


NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, MAINE

BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL
FIELD HEARING
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
JULY 6, 2005



Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20510

July 1, 2005

Secretary Anthony Principi
Chairman, Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Chairman,

As you continue your evaluation of recommendations made by the Department of Defense concerning base closures and realignments, we respectfully submit the enclosed advanced copy of the hearing book on Brunswick Naval Air Station prepared for the Commission's July 6 regional hearing in Boston.

Therein you will find the testimony that will be offered by our delegation, accompanied by supporting visuals and background information. These materials were developed as part of a collaborative effort among the Maine congressional delegation, the office of Maine Governor John Baldacci, and the NAS Brunswick Task Force.

We hope you find the book to be a helpful resource in your independent evaluation of Brunswick Naval Air Station and look forward to presenting our case to you personally in Boston.

Please do not hesitate to contact us should you or your staff have any questions pertaining to Brunswick or the materials hereby submitted.

Sincerely,


OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
United States Senator


SUSAN M. COLLINS
United States Senator


THOMAS H. ALLEN
United States Representative


MICHAEL H. MICHAUD
United States Representative

cc: Hon. James Bilbray, Member
Hon. Phillip Coyle, Member
ADM Harold Gehman, USN (ret), Member
Hon. James Hansen, Member
Gen. James Hill, USA (ret), Member
Gen. Lloyd Newton, USAF (ret), Member
Hon. Samuel Skinner, Member
Gen. Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (ret), Member

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Supporting documentation

9. White paper on "The Logic of Realignment"
10. Cost analysis assessment for realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station
11. Economic impact data
12. Brunswick preliminary MMA Site Evaluation Report
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AGENDA

BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING, JULY 6, 2005

Boston Convention and Exhibition Center
415 Summer Street, Boston, MA

- 1. OPENING STATEMENT/CASE OVERVIEW** - Senator Olympia J. Snowe

- 2. MILITARY VALUE/MISSION**
 - A. RADM Harry Rich, United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic

 - B. Senator Susan M. Collins

- 3. COSTS AND COST SAVINGS** - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

- 4. ECONOMIC IMPACT** - Rep. Thomas H. Allen

- 5. CLOSING ARGUMENTS** - Sen. Olympia J. Snowe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense recommendation to realign elements at Naval Air Station Brunswick, specifically to remove the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, results from a failure to properly apply the Base Closure and Realignment Criteria. *Substantial Deviations from the Selection Criteria are listed below:*

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- **Ignored Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security.**
- **Degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NAS Brunswick.**
- **Ignored introduction of Multi-Mission Aircraft.**
- **No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.**

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- **Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.**
- **Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.**

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

- **No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.**
- **Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NAS Brunswick's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).**

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- **Failed to consider cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.**
- **Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.**
- **Failed to consider impact of fatigue life expenditure on P-3 aircraft due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.**
- **Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.**
- **Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.**

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- **Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs. For example, over-estimated number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario as MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.**
- **Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.**

Substantial Deviation from Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- **Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.**
- **Calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.**
- **Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%.**

Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Opening Statement and Case Overview

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, on behalf of the State of Maine, the Governor and its congressional delegation, I will now proceed to the case of Brunswick Naval Air Station.

As you know, Brunswick is the only fully operational, active-duty airfield in the Northeast United States. And yet, DoD proposes to move its mission – and the crucial protection it provides – over 1,200 miles away.

Single-siting of maritime patrol aircraft in this instance doesn't make sense – because geography matters, and strategic location is the primary attribute for operational bases such as Brunswick.

Over the next hour, we will provide you with data and analysis that will lead to one inescapable conclusion – that realignment is *not* the answer. Rather, Brunswick Naval Air Station *must* remain fully active and operational.

The case we will present today will demonstrate that the Department of Defense recommendation to realign NAS Brunswick by removing the P-3 and C-130 aircraft squadrons and their supporting personnel, and relocating them to Jacksonville, Florida, results from a failure to properly apply the selection criteria.

Criterion 1

With regard to Criterion # 1 that speaks to capacity and readiness we will show at least four deviations.

SLIDE #1

First, the recommendation ignores Brunswick's advantages for operations and training by the current **Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft force**, and will actually degrade our nation's readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from Brunswick.

Second, no data calls were made to evaluate the new criteria of joint war fighting capabilities. Indeed, the only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from Reserve Air Bases before Brunswick was considered for closure – and even *these* weren't revisited after the final decision to instead realign.

Third, in reviewing Navy meeting minutes, we find that the strategic location of Brunswick was raised as a concern on at least *10 separate occasions*.

In fact, the Commander of the **Northern Command** concluded that closing Brunswick would negatively affect the Navy's ability to support **Northern Command's** homeland defense missions...and the **Commander of the Navy's Fleet Forces Command** has requested an operational airfield in the northeast under Navy control.

In the end, while **NORTHCOM's** recognition of Brunswick's strategic military value persuaded the Secretary of Defense's **Infrastructure Executive Council** to keep Brunswick open, that same rationale indisputably should have been a repudiation of single-siting of maritime patrol forces on the East Coast as a Navy goal.

And finally, the Navy failed to assign Brunswick a Military Value score for its Strategic Location *despite* the fact that geography is a primary attribute of strategic value, *despite* DoD's recognition of Brunswick's strategic value, and *despite* the fact that, in August of 2004, **the Navy Analysis Group** was presented a list of recommended airfields that should be *assigned* military value scores for strategic location – *and Brunswick was on that list*.

Together, these and other facts we will cite demonstrate that the recommendation to close Brunswick substantially deviates from Criterion One.

Criterion 2

With regard to Criterion # 2 -- the availability of facilities – we will show three primary deviations.

SLIDE #2

First, DoD clearly ignored Brunswick's value as a base for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions, including those necessary to support maritime domain awareness, protect against the greatest threat against this country -- WMD attack -- and respond to other threats to the Northeast.

Second, the DoD failed to recognize that Brunswick is the only base with the infrastructure in place today to support the aircraft of the future – the **Multi-Mission Maritime, or MMA, Aircraft**. *Only* Brunswick has a hangar capable of receiving these aircraft.

And third, DoD overlooked the fact that realignment will only increase, not decrease, excess hangar capacity – with Jacksonville required to build the special MMA-capable hanger the Navy already built at Brunswick with an investment of \$34 million.

Criterion 3

With regard to Criterion # 3 -

SLIDE #3

- ability to accommodate surge, we will show DoD conducted *no* data calls..ran *no* scenarios...to evaluate the total force requirements necessary to sustain that capability.

Moreover, DoD failed to recognize the potential advantages of joining **MARITIME PATROL** forces under NORTHCOM for homeland defense, with **National Guard and Reserve forces** at a future Armed Forces Reserve Center at Brunswick -- for the purposes of bolstering Homeland Security.

Criterion 4

With regard to Criterion # 4 -- the cost of operations and manpower implications – we will demonstrate three primary deviations –

SLIDE #4

First, DoD failed to account for the higher mission costs attributable to the additional distances aircraft must fly to perform missions or transits which could be done more economically from NASB.

Second, DoD failed to consider the adverse personnel impact of this realignment on those performing detachment and surge operations from Brunswick.

And third, DoD failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, which indicate that VP-92 will be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve Patrol and Reconnaissance squadrons.

Criterion 5

And on the related subject of Criterion # 5 -- the extent and timing of cost savings -- you will see at least three deviations.

SLIDE #5

First, you will see DoD simply ignored the impending introduction of the MMA.

The DOD's recommendation to relocate Brunswick's aircraft and support personnel to Jacksonville completely overlooks the costs of transitioning from the P-3 aircraft to the MMA during the payback period.

As a result of these erroneous calculations, the Navy's net present savings claim of \$239 million is inflated – while the actual figure is \$56 million. Likewise, the Navy wrongly asserts a payback period of 4 years, when the reality is actually *9 years*.

Second, DoD seriously over-estimated the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment. In fact, about 40% of those positions are already slated for elimination by the MMA program, and therefore cannot be counted as cost savings over the 20-year payback period.

And third, DoD failed to consider any scenario that would have assigned the MMA or other aviation assets to Brunswick. Such scenarios had the potential to eliminate the substantial MILCON that will be required at Jacksonville if this recommendation for realignment is approved.

Criterion 6

Finally, as regards Criterion # 6 —

SLIDE #6

economic impact -- you will hear how the Navy inaccurately placed Brunswick in the Portland **Metropolitan Statistical Area** versus an independent labor market of its own.

As a result, the economic impact from Brunswick's realignment is actually eight times greater than claimed by the Department for this rural region and the State of Maine — all the more stunning given that *two* Maine facilities on the recommendation list are merely 80 miles apart.

Conclusion

Chairman Principi, Commissioners, this will be the case you will hear over the next hour. We appreciate your kind attention and, with that, **Rear Admiral Harry Rich, U.S. Navy retired, former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic**, will speak in greater depth with regard to the issue of military value.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 1: Current/Future Missions & Operational Readiness

- Ignores Brunswick advantages -- degrades readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville to perform missions which can only be performed from NASB.
- No data calls to evaluate joint war fighting capabilities.
- Ignores Brunswick's strategic location -- Homeland Defense missions such as maritime domain awareness, maritime interdiction and proliferation security suffer through realignment.
- No military value score for strategic location.

Ignores introduction of Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 2: Availability of Facilities

- Ignores Brunswick's military value for Homeland Defense.
- **Inadequately considers the only infrastructure available to support MMA: NAS Brunswick has only hangar capable of receiving the Boeing 737 MMA aircraft.**
- Excess capacity would actually be exacerbated as the realignment of NAS Brunswick will increase hangar excess capacity due to the requirement to build additional MMA-capable hangars at NAS Jacksonville.

Gaining scenarios were not revisited after the final decision was made to realign, rather than close, NAS Brunswick.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 3: Contingency, Mobilization & Surge Capacity

-No data calls or scenarios conducted to evaluate ability to accommodate contingency or surge operations or training.

-Did not consider role of maritime patrol for Homeland Defense under NORTHCOM in seamless conjunction for operations and training with Guard and Reserve forces for Homeland Security (at NASB's future Armed Forces Reserve Center).

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 4: Costs and Manpower Implications

- Failed to account for higher mission costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly to deploy/perform missions or transits.
- Failed to consider impacts of detachment and surge operations on personnel tempo.
- Failed to consider Naval Reserve demographics, e.g., VP-92 (reserve squadron) may be unable to achieve full manning at Jacksonville in the presence of other Reserve patrol and reconnaissance units.

No consideration of cost savings impact of MMA on personnel and facilities costs – result is inflated savings and shorter than achievable payback.

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 5: Extent and Timing of Savings

- Failed to properly account for introduction of MMA impact on personnel and facilities costs.**
- Failed to correctly estimate the number of maintenance personnel eliminated under realignment scenario; MMA contractor will provide maintenance personnel - not Navy.**
- Failed to analyze any scenario considering initial fleet introduction of MMA at NAS Brunswick instead of NAS Jacksonville thereby eliminating (and postponing other) MILCON and other requirements at Jacksonville.**

Substantial Deviation from the Selection Criteria

Criterion 6: Economic Impact

- **Incorrectly placed NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, claiming an adverse economic impact of only 1.3% – grossly underestimating actual impact by a factor of eight.**

Incorrectly calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 4,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Only 2,718 military positions at BNAS are active duty.

Reduces total current active duty military in the region by 85%



Testimony of
Rear Admiral Harry Rich
United States Navy, Retired
Former Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic Fleet

Before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
On

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Military Judgment and Operational Issues

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen,

My role in today's hearing is to address the operational issues that are of concern if NAS Brunswick is realigned as proposed by DOD.

I have selected four issues that would be of great concern to me if I were the operational commander. I will briefly discuss each of them.

I have assumed that the role of the Atlantic Fleet long range Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, as part of DOD's Homeland Defense mission, will be to defend our Atlantic coast, all 32 thousand miles of it, in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard, against terrorist's attempts to deliver weapons of mass destruction into our highly vulnerable ports. As we are all painfully aware, that mission came into sharp focus on 9-11.

To execute that mission will require ocean surveillance around the clock out to 1000 miles. It can be expected that the concentration of targets will be in the North Atlantic shipping lanes.

In mission planning enroute time to the target area is a critical factor. Enroute time from Brunswick, for the P-3, to the shipping lanes is less than 30 minutes. From Jacksonville it's

three hours. To me as the operational commander that would be unacceptable if there is a viable alternative. And there is! I would immediately move the planes back to Brunswick. Which begs the question: "Why move them in the first place?"

Operational commanders can be expected to require 24-hour manned aircraft coverage on targets of special interest. Using a mission profile of 12 hours, which is generally accepted as maximum for the P-3, the crew can go out 1000 miles in about 3 hours, stay on station six hours and return to base. Total flight time 12 hours. From Jacksonville that profile fits; three hours to the shipping lanes, six hours on station and three hours home. That requires 4 flights per day to provide 24-hour coverage. That's 48 flight hours at a cost of just under \$8000 per flight hour (\$7,876). From Brunswick that same coverage would be achieved with just over two sorties per day, about 25 flight hours, or roughly half the cost of staging from Jacksonville.

Rapid response has been the hallmark of VP squadrons for more than 50 years. Urgent deployments to the Mediterranean or Middle East are not uncommon and it would take at least three hours longer from Jacksonville than from Brunswick. The added cost would be 25-30 thousand dollars per aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, it's somewhat ironic that during your recent visit to NAS Brunswick there were two Jacksonville based P-3s sitting on the ramp. They were enroute home from Sigonella in the Mediterranean and were forced to stop at Brunswick to refuel.

Having dual runways available may seem like a minor factor, but let me assure you it's not if you are forced to land on a taxiway because of a crash on the active runway; or even repaving as happened at Sigonella. NAS Brunswick has parallel 8000 ft. Runways that have recently been resurfaced. If one becomes unusable for any reason, operations can continue uninterrupted.

Finally, I would be very concerned about unnecessarily using up the precious service life remaining in our fleet of P-3s. As the CNO, Admiral Clark, recently stated at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, "... because of high demand, we are flying the wings off the P-3s. Two years ago we had 220 P-3s in the navy inventory. We've been forced to retire 70 in the last 18 months. They reached the end of their service life and were no longer considered safe to fly. The 150 remaining must be made to last until the MMA, the follow-on aircraft, becomes operational in 2012 at the earliest. Unless we restrict flying in non-wartime environments and eliminate every transit and enroute hour possible, the P-3 may not make it to the transition window. Because of the increased flight hours inherent in DOD's plan for NAS Brunswick, realignment will only exacerbate this problem.

Mr. Chairman, as you've heard me say before, a strategy to protect our extensive coastal borders is key to homeland defense, and, as you know, that strategy is just evolving. If the role of the Atlantic Fleet Maritime Patrol Force is as I have postulated, then a fully capable, operational air station strategically located in the Northeast with permanently assigned long range Maritime Patrol Aircraft is absolutely critical to success.

There is only one left and DOD proposes to essentially put NAS Brunswick in mothballs and single site all six Atlantic Fleet VP squadrons 1000 miles to the south.


Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, it's probably a gross understatement, but I have great difficulty understanding the logic in such a move.

Thank you.

RADM Harry Rich USN (Ret)

Former Commander Patrol Wings

Atlantic Fleet



**STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS
BRAC COMMISSION HEARING
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
6 JULY 2005
NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK**

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I am Senator Susan Collins.

DoD's first BRAC criterion focuses on current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force. This includes the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness.

(show disappearing bases slide)

Brunswick is the only fully capable operational DoD airfield remaining north of New Jersey. Previous BRAC rounds closed all other active duty air bases in the Northeast, as this slide demonstrates.

(pause for slide)

Brunswick is strategically located adjacent to the great circle routes for ships and aircraft crossing the North Atlantic. This location makes Brunswick a vital link in our national defense posture and critical for surveillance of ships coming from Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

(show slide)

Indeed, its proximity to major population centers, combined with its ability to support every aircraft in the DoD inventory, makes BNAS essential across the full range of homeland defense operations and contingencies.

Brunswick's unique location provides it with *correspondingly unique capabilities* for current and future operations in the defense of our homeland. Brunswick was a key base for homeland defense during the months following September 11th, providing P-3 surveillance missions under Operation Vigilant Shield, and land-based combat air patrol for Navy ships at sea.

And only Brunswick Naval Air Station can perform such missions efficiently in the future. Maritime patrol assets from Brunswick will continue to be needed to locate and monitor ships in the North Atlantic, including those potentially carrying weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles, or other threats to our shores.

(show MPA coverage area slide)

Maritime Domain Awareness is a key component of homeland defense. Properly based Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, or "MPRA," is essential to this increasingly important mission.

As Rear Admiral Rich has pointed out, response time and endurance on-station are critical in MPRA operations, and the location of a maritime patrol aircraft base is critical to those capabilities. The removal of full-time, operationally ready maritime patrol assets from the northeast is contrary to the very concept of Maritime Domain Awareness and would leave our nation vulnerable.

Removal of these aircraft would *degrade readiness* by requiring detachments from Jacksonville, Florida, to perform missions that can be performed much more efficiently and effectively from Brunswick. It is a move that would increase the risk of failure in the defense of our homeland, a mission in which even a single failure could be catastrophic.

A review of the Navy's analysis group minutes proves that the strategic location of Brunswick was confirmed by warfighting commands no fewer than ten separate times during the deliberations. The Commander of Fleet Forces and the Commander of Northern Command repeatedly voiced grave concerns to the Navy about the potential loss of Brunswick to their warfighting readiness.

These commanders also said that the closure of Brunswick would damage the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions. Removal of Brunswick's air assets would have the same negative effects on this mission as would closure.

The minutes show that the military value of individual facilities was determined early in the BRAC review process. In August 2004, the Navy's infrastructure team presented the Navy analysis group with a list of 33 airfields that should be assigned military value scores for strategic location. Brunswick Naval Air Station was on that list.

(show slide)

Yet, the Navy determined that only two airfields would receive scores for strategic location. The fact that Brunswick was not given any credit for its strategic location after two commanders weighed in no fewer than ten times about the strategic value of Brunswick's location is inexplicable.

(show slide) The minutes of a January 2005 Navy analysis group meeting show that discussions were held on whether a scenario to close Brunswick was desirable, quote,

“in light of the fact that Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in

facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent.”

Despite these concerns and those of our operational commanders, the Navy still forwarded to the Infrastructure Executive Council a recommendation to close Brunswick. As far as we can determine from a review of the minutes, the overriding factor that led the Navy to ignore the many advantages of Brunswick was a goal to locate maritime patrol aircraft at a single site on the East Coast. Yet, the Commander of Fleet Forces warned that: (show slide)

“Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of *closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities.*”¹

The IEC subsequently rejected the recommendation to close Brunswick because, and I quote again, “Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding Northern Command’s homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England.”²

Commissioners, this statement recognizes that Brunswick is not just a training site or staging area. It is an operational airfield in the defense of our nation.

The Navy’s recommendation to close Brunswick was overturned by the Council due to the base’s overwhelming strategic military value. This determination should have triggered the

¹ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP, 7 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0432), Enclosure 8, Slide 11

² Report of DAG Deliberations of 8 February 2005 (N-RP-501), Page 11.

reconsideration of single-siting maritime patrol forces on the East Coast. Yet, we can find no evidence that this occurred. The first measure of military value – the impact on mission capabilities and operational readiness --was ignored.

The second BRAC criterion measures military value by considering the availability and condition of a base's land, facilities, and associated airspace. This is what the Navy's Infrastructure Analysis Team stated on January 11, 2005, concerning the infrastructure at Brunswick (show slide):

- “NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365, and offers unique Joint /NATO strategic, physical, and training assets.
- NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions.
- Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy / Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training requirements at a single site.
- Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying populated areas.”

Brunswick Naval Air Station is in first-class condition, with more than \$120 million in recapitalization and military construction during the past five years. As a result of this investment, DoD has, in effect, an all-new airfield at Brunswick.

(show slide)

With its side-by-side 8,000-foot runways, there are literally no aircraft in the DoD's current or future inventory that Brunswick cannot support either in a transient role or permanent assignment.

(show slide)

Other investments included: (show slide)

- Hangar 6 - Six Bays
- Runway Recapitalization
- Ramp & Taxiway Repairs
- Aircraft Control Tower
- Family Housing, Phases I, II & III
- Transient Quarters
- Relocated Base Entrance

NATO has recognized the importance of Brunswick to its operational capability, and backed up that recognition with significant investment in the base's facilities. The station's NATO-built

fuel farm regularly supports all types of foreign aircraft. Its state-of-the-art Tactical Support Center, also NATO-funded, provides essential command and control for operational and exercise flights by U.S. and NATO maritime patrol aircraft.

(show slide)

Of great significance, as has been mentioned, is the fact that Brunswick has the only hangar capable of hosting the MMA aircraft, which is scheduled to replace the P-3 starting in 2012. This hangar was specifically designed to support the MMA and its related unmanned aerial vehicles.

The recommendation to realign Brunswick significantly deviated from BRAC selection criterion two by inadequately considering the value of this brand-new infrastructure. Under realignment, additional MMA-capable hangars would need to be constructed in Jacksonville. Rather than reduce excess capacity, this realignment would increase it and require significant military construction costs.

As home to the four active duty squadrons, Brunswick provides basing and support essential to the entire Maritime Patrol Aircraft force under the Navy's new Fleet Response / Flexible Deployment concept.

This concept increases the proportion of MPRA aircraft and crews at bases in the United States, and requires them to maintain a high state of readiness for immediate surge deployments to overseas bases. The Station's simulator capacity is essential to meet the training needs of the fleet's P-3 crews. I would note that the simulators at Jacksonville are already at maximum utilization now.

Brunswick's facilities, unencumbered airspace, and location at the nearest point in the United States to Europe and the Middle East provide the capabilities to support the Fleet Response concept. The conditions of criterion two are fully met by Brunswick Naval Air Station, but not properly recognized by this realignment proposal.

The third BRAC criterion is the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force requirements.

(show slide)

Brunswick's role during *Operation Iraqi Freedom* clearly demonstrates its ability to accommodate mobilization and surge requirements. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft crossing the Atlantic Ocean. The base hosted or provided logistical support for more than 120 aircraft returning from Middle East operations.

Brunswick also provided berthing for more than 850 DoD personnel returning from Iraq to the U.S. through Brunswick. The base's ramp space is sufficient to park more than 250 maritime patrol or other large aircraft under maximum surge conditions.

Additionally, as the northeasternmost base in the United States, Brunswick supports mobilization efforts every day. Naval Air Station Brunswick is the closest U.S military airfield to the current theater of operations.

Despite all the talk of transformation and jointness during this BRAC round, it is remarkable that the Navy did not ask in even one data call whether Brunswick could expand its current missions to more fully utilize the Air Station's capacity. The only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from reserve air bases before Brunswick was considered for closure.

This option was not even revisited after the final decision was made to realign, rather than close, Brunswick.


Clearly, the Navy and the OSD missed a tremendous opportunity to strengthen U.S. military capabilities by not placing other operational forces at Brunswick to fulfill current and future total force requirements that meet contingency, mobilization, surge operations, and training missions.


A realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station to a Naval Air Facility eviscerates the military value of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance assets by removing them from *a superb facility in a critical theater of operations*. It would require future detachments – from one U.S. base to another – to meet mission requirements.

The removal of Brunswick's aircraft would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness. It would reduce response time in times of crisis. This proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions. It would result in a Navy and a Department of Defense that will operate less effectively and efficiently, and with many hidden costs.

Taken together, the first three criteria I have discussed are a measure of the most crucial elements of military value, now and in the future. By any fair and complete assessment, Brunswick Naval Air Station measures up. It must remain fully operational.

Senator Snowe is our next speaker.





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NEW ENGLAND

APPALACHIAN MOUNTAINS


NEW HAMPSHIRE


NEW BRITAIN

2005

NEW ENGLAND

NAS Brunswick's Strategic Importance





KEFLAVIK

BRUNSWICK

SHIPPING LANES

JACKSONVILLE

**CURRENT MPA
COVERAGE AREA**

**Mercator Projection
Radius of all circles = 1000 NM**

Brunswick: Strategic Location



Department of the Navy
Infrastructure Analysis Team

Aviation Military Value DoN Targeted Activities

- MCAS Beaufort
- MCAS Cherry Point
- MCB Hensell (Kaneohe Bay)
- MCAS Camp Pendleton
- MCAS Miramar
- MCAF Quantico
- MCAS New River
- MCAS Yuma
- NAF El Centro
- NAS Key West
- NAF Washington
- NAS Atlanta
- NAS Brunswick
- NAS Fallon
- NAS Jacksonville
- NAS JRB Ft Worth
- NAS JRB New Orleans
- NAS JRB Willow Grove
- NAS Lemoore
- NAS Oceana
- NAS Whidbey Island
- NAS Corpus Christi
- NAS
- Naval Station Norfolk
- Naval Base Ventura County (P1 Mugu)
- NAWC (AD) Patsent River
- NAWC (WD) China Lake
- NAES Lakehurst

DoN only - does not include Army and Air Force installations

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8/30/2004

NAS Brunswick

10/10/2004 10:10:10 AM
10/10/2004 10:10:10 AM

Brunswick: Homeland Defense Requirement

19. The DAG further discussed whether this scenario is desirable in light of the fact that NAB Brunswick is the last active-duty DOD air base in New England and is relatively unencroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent. The Defense mission could most likely be performed at other DOD airfields in the Northeast. The DAG recommended that the JAT to collect information from CFF, SERE school, research alternative relocations.

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X

"Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent."

*Report of DAG Decisions of 11 January
2005 (NRRP-0432), Page 8.*

Brunswick: Unacceptable Expense if Closed



Department of the Navy
Infrastructure Analysis Team

Scenario Issues

• CFFC

Description: This scenario relocates all VP squadrons VPU-1 and VR-62 (Reserve C-130) squadron to NAS Jacksonville and closes NAS Brunswick. It also results in the closure of the SERE School at Rangleoy and relocates that training function to the Norfolk Fleet Concentration Area. Due to operational synergies derived from basing aircraft with other similar type/model/series aircraft VP-62 is recommended to be based at NAS JRB Willow Grove vice NAS Jacksonville. Extensive construction is required at NAS Jacksonville to support this scenario as well as construction and land acquisition of approximately 6000 acres to support the relocated SERE training in the vicinity of Norfolk. This scenario eliminates the last active duty DOD Air Station in New England. NAS Brunswick is strategically located to support Homeland Defense Missions. Amplification of impacts to Strategic Missions is being provided via SPOC via SIPRNET. The closure of NASB supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed.

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"Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed."

Report of DAG Decisions of 11 January 2005 (N-RP-0432), Page 147.

Brunswick: Only Naval Aviation Footprint in New England

25. CDR Deputy presented updated COBRA results for scenario DDN-0134, which would close NAS Brunswick, ME, and relocate naval aviation and non-naval aviation assets to numerous receiver sites. Enclosure (6) pertains. Ms. Davis informed the DAG that IEN senior leadership has expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England. IEN will continue to examine RF40 2005 options and alternatives. IEN Operations stated that the IAT Operations will continue to examine alternative scenarios to realize the IAT Operations. She explained that a realignment scenario would convert Brunswick into a Naval Air Facility (NAF) and relocate naval aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville, FL, and non-naval aviation assets and necessary BOS personnel to other sites, and maintaining the operational capability of the airfield. She further explained that a deactivation scenario would relocate all aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville, FL, and retain caretaker workforce. Ms. Davis also reminded the DAG that IEN, at its 27 January 2005 deliberative session, directed the DAG to consult with the Air Force concerning possible relocation of the Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group

11

Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England


Brunswick: Navy Highlights Military Value

"NASB, the last active duty DOD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365 and offers unique Joint/NATO strategic, physical, and training assets"

"NASB is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions"

"Of note, NASB has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy/Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet SERE training requirements at a single site."

"Armed aircraft can depart NASB and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying inhabited areas."



Dual Runways



Recent Recapitalization

Hangar 6 - Six bays (\$33.9M, completed FY 05)

Runway Recapitalization (\$10.7M, FY 01-05)

Ramp & Taxiway Repairs (\$8.7M, FY 03)

Aircraft Control Tower (\$8.2M, FY 05)

Family Housing - Phases I, II & III - 220 Homes (\$33.4M, FY 01-05)

Transient Quarters (\$17.7M, FY 04)


Re-Located Base Entrance (\$1.65M, FY 04)

Separate Truck & Vendor Entrance (\$1.3 M, FY 04)

Small Arms Range (\$940K, FY 05)

MWD Kennel (\$346K, FY 05)

40 Natural Gas Boilers (\$7.0M, FY 05)



NATO Fuel Farm

Hangar 6



Brunswick Hosts 123 Aircraft Returning from Middle East Operations


66 F/A-18

6 C-40

32 A/V-8

2 C-9

17 C-130



Testimony of
Sen. Olympia J. Snowe
before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station, Brunswick
Costs and Cost Savings
July 6, 2005

Good afternoon.

As I said before, the Navy's justification for the realignment of Naval Air Station, Brunswick is based solely on reducing operating costs while single-siting the **East Coast Maritime Patrol community** at Naval Air Station Jacksonville.

The Navy proposes to accomplish these cost savings primarily by merging depot and intermediate maintenance activities thus **“reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.”**

Today we intend to demonstrate that the cost savings put forward by the Navy are erroneous and built upon assumptions that can not withstand even rudimentary scrutiny.

We will highlight how the Navy's analysis process led to overstated personnel savings, ignored mission costs and understated military construction which led to a flawed conclusion - that realignment of NAS Brunswick was fiscally viable.

While the Navy's recommendation postulates that a one-time investment of \$147.6 million will result in a 20-year savings of \$239 million with an expected 4-year payback, we will show a significantly different outcome: a 9-year payback and a 20-year savings of only \$56 million.

Are we willing to sacrifice the unique strategic advantage that NAS Brunswick offers in securing our homeland in order to save a theoretical \$2.8 million annually? This is an extremely small margin to support a decision with such far-reaching national security implications.

Our analysis is based on the work of Mr. Ed Anderson whom many of you met during your visit to Brunswick.

He is a senior aviation economics consultant and former P-3 pilot who works for one of America's foremost aviation industry analysis firms who has setup and run the COBRA model to measure the cost impact of identified errors in the data and methodology.

In deconstructing the COBRA scenario report and data calls, he identified errors that raise serious concerns about the validity of the DOD case for realigning NAS Brunswick.

The errors were primarily due to basing the cost analysis solely on the P-3 without accounting for planned reduction in support requirements due to the MMA program...

Failure to account for increased mission costs; military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick...

And unrealistic assumptions concerning the timing of military construction at NAS Jacksonville and ability to accommodate Brunswick squadrons according to the proposed schedule.

First, the Navy's most significant error was to base their 20-year cost analysis solely on the P-3C aircraft, while ignoring the fact that the Navy plans to begin phasing out the P-3 in 2012, replacing them with a smaller fleet of contractor-maintained Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft or MMA, a key element in the Navy's 20-year Force Structure Plan.

This is precisely where the Navy's cost savings argument begins to unravel because the entire financial case for single-siting East Coast P-3s rests on the hypothetical elimination of 403 personnel by 2011 and continuing through the remaining 20 years of the projection.

SLIDE #1

This “straight-line projection” of personnel savings is fundamentally flawed because 157 of those personnel will be replaced by Boeing as part of the **Contractor Logistic Support or CLS program** that was part of the justification for replacing the P-3 with the MMA. The CLS program will also result in the reduction of facilities for which the Navy has claimed savings under BRAC.

These errors alone result in an understatement of recurring costs by \$14.2 million annually.

Second, the Navy’s analysis completely ignores the substantial increase in mission costs that will result from basing Maritime Patrol Aircraft at Jacksonville rather than Brunswick.

Given that it is 1200 miles from NAS Jacksonville to NAS Brunswick and, by extension, that much further to P-3 deployment sites, operational areas and exercise areas, the increased flying time for every sortie is 4 to 7 hours per round trip at a cost of about \$8,000 per flight hour.

SLIDE #2

For example, a single round trip to **Sigonella, Italy** or the **Mideast** will cost an additional \$55,000 in the P-3 and an estimated \$37,000 for the MMA. This error alone results in an understatement of Mission Costs by \$2.5 million annually.

Also closely tied to the increased mission costs of flying from NAS Jacksonville rather than NAS Brunswick are the simple fact of life costs of moving the squadrons to NAS Jacksonville. As we conducted our analysis, again, we found the Navy, while meticulous in some details, missed the big picture in others.

For example, their analysis calculates the costs of moving people, vehicles, household goods, and so forth to Florida.

However, it makes no allowance for the cost of relocating the aircraft, nor does it make any allowance for the numerous liaison flights that will take place between Brunswick and Jacksonville before and after the move.

Since it costs over \$27,500 to fly each P 3 the 1200 miles from Brunswick to Jacksonville, even if the squadrons move during deployment, they will have to fly an additional three hours or so to reach NAS Jacksonville. This oversight results in an understatement of one-time moving costs by \$2.6 million.

The **third** area in which we found the Navy's analysis faulty was in their overstatement of military construction cost avoidances at NAS Brunswick. Navy analysts claimed \$6.7 million in savings due to the cancellation of Hangar 1 demolition efforts and the cancellation of the weapons magazine replacement project.

These credits are incorrectly applied to the realignment scenario because should NAS Brunswick be converted to an active Naval Air Facility, it would still be necessary to demolish Hangar 1 and it would still be necessary to complete the **Weapons Magazine Replacement** in order to support future detachments of operational aircraft.

Under the realignment scenario, the Navy should not claim these savings and therefore understated military construction costs by \$6.7 million.

Finally, the Navy also failed to properly consider the timing and phasing of military construction projects at NAS Jacksonville.

We found a note in the **Patrol Wing Five realignment scenario data call** that indicated the first NAS Brunswick based squadron would relocate in 2009 upon completion of hangar military construction.

But the same scenario shows that military construction in Jacksonville could not possibly be completed by then because the space for hangars and ramps will still be occupied by active duty S-3 squadrons.

The Navy's analysis also wrongly assumes that NAS Jacksonville would be able to accommodate 50% of Brunswick's squadrons when military construction is half complete. It just doesn't work that way – you can't put aircraft, or people, into a half-finished hangar. No squadron relocation can take place until all military construction is complete.

This argument is supported by language submitted by NAS Jacksonville in response to the realignment scenario data call:

SLIDE # 3, 4, 5

“NAS Jacksonville has no available hangar space suitable to house the types of aircraft that are relocating. Per latest Naval Facilities Command planning criteria, each relocating squadron is entitled to one Type II hangar module. Quantity is based on a total of five modules.”

“The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.”

“Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron.”

Given that the Navy proposes to spend \$119 million to build five *additional* hangar modules for the Brunswick squadrons, the realignment of NAS Brunswick actually increases naval aviation excess capacity.

Relocating NAS Brunswick aircraft squadrons and personnel requires military construction of hangars and ramp space to accommodate not only the near-term arrival of the MMA, but also to meet shortfalls in hangar space for the additional NAS Brunswick P-3 squadrons thereby increasing the number of overall hangar modules.

But the Navy also failed to account for the “Type III” MMA-capable hangars in the Navy's capacity analysis.

Although the Navy recognized that the MMA would enter the Fleet during the 20-year BRAC implementation period, the evaluation process did not allow **for “the introduction of aircraft types not currently on board an activity...”**

This restriction, therefore, prohibited the consideration of the MMA’s introduction even though the Navy was well aware that it would occur one year later in 2012. Not considering the new MMA-capable hangar – already constructed at Brunswick with an

investment of \$34 million -- *ignores* this valuable infrastructure and illustrates that the Navy's methodology for calculating excess capacity is fundamentally flawed.

Even the **Department of the Navy's Analysis Group** realized that realignment is not the right decision.

CUE SLIDE #6

A review of the meeting minutes for 24 January 2005 reveals that the group **“determined the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated.”**

It is clear that the Navy failed to think through the costs of realignment. After the recommendation for closure was overturned because of its obvious strategic value, the Navy scrambled to develop a rationale and cost savings to justify realignment, but failed to conduct a rigorous analysis that would account for the future MMA role at Brunswick, the increased mission costs and the hidden costs underlying the realignment decision. We can only conclude that the drive for false savings was overwhelming.

CUE SLIDE #7

When the Navy's cost analysis is corrected to reflect the above additional considerations, the financial justification for realignment fails. The payback period becomes a more realistic 9 years versus 4 years and the purported 20-year net present value savings of \$238.8 million is closer to \$56.5 million.

It is clear that the Navy's sole reason for recommending the realignment of NAS Brunswick – cost savings – is not supportable by the facts.

The Navy's analysis does not comply with the expressed requirement of military value criteria number **four** to consider the cost of operation and manpower implications or selection criteria number **five** to consider the extent and timing of saving and therefore is a substantial deviation.

Projection of Personnel Savings Fundamentally Flawed

Of projected elimination of 403 personnel by 2011:

- 157 to be replaced by Boeing as part of Contractor Logistic Support program with introduction of MMA
- In reality, 246 positions eliminated as a result of realignment.

Personnel cost savings greatly overstated

**GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE FROM NAS JACKSONVILLE
TO
BAGHDAD, IRELAND, SIGONELLA, & ICELAND**



All routes lead past NAS Brunswick

NAS Jacksonville's Inability to Accommodate Brunswick Squadrons

The following information is for informational purposes only. It is not intended to be used for any other purpose. This information is for informational purposes only. It is not intended to be used for any other purpose.

	<p>It is the responsibility of the squadron to provide the appropriate equipment for the hangars. This includes the maintenance of the equipment and the provision of the appropriate spare parts. The squadron is responsible for the maintenance of the equipment and the provision of the appropriate spare parts.</p>	
<p>As noted previously, the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years.</p>	<p>The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years.</p>	<p>The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years. This is due to the size of the hangars and the fact that the S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years.</p>

Page 6

The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.

NAS Jacksonville's Inability to Accommodate Brunswick Squadrons

Small text at top of page:
 1. The last column is for the user to indicate if the proposed activity is a new activity or an existing activity.
 2. The last column is for the user to indicate if the proposed activity is a new activity or an existing activity.
 3. The last column is for the user to indicate if the proposed activity is a new activity or an existing activity.

	The last column is for the user to indicate if the proposed activity is a new activity or an existing activity.	
	In order to provide a parking apron for the aircraft and parking apron for the aircraft, the area must be relocated. Child Street is a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville and must be relocated. Child Street is a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville and must be relocated.	
	This is the assumed cost of the proposed activity. PAC Code and other codes do not apply to this activity.	400
	Manual parking is required for the personnel assigned to the squadron that will be occupying the new aircraft maintenance building.	
	The facility is required to support a fleet of aircraft.	4000

Page 7

Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron.

Brunswick: Realignment Does Not Provide Good Return on Investment

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Subj: REPORT OF DAG DELIBERATIONS OF 24 JANUARY 2005

continuing to consult with the Marine Corps and 1st Naval Construction Division concerning alternate receiving sites. See slide 11 of enclosure (7). CDR Deputy indicated that 1st Naval Construction Division was considering Westover AFB, VA, as a possible receiving site. Mr. Leather then revised the recurring costs and savings for scenario DON-0118. He explained that the most significant recurring savings would result from the elimination of billets. See slides 12 through 14 of enclosure (7).

23. The DAG determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment. It would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville. The scenario would provide savings since fewer billets would be eliminated. It was determined that relocation of FASOTRACKLANT to MCAS Cherry Point was preferable since it would provide a SEPB school in San Diego. Appropriately, the DAG directed the JAT Operations Team to conduct 50/50 analyses through 9 analyses and CRRA for scenario DON-0118. The scenario, which relocates FASOTRACKLANT BRT and MCAS Cherry Point, is for the DAG's review.

24. CDR Deputy, LtCol Terri E. Bridg, USMC, and Mr. Leather presented updated COBRA results for three scenarios that realign NAS Oceana, VA, and relocate aviation assets to NAS Whiting Field, FL (scenario DON-0140), MCAS Beaufort, SC (scenario DON-0151), and Moody AFB, GA (scenario DON-0118). Enclosure (8) pertains. CDR Deputy reminded the DAG that it decided to remove scenario DON-0119, which would realign NAS Oceana and relocate assets to NAS Pensacola, FL, from further consideration at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. CDR Deputy informed the DAG that the updated COBRA results contained the same assumptions applied to the COBRA results reviewed by the DAG at its 17 January 2005 deliberative session. See slide 2 of enclosure (8). Mr. Leather recapped the updated COBRA results, noting that an evaluation of the one-time costs and steady state savings indicates the following Payback periods and 20-year NPV costs for the three scenarios: Scenario DON-0140 - Payback in 24 years and 20 year NPV costs approximating \$193.2M; Scenario DON-0151 - Payback in over 100 years and 20 year NPV costs approximating \$594.1M; and, Scenario DON-0118 - Payback in 14 years and 20-year NPV savings approximating \$16.9M. See slide 3 of enclosure (8).


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
“determined that the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated.”

NET SAVINGS DUE TO BNAS REALIGNMENT

(Net Present Value)



Realignment results in a payback period of 9 years (not 4) and 20 year savings of only \$56 million (not \$238 million)



**Testimony of
Representative Tom Allen
before the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission Regional Field Hearing
on
Naval Air Station Brunswick
Economic Impact
July 6, 2005**

Good afternoon, Chairman Principi and Members of the Commission.

At the end of the Maine portion of the hearing, Governor Baldacci will testify to the overall economic impact on Maine of the three recommendations that affect us.

I will speak now to the Department of Defense's economic analysis for Brunswick. By using the wrong labor market in its analysis, the Department grossly underestimated the negative impact of the realignment recommendation. This constitutes a deviation from Criteria 6.

The Department calculated the impact of the NAS Brunswick realignment within the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). But Brunswick isn't in the Portland MSA. Brunswick has its own, separate Labor Market Area called the Bath-Brunswick LMA.

[insert ALLEN slide 1 – map]

This map of Southern Maine shows these two separate labor markets.

According the DOD figures, the realignment of Brunswick would result in the loss of 2,317 military jobs, 42 military contractor jobs, 61 direct civilian jobs, and 1,846 indirect civilian jobs, for a total of 4,266 net jobs lost. By incorrectly placing NAS Brunswick in the Portland MSA, DOD claimed an adverse economic impact of only **1.3 percent**. The reality is many orders of magnitude higher.

NAS Brunswick accounts for one-third of all jobs in the Town of Brunswick. Looking just at the net direct job loss (2,420), the realignment would result an adverse economic impact of **15.2 percent** on the Town.

Expanding the scale a bit, NAS Brunswick accounts for 13 percent of all jobs in the Bath-Brunswick LMA. Looking just at both the direct and indirect job lost (4,266), the realignment would cause a loss of **10.4 percent** in this labor market. That 10.4 percent is the figure that DOD should have used for its economic impact analysis.

[insert ALLEN slide 2 – bar chart]

Thus, the negative effect on the local economy is **8 times** greater than what DOD claims.

A corrected adverse economic impact figure of 10.4 percent would leave Brunswick with the third highest economic hit, on a percentage basis, of any community on the list, after Cannon Air Force Base, NM, and the Crane Naval Support Activity, IN.

We also believe that the DOD projection for number of civilian jobs lost (61) is low. The civilians are there to support the uniformed personnel. Since the realignment removes all active duty presence at the base, it is reasonable to expect a higher proportion of civilian jobs would vanish. If the present ratio of military to civilian jobs remains after realignment, the number of civilian jobs lost could exceed 600, or 10 times the DOD forecast. This prospect would increase the economic impact to **11.8 percent** in the Labor Market Area.

Given the flawed analysis, we believe that DOD has substantially deviated from Criteria 6, consideration of economic impact.


As three of you saw during your site visit, Brunswick is a small town, with a population of just over 21,000. There are only 79,000 people in the LMA. According to an economic analysis by the State, the downsizing would cause a payroll reduction of \$136 million, retail sales losses of \$16 million, rental losses of \$13 million, financial and

insurance sector losses of \$12 million, and construction industry losses of \$10 million. All are annual figures.

Just 10 miles down the road from Brunswick is Bath Iron Works. With 6,000 jobs, it is the largest single-site employer in the State of Maine. Bath Iron Works is facing potentially dramatic reductions in its workforce, due to a widening production gap between the end of the DDG-51 destroyer program and the start of the DD-X destroyer. We know that this private company is outside the purview of the Commission, but the downsizing of both the air station and the shipyard, at the same time, would deliver a double blow to the community. We appreciate that the Commission is willing to consider additional information about economic impact, and urge you to consider the consequences of the potential evaporation of military-related jobs and industry in the State.

Thank you. Senator Snowe will now make closing comments.

NAS Brunswick Economic Impact Evaluated in Wrong Labor Market



Economic Impact on Brunswick

Corrected effect is 8 times larger

10.4%

Third highest
on BRAC list

1.3%



DOD estimate
(wrong labor market)

Actual impact
(correct labor market)



**Testimony of
Senator Olympia J. Snowe**

**before the
BRAC Commission Regional Field Hearing
on**

Naval Air Station, Brunswick

Closing Arguments

July 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman and esteemed Members of the Commission, thank you for your time and attention in this hour.

In the end, the facts show that DoD's recommendation to realign Brunswick is based on an *overvaluation* of cost savings and a gross *undervaluation* of strategic importance. This equation adds up to a grave risk for America's maritime security and our national homeland defense.

It is a litany of failures that undermines DoD's sole justification for realignment on the basis of cost savings --

A failure to account for cost savings from the airplanes of the future...

A failure to account for the new \$34 million hanger at Brunswick to *house* those aircraft...

A failure to consider the full cost of moving squadrons to Jacksonville...

A failure to recognize the accompanying increased mission costs.

In other words, the Navy's claim of cost savings is a mirage. What is *real*, however, is the new, post- 9-11 threat environment in which we live – and Brunswick's indispensable strategic value *within* that new environment.

The Secretary of Defense...the Secretary of the Navy...the Chief of Naval Operations...the Commanders of Fleet Forces Command...and the Northern Command on *ten separate occasions* have stated that Brunswick is *vital* to the maritime defense of the nation -- leaving us with only one question –

Why, then, has the Department of Defense deserted the Northeastern United States, leaving us devoid of any active military aviation assets?

SLIDE #1

Given DoD does not even attempt to justify this proposed realignment on the basis that it enhances homeland security..or bolsters readiness...or increases our mission capabilities...

And *given* we have shown that their cost savings calculation – DoD's *sole justification* for realignment -- *fails*...

The *overwhelming strategic military value* of NAS Brunswick should trump any decision to close or realign this vital national asset. Because without a fully functional base, ready to respond at a moment's notice, our nation's maritime security will be at risk – and therefore, Brunswick should remain an active, fully-operational Naval Air Station.

Thank you, and we would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

What is the Navy's Logic in Realigning Naval Air Station Brunswick to a Naval Air Facility?

Commissioners of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission have asked the question, 'What is the Navy's logic in deciding to realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine, to a Naval Air Facility, and relocating its aircraft, along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support, to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida?' It is difficult to understand how a Naval Air Facility with no operational aircraft and a limited number of caretaker personnel could remain vibrant and operationally effective when needed for operational or training missions or during a national emergency. An examination of the process that yielded this realignment recommendation reveals the Navy's logic, as well as highlights several of the process and recommendation discrepancies.

By just reviewing the DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations,¹ it appears the Navy followed a four step process in making their recommendations. The first step in the process was to conduct a "Capacity Analysis" to determine if excess capacity existed among the currently available infrastructure. This infrastructure is used to house aviation squadrons and to maintain their aircraft, as well as, provide ample airfield operating resources and training infrastructure and ensure sufficient support facilities. The principal capacity metric was the "Hangar Module", defined as the hangar space, line space, admin space, operational space, and maintenance shop space required to house one squadron. The Navy compared the number of existing hangar modules at Navy and Marine Corps aviation activities against the number of projected operational squadrons based on the Navy's 2024 Force Structure Plan. The outcome of this

¹ *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; pages C-2 through C-8*

“Capacity Analysis” was a determination that the Navy would have excess capacity in 2024 of 19 percent.²

An aircraft the size of the P-3 requires a hangar of a certain size that was classified as a “Type II Hangar.” The results of the Navy’s capacity analysis for the four aviation activities currently hosting P-3 aircraft are as follows:³

NAS Whidbey Island, WA	6 Type II Hangar Modules
NAS Brunswick, ME	16 Type II Hangar Modules
NAS Jacksonville, FL	20.5 Type II Hangar Modules
MCB Hawaii	4 Type II Hangar Modules

The second step in the process was to conduct a “Military Value Analysis” of all Navy and Marine Corps aviation activities to assess an activity’s “value” regarding its ability or potential ability to base operational squadrons. The military value matrix used in this analysis evaluated 5 attributes including questions on operational infrastructure, operational training, airfield characteristics, environment and encroachment, and personnel support/quality of life. From this analysis, the military value scores for the activities currently hosting P-3 squadrons are as follows:⁴

NAS Jacksonville, FL	71.62
NAS Whidbey Island, WA	67.13
MCB Hawaii	52.52
NAS Brunswick, ME	50.85

The next step in the process was to conduct a “Configuration Analysis” to “develop solutions that progressively reduced excess capacity while maximizing military

² *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; pages C-2 through C-4*

³ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP dtd 16 June 2004 (N-RP-0149)*

⁴ *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; pages C-4 through C-5*

value and maintain grouping of like-aircraft reflective of operational units.” The initial model results suggested that both Naval Air Station Brunswick and Marine Corps Base Hawaii should be considered for closure.⁵

The final step consisted of “Scenario Development and Analysis.” The DON Analysis Group reviewed capacity data, military value scores and the results of the configuration analysis to develop scenarios to reduce excess capacity, increase overall military value, place squadrons of like-aircraft at single sites where possible, increase maintenance efficiencies, and leverage joint opportunities. A closure scenario for NAS Brunswick was developed by the DON Analysis Group since it had been contained in one of the configuration model outputs, “In light of the capacity at Naval Air Station Jacksonville that will be available following the retirement of the S-3 community, and the smaller operational “footprint” of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) as compared to the P-3.”⁶

A review by “deliberative bodies” noted that U. S. Northern Command was concerned about the closure of NAS Brunswick, as closure of the airbase would have a negative impact on the Command’s ability to perform its Homeland Defense mission in the Northeast United States. The OSD’s Infrastructure Executive Council “concluded that a realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick was preferable to a complete closure because, while it attains training and maintenance efficiencies by single siting East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, it also retains an operational airfield in the northeast that can be used to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility.”⁷

The logic of realignment appears to have been based on the failed logic to close Brunswick Naval Air Station for the strategic location of this airfield is too critical

⁵ *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; pages C-5 through C-6*

⁶ *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; pages C6 through C-8*

⁷ *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; page C-8*

for Homeland Defense for the Secretary of Defense to ignore the concerns of U.S. Northern Command. The Navy recommended closure for NAS Brunswick, but U.S. Northern Command concerns about the strategic military value of NAS Brunswick essentially trumped the closure decision. Certainly this is too simply an explanation as to how this recommendation was made. What remains to be understood is what a Naval Air Facility with no operational assets means. What are the hidden costs with keeping such a national strategic asset open, operational, and viable? How does the Navy and OSD respond rapidly to a homeland defense mission “as needed?” Will the base be operational and ready when a national emergency occurs? Was this really the proper disposition for the last dual-runway, operational airfield north of McGuire AFB in New Jersey? Most of these questions remain unanswered, but additional analysis reveals certain flaws in the process that lead to the recommendation to realign Naval Air Station Brunswick.

Further Analysis

An in-depth review of the Meeting Minutes of the Navy’s Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) and the Department of the Navy Analysis Group (DAG) provide a better understanding of the actual decision process the Navy followed in making its recommendation to realign NAS Brunswick to a Naval Air Facility and relocate its aircraft, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Jacksonville. Several important elements in the Navy’s review of excess capacity and military value were either overlooked or not focused on by the reviewing authorities.

In June 2004, the Navy’s Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG) reviewed Naval Aviation Operations future issues that would influence the BRAC decision process. Key to any decisions affecting Naval Air Station Brunswick was recognition that the Navy would begin transitioning from the P-3C aircraft to the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) during 2013-2019.⁸ This time period is during the 20-year

⁸ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP dtd 16 June 2004 (N-RP-0149), page 4*

payback period of any cost savings that might result from a BRAC decision to close or realign any facility. What the Navy recognized but failed to address, is the fact that the Boeing MMA 737 aircraft is too large to fit inside the current Navy Type II Hangar. On 31 August 2004 the DAG was briefed that the MMA and C-40 aircraft did not fit into either of the hangar type modules already defined.⁹ Essentially, the MMA will require a larger “Type III” Hangar. Further examination of existing capacity would have shown the Navy that only NAS Brunswick currently has a Hangar suitable for the MMA. A recent summary report to the Navy March 2005 Preliminary MMA Site Evaluation Report for NAS Brunswick concludes that “From an infrastructure perspective, Naval Air Station Brunswick is feasible as a MOB [Main Operating Base] location with minimal investment required for [MMA] IOC [Initial Operating Capability] 2013. Further, Hangar 6 was assessed to be ready for MMA to move in to. Additionally, Hangar 5 [would be] initially used to support P-3 squadrons. This hangar could be modified to support MMA by increasing the depth of the hangar to accommodate the length of the aircraft and increasing the height of hangar doors to accommodate the tail height.”¹⁰ In comparison, the Preliminary MMA Site Evaluation report for NAS Jacksonville, Florida, states that “...it was determined none of the existing hangars were tall enough nor deep enough to house MMA, which is much larger than the P-3 aircraft.”¹¹ The report also noted that MMA is longer and has a larger wingspan than the Navy’s C-40 logistics aircraft currently operating from NAS Jacksonville. As will be seen later, the decision to move NAS Brunswick operational squadrons to NAS Jacksonville requires significant MILCON to accept just the relocated P-3 aircraft and supporting personnel.

Two facts remain, however, that have not been properly evaluated. One is the improper accounting for “Type III” MMA-capable hangars in the Navy’s capacity analysis. Although the Navy recognized that the MMA would enter the Fleet during the 20-year BRAC implementation period, the evaluation process did not allow for “the

⁹ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP dtd 7 Sep 2004 (N-RP-0189), page 4*

¹⁰ *Cover memo for the Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick Maine MMA Site Evaluation Report (Preliminary); 13126/A1J1B/PMA-290/PS/0005/-20 March 2005; page 1*

¹¹ *Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, Florida MMA Site Survey Report (Preliminary); 13126/A1J1B/PMA-290/PS/0005/-05 January 2005, page 24*

introduction of aircraft types not currently on board an activity...”¹² This restriction, therefore, prohibited the consideration of the P-3 replacement aircraft, the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), which will enter the Fleet with an Initial Operating Capability of 2012-13. In 2012-13 the first squadron of MMAs will enter the Fleet. Not considering the new MMA-capable hangar the Navy has invested in at Brunswick ignores this valuable infrastructure and illustrates that the Navy’s methodology for calculating excess capacity is fundamentally flawed.

The second fact not properly evaluated is the lack of recognition that realigning NAS Brunswick actually increases Naval Aviation excess capacity. Relocating NAS Brunswick aircraft squadrons and personnel requires Military Construction of hangars and ramp space to accommodate not only the near-term arrival of the MMA, but also to meet shortfalls in hangar space for the additional NAS Brunswick P-3 squadrons. Language in NAS Jacksonville’s Data Call DON-0138B supports the facts that MILCON is needed:

"NAS Jacksonville has no available hangar space suitable to house the types of aircraft that are relocating. Per latest NAVFAC planning criteria, each relocating squadron is entitled to one Type II hangar module. Quantity is based on a total of five modules.

"NAS Jacksonville currently has an existing deficit of aircraft parking apron. Based on the type and quantity of aircraft proposed for relocation, and based on current NAVFAC planning criteria, a total of 197,085 SY of new parking apron and taxiway is required. However, there is insufficient area available to construct this amount of new parking apron. In order to provide the required amount of apron space, it will be necessary to demolish existing hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116.

¹² *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV, Department of the Navy Analysis and Recommendations; page C-5*

"The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation.

"Due to the age and potential historical nature of these hangars, Level II historical documentation will be required.

"Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron."¹³

NAS Brunswick currently has a capacity of 20 Hangar Modules, 4 Type I and 16 Type II (a portion of which is MMA-capable). The realignment scenario would essentially retain these 20 hangar modules while simultaneously building new infrastructure at NAS Jacksonville. Whether NAS Jacksonville reduces capacity through military construction to replace and consolidates old hangars not capable of housing either P-3s or MMA, the net result will be an increase in capacity for East Coast Naval Air Stations.

Another element of the Navy's logic that needs examining is the determination of Military Value scores. The minutes of the Department of the Navy Analysis Group's (DAG) meetings show that the Military Value of individual facilities was determined early in the BRAC review process. The method used to measure a facility's Military Value was based on a matrix of statements or questions. For example, one naval aviation question asked how many runways an airfield had and another asked how close an airfield was to training ranges. A quantitative score then yielded Military Value. Although most of these statements provided quantitative measures of an airfield's capabilities, some required a qualitative decision be made, such as in the area of "Strategic Location." In August 2004, the Navy Analysis Group was presented a list of

¹³ *NAS Jacksonville Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, reference DoD54333, pages 4-11*

recommended airfields that should be assigned Military Value scores for Strategic Location. NAS Brunswick was on that list. Yet, amazingly, the only Navy airfields for which the group approved scores for “Strategic Location” were Marine Corps Base Hawaii, and Naval Air Station Key West.¹⁴

As only two airfields were assigned a Strategic Location score, it might be assumed the logic was that most U.S Navy airfields were not deemed “strategic.” If true, this should have changed as the BRAC process progressed, especially in the case of NAS Brunswick. Again, reviewing Navy meeting minutes, we find that the strategic location of Brunswick was raised as a concern no less than 10 separate times. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command and the Commander, Northern Command voiced concerns to the Navy’s analysis group. These Commanders said that the potential closure of Brunswick would negatively affect the Navy’s ability to support Northern Command’s homeland defense missions.¹⁵

The DAG in January 2005 even discussed whether a scenario to close NAS Brunswick was desirable, “in light of the fact that NAS Brunswick is the last active-duty DOD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a Homeland Defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent.”¹⁶ NAS Brunswick *is* the last DOD air base in New England, but it is also the last active duty air base north of McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.

Despite these concerns, there is no evidence that the Navy ever reviewed its evaluation of the Military Value of Brunswick to assign the air base a more appropriate value for strategic location. The following statement from the Commander of Fleet Forces Command to the Navy’s Analysis Group should have caused the Navy to

¹⁴ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP dtd 7 Sep 2004 (N-RP-0189), page 11*

¹⁵ *See Infrastructure Analysis Team memorandum: N-RP-0277; 0326; 0329; 0432;0435; 0479; 0438; 0501; 0440; 0527;*

¹⁶ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP dtd 7 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0432), page 8*

reconsider any closure or realignment scenario for NAS Brunswick. The commander said, “Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities. This scenario also removes any future transformational flexibility options at NAS Jacksonville as all remaining build-able acres are now being committed.”¹⁷ This statement alone clearly raises CFFC’s concerns about closing NAS Brunswick but also indicates a concern for placing too many assets at NAS Jacksonville. Further, CFFC’s comments about NAS Brunswick “offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities” was also never explored by the Navy. Despite these concerns from operational commanders, the Navy still forwarded to OSD’s Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) a recommendation to close NAS Brunswick.¹⁸

The IEC rejected the recommendation to close NAS Brunswick and expressed concern that “the total closure of NAS Brunswick would adversely impact Department of the Navy aviation operations in the Northeast United States.”¹⁹ This recommendation to close NAS Brunswick by the Navy was essentially trumped by the IEC due to NAS Brunswick’s overwhelming strategic military value and should have been the basis to remove single-siting of MPRA forces on the East Coast as a Navy goal. Clearly, maintaining NAS Brunswick in an active status has become an over-riding requirement as expressed by CFFC, NORTHCOM, and OSD, and its strategic location should now greatly outweigh any other quantitative measure of its military value.

Clearly, the logic the Navy and OSD used to recommend realigning NAS Brunswick missed a tremendous opportunity to transform and strengthen U.S. military capabilities in the NE United States. By not considering placing other operational forces at NAS Brunswick to fulfill current and future total force requirements, the Northeast

¹⁷ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP dtd 7 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0432), Enclosure 8, Slide 11

¹⁸ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP dtd 28 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0485), page 4

¹⁹ Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION GROUP dtd 9 May 2005 (N-RP-0592), page 2

United States will stand deserted of any active military aviation assets. Instead, the Northeast will be guarded by a Naval Air Facility, which is simply an air base with no operational air assets. Why were no scenarios run for adding assets to NAS Brunswick, especially after its strategic military value so resoundingly defeated a closure recommendation? The only conclusion can be that a drive for false savings was overwhelming. No estimates can be made for the hidden costs that will reside with this decision to place Brunswick into an air facility status.

So, what was the Navy's logic to realign NAS Brunswick? Simply that the strategic military value of NAS Brunswick is so overwhelming that closure is not an acceptable solution. The Navy wanted to close NAS Brunswick ignoring the strategic military value of the last active military air base in the Northeast and the strong advice of CFFC and NORTHCOM. Fortunately, OSD reversed this closure recommendation because of NAS Brunswick strategic value. The question that remains is, "Why is realignment the solution?"

Simply, realignment is not the solution. Even the DON Analysis Group realized that realignment is not the right decision. A review of the meeting minutes for 24 January 2005 reveals that the DAG "determined the scenario to realign NAS Brunswick did not provide a good return on investment since it would still require significant MILCON costs to relocate the aviation assets to NAS Jacksonville and would provide reduced savings since fewer billets would be eliminated."²⁰ The proper logic then, based on strategic military value and a significant capacity to support MMA and other transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities, would be to keep NAS Brunswick fully operationally manned and ready with active, reserve, joint and Naval Aviation forces.

²⁰ *Navy Infrastructure Analysis Team MEMORANDUM FOR THE DON ANALYSIS GROUP dtd 24 Feb 2005 (N-RP-0476), pages 9-11*

An Assessment of the Pentagon's Business Case for Realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick

**Ed Anderson, Aviation Analyst
Conklin & de Decker Associates
Orleans, Massachusetts**

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Introduction

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense transmitted a report of its recommendations for base closures and realignments to Congress and to the 2005 BRAC Commission. Among the actions recommended is the following:

“Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME to a Naval Air Facility and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Consolidate Aviation Intermediate Maintenance with Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, FL.”¹

According to the report, the realignment is justified because it “will reduce operating costs while single siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville.” The recommendation postulates that a one-time investment of \$147.6 million will result in annual recurring savings of \$34.87 million with an expected 4-year payback and a 20-year net present value savings of \$238.77 million.

This study examines the assumptions, data and analytical methods used by the Department of the Navy that led to the above recommendations and demonstrates that errors and omissions were committed in the Navy's analysis. The most significant error was to base the 20-year financial analysis solely on the P-3C aircraft, while ignoring the fact that the Navy plans to begin phasing out the P-3 in FY12, replacing them with a smaller fleet of contractor-maintained P-8 Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).² The MMA is a key element in the Navy's 20-year Force Structure Plan.³

When these flaws are corrected, this analysis demonstrates that the sole justification for this proposed realignment action—to reduce operating costs—is not met.

¹ DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analysis and Recommendations (Vol. IV) *Recommendation for Realignment Naval Air Station, Brunswick Maine*, Page C-11

² “The present plan is to stand down a P-3 squadron in FY12 for training and transition to the first MMA squadron.” *NAS Jacksonville MMA Site Evaluation (Preliminary)*, Page 24

³ Note: Public Law 101-510 requires that the Department of Defense base its BRAC recommendations on its 20-Year Force Structure Plan.

Importance of Costs/Savings as Evaluation Criteria

The Base Closure Act stipulates that base closure/realignment recommendations will be based primarily on four Military Value criteria. One of the four criteria is, “The cost of operations and manpower implications.”

In fact, the Navy’s entire justification for relocating NAS Brunswick squadrons to NAS Jacksonville is to **reduce operating costs** by merging depot and intermediate maintenance activities thus “reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.”⁴

There is no claim that the realignment will enhance homeland security, improve readiness or increase mission capability in any way. Therefore, it is of critical importance that the 20-year financial analysis be consistent with the Navy’s 20-Year Force Structure Plan.

The COBRA Model

All BRAC recommendations must be supported by cost analysis using an economic analysis program known as Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or COBRA. The current COBRA model, version 6.10, is the latest derivative of a computer program developed by the US Air Force in 1988 and has been adapted for use in each BRAC round since.

One of the criticisms of COBRA is that it is not really a strategic model, yet it is being used to support strategic decisions. There are no provisions in the model for assessing financial risk factors. There is no “best case, worst case” scenario analysis. The model takes six years of data and projects 20 years of results without any consideration of external economic, political, or national security issues.

COBRA was designed as a universal tool for comparing the net costs/savings of various base realignment scenarios. However, like most universal tools, there are shortcomings when it comes to handling non-standard situations. While the model is useful for estimating the costs of relocating/eliminating personnel and equipment—and of building/demolishing facilities—it is not capable of dealing with the complexities of Navy operations, mission productivity and evolving mission requirements.

One serious shortcoming is the fact that the COBRA model does not have provisions for entering changes that are planned/expected after year six. “COBRA calculates the costs and savings of realignment actions over a period of 20 years. It models all activities (moves, construction, procurements, sales, closures) as taking place during the first 6 years, and thereafter all costs and savings are treated as steady-state.”⁵

Failure to recognize this limitation and deal with it correctly can lead to results that are far off the mark.

⁴ DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission; Department of the Navy, Analysis and Recommendations (Vol. IV) *Recommendation for Realignment Naval Air Station, Brunswick Maine*, Page C-11

⁵ *COBRA Users Manual*, Page 4

DOD Data Releases

The initial round of data released by the Pentagon on May 23 included a 35-page printout generated by the COBRA model—a report of the NAS Brunswick realignment scenario. (See Attachment 1). The following table is from page one of the COBRA Summary Report for the proposed NAS Brunswick Realignment Scenario DON-0138B:

Starting Year:	2006							
Final Year:	2011							
Payback Year:	2015 (4 Years)							
NPV in 2025 (\$K):	-238,771							
1-Time Cost (\$K):	147,156							
Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	3,154	0	45,016	45,459	19,015	0	112,645	0
Person	-120	-647	-1,202	-2,589	-5,263	-21,889	-31,709	-38,711
Overhd	3,987	2,975	2,877	3,304	3,310	2,382	18,834	1,321
Moving	0	0	300	2,189	2,310	1,655	6,454	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	125	1,037	2,110	3,118	6,390	2,518
TOTAL	7,022	2,327	47,116	49,401	21,482	-14,734	112,615	-34,872
POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	
Off	2	2	0	1	1	32	38	
Enl	0	6	3	7	20	272	308	
Civ	0	0	0	5	15	37	57	
TOT	2	8	3	13	36	341	403	
POSITIONS REALIGNED								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	
Off	0	0	0	107	134	36	277	
Enl	0	0	0	705	686	303	1,694	
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	
TOT	0	0	0	812	820	343	1,975	

Additional data releases included the COBRA Users Manual, the Algorithm Manual and other supporting documents. Then, on June 8 DOD released additional data in the form of dozens of Redacted Scenario Data Calls. These data calls provided most of the information required to understand the proposed scenarios. The recommended NAS Brunswick Realignment is scenario number DON-0138B and is defined by six Scenario Data Call files.⁶

⁶ Six scenario data files are: COMFLTFORCOM_NORFOLK_VA.pdf, COMPATRECONWING_FIVE_BRUNSWICK_ME.pdf, NAS_BRUNSWICK_ME.pdf, NAS_JACKSONVILLE_FL.pdf, NAVAIRES_BRUNSWICK_ME.pdf, and NAVRESCEN_BANGOR_ME.pdf

Deconstructing the Navy's Cost Analysis

In deconstructing the COBRA scenario report and data calls, our analysts identified errors that raise serious concerns about the validity of the DOD case for realigning NAS Brunswick. The errors were primarily due to the following factors:

- **Basing the cost analysis solely on the P-3** without accounting for planned reduction in support requirements due to the MMA program. It is clear from their own documentation that Navy analysts were aware of the MMA's reduced support requirements. They refer to, "...the smaller operational "footprint" of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) as compared to the P-3." Yet, their cost analysis is based entirely on the high manpower requirements of the P-3.
- **Failure to account for aircraft operating costs** such as the costs of relocating squadron aircraft to NAS Jacksonville and the additional mission costs of flying up to 1100 miles (each way) farther to reach operating areas, multi-national exercises and standard deployment sites.
- **Unrealistic assumptions concerning the timing of Military Construction** at NAS Jacksonville and ability to accommodate Brunswick squadrons according to the proposed schedule.

Six remarkable errors are discussed in the following paragraphs, along with an analysis of the financial impact of each error and the recommended corrective actions:

- 1) **Overstated Personnel Savings.** The Navy's entire business case for single-siting east coast P-3s rests on the theoretical elimination of 403 Personnel beginning in 2011 and continuing through the "beyond" years 2012-2025 (refer to table on page 5). Yet, many of the positions identified for elimination are already slated for elimination as the P-3 fleet progressively stands down beginning in FY12. Even if the proposed ambitious relocation schedule were met, it would be improper to credit the BRAC realignment with eliminating these positions for 15 years.

Analysis

The replacement P-8 will be contractor-maintained by Boeing under a Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) program. A large part of the justification for replacing the P-3 with the P-8 was the savings that would result from the elimination of AIMD and other military maintenance positions.

The CPRW-5 Scenario Data Call⁷ and the NAS Brunswick Data Calls⁸ provide a breakdown of positions proposed for elimination. The following is a list of eliminated positions that have been improperly credited to BRAC realignment.

⁷ CPRW-5 Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, pages 4-5

⁸ NAS Brunswick Data Calls DON-0138, pages 7-9, and DON-0138B, pages 4-6

Aircraft Maintenance/Supply Positions Eliminated

	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	TOTAL	Reference
AIMD	8	91	-	99	DON-138B CPRW-5 Data Call
ASD	1	19	2	22	DON-138B CPRW-5 Data Call
Aviation Supply Support	-	11	25	36	DON-138 NASB Data Call
TOTAL	9	121	27	157	

It is wrong to credit BRAC with eliminating maintenance/support positions that are programmed for elimination under the MMA program. ***This error alone results in an understatement of Personnel Costs by \$13.8 million annually.***

(Note: Even the additional 250+ Aviation Intermediate Maintenance and Aviation Supply (AIMD/ASD) positions slated to relocate to Jacksonville in FY09-FY11 will be phased-out starting in FY12 when the first P-3 squadron stands down.)

Recommended Corrective Action.

This COBRA scenario should be run again after reducing the proposed 403 eliminations by the above 157 positions. This can be accomplished on *Input Screen Six (Brunswick)* by correcting the user entries under *Scenario Changes by Year (+ Additions/-Eliminations)*.

- 2) **Overstated Facilities Shutdown.** Scenario DON-0138B (Input Screen Five) assumes that 874,000 sq ft of facility space would be closed due to the realignment.

Analysis

According to the relevant data call file, 126,000 sq ft is attributable to AIMD shutdown.⁹ This should not be recognized as a BRAC benefit because AIMD is already slated to be shutdown due to the MMA CLS program. Only the remaining 748,000 sq ft of facilities shutdown should be counted as BRAC savings. ***This error results in an understatement of overhead costs by \$415,000 annually.***

Note: A footnote for *Input Screen Five* states, “Brunswick has included costs that appear to be for a closure and not for a realignment.”

Recommended Corrective Action

Correcting for this error is accomplished on *Input Screen Five (Brunswick)* by changing the number of *Facilities Shutdown (KSF)* to 748,000 sq ft.

- 3) **Ignored Mission Costs:** There are no Mission costs shown in the scenario summary, even though NAS Jacksonville is much farther than Brunswick from North Atlantic operating areas, multi-national exercises and most deployment sites. The COBRA Users Manual states:

⁹ *NAS Brunswick Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, DoD54330, page 16*

“... the analyst/user should primarily consider whether the costs/savings are mission or support related. The most important thing is to capture all known costs/savings incurred with the realignment action.”¹⁰

Analysis

An analysis of P-3 deployment sites, operational areas and exercise areas shows that Jacksonville is 800 to 1100 miles farther from most of these locations than is NAS Brunswick. This increases flying time by 4 to 7 hours per round trip, at a cost of \$7,876 per P-3 flight hour.¹¹ For example, a single round trip to Sigonella or the Mid East will cost an additional \$55,000 in the P-3 (estimate 1/3 less for the P-8.) As shown in the accompanying analysis,¹² this error results in an ***understatement of recurring Mission Costs by \$2.5 million annually.***

Recommended Corrective Action.

This COBRA scenario should be run again after entering the appropriate value on *Input Screen Five (Brunswick)* under *Activity Mission Costs (\$K)* year 2011. According to our analysis, a value of \$2.5 Million is justified.

- 4) **Understated Moving Costs.** The COBRA analysis is very detailed in calculating the costs of moving people, vehicles, household goods, etc. to Florida. However, it makes no allowance for the cost of relocating the aircraft. Nor, does it make any allowance for the numerous liaison flights that will take place between Brunswick and Jacksonville before, during and after the move. These are all one-time moving costs.

Analysis

It costs over \$27,500 to fly each P-3 the 1100+ miles from Brunswick to Jacksonville. Even if the squadrons move during deployment, they will have to fly an additional 2.5-3.5 hours to reach NAS Jacksonville. This error results in an ***understatement of Moving Costs by \$2.6 million.*** (See the analysis in attachment 2)

Recommended Corrective Action

It is recommended that the COBRA scenario be run again after allowing for the cost of flying squadron aircraft between Brunswick and Jacksonville. Correcting for this error can be accomplished on *Input Screen Five (Brunswick)* by increasing the values for *One-Time Moving Costs (\$K)*. Our analysis indicates that corrective values should be 1,285 (\$K) in year 2010 and by 1,285 (\$K) in year 2011.

¹⁰ COBRA Users Manual, page 30

¹¹ From FY 2004 Navy VAMOSC Data (available on-line to registered users.)

¹² See Attachment 2

- 5) **Overstated MILCON Cost Avoidance.** Under the original base closure scenario, Navy analysts claimed \$6.7 in MILCON Cost Avoidance due to:
- Cancellation of the demolition of Hangar 1. “Hangar 1 is scheduled to be demolished in FY2006 as part of P-121.”
 - Cancellation of P-175, Weapons Magazine Replacement. “This project is currently under design and could be cancelled as a result of this scenario with the listed cost avoidance.”¹³

Analysis

These credits, while correct for a base closure, were incorrectly carried forward to scenario DON-0138B. If NAS Brunswick were converted to an active Naval Air Facility, it would still be necessary to demolish Hangar 1 (it is literally falling apart) and it would still be necessary to complete the Weapons Magazine Replacement in order to support future detachments of operational aircraft. This error results in an *understatement of Military Construction Costs by \$6.7 million.*

Recommended Corrective Action

Correcting for this error is accomplished on *Input Screen Five (Brunswick)* by deleting the 6,700 *Mission Milcon Avoidance (\$K)* under year 2006.

- 6) **Unrealistic MILCON Time-Phasing.** According to a note in the CPRW-5 Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, the first Brunswick Squadron “relocates in FY09 upon completion of hangar MILCON.”¹⁴

Analysis

Scenario DON-138B shows Military Construction beginning in 2008. Yet the space where hangars and ramps will be built will not be available until 2009 or later because active S-3 squadrons currently occupy them.¹⁵

The relocation schedule used in this realignment scenario is unrealistic. In running the COBRA model, the analyst used default settings for MILCON time-phasing. This means that each year's MILCON is proportional to the following year's personnel transfer; so, nearly half of the construction would occur in 2008. Most of the rest would occur in 2009.

The scenario also wrongly indicates that NAS Jacksonville would be able to accommodate 50% of Brunswick's squadrons when MILCON is half complete. It doesn't work that way. You can't put aircraft, or people, into a half-finished hangar. No squadron relocation could take place until all MILCON is complete.

¹³ *NAS Brunswick Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, DoD54329, pages 15-16*

¹⁴ *CPRW-5 Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, reference DoD54310, page 6*

¹⁵ *NAS Jacksonville Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, reference DoD54333, page 7*

The argument that the schedule is unrealistic is supported by language in NAS Jacksonville's Data Call DON-0138B¹⁶ as follows:

"NAS Jacksonville has no available hangar space suitable to house the types of aircraft that are relocating. Per latest NAVFAC planning criteria, each relocating squadron is entitled to one Type II hangar module. Quantity is based on a total of five modules."

"NAS Jacksonville currently has an existing deficit of aircraft parking apron. Based on the type and quantity of aircraft proposed for relocation, and based on current NAVFAC planning criteria, a total of 197,085 SY of new parking apron and taxiway is required. However, there is insufficient area available to construct this amount of new parking apron. In order to provide the required amount of apron space, it will be necessary to demolish existing hangars 113, 114, 115, and 116."

"The S-3 squadrons are being decommissioned over the next five years, thus freeing up these hangars for demolition. Due to the size of the hangars, they are not suitable to accommodate any of the squadrons and aircraft proposed for relocation."

"Due to the age and potential historical nature of these hangars, Level II historical documentation will be required."

"Child Street, a major traffic artery on NAS Jacksonville, must be relocated. Unless Child Street is relocated, there is insufficient area available to construct the required hangar and parking apron."

Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the proposed new hangars will be ready to occupy before FY11. Thus, the entire realignment action would be pushed back several years into the timeframe when P-3 squadrons are transitioning to the new P-8 MMA.

It is impractical to estimate the value of this cost error without running an entirely different scenario based on new (corrected) scenario data calls.

Recommended Corrective Action.

Given the above facts, DON should explain how it proposes to relocate Brunswick squadrons to Jacksonville according to the proposed schedule, given the requirement to:

- 1) Wait for S-3 squadrons to be decommissioned over the next five years
- 2) Re-route Child Street, a major traffic artery
- 3) Demolish four historic hangars
- 4) Build five new Type II hangar modules with adequate parking apron on the site of the old hangars

¹⁶ *NAS Jacksonville Scenario Data Call DON-0138B, reference DoD54333, pages 4-11*

Otherwise, scenario DON-0138B should be replaced with one based on a realistic schedule for MILCON at NAS Jacksonville.


Correcting Flaws in the DON-0138B Scenario Analysis

We used the COBRA model to measure the cost impact of the above listed errors and to test corrective actions. We first ran the model based on the original DON-0138B inputs in order to validate the accuracy and consistency of our data. This run successfully produced the same results as those released in scenario DON-0138B.

When the recommended Scenario DON-0138B is corrected for the above quantitative errors, the results are dramatically different than those postulated in the baseline analysis. The promised **4-year payback becomes a 9-year payback**. The promised **20-year NPV savings of \$238.8 million are more like \$56.5 million**, for an average of about \$2.8 million (NPV) annually. The **Return On Investment is only 7.1%**. (See table below.)

It is important to note that this analysis is based on the questionable assumption that the proposed realignment action can meet the proposed schedule. Even a one-year schedule slip would further diminish the financial case for this realignment action.

Starting Year:	2006							
Final Year:	2011							
Payback Year:	2020 (9 Years)							
NPV in 2025 (\$K):	56,460							
1-Time Cost (\$K):	147,305							
Net Costs in 2005 Constant Dollars (\$K)								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Beyond
MilCon	9,854	0	45,016	45,459	19,015	0	119,344	0
Person	-120	-647	-1,202	-2,589	-5,263	-15,769	-25,590	-24,864
Overhd	3,724	2,778	2,730	3,266	3,386	2,821	18,705	1,856
Moving	0	0	300	2,189	3,594	2,727	8,810	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	2,531	2,531	2,531
Other	0	0	125	1,037	2,110	3,118	6,390	2,518
TOTAL	13,458	2,131	46,969	49,362	22,842	-4,572	130,190	-17,958
POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	
Off	2	2	0	1	1	23	29	
Enl	0	6	3	7	20	151	187	
Civ	0	0	0	5	15	10	30	
TOT	2	8	3	13	36	184	246	
POSITIONS REALIGNED								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	
Off	0	0	0	107	134	36	277	
Enl	0	0	0	705	686	303	1,694	
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	
TOT	0	0	0	812	820	343	1,975	



Conclusion

The DOD's recommendation to realign NAS Brunswick by relocating its aircraft and support personnel to NAS Jacksonville does not consider the MPRA community transition from the P-3 aircraft to the MMA during the payback period. This factor alone has significant impact on the Navy's projected cost savings, and as our analysis has shown, changes the payback period and net present value savings in this scenario.

A review of the Department of the Navy's Analysis Group (DAG) meeting minutes reveals that as early as June 2004 Navy BRAC analysis teams were aware that the P-3 community would be transitioning to the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) as early as 2012. Further, the DAG was briefed in August of 2004 that the MMA aircraft would not fit into the current Type II Hangar Modules. Although these facts were apparent to the Navy evaluation teams, all scenarios concerning the closure or realignment of NAS Brunswick failed to consider the impact the introduction of the MMA would have on cost savings. Additionally, the Navy BRAC process never considered the fact that NAS Brunswick is currently the only Navy active duty airfield with a hangar module capable of hosting the MMA aircraft (a Boeing 737 derivative). The result was an inflated NPV savings figure and shorter than achievable payback period.

The only reason given for the realignment action was to save money through the elimination of personnel. Yet, the cost analysis is based on assumptions that over-estimate the number of maintenance personnel that will actually be eliminated under a realignment scenario. At least 157 of the eliminated positions are already slated for elimination by the

MMA program and should not be counted as cost savings over the 20-year payback period.

Another issue, that must be sorted out to gauge whether projected cost savings are realistic, concerns the schedule for Military Construction at NAS Jacksonville and the timing of NAS Brunswick squadron relocation. NAS Jacksonville's data calls reveal several challenging MILCON issues: demolish 4 historic hangars after filing historical Level II documentation; build 5 Type II hangar modules; build parking apron space, currently not available, but required before receiving any additional aircraft; and, re-route Child street. What was not mentioned in the data call will be a need for additional P-3 trainers for use by the four additional P-3 squadrons that NAS Jacksonville would receive.

Finally, the Navy's cost analysis ignored the cost issues associated with the higher Mission Costs due to the additional distances aircraft must fly on operational flights and deployments.

When the Navy's cost analysis is corrected to reflect the above additional considerations, the financial justification for realignment fails. The payback period becomes a more realistic 9 years and the purported 20-year NPV savings of \$238.8 million is closer to \$56.5 million.

Economic Impact: Realignment of the Brunswick Naval Air Station May 27, 2005

Summary:

The economic impact to Brunswick and the surrounding Bath/Brunswick region as determined by the Department of Defense is flawed.

1. The Department of Defense has calculated the economic impact based on the assumption that all 5,000+ military personnel at BNAS are active duty. Of the total military positions at BNAS, only 2,718 are ACTIVE duty military. The remainder includes 1,341 reservists (SELRES) which are included in the full-time military payroll count along with 400+ SUPSHIP Naval personnel and 702 civilian positions. *Therefore, the base is essentially "mothballed" rather than realigned.*
2. The Department of Defense has assumed that Brunswick is located within the Portland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) for purposes of economic impact analysis. Brunswick is not located in the Portland SMSA and the numbers are flawed. The use of the Portland SMSA greatly impacts the analysis. *Therefore, the economic impact is far greater than reported.*
3. BNAS is located in the center of the Town of Brunswick and divides the community into two areas. By de facto "mothballing" the base, the inability of the community to seek redevelopment and reuse opportunities will substantially impact business, recreational, residential and job replacement opportunities. *Therefore, the ability of the community to recover is effectively stalled.*

The following should be specifically considered:

- BNAS realignment will result in a loss of 2,317 full time *active duty military* employees leaving the area. *This is a reduction of 85% of the total current active duty military. The assumption that BNAS will be reduced by only one-half is misleading.*
- Unemployment will more than double, increasing from 4.7% to between 10-11% based upon the indirect jobs that will be impacted by the realignment.
- Rental housing vacancies may increase by 1,500 units representing about 30% of the regional supply and 50% of the Brunswick of multifamily rental housing. (Source: RKG Associates)

- The local real estate market will decline and real estate value will decrease, especially in the multi-family and smaller home single family market.
- Lost opportunity costs will greatly impact the area's ability to recover job losses and revenue. The current plan to "realign" the base will be a de facto "mothballing" and will not enable the community to pursue reuse alternatives for recreation, industrial development, open space and other appropriate uses for the area. As currently planned, there will be no property declared surplus. The realignment will result in a reserve base and reserve bases do not generate a significant number of jobs.

This information is provided to encourage the Department of Defense to reconsider the recommendation for realignment of Brunswick Naval Air Station. A preliminary REMI economic analysis has been run, however a number of issues involved in the measurement of military employment pre and post realignment need to be resolved before the model can be fully employed to understand the economic consequences.

This report is intended to capture major issues only and is organized with the following information:

- Labor Market Impact
- Payroll Impact
- Real Estate Impact
- School/Education Impact
- Retail Sales Impact
- Lost Opportunity Costs
- Military Retiree Community
- Spousal Impact
- Quality of Life Indices

Labor Market Impact:

Note: The following labor market information is specifically for the Town of Brunswick as the local area and the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market as a regional area.

- BNAS employment (both civilian and military) represent over 33% of the Town of Brunswick labor force and 13% of the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market.
- Unemployment rates, as a result of realignment, would increase from 4.7% in February, 2005 to between 10% and 11% of the Bath/Brunswick Labor market, depending on base data used.
- The number of people employed in the Bath/Brunswick Labor Market would decrease by 7%.

Town of Brunswick and Bath/Brunswick Regional Labor Market Impacts		
	NASB	Percent
<i>Town of Brunswick Labor Market:</i>		
Total BNAS Jobs	5,227	
Total Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market	10,687	
Total BNAS and Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market	15,914	
Percent of BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market		33%
Percent of Non-BNAS Jobs in Town of Brunswick Labor Market		67%
Total Percent BNAS and Non-BNAS employees		100%
<i>Bath/Brunswick Labor Market:</i>		
Total BNAS Jobs	5,227	
Total Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market	35,610	
Total BNAS and Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market	40,837	
Percent of BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market		13%
Percent of Non-BNAS Jobs in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market		87%
Total Percent BNAS and Non-BNAS employees		100%
<i>Impact of BNAS Realignment on Labor Markets:</i>		
Civilian Job Losses (source: DOD)	61	
Indirect Job Loss Projections (source: SPO)	2,194	
Total Civilian and Indirect Job Loss	2,255	
Resulting Unemployment Rate in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market		10%
Resulting Bath/Brunswick Civilian Labor Market? Realignment	37,905	
Percent Decrease in Bath/Brunswick Labor Market Participation		7%

Source: Town of Brunswick Department of Economic Development

- BNAS realignment will result in a loss of 2,317 full time *active duty military* employees leaving the area. *This is a reduction of 85% of the total current active duty military and \$136,200,000 loss in direct and indirect earnings.*
- Military Reserves will be reduced, leaving 1,075 reserves at BNAS. These reserves operate on a weekend and reserve training basis only, with up to 50% residing outside the state. The reserves are primarily ground based reserves; no flight related staff will remain.

- Civilian Jobs Loss: The military identifies 61 civilian jobs that are to be cut. That is the “low projection”. If the present ratio of military to civilian support were to remain, the civilian job loss number may grow to as many as 615. That would more than double the present unemployment rate (including indirect job elimination).
- Summary: Overall, jobs will continue to decline as a result of the decline in military jobs through 2009 (REMI Model, May 2005). The result will be a depressed job market in the local economy.

Payroll Impact:

BNAS produces \$295 million in direct and indirect payroll per year. To place this in context with the local area, that monetary amount is over half of all payrolls produced by employees in Sagadahoc County on an annual basis. Projections, (which do not include the high projection for lost civilian jobs) suggest a loss of \$136.2 million in payroll from the BNAS realignment, or over 50% of the BNAS present payroll.

BNAS Payroll and Payroll Impacts Before Realignment				
		Direct	Indirect	Total
BNAS Payroll	Civilian	\$22,000,000	\$10,800,000	\$32,800,000
	Military	\$125,000,000	\$53,400,000	\$178,400,000
Procurement		\$0.00	\$84,500,000	\$84,500,000
Total Earnings		\$147,000,000	\$148,700,000	\$295,700,000
Employment		5,227 employees	4,918 employees	10,145 employees
BNAS Payroll Realignment Impacts				
		Direct Loss	Indirect Loss	Total Loss
BNAS Payroll	Civilian	\$2,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$3,000,000
	Military	\$67,500,000	\$19,400,000	\$86,900,000
Procurement		\$0	\$46,300,000	\$46,000,000
Total Earning and Procurement Loss		\$69,500,000	\$66,700,000	\$135,900,000
Decrease from Realignment		-47%	-45%	-46%

Source: Brunswick DECD, State Planning Office, 2005

- Salaries can range (including salary and housing assistance) from \$42,990 to \$74,250. These salaries are within the median income range of the region; their loss will negatively impact average median salary.

- The preliminary REMI model calculating impact on various economic sectors in the region shows the following:
 - Retail sales loss of \$15.5 million annually.
 - Real estate and rental losses exceeding \$12.5 million annually.
 - The financial and insurance markets will decrease by almost \$12 million annually.
 - The construction industry will decline by almost \$10 million annually
 - Declines occur to 17 different sectors in the economy and are projected to continue through at least the next ten years.

Real Estate Impact:

The impact to the Brunswick area real estate market will be dramatic. It should be viewed in three areas; impact on the Town government due to the privatization of military housing in November of 2004, impact on landlords/renters and impact on the home owner market.

1. Navy Housing Privatization Impact on BNAS Realignment

In November 2004 Brunswick and Topsham both entered into Agreements with GMH Communities Trust (Northeast Housing LLC) a partner with the Navy, which acquired housing units while enabling the Navy to retain the underlying land. As a result of this “military housing privatization”, Brunswick and Topsham started providing some services to the military housing in exchange for a payment in lieu of taxes.

In Brunswick, the Town expects to receive \$544,000 per year to provide negotiated services to 463 housing military housing units which are located “outside the fence”. The Town has anticipated receipt and expenditure of those funds as part of the budgeting process.

Loss of \$544,000 yearly income to the Town of Brunswick used to fund municipal services is significant. The Town of Topsham is similarly impacted although on a smaller scale. Topsham’s Agreement provides for \$180,000 in fees paid to the municipality for services provided under the terms of the Agreement. This loss would be proportionately significant for Topsham.

2. Off Base Home Ownership Housing Impact:

Military representatives estimate that up to 2,000 personnel live off base, with the majority residing in the towns of Brunswick, Bath and Topsham. Of the total off-base personnel, it is estimated that 500 own their own homes and 1,500 are in rental units. Up to 2,000 housing units within the core housing market area are at-risk for becoming vacant. Most of these units are at the middle to lower end of the housing market.

The flow of BNAS personnel from the housing market will depress the local housing market and significantly depress the local construction industry. It is estimated that 56% of the military families live in Brunswick, suggesting that as many as 149 homes may be owned by military personnel. Approximately one fifth of those homes purchased each year are new construction, therefore, the loss of annual construction revenue to Brunswick is \$5.9 million.

The housing market will see a flood of homes put on the market which will have a negative impact on the number of properties sold and total sales, resulting in substantial losses to the local, regional and state real estate economy. Assuming that military families make up 149 home purchases in any one year in Brunswick, the loss of buyers could impact the number of properties sold, reducing the number of sales by between 31% and 54% annually.

Brunswick Residential Property Sales		
Year	# Of Properties Sold	Total Sales
2001	276	\$42,307,896
2002	390	\$59,370,250.40
2003	453	\$82,550,781
2004	482	\$114,112,534
2005	71 (1 st Quarter)	\$15,989,210 (1st Quarter)

Source: Brunswick Assessing Office: 2005

3. Rental Market Impact:

The impact on rents and price levels in the community would be substantial. It is estimated that Navy personnel living in private housing in the communities account for 30-35% of those living in multifamily units. Taking privatization and off base housing together, current Navy plans would result in 50% of the apartments becoming vacant. This will result in a dramatic loss of rental income to landlords, devaluation of property values and loss of tax income to the towns, the potential for disinvestment and other social and economic impacts.

School/Education Impact:

Children of military employees at BNAS average approximately 20% of the student population in the Town of Brunswick School Department each year. In the past ten years, between 595 to 671 military-dependent children have been included in the approximate 3,300 total school population. In addition to the positive social benefits that these children have brought to the community, the School Department receives approximately \$1.1 million in Federal Education

Aid. (Source: Brunswick School Department)

Lost students and lost funding would all decrease the quality of education provided to the remaining residents of Brunswick by reducing the diversity of students and the programs that can be offered.

MSAD 75, the school system for Topsham residents has approximately 10% of the student body comprised of military dependents. The loss of impact aid to the MSAD is estimated to be in the range of \$150,000.

Impact on Local Colleges

- University of Maine-Augusta (located in Bath) currently enrolls approximately 400 students. Of that total, 20 - 25% are active duty or dependents of active duty military, which calculates to 80 -100 students. Base realignment would result in the loss of approximately \$400,000 in revenue, reduced class offerings and loss of employment. (Source: University of Maine-Augusta/Bath campus)
- Southern Maine Community College estimates a decline in student enrollment by 10-15%. The college would correspondingly reduce classes and professors. (Source: SMTTC)
- Southern New Hampshire University located in Brunswick enrolls between 800 to 1,000 students each semester. Approximately 50% of those students are active duty military or active duty military dependents participating in both graduate and undergraduate courses. The loss of those students would impact SNHU significantly in reduction of classes, professors and loss of approximately \$450,000 in revenue. (Source: SNHU)

Lost Opportunity Costs:

The geographic location of BNAS is significant. The over 3,000 acres which make up the base bisect the Town of Brunswick into two separate commercial and residential areas. Any decision to de facto “mothball” the base will deprive the community and the state of the opportunity to reuse portions for recreation, open space, industrial development, housing, job replacement activities and many other uses that contribute to the health and vitality of a community. As an operational base, the personnel significantly contribute to the community. As a “mothballed” base, the land, and resulting lack of activity will divide the community. The lost redevelopment and/or lost joint reuse opportunities should be considered as a significant adverse economic and social impact. Plans are underway to develop a joint reserve facility on the base. In four previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission recommended 27 actions in which a reserve enclave was to be established at a closed or realigned base. In the 1995 round, the GAO recommended that DoD should clearly state what infrastructure was needed which would result in retention of appropriate acreage. (Source NAID/ADC infobrief May 2005)

Retail Sales Impact:

It is estimated that 83% of BNAS military personnel live in Brunswick, or its surrounding communities. (Source: RKG using BNAS zip code data) With a payroll reduction of \$69.5 million, it can be expected that the impact in retail sales will be significant. The preliminary REMI model suggests that there would be a decrease of \$22.9 million in retail trade venues throughout Cumberland County. The Brunswick area would be hardest hit.

Assuming that 50% of the military payroll is spent in Brunswick and applying an average disposable income figure for military families of 33%, the annual retail sales loss would be approximately \$11 million per year. This would likely apply across all retail categories. Its impact on the local economy is substantial.

Military Retiree Community

An estimated 5,700 military retiree's and family members live in the area to take advantage of the region and of BNAS. (Source NASB 2004 Report to Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission) The impact of base realignment on this group is unknown however; it is known that currently 60% of all commissary customers are military retirees. Of the total commissary customers, 33% are active duty, 7% are reserves and the remainder is retirees.

(Source: Base Commissary)

Spousal Impact:

Between 60-75% of all full-time active duty military spouses work in the local job market. The role of spouses in the local economy can not be overstated. Recent surveys of the job center suggests that military spouses play an important role in participating in local part time jobs as well as participating to fill both part time and full time teaching needs in the school system. They are also active volunteers.

Quality of Life Indices:

The national media views Brunswick as a great location to live. The cultural and natural amenities it offers attract many looking to relocate to a unique and special place. Among the military, Brunswick is a very popular place to retire, with the existing base being a critical reason for that choice. Over 5,700 military retirees and their families have chosen to live in the Brunswick area (Census, Town of Brunswick).

Other publications that find Brunswick a great place to live are:

- Cyclists: AARP (Nov. /Dec. issues) identified Brunswick as the 8th best place to cycle in the nation.
- Money magazine identifies Brunswick as the 3rd best place to retire (July, 2000).
- Outside Magazine identifies Brunswick as one of the Top 40 College Towns in the Country.
- Brunswick has been featured as a top retirement community in *Where to Retire* (November, 2003), *The New Retirement: The Ultimate Guide to the Rest of Your Life* (Cull inane, Fitzgerald), and *Where to Retire in Maine* (Doudera).

The popularity of Brunswick as a place to live extends to the military as well. Expansion Management published the results of a survey in its magazine in November of 2004. Among the 354 metropolitan areas that house military bases, Brunswick was ranked 74, or in the upper 20%. The report, which tested for a variety of quality of life indices, ranked Brunswick high in quality of life, education, lack of crime, housing availability, recreation and leisure, among others. Brunswick ranked number one in its population group for having the lowest crime rate. These and many other characteristics make Brunswick one of the top places for military personnel to live or retire.

**BOEING SITE SURVEY INPUT TO
NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) BRUNSWICK, MAINE
P-8A AIRCRAFT SITE EVALUATION REPORT
(PRELIMINARY)**

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the Site Evaluation is to identify the support requirements for the P-8A aircraft at NAS Brunswick, Maine (NASB). The information provided is intended as guidance in development of a Preliminary Site Plan with supporting cost data for consideration at NASB as a P-8A Main Operating Base.

1.2 Assumptions

Use the following assumptions in the development of the Preliminary Site Plan:

- a. The first squadron of six aircraft could be stood up as early as the third quarter of FY2012.
- b. Two additional squadrons six aircraft each would follow closely as build schedule allows.

Note:

Boeing has determine that three hangar bays will be required to support 18 aircraft under the proposed CLS Support Concept.

- c. Operational Training Facility has to be ready for students by the third quarter of FY2013.
- d. There will be one centralized aircraft maintenance department for all squadrons with line (organizational) maintenance being preformed by Contractor Logistics Services (CLS) personnel.
- e. Supply Chain Management (SCM) operations will be accomplished by CLS personnel utilizing a closed loop process.
- f. Support Equipment (SE) support will be the responsibility of the CLS personnel except for licensening, which will remain as at NASB responsibility.
- g. The Navy will be required to provide the necessary facilities, infrastructure, and furnishings to support training, aircraft maintenance, SE, and SCM operations at NASB.

(See Attachment A)

1.3 Additional Information

In addition to the NASB Preliminary Site Plan and costing data, request a rough order of magnitude (ROM) for these additional assumptions.

- a. An additional 12 aircraft in the maintenance department.

Note:

Boeing has determined that five hangar bays will be required to support 30 aircraft under the proposed CLS Support Concept.

- b. Operational Training Facility requirements will need to be increased to support the additional student throughput.
- c. All assumptions provided in paragraph 1.2 Assumptions above also apply.

2. TRAINING AND TRAINERS

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluation, and recommended corrections to support Operational Training.

2.1 171 35 Operational Trainer Facilities

Functional Requirement: The Operational Trainer Facility will accommodate one Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), one Tactical Operational Trainer (TOFT), and two Weapons Tactical Trainers (WTTs). (See Attachment B)

Training facilities will also include space for classrooms, training devices, support equipment, tools, supplies, computer based training stations, internal and external network intercommunications equipment, training media storage, Contractor Maintenance Services (CMS) offices, student study rooms, instructor offices, management and briefing areas, and communication closets. The Operational Training facility must be constructed to the Secret Level with SCIF included within the building.

Evaluation: During the site evaluation it was determined that the NASB Operational Training

Facility would not be adequate to support P-8A training requirements. During the conversations with the PW personnel it was determined that modification of existing spaces would not provide a solution.

Recommended Corrective Action: NASB has identified a possible location to construct a new Operational Training Facility. The Operational Training Facility should be identified in the NASB Site Plan. Details regarding training facility requirements are provided in Attachment B.

3. OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

3.1 Operational Facilities Composition

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for the operational facilities required to support the P-8A aircraft.

3.2 Airfield Pavement Criteria

The strength of pavements required at an airfield is determined by the maximum gross weight of the aircraft it must support. Data for airfield pavement design criteria peculiar to the P-8A AIRCRAFT includes aircraft gear configuration, number of wheels, wheel spacing, tire size, and inflation pressures (See Figure 3-1). The airfield pavement criteria for the P-8A landing on rigid and flexible pavement (specifically, the Aircraft Classification Numbers (ACNs)) are illustrated in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The Pavement Classification and Pavement Index Numbers (PCNs/PCIs) are contained in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-4.

Table 3-1
Runway PCN Values

STATION	EFD	RUNWAY	RUNWAY PCN	LENGTH (ft)	WIDTH (ft)
BRUNSWICK				8,000	
BRUNSWICK				8,000	

MAXIMUM DESIGN TAXI WEIGHT	LB	188,200
MAXIMUM DESIGN TAKE OFF	LB	187,700
MAXIMUM DESIGN LANDING WEIGHT	LB	149,800
NOSE GEAR TIRE SIZE	IN.	27X7.7-15 12 PR
NOSE GEAR TIRE PRESSURE	PSI	185
MAIN GEAR TIRE SIZE	IN	H44.5 X16.5 – 21 28 PR
MAIN GEAR TIRE PRESSURE	PSI	204 THRU 205




Figure 3-1 Maximum Weights, Tire Size, and Landing Gear Footprint

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering




Figure 3-2 ACNs for Flexible Pavement




Figure 3-3 ACNs for Rigid Pavement

TO BE INSERTED BY NAVAIR

Figure 3-4 PCI Values

3.3 Runway/Fixed Wing

Functional Requirements: Runways are paved surfaces for aircraft takeoff and landing. Traffic density, airfield mission, operational procedures, and local environmental factors determine an airfield's required number of runways. Runway orientation is determined by analyzing wind data, terrain, generated noise levels, and local development planning. See Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) DM-21.1 for wind rose analysis and design criteria.

Evaluation: NAS Brunswick runway(s) TBD are suitable for operation of P-8A at 187,700 lbs maximum design takeoff and 154,600 lbs landing weights. The actual performance of the aircraft will be verified during TBD. General airfield information is shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. The ACNs for the P-8A takeoff and landing on flexible and rigid pavement are shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The PCNs and PCIs are contained in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-4.

Recommended Corrective Action: Continue with a suitable maintenance and repair program to maintain appropriate PCN and PCI ratings for runways.




Figure 3-5 Class B Runway – Typical Layout

3.4 112 10 Taxiway

Functional Requirements: Taxiways should be located to provide a smooth flow of aircraft traffic to and from runways and service and parking areas. Criteria specified in NAVFAC P-80 are sufficient to meet the requirements of the aircraft.

Evaluation: NAS Brunswick taxiways are suitable for operation of P-8A aircraft with a maximum design taxiway weight of 188,200 pounds. The ACNs for the P-8A aircraft on flexible and rigid pavement are shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The PCNs and PCIs are contained in Figure 3-4.

Recommended Corrective Action: Continue with a suitable maintenance and repair program to maintain appropriate PCN and PCI ratings for taxiways.

3.5 Hangar Five and Six Aircraft Parking Apron

Functional Requirements: Aircraft parking aprons consist of paved areas in close proximity to maintenance hangars to provide spaces, tie down points, line maintenance, loading, unloading, and servicing of aircraft in addition to providing parking space. There is no standard size or

apron configuration. The size is based on the type and number of aircraft to be parked, the requirement for squadron integrity, and 45 versus 90 degree parking. The area required includes parking space, wing-tip separation between aircraft, and interior/peripheral taxi lanes. Aprons used for ordnance handling require special siting considerations. (See category code 116 56)

Evaluation – Hangar Six: The Hangar Six parking and access apron is a concrete ramp that serves to allow for access to Hangar Six. The condition of this ramp is excellent, with no spalling or cracking evident. I was informed that some of the slabs in front of Hangar Six are scheduled for demolition and replacement. The ramp is of sufficient size to accommodate P-8A hangar movements, but will need to be re-striped to accommodate the P-8A airplane. Hangar mounted external ramp lighting is available for night operations. Airplane static grounding is presently accomplished via tiedown padeyes, although plans are underway to install static grounding ports on the ramp. The concrete ramp slab thickness is unknown, so this area should also be analyzed for load bearing capabilities.

Approximately (7) P-8A airplanes may be parked along the south portion of the ramp if a blast fence is erected.

Evaluation – Hangar Five: The Hangar Five parking and access apron is a concrete ramp that serves to allow access to Hangar Five. The Hangar Five parking and access apron of Hangar Five is adequate to accommodate P-8A hangar movements. The concrete thickness is unknown. Padeyes are used for static discharge grounding. The ramp appears to be in good condition with no obvious cracking or spalling

Recommended Corrective Action: Utilizing the information provided in the SER a comprehensive aircraft parking layout should be developed based upon apron requirements for existing and projected aircraft. Landing gear layout, tire pressures, and size data is provided in Figure 3-1. The Site Plan should allow for tie downs in areas that are not peripheral taxi lanes to maximize apron flexibility. Concrete slab thickness should be determined and analyzed for load bearing capabilities. Once load bearing capabilities are determined, a suitable maintenance and repair program to maintain appropriate PCN and PCI ratings for rampways should be

implemented.

Note

The aircraft wing is being redesigned to remove the winglets and install raked wingtips thereby increasing the wingspan to a maximum of 125'00". The exact dimensions are unknown at this time as the raked design has not been released to date.

3.6 Aircraft Washrack Pavement

Functional Requirements: Aircraft washracks are provided at all air installations for cleaning of aircraft in conjunction with periodic maintenance. A minimum of one washrack is required at each NAS, Naval Air Facility, and equivalent Marine Corps facilities. The total number of washracks required at an installation depends on numbers and types of on-board aircraft.

Evaluation: NAS Brunswick has one washrack that service existing assigned aircraft. It appears that the existing facility will be able to be utilized for the P-8A.

Recommended Corrective Action: Evaluate the existing washrack to confirm compatibility with P-8A.

3.7 Aircraft Compass Calibration Pad

Functional Requirements: An aircraft compass calibration pad is a paved area in a magnetically quiet zone where the compass in the aircraft is calibrated. There are two types of calibration pads.

- Type I is used with the magnetic compass calibration set
- Type II includes a compass rose and turntable and may be used with or without the compass calibration set

Either pad type will only handle one aircraft at a time. A minimum of one pad is provided at each station. Access to the calibration pad is oriented to facilitate aircraft entering the pad facing magnetic north. Each pad also requires a target placed at a known but arbitrary bearing at a distance of approximately one-half mile from the pad and visible from both the aircraft and the

compass calibration set.

Evaluation: The present compass calibration pad is not adequate to support the P-8A. Compass calibration will be required after the compass has been removed and replaced.

Recommended Corrective Action: The size of the compass calibration pad must be reviewed to ascertain what required actions are necessary to accommodate P-8A.

3.8 Arming and De-arming Pad

Functional Requirements: This arming and de-arming pad provides a paved area for activating or deactivating weapons systems on-board aircraft. It is utilized at all Navy and Marine Corps air installations where gunnery, rocketry, and/or missile firing are conducted. The number of pads at an installation depends upon the demand at that installation. The pads are sited at either end of the primary runway and, if additional pads are required, at either end of the crosswind runways. Aircraft utilizing the pad normally park parallel to the runway headed in the direction providing the maximum length of undeveloped space along the extended longitudinal centerline of the aircraft. In no case is arming or de-arming of propelled ordnance allowed when the aircraft is facing inhabited areas on or near the air installation. For design criteria, see NAVFAC DM-21. A waiver to airspace clearance criteria is not required when the arming and de-arming pad is sited as shown in DM-21.

Evaluation: Present dimensions of the arming and de-arming pad does not seem to be adequate to support P-8A aircraft.

Recommended Corrective Action: Verify the using the P-8A dimensions provided and make the necessary corrections as required. (See Attachment C)

3.9 116 42 Blast Protective Pavement

Functional Requirements: Blast protective pavement provides blast erosion protection for the areas adjacent to the ends of the runways, arming and de-arming pads, and aircraft engine power check pads. These areas are subject to the repetitive high velocity and temperature erosion

effects of jet engine exhaust wakes.

Evaluation: The P-8A has a relatively low temperature exhaust. However, the velocity wake is very large. It appears that the existing blast pavements will be adequate.

Recommended Correction: Testing during the SDD phase should verify the blast wake, and the impact on pavements should be determined at NAS Patuxent River.

3.10 116 45 Line Vehicle Parking

Functional Requirements: Line vehicle parking spaces contiguous to taxiway and parking aprons are allocated to mobile equipment assigned for flight line use. Parking areas shall be selected to permit optimum efficiency in the use of equipment (for example, squadron vehicles will normally be assigned space close to the squadron maintenance hangar) and to conform to lateral safety clearances for existing and projected airfield pavements. Where weather requires and the clearances permit, shelter for line vehicles may be provided.

Evaluation: Specific types and numbers of line vehicles required by the CLS contractor are currently unknown. Because of the non-traditional maintenance concept for this aircraft, the vehicles requiring this parking will be controlled and maintained by the CLS contractor. This requires a dedicated space as close as possible to the aircraft line and CLS contractor maintenance personnel.

Recommended Corrective Actions: Type and quantity of aircraft line vehicles should be determined during SDD. Line vehicle parking should be identified in the Site Plan.

3.11 116 56 Combat Aircraft Ordnance Loading Area

Functional Requirements: The combat aircraft ordnance loading area is primarily an apron where explosives are loaded/off-loaded from combat aircraft departing and/or returning from weapons training flights. This area is required when space is not available on the parking apron for loading mass detonating ordnance that meet the explosive quantity-distance requirements specified in Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) OP-5, Volume I (Ammunition and

Explosives Ashore-Safety Regulations for Handling, Storing, Production, Renovation, and Shipping). The weapons are not armed on this apron; see Category Code 115 35, Arming and De-arming Pad Policy. Due to ordnance handling taking place on this apron, its location with respect to other facilities shall be determined using the quantity-distance requirements and explosive prohibited areas specified in NAVSEA OP-5, Volume I. The apron shall be separated from any inhabited building by the inhabited building distance based on the total quantity of explosives (Net Explosive Weight) to be handled on the apron at one time. In addition, the airfield safety clearances specified in NAVFAC P-80.3, Airfield Safety Clearances apply and:

- The apron must be outside the runway primary surface
- Parked aircraft shall not penetrate any transitional surface
- No objects shall be sited within 100 feet of the edge of this apron

Evaluation: This covered by previous requirement 3.8 Arming and De-arming Pad.

Recommended Corrective Action: (See Attachment C)

3.12 Fire and Rescue Vehicle Alert Pad

Functional Requirements: This facility provides a parking area for an Immediate Response Alert Vehicle. The purpose of the Immediate Response Alert is to:

- Observe all landings and take-offs
- Respond immediately to any aircraft accident
- Provide timely rescue of personnel involved in emergencies

The pad should be large enough to park one appropriately sized fire truck and should be located no closer than 150 feet from the runway edge. The pad should not include a protective shelter or any other structure, which would violate airfield safety clearance criteria, for guidance see NAVFAC P-80.3, Airfield Safety Clearances. The pad should be connected to the runway by a 16-foot-wide access roadway. If there is no access to the alert pad other than from the runway, the parking space should be widened as required to allow the truck sufficient space to turn around.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, the NAS Brunswick Fire Station Chief stated that NAS Brunswick was a Cat 2 airfield and had sufficient resources, both men and equipment, to support P-8A AIRCRAFT operations.

Recommended Corrective Action: No new manning or equipment requirements will be necessary to support P-8A aircraft. However, training and documentation for NAS Brunswick personnel on P-8A aircraft battery locations, cutout locations, equipment locations, etc., shall be required to ensure P-8A firefighting and rescue knowledge is sufficient.

3.13 Aircraft Truck Fueling Facility

Functional Requirements: An aircraft truck fueling facility is used to transfer fuel to refuel trucks for subsequent fueling of the aircraft. The fueling equipment is located on concrete islands that are designed to provide fuel from one side only. Where more than one island (one fueling outlet per island) is required, they shall be arranged parallel to each other with 15 feet between adjacent sides. The pavement between islands is sloped to a drain or catch basin, which is connected to a containment area in case of a fuel spill. See NAVFAC P-272, Drawing 14039987 for a sketch of a typical refuel fill stand and NAVFAC DM-22 for design criteria.

Evaluation: NAS Brunswick uses a contract fueling service that provides 24/7 fueling coverage for both assigned and transient aircraft. During the Site Evaluation, it was reported by NASB personnel that providing fueling service to P-8A aircraft will not require additional resources or personnel.

Recommended Corrective Action: NAS Brunswick will evaluate the capacity of their refueling stand and base fuel supply tanks to support the additional volume required by P-8A and propose any necessary modifications in the Site Plan. Training and documentation for NAS Brunswick personnel on P-8A fueling/defueling procedures shall be required prior to P-8A arrival at NASB.

3.14 121 30 Aircraft Defueling Facility

Functional Requirements: The Aircraft Defueling Facility is used to facilitate aircraft

maintenance and defuel aircraft of contaminated fuel. Normally, a designated defuel truck is used to provide defueling services.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, NASB personnel indicated that there is a dedicated 10,000 gallon defueling truck available.

Recommended Corrective Action: No corrective actions for either manpower or resources are necessary to support P-8A defueling requirements at NAS Brunswick. Training and documentation for NAS Brunswick personnel on P-8A fueling/defueling procedures shall be required prior to P-8A arrival at NASB.

3.15 123 10 Filling Station

Functional Requirements: The Filling Station is required to fuel equipment and support vehicles. The Filling Station includes fuel dispensing pumps, access roads, area lighting, shelter, and fire protection. The facility should be located in the vicinity of the aircraft Ground Support Equipment (GSE) shop.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, it was determined the facility is adequate to support P-8A GSE requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: The contractor will require station accounts to purchase fuel for contractor owned vehicles (e.g., trucks, vans, lift trucks, etc.), and miscellaneous station services. Consideration must be given to the increased number of aircraft supported.

3.16 124 30 Aircraft Ready Fuel Storage

Functional Requirements: Aircraft ready fuel storage tanks are required to provide an operating and reserve supply of jet fuel. At air stations, all aviation fuel storage is considered to be aircraft ready fuel. A ten-day supply is required to be stored at air stations within the continental U.S.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, NASB personnel indicated that site storage tanks had sufficient excess capacity to support P-8A operations.

Recommended Corrective Action: NAS Brunswick should evaluate the capacity of their fuel storage in order to support the additional volume required by P-8A and identify any required modifications in the Site Plan.

3.17 149 50 Blast Deflector Fence

Functional Requirements: Blast deflector fences are structures that direct the exhaust from jet engines upward. They are used in congested, parking, and maintenance areas (aircraft power check pad) to protect personnel, equipment, and structures from the blast effect of jet engine exhaust.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation it was determined that no blast fences currently exist at NASB.

Recommended Corrective Action: Installation of a blast fence along the southern portion of Hangar Six ramp will allow for P-8A parking on the ramp.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

4.1 Organizational Maintenance Facilities Composition

This section covers functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for the facilities to support organizational maintenance. Category codes and nomenclatures covered in this section are listed below.

211 05 Maintenance Hangar – 0H Space

211 06 Maintenance Hangar – 01 Space

211 07 Maintenance Hangar – 02 Space

Maintenance Hangars are required to provide weather-protected shelter for the servicing and repair of Navy aircraft at the organizational level and emergency shelter for operable aircraft.

These hangars are to contain a hangar space (OH), crew and equipment space (01), and administrative space (02). Each of these spaces is assigned a separate category code.

4.2 211 05 Maintenance Hangar – OH Space

Functional Requirements: This space is high bay and is used for organizational maintenance of the aircraft in a controlled environment.

Evaluation – Hangar Six

General

Hangar Six is a new hangar with construction completed in 2005. It houses up to (6) P3 Orion aircraft. The hangar is divided into two major 3-bay areas, with a concrete blockhouse separating the two areas. The hangar is a steel-framed structure with concrete masonry sill walls. The exterior is sheathed in insulated metal siding. The hangar bays have hangar doors that open to the south. The hangar doors are fabric and have translucent sections. A multiple story shop and administrative area adjoins the hangar bay along the north hangar bay wall. The hangar bays can serve as washracks. The hangar is clean, tidy, free of FOD, and is in excellent condition. POV automobile parking is available to the immediate north of the shop and administrative areas.

Cranes

Five-ton bridge cranes are located throughout the hangar bay areas.

Heating

The Hangar Six airplane bays have a modern radiant and forced air gas-fired heating system that will provide comfortable working conditions throughout the winter months. The hangar door floor area is also heated.

Lighting

Hangar Six has an overhead high intensity discharge lighting system that provides adequate lighting for nighttime maintenance.

Compressed Air

Hangar Six has a low pressure compressed air system. This system has filtration and water

separation capability.

Hangar Fire Protection and Security Systems

The hangar bays have overhead and trench sprinkler systems, portable dry chemical and wheeled halon extinguishers, trench drains, and fire alarm systems throughout. The trench sprinkler system is AFFF. Emergency eye wash stations are located in the bays. The west bay has an airplane fuel cell vent system. Note that the hangar floor is sloped for fire water runoff. The hangar also has a closed circuit security TV system.

Hangar Aircraft External Power

The hangar has (4) 90kva 400Hz ground power receptacles in each major bay area. Because the ground power requirements for the P-8A are more sensitive/demanding than for the P3 Orion, it is strongly recommended that the Navy test their ground power systems to ensure they conform to the 737-800 tolerances as indicated in the 737 Facility and Equipment Planning Document D626A002. An excerpt from this document is shown in enclosure (4). Note that Hangar Six has (5) floor static ground points per P3 Orion parking space. The static grounding points were inspected 12-10-04. Although static grounds require a maximum of 10,000 ohms resistance

Hangar Floor

The hangar floor is in excellent condition. The floor is sealed. A review of Hangar Six NAVFAC drawing 2217551 / Sheet SB 108 indicates that the hangar bay concrete slab consists of 267mm (10.5") of unreinforced concrete over 305mm (12.0") of crushed stone. Per Boeing recommendations, a 737-700 with a weight of 120,000 pounds should be supported by a concrete slab of approximately 11", assuming a high-quality subgrade support condition

Note that airplane jacking may induce additional floor loading, and any floor slab analysis should consider jacking scenarios.

Hangar Dimensions

Horizontal dimensions of the hangar can support the housing of (4) P-8A aircraft simultaneously. Note that a minimum of 20' of horizontal clearance off each wing, 20' of horizontal clearance off the nose, and 25' of clearance off the tail are generally recommended for maintenance. If

these standards cannot be met, I strongly recommend that high procedural diligence be maintained whenever performing P-8A hangar movements.

Per NAVFAC drawing 2217670 / Sheet AE 301, the lower chord of the hangar door truss has a vertical clearance of 47'. The fabric hangar doors can be raised above this lower chord when the doors are in the fully-raised position. Per NAVFAC drawing 2217670 / Sheet AE 301, the hangar bays are measured to have a vertical clearance of approximately 54', given that the lowest point of the internal hangar ceiling is established by the 5 ton crane rail & hook height. Because the P-8A has vertical stabilizer height of 42'02", the hangar has adequate vertical clearance for P-8A maintenance operations.

Recommended Corrective Action: Confirm vertical measurements in the hangar as the above findings are solely based upon a drawing analysis. Perform a detailed analysis of hangar floor thickness to confirm suitability for P-8A.

Evaluation – Hangar Five

General

Hangar Five was constructed in 1980. It houses up to (7) P3 Orion aircraft. The hangar is divided into three major bay areas. The two outboard bay areas can house (3) P3 Orions each, with a central single airplane corrosion control bay between the two areas. The hangar is a steel-framed structure with concrete masonry sill walls. The exterior is sheathed in insulated metal siding. The hangar bays have metal horizontal sliding hangar doors. The doors do not have door pockets so they must be moved as necessary within the hangar envelope to accommodate airplane movements. A single story shop and administrative area adjoins the hangar bay along the east hangar bay wall. The hangar is clean, tidy, free of FOD, and is in excellent condition. POV automobile parking is available immediately to the east of the shop and administrative areas.

Cranes

Three-ton bridge cranes are located in portions of the hangar bay areas.

Heating

The Hangar Five airplane bays have a steam heating system that will provide comfortable working conditions throughout the winter months.

Lighting

Hangar Five has an overhead lighting system that provides adequate lighting for nighttime maintenance.

Compressed Air

Hangar Five has a low-pressure compressed air system. A compressed air placard states "100 psi maximum".

Hangar Fire Protection Systems

The hangar bays have overhead sprinkler systems, wall mounted AFFF fire hoses, pendent foam fire nozzles, fire extinguishers, and trench drains. Emergency eye wash stations are located in the bays. Note that the hangar floor is sloped for firewater runoff.

Hangar Aircraft External Power

Hangar Five receives 400 Hz ground power from ground power carts. The hangar has floor static ground points. The static grounding points were inspected 4/04, and state that the grounding resistance is less than 10 ohms.

Hangar Floor

The hangar floor is in good condition. The floor is painted. A review of Hangar Five NAVFAC drawing 2037463 / Sheet S 6 indicates that the hangar bay concrete slab consists of 11" of unreinforced concrete over 6" of (aggregate) base.

Hangar Dimensions

The hangar bays are only 117' deep and the vertical clearance at the hangar doors is 42'09". Because the lowest internal ceiling chord elevation is approximately 46'09", this hangar is

inadequate to support extended P-8A maintenance activities without first performing major hangar alterations.

Ramp Adjacent to Hangar Five (Parking Ramp to the South of the Hangar)

This concrete ramp in front of Hangar Five is adequate to accommodate P-8A hangar movements. The concrete thickness is unknown. Padeyes are used for static discharge grounding. The ramp appears to be in good condition with no obvious cracking or spalling

Note

The aircraft wing is being redesigned to remove the winglets. This redesign will result in the wingspan of the aircraft being increased; the exact dimensions are unknown at this time but not expected to be beyond 125'00".

Recommended Corrective Action: Review the hangar requirements and include modifications and/or new construction necessary to support P-8A. Evaluate ramp and hangar concrete thickness and include modifications and/or new construction necessary to support P-8A AIRCRAFT. If Hangar six is made available for P-8A squadrons in NASB Site Plan modifications to Hangar five would not be required at this time.

4.3 211 06 Maintenance Hangar – O1 Space

Functional Requirements: This space is generally behind the OH space and is at ground level. The organizational maintenance shops and production control are typically in these spaces.

The present concept is to have a centralized CLS maintenance team attached to the Wing not each squadron. The CLS maintenance team will support all P-8A aircraft at NASB and could be conducted from a centrally located facility.

Evaluation: Assuming overlap of P-3 and P-8A operations and maintenance, NASB is well suited with current facilities to support both sets of operations and associated organizational maintenance requirements assuming P-3 maintenance was performed in Hangar Five and P-8A maintenance was performed in Hangar Six.

Recommended Corrective Action: No corrective actions are required at this time.

4.4 211 07 Maintenance Hangar – O2 Space

Functional Requirements: This space provides administrative offices for the squadron.

Evaluation: Both Hangar Five and Hangar Six have sufficient administrative spaces for squadron activities.

Recommended Corrective Action: No corrective actions are required at this time.

4.5 CLS Administration

Functional Requirements: This space would provide for overall CLS Site Management. It would provide space for Site Managers, Spares Managers, overall data storage, and general administration services.

Evaluation: This is a new requirement derived from the CLS support concept. Based on site survey results, sufficient administrative spaces are available in both Hangar Five and Six to support CLS requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: No corrective actions are required at this time. (Attachment D is provided to depict the Notional Wing Centralized Maintenance Concept.)

5. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

5.1 Intermediate Maintenance Facilities Composition

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for intermediate maintenance facilities at NAS Brunswick. It is anticipated that minimal intermediate maintenance facilities support will be required. The overall support concept will be evaluated during SDD.

5.2 211 54 Aviation Armament Shop

Functional Requirements: An aviation armament shop requires space and utilities to support intermediate maintenance of guided missile launchers, bomb racks, and pylons. A storage area and Armament Weapons SE work center also requires space in this shop.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, it was determined the current aviation armament shop meets all requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: P-8A will use the same weapons as P-3 aircraft. However, consideration must be given to the increased number of aircraft supported.

5.3 211 75 Parachute Survival Equipment Shop

Functional Requirements: A parachute and survival equipment shop provides space and utilities required to support inspection, repair, modification, and repacking of parachutes, rafts, and life vests during intermediate maintenance. Space is also provided for testing and repair of oxygen systems as well as aircrew personal equipment.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, the squadron parachute and survival equipment facilities were evaluated.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use Attachment A to help determine Parachute Survival Equipment and storage space requirements. Any modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements should be provided in the NASB Site Plan.

5.4 218 60 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Shop

Functional Requirements: Intermediate maintenance of aircraft GSE is performed in this shop. Ground support equipment, often referred to as yellow gear, includes such items as tow tractors, trucks, fork lifts, trailers, compressors, power generators, maintenance stands, jacks, and other GSE that support aircraft operations. The GSE shop requirement is based on the average number of on-board aircraft.

Evaluation: While specific requirements such as types and number of GSE are still TBD, the site survey evaluation indicated that sufficient infrastructure is available for supporting GSE maintenance requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: No recommended actions at this time.

Note

Although the CLS team will maintain and operate the GSE, NASB will retain the responsibility of operator licensing In Accordance With (IAW) local regulations and policies.

5.5 218 61 Ground Support Equipment Holding Shed

Functional Requirements: The GSE Holding Shed provides a secure and sheltered storage area for GSE awaiting either repair or issue.

Evaluation: Due to limited time, and minimal information regarding specific requirements such as types and number of GSE and any particular facilities requirements for this space, no evaluation of existing spaces was done.

Recommended Corrective Action: No action recommended at this time.

6. SUPPLY FACILITIES

6.1 Supply Facilities Composition

This section provides the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions to support SCM. The P-8A program will employ a non-traditional approach to SCM where the contractor provides for provisioning of spare parts to ensure all procured and stocked spare and repair parts are current with delivered aircraft configurations.

6.2 441 10 General Warehouse Navy

Functional Requirements: A general warehouse provides bulk and bin storage, aisles, receiving, packing, crating, and administrative space. Facilities excluded from this category are all shop stores, ready issue stores, and miscellaneous storage not physically located in a supply department.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation Bldg 294 was evaluated Because of the non-traditional approach to SCM, general warehousing and Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHS&T) will be controlled and maintained by the CLS team. This would require a dedicated space with controlled access.

Recommended Corrective Action: Determine modifications to existing spaces in Bldg 294 and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the NASB Site Plan. Recommend use of Attachment A to help determine warehousing and PHS&T requirements.

6.3 441 30 Hazardous and Flammable Storehouse

Functional Requirements: The storehouse is similar to a general warehouse in most respects except provisions are made to prevent and remove, through proper ventilation, evaporated and gaseous fumes IAW National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) Standard No. 30. Materials normally considered for storage in this category include paints, certain package petroleum, oil, lubricants, chemicals, acids, corrosive liquids, oxidizing materials, and other similar hazardous and/or flammable materials.

Evaluation: The hazardous and flammable storehouse **Bldg XXX** was not evaluated during the Site Evaluation. Limited hazardous and flammable storage capability will be also required in the warehouse area. The maintenance department will also require a similar capability adjacent to the hanger spaces area.

Recommended Corrective Action: This requirement should be covered in the Site Plan.

TSC / MOCC Facilities

(See Attachment E)

NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA
MMA SITE EVALUATION REPORT
(PRELIMINARY)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Site Evaluation Report (SER) is to identify the support requirements for the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) during consideration of Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, Florida. The data provided is intended as guidance in developing a Site Plan and supporting DD Form 1391s for NAS Jacksonville.

1.2 Scope

The Preliminary SER delineates the support requirements for both training and operational facilities as established during the acquisition process and is supported by the P-3 Weapon System Planning Document (WSPD) and the OPNAV (N78) U.S. Navy Aircraft Inventory Budget Exhibit. The Preliminary SER is provided as a guide to be used in conjunction with the Boeing Facilities Requirements Document (FRD – Attachment A) in development of the proposed Site Plan.

Once the Preliminary SER has been reviewed and NAS Jacksonville personnel have developed a proposed Site Plan, the SER will be updated and used in facilities planning. Also the SER will be staffed at the appropriate levels to ensure concurrence by N78. The MMA Program Office will assist NAS Jacksonville in the development and tracking of the appropriate documentation to ensure a successful introduction of MMA.

1.3 Assumptions

The following assumptions were identified and used during the MMA Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract and subsequent aircraft deployment.

- a. Initial MMA skills training for Fleet personnel will be provided at the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Training Center at NAS Jacksonville.

- b. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) will be evaluated using a Fleet squadron at NAS Jacksonville. The IOC squadron is defined as the first squadron fully manned, trained, and ready to deploy.
- c. Follow-on operational training will be established at each Main Operating Base (MOB) for the Fleet MMA squadrons, and NAS Jacksonville will be the first MOB.
- d. There will be a seven to eight-year overlap of MMA and P-3 training and support requirements at NAS Jacksonville.
- e. A Performance Based Logistics contract will be used to provide full Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) for aircraft maintenance, Support Equipment (SE) management and repair, and Supply Chain Management (SCM).
- f. The Navy will be required to provide the necessary facilities, infrastructure, and furnishings to support training, maintenance, SE, and SCM concepts established for MMA.

1.4 Milestones

The following list identifies milestones associated with the aircraft/personnel arrival dates, facilities requirements, and actions needed to support MMA IOC.

- a. Development of the NAS Jacksonville Site Plan based on MMA requirements.
- b. Development of documentation (DD Form 1391s, etc.) to support funding of the required new construction and modifications to support the Site Plan. The documentation to support the initial requirements should be started in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005.
- c. FRS Integrated Training Center (ITC) facilities, infrastructure, and furnishings will be required in 4th quarter FY11 to facilitate equipment installation and testing in order to support the first class in FY12. (See Attachment A for details)

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- d. Operational follow-on training facilities, infrastructure, and furnishings will be required in 3rd quarter FY12 to facilitate equipment installation and testing in order to support the first class in FY13. (See Attachment A for details)

- e. Hangar spaces, ramp areas, and maintenance spaces will be required to provide adequate weather protection for aircraft and maintenance personnel in FY12 in order to support the first three FRS aircraft. By FY17, the FRS is projected to have a total of 12 aircraft. (See Section 4.2 and Attachment A for details)

- f. Hangar spaces, ramp areas, and maintenance spaces will be required to provide adequate weather protection for aircraft and maintenance personnel in order to support the first squadron of six aircraft with support personnel arriving in FY12 to support IOC. Transition of the second and subsequent squadrons will be dependent on the production and delivery schedule of the aircraft.

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Note

The full compliment of 24 aircraft (12 FRS aircraft and two six-plane Fleet squadrons) and approximately 207 support personnel are scheduled to be in place at Jacksonville by FY17. (See Table 1-1, Projected Aircraft and Personnel Schedule).

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1.5 Proposed Site Plan

1.5.1 To Be Determined

Note:

Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 reflect NAS Jacksonville as it is. These figures will be updated to reflect changes contained in the proposed Site Plan and DD Form 1391s upon approval.

Table 1-1

Projected Aircraft and Support Personnel by Year

Fiscal Year	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17
Number of Aircraft	8	9	13	17	21	24
Billet Title						
Site Manager	1	1	1	1	1	1
Admin Assist	1	1	1	1	1	1
Stores Mgr	1	1	1	1	1	1
Storekeeper LD	3	3	3	3	3	3
Storekeeper A	2	2	3	4	5	5
Storekeeper B	2	2	3	4	5	5
Receiving QA	2	2	2	3	3	3
Logs/Records	2	2	2	3	3	3
Safety/HAZMAT	1	1	1	2	2	2
Tool Control	3	3	3	3	3	3
SE Manager	1	1	2	2	2	2
SE Admin	1	1	2	4	5	6
SE Technician LD	1	1	1	2	3	4
SE Technician A	2	2	4	4	5	6
SE Technician B	2	2	4	4	5	6
Instructor (Training/Records)	1	1	1	1	2	2
Maintenance Manager	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maintenance Planning	3	3	3	4	5	5
Admin Assist	1	1	1	1	1	1
Field Service Rep	2	2	3	3	3	3
Shift Supervisors	3	3	3	4	5	5
A/C Technician LD	3	3	3	5	8	8
A/C Technician A	9	9	14	21	27	27
A/C Technician B	10	10	18	23	30	33
AvEquip Technician	8	8	12	16	20	21
Line Division	6	6	8	10	15	15
Supervisor (Det)	--	--	2	2	4	4
Maintenance Control (Det)	--	--	2	2	4	4
A/C Technician A (Det)	--	--	7	7	9	9
A/C Technician B (Det)	--	--	7	7	9	9
Admin (Det)	--	--	2	2	4	4
Line Division (Det)	--	--	4	4	5	5
Total	72	72	124	154	199	207

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2. TRAINING FACILITIES

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended corrections for both initial and follow-on training.

2.1 Initial and Operational Training Facilities

Functional Requirements: An MMA ITC will be required at the FRS to accommodate two Operational Flight Trainers (OFTs), two Tactical Operational Flight Trainers (TOFTs), two Weapons Tactics Trainers (WTTs), one Integrated Avionics Trainer (IAT), one Weapons Load Trainer (WLT), and several Part Task Trainers (PTTs) for each of the crew stations. (See Figure 2-1)

The ITC will also include space for classrooms, training devices, support equipment, tools, supplies, Computer-Based Training (CBT) stations, internal and external network intercommunication equipment, training media storage, Contractor Maintenance Support (CMS) offices, student study rooms, instructor offices, management and briefing areas, and communication closets. The ITC must be constructed to the Secret level with a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) included within the building.

Evaluation: During the seven to eight-year transition period from P-3 to MMA training and operations, the FRS will be required to provide initial training simultaneously for both the P-3 and the MMA aircrew. As a result of this overlapping transition period, plus the construction phase, and since MMA can not recapitalize on any of the existing P-3 trainers, there are no current P-3 training facilities/spaces that can be converted to MMA training without severely impacting ongoing P-3 training efforts. The ITC will be required in 4th Quarter FY11 to facilitate equipment installation and testing in order to support the first classes in 2nd Quarter FY12. The floor plan of the ITC is expected to be approximately 93,511 square feet.

Recommended Corrective Action: The FRS will require an ITC as outlined in Attachment A (Table 2-1 provides the projected personnel required to support the ITC).

Table 2-1
Training CMS

	Two Separate Training Facilities at NAS Jacksonville, FL		One Training Facility at Jax
	FRS	Operational	FRS & Operational Jacksonville
Training Program Management	1.0		1.0
Librarian	1.0		1.0
Maint/Doc - HAZ MAT	1.0		1.0
PTS Device Tech	3.0	2.0	4.0
MTS Device Tech	2.0	0.0	2.0
Computer Tech	3.0	0.5	3.0
Network Tech	1.0	0.5	1.0
Supply Support	1.0		1.0
Configuration Management	1.0		1.0
CLS Maintenance Instructors	1.0	0.0	1.0
OFT/TOFT Operators	4.0	4.0	6.0
Courseware Support	1.0	0.0	1.0
Security	2.0	2.0	2.0
Total	22	9	25

2.2 171 35 Operational Trainer Facilities

Functional Requirements: The Operational Trainer Facility will accommodate one OFT, one TOFT, and two WTTs.

Training facilities will also include space for classrooms, training devices, support equipment, tools, supplies, CBT stations, internal and external network intercommunication equipment, training media storage, CMS offices, student study rooms, instructor offices, management and

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briefing areas, and communication closets. The Operational Training Facility must be constructed to the Secret level with a SCIF included within the building.

Evaluation: Currently, the FRS and operational users share the P-3 trainer suites at NAS Jacksonville. The reduction of on-aircraft training in the MMA increases the need for a separate operational trainer facility. As a result of the overlapping P-3/MMA transition period, plus the construction phase, and since MMA can not recapitalize on any of the existing P-3 trainers, there are no current P-3 training facilities/spaces that can be converted to MMA training without severely impacting ongoing P-3 training efforts.

The facilities, infrastructure, and furnishings to accommodate the training requirements of the MOB training system installation will be required in FY12 to support the first squadron Training and Readiness requirements in FY13. The MOB operational training facility is expected to be approximately 19,147 square feet

Recommended Corrective Action: The operational squadrons require a separate training system from the FRS. If land-space considerations require co-locating the Operational and FRS trainers, additional floor space must be added to the ITC to accommodate the increase of trainers. Efficiencies can be achieved with this combination in office space, manpower, and infrastructure requirements. The Operational Trainer Facility requirements are outlined in Attachment A (Table 2-1 provides the projected personnel required to support the Operational Training Facility).

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3. OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

3.1 Operational Facilities Composition

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for the operational facilities required to support the MMA.

3.2 Airfield Pavement Criteria

The strength of pavements required at an airfield is determined by the maximum gross weight of the aircraft it must support. Data for airfield pavement design criteria peculiar to the MMA

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includes aircraft gear configuration, number of wheels, wheel spacing, tire size, and inflation pressures (See Figure 3-1). The airfield pavement criteria for the MMA landing on rigid and flexible pavement (specifically, the Aircraft Classification Numbers (ACNs)) are illustrated in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The Pavement Classification and Pavement Index Numbers (PCNs/PCIs) are contained in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-4.

Table 3-1
Runway PCN Values

STATION	EFD	RUNWAY	RUNWAY PCN	LENGTH (ft)	WIDTH (ft)
JACKSONVILLE	SOUTH	14-32	42/F/B/W/T	6,000	200
JACKSONVILLE	SOUTH	9-27	50/R/C/W/T	8,000	200

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MAXIMUM DESIGN TAXI WEIGHT	LB	184,700
MAXIMUM DESIGN TAKE OFF	LB	184,200
MAXIMUM DESIGN LANDING WEIGHT	LB	154,600
NOSE GEAR TIRE SIZE	IN.	27X7.7-15 12 PR
NOSE GEAR TIRE PRESSURE	PSI	185
MAIN GEAR TIRE SIZE	IN	H44.5 X16.5 – 21 28 PR
MAIN GEAR TIRE PRESSURE	PSI	204 THRU 205




Figure 3-1 Maximum Weights, Tire Size, and Landing Gear Footprint

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


Figure 3-2 ACNs for Flexible Pavement




Figure 3-3 ACNs for Rigid Pavement

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


Figure 3-4 PCI Values (Dec 2004)

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3.3 111 10 Runway/Fixed Wing

Functional Requirements: Runways are paved surfaces for aircraft takeoff and landing. Traffic density, airfield mission, operational procedures, and local environmental factors determine an airfield's required number of runways. Runway orientation is determined by analyzing wind data, terrain, generated noise levels, and local development planning. See Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) DM-21.1 for wind rose analysis and design criteria.

Evaluation: NAS Jacksonville runway 9-27 is suitable for operation of MMA at 184,200 lbs maximum design takeoff and 154,600 lbs landing weights. The actual performance of the aircraft will be verified during the SDD phase. General airfield information is shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. The ACNs for the MMA takeoff and landing on flexible and rigid pavement are shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The PCNs and PCIs are contained in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-4.

Recommended Corrective Action: The existing runway is suitable within takeoff and landing weight limits; however, NAS Jacksonville should investigate solutions for runway 9-27 clear zone tree growth intrusion into the imaginary surfaces as defined in NAVFAC P-80.3. (See Figure 3-5 below) The specific Operating Procedures at NAS Jacksonville would need to be adjusted for altitude, temperature, safety factor(s), and effective gradient(s) as required by the P-80. Also, NAS Jacksonville should continue with a suitable maintenance and repair program to maintain appropriate PCN and PCI ratings for runways.

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


Figure 3-5 Class B Runway – Typical Layout

3.4 112 10 Taxiway

Functional Requirements: Taxiways should be located to provide a smooth flow of aircraft traffic to and from runways and service and parking areas. Criteria specified in NAVFAC P-80 are sufficient to meet the requirements of the aircraft.

Evaluation: NAS Jacksonville taxiways are suitable for operation of MMA with a maximum design taxiway weight of 184,700 pounds. The ACNs for the MMA on flexible and rigid pavement are shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The PCNs and PCIs are contained in Figure 3-4.

Recommended Corrective Action: Continue with a suitable maintenance and repair program to maintain appropriate PCN and PCI ratings for taxiways.

3.5 113 20 Aircraft Parking Apron

Functional Requirements: Aircraft parking aprons consist of paved areas in close proximity to maintenance hangars to provide spaces, tie down points, line maintenance, loading, unloading, and servicing of aircraft in addition to providing parking space. There is no standard size or apron configuration. The size is based on the type and number of aircraft to be parked, the

requirement for squadron integrity, and 45 versus 90 degree parking. The area required includes parking space, wing-tip separation between aircraft, and interior/peripheral taxi lanes. Aprons used for ordnance handling require special siting considerations. (See category code 116 56)

Evaluation: NAS Jacksonville has a Military Construction (MILCON) project under design adjacent to Building 30, the VP-30 hangar complex. A second phase to the MILCON will provide an additional parking apron. Figures 3-6a and 3-6b illustrate a possible apron parking solution and the required dimensions.

It was noted during the Site Evaluation that the aircraft tie downs for the apron adjacent to Building 30 were laid out solely to support P-3 aircraft. With the introduction of MMA and the approximately eight years of overlap between MMA arrival and the P-3's departure, the existing and new apron layouts for aircraft, tie downs, and static grounds should be modified to provide the maximum flexibility of aircraft parking for both the P-3 and MMA.

Recommended Corrective Action: Utilizing the projected aircraft arrival information provided in Table 1-1, the SER, and existing MILCON projects, a comprehensive aircraft parking layout should be developed based upon apron requirements for existing and projected aircraft. Landing gear layout, tire pressures, and size data is provided in Figure 3-1. The Site Plan should allow for tie downs in areas that are not peripheral taxi lanes to maximize apron flexibility. Consideration should also be given to adding tie down anchors to the apron in front of Building 30.

Note

The aircraft wing is being redesigned to remove the winglets. This redesign will result in the wingspan of the aircraft being increased; the exact dimensions are unknown at this time.

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


Figure 3-6a Requirement in feet for 6 parked MMA




Figure 3-6b Estimated separation to keep aircraft outside the 35 MPH exhaust velocity contour at breakaway power

Figure 3-6 Notional Parking Arrangements

3.6 116 10 Aircraft Washrack Pavement

Functional Requirements: Aircraft washracks are provided at all air installations for cleaning of aircraft in conjunction with periodic maintenance. A minimum of one washrack is required at each NAS, Naval Air Facility, and equivalent Marine Corps facilities. The total number of washracks required at an installation depends on numbers and types of on-board aircraft.

Evaluation: NAS Jacksonville has three washracks that service existing assigned aircraft. Each of these has been equipped with an overhead structure that provides a secure place for personnel to attach safety devices while washing aircraft upper portions. It appears that the existing facilities may be able to be utilized for the MMA; however, there are serious concerns regarding wing tip and tail clearances within the existing structure.

Recommended Corrective Action: Evaluate the existing washrack and overhead structure dimensions to ensure compatibility with the aircraft.

Note

The aircraft wing is being redesigned to remove the winglets. This redesign will result in the wingspan of the aircraft being increased; the exact dimensions are unknown at this time.

3.7 116 20 Aircraft Compass Calibration Pad

Functional Requirements: An aircraft compass calibration pad is a paved area in a magnetically quiet zone where the compass in the aircraft is calibrated. There are two types of calibration pads.

- Type I is used with the magnetic compass calibration set
- Type II includes a compass rose and turntable and may be used with or without the compass calibration set

Either pad type will only handle one aircraft at a time. A minimum of one pad is provided at each station. Access to the calibration pad is oriented to facilitate aircraft entering the pad facing magnetic north. Each pad also requires a target placed at a known but arbitrary bearing at a distance of approximately one-half mile from the pad and visible from both the aircraft and the

compass calibration set.

Evaluation: The present compass calibration pad is not adequate to support the MMA. Compass calibration will be required after the compass has been removed and replaced. (See Figure 3-7)

Recommended Corrective Action: The size of the compass calibration pad must be reviewed to ascertain what required actions are necessary to accommodate MMA.

3.8 116 35 Arming and De-arming Pad

Functional Requirements: This arming and de-arming pad provides a paved area for activating or deactivating weapons systems on-board aircraft. It is utilized at all Navy and Marine Corps air installations where gunnery, rocketry, and/or missile firing are conducted. The number of pads at an installation depends upon the demand at that installation. The pads are sited at either end of the primary runway and, if additional pads are required, at either end of the crosswind runways. Aircraft utilizing the pad normally park parallel to the runway headed in the direction providing the maximum length of undeveloped space along the extended longitudinal centerline of the aircraft. In no case is arming or de-arming of propelled ordnance allowed when the aircraft is facing inhabited areas on or near the air installation. For design criteria, see NAVFAC DM-21. A waiver to airspace clearance criteria is not required when the arming and de-arming pad is sited as shown in DM-21.

Evaluation: The aircraft will require an arming and de-arming pad. The existing pad has taxi lines and tie down points to accommodate five P-3 aircraft. This configuration will require a review to ascertain the necessary actions so that MMA aircraft may be adequately supported.

Recommended Corrective Action: An aircraft-parking layout is required in order to determine the suitability of the existing arming and de-arming pad. The pad is serving a variety of carrier-based and patrol type aircraft. Consideration should be given to adding additional tie down anchors to the apron should the parking plan warrant. (See Figure 3-7)

3.9 116 42 Blast Protective Pavement

Functional Requirements: Blast protective pavement provides blast erosion protection for the areas adjacent to the ends of the runways, arming and de-arming pads, and aircraft engine power check pads. These areas are subject to the repetitive high velocity and temperature erosion effects of jet engine exhaust wakes.

Evaluation: The MMA has a relatively low temperature exhaust. However, the velocity wake is very large. It appears that the existing blast pavements will be adequate.

Recommended Correction: Testing during the SDD phase should verify the blast wake, and the impact on pavements should be determined at Patuxent River NAS.

3.10 116 45 Line Vehicle Parking

Functional Requirements: Line vehicle parking spaces contiguous to taxiway and parking aprons are allocated to mobile equipment assigned for flight line use. Parking areas shall be selected to permit optimum efficiency in the use of equipment (for example, squadron vehicles will normally be assigned space close to the squadron maintenance hangar) and to conform to lateral safety clearances for existing and projected airfield pavements. Where weather requires and the clearances permit, shelter for line vehicles may be provided.

Evaluation: Specific types and numbers of line vehicles required by the CLS contractor are currently unknown. Because of the non-traditional maintenance concept for this aircraft, the vehicles requiring this parking will be controlled and maintained by the CLS contractor. This requires a dedicated space as close as possible to the aircraft line and CLS contractor maintenance personnel.

Recommended Corrective Actions: Type and quantity of aircraft line vehicles should be determined during SDD. Line vehicle parking should be identified in the Site Plan.

3.11 116 56 Combat Aircraft Ordnance Loading Area

Functional Requirements: The combat aircraft ordnance loading area is primarily an apron where

explosives are loaded/off-loaded from combat aircraft departing and/or returning from weapons training flights. This area is required when space is not available on the parking apron for loading mass detonating ordnance that meet the explosive quantity-distance requirements specified in Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) OP-5, Volume I (Ammunition and Explosives Ashore-Safety Regulations for Handling, Storing, Production, Renovation, and Shipping). The weapons are not armed on this apron; see Category Code 115 35, Arming and De-arming Pad Policy. Due to ordnance handling taking place on this apron, its location with respect to other facilities shall be determined using the quantity-distance requirements and explosive prohibited areas specified in NAVSEA OP-5, Volume I. The apron shall be separated from any inhabited building by the inhabited building distance based on the total quantity of explosives (Net Explosive Weight) to be handled on the apron at one time. In addition, the airfield safety clearances specified in NAVFAC P-80.3, Airfield Safety Clearances apply and:

- The apron must be outside the runway primary surface
- Parked aircraft shall not penetrate any transitional surface
- No objects shall be sited within 100 feet of the edge of this apron

Evaluation: The combat aircraft ordnance loading area has taxi lines and tie down points to accommodate five P-3 Aircraft. The present configuration will require a review to ascertain the required actions for support of the MMA. (See Figures 3-7 and 3-8)

Recommended Corrective Action: Any modification necessary to support ordnance loading should be identified in the Site Plan.

3.12 116 60 Fire and Rescue Vehicle Alert Pad

Functional Requirements: This facility provides a parking area for an Immediate Response Alert Vehicle. The purpose of the Immediate Response Alert is to:

- Observe all landings and take-offs
- Respond immediately to any aircraft accident
- Provide timely rescue of personnel involved in emergencies

The pad should be large enough to park one appropriately sized fire truck and should be located

no closer than 150 feet from the runway edge. The pad should not include a protective shelter or any other structure, which would violate airfield safety clearance criteria, for guidance see NAVFAC P-80.3, Airfield Safety Clearances. The pad should be connected to the runway by a 16-foot-wide access roadway. If there is no access to the alert pad other than from the runway, the parking space should be widened as required to allow the truck sufficient space to turn around.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, the Aviation Fire Fighting office at the Naval Air Systems Command stated that NAS Jacksonville had the proper size and number of fire trucks to support P-3 operations, and that the MMA would place no additional requirements on the base.

Recommended Corrective Action: No new requirements will be necessary to support MMA aircraft.

3.13 121 20 Aircraft Truck Fueling Facility

Functional Requirements: An aircraft truck fueling facility is used to transfer fuel to refuel trucks for subsequent fueling of the aircraft. The fueling equipment is located on concrete islands that are designed to provide fuel from one side only. Where more than one island (one fueling outlet per island) is required, they shall be arranged parallel to each other with 15 feet between adjacent sides. The pavement between islands is sloped to a drain or catch basin, which is connected to a containment area in case of a fuel spill. See NAVFAC P-272, Drawing 14039987 for a sketch of a typical refuel fill stand and NAVFAC DM-22 for design criteria.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, insufficient information was available to determine the impact of increased demand on truck fueling facilities.

Recommended Corrective Action: NAS Jacksonville will evaluate the capacity of their refueling stand to support the additional volume required by MMA and propose any necessary modifications to the Site Plan.

3.14 121 30 Aircraft Defueling Facility

Functional Requirements: The Aircraft Defueling Facility is used to facilitate aircraft maintenance and defuel aircraft of contaminated fuel. Normally, a designated defuel truck is used to provide defueling services.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, insufficient information was available to determine the impact of increased demand on truck defueling facilities.

Recommended Corrective Action: NAS Jacksonville will evaluate the capacity of their defueling stand to support the additional volume required by MMA and propose any necessary modification in the Site Plan.

3.15 123 10 Filling Station

Functional Requirements: The Filling Station is required to fuel equipment and support vehicles. The Filling Station includes fuel dispensing pumps, access roads, area lighting, shelter, and fire protection. The facility should be located in the vicinity of the aircraft Ground Support Equipment (GSE) shop.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, it was determined the facility is adequate to support MMA requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: The contractor will require station accounts to purchase fuel for contractor owned vehicles (e.g., trucks, vans, lift trucks, etc.), and miscellaneous station services. Consideration must be given to the increased number of aircraft supported.

3.16 124 30 Aircraft Ready Fuel Storage

Functional Requirements: Aircraft ready fuel storage tanks are required to provide an operating and reserve supply of jet fuel. At air stations, all aviation fuel storage is considered to be aircraft ready fuel. A ten-day supply is required to be stored at air stations within the continental U.S.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, insufficient information was available to determine the impact of increased demand on aircraft ready fuel storage facilities.

Recommended Corrective Action: NAS Jacksonville will evaluate the capacity of their fuel storage in order to support the additional volume required by MMA and identify any modifications to the Site Plan.

3.17 149 50 Blast Deflector Fence

Functional Requirements: Blast deflector fences are structures that direct the exhaust from jet engines upward. They are used in congested, parking, and maintenance areas (aircraft power check pad) to protect personnel, equipment, and structures from the blast effect of jet engine exhaust.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation it was determined the blast deflector fence is sufficient.

Recommended Corrective Action: No new requirements will be necessary to support MMA.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

4.1 Organizational Maintenance Facilities Composition

This section covers functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for the facilities to support organizational maintenance. Category codes and nomenclatures covered in this section are listed below.

211 05 Maintenance Hangar – 0H Space

211 06 Maintenance Hangar – 01 Space

211 07 Maintenance Hangar – 02 Space

Maintenance Hangars are required to provide weather-protected shelter for the servicing and repair of Navy aircraft at the organizational level and emergency shelter for operable aircraft. These hangars are to contain a hangar space (OH), crew and equipment space (01), and administrative space (02). Each of these spaces is assigned a separate category code.

4.2 211 05 Maintenance Hangar – OH Space

Functional Requirements: This space is high bay and is used for organizational maintenance of the aircraft in a controlled environment.

The initial requirement to support the first three MMA FRS aircraft in FY12 will be in addition to the existing P-3 aircraft presently being maintained. The remaining MMA FRS aircraft will be scheduled to arrive FY13 through FY17. It is anticipated the P-3 aircraft supporting the FRS will be reduced over the same period but no schedule has been provided to date.

The present plan is to stand down a P-3 squadron in FY12 for training and transition to the first MMA squadron. Although there is no present schedule for establishment of the second MMA squadron, it will also be preceded by standing down and transitioning a P-3 squadron.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, it was determined none of the existing hangars were tall enough nor deep enough to house MMA, which is much larger than the P-3 aircraft (Figures 4-1 and 4-2 provide specific measurements). Based on the current support concept and Boeing's recommendations during the Site Evaluation, it was determined that three maintenance bays would be adequate to support the full complement of aircraft currently planned for NAS Jacksonville.

MMA is also longer and has a larger wingspan than the C-40. (Figure 4-3 provides two pictures of the C-40 in Hangar 1000)

Note

The aircraft wing is being redesigned to remove the winglets. This redesign will result in the wingspan of the aircraft being increased; the exact dimensions are unknown at this time.

Recommended Corrective Action: Evaluate the hangar requirements and propose modifications and/or new construction necessary to support MMA in the Site Plan.

4.3 211 06 Maintenance Hangar – O1 Space

Functional Requirements: This space is generally behind the OH space and is at ground level. The organizational maintenance shops and production control are typically in these spaces.

The present concept has the CLS maintenance team resident at the Air Station and not the squadron. The CLS maintenance team will support both FRS and squadron aircraft and could be accomplished from a centrally located facility. The present plan is to ramp up the CLS team between FY12 and FY17 (See Table 1-1).

Evaluation: Based on the overlap of P-3 and MMA there were no spaces available to support the initial requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, pages C-7 and C-8) to determine maintenance team facilities requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

4.4 211 07 Maintenance Hangar – O2 Space

Functional Requirements: This space provides administrative offices for the squadron.

Evaluation: This space was not available for evaluation during the site survey.

Recommended Corrective Action: Any modification to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements should be provided in the Site Plan.

4.5 CLS Administration

Functional Requirements: This space would provide for overall CLS Site Management. It would provide space for Site Managers, Spares Managers, overall data storage, and general administration services.

Evaluation: This is a new requirement derived from the CLS support concept. No spaces were available to review.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, page C-7) to determine administration facilities requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

5. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

5.1 Intermediate Maintenance Facilities Composition

This section addresses the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions for intermediate maintenance facilities at NAS Jacksonville. It is anticipated that minimal intermediate maintenance facilities support will be required. The overall support concept will be evaluated during SDD.

It was determined that the following categories will not be impacted by the introduction of MMA at NAS Jacksonville.

- 211 01 Aircraft Acoustical Enclosure
- 211 08 Airframe Shop
- Hydraulics/Pneumatics Shop
- Welding Shop
- Structures Shop
- Fiberglass/Plastics/Composites Shop
- Machine Shop
- Cleaning Shop
- Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) Shop
- Paint Shop
- Tire and Wheel Shop
- 211 21 Engine Maintenance Shop
- Compressor Power Unit Test Stand

211 45 Avionics Shop
116 65 Tactical Support Van Pad
211 55 Aviation Armament Support Equipment Holding Shed
211 81 Engine Test Cell
211 89 Power Check Pad without Sound Suppression
218 50 Battery Shop

5.2 211 54 Aviation Armament Shop

Functional Requirements: An aviation armament shop requires space and utilities to support intermediate maintenance of guided missile launchers, bomb racks, and pylons. A storage area and Armament Weapons SE work center also requires space in this shop.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, it was determined the current aviation armament shop meets all requirements.

Recommended Corrective Action: MMA will use the same weapons as P-3 aircraft. However, consideration must be given to the increased number of aircraft supported. (See Table 1-1)

5.3 211 75 Parachute Survival Equipment Shop

Functional Requirements: A parachute and survival equipment shop provides space and utilities required to support inspection, repair, modification, and repacking of parachutes, rafts, and life vests during intermediate maintenance. Space is also provided for testing and repair of oxygen systems as well as aircrew personal equipment.

Evaluation: During the Site Evaluation, the squadron facilities were not evaluated.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, page C-7) to determine Parachute Survival Equipment and storage space requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

5.4 218 60 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Shop

Functional Requirements: Intermediate maintenance of aircraft GSE is performed in this shop. Ground support equipment, often referred to as yellow gear, includes such items as tow tractors, trucks, fork lifts, trailers, compressors, power generators, maintenance stands, jacks, and other GSE that support aircraft operations. The GSE shop requirement is based on the average number of on-board aircraft.

Evaluation: Due to limited time, and minimal information regarding specific requirements such as types and number of GSE and any particular facilities requirements for this space, no evaluation of existing spaces was done. Because of the non-traditional support concept, the GSE will be controlled and maintained by the CLS contractor. This requires a dedicated space with controlled access.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, pages C-8 and C-9) to determine GSE shop requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

Note:

Although the CLS team will maintain and operate the GSE, NAS Jacksonville will retain the responsibility of operator licensing In Accordance With (IAW) local regulations and policies.

5.5 218 61 Ground Support Equipment Holding Shed

Functional Requirements: The GSE Holding Shed provides a secure and sheltered storage area for GSE awaiting either repair or issue.

Evaluation: Due to limited time, and minimal information regarding specific requirements such as types and number of GSE and any particular facilities requirements for this space, no evaluation of existing spaces was done.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, page C-8) to determine GSE holding shed requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

6. SUPPLY FACILITIES

6.1 Supply Facilities Composition

This section provides the functional requirements, evaluations, and recommended actions to support SCM. The MMA program will employ a non-traditional approach to SCM where the contractor provides for provisioning of spare parts to ensure all procured and stocked spare and repair parts are current with delivered aircraft configurations.

6.2 441 10 General Warehouse Navy

Functional Requirements: A general warehouse provides bulk and bin storage, aisles, receiving, packing, crating, and administrative space. Facilities excluded from this category are all shop stores, ready issue stores, and miscellaneous storage not physically located in a supply department.

Evaluation: Because of the non-traditional approach to SCM, general warehousing and Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHS&T) will be controlled and maintained by the CLS team. This requires a dedicated space with controlled access.

Recommended Corrective Action: Recommend use of Boeing's FRD (Attachment A, page C-9) to determine warehousing and PHS&T requirements. NAS Jacksonville determine modifications to existing spaces and/or new construction necessary to support these requirements. Results should be provided in the Site Plan.

6.3 441 30 Hazardous and Flammables Storehouse

Functional Requirements: The storehouse is similar to a general warehouse in most respects except provisions are made to prevent and remove, through proper ventilation, evaporated and

gaseous fumes IAW National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) Standard No. 30. Materials normally considered for storage in this category include paints, certain package petroleums, oil, lubricants, chemicals, acids, corrosive liquids, oxidizing materials, and other similar hazardous and/or flammable materials.

Evaluation: The hazardous and flammables storehouse was not available for evaluation during the Site Evaluation. Supply Support will require hazardous and flammables storage capability in the warehouse area. The FRS and each squadron will also require a similar capability adjacent to the hanger spaces area.

Recommended Corrective Action: This requirement should be covered in the Site Plan.





2004 Report to Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

July 2004

NAS Brunswick Task Force
Chamber of Commerce of the Bath/Brunswick Region
59 Pleasant Street
Brunswick, Maine 04011
207.725.8797



Patrol Squadron 10

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NAS Brunswick Task Force
Chamber of Commerce of the Bath-Brunswick Region
59 Pleasant Street
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207.725.8797

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One of the key components of NAS Brunswick's high military value is its flexibility.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NAS Brunswick is the only military facility capable of providing aerial surveillance and interdiction of the US northeast coast and maritime approaches, a capability that is absolutely essential for effective homeland security. Its high military value stems from its strategic location, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered air-space, no encroachment issues or environmental concerns, and a significant capacity for growth. It is imperative to our national security to keep NAS Brunswick fully operational.

Currently the home for four active and two reserve squadrons, NAS Brunswick is a master airfield for U.S. and NATO Maritime Patrol Forces. In addition, NAS Brunswick is integral to the shipbuilding efforts of Bath Iron Works by providing crew support through the Supervisor of Ship Building (SUPSHIPS) Bath, Maine. NAS Brunswick currently employs 5,227 personnel, with 817 civilians. It is Maine's second largest employer and will contribute \$243 million to the regional economy during FY2004.



Since BRAC 95, NAS Brunswick has for the most part been rebuilt and is essentially a new air station. There are no aircraft in the DOD's inventory that it cannot support either in a transient role or permanent assignment. Operating costs have been substantially reduced and no construction is needed to support future growth.

One of the key components of NAS Brunswick's high military value is its flexibility. With the threat to our national security a moving target, transformation of the force structure to meet the threat will require constant recalibration and change. The supporting infrastructure must be able to adapt quickly and at reasonable cost. NAS Brunswick is ideally situated to meet the challenge.



***As we look back at 9/11,
we urge all decision-makers
to remember that the primary
thrust of the attack was in
New York City and that
the northeast has some
of the largest population
areas in the United States.***

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Iraqi Freedom Transient Aircrew



Marine Corps Harriers returning from Iraq



Townhouse-style housing at NAS Brunswick

INTRODUCTION

Brunswick, Maine, is located 1/2 hour north of Portland, Maine’s largest city, and 2 1/2 hours north of Boston. With a regional population of 70,000, Brunswick is home to the Naval Air Station Brunswick (NAS Brunswick), originally built in 1943. Completely renovated and updated since 1997, NAS Brunswick employs more than 5,000 active duty, reserve and civilian personnel. NAS Brunswick houses four active and two reserve squadrons and is the only active duty DOD airfield in the Northeast United States.

1. PURPOSE

The citizens of the Bath-Brunswick Region and of Maine have formed the Brunswick Naval Air Station Task Force to provide information that is relevant, accurate, complete and verifiable to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) and to all decision makers in the BRAC process. The Task Force has written and issued this report.

2. BACKGROUND

In 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995, neither the Department of Defense (DOD) nor then current Base Realignment and Closure Commissions recommended closure or realignment for NAS Brunswick. All of the logic that justified those decisions remains valid today. In fact, the military value of NAS Brunswick is even greater today when viewed under the Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 process:

- Current and future military capability;
- Availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace;
- Ability to accommodate future total force requirements;
- Cost of operations and manpower implications;
- Costs and savings of closure;
- Economic impact on local communities;
- Local economy;
- Community infrastructure to support forces; and
- Environmental impact

The balance of this report examines these criteria as they are manifested at NAS Brunswick.



NAS Brunswick


NAS Brunswick is the only fully capable and operational DOD airfield remaining in the northeastern United States.

CURRENT AND FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITY

CURRENT CAPABILITY

1. STRATEGIC LOCATION

NAS Brunswick is the only fully capable and operational DOD airfield remaining in the northeastern United States. It is strategically located adjacent to great circle routes for ships and aircraft crossing the North Atlantic.



Its unique location near these routes makes it a vital link in our national defense posture and critical for homeland security, including surveillance of ships coming from Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. NAS Brunswick was a key base for homeland defense during the months following September 2001, providing surveillance missions under Operation Vigilant Shield, and land-based combat air patrol for navy ships at sea.

Indeed, this location close to major population centers, combined with the ability to support every aircraft in the DOD inventory (including C-5, KC-10 and B-52 aircraft, as well as Air Force One), make NAS Brunswick essential across the full range of

Homeland Defense operations and contingencies. (NAS Brunswick’s role during Operation Iraqi Freedom is described in Figure 1). It is a preferred re-fueling stop for tactical jet and turbo-prop aircraft crossing the Atlantic Ocean.

Significantly for force protection, NAS Brunswick is the only airfield in the Region with a completely secured perimeter for military operations. This advantage is even further enhanced by approach and departure paths over the adjacent open ocean, optimal for flight security as well as the safe conduct of operations involving live weapons.

“Operation Iraqi Freedom” Support

All four NAS Brunswick active-duty P-3 squadrons flew in Iraq

NAS Brunswick hosted or provided logistical support for over 117 aircraft returning from Middle East operations:

- 66 F/A-18
- 32 A/V-8
- 17 C-130
- 6 C-40
- 2 C-9

859 DOD personnel returned to CONUS through NAS Brunswick

Figure 1

Today, more than 1,100 Naval Reservists travel from throughout the Region to drill at NAS Brunswick.

2. PREMIER SITE FOR U.S. AND ALLIED MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

Home to the four active duty squadrons of Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing FIVE, NAS Brunswick provides basing and support essential to the entire Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) force under the Navy's new Fleet Response/Flexible Deployment concept.



MMA Concept Aircraft

This concept increases the proportion of MPA aircraft and crews at bases in the continental United States, and requires them to maintain a high state of readiness for immediate surge deployments to forward bases. NAS Brunswick, with its immediate access to over 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace over the North Atlantic, as well as Maine and New Hampshire, enables its squadrons to maintain the highest state of training and readiness.

The air station currently has in place and in service an Operational Flight Trainer (2F87) used for pilot training and proficiency, and a Weapons Systems Trainer (2F140) for aircrew training and proficiency. NAS Brunswick also operates the Small Point Mining Range, located 14 miles

southeast of the main station, where splash points of practice mines are observed and recorded, as well as the Redington Training facility, located 70 air miles northwest, where Tomahawk missile testing has been conducted. These trainers and facilities, the station's side-by-side runways, and outstanding support contribute to NAS Brunswick's status as a premier site for U.S. and allied MPA training and operations.

3. NAVAL RESERVE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Recognizing the station's outstanding qualities as a training site, the Naval Air Reserve moved its units from other northeast U.S. locations to NAS Brunswick subsequent to the 1995 BRAC process.

Drawing on the advantages of collocation with its active-duty counterparts, the Reserve MPA squadron at Brunswick (VP-92) has since then been consistently recognized as the best P-3 squadron in the Reserve Force. NAS Brunswick is also home to a Reserve C130 squadron, which provides essential cargo and personnel airlift to Navy commands worldwide. NAS Brunswick's location and 24/7 support enable this squadron to meet its demanding, high-tempo operations.



Naval Air Reserve C-130 Aircraft

In addition to these two squadrons, NAS Brunswick also provides support and training facilities to a wide variety of other Reserve "hardware" units. In 2001 the Naval Reserve added to this

NAS Brunswick's side-by-side 8,000-foot runways permit simultaneous VFR operations and provide an ideal setting for UAV operations.

mix by relocating its non-aviation units from Portland to Brunswick in order to take advantage of the station's assets and efficiencies.

Today, more than 1,100 Naval Reservists travel from throughout the Region to drill at NAS Brunswick. **With no other basing option remaining in the northeast U.S., closing the base would mean the loss of all these Navy assets, and indeed the loss of the entire regional demographic to the Naval Reserve.**

4. NATO AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

NATO has recognized the importance of NAS Brunswick to its operational capability, and backed up that recognition with significant investment in base facilities. The station's NATO-built fuel farm regularly supports all types of foreign aircraft. Its state-of-the-art Tactical Support Center, also NATO-funded, provides essential command and control for operational and exercise flights by U.S. and NATO MPA aircraft staged at NAS Brunswick.



NATO-built fuel farm

5. SUPPORT OF NON-AVIATION ACTIVITIES

Approximately twenty percent of NAS Brunswick's activities, facilities, and services directly support the shipbuilding program at nearby Supervisor of

Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS), Bath and the Bath Iron Works Corporation (BIW). The nucleus crews of ships under construction and Navy personnel assigned to SUPSHIPS staff receive berthing and messing support at NAS Brunswick, plus medical, dental, some family housing, personnel support, and a wide variety of essential "people support" activities conducted at most large military bases. NAS Brunswick also provides ammunition, weapons, and other support for the aircraft and helicopters used by BIW and SUPSHIPS for combat systems trials.




Bath Iron Works

In addition to SUPSHIPS, NAS Brunswick supports numerous other non-aviation activities. Among these is the Atlantic Fleet Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program conducted at the Redington Training Facility's 12,468-acre site. Other supported units include the Marine Corps Reserve and NMCB 27, a fully capable Seabee Battalion.

NAS Brunswick is **ready now** for the future of Maritime Patrol Aviation.

FUTURE CAPABILITY

1. MULTI-MISSION MARITIME AIRCRAFT BASING AND SUPPORT



NAS Brunswick is ready now for the future of Maritime Patrol Aviation, the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). Scheduled to replace the P-3C starting in about 2012, the airframe for the MMA is currently being identified. NAS Brunswick's facilities are optimal for MMA: its newly completed MPA Hangar (Figure 2) is designed specifically to accept all of the airframe types currently under consideration for the MMA.

Integral to the MMA program is the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The BAMS UAV will augment the MMA aircraft in most mission areas, and will also be procured by the Air Force for overland surveillance missions. NAS

Brunswick's side-by-side 8,000-foot runways permit simultaneous VFR operations and provide an ideal setting for UAV operations. The station provides an economical and effective option for basing both Navy and Air

Force BAMS UAV units. NAS Brunswick has room to accept all seven Atlantic Fleet MPA squadrons (plus one C-130 squadron) and provide basing for UAV units and operations.

2. ARMED FORCES RESERVE CENTER

The Adjutant General of Maine's National Guard contingent has identified NAS Brunswick as the ideal location for a joint Armed Forces Reserve Center (AFRC), and is currently organizing such an establishment. The AFRC will bring together National Guard and Air National Guard units at the Air Station. NAS Brunswick's location, facilities, and full-time support will enable efficiencies and economies not possible under the existing dispersed basing of these units. Establishing the AFRC at NAS Brunswick is currently the "top priority" for the Guard in Maine.



Newly-constructed Hangar #6

Figure 2



Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

NAS Brunswick has all the advantages necessary to become the center of excellence for Joint Forces Special Warfare unit basing, training, and mobilization in the eastern U.S.

3. MARITIME INTERDICTION CENTER

Interception and interdiction of seaborne threats, including possible carriers of weapons of mass destruction, before they can reach the United States, has emerged as a critical aspect of homeland defense.

Brunswick's strategic location, adjacent to all North Atlantic approaches to the U.S., combined with its ability to support Navy, Coast Guard, and Special Forces units of any type, makes it ideal as a locus for these capabilities and operations.

4. AERIAL REFUELING MASTER BASE

Extensive ramp space for aircraft parking, dual parallel runways, and superb all-weather capability make NAS Brunswick available now to be an outstanding base for any of DOD's aerial refueling units, including KC-10 and future 767 tanker aircraft. Here again, Brunswick's superb siting makes it both effective and efficient for transatlantic refueling, battle group support, and aerial refueling training.

5. FIGHTER SQUADRON BASING AND SUPPORT

Along with current Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA) and future Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) basing and support, NAS Brunswick has the capabilities and potential to provide a basing option for an active duty or reserve fighter squadron. From the dual side-by-side runways and hangars, including the new Hangar #6, to the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Detachment (AIMD) spaces and all of the other support facilities previously discussed, NAS Brunswick is ideally situated to add to its Homeland Security role and missions. Fighter aircraft and aircrews based in Brunswick would be closer to major Northeast cities/population areas and thus have reduced flight time to be on-scene in the event of a crisis or emergency. Personnel and equipment would also be afforded the opportunity to train and operate in the New England seasonal environments they are likely to encounter in real world operations.

6. SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

NAS Brunswick has all the advantages necessary to become the center of excellence for Joint Forces Special Warfare unit basing, training, and mobilization in the eastern U.S. This capability has already been proven in Joint Exercises such as "Essex Mountain" and "Highland Contact", and is due to Brunswick's easy accessibility, availability of diverse facilities and terrain, and four-season climate.

NAS Brunswick has immediate access to more than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace...

AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF LAND, FACILITIES, AND AIRSPACE

1. LOCATION AND CAPACITY

NAS Brunswick is located 20 miles northeast of Portland on the relatively flat Maine seacoast. The main station occupies 3,091 acres, of which fewer than half have been developed. This substantial undeveloped capacity is supported by existing infrastructure and is available for immediate use for new facilities, enabling significant expansion of the station’s missions and functions if required.

NAS Brunswick also maintains an additional 261 acres at the Topsham Annex, and a 66-acre completely undeveloped parcel in Brunswick, 1.5 miles from the main station. There is also one off-base military housing area, and a remote antenna site. Notable for its capacity for future use, the station’s Redington Training Site consists of 12,466 acres located 70 air miles north of Brunswick near Rangeley, Maine.

NAS Brunswick has no encroachment or environmental issues that would inhibit expansion, and it has building-free clear zones off the ends of both runways. Its coastal location permits departures and arrivals over open ocean. Combined with the base’s completely secured perimeter (the only fully secure airfield in the northeast), this ideal setting maximizes force protection and flight security.



Figure 3

2. AIRSPACE

NAS Brunswick has immediate access to more than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace, including 35,000 square miles of designated over water operating areas less than 15 minutes’ flight time from the base. (Figure 3). This available airspace makes NAS Brunswick ideal for full mission flight crew training in any type aircraft.

With all of its recent and current improvements and upgrades, NAS Brunswick is essentially a brand-new airfield ready for increased use now.

3. FACILITIES

Flight Facilities – NAS Brunswick’s two parallel runways, each 8,000 feet long and 200 feet wide, can operate all aircraft in the current or anticipated DOD inventory. Structural aircraft apron (ramp) space totals 4.5 million square feet, sufficient to park 86 maritime patrol or other large aircraft under normal operating conditions, or more than 250 such aircraft under maximum surge conditions.



NAS Brunswick’s two parallel runways

In the last four years, the entire airfield has been upgraded at a cost of \$9.5 million, including reconstruction of both runways and all taxiways. A new \$2.4 million environmentally friendly rinse and de-ice facility has accompanied substantial improvements to the aircraft parking areas.

NAS Brunswick is an all weather air station, with fully IFR-equipped (ILS/PAR/TACAN) 24-hour operations year-round. The parallel runway configuration, ideal for UAV operations, permits dual runway use during VFR conditions. A new state-of-the-art \$ 9.8 million airport tower and radar air traffic control facility is now under construction,

and will contain over \$5 million worth of new electronic equipment. With all of its recent and current improvements and upgrades, NAS Brunswick is essentially a brand-new airfield ready for increased use now.

Aircraft Hangars and Support Facilities – NAS Brunswick has four large aircraft hangars suitable for maritime patrol or other large aircraft. Notable is the new \$32 million six-bay hangar, specifically designed to accommodate the next-generation patrol aircraft (MMA) as well as UAV’s. The station also has a new 1.7 million-gallon capacity fuel storage facility (funded by NATO), adding to its outstanding support capability. A new \$3 million P-3 Operations Building is also now operational. All operational MPA squadrons currently in the Atlantic Fleet can be accommodated at NAS Brunswick in its existing, modern facilities. No additional military construction is required.



Hangar #1 - Renovated in 1995



Newly-constructed Hangar #6

NAS Brunswick's four-season climate makes it ideal for the all-weather flight training, essential for MPA and other DOD aircrew readiness.

4. CLIMATE

NAS Brunswick's four-season climate makes it ideal for the all-weather flight training essential for MPA and other DOD aircrew readiness. It is the only Naval Air Station on the U.S. East Coast capable of providing winter-weather flight training and cold-weather survival training. **Despite this diversity of conditions, NAS Brunswick has for the last four decades kept its runways and airfield fully operational 365 days a year.**



All-weather training

NAS Brunswick is essentially a "new" air station!

COST OF OPERATIONS AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

NAS Brunswick is essentially a "new" air station. After the 1995 round of base closures, Department of the Navy (DON) began an aggressive program to update the station. In 1997 Military Construction (MILCON), Operations and Maintenance (O&MN), and Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) expenditures ramped up from an average of \$9.25 million for the previous seven years to \$19.6 million; between 2001 through 2004 the average has been \$37.5 million.



Future Control Tower - 2005

DON began with demolishing antiquated facilities and utilities. Since 1997, 39 buildings totaling 460,000 square feet have been demolished, saving \$700,000/year in maintenance and another \$500,000/year in energy costs. In 2004 three more buildings are scheduled to be demolished.

Military construction projects between 2000 and 2005 include a new maintenance hangar (to replace two World War II era hangers), a new Control Tower, and Weapons Magazines. The runways, the aprons, flight line security fence, and older hangers will have all been repaired to a like-new condition. There is no major MILCON required within The Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and beyond.

One significant project in all of NAS Brunswick's revitalization is the decentralizing of the base heating system in 1999. All buildings are now heated individually by natural gas or oil as the market dictates, an improvement which is cost effective, efficient and allows further expansion of facilities as missions change. Thus far, the savings realized have been more than \$800,000/year.

DON has also made significant improvements to the station's quality of life infrastructure.

Townhouse-style quarters have replaced aging barracks for the single sailors (\$14.4 million), a 500-bed transient barracks has been added (\$22.6 million), over 220 new family houses have been built (\$33.1 million), and a new Recreation Mall with contract food vendors and family-oriented activities has been added (\$1.5 million).



Newly-constructed 500-bed transient barracks

As we look back at 9/11, we urge all decision-makers to remember that the primary thrust of the attack was in New York City, and that the northeast has some of the largest population areas in the United States (22,152,000).*



Maine	1,294,464
New Hampshire	1,275,056
Vermont	616,592
Massachusetts	6,427,801
Rhode Island	1,069,725
Connecticut	3,460,503
New York City	8,008,278

Total: 22,152,419

** Population totals for Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut & New York City.*

MILCON IMPROVEMENTS

PROJECT	COST (IN MILLIONS)	ESTIMATED COMPLETION
Recently Completed		
Permanent Party Quarters	\$14.0	Completed
P3 Operations	3.0	Completed
Relocate Gate Entrance	1.4	Completed
Dyer's Gate Truck Entrance	1.1	Completed
Small Arms Range	.8	Completed
Taxiway Repairs	3.4	Completed
	Total: \$ 23.7	
Current Projects		
Hangar 6	\$21.4	September 2004
Housing Phase 2 (126 Homes)	19.1	August 2004
Transient Quarters	17.7	September 2004
Tower	9.8	December 2004
Housing Phase 3 (22 Homes)	5.0	August 2005
Runway/Apron Repairs	5.9	September 2004
	Total: \$ 78.9	
	Grand Total: \$102.6	

COSTS AND SAVINGS OF CLOSURE

The authors of this report can only guess as to any monetary costs or savings related to closure. We are certain, however, that the cost to national defense is one that should be taken very seriously. As we have noted throughout this report, NAS Brunswick is the only active duty Naval Air Station north of Virginia.

As we look back at 9/11, we urge all decision-makers to remember that the primary thrust of the attack was in New York City, and that the northeast has some of the largest population areas in the United States (22,152,000). In fact, the military value of NAS Brunswick is higher now than at any time since World War II. The negative impact on national defense would far outweigh any possible cost savings resulting from the elimination of this vital link in our national defense posture.

If these 817 civilian jobs on base were eliminated, unemployment for the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market Area would increase by 66% — a rate that almost doubles from 3.6% to 6%!

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Photography by Kemebec Camera & Darkroom, Bath, ME 207-442-8628



Maine Street,
Brunswick, Maine

1. OVERVIEW

NAS Brunswick has a major impact on the Bath–Brunswick Region in terms of economic contribution and employment. During fiscal year 2004, the air station will contribute more than \$333.6 million to the regional economy. This figure includes \$147 million in salaries for military and civilian employees, \$62 million in military construction contracts and material purchases, and \$34 million in medical purchases. In addition, NAS Brunswick owns 3,200 acres of real estate in Brunswick and Topsham. If all figures stated above remain constant for the next ten years, the economic contribution from NAS Brunswick to the regional economy would be \$2.4 billion.

2. MILITARY OPERATION EXPENDITURES

Military Personnel – The number of people directly involved with base activities is equally as significant as their economic contribution; the total statewide Navy community is 17,963, including 5,227 military & civilian employees, 5,704 active duty family members, and 5,700 retiree’s and family members. The active duty personnel at NAS Brunswick totals 4,410 (573 officers, 3,837 enlisted), representing an annual payroll of \$124.9 million.

In addition, three Naval Air Reserve (NAR) Units are located at NAS Brunswick. Total payroll for all Reserve personnel was over \$21 million in 2003. The number of full time Reserve personnel (including both officers and enlisted) is 376 with total payroll in 2003 of over \$14.4 million. Selected Reserve personnel (weekend drillers) account for 785 officer and enlisted positions with an annual payroll in 2003 of \$6.7 million. The Naval Air Reserve’s 2003 budget for Operations and Maintenance (O & MNR) totals over \$9.7 million.

Civilian Personnel – Currently, 817 civilian personnel work on base providing skilled labor for a wide variety of support activities. These personnel include budget analysts, public works, tradesmen, security and administrative personnel, medical and dental technicians, daycare workers and communications specialists. To help support equal employment opportunities in the Region, NAS Brunswick employs over 250 people with disabilities (within the 817-civilian job force).

Total annual payroll for full- and part-time civilian employees is \$22 million. Over the next ten years this annual payroll figure amounts to \$220 million in disposable income throughout the Region. If these 817 jobs were eliminated, unemployment for the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market Area would increase by 66% – a rate that almost doubles from 3.6% to 6%.

Currently under construction is a \$32 million six-bay hangar that will be able to accommodate the next-generation P-3 replacement aircraft as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Military Contractual Expenditures – Approximately 20 percent of NAS Brunswick’s activities, facilities and services directly support the Navy’s AEGIS Destroyer shipbuilding program at nearby Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath and the Bath Iron Works (BIW) Corporation. 636 Navy personnel are associated with BIW including 420 ships’ crew. For those personnel stationed in Bath, NAS Brunswick provides support services such as clinic/health care, chaplain, social services and air support for Naval testing and training. Over 25% of warehouse space at the air station is dedicated to this program.



Hangar #6 in construction

Military Construction (MILCON) Expenditures (Infrastructure Improvements)

– As previously noted, since 1997, NAS Brunswick has demolished 460,000 square feet of space in 39 buildings saving \$700,000 per year in maintenance and \$500,000 per year in energy costs. The 1999 installation of 40 dual-fuel boilers (natural gas/oil) and the demolition of the base’s central steam plant now save \$838,000 annually. In the last four years, the entire airfield has been upgraded including:

- Reconstruction of both runways and all taxiways for over \$9.5 million
- An environmentally friendly rinse and de-ice facility for \$2.4 million
- Significant repairs to the aircraft parking ramp
- A new \$3 million P-3 Operations building
- Taxiway Repairs for \$3.4 million

(See chart page 12)

Nearing completion is a \$32 million six-bay hangar that will be able to accommodate the next-generation P-3 replacement aircraft as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Within three months, work will begin on a new \$9.8 million airport traffic control tower that will contain over \$5 million of new electronic equipment. In addition to handling the base’s air traffic control, the tower also provides traffic control for the Wiscasset and Thomaston airports. Other significant military construction projects this year include (with completion dates):

- Housing Phase II 126 Homes (\$19.1M – August 2004)
- Transient Quarters (\$17.7M – September 2004)
- Housing Phase III 22 Units (\$5M – August 2005)

In the past four years, the quality of life of NAS Brunswick’s military personnel has been significantly upgraded with the construction of 190 townhouses to replace aging barracks (\$14.4 million), a 500-bed transient barracks (\$22.6 million), more than 220 new family houses (\$33.1 million), and a new \$1.5 million Recreation Mall with contract food vendors and family-oriented activities. A new 30-unit Navy lodge was completed in 2000 to accommodate families looking for area housing, and the lodge is expected to double in size within the next two years.

A substantial amount of economic impact is generated in the Region through the resultant \$147 million in military and civilian salaries.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT

As Maine's second largest employer, NAS Brunswick employs 5,227 military and civilian personnel, including 573 officers, 3,837 enlisted personnel, and 817 civilians. A substantial amount of economic impact is generated in the Region through the resultant \$147 million in military and civilian salaries. This disposable income purchases the necessities of life such as housing, transportation and food, and plays a vital role in the Region's overall economic vitality. It is also important to note that Mainers comprise over 90% of the personnel hired by contractors for base projects.



NAS Brunswick provides a "critical mass" for regional projects and improvements which require a scale not achievable without its economic impact.

The previously mentioned transition of NAS Brunswick to dual-fuel boilers made the introduction of natural gas to the Mid-Coast Region economically viable, with resulting widespread benefits to industry and growth. Another example is the annual \$34 million in NAS Brunswick's medical purchases. These expenditures are typically for medical services located outside the station, and have directly enabled major improvements to regional health care services and infrastructure.

A third of NAS Brunswick's often-overlooked economic impacts on the area is the annual funding the Brunswick School system receives from the Department of Education for federally connected children. For the 2003 fiscal year, the Brunswick School system received over \$800,000 as a result of having 643 military dependent children in its public schools.

Finally, each year, approximately 1,046 new personnel are assigned to NAS Brunswick for two- or three-year tours of duty, bringing with them 418 spouses who, while initially unemployed, represent a renewable pool of very talented and highly motivated employees, 40% of whom are college educated.

1. HOUSING & ECONOMIC IMPACT

Approximately 25% of the active duty military personnel live on base; the other 75% (or 2,400) are located off base within the Region. The economic impact resulting from off base housing plays an important role in the overall vitality of the Region. For example; enlisted personnel (E-5) that are attached to squadrons and live off base earn an average of \$42,990 annually. A Junior Officer (O-3) with flight pay and housing allowance (BAH) earns an average of \$74,250. In the real estate industry 30% of disposable income is used as a guideline to determine the monthly amount of housing costs an individual can afford to pay (either mortgage or rental). With this in mind, enlisted personnel on the average spend approximately \$12,000 per year and Officers spend on the average about \$22,000 to meet their housing needs. **Estimated average impact on the regional housing economy (based on averages) is in excess of \$30 million on an annual basis.** If the base were to close, over 2,000 housing units would be vacant thus causing a significant change in the regional housing market.

One of the major reasons there are 5,700 military retirees and family members in the Region is because of some services and facilities at NAS Brunswick.

In terms of active duty expenditures related to transportation and food (includes home & eating out), the Bureau of Labor Statistics states that family "budgeting" typically allocates approximately 15% for each of these two categories. Similar to the previous example, enlisted personnel on the average spend approximately \$12,000 per year and Officers spend on the average about \$22,000 for transportation and food. **Estimated average impact on the regional economy (based on averages) is in excess of \$31 million on an annual basis.**

2. MILITARY RETIREE IMPACT

One of the major reasons there are 5,700 military retirees and family members in the Region is because of some services and facilities at NAS Brunswick (e.g. Exchange, Commissary, medical clinic, recreation mall). A vast majority of these retirees live in nearby Midcoast communities and contribute significantly to the Region's economic livelihood. The Region risks losing many of these retirees if the base is closed and services moved out of state.

3. COMMUNITY OUTREACH

NAS Brunswick personnel have a long history of building relationships between the military and civilian communities and are actively working as partners with the Chamber of Commerce of the Bath-Brunswick Region, the Military-Community Council, the MidCoast Council for Business Development and Planning, the American Red Cross, and numerous other state, regional and local organizations. The Naval community serves as volunteers and provides leadership and enrichment to the Boy Scouts, church groups and numerous civic organizations.

ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTOR	REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
Military Payroll	
Active Duty	\$124.9 million
Civilian Personnel	22.0 million
Military Construction & Material Purchases	62.0 million
Medical Purchases	34.0 million
Naval Air Reserve Payroll	21.0 million
Operations and Maintenance	9.7 million
Off Base Housing Costs for Active Duty	30.0 million
Transportation & Food Costs for Active Duty	30.0 million
TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT	\$333.6 million

The Town and the surrounding Region have a long history of mutual support and cooperation with NAS Brunswick.

TOWN OF BRUNSWICK INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT FORCES

1. OVERVIEW

The Town of Brunswick has been the home of NAS Brunswick since it opened in April 1943. The base operated throughout World War II, when it served not only as a base for anti-submarine patrol missions but also training Canadian Air Force pilots. In 1947 NAS Brunswick was decommissioned but with the rise of the Cold War was recommissioned in 1951 and since then has played a vital role in the defense of the North Atlantic.



Bowdoin College

The Town of Brunswick serves as a regional center of more than 70,000 people, 21,000 of whom are Town residents. It is a progressive community, governed by a Town Council and a Town Manager, with a vibrant downtown, energetic arts and cultural groups, and an active shopping area. Brunswick has a strong sense of community and is home to two hospitals, schools, historical museums, Bowdoin College, a professional summer theater, many churches and a variety of recreational opportunities.

The Town and the surrounding Region have a long history of mutual support and cooperation with NAS Brunswick.



First Parish Church

Photography by: Kennelbec Camera & Darkroom, Bath, ME 207-442-8628



Brunswick Mall

The relationship between the Town and the base in regard to fire and medical services is an example of mutual cooperation and efficiency.

2. SCHOOLS

The Town of Brunswick School Department consists of four elementary schools, one junior high school and one high school. Children of NAS Brunswick personnel have been attending Brunswick Schools for over 50 years. The community is accustomed to accommodating the transitory nature of this student population, a process that requires assessing the student skills and prescribing an instructional program to best meet the needs of each student. Over the past ten years, between 595 to 671 military-dependent children have attended Brunswick public schools each year, including students residing within base property as well as those living off base.

3. FIRE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

The Town of Brunswick provides a full range of emergency services to its residents, including NAS Brunswick, and responds to nearly 3,000 emergency, fire and EMS calls each year. Twenty-five full-time firefighters, most of whom are also licensed as Emergency Medical Technicians or Paramedics, operate the department's emergency ambulances at the Advanced Life Support level.

The Fire Department works cooperatively with the NAS Brunswick and provides mutual aid to the base. In FY 2002-2003, the Town responded to 21 fire calls either on-base or in off-base military housing. The Brunswick Fire Department is the first responder to off-base housing. The Town of Brunswick responds with paramedic/ambulance service upon request by the Naval Air Station. The high level of medical training (paramedic) provided by the Town of Brunswick personnel is often required by NAS Brunswick to supplement their existing ambulance personnel. In addition, the Town responds to all off-base housing ambulance calls.

The relationship between the Town and the base for fire and medical services is an example of mutual cooperation and efficiency. NAS Brunswick and the Town of Brunswick achieve an exceptionally high level of service through the synergy of their working relationship. The example set here should be a model for all DOD facilities and their surrounding communities.

4. POLICE

The Brunswick Police Department has a strong working relationship with NAS Brunswick. The base and the Town have shared joint training exercises and planning of numerous events, including dignitary protection details, Safety Stand-down Training and others. The ability to conduct joint exercise and training has been a benefit to the military operation as well as to the citizens of Brunswick. There are frequent coordinating meetings with representatives of the military structure to discuss and plan events that impact the community. Since the events of 9/11, the Town and NAS Brunswick have worked even more closely to handle the change in threat conditions and have been true partners in several operations concerning the needed response to heightened security warnings.

The Criminal Investigations Division of the Town of Brunswick works concurrently with members of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, DOD Police, and Navy personnel during criminal investigations. Regulations have permitted concurrent jurisdiction, allowing the Brunswick Police Department

People who have served NAS Brunswick are moving back after retiring from military service.

to swear in DOD Police Detectives as Brunswick Reserve Officers. This structure allows more latitude in prosecuting cases through the Cumberland County District Attorney's Office and the State Courts for both criminal and traffic offenses.

4. HOUSING

As with most of the nation, the price of existing homes in Brunswick has risen dramatically in the past several years. To respond to this increase, the Town of Brunswick has prepared a document titled: **Action Plan for Housing in Brunswick: 2003**, which sets forth specific actions to increase affordable housing stock in the community.

The number of active duty military families within the housing market area has dropped nearly by half in recent years, from 3,081 in 1990 to 1,697 in 2000. Conversely, the number of veterans over age 65 has increased by 1,193 in the same period. People who have served NAS Brunswick have found the Region to be compatible with their lifestyles and, in many cases, are moving back after retiring from military service.

As part of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act of 1996, the Navy is in the process of forming a limited liability partnership with a private company (GMH Military Housing) to own, operate, manage and maintain the existing inventory of Navy owned family housing units, as well as construct any new or replacement units in both Brunswick and Topsham. Currently there are a total of 750 units that will be covered under this program in both communities. The privatization agreement is expected to be approved by Congress prior to November 1, 2004.

5. BRUNSWICK ECONOMY

The Town of Brunswick is a service center community for the Region. As such, it plays a critical role in providing employment, shopping and socially significant services throughout the Region. Brunswick provides a home and services to a variety of private sector companies and is host to almost half of all the jobs in the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market.

Military spouses quickly find jobs within this labor market, which numbers in excess of 33,000 jobs. In the Town of Brunswick, the labor force increased by 1,276 jobs, 8.7%, between 1990 and 2000. These new jobs were primarily in the professional, management, administration and service sectors.

The Town's workforce trend toward the service industry is a positive move, especially when examining projections for the fastest growing industries in Maine over the next ten years. Social services in the state are expected to grow 47%, amusement and recreation services 33%, health services by 22% and bank services 9.7%. A strong retail core in the downtown and at nearby Cooks Corner will also be aided by a projection of growth in the retail sector of 13.4%.

The Bath-Brunswick Region is a very special place to live.

6. PARKS AND RECREATION

The Town of Brunswick's Parks and Recreation Department manages a parks system with more than thirty-five different facilities: ball fields, athletic facilities, tennis courts, playgrounds, a swimming area, boat landings, gymnasiums, trails and neighborhood parks. In addition, in 2003 the department offered in excess of one hundred different recreation programs involving over 24,500 registered participants. A review of the recreation program participant database for 2003 yields a conservative estimate of at least ten percent of the households who participated in some form of Town-sponsored recreation representing military spouses and their families.

The Town's Parks and Recreation Department works collaboratively with The Navy's Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Services in an attempt to not duplicate program offerings wherever possible. For example, the Town sponsors youth sports and athletics and military children participate in large numbers in these offerings. Conversely, MWR does not administer these types of youth sports programs.

"The reason I decided to retire in this area was because of the truly unique blending of the civilian community, the college and the military that I have not found anywhere else."

RADM Harry Rich USN (Ret.)

State of Maine

In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Four

JOINT RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT AND ADVOCACY FOR THE MILITARY BASES IN MAINE

WE, your Memorialists, the Members of the One Hundred and Twenty-first Legislature of the State of Maine now assembled in the Second Special Session, most respectfully present and petition the Congress of the United States as follows:

WHEREAS, within the year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, will make recommendations about which military installations are to be considered for closure in cost-cutting measures for the military and has indicated that reductions may total 25% or an estimated 100 bases; and

WHEREAS, the State of Maine has 3 distinct and important military installations that are potentially at risk for closure: the naval shipyard in Kittery, the Naval Air Station Brunswick and the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic Coder Detachment; and

WHEREAS, the naval shipyard in Kittery is one of only 4 public shipyards in the Nation, is vital to our maritime strength and is of major importance to 2 states' local economies; and

WHEREAS, Naval Air Station Brunswick is the only fully capable air base in the northeastern United States, does not encroach on the civilian community and has plenty of space for expansion, even for housing other branches of the military. Naval Air Station Brunswick is on the coast, and aircraft can take off and land without flying over major centers of population; and


WHEREAS, the Coder detachment's primary mission is Very Low Frequency communications with submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea; the installation has the most powerful radio transmitter in the world and is staffed with 84 civil service workers, who ensure the signal stays in the wind to the submarine fleet; and


WHEREAS, the people of the State of Maine have long been at the forefront of our Nation's defense, are first to join and send troops in any conflict and have a strong tradition of support and appreciation for the bases within our borders; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED: That We, your Memorialists, take this opportunity to convey our appreciation for the advocacy and support for our 3 bases that the Congress of the United States and the Maine Congressional Delegation have provided over the years, and we strongly urge the Congress of the United States to consider the importance of these installations in this time of war on terrorism and the vital need to protect our Nation; and be it further

RESOLVED: That suitable copies of this resolution, duly authenticated by the Secretary of State, be transmitted to the President of the United States Senate, to the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and to each Member of the Maine Congressional Delegation.

In Senate Chamber
Read and Adopted
Roll Call #352 (Vote 17 - Yeas 0)
April 13, 2004
In Concurrence



J. J. O'BRIEN
Secretary of the Senate


ATTEST: 
BEVERLY C. DAGGOTT
President of the Senate

In Conference Chamber, I have caused the
enactment of the foregoing to be formally attested, GIVEN under
my hand at Augusta, this thirteenth day of April, in the
year two thousand and four.


DAN A. GWADOWSKI
Secretary of State

In House Chamber
Read and Adopted
April 13, 2004
Sent up for Concurrence
Ordered Sent to the Senate


MILICENT M. MACFARLAND
Clerk of the House

ATTEST: 
PATRICK COLWELL
Speaker of the House of Representatives