RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AND SUBSTANTIATING DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE BRAC PROPOSAL TO REALIGN POPE AFB
July 14, 2005

REFERENCE THE BRAC REGIONAL HEARING AT CHARLOTTE, NC
JUNE 28, 2005



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July 14, 2005

Anthony Principi
Chairman BRAC Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

North Carolina fully supports the BRAC process and the role of the BRAC commission in reviewing the proposals from the Department of Defense and determining if they meet the BRAC statute and criteria. We are delighted that DOD has recognized the incredible value of North Carolina's military installations and has proposed moving additional military forces and capabilities to these installations.

I appreciated the opportunity to participate in the regional BRAC hearing in Charlotte on June 28, 2005, and during that hearing, the commissioners asked questions about the proposal to realign Pope AFB. As you know, we are concerned about the proposal to shut down the 43rd Airlift Wing and transfer the installation and the airfield functions to the Army. With this letter, I am submitting on behalf of the representatives of the Fayetteville community their response to the commission's questions along with additional information which substantiates our concerns.

This BRAC round offers a tremendous opportunity to establish a joint base Bragg/Pope that would meet all OSD BRAC guidance for joint training and basing opportunities. Please closely review these points and consider the potential degradation to our nation's 911 Crisis Response Force if these team is dissolved. Thank you for all the time and effort you are devoting to reviewing the BRAC process and considering our concerns.

With much gratitude,

Elizabeth Dole

Elizabeth Dole

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POPE AFB REALIGNMENT RESPONSE

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SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The crisis reaction forces at Fort Bragg constitute a unique military capability that responds quickly to contingency operations worldwide. The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB has been a critical part of this team for more than twenty years and has participated in many successful combat operations including Just Cause in Panama, Urgent Fury in Grenada and Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The joint training, planning and execution opportunities have forged a strong relationship and a proven team to create the premier power projection force that supports the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and is not replicated anywhere else in our military force structure.

Equally important to participating in combat operations, the Wing provides numerous functions to maintain the airfield, execute airfield operations and to support strategic airlift operations from Pope AFB, including operational planning, airlift coordination, maintenance, and logistics and outload support. The 43rd Airlift Wing provides the expertise and infrastructure that keeps the airfield operational and allows high-density aircraft operations to flow smoothly. The Army does not have the requisite skills or expertise to maintain an airbase to the same standard as the Air Force. It is not an Army mission to maintain or operate an airfield to the standards necessary to conduct Joint Crisis Response operations or sustained strategic airlift. Army airfields typically support Army aviation units consisting of helicopters and light aircraft. This realignment will negatively impact the joint training, operational, and deployment capability of forces on Fort Bragg, and compromise our nation's crisis response capabilities.

It appears that the BRAC cross service coordination process for this proposal failed to be completed in the last few weeks before the DOD BRAC announcements. One month prior to OSD approval of the BRAC recommendations, the Army and Joint Cross Service Group were working toward a proposal to move FORSCOM and US Army Reserve Command headquarters to Pope AFB and establish a joint base Bragg/Pope. This proposal was approved by the HSA Joint Steering Group at the end of March, 2005. The HAS Joint Steering Group then rescinded and superseded that position in April by proposing to realign Pope AFB and transfer the installation to the Army. Until that point, the Army coordination indicated that airfield operations at Pope AFB, or at a joint base Bragg/Pope, would be handled by the Air Force. There was no apparent planning or coordination between the services for the Army to take over airfield operations and support operations. To operate Pope airbase at its current OPTEMPO and mission profile would be unique to the Army and they could not prepare cost or manpower analysis for such an undertaking. It is clear that failure to maintain Pope's operational capabilities will degrade the joint power projection mission of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, and the warfighting capability of both services; therefore, this disconnect between the services' positions compromised the process and generated this flawed recommendation.

The Military Value analysis used formulas with weighted criteria that resulted in very low values for the crisis response and airlift missions at Pope AFB. The maximum points allowed for Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force was 10 out of 100. Using the sum of the eight mission areas, resulted in low scores for an Air Force base with a mission to support the Army, and provided quantitative justification to close Pope AFB.

Accurate weighting criteria would have reflected the strategic importance of supporting joint crisis response forces.

The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB and the airborne and special operations forces at Fort Bragg constitute a valuable and unique power projection capability that is not replicated anywhere else in the world. Dissolving this team and transferring Pope AFB to the Army instead of establishing a Joint Base is a flawed recommendation that will compromise joint training and warfighting capabilities and place the Crisis Response mission at risk. The Army cannot maintain the airfield to the standards and capability needed to support the power projection mission. The decision to disestablish the wing and transfer the base to the Army should be reversed and the installation should be established as Joint Base Bragg/Pope.

SECTION 2: INTRODUCTION

Questions asked by BRAC commissioners following the presentation at the BRAC hearing on June 28 are summarized:

- Did we analyze the cost of reversing the decision to realign Pope AFB?
- The Air Force plans to support deployment operations from Fort Bragg, why can't aircraft land, load troops and depart without support from the airlift wing?
- Strategic deployments are supported with long-range airlift, how is the deployment mission degraded since C-130s are not used for this purpose?

An additional question asked by Chairman Principi to Secretary Rumsfeld in a letter dated July 1, 2005 is also addressed: "Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?"

This response addresses these questions and clarifies the missions and functions performed by the 43rd Airlift Wing; assesses airfield facilities and ramp space; identifies a flawed coordination process for this proposal; analyzes inconsistencies in the formulas used by the Air Force to establish MCI; and defines the mission decrement referred to in the proposal to realign Pope AFB.

The proposed actions to move FORSCOM Headquarters and Army Reserve Command Headquarters to Fort Bragg/Pope AFB are absolutely the right move for the Army. Combining these headquarters with 18th Airborne Corps, US Army Special Forces Command, and Joint Special Operations Command to provide a secure and combined location for warfighting and training command headquarters provides synergy and efficiencies that cannot be found in other locations. These actions are not dependent on the BRAC actions to disestablish the airlift wing and transfer the installation to the Army. Therefore, we fully support these actions and they are not discussed in this report.

Pope Air Force Base, NC Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station, and Yeager Air Guard Station, WV, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR

Recommendation: Realign Pope Air Force Base (Air Force Base), North Carolina. Distribute the 43d Airlift Wing's C-130E aircraft (25 aircraft) to the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas; realign the 23d Fighter Group's A-10 aircraft (36 aircraft) to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia; transfer real property accountability to the Army; disestablish the 43rd Medical Group and establish a medical squadron. At Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, realign eight C-130E aircraft to backup inventory; retire 27 C-130Es; realign one C-130J aircraft to the 143d Airlift Wing (ANG), Quonset State Airport Air Guard Station, Rhode Island; two C-130Js to the 146th Airlift Wing (ANG), Channel Islands Air Guard Station, California; and transfer four C-130Js from the 314th Airlift Wing (AD) to the 189th Airlift Wing (ANG), Little Rock Air Force Base.

Realign Yeager Airport Air Guard Station (AGS), West Virginia, by realigning eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft active duty/Reserve associate unit, and by relocating flying-related expeditionary combat support (ECS) to Eastern West Virginia Regional Airport/Shepherd Field AGS (aerial port and fire fighters). Close Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS), Pennsylvania and relocate 911th Airlift Wing's (AFRC) eight C-130H aircraft to Pope/Fort Bragg to form a 16 aircraft active/reserve associate unit. Relocate AFRC operations and maintenance manpower to Pope/Ft. Bragg. Relocate flight related ECS (aeromedical squadron) to Youngstown-Warren Regional APT ARS. Relocate all remaining Pittsburgh ECS and headquarters manpower to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Air National Guard units at Pittsburgh are unaffected.

Justification: Downsizing Pope Air Force Base takes advantage of mission-specific consolidation opportunities to reduce operational costs, maintenance costs and the manpower footprint. The smaller manpower footprint facilitates transfer of the installation to the Army. Active duty C-130s and A-10s will move to Little Rock (17-airlift) and Moody (11-SOF/CSAR), respectively, to consolidate force structure at those two bases and enable Army recommendations at Pope. At Little Rock, older aircraft are retired or converted to back-up inventory and J-model C-130s are aligned under the Air National Guard. Little Rock grows to become the single major active duty C-130 unit, streamlining maintenance and operation of this aging weapon system. At Pope, the synergistic, multi-service relationship will continue between Army airborne and Air Force airlift forces with the creation of an active duty/Reserve associate unit. The C-130 unit remains as an Army tenant on an expanded Ft. Bragg. With the disestablishment of the 43rd Medical Group, the AF will maintain the required manpower to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Air Force active duty military members. The Army will maintain the required manpower necessary to provide primary care, flight and occupational medicine to support the Army active duty military members. The Army will provide ancillary and specialty medical services for all assigned Army and Air Force military members (lab, x-ray, pharmacy, etc).

The major command's capacity briefing reported Pittsburgh ARS land constraints prevented the installation from hosting more than 10 C-130 aircraft and Yeager AGS cannot support more than eight C-130s. Careful analysis of mission capability indicates that it is more appropriate to robust the proposed airlift mission at Fort Bragg to an optimal 16 aircraft C-130 squadron, which provides greater military value and offers unique opportunities for Jointness.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $218 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $653 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $197 million, with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the cost and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $2,515 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 7,840 jobs (4,700 direct jobs and 3,140 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fayetteville, North Carolina Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 4.01 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 246 jobs (156 direct jobs and 90 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Charleston, West Virginia Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is 0.14 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 581 jobs (322 direct jobs and 259 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Metropolitan Statistical economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Impact on Community Infrastructure: A review of the community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support forces, missions and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: There are potential impacts to air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands that may need to be considered during the implementation of this recommendation. There are no anticipated impacts to dredging; or marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries. Impacts of costs include $1.29 million in costs for environmental compliance and waste management. These costs were included in the payback calculation. There are no anticipated impacts to the costs of environmental

restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to the implementation of this recommendation.

CAPABILITIES

SECTION 3

MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

This section addresses questions about the missions, capabilities and deployment requirements at Fort Bragg/Pope AFB.

Three specific questions asked were:

- You would suggest that the Commission and our staff should analyze the capabilities that would be required to provide that support mission, and see what is the best and most logical place and most cost effective place to put it at to make sure the warfighter reaches the war in time with the equipment and properly deployed.

- Can these functions be replicated somewhere else?

- (reference Combat Operations) They didn't employ in C-130s...other deployments really occur in aircraft that are not at Pope...and are basically brought in to handle the mission. There's more to it than that, that the Army couldn't do that – the Air Force would have to do that.

Section 3 includes:

3A: Units and Mission Capability

3B: Combat Airlift Operations Flown From Pope AFB

3C: Airlift Wing Support for Exercises, Operations and Deployment

3D: Evolving Missions

3E: Mission Degradation

SECTION 3: MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

3A: Mission Capability

Fort Bragg and Pope AFB constitute a unique power projection capability unlike any other military installation in the country. Forces on Fort Bragg must meet requirements to execute on the shortest timeline of any forces in our military as directed by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). With the Pope AFB airfield adjoining Fort Bragg, crisis response forces can stage and deploy faster than at any other installation, and units do not have to leave the installation to stage and board aircraft, allowing force movements to remain undetected. These forces include three 82nd Airborne Brigade Combat Teams, with a fourth projected; Special Forces from the US Army Special Operations Command; and the Joint Special Operations Command. There are combat planning staffs on Fort Bragg/Pope AFB from the 18th Airborne Corps, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations Command, and the 43rd Airlift Wing. In addition, combat controllers from the 18th Air Support Operations Group, and 14th Air Support Operations Squadron, and the Combat Controllers School train and deploy with Army units. The capabilities that exist at Fort Bragg and Pope AFB can not be replicated anywhere else due to the wide range and specialized training of crisis response forces at Fort Bragg; the training, planning, execution and airlift support provided by the 43rd Airlift Wing; the capability to deploy quickly to meet crisis timelines; and the ability to conceal preparations and maintain secrecy.

Forces at Fort Bragg provide a variety of options to the President and Secretary of Defense during crisis planning that no other base can provide. With the addition of the Homeland Defense mission, units at Fort Bragg may be required to respond quickly to an international crisis or to a national emergency or terrorist act in the United States. If this response capability is degraded, our national security could be affected. Some other major Army installations that have runways on the post that can accommodate strategic lift aircraft are: Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, and Fort Campbell. Fort Bliss is home to the Army Air Defense Command, which does not have a rapid response mission. Fort Hood is home to III Corps, the 4th Mechanized Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all heavy forces that move the majority of their equipment by rail. Fort Campbell is home to the 101st Airborne Division, which is heavily equipped with helicopters, which also deploys primarily by rail. None of the Army's airfields operate at the same level, alert status and tempo of Fort Bragg/Pope AFB.

3B: Combat Airlift Operations from Pope AFB

Over the last four decades, the unique relationship and organizations of Ft Bragg and Pope AFB were created specifically to support the nation's Crisis Response mission as directed in our militaries' classified contingency plans. Airlift Wings at Pope AFB have supported Combat Operations that were planned and executed from the base. They provided the primary airlift and execution planning for Grenada, Panama and Haiti. This required the wing to closely coordinate with the Corps staff and to provide the majority of the Air Force planning for the operation and to orchestrate the preparation, briefings, loading, marshalling and launching of all aircraft, personnel and equipment, and

deconflict the flights into the battle area. These are just a few examples of the order of magnitude of Pope operations from past Crisis Response missions and only includes operations when aircraft launched from or cycled through Pope AFB:

Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), 1983: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. Approximately 24 C-141s were positioned at Pope AFB to support the 82nd Airborne Division's move, but were configured for air land operations and had to be reconfigured for airdrop operations on Pope during the 18-hour preparation window prior to launch. Additionally, three C-5A aircraft cycled through Pope during this same period to pick up and deploy special operations forces.

Operation Just Cause (Panama), 1989: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. 31 C-141s were initially loaded at Pope and sent to Charleston AFB for staging. 20 C-141s were positioned at Pope AFB to support the 82nd Airborne Division's initial airfield seizure airdrop operations, followed by 43 C-141s and 16 C-5s conducting airland operations. An ice storm in North Carolina the night of the operation could have canceled the mission had the Army and Air Force commanders not had developed confidence in each others abilities through multiple joint training exercises and habitual planning relationships.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Kuwait/Iraq), 1990/1: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. The initial aircraft launched at 1:40PM, August 8, 1990 and was followed by approximately 889 C-141, 430 C-5 and 485 commercial charter (CRAF) missions operating around the clock from Pope AFB until all XVIII Airborne Corps and special operations forces had been deployed from Fort Bragg, approximately 40,000 soldiers and their unit equipment. Almost half of this movement was accomplished in the first 30 days.

Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994: Forces had to be ready to launch 18 hours after alert. The combat airdrop (airfield seizure) was to be executed from 32 C-130 aircraft followed by 54 C-141 aircraft to airdrop additional personnel and equipment. 37 of the C-141 aircraft were pre-loaded with equipment at Pope and then staged at McGuire and Charleston AFBs. The 32 C-130 aircraft and 17 C-141 aircraft launched directly from Pope AFB. An additional 32 C-130 aircraft were supporting special operations forces from other airfields.

In every case, forces had to be prepared to deploy within 18 hours of alert. In every case, the Air Force planning, staging, and execution requirements far exceeded the capabilities of a squadron headquarters or the expertise of an Army garrison staff. In every case, the base operations and support infrastructure was robust enough to handle the Crisis Response mission. This would not have happened without support from the Airlift Wing. The expertise and resources requisite to a Wing organization have the ability to execute initial planning while simultaneously receiving and preparing platforms and personnel from across the Air Force tailored to the mission profile to meet the impeding operational requirement. The current BRAC recommendations do not ensure

that this documented joint response requirement can be sustained and therefore does not comply with the DOD BRAC guidance

3C: Airlift Wing Support for Exercises, Operations and Deployments

In the deployment scenario the main wing functions are the marshalling and loading of equipment, preparation of aircraft, and command and control of the launches to meet the established timelines. The issue of support for the Army during deployments is dependent on the size of the operation. Wing assets normally require augmentation to support the deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division, 18th Airborne Corps Headquarters and support staff. During large-scale deployments or exercises such as Large Package Week, CAPSTONE, and Joint Forced Entry Exercises (JFEX), additional maintenance personnel are needed to meet the added workload. The Wing provides the daily route and drop zone deconfliction for any and all AF aircraft conducting training or Army support at Pope AFB. In some exercises, even though wing aircraft may not be involved with the exercise or training event, the 43rd Wing provides support for core functions and planners and schedulers assist with scenario development and events timeline to ensure compatibility with all base activities and to provide the proper level of visibility and success of the missions. The Airlift Wing staff deployed to SWA to provide a battle staff during Desert Storm. The 43rd Airlift Wing currently provides 10 C-130E aircraft and 15 aircrews to the CENTCOM AOR, and because of this heavy usage, the Wing borrows aircraft from active and ARC bases to keep the mission going both deployed and at home. The planned replacement of the C-130E aircraft with C-130J aircraft at Pope AFB was an important aspect to maintain our airlift capability and support Army operations. The funding cut for the C-130Js by OSD, affected the Air Force proposal to realign Pope AFB, as the military justification for closing the wing was to consolidate an aging aircraft fleet. The C-130J provides longer range, faster deployments and more load capacity than the C-130E, and will be used for strategic and intratheater airlift operations.

3D: Evolving Missions

In addition to the current spectrum of operations that U.S. forces are supporting around the world, there are evolving missions associated with the War on Terrorism and Homeland Defense. Terrorist acts, especially those associated with nuclear or chemical/biological weapons, would conceivably require a rapid military response. Missions could include securing an area or a city, restoring the peace, engaging terrorists, CNB containment and cleanup, and retaliation for an attack. Responding to a potential terrorist act with overwhelming force or engaging forces prior to an attack could prevent the act from taking place. All of these missions would require a rapid response with appropriate force and equipment. With the current relationship between Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, and with the airlift wing in place, crisis response forces are available to respond quickly to these situations. If the wing is disestablished, aircraft would need to deploy to the installation, which adds time to the crisis response. Execution planning would also be delayed.

Other missions that have been supported in the past and may be needed in the future are Humanitarian Relief, and support for the War on Drugs.

3E: Mission Degradation

A brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division designated the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) is required to be staged for deployment in 18 hours and airborne within 24 hours of notification by the President. Deploying the entire Brigade requires approximately 76 C-130s or 20 C-17s. If an Airlift Control Element or team had to deploy to Fort Bragg to plan, coordinate and control airborne operations, they would not meet the required timelines. In addition, if the orders call for a large-scale deployment requiring surge operations, augmentation of many airfield functions listed above may be required. An associate RC squadron would not have the planning section or trained personnel to plan combat operations similar to operations in Grenada, Haiti and Panama. The relationships between Corps, Special Forces and Wing staffs, built on working together and solving problems during numerous joint training exercises would no longer exist. This is a degradation that our crisis reaction forces cannot afford.

Forces at Fort Bragg and the Airlift Wing at Pope AFB have reacted quickly to contingency crisis for the past twenty years. Breaking up this team and degrading our crisis response capability does not make good military sense while we are engaged in a War on Terrorism and involved in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas around the world. The military justification for closing the wing and consolidating an aging aircraft fleet is far outweighed by the responsibility to our national security for developing an increased crisis response capability at a newly designated joint base Bragg/Pope. Establishing joint base Bragg/Pope and maintaining the Airlift Wing is a tremendous opportunity to increase our power projection capability and adhere to DOD BRAC guidance to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness with joint basing opportunities.

SECTION 4

AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

This section addresses Pope AFB airfield facilities, functions and operations to support mission requirements.

Section 4 includes:

4A: Airfield Facilities

4B: Airfield Functions and Operations

4C: Airlift Wing Support for Airfield Operations

4D: Support information and graphics

SECTION 4: AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

4A: Airfield Facilities

The airfield facilities at Pope AFB are in excellent condition, highly maintained to Air Force and FAA standards and specifically designed to support Army operations at Fort Bragg. The ramp area at Pope AFB achieved the maximum score of 100 for MCI in six of the seven applicable mission areas, with the airlift scoring 75.

The Blue Ramp is the primary ramp for Wing operations and according to Air Mobility Command; it has room for 64 C-130s, Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA), or room for 36 A-10s and 28 C-130s. The Blue Ramp (shown in dark green on attached map) has 194,000 square yards of parking space and is adjacent to the A-10 ramp, which has an additional 190,000 square yards and is currently used for A-10 operations.

The Green Ramp (colored burgundy) has direct access to Fort Bragg and is the primary staging area for Army operations. It has 260,000 square yards of ramp space, sufficient to stage 20 C-17s at a time, which is adequate to move an entire Division Ready Brigade. As part of the $118.5 million Outload Enhancement Program, three 40,000 square ft staging facilities were constructed on the Fort Bragg side of the Green Ramp, permitting soldiers to prepare for deployment and for their equipment to remain out of the elements. Information on the Outload Enhancement Program is included in Section 4D.

The Yellow Ramp (colored yellow) is primarily used for JSOC operations. With 48,000 square yards of ramp space, it can hold four C-17s. There are six newly constructed munitions and hazardous cargo loading areas, colored red, on the southwest side of the airfield with new taxiways accessing the runway.

The Silver Ramp is adjacent to base operations, and is used primarily for VIP flights. It is adjacent to the Blue Ramp and has room for three additional C-130s.

Other recent enhancements to the Green Ramp are new POL aircraft fueling facilities, and new munitions load areas. The new load areas compliment the large munitions storage area shown on the map.

4B: Airfield Functions and Operations

Airfield Operations are the responsibility of the 43rd Airlift Wing and the Wing performs functions that are normal for major Air Force bases. However these same functions are not the standard at Army Airfields, and the expertise to meet those standards is not the norm because the Army does not routinely support major aircraft operations such as those required at Pope AFB and most other major AMC bases. A few examples are listed that are Air Force unique functions:

SECTION 4: AIRFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

The Air Force has time tested standardization/evaluation functions at the Wing, MAJCOM, and AF levels with regular scheduled inspections and certification of airfield facilities and functions.

Air Traffic Control operates from the Pope tower 24 hours a day, seven days a week and aircraft operate throughout this period. Air Force trained and FAA certified air traffic controllers are also used for radar approaches, departures and controlling traffic in the local area. Trained and certified personnel in base operations work on a daily basis with the FAA, reviewing and filing flight plans and coordinating flights.

Fire fighting personnel are specially trained, and equipment is specially designed to suppress aircraft fires and rescue crewmembers, and specifically at Pope AFB they receive additional training for firefighting support for large aircraft and for dealing with hazardous cargo and munitions. Munitions load crews are trained on all types of AF aircraft, and are certified for various types of equipment and loads. Munitions storage areas on Pope AFB and Fort Bragg are utilized when munitions are loaded and deployed to support combat operations.

Ice and snow removal equipment was purchased by the wing to keep the runway open at all times and under all conditions. Rapid runway repair is a specialty function required by the Air Force to maintain the runway in operational status and rapidly repair damages to operational status. The Wing's Civil Engineer squadron provides airfield and facility support, and sets a high priority on maintaining and upgrading the airfield. The 43rd Logistics Group maintains parts and provides logistical support for PAA and visiting aircraft. The 43rd Maintenance Group maintains Wing assigned aircraft and supports repair for visiting aircraft. The Airlift Wing annual budget includes a significant investment for airfield maintenance and repair. Long-term upgrades, such as munitions load areas, fire fighting training facilities, and new staging areas receive high priority in the five-year plan and also receive strong congressional support. All these considerations are the 'norm' for the Air Force in sustainment of it base infrastructure and therefore efficiencies are gained through similar requirements at its numerous airfields.

The demands of maintaining Pope to its current standards would be unique to the Army and the Army's priorities and budgeting for airfield support have not been set at the same levels and have not been realized at other Army Airfields. Also, the Army simply does not have the institutional expertise within its service that the Air Force does at maintaining airfield operations and support facilities to a standard necessary to meet short notice surge operations as for a crisis response, or long-term high optempo strategic deployment operations as we saw during Operation Desert Storm. Army airfields traditionally operate to support army aviation assets, consisting primarily of helicopter and light aircraft. The Army does not have a mission to support strategic airlift and army airfields do not have an organic capability to support this mission. The Army should not be required to support the airlift mission and doing so would be a duplication of roles and missions. Failure to support the airlift mission would result in mission degradation.

4C: Airlift Wing Support for Airfield Operations

The following list of functions is included to provide a scope of the responsibilities inherent to operating, maintaining and supporting airfield operations. Over 6,000 personnel are assigned to the 43rd Airlift Wing, and the majority of these functions are managed by flights or squadrons.

Planning Section: Operations, Inspections, Anti-terrorism, Scheduling and Documentation
Rapid Runway Repair section
Damage Control Center
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Communications squadron
Munitions load Flight
Fire Protection Flight
Liquid Fuels
Facilities Manager
Wing FOD Manager
Aerospace Ground Equipment
Avionics
Engines, Fuels and Pneudraulics
Structural Maintenance
Aircraft Schedulers
Resource Advisors
Logistics support: Disaster Preparation; Environmental Coordinator; Plans and Mobility
Maintenance: Repair and Reclamation; Aircraft wheel and tire
Material support
Test cell
Fabrication: Metal technology, NDI, refurbishment, structural maintenance
Survival equipment
Sortie generation
Enroute Operations: mission scheduler, superintendents, loadmasters, QA
Life support: equipment and oxygen sections
ATC: flight planning
Airfield manager: Air Traffic Control, Tower, GCA
Range scheduling
Intelligence section
Weather section
Combat readiness and resources
Aerial Delivery: parachute rigging, fabrication and chute shop
Air Terminal Operations Center

4D: Supporting Information and Graphics

(Supporting information follows.)

DRAFT DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT – FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE UNDER FOIA

POPE RAMP LAYOUT



POPE OVERVIEW

As of	30 Sep 2005	30 Sep 2011
Assigned Weapon System Type(s) (MDS)	C-130E	C-130E/J
Total PAA	28	28
# Flying Squadrons	2	2
Total Available Aircraft Parking Spaces	30	30
Unused Aircraft Parking Spaces	7	7

Template Used	C-130J
Standard PAA Per Squadron	16

POPE OVERVIEW (CONT'D)
TENANT FLYING UNITS

	As of	30 Sep 2005		30 Sep 2011	
Tenant Flying Unit	Type AC	# Aircraft	# Parking Spaces Used	# Aircraft	# Parking Spaces Used
ACC Fighter Unit	A-10	36	36	36	36
Army Golden Knights	C-31	2	5	2	5
	UV-18	2		2	
	UV-20	1		1	
Various Other Units	C-208	2	6	2	6
	PC-6	1		1	
	CN-235	1		1	
	DHC-6	1		1	
	T-34	1		1	

POPE
ESTIMATED CAPACITY AFTER 2011

Weapon System Type (MDS)	C-130
Maximum Operational Capacity (With A-10s Assigned)	32 PAA
Maximum Operational Capacity (With A-10s Relocated)	64 PAA *

*Leaves 80,000 SY of unused ramp space on former A-10 Ramp to support Joint requirements

OUTLOAD ENHANCEMENT PLAN FORT BRAGG'S ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM

PHASE	DESCRIPTION	COST	Program Year	Projected Completion
1a.	A/DACG Staging Complex	$13.2M	1996	2Q99
1b.	A/DACG Staging Complex	$29.0M	1999	4Q02
2.	Hvy Drop Rigging Facility	$30.0M	2000	4Q02
3.	Ammunition Holding Area	$15.0M	2001	4Q03
4.	POL Storage Complex	$17.5M	2003	2Q05
5	Central Marshalling Area	$13.5M	2008	3Q10

ASMP Master Plan



OUTLOAD ENHANCEMENT PLAN
PROJECT PHASING

PHASES	PROGRAM COST	
1a.	$13M	INFRASTRUCTURE, IRC AHA, PERSONNEL SHELTER
1b.	$29M	CARGO HANDLING FACILITY & PERSONNEL SHELTERS
2.	$30M	HEAVY DROP RIGGING FACILITY
3.	$15M	AMMUNITION HOLDING AREA
4.	$17.5M	FUELS FACILITY

BREAKDOWN

SECTION 5: BRAC COORDINATION BREAKDOWN

The BRAC coordination process for this proposal broke down between the Joint Cross Steering Group, the Army and the Air Force. This was especially evident in the last few weeks before the DOD BRAC announcements. There was no apparent planning or coordination on the part of the Army to take over airfield operations and support operations as they are today. The Army did not prepare cost or manpower analysis for maintaining and operating the airfield.

From all documents reviewed, it appears that the Army was planning on Fort Bragg and Pope AFB to become Joint Base Bragg-Pope from the first time it surfaced as an option by the HSA JCSG. Joint Base Bragg-Pope was carried as an approved recommendation by the HSA JCSG up to and including the 29 March 2005 meeting. We have to assume that 'approved' means that the recommendation had been addressed and supported by both services and the Joint Staff.

On those same HSA JCSG slides, it relocates FORSCOM headquarters from Ft McPherson to 'Pope AFB'. Therefore, it is logical that when the JCSG says 'Joint Base', that it means both services continue to be represented and both services continue to execute their operational responsibilities, and only the administrative and facility support functions (facility maintenance, health care, MWR, PX/BX, commissary, etc.) would be consolidated under a single service for efficiency.

The 26 April 2005 HSA JCSG slides delete Joint Base Bragg-Pope, however the Army continued to represent their BRAC planning in terms of a Joint Base. The Army BRAC 2005 analyses and recommendations released in May 2005 state that:

"Through coordination with and the leadership of the HSA JCSG the Army developed recommendations to collocate headquarters at joint campuses...by relocating the Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) to Pope AFB, NC."

Additionally, The Army Basing Study (TABS), which provided guidance to the Army installations on preparation to execute the BRAC recommendations and was also released in May, 2005 states the following:

- US Forces Command and US Army Reserve Command to Pope AFB.
- Transfer real property and ownership of Pope AFB to the Army and Fort Bragg, NC. The Air Force will realign various operational units from Pope AFB to other bases. A C-130 unit and approximately 1800 personnel will remain. This will establish a more efficient Joint Base.
- We also anticipate an increase in our garrison staff and some support organizations. The garrison functions and the medical functions of Pope will fall under Fort Bragg. (Note it does not say the operation of the airbase)
- Fort Bragg will become a consolidated, joint installation under Army control.

SECTION 5: BRAC COORDINATION BREAKDOWN

We have found no Army generated COBRA data that addresses their expectations of assuming the operational costs of sustaining Pope's infrastructure or OPTEMPO dollars for runway and ramp repairs/sutainment or military construction.

The Army is now assessing the cost of operating Pope AFB as an Army airfield. They do not intend to operate it at the current level of operations, or at a level to support large-scale contingency operations. The Army does not inherently provide these functions and has relied on the Air Force to provide airlift and maintain and operate airfields supporting airlift operations. The Army does not have the personnel, equipment, training or expertise to maintain or operate the airfield to the standards necessary to fully support combat operations, strategic airlift or large-scale crisis reactions. Failure to operate the airfield as it operates today will degrade the capability of the installation to provide strategic airlift, support contingency operations and provide airborne training with C-130s.

ANALYSIS

SECTION 6

Military Value Analysis

This section discusses the Military Value analysis and the weighting and formulas used to determine the MCI.

Section 6 includes:

6A: AF Process and Criteria Weighting

6B: Military Capability Index Scoring

6C: MCI Formula Analysis

6D: Supporting Information

SECTION 6: MILITARY VAUE ANALYSIS

6A: AF Analytical Process and Criteria Weighting

According to the Air Force BRAC Report, the Air Force base analysis was shaped by three principles: military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the primary factor; all installations were treated equally; and installation military value was determined not only on a base's current mission but also on its capacity to support other core missions. Certified data was derived from the individual installations and the BCEG assigned weighing guidance that was used in formulas to establish an MCI. Each installation received a separate MCI for each of the eight mission areas: fighter; bomber; tanker; airlift; special operation/combat search and rescue; command and control/intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (C2ISR); unmanned aerial vehicles; and space control. Active and Reserve Component installations were considered on an equal basis and were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight AF mission areas.

This appears to be a fair process, however the scoring criteria is heavily weighted for bases with long runways, room for expansion and capability to support multiple missions. Selection Criteria #1 (Current and Future Mission) accounted for 54.3 percent of the total score; Selection Criteria #2 (Condition of Infrastructure) was 33.2 percent; Selection Criteria #3 (Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force) was 10 percent; and Selection Criteria #4 (Cost of Operations/Manpower) was 2.5 percent. Even if Pope AFB received maximum points in Contingency, Mobilization and Future Force, it only accounted for ten percent of the Military Value of the base. Bases that did not score well in the categories including runway dimensions and distance from low level routes and airspace, which was applied to all eight mission areas, scored lower in total ranking, which provided quantitative justification for closure or realignment.

6B: Military Capability Index Scoring

Pope AFB's primary mission is to support airlift operations for the 82nd Airborne Division and Special Operations Forces at Fort Bragg, which is specifically addressed in Selection Criteria # 3. It is not intended to support Bomber, Space Operations or C2ISR. The Air Force only weighted SC #3 as ten percent of the total MCI for each mission area. So, although Pope AFB's MCI for SOF/CSAR was first out of 154 installations and the MCI for Airlift was third, it did not meet criteria in other mission areas to score well overall. As an example, Pope AFB scored zero points in four mission areas because the runway was 500 feet shorter than the minimum runway criteria for any points in these mission areas. The primary runway at Pope AFB is 7,500 feet long, with 1,000 feet overruns on both ends, and the runway criteria for Fighter, Bomber, SOF and C2ISR mission areas resulted in zero points awarded for the runway. The formula disregarded that the runway is adequate to support Fighter and SOF operations on a regular basis, that A-10s, F-16s and C-130s were stationed at Pope AFB for years, and the base is used regularly by tankers and strategic airlift aircraft. In the Air Force formulas, runways shorter than 8,000 feet received zero points in the MCI assessment.

6C: MCI Formula Analysis

Pope AFB scored low in other mission areas due to criteria that was not applicable to the mission and due to formulas that were applied across the board to all mission areas. Selection criteria #3 was scored low (less than 50%) in most mission areas for Pope AFB, although it scored 100% in 7 of the 8 mission areas (Space Ops did not have a runway category) for its ability to support large-scale mobility deployment. However, this area was only 1.2 to 2.2 maximum points out of 100. The low scores in SC#3 were due to zero points awarded for "Buildable acres for Industrial Operations and Air Operations growth", which was worth almost double the ability to support large-scale mobility deployment. In Selection Criteria #1, proximity to low level routes was weighted from 13.98 to 39.1 maximum points. The Air Force weighted "proximity to airspace supporting the mission" from ten to twenty times more important than "ability to support large-scale mobility deployment" in all mission areas.

The formulas used in this process did not account for Pope AFB's unique power projection role and did not consider the proposal to establish a Joint Base Bragg/Pope. Considering these factors would have resulted in a much higher MCI score. These inconsistencies indicate that the weighting factors and scoring criteria did not accurately reflect the military value of Pope AFB or for different and unique military installations.

6D: Supporting Information

Supporting information follows.

Airlift MCI					
Base	Overall MCI Score	Crt 1 Current and Future Mission	Crt 2 Condition of Infra-structure	Crt 3 Contingency Mobilization Future Forces	Crt 4 Cost of Ops / Manpower
Maxwell AFB	59.90	70.78	55.31	22.48	85.68
McChord AFB	57.95	49.64	71.78	38.95	57.08
McConnell AFB	54.65	45.85	65.92	43.00	75.83
McEntire AGS	59.35	71.70	49.85	35.48	85.19
McGee Tyson APT AGS	48.32	47.96	51.87	25.79	86.02
McGuire AFB	51.80	39.42	62.51	67.95	37.26
Memphis IAP AGS	48.01	50.94	45.72	37.17	75.57
Minn/St Paul IAP ARS	41.52	32.19	52.63	36.80	47.69
Minot AFB	54.34	39.70	65.42	70.91	73.42
Moffett Federal Field AGS	33.14	40.10	31.66	11.59	15.79
Moody AFB	51.72	52.29	41.64	81.05	91.37
Mountain Home AFB	59.77	46.58	68.64	81.35	68.58
NAS New Orleans ARS	41.65	46.93	39.81	17.20	72.63
Nashville IAP AGS	39.77	48.71	27.61	39.33	78.64
Nellis AFB	63.95	59.85	72.31	53.08	43.94
New Castle County Airport AGS	36.96	48.83	28.33	15.48	47.53
Niagara Falls IAP ARS	40.03	35.85	43.28	41.92	55.66
Offutt AFB	47.07	43.55	49.10	48.25	73.20
Onizuka AFS	3.09	0.00	4.00	10.08	16.85
Otis AGB	38.95	36.97	36.90	55.82	42.04
Patrick AFB	42.23	47.00	32.91	52.75	66.83
Pease International Trade Port AGS	46.65	43.72	52.48	39.09	33.80
Peterson AFB	57.20	58.40	59.78	39.75	61.91
Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP AGS	48.12	53.14	45.21	32.12	68.42
Pittsburgh IAP AGS	44.85	36.28	55.13	35.53	69.30
Pittsburgh IAP ARS	39.64	36.28	42.44	36.01	69.59
Pope AFB	69.99	71.21	73.40	46.19	86.08
Portland IAP AGS	42.32	46.23	37.58	39.48	60.13
Quonset State APT AGS	35.29	40.77	29.32	33.62	40.59
Randolph AFB	49.20	43.66	51.76	56.76	78.51
Reno-Tahoe IAP AGS	40.51	44.93	39.29	23.44	47.47
Richmond IAP AGS	42.64	53.44	35.69	13.67	75.18
Rickenbacker IAP AGS	50.04	45.27	61.23	20.26	71.11
Robins AFB	63.89	52.22	71.87	78.50	87.45
Rome Laboratory	4.92	0.00	4.00	16.80	63.10
Rosecrans Memorial APT AGS	38.22	40.01	32.73	41.97	81.65
Salt Lake City IAP AGS	43.99	45.47	43.47	32.41	71.72
Savannah IAP AGS	45.10	52.68	38.84	26.30	84.65
Schenectady County APT AGS	37.72	49.21	25.33	30.66	60.05
Schriever AFB	5.78	0.00	4.00	27.31	55.46
Scott AFB	44.55	39.62	52.04	33.65	53.95
Selfridge ANGB	47.27	44.66	52.56	38.56	42.51
Seymour Johnson AFB	78.03	71.25	83.82	83.34	85.03
Shaw AFB	67.70	71.86	59.50	78.12	85.64
Sheppard AFB	55.21	60.81	52.33	35.24	80.04
Sioux Gateway APT AGS	39.30	39.33	37.14	38.03	79.98

1.4 Airlift

1.4.1 Effective Weights (Airlift MCI)

Bold rows indicate OSD military value selection criteria and associated effective weights. Shaded rows indicate Air Force military value attributes and associated effective weights. Rows with no enhancement indicate individual questions with the leading numeric indicating the question number. Question effective weights sum to the attribute above them and attribute effective weights sum to the criterion above them. The criteria **(bold)** sum to 100.

Name	Eff. %
1 - Current / Future Mission	**46.00**
1 - Operating Environment	9.20
1242 - ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.98
1271 - Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	3.22
2 - Geo-locational Factors	36.80
1246 - Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	13.98
1248 - Proximity to DZ/LZ	14.72
1273 - Aerial Port Proximity	8.10
2 - Condition of Infrastructure	**41.50**
3 - Key Mission Infrastructure	33.20
1 - Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	4.32
8 - Ramp Area and Serviceability	5.98
9 - Runway Dimension and Serviceability	5.98
19 - Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	3.32
1207 - Level of Mission Encroachment	1.66
1235 - Installation Pavements Quality	11.95
4 - Operating Areas	8.30
1249 - Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ	8.30
3 - Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces	**10.00**
5 - Mobility/Surge	4.40
1214 - Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.20
1241 - Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	2.20
6 - Growth Potential	5.60
213 - Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68
1205.1 - Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96
1205.2 - Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96
4 - Cost of Ops / Manpower	**2.50**
7 - Cost Factors	2.50
1250 - Area Cost Factor	1.25
1269 - Utilities cost rating (U3C)	.13
1402 - BAH Rate	.88
1403 - GS Locality Pay Rate	.25

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: Airlift

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.
Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.
Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.
Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

SC#	Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1	1246.00	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	13.98	6.51	7.47	92.53
1	1273.00	Aerial Port Proximity	8.10	4.05	4.05	88.48
2	1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	11.95	8.96	2.99	85.49
2	9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	5.98	3.36	2.61	82.88
2	19.00	Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	3.32	0.96	2.36	80.52
3	1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	78.56
3	1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	76.60
1	1248.00	Proximity to DZ/LZ	14.72	12.99	1.73	74.87
2	8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	5.98	4.48	1.49	73.38
3	1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.20	0.74	1.46	71.92
1	1249.00	Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ	8.30	7.51	0.79	71.13
2	1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	1.66	0.88	0.78	70.35
4	1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	70.15
4	1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	70.05
4	1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	69.99
2	1.00	Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	4.32	4.32	0.00	69.99
3	213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68	1.68	0.00	69.99
3	1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	2.20	2.20	0.00	69.99
1	1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.98	5.98	0.00	69.99
1	1271.00	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	3.22	3.22	0.00	69.99
4	1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	69.99

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: Tanker

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	39.10	20.99	18.11	81.89
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	14.53	9.08	5.45	76.44
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	9.55	5.25	4.29	72.15
1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	3.85	1.29	2.56	69.59
19.00	Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	3.32	0.96	2.36	67.23
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.58	0.00	1.58	65.65
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.58	0.00	1.58	64.07
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	2.08	1.10	0.98	63.09
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	62.89
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	62.79
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	62.73
1.00	Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	4.15	4.15	0.00	62.73
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	7.89	7.89	0.00	62.73
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.35	1.35	0.00	62.73
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	1.65	1.65	0.00	62.73
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	6.90	6.90	0.00	62.73
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	62.73

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: Bomber

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1246.00	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	16.56	8.90	7.66	92.34
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	5.52	0.00	5.52	86.82
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	4.94	1.23	3.70	83.12
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	20.24	16.79	3.45	79.67
19.00	Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	2.91	0.84	2.07	77.60
1266.00	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	12.45	10.40	2.05	75.55
1231.00	Certified Weapons Storage Area	2.03	0.00	2.03	73.52
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	71.56
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	69.60
1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.64	0.89	1.75	67.85
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	2.03	1.07	0.96	66.89
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	66.69
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	66.59
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	66.53
1.00	Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	2.03	2.03	0.00	66.53
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	3.49	3.49	0.00	66.53
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68	1.68	0.00	66.53
1232.00	Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	3.20	3.20	0.00	66.53
1233.00	Sufficient Munitions Storage	2.91	2.91	0.00	66.53
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	1.76	1.76	0.00	66.53
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.52	5.52	0.00	66.53
1271.00	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	3.68	3.68	0.00	66.53
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	66.53

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: Fighter

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	22.08	10.55	11.53	88.47
1246.00	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	7.25	2.47	4.77	83.70
1203.00	Access to Adequate Supersonic Airspace	6.72	3.36	3.36	80.34
1270.00	Suitable Auxiliary Airfields Within 50NM	5.18	2.59	2.59	77.75
1266.00	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	11.95	9.43	2.52	75.23
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	2.28	0.00	2.28	72.95
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	70.99
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	69.03
1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.64	0.89	1.75	67.28
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	2.28	1.21	1.08	66.20
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	66.00
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	65.90
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	65.84
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	2.97	2.97	0.00	65.84
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68	1.68	0.00	65.84
1221.00	Hangar Capability - Small Aircraft	3.88	3.88	0.00	65.84
1232.00	Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	3.65	3.65	0.00	65.84
1233.00	Sufficient Munitions Storage	4.79	4.79	0.00	65.84
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	2.97	2.97	0.00	65.84
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	1.76	1.76	0.00	65.84
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	5.98	5.98	0.00	65.84
1271.00	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	5.52	5.52	0.00	65.84
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	65.84

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: SOF / CSAR

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	14.72	9.60	5.12	94.88
1266.00	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	14.84	11.05	3.79	91.09
1246.00	Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission	3.68	0.56	3.12	87.97
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	2.80	0.00	2.80	85.17
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	83.21
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.96	0.00	1.96	81.25
1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	1.76	0.59	1.17	80.08
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	1.49	0.79	0.70	79.38
1243.00	Airfield Elevation	3.68	3.39	0.29	79.09
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	78.89
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	78.79
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	78.73
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	4.67	4.67	0.00	78.73
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	1.68	1.68	0.00	78.73
1232.00	Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	2.24	2.24	0.00	78.73
1233.00	Sufficient Munitions Storage	2.80	2.80	0.00	78.73
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	4.67	4.67	0.00	78.73
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	2.64	2.64	0.00	78.73
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	4.14	4.14	0.00	78.73
1248.00	Proximity to DZ/LZ	14.72	14.72	0.00	78.73
1249.00	Airspace Attributes of DZ/LZ	7.99	7.99	0.00	78.73
1271.00	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	5.06	5.06	0.00	78.73
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	78.73

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: C2ISR

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	29.90	16.05	13.85	86.15
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	9.13	0.00	9.13	77.02
19.00	Hangar Capability - Large Aircraft	2.91	0.84	2.07	74.95
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	16.19	14.16	2.02	72.93
1214.00	Fuel Dispensing Rate to Support Mobility and Surge	2.80	0.94	1.86	71.07
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	1.80	0.00	1.80	69.27
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	1.80	0.00	1.80	67.47
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	2.08	1.10	0.98	66.49
1251.00	Frequency Spectrum Limitations (FSL)	8.05	7.12	0.93	65.56
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	65.36
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	65.26
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	65.20
1.00	Fuel Hydrant Systems Support Mission Growth	2.08	2.08	0.00	65.20
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	9.13	9.13	0.00	65.20
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	2.40	2.40	0.00	65.20
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	1.20	1.20	0.00	65.20
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	8.05	8.05	0.00	65.20
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	65.20

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: UAV / UCAS

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
1245.00	Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (ASM)	20.70	15.89	4.81	95.19
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	3.50	0.00	3.50	91.69
1205.20	Buildable Acres for Air Operations Growth	2.80	0.00	2.80	88.89
1251.00	Frequency Spectrum Limitations (FSL)	6.58	4.39	2.18	86.71
1266.00	Range Complex (RC) Supports Mission	12.45	11.28	1.17	85.54
1207.00	Level of Mission Encroachment	1.45	0.77	0.69	84.85
9.00	Runway Dimension and Serviceability	5.23	4.79	0.44	84.41
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	84.21
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	84.11
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	84.05
8.00	Ramp Area and Serviceability	5.23	5.23	0.00	84.05
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	0.70	0.70	0.00	84.05
1232.00	Sufficient Explosives-sited Parking	5.81	5.81	0.00	84.05
1233.00	Sufficient Munitions Storage	5.81	5.81	0.00	84.05
1235.00	Installation Pavements Quality	5.52	5.52	0.00	84.05
1241.00	Ability to Support Large-Scale Mobility Deployment	3.00	3.00	0.00	84.05
1242.00	ATC Restrictions to Operations	6.33	6.33	0.00	84.05
1271.00	Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions	3.29	3.29	0.00	84.05
1272.00	Installation Crosswind Conditions	9.11	9.11	0.00	84.05
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	84.05

USAF BRAC 2005 Base MCI Score Sheets

Base Score Sheet for Pope AFB
MCI: Space Ops

(The questions that lost the most points are at the top of the list.)

Max Points
This is the maximum number of points this formula can contribute to the overall MCI score.

Earned Points
This is the number of points this formula did contribute to the overall MCI score for this base.

Lost Points
The difference between Max Points and Earned Points.

Running Score from 100
The maximum MCI score is 100 and the minimum is 0. This is a running balance that shows the impact of the lost points from the formula evaluation on the overall MCI score for the base.

Formula		Max Points	Earned Points	Lost Points	Running Score from 100
30.00	Buildable Acres (Space Mission Bed Down Area)	41.50	9.56	31.94	68.06
1210.00	Line-of-Sight Encroachment	23.00	7.59	15.41	52.65
1205.10	Buildable Acres for Industrial Operations Growth	7.00	0.00	7.00	45.65
1250.00	Area Cost Factor	1.25	1.05	0.20	45.45
1402.00	BAH Rate	0.88	0.78	0.10	45.35
1269.00	Utilities cost rating (U3C)	0.13	0.07	0.06	45.29
213.00	Attainment / Emission Budget Growth Allowance	3.00	3.00	0.00	45.29
1226.00	Population Density Impact on USAF Mission	23.00	23.00	0.00	45.29
1403.00	GS Locality Pay Rate	0.25	0.25	0.00	45.29

Final Selection Criteria
Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration tot military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

Introduction

Part 2 to the Air Force report contains detailed information on military value analysis, criteria 6-8 considerations, and capacity. Chapter 1 contains question-level detail for each of the eight Mission Compatibility Indices the Air Force used in military value analysis. This section includes the question, metrics, and formulas used to derive military value ratings for the bases. Chapters 2 and 3 contain criteria 6-8 and capacity considerations not presented elsewhere in OSD or Air Force submissions.



Department of the Air Force

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Secretary of Defense, in initiating the BRAC 2005 effort, established the following goals:

- Transform the current and future force and its support systems to meet new threats,
- Eliminate excess physical capacity,
- Rationalize the base infrastructure with the new defense strategy,
- Maximize both warfighting capability and efficiency, and
- Examine opportunities for joint activities.

Consistent with these goals, the Secretary of the Air Force established the following four goals to support right-sizing the force and enhancing its capabilities through BRAC 2005:

- Transform by maximizing the warfighting capability of each squadron,
- Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy,
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.

Strategy

The Air Force strategy for BRAC 2005 was to consolidate and right-size operational and support units and in the process reduce excess infrastructure and capacity. This strategy was dictated by two primary dynamics. First, over the 20-year period of the force structure plan (FSP), the Service's combat force will become smaller, even as it becomes more capable. Older weapons systems are being replaced by more capable platforms on a less than one-for-one basis. Second, the current force is organized in too many small, less than optimal sized operational units.

BRAC offered the Air Force the opportunity to rebase its current force to increase its combat capability and efficiency, while preparing to integrate new weapons systems into the Service during the 20-year period of the FSP. Concurrently, this rebasing strategy ensured that the restructured force provided capabilities to support the new defense strategy; increased overall efficiency by eliminating excess plant capacity; retained those Air Force bases that, by virtue of location or other difficult to reconstitute attributes, had the highest military value; supported joint basing initiatives where feasible; and generated savings within a reasonable period.

Selection Process

The Air Force BRAC analysis was grounded in the 20-year Force Structure Plan, the Service's facility inventory, and the BRAC selection criteria. In developing its recommendations, the Air Force base analysis was shaped by three underlying rules:

- Military value, both quantitative and qualitative, was the primary factor;
- All installations were treated equally; and
- Installation military value was determined not only on a base's current mission but also on its capacity to support other core missions.

The Secretary of the Air Force chartered the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) to advise and assist him in developing BRAC recommendations. The BCEG comprised 12 senior military and civilian executives.

Capacity Analysis

The Air Force estimated the theoretical capacity of each installation using data collected from its installations, other data available at Headquarters Air Force, and weapons system templates provided by the Air Force Major Commands. These templates detailed operational and support capabilities required to host the major weapons systems.

This capacity information, along with other inputs, was used in the Air Force Cueing Tool (the cueing tool is a Binary Integer Goal Programming tool) identify an optimal set of bases to support a specified force.

Military Value Analysis

The Service assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data derived from individual installations. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel or relocatable equipment and forces, the military value assessment stressed installation characteristics that were either immutable or outside the control of the Air Force or were difficult to replicate elsewhere due to expense or complexity. Immutable characteristics include geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and prevailing weather. Difficult-to-reconstitute characteristics include the installation's transportation infrastructure, missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.

Applying operational capability data collected through a web-based installation data gathering and entry tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4 and the weighing guidance assigned by the BCEG, each of the Air Force's 154 installations was given a Mission Capability Index (MCI). For a given installation, there was a separate MCI for each of the eight mission areas (fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, special operation / combat search and rescue, intelligence / surveillance / reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space control).

Ultimately, using these data to assess all Active and Reserve Component installations on an equal basis, all installations were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight Air

meet contingency needs, and the maximum potential capacity at each location. Once the data call questions were completed, they were forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Each group evaluated capacity analysis responses to identify opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness.

Military Value Analysis (Criteria 1-4)

As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary consideration in developing the Department's recommendations for base realignments and closures. The Department determined that military value had two components: a quantitative component and a qualitative component. The qualitative component is the exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. This component is discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. The quantitative component, explained in greater detail below, assigns attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions.

To arrive at a quantitative military value score, the proponents began by identifying attributes, or characteristics, for each criterion. The proponents then weighted attributes to reflect their relative importance based upon things such as their military judgment or experience, the Secretary of Defense's transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. A set of metrics was subsequently developed to measure these attributes. These were also weighted to reflect relative importance, again using, for example, military judgment, transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. Once attributes had been identified and weighted, the proponent developed questions for use in military value data calls. If more than one question was required to assess a given metric, these were also weighted. Each analytical proponent prepared a scoring plan, and data call questions were forwarded to the field. These plans established how answers to data call questions were to be evaluated and scored. With the scoring plans in place, the Military Departments and JCSGs completed their military value data calls. These were then forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The analytical proponents input the certified data responses into the scoring plans to arrive at a numerical score and a relative quantitative military value ranking of facilities/installations against their peers.

Scenario Development

With capacity and military value analyses complete, the Military Departments and JCSGs then began an iterative process to identify potential closure and realignment scenarios. These scenarios were developed using either a data-driven optimization model or strategy-driven approaches. Each approach relied heavily on the military judgment and experience of analytical proponents.

The optimization models used by proponents incorporated capacity and military value analysis results and force structure capabilities to identify scenarios that maximized military value and minimized the amount of capacity retained. These models were also used to explore options that minimized the number of sites required to accommodate a particular function or maximized potential savings. As data results were analyzed, additional scenario options were evaluated.

- **Intelligence.** The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analyses, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

Analytical Process

During the BRAC 2005 process, the Military Departments and JCSGs followed a series of related, but separate analyses. These basic steps were capacity analysis, military value analysis, scenario development, and scenario analysis. Using these analytical elements, each proponent tailored its procedures to analyze its assigned installations and activities. The chart below provides a summary of this process.



Key Aspects of Process

CAPACITY

Inventory
- What
- Where
- How Big
- Usage
- Surge

MILITARY VALUE

Selection Criteria 1 - 4
- What's important
- How to measure
- How to weight
- Rank order

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
- 20-year force structure plan
- Capacity Analysis
- Military Value Analysis
- Transformational ideas
- Guiding principles

SCENARIO ANALYSIS
- Selection Criterion 5 – Potential Costs & Savings (COBRA)
- Criteria 6, 7, 8 – Economic, Community, & Environmental Impacts

Capacity Analysis

To maximize warfighting capabilities and the efficiency of the current domestic infrastructure, each Military Department and JCSG began its analysis by determining the capacity of the installations and activities within its purview. The intent of this analysis was to develop a comprehensive inventory based upon certified data that included both physical capacity (buildings, runways, maneuver acres, etc.) and operational capacity (workload or throughput). Each proponent prepared a comprehensive capacity data call to meet its requirements. The groups' task was to determine which bases and sites performed each function, how the physical and operational capacity at those installations was being used, whether surge capabilities would

COST ANALYSIS

SECTION 7: COST ANALYSIS

The OSD BRAC report lists cost assessment for the Pope AFB realignment proposal for one-time costs of ($218.1 million), with net implementation savings of $652.5 million, and net annual savings of $197.0 million. The projected payback is immediate and the 20-year net present value savings is projected as $2,515.4 million. These figures do not appear to reflect the cost of continuing to operate the installation, although these costs will be transferred to the Army. The BRAC statue requires that BRAC cost assessments reflect any cost that will be transferred to a DOD or non-DOD entity to be reflected in the cost analysis.

The Army was not expecting to operate the base and did not develop cost figures for this area. The actual costs for the Army to operate the airfield and maintain the facilities and equipment can be expected to be higher than with the Air Force operating the installation. With 154 installations, the Air Force has developed efficiencies and expertise in operating Air Force bases. The Army has a handful of large army airfields located on Army installations, none of which handle the volume or profile of aircraft that fly out of Pope annually nor the crisis response requirements of Pope. The Army does not have the inherent expertise, learned efficiencies or specialized equipment required to operate a major airfield such as Pope. They will need to build this capability, which will take time and additional expense. It will be more expensive for the Army to maintain and operate Pope AFB to the same level of standards and operations that currently exist, than for the Air Force to continue to operate these functions.

activation of forces enhances military value and training capabilities by locating Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support Joint specialized training needs, and by creating needed space for the additional brigade at Fort Bragg. This recommendation is consistent with, and supports the Army's Force Structure Plan submitted with the FY 06 budget, and provides the necessary capacity and capability (including surge) to support the units affected by this action.

- This recommendation never pays back. However, the benefits of enhancing Joint training opportunities coupled with the positive impact of freeing up needed training space and reducing cost of the new BCT by approximately $54-$148M (with family housing) at Fort Bragg for the Army's Modular Force transformation, justify the additional costs to the Department.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina

One-Time Costs:	$218.1 million
Net Savings during Implementation:	$652.5 million
Annual Recurring Savings:	$197.0 million
Return on Investment Year:	2006 (0)
Net Present Value over 20 Years (Savings):	$2,515.4 million

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

One-Time Costs:	$334.8 million
Net Savings during Implementation:	$446.1 million
Annual Recurring Costs:	$ 23.8 million
Return on Investment Year:	None
Net Present Value over 20 Years (Costs):	$639.2 million

Total

One-Time Costs:	$552.9 million
Net Savings during Implementation:	$1,098.6 million
Annual Recurring Savings:	$173.2 million
Return on Investment Year:	
Net Present Value over 20 Years (Savings):	$1,876.2 million

infrastructure by increasing the number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of dollars annually.[14]

Issues Identified with Approved Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each recommendation, particularly where recommendations involve multiple locations. Nonetheless, we offer a number of broad-based observations about the proposed recommendations and selected observations on some individual recommendations. Our analysis of the Air Force recommendations identified some issues that the BRAC Commission may wish to consider, such as the projected savings from military personnel reductions; impact on the Air National Guard, impact on other federal agencies; and other issues related to the realignments of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota and the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota.

Military Personnel Savings

Our analysis showed that about $732 million, or about 60 percent, of the projected $1.2 billion net annual recurring savings are based on savings from eliminating military personnel positions. Initially, the Air Force counted only military personnel savings that resulted in a decrease in end strength. However, at the direction of OSD, the Air Force included savings for all military personnel positions that were made available through realignment or closure recommendations. The Air Force was unable to provide us documentation showing at the present time to what extent each of these positions will be required to support future missions. According to Air Force officials, they envision that most active slots will be needed for formal training, and all the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will be assigned to stressed career fields and emerging missions. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that positions will also be reviewed during the Quadrennial Defense Review, which could decrease end strength. Either way, claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC recommendations.

[14] GAO, *Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs*, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).

Coast Guard could be affected if the base was closed, their cost and savings analysis did not consider any costs that could be incurred by the Coast Guard. Air Force officials stated they didn't have access to credible cost data during the BRAC process since cost estimates would have been speculative; the Air Force could not assume the final disposition of the facility and how much, if any, of the facility the Coast Guard would opt to retain. The Coast Guard is in the process of developing potential basing alternatives, to include costs impacts, for each affected location. Subsequent to the recommendations being made public, the Coast Guard estimated that they would incur about $17 million in additional annual operating costs to remain at Otis Air National Guard Base.

Realignment of Selected Active Bases

The realignment of Pope Air Force Base[20] involves the transfer of 100 percent of the acres and facilities to the Army to become part of Fort Bragg, with a C-130 active/reserve associate unit remaining to support the Army. Our analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between the savings claimed by the Air Force and the costs projected by the Army regarding base operations support, recapitalization, and sustainment for facilities on Pope Air Force Base. For example, the Air Force claimed total net annual recurring savings of about $36 million for not providing base operations support and recapitalization and sustainment of facilities on Pope Air Force Base. However, the Army estimated total annual recurring costs for these areas to be about $19.5 million. This estimated cost comprises over $13 million from the Army as well as over $5.5 million from the Air Force to remain as tenant at Fort Bragg. According to Army officials, their estimated costs included taking ownership for all facilities on Pope Air Force Base.

The Air Force is also proposing to realign Eielson Air Force Base by moving all active duty units, leaving the Air National Guard units, and hiring contractors to provide base operating support and maintenance and repair of the facilities. The Air Force projects this action would produce a 20-year net present value savings of $2.8 billion, the most of any Air Force recommendation. Air Force officials said the decision to realign Eielson was made because of the high cost of operating the base and its value as major training site. The officials noted that the realignment will enable the Air Force to expand an annual training exercise as well as provide

[20] The Pope Air Force Base recommendation includes the closure of Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and the realignment of Yeager Air Guard Station and Little Rock Air Force Base.

CONSIDERATION

SECTION 8: WORKFORCE COSIDERATIONS

COMMUNITY LABOR CAPACITY

At the Base Realignment and Closure hearing in Atlanta, a Georgia representative questioned the ability of the Fayetteville, North Carolina area to fulfill the labor force needs associated with the proposed relocation of U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command to Ft. Bragg/Pope Air Force Base.

This community has a long history of providing the military, government and private sectors with high quality employees at reasonable cost. Several factors have led to this experience.

Fayetteville has a large and growing labor shed from which to draw. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, employers in Cumberland County can draw potential employees from an eleven (11) county area of North Carolina. **The total population within the labor shed is 1,708,144.**

The labor force within commuting distance is 827,377 people. Of that number, approximately 4.7 percent (38,818 people) are currently unemployed.

Significant skills, experience and education exist among the ranks of the unemployed. Some typical office related job titles and the number of people registered for unemployment within those categories in the labor shed area are:

MANAGERIAL & ADMINISTRATIVE

Accountants & auditors	5,645
Budget & management systems analysis	1,137
Purchasing management	1,135
Personnel administration	1,143
Administrative specializations (NEC)	3,676

PROFESSIONAL, PARAPROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL

Systems analysis & programming	1,334
Data communications & networks	860
Computer systems technical support	797

SECRETARIAL, GENERAL CLERICAL & BOOKKEPING

Stenography, typing, filing & related	5,043
Computing & account recording	3,165

Source: *North Carolina Employment Security Commission, July 17, 2005*

SECTION 8: WORKFORCE COSIDERATIONS

The above figures include only those people currently registered with Employment Security. There are no doubt many others who may have given up looking for work or temporarily left the labor force.

Approximately 8,000 people exit the military each year in Cumberland County. Many of these people would like to stay in the area if adequate job opportunities were available. In addition, many of these people may possess skills needed by the headquarters operations.

Approximately 100,000 retired military and military related family members live in the ten county region surrounding Ft. Bragg/Pope Air Force Base. Some of these people may have backgrounds of interest and be interested in working with the new headquarters operations.

Underemployment is a problem in North Carolina. In many cases, people are employed in positions for which they are over-educated or qualified. When jobs open in fields where people can better use their education and training, employers are often swamped with qualified applicants. In Cumberland County alone, over 40,000 people are employed in economic sectors where the average wage is below $9.50 per hour (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003).

CONCLUSION

SECTION 9: CONCLUSION

The Airlift Wing at Pope AFB and the highly trained and diverse forces at Fort Bragg constitute a valuable and unique power projection capability that cannot be replicated anywhere else in the world. Breaking up this team and transferring Pope AFB to the Army would be a mistake that could affect our country's capability to respond quickly and with overwhelming force to a crisis or contingency. The proposal to realign Pope AFB ignores the value of joint training, joint planning and joint war fighting. It was based on Air Force priorities to consolidate an aging C-130 fleet at another base and transfer to the Army the expense of operating and maintaining the airfield. If the airfield is transferred, the Army will still need to maintain the airfield and perform airfield functions normally performed by the Air Force. Due to the late approval of this proposal by DOD, the Army did not understand or estimate the cost, manpower requirements and complexity of maintaining the airfield and installation at a level consistent with deployment and surge operations. Although the BRAC statute requires costs transferred to other DOD and non-DOD organizations are accounted for, these costs were not reflected in the cost analysis for this proposal.

We are concerned that the analytical process used by the Air Force did not accurately reflect the military value of Pope AFB and the role of the Airlift Wing in supporting joint operations. Although Pope AFB was rated the number one base in the Air Force for supporting Special Operations Forces and Combat Search and Rescue, and number three for supporting airlift, the Military Capability Indexes were weighted so low for deployment and surge capability that it received very little credit for these scores, and was rated 49th overall. In other Mission Areas, Pope AFB lost more points for its 7500 ft runway and distance from training space than the maximum available for deployment and surge capability. The quantitative process used to establish Military Value was flawed resulting in inaccurate scores and justification that supported the proposal to disestablish the Airlift Wing. These inequalities are discussed in the MCI section of this response. The airfield functions, operational planning expertise and joint relationship between Fort Bragg and Pope AFB that are critical to contingencies, deployment and surge operations, far outweigh the lack of additional growth and operational factors in other mission areas. The capability to support combat operations with C-130Js, with increased range and payload, was also not considered.

Due to these significant deviations from selection criteria, and even more importantly, the significant degradation to our country's crisis reaction capability, we strongly recommend the following:

- That the BRAC Commission reverse the proposal to disestablish the 43rd Airlift Wing;
- That the Air Force continues to operate the airfield and not transfer Pope AFB to the Army; and
- That the installation be established as Joint Base Bragg/Pope.

Thank you for consideration of this information and of our recommendations.

BRAC REGIONAL
HEARING

SECTION 10: SLIDES FROM BRAC REGIONAL HEARING

Slides from the BRAC Regional Hearing at Charlotte on June 28, 2005 follow.

Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base

Supporting Our Nation's Defense



Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Charlotte Regional Hearing–June 28, 2005

Ft.Bragg/Pope AFB

AMERICA'S

"911"

CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE

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BRAGG/POPE AND LOCAL COUNTIES



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BRAGG/POPE BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS

- Move FORSCOM and USARC Headquarters to FtBragg/Pope AFB
- Add a Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
- Add additional units from Europe
- Transfer Pope AFB to the Army
- Disestablish 43d Airlift Wing, replace with Associate AFRC C-130H squadron

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FORSCOM AND USARC MOVE TO BRAGG/POPE



XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS

Unique Capability

4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd ABN DIV

FORT BRAGG LAND ALLOCATION



AIR FORCE BRAC PROPOSAL TO REALIGN POPE AFB

- **Disestablish the 43d Airlift Wing.**
- **Replace the Wing with an Associate Reserve C-130 Squadron**
- **Transfer Pope AFB to the Army**

Ft.Bragg/Pope AFB

- Nation's premiere power projection team
  - Grenada – Operation Urgent Fury
  - Panama – Operation Just Cause
  - Kuwait/Iraq – Operation Desert Shield/Storm
  - Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom
  - Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom
  - Numerous other Contingency Operations
- 43rd Airlift Wing is a critical part of this team

JOINT TASK FORCE

As the Contingency Response Force, XVIII ABN Corps and the 43d Airlift Wing has a responsibility and frequent role as the basis for a Joint Task



Joint Exercises:
- Purple Dragon
- Unified Endeavor
- Millennium Challenge

REAL WORLD CONTINGENCIES

OPERATION JUST CAUSE PANAMA

A Joint operation requiring deployment from multiple airfields and sequential employment in the objective area.



OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM KUWAIT and IRAQ

Short notice response to support Political/Military goals, followed by the largest joint airlift in the history of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB



Ft.Bragg/Pope AFB

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OSD BRAC Guidance

- BRAC Statute specifies that the Selection Criteria must make Military Value the primary consideration
- The Overarching Principle for Deployment and Employment emphasizes joint and combined basing, power projection, rapid deployment capability and the capability to mobilize and surge
- Power projection is the first of 6 major capabilities listed in guidance
- SecDef: "A primary objective of BRAC 2005 is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity."

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Joint Cross Service Groups

- JCSGs were tasked to assess opportunities for joint basing and to propose Joint Service Installations.
- HSA JCSG approved proposal to establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base, Mar 05
  - Proposal met all OSD guidance
  - Accommodated Army desire that the AF continue to operate Bragg/Pope Airfield

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JCSG and AF Proposals

- There was a disconnect between the HSA JCSG and the Air Force proposal to close Pope AFB
- AF proposal #0122v3 realigned Pope AFB, disestablished the 43rd Airlift Wing and turned the airfield over to the Army.
- HSA JCSG Proposal to establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base was rescinded and superseded by AF proposal to realign Pope to the Army, Apr 05

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Air Force BRAC Process

- Air Force Guidance for BRAC 2005:

"Increase effectiveness and reduce excess infrastructure and capacity by realigning and right sizing operational and support units."

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Air Force BRAC Process

- AF used an aircraft platform approach, which emphasized fleet consolidation and cost savings
- Process resulted in inconsistencies in assessing the military value of joint warfighting installations, which was identified by OSD Red Team evaluation
- Bases supporting joint training deployments and surges, such as Pope AFB, did not rank well in this process

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Military Value

- Pope AFB rated #1 base for SOF/CSAR support (includes A-10s)
  - Selection Criteria #1/#2 rated high (81.5%/82.4%)
  - Selection Criteria #3 rated much lower (49%)
- Also ranked high for Airlift Support
  - Selection Criteria #1/#2 rated high (71.2%/73.4%)
  - Selection Criteria #3 rated much lower (46%)
- Low ranking in SC#3 was unjustified and deviated from BRAC guidance

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Selection Criteria

- SC #3: "The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training."

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Improvements to Deployment and Surge Capabilities

- Outload enhancement and other improvement programs are ongoing with increased deployment and surge capabilities
- Over $100 million in improvements to ramps, taxiways, munitions load areas and staging areas
- Airfield improvements and new aircraft for C-130J operations should have resulted in high ratings for military value index of SC#3

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Air Force BRAC Process

- 43rd Airlift Wing was projected to receive new C-130J aircraft starting in 2007
  - New Military Construction had started
- OSD cut funding for C-130Js in 2004; funding was not restored until after BRAC announcements
- Initial AF proposal to consolidate the fleet was based on "aging" C-130E fleet

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Evaluation of Air Force Proposal

- AF Proposal deviates significantly from OSD Selection Criteria Guidance
  - Contradicts BRAC statute that the Selection Criteria must make Military Value the primary consideration.
  - Violated OSD Principle: "Ensure joint basing realignment increases military value...to support surge operations"
  - AF assessment under valued the capability of Pope AFB to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements (SC #3)
- Implementation will negatively impact power projection, deployment and surge capabilities at Ft.Bragg

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Recommendation

- Reverse the decision to disestablish the 43rd Airlift Wing and transfer Pope AFB to the Army
- Establish Bragg/Pope as a Joint Base, which was proposed by JCSG

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Community Support

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Community Support

- Civilian/Military relationship is exceptional
- Close bonds with military personnel and families
- Growing community
- Full support for BRAC and future missions

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Community Support

- Amtrak, taxi and shuttle services
- U.S. Airways/Delta providing air service
- 5,000 Hotel/Motel rooms in Cumberland Co
  - Additional facilities under construction
- Wide range of meeting and conference facilities available, including Crown Center

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Community Support

- Significant number of recreational and cultural opportunities
- 75th largest school system in the nation
- Cost of living below national average
- One of five hottest housing markets in the nation
- 'Environmentally friendly' collaborative effects

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Community Support

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Ft.Bragg/Pope AFB

AMERICA'S
"911"
CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE

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