


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2005 BRAC
JUNE 21, 2005

COMMISSIONER
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COMMISSIONER
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(USAF, RET)

RED RIVER DEFENSE COMPLEX

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT

RED RIVER MUNITIONS CENTER

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT RED RIVER

COMMUNITY IMPACT

Chart 3

One of our major concerns is that Red River's true military value is not captured by the present BRAC model and the primary consideration should be support to the War fighter in the field. We believe there is substantial deviation from the criteria on military value and let me show you why.

Military Value

**Military Value
primary consideration
to support
the Combat Commander
Ignoring this constitutes Substantial
Deviation**

Chart 4

Red River is the only installation that has three major missions: a depot maintenance mission, an ammunition mission, and a major distribution mission. There is a synergy that is created by having all three in one location and the evaluation model simply doesn't capture that value.

Let me give you some examples of how this affects military value: If you need to ship a Bradley to the mid-east quickly, you pull it out of storage and discover that the TOW launcher won't elevate. You don't have to go half way across the country to get it repaired; the depot maintenance shop is just next door. But, under the BRAC proposal the Bradley would be at Oklahoma City and the repair point in Alabama.

Let's say you need to ship Patriot missiles quickly. Now you can pull them out of storage, re-certify them, and then ship them all from Red River. But, under the BRAC proposal, the missiles would be pulled from storage at McAlester, OK shipped to Letterkenny for re-certification, be re-certified, then shipped to field.

Another example, if a huge workload occurs in one area and there are just not enough people or equipment to respond....it only takes a phone call to get help from the other areas.

This is the kind of true military value that only Red River provides and I'm not sure any analytical model can capture that value.

Bullet 2 – Some of Red River's workload was relocated to other installations with essentially the same military value. For example, Letterkenny scored only 8 one hundredths of a point higher than Red River and that was only because they had a better child care facility.

Bullet 3 – Red River's military value rating for these components was rated higher than the receiving depots military value for these components.

Why move tactical vehicle components to two Pennsylvania bases away from where the vehicles are stationed?

On Depot Fleet and Field Support, Red River is rated higher than Anniston or Letterkenny.

In summary, we believe there is substantial deviation from the criteria on military value.

- This is the only joint installation in the United States that has a maintenance mission, ammunition mission and a major distribution mission. These missions work together to support our troops in an efficient and highly responsive manner. The only true way to compile the military value of this defense complex is thru the eyes of the soldier.
- Portions of Red River's workload was relocated to other installations with essentially the same military value.
- The recommendation to close Red River does not maximize military value for:
 - Armament and Structure Components
 - Construction Equipment
 - Starters/Alternators/Generators
 - Tactical Vehicles
 - Depot Fleet/Field Support

Chart 5

Army Depot Capacity is the next issue. We believe that the Army must retain all depots to support the War Fighters.

Here's what the Secretary of the Army has said.

Army Depot Capacity – Issue 1

**The Army must
retain all Depots to
support War
Fighters**

Chart 6

This is an article from National Defense in May 2005 where the Secretary of the Army said that the Army is not in a position to close any of the depots and he also said that the workload is going from 19 million direct labor hours this year to 26 million next year an increase of 32%.

Bullet 2 – Back in December of 04, the Army told the Cross Service Group that they could not close Red River or Letterkenny because of the increased workload.

Bullet 3 – The Army's own analysis shows there is no significant excess capacity among the five depots.

- “Army depots are working beyond capacity and show no signs of slowing down, says **Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey**. With these industrial facilities operating 24/7 to keep up with equipment repair workloads, **the Army is not in a position to close any of them**, even as a round of base closures looms, he asserts. This year, the services eight depots and arsenals will generate 19 million direct labor hours. Next year, the number is going up to 25 million direct labor hours. ‘We have surge capacity within that, and we pay very close attention to having that capability,’ says Harvey. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission will have to take that into account. ‘We are going to maintain the capability to surge—in the 25 to 30 million range” (from National Defense/May 2005).
- DA told IJCSG in 7 Dec 04 (SRG Meeting #23) that they could not close Red River or Letterkenny.
- DA analysis on Depot Maintenance shows no significant excess among 5 depots.

Chart 7

The Joint Service Group deviated from their own parameters and “artificially created” 2.6 million direct labor hours of capacity at Anniston and Letterkenny to permit closure, over Army objections.

Army Depot Capacity – Issue 2

**Industrial Joint Cross Service Group
(IJCSG) deviated from DoD
parameters for capacity and
“created” 2.6 million direct labor
hours in Anniston and Letterkenny
to permit closure over Army
objections**

Chart 8

Bullet 1 – The DOD Handbook uses 40 hours per week in determining depot capacity. The goal is to load the depots at 85% capacity with 15% remaining for surge.

Bullet 2 & 3 – The Joint Service Group used 60 hours per week in order to show sufficient capacity to move Red River's 2.1 million man hours to other depots.

Bullet 4 – The analysis did not consider Red River's workload for FY 05 or 4.0 million or FY 06 workload of 5.6 million.

Bullet 5 – Their plan eliminates surge capacity and poses a major risk to the War fighter. We simply do not believe that there is enough capacity to handle existing workload and future workload without keeping Red River open.

- DoD handbook uses 1 shift, 8 hours/day or 40 hrs per week for capacity analysis.
- IJCSG used 60 hrs per week which is reserved for surge capacity
-
- IJCSG chose to modify depot capacity numbers to justify moving 2.1 million direct labor hours (DLH) from Red River.
- This analysis did not consider Red River's workload for FY05 (4.0 million DLH) and for FY06 (5.6 million DLH).
- Their plan eliminates surge capability and adversely impacts readiness.

Chart 9

The same is true for the Red River Munitions Center.

There is not enough capacity to accommodate Red River Munitions Center and Lone Star Ammunition Plant's current stored ammunition.

Red River Munitions Center

There is insufficient ammunition storage capacity within the Army to accommodate the Red River Munitions Center and Lone Star Ammunition Plant's current stored ammunition

Chart 10

Bullet 1 – The plan is to move Red River and Lone Star ammunition storage and demil to McAlester. Although the goal is 85% capacity, if you fill McAlester to 100% capacity you still need another 1.9 million square feet of storage space.

Bullet 2 – Red River stores Stinger missiles in some of the 88 high security igloos. McAlester only has 50 high security igloos but the BRAC plan doesn't include any new facilities or upgrades.

Bullet 3 – Relocating the Chaparral Missile facility will be very expensive, the equipment is old and repair parts are difficult to get. Standing up a new facility at another location involves significant risk in losing the capability altogether.

Bullet 4 – There is no provision for accomplishing the workload of 107 personnel at Red River. No positions are shown to transfer to or from McAlester.

And now Fred Milton will discuss DLA's Defense Distribution Depot.

- The BRAC recommendation is to move the ammunition storage and demilitarization from Red River Army Depot and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. Since the BRAC data was gathered, McAlester has shown a significant increase in storage occupancy and is currently over the optimum level set by Joint Munitions Command. Assuming 100% capacity, there is still a shortage of 1.9 million square feet to store the ammunition from Red River and Lone Star. The goal of the Joint Munitions Command is 85% capacity.
- Red River currently has critical sensitive ammunition such as Stinger missiles stored in 88 Category I and II igloos. McAlester has 50 Category I and II igloos and will need additional Category I and II storage, but the Army Plan does not call for any additional facilities to be built or for upgrade of facilities to meet Category I and II requirements.
- Approximately \$8.3M would be required to replicate the Chaparral Missile Facility and move the sophisticated test equipment.
- The BRAC report shows no provision for accomplishing the workload of 107 Red River Munitions Center workforce on McAlester's personnel rolls other than the statement that "it is anticipated that the missions can be accomplished with existing workforce." No positions are shown to transfer to or from McAlester.

Chart 11 – The Defense Distribution Depot Red River was top ranked in the Central Region and slated for disestablishment only when Red River Army Depot was proposed for closure.

***DLA's Defense Distribution Depot
(DDRT) – Red River, Texas***

**The top ranked Red River DDRT
was slated for disestablishment
due only to
potential RRAD Closure**

Chart 12

Bullet 1 – The Supply and Storage Joint Cross Service Group ran numerous scenarios supporting the candidate recommendations including combinations of available distribution depots in groups of 2, 3, 4, and 5 depots to be designated as Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDP's). They were looking for the optimal solution meeting the mission demand and capability requirements.

Sub Bullet 1 – As a result of this process, a requirement for 4 SDPs was determined to be optimal.

Sub Bullet 2 – Several scenarios included Oklahoma City Distribution Depot as an SDP but not the best solution for the Services based on military value, customer wait time and the numerous other criteria used.

Sub Bullet 3 – Even with outsourcing selected commodities for total supply and storage operations, a reduction to 3 SDPs as an optimal alternative would leave significant shortfall.

Three selected commodities include:

1. Tires (Federal Supply Group 26)
2. Packaged petroleum, oils, lubricants;
3. Compressed gases.

Sub Bullet 4 – Selected the scenario with Red River Distribution Depot, ranked as number 1 and designated them as the SDP for the Central Region. (S&S 0004)

Sub Bullet 5 – DDRT remained as the SDP until the co-located Army Depot was recommended for closure. (S&S-0048). The Joint Study Group accomplished NO follow-on argument or scenario to substantiate S&S-0048 standing on its own despite the linkage to the potential closure of the Army depot that we can find! Even the following question was posed by the RED TEAM Advisors to the S&S group in reference to this scenario “Have you really made your case for moving “The DDRT” out of Red River?

SUPPLY & STORAGE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP SCENARIOS ANALYSIS

- The DDRT is rated number one for placement as Strategic Distribution Platform (SDP) in the Central Region.
 - 4 SDP's are required because of capacity/mission demand issues
 - They considered Oklahoma City Distribution Depot as SDP alternative location and NOT SELECTED!
 - They attempted to optimize to 3 SDP's by contracting out some supply & storage functions, but capacity was still insufficient.
 - Red River was rated #1 and designated Central Area SDP!
 - DDRT remained the Central Area SDP until Red River was recommended for closure.
 - Red River SDP was transferred to #2 Oklahoma City only as a result of Army closure.
- Moving the mission to the Oklahoma City Distribution Depot will require \$43M military construction.
- Recommend the BRAC Commissioners remove Red River from the BRAC closure list and DDRT be designated as the Central Region Strategic Distribution Platform.

NOTE: S&S-0051 R does not make this case. The DDRT values in the COBRA were “zeroed out”...

Sub Bullet 6 – The SDP was transferred to the number 2 ranked Oklahoma City Distribution Depot only as a result of the potential closure of Red River.

Bullet 2 – A \$43 MILLION major MILCON will be required when this mission is transferred to Oklahoma City Distribution Depot. And as currently structured, this proposed construction will provide only 65% of the operational space that currently resides in ONE BUILDING (Bldg 499) at the DDRT.

DDRT Bldg 499 – 680,000 SF (640,000 SF is operational)

Oklahoma City proposed operational facility construction 413,000 SF (390,000 SF plus 23,000 SF for CCP operations)

Bullet 3 – A key action as a result of your review, analysis and decision making process is re-designating the DDRT as the Central Region Strategic Distribution Platform for DLA when Red River Army Depot is removed from the BRAC closure list.

SUPPLY & STORAGE JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP SCENARIOS ANALYSIS

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Chart 13

The economic impact can be summarized in one word: Devastating!

Economic & Employment

**Economic Impact:
Devastating**

Chart 14

The projected unemployment rate will exceed 14%. The post BRAC 95 redevelopment was anchored by Red River Army Depot and the anchor tenant is here because Red River is here. Closing Red River will eliminate the anchor tenant.

In summary, the DOD

- Ignored military value
- Ignored the Army's recommendation
- Cooked the books on capacity
- Threatens surge capacity and readiness
- Ignores the fact Ammo realignment won't fit at McAlester and
- Closes the #1 ranked DLA facility, DDRT

And the economic impact will be devastating!

Economic Impact

- Projected unemployment rate will exceed 14 %
- Post BRAC 95 redevelopment anchored by RRAD
- Anchor tenant is here because of RRAD
- Closing RRAD eliminates the anchor tenant
- Overall economic impact in excess of \$400 million/yr

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Military Value

**Military Value primary consideration to support the Combat Commander
Ignoring this constitutes Substantial Deviation**

Army Depot Capacity – Issue 1

The Army must retain all Depots to support War Fighters

Army Depot Capacity – Issue 2

Industrial Joint Cross Service Group (IJCSG) deviated from DoD parameters for capacity and “created” 2.6 million direct labor hours in Anniston and Letterkenny to permit closure over Army objections

Red River Munitions Center

There is insufficient ammunition storage capacity within the Army to accommodate the Red River Munitions Center and Lone Star Ammunition Plant’s current stored ammunition

DLA’s Defense Distribution Depot (DDRT) – Red River, Texas

The top ranked Red River DDRT was slated for disestablishment due only to potential RRAD Closure

Economic & Employment

Economic Impact: Devastating

WASHINGTON PULSE

MILITARY SCIENTISTS DON'T TAKE NAMES IN VAIN

In the world of military hardware projects, the right name—and acronym—can make a huge difference when seeking political and financial support on Capitol Hill. A case in point is an underwater surveillance system developed by the Office of Naval Research. The project initially was named “Persistent Undersea Surveillance.” But once ONR officials realized the acronym was PUS, they concluded the name had to be changed. “I didn’t think I could get the Hill to fund ‘PUS,’” says Rear Adm. Jay M. Cohen, chief of naval research. The fix was simple. “We added ‘littoral’ and we went from ‘PUS’ to ‘PLUS’ ... And who’s going to argue with ‘PLUS?’”

AIR FORCE TOUTS ROLE IN HUNTING INSURGENTS

The Air Force is finding new ways to target insurgents in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Walter E. “Buck” Buchanan III, commander of the air component of the U.S. Central Command, told a seminar on Capitol Hill. Aircraft equipped with advanced sensors are being used to track suspected enemies and pass their location to U.S. forces on the ground, he said. For instance, aerial reconnaissance helped locate an Iraqi whose house was full of brand-new copper stolen from the country’s government and industrial facilities.

COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT UNFIT FOR DUTY? ...

The safety record of the Coast Guard’s aircraft fleet is nothing short of alarming, according to senior officials. Aging helicopters are the primary culprits. Although several programs already are under way to upgrade and replace outdated aircraft, the fleet is displaying troubling evidence of poor health, notes Vice Adm. Terry M. Cross, vice commandant of the Coast Guard. In 2003, the fleet recorded 63 potential engine failures per 100,000 hours of flight. Last year, they jumped to 329 out of 100,000 hours. By comparison, the Federal Aviation Administration standard is 1 per 100,000.

... REVISED WISH LIST RAISES EYEBROWS

The Coast Guard, meanwhile, recently submitted to Congress a much anticipated revised requirements document for its multibillion-dollar Deepwater program. Under Deepwater, the Coast Guard will spend between \$19 billion to \$24 billion during the next two decades to replace its aging aircraft and ships. The program started in 1999. After 9/11, however, the Coast Guard’s expanded missions prompted a lengthy review of the hardware requirements. Of note in the revised plan is a dramatic change in the aircraft mix. The original idea was to buy six C-130J transports and 35 C-235 maritime patrol aircraft. The new blueprint calls for 22 C-130s and 20 C-235s. The updated procurement plan also eliminates the Bell/Agusta AB139 helicopter from the program.

BUSY DEPOTS SAFE FROM BRAC

Army depots are working beyond capacity and show no signs of slowing down, says Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey. With these industrial facilities operating 24/7 to keep up with equipment repair workloads, the Army is not in a position to close any of them, even as a round of base closures looms, he asserts. This year, the service’s eight depots and arsenals will generate 19 million direct labor hours. Next year, the number is going up to 25 million direct labor hours. “We have surge capacity within that, and we pay very close attention to having that capability,” says Harvey. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission will have to take that into account. “We are going to maintain the capability to be able to surge—in the 25 million to 30 million range.”



“The Navy really did show a sense of humor by putting a policy guy, me, in charge of war-fighting requirements.”

Vice Adm. Joseph A. Sestak Jr., deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and programs, musing on the difficulties of planning a shipbuilding strategy for the U.S. Navy.

“... We were waiting for the starship Enterprise to arrive.”

Gen. Peter J. Schoemaker, Army chief of staff, putting in plain words the reasoning behind the service’s decision to restructure the Future Combat Systems program. The Army, he said, needed to ensure that the advanced technologies in FCS provided “continuity from where we are today to the future.”

“I want people to smoke the pipe, stare at the ceiling and say, ‘what if?’”

Thomas Yost, team leader for unmanned aerial vehicle programs at the U.S. Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Command, whimsically recommending regular smoke breaks to help industry come up with innovative UAV concepts.

“Marines can be ‘retentive’ about controlling the air space.”

Lt. Gen. Jan Huly, deputy Marine Corps commandant for plans, programs and operations, describing the coordination challenges Marines face in Iraq while operating unmanned aircraft in air space that must be shared with the other services. Marines in Iraq operate more than 100 UAVs.