



# ***NAS JRB Willow Grove***

Visit of Governor Edward G. Rendell  
To Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission

August 1, 2005



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Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell appreciates the opportunity for him and leaders of the efforts to protect the outstanding military value of NAS JRB Willow Grove to meet with the staff of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The purpose of the meeting is to provide additional perspectives on the proposed closure of this installation with accompanying deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and removal of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve.






# TAB A

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



**Written Submission to  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
on  
NAS JRB Willow Grove  
Visit of Governor Edward G. Rendell and Staff  
1 August 2005**

**Prepared by  
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  
Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veterans Affairs and  
Regional Military Affairs Committee  
Suburban Horsham Willow Grove Chamber of Commerce**

**Executive Summary:**

This document is being submitted to supplement materials previously submitted to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC Commission) and staff and to provide new insights into several issues. We may submit additional documentation to staff of the Commission on or before August 10, 2005.


Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove (NAS JRB Willow Grove) consists of 1,100 acres of Department of Defense (DoD) properties (Navy and Air Force) located in Montgomery County, PA, with an 8,000 foot runway, and a digital Air Traffic Control Radar. United States Naval Reserve, United States Air Force Reserve, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, United States Marine Corps Reserve, and United States Army Reserve have had personnel, equipment, and units training and operating jointly on the facility since 1995. The US Coast Guard has used this facility as a staging area, and FEMA considers this facility as a critical asset. Joint operations, maintenance, and training are conducted at Willow Grove every day of the year. The DoD recommendation for closure of NAS JRB Willow Grove and associated deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing (Pennsylvania Air National Guard) and removal of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing (AFRES) substantially deviates from the established final selection criteria, and it is based on flawed analyses.

The preferred alternative for the future of NAS JRB Willow Grove is for the BRAC Commission to vote to reverse the DoD recommendation and maintain all the elements of jointness that make this installation so important. In any event, it is vital to maintain military flying operations at this key strategic location in the Mid-Atlantic region in close proximity to major centers of population and the National Capital region. We have developed several options (TAB B) for maintaining military flying operations at NAS JRB Willow Grove even in the absence of the Navy.

These options include:

- Operation and maintenance of air field by Air Force Reserve, Marine Reserves or Air National Guard under a host/tenant arrangement like those used successfully across America. One of the reserve component entities currently operating out of Willow Grove will be designated as host unit for the installation and others will be their tenants.

# Pennsylvania



## CURRENT

Locations: Harrisburg  
Pittsburgh AGS  
Pittsburgh ARS  
Willow Grove

## FORCE STRUCTURE

Aircraft changes:	Current	Future	BRAC
EC-130 (Harrisburg - ANG)	4	6	6
KC-135 (Pittsburgh - ANG)	16	16	16
C-130 (Pittsburgh - AFR)	8	8	0
C-130 (Willow Grove - AFR)	9	8	0
A-10 (Willow Grove - ANG)	15	15	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>22</b>

**JCSG / JAST Scenarios:**  
• Willow Grove DON-0084, NBP: A-10

**Issues/Closed Installations:**  
• Willow Grove Ceases Flying Operations  
• Pittsburgh ARS Closes

Color Scheme: Active / Guard / Reserve

## STATE IMPACT (Acft)

-31

## STATE IMPACT (Manpower)

Full Time

Drill

TOTAL

-840

-3413

# Willow Grove ARS (PA)

## Outgoing


- Willow Grove ARS (913th Airlift Wing) (AFRC) assigned C-130E aircraft (10 PAA) will retire
- Willow Grove AGS (111th Fighter Wing) (ANG) assigned A-10 aircraft will be distributed to:
  - 3 PAA to 124th Wing (ANG), Bolee Air Terminal AGS, ID
  - 3 PAA to 127th Wing (ANG), Selfridge ANGB, MI
  - 3 PAA to 175th Wing (ANG), Martin State AGS, MD
  - 6 PAA retire
- 270th Engineering Installation Squadron (ANG) will remain as an enclave
- AFRC ECS manpower will move to Eglin AFB, FL

Candidate Recommendation and cost/savings for Willow Grove was transferred to the Navy under DON-0084A.

## Manpower

Impact thru 2011	Full Time	Drill
	-521	-1966

## Spider Diagram



## JCSG / JAST Actions

- DON-0084A - Close NAS JRB Willow Grove
- 56 personnel



# TAB B

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## Maintaining Military Flying Operations at NAS JRB Willow Grove

**Statement of the Problem:** The DoD recommendations for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round included closure of Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Willow Grove, and the associated deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, PaANG, 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, AFRES, and movement of Navy and Marine reserve flying units. DoD failed to evaluate alternatives for maintaining military flying operations at Willow Grove in the absence of the Navy, which current operates the airfield. This failure led directly to the recommended deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> FW and the disbanding of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing.

**Suggestion Solution:** There exist time-tested, cost effective, realistic and viable options to maintain military flying operations at Willow Grove. The existence of these options justify a BRAC Commission decision to disapprove DoD recommendations for programmatic changes to flying units currently located at Willow Grove.

**Background:** Located in Montgomery County, close to Philadelphia, Willow Grove offers a key strategic location. It provides:

- FAA backup
- 8,000 foot runway
- Digital radar
- Access to sea lanes and proximity to key training ranges
- Close to major population centers
- Close to the National Capitol Region
- National Strategy for Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authorities
- Surge capability in the event of need.
- Proximity to civilian medical resources
- Future basing of EPA (Aspect) Aircraft

It would be a tragedy to abandon military flying operations at Willow Grove. Once these operations are abandoned, it will be essentially impossible to restore them.

Our best estimate is that the current cost of providing flying operations at Willow Grove is about **\$8 million per year**. This includes the cost of the fire department (\$3 million per year), lighting, maintenance, tower operations, etc. This \$8 million estimate is part of a larger BOS (Base Operation Support) budget (about \$21.5 million) for NAS JRB Willow Grove, which includes many items not directly related to operation of the airfield.

The Navy is currently undertaking a project (estimated cost \$3 million) to repair/upgrade the runway at Willow Grove. This work is scheduled proceed regardless of the status of the BRAC process. Thus Willow Grove offers an improved 8,000 foot runway, capable of handling any aircraft in the U.S. inventory, with modern up-to-date radar and associated facilities.

**Option One: Maintain Current Joint Status** – This is the preferred alternative. The Navy will continue to operate the base and maintain flying operations. Willow Grove will continue to be a joint center of excellence and joint missions will evolve and grow in the future. It is possible that the current arrangements could evolve into a Host/Tenant type operation with Navy maintaining overall base operations and other users sharing the costs.

**Option Two: Reserve Component Host/Tenant Maintenance of Flying Operations.**

Under this option, the Pennsylvania Air National Guard (111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing), the Air Force Reserve (913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing), or Army or Marine Reserve units would take over the responsibilities for maintaining flying operations from the Navy, who would depart from Willow Grove as proposed in the DoD recommendation. The airfield would be operated under a traditional host/tenant arrangement used across America. For example, the Pennsylvania Air National Guard could assume the responsibility of host and operating Willow Grove as an Air Guard Station, with the other components acting as tenants. It would be equally workable for one of the other RC entities remaining at Willow Grove to act as host with the ANG to be a tenant. In any event, this approach would work efficiently in a cost-effective manner.

We in Pennsylvania have a recent example of converting an installation to a National Guard-managed training site. The 1995 BRAC round closed the Army Garrison at Fort Indiantown Gap and converted the post into a National Guard training site. As documented in the GAO report under this TAB, the Army Audit Agency concluded that costs of operation declined by about \$11.8 million annually while overall training has increased by 7%. In many reserve component training categories, training has increased from 23% to 58% since the closure of the Army Garrison. What's more using available federal funds, the Fort Indiantown Gap training site has made substantial improvements to the infrastructure.

Placing the responsibility for operation of Willow Grove under a reserve component host with other units as tenants would mean that military flying operations could continue at this key strategic location. The following units are expected to operate at Willow Grove:

- 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard<sup>1</sup>
- 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve<sup>2</sup>
- Army Reserve Aviation
- Marine Reserve Aviation; MAG-49; HMM-772, HML-775<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Prior to the Navy's recommendations to cease flying operations at Willow Grove, the 111<sup>th</sup> FW has been identified for continued operation and assignment of additional primary aircraft (PAA) as part of preliminary future force discussions. If Willow Grove had been properly evaluated, the military value of the 111<sup>th</sup> would clearly have justified its continued operation. It was only the Navy's action to leave Willow Grove that led to the associated "deactivation" of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing was in line to upgrade to C-130J aircraft instead of disbanding. Again, it was the Navy's action, and not an objective evaluation of the military value of the 913<sup>th</sup>, that led to its recommended disappearance, with hardly a word of justification. Note that the airlift capabilities of the 913<sup>th</sup> provide a way ahead for many important future joint operations.

<sup>3</sup> Units slated for movement to McGuire AFB, NJ could (and probably would) stay at, or come to, Willow Grove if flying operations are maintained there. It would be cheaper for DoD to keep these units at Willow Grove than to spend \$65 million for military construction to accommodate their move to McGuire

- o Even Navy Reserve Aviation units may stay; VR-52, VR-64, VP-66, and 24 Naval Air Reserve units<sup>4</sup>

Maintaining these units at Willow Grove will provide many opportunities for joint training and joint operations.

**Option Three: Joint DoD Operation of Installation.** This option is a variation on Option Two. Instead of one of the units acting as host and the others as tenants, DoD would operate the base as a joint operation, perhaps with a contractor operating the base and the various users contributing the costs. The "base commander" could come from any using component and might rotate among them. Providing base services in this way is described in the Grant Thornton Study under TAB C. The costs and benefits of this option are estimated to be similar to those for Option Two.

**Option Four: Joint Military/Civilian Operation of Willow Grove.** This option would maintain military flying operations at Willow Grove as a partnership with a civilian (municipal or other) airport authority, which would operate the air field for both military and civilian (corporate jet port) use. The long-range potential to keep Willow Grove open as a corporate jet port has been recognized by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (see attached letter). There is a substantial demand for corporate aircraft basing in the Bucks-Montgomery County area of the Philadelphia suburbs, and this demand could be met by operating Willow Grove for both civilian and military aircraft.

This option would require some capital improvements to the Willow Grove airfield, including installation of an instrument landing system (ILS) or modern variant of such a system. FAA and other funds may be available to support this conversion. Most of the infrastructure for a successful corporate jet port is already in place at Willow Grove, and military/civilian joint use is a proven concept. In Pennsylvania alone, two military units are based at Pittsburgh International Airport (911<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing and 171<sup>st</sup> Air Refueling Wing), ARNG and Marine Reserve units are based at John Murtha Johnstown/Cambria Airport, and the 193<sup>rd</sup> Special Operations Wing (PaANG) is based at Harrisburg International Airport. HIA is a particularly telling example because it converted from a military installation (Olmstead Air Force Base) to a civilian airport operated by an airport authority with an Air National Guard flying unit as a tenant.

The military/civilian partnership offers the most attractive option in terms of long-term operating cost savings since part of the cost of the operating the installation would be borne by civilian corporate jet users. Although this option does require some capital investment, it would permit the continued operation of the military flying units at Willow Grove. All the same units that would operate out of the installation under a traditional host/tenant arrangement (Option Two) could continue to operate there in the future under a joint military/civilian operation.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3.

**The following table** illustrates a comparison of the costs of the four options for maintaining military flying operations at Willow Grove:

Option	Annual Operating Costs for DoD Entities	Additional Capital Improvements	Comments
Navy Operation	\$8 million		Maintain Status Quo. Build on jointness for the future.
ANG/other RC Host/Tenant	\$6.8 million		Costs allocated across DoD units
DoD Joint Operation	\$6.8 million		Costs allocated across DoD units
Joint Military/Civilian (Corporate Jet Port)	\$5.5 million	\$3 to \$5 million	ILS system installation and other capital improvements required. Costs allocated across DoD units



DVRPC

DELAWARE  
VALLEY  
REGIONAL  
PLANNING  
COMMISSION

C R E A T I N G &gt; T O M O R R O W &gt; T O D A Y

190 N. INDEPENDENCE MALL WEST  
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July 26, 2005


Mr. Edgar D. Ebenbach  
Chairman of the Board  
Co-Chair, Regional Military Affairs Committee  
Suburban Horsham Willow Grove Chamber of Commerce  
117 Park Avenue  
P.O. Box 100  
Willow Grove, PA 19090

Dear Mr. Ebenbach:

Please be advised that the Board of DVRPC at its June 23, 2005 meeting, adopted the revised Regional Aviation System Plan for the Delaware Valley to Year 2030. One component of this plan is the recommendation that Willow Grove NAS be used in the future to address civilian corporate aircraft demand in the Bucks-Montgomery County areas of the Philadelphia suburbs (see attached documentation).

DVRPC is the federally designated metropolitan organization of the nine county Philadelphia metropolitan area including Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania; and Mercer, Burlington, Camden and Gloucester counties in New Jersey. DVRPC is funded by USDOT, and specifically FAA with regard to aviation planning, to periodically produce and update long range plans for development of transportation modes in the region.

Very truly yours,

  
John J. Cascia  
Executive Director

Attachment

c: Secretary Alan Biehler, PENNDOT

JJC:rm:lym



June 2003

# MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

## Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves





Highlights of GAO-03-723, a report to the Secretary of Defense

## Why GAO Did This Study

While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1) specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.

## What GAO Recommends

As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense provide the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with data that clearly specify the (1) infrastructure needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the recommendations.

[www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-723](http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-723).

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Barry Holman at (202) 512-8412 or [holmanb@gao.gov](mailto:holmanb@gao.gov).

# MILITARY BASE CLOSURES


## Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves

### What GAO Found

The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave.

The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of \$6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs.

### Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds



Source: DOD.

# Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC)

Installation	BRAC recommendation	Utilization
Fort Hunter Liggett	Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the Army Test and Experimentation Center missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the reserve component.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve managed the base, assuming control of the property in December 1994 from the active Army.</li> <li>• In September 1997, the base became a sub-installation of the Army Reserve's Fort McCoy. The training man days have increased by about 55 percent since 1998.</li> </ul>
Fort Chaffee	Close Fort Chaffee except for minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for a reserve component training enclave for individual and annual training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training man days (75 percent) while the active component had 24 percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel.</li> <li>• In October 1997, base management transferred to the Arkansas National Guard. Overall training has decreased 51 percent with reserve component training being down 59 percent.</li> </ul>
Fort Pickett	Close Fort Pickett except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a reserve component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of the training man days (62 percent) while the active component had 37 percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel.</li> <li>• In October 1997, base management transferred to the Virginia National Guard. Overall training has increased by 6 percent.</li> </ul>
Fort Dix	Realign Fort Dix by replacing the active component garrison with an Army Reserve garrison. In addition, it provided for retention of minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as an enclave required for reserve component training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training man days (72 percent) while the active component had 8 percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel.</li> <li>• In October 1997, base management transferred to the Army Reserve. Overall training has increased 8 percent.</li> </ul>
Fort Indiantown Gap	Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential ranges, facilities and training areas as a reserve component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training man days (85 percent) while the active component had 3 percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel.</li> <li>• In October 1998, base management transferred to the Pennsylvania National Guard. Overall training has increased by about 7 percent.</li> </ul>

**Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC)**

<b>Installation</b>	<b>BRAC recommendation</b>	<b>Utilization</b>
Fort McClellan	Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a reserve component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base.</li> <li>• In May 1999, base management transferred to the Alabama National Guard. Overall training has increased 75 percent.</li> </ul>
Fort Devens	Close Fort Devens. Retain 4600 acres and those facilities necessary for reserve component training requirements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Army managed the base.</li> <li>• In March 1996, base management transferred to the Army Reserve as a sub-installation of Fort Dix.</li> </ul>
March Air Reserve Base	Realign March Air Force Base. The 445 <sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve, 452 <sup>nd</sup> Air Refueling Wing, 163 <sup>rd</sup> Reconnaissance Group, the Air Force Audit Agency and the Media Center will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1993, the active Air Force managed the base, with major activities being the 452<sup>nd</sup> Air Refueling Wing, 445th Airlift Wing and the 452<sup>nd</sup> Air Mobility Wing, 163<sup>rd</sup> Air Refueling Wing.</li> <li>• In April 1996, base management transferred to the Air Force Reserve with major activities being the 63rd Air Refueling Wing and the 144<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing as well as tenants such U.S. Customs.</li> </ul>
Grissom Air Reserve Base	Close Grissom Air Force Base and transfer assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air reserve components.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force managed the base with major activities being the 434th Air Refueling Wing and several Air Force Reserve units.</li> <li>• In 1994, base management transferred to the Air Force Reserve. Grissom Air Reserve Base houses the 434<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing as well as other tenants such as the Navy Reserve.</li> </ul>
Homestead Air Reserve Base	Realign Homestead Air Force Base. The 482d F-16 Fighter Wing and the 301 <sup>st</sup> Rescue Squadron and the North American Air Defense Alert activity will remain in a cantonment area.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force managed the base, with major activities being the 482<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Wing and the 301<sup>st</sup> Rescue Squadron.</li> <li>• In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew destroyed most of the base. After the base was rebuilt and management transferred to the Air Force Reserve, operations were reinstated with major activities being the 482<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Wing and the NORAD Air Defense Alert activity.</li> </ul>

Sources: 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.

# Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds

<b>BRAC Round</b>	<b>Bases With Enclaves</b>	<b>Acreage</b>
1988	Fort Douglas, Utah	50
	Fort Sheridan, Ill.	100
	Hamilton Army Airfield, Calif.	150
	Mather Air Force Base, Calif.	91
	Pease Air Force Base, N.H.	218
1991	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	138
	Fort Devens, Mass.	5,226
	Grissom Air Force Base, Ind.	1,380
1993	Sacramento Army Depot, Calif.	38
	Griffiss Air Force Base, N.Y.	39
	Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.	852
	March Air Force Base, Calif.	2,359
1995	Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio	168
	Camp Kilmer, N.J.	24
	Camp Pedricktown, N.J.	86
	Fitzsimmons Medical Center, Colo.	21
	Fort Chaffee, Ark.	64,272
	Fort Dix, N.J.	30,944
	Fort Hamilton, N.Y.	168
	Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif.	164,272
	Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.	17,227
	Fort McClellan, Ala.	22,531
	Fort Missoula, Mont.	16
Fort Pickett, Va.	42,273	
Fort Ritchie, Md.	19	
Fort Totten, N.Y.	36	
Oakland Army Base, Calif.	27	

Sources: 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.

# Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

19 JUN 2003

Mr. Barry W. Holman  
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Holman:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, GAO-03-723, "MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves," dated May 15, 2003 (GAO Code 350231).

An important element of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is the timely collection of complete and accurate data used by the Department and the BRAC Commission in the evaluation process. The GAO report provides two recommendations that would require DoD to provide the Commission with specific infrastructure requirements (e.g. acreage and total square footage of facilities), and estimated operation and maintenance costs for any Reserve component enclave proposed in BRAC 2005.

I recognize that in the past, Reserve components may have been required to obtain real property in "all or none/as-is" condition that resulted in higher than projected operation and maintenance costs. However, the Secretary of Defense in his November 2002 memorandum reemphasized efficient and effective basing strategies for BRAC 2005. It is certainly more efficient to capture real property requirements for Reserve components early in the BRAC process to the maximum extent practicable, and present that data to the Commission in the same level of detail as presented for the Active components.

It is imperative that the Reserve components receive early notification of potential realignments or closures to effect efficient planning of future Reserve enclaves. I agree that when establishing a Reserve enclave, it is important to recognize the "move-in" costs associated with assuming the responsibilities of becoming an installation host. In past BRAC rounds, the Reserve components' requirements were considered later in the process, which led to less effective use of Department resources.

I concur with the recommendations as stated, and will work to resolve the issues addressed within this report and ensure that the need for appropriate planning is recognized early in the BRAC process.

Sincerely,

T.F. Hall

Enclosure



**GAO DRAFT REPORT, GAO-03-723**  
**“MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Better Planning Needed for Future**  
**Reserve Enclaves,” (GAO Code 350231).**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS**  
**TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS**

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish provisions to ensure that the data provided to the base realignment and closure commission clearly specify the infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage of facilities) needed for any proposed reserve enclaves. (Page 20/Draft Report).

**DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.**

As the GAO stated in the report, “information provided to the commission should be as complete and accurate as possible”. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs recommends that Reserve component facilities information presented to the BRAC commission should be at the same level of detail as presented for the Active components.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish provisions to ensure that the data provided to the base realignment and closure commission clearly specify the estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves. (Page 21/Draft Report).

**DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.**

In some cases, the Reserve components may have been required to pick up real property in “as-is” condition resulting in higher than projected operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs recommends that Reserve component cost data presented to the BRAC commission capture as complete and accurately as possible projected O&M costs for future Reserve enclaves.

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# Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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## GAO Contact

Michael Kennedy (202) 512-8333

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## Acknowledgments

*In addition to the individual named above, Julie Chamberlain, Shawn Flowers, Richard Meeks, Maria-Alaina Rambus, James Reifsnyder, Donna Weiss, and Susan Woodward made key contributions to this report.*

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# TAB C

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## **Point Paper Jointness**

**Statement of the Problem:** Not only were there substantial evaluation errors related to the joint nature of NAS JRB Willow Grove (see TAB F), the DoD recommendations for this installation completely failed to recognize the joint opportunities that Willow Grove provides today and can provide in the future. This is a substantial deviation from the first military value criterion, which was supposed to have been given great weight in this BRAC round:

**1. Military Value. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.**

### **Issues:**

The DoD recommendations for NAS JRB Willow Grove deviate substantially from this criterion in several significant ways. First and foremost - Willow Grove is a joint installation today, and has been for ten years. It took ten years for Willow Grove to hone those joint skills until today, it is a superior example of joint operations and joint training as the following examples will illustrate:

- Day-to-day joint operations at Willow Grove mirror joint operations forward operating locations (such as Bagram in Afghanistan)
- A joint working group of all the services oversees joint operations
- The 111<sup>th</sup> FW trains and fights with the 28<sup>th</sup> Division of PA Army National Guard
- Units from all the services participate in Joint training including Intel operations, logistics support operations, warfighting training operations, including 24 annual joint training opportunities using nearby ranges at Fort Indiantown Gap

Day-to-day operations involve joint interactions. These joint operational activities involve more than mere co-location. What's more actual joint operations, and synergies will be significantly degraded by the recommended closure at Willow Grove. In fact, the recommendation to close NAS JRB Willow Grove and Willow Grove ARS, breaks significant joint support activities between the 28<sup>th</sup> Division, the 56<sup>th</sup> Stryker Brigade, and the current forces stationed at Willow Grove.

The Air Force recognized the importance of joint opportunities in its identification of the benefits of basing A-10 units in proximity to the Army units they train and fight beside. What's more, one of the Air Force BRAC principles states that squadrons should be located within operationally efficient proximity to DoD-scheduled airspace, ranges, MOAs and low level routes. NAS JRB Willow Grove and Willow Grove ARS offer all these advantages. It is located in close proximity to the air to ground range at Fort Indiantown Gap where the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing routinely and regularly participates in joint training with the Army units it supports.

The Air Force BRAC report (AF-22) states in its justification that Barksdale A-10 unit provides close air support to Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), one of the nations premier joint training opportunities. When asked by BRAC Commission about consideration of moving Navy east coast Master Jet Base to Moody AFB and subsequent move of Moody A-10's to Cannon AFB the DOD response was as follows:

**KEY POINT: Need for Battlefield Airmen Training works at Moody AFB**

"During the BRAC process, the Air Force identified an emerging need for a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus for the Expeditionary Combat Support(ECS) family of specialties such as Combat Rescue, Combat Control, Terminal Attack Control and Special Operations Weather. Moody was identified as a potential site for this purpose. Of all Air Force Bases, Moody had the right infrastructure/range complex and proximity to other areas such as the Gulf Range Complex at Eglin and Tyndall. The Air Force decided to leave the CSAR aircraft at Moody and place A-10 aircraft there also (Moody scored 8 points higher than Davis-Monthan for SOF/CSAR). Also, as a part of the BRAC process, the Army proposed the realignment of the Armor Center/School to Fort Benning, GA and the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin (to be in close proximity with the Air Force Special Operations Command). Therefore, the establishment of a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus at Moody can provide a center of excellence for airmen in expeditionary combat support fields and also provide Air Force and joint training opportunities within operational proximity of Moody AFB. A-10/CSAR aircraft collocated at Moody AFB will provide an east coast CSAR training efficiency similar to Davis-Monthan AFB. Moody AFB is rated 11 of 154 in the SOF/CSAR MCI and is also in the top ten of all installations in 4 of the other 7 MCIs. It remains one of the Air Force's most valuable installations.

Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity to the base, and for the A-10 aircraft, that is mandatory. Cannon AFB did not rank well within the SOF/CSAR MCI and therefore, the Air Force did not consider Cannon AFB to bed down the active duty A-10 mission."

From these statements of justification there are two top priorities to the bed down of A-10 aircraft.

1. Joint training opportunities at premier combat training centers such as JRTC and National Training Center (NTC). The joint training currently accomplished Ft Indiantown Gap(FIG) serves to enhance the 28th ID close air support training opportunities that they can take better advantage of opportunities at combat training centers. In fact training at FIG approaches that of JRTC and the 111FW A-10's are an integral and highly accessible element. We are currently in the process of forming an ASOS at FIG to support the 28th ID.

2. Training Battlefield Airmen consist of Special Operations Combat Controllers and Air Support Operation Squadron (ASOS) Air Liaison Officers(ALO) and Joint Terminal Attack controllers (JTAC). According to DOD comments and AF Chief of Staff's position this mission is a high priority and there is a need to train additional airmen to support Army Modularity. Over the past three years elements of every stateside ASOS and two overseas units have train at FIG. Many units have trained here multiple times as well as Combat Controllers making it the training site of choice for Battlefield Airmen. With this experience and the standing up of the ASOS we feel we are well suited to provide additional capacity for Battlefield Airmen Training in the future, again with the 111FW A-10's as an integral and accessible element.

Joint training and joint interaction need not be and should not be just an Army and Air Force effort. From all this, it is clear that NAS JRB Willow Grove should be maintained and enhanced as the joint center of excellence in existence today. The Navy should keep MAG 49 and subordinate unit HMH-772 in place at Willow Grove and consider relocate HMLA-775 from Johnstown, Pa to Willow Grove. These options were discussed according to minutes of Navy BRAC meetings. This would maintain an already working relationship and continue Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training at range airspace in close proximity.

Also discussed in Navy BRAC meeting was the Army National Guard establishing a presence at Willow Grove. The Pennsylvania Army Guard is in fact interested in relocating Brigade and Battalion headquarters as well as two infantry companies of the new Stryker brigade to Willow Grove. This enhances ongoing joint training with this transformational unit and will provide potential synergies with the Army Reserves. Maintaining the 913th AW at Willow Grove would also provide excellent joint training opportunities for the Stryker Brigade in the rapid deployment of this lighter more mobile Army formation.

Joint bases are not easy to establish and it would be wrong to throw away 10-years of experience in jointness in action at Willow Grove. The attached study on operation of joint bases illustrates some of the issues and opportunities related to jointness.

The success of these joint activities is illustrated by the many deployments that Willow Grove units have participated in:

- o 111<sup>th</sup> FW PA ANG A-10s deployed for OIF and OEF
- o VR-52 deployed for OIF and OEF
- o HMH-772 H-53s deployed to USS Nassau for OIF
- o MAG-40 deployed for OIF
- o 913<sup>th</sup> C-130s mobilized/deployed for OIF
- o MWSS 472 deployed to Iraq
- o VP P-3s squadrons deployed for Joint Drug Ops
- o VP-P-3s squadrons deployed for Kosovo Ops
- o RIA 16 supported ONE, OIF, and OEF

Despite the fact that Willow Grove is already a Joint Center of Excellence, the Department of the Navy, which made the effective recommendation to close Willow Grove, did not evaluate NAS JRB Willow Grove jointly and assign a joint military value. In fact, a joint analysis for NAS JRB Willow Grove as a total force structure is not provided and can not be found. Taking this point a step further, it is clear that the Willow Grove installation was, if anything, penalized for being joint in the military value evaluations of the separate services. No joint process procedures can be found that assigns joint military value to a facility. This is a serious and substantial deviation from the final selection criteria.

It's abundantly clear that the Air Force and the Navy each did its own separate evaluation without accurately evaluating or assigning proper military value to the total joint base. The services and several Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG) justify BRAC recommendations by creating or enhancing Joint Centers of Excellence (JCE) – however, there are no definitions or glossary references to what JCE is. Assumptions are made regarding joint military services, that they would understand and accept that DoD knows what a JCE is and would not merely collocate forces, personnel, and units under the guise of creating or enhancing JCE. In this case (NAS JRB Willow Grove including Willow Grove Air Reserve Station), has clear joint

operations, maintenance, training, and synergies which were deconstructed at an existing accepted joint facility to merely co-locate functions at non-joint facilities. Thus, current and future operational readiness of the total force for joint warfighting, training, and readiness is seriously degraded by the action to close NAS JRB Willow Grove (which includes Willow Grove ARS), a serious and substantial deviation from the BRAC Criterion.

CHALLENGE

# Installation Management

RESULTS OF A 2005 SURVEY



Grant Thornton 

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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**J**oint warfighting doctrine and efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of military base structure have combined to create a new approach to the structure and management of military installations. These are the military bases, stations, forts, and other facilities in the United States and overseas. The new approach includes joint basing, which means co-locating assets and units of different Military Services at the same base. In addition, the Military Services are experimenting with new models for delivering base services, including competitive sourcing and regionalization of some services. Regionalization also applies to new base governance structures being used in some of the Military Services.

Such change is an opportunity to develop a comprehensive approach to improving military installations, their services, and their ability to become a firm foundation for all other aspects of jointness. To explore the opportunity, in 2005 the American Society of Military Comptrollers (ASMC) sponsored and Grant Thornton LLP conducted a survey of defense officials. They identified the following key issues at the forefront of this opportunity:

★ **GOVERNANCE.** Who is going to be in charge of a base and what will be the responsibilities of hosts and tenants are major issues, according to respondents. Current governance models suggested by interviewees include the regional approaches now used by the Army and Navy and alternating base command among the organizations occupying an installation. Whatever model is used, roles must be clear.

★ **COMMON LEVELS OF SERVICE.** One of the barriers to joint basing is that the four Military Services “have inherently different standards for base-level services,” according to respondents. Common service standards will be needed to develop clear, acceptable installation service agreements (ISA) at joint bases.


★ **CULTURAL ISSUES.** The culture of each branch of the Military Service is manifested in the installations it controls, and must be taken into account when developing standards for base services. Many interviewees said that cost efficiency measures cannot jeopardize a branch’s culture.

★ **PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, COSTING, AND BUDGETING.** Clear standards for services are the starting point for effective installation management. With clear standards, bases can apply managerial cost accounting to develop accurate performance models for base services that can be used for performance budgeting and planning.

★ **ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF SERVICE DELIVERY.** For commercial-type services, competitive sourcing and privatization may help to reduce costs even when a service continues to be delivered by in-house personnel.

To make joint basing and regionalization work, base commanders, service managers, and comptrollers will need to enhance their skills in cost accounting and modeling, and improve financial information systems to support performance management.

Jointness, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), regionalization, and competitive sourcing all offer opportunities to develop a base environment that supports 21st century airmen, Marines, sailors, and soldiers. Survey respondents agree that now is the time to develop the policies and tools needed to make this happen.





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# ABOUT THE SURVEY

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Between January and March 2005, ASMC sponsored Grant Thornton's Global Public Sector group in surveying Department of Defense and Uniformed Services executives and installation-level financial managers on their opinions of recent trends in the management of military installations. Survey respondents were assured of anonymity in both the interview and the online portions of the survey. This insured the confidence and full cooperation of the participating officials.

## SCOPE

The survey focuses on issues related to the management of military installations in an era of jointness in military doctrine, base realignment and closure, and regionalization. The survey questions cover the services that installations provide to their tenants and how installations may be governed.


## METHODOLOGY

With the guidance of ASMC members, Grant Thornton developed a survey instrument with open-ended questions covering installation management, joint basing, regionalization of bases and base services, standards for base operating services, and related financial management issues. We asked experts in these fields to review the questionnaire and incorporated their comments into a final instrument. Grant Thornton professionals conducted the interviews with 20 top officials in installation management at the Departments of Defense, Air Force, Army and Navy, and the Marine Corps. In addition, we posted an online survey instrument at ASMC's Web site, which was a closed-ended questionnaire covering the same topics as the other survey, with an emphasis on installation- or garrison-level operations. There were 54 valid responses to the online survey, including short written comments useful for understanding the face-to-face survey. Together, the two surveys offer a broad, inclusive understanding of the challenges confronting service executives in transforming military strategy for installations into fiscal reality.



# INTRODUCTION

Within the continental United States (CONUS), the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, Defense, and the U.S. Marine Corps operate 192 installations that can be called major military bases, posts, forts, or stations.\* The Military Services and Department of Defense (DoD) and the Uniformed Services are starting to transform the structure of these installations. In this background section of the report, we will review the causes and nature of the changes they face.



**TOTAL: 192 LARGE TO MEDIUM MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES\***

\* Bases with a total plant replacement value of more than \$828 million. Source: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Department of Defense Base Structure Report, FY 2004 Baseline.

## CAUSES FOR CHANGES IN INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

Respondents to our survey identified three major causes for change: the doctrine of jointness, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program, and regionalization. The jointness doctrine focuses on warfighting, while BRAC and regionalization are business-oriented initiatives more concerned with saving money, efficiency, and better management.

### NEW DOCTRINE: JOINTNESS

Responding to the challenges of 21st century warfighting and peacekeeping, over the last decade, the architects of U.S. military doctrine developed a joint approach to going

to war. Under the doctrine, components of all four major military forces—Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines—have a shared operational capability to plan, train, and go to war. According to one respondent to this survey, this has given the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) “an increasing interest in installation infrastructure because, in their view, the way we fight is the way we train—and fighting in recent conflicts has been joint. Therefore, the COCOMs are strong advocates of joint basing, joint utilization of services and facilities, and joint training.”

Joint basing means co-locating units from the different Military Services at the same installation. On a small scale, joint basing has been a fact of life for decades, with many major bases having a few tenants from serv-

### TYPICAL MILITARY BASE OPERATING SERVICES (BOS OR BASOPS)

Military installations are responsible for providing the following types of services to tenant organizations and the installation as a whole.

- ★ **Operating forces support:** airfield, port, and other operations support; supply.
- ★ **Community support:** Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, child development, dining facilities, family support, family and bachelor housing.
- ★ **Base support:** utilities; facility services, management and investment; environmental compliance, conservation and pollution prevention; force protection, fire/emergency services and safety; governance, resource management, information technology services, and personnel services.



ices other than the one in command of the installation. The jointness doctrine, however, highlights the need to house and train personnel from the different services in facilities appropriate to their joint missions. We surmise from the results of this survey that widespread awareness of the full impact of jointness on military installations is slowly starting to emerge.

## REGIONALIZATION

Regionalization means developing a command hierarchy in which installation commanders report to regional headquarters that in turn report to a central installation command at the Military Service level. Examples of how two of the Military Services have recently started do this may be seen in the box to the right.

Also, regionalization means centralizing the control and sometimes production of certain base operating services and other support services. In the past, most installations tended to be self-contained units, providing most of their own services even though some bases were proximate or even adjacent to each other. Better communication capabilities and other advances make it possible to centralize some services, such as civil engineering planning and information systems services, thereby creating opportunities to use a single service provider for a region's installations.

## BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

On May 13, 2005, the DoD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission the shutting down of 33 out of 318 CONUS bases with a plant replacement value of \$100 million

### ARMY AND NAVY REGIONAL APPROACHES TO INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

**Army.** The Army takes a structured approach to regional installation management. In August 2002, the Army established a central Installation Management Agency (IMA) to "provide equitable, effective and efficient management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness and execution, enable the well-being of Soldiers, civilians and family members, improve infrastructure, and preserve the environment." IMA has nine regions that oversee the management of and funding for the bases in their areas. Army officers called Garrison Commanders manage daily BASOPS activities and report to the regions, but are accountable both to their regional headquarters and the senior mission commander on the installation.

**Navy.** Within the Navy, a Commander, Navy Installations (CNI), established in October 2003, manages bases and stations in ten CONUS regions and six regions outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). CNI and the regions provide policy, guidance, and resources for operating, community, and base support activities and oversee the execution of this support.

or more. Also, DoD proposed major realignments of 400 or more personnel at 29 bases, which means the installations stay open, but will gain or lose missions and units. If adopted, DoD's plans would create seven joint bases and change installation management functions from one Military Service to another at five bases. In addition, several joint functions in medical, intelligence, logistics, and administrative areas would be realigned to a single base.

This is the fifth round of a BRAC process established by Congress in 1988. By 1995, the first four rounds resulted in closing 97 major bases, 55 major realignments, and 235 minor actions. Simply maintaining and repairing the extra facilities would have been a significant drag on the defense budget, and the cost of modernizing them would have been prohibitive. Closing and realigning

these installations saved American taxpayers approximately \$18 billion through FY 2001 and a further \$7 billion per year since then.

However, in 2005, caution some survey respondents, extra space will be needed for wartime surges and to absorb the tens of thousands of OCONUS military personnel and dependents slated to return to domestic bases. Indeed, DoD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in announcing the 2005 BRAC proposal, indicated that the need for surge capacity and for housing returning units led to a reduction in the number of closures first considered.

**It is a mistake to think of jointness, BRAC, and regionalization as unrelated. They influence each other and together affect how the military will manage installations in the future.**

# JOINTNESS AND REGIONALIZATION

In the previous section, we reported that survey respondents saw three causes for changes in military installation management. In this section, they raise issues concerning two of the causes: jointness and regionalization.

## JOINTNESS

Survey respondents see both positive and negative aspects of joint basing, which is the policy of co-locating units from different Military Services that go to war together on the same military installation. The pros to joint basing revolve around enhancing the capabilities of warfighters. The cons concern the different cultures of Military Services, the levels of service offered to tenants, and

### THREE LEVELS OF JOINT BASING

According to one respondent, jointness has three levels that must be considered in installation management.

- 1. High-level or interservice jointness:** This includes joint operational capabilities, which means sharing facilities such as runways, training ranges, and bases in order to reduce the size of the existing base infrastructure.
- 2. Mid level:** At bases and facilities, jointness can mean hosts and tenants sharing costs for common levels of services.
- 3. Low level:** This includes consolidating contracts for common services so that each base has only one contract for a given function, such as cleaning and repairs, which all tenants pay for based on their usage.

the accountability of base commanders. Both believers and nonbelievers doubt the capability of existing financial practices and systems to fairly calculate the cost of the services an installation provides to tenants.

Several interviewees said that jointness would result in saving money, but felt that this was not the main reason to consider joint basing. Jointness is a warfighting strategy and is part of a natural adjustment to the changing nature of national defense. In that light, the management discussion of joint basing needs to focus not on “why” but on “how do we do it?” Even so, some proponents caution that, as one said, “marrying the capabilities and mission of joint forces who fight together and support each other makes sense, but jointness for its own sake will do no good.” Said another, “The key is to figure out how current and future needs and capabilities will fit into the structure of joint bases—decisions should be based on anticipated warfare capabilities.”

## CULTURAL ISSUES OF JOINT BASING

Several respondents had strong, visceral feelings about the effect on their culture of joint basing. For example, many felt that joint basing would, as one said, “dilute the culture and erode the esprit de corps” of their particular Military Service. Said another, “Each Service has a distinct culture of what it means to be part of that Service and they are not willing to compromise what makes them special and

unique.” Interviewees mentioned several aspects of culture on which the Services differ: discipline, levels of care and support given to dependents, and even the style of housing offered to uniformed personnel and their families. Such issues must be considered when developing plans for joint basing, along with the common levels of service discussed in the next section.

## GOVERNANCE

Going into combat, jointness on the battlefield still means there must be a single commanding officer and a clear chain of command. Every soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman understands the need for this leadership structure. To succeed, a joint base needs a governance structure that is equally strong and clear. However, according to one respondent, “Joint basing may break the chain that now goes from military installation commanders to major combat commanders. This reduces the control that major commanders have over military bases.”

Viewed from a tenant perspective, a key concern among respondents was the position of organizations that are not part of the same service as the host unit. Here, the issue is fairness: will these tenants receive the same level of service and consideration as those wearing the same uniform as the installation commanding officer? If there is insufficient funding, will units from some services be charged more or get short shrift? A related issue is recourse—what are the options for tenants from one service who

think a base commander from another is unfair to them? Must their complaint go all the way up one Military Service's chain of command and down another's before there is redress? Or are there governance models that offer better, faster routes to remedies?

Suggested solutions to the problem include rotating base command among the Services at an installation or creating a "purple suit" command structure through the Department of Defense. One respondent said that the DoD Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program offers a model for the rotating command approach. The JSF program management office (PMO) is staffed by personnel from the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. Command of the PMO rotates between Air Force and Navy officers. When an officer from one service is in command, he or she reports to the Service Acquisition Executive of the other service.

A purple suit model is somewhat like that used in civilian airports. Typically, airports

single Department-level organization. In the Army, this is the Installation Management Agency (IMA) and in the Navy it is the Commander, Naval Installations (CNI). For more information, see the box on page 5, "Army and Navy Regional Approaches to Installation Management." This model stresses operational efficiency but has not been tested in a true joint environment.

Another significant issue to the military is the number of general officers who play a dual role as base and combat commanders. Turning over the work of base management to a colonel trained and experienced in installation management would free these generals to focus on warfighting, said some interviewees. According to one, "Colonels are quite capable of running bases and stations, and many do so now." In every case, said an interviewee, "It is important installation management has defined roles and we know who is in charge and who is a follower."

Regarding the regionalization or consolidation of specific BASOPS, some respondents see great efficiencies and savings from having a single regional provider for services such as laundry, office supplies, planning, major procurement, and financial management. These efficiencies derive from economies of scale that cut unit costs through lower overhead and bulk purchases. According to one interviewee, "Some people like to say that there is no business case for regionalization, but that is not true—a business case has been made. With regionalization we need to look at things on a commodity-by-commodity basis. For each commodity, we need to determine if the solution is enterprise, regional or local."

However, said another interviewee, "The problem with regionalization is convincing people that they will continue to get service. We are asking them to go from having direct control over the resources to produce a service, to living on promises of delivery. This is a hard sell, particularly when people do not see the service provider on base. We found that distance from the service provider to the customer is a major factor in the reluctance to believe that service will not suffer. Establishing very small detachments of service personnel at the customer location helps avoid the perception of 'out of sight, out of mind.'"

While no interviewee disagreed about the need for joint basing and regionalization, many worry about how the two policies will affect the culture or ethos of their Military Service. The nexus of this concern is the level of performance for base services in a joint or regional environment. We address this in the next section.

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It is important installation management has defined roles and we know who is in charge and who is a follower."

—Survey Respondent

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have a single manager who is responsible for providing basic services to all airlines and other organizations that use the facility. However, the airport manager reports to another executive such as the chairperson of a municipal travel authority, not to any one airline. Purple suiting base leadership would give command of a base to a uniformed officer from any of the Military Services. However, the commander would report to a higher echelon officer or civilian working in a DoD agency, rather than to an organization within the commander's Military Service.

A third model for base governance already is in place in the Army and Navy. The two Military Departments have started to use a model in which a base commander reports to a regional installation management headquarters that in turn is directly accountable to a

## REGIONALIZATION

As noted in the previous section, regionalization means developing a command hierarchy in which base commanders report to regional headquarters that in turn report to a central installation command at the Military Department level. Also, regionalization means centralizing the control and sometimes delivery of certain BASOPS and other support services outside the perimeters of military installations.



# COMMON LEVELS OF SERVICE

Service standards are the levels of performance a service provider offers to users. For example, the standards for base housing include availability, size, amenities, condition, and location. For facility services, standards include the time between when a call for repair service is made and when the repair is finished. Standards for the same service can vary greatly, depending on what the user wants to pay, the funds available, and the importance of the service.

If joint basing and regionalization falter, according to many survey respondents, it will largely be because there is no process to reconcile differing expectations about the levels of performance of base service. According to some interviewees, the starting point for this problem will be that the Military Departments have not been able to agree on common levels of service.

managers who responded to our online survey. They say that often the service standards at their installations are unclear, uncommunicated, or unenforced. According to one, "Since the installation's level of service is hardly ever measured, we have few standards and little, if any, indication of performance."

In some cases, they said, charges for serv-

flexible, according to several respondents. Said one, "I don't believe a cookie-cutter approach would work. The outcome of the discussions about common levels of services could be that installations will set differing standards based on the unique needs of each base." Here again, the analogy of a civilian airport is useful. Most large and medium-sized civilian airports must meet national standards in areas such as safety and security. They may offer a basic level of service to all airlines and other tenant organizations, but will negotiate higher levels for individual tenants who have unique needs and who are willing to pay for better or different service.

Priorities are important when developing standards. This is especially true when some base services are considered "free" by tenants whose budgets are not charged for them (or charged the full cost). On the other hand, some units may lack the funding to pay in full for a particular service. One approach to solving the problem, said one interviewee, is to start the standard-setting process with some very basic questions. "First, you need to decide which services you consider to be essential; second, what level of performance is appropriate or affordable; and third, how it can best be performed. There are many options for delivering the service, either with military, civilian or contractor personnel, or a mix of all three."

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If joint basing and regionalization falter, it will largely be because there is no process to reconcile differing expectations about the levels of performance of base service.

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## COMMON STANDARDS CENTRAL TO SUCCESS

Nearly every respondent to this survey emphasized that the Uniformed Services "have inherently different standards for base-level services." Without common standards for joint basing, the military as a whole will find it difficult to develop installation service agreements (ISA) that are clear and acceptable to the different military branches. Lacking standards, tenants from different branches will be in constant conflict with base commanders over service quality.

Actually, that would not be much of a change from the present situation, according to installation-level financial

ices tend to be "whatever the base can get away with" instead of the level of service or the amount of resources a tenant budgets for it. In addition, poorly defined service levels frequently result in tenants being required to make some repairs themselves. One tenant echoed the common complaint that, "If we ever want it to happen, or happen at a level of service greater than the garrison's minimum, then we have to pay."

## DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR SERVICE

While the process for developing common levels of service may need to be standard, the levels themselves should be

## SERVICE STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT


Several interviewees pointed out that common standards for base services are the starting point for effective performance management and performance-based budgeting, and that “Cost and performance management is the foundation for building information on the efficient delivery of installation management services.” Older practices, such as calculating costs and budgets on historical expenditures, have tended to create “haves and have nots among bases. Rich installations stay rich while poor ones stay poor. There needs to be a way to model requirements.”

Performance management is particularly important because BASOPS and related services tend to operate on a level-of-effort, or level-of-funding basis, according to some respondents. This requires “a cost model with a graduated scale, that enables you to move service levels up or down to match available funding.” Said another, “The ultimate solution may be to develop a base services requirements model and have the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) mandate its use. OSD involvement in base services is not likely in the near future, but it will happen some day.”

According to respondents, other applications of this type of model are:

- ★ For justifying charges made to tenants
- ★ For performance budgeting
- ★ On a regional or national basis, for identifying cost and performance outliers—the best and worst performers for a particular service in terms of unit cost
- ★ Spotting best practitioners who can become regional providers of a service
- ★ Detecting potential targets for process improvement, outsourcing, or privatization
- ★ Determining the full cost of decisions, such as by “revealing that deferred maintenance in the short term will cost more over the long term.”

Serious, sustained effort is needed to obtain these benefits, said respondents.



“Cost and performance management is the foundation for building information on the efficient delivery of installation management services.” —Survey Respondent

According to one interviewee, “If we deploy common levels of service and cost management and ‘walk the talk,’ the future is bright and we can make a difference.” Cautioned another, “To the extent that cost and performance management initiatives are doable and real, they will help us to succeed. It must be something practical and workable, and not driven by management buzzwords.”

Respondents tied success in cost management to the need to become better managerial accountants, which will “allow you to know where money is spent, what services are delivered and to manage levels of service centrally.”

Activity-based costing and management (ABC or ABC/M) were the most frequently mentioned cost accounting approaches.

Respondents to our survey would worry less about joint basing and regionalization if they felt more assured of base operating services that met their standards or expectations of performance. An agreed-upon process or model used to arrive at common levels of service is thus a critical component of successful joint basing. Such models require sound cost accounting, and make performance management possible.

### BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

According to one respondent, “A new base commander is going to need two things: a good business office and a great comptroller.” Throughout this report, participants in our surveys stressed that much of the challenge of jointness and regionalization is financial. To achieve joint basing and ensure that BRAC aftereffects are positive, business and financial managers at all echelons need to sharpen their skills in cost and performance management, innovative ways of funding operations, and providing sound financial information to decision makers. Below, we show what survey respondents suggested for improving business and financial aspects of installation management.

<b>Accounting systems</b>	Accounting systems will need to become capable of calculating accurate charges to tenants for services.
<b>Charts of accounts</b>	The Military Services and Defense agencies have different ways of defining and rolling up cost elements. Jointness will require a common chart of accounts and methods of aggregating costs.
<b>Cost models</b>	Better cost and performance models will be needed to determine unit costs, to change service levels based on available funding, and identify cost-effective best practices.
<b>Managerial accounting</b>	To be effective at cost and performance management, installation comptrollers will need better managerial accounting.

# WHO WILL PROVIDE BASE SERVICES?

It is unrealistic to discuss installation management without looking at alternative providers of commercial-type services found on military bases. Joint basing, BRAC, and regionalization may not require changing service providers, but certainly the three initiatives offer the opportunity to examine alternative service delivery methods. In addition, President George W. Bush's initiative on competitive sourcing, spelled out in the President's Management Agenda, compels the review of how some services will be delivered. We queried survey participants about two types of private sector provider activities: competitive sourcing and privatization.

## COMPETITIVE SOURCING

Competitive sourcing means that potential providers of base services must engage in formal competitions for the privilege of doing the work. Often, the competition is between base functions that are operated by civilian employees, and private contractors who provide the same types of services. Interviewees had mixed views of the benefits and practices of these competitions. For example, one respondent said "We have made a lot of progress in competition and will continue down this road. Decreases in cost will enable us to do more. Key benefits include predictability, good management, good internal controls and business processes using high technology." Another said, "Competitions are driving efficiencies. They are helping because competition gets out inefficiencies."

The negative side of competition, said another, is that "Competitive sourcing can be a tremendously disruptive action. It drains resources away from and interferes with the conduct of business, and is an inefficient way to generate efficiencies." Another said, "Competitive sourcing creates constant churn. It is difficult to

implement broader initiatives when you are constantly churning, because things get put on hold until after doing competitive sourcing. This complicates how you would combine activities in a joint environment."

## PRIVATIZATION

In the United States and some other countries' military branches, the term privatization is mostly used to refer to arrangements related to buildings and utilities (power, water, and wastewater). A typical arrangement for housing privatization is for a company to capitalize, build, and maintain off-base housing, then lease it to the base. Interviewees in our survey did not find fault with the trend to privatize housing, because this generates needed capital, nor with privatized utilities, which are commodities. Several felt that privatization has resulted in better quality housing. The only complaint about privatization was that, during times of tight budgets, it favors private sector providers over on-base military providers. In the military, this is because major construction may need to follow a capital expenditure process (MILCON) that is vulnerable to budget cuts, while privatization may only require a base to use its operations budget.

## COMPETITION AND FLEXIBILITY IN USING RESOURCES

During the survey, we heard from some base-level managers that competitive sourcing changes the perception of the nature of the funding used to pay for a service. This can have serious implications, especially because of the strains that the Global War on Terrorism is placing on the federal budget. The problem, said one respondent, is that "If a contractor wins a competition it becomes a 'must pay' bill. If the in-house work force wins they are still viewed as a discretionary bill." As well, said several interviewees, it is relatively easy to cut the budget of government service providers, but doing the same is more difficult when the provider has a contract which specifies level of effort, payment terms, and other factors. Some said that this is particularly unfair to the government winners of competitive sourcing.

Responding to these complaints, one interviewee said, "First off, their model and perception is wrong. All services are discretionary; it is just a matter of what mechanism we use to create a change. If it is a contract we can recompetee it, we can cancel it, we can build savings algorithms into the basic agreement, and so on."



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“It was benign neglect to a great extent that got us into the condition where our in-house work force is not as efficient as it could be, and we cannot allow that to happen again.”

—Survey Respondent

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## COMPETITION WITH OTHER MILITARY DEMANDS

All survey respondents agreed that military installation services always compete against operational requirements, with warfighting at the top of the priority list. Some respondents likened the BASOPS budget to a bank that the operations commands borrow from throughout the year, but then fail to repay.

Being on a wartime footing has not helped any. According to an interviewee, “The Iraq War has diverted lots of facilities’ repair and maintenance funds to the support of the war effort while DoD waits for supplemental funding. Yet, when Congress passes the supplemental appropriation it is usually late in the year and a certain

percentage of the new money typically cannot be obligated in time to meet the year-end deadline. The result is that the funds flow to other accounts such as the Currency Adjustment Account.”

Whether base service and support funds are siphoned off or are simply never sufficient, respondents to both the in-person and online surveys say that installations need to improve the efficiency and productivity of BASOPS and other services. This challenge falls squarely on management’s shoulders. As one interviewee said, “It was benign neglect to a great extent that got us into the condition where our in-house work force is not as efficient as it could be, and we cannot allow that to happen again.”



# FUTURE CONCERNS

Military installations are undergoing the early stages of a major transformation brought about by a military strategy of joint operations and basing, by regionalization of services and command structure, and by competitive sourcing. Several survey respondents think it wise for the military to consider the following potential issues when planning future realignment and consolidation.

**Returning personnel.** U.S. military forces are drawing down their presence in some regions of the world, such as Western Europe and South Korea. However, the overall demand for warriors has increased. Military personnel and their dependents will need to find space among existing domestic bases—an argument for caution in reducing what now seems to be excess capacity.

**Initial funding after moves.** “Installations that are winners in the BRAC process or that otherwise absorb units and personnel from other bases are probably going to be losers in terms of operating costs,” said an interviewee. According to several respondents, this is because funds accompanying the new tenants may not be sufficient for

the services they require. Forced to divide the same amount of resources among more tenants, base commanders may have to lower service standards for everyone. To prevent this, said another respondent, “DoD needs to avoid instituting jointness on a pay-as-you-go basis, which would insure that organizations with different expectations would find themselves either frustrated in obtaining services or short-changed in paying for them. There needs to be sufficient time allowed to provide adequate funding both to new hosts and to tenants thru the POM and budget process so that both sides have the funding needed to pay the bills.”

## CONCLUSION

Today and over the next few years, DoD and the Military Services have opportunities to create a military installation system

that fully supports the jointness doctrine, while at the same time achieving efficiencies in how bases deliver services. The opportunities include the following:

- ★ Developing a base governance structure that reflects jointness doctrine
- ★ Establishing a sound, acceptable system for setting common levels for standards of base services
- ★ Using the standards, along with performance measures and cost accounting information, to create performance models for base services which can be used for performance budgeting and planning
- ★ Applying competitive sourcing to identify the most cost-effective way to deliver base services.

In summary, the quality and appropriateness of base facilities and services can be a hurdle on the way to combat, or a high-performance launch pad for the world's greatest warfighters and peacekeepers.



## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

If you would like more copies of this survey or an opportunity to hear more about its content and about the challenge of installation management, please contact ASMC or Grant Thornton at the addresses below. We will be pleased to discuss providing your organization with a briefing or to present survey results at a conference or seminar.

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


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# TAB D

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## **Point Paper Future Joint Opportunities**

**Statement of the Problem:** Willow Grove offers many opportunities joint missions that were simply overlooked or not evaluated as part of the DoD recommendation to close this installation. (See also TAB C) These oversights are a substantial deviation from final criterion number 1:

- 1. Military Value. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.**

### **Issues:**

Because of its proximity to training ranges where joint training occurs today, Willow Grove offers the potential for substantial expansion of joint training opportunities in the future. As described in more detail under TAB C, one of these opportunities relates to the new battlefield airmen training effort. The joint training currently accomplished Ft Indiantown Gap (FIG) will serve to enhance the 28th ID close air support training opportunities that they can take better advantage of opportunities at combat training centers. In fact training at FIG approaches that of JRTC and the 111FW A-10's are an integral and highly accessible element. We are currently in the process of forming an ASOS at FIG to support the 28th ID.

Training Battlefield Airmen consist of Special Operations Combat Controllers and Air Support Operation Squadron (ASOS) Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and Joint Terminal Attack controllers (JTAC). According to DOD comments and AF Chief of Staff's position this mission is a high priority and there is a need to train additional airmen to support Army Modularity. Over the past three years elements of every stateside ASOS and two overseas units have train at FIG. Many units have trained here multiple times as well as Combat Controllers making it the training site of choice for Battlefield Airmen. With this experience and the standing up of the ASOS we feel we are well suited to provide additional capacity for Battlefield Airmen Training in the future, again with the 111FW A-10's as an integral and accessible element.

Joint training in the future will not be and should not be just an Army and Air Force effort. The MV-22 (Osprey) is planned replacement for CH-53 flown by the HMH-772. The joint training with A-10 for CSAR mission, airlift potential for National Guard Civil Support Team and proximity to Boeing Plant creates synergies valuable to the National Defense Strategy. CV-22 version to be flown in the future by AF Special Operations creates additional possibilities for efficient joint operations at Willow Grove. Certainly there is tremendous potential for the Joint Strike Fighter to operated same efficient manner at Willow Grove in the future

Other future joint opportunities include:

- Possible relocation HMLA-775 from Johnstown, Pa to Willow Grove. These Marine Reserve Super Cobras will provide enhanced joint training opportunities. This would maintain an already working relationship and continue Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) training at range airspace in close proximity.

- Stryker Brigade Use of Willow Grove and expanded training. The Pennsylvania Army National Guard is the host to the only reserve component Stryker Brigade in the Army. The PAARNG is in fact interested in relocating Brigade and Battalion headquarters as well as two infantry companies of the new Stryker brigade to Willow Grove. This enhances ongoing joint training with this transformational unit and will provide potential synergies with the Army Reserves. Maintaining the 913th AW at Willow Grove would also provide excellent joint training opportunities for the Stryker Brigade in the rapid deployment of this lighter, more mobile Army unit.
  
- As Congressman Weldon pointed out at the Regional Hearing on July 7 (Uncertified Transcript, Page 94), the EPA has expressed an interest in basing one of its ASPECT flying laboratories at Willow Grove. This aircraft and its mission relate directly and substantially to homeland security concerns. ASPECT provides an emergency response sensor package to provide homeland security forces with information on possible chemical releases. It is a partnership between the Environmental Protection Agency and the DoD to respond to chemical incidents from a safe distance. Willow Grove is a natural location for basing the ASPECT mission, as long as flying operations are maintained there. (See attached fact sheet).



## Region 7

Iowa  
Kansas  
Missouri  
Nebraska


## Fact Sheet

November 2003

### ASPECT: EPA's Flying Laboratory

#### INTRODUCTION

A partnership between EPA and the U.S. Department of Defense has led to development of equipment mounted in a small aircraft that can obtain detailed chemical information from a safe distance. The equipment – Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology (ASPECT) – is an emergency response sensor package operated by EPA. It provides first responders – emergency workers on scene -- with information on possible chemical releases. ASPECT has been used by seven of the 10 EPA regions for



25 separate response actions. They include monitoring the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, numerous fires, the Columbia shuttle recovery, and – most recently – the California wildfires.

#### HOW IT WORKS

ASPECT consist of sensors mounted in an AeroCommander 680 twin-engine

aircraft. It can detect chemicals and several different radiological materials. ASPECT is also capable of collecting high-resolution digital photography and video and can take thermal and night images by using instruments that track differences in heat below the airplane.

It is equipped with a Global Positioning System and uses navigation data to match photographic and infrared information with physical locations. This allowed EPA staff members to find and electronically tag the location of debris as small as one square foot during recovery of the Columbia shuttle wreckage.

Quick delivery of chemical data to first responders is an important requirement of an emergency response. All information ASPECT collects can be sent to a ground unit using a wireless system.

ASPECT can also be used for non-emergency projects, including aerial photography, thermal imaging and radiation surveys. Activation of the system can be coordinated through the program manager.

The aircraft and sensor systems are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for emergency response. Any EPA on-scene coordinator can activate ASPECT. A phone call gets the system into the air in less than an hour.


ASPECT is a time and cost-effective response tool. It is based out of EPA Region 7's office in Kansas City, Kan., and can deploy to any part of the continental United States in less than nine hours.



# T A B L E

Aug 1, 2005

## ***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## **Point Paper**

### **Misuse of the BRAC Process**

**Statement of the Problem:** DoD's recommendations for units at NAS JRB Willow Grove include several that represent a clear misuse of the BRAC process. These include deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard without the consent of the Governor of Pennsylvania, disbanding of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing for programmatic reasons and disestablishment of VP-66 for programmatic reasons.

**Issues:**

It is not the purpose of this point paper to reargue the issues raised in litigation filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Rendell et al. v. Rumsfeld, Civ. Act. No. 05-3563 (2005)). This action was filed on July 11, 2005 and challenges the DoD recommendation to "deactivate" the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, without the consent of the Governor. Pennsylvania believes it will prevail on the merits of this litigation if the court reaches these issues. Regardless of the judicial disposition of these matters, it is our position that the BRAC Commission can and must take a stand on the DoD's misuse of the BRAC process.

On July 14, 2005, the Commission's Deputy General Counsel issued a well-reasoned and thoroughly researched memorandum outlining the misuse of the Base Closure Act and the BRAC process. Mr. Cowhig pointed out the DoD/Air Force recommendations involved:

- the creation of a statutory requirement to base certain aircraft in specific locations;
- the use of the Base Closure Act to effect changes that do not require the authority of the Act;
- the use of the Base Closure Act to effect changes in how a unit is equipped or organized;
- the use of the Base Closure Act to relocate, withdraw, disband or change the organization of an Air National Guard unit;
- the use of the Base Closure Act to retire aircraft whose retirement has been barred by statute, and;
- the use of the Base Closure Act to transfer aircraft from a unit of the Air Guard of one state or territory to that of another.

Several of the problems addressed in this Memorandum are involved in the proposed actions for NAS JRB Willow Grove:

DoD never sought and never received the consent Governor Rendell the proposed activation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing. The Cowhig memorandum correctly analyzed the Commission's responsibility in this case, even in the absence of any litigation:

Withdrawing, disbanding, or changing the organization of the Air National Guard units as recommended by the Air Force would be an undertaking unrelated to the purpose of the Base Closure Act. It would require the Commission to alter core defense policies.

Where the practical result of an Air Force recommendation would be to withdraw, disband, or change the organization of an Air National Guard unit, **the Commission may not approve such a recommendation** without the consent of the governor concerned and, where the unit is an organization of the National Guard whose members have received compensation from the United States as members of the National Guard, of the President. (Emphasis added.)

What's more, the proposed deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing misuses the Base Closure Act in other ways. It moves aircraft from an ANG unit in one state (Pennsylvania) to units in other states. It would result in statutory requirements to base aircraft in particular locations. It makes changes that do not require the authority of the Base Closure Act. The proposed deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> is based on force structure, programmatic decisions, and the Navy's own justification for the action admits this:

This recommendation enables Air Force Future Total Force transformation by consolidating the A-10 fleet at installations of higher military value. (BRAC Report, DoN, page 22).

The Adjutants General Association of the United States and the National Guard Association of the United States have recently (July 22, 2005) taken a clear stand on this issue. Programmatic, force structure changes to the Air National Guard proposed as part of the Air Force's future total force transformation should be considered under existing planning processes. These processes should involve input from the states, in ways that the DoD BRAC recommendations failed to do. This collaborative, cooperative process has worked in the past and can work in this instance. On July 25, 2005, AGAUS wrote to Chairman Principi and stated:


The Adjutants General believe the proposed recommended actions are beyond the scope of the Base Closure Act, and it would therefore be improper for the BRAC Commission to include these actions in its recommendations to the President and to the Congress. There are well established processes for dealing with these operational decisions – processes that have stood the test of time and have been followed for decades to the mutual advantage of the federal government and those of the states and territories.

Although the Cowhig memorandum focused on legal issues related to the National Guard, its principles extend much beyond the Air National Guard. At Willow Grove, it is clear that the Air Force and the Navy used the BRAC process to force programmatic changes that go beyond those required for installation decisions. The disbanding of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, with hardly a word of justification, and the movement of the ECS component associated with the wing to Eglin AFB, FL represents a clear misuse of the BRAC process. Like the changes to the 111<sup>th</sup>, this appears to have been based on the faulty assumption that there were no options to maintain flying operations at Willow Grove if the Navy leaves the installation.

The Navy also misused the process with the proposed disestablishment of VP-66. This is clearly a force structure programmatic action that appears to have been used to justify other decisions.

Finally, the DoD's recommendations to close Willow Grove depends on the retirement of KC-135E aircraft based at McGuire AFB, NJ. (BRAC Report, DoN, page 22) states that "the capacity created by the Air Force force structure retirement of KC-135Es (16 primary aircraft authorized) from McGuire Air Force Base enables the execution of this recommendation." The problem is that the retirement of these aircraft is barred by Congressional action. As the Cowhig Memorandum pointed out, it is improper to use the Base Closure Act to retire aircraft where Congress has barred such retirement.

The BRAC process has been described as creating an elaborate spider web where a break in one area has impacts on another. In this case, the recommended closure of NAS JRB Willow Grove is not "enabled" by new capacity created at McGuire, and therefore it should be disapproved.



# TAB F

Aug 1, 2005

## ***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



Point Paper  
Military Value Evaluation Errors

**Statement of Problem:** The DoD recommendation to close Willow Grove and the associated deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard and disbanding of the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve, is based substantial deviations and a lack of transparency in the evaluation process. The DoD recommendations are based on **assumptions** and not a clear analysis because a complete analysis was not done.

All installations were to have been evaluated on a fair and equal basis. Military value was to have been the primary consideration, and installations were not to have been evaluated based solely on the missions they perform today. DoD's evaluation process as applied to Willow Grove was fundamentally flawed.

**Navy Evaluation:** It is clear that the Navy's decision to close Willow Grove drove all the other recommended actions. The Navy's evaluation of the military value of Willow Grove, in comparison to the other two Joint Reserve Bases (Fort Worth, which was arrayed just one place above Willow Grove, and New Orleans) appears to have been based on subjective military judgment rather than accurate military value scoring. Examples:

- NAS JRB Willow Grove was analyzed jointly only with Joint Cross-Service Group -- Education and Training Group (Specialized Skill Training Subgroup) – but was compared only by Navy activity – not by entire base. NAS Willow Grove was the only Reserve activity consider by this subgroup – but, Navy did not consider – all services at the JRB.
- New DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support requirements for VP, VR, HMHH, and Reserve units or manpower were not considered. The strategy calls for Reserve assets and Reserve manpower which will be equipped, trained, and ready to assume maritime strategy and meet emerging requirements for US Northern Command.
- VP Patrol Reserve assets are needed and required to meet the requirements as articulated in new DoD Strategy, as well as – Patrol, Reconnaissance, and Drug Interdiction missions.
- VR Airlift Reserve assets are needed and required to meet the requirements as articulated in new strategy
  - ❖ A master C-130 base for USNR and USMCR assets was not considered
- A master C-130 facility for **all services** – including USMCR (attached to MAG-49) was not considered.
- Existing, trained, and available Reserve manpower is needed to meet US NORTHCOM National Maritime Strategy.
- VP Reserve and VR Reserve, as well as USMCR Reserve forces were not considered as surge, mobilization assets due to unsubstantiated Active Reserve Integration plan.
- NAS JRB Willow Grove has experience in mobilization of all Reserve and Guard forces. McGuire does not have experience in Joint mobilization for forces.
- Willow Grove Joint Reserve Base is an experienced surge contingency operational facility.



- Navy has submitted paperwork to disestablish (decommission) VP-66; which is 100% manned, ready, and able to conduct any AC operations at 1/3 of the cost.
- Navy did not properly account for expenditures for closing. Cost of Air Force/Marine Corps moves underestimated.
- Neither the Navy nor the Air Force nor DOD evaluated alternatives for continuing flying operations at Willow Grove in the absence of the Navy.

**Lack of Joint Evaluation:** The lack of joint data indicates a failure to evaluate the entire base and assign a military value based on the joint operation of the base. In fact, it's possible to conclude from the way the process worked at Willow Grove, that DoD doesn't know how to evaluate a truly joint facility, and has not developed the metrics or methodology to support such an analysis. Each service did its analysis separately and stopped, and then assumed that the other services were departing. It appears that, due to these faulty assumptions, each service ceased consideration of alternatives. Making an assumption is not the same as doing an analysis!

There is credible and strong indication that NAS JRB Willow Grove was never properly evaluated or considered as an installation in its entirety by either the Navy or the Air Force. This circular logic, derived from AF and Navy minutes is dated as shown:

- 7 December 04: DoN 0069 – AF indicates this action impacted by another services action list (DoN 0069). DoN 0069 data have not been reviewed. It is unknown if this action is predecessor to Willow Grove closure scenario (DoN 0084) or action considering the retention of Willow Grove by the Navy.
- 10 February 05: Part of the justification for the Navy's departure was based on the "Army and Air Force assets were scheduled to move out of NAS JRB Willow Grove". AF subsequently (after this date) justified its departure to enable the Navy's action.
- 3 March 05: Air Reserve unit relocations justified by Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) – the senior deliberative AF body – because it "enables DoN 0084." These minutes appear to be a clear statement that Air Force played a supportive role for the unanalyzed Navy action, and not a partnering role that would have been appropriate before taking apart a Joint Base and true Joint Center of Excellence.
- These records of minutes and justifications strongly suggest that each service was using the other as the reason to depart and neither felt comfortable enough with the action to claim responsibility based on military value arguments.
- 7 April 05: Air Force sent "cost to enclave Air Reserve Components (ARC) at McGuire for inclusion into DoN 0084. Cost in DoN 0084 of this is may be reflected in DoN 0084 – neither minutes nor other data released by DoD provides insight to understand how the costs and savings estimated to support the ARC at McGuire were developed or used.
- All available documents indicate that Navy analyzed its side of the installation, and the Air Force studied how/where to move units based on assumption that field would be closed.



**Cost Analysis:** The Navy's COBRA analysis is flawed. The bulk of the savings (\$178 million) is in personnel costs, but most of these savings are illusory since there is no reduction in military end strength. These costs are just moved, not saved. The Government Accountability Office's July 1, 2005 report confirmed that this error was pervasive in the DoD recommendations. Personnel positions associated with force structure are eliminated at the losing installation, but not 'bought back' at the gaining site. This is an incorrect action. For example The Navy's 486 personnel eliminated (538 from DoN 0084 adjusted by the Excursion add back) by the Navy recommendation can not all be taken as "savings" unless their functions are assumed by personnel at McGuire AFB. Navy personnel moving to McGuire are not facility support. The 20-year savings would be further reduced and payback period extended.

DoD estimates that substantial MILCON (about \$66 million) will be required at McGuire AFB if USNR and USMCR moved there from Willow Grove, and these estimates are probably too low. In addition, there are substantial deviations in that:

- o Cost of Reserve units and manpower are 1/3 the cost of active units
- o Cost of replacement of Navy VP reserve experience has not been estimated or counted; nor has the consideration for future reserve requirements
- o Savings to deactivate Active VP units and maintaining Reserve VP units was not analyzed.
- o Savings to Realign Active Requirements under Reserve-Active units was not considered
- o Procurement of replacement of P-3 is not scheduled until 2012, until that time, Reserve manpower and units are needed to address the emerging threats, fighting the GWOT, continuing the Drug Interdiction, and to engage the HLD requirements for Navy.

As previously pointed out, the Navy's COBRA analysis has an error in that it eliminates (and takes credit for cost savings for) 52 more personnel in each year from 2007 through 2011 than actually are assigned. By adjusting the personnel to reflect those actually assigned and eligible to be moved from NAS Willow Grove (Navy only), there is significant reduction in the personnel savings and 20-year, implementation period and annual savings in 2012 and beyond.

No complete COBRA analysis was published for the Willow Grove Air Reserve Station. Both the Navy and the Air Force applied active force constructs to reserve component units. Reserve component personnel cannot simply be reassigned or ordered to other units. In fact a survey<sup>1</sup> conducted by the 111<sup>th</sup> ANG personnel showed that on average 75% to 85% of them would not move to a new Reserve unit. Instead, many aircrew, mechanics, and support personnel with combat experience and extremely expensive training will be lost. The DOD recommendations fail to capture the costs of retraining or replacing these experienced personnel. This violates BRAC Final Criterion #4, which relates to costs of operations and manpower considerations.

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<sup>1</sup> ANG Brief to BRAC Commission dated 7/5



**913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing (AF Reserve):** The 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing's briefing to Commission Chairman Anthony Principi on July 5 pointed out several errors in the Military Compatibility Indices (MCI), which the Air Force used as a purportedly "objective" basis for showing military value. The 913<sup>th</sup> pointed out that it has never been identified in any DoD documentation as a unit recommended for closure. It just appears to "disappear" with hardly a word of justification.

The COBRA data provided by the Navy did not include any evaluation of the Willow Grove ARS, except – supposedly – for moving costs. There is no explanation of how the expeditionary combat support function (ECS) from the 913<sup>th</sup> is to move to Eglin AFB or what happens to other unit personnel.

The Air Force's MCI analysis has errors as applied to the 913<sup>th</sup>. The parking calculation does not accurately reflect the actual capacity at Willow Grove. In what is certainly a classic example of a "Catch-22," the 913<sup>th</sup> was downgraded because of lack of fuel hydrants, but fuel hydrants are not required (or really authorized) for airlift units of this kind. The 913<sup>th</sup> lost points because of proximity to training routes, but such training routes are not required for C-130 training.

The overarching errors in approach in the Air Force MCIs have unfairly penalized the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing as well as other units at Willow Grove. The MCI questions disadvantaged reserve units and joint installations and benefited large active duty installations.

**111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing (ANG):** The 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing has completed a detailed evaluation of the MCI applied to it. This evaluation is attached. When a corrected MCI for SOF/CSAR is applied to Willow Grove, it comes out at the top of the list of ANG A-10 units. Even with the flawed analysis, the military value of the 111<sup>th</sup> is ranked ahead of at least one unit that is retained, thereby undermining the improper programmatic rationale for deactivating the 111<sup>th</sup>.



**Executive Summary for corrected Mission Compatible Indices (MCI) data under the SOF/CSAR Category**

Attached is the list of questions used to determine Mission Compatible Indices (MCI) value for the SOF/CSAR MCI ratings. The attachments include our comments (111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing) indicating possible errors in the calculation process and adjustments to scores.

In general, the scoring system favors the typical active duty base. For that purpose, our main comparison will be between the Air National Guard bases in the SOF/CSAR category flying the A-10. Note: The surviving Reserve A-10 units are all located on Active Duty bases.

**The DoD published MCI scoring for the 6 current A-10 ANG bases are:**

(Selfridge is included for reference)

	Willow Grove	Boise	Baltimore	Barnes	Bradley	Kellogg	Selfridge
MCI	37.70	41.32	39.45	35.50	35.28	30.54	42.08
RANK	3	1	2	4	5	6	

There are numerous errors in the data collection process that may apply to some or all of the units. Some specific errors made on the Willow Grove calculations were due to the fact that there is no process to determine scores for the type of Joint base from which we operate.

The "OBVIOUS ERRORS" we see were made in Ramp Area and Serviceability, Installation Pavement Quality, and Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment. Simply correcting those two oversights the MCI scoring becomes:

**Corrected MCI scoring based on above information:**

	Willow Grove	Boise	Baltimore	Barnes	Bradley	Kellogg	Selfridge
MCI	43.84	41.32	39.45	35.50	35.28	30.54	42.08
RANK	1	2	3	4	5	6	

The next set of errors are a little less quantifiable but significant. These errors appear to have been made because alternative options were never considered (i.e. redistribution of land between the services and private sectors). These errors were in Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth and Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth. With this Correction:

**Further refinement of the MCI score based on these issues:**

	Willow Grove	Boise	Baltimore	Barnes	Bradley	Kellogg	Selfridge
MCI	45.69	41.32	39.45	35.50	35.28	30.54	42.08
RANK	1	2	3	4	5	6	

The final set of errors that we have found in our research appear to be either procedural errors or collection error. First was in Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions. The next, and most significant, errors were in Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM) and Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission.

**Final rankings incorporating all data corrections:**

(Ranking includes all A-10 Bases – Active, Guard, and Reserve)

	Will	Boi	Balt	Barn	Brad	Kell	Self	Moody	DM	Whit	Bark
MCI	53.2	41.3	39.4	35.5	35.2	30.5	42.0	60.72	52.46	50.9	49.8
RANK	2	2	5	0	8	4	8	1	3	2	5

The following pages contain the details of this summary and are broken down by each question of the SOF/CSAR category.



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## Command Summary A-10s

Base	MDS	Total PAI	Total Existing Parking Spaces/Unused	Estimate Cost to Robust to 24 PAI (\$M)	Estimated Cost to add 1 Increment (\$M)	Estimated Cost to add 2nd Increment (\$M)	Total Cost to add 2 Increments (\$M)	R c t
Baltimore, MD	A-10	15	33 / 18	0.0	21.5	4.5	26.0	Y
Barnes, MA	A-10	15	24 / 9	0.0	28.8	1.7	30.5	M
Boise, ID	A-10	15	30 / 15	0.0	27.7	11.3	39.0	M
Bradley, CT	A-10	15	36 / 21	0.0	13.6	14.2	27.8	M
W.K. Kellogg, MI	A-10	15	39 / 24	0.0	29.4	2.2	31.6	Y
Willow Grove, PA	A-10	15	33 / 18	0.0				

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## Willow Grove, PA Estimated Costs

Template used	A-10
Robust to 24 PAI	
Showstopper	None
Major Construction	0.0
Minor Construction	0.0
Other procurement	0.0
Subtotal	0.0
Add One Increment (6 PAI)	30
Showstopper	Real Prop*
Require additional Navy property to expand	

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Note additional Navy property to extend equates to a showstopper. The purpose of joint use fields is to overcome this mindset, which we at Willow Grove know we can work with the Navy to accommodate the needs of the DoD.

In addition the statement is in error, without Navy parking we can handle 24 A-10s plus one increment of 6 for a total of 30. Currently the ANG ramp is striped to park 26 A-10s and the Reserve ramp is striped to park 16 C-130s.

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	9.00
Title	Runway Dimension and Serviceability
Criterion	Condition of Infrastructure
Attribute	Key Mission Infrastructure
Formula	<p>Check the dimension of all serviceable runways that support the installation.</p> <p>Calculate a score for each runway at the installation as follows:</p> <p>If the runway is not serviceable, get 0 points. See OSD Question 9, column 15 for this data. (N/A means no.)</p> <p>Otherwise, if the runway is &lt; 150' wide, get 0 points. See OSD Question 9, column 8 for this data. (N/A means no.)</p> <p>Otherwise, if the runway is &lt; 8,000' long, get 0 points. See OSD Question 9, column 7 for this data. (N/A means 0.)</p> <p>Otherwise, if the runway is &gt;= 10,000' long, get 100 points.</p> <p>Otherwise, pro-rate the runway length from 8,000' to 10,000' on a 50 to 100 scale to get the points.</p> <p>The overall score is the highest score received by any one runway.</p> <p>Example:</p> <p>An installation has two runways, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha is 12,000' long, 160' wide, and full of huge holes because it has partially been demolished, so it is not serviceable. Bravo is 9,000' long and 152' wide, plus it is fully serviceable. Runway Alpha scores 0 points because it isn't serviceable. Runway Bravo meets all the specified criteria so it gets some points. 9,000' is halfway between 8,000' and 10,000', so Runway Bravo gets 75 points. Runway Bravo has the highest score for any runway at the installation, so its score of 75 is used for the installation's score.</p>

Source	FLIP, AFCEA, Pavement Evaluation/Condition Report/Survey; Existing Record Drawings or Physical Verification; Base Real Property Records
Formula Score	50.00 This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	2.00 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	1.40 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	1.40 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Supporting Data

Section	Question	Field
1 Air/Space Operations	9 .	Runways
1 Air/Space Operations	9 .7	Length
1 Air/Space Operations	9 .8	Width
1 Air/Space Operations	9 .15	Serviceable (5)

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	1.4	0.7	2.8	0.34	0	0	0.7

Comments: None

Formula	Title
2130C	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance
	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces
	Growth Potential
	Formula

Check the attainment designation categories of the installation's MAAS (National Ambient Air Quality Standard) for the following applicable criteria: Attainment, Nonattainment, Nonattainment (Deferred), Maintenance, and Unclassified. Identify the amount of the SIP emissions budget for non-attainment and maintenance criteria pollutants, if any, allocated to the installation.

Use the following formula to compute the score:

Multiply the Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA by the Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance "B" for the base score. Add the SIP Score to the base score. If the base score is now over 100, reduce it to 100.

SIP Score

Sum the installation SIP Growth Allowance (Tons/Year) for the following pollutants: 001, VOC, and DOC. Next:

See OSD question 221, column 3 for the installation SIP Growth Allowance (Tons/Year). See OSD Question 221, column 1 for the constraint.

If the total is > 0, then SIP Score = 20, otherwise it is 0.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA and "B":

Perform the following calculation for each of the specified criteria pollutants and pick the lowest value from them all:

The criteria pollutants are: 002, PM10, 004, SO2, 006, CO, 007, 03 (km<sup>3</sup>). See OSD Question 213, column 1 for this data.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance MinA:

If the MAAS Designation is Attainment, Unclassified, Nonattainment (Deferred), Unclassified/Attainment (EAC), or N/A, get 100. See OSD Question 213, column 2 for this data.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Designation is Maintenance, get 77.778.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Classification is Marginal, Support 1, Moderate, Primary, or Secondary, get 66.667. See OSD Question 213, column 3 for this data.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Classification is Serious, get 43.5.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Classification is Severe, Severe-15, or Severe-17, get 25.714.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Classification is Extreme, get 7.

Otherwise, get 0.

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance "B":

If the MAAS Designation is Attainment, Unclassified, Nonattainment (Deferred), Unclassified/Attainment (EAC), Nonattainment (Deferred) (EAC), or N/A, get 1. See OSD Question 213, column 2 for this data.

Otherwise, if the MAAS Designation is Maintenance, get 9.

Formula 213.00

Title

Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance

Formula	60.00	This is the unweighted formula's score for the base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for the formula is applied.
Max Points	1.00	This is the maximum number of points the formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	1.01	This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	0.67	The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Source

Code 13: Current Edition of 40 CFR 61.0 or Federal Register or Federal Register Citation to EPA's status' DOD#221; State Implementation Plan

Final rule approving the areas "maintenance plan" and "redesignation" of the area to attainment

The installation SIP Growth Allowance (Tons/Year) for D01, VOC is 0, for D02, NOx is 1. As the total of these two values is = 0, the SIP Score = 20, which needs to be added to the base score of 20.5712, for a new base score of 40.5712. This is less than 100, so it does not need to be reduced to 100, which makes the final score = 40.5712

20.5712 \* .8, which equals 20.5712, is the lowest value, so it becomes the base score.

The NAAQS Designation for D02, PM10 is Maintenance and the NAAQS Classification is N/A, which means 77.778 \* .9.

The NAAQS Designation for D04, SO2 is Maintenance and the NAAQS Classification is N/A, which means 77.778 \* .9.

The NAAQS Designation for D04, SO2 is Maintenance and the NAAQS Classification is N/A, which means 77.778 \* .9.

The NAAQS Designation for D05, CO is Nonattainment and the NAAQS Classification is Severe, which means 25.714 \* .6.

The NAAQS Designation for D07, O3 (8hr) is Maintenance and the NAAQS Classification is N/A, which means 77.778 \* .9.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Serious, get .6.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Severe, Severe-15, or Severe-17, get .7.

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Extreme, get 1.

Otherwise, get 0.

Example:

Otherwise, if the NAAQS Classification is Marginal, Suspect, Moderate, Primary, or Secondary, get .3. See OSD Question 213, column 3 for this data.

Comments: NONE

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.91	0.0	0.67	0.67

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
1.85	1.82	1.93	1.90	1.87	1.47	1.94	

Comments: No alternative options were considered. If the Navy were to depart how many buildable acres would be available to the ARS and ANG?

If we were to make this a commercial field with an AF and Army joint use field how many acres would be available.  
 Currently the ANG and AFRES occupy only 170 acres of the 1100 acre installation.

As a conservative estimate with redistribution of land between private sectors and surviving services, we should receive a score of 50% or 0.98.

MCI: SOF / CSAR

1205 1B	Formula	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth
	Criterion	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces
	Attribute	Growth Potential
	Formula	Identify the number of "buildable," unconstrained, development acres available for industrial operations.
		Sum the number of buildable acres at the installation. See OSD Question 1205, column 3 for the data. (N/A means 0.)
		If the number of acres is >= 150, get 100 points. If < 5 acres, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the number of acres between 5 and 150 on a 0 to 100 point scale.
		Example: There are three separate tracts of land that are suitable, comprised of 10, 22.5, and 45 acres respectively, for a total of 77.5 acres. 72.5 is halfway between 5 and 150 acres, so the score is 50.
	Source	AFI 32-7062, AICUZ Study Base Comprehensive Plan component plans such as Cultural Resource Management Plans, Natural Resource Management Plans and special studies, Base comprehensive plan maps
	Formula	This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
	Score	5.52
	Max Points	1.96
	Points	0.11
	Earned Points	0.11
	Lost Points	1.85
		The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.
Supporting Data		
Section 4 CE Programming	1205 3	Installation - Unconstrained Development Acreage
Section 4 CE Programming	1205 3	Total Unconstrained, Buildable Industrial Operations





Formula :214.00

Formula	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge
Title	
Criterion	Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces
Attribute	Mobility/Surge
Formula	Check the installation's sustained jet fuel dispensing rate capability.

Sum the JPS and JPS figures for jet fuel dispensing. See OSD Question 1214, column 4, for both JPS and JPS. (N/A equals 0.)  
 If the sum is >= 2,500,000 gallons, get 100 points. If the sum is < 2,500,000 gallons, get 0 points.  
 Otherwise, pro-rate the sum of gallons between 0 and 2,500,000 on a 0 to 100 point scale.  
 Example  
 JPS can handle 500,000 gallons. JPS can handle 750,000 gallons, for a total of 1,250,000 gallons  
 1,250,000 is halfway between 0 and 2,500,000 gallons, for a score of 50.

Base Support Plan as required by AFI 10-404, Attachment 20

Source	8 00	This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equates the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied
Formula	1.76	This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Max Points	0.14	This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base
Earned Points	1.02	The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.
Lost Points		

Supporting Data		
Section	Question Field	
1	Air/Space Operations	Runways
1	Air/Space Operations	Length
1	Air/Space Operations	Width
1	Air/Space Operations	Serviceable (5)
15	Fuel	POL - Maximum Dispensing Rate
15	Fuel	Jet Fuel Dispensing Rate
15	Fuel	Sustained Jet Fuel Dispensing Rate

SELF	0.54
BTC	1.42
BOI	1.4
BDL	1.6
MTN	1.53
BAF	1.7
NXX	1.62
PTS LOST	1.62

Comments: There is no requirement for a fighter unit or even a tactical airlift squadron to have such a capability. Since no requirement exists no effort is made to install such equipment to satisfy this category.  
 A more appropriate question may be, if funding were provided, could/does the installation have the capability to install such equipment.

1232.00

Formula	
Title	Surface Exploves-sted Parking
Condition	Condition of Infrastructure
Attribute	Key Mission Infrastructure
Formula	

List: the number of exploves-sted parking spots by MDS (Mission Design Series).  
 If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.  
 Total: the number of exploves-sted parking spots. See OSD Question 1232, column 2 for this data.  
 (N/A equals 0.)  
 If the total >= 10, get 100 points.  
 Otherwise, if the total >= 8, get 33 points.  
 Otherwise, get 0 points.  
 Example:  
 The installation has two kingns for exploves-sted parking spots, with 5 and 4 respectively, which totals to 9.  
 9 is between 8 and 10, so the score is 33 points.

Source	AFMAN 91-201, Exploves Safety Standards: Installation Exploves See Plan
Formula	This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	224 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	224 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	0.00 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Supporting Data	
Section	Question, Field
1	Air/Space Operations Runways
1	Air/Space Operations Length
1	Air/Space Operations Width
1	Air/Space Operations Serviceable (5)
30	Safety Munitions - Live Load Area
30	Safety Number of Shed Parking Spots

Comments: None

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	1233.00																						
Title	Sufficient Munitions Storage																						
Criterion	Condition of Infrastructure																						
Attribute	Key Mission Infrastructure																						
Formula	<p>List: maximum explosive capacity for the installation's hazard classification Class 1.1 munitions storage areas, in pounds. Maximum assumes one AC-130 squadron of 12 PAA and minimum of 8 PAA and 3 PAA HH-80 (HH-80 storage requirement absorbed by AC-130 capacity with no lost capability).</p> <p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.</p> <p>Otherwise, total the capacity. See OSD question 1233, column 1 for this data. (N/A means 0.)</p> <p>If the total &gt;= 564480, get 100 points.          Otherwise, if the total &gt;= 370380, get 75 points.          Otherwise, get 0 points.</p> <p>Example</p> <p>There are two storage areas, with a capacity of 200,000 each, for a total of 400,000. 400,000 is between 370,380 and 564,660, so the score is 75 points.</p>																						
Source	AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards: Installation Explosives Site Plan.																						
Formula Score	0.00	This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.																					
Max Points	2.80	This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.																					
Earned Points	0.00	This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.																					
Lost Points	2.80	The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.																					
<p><b>Supporting Data</b></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Question</th> <th>Field</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1 Air/Space Operations</td> <td>0</td> <td>Runways</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Air/Space Operations</td> <td>0.7</td> <td>Length</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Air/Space Operations</td> <td>0.8</td> <td>Width</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Air/Space Operations</td> <td>0.15</td> <td>Serviceable (5)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>36 Safety</td> <td>1233</td> <td>Munitions - Explosive Capacity w/o Waivers</td> </tr> <tr> <td>36 Safety</td> <td>1233.1</td> <td>Hazard Class 1.1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Section	Question	Field	1 Air/Space Operations	0	Runways	1 Air/Space Operations	0.7	Length	1 Air/Space Operations	0.8	Width	1 Air/Space Operations	0.15	Serviceable (5)	36 Safety	1233	Munitions - Explosive Capacity w/o Waivers	36 Safety	1233.1	Hazard Class 1.1
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1 Air/Space Operations	0.15	Serviceable (5)																					
36 Safety	1233	Munitions - Explosive Capacity w/o Waivers																					
36 Safety	1233.1	Hazard Class 1.1																					

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8

Comments: Storage of 1.1 munitions is most important to support combat deployments. No SOF/CSAR unit currently conducts combat operations from their home base. To expend 1.1 munitions, the storage of such is only half of the equation. If the goal were to determine which installations could train with 1.1 munitions (delivered off A/C), range availability must be factored in.

More appropriate question would be to determine which units can store enough 1.1 munitions to deploy to their combat location. This would include (for A-10s for example) storage of Aim-9s and 30mm HEI.

Willow Grove has been in the process of procuring funding for a joint munitions area for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This project was funded but put on hold after the BRAC list was published. This storage facility will be able to store enough Aim-9s and 30mm HEI to support combat deployments leaving CONUS.

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1235.00
Title	Installation Pavements Quality
Criterion	Condition of Infrastructure
Attribute	Key Mission Infrastructure
Formula	Identify if the installation pavement for the primary runway can support SOF / CSAR aircraft operations.  If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.  Compute the runway pavement suitability score and the apron pavement suitability score. Each of these is worth 50% of the overall score.  Runway Pavement Suitability:  Find the highest PCN among all the runways. See OSD Question 1235, column 3 for this data. (N/A means 0.) Compute a score for every runway with that PCN and use the highest scoring runway.  Score the runway for runway pavement suitability as follows:  If the PCN is N/A or 0, get 0 points. Otherwise, if the C-5B ACN divided by the PCN = 0, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1235, column 6 for the C-5B ACN. (N/A means 0.) Otherwise, if the C-5B ACN divided by the PCN <= 1.0, then get 100 points. Otherwise, if the C-5B ACN divided by the PCN <= 1.1, then get 75 points. Otherwise, get 0 points.  Apron pavement suitability:  Score each apron for pavement quality and choose the highest scoring apron.  Get the C-5B ACN. See OSD Question 1240, column 8 for this data. (N/A means 0.) If the PCN is 0 or N/A, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1239, column 4 for this data. Otherwise, sum the apron pavement square yardage (see OSD Question 1239, column 2) where the C-5B ACN divided by the PCN > 0 and <= 1.0.  If the C-5B square yardage >= 240,000, get 100 points. Otherwise, if the C-5B square yardage >= 120,000, get 50 points. Otherwise, if the C-5B square yardage >= 60,000, get 25 points. Otherwise, get 0 points.  Example:  There are 2 runways on the base, but one has the highest runway pavement PCN value, which is 60. The ACN for a C-5B on that runway is 40. 40 divided by 60 is <= 1.0, so the base gets 100 pts for runway pavement suitability.  There are 2 apron pavements on the base. Apron Alpha has a PCN of 50 and 100,000 square yards of surface. Apron Bravo has a PCN of 30 and 150,000 square yards. The ACN for C-5Bs on both aprons is 45.  Apron Alpha's ACN/PCN ratio for C-5Bs is 45/50, which is less than 1.0. This counts as 100,000 square yards for the C-5B. Apron Bravo's ACN/PCN ratio for C-5Bs is 45/30, which is more than 1.0, so it's square yards aren't counted towards C-5B square yardage. This gives us a total of 100,000 C-5B square yards, which is between the 60,000 and 120,000 C-5B square yards needed for a score of 25 points.  50% of the Runway pavement suitability score of 100 equals 50. 50% of the apron pavement score of 25 equals 12.5. 50 plus 12.5 equals a score of 62.5

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1235.00	
Title	Installation Pavements Quality	
Source	AFCESA Pavement Evaluation Report and Base General Plan, Existing Record Drawings or Physical Verification; Base Real Property Records, FLIP; ASSR	
Formula Score	50.00	This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	4 67	This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	2.33	This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	2.33	The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

**Supporting Data**

Section	Question	Field
1	Air/Space Operations	0 Runways
1	Air/Space Operations	9.7 Length
1	Air/Space Operations	9.8 Width
1	Air/Space Operations	9.16 Serviceable (5)
37	Airfield Pavements	1235 Airfield Pavements - Runway (1 of 2)
37	Airfield Pavements	1235.3 Controlling Feature PCN
37	Airfield Pavements	1236 Airfield Pavements - Runway (2 of 2)
37	Airfield Pavements	1236.6 ACN for C-5B at 840 Kips
37	Airfield Pavements	1239 Airfield Pavements - Aprons (1 of 2)
37	Airfield Pavements	1239.2 Total Size of Primary Facility (2)
37	Airfield Pavements	1239.4 Predominant Feature PCN (4)
37	Airfield Pavements	1240 Airfield Pavements - Aprons (2 of 2)
37	Airfield Pavements	1240.8 ACN for C-5B at 840 Kips

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	2.33	1.17	3.5	1.17	0.58	0.58	2.33

Scored in error:

Runway

Highest P.C.N (OSD Question 1235 column 3) = 50

C-5B A.C.N (OSD Question 1236 column 6) = 45

45/50 <= 1.0 therefore we receive 100 points

Apron

Once again did not include Navy ramp. The Navy has 280,000 SY of unaccounted for ramp space (unaccounted for in OSD question 1239)

**Accordingly, we should receive maximum points.**



**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1242.00
Title	ATC Restrictions to Operations
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Operating Environment
Formula	<p>List the percentage of installation departures delayed by Air Traffic Control.</p> <p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.</p> <p>Check the Delayed Departures Percentage. See OSD question 1242, column 5 for this data.</p> <p>If the percentage delayed = 0, get 100 points.          Otherwise, if the percentage delayed is &gt;= 3%, get 0 points.          Otherwise, pro-rate the percentage delayed between 0 to 3% on a 100 to 0 point scale.</p> <p>Example:</p> <p>The departure percentage delayed is 1%. 1% is one third of the way between 0 and 3%, so the score is 66.67 points.</p>
Source	CAMS (Computerized Aircraft Maintenance System)/ G081
Formula Score	100.00 This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	4.14 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	4.14 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	0.00 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points

Supporting Data		
Section	Question.Field	
1 Air/Space Operations	0 .	Runways
1 Air/Space Operations	0 . 7	Length
1 Air/Space Operations	0 . 8	Width
1 Air/Space Operations	0 . 15	Serviceable (5)
39 Airfield Management	1242 .	Air Operations - Departure Delays
39 Airfield Management	1242 . 5	Percentage Delayed for ATC

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Comments: None.

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1243.00
Title	Airfield Elevation
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Geo-locational Factors
Formula	<p>Check the installation's airfield elevation.</p> <p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.</p> <p>If the elevation &lt;= 0', get 100 points. See OSD Question 1243, column 1.                  Otherwise, if the elevation is &gt;= 2800', get 0 points.                  Otherwise, pro-rate the elevation between 0' and 2800' on a 100 to 0 scale.</p> <p>Example:</p> <p>The elevation is 2100'. 2100' is 75% of the way between 0' and 2800', so the score is 25%.</p>
Source	IFR Supplement
Formula Score	87.07 This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	3.08 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	3.20 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base
Lost Points	0.48 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Supporting Data		
Section	Question	Field
1	Air/Space Operations	0 . Runways
1	Air/Space Operations	0 . 7 Length
1	Air/Space Operations	0 . 8 Width
1	Air/Space Operations	0 . 15 Serviceable (5)
39	Airfield Management	1243 . Air Operations - Airfield Elevation
39	Airfield Management	1243 . 1 Answer

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	0.48	0.36	0.03	0.23	3.68	1.25	0.76

Comments: None

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	124E.00
Title	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Geo-locational Factors
Formula	<p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, usable runway then score 0 pts.</p> <p>All airspace over 200 Nautical Miles (NM) away will be ignored. See OSD # 1245, column 2. (N/A means more than 200 NM.) Data in OSD #s 1266, 1245 and 1274 must be matched via column 1 in each question.</p> <p>Calculate each of the subcategories scores listed below, and weight as listed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20% Airspace Volume (AV)</li> <li>15% Operating Hours (OH)</li> <li>15% Scoreable Range (SR)</li> <li>15% Air to Ground Weapons Delivery (AGWD)</li> <li>5% Live Ordnance (LO)</li> <li>10% Electronic Combat (EC)</li> <li>10% Laser Use Authorized (LU)</li> <li>5% Flare Authorized (FA)</li> <li>5% Chaff Authorized (CA)</li> </ul> <p>Each of the subcategories use the following general pattern for calculating them:</p> <p>Check the corresponding subcategory in formula #1266. If it would get 0 points for that subcategory, get 0 points here also.</p> <p>Otherwise, compute a raw total for the subcategory for the base according to this formula:</p> <p>For each airspace:</p> <p>If the distance to the airspace is &gt; 200 miles, get 0 points.</p> <p>Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 200 miles, get 10 points.</p> <p>Otherwise, if the distance to the airspace = 10 miles, get 100 points.</p> <p>Otherwise, pro-rate the distance to the airspace from 10 miles to 200 miles on a 100 to 10 point scale.</p> <p>Once you have a base raw subcategory total, find the highest, and the lowest, non-zero raw total for the subcategory across all bases.</p> <p>If the raw total = 0, that subcategory score = 0.</p> <p>Else, if the raw total = the highest raw total, the subcategory score = 100.</p> <p>Else, if the raw total = the lowest, non-zero raw total, the subcategory score = 10.</p> <p>Else, pro-rate the raw total between the lowest non-zero raw total and the highest raw total on a 10 to 100 scale.</p> <p>Once each score for each subcategory is known, multiply them by their respective weighting percentage and total the results for the overall score. The overall mechanism is very similar to that of formula #1266.</p>
Source	FLIP AP-1A, IFR Supp, Falcon View or other certified flight planning software
Formula Score	34.16 This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	14.72 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	5.03 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	9.69 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	124E.00
Title	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)
Supporting Data	
Section	Question.Field
1 Air/Space Operations	9 . Runways
1 Air/Space Operations	9 7 Length
1 Air/Space Operations	8 8 Width
1 Air/Space Operations	9 . 15 Serviceable (5)
1 Air/Space Operations	1245 . Airspace - Distance to Airspace
1 Air/Space Operations	1245 1 Airspace/Route Designator
1 Air/Space Operations	1245 . 2 Distance to Airspace/Route
2 Army Operations	1274 Airspace Attributes - Ranges (2 of 2)
2 Army Operations	1274 . 2 Airspace Volume: at least 2,100NM cubed; altitude block >=20,000'
2 Army Operations	1274 3 Flare
2 Army Operations	1274 4 Chaff
2 Army Operations	1274 5 Live Ordnance
27 Ranges	1266 . Airspace Attributes - Ranges (1 of 2)
27 Ranges	1266 3 Scoreable range complexes/target array
27 Ranges	1266 4 Air to Ground Weapons Delivery
27 Ranges	1266 6 IMC weapons release
27 Ranges	1266 7 Electronic Combat
27 Ranges	1266 9 Laser Use Authorized

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	9.69	12	7.92	11.93	11.29	12.08	12.22

Multiple errors in this question. Biggest error that affects our installation grade is that R5002 was not properly categorized.

R5002 was improperly rated as:

- Non Scoreable Range
- Non Air to Ground Weapons Delivery
- Non Laser use Authorized
- Hours of Operation 12 (should be NOTAM)

This is our closest range (42NM). Since it is our closest range, we are most penalized by these omissions. I believe our range score would be significantly higher if correct data was used.

R5802 was improperly rated:

Significant increase in airspace was activated prior to BRAC decision but not considered. This range is only 69NM from Willow Grove, again, due to significance of this range we feel we were penalized. Hours of Operation were only rated at 12. This should be by NOTAM. As with R5002, the schedulers of all users have a biannual meeting to discuss range times and availability. The range may only operate an average of 12 hours per day; however, they adjust their schedule according to the user's wishes. In effect, the range operates by NOTAM.

Duke MOA improperly rated:

Duke MOA shows that it is open only 5 hours per day. The MOA is opened by NOTAM and should reflect such.

The three ranges above are mentioned because they are Willow Groves most used ranges. There are many more errors that affected the MCI score of Willow Grove (both positive and negative). The entire range scoring system is too complicated to be corrected and too full of errors to be of use.

In neither the categories of Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM) and Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission are there any criteria for joint training opportunities, yet the Air Force made deliberate decisions on the closure list for these opportunities.

Willow Grove has the unique and fortunate access to two Class A ranges within a 20 minute flight. One range is in southern New Jersey, one is in central Pennsylvania, one of the two usually affords us weather requirements to complete a mission. BOTH PROVIDE US WITH ROBUST JOINT TRAINING OPPORTUNITES. Willow Grove is in the BEST location of all East Coast fighter units in terms of Range Space.

**Our proximity to ranges is better than Baltimore's who lost only 7.92 points, to level the errors we should gain a minimum of 1.77 points.**

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula 1248.00

Title	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Geo-locational Factors
Formula	

Check the distance to all Airspace for Special Use (IR/VR routes) within 50 Nautical Mile (NM) radius of the installation.

If installation has no runway or active runway, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

For a list of routes, see OSD Question 1246. The type of route can be found in column 1, Entry point distances are found in column 2, Exit point distances are found in column 3. For distances, N/A means 0 points.

IR Entry points, IR Exit points, VR Entry points and VR Exit points are each worth 25% of the score

$$(.25 * IR\ Entry) + (.25 * IR\ Exit) + (.25 * VR\ Entry) + (.25 * VR\ Exit)$$

Entry and Exit Point:

Within each of the above four categories, award each route points as follows:

If the distance = N/A, get 0 points.

Otherwise, if the distance is <= 10 Nautical Miles (NM), get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the distance is > 10 NM and <= 50 NM, get 10 points.

Otherwise, if the distance is > 50 NM on a 100 to 100 point scale.

Total the number of points received above for each base for each of the above four categories.

Get the highest base score in each of the above four categories.

If the installation's score for one of the above categories = 0, it remains 0.

Otherwise, if the installation's score for one of the above categories = the highest score in its respective category, get 100 points.

Otherwise, if the installation's score for one of the above categories = the lowest non-zero score in its respective category, get 10 points.

Otherwise, if the installation's score between the lowest non-zero and highest score in its respective category on a 10 to 100 point scale.

Example

Two IR routes and 1 VR route.

IR Route Alpha has an entry point 5 miles away and an exit point 30 miles away.

IR Route Bravo has an entry point 50 miles away and an exit point 80 miles away.

Alpha's entry point is within 5 miles, so its IR Entry amount is 100 points. The exit point 30 miles distant is 50 percent of the way between 10 and 50 miles, so its IR Exit point amount is 50 points.

Bravo's entry point is 50 miles away, so its IR Entry amount is 10 points. The exit point is 80 miles away, so its amount is 0 points.

The IR Entry total for these two routes is 100 + 10 for 110 points. The total IR Exit total for these two routes is 50 + 0 for 50 points.

The highest IR Entry total for any base is 105 and the lowest non-zero IR Entry total for any base is 50.

The highest IR Exit total for any base is 105 and the lowest non-zero IR Exit total for any base is 50.

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula 1248.00

Title	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission
Formula	

So, this base's IR Entry score is 100, because 105 is equal to 105 on a 10 to 100 point scale gives this base an IR Exit score of 55.

VR Route Charlie has an entry point 3 miles away and an exit point 4 miles away.

Both the entry and exit point are within 5 miles, so both the VR Entry and VR Exit category amounts get 100 points.

As there is only one VR route, that makes the VR route totals the same, 100 points each.

The highest VR Entry total for any base is 300 and the lowest non-zero VR Entry total for any base is 50 points.

Ditto for the VR Exit totals.

So, this base's VR Entry score of 100 is prorated between 50 and 300 on a 10 to 100 scale. Since 100 is 20% of the way from 50 to 300, the VR Entry score is 28 points.

Ditto for the VR Exit totals.

By applying the 25% weighting to each of the four category scores, in IR Entry, IR Exit, VR Entry and VR Exit order, we get the overall score.

$$(.25 * 100) + (.25 * 55) + (.25 * 28) + (.25 * 28) = 52.75 \text{ points.}$$

Source

FLIP AP-18: IFR Supp: Falcon View or other certified flight planning software

Formula 9.07

This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.

Max Points 3.68

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points 0.30

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points 3.38

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Supporting Data

Section

Question Field

1	AirSpace Operations	Runways	8
1	AirSpace Operations	Length	8.7
1	AirSpace Operations	Width	8.8
1	AirSpace Operations	Serviceable (5)	8.15
1	AirSpace Operations	ArSpace - Distance to Routes	1248
1	AirSpace Operations	Route Designer	1248

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
	3.38	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.28	3.4	3.34

Comments:

LATN as a tactical requirement is rapidly becoming obsolete as threats and on-board navigation and weapon delivery systems drive employment into the medium and high altitude arena's

It is important to maintain a basic level of low level capabilities. These skills can be maintained by two or three low level routes (IR, VR or SR) in combination with a designated LATN area.

Willow Grove has ample access to VR and SR routes within 150 miles, however we opt to use our LATN area because it provides a more combat realistic training environment.

**Bottom line – we have more VR and SR routes than we currently need yet we are penalized for not having enough.**

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1249.00
Title	Proximity to DZ/LZ
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Geo-locational Factors
Formula	

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDI	BOI	BTC	SELF
	12.08	12.08	12.47	12.08	12.47	13.25	7.66

Check the distance to all USAF-certified Landing Zones/Drop Zones within 50NM radius of the installation that meet zone requirements.

OSD Question 1249 is assigned to a regional base unit (Widget Unit #210) for technical reasons since the data is identical for all bases. So, regardless of the organization being checked, all references to OSD Question 1249 will find their data under Widget Unit # 210, which was a technical way to avoid having to enter the exact same data once per base. Widget Unit # 210 does not exist in real life.

If installation has no runway or active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

Drop Zones (DZ) count for 50% of the overall score. Landing Zones (LZ) count for the remaining 50%.

The data on the DZ's and LZ's is split across two OSD questions, 1249 and 1248. This means that the data in one question has to be matched with its respective data in the other question. This is done by matching the ZAR code, which is found in column 1 of both OSD Questions 1249 and 1248.

Compute the points received for each LZ as follows, then total them into an LZ total:

If the LZ is < 3500' by 60' and < 3000' by 60', get 0 points. See OSD Question 1249, columns 3 and 4 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the LZ > 50 miles, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1248, column 3 for this data. (N/A or no matching LZ in OSD question 1249 means > 50 miles.)  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the LZ = 50 miles, get 10 points.  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the LZ <= 10 miles, get 100 points.  
 Otherwise, get 0 points.

Compute the points received for each DZ as follows, then total them into a DZ total:

If the DZ is < 1000 yds by 1500 yds, and < 700 yds by 1000 yds, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1249, columns 6 and 7 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the DZ > 50 miles, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1248, column 3 for this data. (N/A or no matching DZ in OSD question 1249 means > 50 miles.)  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the DZ = 50 miles, get 10 points.  
 Otherwise, if the distance to the DZ <= 10 miles, get 100 points.  
 Otherwise, get 0 points.

After the above LZ and DZ totals have been computed for each base, determine the score for each as follows:

Get the Highest LZ total of any base and the Lowest non-Zero LZ total of any base.  
 Get the Highest DZ total of any base and the Lowest non-Zero DZ total of any base.

If the total = 0, then the respective points for that total = 0

Otherwise, pro-rata the total from the respective lowest non-zero total to the respective highest score on a 10 to 100 scale.

Take 50% of the LZ score just calculated and add to it 50% of the DZ score just calculated for the overall score.

Example:

There are two drop zones within 50 miles, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha is 3100' by 65' and Bravo is 2000'

Comments: May be applicable to Helicopter units but not A-10s. Realistically, we have multiple ranges within CSAR training distances to accomplish requirements of DZ/LZ training. Our two closest ranges (43NM and 67NM) have ample locations for Helos to land and train to CSAR objectives.

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1248.00
Title	Proximity to DZ/LZ
Source	by 100. Alpha is 10 miles away and Bravo is 30 miles away. Alpha is bigger than 3000' by 60', so it qualifies for points. Since it is 10 miles away, it gets 100 points. Bravo is smaller than 3000' by 60', so it is too small and gets 0 points. The DZ total is 100 points. The highest DZ total across all bases is 500 and the lowest non-zero DZ total across all bases is 100. The DZ score is 10 points, since it equals the lowest overall DZ total. There are two landing zones within 50 miles. Charlie and Delta. Charlie is 1000 yds by 1500 yds and so is Delta. Charlie and Delta are both 10 miles away. Both are >= the 1000 yds by 1500 yds size, so both qualify for points. Since both are 10 miles away, they both get 100 points. The LZ total is 200 points. The highest LZ total across all bases is 200 and the lowest non-zero LZ total across all bases is 50. The LZ score is 100 points, since it equals the highest overall LZ total. Now, take 50% of each of the two totals to make the overall score: (.50 * 10) + (.50 * 100) gives an overall score of 55.
Formula Score	17.04
Max Points	14.72
Earned Points	2.04
Lost Points	12.08

IFR Supp: ZAR (AMC Zone Availability Report); AF Form 3822 (Landing Zone Survey) or AF Form 3823 (Drop Zone Survey); Falcon View or other certified flight planning software	
This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.	
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.	
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.	
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.	
Supporting Data	
Section	Question/Field
1 Air/Space Operations	8 Runways
1 Air/Space Operations	0 7 Length
1 Air/Space Operations	0 8 Width
1 Air/Space Operations	8 15 Serviceable (S)
1 Air/Space Operations	1248 Airspace - Distance to Zones
1 Air/Space Operations	1248 2 ZAR Doc / Index Number
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 Airspace Attributes - Zones
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 2 ZAR Doc/Index Number
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 3 Landing Zone: >=3000' x 80'
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 4 Landing Zone: >=3500' x 80'
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 6 Drop Zone: >=700 yds x 1000yds
1 Air/Space Operations	1249 7 Drop Zone: >=1000 yds x 1500 yds

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula 1249.00

Title	Airspace Attributes of D21Z
Criterion	Condition of Infrastructure
Attribute	Operating Areas
Formula	Check the attributes of USAF-certified Landing Zones / Drop Zones which have current AMC surveys.

OSD Question 1249 is assigned to a notional base unit (Widget Unit #210) for technical reasons

reference to OSD Question 1249 will find their data under Widget Unit #210, which was a technical way to avoid having to enter the exact same data once per base. Widget Unit #210 does not exist in real life.

If installation has no runway or active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

Drop Zones (DZ) count for 50% of the overall score. Landing Zones (LZ) count for the remaining 50%.

The data on the DZs and LZs is split across two OSD questions, 1249 and 1248. This means that

the data in one question has to be matched with its respective data in the other question. This is

done by matching the ZAF code, which is found in column 1 of both OSD Questions 1248 and 1249.

Compute the points received for each LZ as follows, then total them into an LZ total:

If the distance to the LZ > 50 miles, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1248, column 3 for this data. (N/A or no matching LZ in OSD question 1248 means > 50 miles.)  
 Otherwise, if the LZ is >= 3500' by 80', get 100 points. See OSD Question 1249, column 4 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, if the LZ is >= 3000' by 60', get 50 points. See OSD Question 1249, column 3 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, get 0 points.

Compute the points received for each DZ as follows, then total them into a DZ total:

If the distance to the DZ > 50 miles, get 0 points. See OSD Question 1248, column 3 for this data. (N/A or no matching DZ in OSD question 1248 means > 50 miles.)  
 Otherwise, if the DZ is >= 1500 yds by 1500 yds, get 100 points. See OSD Question 1249, column 7 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, if the DZ is >= 700 yds by 1000 yds, get 50 points. See OSD Question 1249, column 6 for this data. (N/A means no.)  
 Otherwise, get 0 points.

After the above LZ and DZ totals have been computed for each base, determine the score for each as follows:  
 Get the Highest LZ total of any base and the Lowest non-zero LZ total of any base.  
 Get the Highest DZ total of any base and the Lowest non-zero DZ total of any base.  
 If the total = 0, then the respective points for that total = 0.  
 Otherwise, pro-rate the total from the respective lowest non-zero total to the respective highest score on a 10 to 100 scale.

Take 50% of the LZ score just calculated and add to it 50% of the DZ score just calculated for the overall score.

Example:

There are two drop zones within 50 miles, Alpha is 3100' by 85' and Bravo is 2000'

MCI: SOF / CSAR

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula 1249.00

Title	Airspace Attributes of D21Z
Formula	Alpha is between 3000' by 60' and 3500' by 80' and gets 50 points. Bravo is too small so it gets 0 points. The DZ total is 50 points. The highest DZ total across all bases is 50 and the lowest non-zero DZ total across all bases is 50. The DZ score is 10 points, since it equals the lowest overall DZ total. There are two landing zones within 50 miles, Charlie and Delta. Charlie is 1000 yds by 1500 yds and Delta is 1000 yds by 1500 yds size, so both get 100 points. The LZ total is 200 points. The highest LZ total across all bases is 200 and the lowest non-zero LZ total across all bases is 50. The LZ score is 100 points, since it equals the highest overall LZ total. Now, take 50% of each of the two totals to make the overall score: $(50 * 10) + (50 * 100)$ gives an overall score of 55

IPR Supp: ZAF (AMC Zone Availability Report), AF Form 3622 (Landing Zone Survey) or AF Form 3623 (Drop Zone Survey), Falcon View or other certified flight planning software

Formula 15.81

This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied

Max Points 7.99

This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Source

Formula 15.81

This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base

Earned Points 1.26

The difference between Max Points and Earned Points

Lost Points 6.73

Supporting Data	Question Field
1	Air/Space Operations
8	Runways
1	Air/Space Operations
8	Length
1	Air/Space Operations
8	Width
1	Air/Space Operations
0	Serviceable (S)
1	Air/Space Operations
1249	Airspace - Distance to Zones
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	ZAF Doc / Index Number
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	Airspace Attributes - Zones
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	ZAF Doc/Index Number
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	Landing Zone: >=3000' x 60'
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	Landing Zone: >=3500' x 80'
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	Drop Zone: >=700 yds x 1000yds
1	Air/Space Operations
1248	Drop Zone: >=1000 yds x 1500 yds

Same as previous question

PTS LOST	6.73	6.73	6.84	6.73	6.96	7.19	5.53
	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF



MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula

1296.00

Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission

Title

Condition of Infrastructure

Attribute

Operating Areas

Formula

If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.

Only airspace within 200 Nautical Miles (NMI) will be considered in the calculations. All others will be ignored. See OSD Question 1245, column 2. (N/A means more than 200 NMI.)

Data is in OSD Questions 1268, 1245 and 1274 must be matched via column 1 in each question.

Calculate each of the subcategories scores listed below, and weight as listed.

20% Airspace Volume (AV)

15% Operating Hours (OH)

15% Scoreable Range (SR)

15% Air to Ground Weapons Delivery (AGWD)

5% Live Ordnance (LO)

10% Electronic Combat (EC)

10% Laser Use Authorized (LU)

5% Flare Authorized (FA)

5% Chaff Authorized (CA)

Each of the subcategories use the following general pattern for calculating them:

Compute a raw total for the base by following the instructions for the respective subcategory total.

Find the highest, and the lowest, non-zero raw total for the subcategory across all bases.

If the raw total = 0, that subcategory score = 0.

Else, if the raw total = the highest raw total, the subcategory score = 100.

Else, if the raw total = the lowest, non-zero raw total, the subcategory score = 10.

Else, pro-rate the raw total between the lowest non-zero score and the highest score on a 10 to 100 scale.

Once each score for each subcategory is known, multiply them by their respective weighting percentage and total the results for the overall score.

Airspace Volume Raw Total:

Get AV for the pts. See OSD Question 1277, column 2. (N/A means 0.)

Flare Authorized Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If FA = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1274, column 3. (N/A means No.)

Else, get 0 pts.

Operating Hours Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If the OH < 1 or = N/A, get 0 pts. See OSD Question 1266, column 2.

Else, if the OH = 1 or LIMIT or INTMT, get 10 pts

Else, if the OH = 24 or NOTAM, get 100 pts.

Else, if the OH = NOTAM, get 100 pts.

Else, pro-rate the OH between 0 and 24 on a 10 to 100 point scale.

Scoreable Range Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If the SR = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1268, column 3. (N/A means No.)

Formula

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula

1296.00

Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission

Title

Operating Areas

Attribute

Condition of Infrastructure

Formula

If the AGWD = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1268 column 4. (N/A means No.)

Sum the pts for each airspace:

Else, get 0 pts.

Air to Ground Weapons Delivery Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If LO = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1274, column 5. (N/A means No.)

Else, get 0 pts.

Electronic Combat Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If EC = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1266, column 7. (N/A means No.)

Else, get 0 pts.

Laser Use Authorized Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If LU = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1266, column 8. (N/A means No.)

Else, get 0 pts.

Chaff Authorized Raw Total:

Sum the pts for each airspace:

If CA = Yes, get 100 pts. See OSD Question 1274, column 4. (N/A means No.)

Else, get 0 pts.

Example:

AV = 20,000, get 20,000 pts

There are two airspaces within the distance specified above, and they both have these characteristics (which means their raw totals will be double the number of pts listed) followed by the lowest non-zero and highest raw totals across all bases

OH = NOTAM, get 100 pts; 20,000 to 150,000 pts

SR = Yes, get 100 pts; 200 to 500 pts.

AGWD = No, get 0 pts; 200 to 1000 pts.

LO = Yes, get 100 pts; 500 to 1000 pts.

EC = N/A, get 0 pts; 200 to 2000 pts.

LU = Yes, get 100 pts; 100 to 1000 pts.

FA = Yes, get 100 pts; 200 to 1000 pts.

CA = Yes, get 100 pts; 200 to 1000 pts.

Subcategory scores

AV = 10 pts.

OH = 10 pts.

SR = 10 pts.

AGWD = 0 pts.

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	9.15	10.6	7.82	10.21	10.68	11.43	12.09

Comments: Same comments as for the question referring to Proximity of Airspace. Many of the ranges were improperly categorized.

Compared to other SOF/CSAR bases rated we feel Willow Grove most compares to Moody AFB. Moody lost 2.91 points in this category compared to our loss of 9.15 points.

**We feel we should be comparable to Moody and lose only 4 points in this category.**

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1288.00						
Title	Utilities cost rating (U3C)						
Criterion	Cost of Ops / Manpower						
Attribute	Cost Factors						
Formula	<p>Check the Utilities Costs and Climatic Consideration (U3C) Rating for the installation.</p> <p>If the U3C rating is &lt;= .59, get 100 points. See OSD Question 1288, column 1 for this data. Otherwise, if the U3C rating is &gt;= 2.29, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the U3C rating between .59 and 2.29 on a 100 to 0 scale.</p> <p>Example:</p> <p>The U3C rating is 1.0. 1.0 is 59.41% of the way between .59 and 2.29, so the score is 40.59.</p> <p>ASHRAE Standards; DoD 5120 45-M-2; Defense Utility Energy Reporting System; UFC 3-400-02; DOE Website; Buildings Energy Databook; Table 7.4 Typical Commercial Buildings</p>						
Source							
Formula Score	34.71						
Max Points	0.13						
Earned Points	0.04						
Lost Points	0.08						
Supporting Data	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Question Field</td> <td>Utilities Cost Rating (U3C)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1288</td> <td>Answer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1288</td> <td>.1</td> </tr> </table>	Question Field	Utilities Cost Rating (U3C)	1288	Answer	1288	.1
Question Field	Utilities Cost Rating (U3C)						
1288	Answer						
1288	.1						

NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.05

Comments: None

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	1271.00
Title	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions
Criterion	Current / Future Mission
Attribute	Operating Environment
Formula	<p>Check the average number of days annually the prevailing weather is better than 3000/3 Nautical Miles (NM).</p> <p>If installation has no runway or no active runway, or no serviceable, suitable runway then score 0 pts.</p> <p>If the average number of days <math>\geq</math> 300, get 100 points.                  Otherwise, if the average number of days <math>\leq</math> 250, get 0 points.                  Otherwise, pro-rate the average number of days between 250 and 300 on a 0 to 100 scale.</p> <p>Example:</p> <p>The average number of days annually where the prevailing weather is better than 3000/3 NM is 275. 275 is halfway between 250 and 300, for a score of 50.</p>
Source	AFCCC Climatological tables
Formula Score	50.00 This is the unweighted formula's score for this base on a 0 to 100 scale. A score of 100 equals the Max Points once the weighting for this formula is applied.
Max Points	5.00 This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points	2.53 This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points	2.53 The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Supporting Data		
Section	Question	Field
1 Air/Space Operations	0	Runways
1 Air/Space Operations	0	Length
1 Air/Space Operations	0	Width
1 Air/Space Operations	0	Serviceable (5)
39 Airfield Management	1271	Air Operations - Prevailing Weather
39 Airfield Management	1271	Weather > 3000/3NM

	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
PTS LOST	2.53	1.52	0	1.92	0	5.06	1.72

Notes:

It appears the DoD used a two year look back for the prevailing weather conditions. Data is conveniently available for a much longer period of look back, which obviously gives a more accurate estimate of weather.

Using the 30 year look back numbers, Willow Grove moves from 275 to 287 days above 3000/3. Our score should have shown us losing 1.32 points not 2.53, which puts in line with most of the other east coast bases.

Additionally 3000/3 at the home station has very little relevance. Wx below 3000/3 will require landing with divert fuel and may impact sortie length, however at Willow Grove, even on some of the most robust training sorties we fly, we are capable of landing with fuel to reach a suitable alternate without impacting training.

A more appropriate Wx grading system would be prevailing Wx at training locations. For A-10s most of our training is accomplished on Air to Surface ranges. If there weather on those ranges is below a minimum (usually lower than 3000/3) we cannot use that range. That may impact training for the day. Weather criteria that may affect operations are extreme heat or cold, lightning, solid clouds to higher flight levels, etc.

Additional comment: Moody received 0 points deducted for Wx. It may be true they have limited days below 3000/5, however already this year they have evacuated their aircraft to avoid hurricanes.

MCI: SOF / CSAR

Formula	1402.00
Title	BAH Rate
Criterion	Cos: of Ops / Manpower
Attribute	Cos: Factors
Formula	Check the 2004 monthly BAH rate for an O-3 with dependents. See OSD question 1402, column 1 for this data.  If the BAH rate <= 740, get 100 points. Otherwise, if the BAH rate >= 2013, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the BAH rate between 740 and 2013 on a 100 to 0 scale.  Example:  The BAH rate is 974. 974 is 18% between 740 and 2013, which results in a score of 82.00.  <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/periodicals/bah.html">www.dtic.mil/periodicals/bah.html</a>
Source	
Formula Score	17.44
Max Points	0.88
Earned Points	0.15
Lost Points	0.72

Supporting Data	
Section	Question Field
13 Finance	1402 BAH Rate
13 Finance	1402 .1 BAH Rate

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
	0.72	0.54	0.58	0.5	0.13	0.22	0.48

Comments: None

**MCI: SOF / CSAR**

Formula	1403.00
Title	GS Locality Pay Rate
Criterion	Cost of Ops / Manpower
Attribute	Cost Factors
Formula	Check the 2004 locality pay rate for the GS pay schedule. See OSD question 1403, column 1 for this data. (N/A equals 0.)  If the pay rate <= 10.90, get 100 points. Otherwise, if the pay rate >= 20.37, get 0 points. Otherwise, pro-rate the pay rate between 10.90 and 20.37 on a 100 to 0 scale
Example:	The pay rate is 14.31, which is 36.01% of the way between 10.90 and 20.37, which results in a score of 63.99.

Source	Office of Personnel Management Web page
Formula Score	63.33
Max Points	0.25
Earned Points	0.13
Lost Points	0.12

Supporting Data	
Section	Question Field
13 Finance	1403 GS Locality Pay Rate
13 Finance	1403 .1 GS Locality Pay Rate

PTS LOST	NXX	BAF	MTN	BDL	BOI	BTC	SELF
0	0.12	0	0.1	0.16	0	0	0.2

Comments: None



# TAB G

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## ***Point Paper***

### Home Land Defense and Homeland Security Issues

**Statement of the Problem:** DoD recommended closing NAS JRB Willow Grove despite the fact that it is a key defense asset in a strategic location in close proximity to Philadelphia, the Northeast Corridor, and the National Capitol Region. Its usefulness as a staging area for homeland defense and homeland security missions depends on the continued viability of flight operations at this site. Abandoning this asset in the face of homeland defense and homeland security threats and in light of the newly issued DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support<sup>1</sup> makes no sense. The DoD recommendation violates final section criterion # 2: In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value, will consider:

**2. Military Value: The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including. . . staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.**

#### **Issues:**

- DoD does not appear to give any consideration to Willow Grove as a staging area for HLS or HLD. This itself is a substantial deviation.
- No data can be found evaluating the Military Value of Willow Grove's strategic location close to the National Capitol Region (NCR).
- In the past, Willow Grove can and has accommodated contingency, mobilization, and surge operations both for military and HLS/HLD operations. There are no data that indicate this was reviewed or considered. Key factors not considered:
  - Close to logistical hub – rail, air, land, sea
  - Close to emergency care facilities – over 13,000 hospital beds in the immediate region
  - Availability for emergency preparedness for the Commonwealth of PA and for national government
  - Willow Grove's use currently as a back-up station for FEMA and PEMA with the National Guard and Reserve assets available – airlift (Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force).
  - Facilities available for HLS/HLD training
- Data or analyses that Future HLS and HLD missions were considered for these joint forces are not evident. For example, the newly issued DoD Strategy Homeland Defense and Civil Support could leverage capabilities uniquely available at Willow Grove:
  - Reconnaissance and surveillance covering wide areas of the maritime and air domains<sup>2</sup> could be a perfect new mission for the former P-3 squadrons at Willow Grove
  - Protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population<sup>3</sup> is a natural role for the ANG

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<sup>1</sup> Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support – DoD – June, 2005

<sup>2</sup> Ibid – pgs 3, 21&22

<sup>3</sup> Ibid – pgs 5, 22, 25, 35 & 36

- Support for Civil Authorities<sup>4</sup> is a role already played by Willow Grove in their relationships with FEMA, PEMA, and others. FEMA, for example is attempting to expand their use of the Willow Grove facility, leveraging on the assets already present.

### ***Partnership with Federal Emergency Management Agency:***

#### **Willow Grove JRB Future capabilities for FEMA:**

FEMA has determined that Willow Grove JRB can support the following functions:

**FEMA *Mobilization Centers*.** A mobilization center is a designated location for receiving and processing resources and personnel prior to their deployment to a staging area or incident site. It may coincide with the point of arrival. For arriving personnel, the mobilization center may have to provide briefings, billeting, and feeding.

**FEMA *Staging Areas*.** At staging areas, personnel and equipment are assembled for immediate deployment to an operational site in the affected area. Local jurisdictions should identify potential staging areas; options include fairgrounds and academic facilities.

**FEMA *Lodging*.** An influx of volunteers and government workers creates a need for billeting. Provision should be made for this at points of arrival and mobilization centers.

- National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) staging: Used Willow Grove 10 years ago and could further develop this capability. 111<sup>th</sup> Medical Group personnel have recently been certified on patient decontamination and have the necessary equipment to provide invaluable support to NDMS operations.

#### **Future Military MILCON that would greatly benefit FEMA operations:**

- **Joint Deployment Processing Facility.** This facility would provide training and actual deployment space for receiving and processing personnel and baggage; baggage pallet buildup; counseling; passenger processing, briefing and holding area. An 8,000 SF deployment processing facility is authorized at any installation charged with deploying personnel and equipment in support of deployment tasking. This facility could be joint use for the base with ANG ownership. With the minimum 8,000 SF design, a small independent office could be provided for each joint user. Cost is between \$1-1.5M. With additional joint funds, the facility could be expanded to provide storage and cargo processing.

Other Air Force base mobility centers have plans to be used by FEMA as the initial housing for Federal response personnel.

We expect to receive a letter from FEMA indicating support for future use of Willow Grove. This future, homeland security-related use, can be accommodated under any of the alternatives discussed for continuation of flying operations at Willow Grove (TAB B).

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid – pg 5, 27, 31

***Partnership with Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA):***

Willow Grove is the primary site for military (National Guard or Guard EOC coordinated) support to PEMA in southeast Pa. This will be especially true in the future as we consider moving the Pa National Guard task force headquarters to the base (111FW). The south east Pa, Task Force Commander is the 56 Brigade Commander primary with the 111FW Combat Support Commander secondary. As we discuss moving the 56 Brigade to the base this aligns both headquarters at NAS Willow Grove. If the brigade headquarters is elsewhere it still makes sense to use the base as the site for task force headquarters and marshalling support for civil authorities. Collocation with FEMA is also of great benefit.



# TAB H

Aug 1, 2005

## ***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



## Point Paper Economic Impacts

**Statement of Problem:** The DoD substantially understated the economic impact on surrounding communities of the proposed closure of NAS JRB Willow Grove through inaccurate calculation of the total joint base employment. This is a substantial deviation from final criterion 6 by which consideration is to be given to:

**Criterion 6. The economic impact on existing communities  
in the vicinity of military installations**

In fact, the economic loss to the surrounding communities is over **five times greater** than that calculated by DoD.

**Supporting Information:**

The following two tables illustrate the problems in the DoD calculations:

Table 1: DoD Recommendation -Eliminated Positions<sup>1</sup>

SERVICE	ACTIVE DUTY	CIVILIAN	RESERVE	DIRECT TOTAL	INDIRECT	TOTAL
All	865	362	5	1,232	698	1,930

Table 2: Base Team Positions<sup>2</sup>

SERVICE	ACTIVE DUTY	CIVILIAN	RESERVE	DIRECT TOTAL
Navy	1,050	213	2,414	3,677
Marines	438	0	279	717
Air Force	8	331	1,126	1,465
Air Guard	69	205	752	1,026
Army	5	9	184	198
Totals:	1,570	758	4,755	7,083

As is apparent from a cursory comparison of the tables, DoD underestimated the total population of direct base employees both Active Duty and Civilian by a factor of almost two, and gave no consideration to the Traditional Reservists who are based at Willow Grove. It is astonishing that, in evaluating the economic impact of closing a JOINT RESERVE BASE, DoD would ignore the economic contribution that RC pay makes to the surrounding community, thereby underestimating the employee population affected by the closure recommendation by over 5.5 to 1.

<sup>1</sup> DoD Recommendation Volume 1, Part 1, Page B-31

<sup>2</sup> Navy Brief to BRAC Commission dated 7/5/2005, Slide 5

This error is compounded when the area economic impact is calculated using standard Input-Output Department of Labor models. DoD calculated 698 Indirect Jobs (using a 0.5666 multiplier) to calculate 1,930<sup>3</sup> Total Job Losses in the recommendation. However, an independent consultant Econsult Corporation who reviewed this matter for the Suburban Chamber<sup>4</sup> used a similar, but more conservative multiplier (0.4443), and figures quite similar to those included in Table 2 to obtain a figure of 3,147 Indirect Jobs, and calculated a Total Job Loss figure of 10,408 for the region. The same consultant used these job losses to identify an accompanying loss of \$378 million in annual economic activity for the region, 45% concentrated in the two surrounding Congressional districts. Subsequent communications and consultation between BRAC Commission staff and Econsult personnel reveal that the methodology used is equivalent, and that the difference in results is entirely attributable to the lower, incorrect figures used by DoD as input to their calculations.

DoD's and Navy misstatement of these facts is a significant error, and one that has seriously understated the serious economic impact that the recommendation for closure will bring. These calculation errors points out the seriousness of miscalculations used throughout the Active construct analysis of this Joint Reserve Base.

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<sup>3</sup> In an unexplained discrepancy , the detailed recommendation for Willow Grove found in Volume 4, Attachment C, page C-13 shows impact as 1,142 direct jobs, 663 indirect, 1,805 total, which makes the point we are making in this section even more strongly.

<sup>4</sup> See Econsult Report submitted to the Commission on 7 July 2005

## Economic Impacts for Closing NAS JRB Willow Grove

- The DoD's own COBRA analysis for Willow Grove shows one-time closing costs of \$126 million.
  - Most of these costs (\$66 million) are for new military construction at McGuire AFB to accommodate Navy units moving there.
  - \$44 million are moving costs
- The DoD estimated costs for military construction at McGuire are too low because they failed to take into account retention of the KC-135s there.
- Planned military construction costs at Willow Grove over the next five years are about \$15 million (for a new commissary, etc.) and DoD claims a credit for avoiding these costs.
- We believe Willow Grove could maintain flying operations with no additional military construction costs.
  - Repairs to runway are already programmed and will start soon.
- DoD claims the \$126 million in costs for closing Willow Grove are offset by net savings in personnel, overhead and other costs.
  - \$178 million of the claimed cost savings are personnel
  - **BUT** as the GAO observed, most of these supposed personnel cost savings are illusory because the personnel don't go away – they are moved. Military end strength remains constant.

Costs 2006 - 2011	DoD Estimate	Offsetting savings	Net	Comment
Military Construction	\$65 million	\$15 million	\$50 million	DoD estimate of costs at McGuire are unrealistically low.
Personnel	\$71,000	\$178 million	-\$178 million	Personnel cost savings are illusory



# TAB I

Aug 1, 2005

## ***NAS JRB Willow Grove***



# NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE



Presented by  
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  
Governor's Base Development Committee  
and  
Suburban Horsham Willow Grove Chamber of Commerce  
to  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
July 7, 2005  
Washington, DC

# NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE




The Honorable Allyson Y. Schwartz  
Member of Congress

# NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE



Mr. Ed Ebenbach  
Suburban Horsham Willow Grove  
Chamber of Commerce



#### NAVY

- Commander Reserve Patrol Wing (5 Squadrons)
- VP-66 Patrol Squadron (4 P-3C)
- VR-64 Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (4 C-130)
- VR-52 Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (4 C-9B)
- Naval Air Reserve Anti-Sub Warfare Training Center
- Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department
- Naval Air Reserve; (Including Reserve Intel)
  - 24 Additional Navy Reserve Units (1,200+ Reserves)
- Navy Medical / Dental Clinic / Pharmacy
- Reserve Recruiting, Child Development Center
- Navy Exchange, Navy Commissary (on hold)
- Naval Criminal Investigative Unit
- Sea Cadets

#### COAST GUARD

Base is staging area for all CONUS deployments

#### MARINES

- MAG-49 Marine Aircraft Group Headquarters
- HMH-772 Helicopter Marine Heavy Squadron
- MWSS 472 Marine Wing Support Squadron

#### ARMY RESERVE

- 99<sup>th</sup> Regional Readiness Headquarters
- 1215<sup>th</sup> Army Reserve Garrison Support Unit
- Inspector General
- 656<sup>th</sup> Area Support Group

#### AIR FORCE RESERVES

- 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing
  - 327<sup>th</sup> Airlift Squadron
  - 31<sup>st</sup> Aerial Port Squadron
  - 92<sup>nd</sup> Aerial Port Squadron

#### AIR NATIONAL GUARD

- 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing
  - 103<sup>rd</sup> Fighter Squadron
  - 270<sup>th</sup> Engineering Installation Sq

#### U.S. Air Force Auxiliary

- Civil Air Patrol and Cadet Programs

#### OTHER AGENCIES

- FAA – Alternate Flight Operations Center
- Federal Emergency Mgt Agency (FEMA)
  - Alternate Operations Center
- Southeast Counterterrorism Task Force
  - Future CBRNE training
- Pa Emergency Mgt Agency (PEMA)
  - Advanced Radiological Training
- Community First Responders
  - Aircraft Firefighting training
- Delaware Valley Historical Aircraft Association and Museum
- AF, ARMY, NAVY JROTC Programs

## NAS JRB Willow Grove

### **Willow Grove – Substantial Deviations**

- Erroneous Assumptions and lack of analysis in assessing jointness
- Substantial miscalculations in the assessment of the availability of land, facilities, and associated airspaces
- Lack of consideration of the base's strategic location with respect to Homeland Defense and Homeland Security
- Substantial deviations and inconsistencies in the Evaluation Process
- Improper deactivation of an Air National Guard Wing
- Inadequate consideration of demographics, manpower, and skill set losses
- Inadequate consideration of future mission capabilities

## Economic Impacts

- DoD substantially understates economic loss to community from closing Willow Grove.
- Our independent \* review of job losses shows:

SERVICE	ACTIVE DUTY	CIVILIAN	RESERVE	DIRECT TOTAL	INDIRECT	GRAND TOTAL
Navy	1,050	213	2,414	3,677		
Marines	438	0	209	717		
Air Force Reserve	8	331	1,126	1,465		
Air Guard	68	201	935	1,204		
Army	5	9	184	198		
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>1,569</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>4,755</b>	<b>7,261</b>	<b>3,147</b>	<b>10,408</b>
<b>DoD:</b>	<b>865</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1,232</b>	<b>698</b>	<b>1,930</b>

Our area will lose 5 times more jobs than DoD estimated.

\* Study completed by Econsult using payroll figures obtained from NAS JRB Willow Grove

## Economic Impacts


Branch of Service	Service Total in Millions
Navy	\$224
Air Force Reserve	\$79
Air National Guard	\$57
Army Reserves	\$2

• **10,400 jobs lost**

• **4,750 Reservists NOT Counted**

• **\$378M Economic Impact**

• **Concentrated Area**



## Community Support

- The Horsham Willow Grove Community wants to **SAVE OUR BASE**:



## Community Support

Airshow – May 2005



Over 500,000 Visitors!

## Community's Conclusions

- Our committee, the State and other local officials have worked hard to understand the basis for the DoD Willow Grove Recommendations.
- We find that the data and evaluations of NAS JRB Willow Grove and the Willow Grove Air Reserve Station are incomplete, unavailable, or masked.
- Installation was not evaluated in whole as a joint facility
- The lack of data undermines the supposed fairness of the BRAC process
- Multiple substantial deviations invalidate recommendation

## NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE



Major General William B. Lynch  
Pennsylvania Base  
Development Committee


## Jointness

- ***“For the first time, the BRAC deliberations took place with an emphasis on “Jointness.” The Department recognized that operating jointly***
  - *reduces overhead costs,*
  - *improves efficiency, and*
  - *facilitates cooperative training...”*


Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

## JOINTNESS



**NAS JRB Willow  
Grove is joint  
today!**



Naval Reserves



913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing  
AFRES





## Army Reserves

## Jointness

- ***Military Value Criterion # 1.*** The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
- DoD's recommendation for Willow Grove substantially deviates from the first military value criterion.

## Jointness

- NAS JRB Willow Grove has 10 years of experience in jointness!
  - **Many day-to-day operations involve joint interactions.**
  - **These joint operational activities involve more than mere co-location.**
- Willow Grove should be considered a **JOINT CENTER OF EXCELLENCE**

## Jointness

- Actual joint operations will be significantly degraded by the recommended closure at Willow Grove.
- Closing NAS JRB Willow Grove & Willow Grove ARS will break significant present and future joint support activities
  - 28th Division, the 56th Stryker Brigade, and the current forces stationed at Willow Grove

## Jointness

- DoD did not evaluate NAS JRB Willow Grove as a total structure.
  - The Air Force did its evaluation and Navy did its own independent evaluation without accurately evaluating or assigning proper military value to the total base.
- A joint analysis for NAS JRB Willow Grove as a total force structure is not provided and can not be found.

## Jointness

Willow Grove was penalized for being joint in the military value evaluations of the separate services.

## Jointness

- Willow Grove is a great example joint operations and joint training
  - Day-to-day joint operations at NAS JRB Willow Grove mirror joint operations at forward operating locations.
  - A joint working group of all the services oversees joint use on a regular basis.
  - The 111th FW trains and fights with the 28th Infantry Division of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
  - Units from Willow Grove participated in 24 joint training opportunities in the last year, many using the nearby range at Fort Indiantown Gap.

## Joint Warfighting Examples

- 111<sup>th</sup> PaANG A-10s deployed for OIF and OEF
- VR-52 C-9s deployed for OIF and OEF
- HMH-772 H-53s deployed to USS Nassau
- MAG-49 deployed for OIF
- 913<sup>th</sup> C-130s mobilized/deployed for OIF
- MWSS 472 deployed to IRAQ
- VP P-3s Squadrons deployed for Joint Drug Ops
- VP P-3s Squadrons deployed for Kosovo Ops
- RIA 16 Support for OIF and OEF

OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom

## Jointness

Willow Grove is the prototype joint base and the best example of joint service cooperation in the country



WILLOW GROVE, PA


Willow Grove mirrors jointness of forward operating locations like Bagram



BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN

## Military Value

Proximity to Training Ranges




## Military Value

Proximity to Training Ranges

**WILLOW GROVE HAS THE LEAST TRAVEL TIME**

Closest Bombing Range



## Land, Facilities, Airspace

- DoD Substantially Deviated from BRAC Criteria in evaluation of Willow Grove's Land, Facilities and Airspace
- *Military Value: The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.*
  - Military Value Criterion #2

## Land, Facilities, Airspace

- The Navy and Air Force land analyses were seriously flawed.
  - Neither service accurately evaluated total lands at Willow Grove
  - There is ample room for increasing assigned aircraft (up to 24 A-10s and 16 C-130s) at the Air Reserve Station without need for Navy facilities
  - There is ample room for increasing assigned aircraft for Navy and Marines without need for AF facilities
  - AND, the biggest flaw of all, DoD failed to consider total joint land use potential.



## **Land, Facilities, Airspace**

- NAS JRB Willow Grove does not have significant encroachment issues.
- McGuire AFB is slated to receive Navy and Marine Corps assets of NAS JRB Willow Grove and Johnstown.
  - McGuire has potential encroachment issues .

## **Land, Facilities, Airspace**

- Legislative language requires older C-130, and older KC-135 to be retained.
- The Navy plan depends on “retirement” of KC-135s at McGuire.
  - “The capacity created by the Air Force force structure retirement of KC-135Es (16 primary aircraft authorized) from McGuire AFB enables the execution of this recommendation.”
    - BRAC Report DoN Page 22 (Navy and Marine Corps)
- MILCON NOT required to keep Willow Grove
- Willow Grove airfield is precious national asset at key location.



## The ANG 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing

- **1023 Authorized Positions**
  - ✓ 749 Traditional / 205 Technician / 69 AGR
  - ✓ 99% Manned
  - ✓ 75% of members have combat experience
- **First ANG unit to deploy to Kuwait & Afghanistan**
- **Only A-10 unit to deploy for both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003**
- **Five deployments to Southwest Asia in eight years**
  - ✓ 2005 – Gallant Unit Citation
  - ✓ 2004 – Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with Valor
  - ✓ 2003 – ANG Distinguished Flying Unit Award
  - ✓ 2002 – Air Force Outstanding Unit Award



## Deactivation of the ANG 111th Fighter Wing

- Governor Rendell has advised Secretary Rumsfeld that he does not consent to, or approve of, deactivation of this ANG unit.
  - Federal law requires the consent and approval of the Governor for certain actions affecting National Guard units.
  - The DoD BRAC recommendations for the 111th Fighter Wing overlooked or ignored the role of the state with regard to its National Guard unit.



## Deactivation of the ANG 111th Fighter Wing

- Using the BRAC process to deactivate ANG units subverts the BRAC process.
  - No other ANG unit in the country was “deactivated” through the BRAC process.
  - BRAC was to have fairly evaluated installations
- The official Navy justification for “deactivation” of the 111<sup>th</sup> FW states:

“This recommendation enables Air Force Future Total Force transformation. . . .”  
*(Section 2: Recommendations, DoN Page 22)*
- **DOD RED TEAM** identified the problems.
- Deactivation of the 111<sup>th</sup> FW is WRONG!



## Deactivation of the ANG 111th Fighter Wing

- National Guard is Federalism in Action
- Collaboration, Cooperation, Coordination
- In BRAC 2005, the Army got the process right!
- The Air Force and Navy got it wrong!




## Deactivation of the ANG 111th Fighter Wing

- Manpower, training, and expertise is lost forever and would be expensive to recover
  - Many aircrew, mechanics, and support personnel with extensive combat experience and extremely expensive training will be lost.
    - This violates BRAC Criterion 1 as it decreases readiness of the current force.
  - The DoD recommendations fail to capture the costs of retraining or replacing these experienced personnel.
    - This violates BRAC Final Criterion #4, which relates to costs of operations and manpower considerations.



## 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing Recruiting & Retention A-10 Manning 2002-Present (ANG)



Willow Grove provides a rich recruiting environment for all units!

## Recruiting and Retention



### Manpower Concerns Nationwide

- Challenging recruiting environment
- Applies to all Willow Grove Units
- Loss of highly skilled Reservists
- Community Based Military being eroded

## The BRAC Process

### Willow Grove: What Went Wrong?

#### – The AF and Navy Minutes tell the Story:

- Dec 2004: AF discusses impacts on other service
- 10 February 05: Navy justifies closure in part because of AF leaving
- 3 March 05: AF justifies action because of Navy closure.
- 3 May 05: AF justifies deactivation because it enables DON 0084
- Each service was using the other as the reason to depart
- Assumptions NOT Analysis

## The BRAC Process

- NAS JRB Willow Grove was never properly evaluated or considered as an installation in its entirety by either the Navy or the Air Force.
- All available documents indicate that Navy analyzed its side of the installation, and the Air Force studied how/where to move units based on assumption that airfield would be closed.

## The BRAC Process

- Failure to evaluate alternatives
- ***What if the Navy goes away?***
- There are alternatives to keep flying operations at Willow Grove.
  - Marines, Army Reserve, AFRES, or ANG could maintain flight operations.
  - Joint civilian/military use not considered.

## **The BRAC Process**

- In the process of this partial analysis, entire units stationed at NAS JRB were overlooked:
  - Example: Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) 472 for USMCR is hardly mentioned at all.
  - No justification or rationale is offered for the changes to the 913<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing!
    - This important airlift unit just disappears with hardly a word of explanation.

## **The BRAC Process**

- “Enron-like” accounting in COBRA Analysis.
  - The Navy’s COBRA analysis is flawed in that it eliminates 52 more personnel in each year from 2007 through 2011 than actually are assigned.
  - Error results in significant overstatement of savings
  - In this DoD recommendation, personnel positions associated with force structure are eliminated at the losing installation, but not ‘bought back’ at the gaining site. This is an incorrect action.

## The BRAC Process

- Both the Navy and the Air Force applied active force constructs to reserve component units.
  - Reserve component personnel cannot simply be reassigned or ordered to other units.
    - Many aircrew, mechanics, and support personnel with combat experience and extremely expensive training will be lost.

## Reserve Component vs. Active Duty

### Reserve Components Offer

- Three times the experience
- One third the cost
- **MILITARY VALUE!**

### Willow Grove JRB

- Shared Facilities
- Joint Projects



## **Reserve Component vs. Active Duty Personnel Impacts**

### **111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing Survey**

**Full-Timers → 80% Will Not Move**

**Part-Timers → 87% Will Not Move**

**Average: 85%**

**Our Members ARE a part of the Community**


**They can't just be transferred like AD**

## **The BRAC Process**

- The DoD recommendations fail to capture to costs of retraining or replacing these experienced personnel. This violates BRAC Final Criterion #4, which relates to costs of operations and manpower considerations.
- AF Military Compatibility Indices were slanted to favor active duty installations over reserve component installations
  - Seemingly objective criteria involve factors favoring active duty installations
  - There were significant errors in the MCIs for Willow Grove ARS

## Military Value – C-5/C-17 Capability

Aircraft		Incorrect Data has skewed the Air Force MCI Numbers
C-5		
C-17		



## Published SOF/CSAR MCI's

BASE	OVERALL
BOISE	41.35 (1)
MARTIN STATE	39.45 (2)
WILLOW GROVE	37.71 (3)
BARNES	35.50 (4)
BRADLEY	35.40 (5)
BATTLE CREEK	30.50 (6)

## Corrected SOF/CSAR MCI's

BASE	OVERALL
WILLOW GROVE	42.12 (1)
BOISE	41.35 (2)
MARTIN STATE	39.45 (3)
BARNES	35.50 (4)
BRADLEY	35.40 (5)
BATTLE CREEK	30.50 (6)

## Military Value

Willow Grove was both underrated in some instances and not rated at all in others.

## NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE



Major General Jessica L. Wright  
The Adjutant General  
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

### **Deactivation of 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing**

- AF approach to BRAC 2005 is a national issue of concern to all TAGs.
- You heard about our concerns in Atlanta.
- Discussed alternative scenarios for ANG Units
- Include 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing if ANG wings are considered in aggregate

## **Deactivation of 111<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing**

- Deactivation of 111th FW NOT approved by state governor
- Deactivation of 111th FW NOT coordinated with me or my staff

## **Willow Grove Provides Jointness NOW**

- Habitual joint training with 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division
- Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOS) and Special Tactics Squadrons (STS) come to Fort Indiantown Gap to train in part because 111<sup>th</sup> provides air-to-ground range training.
  - Units from across nation train here because of realistic joint training.
- AF justified adding to Reserve A-10 unit at Barksdale because of proximity to joint training but gave no credit to Willow Grove and 111<sup>th</sup>.



NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE



The Honorable Curt Weldon  
Member of Congress

NAS JRB WILLOW GROVE








# TAB J

Aug 1, 2005

***NAS JRB Willow Grove***





# TAB K

Aug 1, 2005

## *NAS JRB Willow Grove*

