

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JAN 4 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS
INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS**SUBJECT: Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum Seven – Surge****Background**

The Secretary of Defense's memorandum of November 15, 2002, established the authorities, organizational structure, goals, and objectives for the Department's development of BRAC 2005 recommendations. Policy Memoranda One through Six provided further guidance on implementing BRAC 2005. This memorandum is the seventh in a series of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) policy memoranda implementing BRAC 2005. The USD (AT&L) will publish additional policy memoranda, as necessary, throughout the BRAC process.

Purpose

This guidance clarifies how the Department has and will meet the statutory requirements to consider surge in the development of the Secretary's realignment and closure recommendations for submission to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (2005 Commission) and applies to the Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs).

The need to surge can arise for any number of reasons, including contingencies, mobilizations, or extended changes in force levels. Section 2822 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136) requires the Secretary of Defense to "assess the probable threats to national security and, as part of such assessment, determine the potential, prudent, [sic] surge requirements to meet those threats." This section further provides that the Secretary shall use the surge requirements determination in the base realignment and closure process. Additionally, Section 2832 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375) modified the previously published BRAC selection criteria to add "surge" to criterion three. This memorandum establishes the framework through which the Department can comply with these requirements.



Policy Guidance

A. Requirements v. Capabilities

To execute the defense strategy, U.S. forces need flexible, adaptive, and decisive joint capabilities that can operate across the full spectrum of military contingencies. In the past, force development, including that to accommodate surge, was requirements-driven, based on specific threats. However, in today's security environment, it is impossible to predict with confidence which nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors may threaten U.S. interests at home or abroad. To mitigate this risk, the United States must anticipate a broad range of capabilities that an adversary might employ and the necessary capabilities, including the capability to surge, that the United States must field to dissuade, deter, or defeat the adversary. The requirements of Sections 2832 and 2822 will be fully realized through this capabilities-based analysis.

B. Determining Surge Capabilities

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, requires any closure or realignment recommendations to be based on the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and final selection criteria. With regard to the force structure plan, each JCSG and Military Department must demonstrate correlations between the probable threats, probable end-strength levels, major military force units, and anticipated funding levels listed in the force structure plan, and the configuration of facilities supporting their functional areas that will result from their candidate recommendations. As a part of this evaluation of future required capabilities, the Military Departments and JCSGs will determine any surge capabilities necessary to meet probable threats and projected changes in force structure.

C. Assess Capacity Available to Surge

The first stage of the BRAC process, capacity analysis, includes common definitions for the functions that fall within the JCSGs' or Military Departments' area of responsibility and metrics that will measure capacity. Characterization of potential excess capacity allows the JCSGs and Military Departments to assess what capacity is available to surge.

D. Value the Capability to Accommodate Surge

In the next stage of the BRAC process, called military value analysis, each JCSG and Military Department must evaluate the infrastructure supporting their functions within the framework provided by the BRAC selection criteria. Within these criteria, criteria one and three capture the concept of surge. Criterion one requires the Department to consider "current and future" mission capabilities and criterion three requires the


Department to assess the “ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.” Through the selection of attributes for criteria one and three, weighing those attributes, and establishing metrics to measure those attributes, each JCSG and Military Department ensures that surge is appropriately reflected in its military value analysis.

E. Assess Surge in Scenario Analysis

In the final stage of the process, scenario analysis, the Department analyzes alternative configurations of its infrastructure against the force structure plan and the selection criteria to arrive at candidate closure and realignment recommendations. This analysis represents another opportunity to fully consider surge capabilities because it incorporates surge considerations made during the evaluation of capabilities necessary to support the force structure plan, and the capacity and military value analyses. Additionally, within this analysis, the Department can ensure that it retains the capability to surge by retaining difficult-to-reconstitute assets. In 1999, after four rounds of BRAC, the Department looked closely at its ability to accommodate surge and found that even after four rounds of BRAC it could accommodate the reconstitution of a robust force structure because it had recognized the military value of “difficult-to-reconstitute” assets during the earlier BRAC processes.

“Difficult-to-reconstitute” assets consist of infrastructure that is not readily commercially available for military use. These assets go beyond physical structures to include elements of topography and the ability to use the assets as required to fulfill a military need. In contrast, “reconstitutable assets” are physical facilities and structures that can easily be constructed (e.g., buildings, hangars, piers, runways and shops). These assets are costly to operate and maintain, and require periodic recapitalization.

In making closure and realignment recommendations the JCSGs and Military Departments should ensure that their analysis recognizes the military value of “difficult-to-reconstitute” assets. Through careful development of closure and realignment recommendations that recognize this value, the JCSGs and Military Departments will retain sufficient difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge, accommodate a significant reconstitution of the force, and support all forces, including those currently based outside the United States.



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