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REGIONAL JOINT READINESS CENTER
A VALUE-ADDED REGIONAL RESOURCE

A Joint Readiness Study

Prepared for

The Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon propelled the United States into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The U.S. and the world have entered a new age of uncertainty.

The U.S. has the responsibility to protect our citizens and to defend our land against attack. In order to do this effectively we must pre-empt those who attack and try to damage and destroy us. This means that our ability to respond appropriately must be available at all times.

The first step is to establish a functional group composed of civil, political, medical and military organizations with special expertise, communications and resources to meet appropriately all challenges that may occur to our citizens and our land. The military value of the Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) is based on quantitative analytical evaluation for DoD which includes joint basing, the capability to mobilize and surge, the ability to deliver effective, cost efficient operations, cost savings from shared use of facilities, enhances the damands of the National Military Strategy and homeland defense and provides a secure base with the ability to support operational forces.

An initial operational RJRC capability includes:

- Establishment of a limited capability on a DoD site at PIT.
- Co-locating the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) from the Federal Building in downtown Pittsburgh with the 911th Airlift Wing at PIT.
- Formalizing a partnership between the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and the 171st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) to develop a readiness skills verification program for Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS).
- Linking military distance learning centers through the existing infrastructure of the 99th Regional Readiness Command, the 171st ARW, the 911th Airlift Wing and the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center.

Implementation of the initial operating capability includes:

Phase I – Transition Period. A timeframe of 60 days would provide a transitional period for military and DoD defense related entities to establish a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), designate staffing and integrate RJRC's infrastructure.

Phase II – Plan Modification. The next 60 days would include the modification of existing plans and integrate defense related entities (FAA, TSA, CBP and DEA).

Phase III – Initial Implementation. Four months is allotted for implementation of the plan. A one year review will be conducted to review problems and make revisions.

Pittsburgh is potentially the key stone to the future of joint homeland security and homeland defense. It has a strong baseline of military bastions from all services which are strategically located throughout the region. Pittsburgh also has the potential to take advantage of the untapped resources in the region for further growth of these capabilities at economical rates over other areas. Pittsburgh is at the center of the East Coast population and is well located to be a national asset.

Historically, National Guard bases have been spared from BRAC cuts. In previous rounds, only four Guard bases have been affected, including three that were relocated and one that was closed. However, the upcoming base closure process may target Guard facilities this year because of the Pentagon's emphasis on the need for military installations that can support joint military operations.

By mid-May, the Pentagon will publish a list of bases it wants to close or realign which will then be reviewed by the newly appointed BRAC commission. After holding public hearings, the commission will make final recommendations to the president and Congress in the fall, which must accept or reject them in their entirety.

The RJRC is the centerpiece for a regional military presence through the 2005 BRAC and the development of further opportunities at the Pittsburgh International Airport. This will take a unified effort. Supporting this proposal begins with the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania. The Council's first step in unifying support for the RJRC is to involve the stakeholders as listed in Chapter 5, Senator Pippy, Representative Mustio from the Pennsylvania General Assembly and Congressmen Murtha and Murphy. In addition, the Council asks for participation from the communities (e.g., to inform the Pennsylvania leadership and to secure seed funding to accelerate the start up of the RJRC).

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) enables the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania to accomplish its mission. The RJRC focuses on the joint activities performed by regional military forces and defense related agencies.

The RJRC outlines how the strategic presence at the Pittsburgh International Airport enables civil-military operations, homeland security and a community-based medical component to function together, effectively and efficiently.

The action plan includes the development of an infrastructure for collaboration and consolidation of information and response efforts in the RJRC.

This document identifies and describes three scenarios used to assess the operational value of a RJRC to DoD. Priorities are identified and addressed within the National Preparedness Goal. These priorities include initiating the DHS National Incident Management System and National Response Plan; expanding regional collaboration; fortifying information sharing and collaborative capabilities; strengthening the ability to respond to chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive weapons; and strengthening medical surge capabilities. Included in the RJRC CONEMP are the following chapters:

Chapter 1 - Introduction and scope of the document

Chapter 2 - Overview of the assumptions and BRAC 2005 situation

Chapter 3 - Discussion of the regional factors for the establishment of a RJRC

Chapter 4 - Description of the mission, organizations and facilities

Chapter 5 - Overview of the operational constraints and limitations

Chapter 6 - Discription of the Action Plan for a RJRC

Chapter 7 - Discussion of the potential benefits of establishing a RJRC at PIT to DoD

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

1.1 Our Mission

Our mission is to assist defense-dependent communities that may be impacted and to develop a pro-active regional strategy to prevent future negative base realignments and closures (BRAC). The problem: it is critical that Pittsburgh becomes fully engaged to protect and enhance its defense communities given the challenges that the Defense Department faces as the nation confronts a Global War on Terrorism. Support for regional communities that rely on defense facilities need support now and in the event of future rounds of base closures. Pittsburgh's defense community can lose jobs through operational and budgetary decisions made by the military services and DoD.

On November 17, 2004, the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania contracted with *The Dupuy Institute* to undertake a study aimed at developing a concept for establishing a Regional Joint Readiness Center to further develop central airport sites and consolidate existing regional military and defense related entities at the Pittsburgh International Airport. Concurrently, a strategy and action plan for implementation will be developed to promote the acceptance for the project. In addition, this study serves notice that the Military Affairs Council will be engaged with the military services, military installations and activities, defense-department communities, defense-related business, and people (active duty, retired and civilian) who make up the defense community.

The Pittsburgh region, through the Military Affairs Council of Western Pennsylvania, can join the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation to offer leadership and speak with a single voice. A region that speaks with one voice has enormous power and influence with the military services, the DoD and the federal community in Washington, D.C. The issues of the Pittsburgh region are vitally important to the future of the region and should be heard as a single voice.

1.2 Central Idea

"Where there is unity, there is always victory."

-- Publilius Syrus (First Century BC)

The Regional Joint Readiness Center Concept describes how the Pittsburgh International Airport will become a strategic presence in the eastern United States by incorporating civil-military operations, homeland security and a community-based medical component.

The Pittsburgh International Airport provides development opportunities for several reasons. First, it is located within 2-1/2 hours of the majority of population centers in the United States.

Second, this airport has a proven record as an all-weather airport that never closes. Third, there is strong backing from the Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation and support from Allegheny County and the airport authority for an expanded military presence. Fourth, PIT saves DoD money and fifth, it is good for national defense.

Briefly, co-locating functions in a centrally located and convenient facility tends to promote efficiencies of scale. Easy access would be available to support the airport, the city of Pittsburgh, the medical community, cargo and storage movements and homeland security. This would all be possible without encroaching on community issues.

CHAPTER 2
PLANNING FOCUS

2.1 Assumptions

- Terrorism will remain a major focus of national security because it will continue to be unpredictable, yet credible, well organized and well financed.
- The readiness center can be established quickly and further developed in phases with the needed military construction funds.
- Regional medical facilities have the emergency resources capable of supporting major medical disasters, including terrorist attacks or other events.
- Existing deficiencies in accessibility of the airport corridor and the City of Pittsburgh will be alleviated when the I-79 to I-80 link is completed.
- Airport site development is flexible enough to enable new usage and capabilities to focus constrained resources on cost-effective consolidation.
- Co-location of all units at Pittsburgh International Airport is not required for operations of the Regional Joint Readiness Center.
- Increased regional cooperation will increase the amount of state and federal funding available for initiatives.

2.2 Situation

"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight."

SecDef Rumsfeld's Remarks to National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

There have been four previous BRAC rounds: 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Collectively,

they resulted in the elimination of nearly 100 major bases. Many others were realigned. Even so, the Department of Defense continues to argue that many more bases should be closed to eliminate what it calls "excess capacity" and free up billions of dollars for other uses, from new weapons systems to higher pay for the military.

In an April 1998 report to Congress, the Department claimed that, despite four previous rounds of BRAC, it still has nearly 25 percent excess base capacity overall. The Department has relied heavily on this report to argue to Congress that it needs closure authority to eliminate excess capacity and achieve other strategic and financial goals. Some Pentagon insiders have indicated this could mean the closure of at least 100 and perhaps as many as 150 of the nation's 425 bases.

The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have reviewed the 1998 report and both pointed out shortcomings in the analysis underpinning DOD estimates of savings from prior BRAC rounds and remaining excess capacity. The GAO noted that the analysis provided only a "rough measure of excess capacity," and did not report capacity "as a percentage of the total capacity by types of installations, such as the total capacity in all depots." The CBO found the DOD approach to estimating excess capacity was reasonable and would, at least in the aggregate, yield a credible estimate but worried that "it may not provide good estimates for particular categories of installations."

The concept of excess capacity is easy to understand. Fewer aircraft need fewer runways and hangers. Fewer ships need fewer piers. The difficulty comes in quantifying just how many runways or piers may be needed in 20 years, the time frame of BRAC 2005.

For the estimates in the April 1998 report, DOD defined a metric or family of metrics for each category. Each metric was a ratio that expressed an indicator of capacity (maneuver base acres, facility square feet, etc.) with a relevant measure of force structure (maneuver brigades, personnel spaces assigned, etc.) in 1989—the year selected as a baseline. For some installation categories, the use of multiple metrics led to differing estimates of excess capacity, hence the use of a range.

Next, the Department estimated future capacity needs by multiplying the 1989 metric value by an estimate of force structure needed in 2003. In essence, the product is the amount of capacity required for the future force structure, keeping constant the ratio of capacity to force structure that existed in 1989. Subtracting this estimate of capacity requirements from the amount of capacity following the completion of all BRAC 1995 realignments and closures yielded an estimate of excess capacity.

This approach seems reasonable if there is a linear relationship between force size and the infrastructure, such as piers and runways, needed to support it, and so long as estimates of future force structure needs are sound.

Another concept is military value. The concept of military value is critical in deciding which bases to close or realign. As in past rounds, BRAC 2005 will give priority consideration to keeping those bases considered to have the highest military value to the force of the future. Clearly, the legislation drawn up by Congress to authorize the next round mandates that military value will have primary consideration among the selection criteria.

As is the case with excess capacity, the concept of military value seems simple enough. In essence, it "represents the ability of the installation to contribute to DOD future mission capabilities and operational readiness."

As required by law, the Department has tried to define military value by drawing up a set of criteria for closing and realigning military bases. In December 2003, the department published these criteria in the *Federal Register*. Despite receiving more than 200 letters from Congress and community leaders during the public comment period, the department's final criteria published in February were identical to the original. They are as follows:

- Current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total military force, including joint warfighting, training and readiness.

- Availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval or air forces throughout diverse climate, terrain and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at existing and potential receiving locations.

- Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

- The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

The DOD addressed these comments in a February 12, 2003, *Federal Register* announcement. Here, the department simply noted those comments on the criteria.

Now the details on measuring military value will be decided by seven DOD joint cross-service groups known as JCSGs. These groups are assigned a functional area in which the services might jointly share work and develop the set of metrics for ranking the military value of bases. The JCSGs are intelligence, industrial, technical, medical, education, headquarters and support activities and supply and storage.

In carrying out its work, JCSGs receive top-level guidance from the Secretary of Defense

and the two groups he has established to oversee the BRAC process.

- The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) will provide policy and oversight. Chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, its membership includes the service secretaries and chiefs of staffs of each service, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)).

- The Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) will manage the efforts of the seven JCSGs. It is headed by the USD (AT&L) and includes the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the assistant service secretaries for installations and environment and others.

From various comments in the press, it is clear that Secretary Rumsfeld's plan to run BRAC 2005 as a top-down process, unlike his predecessors who mostly accepted closure recommendations developed by the services and forwarded them to the BRAC Commission. Clearly, the Secretary plans to use this BRAC to accomplish one of his top goals: ***transforming the way the DOD fights wars, buys weapons and manages its personnel.*** Simply put, his plan is to use this round of BRAC to totally overhaul how the department bases and houses military forces. The idea is how to create joint bases that will allow the services to combine separate but similar functions (precisely the kinds being studied by the seven JCSGs).

CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL FACTORS

This chapter identifies and describes the environment for a RJRC located at the Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT). Civil-military operations, homeland security and a community-based medical component would operate within that setting.

3.1 Demographics

The Pittsburgh region includes the central city, its suburbs and future growth areas. First, is the city of Pittsburgh, a major medical, educational, government, cultural and industrial center. Pittsburgh has a population of 335,000.

The adjacent Southwestern Pennsylvania region includes 9,550 square miles and includes 13 counties (Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Cambria, Fayette, Greens, Indiana, Lawrence, Mercer, Somerset, Washington and Westmoreland) with a population of over 2.7 million. The 2000 U.S. Census forecasts that the population in the region will reach three million people with an expected growth of 2.3 percent by 2010. The total population within a 30-mile radius of the airport is well over five million (2000 U.S. Census). A strong and diverse economy drives the high technology and industrial employment surrounding Pittsburgh.

Future growth areas include portions of Ohio and West Virginia, which are within the 30-mile radius of PIT. These include Columbiana and Jefferson counties in Ohio as well as Brooke, Hancock and Ohio counties in West Virginia. The combined population is almost 300,000.

3.2 Airport Considerations

PIT is strategically located. PIT is within a two and one-half hour flight to over 65 percent of the U.S. population. During the past 15 years PIT has established a reputation as an efficient, safe and an all-weather airport. PIT ranks in the top five U.S. HUB airports with the least traffic congestion. It is operated by the Allegany County Airport Authority. Over 280,000 aircraft are operating out of PIT per year.



Pittsburgh International Airport

Major carriers serving PIT include US Airways, Delta, Air Tran, Independence Air, Continental, United, Northwest, Air Canada, America West, USA 3000, ATA and American. Thirty-one national, regional, international and commuter airlines operate out of PIT. Southwest Airlines and Hooters Air will begin scheduled service to PIT in 2005.

PIT annual passenger traffic in 2004 was about 13 million travelers. Recently, the reduction of US Airways flights resulted in a decrease in passengers of approximately 27 percent from December 2003 to December 2004. *"Analysis of Scheduled Airline Traffic"* reported by PIT confirmed this decrease.

3.2.1 Demand and Capacity.

Table 1 lists the average minutes of delay per operation for 35 airports contained in the Federal Aviation Administration's OEP. PIT has an average 5-minute delay per operation within the range of 3 to 10 minutes. PIT's share of air carrier operations is 43 percent. (The range is 32 percent for Cincinnati and 84 percent for LaGuardia). GA and military operations are limited, 7 percent for PIT compared with 2 percent for Atlanta and 31 percent for Honolulu. PIT has 42 percent originating passengers with LaGuardia at 92 percent and Cincinnati at 23 percent. PIT's percentage of connecting passengers is 58 percent within the range of 8 percent for LaGuardia and 77 percent for Cincinnati.

Figure 1 shows the share of commuter and air carrier operations by airport. Only at 4 airports (Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Washington Dulles and Salt Lake City) were commuter aircraft (aircraft with 60 or fewer seats) operations greater than air carrier operations.

Figure 2. Eleven airports indicate that their connecting passenger levels are greater than their originating passenger levels, and of those eleven, only two (Cincinnati and Charlotte) have more than 70 percent of their passengers connecting to other flights.

Table 1: Selected Demand and Capacity Measures for 35 OEP Airports (2002 Data Ranked by Enplanements).

Locid	Airport	Hub Size	Enpl Rank	Ops Rank	Air Carrier Ops of Total Ops	Commuter & Air Taxi Ops of Total Ops	GA and Military Ops of Total	Avg Enpl Per Dep	Avg Minutes of Delay	Est. Orig Pax (%)*	Est. Conn Pax (%)*	% Dom	% Intl	Number of Existing Runways
ATL	Atlanta	L	1	2	73%	25%	2%	87	9	33%	67%	92%	8%	4
ORD	Chicago O'Hare	L	2	1	68%	29%	3%	72	7	43%	57%	86%	14%	6
LAX	Los Angeles	L	3	4	61%	23%	16%	87	5	58%	42%	74%	26%	4
DFW	Dallas/Ft. Worth	L	4	3	65%	32%	3%	67	7	39%	61%	92%	8%	7
PHX	Phoenix	L	5	5	64%	19%	17%	72	6	59%	41%	97%	3%	3
DEN	Denver	L	6	8	67%	30%	3%	71	5	53%	47%	96%	4%	6
LAS	Las Vegas	L	7	9	65%	17%	18%	83	4	81%	19%	97%	3%	4
IAH	Houston	L	8	14	58%	37%	5%	73	7	37%	63%	83%	17%	5
MSP	Minneapolis/St. Paul	L	9	7	69%	17%	14%	73	8	44%	56%	93%	7%	3
DTW	Detroit	L	10	10	68%	26%	5%	67	8	45%	55%	90%	10%	5
SFO	San Francisco	L	11	32	74%	20%	6%	69	5	62%	38%	77%	23%	4
EWR	Newark	L	12	19	69%	28%	3%	74	9	67%	33%	75%	25%	3
JFK	New York JFK	L	13	40	84%	13%	3%	103	8	53%	47%	50%	50%	4
MIA	Miami	L	14	16	69%	16%	15%	75	6	43%	57%	52%	48%	3
SEA	Seattle	L	15	27	60%	39%	1%	72	5	70%	30%	92%	8%	2
MCO	Orlando	L	16	38	66%	23%	11%	96	4	85%	15%	94%	6%	4
STL	St. Louis	L	17	15	65%	29%	6%	59	8	41%	59%	98%	2%	5
PHL	Philadelphia	L	18	12	57%	27%	16%	61	10	62%	38%	88%	12%	4
CLT	Charlotte	L	19	13	51%	38%	11%	56	7	26%	74%	96%	4%	3
BOS	Boston	L	20	20	51%	44%	5%	57	7	80%	20%	84%	16%	5
LGA	LaGuardia	L	21	30	59%	38%	3%	64	10	92%	8%	94%	6%	2
CVG	Cincinnati	L	22	11	32%	62%	6%	46	7	23%	77%	95%	5%	3
HNL	Honolulu	L	23	35	55%	14%	31%	86	3	66%	34%	77%	23%	4
BWI	Baltimore/Washington	L	24	36	68%	21%	11%	68	6	81%	19%	97%	3%	4
SLC	Salt Lake City	L	25	22	38%	40%	22%	58	5	57%	43%	99%	1%	4
PIT	Pittsburgh	L	26	17	43%	50%	7%	44	5	42%	58%	97%	3%	4
FLL	Ft. Lauderdale	L	27	45	54%	23%	23%	78	5	89%	11%	94%	6%	3
MDW	Chicago Midway	L	28	39	55%	26%	19%	66	7	67%	33%	99%	1%	5
IAD	Dulles	L	29	21	33%	47%	20%	49	7	64%	36%	75%	25%	3
TPA	Tampa	L	30	53	59%	24%	17%	76	4	89%	11%	98%	2%	3
SAN	San Diego	L	31	82	71%	21%	8%	80	4	91%	9%	98%	2%	1
DCA	Washington National	M	32	96	67%	30%	3%	70	4	91%	9%	98%	2%	3
PDX	Portland	M	34	43	44%	39%	17%	52	3	83%	17%	98%	2%	3
MEM	Memphis	M	36	24	60%	27%	13%	30	8	38%	62%	97%	3%	4
CLE	Cleveland	M	38	48	56%	35%	9%	43	6	68%	32%	97%	3%	4

Note: These are only estimates of Origin and Destination and transfer passenger activity based on U.S. DOT T-100 data for Calender Year 2002. (NPIAS 2005-2009)

3.2.2 Runways.

PIT has a high-capacity, all-weather runway system to support its operations. For example, **PIT was the only major airport in the Northeast that remained open throughout the February 2003 winter storms**.

The airfield layout is given below (**Figure 3**). There are four runways with the possible construction of one additional runway. The runways are: 28L/10R (11,500 by 200 feet); Runway 28R/10L (10,000 by 150 feet), Runway 28C/10C (9,708 by 150 feet) and Runway 14/32 (8,100 by 150 feet).

Figure 1: Percentage of Commuter and Air Carrier Operations at 35 OEP Airports in 2002 (Ranked by highest share of commuter/air taxi operations).



Note: Air carrier operations are those by aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats; general aviation and industry operations not shown.

Source: FAA Terminal Area Forecast.

Figure 2: Percentage of Connecting Passengers at 35 OEP Airports in 2002).



Note: These are only estimates of connecting passenger activity based on U.S. DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 data for Calendar Year 2002.



Figure 3: Aerial view of PIT

Currently, the airport with its long runways and associated facilities is capable of accommodating the large civil aircraft that are expected to enter service by 2006. For example, Runway 28L/10R meets the FAA runway standard for larger aircraft and can accommodate the new Airbus 380. This plane is 50 feet wider with the longer cabin seating between 150 and 400 more passengers than the largest aircraft in regular service today. This is significant because many airports will have difficulty accommodating the new large aircraft with 262-foot wingspans.

3.2.3 Cargo.

Department of Commerce statistics indicate the importance of air cargo to the U.S. economy. In 2000, 36 percent of exports (measured by value) were shipped by air. (High-value, lightweight and perishable goods preferably are shipped by air transportation.) Between 1997 and 2002, the value of shipments by air increased 22 percent. This reflects reduced in-transit time for goods, lower shipping costs and more frequent service.

PIT has the capacity and all-weather runway system to support the development of air cargo shipments. Two new buildings will enlarge the cargo space capacity to 325,639 square feet. The Allegany County Airport Authority recently indicated that cargo volume is up almost 5 percent this year. Air cargo is expected to grow at an annual rate of 4.5 percent through 2015 according to the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS). Currently, 150,000 metric tons of cargo are moved through PIT per year.

PIT supports cargo operations including cargo sorting and transfer facilities for all passenger carriers as well as FedEX, UPS, Airborne Express, DHL and regional US Postal Service operations. Enplaned and deplaned mail accounted for almost 22,000 metric tons in 2004. During the same time period the amount of cargo enplaned and deplaned was more than 98,000 metric tons.

3.2.4 Multi-purpose Facilities.

Over 7 million square feet of free-standing office structure is available in the PIT area. The Allegheny Airport Authority owns several of these sites.

3.2.5 Fuel Facilities.

PIT has four jet fuel storage tanks on site with a capacity of 600,000 annual aircraft operations (7,500,000 million gallons). The current usage factor is estimated at 275,000 aircraft operations.

3.2.6 Surface Access.

PIT is approximately 25 minutes from downtown Pittsburgh. Overland access to and from PIT is in the design process for emerging transportation demands. As it stands now access to and from PIT consists of two major highway corridors. The first is Parkway West/Beaver Valley Expressway that provides east-west access to PIT (see **Figure 4** below). I-279 extends west from downtown Pittsburgh to PIT. It is 15 miles long and makes up a portion of Parkway West (This highway is known by three different designations: I-279, U.S. 22/30 and S.R.60). East-west U.S. 22/30 and the north-south S.R. 60 are part of this road network that complements the interstate corridor.



Figure 4
Parkway West

Second is I-79. This interstate provides the north-south access to the airport from Erie, Pennsylvania to West Virginia and beyond. Currently the interstate from Parkway West to I-79 north is incomplete pending the completion of ramps for north-south access, which are being designed.

Road access (both east-west and north-south) to PIT is a major regional priority. Interstate highway designation for Parkway West-Route 60 from I-79 to I-80 is significant for access to the airport. This corridor is currently designated SR 22/30 from I-79 to SR 60 and SR 60 from SR 22/30 to I-80. Portions of these highways are also known as Parkway West, the Southern Expressway and the Beaver Valley Expressway.

In addition, a PIT Development Study *" Pittsburgh International Airport Area, A Development Program for the Airport Market Area"* strongly supported a mass transit system to and from the airport and downtown Pittsburgh.

3.2.7 Land Ownership.

PIT is located on approximately 10,000 acres of airport property owned by Allegheny County. The Allegheny County Airport Authority leases this property and operates PIT. Most of the land is not used and is available for development. Airside and landside sites are available for development now.

3.2.8 Environmental Issues.

Environmental issues include development to achieve an acceptable balance between airport operational requirements and the expectations of residents of the surrounding area for a quiet environment (NPIAS 2001-2005). DOT and the FAA together set the goal of reducing the number of people who are exposed to significant aircraft noise (65 decibels or more) (NPIAS). Despite the reduction in aircraft noise, public concern and sensitivity is still very high throughout many areas.

As outlined in Appendix 2.d, DoD is concerned about the impact that encroachment has on military readiness. The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria (Appendix 2.a) lists environmental impact as a criteria for selecting military installations for closure or realignment. Clearly, encroachment is the leading environmental issue for DoD. ***Encroachment means all external influences that threaten or constrain testing and training activities, such as urban sprawl, the presence of endangered species and environmental regulations.*** Two initiatives that address the problem are: first, a new Army environmental policy announced in October 2004, *"The Army Strategy for the Environment: Sustain the Mission—Secure the Future"*. Sustaining the environment is an integral part of all installation functions. Other services and federal agencies are evaluating the Army's strategy as they move to draft their own sustainability strategies.

Another initiative is the noise reduction measures taken by the 171st Air Refueling Wing. See picture below.



Exposed area to a noise level in excess of 75 dBA

KC-135E/TF33 (MTOW 299,100lb)
KC-135R/CFM56-2 (MTOW 322,500 lb)

The picture to the left illustrates an initiative taken by the 171st Air Refueling Wing to contain noise disturbance. Conversion of engines on primary aircraft (KC-135) reduced the noise footprint by 90 percent and is fully ICAO Stage III/IV compliant.

There appear to be no environmental impediments at PIT. Aircraft noise reduction and compatible land uses in areas around PIT are priorities. The results have successfully reduced noise exposure and thereby enhanced communities and the natural environment affected by aircraft noise levels.

3.2.9 Areas Available for Development.

The map below identifies five aviation areas totaling 1,182 acres available for development at PIT. Areas within the perimeter of the airport are shown in red. The largest area is situated adjacent to the runway in the northwest (Plot A, 464 acres). The smallest area (Plot E,14 acres) is located on the east side of PIT between the 171st Air Refueling Wing and the 911th Airlift Wing. Plot B (369 acres), Plot C (161 acres) and Plot D (174 acres) constitute the balance of the area available for development within the perimeter of PIT. The areas shown in blue total some 3,076 acres and are programmed for landside development.



PIT Development Areas

3.2.10 Incentive for Foreign Trade.

PIT is one of four sites in the Pittsburgh area designated as a foreign-trade zone (FTZ). More than 5,000 acres of airport land is FTZ designated. A FTZ fuel farm offers fuel savings for international flights. Estimated savings on taxes for foreign fuel can be as high as 9 cents per gallon. Businesses that locate in the FTZ can receive significant tax benefits under applicable legislation. Among the tax incentives, customs duties and excise taxes are due only at the time of transfer from FTZ for U.S. consumption. If the commodity never enters U.S. commerce, no duty or taxes are paid on those items when they are exported from the zone. To date, aircraft fueling has been the only commodity where FTZ benefits have accrued.

3.2.11 Innovation.

The Airmall terminal at PIT illustrates an innovative method to increase an airport's retail

potential. The public owner of the mall is Allegheny County. A private operator manages the facility of over 100 outlets. These retail outlets represent a wider diversity of products and services than U.S. airports generally provide. According to airport authorities, the mall is currently generating $12 per passenger as opposed to a national average of $3.85.

3.3 Military Presence

The military has been an important component of the airport since the 1940's. There are three military units located at PIT: the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's 171st Air Refueling Wing, the Air Reserve's 911th Airlift Wing and the Army's Reserve 99th Regional Readiness Command. These units provide employment for thousands of people, serve vital national defense needs and disaster relief efforts. The 2002 Urban Land Institute Report indicated that the ***"economic impact of the military presence at PIT far exceeds any impact that potential air cargo operations might have."*** More recently, military air missions grew from 5,338 to 6,652 in 2004.

3.4 Homeland Security

"...nearly a year ago, we saw the terrorists, cold-blooded killers, using our openness, the openness of our societies against us. We were awakened to threats that can arrive across boarders. We realized, at least in our country, that we had become a battlefield. And we've got to confront those threats. We have no choice but to confront the threats head-on, while we preserve the freedom and openness of our societies."

President George W. Bush

3.4.1 Homeland Defense vs. Homeland Security.

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) defined Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) in order to achieve a unified approach.

- "***Homeland security*** is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."

HLS is within the purview of federal and state agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state emergency management offices. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is primarily responsible for HLS and is supported by the DoD.

- "***Homeland defense*** is the protection of the U.S. territory, domestic population

and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States."

The link between HLS and HLD is critical. The determination of whether a situation is HLD or HLS can have significant implications as to how, by whom and with what authorities operations are planned and conducted.

3.4.2 PA Act 227.

The nine regional task forces shown below were established by the Pennsylvania Counterterrorism Planning, Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Act 227). Their purpose is to coordinate the activities of county law enforcement agencies to counteract terror threats.



Regional Counterterrorism Task Forces

3.4.3 Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency.

The Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA) is the coordinator for homeland security, natural disaster relief and recovery within the southwestern region. In other words, ACEMA coordinates the response to acts of terrorism, WMD and man-made and natural disasters. The ACEMA is comprised of Emergency Management Coordinators from 13 counties (Pennsylvania Region 13 Task Force) and one from the City of Pittsburgh. Federal departments, agencies and NGOs are activated based on the nature, severity, magnitude and complexity of the specific threat. The area of responsibility includes 706 local municipalities, 726 fire departments, 392 police departments, 203 EMS agencies, 65 hospitals, 15 state certified HAZMAT teams, 2 explosive ordinance teams and 35,000 First Responders.

The Center may be activated for high-profile, large-scale events that present heightened

threat situations, such as the United Flight 93 plane crash in 1993. The following is an example of what has taken place since September 11, 2001. It is an illustration of rapid reaction to a potentially deadly environmental disaster caused by the derailment of a Norfolk Southern tanker that was carrying toxic material.





The first figure shows the derailment of two tankers carrying hazardous materials the occurred in East Deer Township on January 31, 2005. Of the 84-car train, 13 cars derailed and at least one tanker leaked anhydrous hydrogen fluoride into the Allegheny River. The second figure shows heavy machinery pulling the tankers from the river.

In addition, there are 5 Nuclear Reactors in Pennsylvania. The Beaver Valley Nuclear facility is the closest to Pittsburgh and within 25 miles of the city and 10 miles from PIT. Ninety companies handle nuclear materials within Southwest Region.

3.4.4 Homeland Security Funding.

Pennsylvania has received $ 88 million in Homeland Security funding. Of that amount the Allegheny region received $11 million. Federal FY 2005 Homeland Security grant for Pennsylvania is almost $88 million out of a total allocation of $2.5 billion.

3.5 Medical Component

3.5.1 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC).

UPMC is the region's largest provider of healthcare. UPMC is a major academic medical center and is ranked seventh in overall NIH funding. UPMC has the capability to facilitate and provide medical responses and trauma care to victims of terrorist attacks, including WMD and bio-terrorism. These responses are integrated with relevant city, county, regional, state and federal emergency and disaster plans.

3.5.2 National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

UPMC and NDMS are part of a federal initiative that provides a nationwide, coordinated response of emergency medical services for disaster relief. In has the capability of handling 100,000 seriously injured patients requiring trauma care and hospitalization. For example, UPMC has established formal agreements with local, regional and national healthcare organizations for the acceptance of patients transferred to other facilities during a disaster in order to provide appropriate medical care. The Pittsburgh VA Healthcare System (VA HCS) is a designated Federal Coordinating Center for the Southwestern Pennsylvania/Northern West Virginia area.

3.5.3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE).

The above initiatives compliment and expand the leadership of UPMC in biological, chemical and nuclear events. For example, in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) enemies and innocent civilians can be difficult to distinguish. Among the tools that the military uses is biometrics. DoD defines biometrics as "measurable physical characteristics or personal behavior traits used to recognize the identify or verify the identity of an individual." These include fingerprints, facial images, voice recorders and iris recognition used by defense organizations and law enforcement agencies for identification purposes.

UPMC's bioterrorism preparedness efforts, the Center for Biosecurity and the retna work done by the Diabetes Institute, maintain high levels of expertise and research activity in bioengineering and biomedical informatics. This high level biomedical expertise and research activity in bioengineering and informatics is aimed at preventing the development of biological agents and diminishing their lethal effects. These and other successful biometric initiatives reflect UPMC's close cooperation and work with the Centers for Disease Control, the Defense Science Board, state agencies including the Pennsylvania National Guard and the DoD.

3.5.4 Defense Applications.

Other expertise and capabilities include:

- **The 91 Whiskey Combat Medic Program.** This is the first military program in the world to use large-scale deployment of medical simulation to achieve training objectives. Training includes theories and practices of Basic Trauma Life Support or Pre-hospital Trauma Life Support, Trauma AIMS (advanced airway, intravenous therapy, medications and pharmacology, stock management), and CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation).

- **Special Operations Performance Enhancement and Injury Prevention Laboratory.** This program, to be installed at Fort Campbell during FY 2005, involves two phases. Phase I develops a physiologic profile of Special Operations soldiers including parameters such as maximal oxygen uptake, lactate threshold and body composition. Musculoskeletal profiles will be developed by assessing those biochemical and neuromuscular protective mechanisms that are known to contribute to injury. Phase II involves the development and implementation of injury prevention training programs.

- **The Institute for Simulation, Education and Research (WISER).** This is an integrated computer simulation program with automatic data acquisition, collection, analysis and immediate feedback. This program uses a system that provides 16 simulators as a resource for a twenty-hospital health system that emphasizes medical and nursing training, patient safety and educational research.

- **Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS).** This is a USAF Medical Services initiative designed to implement and evaluate telemedicine systems and clinical telemedicine applications. The program is installed in Teleradiology at Wright Patterson AFB and in Telepathology/Pediatrics at Keesler AFB.

3.5.4 Military Tie.

PIT has a major role in this process. The airport, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Air National Guard and the 911th Airlift Wing will implement its disaster plan (ZULU B), establish a patient reception area in designated locations and provide air control to prioritize the landing and safety of medical evacuation flights.

3.6 Community Issues

3.6.1 Lack of Advocacy.

BRAC has changed the economic picture in the Southwestern Region especially since the 1980's by identifying bases and other facilities which are recommended for closure. Generally, DoD gives priority consideration to military value including the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge and future force requirements. BRAC 2005 military value principles are considered to be the primary consideration to be used by the Joint-Service Groups and Military Departments in applying the BRAC selection criteria to rank the facilities in the process. Based on previous BRAC's a broad approach is to unify the region's political base within the state and federal government and the Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation.

3.6.2 High Speed Access to PIT.

There is no mass transit access to PIT, especially from downtown Pittsburgh and Oakdale. The existing roadway is inadequate, congested and outdated. Highway improvement programs are planned but development has been stopped. A potential solution to modernize the transportation system is to link Oakdale and UPMC to the airport. This plan appears to be feasible and cost-effective.

3.6.3 US Airways.

The airline industry losses for the 11 largest passenger airlines [excluding American Trans Air (ATA) which is in bankruptcy and has not reported financial results] reached $9.2 billion in 2004. According to ATA this is an increase over the $2.4 billion lost by the same carriers in 2003. US Airways has reduced service to PIT. Airport authorities indicated that in 2000, US Airways employed 11,500 and 510 daily departures. Today the airline has 5,500 employees and 230 departures a day. The shift away from Pittsburgh has resulted in a significant loss of jobs and has left a large pool of skilled employees available for work.

3.6.4 New Commissary Construction.

In 2000, a delegation representing the Pennsylvania military held informal discussions with representatives from Fort Lee, Virginia regarding the construction of a new commissary near PIT. No formal request was submitted for consideration. The current commissary is located at the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in Oakdale. The building requires modernization, docking and parking facilities. The Kelly Facility supports about 100 active duty personnel. The addition of National Guard and Reserve forces would increase the need for facilities such as a modern commissary. New construction requests are based on the size of the active force the facility services.

CHAPTER 4
MISSIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND FACILITIES

This section lists regional organizations and elements and describes the functions of selected DoD organizations. Regional organizations encompass military organizations located at PIT, subordinate and other DoD agencies, and defense related activities. Also included is a discussion of programmed facility requirements.



30-mile radius surrounding Pittsburgh International Airport

Pittsburgh has untapped resources that are economical and the major population center in the Northeast Corridor. For example, the total population in the 11 counties surrounding PIT is 2,596,204, including 185,969 from Columbiana and Jefferson counties, Ohio and 105,541 from Brooke and Hancock counties in West Virginia.

Data Source: 2000 U.S. Census

4.1 Major Regional DoD Organizations Located at PIT

The 171st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) is the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's largest unit. Equipped with 16 KC-135R Stratotanker air-refueling aircraft, the wing conducts training and operational missions throughout the world. In addition, the unit is capable of providing deployable Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) as shown below.

KC-135R Stratotanker

Throughout its five-decade history, the 171st ARW has flown fighter, transportation and tanker aircraft. Since it earned its federal recognition in January 1947, the Wing has been called to federal service to support the Vietnam Conflict, and Operations Desert Storm, Allied Forces, Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Despite a high OPTEMPO, the 171st has always responded with rapid mobilization to meet global reach and global power projection missions.

The current wing is the result of a 1993 consolidation of the 112th Air Refueling Group into the existing 171st Air Refueling Wing. With the consolidation, the two flying squadrons, the 146th and the 147th, were reunited under the same flag for the first time since World War II when they were part of the 53rd Fighter Wing. The 171st is located on 179 acres and occupies 419,362 square feet.

EMEDS Critical Care Unit

EMEDS Operating Room

EMEDS provides health care to US forces in a deployed environment. A five-member mobile surgical team can provide up to 10 emergency, life-or-limb-saving surgeries with the materials they carry on their backs. Because EMEDS uses a modularized design, it is tailorable to requirements. For example, additional modules can easily be added. EMEDS is also prepared to meet NBC threats. Each module has 25 ventilators and medical supplies to care for 100 radiological, biological or chemical casualties.

The 171st has an authorized strength of 1,500 military and 23 civilian personnel. Its annual operating budget is $70.8 million.

The 911th Airlift Wing provides airdrop, landing and cargo extraction systems airlift support to active duty forces and participates in joint service training exercises. The unit also provides intra-theater aero-medical evacuation. In mid-2003, the unit was redesignated as a Joint Base, as part of a larger Air Force Reserve Command realignment, to better reflect the multi-use of their facilities. The 911th is situated on 115 acres and occupies 511,366 square feet.

C-130H Hercules

The flexible design of the Hercules enables it to be configured for many different missions. The C-130H can be rapidly reconfigured for various types of cargo such as palletized equipment, floor-loaded material, airdrop platforms, container delivery system bundles, vehicles and personnel or aeromedical evacuation.

The 911th has an authorized manning level of 1,275 military, 320 civilian personnel and 9 C-130H aircraft. The overall economic impact to the local community is estimated at $64 million annually.

The 99th Regional Readiness Command (RRC), headquartered in Pittsburgh, is vital to

logistics support for both CONUS and OCONUS operations of the Army. This logistics support command has 29 percent of its soldiers currently deployed in support of operations worldwide. The 99th RRC is comprised of more than 200 units and over 23,000 soldiers. The unit is headquartered in Pittsburgh and has responsibility for Reserve Operations in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware and Washington D.C. Three building are occupied: a Headquarters Building, a vehicle maintenance facility and a storage building. These three building represent almost 170,000 square feet. There is also additional room for expansion.

Headquarters of 99th Regional Support Command, Moon Township, Allegheny County, June 2002.

4.2 Other DoD Activities

Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) is a separate Department of Defense Agency. The Pittsburgh MEPS tests, examines and processes applicants for enlistment into the Armed Forces. It has an area of responsibility that includes 21 counties in Pennsylvania, 4 counties in Ohio, 22 counties in West Virginia and 2 counties in Maryland. MEPS' economic impact on the Pittsburgh region is over $3.2 million annually. The Pittsburg MEPS is located in the Federal Building in the downtown area of Pittsburgh and occupies 20,000 square feet of office space.

Charles E. Kelly Support Facility is a sub-installation of Fort Dix, New Jersey. It provides support services to the region's military, their dependents and the retired community. Tenants include an Army Air Force Exchange, Federal Aviation Administration site and a commissary. The Defense Commissary Agency considered closing the commissary in 1997 based on fewer than 100 active duty personnel assigned to the facility. The Kelly facility was also realigned as a result of the 1995 BRAC. The facility is located on 188 acres.

The Kelly Commissary requires modernization, docking and parking facilities. It supports about 100 active duty personnel. The addition of National Guard and Reserve forces may increase the need for facilities such as a new modern commissary. However, new construction requests are based on the size of the active force a facility services. Although the construction of new commissaries is based on the size of the active duty population serviced, the GAO Study of the FY 2005 Authorization Act pointed out the need to consider the feasibility of constructing new commissary facilities based on the recent authorization for use of these facilities by Reserve and National Guard personnel.

Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center administers training to Navy Reserve units in Southwestern Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia and the Marine Corps Military Police. There are 13 Naval units, approximately 380 sailors, that undergo training at the facility. The Marines add another 147 personnel to the annual training throughput. Classrooms, a distance learning center and a six-lane pistol range are included. The Center is a 7,500 square foot Navy owned facility located on 12 acres in North Versailles, North Versailles Township (about 10 miles from downtown Pittsburgh).

The following list identifies other organizations and activities located in the region.

U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency
U.S. Defense Logistics Agency
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Navy
U.S. Army Reserve Center
U.S. Army Contracting Agency (Division)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
DoD ASVAB Test Site
Defense Investigative Service (Industrial Security)
U.S. Army Warehouse and Repair Service (Neville Island)
Leech Farm USAR Center

4.4 Non-DoD Agencies

U.S Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
U.S. Secret Service
U.S Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)
U.S. Customs and Boarder Patrol (CBP)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
National Oceanic & Atmosphere Administration (NOAA)
Center for Disease Control (CDC)
U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF)
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Federal Protective Service
U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHA) (Motor Carrier Office)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
U.S. Department of Energy (DEA) (National Technology Labratorary)
U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)

Note: ***Four of the above non-DoD agencies are co-located at PIT: FAA, TSA, CBP and DEA.***

4.4 Facility Status

4.4.1 Programmed Requirements.

New Headquarters Building. A $684 thousand MILCON project was approved for design of the 911th Airlift Wing Headquarters Building. (Senate Report 108-082, Military Construction Appropriation Bill, 2004.) The new building is 30,000 square feet. $10 million for construction is programmed in FY 2009.

Transit Quarters. The 911th Airlift Wing has programmed construction of new transit quarters and dining facility in FY 2008. $17.4 million is programmed for the construction of a three story transit quarter building with dining facility, recreation center and 80

individual rooms and four suites (Project Number JLSS079001). This project is Phase I of a three phase requirement.

4.4.2 Unfinanced Requirements.

Army Guard Surface Maintenance Facility, Pittsburgh. This project will replace cramped and unsafe facilities, providing a modern workplace for 87 full-time personnel. It will be constructed with $20.6 million in federal funds on land already occupied by the Guard at the Pittsburgh International Airport. $1.9 million has been requested for design in FY 2006.

Apron Reconstruction. The 911th Airlift Wing has a requirement for reconstructing the West apron in FY 2008 (Project Number JLSS96002). This project is for pavement replacement, aircraft tie down and ground rod installation and apron painting.

Transit Quarters. This is a continuation of the 911th Airlift Wing's programmed project above. $31.4 million is programmed for the construction of eight three story buildings. Each building is to contain 60 individual rooms, a business suite and a handicap accessible suite (Project Numbers JLSS089001, JLSS019022 and JLSS069001). This project is designed to accommodate lodging for visiting personnel (TDY) and MEPS requirements.

Fitness Center. The 911th Air Force Reserve Airlift Wing has programmed requirements for a new fitness center in FY 2008. The project includes construction of a 2,000 gross square meter fitness center with gymnasium, racquetball courts, fitness equipment, locker room and administrative and storage areas. Demolition of the existing facility is also included in the requirement. The project cost is $5.8 million (Project Number JLSS019018).

Commissary and Exchange. Senator Santorum has held general discussions on the feasibility of building a new commissary and seems to support the initiative. However, no active follow-up has occurred. In discussions with the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), they indicated that they have not received a request for a requirements survey or any other formal indication for the construction of new commissary facilities either at the Kelly Facility or the 99th RRC. A requirements survey is the first step in the process for new commissary construction. Base exchanges are located at the Kelly Facility and also at the 171st ARW and the 911th Airlift Wing.

CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

This section provides a synopsis of the main points and principles to consider in determining the constraints and limitations for establishing the Regional Joint Readiness Center. Also included are examples of legislation in other states to be assessed for potential use in Pennsylvania.

5.1 Legislation

Title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure Realignment Act (Pub. L. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note) or the **Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990** (Pub. L. 100-526, Part A of Title XXIX of 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note).

Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that Army or Air National Guard units may not be "relocated or withdrawn under this chapter without the concent of the governor of the state." Congressional sources familiar with the law say the words "under this chapter" give the statute no influence over the BRAC law, which is contained in a separate chapter under Title 10.

HB 2141: Military Airport, Development, Planning and Zoning establishes requirements for notification and land planning to include defining accident potential zones, clear, high noise and land use development and sound attenuation standards.

PA Counterterrorism Planning, Preparedness and Response ACT 227. The Act established nine regional offices to coordinate law enforcement activities in response to terrorists threats.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Act establishes a national environmental policy and applies to all agencies of the federal government.

Executive Order 200-2-11, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Subject: Pennsylvania Homeland Security, September 12, 2002.

5.2 DoD Guidelines

DoD 1225.7, Reserve Component Facilities, Programs and Unit Stationing, June 6, 2001.

DoD Regulation 1330.17-R states that commissaries will be disestablished when the installation no longer has an active duty mission or less than 100 active duty personnel are assigned.

AR 60-10, Army and Air Force Exchange Service General Policies, June 17, 1988.

AR 60-20, Exchange Facilities at State-Owned Installations, December 15, 1992.

AFR 147-7 indicates that an exchange may be established at any installation where military personnel are present and assigned to duty. AAFES exchanges are set up primarily for the use of extended active duty Army and Air Force members and their dependents. However, an exchange may be provided at a location other than a military installation. This may be accomplished if military personnel are present and assigned to duty at that location. For example, exchanges set up at state-operated installations will be operated and controlled by AAFES. States enter into a memorandum of agreement for the operation of exchange facilities at state-owned installations.

DoD Armed Services Commissary Regulation (ASCR), April 1987, as amended August 1990.

NGBR 415-10, Army National Guard Facilities Construction, July 25, 2003.

5.3 QDR 2005 Implications

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the major study that influences the manner in which forces are organized, trained and equipped for future needs. It also impacts the apportioning of resources and the determination of the roles and missions of each of the armed services. Another area impacted is homeland defense.

QDR-style assessments have taken place every four years since 1993. For this QDR, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has the permission of Congress to delay the normal QDR deadline (September of each new presidential term) to February 2006.

As the QDR gets underway, the Bush administration is under increasing pressure to deal with a huge budget deficit. For example, on August 5, 2004, President Bush signed the Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005, which totaled $417.5 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The White House then asked for an additional $82 billion in supplemental funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, which brings military spending for FY05 to nearly $500 billion.

The FY06 budget focuses on reducing the investment accounts. Specifically, this includes procurement of new weapons systems and research and development. DoD has already announced its intent to reduce Navy aircraft carrier groups from 12 to 11, to terminate the

production of C-130J cargo aircraft and to downsize the Air Force F/A-22 fighter program from 381 to 150 aircraft.

However, military personnel and operations and maintenance costs are the two largest portions of the defense budget. Significant reductions in defense spending can be achieved only if those costs are reduced. And the only way to reduce those costs is to downsize active duty military forces. In conjunction with downsizing the force and the reduction in the investments accounts, operations and maintenance costs are likely to grow. There are several reasons for this growth: 1) Iraq and Afghanistan; 2) ageing equipment; 3) budget constraints; 4) military transformation and adapting to today's threats; and 5) increasing OPTEMPO requirements.

The FY07 budget likely will be even worse.

5.4 Advocacy

5.4.1 Perspective.

Pennsylvania is widely described as a politically moderate state. Although the majority of its Congressional representation is Republican, the governor is a Democrate. John Kerry won it over President Bush in 2004 by a margin of 51 percent to 49 percent, while Al Gore won the state over Bush in 2000 by 51 percent to 46 percent.

Around 40 percent of Pennsylvania's population resides in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. According to the 2004 election results, the national trend was for voters living in urban areas to vote for the Democratic Party, while those in rural areas tended to vote for the Republican Party.



Figure 5: Results of the 2004 Presidential Election

Figure 5 shows 2004 national voting patterns, indicating a high concentration of Democratic voters in high-density urban areas. (Vertical bars indicate population density, while colors indicate the majority of votes cast [red-Republican; blue-Democratic]).

The 2004 voting results in Pennsylvania paralleled the national results. **Figure 6** shows the results by county. The majority of counties voted Republican, but the most populous areas voted for Democrats. Note that the outcome in the Southwest Region is predominately Republican. Also important is the fact that Pennsylvania has significantly more Republicans elected to public office than Democrats.



Figure 6: How Pennsylvania Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election.

5.4.2 Bipartisan Alliance. The following individuals within state and federal governments and the Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation are key to facilitate the creation of a Regional Joint Readiness Center. Inherent in this project is the combined support of both parties at the local, state and national levels.



Congressional Support

U.S. Senators

There is strong support among both parties for maintaining a strong military presence in the Southwest Region. **Senator Santorum (R)** is currently Chairman of the Republican Conference committee. In general, he has lobbied the Secretary of Defense on the value of military installations throughout Pennsylvania in preparation for BRAC 2005. More specifically, Santorum has been a solid voice in providing support for a new commissary in the region and in major environmental initiatives.

Senator Arlen Specter (R) is the senior member of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee and the Governmental Affairs Committee which has oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. He has fought to protect Pennsylvania's military installations from closure and is intensifying those efforts in 2005. He has also made clear progress to improve the security of the homeland.

U.S. House of Representatives

Congresswoman Melissa Hart (R), District 4, is a ten-year member of the Pennsylvania State Senate. She was elected to the House of Representatives in 2000 and currently sits on the House Ways and Means Committee. Among her legislative priorities is promoting economic development to include the investment in critical infrastructure in the area surrounding the Pittsburgh International Airport.

Congressman Bill Shuster (R), District 9, currently serves on the Armed Services Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. He also serves on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. He has been a strong advocate for the military and the security of the homeland.

Congressman John Murtha (D) of District 12 has fought many military campaigns on Capitol Hill and has won major legislative victories on long-stalled priorities. As a ranking member of the House Defense iorioundthe 12th District. In recognition of his untiring commitment to homeland security was elected to the House of Representatives in 2002, after having served in the Pennsylvania State Senate since 1996. He has played a leading role in the developments at the Pittsburgh International Airport. Another measure of the combined support is in Pennsylvania National Guard funding. For example, of the $407 million allotted to the Guard in FY 2003, $170 million was allocated to Districts 4, 7, 12, 14 and 18.

Congressman Mike Doyle (D), District 14, was elected to the House of Representatives in 1994, filling the seat vacated by Senator Santorum. The Doyle Center for Manufacturing Technology provides small manufacturing enterprises with state-of-the-art training and technology to improve the value, quality and responsiveness required to

become vital contributors in the supply chain of the defense industry. The Doyle Center is creating a national network of subject matter experts that will be brought together to form multiple Virtual Manufacturing Enterprises to produce products in the defense manufacturing industry.

Governor Rendell (D). The Governor was the former mayor of Philadelphia from 1992 to 1999. He was elected as Governor in 2002. Governor Rendell established a Base Retention and Conversion Program designed to assist local defense organizations in protecting the 60,330 Active, Reserve and National Guardsmen who are at risk because of the 2005 BRAC. The Governor's program includes $1.25 million for the development of a statewide strategy, grants and studies associated with military bases. His strong commitment to support the military forces places him in a leadership role in the areas of national security, defense and resource utilization.

Pennsylvania General Assembly

Senator John Pippy (R) of District 37 is actively supporting military and airport initiatives. He has been instrumental in sustaining military bases and airport funding. Recently he teamed with **Mark Mustio (R)**, District 44, (Allegheny County) in obtaining $800,000 in state funding for the rehabilitation of taxiways at PIT in 2004.

The Southwest Region

Other key supporters of airport development and military presence in the Southwest Region are **Dan Onaroto (D)**, Allegheny County Chief Executive and **Kent George**, Executive Director, Allegheny Airport Authority, **George Huber**, Senior Vice President of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, **Mike Langley**, Chief Executive Officer, Allegheny Conference on Community Development, and the Pennsylvania Auditor General, **Jack Wagner (D)**.

- **Dan Onaroto** has been very effective in obtaining funding from Harrisburg. In the last two years he has landed some $20 million for airport projects such as warehouse distribution, transportation improvements and an additional 60 acres for land site development.

- **Kent George** sold Southwest Airline on establishing operations at PIT. Southwest

typically increases airport operations by about 20 percent. PIT is anticipating a similar boost in their operations due to Southwest's presence.

- **George Hubert** is key in helping the military, federal agencies, state and local governments achieve a consistent level of national preparedness. He has strengthened medical surge capabilities and has also strengthened response to chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) weapons.

- **Mike Langley's** top priorities include unifying public-private partnerships that create development opportunities in the region. He found synergies between business, military initiatives and public policy, where his niche expertise is critical.

- **Jack Wagner** is a former state senator who has continued to provide support for military initiatives and regional developments.

This represents the Southwest Regional core political base. The State and National Congressional delegations of Pennsylvania need to know the facts of this study. They are best suited to facilitate an initiative to establish a Regional Joint Readiness Center. For political action, see concluding remarks in Chapter 8.

5.5 States, Legislation, Ideas

It is important to consider other state initiatives that have been successful in enhancing the military value of installations. Many of these initiatives could be the 'one key 'that keeps a states' installation off the BRAC.

Alabama

Alabama has actively supported the expansion of military programs in the state for many years. In early 2004, Alabama allocated funding to improve the infrastructure around military installations. For example, the state committed $6 million to Ozark-Enterprise Community College to build a state-of-the-art aviation school to support Fort Rucker, home of the Army Aviation, in March 2004. Later, the state built four new homes and donated them to the federal government as new senior officer quarters.

Arizona

In 1992, Arizona offered tax credits to defense companies relocating to Arizona. In 1995, the state enacted legislation to address residential encroachment around Arizona's military airports. The law requires cities, towns and counties to adopt land-use plans and

enforce zoning regulations that ensure compatible development. Another encroachment law enacted in 2000, placed the enforcement of the statute with the Attorney General and required cities, towns and counties with territory within the vicinity of a military airport to submit biyearly reports of compliance. Another encroachment measure enacted in 2001 prohibits the construction of residential housing on land surrounding a military airport, but allows wastewater treatment facilities and agricultural operations to be constructed.

More recently, Governor Napolitano led efforts to enhance the military value of Arizona's military installations. In close coordination with Senators Kyl and McCain, the state obtained $27 million to purchase land around military installations. These funds and a state supplement have significantly reduced potential encroachment concerns. In 2004, additional legislation was passed that: 1) extended the same protection to auxiliary military airports that was previously granted military airports, 2) prohibited the building of an underground gas storage facility near Luke AFB due to safety concerns , 3) clarified the definition of military training air routes as a low level military route that allows DoD aircraft to conduct flights as low as 100 feet above ground at speeds in excess of 250 knots and further protects the military air training routes in the state, 4) appointed a ***Military Affairs Committee*** to monitor and make recommendations on executive, legislative and federal actions necessary to sustain and develop Arizona's military installations, training and testing ranges and associated airspace, and 5) established a Military Installation Fund which included an initial appropriation of $14.3 million from the Public Conservation Account for military installation preservation. The law also provided that 5 percent of the retired and active military state income tax would be diverted to the Military Installation Fund.

California

California created the **California Defense Conservation and Retention Council** to oversee efforts to minimize base closures and study the long-term protection of land adjacent to military installations and the economic issues associated with each installation. In 2002, a law was passed that requires cities and counties to consider the impact of new development on military readiness.

Recently, Fort Irwin, in partnership with the Department of Interior, proposed to Congress an initiative to expand the Army's National Training Center. The proposal attempts to balance the Army's needs with environmental concerns over protecting natural resources. Briefly, the Army seeks to use an additional 132,000 acres for training activities.

California, the nation's leader in military bases with 61, has allocated nearly $750,000 in 'retention' grants for local communities to study ways to better link their bases to military needs. For example, the City of San Diego has studied the military facilities located in

San Diego County. The study concluded that the 12 military bases within San Diego County are uniquely located with specific missions of strategic importance.

Florida

The Environmental Land and Water Management Act permits the Governor and cabinet to designate Areas of Critical State Concern. This act precludes unsuitable development that endangers resources of regional or statewide significance. Although Florida has not declared their military installations as Areas of Critical State Concern, this statue could serve as a meaningful tool to address encroachment.

Florida was the first state in the nation to take advantage of partnership agreements to acquire, on a cost-shared basis, property around military installations that would be incompatible with military missions.

In 2003, the state and the Army National Guard signed a cooperative agreement to purchase property surrounding Camp Blanding Training Center. The total cost for the 8,737 acres was approximately $13 million. The state funded $12.5 million and the balance of $500,000 was federally funded.

Illinois

Illinois allotted $330 million to build a civilian airport on Scott AFB. This initiative gives Scott AFB access to a larger runway and a state-of-the-art air control tower.

Mississippi

In June 2003, Mississippi established a multi-million dollar bond authority for local communities to improve base related infrastructure. Mississippi may lead the nation in funds spent on DoD lobbying (estimated at about $900,000).

Rhode Island/Connecticut

In 2004, Rhode Island allocated $750,000 to BRAC 2005 initiatives. Connecticut has appropriated $350,000 to protect submarine base in Groton from closure or realignment.

New Mexico

The New Mexico Development Department of Otero County has completed a Joint

Diversification Study to implement two major actions with regard to the BRAC: 1) developing strategies for acquiring new missions for Holloman AFB and White Sands Missile Range; and 2) implementing defensive strategies to keep these bases off the BRAC list. These strategies include initiatives that increase base infrastructure and promoting the unique military and community capabilities to DoD (such as White Sands Missile Range, Fort Bliss and Holloman AFB), and aggressively pursuing new missions for these bases.

CHAPTER 6
ACTION PLAN

The action plan is based upon an accelerated and comprehensive development of the proposed Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) at the Pittsburgh International Airport. Development includes an infrastructure for collaboration and consolidation of information and response efforts. For example, the UPMC is a partner in the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) which currently provides nationwide medical services to over 75 designated areas in the country. The purpose is to respond to the needs of victims of health emergencies with quick response capability and the ability to provide definitive medical care.

The following structure of the RJRC focuses on the concept of employment (CONEMP), the strategy proposal, implementation efforts and timelines for necessary activities to win the global war on terrorism.

6.1 Concept of Employment

The proposed Regional Joint Readiness Center at the Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT) will focus on special interest areas, the monitoring regional and state events, tracking evolving situations and developing situational understanding as events unfold. RJRC is composed of four cross-functional components in order to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These are the military component, the homeland security component, the medical component and the non-DoD component.

Regional Joint Readiness Center



Figure 7

- **The military component.** The major military organizations located at PIT are: the 911th Airlift Wing, the 171st Air Refueling Wing and the 99th Regional Readiness Command. Consolidation of elements of the 910th, 913th and 914th Airlift Wings may follow. Military assistance is always in support of a lead federal agency, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The first responders to an HLD event on land may be the Army NG in either a State Active duty (SAD) or Title 32 status.

- **The homeland security component.** Homeland Security determines the flow of communications and information, allocation of resources and the response to core security efforts that will thwart or minimize damage.

- **The medical component.** The medical component brings nationwide, coordinated responses to emergency medical situations in the event of terrorist attacks or other large-scale disasters (e.g., CBRNE).

- **The non-DoD component.** A critical factor of the non-DoD component is to measure the effectiveness of defense related entities on reducing the threat and capability of terrorism. This includes minimizing the damage and promoting the recovery from the attacks. Initially, these entities include FAA, TSA, CBP, and DEA.

PIT. RJRC represents a combined effort to develop central airport sites and consolidate existing regional military and defense related entities at PIT. RJRC is further supported by the collaborative information environment used by the Southwest Region to conduct daily operations.

The above components work within the RJRC to facilitate collaboration among all components, interagency partners, as well as external military and civilian agencies. PIT provides the location and development potential to build upon the existing elements of the military component.

RJRC as an operational organization would be initiated during two phases of crises action planning:

- Normal daily operations of the RJRC would include monitoring world events and developing an understanding of special interest areas. The primary focus would be preparation for crisis events, understanding critical situations, analysis, planning and information sharing on a regular basis. As these events develop, planning and preparation actions are continually shared and coordinated among the components.

- If the situation continues to develop, other elements can be brought into the

process as the intensity of the crisis increases. If the decision develops that requires a response, the decision is made to respond at the level required.

The RJRC executes its operations through several constructs, ranging from direct command of forces to Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) or single discipline task forces to address specific situations using assigned or allocated resources. In support of HLS efforts, special technical expertise, planning support or execution of functional responsibilities on an operational basis with close coordination across geographical and organizational boundaries may be required.

The ability to link components together either through collocation or communication technologies is critical to exchanging information necessary for effective employment. Initially, that means that the military component will be able to expand its operations as RJRC develops and additional resources become available.

6.2 Strategy

The strategic effort of the RJRC in the GWOT is to focus on the value of the military presence in the region and role of the RJRC to DoD. The National Guard (NG) and Reserve Components (RC) with an excellent reputation for community-based accomplishments as well as outstanding participation in both Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom operations.

PIT occupies a unique geostrategic location. PIT has the ability to cover two-thirds of the nation's population within a flight time of less than three hours. In addition, PIT has access to the resources of a major population center within the northeast corridor and the entire eastern seaboard. The geographic area includes 13 counties in western Pennsylvania and the 5 counties from Ohio and West Virginia in the 30-mile radius surrounding PIT. The key to the strategy is: 1) consolidating airlift capabilities within 150 miles from PIT; 2) establishing effective community partnerships (including homeland defense missions) and 3) integrating UPMC with the military component (e.g., EMDS). Also it is proposed that the Institute of Homeland Security at Indiana University of Pennsylvania be linked with RJRC.

The objective is to build strong bipartison support for establishing RJRC to support both homeland defense and homeland security requirements. This includes organizing advocacy in the state of Pennsylvania as well as on Capital Hill. In addition, RJRC requires support from a wide range of federal agencies outside DoD, including HLS, the US Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Communications System (NCS) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See Chapter 4 for additional organizations and agencies.

Within RJRC, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) would be established

from the components identified in **Figure 6**. The JIACG would be the nexus for civil-military organization, collaborative and coordination for planning and management. In order to achieve unity of effort, JIACG must be empowered to act or have an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the shared vision of all components is achieved.

6.3 Implementation Plan and Timelines

The goal is to sustain the regional military presence through the 2005 BRAC process and to further develop opportunities at PIT. Critical to the preservation of military activities is effective communication of the RJRC initiative to national decision makers. Community officials at all levels will need to be actively involved and assist their installations and activities to be as effective and relevant to defense as possible.

Actions to standup the RJRC, now, before the upcoming visit of the BRAC commission include:

- **Establishing a limited capability on a DoD site at PIT.** Shared funding would provide resource start-up operations. A rental trailer would be the initial location. Trailers have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive, quick to activate and easy to maintain. As first efforts, they would seem to provide a start to the project within a small budget. Manning required would be 1-2 personnel each from the 99th Regional Readiness Command, 171st Air Refueling Wing and the 911th Airlift Wing. Estimated cost for each unit is between $10,000 to $15,000. Supplemental funding may be provided from outside those commands.

- **Relocating the MEPS from the Federal Building, downtown Pittsburgh, to the 911th Airlift Wing at PIT.** Currently, MEPS occupies 20,000 square feet of office space. However only 10,000 to 15,000 square feet are required. This is at least 5,000 square feet more than is required. MEPS also uses billeting and dinning facilities at the 911th. With collocation, the annual cost avoidance is estimated to be over $135,000.

- **Formalizing a partnership between the University of Pittsburg Medical Center (UPMC) and the 171st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) to develop a Readiness Skills Verification Program for Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS).** This joint initiative is aimed at providing the 171st ARW with UPMC in-house courses to immerse nurses, medical technicians and physicians in all phases of trauma care and to assist in the maintenance of wartime skills resulting in the savings of millions of dollars over time.

- **Linking military distance learning centers through the existing infrastructure of the 99th Regional Readiness Command, the 171st ARW and the 911th Airlift Wing.** This would provide a web-based joint digital training

facility to provide self-development training and access to training products hosted in one location with reach out to all military activities in the region.

The CONEMP would be effective upon issuance with a phased implementation process during the first year. The implementation phases are as follows.

Phase I – Transition Period. This 60-day timeframe is intended to provide a transitional period for military and DoD defense related entities to establish a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), designate staffing and become familiar with the RJRC's structure, processes and protocalls. This is the key to success.

Phase II – Plan Modification. The second 60-day period is intended to provide the opportunity to modify existing plans and integrate defense related entities (FAA, TSA, CBP and DEA) to align with the CONEMP.

Phase III – Initial Implementation. Four months after the issuance, the CONEMP is to be fully implemented. At the end of this period, a 1-year review will be conducted to assess the implementation process and make necessary revisions. Following this initial review, a 4-year review cycle will begin.

Within 120 days of the issuance of this plan, in coordination and consultation with military and defense related entities, the following will:

- **Develop and publish operational procedures for the RJRC.**

- **Identify appropriate assets and establish agreements and procedures for their rapid employment.**

- **Designate representatives to staff the RJRC.**

- **Integrate defense related entities (FAA, TSA, CBP and DEA) and their operations centers and support facilities into RJRC.** Also identify CIP assets, such as those in the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and provide assurance through analysis, assessment and remediation. Capitalize on the asset owner's plan. Establish connectivity with the JTTF. For example, PIT participates in the Pittsburgh area JTTF, now.

- **Initiate action to Consolidate Reserve Component airlift operations at PIT.** This includes the 910th Airlift Wing, Youngstown, Ohio; the 913th Airlift Wing, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania; and the 914th Airlift Wing, Niagra Falls, New York. PIT has the capacity to base and maintain additional aircraft through low-cost development initiatives.

- **Program MILCON construction.** The 911th Airlift Wing has two initiatives in the FY 2005 Budget, a new headquaters building programmed in FY 2006 and the first of a four-phased transit quarters and dinning facility requirement is programmed in FY 2008. The three remaining phases of the transit quarters and dinning facility initiative are unfunded and need to be programmed in FY 2007.

CHAPTER 7
POTENTIAL DoD BENEFITS

The military value of the Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) is based on quantitative analytical evaluation for DoD which includes joint basing, the capability to mobilize and surge, the ability to deliver effective, cost efficient operations, cost savings from shared use of facilities, enhances the demands of the National Military Strategy and homeland defense and provides a secure base with the ability to support operational forces.

7.1 What the Regional Joint Readiness Center Does

The ability of a community to respond quickly and effectively in a crisis – whether a natural disaster, a shooting spree by a single person, a major traffic accident or a terrorist attack – is critical. What is needed in order to respond appropriately is:

- Advanced preparation and contingency planning
- Situational awareness
- Communication
- Horizontal integration among all key stakeholders, organization and individual responders
- Access to facilities and
- Prepositioned resources ready for immediate use

The proposed Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) provides a "one-stop" structure that facilitates collaboration. Local entities, military forces, homeland security, specialized medical resources and non-DoD federal agencies (as depicted in **Figure 8** below) make up the core (i.e., the RJRC). Integration of these capabilities by the RJRC results in effective response to crises and translates into lives saved.



Figure 8: Coordination and Collaboration in the Regional Joint Readiness Center

7.2 The Regional Joint Readiness Center: DoD Value Added

- **Contingency planning, training, and exercise support**: The RJRC's coordination of planning, training, and exercise activities significantly improves effectiveness when responding to a crisis.
- **Enhanced situational awareness**: RJRC would be able to provide enhanced situational awareness of an impending crisis. As a situation develops RJRC would provide up to the minute information needed to plan and support appropriate response activities.
- **Operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration**. This capability is important in all crises. In situations which combine local, regional and national forces the need to communicate controls the activities and enables an effective response.
- **Logistics and sustainment**: PIT and the RJRC provide a secured area to support response and recovery operations. For example, fixed wing and helicopter flight operations and assistance for mass casualty overflow, are able to operate at optimal levels that result in saving lives in man-made and natural disasters.

7.3 Analysis of Regional Joint Readiness Center

The study team employed a four-phased assessment methodology to evaluate the utility and effectiveness of the proposed RJRC under a range of conditions. Detailed analysis

was conducted on three specific scenarios (see scenario-driven analysis and assessment in Annex B for additional details):

- **Scenario 1: Sabotage and Explosive Device Bombings.** A terrorist cell employs sabotage, suicide bombings and explosive device attacks to cripple Pittsburgh.

- **Scenario 2: Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Attack.** A terrorist's organization detonates an RDD at Heinz Field.

- **Scenario 3: Major Combat Operations and Biological Weapons Attack.** War breaks out on the Korean peninsula. On the verge of defeat, North Korea employs WMD against the civilian populations of the United States and Japan.

7.4 Findings

Contingency planning, training and exercise support. These activities significantly improved effectiveness during the response phase of each scenario.

Enhanced situational awareness. The capability to provide enhanced situational awareness prior to a crisis, coupled with en route updates for units deploying to support a crises, was of importance in the pre-incident, response and recover phases.

Operational capability for communication, coordination and integration. This capability was of importance in all three scenarios, but critical in Scenario #1 and Scenario #3 when current response capabilities were quickly overwhelmed. In particular, the ability of forces to "fall in" on established facilities and communication plug-ins increased both the speed and effectiveness of the initial response significantly.

Communications and public affairs. This capability was of key importance in thwarting a specific adversary objective in Scenario #1 and in ensuring U.S. ability to respond effectively in all scenarios.

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). This center provided critical medical response during all scenarios. In Scenario #3, research into defenses against biological weapons attacks (in this case smallpox) is key to deterring enemy attacks or, if that fails, detecting the attack, preventing its spread and saving victims.

Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS) and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). The telemedicine and medical reachback/augmentation capabilities by these programs were essential in all three scenarios.

Logistics and sustainment. The ability of PIT and the RJTC to stockpile emergency

supplies and equipment (particularly medical) was of importance in responding to Scenario #1 and Scenario #3. In addition, the ability of PIT and the RJRC to provide a readily secured area to support response and recovery operations, conduct fixed wing and helicopter flight operations and provide assistance for mass casualty overflow was important in all three scenarios.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

"Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change—a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational patterns and command practices."

General Richard B. Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Bases are changing. Technological advancements, efficiency and effectiveness are prime. From bases, power is projected and sustained. The key for bases continues to be the provision of effective and efficient facilities that can train, mobilize and deploy the force as well as sustain and reconstitute deployed forces and take care of families.

By mid-May, the Pentagon will publish a list of bases it wants to close or realign, which will then be reviewed by the newly appointed BRAC commission. After holding public hearings, the commission will make final recommendations to the president and Congress in the fall, which must accept or reject them in their entirety.

Historically, National Guard bases have been mostly spared from BRAC cuts. In previous rounds, only four Guard bases have been affected, including three that were relocated and one that was closed. However, the upcoming base closure process may have a stronger likelihood of targeting Guard facilities because of the Pentagon's emphasis this year on the need for military installations that can support joint military operations.

Pittsburgh is potentially the key stone to the future of joint homeland security and homeland defense. It has a strong baseline of military bastions from all services strategically located throughout the region. It also has the potential to take advantage of the untapped resources in the region for further growth of these capabilities at economical rates over other areas. In addition, PIT is the only major airport in the Northeast that remained open through the February 2003 winter storms. Pittsburgh is also at the center of the population of the East Coast and is well located to be a great national asset.

The goal of the RJRC is to establish overall preparedness against current and future threats.

Among its major benefits to the Department of Defense are: the RJRC takes advantage of joint basing, provides value in GWOT, ensures capability to mobilize and surge, delivers effective and cost efficient operations, properly aligned to maximize shared use of facilities, optimally located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy and for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense) and a secure base that provides responsive global support to operational forces.

The following actions provide an initial operational RJRC capability. Community development "seed" funding would accelerate the standup of the RJRC.

- Establishing a limited capability on a DoD site at PIT.
- Colocating the MEPS from the Federal Building, downtown Pittsburgh, with the 911th Airlift Wing at PIT.
- Formalizing a partnership between the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and the 171st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) to develop a Readiness Skills Verification Program for Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS).
- Linking military distance learning centers through the existing infrastructure of the 99th Regional Readiness Command, the 171st ARW, the 911th Airlift Wing and the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center.

An initial operating capability would be followed by a three-phased implementation plan.

Phase I – Transition Period. This 60-day timeframe is intended to provide a transitional period for military and DoD defense related entities to establish a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), designate staffing and become familiar with the RJRC's structure, processes and protocalls. This is the key to success.

Phase II – Plan Modification. The second 60-day period is intended to provide the opportunity to modify existing plans and integrate defense related entities (FAA, TSA, CBP and DEA) to align with the CONEMP.

Phase III – Initial Implementation. Four months after the issuance, the CONEMP is to be fully implemented. At the end of this period, a 1-year review will be conducted to assess the implementation process and make necessary revisions. Following this initial review, a 4-year review cycle will begin.

The Regional Joint Readiness Center (RJRC) is the centerpiece to sustain regional military presence through the 2005 BRAC and to further develop opportunities at The Pittsburgh International Airport. It will take a unified effort. The approach to obtain the necessary backing begins with the Military Affairs Council of Western

Pennsylvania. The Council calls for participation to broader community interests (e.g., educate the Pennsylvania leadership and circulate the handout in Annex A).

The Council's first step in the process of unifying support for the RJRC is to gain the support of the stakeholders as listed in Chapter 5. Senator Pippy-Representative Mustio initiatives the motivation of the concurrent support of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and Congressmen Murtha and Murphy. Under Congressman Murtha's leadership, Senators Santorum and Spector rally support for the establishment of the RJRC.

ANNEX A
REGIONAL JOINT READINESS CENTER HANDOUT

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REGIONAL JOINT READINESS CENTER (RJRC)

A VALUE-ADDED REGIONAL RESOURCE

AN ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ***RJRC***, BASED ON DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY SCENARIOS AND ADAPTED TO THE PITTSBURGH AND THE SOUTHWEST REGION, REVEAL ITS INTRINSIC VALUE TO DOD, DHS AND LOCAL, REGIONAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THEIR CAPACITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMERGENCY PREPARATION AND RESPONSE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM.

AS A CENTER FOR LINKING THE NEARBY CAPABILITIES, RESOURCES, AND RESPONSE POTENTIAL OF DOD MILITARY, HOMELAND SECURITY, MEDCIAL, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES, THE ***RJRC*** PROVIDES UNLIMITED SPACE AND IS IDEALLY AND GEOSTRATEGICALLY LOCATED TO SERVE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. CAREFUL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ***RJRC*** IN THE CONTEXT OF SCENARIO-BASED TERRORIST AND WMD EVENTS REVEAL ITS INTRINSIC VALUE TO DOD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.



THE RJRC *IS THE CATALYST FOR:*

* **JOINT OPERATIONS = *OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES***
* **REGIONAL FACILITY CONSOLIDATION = *COST SAVINGS***
* **RAPID RESPONSE TO NATIONAL EMERGENCIES = *LIVES SAVED***
* **PRE-POSITIONED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT = *RAPID EMERGENCY RESPONSE***
* **REGIONAL AND DOD MEDICAL TRAINING FOR BIO-TERROR = *BIO-SECURITY***
* **STANDOFF FOCAL POINT FOR GWOT TRAINING AND EXERCISES = *ENHANCED PHYSICAL SECURITY***
* **MILITARY, DHS, MEDICAL, AND NON-DOD COORDINATION/TRAINING = *REALISTIC PREPARATIONS***

RJRC SCENARIO-BASED VALUE ADDED

- For the region, the ***RJRC*** is ideally suited to provide for Joint contingency planning, training, and exercise support.
- ***RJRC*** facilitated community and DoD partnerships create realistic opportunities for scenario-driven training exercises and emergency response incorporating a full array of USG, DoD, medical and non-DoD assets.
- ***RJRC*** Joint opportunities create situational awareness and develop enhanced planning, training, and interoperability between non-DoD agencies such as the Regional Joint Terrorism Task Force and the FBI's Joint Operation Center.
- Consolidation of sites to the ***RJRC*** creates enhanced operational capability for communication, coordination, integration and creates long-term cost savings.
- ***RJRC*** provides space for established structures and communication plug-ins.

- For the United States, the ***RJRC*** provides for a more secure location for DoD and DHS roles and missions execution – uniquely situated away from East Coast urban concentrations.
- ***RJRC*** provide stand-off capabilities to respond to bio-terrorism contingencies.
- The ***RJRC*** affords most realistic location for scenario-driven Joint bio-terrorism training exercises.
- ***RJRC*** scenario-driven exercises permit incorporation of medical activities such as UPMC, IMITS, NDMS in a joint environment with DHS and local DoD elements such as 171st Wing (Expeditionary Medical Support) or 911th Airlift Wing.
- ***RJRC*** affords adequate space for the pre-positioning of contingency

ANNEX B
SCENARIO-DRIVEN ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

The scenarios were based on the scenario set in the **National Defense University Center for Counterproliferation and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency *NBC Scenarios: 2002-2010* publication.** Adaptations were made when required to reflect the specific operating conditions and requirements in the Southwestern Pennsylvania Emergency Response region.

While the intelligence picture developed as part of each scenario generally reflects suspected terrorists capabilities and known tradecraft, all scenarios are fictitious and Applied Military Technologies is not aware of any credible intelligence that indicates that such an attack is being planned, or that the agents or devices in question are in possession of any known terrorist group.

Scenario 1: Sabotage and Explosive Device Bombings

Overview: While the attacks of Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were a concerted effort to destroy the primary tangible and symbolic vestiges of U.S. national power and to elevate its own position in the Islamic world, the terrorist organization has now shifted its strategy. Their current objective is to attack at the heart of the American people, thereby creating a climate of fear and undermining American confidence in local, regional, and federal institutions. In a concerted and coordinated action, Al Qaeda attacks multiple large U.S. cities by means of sabotage, suicide attacks, direct action raids and sniping attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).

As part of this campaign, Al Qaeda targets Pittsburgh. They fail in their initial attempt to crash a Cessna aircraft into the Three Mile Island power facility but commence a direct action attack at that location shortly thereafter. Al Qaeda simultaneously broadcasts over the internet and to the news media their intention to cause a meltdown of that facility. As fear and panic spreads, large segments of the population begin a panicked attempt to evacuate the area onto evening rush hour traffic. Within one hour, two members of the terrorist cell initiate VBIED detonations in the traffic lanes in both directions of the Fort Pitt Tunnel and Fort Dequane Bridge, shutting down I-376 west from downtown Pittsburgh toward PIT. As traffic is rerouted across the West End Bridge a suicide bomber in an explosive laden vehicle detonates at the entrance to Liberty Tunnel, thereby sealing a major exit route. Two large vehicle explosions occur at the Mercy and Allegheny General Hospitals, causing significant casualties and overwhelming triage capacity of those facilities. Other Emergency First Responders are hampered in getting to the scenes of the casualties due to unprecedented traffic jams on I-376 and I-279.

Their response is made even more intense and difficult by reports (later proven to be false) of sniper attacks against Emergency First Responders and police. The Al Qaeda terror cell also plans smaller acts of sabotage against infrastructure to include power and natural gas lines. It is unknown what other areas of the city or concentrations of the population are targets for potential attack.

This scenario emphasizes the importance for preparations for an asymmetric attack against a large population center targeted by a well-organized terrorist cell employs a full range of explosive devices to destroy property, murder citizens, create panic, and challenge the full range of response capabilities. It further illustrates the need for coordination across a number of local, state, and Federal agencies, as well as non-government organizations. The scenario further reveals the need for the establishment of physically secure area for incident management and response and recovery operations.

The proposed Regional Joint Readiness Center played a critical role during the pre-incident, response, and recovery phases of this scenario.

Pre-Incident: The RJRC provides a dedicated, operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration of activities in a crisis. Prior to the terrorist attacks, the RJRC played a critical role in supporting regional and local contingency planning, training programs, and exercises. This capability supports integrated planning and response by key agencies such as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA), the Southwestern PA Emergency Response Group (Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Cambria, Fayette, Greene, Indiana, Lawrence, Mercer, Somerset, Washington, Westmoreland Counties), the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Pennsylvania State Police, National Guard, and other organizations), local fire departments (including the five battalions and 35 fire stations in the city of Pittsburgh and the 113 fire stations in Allegheny County), local police departments (including City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, and borough/township police departments), emergency medical services, and hospitals (including the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), Allegheny General Hospital, Jefferson Hospital, Ohio Valley General Hospital, St. Francis Medical Center, Pittsburgh Veterans Affairs Hospital, Somerset Hospital, The Western Pennsylvania Hospital, and Armstrong County Hospital).

In this scenario, the routine warnings, alerts, and reporting provided by the RJRC significantly enhanced the alert posture of the agencies mentioned above before the attacks are initiated. As an information fusion center, RJRC serves as a clearing house for dissemination of information (e.g., Al Qaeda and other terrorist group tactics; trends and events that may prompt higher levels of risk for the Allegheny County area; recent U.S. homeland security initiatives and programs; regional contingency planning activities; lessons learned during recent exercises; etc). For example, three weeks before the attacks, U.S. forces raided an insurgent safehouse in Iraq that included blueprints depicting how a light aircraft could be equipped with an improvised explosive device. U.S. forces in Iraq issued an alert for the Green Zone in Baghdad, warning that insurgents

intended to employ a new type of aerial-borne improvised explosive device (ABIED) against the U.S. Embassy. After receiving information about this alert in Iraq, the RJRC provided a short warning report about ABIEDs, with accompanying analysis tailored to the potential threat in the Allegheny County area. Sensitized to this threat, the police subsequently prevented the attempted theft of the Cessna aircraft that was intended for use in the attack against the Three Mile Island power facility.

The RJRC also provided an update about the upcoming Eid-ul-Adha holiday (Islamic Festival of Sacrifice), celebrated as a commemoration of the Prophet Abraham's willingness to sacrifice everything for God, including the life of his son Ishmael. The RJRC forwarded a recent article on the Al-Jazeera website about recent attempts by Islamic extremist groups to distort the meaning of the Eid-ul-Adha holiday as a exhortation to violent attacks. This information was used by some police, emergency response, and National Guard commanders to put their organizations on a heightened state of alert. The RJRC also maintains a list of capabilities for all DoD forces (Active, National Guard, and Reserve) relevant to homeland security/emergency preparedness planning and, as a courtesy, forwards its regular reports to those units in the region. On his own initiative the commander of the 756th Ordnance Company (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) at Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA talked to the commander of G Company, 140th Aviation about possible use of helicopter assets to move his technicians quickly to the site of any attacks occurring during Eid-ul-Adha. The commander of the 319th Engineer Company (Construction Support) at Butler, PA also decided to put his unit on a higher state of alert.

Response: The ability of the RJRC to provide enhanced situational awareness and support communication, coordination, and integration of activities was of significant value in this scenario. After the initial attacks at the Three Mile Island power facility, Al Qaeda broadcast propaganda (using the internet and false reports to the news media) in an attempt to generate mass panic. The RJRC provided accurate and recent information to organizations coordinating the response to the attacks. It also supported the dissemination of accurate information to local warning and communications organizations (including SEVAN/PaSTAR, the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service [RACES], and the Emergency Alert System). This proved to be particularly important when false rumors of sniper attacks against Emergency First Responders and police threatened to impair response to the attacks.

As an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration, the RJRC provided updates and situational awareness to units arriving to the City of Pittsburgh to assist. For example, the RJRC provided en route updates to the staff of the 28th Infantry Division as it deployed to PIT to support the local community response. After arriving at PIT, the Division headquarters set up its Tactical Operations Center in a location that had been preestablished by the RJRC, complete with local telephone lines and plug-ins to local emergency response communications infrastructure.

The established facilities and communication plug-ins maintained at PIT were employed by a number of organizations to coordinate response activities, to include experts from

the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency, the Southwestern Pennsylvania Emergency Response Group, and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force.

Warehouses and facilities at the RJRC used for stockpiling critical medical and relief supplies for use in emergencies also came in handy during this scenario. After two large vehicle explosions occurred at the Mercy and Allegheny General Hospitals, the RJRC was able to redirect supplies and equipment to help avert the overloading and collapse of local medical response capabilities. The 911th Airlift Wing and the 171st Air Refueling Wing began flying in other critical medical supplies, as well as medical personnel from outlying areas. The RJRC also supported efforts by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to serve as a hub for medical operations, as well as the activation of the National Disaster Medical Center. The Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS) saved the lives of seven citizens who were severely injured during the terrorist attacks. Experts from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and Bethesda Naval Medical Center who had treated similar cases in Iraq and Afghanistan were able to provide expert medical consulting to local hospital staffs.

The RJRC also supported efforts by the U.S. Army Reserve's 99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC) and the Adjutant General of the Pennsylvania National Guard to deploy military assets to respond to the crisis. Support for incoming units included en route situational updates, the ability to "fall in" on established facilities and communications plug-ins at PIT, and integration into an established coordination hub for most effective employment of assets. This included military units to support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs), bring in supplies, equipment, personnel, and other assets (Aviation, Transportation), support casualty care operations (Medical), remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation), clear debris (Engineer), and provide traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). Although the communications infrastructure was not damaged during the attacks, Army National Guard Signal units provided additional capability to support relief operations. This become important as the existing telecommunications networks proved incapable of handling the surge in volume that followed the initial attacks. The Army National Guard's 28th Signal Battalion, headquartered in Pittsburgh, helped cope with the initial surge of requirements and provided support for integration of other signal units that set up at PIT.

Recovery: RJRC continued to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration during the recovery phase of this scenario. As crisis response units returned home and organizations responsible for supporting the community's recovery arrived, the RJRC continued to provide established facilities and communication plug-ins, supporting the following priority operations:

- Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure.
- Public works infrastructure restoration.
- Engineering construction management.
- Housing and human services.
- Public health.

- Urban search and rescue.
- Environmental safety and cleanup.
- Public safety and security.
- Long-term community recovery and mitigation.

In addition to supporting local, state, and Federal agencies, the RJRC also supported the efforts of non-governmental organizations engaged in tasks such as providing and distributing food, clothes, hygiene products and other items; providing counseling, shelter materials, logistical assistance, mass feeding, financial assistance, elder and/or child daycare transport, and rebuilding, repair, and cleanup support.

Scenario Assessment: Relevant U.S. capabilities to support pre-incident, crisis response, and recovery operations in this scenario are summarized below in Table A.

Table A: Capabilities to Support Operations in Scenario 1 (Explosive Device Incident)

Key Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA)	o Regional coordinator for contingency planning, training, and exercises.	o Coordinate regional response (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify emergency response requirements and organize deployment of additional assets. o Support/sustain emergency response operations.	o Coordinate regional recovery efforts (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify recovery requirements and organize deployment of assets. o Support/sustain recovery operations.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)	o Medical science and technology (S&T) research. o Train medical personnel. o Provide expert input for contingency plans. o Support emergency exercises. o Medical equipment/supplies.	o Support emergency medical response efforts. o Provide casualty care. o Activate and interface with the National Disaster Medical System. o Coordinate movement of casualties to/from UPMC. o May coordinate employment of other medical assets.	o Support long-term health treatment efforts.
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)	o Contingency planning for mass casualty events (up to 100,000 individuals). o Network of hospitals/health care facilities.	o May activate NDMS network to support the mass casualty event. o Coordinate movement of casualties to appropriate facilities.	o Provide support through NDMS network, as necessary, to support long-term health care needs.
Medical Research Programs[1]	o New technologies and capabilities for		o Employ lessons learned during crisis

[1] Key medical S&T programs include the 91 Whiskey Combat Medic Program, Special Operations Performance Enhancement and Injury Prevention Laboratory, and the Institute for Simulation, Education and Research (WISER).

Key Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
	advanced training of first responders and medical personnel.		to enhance future medical S&T programs.
Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS)	o Distance training of medical personnel.	o Telemedicine connectivity during crisis response. o Remote medical assistance for casualty care and medical operations.	o Telemedicine connectivity to support long-term health care.
171st Air Refueling Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	o Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) personnel respond to crisis. o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas at PIT. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	
911th Airlift Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	o Provide intra-theater aeromedical evacuation. o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas at PIT. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT.
99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC)	o Coordinate U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) involvement in contingency planning, training, and exercises. o Monitor/enhance unit readiness.	o Provide notification and alert to USAR units for potential support to crisis/consequence management operations. o Coordinate employment of USAR units (if directed). o May provide sustainment/support for emergency response operations.	
Civilian Departments & Organizations (other) - Fire - Police - EMS - Hospitals - HAZMAT teams	o Provide expert inputs/support for contingency planning. o Involvement in training/exercises.	o Immediate casualty care, initial reporting, and other first response (EMS, Fire, Police). o Immediate casualty evacuation (EMS, Fire). o Traffic/population control	o Traffic/population control (Police). o Long-term health care (local hospitals).

Key Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
- Civilian EOD		(Police). o Casualty care (local hospitals). o Casualty removal (local hospitals, EMS, National Disaster Medical System network).	
Military Forces - Aviation. - Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC). - Engineer. - EOD. - Medical. - MP. - Transportation /Support. - Signal. - Public Affairs. - General purpose	o Conduct normal military training.	o Support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs). o Bring in supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets (Aviation, Transportation). o Support casualty care operations (Medical). o Remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation). o Clear debris (Engineer). o Traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). o Establish communications infrastructure, if damaged during attack (Signal).	

Regional Joint Readiness Center Impacts: In Scenario 1, the RJRC provided enhanced capability to respond in the following areas: [a] Situational Awareness; [b] Communication, Coordination, and Integration; [c] Deployment Support; [d] Employment; [e] Sustainment.

Scenario 2: Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)[2]

Overview: This scenario involves the detonation of a radiological dispersal device in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The event is orchestrated by an Al-Qaeda terrorist cell and deliberately timed to coincide with a major National Football League playoff game. While there are casualties and some immediate property damage, most of the impact involves contamination of large areas, as well as the likely psychological effects of such an event. The planned operation requires just two operatives: a resident alien living in Pittsburgh and an explosives specialist.

The Target: Pittsburgh recently erected Heinz Field to replace the Three Rivers Stadium. The stadium is situated just north of Pittsburgh's Point State Park (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Location of Heinz Field


RJRC - Pittsburgh Int'l Airport
Ohio Valley General Hospital
Univ. of Pittsburgh – Medical Ctr
Allegheny County Airport
Rochester
Monaca
Freedom
Industry
Conway
Baden
Mars
Bradford Woods
Curtisville
Economy
Ambridge
Leetsdale
Bell Acres
New Kensington
Edgeworth
Sewickley
Coraopolis
West View
Springdale
Fox Chapel
Verona
Aspinwall
Etna
Bellevue
McKees Rocks
Ingram
Pittsburgh
Crafton
Mount Oliver
Edgewood
Monroeville
Pitcairn
Trafford
Turtle Creek
Dormont
Heidelberg
Oakdale
Burgettstown
Midway
McDonald
Brentwood
Duquesne
Mount Lebanon
Dravosburg
McKeesport
Pleasant Hills
White Oak
Versailles
Jefferson
Thompsonville
McMurray
Canonsburg
Houston
McGovern
Bethel Park
Bethel Park
Bethel Park

Estimates for the number of people at risk in this scenario are based on a sold out football playoff game attendance. During the half-time show, it is possible that there will be approximately 75,000 people in attendance:

- 65,000 in the Heinz Field seating area;
- 5,000 in the immediate city blocks surrounding the stadium;
- 5,000 in the stadiums luxury rooms, locker rooms, and concessions; and
- 20,000 in and around the area.

The population of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County are also potentially at risk. In this scenario, real-time publicity is an objective. The game will be broadcast nationally during prime-time television coverage beginning early evening. Local media (press, television, and radio) provide excellent coverage of locally hosted sporting events. Maps are published in the newspapers, depicting what transit routes have been blocked or restricted. The schedule of events is readily available. Maps of both the stadium and downtown Pittsburgh are easily obtained on the internet or at local bookstores. However, while a large amount of information is available for planning purposes, the additional security surrounding an NFL playoff game poses some challenges to the Al-Qaeda cell.

Munitions and Delivery System: The group creates a RDD with two essential ingredients: plutonium (Pu-239) and cesium (Cs-137). Specifically, the device employs 100 kilograms of C-4 plastic explosives to disperse 50 grams of Cs-137 and 2 kilograms of Pu-239. The RDD is an unsophisticated shaped charge. The radioactive materials are placed within a bowl of C-4. The eventual explosion will expel the radioactive materials up and out.

The plutonium is obtained from a Russian criminal organization. A trusted scientist (an extended network member) examines the material on delivery to ensure that it is, in fact, Pu-239. The scientist is paid for her services and sent home, unaware that an operation is planned. There are two kilograms of material in one kilo Russian storage containers. The two packages will travel separately to the United States to maximize the likelihood that a sufficient quantity will safely arrive.

For Pu-239, alpha radiation is a hazard. Alpha particles are very dangerous if inhaled or otherwise ingested. However, they have very limited ability to penetrate materials; an alpha particle cannot penetrate unbroken skin. In normal handling plutonium is more of a toxic hazard than a radiation hazard. It causes heavy metal poisoning. It is relatively safe to handle if personnel wear gloves and a protective mask similar to those used in dental offices.

A medical student working at a hospital in Pittsburgh is paid to locate the source for cesium (Cs-137) – which has a number of common medical and industrial applications. All he has to do is provide information concerning the security system and the location of the Cs-137. Two Americans are paid to steal 50 grams in May 2005, unaware of the impending operation. The Cs-137 is stored in the same protective container it was previously stored in at the hospital. Since everything else taken from the hospital was

expensive lab equipment, the police investigation concludes that the burglar is probably unaware of the radioactive substance in his possession.

Cs-137 is a highly radioactive beta emitter. Beta particles are hazardous inside or outside the body; however, they cannot penetrate through the skin or comparable barriers. Cs-137 naturally produces a short-half-life radioactive gamma emitter. Gamma rays have tremendous penetration capabilities. They can impact all body tissues. These gammas are the primary hazard associated with Cs-137. While Cs-137 is routinely used in medical and industrial applications in very small quantities, it can pose a significant safety hazard. It must be stored in sealed glass or stainless steel containers.

C-4 plastic explosive is an appropriate dissemination device, although other detonation mechanisms would suffice should the desired 100 kilograms be unavailable. A standard 15-foot truck is large enough to handle the assembled device – and easy to rent for several days at a time.

Preparations: The plutonium is smuggled into the United States in June 2005. No attempt is made to move the radioactive materials through major airports or ports that might have detectors. One kilogram of Pu-239 obtained from the Russian criminal organization is sent through Canada. Drug shipment channels are used to move it to Pittsburgh, where it resides near the airport in a self-storage shed. The other kilogram of Pu-239 is sent by sea to Central America. Again, drug channels are used to move it to a self-storage center in a southern suburb of Pittsburg. The Cs-137 is stored in yet a third shed in Pittsburgh proper. The resident alien has paid in advance for the one year rentals at all three locations. No one involved in the transportation of the Pu-239 and Cs-137 knows about the operation.

The weekend prior to the operation, the resident alien rents a 15-foot truck, picks-up the stored Pu-239, and takes the material to the storage area where the Cs-137 is kept. The truck is then painted and plastered with magnetic "Custom Catering" signs. Connections in the drug business provide the C-4. During the same weekend, the explosives expert enters the United States on a tourist visa, rents a car at Pittsburgh International Airport, and drives to downtown Pittsburgh.

The Incident: On the morning of the playoff game, the operatives meet at the storage shed and load the materials into the truck. Lead bricks and panels are set up to provide shielding in a box around the RDD. The C-4 is set up in a bowl arrangement. The radioactive materials are placed within the bowl. This is done quickly, using expedient safe handling equipment to put some distance between the handlers and the radioactive materials. There is a lid on the device that will blow off when the detonation occurs, but provides necessary protection in the interim. The explosives expert sets the timers in place and ensures that the RDD is ready.

At 1630, the operatives stop to refuel at the intersection of Highways 50 and 21 as planned. The explosives expert gets into the back of the truck, sets the back-up 120 minute fuse, and arms the fuse that will be triggered if anyone tries to open the door of

the truck after he flicks the switch. The explosives expert gets back into the car. He arms the door-arming switch. [From this point, interdiction options are limited. The device is set to detonate within 120 minutes. The truck is already within a densely populated part of Pittsburgh in the general vicinity of the airport.]

The truck and rental car head toward the Heinz Field. At 1700, the driver stops the truck at the security line at the corner of Art Rooney Avenue and North Shore. He gets out, locking the door as he exits. He asks questions about gaining access. The driver soon stops talking to the security guards and says that he is going to have to call the home office for instructions; he claims to be unaware of the need for special passes. He gets out his cell phone and walks toward the back of the truck. To an observer, he appears to be trying to find a spot where he can get a good connection. He keeps walking. The security people call, but he ignores them. The explosives expert pulls up behind the truck and the operatives flee the scene. At a safe distance, the expert hits the detonation switch; the device explodes precisely at 1830 local time.

Weapons Effects: The RDD may cause direct explosive damage to property, injury or death to people standing nearby, and radiation sickness or death if the total effective dose is sufficiently high. The blast damage that would result from an explosion of 100 kilograms of C-4 plastic explosive crater radius of 16.3 feet, depth of 2.6 feet. While lethal to police and others in the immediate vicinity of the truck, significant damage to the stadium is not likely. The principal function of the explosive charge is to loft radioactive material for dispersal by surface winds. Based on comparable results in other cities that have been modeled, it is expected that as few as 100 individuals would receive lethal radiation doses and approximately 20,000 would require medical treatment for radiation sickness and radiation exposure. (Moreover, many more of those exposed might also seek medical treatment once a radiological connection to the incident is established.)

This scenario highlights the need for situational awareness; communication, coordination, and integration; deployment support; and the employment and sustainment of response forces. It further illustrates the need for preparations against attacks by adversaries using unconventional methods and the need for the establishment of physically secure area for incident management and response and recovery operations.

Pre-Incident: The RJRC provides a dedicated, operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration of activities in a crisis. Prior to the RDD attacks in this scenario, the RJRC played a critical role in supporting regional and local contingency planning, training programs, and exercises (this support was particularly important in the area of response to a radiological incident). This RJRC capability supports the integrated planning and response activities of key agencies such as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency, the Southwestern PA Emergency Response Group, the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force, local fire departments, local police departments, emergency medical services, and hospitals. Also critical to this effort was the integration of local HAZMAT capabilities (e.g., the 28 paramedics and 45 Firefighters in the City of

Pittsburgh and the 5 teams in Alleghany County). Indirectly, the research efforts of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center resulted in the fielding the technologies and techniques employed to treat casualties from WMD events.

In this scenario, the NFL playoff game resulted in a heightened state of alert for police and emergence response organizations prior to the incident, to include the movement of personnel from the National Guard 3rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) to Pittsburgh. The RJRC provided facilities for the 3rd WMD-CST, as well as other response organizations that the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency had identified to provide a contingency capability during the NFL playoff. These organizations operated from facilities that had been preestablished by the RJRC, complete with local telephone lines and plug-ins to local emergency response communications infrastructure.

As an information fusion center, RJRC serves as a clearing house for dissemination of information (e.g., Al Qaeda and other terrorist group tactics; trends and events that may prompt higher levels of risk for the Allegheny County area; recent U.S. homeland security initiatives and programs; regional contingency planning activities; lessons learned during recent exercises; etc). In addition to the routine warnings, alerts, and reporting provided by the RJRC as part of its normal operations, the RJRC staff provided a package of information relevant to attacks that might occur at Heinz Field. This included information on the police and security organizations involved at Heinz Field and maps of transit routes during the game. As part of its normal distribution of information, these reports were provided to the 128th Chemical Company (Pennsylvania Army National Guard, located in Philadelphia), the 52nd WMD-CST (located in Ohio, 185 mile driving distance from Pittsburgh) and the 35th WMD-CST (located in West Virginia, 239 miles from Pittsburgh)

Response: The ability of the RJRC to provide enhanced situational awareness and support communication, coordination, and integration of activities was of significant value in this scenario. After the attack at Heinz Field, the RJRC provided accurate and recent information to organizations coordinating the response to the attacks. It also supported the dissemination of accurate information on the radiological threat, information on radiation sickness symptoms and how to seek assistance, precautions that individuals could take to avoid radiation exposure and long-term health effects, and other information to prevent mass panic, exodus from the city, and overloading of response capabilities. This information was made available to local warning and communications organizations (including SEVAN/PaSTAR, the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service [RACES], and the Emergency Alert System) and proved to be valuable in preventing a complete gridlock of the city's transportation infrastructure after the attack.

As an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration, the RJRC provided updates and situational awareness to units arriving to the City of Pittsburgh to assist. For example, the RJRC provided en route updates to the staff of Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) and the U.S. Army 20th Support Command as it deployed to PIT to support the local community response. After arriving at PIT, these units established

Tactical Operations Centers in a location that had been preestablished by the RJRC, complete with local telephone lines and plug-ins to local emergency response communications infrastructure.

The established facilities and communication plug-ins maintained at PIT were employed by a number of organizations to coordinate response activities, to include experts from the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency, the Southwestern Pennsylvania Emergency Response Group, and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force.

Warehouses and facilities at the RJRC used for stockpiling critical medical and relief supplies for use in emergencies also came in handy during this scenario. The 911th Airlift Wing and the 171st Air Refueling Wing also began flying in other critical medical supplies, as well as medical personnel from outlying areas. Importantly, the RJRC also supported efforts by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to serve as a hub for medical operations, as well as the activation of the National Disaster Medical Center. The Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS) saved the lives of two citizens who were severely injured during the terrorist attacks. Doctors from Ukraine who had treated victims of Chernobyl were able to provide expert medical consulting to local hospital staffs.

The RJRC also supported efforts by the U.S. Army Reserve's 99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC) and the Adjutant General of the Pennsylvania National Guard to deploy military assets to respond to the crisis. Support for incoming units included en route situational updates, the ability to "fall in" on established facilities and communications plug-ins at PIT, and integration into an established coordination hub for most effective employment of assets. This included military units to support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs), bring in supplies, equipment, personnel, and other assets (Aviation, Transportation), support casualty care operations (Medical), remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation), clear debris (Engineer), and provide traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). Although the communications infrastructure was not damaged during the attacks, Army National Guard Signal units provided additional capability to support relief operations. This become important as the existing telecommunications networks proved incapable of handling the surge in volume that followed the initial attacks. The Army National Guard's 28th Signal Battalion, headquartered in Pittsburgh, helped cope with the initial surge of requirements and provided support for integration of other signal units that set up at PIT.

Recovery: RJRC continued to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration during the recovery phase of this scenario. As crisis response units returned home and organizations responsible for supporting the community's recovery arrived, the RJRC continued to provide established facilities and communication plug-ins, supporting the following priority operations:

- Environmental safety and cleanup.
- Public health.

- Public works infrastructure restoration.
- Housing and human services.
- Public safety and security.
- Long-term community recovery and mitigation.

In addition to supporting local, state, and Federal agencies, the RJRC also supported the efforts of non-governmental organizations engaged in tasks such as providing and distributing food, clothes, hygiene products and other items; providing counseling, shelter materials, logistical assistance, mass feeding, financial assistance, elder and/or child daycare transport, and rebuilding, repair, and cleanup support.

Scenario Assessment: Relevant U.S. capabilities to support pre-incident, crisis response, and recovery operations in this scenario are summarized below in Table B.

Table B: Capabilities to Support Operations in Scenario 2 (Radiological Dispersal Device)

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA)	o Regional coordinator for contingency planning, training, and exercises.	o Coordinate regional response (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify emergency response requirements and organize deployment of additional assets. o Support/sustain emergency response operations.	o Coordinate regional recovery efforts (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify recovery requirements and organize deployment of assets. o Support/sustain recovery operations.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)	o Medical science and technology (S&T) research against radiological threats. o Train medical personnel. o Provide expert input for contingency plans. o Support emergency exercises. o Medical equipment/supplies.	o Support emergency medical response efforts. o Provide casualty care. o Activate and interface with the National Disaster Medical System. o Coordinate movement of casualties to/from UPMC. o May coordinate employment of other medical assets.	o Support long-term health treatment efforts. o Sponsor S&T efforts to address long-term health needs arising from incident.
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)	o Contingency planning for mass casualty events (up to 100,000 individuals). o Network of hospitals/health care facilities.	o Activate NDMS network to support the mass casualty event. o Coordinate movement of casualties to appropriate facilities.	o Provide support through NDMS network, as necessary, to support long-term health care needs.
Medical Research Programs	o New technologies and capabilities for advanced training of first responders and medical personnel.		o Employ lessons learned during crisis to enhance medical S&T programs.
Integrated Medical	o Support distance	o Telemedicine	o Telemedicine

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Information Technology System (IMITS)	training of medical personnel.	connectivity during crisis response. o Remote medical assistance for casualty care and medical operations.	connectivity to support long-term health care.
171st Air Refueling Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	o Deploy Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) capability to respond to crisis. o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	
911th Airlift Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	o Provide intra-theater aeromedical evacuation. o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas at PIT. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT.
99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC)	o Coordinate U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) involvement in contingency planning, training, and exercises. o Monitor/enhance unit readiness.	o Provide notification and alert to USAR units for potential support to crisis/consequence management. o Coordinate employment of USAR units (if directed). o May provide sustainment/support for emergency response operations.	
Civilian Departments & Organizations (other) - Fire - Police - EMS - Hospitals - HAZMAT teams - Civilian EOD	o Provide expert inputs/support for contingency planning. o Involvement in training/exercises.	o Immediate casualty care, initial reporting, and other first response (EMS, Fire, Police). o Immediate casualty evacuation (EMS, Fire). o Traffic/population control (Police). o Casualty care (local	o Traffic/population control (Police). o Long-term health care (local hospitals). o Support long-term decontamination efforts (HAZMAT).

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
		hospitals). o Casualty removal (local hospitals, EMS, National Disaster Medical System network). o Immediate decontamination support (HAZMAT).	
Military Forces - Aviation. - Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC).[3] - Engineer. - EOD. - Medical. - MP. - Transportation /Support. - Signal. - Public Affairs. - General purpose	o Conduct normal military training.	o Bring in supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets (Aviation, Transportation). o Support casualty care operations (Medical). o Remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation). o Identify and protect against hazards (NBC defense). o Clear debris (Engineer). o Traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). o Establish communications infrastructure (Signal). o Support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs).	

Regional Joint Readiness Center Impacts: In Scenario 2, the RJRC provided enhanced capability to respond in the following areas: [a] Situational Awareness; [b] Communication, Coordination, and Integration; [c] Deployment Support; [d] Employment; [e] Sustainment. Detailed findings are presented on pages 25-27 of this report.

[3] May include support from assets such as the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), active or reserve units assigned to the U.S. Army 20th Support Command, and other DoD chemical units.

Scenario 3: Major Combat Operations and Domestic Biological Weapons Attack[4]

Overview: This scenario posits a situation in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launches a conventional attack against the Republic of Korea (ROK). The DPRK military penetrates to the outskirts of Seoul, launches attacks throughout the country using special operations forces (SOF), ballistic missiles, and long-range artillery, and seeks to hit staging areas in Japan with conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. Heavy casualties ensure and the 171st Air Refueling Wing's EMEDS group deploys to treat Korean and American casualties. When U.S. and South Korean forces counterattack, North Korea's most senior decision makers believe that the regime will soon fall. They authorize a final act of punitive retaliation: the use of nuclear weapons and smallpox against the United States and Japan to inflict maximum damage on the foreigners who "unjustly" persecuted the North.

Background: Following three years of steadily worsening economic performance, North Korea experienced heavy spring rains and summer floods that destroyed much of the fall harvest. Grain shortages were over 4 million tons, resulting in mass starvation. Industrial production continued to slide and successful U.S. programs to counter the proliferation of WMD, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, cut off most of North Korea's export earnings from ballistic missile and WMD exports (a key source of foreign currency). Despite these problems, the regime continued its efforts to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities.

Faced with the possibility of internal regime collapse and facing challenges from political factions within the communist Korean Workers Party, Kim Jong-il approved a plan to invade South Korea. On 15 December 2009, North Korean armed forces launched a surprise attack across the length of the 38th parallel. Their surprise attack, use of special operations teams, and early use of chemical weapons against U.S. and ROK forces, enabled them to make impressive initial gains. Seoul suffered heavy artillery damage and North Korean troops reach the outskirts of the South Korean capital city. Over the next several days, however, the North Korean offensive faltered. Threatened with cutoff and encirclement, the DPRK forces ultimately fell back to their original positions. Eventually, the retreat turns into a rout, and by mid-January U.S. and ROK forces approached Pyongyang. North Korean threats to resort to nuclear weapons against the United States, South Korea, and Japan (a principal regional staging area for US forces) failed to halt the US-ROK counteroffensive.

The North Korean WMD Attack: Kim Jong-Il authorizes the use of three nuclear weapons against two separate targets: Tokyo, Japan and Honolulu, Hawaii. He also authorizes the use of a lethal biological agent against multiple U.S. cities, including San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh, and Atlanta. Given the incubation period

[4] This scenario is adapted from the NDU Center for Counterproliferation and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, *NBC Scenarios: 2002-2010*, April 2000.

required for smallpox, DPRK military planners decide that the biological attack should be covertly conducted in advance of the nuclear attacks. On 15 January, the National Defense Commission directs the National Defense Research Institute and Medical Academy to prepare small, pressurized containers – resembling shaving cream dispensers – with smallpox. That same day, the intelligence-related Operations Department of the Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs (which reports to the Korean Workers Party) is instructed to prepare operatives for clandestine infiltration into China. The operatives, previously inoculated against smallpox, have one week to plan separate routes for the same mission: delivering their pressurized canisters to a designated location in Tokyo by 28 January.

The primary operative for the attack on Pittsburgh plans to cross the Chinese-North Korean border disguised as a war refugee and then proceed to Beijing, where he will fly via a commercial airline (with forged documentation) direct to Tokyo's Narita International Airport. The secondary operative (his back-up) plans to visit Beijing under the cover as a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to solicit military assistance from China. He will then fly commercially to Vietnam on a forged Chinese passport, and from there to Tokyo. On 29 January, the operatives rendezvous at an appointed time at Narita International Airport, and one of the operatives boards a flight bound for the United States with the pressurized containers in a carry-on bag. The operative travels as a Korean-American on a forged American passport. The operatives transfer to a domestic flight landing in Pittsburgh and release the small pox agent in the airport terminal.

This scenario tests the capabilities of the 171st Air Refueling Wing's EMEDS group, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Ceneter, and other assets to support U.S. and allied forces in a major combat operation likely to generate high numbers of civilian and military casualties. It highlights the need for research into detection, vaccine, and treatment capabilities against biological weapons attacks. It demonstrates the importance of situational awareness; communication, coordination, and integration; deployment support; and the employment and sustainment of response forces to respond to a biological weapons incident. It further illustrates the need for preparations against attacks by adversaries using unconventional methods and the need for the establishment of physically secure area for incident management and response and recovery operations.

Pre-Incident: The RJRC provides a dedicated, operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration of activities in a crisis. Prior to the RDD attacks in this scenario, the RJRC played a critical role in supporting regional and local contingency planning, training programs, and exercises (this support was particularly important in the area of response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats). This RJRC capability supports the integrated planning and response activities of key agencies such as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency, the Southwestern PA Emergency Response Group, the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force, local fire departments, local police departments, emergency medical services, and hospitals.

Of particular importance were the research efforts of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center resulted in the fielding the technologies and techniques employed to protect against biological weapons attacks. Although these efforts did not deter the use of smallpox in the scenario that was postulated, they might be decisive in terms of preventing the spread of the smallpox agent, treating victims of the attack, and saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens.

As an information fusion center, RJRC serves as a clearing house for dissemination of information. Prior to the North Korean surprise attack, the RJRC provided routine warnings, alerts, and reporting on WMD capabilities of foreign regimes, including those possessed by the North Koreans.

Response: The ability of the RJRC to provide enhanced situational awareness and support communication, coordination, and integration of activities was of some value in the first phase of this scenario (North Korean invasion of South Korea) and critical value in the second phase (North Korean biological attack). During the first phase, the RJRC supported the deployment of medical capabilities from PIT to treat U.S. and South Korean casualties. This included the deployment of the 171st Air Refueling Wing's EMEDS group, with a medical/surgical team and 50+ beds. Both the 171st Air Refueling Wing and the 911th Airlift Wing supported both combat and medical operations during the war in Korea, to include evacuation of casualties for treatment. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center was designated as a CONUS-based site for mass casualty treatment and established a patient reception site near PIT. UPMC was selected based on their specialized capabilities, capacity to handle surge medical requirements on short notice, and close proximity to Pittsburgh International Airport. The UPMC coordinated with other medical organizations (Army Medical Command, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services) and the network of facilities in the National Disaster Management System to coordinate medical treatment. Furthermore, using the IMITS telemedicine capability, UPMC medical experts provided support to local hospital staffs working in South Korean and Japan to care for casualties.

During the second phase of the scenario, the RJRC provided accurate and recent information to organizations coordinating the response to the smallpox attack. It also supported the dissemination of accurate information on the smallpox threat, information on smallpox symptoms and how to seek assistance, precautions that individuals could take to avoid being infected, and other information to prevent mass panic. This information was made available to local warning and communications organizations (including SEVAN/PaSTAR, the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service [RACES], and the Emergency Alert System).

As an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration, the RJRC provided updates and situational awareness to units arriving to the City of Pittsburgh to assist in the response. For example, the RJRC provided en route updates to the staff of the 329th Medical Ambulance Company (Erie, PA), the 339th Combat Support Hospital (Oakdale, PA), the 1st and 9th Medical Companies (Aberdeen, MD), the 104th Air Ambulance Medical Company (Parkville, MD), and the 48th Combat Support Hospital

(Ft. Meade, MD). After arriving at PIT, these units established Tactical Operations Centers in a location that had been preestablished by the RJRC, complete with local telephone lines and plug-ins to local emergency response communications infrastructure.

The established facilities and communication plug-ins maintained at PIT were employed by a number of organizations to coordinate response activities, to include experts from the Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency, the Southwestern Pennsylvania Emergency Response Group, and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force.

Warehouses and facilities at the RJRC used for stockpiling critical medical and relief supplies for use in emergencies also came in handy during this scenario. Importantly, the RJRC also supported efforts by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to serve as a hub for medical operations, as well as the activation of the National Disaster Medical Center. The RJRC also supported efforts by the U.S. Army Reserve's 99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC) and the Adjutant General of the Pennsylvania National Guard to deploy military assets to respond to the crisis. Support for incoming units included en route situational updates, the ability to "fall in" on established facilities and communications plug-ins at PIT, and integration into an established coordination hub for most effective employment of assets. This included military units to support casualty care operations (Medical), remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation), support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs), bring in supplies, equipment, personnel, and other assets (Aviation, Transportation), and provide traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). Although the communications infrastructure was not damaged during the attacks, Army National Guard Signal units provided additional capability to support relief operations. This become important as the existing telecommunications networks proved incapable of handling the surge in volume that followed the initial attacks. The Army National Guard's 28th Signal Battalion, headquartered in Pittsburgh, helped cope with the initial surge of requirements and provided support for integration of other signal units that set up at PIT.

Recovery: RJRC continued to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration during the recovery phase of this scenario. As crisis response units returned home and organizations responsible for supporting the community's recovery arrived, the RJRC continued to provide established facilities and communication plug-ins, supporting the following priority operations:

- Public health.
- Medical.
- Mental health services.
- Mortuary services.
- Environmental safety and cleanup.
- Public works infrastructure restoration.
- Housing and human services.
- Public safety and security.
- Long-term community recovery and mitigation.

In addition to supporting local, state, and Federal agencies, the RJRC also supported the efforts of non-governmental organizations engaged in tasks such as providing medical and psychiatric assistance; providing and distributing food, clothes, hygiene products and other items; providing counseling, shelter materials, logistical assistance, mass feeding, financial assistance, elder and/or child daycare transport, and rebuilding, repair, and cleanup support.

Scenario Assessment: Relevant U.S. capabilities to support pre-incident, crisis response, and recovery operations in this scenario are summarized below in Table C.

Table C: Capabilities to Support Operations in Scenario 3
(Major Combat Operations and Domestic Biological Weapons Attack)

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA)	o Regional coordinator for contingency planning, training, and exercises.	*Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Coordinate regional response (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify emergency response requirements and organize deployment of additional assets. o Support/sustain emergency response operations.	o Coordinate regional recovery efforts (Federal, State, and local organizations). o Identify recovery requirements and organize deployment of assets. o Support/sustain recovery operations.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)	o Science and technology (S&T) research against biological weapons threats, including vaccines, BW detection, and treatments. o Train medical personnel. o Provide expert input for contingency plans. o Support emergency exercises. o Medical equipment/supplies.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o UPMC designated as a CONUS-based site for mass casualty treatment. o Provide casualty care (U.S. and South Korean military). *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Support emergency medical response efforts. o Provide casualty care. o Activate and interface with the National Disaster Medical System. o Coordinate movement of casualties to/from UPMC. o May coordinate employment of other medical assets.	o Support long-term health treatment efforts. o Sponsor S&T efforts to address long-term health needs arising from BW attack.
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)	o Contingency planning for mass casualty events (up to 100,000 individuals).	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Coordinate movement of U.S. and South Korean	o Provide support through NDMS network, as necessary, to

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
	o Network of hospitals/health care facilities.	military casualties to appropriate medical facilities. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Activate NDMS network to support the mass casualty event. o Coordinate movement of casualties to appropriate medical facilities.	support long-term health care needs.
Medical Research Programs	o New technologies and capabilities for advanced training of first responders and medical personnel.		o Employ lessons learned during crisis to enhance medical S&T programs.
Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS)	o Support distance training of medical personnel.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Telemedicine connectivity during military operations. o Remote medical assistance for U.S. and South Korean casualty care. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Telemedicine connectivity during BW crisis response. o Remote medical assistance for casualty care and medical operations.	o Telemedicine connectivity to support long-term health care.
171st Air Refueling Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Deploy Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) capability to assist U.S. and/or South Korean forces. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to Korea. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from Korea. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas at PIT. o Employ mobility assets to	

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
		fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	
911th Airlift Wing	o Training and readiness for crisis response.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Provide aeromedical evacuation (Pacific theater). o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to Korea. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from Korea. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Provide aeromedical evacuation. o Support establishment of patient reception and emergency staging areas at PIT. o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT. o Employ mobility assets to transport critical casualties from PIT.	o Employ mobility assets to fly supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets to PIT.
99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC)	o Coordinate U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) involvement in contingency planning, training, and exercises. o Monitor/enhance unit readiness.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Provide notification and alert to USAR units for potential deployment to Korea. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Provide notification and alert to USAR units for potential support to crisis/consequence management. o Coordinate employment of USAR units (if directed). o May provide sustainment/support for emergency response operations.	

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Civilian Departments & Organizations (other) - Fire - Police - EMS - Hospitals - HAZMAT teams - Civilian EOD	o Provide expert inputs/support for contingency planning. o Involvement in training/exercises.	*Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Immediate casualty care, initial reporting, and other first response (EMS, Fire, Police). o Immediate casualty evacuation (EMS, Fire). o Traffic/population control (Police). o Casualty care (local hospitals). o Casualty removal (local hospitals, EMS, National Disaster Medical System network). o Immediate decontamination support (HAZMAT).	o Traffic/population control (Police). o Long-term health care (local hospitals). o Support long-term decontamination efforts (HAZMAT).
Military Forces - Aviation. - Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC). - Engineer. - EOD. - Medical. - MP. - Transportation /Support. - Signal. - Public Affairs. - General purpose	o Conduct normal military training.	*First Phase* (Conventional War in Korea). o Deploy to Korea to conduct major combat operations. *Second Phase* (North Korean BW Attack Against U.S. Cities). o Bring in supplies/equipment/ personnel/other assets (Aviation, Transportation). o Support casualty care operations (Medical). o Remove casualties (Aviation, Medical, Transportation). o Identify and protect against hazards (NBC defense). o Clear debris (Engineer). o Traffic/population control (MP, general purpose forces). o Establish communications infrastructure (Signal). o Support emergency communications with public (Public Affairs).	

Findings and Conclusions.

In all three scenarios, the RJRC provided enhanced capability to respond in the following areas: [a] Situational Awareness; [b] Communication, Coordination, and Integration; [c] Deployment Support; [d] Employment; [e] Sustainment. Table D (below) provides a detailed summary of contributions and enhancements, related to the major organizations and phases evaluated in each scenario.

Table D: Regional Joint Readiness Center – Areas of Enhancement

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency (ACEMA)	o RJRC augments regional coordination for contingency planning, training, and exercises. o RJRC provides dedicated, operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances ACEMA situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting. o RJRC supports ACEMA training and exercise programs.	o RJRC supports effective deployment and employment of emergency assets as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances ACEMA situational awareness through status updates and reporting. - Including mission planning support for ACEMA elements en route. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for ACEMA personnel deployed to PIT.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for recovery organizations and personnel deployed to PIT.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)	o RJRC arranges for and provides location to UPMC for training and exercises. o RJRC enhances UPMC situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting. o RJRC may stockpile emergency medical equipment and supplies.	o RJRC supports effective employment of UPMC medical capabilities as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances UPMC situational awareness through status updates and reporting.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting.
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)	o RJRC arranges for and provides location for training and exercises to hospitals in the NDMS network. o RJRC enhances NDMS network's situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting. o RJRC may stockpile emergency medical equipment and	o RJRC supports effective employment of NDMS assets as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances NDMS network's situational awareness through status updates and reporting. - Including mission planning support for NDMS liaisons	

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
	supplies.	and/or elements en route. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for NDMS personnel deployed to PIT.	
Medical Research Programs[5]	o RJRC helps identify opportunities to leverage ongoing medical research programs for contingency missions.		o RJRC helps identify lessons learned and opportunities to leverage medical research programs for future contingency missions.
Integrated Medical Information Technology System (IMITS)	o RJRC provides dedicated, operational capability for communication, coordination, and integration. - Plug-in for IMITS.	o RJRC supports effective employment of remote medical expertise by integrating IMITS telemedicine into an established hub for emergency communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC may convey IMITS information to medical personnel/units en route to PIT.	o RJRC supports effective employment of remote medical expertise for enhanced long-term healthcare by integrating IMITS telemedicine into an established hub for emergency communication, coordination, and integration.
171st Air Refueling Wing	o RJRC arranges for and provides location to 171st Air Refueling Wing for training and exercises on homeland security/ emergency preparedness. o RJRC enhances 171st Air Refueling Wing's situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting. o RJRC may stockpile emergency medical equipment and supplies for 171st Air Refueling Wing's EMEDS.	o RJRC supports effective employment of 171st Air Refueling Wing assets as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances 171st Air Refueling Wing's situational awareness through status updates and reporting.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting.
911th Airlift Wing	o RJRC arranges for and provides location to 911th Airlift Wing for	o RJRC supports effective employment of 911th Airlift Wing assets as an	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication,

[5] Key medical S&T programs include the 91 Whiskey Combat Medic Program, Special Operations Performance Enhancement and Injury Prevention Laboratory, and the Institute for Simulation, Education and Research (WISER).

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
	training and exercises on homeland security/ emergency preparedness. o RJRC enhances 911th Airlift Wing situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting.	established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances 911th Airlift Wing's situational awareness through status updates and reporting.	coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting.
99th Regional Readiness Command (99th RRC)	o RJRC arranges for and provides location to 99th RRC units for training and exercises on homeland security/ emergency preparedness. o RJRC enhances 99th RRC situational awareness through warnings, alerts, and reporting.	o RJRC supports effective employment of 99th RRC units as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances 99th RRC's situational awareness through status updates and reporting. - Including mission planning support for NDMS liaisons and/or elements en route. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for U.S. Army Reserve units deployed to PIT.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for any U.S. Army Reserve units involved in recovery support.
Civilian Departments & Organizations (other) - Fire - Police - EMS - Hospitals - HAZMAT teams - Civilian EOD	o RJRC arranges for and provides location to fire, police, EMS, and related civilian organizations for training and exercises on homeland security/ emergency preparedness. o RJRC enhances situational awareness of civilian departments and organizations through warnings, alerts, and reporting.	o RJRC supports effective employment of fire, police, EMS, and related civilian organizations as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances situational awareness through status updates and reporting. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for additional personnel deployed to PIT.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and reporting.
Military Forces - Aviation. - Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC). - Engineer. - EOD. - Medical.	o RJRC may arrange for and provides location to military forces for training and exercises on homeland security/ emergency preparedness. o RJRC maintains list of capabilities for all DoD	o RJRC supports effective employment of military units as an established hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC enhances situational awareness through status updates and reporting.	o RJRC continues to serve as a hub for communication, coordination, and integration. o RJRC continues to enhance situational awareness through status updates and

Organizations	Pre-Incident	Response	Recovery
- MP. - Transportation /Support. - Signal. - Public Affairs. - General purpose	forces (Active, National Guard, and Reserve) relevant to homeland security/emergency preparedness planning.	- Including mission planning support for military units and personnel en route. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for units deployed to PIT.	reporting. o RJRC provides established facilities and communication plug-in for any military forces involved in recovery support.

While the intelligence picture developed as part of each scenario generally reflects suspected terrorists capabilities and known tradecraft, all scenarios are fictitious and Applied Military Technologies is not aware of any credible intelligence that indicates that such an attack is being planned, or that the agents or devices in question are in possession of any known terrorist group.

ANNEX C
KEY DOCUMENTS

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ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JAN 4 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS
INFRASTRUCTURE STEERING GROUP MEMBERS
JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP CHAIRMAN

Subject: 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria

The Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-510, to specify the selection criteria. Specifically, the amendment revised the criteria previously published by the Secretary of Defense by adding the word "surge" to criterion three. The amendment also revised the wording, but not the meaning, of criteria one and seven, to avoid the use of the possessive.

The Department shall use the attached 2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Selection Criteria, along with the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory, to make recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States, as defined in the base closure statute. This direction supersedes any previous direction regarding selection criteria for the BRAC 2005 process. The 2005 BRAC Commission will also use these criteria in their review of the Department of Defense's final recommendations.

Michael W. Wynne
(Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment:
As stated

Final Selection Criteria
Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration tot military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

OCT 14 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUPS

SUBJECT: Policy Memorandum Two--BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles

The Department has determined that the most appropriate way to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in making closure and realignment recommendations is to determine military value through the exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation. The quantitative analytical foundation is built by the Joint Cross-Service Groups and Military Departments applying the BRAC selection criteria to rank the facilities for which they have responsibility. The exercise of military judgment occurs through the application of principles. Limited in number and written broadly, the principles enumerate the essential elements of military judgment. The Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups shall use the attached principles when applying military judgment in their deliberative processes.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
Chairman, Infrastructure Steering Group

Attachment:
As Stated

BRAC Principles

Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and service doctrine and tactics.

Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, including quality of work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that takes advantage of opportunities for joint basing.

Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

Operational Readiness Training Complex Memorandum

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT
600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0600

23 JAN 2004

DAIM-FD

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADQUARTERS, INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 2511 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY, ARLINGTON, VA 22202

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROGRAMS, 441 G. STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20314

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Training Complexes

1. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the success of the Army's Facility Reduction Program have forced Installations to quickly implement a variety of work-arounds to house the large number of Reserve Component soldiers being mobilized to either deploy (Mobilize and Deploy) or remain on post (Mobilize and Stay). Additional strain has been created by a large number of soldiers in medical hold status.

2. The above facility shortfall has also led to increasing difficulty to support recurring transient requirements for Reserve Component (RC) Annual Training, and Active Component (AC) Transient Collective Training.

3. To address the above requirements, the Army is considering a major long-term construction program to create Operational Readiness Training Complexes on Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms. There also may be need in the near-term to quickly construct such facilities at selected locations.

4. Consistent with the Army's new policy on Installation Design Standards, it is necessary to establish appropriate construction standards for new or renovated billets to support these requirements. There is a consensus between the Active and Reserve Components that the most efficient and flexible solution to these dynamic requirements is to provide a mix of open-bay billets (with a gang latrine in each building) and 2+2 modules (two 200 net square feet rooms with a shared bath). For planning purposes, construction standards will depend on intended usage as follows:

a. Mobilize and Stay (could also be used for Medical Hold):
- Private through Corporal – 2+2, two per room
- Sergeant and Staff Sergeant – 2+2, one per room
- Sergeant First Class and above – 2+2, one per module (both rooms)

ORTC Memorandum Continued

DAIM-FD
SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Training Complexes

b. Mob & Deploy, RC Annual Training, and AC Transient Collective Training:
- Private through Corporal – Open-Bay, 90 net square feet per person
- Sergeant to Staff Sergeant – Open-Bay, 135 net square feet per person, with optional free-standing privacy partitions
- Sergeant First Class to First Sergeant; Warrant Officer 1 through Chief Warrant Officer 3; Second Lieutenant through Captain – 2+2, two per room
- Sergeant Major, Chief Warrant Officer 4, Major and above – 2+2, one per room

5. The need for other features associated with barracks such as laundries, dayrooms, mudrooms, kitchens, etc will be determined during development of the standard design. In addition to barracks, Operational Readiness Training Complexes could include other facilities, depending on the site, to support company operations, battalion headquarters, brigade headquarters, organizational maintenance, dining, and perhaps in-out processing and community support.

6. Request USACE expeditiously identify a Center of Standardization for Operational Readiness Training Complexes to develop a standard design and criteria, and to oversee the planning, design, construction, and operation and maintenance of all complexes. To initiate this effort, request that USACE make available $100,000 of MCA Planning and Design funds. POC is Mr. Huffman, DAIM-FDH, 703-601-2504 (DSN 329), Charles.Huffman@hqda.army.mil.

7. Quality Facilities for Quality Soldiers!

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT:

JOHN B. NERGER
Director, Facilities and Housing

CF:
G1 (DAPE-PRR)
G3
G8 (DAPR-PDR)
FORSCOM
TRADOC
Army Reserve
NGB-AR
HQ-IMA (Operations, DPW Branch)

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

AUG 2 3 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Working with State and Local Governments to Combat Encroachment

As each of you is keenly aware, the Department of Defense (DoD) faces the challenge of encroachment on military readiness activities. Encroachment occurs when the supply of resources needed to perform the mission (attributes of land, water and air-is restricted by market) based regulations or unavailable due to competing needs in the surrounding community. As part of our effort to prevent encroachment, we have actively pursued clarifications to existing federal law to assure our ability to train as we fight. However, legislative action at the national level is just one element of our encroachment strategy. In addition, we must focus at the regional, state and installations level to educate and advise local/state governments and communities on the safety and operational impact of decisions affecting resource use on and around installations and test and training areas.

Component staff has inquired whether active participation in local planning processes could be seen as a compensable "taking" of property by the United States if local authorities act in accordance with installation recommendations. DoD General Counsel has advised that the majority of judicial decisions addressing the issue dispel this concern. Specifically, most courts considering the issue (generally in the context of local zoning decisions) have determined that there is no federal liability for a taking where a federal agency uses its position as an influential landowner to persuade local governmental bodies to adopt a position compatible with an installation mission needs.

The Department of Defense and the Military Departments have a number of programs in place to develop and share information to assist local governments in making land use decisions that are compatible with operations at defense installations. For example, DoD Instruction 4165.57, Air Installation Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) (32 CFR, Part 256), and similar instructions for ranges and ground installations, establish an approach for installations to analyze land use compatibility issues in the vicinity of military operations and propose potential solutions to local governing bodies and planning officials.

Similarly, DoD Directive 3030.1, Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), authorizes grants to eligible state and local governments to conduct Joint Land Use Studies in cooperation with a military installation and DoD Directive 3200.15, Sustainment of Ranges and Operating Areas, requires multi-tiered (e.g., national, regional and local) coordination and outreach programs in support of sustaining ranges and operational areas. Each of these policies encourages active involvement and technical assistance in local land use planning processes to ensure concerns related to encroachment are shared and appropriately resolved. Of course, in developing our outreach strategies, we should take an interdisciplinary approach that includes our Regional Environmental Coordinators, installation representatives, legal representatives and other needed disciplines.

As we continue our efforts addressing the impact of encroachment on military readiness, it is imperative that we effectively use all the tools and resources available to us. In this regard, I recommend you direct more active involvement at the installation and Regional Environmental Coordinator level in all aspects of state and local planning that could impact readiness. I have also asked my staff to include this topic as a discussion item at an upcoming Range Sustainment Working Integrated Product Team meeting to discuss actions being taken in furtherance of this policy.

Philip W. Grone
Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)

cc: DoD/GC (E&I)

ANNEX D
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

ACEMA	Allegheny County Emergency Management Agency
AAFES	Army Air Force Exchange System
AFB	Air Force Base
ARW	Air Refueling Wing
ATF	U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms

B

BVNPP	Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plant
BRAC	Base Realignments or Closures
BTS	Border and Transportation Security

C

CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives
CONEMP	Concept of Employment
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CBP	US Customs and Border Protection
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CIA	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
CONEMP	Concept of Employment
CONUS	Continental of United States
C-STARS	Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills

D

DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
CDC	Center for Disease Control
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency

DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation

E

EMEDS	Expeditionary Medical Support
EOC	Emergency Operation Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness and Response

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	U.S. Federal Highway Administration
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FTZ	Foreign Trade Zone
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GA	General Aviation Airport
GAO	United States General Accounting Office
GSA	U.S. General Services Administration
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism

H

HAZMAT	Hazardous Material
HLD	Homeland Defense
HLS	Homeland Security

I

ICAO	International Cargo
ICP	Incident Command Post
IEC	Infrastructure Executive Council
IED	Incident Command Post

IEG	Infrastructure Executive Council
IMITS	Integrated Medical Information Technology Systems
INRP	Initial National Response Plan
ISD	Infrastructure Steering Group
ISC	Infrastructure Executive Council
ISG	Infrastructure Steering Group
IUP	Indiana University of Pennsylvania

J

JCSGs	Joint Cross-Service Groups
JIATF	Joint Interagency Forces
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force

M

MEPS	Military Entrance Processing Station
MILCON	Military Construction

N

NCS	National Communications Systems
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NG	National Guard
NPIAS	National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
NGO	National Guard Organizations
NIH	National Institute of Health
NOAA	National Oceanic & Atmosphere Administration
NORTHCOM	US Northern Command
NPIAS	National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
NPP	National Priorities Project
NRA	Nuclear Regulatory Agency

O

OCONUS	Outside Continental of United States
OEP	Operational Evaluation Plan
OEP	Office Emergency Preparedness

P

PEMA	Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
PIT	Pittsburgh International Airport

Q

QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review

R

RC	Reserve Components
RJRC	Regional Joint Readiness Center RJRC
RRC	Regional Readiness Command

S

SAD	State Active Duty

T

TDY	Temporary Duty
TSA	U.S Transportation Safety

U

UPMC	University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
USCG	US Coast Guard
USCIS	US Citizenship and Immigration Services
USD AT&L	Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

V

VA HCS	VA Healthcare System

W

WISER	The Institute for Simulation, Education and Research
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction