



DCN 8474  
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000

22 Sep 04

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BRAC 2005

Ref: (a) USD(AT&L) memo of 8 Sep 04

We have reviewed the proposed Transformational Options for BRAC 2005 as provided in the attachment to reference (a), and I am responding on behalf of the Department of Navy Infrastructure Steering Group members.

Although we do not have major objections with most of the proposed seventy-seven (77) options listed under "Recommended Approval," we do believe the Department should pursue a smaller set of mandatory "Transformational Options." Not only will this bound the data collection effort required to analyze these mandatory scenarios, it will also more clearly focus efforts on those goals the Secretary of Defense set out in his BRAC kick-off memo.

Accordingly, we therefore recommend reorganizing the options being recommended for approval into four categories:

(1) SECDEF Transformational Options - These are overarching in nature with broad application and are viewed as changing the way DoD does business.

(2) Options to be addressed by the ISG - These are targeted to a more specific audience or Service and are more narrow in their application. They should be used by the ISG to frame scenario development and review JCSG scenarios but analysis should not automatically be mandated.

(3) Options that can be implemented outside of BRAC - These are more policy oriented and focused on changes in the way we manage our businesses. They also appear to result in less infrastructure adjustment if implemented. These options should be considered for DoD implementation outside of BRAC.

(4) Options that appear to be duplicative and should be deleted.

The attachment to this memo contains the draft Transformational Options, rearranged as described above, using the original numbering scheme contained in your list of options. We also include specific comments in line in/line out format recommending changes either to the wording of the option for clarity or to the assignment (application) of the option for consistency and completeness.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MM-0020

3 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND  
CLOSURE (BRAC) 2005

1. On May 23, 2003, USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) requested the Military Departments to identify key transformational options for stationing and supporting forces and functions that will rationalize our infrastructure consistent with defense strategy and contribute to increased efficiency and effectiveness (Attachment 1). The options approved by SECDEF must be analyzed by the Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) during their BRAC processes.
2. As the Department of Navy's focal point for BRAC 2005, my office will be consolidating the Department's input to USD (AT&L). Please provide your suggestions, in the format outlined in Attachment 1, to this office by COB 16 June 2003.
3. Should you have any questions please contact me at (703) 697-6638.

*vr*  
*Anne Rathmell Davis*

Anne Rathmell Davis  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Infrastructure Analysis)

Attachment:

1. USD (AT&L) memo dtd May 23, 2003

**\*MASTER DOCUMENT\***  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000 08 July 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BRAC 2005

Ref: (a) USD(AT&L) memo of 21 Jun 04

Encl: (1) DON Comments on Proposed Transformational Options  
(2) DON Proposed Additional Transformational Options

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I have reviewed the proposed Transformational Options provided in the attachments to reference (a). We concur with the recommendation to eliminate from further consideration all of the inputs contained in Attachment 2 to the reference, since they are all either beyond the scope of the BRAC process or insufficiently defined to be effective as scenarios. Specific comments on the Transformational Options in Attachment 1 to the reference are contained in enclosure (1). However, we would like to offer the following general comments.

We understand that the intent of these Transformational Options is to ensure the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) thoroughly analyze options for reconfiguring our infrastructure, beyond mere capacity reductions. We also believe at least some Transformational Options should provide a forcing function to impel the search for innovative alternatives and consideration of options that lie beyond those that are easiest or most obvious. However, given the broad language used in some of the proposed Transformational Options, we are concerned that there is no apparent boundary to the number of options/scenarios that could result. Accordingly, recommend that, prior to SECDEF promulgation of the Transformational Options for analysis, each option be clearly defined as to scope and assignment. This will likely mean that each is translated into specific scenario taskers and assigned to specific Military Departments and/or JCSGs for analysis. In that way, we can satisfy ourselves, the Commission, and the public that we, in fact, did the analysis SECDEF has committed to do.

A number of the Transformational Options submitted last year appear to be restatements of the charter and scope of analysis that is currently underway within one or more of the JCSGs. We suggest that this analysis, with Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) oversight, is sufficient to meet SECDEF's stated intent, and that there is no need to separately publish a Transformational Option. The real concern is that the published Option may inadvertently exceed the scope of analysis ultimately conducted by a JCSG and approved by the ISG. This could put us in the position of having to explain to the Commission why we were unable to meet a SECDEF tasking, when the real mechanism to accomplish this is the entire ISG/JCSG process.

Additionally, we need to carefully review each of the Transformational Options to ensure we are collecting the data to be able to conduct the analysis required. Each of the JCSGs and the Military Departments has established its own scope of analysis, and built its data collection on that scope. While we are very supportive of ensuring a broad set of options is analyzed, we must be careful not to require analysis for which we have not captured the necessary data elements.

Finally, if we assume that each Transformational Option represents mandatory analysis of one or more scenarios, we should discuss what is the optimum number of Transformational Options we should recommend to SECDEF. We should expect each JCSG and Military Department to generate numerous scenarios arising from their own analysis. While we want to ensure thorough review of various alternatives, an unbounded number of scenarios resulting from the Transformational Options could result in more analytical work than the process can sustain.

As you have requested, we are taking this opportunity to provide additional Transformational Options for consideration. They are included in enclosure (2). We will be prepared to discuss in detail at the appropriate time.

Since the result of this review and input will be the development of a new set of Transformational Options, we suggest it could be useful to have that new product reviewed and discussed by the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the Joint Cross-Service Groups before it is provided to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) for review. As we have seen with the original Transformational Options, we may well get input at varying levels of detail and approach. A consolidated product that seeks to frame the Transformational Options in the same language could greatly facilitate the ISG's review.



H. T. Johnson

## DON Comments on Proposed Transformational Options

### Attachment 1 – Transformational Options That Can Be Translated Into Scenarios

1. Integrate Reserve Component elements with respective active and joint components. The value of locating Reserve facilities within the community must also be considered, given the role that Reserve activities play in strengthening the link between the armed forces and American society.

Recommendation: Delete. Use #30.

2. Examine optimizing and consolidating both advanced pilot training and maintenance training for similar platforms (e.g., joint training of the Joint Strike Fighter).

Recommendation: Too broad. Focus should be on specific joint platform, JSF. Replace with:

Examine co-location of graduate flight training and maintenance training for the Joint Strike Fighter at the same site forming an Integrated Training Center, versus co-locating multiple maintenance training functions at the same site.

3. Explore consolidating aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same bases. By exploring this joint basing concept, the Services may be able to station their CONUS mobility units/assets closer to planned air and sea ports of embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization. Co-locating Service special operations units, especially overseas, could further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities.

Recommendation: Although already being pursued in the JAST process, agree to formalizing inter-service efforts as follows (split into three different options):

Explore consolidating aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same base.

Explore the capability of the Services to station their CONUS mobility units/assets closer to planned air and seaports of embarkation to facilitate rapid mobilization.

Co-location of Service special operations units could further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities

This could also foster the need to look at combining logistic support elements associated with the operational units.

4. Restructure and/or combine Service acquisition organizations. Significant gains in efficiency might be achieved by combining/merging/co-locating selected acquisition activities. Among

these, consider transforming service-specific product centers into jointly-managed centers for items such as avionics, aeronautics and other weapons.

Recommendation: Do not consider Service acquisition organizations in total. Refocus and replace this option as follows:

Restructure and/or combine Service RDT&E acquisition organizations.

5. Restructure/combine Service training activities and organizations. There is a broad range of possible opportunities in this area. Explore consolidating/co-locating our commissioning sources or combining/co-locating Service professional military education (PME) schools at the intermediate and senior levels. Consider combining/merging Service specific test pilot schools. Combining the Services' range management offices into one joint management office could not only reduce overhead, but it could produce more efficient use of a precious DoD resource.

Recommendation: Needs to be rewritten and divided into separate TO's. Some of the language is already basic to the charter of the E&T JCSG. Do not recommend including consolidation and/or co-location of commissioning source programs – cultural issue that should be preserved. The two options that can be explored are:

Combine/co-locate Service professional military education at intermediate and senior levels.

Combine/merge Service specific test pilot schools.

6. Examine the redistribution of strategic lift assets to facilitate rapid deployment to the war fight from both east and west coasts.

Recommendation: Insert the following:

“... strategic **air** lift...”

7. Co-locate federal, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services. Opportunities for co-location will most likely present themselves in municipal settings where federal installations already exist, and sufficient adjacent infrastructure is available. If no permanent installations exist then collocation could occur entirely through a leasing agreement. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) must remain a key consideration when evaluating alternatives to relocate/co-locate various facilities. It is imperative that we balance the benefits and risks associated with any effort to transform DoD infrastructure/bases.

Recommendation: Change to include only the following:

Co-locate Defense Agencies, joint, and military department facilities to produce efficiencies in force protection and quality of life services.

8. Consider outsourcing all graduate education, to include Service War Colleges to private colleges/ universities -- or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites. Leverage distance learning to reduce residential requirements.

Recommendation: Change to: "Consider providing graduate education, except Service War Colleges, at private colleges/universities or maximize outsourcing and then consolidate to minimum sites."

9. Consolidate/privatize common specialty training. The Army Engineering School at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO may be a good model of multi-service training with contract instructors.

Recommendation: Delete. Consolidation review is already an action for the E&T JCSG. Do not recommend including privatization initiatives as part of BRAC for common specialty training.

10. Establish Centers of Excellence with joint or inter-service training, i.e., combining common or similar instructional institutions (e.g., Judge Advocate General Schools) to form a "DoD University" with satellites training sites or provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions.

Recommendation: Probably already included in E&T, focus on professional development analysis. May be written as follows:

Establish Joint Centers of Excellence for common professional training schools (e.g Judge Advocate General School) to form a "DoD University."

11. Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, basic flight training -- helo, prop, and jet). Similarly, aircraft type training for common airframes (e.g., Osprey, H-60, C-130, JSF, etc.) should be consolidated at a minimum number of joint sites -- or single joint site.

Recommendation: Delete. Part of the basic charter of the E&T JCSG. If included, change to: "Analyze how we can better combine the efforts of the Services in those areas where the instructional flight training syllabus is essentially the same (e.g., ground school, undergraduate flight training including UAVs). Similarly, graduate level training for the Joint Strike Fighter should be considered for consolidation. Other aircraft with similar training requirements common to two or more Services either are scheduled for decommissioning or are already subject to joint training agreements."

12. Consolidate Services' common functions: supply, medical, legal, religious programs.

Recommendation: Delete, too broad as stated. Legal and religious programs already excluded from review. Supply and Storage JCSG already looking at the supply function, Medical JCSG also to some extent doing the same according to their charter.

13. Evaluate Joint Service Installation Management by Region vice Service.

Recommendation: Delete. To extent practical under this BRAC round, H&SA JCSG already is reviewing.

14. Consolidate Base Installation Maintenance Requirements by geographic area.

Recommendation: Delete. To extent practical under this BRAC round, H&SA already is reviewing.

15. Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Consider all seven elements of the RC structure. The focus of the analysis will be on the requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations supporting Reserve and National Guard administrative and headquarters functions, excluding state owned and/or controlled facilities of the National Guard. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

Recommendation: Change to:

Determine alternative facility alignments to execute Reserve Component (RC) headquarters administrative missions and functions. Alternatives should include consideration of combining headquarters and/or moving headquarters to operational bases.

16. Identify alternative concepts for realigning mobilization facilities DoD-wide. This analysis should focus on requirements for and capabilities of facilities and installations in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard Components of all Services to mobilize, prepare, train, deploy, and sustain forces committed to combat operations, whether overseas or in the US.

Alternatives to consider include:

- (1) Establishment and consolidation of mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, deploy, and train service members.
- (2) Establishment of joint pre-deployment (e.g. personnel processing) centers.

Recommendation: Change to:

(1) Establish and consolidate mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, train and deploy service members.

(2) Establish of joint pre-deployment/re-deployment processing sites.

17. Evaluate DoD headquarters and support activities in the National Capital Region (NCR).

This analysis should focus on the OSD Staff and activities; Joint Staff and activities; service

headquarters staffs and their field operating agencies; staff support activities; and direct supporting units, service commands, and Defense agencies and their missions, functions and facilities, owned or leased in the NCR. Analysis opportunities may include:

- (1) Assessment of the need for the presence of these activities in the NCR and options for realignment out of the NCR.
- (2) Elimination of all leased space in the NCR.
- (3) Examination of the potential for consolidation of joint and service activities in the NCR as a base cluster.

Recommendation: Change to:

Assess the need for headquarters, commands and activities to be located within 100 miles of the Pentagon. Evaluation will include analysis of realignment of those organizations found to be eligible to move to DoD-owned space outside of the 100-miles radius.

18. Eliminate all leased space occupied by DoD organizations within the United States. Growing concerns for force protection, in addition to lease costs, make this an emerging issue and important issue for review. Several types of agencies, i.e. recruiting offices, could be excluded from the analysis.

Recommendation: Change to:

Minimize need for leased space, excluding those functions that need to operate in non-federal facilities, e.g. recruiting storefronts

19. Evaluate Military Air Traffic Control (ATC) activities and locations. This analysis would identify BRAC implications for military ATC facilities. Potential issues include:
  - (1) Establishment of a single executive agent for military ATC.
  - (2) Regionalization and/or consolidation of ATC.

Recommendation: Delete. Not sure this is a BRAC action to realign function without a clear understanding of it facility component or savings potential

20. Identify the potential to reduce installation operating costs through inter-service agreements, consolidations, and elimination of duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. Examples of these services are MWR, public works, public safety, childcare services, housing services, and buildings/grounds/roads maintenance. (GAO Report High Risk Series - Defense Infrastructure, February 1997.) Assess the potential for the increased sharing of bases on an inter-service or intra-service basis to maximize the use of available training ranges and other facilities.

The analysis would determine the feasibility of consolidating contracting for services. DoD spending in service contracts approaches \$1B annually, but according to GAO, DoD's management of services' procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not well spent. GAO recommended that DoD's approach should provide for an agency-wide

view of service contract spending and promote collaboration to leverage buying power across multiple organizations. Possible impact would be a reduction in personnel and office space through possible consolidation of function. (GAO Report — Best Practices — Improved Knowledge of DoD Service Contracts Could Reveal Significant Savings - June 2003.)

Recommendation: Delete (consolidation of service contracts not a BRAC issue). H&SA JCSG already looking at the practicality of consolidation of installation management in select areas.

21. Examine DoD human resources management processes and locations. Potential issues include:

- (1) Consolidation of military personnel agencies at one location.
- (2) Consolidation of civilian personnel agencies at one or several locations.
- (3) Joint regionalization of civilian personnel agencies.

Recommendation: OK. Add:

(4) Consolidation of military/civilian personnel agencies within Services

22. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP). While the Navy has a single inventory control point located at two sites, there is an opportunity for significant consolidation of ICPs by all Services. For example, the Air Force has three independent ICPs, each located at their Air Logistics Centers. Consolidating them to a single ICP would permit reduced overhead and headquarters staffing as well streamlining of business practices. However, such a course of action may also include some costs and loss of efficiencies, including union issues, loss of skilled workforce, and the loss of direct interface with customers located at/near ICPs that will no longer exist.

Recommendation: Change and view as two options:

- Evaluate the consolidation of ICP into a single ICP within each Service
- Evaluate the opportunity to consolidate and make joint ICP's

23. Realign Signals Intelligence Exploitation & Production Centers. This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and signals intelligence systems. Combatant Commanders require Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) as a key component of a multi-source intelligence picture. The joint Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs) and service airborne Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) systems represent two of the primary SIGINT assets that meet the Combatant Commander's varied intelligence needs. Under the current force alignment, the RSOCs and remoting-capable airborne ISR assets are not located together; the two asset types maintain completely independent exploitation & production centers, maintenance support, and management staff, even when remoting technologies would enable consolidation of such resources. By consolidating the ground systems and staff for the airborne ISR resources with the RSOCs, the Department of Defense can improve the intelligence support to the war fighter while achieving notable efficiencies in infrastructure and personnel resources. These changes will advance the Department toward the goals of

achieving information superiority and providing integrated, globally available, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities, as directed in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint Vision 2020.

Recommendation: Delete.

24. **Realign Intelligence Support Capabilities.** This option focuses on the co-location/basing of ground and airborne intelligence systems. Enabling decision superiority through timely intelligence relies on more than advanced reconnaissance technology. Skilled people are the secret ingredient. The collected data can only be transformed into meaningful intelligence when people with world-class linguistic and analytic skills have access to the reconnaissance systems. Accurate forecasts of sensor deployments to different geographic regions are required if each ISR system must maintain an independent analysis and production center. Such forecasting has proven difficult. Furthermore, the current force alignment dilutes mission-critical skills between several geographic locations, creates potential operational discontinuities as intelligence support requirements change, and results in greater overall manpower needs and infrastructure costs. Consolidating ISR ground system operations for the U-2 and RC-12 platforms with the RSOCs not only mitigates these drawbacks of the current posture but also gains new capabilities in providing global, persistent surveillance.

Recommendation: Delete.

25. **Evaluate the Defense, Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) operations.** This option seeks to leverage BRAC 2005 to recognize additional workload consolidation, infrastructure reduction, and reduction in the number of DFAS operating locations at which specific functions are performed. While A-76 competitive sourcing is one of the options currently under investigation and implementation is not directly affected by BRAC 2005, implementation of other options such as a High-Performing Organization or a Public-Private Partnership could benefit from the opportunities provided under BRAC 2005. Implementation of a High-Performing Organization, for example, could result in shifting workload and functions to a location that is currently performing significantly better than other locations and closing the poorer performing sites. Centralization of specific functions at a major site and embedding a small number of DFAS personnel at customer locations is another possibility that results in a reduced infrastructure and facility requirements.

Recommendation: Change to:

Consolidate DFAS business line workload and administrative/staff functions and locations.

26. **Evaluate security and continuity of operations at Defense Accounting and Finance Service (DFAS) activities.** The events of 9/11 highlight security and safety concerns for both DFAS personnel and the financial and accounting data. A number of DFAS' 26 current operating locations are not located on military installations. Safety and security are in most cases provided by public services (fire, police, etc). Security of each DFAS location should be evaluated and if significant risks are determined to exist and relocation to military installations or DFAS site consolidation considered. With the migration to fewer sites,

provisions need to incorporate the requirement to have backup equipment systems, and facility plans that replicate functions in the event of an incident or disaster.

Recommendation: Delete, part of change to #25 above.

27. Consider expansion of Total Force Units - Blended/Reserve Associate/Active Associate/Sponsored Reserve. As we rely more on Guard and Reserve components to provide critical peacetime and wartime capabilities, it makes sense to allow some units the opportunity to live, work, and train together. This concept would allow each component to contribute its unique strengths to provide the capability, experience, stability, and continuity required to operate today's information and technology driven forces. It would also enable us to make better use of basing infrastructure and maximize the utilization of expensive weapon systems.

One way to implement this concept is to expand the integration of Active and Reserve Component units. Moving Guard and Reserve units with like assets to active bases or vice-versa could facilitate a leaner, more efficient operations, maintenance, and infrastructure. The Air Force has already established units using this concept. Examples are the merger of the Air National Guard's 116<sup>th</sup> Bomb Wing and Air Combat Command's 93<sup>rd</sup> Air Control Wing to form the 116<sup>th</sup> Air Control Wing (a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Blended Wing) at Robins AFB, GA; and the integration of Air Force Reserve Command's 8th Space Warning Squadron associated with Air Force Space Command's 2<sup>nd</sup> Space Warning Squadron at Buckley AFB, CO. There are currently a total of 11,000 Air Force reservists assigned to associate units, including 32 Reserve Associate flying units. The movement of the 126<sup>th</sup> Air Refueling Wing from Chicago to Scott AFB represents another example of the efficient use of available infrastructure by different components.

Another possible area for integration is to expand the blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce infrastructure, and improve readiness, while preserving home station control. One idea would be blending across Active/RC and service boundaries to provide regional entities more useful for homeland defense (e.g. one that includes air defense, Army Guard state responders, and interagency links in a single location)

Recommendation: AF only.

28. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer secure DoD-owned locations in the region.

Recommendation: OK, not included currently in the H &SA JCSG Washington area analysis.

29. Centralize the systems management and operations of DoD combat support processing servers into enterprise systems management centers to prepare for the net-centric environment being pursued by the Department and to reduce costs and significantly improve the security and performance of server-based processing.

Recommendation: Delete

30. Consolidate the Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if practical, i.e. joint use facilities.

Recommendation: OK, replaces #1.

31. Assign the Army as the executive agent for rotary wing aircraft and the Air Force as the executive agent for all fixed wing aircraft. The Department should consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

Recommendation: Delete. BRAC process not used to identify Executive Agency. Consolidation of pilot training with maintenance already part of previous option.

32. Consolidate the Naval Facilities Engineering Command under the Army Corps of Engineers or completely do away with the Naval Facility Engineering Command.

Recommendation: Delete. Data not available to perform analysis necessary.

33. Consolidate acquisition and logistics activities at the headquarters level (e.g., the Air Force Materiel Command model) to achieve support personnel and overhead reductions.

Recommendation: Delete, not focused. If this option is attempting to get at the consolidation of functions within HQ organizations then it may be in the too hard category for BRAC

34. Designate lead services for common equipment and reduce physical plant and workforces to the minimum number required for the force structure.

Recommendation: Delete. This needs to be better written to focus on specific “common equipment” otherwise too broad.

35. Transfer the operations of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) back to the respective buying entity.

Recommendation: Delete. Don't understand the analysis that would be required to redistribute a consolidated operation.

36. Establish a joint, central organization for all personnel management activities. Retain in each Service only those activities needed to build the force structure requirements, make assignments, and manage war fighting, and occupational skills development.

Recommendation: Delete – see option #21

37. Employ distance learning and available educational resources in local communities to cut down on DoD owned/operated educational facility requirements.

Recommendation: Delete. Too broad. Do we apply distance learning to everything?

38. Evaluate the Military Services' need for multiple initial entry training sites. The Navy and Air Force, each, conduct this primary training at a single installation. However, the Marine Corps operates two recruit training depots—one on the East Coast, one on the West. The Army operates five separate basic training sites.

Recommendation: OK.

## **DON Proposed Additional Transformational Options**

**Background.** In order to serve as forcing functions to the analysis process, Transformational Options should take the form of specific direction to the JCSGs to develop and examine scenarios designed to ensure evaluation of alternatives that may be difficult to conceive or accept. Consideration of joint solutions could be achieved by directing that, for each function or sub-function examined, the JCSG must evaluate a scenario that flows from optimizing without any consideration for Service-specific constraints. That is, the scenario would stem from an optimization that allows functions to flow to the sites with best military value without regard to the Service that owns the site. Similarly, capacity reduction stretches goals could be identified that require, for each function or sub-function examined, the JCSG to evaluate a scenario that reduces capacity by specified fraction. The goal is expressed in terms of a percentage capacity reduction from known current capacity (as developed in certified data), or in terms of an additional percentage capacity reduction over excess capacity. The role of the stretch goal is to impel the analysis to reach for innovative solutions that otherwise might not be considered. The size of the stretch goal must be ambitious to provoke innovation, but not so ambitious as to make it easy to demonstrate that resulting scenarios are not feasible. For both joint solutions and capacity stretch goals, if a JCSG determines that the alternative examined is not feasible, they should be required to report the reasons that led them to that conclusion.

### **Proposed Transformational Options:**

- Each JCSG and Military Department will consider, at a minimum, one joint basing solution for each function analyzed without regard to the Service that owns the sites being evaluated (analysis to eliminate any Service bias). Joint basing is defined as a co-location of another Service asset employing the traditional host-tenant relationship.
- Each Military Department and Joint Cross Service Group will look at the effects of either reducing their functions by 20%, 30%, and 40% from the current baseline, or reducing excess capacity by an additional 5% beyond the analyzed excess capacity, whichever is greater. The objective of this analysis is to uncover ways in which additional gains could be achieved, rather reasons why they could not.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO

JUL 2 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS)

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND  
CLOSURE (BRAC) 2005

Ref (a) DASN (IA) Memo of 3 June 2003

1. In response to the reference, we have considered potential transformational options for stationing and supporting forces and functions in a manner that will contribute to the goals of sizing our infrastructure to the defense strategy and increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. In making our recommendations, we considered the current two-pronged approach for review and analysis of common business functions via the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) and Service unique functions by each Military Department.

2. Our discussions have suggested that the common business functions are currently getting the necessary attention through the JCSGs. The opportunities to examine potential synergies associated with the collocation of operational forces, however, seem less defined. As such, we recommend a process be established to provide this cross-Service analysis, especially in the area of aviation platform bed down.

3. Secondly, options to improve Reserve component integration with their respective active component should also be encouraged. That said, the value of locating Reserve facilities within the community must also be considered, given the role that Reserve activities play in strengthening the link between the armed forces and American society.

4. Finally, while we believe that it is within the charter of the Training and Education JCSG, analysis specifically directed at provision of a Joint National Training Capability through BRAC should be considered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "RL Kelly", is positioned above the typed name.

RICHARD L. KELLY  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Deputy Commandant  
Installations and Logistics



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO  
23 Jun 03

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS)

*Ann*  
Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE  
(BRAC) 2005 - ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. In response to your letter of 23 May 2003, there are a number of ongoing strategic initiatives that have the potential to impact future Navy infrastructure requirements including the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, Sea Power 21, and the Fleet Response Plan. Since these studies will impact the future force structure, it is imperative that the conclusions of these studies serve as the basis for future Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) deliberations and transformational analyses. The Navy will continue to work with JCS to ensure the twenty-year force structure plan is consistent with our ongoing initiatives. Other issues that could be pursued in the context of maximizing warfighting capabilities and efficiencies include:

- Optimizing and consolidating advanced pilot and maintenance training for similar platforms (e.g., joint training of the Joint Strike Fighter).
- Optimizing and consolidating the reserve forces into a seamless, joint reserve training concept that leverages active duty capabilities.
- Incorporating force protection vulnerability assessments into the BRAC evaluation process.
- Incorporating a strategic business analysis into the BRAC process to align the business functions with Defense Strategy, and focus on aggregate vice isolated efficiencies. This would entail an examination of DoD business functions and address infrastructure needs.

2. We remain committed to maintaining an active dialogue to support our BRAC initiatives. I will ensure that your office remains apprised of the implications of the ongoing strategic discussions and their impact to our ongoing BRAC process.

*William J. Fallon*  
WILLIAM J. FALLON  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: TRANSFORMATIONAL OPTIONS FOR BRAC 2005

We concur the list of one hundred thirty-eight (138) Transformational Options in your attachment under "Recommended Disapproval" should be dropped from further consideration.

We appreciate the opportunity to finalize this important step in the BRAC process.



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Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy  
for Base Realignment and Closure

Attachment:  
As stated

## Transformational Options

Recommend Approval:

### Category 1 – SECDEF Transformational Options

1. Consolidate Management at Installations with Shared Boundaries. Create a single manager for installations that share boundaries. Source & Application: H&SA
3. Consolidate or collocate Regional Civilian Personnel Offices to create joint civilian personnel centers. Source and Application: H&SA
5. Collocate active and/or Reserve Military Personnel Centers across Military Departments. Source and Application: H&SA
8. Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Central and Field Sites. Consolidate DFAS business line workload and administrative/staff functions and locations. Source and Application: H&SA
13. Rationalize Presence in the DC Area. Assess the need for headquarters, commands and activities to be located within 100 miles of the Pentagon. Evaluation will include analysis of realignment of those organizations found to be eligible to move to DoD-owned space outside of a 100-miles radius. Source and Application: H&SA and applicable MILDEPs
17. Consolidate correctional facilities into fewer locations across Military Departments. Source and Application: H&SA
20. Establish a consolidated multi-service supply, storage and distribution system that enhances the strategic deployment and sustainment of expeditionary joint forces worldwide. Focus the analysis on creating joint activities in heavy (US) DoD concentration areas, i.e. locations where more than one Department is based and within close proximity to another. Source: Supply & Storage; Application: Supply and Storage and Industrial
28. Consolidate similar industrial commodities under Centers of Technical Excellence. Source and Application: Industrial
36. Establish Centers of Excellence for Joint or Inter-service education and training by combining or co-locating like schools (e.g., form a “DoD University” with satellite training sites provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions). Source and Application: Education & Training

38. Establish a single "Center of Excellence" to provide Unmanned Aerial Vehicle initial (a.k.a. undergraduate) training. Source and Application: Education & Training
42. Consolidate or collocate at a single installation all services' primary/  
**undergraduate/initial** phase of pilot training that uses the same aircraft (T-6).  
Source and Application: Education & Training
56. Consolidate RDT&E functions on fewer installations ~~through inter-service support agreements~~ to enable multidisciplinary efforts to increase efficiencies and reduce redundancy within DoD. Source: Army; Application: Technical, ~~MilDeps~~.
60. Collocate Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if practical, i.e., joint use facilities. Application: MilDeps
67. Consolidate aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same base.  
Application: MilDeps

#### **Category 2 – Options to be addressed by ISG – frame scenario development**

4. Consolidate active and Reserve Military Personnel Centers of the same service.  
Source and Application: H&SA
6. Consolidate same service active and Reserve local Military Personnel Offices within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA
7. Collocate active and/or Reserve local Military Personnel Offices across Military Departments located within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA
11. Establish and consolidate mobilization sites at installations able to adequately prepare, train and deploy service members. Source and Application: H&SA
14. Minimize leased space across the US and movement of organizations residing in leased space to DoD-owned space. Source and Application: H&SA
15. Consolidate HQs at Single Locations. Consolidate multi-location headquarters at single locations. Source and Application: H&SA
16. Eliminate locations of stand-alone headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA
18. Collocate Reserve Component (RC) Headquarters. Determine alternative facility alignments to support RC headquarters' administrative missions. Alternatives

could consider collocation and/or movement of RC headquarters to operational bases. Source: H&SA; Application: MILDEPS

19. Collocate Recruiting Headquarters. Analyze alternative Recruiting Headquarters alignments. Consider co-location of RC and Active Component (AC) Recruiting headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA
23. Decentralize Depot level maintenance by reclassifying work from depot-level to I-level. Source and Application: Industrial
24. Centralize I-level maintenance and decentralize depot-level maintenance to the existing (or remaining) depots.  
Eliminate over-redundancy in functions.  
Consolidate Intermediate and Depot-level regional activities  
Source and Application: Industrial
25. Regionalize severable and similar work at the intermediate level. Source and Application: Industrial
27. Collocate depots: Two Services use the same facility(s). Separate command structures but shared common operations. Source and Application: Industrial
29. Implement concept of Vertical Integration by putting entire life cycle at same site to increase synergies, e.g. production of raw materials to the manufacture of finished parts, co-locating storage, maintenance and demil. Source and Application: Industrial
30. Implement concept of Horizontal Integration by taking some of the most costly elements of the M&A processes and put them at the same site to increase efficiencies, e.g. put Load, Assemble and Pack (LAP) of all related munitions at same site. Source and Application: Industrial
31. Maintain a multi-service distribution and deployment network consolidating on regional joint service nodes. Source and Application: Industrial (this appears to be a duplication of #20 on page 1. It should be more clearly defined to apply to a specific commodity for distribution and deployment or deleted).
32. Evaluate Joint Centers for classes and types of weapons systems and/or technologies used by more than one Military Department:  
Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) Capability Area  
Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & Evaluation)  
Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical

33. Evaluate Service-Centric concentration, i.e. consolidate within each Service:
  - Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) capability area
  - Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & Evaluation)
  - Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical
34. Privatize graduate-level education. Source and Application: Education & Training
35. Integrate military and DoD civilian full-time professional development education programs. Source and Application: Education & Training
37. Establish “joint” officer and enlisted specialized skill training (initial skill, skill progression & functional training). Source and Application: Education & Training
43. Locate (division/corps) UEx and (corps/Army) UEy on Joint bases where practical to leverage capabilities of other services (e.g., strategic lift to enhance strategic responsiveness). Source and Application: Army
44. Locate (brigades) Units of Action at installations DoD-wide, capable of training modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapons. Source and Application: Army
45. Collocate Army War College and Command and General Staff College at a single location. Source: Army; Application: Education & Training
46. Locate Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support specialized training needs, training with conventional forces and other service SOF units and wartime alignment deployment requirements. Source and Application: ~~Army~~  
**MILDEPs**
47. Collocate or consolidate multiple branch schools and centers on single locations (preferably with MTOE units and RDTE facilities) based on warfighting requirements, training strategy, and doctrine, to gain efficiencies from reducing overhead and sharing of program-of-instruction resources. Source and Application: Army
49. Increase the number of multi-functional training areas able to simultaneously serve multiple purposes and minimize the number of single focus training areas for the Reserve Components where possible. Source and Application: Army
51. Locate units/activities to enhance home station operations and force protection.

Source and Application: Army.

53. Collocate functions and headquarters in “Joint Campuses” to enhance interoperability and reduce costs. Source: Army; Application: H&SA
54. Consolidate ~~Army~~ MILDEP RDT&E organizations to capitalize on technical synergy across DoD, academia and industry. Source: Army; Application: Technical
55. Reduce the number of USAR regional headquarters to reflect Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRRI). Source and Application: Army
57. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP) within each Service or consolidating into joint ICPs. Application: Supply and Storage
58. Expand Guard and Reserve force integration with the Active force. Examples:
  - 1) Blended organizations.
  - 2) Reserve Associate, Guard Associate, and Active Associate
  - 3) Sponsored Reserve.
  - 4) Blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce infrastructure, and improve readiness.Application: MilDeps
59. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer, secure DoD-owned locations in the region. Application: Intel
61. Consolidate the Army’s five separate Active Component recruit training sites and the Marine Corps’ two Active Component recruit training sites into one recruit training installation each. Source: Education and Training; Application: Army & ~~Marine Corps~~ DON
64. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter ~~graduate~~ initial flight training and maintenance training.
65. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter ~~graduate~~ initial flight training.
66. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter maintenance training.
69. Collocate Service Professional Military Education (PME) schools at the intermediate and senior levels. Application: E&T
70. Consolidate/Collocate Service specific test pilot schools. Application: MilDeps,

### E&T and/or Technical

71. Collocate ground and signals intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps
72. Collocate ground and airborne intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps
74. Each Military Department and Joint Cross Service Group will look at the effects of either reducing their functions by ~~20%, 30%, and 40%~~ 10% and 20% from the current baseline, or ~~reducing excess capacity~~ **assessing the need to increase capability by an additional 10% beyond the analyzed excess capacity, whichever is greater.** The objective of this analysis is to uncover ways in which additional gains could be achieved, rather reasons why they could not. Source: DON; Application: MilDeps and JCSGs

### Category 3 – Options that can be implemented outside of BRAC or appear to be more policy oriented

2. Regionalize Installation Support. Regionalize management of the provision of installation support activities across Military Departments within areas of significant Department of Defense (DoD) concentration, identified as Geographic Clusters. Option will evaluate designating organizations to provide a range of services, regionally, as well as aligning regional efforts to specific functions. For example, a possible outcome might be designation of a single organization with the responsibility to provide installation management services to DoD installations within the statutory National Capital Region (NCR). Source and Application: H&SA
9. Consolidate Local DFAS Finance & Accounting (F&A). Merge/consolidate local DFAS F&A within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA
10. Consolidate remaining mainframe processing and high capacity data storage operations to existing Defense Mega Centers (Defense Enterprise Computing Centers). Source and Application: H&SA
21. Privatize the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities that perform these functions. Source and Application: Supply & Storage
22. Migrate oversight and management of all service depot level reparable to a single DoD agency/activity. Source and Application: Supply & Storage
26. Partnerships Expansions. Under a partnership, have government personnel work in contractor owned/leased facilities and realign or close facilities where personnel

are currently working. Source and Application: Industrial

39. Establish regional Cross-Service and Cross-Functional ranges that will support Service collective, interoperability and joint training as well as test and evaluation of weapon systems. Source and Application: Education & Training
41. Combine Services' T&E Open Air Range (OAR) management into one joint management office. Although organizational/managerial, this option could engender further transformation. Joint management of OAR resources could encourage a healthy competition among OARs to increase efficiency and maximum utility DoD-wide. Source and Application: Education & Training
40. Integrate selected range capabilities across Services to enhance Service collective, interoperability and joint training, such as Urban Operations, Littoral, training in unique settings (arctic, mountain, desert, and tropical). Source and Application: Education & Training
62. Privatize Household Goods and Personal Property Shipping function. Source: BENS; Application: Supply and Storage, MilDeps
63. Privatize long-haul communications in the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Source: BENS; Application: H&SA
73. Consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft using Executive Agency. Application: Education and Training.
75. Establish a “space test range” for satellite ground testing, threat assessment, and tactics development. Elements of the “range” should be networked using a minimum number of ground facilities to virtually simulate on-orbit operations. Source and Application: Air Force
76. Establish an Army Joint Network Science Technology and Experimentation Center to fully realize the transformational capabilities of interdependent Joint Network Centric Warfare. Source: Army; Application: Technical
77. Air Force use optimum flying squadron sizing and organizational constructs to disproportionately increase combat capability and transform the capability of its AEFs. Source and Application: Air Force

#### **Category 4 – Appear to be Duplicative of other options and can be deleted**

12. Establish joint pre-deployment/re-deployment processing sites. Source and Application: H&SA - Same as #67 on page 2

48. Reshape installations, RC facilities and RC major training centers to support home station mobilization and demobilization and implement the Train/Alert/Deploy model. Source and Application: Army – **Appears to duplicate portions of #60 and #11 on page 2; #49 on page 4**
50. Collocate institutional training, MTOE units, RDTE organizations and other TDA units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and enhance training. Army – **Appears to duplicate #44 on page 4**
52. Consolidate aviation training with sister services for like-type aircraft to gain efficiencies. Source: Army; Application: all services – **Appears to duplicate #42 on page 2 – also should be an E&T application if considered**
68. Collocate Service special operations units where they further reduce infrastructure requirements and enable improved training opportunities – **Appears to duplicate #46 on page 4**