



**Brief Biographies of NASB Task Force Members Presenting to BRAC  
Commissioners on June 2, 2005**

**Cdr. Richard (Rick) Tetrev, USN (Ret.)  
Chairman, NASB Task Force**

Cdr. Tetrev is a retired naval officer with over 26 years of service as both an enlisted man and an officer. He served three tours of duty in Brunswick beginning in 1978 with Wing 5, later as a department head in Patron 10 in the mid 80s, and finished his career as the Executive Officer of NASB. During the initial BRAC round he participated through his assignment in OPNAV as the Administrative Assistant to VADM Wm. D. Smith, USN Navy Programming, Planning, and Budgeting. In the 1993 and 1995 rounds he participated in Brunswick as he oversaw the data call process.

**RADM Harry Rich, USN (Ret.)**

RADM Rich was born in Searsport, Maine on January 2, 1926. He was raised in Union, Maine and graduated from Union High School in 1943. Eight days later, he joined the United States Navy. He attended Dartmouth College's Navy V-5 Program and later entered Flight Training where he was graduated in June of 1946. RADM Rich flew transport aircraft (DC-4's) in the Pacific and Berlin Airlifts. His squadron tours included the VR-8, VP-23, VP-8 and VX-4, and shipboard tours included the USS Intrepid (CVA11) and USS Wasp (CVS-18). Command Tours included VP-8, NAS Bermuda, Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic Fleet and Command Iceland Defense Force. RADM Rich also attended George Washington University, where he received his BA & MS degrees, the National War College and the Naval War College. He retired to Maine in May of 1978.

**Capt. Ralph J. Dean, USN (Ret.)**

A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Captain Dean is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh with a degree in Civil Engineering, and also holds a Masters of Business Administration from Southern New Hampshire University. Commissioned an Ensign in 1974, he was designated a Naval Aviator in 1975, Patrol Plane Commander and Patrol Plane Mission Commander in 1978. He participated in numerous P-3 operations and deployments world-wide. He also served onboard the USS Saratoga, in the Pentagon, and in multiple command tours. Since 1976, Captain Dean has served numerous tours of duty at NAS Brunswick, including duty as Executive Director of the NAS.

**Don Gerrish  
Town Manager, Brunswick, ME**

Don Gerrish is a Maine native and currently serves as the Town Manger for Brunswick, Maine, a position he has held for the past sixteen years. Prior to his service to the Town of Brunswick, he served as Town Manager of Gorham, Maine for ten years and has a total experience of thirty two years in municipal government. He has served as Past President of the International City County Managers Association. Don is a graduate of the University of Maine.

Erenn Kiriell  
21 Hudon Road  
Lisbon, ME 04250

26 May 2005

Dear Chairman Principi,

I very much appreciate the important work you and the Commission are doing. The security and defense of our country are essential. DoD can only make recommendations within their span of control. Integrating DoD's recommendations and community, state and regional concerns is extremely important. Observing the testimony from DoD officials, the variables and metrics used to make recommendations for closure, realignment and gain has been very informative. I appreciate the tremendous amount of work DoD has accomplished.

I am respectfully asking you to keep Brunswick Naval Air Station fully operational, for the national security, homeland defense and maritime surveillance of the northeastern region of the US. I find it challenging to believe that Brunswick NAS is simultaneously recognized for its strategic value (rationale for realignment) and yet has little military value. As a military retiree and citizen, I am quite concerned about the realignment of Brunswick NAS, essentially transferring all its aircraft and active duty military to Jacksonville Naval Air Station (JAX NAS). At minimum, how is maritime surveillance of the North Atlantic and northeastern US Atlantic to be conducted?

I realize there are many intricacies to DoD/DoN Transformation plans, and while moving BNAS to JAX NAS may fit within a particular opinion of that Transformation model, it does not appear to take into account the impact on National Security in the Northeast Region. Brunswick Naval Air Station is the last military airfield remaining in the Northeast region with a population of over 48 million taxpaying citizens; it serves a truly important role in our national security. It has played an important part in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Asian and Indian Tsunami Relief. Ironically, during hurricane season, JAX NAS P3 squadrons evacuated to Brunswick NAS. Ironically as well, NAS Brunswick is the only Naval Air Station in the US that can support the P-3 replacement aircraft, the multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA), and any other base will require millions of dollars to bring them up to standards. With realignment the proverb, "use it or lose it" seems to apply, without adequate use and continued maintenance, the millions of taxpayer dollars already invested to modernize Brunswick NAS will be wasted. *Realignment may make it a candidate for a Golden Fleece award.*

Up to now, our government has wisely chosen to increase funding for constructing new facilities (nearly completed) making Brunswick NAS capable of supporting all manned and unmanned aircraft, domestic and international (including Air Force One), across the full range of Homeland Defense operations and contingencies. Brunswick NAS has incredible potential for multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA), patrols, interdiction, and future operations. As a comprehensive northeast homeland joint defense and security installation it can support current and future operational and training capabilities on land, sea and air. Pending future capabilities include: Multi-mission maritime aircraft basing and support center, armed forces reserve center, maritime interdiction center, aerial refueling master base, fighter squadron basing and support, special warfare center of excellence, NASB is well prepared for the future.

ADM Clark testified about "closing Oceana NAS that he considered moving all of its 240 odd jets to an Air Force base. Clark said leaders concluded that the alternatives were too far from

the East Coast or would cost too much.” Navy Times. May 30, 2005, pg 15. Perhaps he couldn’t see far enough north to Brunswick NAS, ME.

Brunswick NAS is crucial to current and future national security, and homeland defense, and maritime surveillance and interdiction operations. It is immediately adjacent to all major sea lanes in the North Atlantic, and pathways of international flights. BNAS has more than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise missions. Briefly, Brunswick NAS has; versatile, extensive modern facilities, including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and BAMS and land with no encroachment issues, completely secured perimeter and outstanding force protection layout and capability, an established all-weather training area available for Special Forces and other units, easy access by all forms of transportation, since 9/11 the military value of the base supersedes anytime since WWII. NASB integrates active-duty and reserve forces, Joint national and international military activities including NATO, receiving and deploying over 100 Joint aircraft and over 850 personnel during recent missions. BNAS is integral to the shipbuilding efforts of Bath Iron Works, providing crew support through Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS) Bath, Maine.

Reading through the BRAC volumes, “The DoN is very concerned about economic impact and has made every effort to fully understand all of the economic impacts its recommendations might have on local communities.” However, the DoN used the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME, Metropolitan Statistical Area for its Economic area comparison for Brunswick NAS. The Portland MSA has a population of about 333,500, with the 4266 jobs lost, the percentage is -1.3% (-.0127) loss. Using the Portland MSA significantly minimizes the true effect of BNAS job losses. The Brunswick-Harpswell-Bath-Topsham population represents a more accurate population to assess the 4266 lost jobs from realigning BNAS. With a population of approximately 44,777 and with 4266 jobs lost the percentage is -10% (-.095) jobs lost. In a rural state, with small communities a 10% jobs loss is significant.

With the uncertainty of the ongoing War on Terrorism our nation can not afford to make a mistake and lose, or “mothball” a strategic location and lose the current resources of NAS Brunswick as it will require significant reinvestment to revive the facilities and personnel resources will not easily be available if realignment occurs. The Brunswick, mid-coast Maine regional community strongly supports BNAS mission, personnel and their families. Mainers like other Americans take homeland security and defense of our nation seriously. I thank you for considering my request to *keep Brunswick Naval Air Station fully operational, protecting the national security, homeland defense and maritime surveillance of the northeast region of the US.*

Kind regards,

Erenn Kiriell  
CDR MSC USN (Ret)

## NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK TASK FORCE – 2 JUNE 2005

**NASB is a strategic asset of great military value - *recognized as such by the BRAC process***

- Strategic location
- Ideal under all BRAC criteria (airspace, facilities, no encroachment, low operating cost, ability to accommodate future total force requirements)

**Realignment as proposed by the Navy/DOD contradicts and fails to leverage that military and strategic value to the Navy and the nation**

- Fails to optimize the defensive posture of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft force
  - Homeland Defense mission for MPA *certain but still evolving*
    - Maritime Domain Awareness initiative under NORTHCOM
    - Under the President's Maritime Security Directive - Jan 05
    - Under the USN/USCG Capabilities Integration Roadmap (Navy N6/7) -Summer 05
    - Under the Proliferation Security Initiative

**Realignment data from DOD shows a failure to include *any* mission requirements from NASB**

- Even a small mission requirement extends the payback period from 4 years out to beyond 5 years

**Realignment failed to consider upcoming Force Structure changes including the introduction of the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) in 2012**

- MMA will have no Intermediate Maintenance costs
- Intermediate maintenance savings are the *only* savings from realignment in the DOD case
- Eliminating these false savings post-MMA indicates that realignment will *never* reach payback

**Realignment failed to consider alternative scenarios which *would* be cost-effective**

- Introduction of MMA at Brunswick would eliminate 50% of the MILCON required at Jax by the realignment, and postpone the other 50%

**Realignment improperly calculated the economic impact on the midcoast, the State, and New England**

- Incorrect Metropolitan Statistical Area used by DOD
- Using correct statistics shows huge negative effects from removing 85% of NASB's active duty personnel (75% of the total NAS population)
  - Loss of \$132M in direct payrolls
  - Unemployment would increase from 4.7% to between 10-11% based upon the indirect job losses resulting from realignment.

**SUMMARY: *Realignment would degrade the defensive posture of the nation – it cannot be justified on a mission basis***

***Realignment would not result in savings to the Navy – it cannot be justified on a financial basis***

***Realignment would have economic effects on the region and State which also cannot be justified***

# **Economic Impact: Realignment of the Brunswick Naval Air Station May 27, 2005**

## **Summary:**

The economic impact to Brunswick and the surrounding Bath/Brunswick region as determined by the Department of Defense is flawed.

1. The Department of Defense has calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 5,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Of the total military positions at BNAS, only 2,718 are ACTIVE duty military. The remainder includes 1,341 reservists (SELRES) which are included in the full-time military payroll count along with 400+ SUPSHIP Naval personnel and 702 civilian positions. *Therefore, the base is essentially "mothballed" rather than realigned.*
2. The Department of Defense has assumed that Brunswick is located within the Portland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) for purposes of economic impact analysis. Brunswick is not located in the Portland SMSA and the numbers are flawed. The use of the Portland SMSA greatly impacts the analysis. *Therefore, the economic impact is far greater than reported.*
3. BNAS is located in the center of the Town of Brunswick and divides the community into two areas. By de facto "mothballing" the base, the inability of the community to seek redevelopment and reuse opportunities will substantially impact business, recreational, residential and job replacement opportunities. *Therefore, the ability of the community to recover is effectively stalled.*

The following should be specifically considered:

- BNAS realignment will result in a loss of 2,317 full time *active duty military* employees leaving the area. *This is a reduction of 85% of the total current active duty military. The assumption that BNAS will be reduced by only one-half is misleading.*
- Unemployment will more than double, increasing from 4.7% to between 10-11% based upon the indirect jobs that will be impacted by the realignment.
- Rental housing vacancies may increase by 1,500 units representing about 30% of the regional supply and 50% of the Brunswick of multifamily rental housing. (Source: RKG Associates)

- The local real estate market will decline and real estate value will decrease, especially in the multi-family and smaller home single family market.
- Lost opportunity costs will greatly impact the area's ability to recover job losses and revenue. The current plan to "realign" the base will be a de facto "mothballing" and will not enable the community to pursue reuse alternatives for recreation, industrial development, open space and other appropriate uses for the area. As currently planned, there will be no property declared surplus. The realignment will result in a reserve base and reserve bases do not generate a significant number of jobs.

This information is provided to encourage the Department of Defense to reconsider the recommendation for realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station. A preliminary REMI economic analysis has been run, however a number of issues involved in the measurement of military employment pre and post realignment need to be resolved before the model can be fully employed to understand the economic consequences.

This report is intended to capture major issues only and is organized with the following information:

- Labor Market Impact
- Payroll Impact
- Real Estate Impact
- School/Education Impact
- Retail Sales Impact
- Lost Opportunity Costs
- Military Retiree Community
- Spousal Impact
- Quality of Life Indices

### **Labor Market Impact:**

*Note: The following labor market information is specifically for the Town of Brunswick as the local area and the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market as a regional area.*

- BNAS employment (both civilian and military) represent over 33% of the Town of Brunswick labor force and 13% of the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market.
- Unemployment rates, as a result of realignment, would increase from 4.7% in February, 2005 to between 10% and 11% of the Bath/Brunswick Labor market, depending on base data used.
- The number of people employed in the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market would decrease by 7%.

<b>Town of Brunswick and Bath/Brunswick Regional Labor Market Impacts</b>		
	<b>NASB</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b><i>Town of Brunswick Labor Market:</i></b>		
Total BNAS Jobs	5,227	
Total Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market	10,687	
Total BNAS and Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market	15,914	
<b>Percent of BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market</b>		<b>33%</b>
Percent of Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market		67%
Total Percent BNAS and Non-BNAS employees		100%
<b><i>Bath/Brunswick Labor Market:</i></b>		
Total BNAS Jobs	5,227	
Total Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market	35,610	
Total BNAS and Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market	40,837	
<b>Percent of BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market</b>		<b>13%</b>
Percent of Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market		87%
Total Percent BNAS and Non-BNAS employees		100%
<b><i>Impact of BNAS Realignment on Labor Markets:</i></b>		
Civilian Job Losses (source: DOD)	61	
Indirect Job Loss Projections (source: SPO)	2,194	
Total Civilian and Indirect Job Loss	2,255	
Resulting Unemployment Rate in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market		10%
Resulting Bath/Brunswick Civilian Labor Market? Realignment	37,905	
Percent Decrease in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market Participation		7%

Source: Town of Brunswick Department of Economic Development

- BNAS realignment will result in a loss of 2,317 full time *active duty military* employees leaving the area. *This is a reduction of 85% of the total current active duty military and \$136,200,000 loss in direct and indirect earnings.*
- Military Reserves will be reduced, leaving 1,075 reserves at BNAS. These reserves operate on a weekend and reserve training basis only, with up to 50% residing outside the state. The reserves are primarily ground based reserves; no flight related staff will remain.

- **Civilian Jobs Loss:** The military identifies 61 civilian jobs that are to be cut. That is the “low projection”. If the present ratio of military to civilian support were to remain, the civilian job loss number may grow to as many as 615. That would more than double the present unemployment rate (including indirect job elimination).
- **Summary:** Overall, jobs will continue to decline as a result of the decline in military jobs through 2009 (REMI Model, May 2005). The result will be a depressed job market in the local economy.

### **Payroll Impact:**

BNAS produces \$295 million in direct and indirect payroll per year. To place this in context with the local area, that monetary amount is over half of all payrolls produced by employees in Sagadahoc County on an annual basis. Projections, (which do not include the high projection for lost civilian jobs) suggest a loss of \$136.2 million in payroll from the BNAS realignment, or over 50% of the BNAS present payroll.

<b>BNAS Payroll and Payroll Impacts Before Realignment</b>				
		Direct	Indirect	Total
BNAS Payroll	Civilian	\$22,000,000	\$10,800,000	\$32,800,000
	Military	\$125,000,000	\$53,400,000	\$178,400,000
Procurement		\$0.00	\$84,500,000	\$84,500,000
Total Earnings		\$147,000,000	\$148,700,000	\$295,700,000
Employment		5,227 employees	4,918 employees	10,145 employees
<b>BNAS Payroll Realignment Impacts</b>				
		Direct Loss	Indirect Loss	Total Loss
BNAS Payroll	Civilian	\$2,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$3,000,000
	Military	\$67,500,000	\$19,400,000	\$86,900,000
Procurement		\$0	\$46,300,000	\$46,000,000
Total Earning and Procurement Loss		\$69,500,000	\$66,700,000	\$135,900,000
Decrease from Realignment		-47%	-45%	-46%

Source: Brunswick DECD, State Planning Office, 2005

- Salaries can range (including salary and housing assistance) from \$42,990 to \$74,250. These salaries are within the median income range of the region; their loss will negatively impact average median salary.

- The preliminary REMI model calculating impact on various economic sectors in the region shows the following:
  - Retail sales loss of \$15.5 million annually.
  - Real estate and rental losses exceeding \$12.5 million annually.
  - The financial and insurance markets will decrease by almost \$12 million annually.
  - The construction industry will decline by almost \$10 million annually
  - Declines occur to 17 different sectors in the economy and are projected to continue through at least the next ten years.

### **Real Estate Impact:**

The impact to the Brunswick area real estate market will be dramatic. It should be viewed in three areas; impact on the Town government due to the privatization of military housing in November of 2004, impact on landlords/renters and impact on the home owner market.

#### *1. Navy Housing Privatization Impact on BNAS Realignment*

In November 2004 Brunswick and Topsham both entered into Agreements with GMH Communities Trust (Northeast Housing LLC) a partner with the Navy, which acquired housing units while enabling the Navy to retain the underlying land. As a result of this “military housing privatization”, Brunswick and Topsham started providing some services to the military housing in exchange for a payment in lieu of taxes.

In Brunswick, the Town expects to receive \$544,000 per year to provide negotiated services to 463 housing military housing units which are located “outside the fence”. The Town has anticipated receipt and expenditure of those funds as part of the budgeting process.

Loss of \$544,000 yearly income to the Town of Brunswick used to fund municipal services is significant. The Town of Topsham is similarly impacted although on a smaller scale. Topsham’s Agreement provides for \$180,000 in fees paid to the municipality for services provided under the terms of the Agreement. This loss would be proportionately significant for Topsham.

#### *2. Off Base Home Ownership Housing Impact:*

Military representatives estimate that up to 2,000 personnel live off base, with the majority residing in the towns of Brunswick, Bath and Topsham. Of the total off-base personnel, it is estimated that 500 own their own homes and 1,500 are in rental units. Up to 2,000 housing units within the core housing market area are at-risk for becoming vacant. Most of these units are at the middle to lower end of the housing market.

The flow of BNAS personnel from the housing market will depress the local housing market and significantly depress the local construction industry. It is estimated that 56% of the military families live in Brunswick, suggesting that as many as 149 homes may be owned by military personnel. Approximately one fifth of those homes purchased each year are new construction, therefore, the loss of annual construction revenue to Brunswick is \$5.9 million.

The housing market will see a flood of homes put on the market which will have a negative impact on the number of properties sold and total sales, resulting in substantial losses to the local, regional and state real estate economy. Assuming that military families make up 149 home purchases in any one year in Brunswick, the loss of buyers could impact the number of properties sold, reducing the number of sales by between 31% and 54% annually.

<b>Brunswick Residential Property Sales</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b># Of Properties Sold</b>	<b>Total Sales</b>
2001	276	\$42,307,896
2002	390	\$59,370,250.40
2003	453	\$82,550,781
2004	482	\$114,112,534
2005	71 (1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter)	\$15,989,210 (1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter)

Source: Brunswick Assessing Office: 2005

### *3. Rental Market Impact:*

The impact on rents and price levels in the community would be substantial. It is estimated that Navy personnel living in private housing in the communities account for 30-35% of those living in multifamily units. Taking privatization and off base housing together, current Navy plans would result in 50% of the apartments becoming vacant. This will result in a dramatic loss of rental income to landlords, devaluation of property values and loss of tax income to the towns, the potential for disinvestment and other social and economic impacts.

### **School/Education Impact:**

Children of military employees at BNAS average approximately 20% of the student population in the Town of Brunswick School Department each year. In the past ten years, between 595 to 671 military-dependent children have been included in the approximate 3,300 total school population. In addition to the positive social benefits that these children have brought to the community, the School Department receives approximately \$1.1 million in Federal Education

Aid. (Source: Brunswick School Department)

Lost students and lost funding would all decrease the quality of education provided to the remaining residents of Brunswick by reducing the diversity of students and the programs that can be offered.

MSAD 75, the school system for Topsham residents has approximately 10% of the student body comprised of military dependents. The loss of impact aid to the MSAD is estimated to be in the range of \$150,000.

#### Impact on Local Colleges

- University of Maine-Augusta (located in Bath) currently enrolls approximately 400 students. Of that total, 20 - 25% are active duty or dependents of active duty military, which calculates to 80 -100 students. Base realignment would result in the loss of approximately \$400,000 in revenue, reduced class offerings and loss of employment. (Source: University of Maine-Augusta/Bath campus)
- Southern Maine Community College estimates a decline in student enrollment by 10-15%. The college would correspondingly reduce classes and professors. (Source: SMTC)
- Southern New Hampshire University located in Brunswick enrolls between 800 to 1,000 students each semester. Approximately 50% of those students are active duty military or active duty military dependents participating in both graduate and undergraduate courses. The loss of those students would impact SNHU significantly in reduction of classes, professors and loss of approximately \$450,000 in revenue. (Source: SNHU)

### **Lost Opportunity Costs:**

The geographic location of BNAS is significant. The over 3,000 acres which make up the base bisect the Town of Brunswick into two separate commercial and residential areas. Any decision to de facto "mothball" the base will deprive the community and the state of the opportunity to reuse portions for recreation, open space, industrial development, housing, job replacement activities and many other uses that contribute to the health and vitality of a community. As an operational base, the personnel significantly contribute to the community. As a "mothballed" base, the land, and resulting lack of activity will divide the community. The lost redevelopment and/or lost joint reuse opportunities should be considered as a significant adverse economic and social impact. Plans are underway to develop a joint reserve facility on the base. In four previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission recommended 27 actions in which a reserve enclave was to be established at a closed or realigned base. In the 1995 round, the GAO recommended that DoD should clearly state what infrastructure was needed which would result in retention of appropriate acreage. (Source NAID/ADC infobrief May 2005)

## **Retail Sales Impact:**

It is estimated that 83% of BNAS military personnel live in Brunswick, or its surrounding communities. (Source: RKG using BNAS zip code data) With a payroll reduction of \$69.5 million, it can be expected that the impact in retail sales will be significant. The preliminary REMI model suggests that there would be a decrease of \$22.9 million in retail trade venues throughout Cumberland County. The Brunswick area would be hardest hit.

Assuming that 50% of the military payroll is spent in Brunswick and applying an average disposable income figure for military families of 33%, the annual retail sales loss would be approximately \$11 million per year. This would likely apply across all retail categories. Its impact on the local economy is substantial.

## **Military Retiree Community**

An estimated 5,700 military retiree's and family members live in the area to take advantage of the region and of BNAS. (Source NASB 2004 Report to Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission) The impact of base realignment on this group is unknown however; it is known that currently 60% of all commissary customers are military retirees. Of the total commissary customers, 33% are active duty, 7% are reserves and the remainder is retirees.

(Source: Base Commissary)

## **Spousal Impact:**

Between 60-75% of all full-time active duty military spouses work in the local job market. The role of spouses in the local economy can not be overstated. Recent surveys of the job center suggests that military spouses play an important role in participating in local part time jobs as well as participating to fill both part time and full time teaching needs in the school system. They are also active volunteers.

## **Quality of Life Indices:**

The national media views Brunswick as a great location to live. The cultural and natural amenities it offers attract many looking to relocate to a unique and special place. Among the military, Brunswick is a very popular place to retire, with the existing base being a critical reason for that choice. Over 5,700 military retirees and their families have chosen to live in the Brunswick area (Census, Town of Brunswick).

Other publications that find Brunswick a great place to live are:

- Cyclists: AARP (Nov. /Dec. issues) identified Brunswick as the 8<sup>th</sup> best place to cycle in the nation.
- Money magazine identifies Brunswick as the 3<sup>rd</sup> best place to retire (July, 2000).
- Outside Magazine identifies Brunswick as one of the Top 40 College Towns in the Country.
- Brunswick has been featured as a top retirement community in *Where to Retire* (November, 2003), *The New Retirement: The Ultimate Guide to the Rest of Your Life* (Cull inane, Fitzgerald), and *Where to Retire in Maine* (Doudera).

The popularity of Brunswick as a place to live extends to the military as well. Expansion Management published the results of a survey in its magazine in November of 2004. Among the 354 metropolitan areas that house military bases, Brunswick was ranked 74, or in the upper 20%. The report, which tested for a variety of quality of life indices, ranked Brunswick high in quality of life, education, lack of crime, housing availability, recreation and leisure, among others. Brunswick ranked number one in its population group for having the lowest crime rate. These and many other characteristics make Brunswick one of the top places for military personnel to live or retire.

**Economic Impacts**  
**Brunswick Naval Air Station Realignment**  
**June 2, 2005**

- A loss of 2,317 full time active duty military employees leaving the area is a reduction of 85% of the active duty military and 75% of all employees existing on the base today.
- The Navy used the Portland Labor Market to assess the impact of losing 4,266 military and civilian jobs. The impact was reported as a 1.3% loss in jobs. This is wrong as Brunswick is not part of Portland Labor Market but part of the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market. The impact to the Bath/Brunswick market would be a loss of 10% of the area jobs. This would be one of the highest percentage of jobs lost of any of the effected communities in the BRAC process. It would be devastating to the area.

BNAS produces \$295 million in direct and indirect payroll per year. A conservative reading of the impact will result in a loss of \$136 million in yearly payroll into the local economy.

- Retail sales loss is estimated at \$15.5 million annually
  - Real Estate and rental losses will exceed \$12.5 million annually
  - Financial and insurance industries will decrease by \$12 million annually and construction will decline by an estimated \$10 million annually
- Rental housing vacancies will be hard hit with 1,500 units flooding the market. This could create a 50% vacancy rate in multifamily units in Brunswick and could create 30% vacancy rate in multifamily units the region.
  - The unemployment rate in the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market could more than double from 4.5% to 10% from the loss of non-military jobs.
  - Lost opportunity costs will dim recovery for the region as opportunities for reuse will not be available. The Town is in need of industrial development, recreational opportunities and expanded housing. The proposed realignment virtually leaves the Town and Region with no resources to recover from the economic impact proposed by the realignment.
  - Town government will be hard hit with the potential loss of over \$550,000 in housing privatization funds and \$1.1 million in school subsidy funds for military families, along with the loss of cultural diversity and community involvement of the military and their dependents.

# State of Maine

In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Five

## JOINT RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO MANDATE THAT THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION REJECT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S RECOMMENDATION TO REALIGN NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK AND TO CLOSE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD AND THE DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE IN LIMESTONE

WE, your Memorialists, the Members of the One Hundred and Twenty-second Legislature of the State of Maine now assembled in the First Special Session, most respectfully present and petition the Congress of the United States as follows:

**WHEREAS**, the military value of Naval Air Station Brunswick, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Limestone is highly significant; and

**WHEREAS**, the security of the North Atlantic seaways and the borders of the United States and of the State of Maine are jeopardized by the Department of Defense's recommendation to close Naval Air Station Brunswick, which would put the safety and welfare of United States citizens at risk; and

**WHEREAS**, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine was recently cited by the United States Navy as the most efficient submarine repair facility, public or private, in the Nation; and

**WHEREAS**, the economic and job loss impact of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendations is significant in terms of the potential elimination of an estimated 12,000 military and civilian jobs in both Maine and New Hampshire; and

**WHEREAS**, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission will tour Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery on June 1, 2005 and Naval Air Station Brunswick on June 2, 2005, and the commission's regional hearing on recommendations affecting Maine will occur July 6, 2005, with final recommendations to be made to President Bush by September 8, 2005; now, therefore, be it

**RESOLVED**: That We, your Memorialists, on behalf of the people we represent, respectfully urge and request that the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the United States Congress actively work with the Honorable John E. Baldacci, Governor of Maine, the Maine State Legislature, local task forces and Maine citizens in reviewing the accuracy of the methodology used in developing current recommendations in order to reverse or minimize the recommendations to realign Naval Air Station Brunswick and to close Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Limestone; and be it further


**RESOLVED**: That suitable copies of this resolution, duly authenticated by the Secretary of State, be transmitted to the Honorable George W. Bush, President of the United States, the President of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and each Member of the Maine Congressional Delegation.


# Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine

*“The last active duty DOD airfield  
remaining in New England”*

*Brief for*

## BRAC Commission





## **Missions/Support Functions**

- 39 Tenant Commands
- 4,694 Military and Civilian Personnel
- SUPSHIP / AEGIS Support
- Rangeley / SERE School (FASO)
- Transient Aircraft Support




# NAS Brunswick Airfield




Dual 8,000 foot runways/24 hour ops

175,000 sq ft hangar with apron

# NO ENCROACHMENT





310  
MAW



## Airfield Support Customers





## NASB Squadrons (Current)

VP-8, 10, 26	P-3C	27	Maritime Patrol	Active
VPU-1	P-3C	4	Special Projects	Active
VP-92	P-3C	6	Maritime Patrol	Reserve
VR-62	C-130	3	Cargo Transport	Reserve

## Personnel

### Base & Tenant Commands

Active Duty Personnel	2,710
Civilian Personnel	643
TOTAL	3,353

### Drilling Reservists


1,341

### Off-Base Supported Activities

Military Personnel	1,075
Civilian Personnel	301
TOTAL	1,376

## Increased Facility Efficiency

- Demolition  
Since 1997, NASB has demolished 45 buildings totaling 628,698 SF
- Reduced fuel consumption by 40% and fuel budget by 48%
- Facilities Index – FCI 0.051  
“The relative condition of facilities -a ratio of the cost of maintenance deficiencies to the current replacement value”



## Past Initiatives

- **DSM Boiler Consolidation - \$838k annually**
  - Labor Savings from Steam Plant manning and maintenance avoidance is 10.2 FTEs (\$518k/year)
  - Energy Savings is \$320k per year (40% reduce)
- **Demolition Program – \$1.2M annually**
  - Since 1997, demolished 45 buildings, 628,698 SF
  - O&M savings of \$700k/year based on DoD Cost Manual
  - Energy avoidance savings of \$500k/year based on historic cost per square foot base wide.
- **DSM Energy Work**
  - Energy consumption savings of \$210k/year

## Recent Recapitalization


- Hangar 6 - Six bays (\$33.9M)
- Airfield Tower (\$8.2M)
- Tower Electronics & Communications Suite (\$5.0M)
- Runway Recapitalization (\$10.7M)
- Ramp & Taxiway Repairs (\$8.7M)
- Family Housing - Phases I, II & III - 220 Homes (\$33.4M)
- Transient Quarters (\$17.7M)
- Re-Locate Base Entrance (\$1.65M)
- Separate Truck & Vendor Entrance (\$1.3 M)
- Small Arms Range (\$940K)
- Construct Security Building (\$750K)
- Replace Flight Line & Weapons Fence (\$1.0M)
- Construct MWD Kennel (\$346K)




**Multi-Mission Aircraft – Boeing 737**

## Any P-3 or MMA

6 BAYS FOR P-3/737-700




## Hangar 6 – Completed Mar. '05



## New Transient Barracks – 500 Beds



5.7 mps  
Army Work on  
has had  
for clean



**New Tower – Under Construction**

## **Joint Armed Forces Reserve Center**

**Me. Nat'l Guard Installation #23A60  
At NAS Brunswick**

- Army Nat'l Guard, Air Force National Guard & Marine Corps Reserves
- Combat, Engineering & Communication Units
- 16 Acres at NAS Brunswick
- 220,000 sq. ft. two-story building
- 374 Vehicles, box trailers, bulldozers, Oshkosh, etc.
- 976 personnel – monthly utilization
- \$41.9 Million
- NG is targeting FYDP in '05 for '07 Add-On

*16 acres  
will move into  
vacation bldgs  
if using  
money*



## Base and Tenant Activity Personnel

Apr 05

<u>Base Commands</u>	Mill	Civ	Total	<u>Supported Activities</u>	Mill	Civ	Total
NASB/CNRNE	323	398	721	SUPSHR Bath	18	178	196
CPRW5 & Squadrons	1,364	7	1,371	PCU's (Pre-Commissioning)	420	20	440
AIM Det Brunswick	234	0	234	NMCB-27 (SELRES)	400	0	400
FASO	79	16	95	Marine Corps (Act. Duty)	10	0	10
NAVMEDCLINIC	61	30	91	(SELRES)	0	0	160
Commissary (DECA)	0	39	39	NCTAMS Cutler Harbor	0	0	80
PERSUPDET	23	8	31	NAVSAT Prospect Harbor	36	0	24
Air Reserve Ctr.(TAR)	333	0	333	U.S. Army Recruiting HQ	16	0	31
(SELRES) 1,040	0	1,040		Navy Recruiting	15	0	15
Surface Res. Ctr. (TAR)	11	0	11	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,075</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>1,376</b>
(SELRES) 201	0	201					
NMCB-27 (TAR)	8	0	8	Active Duty Family Members			5,064
(SELRES) 100	0	100		Retires and Family Members			5,720
Other Tenants	231	204	435				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,008</b>	<b>702</b>	<b>4,710</b>	<b>TOTAL NAVY COMMUNITY</b>			<b>17,490</b>

**CAPT Mike Hewitt**  
**Commander, Patrol &**  
**Reconnaissance Wing FIVE**

THIS SLIDE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**NAS Whidbey Island**  
**COMPATRECWING 10**  
 VP-1 VP-40  
 VP-46 VP-69  
 VQ-1

**NAS Brunswick**  
**COMPATRECWING 5**  
 VP-8 VP-10  
 VP-26 VP-92  
 VPU-1

**NAS Willow Grove**  
**COMRESPATFOR**  
 VP-64 VP-66

**Norfolk, VA**  
**COMPATRECGRU**

**NAS Jacksonville**  
**COMPATRECWING 11**  
 VP-5 VP-16 VP-45 VP-30  
 VP-62  
 VQ-2 (At NAVSTA Rota)


**MCB Kaneohe**  
**COMPATRECWING 2**  
 VP-4 VP-9  
 VP-47 VPU-2

**NAS New Orleans**  
 VP-94

**NAS Pt. Mugu**  
 VP-65

Revised 4 September 1994  
 2/112x

## P-3C Basing and Operating Sites



## Supporting Homeland Defense

- **12-hour Ready Alert Aircraft**
  - Strike Capable, ISR Platform
  - Harpoon / Maverick / SLAM
- **Tactical Support Center**
  - Full C4I Connectivity
    - ✓ SATHCOM
    - ✓ Data Link
    - ✓ Imagery Transfer

NAS Brunswick  
 CPRW-5  
 VP-8 VP-10  
 VP-26 VP-92  
 VPU-1

THIS SLIDE IS UNCLASSIFIED



## NAS Brunswick's Strategic Importance



## P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-3C Follow-on)



THIS SLIDE IS UNCLASSIFIED





## NAVAL AIR RESERVE

Brief to BRAC Commission  
2 June, 2005  
CAPT Alan LaBeouf

1

## Mission and Vision



The mission of the Navy Reserve is to provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy/Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations from peace to war

The vision of the Navy Reserve is:

Support to the Fleet...*Ready and Fully Integrated*

2

## NAR Brunswick



- Full-Time Support Staff (FTS)
  - 6 Officers, 41 Enlisted
- Provide administrative support to:
  - 2 RESFORONs (250 DRILRES, 289 FTS)
  - 2 augmentation units (630 DRILRES)
- Units located across 4 states
  - ME, NH, MA, RI
  - Training Units/Reservists from Bangor due to BRAC
  - Ongoing Reservist demographics
    - Total living in Maine = 390
    - Total living outside Maine = 490

3

## Mobilization



- 75% of all Reservists eligible for mobilization
  - have been mobilized in support of GWOT
- Total of 313 to date
- Currently mobilized:
  - A-62: 13 Aircrew
  - MCB -27: 12 Seabees
  - Joint Intel Center: 10 Intelligence analysts
  - Medical: 6 Doctors, Dentists, Medical support
  - Other: 2

4

## Operational Support



- Operational support provided to Active component commands throughout the month (e.g. April)
  - 52 man-days to NAS Brunswick storefronts
  - 24 man-days to CPRW-5
  - 56 man-days to Branch Medical Clinic Brunswick
  - 24 man-days to SUPSHIP Bath and Naval Shipyard Portsmouth
- Over active duty support on-going to gaining commands and activities such as Fleet Week and various Fleet training exercises
- Provide capability for Fleet Response Plan

5

## Active/Reserve Integration



- Ultimate goal is to achieve full Active/Reserve component Integration (ARI)
- Units integrated at the operational level
  - MOCC/TSC & CPRW-5
  - VP-92 & VP-26
  - NAVSEA 112 & NAVSEA
  - NAVAIR 0197/NAWC AD 0393 & NAVAIR
  - Naval Security Force Brunswick & NAS Brunswick
- Preparing for next phase of integration

6

Questions?



7



UNITED STATES SENATOR · MAINE  
**SUSAN COLLINS**  
P R E S S R E L E A S E



## **Maine Delegation: Homeland Defense Strategy Makes the Case for NASB and Navy's Maritime Patrol Fleet**

**With NASB "located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes," it is "uniquely positioned" to guard the Northeast's maritime approaches**

FOR IMMEDIATE  
RELEASE

Contact: Jen Burita or Amy  
Swanstrom

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Phone: 202-224-2523

Washington, D.C. –U.S. Senators Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins and U.S. Representatives Tom Allen and Mike Michaud have written to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale making a strong case for the unique and vital role the Brunswick Naval Air Station (NASB) plays in protecting the nation's homeland security. The members cited findings contained in the pre-decisional draft of Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, a White House report of analysis and recommendations on elements of a comprehensive national homeland security plan.

"As Members of Congress from Maine, a state with a long coastline and significant maritime commercial interests, we recognize that guarding maritime approaches is an essential component in protecting the homeland," the Delegation Members wrote. "We are pleased to see that the (President's homeland security) strategy gives extensive consideration to the critical maritime aspects of homeland defense. We are strong supporters of the Navy's maritime patrol fleet. We believe that this community, with its P-3C Orion aircraft and the next generation Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), form an indispensable component to the overall homeland defense strategy."


The Members noted that the existing maritime patrol fleet provides what the report calls for by way of a "persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the U.S. maritime approaches." They stressed that NASB, teamed with bases in Florida, California and Washington ensures maritime patrol cover of the "four corners"

of the continental United States. With a fifth base in Hawaii, the existing P-3 fleet is “optimally based to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness.” They added that the maritime patrol fleet’s forthcoming transition to the even more modern MMA’s with increased capabilities will allow a response time from these bases to any point on the nation’s coast of less than two hours.

“Naval Air Station Brunswick is located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes,” the Members wrote. “Aircrews from NAS Brunswick have been flying in support of Vigilant Shield since September 11, 2001. As the only capable active duty airfield in the Northeast, the base is uniquely positioned to provide awareness of the maritime approaches and protect the economically critical ports in the region.”

The Delegation sent copies of the letter to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Homeland Security Adviser Frances Fragos Townsend, and U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thomas H. Collins.

“We welcome the development of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support as a critical step toward ensuring we have the right strategy, capabilities and force structure to defend the homeland,” the Members concluded. “It is clear that the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol fleet will be an indispensable part of this strategy.”



## Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations

In the business of homeland defense (as in real estate), location is the key. Imagine a naval search for a single, relatively small merchant ship, which intelligence sources have revealed has a hold full of weaponized chemicals. Its destination is a major coastal city. After tense hours of searching, a maritime patrol aircraft locates two possible suspect vessels out of hundreds in one of the world's busiest maritime areas. The aircraft directs two fast naval frigates to the vicinity of the targets. The frigates and their onboard helicopters intercept and challenge the target vessels. One vessel submits to search and is determined to be harmless. The other however, resists interception and boarding. Finally, helicopter-borne special operations commandoes descend upon the vessel, board and secure the ship and its potentially deadly cargo.

This scenario actually occurred in the western Mediterranean Sea last month. The weapons of mass destruction seized were simulated; the entire sequence of events part of a successful exercise of Maritime Interdiction Operations conducted by forces of four NATO nations.

Maritime interdiction capability is a hot item right now for defense planners, a particularly important focus of a larger effort known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is being advanced by 15 core member nations, brought together at the request of President Bush last year to develop cooperative diplomatic, military, and intelligence means to stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many of the maritime interdiction precepts under PSI are evolving from a multinational "game" conducted last September at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and refining these concepts and procedures is clearly a high priority for the

nations involved. Japan recently hosted the latest multinational PSI exercise, the twelfth in the short time since the Initiative began.

As the Mediterranean exercise and others showed, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are a critical, almost always essential part of successful maritime interdiction. Whether conducting a broad-area search, refining a datum provided by other (including national) sensors, or vectoring surface, rotary-wing or special-warfare assets to a target, MPA are a key link in the chain from initial intelligence to intercept. MPA are of particular value in crowded shipping lanes, in areas of poor weather or visibility. No other platform is as versatile in this mission area, one as old and enduring as naval aviation itself. *But land-based aircraft need bases to fly from – bases which optimize their speed, range, and turnaround capability on missions protecting the nation's most vital areas.* The seaborne WMD threat has become primary. Maritime interdiction platforms and infrastructure must be top concerns for naval strategists and planners.

Fortunately help is on the way, again from patrol aviation. The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) promises a substantial increase in capability for commanders responsible for maritime interdiction. Based on the Boeing 737-800, the MMA will bring increased speed, range, and reliability compared to the current workhorse MPA, the P-3C Orion. MMA sensors for interdiction missions will include a new electro-optical and infrared spectrum sensor, moving target indicators, an enhanced inverse synthetic aperture / synthetic aperture radar, and a new signals intelligence suite. Perhaps best of all, MMA will control and exploit the capabilities of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

The aircraft themselves will certainly be fantastic, but land-based planes are only as good as the base they operate from, and the future homes for MMA/BAMS have not yet been identified. Conventional wisdom has it that the transition from the P-3 force to one of fewer than half as many MMA will inevitably result in a reduction in the number of maritime patrol aircraft bases in the U.S. This assumption may be incorrect, since ***optimum basing for maritime interdiction assets is as important as the assets themselves.*** Bases must be located to provide *rapid response* to all coastal areas, particularly those containing major population centers and port facilities. They must be *versatile*, able to support not just MPA, but rotary wing units and special warfare forces with *easy access, unencumbered space and facilities for joint, coordinated training, and self-protection and security* from intrusion or attack. Maritime interdiction is a team game, and collocation of the assets for training and operations is essential.

The current MPA force laydown includes P-3 bases at Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii, Jacksonville, Florida, Brunswick, Maine, and Whidbey Island in Washington State. A robust P-3 capability is maintained for fleet support and other missions at the North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego. These last four bases, at the “corners” of the continental U.S. are perfectly situated for maritime interdiction of WMD threats. From these sites, MMA response time to any point on the coast will be less than two hours, and all major sea lanes of

approach can be covered within the 1200 – 1500 nautical mile operational range of the aircraft.

All four sites have their advantages, and all are essential to that coverage. For example, the **Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine** has remarkable potential as a *joint forces maritime interdiction center* under the PSI initiative:

- The only remaining fully capable active-duty military airfield in the northeastern U.S. and near its coastal cities – **a region of over 48 million people**.
- Immediately adjacent to all major sea lanes in the North Atlantic.
- More than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise missions.
- Versatile and extensive modern facilities (including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and BAMS) and land with no encroachment issues.
- An established all-weather training area available for Special Forces and other units.
- Completely secured perimeter and outstanding force protection layout and capability.
- Easy access by all forms of transportation.

The ports and shipping lanes to the northeastern region of the United States deserve the protection which can only be provided by maritime interdiction forces operating from a base within that region. Obviously transatlantic shipping is critical to our nation's economy, but as west coast ports operate at capacity, more and more operators are redirecting their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast. These shippers prefer to have their cargo spend the additional 7 to 10 days at sea rather than accept delays at west coast ports and during rail transport across the continent. Container traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five years, the fastest rate of growth in over 50 years. All of the enormous volume of shipping to the region must be monitored, and if necessary interdicted whenever it may pose a threat.

The Defense Department's Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) will in 2005 identify military infrastructure for permanent elimination. The BRAC process ***must carefully factor in future requirements for maritime interdiction as they are just now being developed under the PSI***. Caution is indicated - the nation cannot afford to close irreplaceable military facilities just as new concepts and capabilities are being developed to address a burgeoning threat. *Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction headed for our shores is zero-defect work*, and the selection of bases for that effort must be equally judicious and effective. **Location is an enduring essential – we must keep open our bases “at the corners.”**

## **NEW MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES ARE CRITICAL TO DEFENSE OF OUR HOMELAND AND OUR ECONOMY**

Anyone who has flown on a commercial aircraft in the last couple of years must be impressed with the effort and investment the federal government has put into coordinated efforts to defend against terrorism from our skies. Efforts are now being accelerated in an arena less visible to the general public, but even more critical to our safety and our economy. That arena is maritime security and maritime defense. Last December President Bush announced his Maritime Security Policy National Security/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD/HSPD), and measures to implement the directive are now gathering momentum.

### **THE THREAT**

Analysis of the potential threat from the sea has been extensive, including multiple studies by the Congressional Research Service. The results are sobering. Threat scenarios include:

- Use of commercial cargo containers to smuggle terrorists, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons into the United States. (One study looked exclusively at the potential for terrorist nuclear attack using an oil tanker – a particularly difficult threat to detect and interdict)
- Use of a large commercial cargo ship as a collision weapon for destroying a refinery or bridge located on the waterfront
- Sinking of a large cargo ship in a major shipping channel, blocking all traffic to and from that port
- Detonation of a liquefied natural gas or other volatile fuel carrier to cause a massive in-port explosion.

The threat is not limited to Long Beach or Seattle. All maritime regions of the U.S. face these threats, including (increasingly) the northeastern region. Transatlantic shipping is obviously important, but more and more operators are redirecting their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast in order to avoid delays at west coast ports and during rail transport cross-country. Container traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five years.

### **THE POTENTIAL COST OF FAILURE**

Defending against the above threats or others must be a zero-defect game – the cost of one failure could permanently alter the American economy and our way of life. The studies show that detonation of a relatively small (10-20 kiloton yield) and readily transportable nuclear weapon in a port city would immediately kill 50 thousand to one million people. Direct damage to property

would run from a minimum of 50 Billion dollars to as high as 500 Billion dollars. Worse yet, the myriad indirect costs would range as high as 1.3 Trillion dollars.

## MEETING THE THREAT

The President's Directive lays out a strategic vision for maritime security and defense, and that vision, like the recent effort on global intelligence, stresses inter-agency coordination to pull existing and emerging practices together as efficiently and quickly as possible. A new, standing Maritime Security Policy Committee will work to that end.

Developing the national strategy which will be used in executing the vision will be at least as difficult as getting the players to talk to one another, and may take even longer. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security will take the lead here. One focus already identified will be **Maritime Domain Awareness** (MDA). Effective MDA will result in a seamless picture of what is happening on the world's oceans at any given moment.

While the NSPS/HSPD addresses on-shore preparedness and recovery planning and standards should an attack from the sea occur, its importance lies in directing the imagination and energy of all stakeholders toward preventing a catastrophe in the first place. Moving rapidly to leverage the work which has been done already in this area, efforts will include expanding the scope of the **Container Security Initiative** (CSI), a program in which U.S. Customs and other officials inspect and screen shipping containers destined for this country as they are loaded at foreign ports. Many of the world's largest ports have agreed to join the Initiative. A related program called the **Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism** (C-TPAT) is even more ambitious in that it attempts to ensure cargo security throughout the entire supply chain from manufacture until ultimate delivery. Companies participating in C-TPAT will see their goods receive reduced inspection requirements and delays in return for taking personnel security and other measures to prevent their shipments from becoming vehicles for terrorists or their weapons. A third program, still in the pilot stage, called **Operation Safe Commerce**, is meant to evaluate technologies which may enable agencies to rapidly verify the contents of shipments and effectively track them end-to-end.

## SOME CERTAINTIES IN THE EFFORT

While much of the eventual strategy and many of the tools needed for maritime defense of the homeland remain to be determined, some assumptions are approaching the status of sure things:

- Inspections won't get the job done. With over six million cargo containers arriving in the U.S. every year, the physical task is just too great. At the port of Baltimore for example, only about 2% of

arriving containers is visually inspected. Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), retired Coast Guard Admiral James Loy, admits that significant inspections would be “economically intolerable.”

- It's not just port security. *Defense in depth* will be essential, and seamless MDA will be the key. Current Joint Doctrine under the national strategy for Homeland Security calls for DHS and the Defense Department to “locate and defeat threats as far from the homeland as possible.” We cannot afford to wait to detect or interdict threats when they are in the approaches to our ports and harbors.
- International help will be critical. Recognizing this well prior to the NSPD/HSPD, President Bush has pulled together 15 core nations in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to develop cooperative intelligence *and military* means to identify and then stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass destruction. Numerous military exercises are being conducted to develop and hone procedures for interdiction of such threats while they are still at sea.
- Recapitalization of the Coast Guard is absolutely crucial. Responsible for security at 361 U.S. ports, the service desperately needs to replace its aged inventory of equipment, gear which is now falling apart under a withering post - 9/11 operations tempo. The Coast Guard has packaged this recapitalization program as the **“Integrated Deepwater System.”** Three classes of new cutters, as well as a number of new patrol boats, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV'S) and fixed-wing aircraft are projected between now and 2022. These assets, though more capable than those they replace, will be far fewer in number and therefore true replacements rather than a (needed) expansion of capability. Deepwater is a multi-billion dollar program, and whether or not it is a revolutionary “system of systems” (as the service would have it) or a way to market its requirements to meet exponentially expanded missions, it is definitely an investment opportunity the nation can ignore only at great risk. Full funding for the Coast Guard's **Automated Identification System** for monitoring ships near the U.S. coastline is an important component.
- The “Coasties” can't do it alone. Defense in depth will mandate a big role for the Navy. (Operations where DOD has the lead (and DHS follows) are categorized as “Homeland Defense.” All others (when DHS has the lead) are designated “Homeland Security” operations). Fortunately, cooperation among DHS, the Coast Guard, and the Navy has never been better. In his Guidance for 2005, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark established “expanded maritime interdiction operations (MIO) as a core USN capability.” He also called for a “capabilities integration roadmap” for the Navy and Coast Guard to use in support of the global war on

terror, as well as a national Global Maritime Intelligence Center to integrate DHS and DOD information. Not surprisingly, Admiral Clark also called for the resources to support his surveillance, MIO, and maritime homeland protection efforts.

- Satellites won't be enough for MDA. While "national sensors" are crucial in maintaining the big picture, ships, helicopters, land-based maritime patrol aircraft, and special operations units will all be needed. A merchant ship traveling at 21 knots can cover over 1000 miles in a 48 hour period, so coordinated forces must be at the ready to not just monitor, but when necessary interdict or seize threat vessels on short notice. Transfers at sea must be closely scrutinized. Also, deterrence requires platforms that can be seen from the potential threat vessels themselves, a role for patrol aircraft in numbers. Exercises under the PSI have reinforced the vital role of maritime patrol planes in their traditional roles of search, surveillance, and command and control. The Navy's next-generation patrol plane (the Multimission Maritime Aircraft) and its supporting platform, the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV, are under development now and will be essential in both the MDA and MIO efforts.
- Tankers are a unique threat vector in their own right. Detection of nuclear (or other WMD) material concealed within a large or very large crude carrier is an exceptionally difficult technical challenge. A "Tanker Security Initiative," similar to the CSI program for container ships, may be warranted.

## **PUBLIC SUPPORT ESSENTIAL**

Many of the components required to fully implement the President's Directive will require new or expanded funding lines, funding which must be addressed during the current federal budget cycle. Public discussion will be required to focus congressional attention on the issues, and to raise awareness of the threat to all coastal regions of the United States, our national economy, and our way of life. Failure is certainly not an option, and time is not on our side.

## **(SIDEBAR) – BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC) MUST CONSIDER EMERGING REQUIREMENTS FOR MARITIME DEFENSE**

As work to implement the President's Directive on Maritime Security now gets underway, another effort is approaching the end-game. The Base Realignment and Closure process conducted by the Department of Defense will be all over by the end of 2005. In fact, DOD will forward its list of bases and other installations recommended for closure to the BRAC Commission in early May.

Unfortunately, *geography and basing matter in maritime security and defense*. Development of concepts of operations for maritime defense of the homeland will take years. Those "CONOPS" will drive force structure and force laydown decisions, and then infrastructure requirements. A geographic spread of ships, patrol aircraft, helicopters, and UAV's will be needed to support maritime domain awareness in depth, and to enable rapid interdiction of short-fused threats anywhere along our coasts.

Hasty base closure decisions during this time of unprecedented evolution of military missions and functions could induce tremendous risk, risk which must not be taken. While many communities fear the economic impact of a base closure, the real danger associated with BRAC is that a mistake might permit even a single failure in the maritime defense of our homeland – with devastating economic consequences for every American. DOD must keep its maritime basing options open while it sorts out its emerging requirements in this crucial arena.

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 18, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

We have had the opportunity to review the pre-decisional draft of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. We commend the President and you for your leadership on this initiative, and offer our assistance in helping to implement this strategy.

In particular, we are pleased to see that the strategy gives extensive consideration to the critical maritime aspects of homeland defense. As Members of Congress from Maine, a state with a long coastline and significant maritime commercial interests, we recognize that guarding maritime approaches is an essential component in protecting the homeland.

We are strong supporters of the Navy's maritime patrol fleet. We believe that this community, with its P-3C Orion aircraft and the next generation Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), form an indispensable component to the overall homeland defense strategy:

1. Among its strategic goals and key objectives, the strategy states that as part of the layered defense concept, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are working to "integrate U.S. maritime defense and to optimize the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard." It quotes the Chief of Naval Operations on the need to identify, track and intercept threats before they reach U.S. shores, and to "extend the security of the United States seaward." The P-3 is perfectly suited for this mission, and has already adopted an array of joint intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-surface warfare activities. With its extended range, speed, and sensor suite, the MMA will offer even more capability.
2. The strategy identifies the need for core capabilities to (a) detect and track potential maritime threats effectively, (b) intercept and defeat threats in the maritime approaches, and (c) direct consequence management.

The maritime patrol fleet provides these capabilities today, to help “ensure persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the U.S. maritime approaches.” With maritime patrol bases located at the “four corners” of the continental United States, as well as on Hawaii, the P-3 fleet is optimally based to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness. In the future, the MMA’s increased capabilities will allow a response time to any point on the coast of less than two hours from these bases. All major sea lanes of approach can be covered within operational range of the aircraft. As an example, Naval Air Station Brunswick is located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes. As the only capable active duty airfield in the Northeast, the base is uniquely positioned to provide awareness of the maritime approaches and protect the economically critical ports in the region. Aircrews from NAS Brunswick have been flying in support of Vigilant Shield since September 11, 2001.

The strategy also calls for enhanced international collaboration to establish maritime domain awareness of identification and interdiction of potential threats. The P-3 has already demonstrated its value in this area through its contribution to the multi-national exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative. NAS Brunswick is integrated as a NATO facility and regularly supports multiple types of foreign aircraft.

The P-3 also provides a valuable tool for consequence management for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks. As demonstrated in the aftermath of the South Asian tsunami, the P-3s are a rapidly deployable asset that provides decision-makers with real-time information which cannot be provided by any other airborne platform in the U.S. inventory.


3. The strategy identifies the need for shaping the force structure for homeland defense missions. As mentioned, the maritime patrol fleet is already proven to successfully adapt to multiple missions. The strategy calls for the development of new generations of sensors to enhance domain awareness and maritime defense. Both the advanced sensor suite on board the MMA and the aircraft’s planned operational integration with the BAMS UAV meet this goal.


The strategy also observes the critical role for the Naval Reserve in maritime security. The reserve P-3 components have fully integrated with active duty squadrons, forming a seamless operational force. In the case of NAS Brunswick, we note that the planned establishment of a Joint Armed Forces Reserve Center on the base will further enhance the Naval Reserve’s role in homeland defense.


Again, we welcome the development of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* as a critical step toward ensuring we have the right strategy, capabilities and force structure to defend the homeland. It is clear that the U.S. Navy's maritime patrol fleet will be an indispensable part of this strategy. We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and look forward to working with you to advance this strategy.

Sincerely,

  
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE  
United States Senator

  
SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator

  
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD  
United States Representative

  
THOMAS H. ALLEN  
United States Representative

cc: Ms. Frances Fragos Townsend, Homeland Security Advisor  
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, United States Coast Guard

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 18, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

We have had the opportunity to review the pre-decisional draft of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. We commend the President and you for your leadership on this initiative, and offer our assistance in helping to implement this strategy.

In particular, we are pleased to see that the strategy gives extensive consideration to the critical maritime aspects of homeland defense. As Members of Congress from Maine, a state with a long coastline and significant maritime commercial interests, we recognize that guarding maritime approaches is an essential component in protecting the homeland.

We are strong supporters of the Navy's maritime patrol fleet. We believe that this community, with its P-3C Orion aircraft and the next generation Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), form an indispensable component to the overall homeland defense strategy:

1. Among its strategic goals and key objectives, the strategy states that as part of the layered defense concept, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are working to "integrate U.S. maritime defense and to optimize the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard." It quotes the Chief of Naval Operations on the need to identify, track and intercept threats before they reach U.S. shores, and to "extend the security of the United States seaward." The P-3 is perfectly suited for this mission, and has already adopted an array of joint intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-surface warfare activities. With its extended range, speed, and sensor suite, the MMA will offer even more capability.
2. The strategy identifies the need for core capabilities to (a) detect and track potential maritime threats effectively, (b) intercept and defeat threats in the maritime approaches, and (c) direct consequence management.

The maritime patrol fleet provides these capabilities today, to help “ensure persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the U.S. maritime approaches.” With maritime patrol bases located at the “four corners” of the continental United States, as well as on Hawaii, the P-3 fleet is optimally based to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness. In the future, the MMA’s increased capabilities will allow a response time to any point on the coast of less than two hours from these bases. All major sea lanes of approach can be covered within operational range of the aircraft. As an example, Naval Air Station Brunswick is located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes. As the only capable active duty airfield in the Northeast, the base is uniquely positioned to provide awareness of the maritime approaches and protect the economically critical ports in the region. Aircrews from NAS Brunswick have been flying in support of Vigilant Shield since September 11, 2001.

The strategy also calls for enhanced international collaboration to establish maritime domain awareness of identification and interdiction of potential threats. The P-3 has already demonstrated its value in this area through its contribution to the multi-national exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative. NAS Brunswick is integrated as a NATO facility and regularly supports multiple types of foreign aircraft.

The P-3 also provides a valuable tool for consequence management for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks. As demonstrated in the aftermath of the South Asian tsunami, the P-3s are a rapidly deployable asset that provides decision-makers with real-time information which cannot be provided by any other airborne platform in the U.S. inventory.

3. The strategy identifies the need for shaping the force structure for homeland defense missions. As mentioned, the maritime patrol fleet is already proven to successfully adapt to multiple missions. The strategy calls for the development of new generations of sensors to enhance domain awareness and maritime defense. Both the advanced sensor suite on board the MMA and the aircraft’s planned operational integration with the BAMS UAV meet this goal.


The strategy also observes the critical role for the Naval Reserve in maritime security. The reserve P-3 components have fully integrated with active duty squadrons, forming a seamless operational force. In the case of NAS Brunswick, we note that the planned establishment of a Joint Armed Forces Reserve Center on the base will further enhance the Naval Reserve’s role in homeland defense.


Homeland defense strategy, page 3


Again, we welcome the development of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* as a critical step toward ensuring we have the right strategy, capabilities and force structure to defend the homeland. It is clear that the U.S. Navy's maritime patrol fleet will be an indispensable part of this strategy. We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and look forward to working with you to advance this strategy.

Sincerely,

  
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE  
United States Senator

  
SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator

  
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD  
United States Representative

  
THOMAS H. ALLEN  
United States Representative

cc: Ms. Frances Fragos Townsend, Homeland Security Advisor  
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, United States Coast Guard

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 18, 2005

The Honorable Paul McHale  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense  
2600 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-2600

Dear Secretary McHale:

We have had the opportunity to review the pre-decisional draft of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. We commend the President and you for your leadership on this initiative, and offer our assistance in helping to implement this strategy.

In particular, we are pleased to see that the strategy gives extensive consideration to the critical maritime aspects of homeland defense. As Members of Congress from Maine, a state with a long coastline and significant maritime commercial interests, we recognize that guarding maritime approaches is an essential component in protecting the homeland.

We are strong supporters of the Navy's maritime patrol fleet. We believe that this community, with its P-3C Orion aircraft and the next generation Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), form an indispensable component to the overall homeland defense strategy:

1. Among its strategic goals and key objectives, the strategy states that as part of the layered defense concept, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are working to "integrate U.S. maritime defense and to optimize the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard." It quotes the Chief of Naval Operations on the need to identify, track and intercept threats before they reach U.S. shores, and to "extend the security of the United States seaward." The P-3 is perfectly suited for this mission, and has already adopted an array of joint intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-surface warfare activities. With its extended range, speed, and sensor suite, the MMA will offer even more capability.
2. The strategy identifies the need for core capabilities to (a) detect and track potential maritime threats effectively, (b) intercept and defeat threats in the maritime approaches, and (c) direct consequence management.

The maritime patrol fleet provides these capabilities today, to help “ensure persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the U.S. maritime approaches.” With maritime patrol bases located at the “four corners” of the continental United States, as well as on Hawaii, the P-3 fleet is optimally based to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness. In the future, the MMA’s increased capabilities will allow a response time to any point on the coast of less than two hours from these bases. All major sea lanes of approach can be covered within operational range of the aircraft. As an example, Naval Air Station Brunswick is located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes. As the only capable active duty airfield in the Northeast, the base is uniquely positioned to provide awareness of the maritime approaches and protect the economically critical ports in the region. Aircrews from NAS Brunswick have been flying in support of Vigilant Shield since September 11, 2001.

The strategy also calls for enhanced international collaboration to establish maritime domain awareness of identification and interdiction of potential threats. The P-3 has already demonstrated its value in this area through its contribution to the multi-national exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative. NAS Brunswick is integrated as a NATO facility and regularly supports multiple types of foreign aircraft.

The P-3 also provides a valuable tool for consequence management for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks. As demonstrated in the aftermath of the South Asian tsunami, the P-3s are a rapidly deployable asset that provides decision-makers with real-time information which cannot be provided by any other airborne platform in the U.S. inventory.


3. The strategy identifies the need for shaping the force structure for homeland defense missions. As mentioned, the maritime patrol fleet is already proven to successfully adapt to multiple missions. The strategy calls for the development of new generations of sensors to enhance domain awareness and maritime defense. Both the advanced sensor suite on board the MMA and the aircraft’s planned operational integration with the BAMS UAV meet this goal.

The strategy also observes the critical role for the Naval Reserve in maritime security. The reserve P-3 components have fully integrated with active duty squadrons, forming a seamless operational force. In the case of NAS Brunswick, we note that the planned establishment of a Joint Armed Forces Reserve Center on the base will further enhance the Naval Reserve’s role in homeland defense.

Homeland defense strategy, page 3

Again, we welcome the development of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* as a critical step toward ensuring we have the right strategy, capabilities and force structure to defend the homeland. It is clear that the U.S. Navy's maritime patrol fleet will be an indispensable part of this strategy. We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and look forward to working with you to advance this strategy


Sincerely,




OLYMPIA A. SNOWE  
United States Senator



SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator



MICHAEL H. MICHAUD  
United States Representative



THOMAS H. ALLEN  
United States Representative

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 18, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We have had the opportunity to review the pre-decisional draft of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. We commend the President and you for your leadership on this initiative, and offer our assistance in helping to implement this strategy.

In particular, we are pleased to see that the strategy gives extensive consideration to the critical maritime aspects of homeland defense. As Members of Congress from Maine, a state with a long coastline and significant maritime commercial interests, we recognize that guarding maritime approaches is an essential component in protecting the homeland.

We are strong supporters of the Navy's maritime patrol fleet. We believe that this community, with its P-3C Orion aircraft and the next generation Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), form an indispensable component to the overall homeland defense strategy:

1. Among its strategic goals and key objectives, the strategy states that as part of the layered defense concept, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are working to "integrate U.S. maritime defense and to optimize the mutually supporting capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard." It quotes the Chief of Naval Operations on the need to identify, track and intercept threats before they reach U.S. shores, and to "extend the security of the United States seaward." The P-3 is perfectly suited for this mission, and has already adopted an array of joint intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-surface warfare activities. With its extended range, speed, and sensor suite, the MMA will offer even more capability.
2. The strategy identifies the need for core capabilities to (a) detect and track potential maritime threats effectively, (b) intercept and defeat threats in the maritime approaches, and (c) direct consequence management.

The maritime patrol fleet provides these capabilities today, to help “ensure persistent wide-area surveillance and reconnaissance of the U.S. maritime approaches.” With maritime patrol bases located at the “four corners” of the continental United States, as well as on Hawaii, the P-3 fleet is optimally based to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness. In the future, the MMA’s increased capabilities will allow a response time to any point on the coast of less than two hours from these bases. All major sea lanes of approach can be covered within operational range of the aircraft. As an example, Naval Air Station Brunswick is located strategically astride the Atlantic sea lanes. As the only capable active duty airfield in the Northeast, the base is uniquely positioned to provide awareness of the maritime approaches and protect the economically critical ports in the region. Aircrews from NAS Brunswick have been flying in support of Vigilant Shield since September 11, 2001.

The strategy also calls for enhanced international collaboration to establish maritime domain awareness of identification and interdiction of potential threats. The P-3 has already demonstrated its value in this area through its contribution to the multi-national exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative. NAS Brunswick is integrated as a NATO facility and regularly supports multiple types of foreign aircraft.

The P-3 also provides a valuable tool for consequence management for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks. As demonstrated in the aftermath of the South Asian tsunami, the P-3s are a rapidly deployable asset that provides decision-makers with real-time information which cannot be provided by any other airborne platform in the U.S. inventory.


3. The strategy identifies the need for shaping the force structure for homeland defense missions. As mentioned, the maritime patrol fleet is already proven to successfully adapt to multiple missions. The strategy calls for the development of new generations of sensors to enhance domain awareness and maritime defense. Both the advanced sensor suite on board the MMA and the aircraft’s planned operational integration with the BAMS UAV meet this goal.


The strategy also observes the critical role for the Naval Reserve in maritime security. The reserve P-3 components have fully integrated with active duty squadrons, forming a seamless operational force. In the case of NAS Brunswick, we note that the planned establishment of a Joint Armed Forces Reserve Center on the base will further enhance the Naval Reserve’s role in homeland defense.


Again, we welcome the development of the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* as a critical step toward ensuring we have the right strategy, capabilities and force structure to defend the homeland. It is clear that the U.S. Navy's maritime patrol fleet will be an indispensable part of this strategy. We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and look forward to working with you to advance this strategy.

Sincerely,

  
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE  
United States Senator

  
SUSAN M. COLLINS  
United States Senator

  
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD  
United States Representative

  
THOMAS H. ALLEN  
United States Representative

cc: Mr. Stephen Hadley, National Security Advisor

**TITLE V—DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER**

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, acting jointly, are authorized to approve on behalf of the committee any rule or regulation for which the committee's approval is required, provided advance notice of their intention to do so is given to members of the committee.

**THE NATIONAL GUARD**

Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the National Guard, to mark its 368th birthday on December 13.

The National Guard was founded in 1636 and has answered the call to protect this great Nation in the face of every conflict. It was formed even before the birth of America and continues to serve as a safeguard against all enemies and oppressors.

The Guard is now a force of more than 450,000 men and women strong, proudly bearing the seal of American dreams. More than 95,000 of those are serving overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia, protecting America on foreign soil. As some of the Nation's finest, they do not only protect us abroad but do the same here at home, dependably defending us against foreign threats and terrorists.

However, protecting the American people is only part of the heroic contributions the Guard provides us. Those brave souls also serve as rescuers, reaching out to those who are victims of natural disaster, and supporting our people in neighborhoods and communities in times of desperation and need. From coast to coast and around the world, all humanity can count on these valiant Americans.

Each of us owes a great debt of gratitude to every member of the National Guard, from the past and the present, for their sacrifice and dedication to protecting America's cherished freedoms and democracy. It is wonderful that we can honor the National Guard on its birthday and remember its significance to the people.

**LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2005**

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the need for hate crimes legislation. Each Congress, Senator KENNEDY and I introduce hate crimes legislation that would add new categories to current hate crimes law, sending a signal that violence of any kind is unacceptable in our society. Likewise, each Congress I have come to the floor to highlight a separate hate crime that has occurred in our country.

Late last summer, a man was beaten, robbed, and sexually assaulted by a group of three men and one teenager. The alleged motivation behind the assault was the sexual orientation of the victim. The group of assailants met the victim at a gay bar, and he was allegedly targeted because he was gay.

I believe that the government's first duty is to defend its citizens, to defend them against the harms that come out of hate. The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act is a symbol that can become substance. I believe that by passing this legislation and changing current law, we can change hearts and minds as well.

**AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS EXPORT FACILITATION ACT OF 2005**

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today in support of a bill that will facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products abroad. I am delighted to join colleagues from both sides of the aisle in cosponsoring this bill, which will help remove potential impediments to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.

Cuba's geographic proximity to the U.S. makes it an important market for U.S. exporters. This bill will maintain significant economic benefits not only for the farmers in my home State of Indiana, but for farmers throughout the country. Agricultural trade with Cuba is currently allowed under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, TSREEA. This legislation was enacted in the 106th Congress to provide additional markets for U.S. agricultural products and support the American farmer. I have long been an advocate of exercising care when imposing unilateral economic sanctions. Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed and often harm the United States more than the target country. Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those markets and opportunities that we abandon.

There have been indications that TSREEA will be interpreted in a way that may serve to impede agricultural exports to Cuba, which is contrary to the original intent of the bill. This would be a departure from current policy and undermine the benefits for U.S. farmers which the act has achieved. Groups such as the American Farm Bureau have indicated that the opening up of Cuba as a market has provided significant benefit to their members.

Without the important changes that this bill will make, the U.S. economy could be impacted, not only in agricultural exports, but also in related economic output. To prevent this occurrence and to help bolster the agricultural export industry in the U.S., I ask you to join me and the other cosponsors in support of this important legislation.

**BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION'S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE**

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Brunswick Naval Air Station, which is in my own home State of Maine, is a facility

of great importance to our Nation's military. While I could reflect today upon the bravery and tenacity of the P-3 Orion pilots at Brunswick who have supported the global war on terrorism, today I share with my colleagues the significant benefits and strategic advantages that Brunswick Naval Air Station offers our efforts in the areas of homeland defense and maritime interdiction operations. As we look toward the future, and develop new tools to address future threats, we must ensure that these tools are located in facilities where their advanced capabilities can be fully utilized. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that a white paper, authored by Ralph Dean, one of Brunswick's great advocates, entitled Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The white paper provides significant insight on the great advantages that Brunswick Naval Air Station offers.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**HOMELAND DEFENSE AND MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS**

In the business of homeland defense (as in real estate), location is the key. Imagine a naval search for a single, relatively small merchant ship, which intelligence sources have revealed has a hold full of weaponized chemicals. Its destination is a major coastal city. After tense hours of searching, a maritime patrol aircraft locates two possible suspect vessels out of hundreds in one of the world's busiest maritime areas. The aircraft directs two fast naval frigates to the vicinity of the targets. The frigates and their onboard helicopters intercept and challenge the target vessels. One vessel submits to search and is determined to be harmless. The other however, resists interception and boarding. Finally, helicopter-borne special operations commandoes descend upon the vessel, board and secure the ship and its potentially deadly cargo.

This scenario actually occurred in the western Mediterranean Sea last month. The weapons of mass destruction seized were simulated; the entire sequence of events part of a successful exercise of Maritime Interdiction Operations conducted by forces of four NATO nations.

Maritime interdiction capability is a hot item right now for defense planners, a particularly important focus of a larger effort known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is being advanced by 15 core member nations, brought together at the request of President Bush last year to develop cooperative diplomatic, military, and intelligence means to stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many of the maritime interdiction precepts under PSI are evolving from a multinational "game" conducted last September at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and refining these concepts and procedures is clearly a high priority for the nations involved. Japan recently hosted the latest multinational PSI exercise, the twelfth in the short time since the Initiative began.

As the Mediterranean exercise and others showed, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are a critical, almost always essential part of successful maritime interdiction. Whether conducting a broad-area search, refining a datum provided by other (including national) sensors, or vectoring surface, rotary-wing or

special-warfare assets to a target, MPA are a key link in the chain from initial intelligence to intercept. MPA are of particular value in crowded shipping lanes, in areas of poor weather or visibility. No other platform is as versatile in this mission area, one as old and enduring as naval aviation itself. But land-based aircraft need bases to fly from—bases which optimize their speed, range, and turnaround capability on missions protecting the nation's most vital areas. The seaborne WMD threat has become primary. Maritime interdiction platforms and infrastructure must be top concerns for naval strategists and planners.

Fortunately help is on the way, again from patrol aviation. The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) promises a substantial increase in capability for commanders responsible for maritime interdiction. Based on the Boeing 737-800, the MMA will bring increased speed, range, and reliability compared to the current workhorse MPA, the P-3C Orion. MMA sensors for interdiction missions will include a new electro-optical and infrared spectrum sensor, moving target indicators, an enhanced inverse synthetic aperture / synthetic aperture radar, and a new signals intelligence suite. Perhaps best of all, MMA will control and exploit the capabilities of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

The aircraft themselves will certainly be fantastic, but land-based planes are only as good as the base they operate from, and the future homes for MMA/BAMS have not yet been identified. Conventional wisdom has it that the transition from the P-3 force to one of fewer than half as many MMA will inevitably result in a reduction in the number of maritime patrol aircraft bases in the U.S. This assumption may be incorrect, since optimum basing for maritime interdiction assets is as important as the assets themselves. Bases must be located to provide rapid response to all coastal areas, particularly those containing major population centers and port facilities. They must be versatile, able to support not just MPA, but rotary wing units and special warfare forces with easy access, unencumbered space and facilities for joint, coordinated training, and self-protection and security from intrusion or attack. Maritime interdiction is a team game, and collocation of the assets for training and operations is essential.

The current MPA force laydown includes P-3 bases at Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii, Jacksonville, Florida, Brunswick, Maine, and Whidbey Island in Washington State. A robust P-3 capability is maintained for fleet support and other missions at the North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego. These last four bases, at the "corners" of the continental U.S. are perfectly situated for maritime interdiction of WMD threats. From these sites, MMA response time to any point on the coast will be less than two hours, and all major sea lanes of approach can be covered within the 1200–1500 nautical mile operational range of the aircraft.

All four sites have their advantages, and all are essential to that coverage. For example, the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine has remarkable potential as a joint forces maritime interdiction center under the PSI initiative: The only remaining fully capable active-duty military airfield in the northeastern U.S. and near its coastal cities—a region of over 48 million people; immediately adjacent to all major sea lanes in the North Atlantic; more than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise missions; versatile and extensive modern facilities (including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and BAMS) and land with no encroachment issues; an established all-weather training area available

for Special Forces and other units; completely secured perimeter and outstanding force protection layout and capability; and easy access by all forms of transportation.

The ports and shipping lanes to the northeastern region of the United States deserve the protection which can only be provided by maritime interdiction forces operating from a base within that region. Obviously transatlantic shipping is critical to our nation's economy, but as west coast ports operate at capacity, more and more operators are redirecting their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast. These shippers prefer to have their cargo spend the additional 7 to 10 days at sea rather than accept delays at west coast ports and during rail transport across the continent. Container traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five years, the fastest rate of growth in over 50 years. All of the enormous volume of shipping to the region must be monitored, and if necessary interdicted whenever it may pose a threat.

The Defense Department's Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) will in 2005 identify military infrastructure for permanent elimination. The BRAC process must carefully factor in future requirements for maritime interdiction as they are just now being developed under the PSI. Caution is indicated—the nation cannot afford to close irreplaceable military facilities just as new concepts and capabilities are being developed to address a burgeoning threat. Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction headed for our shores is zero-defect work, and the selection of bases for that effort must be equally judicious and effective. Location is an enduring essential—we must keep open our bases "at the corners."

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### VIRGINIA DAVIS COCHRAN

● Mr. LEAHY. It is with great sadness that I inform the Senate that Virginia "Ginny" Cochran of Richmond, VT, died this past Saturday. She was 76.

Ginny Cochran was a native Vermonter originally from Hartland Four Corners. Like her husband Mickey who died in 1998, she attended the University of Vermont. Over the years, the Cochran name became synonymous with Vermont skiing. Ginny and Mickey established their own ski area where thousands of children learned to ski. They instilled a competitive spirit in each of their four children who went on to become internationally known ski racers. One daughter, Marilyn, won a World Cup race in 1969, and another, Barbara Ann, won an Olympic gold medal in 1972. Several of Ginny's grandchildren are already outstanding ski racers.

Ginny Cochran was one of those lifelong Vermonters who personified the essence of what it means to be a Vermonter. She loved the four seasons, she was loved by her community, and she taught countless people how to enjoy freezing weather and beautiful scenery while gliding down snow covered mountains with style.

I ask that a February 6, 2005, article in the Burlington Free Press about the extraordinary life of Ginny Cochran be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Burlington Free Press, Feb. 6, 2005]

SKIING MATRIARCH GINNY COCHRAN DIES  
MOTHER OF OLYMPIANS TAUGHT THOUSANDS TO  
LOVE THE SPORT, AND SPORTSMANSHIP  
(By Susan Green)

Virginia Davis Cochran, whose name has been entwined with Vermont's skiing heritage for more than four decades, died Saturday morning at age 76.

Cochran, known as Ginny, started the Cochran Ski Area in Richmond with her husband, Mickey, in 1961 and over the years taught more than 10,000 children to ski. She also helped her own four children and 10 grandchildren become top skiers—with some joining the U.S. Ski Team and one winning an Olympic gold medal.

Cochran died at Vermont Respite House in Williston of complications from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Mickey Cochran died in 1998.

The Cochran Ski Area began as a family affair when the couple moved to a former dairy farm along the Winooski River. They soon constructed a rope tow for their children: son Bob and daughters, Marilyn, Barbara Ann and Lindy.

Barbara Ann went on to earn the 1972 Olympic gold medal in slalom at Sapporo, Japan. In 1969, Marilyn was the first American to win a World Cup in the giant slalom.

"From the start, neighbors wanted to ski their hill," said David Healy, a friend of the Cochrans, "so Ginny opened her back door and welcomed them in. Her kitchen became the lodge."

The ski area was a modest business offering affordable access to the sport. "They ran a small mom-and-pop operation," Healy said, "and it's the nation's first nonprofit ski area."

In the winter nowadays, 800 schoolchildren come to ski at Cochran's each week, he said.

Cochran also ran the town's after-school ski program for 35 years as a volunteer, Healy said.

Ginny Cochran, who hailed from Hartland Four Corners, met Mickey on a ski trip to Stowe while both were UVM students in the late 1940s. They married in 1949 and moved to Windsor, where Mickey taught high school science.

"They skied with their kids at Mount Ascutney," Healy said, "but they came back to Burlington in 1958. He worked as an engineer at General Electric."

With the purchase of about 190 acres in Richmond, however, the Cochran clan didn't have to stray far from home to indulge their love of the slopes.

"The kids were already racing at Smugglers' Notch," Healy said. "Mickey recognized they needed to practice during the week. His goal was to give them a place to train after school."

Peggy Farr, who met the Cochrans when they arrived in Richmond, remembers the early years at the ski area.

"When the kitchen was still the lodge, one day Ginny had made brownies for her family. My son Chuck spent a lot of time at their house. He and his pals ate them all," she recalled with a laugh.

By way of a belated apology, the now-grown Chuck Farr and his wife made brownies for Ginny Cochran on her 75th birthday in March 2003.

"She had a great influence on so many children," Peggy Farr said. "Two of my three kids and all my grandchildren learned to ski there."

Ditto for Marvin Carpenter, who grew up nearby on what would later be called Cochran Road.

## NAVY ENTERING BRAC MINEFIELD

Last week Navy Secretary John England revealed that his service was close to completing the list of bases and other facilities it will recommend for elimination in this year's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. That initial list will be forwarded to the Department of Defense in mid-February. The criteria used in that list's formulation were published a little over a year ago, sufficient time for the services to collect data, but not enough to allow extravagant study or analysis.

Fortunately, more than in any previous BRAC round, the criteria themselves are tightly focused on military value, emphasizing value to the total force, especially joint warfighting, training, and readiness impacts. The criteria do not explicitly mention "transformation," but Secretary Rumsfeld's favorite buzzword is reflected in their stress on ability to meet future requirements rather than on how any facility is currently used.

What matters now is how the criteria are applied, and here the services, and the Navy in particular, enter dangerous waters. At best this is decision-making under risk, bordering on uncertainty in many cases. Just a couple of these risks are:

- Risk associated with emerging mission areas and CONOPS. One example would be maritime defense of the homeland and associated maritime interdiction operations. The President recently issued a National Security Directive on this area, calling for the development of a strategic vision, a national strategy to implement that vision, and an integrated plan for maritime domain awareness. This effort will have significant force structure and infrastructure implications for the sea services, but will only start to bear fruit long after BRAC 2005 has been finalized. There are other examples of rapidly evolving missions and functions, perhaps more than at any time in our nation's military history.
- Risk associated with irreplaceability. This is not 1940, and finding locations for new navy piers, yards, and airfields, should they be needed in the future, would be colossally expensive, if not impossible along our crowded and highly developed coastlines. Other services would have far more flexibility if (perhaps "when") we face an unanticipated need to expand our military.
- Risk from rigid application of the business case. Applying strict cost/savings criteria is essential in identifying depots, shipyards, and logistical facilities for potential closure, but is chancy when looking at operational bases and stations. What matters most in

those latter cases is the *vision* developed for the post-BRAC use of the facility. Imagination is necessary to assess the value in a transformed operational base in a transformed military. Much of this vision can only be applied by Joint Staff or DOD experts able to see around the service “stovepipes”. There is little time between mid-February and when DOD must forward its list to the Commission (May 1) for this sort of holistic analysis of Department infrastructure. Opportunities will be lost and mistakes made during this short period.

One of the secondary criteria carries its own risk – it calls for considering “the economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.” The risk here is that the service would maintain a facility it doesn’t need and lose what Assistant Secretary of the Navy H.T. Johnson last year called what “may well be our last significant opportunity in the near future to reduce excess infrastructure and thus be able to move scarce dollars to areas that improve readiness.” The opportunity must not be missed. By some accounts the Navy could close *every one* of its shore installations and still not save enough money to meet its future unfunded procurement and modernization requirements. This criterion also provides an opening for political influence and emotion to intrude on what should be an objective and dispassionate process. It was only added under political pressure in the first place, and should be thrown out in execution.

The risk-based approach discussed above will be essential during the remaining few weeks before the overall DOD list is forwarded to the BRAC Commissioners, and during the months of hearings and deliberations to follow. When *uncertainty* appears in the decision-making process about any of our bases, it will be better to do nothing and permit the facility to remain in DOD hands. We cannot afford a mistake which might cost the Navy and our nation the loss of an irreplaceable gem. BRAC is a minefield we truly need to cross for the good of our services, but one which *must* be traversed with extreme caution and a steady eye on the real objective.



UNITED STATES SENATOR · MAINE  
**SUSAN COLLINS**  
P R E S S R E L E A S E



## **SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS' STATEMENT ON DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MAINE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Jen Burita or Elissa Davidson

Friday, May 13, 2005

Phone: 202-224-2523

WASHINGTON, DC- Senator Susan Collins made the following statement regarding the Base Realignment and closure list, which includes recommendations to close Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and realign Brunswick Naval Air Station:

The Department of Defense has decided through its BRAC recommendations to dramatically neglect the northeastern United States. This is a strategic mistake as geographical military diversity is essential to defending the United States and providing a platform for our forces to deploy quickly to places around the world. With Maine and Connecticut among the hardest hit states in the country, the decision to withdraw from an already under-represented region with defense personnel, runs counter to our national security interests.

The northeast is already one of the nation's least guarded regions at a time when military concerns increasingly focus on homeland defense. The 18 Northeastern and Midwestern states, which hold about 40 percent of the nation's population, account for only 10 percent of the active duty military personnel located in the country.

Maine is an ideal state to contribute to defense missions and gain from this activity and I am in disbelief at the recommendations. The state of Maine has made extraordinary contributions to our nation's defense. Maine occupies a far corner of our nation's territory, serving as the principle gateway to our nation's largest and most densely populated metropolitan areas, a region of over 22 million people.

Military installations in Maine defend land, sea, and air approaches into New England and the Mid-Atlantic regions. Further, it continues to be an ideal site for the launch of military operations overseas. Our strategic location, valuable infrastructure, and highly skilled and experienced workforce are models for the rest of the nation. Regional balance and geographic diversity are critical components to an effective military strategy.

# SNOWE PARTICIPATES IN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HEARING ON WORLD THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

## *Voices Concerns About Terrorists Obtaining Stolen Passports, Chinese Navy Buildup; Explores Coast Guard's Role in Homeland Security*

**Contact:** Antonia Ferrier (202) 224-5344  
Thursday, February 17, 2005

WASHINGTON, D.C. – At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing today, U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee member Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine), raised concerns about terrorists entering the country with stolen passports, and submitted written questions on China's growing naval power and the role of the Coast Guard in intelligence gathering and homeland security. Snowe also submitted for the record a Brunswick Naval Air Station (BNAS) Taskforce white paper outlining the value of the base in Homeland Security and Maritime Interdiction Operations.

"The Department of Homeland Security reports that there could be 10 million lost and stolen passports in circulation," said Snowe. "This is a startling fact when we consider that nuclear weapons technology and knowledge continue to spread and could reach the hands of those hostile or potentially hostile to the United States – and that these people could seemingly easily enter the United States."

"The Chinese have been working feverishly to modernize their Navy in order to enhance regional power projection," continued Snowe. "Meanwhile, the US Navy has sent over a budget this year that drastically reduces the number of DD(X)'s slated to be built in the coming years. These actions are troubling because of the threats we may face in the western and northern Pacific basins in the future."

Snowe cited Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark's comment in a Navy document noting the importance of maritime interdiction operations and admission that the Navy and Coast Guard will have to work closely to maintain the military assets needed to accomplish this mission. Snowe submitted written questions regarding the overall U.S. maritime security strategy and whether or not that strategy will inform the Department of Defense's Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC).

"In my view it is absolutely crucial that we maintain critical maritime interdiction assets, particularly bases that allow for full coverage of America's coastline," said Snowe.

"Brunswick Naval Air Station is strategically located to fulfill that mission and I trust that it's unique capabilities will be taken into account by decisionmakers as the BRAC process moves forward."

The panelists were CIA Director Porter Goss, FBI Director Robert Mueller, DIA Director Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, and Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Thomas Fingar.

###