resources
  - Adding the Willow Grove aircrafts has no significant impact

# No encroachment issues

- Surrounded by 1,217,800 acres of protected land
  - State owned land
  - Pinelands Designation
  - County Farmland Preservation


# 108<sup>th</sup> ARW Should be Kept

- Justification
  - Recruitment & Retention
  - 108<sup>th</sup> Tanker Campus
  - Ideal Location
- Assign 12 KC-135R models to the 108<sup>th</sup> and accept the Willow Grove units and aircraft
  - Retires aging force structure
  - Facilitates Willow Grove move

# Recruitment and Retention

- Ability is tied to location
  - Easier for units located near Active Bases
  - NJ Regional population provides a manpower pool
- With 12 KC-135R models, the 108<sup>th</sup> manpower rating would be 100%


# Regional Army Reserve & National Guard Units



**TOTAL ARNG authorized strength 85,117 / 372 units**  
**TOTAL USAR authorized strength 46,259 / 438 units**

# ANG End Strength

*As of 30 April 2005*



# Recruitment and Retention

Quality of personnel is tied to location

- Units located near Active bases have a trained pool of personnel to recruit
- 108<sup>th</sup> is located near multiple Air Terminals

# Regional Air Terminals



Stewart ANG



JFK IA

Newark Int'l  
LaGuardia

Philadelphia Int'l



McGuire AFB




Balt/Wash Int'l

Dulles

Reagan National



Dover AFB



# \$75M invested at McGuire to create the only tanker base of its kind in Northeast

## Military Tanker Base Projects – Air National Guard McGuire AFB

1988	Tanker Engine Repair Shop	\$ .2M
	Alter Building	\$ .18
1990	Alter Training Facility	\$1.05
1991	<i>Decision Made to Convert to Tanker Base</i>	
	Parking (KC-135Aircraft) Apron	\$ .91
1992	KC-135Fuel Syst Maintenance Dock	\$ .66
	KC-135 Tanker Hangar/Design	\$1.2
	Jet Fuel Storage & Dist System	\$ .87
1994	Jet Fuel Operating Ramp	\$11.4
	KC-135 Tanker Hangar/Construct	\$13.3
1996	Consolidated Operations Facility	\$ .97
	Consolidated KC-135 Pkg Apron	\$ .98
	Corrosion Control	\$ .71
	Jt Medical Training Facility/Design	\$1.16
1997	KC-135 Parking Apron, Phase II	\$23.9
2002	Jt Medical Training Facility/Construct	\$4.4
2003	Jt Medical Training Facility/Design	\$ .21
1991- 2005	Sustain/Repair/Maintenance Projects	\$14.7

Total: \$76.8M

In 2005 dollars: \$90.9M

# \$75M invested to create a truly unique tanker base in the Northeast

- Secure pipeline to fuel farm and not trucks
  - Efficient, Safe, Accommodates Surge Operations
- Hydrant System fuels planes directly
- Modern Aircrew Alert Facility
- Only Northeast Tanker Unit on a military installation
- Modern Hangars and Ramp

# Examples of Military Tanker Base Projects at McGuire

Fuel Farm



Fuel Tank

KC-135 Hangar



KC-135 Hangar



KC-135 Hangar



Alert Facility



Alert Facility Bedroom



Alert Facility Kitchen



# Ideal Location

- Necessary for Northeast Tanker Task Force, which is already tanker-lean and will be greatly weakened.
- Best situated for all Northeastern air refueling missions
  - provides refueling support for overseas cargo and tactical homeland defense missions
  - Less than 30 minutes to all Northeastern Seaboard cities
  - Easily coordinates with Tactical assets for training and actual operations


# Support assigning 12 KC-135Rs to McGuire together *with* assets from Willow Grove

- Enough space with minimal cost
  - 3 possible beddown plans and cost of ramp expansion is approximately \$6M
- Promotes jointness on a DoD level
  - All branches Active, Guard, Reserve
- Consolidation increases maintenance and training efficiencies and saves money




# Existing Ramp for 108th



# Aerial View of McGuire AFB



# Three Possible Beddown Plans for 12 KC-135s and Incoming Assets from Willow Grove



# Fits with the Army Plan

- Creates a Regional Joint Mobilization Site and Regional Reserve Headquarters
- Includes Aviation consolidation that compliments McGuire Actions

# Conclusion

- Dix-McGuire-Lakehurst is a one of a kind Joint base in a prime location
- The Army and Navy plans to move assets to Dix and McGuire makes perfect sense both fiscally and militarily
- McGuire is large enough to accept the Willow Grove units and keep the 108th



New Jersey  
Department of Military  
and Veterans Affairs

# **108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing** **New Jersey Air National Guard**

## **Military Value and Future Missions**

Revised: 29 JUN 05

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## *Executive Summary*

- The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is programmed to retire its KC135E model aircraft without a follow-on flying mission as announced in the AF Future Total Force Plan as part of BRAC. The 108<sup>th</sup> will lose two flying squadrons. This will result in a loss of 954 personnel from the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW. Despite the movement of 533 Marine Corps and Navy Reserve personnel to McGuire AFB, there will be a net loss to McGuire of 421 personnel due to the elimination of the flying mission at the 108<sup>th</sup>.
- Until the USAF Tanker Study is completed in the fall of 2005 the USAF doctrine for aerial refueling organizational structure remains unclear. The study is intended to identify the Air Force's future tanker needs and appropriate tanker force structure. Any movement of assets prior to the completion of the study would be premature and counterintuitive.
- There are 31 air refueling wings and 3 air refueling groups in all components of the US Air Force: 4 wings and 1 group in the active AF, 8 wings in the in the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and 19 wings and 2 groups in the ANG. The 2004 White Paper titled "Air Force Organizational Principles" indicates that the USAF considered 16 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) as the doctrinally correct size for KC-135 equipped tanker units as recently as July 2004. That is exactly the size of the 108<sup>th</sup>.
- Decisions regarding the appropriate number of PAA reflected in the 2055 BRAC Report are inconsistent with current Air Force doctrine. Four units remain at 8 PAA, one will have 10 PAA, eight will increase from 8 to 12 PAA, and the other two "super tanker" ANG wings at Rickenbacker and Pittsburgh remain unchanged at 18 and 16 PAA respectively.
- The primary purpose of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as amended in 2004 is for "the closure or realignment of military installations..." (emphasis added). The emphasis is on infrastructure and cost savings realized rather than force restructuring.
- Decisions related to force structure as implemented by the BRAC Report appear to be arbitrary and capricious in that no scoring process was used; the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure recommendations for KC-135R distribution does not mirror the National Guard Bureau (NGB) conversion list in use for over 10 years. Both the Scott (Illinois) and Sioux City (Iowa) wings, lower on the NGB prioritized plan, are now proposed to receive R models while the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing faces retirement of its airplanes without replacement. Neither of these units participates in tanker alert.

- Northeast Tanker Task Force (NETTF) Impact:
  - The 108<sup>th</sup> provides 15% of the fuel offloads for the NETTF. With the elimination of assets at the 108<sup>th</sup> and the 107<sup>th</sup> (Niagara), the remaining NETTF units would have to increase sorties by 78% and offload quantities as much as 53% to meet current demands.
  - The northern NETTF units average 3-9 times as many days per year of freezing precipitation more than the 108<sup>th</sup>. This plan puts 50% of the NETTF aircraft on two municipal airports in the northern edge of the NETTF area of operations.
- The 108<sup>th</sup> is within 30 minutes of Boston, New York City, and Washington, D.C., as well as all east coast major population, industrial and political centers. The wing frequently supports POTUS Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions in the northeast.
- The 108<sup>th</sup> is co-located with the active duty 305<sup>th</sup> Air Mobility Wing (AMW) on the McGuire/Fort Dix/Lakehurst “mega-base” yielding tremendous operational and training synergies. This already fulfills the DOD’s “Total Force” vision of ANG and USAFR units being co-located on active duty joint-service bases
- DOD has invested \$70 million to create the premier tanker base with the most modern fueling system of all ANG tanker units. It is the only unit with bulk fuel deliveries to the fuel farm via secure pipeline. Fuel is delivered to the other airports via thousands of 5,000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks to their fuel farm bulk storage facilities. Fuel tank trucks can be significantly impacted by weather, truck availability, trafficability, and can be overwhelmed during surge operations. The other ANG tanker units do not have the hangar and apron space to accommodate more airframes without significant MILCON expenditures.
- The 108<sup>th</sup> is manned at 93.7% for 16 PAA. Other units currently at 8 PAA and proposed for 50% increases are at even lower strength rates and would likely find it difficult to increase manning. TAG of New Hampshire already identified this as a significant issue and would rather not receive additional tankers.
- The 108<sup>th</sup> maintains a modern and dedicated aircrew alert facility that most other tanker units do not. The 108<sup>th</sup>’s alert crew facility is on base and Force Protection is provided by the host active-duty base security forces.
- Specific and unique deficiencies at other bases:
  - Pittsburgh – weather; strength; fuel delivery by truck; and training difficulties due to co-location with an international airport. The unit is actually unable to perform local traffic pattern training and does all scheduling around airport operations. Least efficient for alert.

- Bangor – weather, strength, MILCON required, fuel delivery, proposed cessation of 24-hour air traffic control.
- Pease – weather, strength, MILCON required, fuel delivery.
- Rickenbacker – fuel delivery, no participation in alert missions, close proximity to Pittsburgh (3-hr drive).
- Selfridge – pending conversion to tankers, which requires training, fuel delivery. Would not participate in alert missions due to location.

## ***Introduction***

The 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing (ARW), New Jersey Air National Guard (ANG) stationed at McGuire Air Force Base is programmed to retire its KC-135E airframes without replacement, as announced in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Report (BRAC). Since this recommendation for the 108<sup>th</sup> is technically not a closure, there was no BRAC scoring utilizing the published BRAC criteria. However the recommendation has the full effect of a closure and affects two flying squadrons, not one.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the military value of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW and the impacts of unit disbandment on the Northeast Tanker Task Force, and to review the capabilities of other tanker bases in the area.

The US Air Force initiated a “Tanker Study” to determine the characteristics of the air refueling capabilities required to support the future Air Force. The Tanker Study is scheduled for completion in the Fall of 2005, after finalization of the 2005 BRAC process. Implementation of BRAC’s tanker restructuring prior to completion of the “study” would negate the outcome of the study and indicate that, in this matter, certain BRAC recommendations do not reflect capabilities based decision-making.

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (AF/BCEG) stated in Candidate Recommendation #USAF-0118 / S434 that their justification for closure of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW was “to enable Future Total Force transformation”. Their assigned Military Value of inactivating the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW was that it “retires aging force structure” and “enables scenario DON-0084”. In DON-0084 the Navy recommended closure of NAS Willow Grove and created a need for airport space to house Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. An acceptable alternate use of potentially vacant airport space seems an ill-considered subjective reason to select a military organization to be disbanded with the subsequent loss of 954 personnel in the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW and the incurred costs associated with placing additional KC-135’s at other retained ANG bases.

There was no consideration of the comparative military value of the current or proposed refueling wings to identify those units with the greatest or least value. The decision to disband the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW appears to be arbitrary in that no objective scoring process was used to compare unit experience, strength, strategic location, existing infrastructure, or “jointness” opportunities and efficiencies. Further, the recommendations for KC-135R aircraft distribution within the 2005 BRAC Report do not mirror the National Guard Bureau (NGB) unit conversion and aircraft distribution list in use for over 10 years. Both the Scott and Sioux City wings were given lower priority on the NGB prioritized plan yet are proposed in the 2005 BRAC Report for conversion to KC-135R’s.

There are 31 air refueling wings and 3 air refueling groups in all components of the US Air Force: 4 wings and 1 group in the active AF, 8 wings in the in the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and 19 wings and 2 groups in the ANG. Until the USAF Tanker Study is completed in the fall of 2005 the USAF doctrine for aerial refueling organizational structure remains unclear. The 2004 White Paper titled “Air Force

Organizational Principles” indicates that the USAF considered 16 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) as the doctrinally correct size for KC-135 equipped tanker units as recently as July 2004. That is exactly the size of the 108<sup>th</sup>.

In the 2005 BRAC Report the USAF recommends modifying the structure of nearly all of its reserve component wings to levels other than what it stated as the optimally correct figure. Wings at Andrews, Sioux Gateway, Lincoln, and Salt Lake will remain at 8 PAA. The wing at Phoenix will increase from 8 to 10 PAA. Wings at Bangor, Selfridge, Pease, McGhee-Tyson, Forbes, Mitchell, March, and Scott will increase from 8 to 12 PAA.

“Super wings”, including the three ANG wings based at Rickenbacker, Pittsburgh, and McGuire, were created to maximize the operational efficiencies gained through greater aircraft densities. There are four active duty Super Tanker Wings and three in the ANG. The ANG Super Tanker Wings at Rickenbacker and Pittsburgh are proposed to remain at 18 and 16 respectively while the “super” wing at McGuire will lose all 16 aircraft. There is no apparent logic to this shuffling of PAA and certainly no military doctrinal support for such widely dissimilar wing structures.

Personnel structure proposed for transfer from NAS Willow Grove to McGuire AFB is 533 Navy and Marine positions, estimated to be 160 full-time and 373 part-time positions. The net result would be a McGuire community net loss of 421 positions: 105 full-time and 316 part-time. But there would be a much greater impact considering the proximity of McGuire AFB to NAS Willow Grove. It seems likely that most of the full-time civilian employees will transfer with their positions to McGuire AFB, only a 35-minute drive from Willow Grove. Their transfer will magnify the loss of positions from the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW. The force reduction for the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW after retirement of the KC-135R aircraft, its aircrews, and maintenance personnel, will result in a loss of 954 positions: 52 active duty, 208 full-time civilian, and 694 traditional drilling Guardmember positions. It is unlikely that many of the incoming positions from Willow Grove would be compatible with the skill sets of displaced ANG civilian employees. Nearly all of the Navy and Marine active duty positions would be filled by incumbents stationed at NAS Willow Grove or with transfers from other USNR/USMCR activities. None of the active duty ANG incumbents should anticipate potential employment with the Navy Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve. One does not easily transfer from the Air Force to the Navy or Marine Corps and as a result nearly all of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW members would be displaced.

Finally, it should be noted that the primary purpose of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as amended in 2004 (Part A of Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is for “the closure or realignment of military installations...” (emphasis added). The emphasis in the statute is on infrastructure and cost savings realized, which must be certified by the Secretary of Defense and Comptroller General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has historically consumed less than 10% of the total Air Force budget. The cost savings achieved through airframe changes appears negligible compared to potential savings if additional airframes had been reallocated from the active duty Air Force to the Air National Guard instead of leaving highly experienced ANG units without airframes.

## ***Unit Background and History***

The 108th Air Refueling Wing traces its heritage back to September 1917 when the 119th Aero Squadron was formed. The 119th Aero Squadron was an active duty training squadron during World War I., was called to active duty in 1940 in preparation for World War II and served nearly three years scattered throughout the Army Air Forces. In 1946, the unit was allocated to New Jersey and returned home, the New Jersey National Guard.

The first post-war New Jersey Air National Guard unit was organized in 1946 and federally recognized as Headquarters, 108th Fighter Group. On May 26, 1949, the 141st Fighter Squadron and Detachment "A" of the 208th Air Service were activated at Mercer Airport in Trenton. Four years later the 108th Fighter Wing, based at Newark Airport, N.J., received Federal recognition on November 1, 1950. Historically, New Jersey has both fighter units and "Aces" - - 34 of the latter to date - - two of whom subsequently commanded the 108th Fighter Wing.

The 108th Fighter Wing was activated in March 1951 for the Korean Conflict and assigned to the Strategic Air Command. Nearly two years later it was transferred to the Tactical Air Command and released from active duty in November 1952. During this time, The unit was redesignated the 108th Tactical Fighter Wing in 1958 and reactivated on October 1, 1961 for the Berlin Crisis and immediately transferred overseas. Of all the Guard and Reserve fighter units activated, the 108th was the first of only two units declared combat-ready upon arrival by U.S. Air Forces, Europe inspectors.

In April 1964, the 108th was the first Air Guard unit to fly "twice the speed-of-sound" after it traded its F-84E "Thunderstreak" for the F-105B "Thunderchief." In April 1981 the unit converted to the F-4D "Phantom" and later, in the fall of 1985, to the F-4E "Phantom II." In 1989, ***the 108th was declared the best Air National Guard flying unit and awarded the coveted Spaatz Trophy.***

In 1993 the 108th converted from F-4Es to the KC-135E "Stratotanker," when it consolidated with the 170th Air Refueling Group and was redesignated the 108th Air Refueling Wing, a super-tanker wing.

In 1991 the 170th was the first air-refueling unit in the nation to launch tankers to establish the now-famous U.S.-Saudi Arabia "air-bridge" during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The group also provided urgently needed medical support and security police personnel to U.S. air bases to assist active duty personnel there or serve as "fill-in" for those already rushed to the combat theater.

By 1993 the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW participated in Operations Provide Hope, Support Hope, Provide Promise and Deny Flight in 1994.

The 108th has also provided support in the Middle East. In March of 1997 and January of 2000, the 108th Air Refueling Wing deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in support of

Operation Northern Watch. Unit personnel were also deployed to bases in Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Southern Watch during this period. Both missions supported the no-fly zone imposed over Northern and Southern Iraq by the United Nations after Operation Desert Storm.

On May 29, 1999, the 108 ARW received a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up, which entailed partial mobilization of the unit to active duty. An Air Mobility Tasking Order also ordered the unit to send aircraft and personnel overseas as part of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

Just prior to September 11, 2001, the 108th had deployed over 250 personnel in support of Operation Northern Watch at Incirlik Air Base Turkey. Shortly after the terrorist attacks the unit deployed over 580 personnel to Oman in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Southwest Asia and over 50 personnel for Operation Noble Eagle within the United States. For its efforts in 2001, ***the 108 ARW was selected as the best Air National Guard unit within the 21st Air Force for 2001 and was awarded the General Malcolm B. Armstrong Trophy.***

During the fall of 2001, the 108th has continued to provide support for the state and nation without hesitation. On February 21, 2003, the 108th received a partial mobilization order authorizing the unit to activate more than 500 Guard members to Afghanistan, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the continuing of missions for Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle.

The 108th's mission continued with more than 140 personnel deploying to Lajes, Air Base, Portugal from February to June of 2003 and 30 members deploying in June and July to Kuwait and Iraq. From December 2003 until February 2004, over 380 Guard members were deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey for Operation Silver, which supported Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing has been mobilized four times in the last five years. They have amassed 3237 flight hours and 721 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle. They have amassed over 6350 hours and 1215 sorties in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The wing has pulled over 1977 "Alert" days resulting in 421 launches.

Fifty-three percent of the maintainers have achieved the 7-level or higher.

The Wing has an impressive roster of aircrews, with total flying experience of 314,373 hours (as of 1 FEB 05). Their 113 aircrew members average 2782 flight hours and include 27 Instructor Pilots, 50 Aircraft Commanders, and 13 Instructor Boom Operators. The Aircraft Commanders average 3800 hours and the Instructor Pilots average 1800 hours of IP time. Twenty-eight of the pilots are type rated in the 767/757 with an average of 1600 flight hours.

## ***Alert Missions in the Tanker Community***

Some aerial refueling units of the U.S. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard routinely support operational missions. Those units, located on the eastern and western seaboard of the continental United States (CONUS) provide aerial refueling support for trans-oceanic military flights. Similarly, wings located near major metropolitan areas commonly support Operation Noble Eagle Homeland Security Combat Air Patrol (CAP) tracks. Refueling wings located in the central states are too far from the trans-oceanic airbridge routes and away from the major CONUS metropolitan concentrations to make their support effective or efficient.

Units that must travel a greater distance and time to reach the airbridge refueling tracks cost more to operate before they ever begin performing the refueling mission. Aerial tankers, the KC-135 and the KC-10, consume fuel to operate the tanker from the same fuel available to deliver to their “customer” aircraft. The farther an aircraft travels to and from the refueling “customer” the more it costs to perform that mission.

Greater tanker travel distance and time reduces the fuel available to offload to the “customer”. Fewer customer aircraft can be refueled per sortie, further reducing efficiency and increasing costs. Missions supported by central CONUS wings would require more sorties to provide fuel offload levels similar to those possible for missions performed by wings located on the seaboard. These tanker units located in the central United States are not employed for any tanker alert missions.

USAF tanker wing basing in the central United States seems to be a throwback to the SAC days of basing aircraft as far inland as possible to guard against surprise ICBM or bomber attacks and to support the “over the top” SAC bomber Arctic routes toward the Warsaw Pact nations. Aircraft operating over the central United States have little need for in-flight refueling when they can land at an airport.

Absent the threat of over the horizon attacks there seems no reason to continue basing tanker wings so far from where their capabilities are required: refueling military aircraft as they transit the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans bound for distant theaters of operation.

## ***Northeast Tanker Task Force***

The Northeast Tanker Task Force (NETTF) is a voluntary cooperative association of KC-135 units in the northeast to support the large volume of trans-Atlantic military traffic supporting our military personnel overseas. The bulk of the task force’s missions support traffic directly related to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom missions.

The Northeast Tanker Task Force is formed by contributions from five KC-135 Air National Guard tanker wings and one Air Force Reserve KC-10 wing, based at McGuire AFB (NJ), Pease ANGB (NH), Bangor International Airport (IAP) (ME), Niagara Falls Air Reserve Stations (NY), and Pittsburgh IAP (PA). NETTF missions are coordinated

by the 101<sup>st</sup> ARW in Bangor Maine and tasked to the participating wings. The US Air Force Air Mobility Command provides funding for aircrew salaries on alert status to support these missions.

The 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing is the center of gravity of the Northeast Tanker Task Force (NETTF). It currently provides 15% of the NETTF fuel offloaded. If the report were executed without modification, then the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW and the 107<sup>th</sup> ARW (Niagara) would no longer contribute to these mission taskings and the remaining NETTF units would have to increase their sorties by as much as 78% and their offload quantities as much as 53% to meet current demands.

The 108<sup>th</sup> is ideally located to support airbridge operations to refuel fighter, cargo and transport missions across the Atlantic to Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia as well as strategic missions under the revised OPLAN 8044. The 108<sup>th</sup> is 20% closer to NETTF and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) Combat Air Patrols (CAP) tracks than the 171<sup>st</sup> ARW at Pittsburgh and 10% closer than all other NETTF units. This proximity resulted in 25% savings from budgeted flight time for the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW. While extreme northern aerial refueling units have efficiency advantages in mission accomplishment for the northern track, and similarly extreme southern units enjoy efficiencies supporting the southern track, the 108<sup>th</sup> is best suited for northeast ONE CAP refueling missions and also best suited for overall refueling support of all three missions (NETTF, ONE, and strategic OPLANS). If equipped with KC-135R's, the 108<sup>th</sup> would be able to increase its fuel off-loads to more than 120,000 pounds per NETTF sortie while significantly reducing its flight times and mission costs. Of the KC-135 ANG units, only the 108<sup>th</sup> is located between the NETTF refueling tracks and the predominate ONE CAP locations.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is strategically located within 30 minutes flying time to Boston, New York City, and Washington DC and is close to all east coast major population, industrial and political centers. Considering its centralized location, the 108<sup>th</sup> is heavily tasked for Northeast ONE missions along the Atlantic seaboard and is frequently called to support POTUS CAP over the mid-Atlantic region. The 108<sup>th</sup> has become TACC's "go to team" to cover short-notice ONE CAP due to their ability to respond quickly when other tanker units cannot.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW has attained an exceptional mission reliability rate in the past 12 months of 96% in the historically less capable E model of the KC-135. The wing enjoys the best NETTF mission efficiency rate per sortie (3.2 hours / sortie) for KC-135E aircraft, resulting in 25% greater than planned fuel offloads. This record of excellence has resulted in the 108<sup>th</sup> being tasked 30% more per alert line than the Air Force Reserve KC-10's for NETTF missions.

The Mid-Atlantic location of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW relieves it from most of the region's severe winter weather, permitting the NJANG to complete missions when other tankers cannot. Nearly all of the other tanker units in the NETTF average two to nine times as many days per year of freezing precipitation than McGuire AFB. The other NETTF units therefore

have to either spend far greater amounts per year to de-ice their aircraft or cancel missions at a much greater rate due to freezing precipitation. Concentration of 50% of the NETTF aircraft in the northern edge of NETTF area would magnify the impacts of regional severe weather. In contrast, maintaining the current dispersion would minimize weather cancellation rates due to such severe winter weather.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is co-located with the active duty 305<sup>th</sup> AMW on the McGuire / Dix / Lakehurst mega-base, yielding tremendous operational and training synergies. Stationing on the mega-base promotes unique opportunities for joint training and mission execution. The current proposal concentrates 50% of the NETTF aircraft on two municipal airports in the northern edge of the NETTF area of operations. The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW's mid-Atlantic location, in close proximity to superior training airspace and ranges, permits excellent support to concentrations of initial or upgrade aviator training in KC-10s, C-17s and C-5s with simultaneous training value to the 108<sup>th</sup> aircrews. This also fulfills the DOD's "Total Force" vision of ANG and USAFR units being co-located on active duty joint-service bases.

### ***Existing Infrastructure***

The 2005 BRAC report did not include the cost of abandoning the \$70 million tanker wing infrastructure on McGuire AFB and the costs associated with placing additional KC-135's at other retained ANG bases rather than at McGuire. McGuire AFB was specifically and uniquely built to be a tanker base.

The air refueling wing specific facilities developed for the 108th at McGuire AFB to house an oversized tanker wing were designed to support as many as 20 tanker aircraft with the most modern fueling system of all ANG tanker units. The 108<sup>th</sup> is the only ANG unit to receive its bulk fuel deliveries to the airport "fuel farm" via secure underground pipeline. Fuel is delivered to other bases by 5000-gallon tank tractor-trailers; each NETTF sortie requires approximately four tractor-trailer deliveries.

An average pipeline receipt of 110,000 gallons takes about six hours; a similar delivery to the air base by tractor-trailer would take 16 trailer loads. Offload time for the small fleet of tractor-trailer tankers would take eight to ten hours to complete.

Each of those tractor-trailer tanks driven over the road represents both an environmental risk as well as an anti-terrorist/force protection risk to every community it passes through en route to the base fuel farm as well as to the airbase itself. Bulk fuel delivery via secure underground pipeline is the model in efficiency, safety, and security and most easily accommodates surge operations.

The other ANG tanker units do not have the hangar and apron space to accommodate more airframes than they already possess without considerable MILCON expenditures. All other ANG refueling infrastructure is a generation behind that at McGuire AFB. Fuel is delivered to the other airports via trucks to the "fuel farm" bulk storage facility. Fuel

tank trucks receive fuel from the “fuel farm” can be significantly impacted by weather, truck availability and traffic (on civilian highways and onto the airport). Furthermore, this method of fuel delivery can be quickly overwhelmed during surge operations.

### ***Strength and Recruiting***

Strength and Recruiting are challenges felt by all ANG and USAFR units . The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is in the epicenter of the highest concentration of population in the US. There were other ANG tanker units listed in the 2005 BRAC Report to receive additional PAA because of their close proximity to a population center however none of them compare to the population center bound by Northern Delaware, eastern Pennsylvania, all of New Jersey, and New York City. If there is any ANG tanker unit can take on additional PAA it would be the 108<sup>th</sup>. Nearly every major airline has a pilot base within a one-hour drive of McGuire AFB. This is important because the traditional pilot or maintainer working part-time for the ANG or USAFR also flies or maintains for an airline. The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW at McGuire AFB is one unit that can support additional ANG pilots and maintainers and would have the easiest time recruiting additional pilots.

The 108<sup>th</sup> is currently manned at approximately 93.7% for a 16 PAA unit structure. Other units are proposed for 50% increases in manning, some of which are at even lower strength rates and unlikely meet higher requirements. Conversion of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW from its existing 16 PAA structure to an 8 or 12 PAA organization structure would result in immediate 100% manning with experienced qualified maintainers and aircrews. Other units would have to find members to fill positions and then train those new members. While currently a **RED** state when compared to a 16 PAA manning document, the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW would be a **GREEN** state when compared to a 12 or 8 PAA document.

The Air National Guard uses color codes to easily identify assigned strength levels. GREEN reflects assigned strength greater than or equal to 96.7% of authorized strength. YELLOW reflects assigned strength greater than or equal to 94.7% but less than 96.7%. RED represents assigned strength less than 94.7% of authorized strength.

Most units in the NETTF will face increased manning requirements under the plan presented in the 2005 BRAC Report. The 101st ARW, Maine ANG, at Bangor International Airport is programmed to increase its primary aircraft authorization (PAA) from 8 to 12; they are also currently as **RED** state with assigned strength of only 91.1% for the smaller 8 PAA authorized strength. The 157<sup>th</sup> ARW, New Hampshire ANG is likewise proposed to increase from 8 to 12 PAA; they, too, are currently graded as **RED** with only 93.8% assigned strength. These NETTF wings are ill-prepared to assume greater strength requirements and corresponding greater taskings under the proposed restructuring of the overall northeast CONUS tanker force. In Pennsylvania, the 171<sup>st</sup> ARW at Pittsburgh IAP, is proposed to maintain 16 PAA; it is currently graded as **YELLOW** at 95.3% manning.

Other Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve ARW's outside the NETTF face similar challenges with achieving current assigned strength requirements. The tanker wing in Phoenix, Arizona is programmed to increase to 12 PAA and is only graded as **YELLOW** at 96.3% assigned manning for 8 PAA. In Hawaii, their tanker wing is proposed to increase from 8 to 12 PAA; they are currently graded as **RED** with only 94.2% manning for the smaller structure. Other wings face similar challenges with manning 8 PAA units and would face even greater challenges meeting increased recruiting requirements for 12 PAA units.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is poised to downsize to a 12 or 8 PAA unit and would be in excellent shape to continue recruiting to that mission. With new recruiting tactics and emphasis in place, the 108<sup>th</sup> will continue to recruit the finest personnel available for any future mission.

### ***Air Base Discussion***

#### **108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, McGuire Air Force Base, NJ**

The 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing's New Jersey location makes it strategically ideal to support operations along the eastern seaboard and across the Atlantic Ocean. Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington DC, Pittsburgh, and Norfolk are all within 30 minutes flying time from the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW's home station at McGuire AFB.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is the only ANG tanker wing in the northeast US and only one of three located on a CONUS military installation thereby reducing overhead compared to stand alone units at civilian airports or Air National Guard airbases. McGuire AFB is the first mega-base, adjoining Fort Dix and Lakehurst NAES; there is no danger of encroachment issues in the foreseeable future. The mega-base is home to an AMC wing and is the leading reserve component force projection platform for overseas deployments since 2001. The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is excellently sited to support aircraft based at locations that concentrate heavily on initial or upgrade training for aviators: the KC-10's and C-17s at McGuire AFB, the C-5s at Westover and Dover, and C-17s from Charleston.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is ideally located for Tactical Employment Training, one of Air Mobility Command's highest priorities. Proximity to the coastline provides access to Warning Areas 105 and 107 in less than 25 minutes. Entire sorties, including air refueling and tactical employment maneuvers, can be flown under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) with minimal assistance of Air Traffic Control. The 108<sup>th</sup> Tactical Arrival and Departure letter of agreement with McGuire AFB ATC was the first such document approved by the Air National Guard for KC-135 aircraft; this program was declared an Outstanding Program by AMC's Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation (ASE) team.

The co-location of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW with the Air Mobility Warfare Center permits frequent interaction. The 108<sup>th</sup> serves as Air National Guard liaison to the Center for KC-135 issues. This relationship permits the 108<sup>th</sup> to participate in Mobility Air Forces Tactics

Review Boards and Tactics Analysis Conferences. The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW seeks greater involvement with the AMWC through integration of the wing with the USAF Mobility Weapons School. Greater details of this opportunity are attached as a Background Paper.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW has over 20 years of experience providing air refueling support for America's strategic nuclear deterrence under OPLAN 8044. On September 11, 2001 the wing stood up three aircraft supporting the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) at the direction of the President. The wing passed AMC Inspector General Operational Readiness Inspections in 1996 and 2002. The wing's aircrews achieved perfect Emergency Action Procedures scores in 1996, 2002, and 2003. During USSTRATCOM Exercise Global Lightning '05 the 108<sup>th</sup> attained the highest participation and execution rate of any Air National Guard unit. The wing and its members are acknowledged mentors to all other NETTF units in their preparation for inspections, deployments, and exercises.

With the exception of Andrews-based KC-135s, the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW is the closest location for supporting Homeland Defense missions for the nation's capitol. Such missions range from operational flying to manning a 24/7 alert force capable of launching within 30 minutes to provide aerial refueling support for combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft. The 108<sup>th</sup> maintains a modern dedicated aircrew "Alert" facility; most other tanker locations have no such facilities. The 108<sup>th</sup> currently supports homeland defense missions for the other major cities on the eastern seaboard. The centralized location of the wing combined with the improved capabilities of the KC-135R would cement the 108<sup>th</sup> as the premiere Homeland Defense refueling asset on the East coast.

### **171<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing, PA ANG, Pittsburgh International Airport**

**DESCRIPTION:** The 171<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing is assigned 16 KC-135R's; there is no change proposed to that authorization based on the BRAC Report. This wing is located on a major airline hub airport. The FAA reports no flight restrictions on the wing but it is reasonable to assume that the unit voluntarily schedules training missions to avoid the peak airline hours. Training for this wing is difficult due to their location on a busy international airport and therefore the unit is unable to perform local traffic pattern training.

**STRENGTH:** Assigned strength for this wing of the Pennsylvania ANG is 95.3% of authorized strength (YELLOW). With no change in PAA programmed so there is no anticipated relief to their recruiting shortfall.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:** There is no additional construction required to accommodate the BRAC proposed aircraft.

**FUEL:** Fuel is delivered to the airport fuel farm via a multitude of 5000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks.

**WEATHER:** Pittsburgh IAP experiences some of the worst winter weather of the NETTF bases. Reduced ceilings and visibility result in delayed takeoffs and arrivals for the large number of civilian aircraft that fly at Pittsburgh daily. The frequent freezing precipitation with its resultant de-icing delays and costs makes operations during winter months inefficient.

**FLIGHT ISSUES:** Pittsburgh is located farther from the air refueling tracks of the NETTF than any other participating wing. Their flight time to and from the North and South tracks reduces their offload quantities and consequently their overall efficiency in contributing to the NETTF and Homeland Defense missions.

**TACTICS:** The 171<sup>st</sup> ARW has historically claimed their location prohibits the conduct of tactical takeoffs, departures, approaches and landings due to the high volume of civilian aircraft. They are now almost halfway complete in their tactics training program but can only complete tactical arrival and departure procedures in the flight simulator or when at USAF controlled airports.

**ALERT:** The 171<sup>st</sup> ARW provides three NETTF alert lines and provides approximately 13% of the sorties and 15% of the NETTF fuel offloaded (slightly less than that provided by the one NETTF line from the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW). This wing unit is the farthest of all NETTF bases from the northern and southern air refueling tracks as well as the ONE CAP tracks, making it the least efficient in terms of sorties per flight hour and fuel available for offload per sortie.

### **101<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing, ME ANG, Bangor International Airport**

**DESCRIPTION:** The 101<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing is assigned 8 KC-135E's; it is programmed to retire the 8 E's and receive 12 R's as proposed in the 2005 BRAC Report. This wing is located on a civilian operated international airport.

**STRENGTH:** Assigned strength for the Maine Air National Guard is 91.1% of authorized strength (RED). They appear ill-suited to achieve the additional strength required to support a 50 % increase in PAA. Their Adjutant General has acknowledged this problem.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:** The increase in PAA, from 8 to 12, would require construction of an additional hangar for Phase maintenance (\$9.3 million) as well as additions to the apron to park four additional aircraft (\$1.1 million each), for an approximate total of nearly \$13.7 million. There is already over \$13 million programmed for airfield pavement and parking aprons simply to continue current 8 PAA operations.

**FUEL:** Fuel is delivered to the airport by thousands of 5000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks each year.

**WEATHER:** Bangor experiences some of the most extreme winter weather of the NETTF bases. The greatest weather impact here is the high average number of days of freezing precipitation each year, requiring frequent de-icing of aircraft and high operating costs. Further, Bangor suffers the greatest annual number of days with temperatures below 10 degrees F and the greatest annual number of days when missions must be canceled due to fog.

**FLIGHT ISSUES:** The FAA plans to reduce air traffic control tower operations to cease at 11:00 PM daily. Lack of an operating airfield tower would require the wing to conduct operations and training with waivers accepting increased risk. It is unclear how a tanker unit with Alert aircraft taskings can operate from an airport without an operational tower.

**TACTICS:** The wing is well along in developing their tactics program. They have a letter of agreement with their home airport permitting tactical takeoffs, departures, approaches, and landings.

**ALERT:** The wing has three NETTF alert lines and provides approximately 15% of the sorties and 15% of the fuel offloaded for the NETTF mission. Its location as the northernmost of the NETTF bases makes it most efficient for northern aerial refueling track missions, but far less efficient supporting southern refueling track or ONE CAP missions.

### **157<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, NH ANG, Pease Air National Guard Base**

**DESCRIPTION:** The 157<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing currently has 9 KC-135Rs authorized; the 2005 BRAC Report proposes increasing their PAA to 12. This unit is located on a “stand-alone” Air National Guard base.

**STRENGTH:** The 157<sup>th</sup> has a current assigned strength of 93.8% (RED) for a 9 PAA wing structure. They appear ill-suited to achieve a 33% increase in assigned strength.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:** There is already \$17 million programmed for airfield pavement and parking aprons simply to continue 9 PAA operations.

**FUEL:** Fuel is delivered to the airport bulk fuel storage site by thousands of 5000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks.

**WEATHER:** Severe winter weather at Pease is primarily the average number of days with temperatures below 10 degrees F. Such cold weather, below 10° F, results in outdoor tasks taking much longer to accomplish. In addition, Pease ranks near the top for NETTF bases for snow accumulation, requiring snow removal to permit continued operations.

**FLIGHT ISSUES:** Not available.

**TACTICS:** This wing has a well-developed tactics training program. They have a letter of agreement with their local airport as well as with Brunswick Naval Air Station to perform tactical arrivals and departures. They have a KC-135R simulator on their home station, permitting maximum use to accomplish required maneuvers.

**ALERT:** The 157<sup>th</sup> ARW stands two alert lines for NETTF as well as support to the ONE CAP mission. They contribute 17% of the sorties delivering 19% of the fuel offloaded. Their northern location makes them more efficient than most in supporting the northern aerial refueling track but less efficient for southern track and ONE CAP missions.

### **121<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing, OH ANG, Rickenbacker Int'l Airport**

**DESCRIPTION:** The 121<sup>st</sup> ARW is an 18 PAA wing equipped with KC-135R's stationed on a civilian international airport. There was no change to the existing wing structure proposed in the 2005 BRAC Report.

**STRENGTH:** With assigned strength at more than 100% (**GREEN**), the 121<sup>st</sup> is capable of maintaining its current force structure.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:** There is no proposed increase in PAA so there is no additional construction projected to accommodate more aircraft. Current construction projects, to continue 16 PAA operations, are estimated at \$9 million.

**FUEL:** Fuel is delivered to the airport bulk fuel storage site by thousands of 5000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks. It receives approximately 8 trucks per day six days per week to meet demand. Nearly 2500 individual tractor-trailers hauling 5000-gallon tankers filled with jet fuel pass through its surrounding communities each year.

**WEATHER:** Not available.

**FLIGHT ISSUES:** Location on a civilian airport requires coordination with civilian air traffic control and fewer opportunities to conduct tactical departures and approaches.

**TACTICS:** Not available.

**ALERT:** This wing does not participate in the NETTF "ALERT" taskings due to its distance from the operational area. It similarly does not contribute to the eastern seaboard ONE CAP missions.

## **127<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing, Selfridge ANG Base, MI ANG**

**DESCRIPTION:** The 127<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing is based on a stand-alone Air National Guard base. The 127<sup>th</sup> is programmed to turn in C-130's and receive 12 KC-135R's. It is reasonable to assume they will occupy the buildings vacated by the co-located AFRC ARW disbanded under the 2005 BRAC Report.

**STRENGTH:** The 127<sup>th</sup> is currently manned at or above 100% for a C-130 equipped wing. With the transfer of Selfridge-based AFRC aircraft to the Selfridge-based ANG wing there should be an abundance of potential unit members but a lack of qualified incumbents. Considerable transition training will be required for ANG aircrew members and maintenance workers to convert their skills to KC-135R and aerial refueling specialties.

**INFRASTRUCTURE:** Programmed construction required to continue operations at the current level requires \$13 million. The addition of 4 tanker aircraft to the base and departure of the C-130's should leave adequate parking space for the resulting fleet.

**FUEL:** Fuel is delivered to the airport bulk fuel storage site by thousands of 5000-gallon tractor-trailer tanks. There is no in-ground hydrant system to parking pads for individual tanker fueling; fuel is transferred from the bulk storage facility to the aircraft via tank trucks. This method is the least desirable, more subject to weather and vehicle interference, and is quickly overwhelmed during surge operations. It would cost nearly \$16 million to install the current technology underground system to deliver fuel to the tanker parking apron.

**WEATHER:** The weather at Selfridge is only slightly worse in all categories than that experienced at McGuire AFB and not significant enough to require comment.

**FLIGHT ISSUES:** The runway length at Selfridge, 9000 feet, limits the maximum takeoff weight of tanker aircraft. This weight limitation restricts the fueling offloading capacities of the wings aircraft.

**TACTICS:** Not available. This unit is currently flying C-130s and would have to develop a Tactics program upon commencing KC-135R flight training.

**ALERT:** This wing would not participate in the NETTF "ALERT" taskings due to its distance from the operational area. It similarly would not contribute to the eastern seaboard ONE CAP missions

## *Flying Safety*

Based on a ten-year recap of flying safety data comparing the records of the Air National Guard and the active Air Force, the number of active duty AF Fighter aircraft Class A flying mishaps per 100,000 flying hours is eight times greater than that of the ANG. In the airlift category the rate of active duty AF Class A mishaps is 16 times greater than in the ANG.

The 108<sup>th</sup> ARW has never had a Class A accident since converting to the KC-135 in 1992. Zero Class A accidents in nearly 71,000 flying hours. The aircrews of the 108th ARW have over 261,000 total flying hours of experience in KC-135 aircraft and over 19,000 hours flying combat and combat support missions. The aircraft are maintained by a highly experienced technical force with an average of more than 15 years on the flight line and 170 years of combined experience in the “back shops”.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve enjoy much better safety rates than the active Air Force for a variety of reasons. Principal among these reasons is high aircrew experience, high maintainer experience, and low unit personnel turnover.

Decreasing the proportionate contribution of the reserve components to the overall Air Force mission performance should be expected to result in an increase in Air Force accidents and mishaps.

## *Conclusions*

A super tanker wing stationed on an Air Force commanded mega-base is programmed to cease flying operations. The wing is scheduled to turn-in all 16 KC-135Es without replacement. The eminently qualified and experienced aircrews, and support personnel of the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing are programmed for disbandment with the retirement of their aircraft. The \$70 million premiere tanker base in the Air National Guard is programmed for less than optimal use. The underground jetfuel hydrants to each tanker parking apron would sit unused or underemployed as parking spaces for helicopters. The 108<sup>th</sup> has existing apron and hangar capacity to accept four additional aircraft, up to a total of twenty-three.

Other units, unable to fill current positions at lesser authorizations and unable to accommodate more aircraft on their aprons and in their hangars will increase their aircraft population. These upgraded wings will have to build new hangars for maintenance and aprons for parking at considerable MILCON cost.. They will fly farther to reach refueling tracks, when the weather permits. They will continue to transport bulk fuel to their airports via insecure environmentally risky tractor-trailer tankers. This is an unsecured and potentially vulnerable mode of transporting jet fuel.

In contrast to BRAC’s pronounced goals of efficiency, “joint-ness”, and military value, tanker assets are being realigned to move aircraft from the right place, the centrally

located east coast mega-base, onto stand-alone bases and international airports that do not have the necessary strength, infrastructure, wartime capabilities, or the strategic location of the 108th ARW.


Surely the military value of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW, one of only three Air National Guard super tanker wing and a key contributor to eastern US aerial refueling support for air bridge operations and Homeland Defense CAP support missions, is greater than the proposed alternate use of the real estate the 108<sup>th</sup> occupies now.

The 108<sup>th</sup> is the right organization with the right people in the right place. Tankers at McGuire are more versatile to support modern real-world aerial refueling taskings.

### ***Recommendation***


The most efficient resolution to the proposed restructuring of the tanker force is to replace the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW's 16 retired KC-135E's with 8 to 12 KC-135R's.








# Post-BRAC KC-135R Distribution



Appendix 5: Northeast US Tanker Locations





Appendix 7: NETTF Project Workload Increases

Projected Increase in workload

Unit(# TTF lines)	Taskings	Sorties	Fuel Offload	% of current offload	% of proposed offload*	proposed offload*	% change in offload*
108 <sup>th</sup> ARW (1)			3,800,000	15%	0	0	n/a
Pittsburgh (3)			3,726,000	15%	22%	5,567,320	49%
Bangor (3)			3,800,000	15%	22%	5,567,320	47%
Niagara (2)			4,650,000	18%	0	0	n/a
Pease (2)			4,860,000	19%	28%	7,085,680	46%
AFRC KC-10 (4)			4,470,000	18%	27%	6,832,620	53%
Total			25,306,000				

Unit(# TTF lines)	Taskings	Sorties	% of current taskings	% of current sorties	proposed sorties*	% of proposed sorties*	% increase in sorties*
108 <sup>th</sup> ARW (1)	135	68	19%	18%	0	0%	n/a
Pittsburgh (3)	94	51	13%	13%	91	24%	78%
Bangor (3)	101	56	14%	15%	91	24%	62%
Niagara (2)	159	77	23%	20%	0	0%	n/a
Pease (2)	121	68	17%	18%	110	29%	62%
AFRC KC-10 (4)	92	59	13%	16%	95	25%	61%
Total	702	379					

Unit(# TTF lines)	Sorties	fuel offload	current Avg offload /sortie	proposed sorties*	proposed fuel offload*	resultant increased offload*	add'l fuel truck deliveries for NETTF mission*
108 <sup>th</sup> ARW (1)	68	3,800,000	55,882	0	0	-3,800,000	
Pittsburgh (3)	51	3,726,000	73,059	91	5,567,320	1,841,320	57
Bangor (3)	56	3,800,000	67,857	91	5,567,320	1,767,320	54
Niagara (2)	77	4,650,000	60,390	0	0	-4,650,000	
Pease (2)	68	4,860,000	71,471	110	7,085,680	2,225,680	68
AFRC KC-10 (4)	59	4,470,000	75,763	95	6,832,620	2,362,620	73
Total							

\* assumption that TTF fuel delivery demand remains constant

Appendix 8: NETTF Weather Data

Average Inches of Snowfall

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
McGuire	6	6	4	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	3	22
Pittsburgh	12.5	10.1	7.7	1.7	0.2	0	0	0	0	0.2	3.2	8.1	43
Pease	18	16	12	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.0	15	67
Bangor	19.7	19.2	14.1	4.2	0.3	0	0	0	0	0.6	4.5	15.9	78
Niagara	24	18	11	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	22	89

Average # of Days Airport Below VFR

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
McGuire	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	54
Pittsburgh	8	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	8	61
Pease	5	4	6	6	6	6	5	4	5	5	5	5	62
Niagara	10	9	5	7	3	3	3	4	3	3	5	7	62
Bangor	6	5	7	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	7	70

Average # of Days Airport Below 200' ½

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
McGuire	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	4.5
Pittsburgh	1	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	6.5
Niagara	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	7.5
Bangor	1	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11.5
Pease	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12

Appendix 9: Background Paper: Integration of the 108<sup>th</sup> ARW and USAF Mobility Weapons School (Maj Francine Main/108OGV/4-6314/fm/2 Jun 05)

The New Jersey Air National Guard, McGuire AFB, offers a unique partnership opportunity to the Center of Excellence for Air Mobility operated by the Air Mobility Warfare Center located on neighboring Fort Dix. Currently, the USAF Mobility Weapons School is headquartered at Fort Dix; however, the flying organizations are situated at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas (C-130), Fairchild AFB, Washington (KC-135), and McGuire AFB, New Jersey (C-17). With conversion of the 108th Air Refueling Wing to a composite wing consisting of KC-135R and C-130J aircraft in partnership with the Mobility Weapons School, all three Weapons Squadrons can be united on one airfield with existing adjacent airspace amenities.

- *Home Stationing at Fort Dix/McGuire AFB offers a full complement of support services with ample expansion capability.*
  - Base can support a high volume of air traffic without encroachment issues
  - Conveniently located near Special Use Airspace (W107/105), Drop Zone (Coyle DZ) and assault runway facilities (Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station)
  - Successful joint ventures with McGuire AFB (57th Weapons Squadron) and Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station (Expeditionary Operations School) in operation
  
- *Affiliation with 108th Air Refueling Wing provides highly skilled work force with proven reliability*
  - Ten-Year Mission Capability Rating 73.9% with Mission Effectiveness Rate of 98.2%
    - Highly skilled maintenance force – 53% 7-level or higher
    - Aircrew Qualification: 27 Instructor Pilots (43%), 50 Aircraft Commanders (79%), 13 Instructor Boom Operators (35%)
    - Average Crewmember experience: 2782 hours
  - Highly Accomplished Unit
    - USAF Outstanding Unit Award and Lt Gen Malcolm B. Armstrong Trophy for the best Air National Guard unit in 21st Air Force
    - Tactics Shop cited as “best seen to date” by ASEV team
    - First ever ANG tanker unit deployed under an Air Combat Command Air Expeditionary Wing
  
- *Unification of Mobility Weapons Schools consolidates existing resources and reduces relocation costs*
  - Headquarters of the Mobility Weapons School and Ronald R. Fogelman Library located at Fort Dix Campus
    - Single building can house two relocating (or all three squadrons) with shared classrooms, administrative staffs and facilities for approximately \$12 million
    - Increase in Student travel costs is only 13%; however, travel access to major airports is greatly improved

- Infrastructure for a seamless transition currently in place
  - Ramp facilities designed for a 20 PMAI KC-135 operation
  - New, modern Squadron Operations building
- *Composite Wing of KC-135R and C-130J aircraft provides vital aerial refueling and tactical airlift support to the State of New Jersey and the Northeast region*
  - Missions are well suited to the Air National Guard
    - The ANG provides 42% of the Tanker force and 40% of the Tactical Airlift force
  - Strategic location of McGuire AFB vital for expeditionary airlift and aerial refueling
    - 108th ARW currently maintains two active Bravo Alert lines for the Tanker Task Force
    - Combat proven: Mission effectiveness rate of 99.5 percent in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM while flying 693 combat/combat support missions
  - Quick response capability to the New York and Washington metropolitan areas makes the 108th ARW essential to homeland defense
    - Unit averaged 3 alert sorties and 2 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) refuelings per day for a year under Operation NOBLE EAGLE
    - Aircrews flew over 2300 hours on 540 sorties offloading over 11 millions pounds of fuel to fighter and AWACs aircraft
    - Over 690 days of alert performed with over 140 mission launches to support CAP refuelings
  - Total NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM numbers outpace any single ANG unit
    - Wing flew 20% of ANG tanker missions and 4% of all ANG flying hours and sorties for the 2001-2002 timeframe

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing – Congressman Frank LoBiondo (NJ-2)**

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**Commissioners--thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I am here to voice my strong support for the New Jersey Air National Guard's 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing in Atlantic City and the expansion of its key air defense role.**

**Its strategic location makes the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing a vital part of our national security and homeland defense, with a long and proud history of almost 30 years of excellence in air sovereignty covering the East Coast of the United States. This strong air defense tradition, coupled with Atlantic City's unique geographic location, makes the 177<sup>th</sup> a key military and community asset.**

**As we are all aware, the horrific events of September 11, 2001, brought home the importance of our nation's air defense. With the end of the Cold War, air sovereignty alert had been made a lower national security priority, and so in 1998, the 177<sup>th</sup> FW in Atlantic City and many other units were taken off NORAD home station alert.**

**Since, that horrible day, the Wing has again been designated a NORAD 24 hour alert site and has flown in excess of 1800 sorties and 6,000 flying hours protecting our skies. The 177<sup>th</sup> currently has 15 Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) and maintains six F-16s on 24 hour alert, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. These alert aircraft can literally be in the air in a matter of minutes and are an**

**essential weapon as our country continues to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT).**

**The most important thing I want to stress to you about the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing today though is the fact that the Jersey Devils are the *only* unit that can provide 24-hour alert coverage capability for five major U.S. cities. For example, as the closest alert site, the 177<sup>th</sup> can reach New York City in less than seven minutes. Within NORAD's required 20-minute window, the Wing also covers Washington D.C., Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, thereby protecting a large segment of the U.S. population. In addition, the unit flies Irregular Air Patrols over sensitive areas such as critical infrastructure facilities.**

**Atlantic City also affords excellent training opportunities in the form of nearby over-water ranges that permit supersonic flight. Within two minutes after take-off, 177<sup>th</sup>**

Page 4 of 6

**fighters can be in an area that allows them to train at the maximum performance of the aircraft. Additionally, the Wing has its own air-to-ground training range at Warren Grove,**

**enabling the Jersey Devils to maintain proficiency in air-to-ground weapons delivery.**

**The infrastructure at Atlantic City Air National Guard base is modern and more than sufficient for current and future missions. In the past few years, our military construction program has resulted in improvements to base facilities, including the opening of a new Communications Complex in 2004 and a groundbreaking on a brand new \$12.7 million alert facility later this year. The 177<sup>th</sup> has ample ramp space and can accommodate additional fighter and other aircraft, should surge capacity needs dictate that in the future along with the capability to accept additional missions and people.**

Page 5 of 6

**Located at the Atlantic City International Airport, the base has a very low yearly operating cost and yearly lease, and**

**an excellent working relationship with the South Jersey Transportation Authority (SJTA). An outstanding record of environmental stewardship and no encroachment are also primary factors underscoring its military value.**

**The men and women of the 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing are key players in the Global War on Terror and their excellence, enthusiasm, and dedication are without equal. The Jersey Devils have a superior end strength level at 98.9%, morale and retention are excellent, and a very high Fully Mission Capable Rate is maintained. Future recruitment at Atlantic City can easily be accommodated.**


**The 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's vital role in our national security underscores the importance of why newer fighters and additional aircraft should be flowed to Atlantic City. I know you are currently reviewing the Air Force's Future Total Force**

**plan, especially as it relates to Air National Guard force structure. I have serious reservations about Future Total Force, as we know the Air Force plans to retire older F-16s, but does not provide for their replacement. The mission of the Jersey Devils is too important to our homeland defense to let this happen.**

**This is why it is essential that the Secretary of Defense's BRAC recommendation for newer fighters and increased Primary Assigned Aircraft in Atlantic City be implemented. I strongly support expanding the Wing to 24 Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) and its conversion to the F-15C. Thank you.**


# 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's Air Defense Coverage Area

Coverage Radius within 7 minutes



# 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's Air Defense Coverage Area


Coverage Radius within 11 minutes



**Within 11 Minutes**

# 177<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing's Air Defense Coverage Area

Coverage Radius within 20 minutes  
(NORAD 24-hour Alert Site Requirement)



**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**Conclusions – Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen**

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Chairman Principi, Commissioners Newton, Turner and Coyle --

I want to thank you for your service to the nation and welcome you to the New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware region. I appreciate the opportunity to appear this morning.

This is hugely important work that you are doing. As a veteran member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have had the opportunity to visit countless U.S. military bases around the world. I understand how critical it is for the Department of Defense – and this Commission – to “get it right” when it comes to our force structure, our posture and our joint military basing strategy. I appreciate the dedication you have brought to this vital task.

I am here along with other members of the New Jersey Congressional delegation to brief you on several of the recommendations made in May by the Department of Defense. Notably, we are very concerned about the Department’s recommendation

to close Fort Monmouth and to retire all 16 KC-135E aircraft now assigned to the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing at McGuire Air Force Base. However, I will allow my colleagues to go into greater detail.

Mr. Chairman, on Page 19 of the report of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group, the Secretary of Defense recommends the creation of an “integrated weapons and armaments specialty site for guns and ammunition” at Picatinny Arsenal in Morris County, New Jersey.

I strongly support this recommendation. It is well-founded on the facts, advances the DoD’s transformation, and it is executable.

For your information, I want to present some facts.

Picatinny Arsenal is already home to:

- the “Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition for DoD – PEO Ammo;
- an armament engineering organization which provides fully integrated life cycle systems engineering for weapons and munitions;

- 70 unique mission facilities with 16 state-of-the-art laboratories staffed by an adaptable, highly specialized workforce;

The DoD BRAC analysis found Picatinny to be the “center-of-mass” for DoD’s guns and ammunition (research, development and acquisition.) It has the workload in this area more than an order of magnitude greater than any other DoD facility. It has the greatest concentration of military value in guns and ammunition (research, development and acquisition.)

The DoD recommendation is transformational. It builds on the joint single manager for conventional ammo to create a robust guns and ammunition “joint center.” It will provide for greater synergy and more efficient operations, all to the benefit the warfighter.

Mr. Chairman, this recommendation is executable.

Picatinny has the necessary experience with joint acquisition and management to properly integrate Navy organizations into a true “joint center” for guns and ammunition.

Picatinny has the necessary facilities to incorporate most of these missions with minimal “MilCon”.

Most important, Picatinny has a dedicated and talented workforce.

I assume you will hear later today about a potential “brain drain” – the loss of intellectual capital.

I would point out that Picatinny has unique access to a highly concentrated and skilled science and engineering (S&E) workforce compared to other states and the nation as a whole. In addition, New Jersey’s educational infrastructure maintains a robust pipeline of future scientific and engineering workers. As a result, Picatinny Arsenal has had no trouble attracting top flight talent – more than 500 engineers and scientists have been hired in recent years. Most of them are young, energetic, creative and dedicated to providing all possible support to our warfighters and the global war on terrorism.

## **Picatinny in Brief**

- The military's integrated center for armaments technology;
- A world recognized leader in the design of advanced weapons systems;
- Leader in the integration of guns, ammunition, and fire control systems for ground, naval and air combat platforms have given our joint service forces overwhelming superiority against enemy forces in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- The Arsenal's 4,000 employees and military program managers represent a critical mass of irreplaceable intellectual capital in both offensive and defensive combat technologies;
- Over 70 unique facilities (including 16 state-of-the-art laboratories) across the site's 6,500 acres;
- Over the past 5 years the government has invested over \$400 million in construction and in procurement of specialized equipment found nowhere else in the commercial sector;

## **Fort Monmouth “Closure”**

- I am deeply disappointed by the Department’s decision regarding Ft. Monmouth. I am anxious to read the Department’s rationale to the precise factors that led to this decision.
  
- Certainly, I join the entire New Jersey Congressional Delegation and our Governor in working to fight for Fort Monmouth. We will do everything we can.
  
- Picatinny vs. Monmouth? There is no direct competition between these two fine military installations. They execute very different missions.
  - Picatinny is guns and munitions, force protection and weapons engineering. It has no commercial counterpart.
  
  - Fort Monmouth specializes in communications, surveillance, electronics and command and control systems.

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

### **Conclusions – Congressman Robert Andrews**

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Chairman Principi, General Newton, Mr. Coyle and General Turner, I am pleased to have this opportunity to share my thoughts with you on the recommendations of the Department of Defense for the 2005 round of BRAC.

New Jersey's role in the defense of our nation is as old as our nation itself. And in the post 9/11 world we live in, New Jersey's strategic location between New York City and Washington, DC makes it a natural place for our military to train, re-supply, research and test the people and equipment that will lead the fight in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to its geographic advantage, New Jersey possesses one of the most highly skilled, educated and vibrant workforces in the nation. This workforce represents an ideal pool of talent to meet the complicated Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Sensors and Reconnaissance needs of our present day military. If the Department of Defense closes Fort Monmouth and moves Team C4ISR elsewhere, the military would lose access to this valuable workforce, and the support that our servicemembers on the front lines depend on may suffer.

As I'm sure the Commission would agree, our military needs the best and the brightest working on the technological solutions needed to defeat a creative and adaptable enemy in the Global War on Terrorism. We can't have just anybody working on the most effective IED jammers for use in Iraq or long range radios to circumvent the mountains of Afghanistan. Out of a sense of patriotism, some of these innovators may choose to uproot their families and relocate to another area. But the reality is that DoD must re-compete in a fluid and competitive economy for members of Team C4ISR who possess skills that can easily transfer to the vibrant New Jersey Information Technology sector. Considering the present challenges faced by our military, including a very high operational tempo, this disruption is a chance that I'm not comfortable taking.

Mr. Chairman, I support moving forward with this round of BRAC and have voted against attempts in Congress to delay or cancel BRAC. I agree that there is excess military infrastructure which stands as an impediment to transforming our military. I adamantly believe that a Cold War mentality still pervades many aspects of our national security, and our military infrastructure is no exception. However, Fort Monmouth is not part of this Cold War legacy. With its intellectually strategic location and state of the art facilities, Fort Monmouth remains the best place in the nation to host the innovators who go to bed at night thinking of ways to keep more American servicemembers alive. At this critical juncture in the Global War on Terrorism, we can't afford the risk associated with starting over.

Finally, I would like to associate myself with the testimony of my South Jersey neighbor and fellow member of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Jim Saxton regarding the Air Force's efforts to enclave Air National Guard aircraft. As this proposal came as a complete surprise to many of us, I am pleased to see that the BRAC Commission is taking a close look at this to ensure that cost savings are not reached at the expense of readiness, homeland defense, recruitment and retention for our Air National Guard.

Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you and the rest of the Commission for allowing me to share my thoughts and concerns with you. You have agreed to participate in a difficult and controversial process that I'm confident will leave us stronger in the long term. Thank you for your service.

**New Jersey Testimony and Presentations**  
BRAC Regional Hearing  
Baltimore, MD  
Friday, July 8, 2005

**Summation – Senator Jon S. Corzine**

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In closing, I would like to say, game, set, and match.

But I probably shouldn't be so brash.

I thank the commission for its attentiveness and its diligence in sorting through the facts and the missions of what I believe are vital military installations in New Jersey.

I do think we in New Jersey have just made the strongest possible case to keep Fort Monmouth open, and keep the 108<sup>th</sup> refueling wing at full strength.

In addition, I believe it is clear why expanding the missions at the 107<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing and Picatinny Arsenal was a correct decision.

However, most significantly today I'd like to point out to the commission how united we are in New Jersey.

The issue before us is not a partisan issue. It is an issue that has united both Democrats and Republicans, and I applaud the contributions today of Senator Lautenberg and Mayor Tarantolo, Congressmen Rush Holt and Frank Pallone, and Congressmen Jim Saxton, Frank LoBiondo, and Rodney Frelinghuysen.

I might be the senior senator for our great state, but Congressman Chris Smith is our delegation leader – and I

thank him for his insight and great support in helping to lead our fight.

And I'd like to thank Admiral Gaffney, General Russ and Bob Giordano for their detailed analysis on why it is so vitally important to keep Fort Monmouth open.

Vital to both our national AND homeland security.

Vital because of the talent, creativity and ingenuity of the thousands who work there -- advancing technology to protect and support our troops overseas.

And if I may reiterate and re-emphasize those who have gone before me this morning, it would be a major mistake to close Fort Monmouth.

Yes, closing Fort Monmouth directly impacts on more than 5,500 military and civilian employees, but it also directly impacts on our national security.

Fort Monmouth is the research leader in communications. Its scientists and skilled engineers created the systems that are so invaluable to our service men and women fighting the global war on terror.

They have modernized intelligence and support systems. They are working feverishly to neutralize the threat of improvised explosive devices.

And their research goes on exactly where it belongs – in the heart of a state that is renowned for its leadership in technology and telecommunications.

As others noted before me, the Fort has attracted the best and the brightest because New Jersey has attracted the best and the brightest. .

Trying to rebuild our high-tech culture somewhere else is counter-productive and expensive. And challenges the claim that shuttering Fort Monmouth would be cost-effective.

Moving Fort Monmouth would harm America's defense and security. It would weaken and disrupt on-going

research. It would weaken the defense department's mission.

Finally, may I add a word about the 108<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard.

As Congressman Saxton noted, the Department of Defense has invested \$70 million to create the premier tanker base in the country. There appears to be no logic to disband this tanker wing by retiring and not replacing refueling air tankers.

Again, let me thank Chairman Principi and Commissioners Newton, Turner and Coyle.

We appreciate the opportunity to state our case, and I believe that we've stated it well.

New Jersey has long contributed to the strength of our nation – with its strategic location, talented workforce and dedicated men and women who are committed to our national defense.

And we hope that based on the arguments presented this morning, the commission will reach the same conclusion.

Thank you.