



# Reserve Officers Association of the United States

*"PRESERVING THE NATION'S DEFENSE FOR OVER 75 YEARS"*

July 14, 2005

BRAC Commission

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi  
Chairman, Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)  
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600  
Arlington, VA 22202

**JUL 15 2005**

Received

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosed white paper addresses the Reserve Officers Association's (ROA) overall concerns about DoD's 2005 recommendations for base closures and realignments (BRAC). It also offers ROA's suggestions to the BRAC Commission for the Reserve Components in particular.

ROA's intent is to properly frame certain important elements of the debate in relation to the Reserve Components. At the same time, ROA appreciates the monumental task facing the commission in developing the final recommendations to the President and Congress.

I greatly appreciate your sharing this white paper with the Commission and your staff. For additional copies of this white paper or to speak to my staff, please see page 34 of the enclosure for names and contact information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dennis M. McCarthy".

Dennis M. McCarthy  
Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret.)  
Executive Director

✓ cc: Mr. Charles Battaglia, BRAC Executive Director

Encl: ROA White Paper, DoD 2005 BRAC Process

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**Reserve Officers Association  
National Headquarters**



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**Department of Defense  
2005 Base Realignment  
and Closure (BRAC) Process**

**July 2005**



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## I. Introduction

This paper will address the Reserve Officer Association's (ROA) overall concerns about DoD's recommendations for base closures and realignments (BRAC) starting in FY 2007. It will also offer our suggestions to the BRAC Commission. ROA's intent is to properly frame certain important elements of the debate. The Commission faces a monumental task in developing their final recommendations and will most likely make several modifications to DoD's initial proposal as it has done in previous BRACs.

Since ROA's May 16, 2005, letter to the BRAC Commission, many of the details of DoD's BRAC proposals are still unknown, but enough details have emerged on the potential impact to the Reserve Components to give ROA even more concern. If the BRAC list of locations impacting Reservists and Guardsmen is allowed to stand as recommended, ROA strongly believes the nation's support for future military efforts will greatly suffer.

By and large, the closure or relocation of Reserve Component (RC) units is problematic for citizen-warriors. Reserve and Guard centers throughout the country are community centered, as are many Reserve Component members' civilian jobs and homes. Also, population demographics is a critical element in recruiting and retention of a quality citizen-warrior force. Implementing the changes the Secretary of Defense recommended puts recruiting and retention at grave risk since RC members will no longer be able to travel to monthly training assemblies. Losing RC members means losing expertise, critical skills, and experience needed to wage the new types of warfare, such as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). A consequence of these negative effects is their direct impact on America's commitment to preserving a strong strategic Reserve and adequate national security.

The current balance between active military forces and Reserve Component forces (approximately 50:50) was incrementally created over time with cognizance of the great costs savings of part-time Reservists and Guardsmen and the Abrams Doctrine, which links the military to communities throughout the nation. It has been known since the 1950s that the nation could not afford the entire force structure needed to defend our nation on active duty. The GWOT has proven that this strategy is as good today as it was in the Cold War.

The approximately 50 percent of the force today in the Reserve Component is saving DoD billions of dollars over having this force structure in the Active Component. That being said, there is a cost to having this Reserve force structure, and one of the costs is decentralization of the force so that units can be located in the communities where the demographics can support them. Again, even though decentralization drives some costs up, the 50 percent of the force in the Reserve Component costs only a fraction of the active half of the force structure.

ROA understands that the centralization proposed by the Army for the Army Reserve makes good sense in most cases because the *demographics of the existing Army Reserve force structure was considered*. But ROA strongly believes that many of the BRAC 2005 proposals for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard may reduce the readiness of the force structure and overestimates the future costs savings. Thousands of highly trained Reservists will be displaced because they will not be able to travel to their new unit locations. If these actions take place soon, ROA believes the readiness to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would be diminished significantly. ROA believe the Commission would find that most all of the units being closed or realigned have already participated at least once in the presidential recalls for the GWOT. This leads ROA to believe they are still very much needed and should not be impacted by such drastic realignments being proposed.

Finally, ROA is concerned that the May 2005 BRAC announcement did not include presentation of transition assistance programs for military personnel, unlike in 1991 when BRAC and the legislation on transition occurred at the same time. Appendix 1 of this paper addresses Reserve transition initiatives, which will be essential for any base closure or realignment program. These initiatives must be considered before the FY 2007 budget is proposed and nothing is put in place for our citizen-warriors affected by the 2005 BRAC announcement and other such future recommendations.

## II. ROA's Concerns of DoD's Proposals

The Reserve Officers Association was disappointed that the substance and presentation of the DoD BRAC announcement did not include all information that would impact the Reserve Components (RC). It is too late to repair the announcement's exclusion of the traditional [drilling] Guard and Reserve positions affected; however, the Commission now has the opportunity to consider the full ramifications of the DoD proposal. To assist the Commission, the following ROA concerns are presented:

- **Although the BRAC indicates that only 546 jobs will be lost by closures and realignment with Navy Reserve Center closures, the report totally failed to reflect the impact on over 12,600 Reservists who will be displaced by these closures.** With more Reservists traveling, the dollars spent on overnight accommodations and meals will have an economic impact.
- **BRAC is used less as a means to reduce excess infrastructure than as a method to implement force structure changes.** Other organizations share ROA's concerns that the BRAC encompassed more than what Congress intended. According to GAO, "While DoD characterized many of its recommendations as transformational—whereby infrastructure would be aligned with the defense strategy—we found that the concept of transformation is not well defined, and many of the recommendations referencing it as support for the proposed BRAC actions are more appropriately categorized as efforts to improve business processes."<sup>1</sup>
- **BRAC selections presuppose rationale with national strategy decisions not yet available under the purview of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Commission on the National Guard and Reserve.** The last QDR was completed before the advent of the war on terrorism and the establishment of a homeland defense mission, both of which will affect the use of the RC forces.
- **The impact to RC billets are not fully addressed as seen with the absence of legislation proposed for transition initiatives. Actual cost of BRAC is skewed without inclusion of transition initiatives.** An indication of this was noted by GAO: "These issues include instances of lengthy payback periods, which is the time required to recoup up-front investment costs for closing or realigning a facility or function; inconsistencies in formulating cost and savings estimates; uncertainties in estimating total costs to the government for implementing recommended actions; and potential impacts on communities surrounding bases that are either losing or gaining large numbers of personnel."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Analysis of DoD's 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785, July 2005, page 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, page 6.

- **Loss of experienced personnel in asymmetrical operations through realignments at a time when some services are experiencing recruiting and retention problems would be detrimental.** Traditionally the forces have been trained for a 180-degree war with symmetrical forces, but the war on terrorism requires engagement with asymmetrical forces in a 360-degree manner.
- **BRAC changes reduce the number of areas where the RCs are successfully coexisting with civilian communities in compliance with the Abrams Doctrine and puts them into communities that will need to accommodate OCONUS reductions.** Again, according to the GAO report "With respect to the latter issue, this BRAC round differs from prior rounds in that many communities will be facing increased growth with the return of thousands of forces from overseas locations and the consequent challenges of addressing increased needs in areas such as schools and housing."<sup>3</sup>
- **The BRAC proposals dismiss successful RC population demographics impact on recruiting.** Realignment assume that positions and personnel moved from one position to another will take place without incurring any vacancies. Many of the realignments take place from one state to another, outside the reasonably accepted commuting distances. Some of the realignments change to entirely different regions of the country. Recruiting difficulties are inevitable as services are already experiencing these conditions without the challenge of realignments; appropriations to enable recruiting these additional positions have not been forecasted; school slots have not been increased to accommodate non-prior service recruitments; and not all population centers are successful recruiting environments.
- **The proposals shift force balance from the RC to the Active Component absent appropriate dialog on the wisdom of such a shift with full consideration of Homeland Security requirements and of an adequately sized strategic Reserve.** Execution of the war on terrorism has been made possible because the Reserve Components allow a surge in force and equipment. Realignment of forces will reduce the countries ability to surge when either anticipated or unanticipated environments emerge.
- **ROA perceives the recommended closures of NAS that have been Navy Air Reserve activities as a justification to decommission Navy Air Reserve Squadrons.**

ROA recognizes that the military is still adjusting to the change from a force designed to meet the Cold War to one designed for changing missions. The point is not that change needs to be stopped; it is that *changes need to be made with all factors considered.*

### III. ROA's Recommendations to the BRAC Commission

After a careful review of the DoD proposals to the BRAC Commission, ROA offers the following key recommendations:

- **Separate RC realignments from the BRAC and reevaluate upon completion of the QDR, Homeland Defense study, and the Commission on the National Guard and**

<sup>3</sup> Ibid GAO Analysis, July 2005, page 6.

**Reserve report.** Any follow-on realignment actions can be proposed by a date agreed to by Congress.

- **Suspend all C-130 and C-135 moves under BRAC pending complete analysis of the QDR, Mobility Capability Study XX and the Congressional Commission of the National Guard and Reserve.** This is chiefly due to the long distance “commuting” required for RC members as a result of closure or realignment of aviation type units without a new mission. To reduce infrastructure costs, AF Agile Combat Support transformation concepts should be considered. Examples include regional mission support centers for personnel, budget, supply, and transportation, such as part-time personnel and office supply vendors with direct delivery to offices at the reserve base. Any follow-on “realignment” actions can be proposed by Dec. 31, 2006 (or alternate date) to the Congress outside the BRAC 2005 process.
- **Ensure all BRAC changes impacting Guard and Reserve personnel comply with the 100-mile reasonable commute policy of DoD.** For aviation related units, a reasonable option would be two hours flying time and dedication of a “Unit Training Assembly (UTA) Airlift” system to support the aviation units.
- **Distribute USN Mine sweep assets to both coasts in support of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.** The MHC class should be transferred to the Navy Reserve for use as training platforms at waterfront Navy Reserve Activities, rather than be decommissioned.
- **Legislate transition incentives now to enable the services to accommodate realignment decisions with the proper force management tools over a reasonable period without sacrificing capability.**

ROA also recommends that, if feasible, the Commission seriously consider leaving a Reserve and/or Guard cantonment area on active bases on the BRAC list where Reserve and Guard units are located.

Additionally, ROA is developing policy and legislative options for ensuring that adequate transition benefits and protections for the thousands of Reservists who would be negatively impacted are in place. ROA is the first Association to study and suggest options concerning transitions benefits and protections. Appendix 1 of this paper describes ROA’s transition ideas and recommendations.

#### **IV. Specific Impact on the Army Reserve**

The Army Reserve leadership is pleased with the proposed BRAC actions. They consider it to be a major victory in terms of efficiency and transformation of the force. The closing of 176 Army Reserve Centers will mean eliminating older facilities, many of which are located in areas of low population density where recruiting is difficult. The plan includes the construction of 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers at a cost of \$2.9 billion. The new joint-use facilities will feature virtual training centers (VTC) and distance learning facilities, fitness centers, maintenance and dining facilities, and instructional facilities that can also be used for overnight lodging for soldiers traveling from distant locations. The Army Reserve states that the 125 new centers will be in close proximity to the affected units and soldiers. If the 176 centers were to remain open it would result in a recapitalization cost almost equal to the cost of the construction of the newer facilities (est. \$2.1 billion).

BRAC for the Army Reserve also fits with the proposed streamlining of Army Reserve command and control, which will create four regional commands and numerous functional command and control headquarters that will provide direct training and command operational units. These command and control changes were fully supported in the BRAC recommendations submitted by the Department of Defense to the BRAC commission.

### ***ROA's Position on the Impact on the Army Reserve***

The Reserve Officers Association supports common sense recommendations that would improve the quality of life for Reserve Soldiers while, at the same time, achieving cost efficiencies. Regarding the Army Reserve, ROA's principal concerns are:

- Closing Reserve centers in small town America seems to violate the Abrams Doctrine.
- How many soldiers will be affected by the elimination of 176 Army Reserve facilities? ROA would like to see the details since the Army Reserve has indicated that the new centers will be close to the centers being closed.
- Where will the affected units go? Will they be relocated or eliminated?
- How will this affect the Army Reserve's new Expeditionary Force Package plan?
- What recommendations might the Guard and Reserve Commission make that could conflict with these plans?
- How will these changes in force structure and command and control match or conflict with recommendations that might come from the Quadrennial Defense Review?
- How many Soldiers will be forced to travel more than 50 miles at their own expense for training?
- Will Soldiers be required to pay for lodging in the new centers? (There is an associated expense for lodging.)
- What will be the effects on recruiting and retention?
- Why move the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) headquarters to Pope Air Force Base? The building is less than 10 years old, paid for, and ideally located for the missions and functions of the Army Reserve. The cost of building a new headquarters would seem to outweigh any benefits of moving. Even if Fort McPherson is closed, the USARC could stay in place with a separate, secure entrance. Many of the civilian work force would likely want to stay in the area and might choose to retire or seek other government positions. The labor pool in and around Fayetteville, N.C., is meager compared to a major metropolitan area.

## **V. Specific Impact on the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve**

"For Navy Reserve Centers, these recommendations close 35 activities and retain 117 centers. Excess capacity is reduced from 14.0 percent to 3.1 percent and military value increased from 59.96 percent to 61.75 percent. For Marine Corps Reserve Centers, the analysis sought to optimally locate activities. Two facilities were identified for closure and movement to existing Navy-owned facilities, keeping 32 Marine Corps-owned Reserve facilities open. Excess capacity is reduced by 5.5 percent. The average military value for Marine Corps Reserve Centers does not change because the two actions move the Marine units onto nearby active duty installations with valued characteristics, thereby enhancing the military value. The net savings to the Department [of the Navy] over 20 years for all 37 closure recommendations is approximately

\$126.2 million," according to *Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV) May 2005*.

The Department of the Navy (DoN) employed a multi-pronged strategy for BRAC 2005 that sought to rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess, balance the effectiveness of fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities, leverage opportunities for total force lay down and joint basing, accommodate changing operational concepts, and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment. In developing BRAC 2005 recommendations, DoN adhered to the principles that its recommendations must eliminate excess capacity, save money, improve operational readiness and jointness, and maintain quality of service.<sup>4</sup>

Thirty-five Navy Reserve Centers of 152 facilities are being closed. Two Marine Corps centers of 187 facilities are also being closed. The closure of 35 Navy centers will be offset by 12 new joint Armed Forces Reserve Centers resulting in a capacity reduction of 12.7 percent of total current square footage. The closure of two Marine Corps centers will result in a capacity reduction of 5.5 percent of total current square footage.<sup>5</sup>

Reserve missions are also being affected by closures of an additional three Navy Air Stations, one Navy station and a Navy support activity. One additional Navy Air Station will also be all but shutdown by having its missions realigned to other locations.

While authorized cuts in USNR end strength are proposed to be 16 percent of the force (13,400 members) the BRAC closures represents 23.68 percent of the facilities. Following the consolidation of 12 of the 35 Navy Reserve Centers with Joint Armed Forces Centers, the closure rate will be closer to 15 percent. USMCR cuts represent one percent of their facilities.

#### ***Active/Joint Base Closures with Reserve Missions***

##### Navy and Marine Headquarters Navy Support Activity, New Orleans

Navy Support Activity (NSA), New Orleans, La., is recommended by DoN for closure in an effort to streamline operations and reduce costs. These facilities include the offices and housing for the staffs of the Commander, Navy Reserve Force Command, and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve.

The Marine Corps plans to continue a presence in New Orleans. Marine Forces Reserve New Orleans, La., and Marine Forces Reserve Kansas City, Mo., will move to Navy Air Station (NAS) Belle Chasse/Joint Reserve Base (JRB), which is about 10 miles down river from NSA.

The Navy Reserve Center New Orleans has already become part of the Joint Armed Services Reserve Center at Belle Chasse. The Navy Air Reserve Activity will continue at JRB (NAS) Belle Chasse. Overloading Belle Chasse's existing infrastructure was not addressed, nor was a potentially transformational realignment proposal by the City of New Orleans and Louisiana.

Navy personnel and Reserve recruiting commands will relocate to Navy Support Activity Millington, Tenn. Navy Reserve Commands will move to Navy Station Norfolk, Va. These moves

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<sup>4</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 1, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

create a Human Resources Center of Excellence at Millington, Tenn. They also co-locate Navy Reserve (NAVRES) with Commander Fleet Forces Command to increase organizational synergies.

**BRAC Justification:** Relocating these functions removes the primary missions from New Orleans, and eliminates or moves the entire workforce, except for personnel associated with the base operations support function and a number of smaller tenant activities. As a result, retention of NOLA will no longer be required.<sup>6</sup>

**Claimed Savings:** The total DoD costs to implement this recommendation is \$164.6 million. The net cost to the Department during the implementation period is a **cost** of \$86.1 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$36.5 million with a payback expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$276.4 million.

**ROA Concern:** The century-old Navy base in New Orleans threatens an economic engine worth \$142 million in payroll.

Navy Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Willow Grove, Pa.

With 865 military and 362 civilian full-time employees, this is the largest among 13 military installations in Pennsylvania that would be closed under BRAC. It has been recommended that Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, their aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support be moved to McGuire Air Force Base (AFB), N.J.

Primary Navy operational tenant of NAS Willow Grove is P-3 patrol squadron VP-66. Other tenants at the installation include the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and one Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron.

The Pentagon wants to create an Armed Forces Reserve Center on 175 acres through the closure and consolidation of several small Army Reserve Centers in the Philadelphia area.

**BRAC Justification:** This recommendation will reduce excess capacity while creating new joint opportunities in the McGuire Air Force Base/Fort Dix/Navy Aviation Engineering Station Lakehurst military concentration area. This recommendation leverages maintenance and operational efficiencies within Marine Corps Reserve Aviation and maintains Reserve forces in areas with favorable demographics. Inclusion of the realignment of Cambria Regional Airport in this recommendation allows the assets currently housed there to be collocated with their headquarters at McGuire Air Force Base.<sup>7</sup>

**Claimed Savings:** The Pentagon estimates it will cost \$126.3 million to close Willow Grove. The net of all costs and savings to DoN during the implementation period is a savings of \$134.7 million. Annual recurring savings to DoN after implementation is \$60.6 million with a payback expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Navy over 20 years is a savings of \$710.5 million.

Recent Department of Defense (DoD) discussions about encroachment have noted that NAS Willow Grove cannot be "fit into" current Air Installations Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ)

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid Navy BRAC Report.

<sup>7</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 22, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

planning templates. Existing encroachment at the east end of the installation precludes initiating effective land controls. However, the west end of the field is relatively free from encroachment, and offers opportunities for DoD and the affected local jurisdictions to undertake an effective partnership to safeguard the field's operating flexibility and future availability.<sup>8</sup>

**ROA Concerns:** Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Willow Grove has been described as a model facility for joint operations because it is able to conduct joint missions across the service branches, plays an important role for the Pennsylvania's National Guard, and is strategically placed near major cities on the East Coast. It is the home to the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Air National Guard and Army Reserve. The DoD has suggested deactivating the 111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard.

The Willow Grove base employs nearly 2,776 military and civilian personnel and contributes nearly \$87 million in economic activity for the district with an estimated \$61.3 million in annual earnings.

Willow Grove is also an important homeland security asset. Its 8,000-foot runway can accommodate all aircraft, including Air Force One. In times of emergency, Willow Grove could take on commercial aircraft from Washington, D.C., to New York. If the 1,100-acre base is closed, DoD would be unable to develop a similar base of this size in the future in that region.

#### Navy Air Station (NAS) Atlanta, Ga.

Cobb County stands to lose 707 active duty and 2,168 Reserve sailors and 526 active duty and 1,027 Reserve Marines. The base could also lose 92 civilian jobs. NAS Atlanta is used by more than 20 Navy and Marine Reserve units, several of which were battle-hardened in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup>

NAS Atlanta is home to the Marine F/A-18 Hornet squadron VMFA-142, which flies air superiority missions. Other squadrons include the VR-46 Eagles, who fly the C-9 Skytrain, providing crucial airlift logistics support, and conduct critical operations in support of U.S. Central Command. The VAW-77 Nightwolves, who fly the E-2C, which provides intelligence missions have made valuable contributions to our counter narcotics efforts. Personnel from the USMC helicopter squadron, HMLA-773, were the first group in the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Air Wing to be mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>10</sup>

Just decommissioned on June 30, 2004, by the Navy, VA-203, the Blue Dolphins, was an F-18C squadron. With this decommissioning, the Navy lost its ability to deploy the Navy Reserve F-18s as a full air wing. One hundred and twenty-nine active-duty jobs and 91 part-time Reserve jobs were lost when the squadron was decommissioned.

**BRAC Justification:** Navy aircraft squadrons will move to the joint Reserve bases in New Orleans, La., and Fort Worth, Texas. Marine Corps squadrons will move to Fort Worth and Robins AFB. The Department of Navy (DoN) has suggested consolidating the Navy Air Reserve Atlanta with Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta located at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Ga., and keeping the Windy Hill Annex open. This recommendation would reduce excess capacity while placing VAW 77 closer to their theater of operations and maintaining Reserve

<sup>8</sup> NAS JRB Willow Grove, Global Security Organization.

<sup>9</sup> Cobb Chamber Aims to Halt Base Closing, *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, May 19, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> NAS plays key role in U.S. National Security; by U.S. Sen. Saxby Chambliss, May 25, 2005, Senate Press Room.

forces in regions with favorable demographics.<sup>11</sup> and will result in increased maintenance efficiencies and operational synergies. Relocating Reserve Intelligence Area 14 to Fort Gillem, Ga. (which is on the BRAC list to close), would create synergies with joint intelligence assets while maintaining the demographic base offered by the Atlanta area for this function.<sup>12</sup>

**Claimed Savings:** The total DoD estimated cost to implement this recommendation is \$43 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$289.9 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$66.1 million with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$910.9 million.

With a common airfield, the larger Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB) and Lockheed Martin manufacturing operations will remain. Dobbins ARB, Ga., in Marietta adjoins Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems. With a 10,000-foot runway, the Dobbins-Lockheed complex includes 3,087 acres. Dobbins ARB is the largest multi-service Reserve training base in the world. NAS Atlanta sits on 166 acres.

**ROA Concerns:** Metro-Atlanta is the largest metropolitan area in the Southeast. NAS Atlanta has its home in a diverse region that provides high quality education, health care, and recreation for our military men and women. The Atlanta area employs the second largest number of people in the defense aerospace industry of any metropolitan area in the country, behind only Los Angeles, and offers unmatched recruiting of Navy Reserve pilots and personnel in critical specialties such as aircraft maintenance.<sup>13</sup>

#### Navy Air Station (NAS) Brunswick, Maine

Brunswick has 29 tenant commands, including a Reserve P-3 squadron (VP-92) and a Reserve Fleet Logistics Support Squadron flying (VR-62) C-130 "Hercules" transports. In addition, over 1,600 Navy Reservists travel from throughout New England to drill at Navy Air Reserve Brunswick, Seabee Battalion and numerous other Reserve commands.<sup>14</sup>

As part of the realignment, Patrol Wing Five and its squadrons of P-3s and one squadron of C-130s will be relocated to Navy Air Station Jacksonville, Fla.

**BRAC Justification:** The realignment of NAS Brunswick will reduce operating costs while single-siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at NAS Jacksonville. This recommendation retains an operational airfield in the northeast that can be used to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility.<sup>15</sup>

**Claimed Savings:** It is estimated that it will cost DoD \$147.2 million to implement this recommendation. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a **cost** of \$112.6 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$34.9 million with a payback expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$238.8 million.

**ROA Concerns:** Located near great circle routes for both shipping and air lanes, NAS Brunswick is the base closest to the European theater and NATO commands.

<sup>11</sup> Georgia, Proposed Navy BRAC Bases for 2005, DoN BRAC Program Management Office.

<sup>12</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 13, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid Senator Chambliss.

<sup>14</sup> Navy Air Station Brunswick, Global Security Organization.

<sup>15</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 18, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

As Maine's second largest employer, NAS Brunswick employs 4,863 military and civilian personnel, including 713 officers, 3,493 enlisted personnel and 657 civilians. The air station provides over \$187 million to the local economy, including \$115 million in salaries, \$38 million in contracts and material purchases, and \$34 million in medical purchases.

#### Navy Station (NS) Ingleside, Texas

NS Ingleside is as close as one comes to a Surface Navy Reserve Base. As part of the latest base closure round, the Navy plans to relocate Mine Warfare Command from Corpus Christi, Texas, to San Diego, Calif. Ingleside, which home ports the Mine Countermeasures Fleet, would be closed and the air base in Corpus Christi, Texas, would be realigned. The command's ships and Mine Counter Measure ships (MCM), with their dedicated personnel, would be relocated from Ingleside to San Diego.

#### Navy Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas

Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) and dedicated personnel, would move to the Navy station in Norfolk, Va. The Mine Warfare Training Center will consolidate with Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center at Navy Base Point Loma.

**BRAC Justification:** This recommendation would move mine warfare surface and aviation assets to major fleet concentration areas and reduce excess capacity. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Navy Air Station Key West, Fla., and Navy Air Station Pensacola, Fla. Additionally, U.S. Coast Guard presence is expected to remain in the Gulf Coast region.<sup>16</sup>

DoN recommends closure to consolidate Navy Mine Warfare Forces at major fleet concentration areas in an effort to streamline operations. Four of the 14 MCM ships have been transferred to the Navy Reserve. Twelve Mine Hunter Coastal (MHC) ships are scheduled for decommissioning between FY 2006 and FY 2008 and will not relocate. The MHC class was delivered to the USN between 1993 and 1999. Navy leadership says that the MHC is not compatible with the fleet with a speed of advance of 12 knots.

**Claimed Savings:** The estimated cost to DoD to implement this recommendation is \$178.4 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of \$100 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation is \$75.6 million with a payback expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$822.2 million.<sup>17</sup>

**ROA Concerns:** The MHC class was transferred into the Navy Reserve Force in 2000. Decommissioning these vessels reduces the number of training platforms. MHCs should be transferred to waterfront Navy Reserve Activities to provide hands-on seamanship training.

Mine counter measure has been a traditional Navy Reserve mission. The new Littoral Combat Ship (LSC) will assume the mine counter measure mission utilizing a plug and play modular system. Manning of the mine counter measure module by USNR teams should be examined.

<sup>16</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 26, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, page 27.

### **Reserve Center Closures**

#### **Alabama:**

- Close Navy Reserve Center, Tuscaloosa, Ala. By closing the Tuscaloosa center, DoD estimated a savings of \$11.4 million over 20 years. The closure will affect seven full-time military personnel employed at the center and about 100 Reservists who are assigned to the Tuscaloosa center. The armed forces are planning to build a new joint armed services Reserve Center in Tuscaloosa to open in 2008. NMCR Center Bessemer is 45 miles away.
- Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile, Ala and relocate the Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Mobile, Ala.

#### **California:**

- Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Encino, Calif., and relocate the Marine Corps units to Marine Corps Reserve Center Pasadena, Calif., 23 miles away.
- Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell, Calif.<sup>18</sup>, *except Armed Forces Reserve Center at Bell is also on the BRAC list to close.*

**Florida:** Close Navy Reserve Center, St Petersburg. The distance to Navy Reserve Center Tampa is 19 miles; Orlando Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center is 104 miles.

**Georgia:** Close Inspector-Instructor Rome, Ga., and relocate Marine Corps Reserve units and support staff to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta 70 miles away.

**Idaho:** Close Navy Reserve Facility, Pocatello. The distance to Navy Reserve Center Boise is 238 miles; Navy Reserve Center Salt Lake City, Utah, is 165 miles.

**Illinois:** Close Navy Reserve Center, Forest Park. The distance to Navy Reserve Center Great Lakes is 43 miles; Navy Reserve Center South Bend, Ind., is 104 miles.

#### **Indiana:**

- Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center, Grissom Air Reserve Base, Bunker Hill, Ind. The distance to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Indianapolis is 80 miles; Navy Reserve Center South Bend, Ind., is 70 miles.
- Close Navy Reserve Center (AFRC) Evansville, Ind. The distance to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Indianapolis is 88 miles; Louisville, Ky., is 117 miles; St. Louis, Mo., is 171 miles.

These cuts in Indiana are recommended by DoN as they reduce excess capacity in the Reserve Center functional area. Existing capacity in support of the Reserve component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements.<sup>19</sup>

#### **Iowa:**

- Close Navy Reserve Center, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The distance to Camp Dodge is 134 miles; Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center, Rock Island, Ill., is 91 miles.

<sup>18</sup> California, Proposed Navy BRAC Bases for 2005, Department of the Navy BRAC Program Management Office.

<sup>19</sup> BRAC, Air Force link.

- Close Navy Reserve Center, Sioux City, Iowa. The distance to Camp Dodge is 201 miles; Navy Reserve Center in Omaha, Neb., is 92 miles.
- Camp Dodge AFRC (Armed Forces Reserve Center) is a proposed facility that would support Iowa Army National Guard units, U.S. Navy Reserve and U.S. Marine Corps Reserve units, a Military Entrance Processing Station, and the U.S. Army Recruiting Battalion Headquarters formerly located in Des Moines. Ironically, included under BRAC realignment showing a loss of 218 jobs, this facility doesn't yet exist.
- Close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Dubuque, Iowa, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison, Wis.,<sup>20</sup> 108 miles away.

**Kentucky:** Close Navy Reserve Center, Lexington, Ky., The distance to the Navy Reserve Center in Louisville, Ky., is 74 miles; Cincinnati, Ohio is 90 miles.

**Louisiana:** Close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Baton Rouge, La., and relocate the Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Baton Rouge. The distance to Navy Reserve Center New Orleans is 80 miles.

**Maine:** Close Navy Reserve Center, Bangor, Maine. The Navy Reserve Center was new construction at Navy Air Station Brunswick, costing \$1.95 million. It was built by the Gulf of Maine Research Institute in exchange for some surplus property. If the Navy Air Station Brunswick is closed, this could also close the NRC at Brunswick. The distance to Manchester, N.H., is about 121 miles; a new Armed Forces Reserve center is being built in Manchester and will be completed in 2007. The distance to Navy Reserve Center in Quincy, Mass., is 144 miles.

**Maryland:** Close Navy Reserve Center Adelphi, Md., The distance to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Washington, D.C., is 12 miles.

**Michigan:** Close Navy Reserve Center Marquette, Mich. The 13,120-square-foot building, in which the Navy Reserve Center is housed, belongs to Marquette County and is in transition to be sold to a private lease company. The distance to Lansing, Mich., is 396 Miles; Green Bay, Wis., is 180 miles away.

**Minnesota:** Close Navy Reserve Center Duluth, Minn. The Reserve center had been scheduled to move from a decades-old building near the Duluth airport to a facility being built on the Air National Guard base on the airport grounds.

**Missouri:** Close the Navy Reserve Center Cape Girardeau, Mo. St. Louis is approximately 120 miles away; Memphis is 180 miles away.

**Nebraska:** Close the Navy Reserve Center Lincoln, Neb. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Omaha is 64 miles away.

**New Jersey:** Close Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, N.J., and relocate Marine Corps Reserve units and support staff to Navy Reserve Center Ft. Dix, N.J., about 20 miles away.

**New York:**

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<sup>20</sup> Iowa, Proposed Navy BRAC Bases for 2005, Department of the Navy BRAC Program Management Office.

- Close the Navy Reserve Center Glens Falls, N.Y. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Albany, N.Y., is 55 miles away; Navy Reserve Center White River Junction, Vt., is 100 miles away.
- Close the Navy Reserve Center Horsehead, N.Y., Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Rochester, N.Y., is about 100 miles away; Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Buffalo, N.Y., is 150 miles.
- Close the Navy Reserve Center Watertown, N.Y. Navy Reserve Center Syracuse, N.Y, is about 71 miles away.

**North Carolina:** Close the Navy Reserve Center, Asheville, N.C. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Charlotte is 130 miles away; Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Knoxville, Ky., is 115 miles away.

**Ohio:** Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron, Ohio, and Navy Reserve Center Cleveland, Ohio, and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Akron, Ohio. The distance between Cleveland and Akron is about 40 miles.

**Oklahoma:** Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa, Okla., and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Broken Arrow, Okla., 15 miles away.

**Oregon:** Close Navy Reserve Center Central Point, Ore. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Eugene, Ore., is about 165 miles away; Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Sacramento, Calif., is about 315 miles away. Navy Reserve Center Central Point was intended to provide a drill site for Navy Reservists in Northern California and southern Oregon.

**Pennsylvania:** Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading, Pa., and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers Lehigh Valley, Pa., 106 miles away.

**Texas:**

- Close the Navy Reserve Center at Lubbock, Texas. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Amarillo is about 125 miles away.
- Close the Navy Reserve Center at Orange, Texas. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Houston is about 120 miles away.

**Washington:** Close the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center Tacoma. The distance to Navy Reserve Center Bangor, Wash., is about 53 miles; Navy Reserve Center Everett, Wash., is 60 miles. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Portland is 145 miles; U.S. Navy Reserve members in southern Washington will have to choose driving further north or head south to Portland, Ore.

**Wisconsin:** Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, Wis., and Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, Wis., and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison, Wis. The distance between Lacrosse and Madison is 144 miles.

**West Virginia:** Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville, W. Va., and relocate the Marine Corps units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Pittsburgh, Pa. The distance between the two centers is 68 miles.

***BRAC Justification:***

These recommendations will reduce excess capacity by consolidating 12 Navy Reserve Centers and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other Reserve centers in the effected areas or into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. Nine of the 12 Reserve center closures are joint actions with the Department of the Army that support relocation into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation will also relocate two Inspector-Instructor activities to existing Reserve facilities on active duty bases. Sufficient capacity for drilling Reservists is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy/Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center. This recommendation reduces excess capacity in the Department of the Navy Reserve center functional area, but existing capacity in support of the Department of the Navy Reserve Component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements.<sup>21</sup>

One rationale provided by Navy leadership for needing fewer Reserve centers is that Navy Reservists will be spending less time in Reserve centers and more time with their gaining commands.

The Navy does not want to be the landlord of Navy Reserve activities. The ownership responsibility has been turned over by the USNR to USN Commander Navy Installations, and a goal is that Navy Reserve Centers will be tenant commands of other locations. The plan was to close stand-alone facilities to mitigate force protection requirements. These facilities would be moved onto existing Navy installations, onto bases of other Armed Forces, or Joint Armed Forces Reserve concentrations.

Under BRAC, installation management functions will be realigned and merged into COMNAVREG Midwest. This move is part of an effort to reduce Navy infrastructure, minimize overhead, and streamline installation management.

***Claimed Savings:***

The total estimated, one-time, cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of a partial list of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers is \$62.35 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period (2006–2011) is a **cost** of \$17 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are \$7.9 million. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of \$66.8 million. Reserve activities with cost calculations are only 14 of the 37 Reserve activities have savings calculations: Encino, Moundsville, Reading, Los Angeles, Akron, Cleveland, Madison, Lacrosse, Dubuque, Baton Rouge, Tulsa, Mobile, West Trenton, and Rome.

Centers not costed in the Navy's BRAC Report are Tuscaloosa, St. Petersburg, Pocatello, Forest Park, Grissom, Evansville, Cedar Rapids, Sioux City, Lexington, Ky., Bangor, Adelphi, Marquette, Duluth, Cape Girardeau, Lincoln, Glens Falls, Horsehead, Watertown, Asheville, Central Point, Lubbock, Orange, and Tacoma. These centers are vulnerable to challenge as the DoN report does not include justification data.

***ROA Concerns:***

Apparently, the Navy used a two-hour drive as its standard to compute acceptable commuting distances. This policy is extending the commuting distance of Navy Reservists, adding increased safety risks when added miles and fatigue are combined with twilight and poor

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<sup>21</sup> Navy BRAC Report, page 30, [http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2\\_04\\_navy\\_mco.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/pdf/pt2_04_navy_mco.pdf).

weather. It should be remembered that Reservists normally drive to drill following a full civilian workday on Friday or in the early morning Saturday. They return home after a full training weekend on Sunday night.

The Army has used a 50-mile radius for planning USAR Reserve Centers. Above 50 miles, the Reserve service provides lodging. Below 50 miles, Reservists re expected to commute home for Saturday night.

Of the recommended closures to US Navy Reserve sites, 66 percent are more than 50 miles away from the closest alternative USNR site. Thirty-seven percent are more than 100 miles away from an alternative site. The longest apparent one-way commute will be 180 miles.

A more accurate means of measurement should be the interval gap, which should define distance between remaining Reserve Centers. This distance is important as when BRAC eliminates a Reserve Center, it is plucking training sites from the middle of a network, increasing the distances between the remaining sites, and stressing the system. For example the distance in Idaho is now 340 miles between Reserve Centers; 192 miles or more in Illinois.

Additionally, a number of peripheral Reserve centers have been recommended for closing, which would be spurs off the network. This extends the commuting distances for those members beyond the peripheral.

Added commuting time and expense to Reservists will be weighed as factors in retention decisions. Greater distances in the mid-west and west will pressure Reservists in the hinterland to quit, creating a coastal, metropolitan demographics for the USNR.

Creating mega centers will complicate administration of pay and record keeping and create training congestion. Reserve Centers of 1,000 members or more succeed only when this Human Resource Capital is time managed, dispersed to training sites away from the Reserve center, or the training center is a campus with multiple locations.

## **VI. Specific Impact on the Air Force Reserve**

ROA has serious concerns about the nation maintaining an effective strategic Reserve that is trained and ready to defend the nation in time of war or contingency. The impact to the Air Force Reserve (AFR) from proposals in the BRAC 2005 Report includes closing four C-130 AFRC bases, two C-135 Wings, and one A-10 Wing. All proposed changes in the report with impact to AFRC are shown by AFRC unit and state on the following chart.

**DoD BRAC Announcement May 13, 20 05 — Impact on AFRC**

<b>State</b>	<b>Base / Page Wing</b>	<b>AIRCRAFT ACTION</b>	<b>ECS/WG HQ ACTION</b>
<b>Ala.</b>	Maxwell AFB/39 908 AW	Gain 4 C130H	No change
<b>Ariz.</b>	Luke AFB/9 944 FW	Lose 15 F-16 New Mission	No Change
<b>Calif.</b>	Beale AFB-10 940 ARW	Lose 8 KC135 New Mission	No Change
	March AFB/11 452 AMW	Gain 4 KC135	No Change
	Vandenberg AFB/41 939 ARW	None	Wing HQ, ECS from Portland
<b>Colo.</b>	ARPC H&SA/33	None	Personnel Processing to Randolph; IMA Mgmt to Robins/HQ AFRC
	Buckley AFB/22 New Group	None	ECS from New Orleans
	Peterson AFB/43 302 AW	Gain 4 C130H Build New AD Associate to AFR	No change
	Schriever AFB/33 310 Space Group	None	Partial ECS from Niagara
<b>Fla.</b>	Eglin AFB (DON/21) Not in announcement	None	Wing HQ, ECS from Willow Grove
	Homestead AFB/47, 50 482 FW	Gain 9 F16	No Change
	MacDill AFB/10, 37 927 ARW	Build New Reserve Assoc to 16 KC135 (AD)	ECS, Wing HQ from Selfridge
<b>Ga.</b>	Dobbins AFB/52 94 AW	Gain 4 C130H	No Change
	Robins AFB H&SA-33	None	ARPC IMA Mgt from Denver
<b>La.</b>	Barksdale AFB-6, 22 917 Wing	Gain 9 A10	No Change

<u>State</u>	<u>Base / Page</u> <u>Wing</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u> <u>ACTION</u>	<u>ECS/WG HQ</u> <u>ACTION</u>
La.	N. Orleans (AFRC Close) 926 FW AF-22	Lose 15 A-10 (ANG Remains)	926 ECS to Buckley; 926 Wing HQ to Nellis
Mich.	Selfridge (AFRC Close) 927 ARW AF-10	Lose 8 KC135 (ANG Remains)	ECS, Wing HQ to MacDill
Mo.	Whiteman AFB/22 442 FW	Gain 9 A10	No Change
N.C.	Pope/Ft. Bragg AFB-35, 52 440 AW/911 AW	Gain 16 C130H Build AD Assoc to Reserve	ECS, Wing HQ from Milwaukee
	Seymour-John AFB/37 916 ARW	Gain 8 KC135R Build AD Assoc to Reserve	No Change
Neb.	Offutt AFB/35 911 AW	None	ECS, Wing HQ from Pittsburgh
Nev.	Nellis AFB/22 926 FW	None	Wing HQ from New Orleans
N.Y.	Niagara ARB(Close)/33 914 AW AFB-33	Lose 8 C130H	ECS to Schriever; Wing HQ to Langley CES to Lackland
Ohio	Youngstown AFB/35 910 AW	None	Aeromed ECS from Pittsburgh
Okla.	Tinker AFB/23, 41 507 ARW	Gain 4 KC135R Build ANG Assoc to AFR	No change
Ore.	Portland (AFRC Close)/41 939 ARW	Lose 8 KC135R (ANG Remains)	ECS, Wing HQ to Vandenberg 304 RQS to McChord
Pa.	Pittsburgh (AFRC Close)/35 911 AW	Lose 8 C130H (ANG Remains)	ECS, Wing HQ to Offutt Aeromed to Youngstown
	Willow Grove NAS (Close) 913 AW DON/21	Lose 8 C130E (A/C loss and ECS move not in announcement)	913 ECS to Eglin
Texas	Carswell JRB/47 301 FW	Gain 9 F16	No Change
	Lackland AFB/33 914 CES	None	CES ECS from Niagara

<u>State</u>	<u>Base / Page</u> <u>Wing</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u> <u>ACTION</u>	<u>ECS/WG HQ</u> <u>ACTION</u>
<b>Texas</b>	Randolph H&SA/33	None	ARPC Personnel Processing from Denver
<b>Utah</b>	Hill AFB/47 419 FW	Lose 15 F-16 New Assoc Reserve to AD	No change
<b>Va.</b>	Langley AFB/33 914 AW	None	Wing HQ from Niagara
<b>Wash.</b>	McChord AFB/41 304 RQS	None	304 RQS from Portland
<b>Wis.</b>	Gen. Mitchell AFRC (Close), 52 440 AW, 52	Lose 8 C130H (ANG Remains)	ECS, Wing HQ to Ft. Bragg

The basic motivation of Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, and Coast Guardsmen is to continue their careers and make a contribution to U.S. national defense in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The BRAC 2005 proposals for closing or most realignments will not allow many citizen soldiers of the AF Reserve to continue to support the GWOT. Specific concerns of the BRAC 2005 Report follow.

First, the proposed changes will impact AF Reserve (AFR) retention and future recruiting. By changing the demographics of Reserve Component bases, at current count over 5,000 AF Reservists will be required to "commute" hundreds of miles to Unit Training Assemblies (UTA) every month. If these changes become final, these servicemen and women will not be able to afford the monthly travel expense and time and will leave the military. Current DoD definition of reasonable commuting distance is 100-mile radius from the drill, or training assembly, site and *none of the proposed locations comply with this DoD policy*. Also, a lack of personnel exists to recruit and, likely, a lack of trained personnel required for the possible future missions at many of the new bases for AFRC "realigned" units. If these changes and "realignments" were directed for active duty units, personnel would be paid to move to the new base location. This does not occur for traditional Reservists whose choice is "commute" a long distance, find another Reserve or Guard position in another nearby unit, retire (only if they have 20 qualifying years of service), or transfer to the Not Affiliated Reserve Section (NARS) of the Air Reserve Personnel Center. As shown in the following chart, more than 70 million miles per year of non-reimbursable travel would be required for monthly UTA by Operation/Maintenance Groups and Expeditionary Combat Support units.

**DoD BRAC Announcement, May 13, 2005  
AFRC OPS/MAINT Groups Moving – Distance Impact for UTAs per FY**

STATE/CITY Unit Moving	PERS		MILES Round-Trip	FY TOTAL MILES
	FT	TR		
<b>La. – N. Orleans</b>				
9A-10 to Barksdale, La.	TBD	TBD	600	TBD
6A- 10 to Whiteman, Mo.	TBD	TBD	1,400	TBD
926 FW HQ to Nellis	30	60	1,500	1,050,000
<b>Mich.– Selfridge</b>				
8C135 to MacDill, Fla.	153	434	1,000	5,200,000
<b>N.Y. – Niagara</b>				
8 C130 to L. Rock, Ark.	130	411	1,800	8,850,000
914 HQ to Langley, Va.	30	60	450	320,000
<b>Ore. – Portland</b>				
4 C135 to Tinker, Okla.	76	217	3,000	7,800,000
4 C135 to Vandenberg, Calif.	76	217	750	1,900,000
304 RS to McChord, Wash.	TBD	TBD	120	TBD
<b>Pa. – Pittsburgh</b>				
8 C130 to Ft Bragg, N.C.	130	411	800	3,900,000
Aeromed to Youngstown, Ohio	8	210	60	150,000
<b>Willow Grove NAS</b>				
8 C130 to TBD	130	411	TBD	TBD
<b>Wis. – General Mitchell</b>				
8 C130 to Ft. Bragg, N.C.	130	411	750	3,700,000
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>893</b>	<b>2,842</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>32,870,000</b>

**AFRC EXPED. COMBAT SPT MOVES– Distance Impact for 12 UTAs per FY**

<b>La. – N. Orleans</b>				
926 ECS to Buckley, Colo.	30	277	1,100	3,650,000
<b>Mich. – Selfridge</b>				
927 ECS to MacDill, Fla.	75	499	1,050	6,250,000
<b>N.Y. – Niagara</b>				
914 ECS to 310 Space Group AFRC/Schriever, Colo.	85	259	1,400	4,350,000
914 CES to Lackland, Texas	2	89	1,500	1,600,000
<b>Ore. – Portland</b>				
939 ECS to Vandenberg, Calif.	75	437	750	3,900,000

STATE/CITY Unit Moving	PERS		MILES Round-Trip	FY TOTAL MILES
	FT	TR		
<b>Pa. – Pittsburgh</b>				
911 ECS to Offutt NE	114	590	800	5,650,000
<b>Willow Grove NAS</b>				
913 ECS to Eglin, Fla.	94	585	900	6,300,000
92 APS to Eglin, Fla.	3	138	900	1,500,000
<b>Wis. – General Mitchell, Milwaukee</b>				
440 ECS to Ft. Bragg, N.C.	100	753	750	6,750,000
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>578</b>	<b>3,627</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>39,950,000</b>

Notes: FT= Full Time Personnel; TR= Traditional Reservist;  
FY Total Miles is for TR personnel only (FT are in place)

Second, the proposed changes could result in a loss of Air Force skills and experience that DoD and USAF desperately needs to fight and win the GWOT. Many BRAC recommendations ignore the cost efficiencies of a trained and ready Reserve, which contrasts with the cost of hiring new personnel off the street without any prior military training. Inexperience, increased training costs, increased recruiting incentives, and loss of community support in the short term will outweigh long-term savings that are projected in the BRAC 2005 Report. DoD is highly using Reserve and Guard personnel for mission tasking where there is insufficient active duty manpower available. Obviously jets and turbo-prop aircraft can travel distances faster than a truck convoy, but the airplane needs fully trained aircrew and aircraft maintenance personnel to launch and fly the airplane in a short period of pre-flight time. If these critical personnel do not live near their base, great delays will occur in launching and maintaining large numbers of airlift aircraft for quickly emerging tasking for GWOT.

The third concern relates to strategic issues that are stated in the DoD National Defense Strategy (NDS), issued by the Secretary of Defense on March 1, 2005. They are:

- NDS states a “layered approach”, capacity to defeat missiles/WMD from a distance and defeat of threats from a distance. Closing AFR/ANG bases or moving units to a few Air Force bases (AFB) close to oceans and the Gulf of Mexico do not contribute to the NDS goals. It appears that dispersed locations, with some consolidations, would better support U.S. national defense and the homeland defense scenarios of the U.S. Northern Command USNORTHCOM).
- An NDS goal is management of “Force management risks” for a ready force. In ROA’s opinion, the BRAC 2005 proposals do not help manage these personnel risks.
- NDS desires “greater flexibility” to contend with uncertainty by not overly concentrating forces in a few locations. How do BRAC 2005 proposals contribute to this goal where multiple AFR/ANG units close or move to a few AFBs? How does this lower the operational vulnerability for DoD military forces? ROA’s position is that

strategic dispersal of aircraft is required for security of personnel, aircraft and facilities.

- Nationally, a local example of “readiness” is the Fire Station that has a specific territory to cover. Regarding USNORTHCOM and state governors readiness requirements, the local “Fire Station” cannot be 500 to 1,000 miles away.

ROA’s fourth concern is that the BRAC Report appears to dismiss strategy to capability linkage for the next twenty years. Documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to be released in 2006, and the Mobility Capability Study “XX” (MCS XX is to update MRS05 in mid-2005), are crucial to effective, long-term “Transformation” of USAF and DoD. Without access to these documents, the BRAC 2005 Report is premature.

The nation needs all C-130 and C-135 aircraft capability from the current DoD inventory until replacement aircraft are produced and delivered to USAF. The BRAC 2005 Report states “documented imbalance in the active/reserve manning mix for C-130s”. Where is this imbalance documented? This has not been briefed to the Congress and funding requested for the “shortfall.” Therefore, the “shortfall” is not validated national policy and should be deleted from discussion of the BRAC 2005 Report. The Congress is concerned about potential USAF retirement of C-130 E and KC-135 aircraft and prohibited this action during FY06 by inclusion in the Senate Armed Services Committee FY 06 NDAA Mark in May 2005. USAF has requested the Congress to authorize and fund C-130J-30 aircraft under a multi-year contract beginning in FY06. *In ROA’s opinion, no action should be taken to reduce the number of C-130 aircraft, aircrews, and aircraft maintenance personnel until the QDR and MCS XX studies are released and future C-130 J aircraft become available to deploy to field units, including the AFRC and ANG.* The C-130J-30 will have a lower life cycle cost for the next 30 years due to its three aircrew positions, which replace five aircrew positions in the C-130 E/H. Furthermore, with the large number of C-130s no longer based at Pope AFB, an AFRC Associate Wing of 16 aircraft cannot fly enough daily Ft. Bragg airborne training missions to meet Army requirements without aircraft flying in from other AFBs. By “realigning” C-130H aircraft assigned to AFRC to active duty bases, active duty Air Force is allowed to “re-capitalize” AFRC assigned aircraft (and retire active C-130Es) that have been providing airlift support to the Air Force for decades to augment the heavy tasking by DoD for the over 40-year-old fleet of 186 C-130Es that are not assigned to the AFRC or ANG.

### ***Air Force Reserve Summary***

In summary, the major flaw in the actions proposed in the BRAC 2005 Report is the total disregard of the crucial factor in all military operations—personnel. While in many places, the report mentions retaining highly trained and experienced Reserve personnel and the recruiting potential within the region, the proposed actions do not accomplish the BRAC 2005 goals. Therefore, dramatic changes need to be made to the proposals to provide the capability for Reserve personnel to train and support DoD missions. Any changes should conform to DoD guidelines for a reasonable commuting distance of 100 miles from the training site. An alternative consideration would be to place the new training site within two hours flying time by USAF “UTA Airlift.”

## APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

### Reserve Transition Initiatives

In response to the end of the Cold War and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Congress addressed the force downsizing through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1993, HR 5006, Conference Report 102-966, Oct. 1, 1992, Guard and Reserve Transition Initiatives (Section 4411 through Section 4422). These initiatives were effective through Dec. 31, 2001.

Ten years later the force is facing the same challenges as it adjusts to the war on terrorism and the 2005 BRAC. At this time more Guard and Reserve members will lose their positions due to closures and realignments than in any previous BRAC actions. The need for transition initiatives compels us to look at the authorities used before and to propose new provisions for consideration.

The Senate report 102-352, July 31, 1992, Sections 541 and 542, defined the transition period and eligible personnel.

"The provisions would apply to personnel in the Selected Reserve from Oct. 1, 1991, to the end of the fiscal year 1995. All of the authorities provided are therefore temporary, and are provided for the purpose of aiding the transition of Selected Reservists who must leave the Selected Reserve because of the downsizing of the National Guard and Reserve Components during this period."

The House amended the above to "clarify that the Guard and Reserve transition initiatives do not apply to Reservists who are in non-pay positions."

The transition initiatives from the NDAA for FY 1993 Conference Report 102-966 (see attachment 1) are summarized as follows:

- Force reduction period retirements
- Retirements with 15 years of service
- Separation pay
- Waiver of continued service requirement for reserve G.I. Bill benefits
- Commissary and exchange privileges
- Applicability and termination of benefits
- Separation benefits for active Guard and reserve personnel

These can also be found in Public Law 102-484.

In Public Law 103-337, a change was made in Section 518: annual payments for members retired under Guard and Reserve transition initiative. This section changed the annual payment from "for five years" to "for a period of years prescribed by the Secretary concerned" and a prorated formula was given.

The final action for the Reserve Transition Assistance Program was In Public Law 106-616 when the authorities were extended to Dec. 31, 2001.

ROA is concerned that the May 2005 BRAC announcement did not include presentation of transition assistance programs for military personnel unlike in 1991, when BRAC and the legislation on transition occurred at the same time. In the 109th Congress: the defense committees have already completed their legislation for FY 2006; DoD is finalizing their proposed legislation for FY 2007; and the Unfunded Legislation and Budget for FY 2008 is starting. That means there is a potential for no measures to be put in place to help displaced military members until FY 2009.

Transition initiatives help the services manage their force by retaining talent and experience, preventing loss of critical skills, and ensuring readiness by enabling leaders to effectively manage the period for the transition within their respective services. The previous adjustment to the force showed how important it is to analyze and target the force. Couple this with the current recruiting and retention environment, and the need for transition initiatives becomes more apparent.

ROA believes transition authorities should consider and offer incentives for the Reserve. These incentives should be targeted to first-term, career, and retirement-eligible personnel. Transition authorities should be used judiciously to benefit both the service and individuals whenever possible. To be implemented and be effective, transition incentives need to be appropriated. Besides enacting the previous transition authorities, ROA believes they should be expanded to include the following.

- Waive time-in-grade
- Waive service commitments
- Waive bonus repayment
- Provide mileage payments for individual duty training and unit training assemblies as appropriate
- Provide airfare for individual duty training and unit training assemblies as appropriate
- Decrease the tax credit mileage area for travel expenses
- Allow PCS moves

Providing updated policies and legislation for the Reserve Transition Assistance Program will help ensure the Reserve Components are a viable force able to meet operational and mobilization requirements.

In keeping with its obligations to its Congressional charter, ROA recommends that the Commission seriously consider the listed concerns in Section II of this paper and those contained in the individual military service sections. Failure to consider demographics in the Base Closure and Realignment process, the skills and experience that Reservists bring to the fight, and the equipment they need to do the jobs they are trained to do will lead to a less secure country. Omitting transition initiatives for certain Reservists and Guardsmen most impacted by BRAC would also be a grave error. Also, it is paramount that the Commission, Congress, and the President wait for the recommendations of the QDR and Commission on the National Guard and Reserve before making final decisions. The information that these latter two commissions will provide when they conclude will be and should essential to the BRAC decision-making process.

**Attachment to Appendix 1**

**Guard and Reserve Transition Initiatives  
Senate Report 102-352 and Conference Report 102-966**

The Defense Department has proposed reducing National Guard and Reserve personnel strength by over 250,000 by the end of fiscal year 1995. Elsewhere in this report, the committee notes that DOD had made no plans for the transition of personnel who would be affected by the proposed reduction. Despite testimony from DOD witnesses that such a plan was being developed, the committee has not received it. The committee is disappointed at the apathy of the DOD in addressing this very important matter. The committee believes that such a plan is essential. Therefore, the committee recommends a set of National Guard and reserve personnel transition benefits.

**Sections 541 and 542** would establish general definitions regarding the transition period and eligible personnel. The provisions would apply to personnel in the Selected Reserve from October 1, 1991 to the end of the fiscal year 1995. All of the authorities provided are therefore temporary, and are provided for the purpose of aiding the transition of Selected Reservists who must leave the Selected Reserve because of the downsizing of the National Guard and reserve components during this period.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision with an amendment. The amendment would clarify that the Guard and reserve transition initiatives do not apply to reservists who are in non-pay positions.*

**Section 543** would prohibit the deactivation of any Selected Reserve unit or the involuntary separation of a Selected Reservist (except for personnel being separated because of adverse personnel actions) during the transition period until the Secretary of Defense has promulgated and submitted to the Congress regulations that implement these provisions. This particular provision would ensure that Selected Reserve personnel are provided a uniform, fair safety net of benefits if they must leave the Selected Reserve because of the National Guard and reserve component downsizing during the transition period.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision with an amendment. The amendment would delete the prohibition on the deactivation of Selected Reserve units. A modified version of this prohibition is contained in another provision elsewhere in this act.*

**Section 544** would require DOD to prescribe uniform procedures for the recruitment, reassignment, retraining, and separation and retirement of personnel consistent with the needs of the Selected Reserve, and with equal consideration for the fair treatment of personnel.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision with a clarifying amendment that would ensure that separating active as well as reserve component personnel will be given priority over non-prior service applicants for Selected Reserve positions.*

**Section 545** would exclude individuals who are discharged or transferred under certain conditions from the benefits provided under this subtitle.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision.*

**Section 546** would allow Selected Reservists who have 20 years of credit for reserve retirement and who are in a Selected Reserve unit to apply for reassignment from the Selected Reserve to the Retired Reserve in order to draw an immediate, reduced retirement annuity.

Under current rules, Selected Reservists who have completed at least 20 years of service creditable for reserve retirement are eligible to draw their reserve retirement annuity at age 60. This rule tends to entice Selected Reservists to remain in the Selected Reserve well after they accumulate 20 years of credit for reserve retirement. Consequently, there is a relatively rich supply of these individuals in the Selected Reserve. This provision would provide an incentive for some of these people to voluntarily leave the Selected Reserve and reduce the pressure on involuntary removals as the reserve components build down.

The reduced retirement annuity under this provision would be paid over a five-year period or up until an individual reaches age 60, whichever is shorter. The annuity would be five percent plus .5 percent for each full year of service past 20 years that an individual has completed multiplied by the annual basic pay to which the individual would be entitled if on active duty. The percent multiplier would be capped at 10 percent.

For example, a noncommissioned officer serving in the Selected Reserve in pay grade E-7 who has completed 20 years of creditable service would receive an annual payment of about \$1,300 for five years. This payment would not affect the retired pay for which the member would be eligible at age 60. Under today's pay scale, such a member would receive about \$5,400 a year beginning at age 60.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision with an amendment. The Amendment would delete a provision in the Senate section that would allow personnel who retire early under this section to be eligible for military health care. The amendment would also provide temporary authority to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force to consider reserve officers for elimination from an active status similar to existing authority provided to the Secretary of the Navy under section 6410 of title 10, United States Code.*

**Section 547** would allow Selected Reservists who have at least 15 but less than 20 years of credit for reserve retirement to apply for such assignment from the Selected Reserve to the Retired Reserve. Such personnel would be eligible for reserve retirement pay at age 60 based on the number of years of reserve retirement credit they have accrued. For example, a noncommissioned officer in the E-7 grade who had 20 years of credit for reserve retirement would receive \$550 per month at age 60. Under this provision, the same NCO with 15 years of service for reserve retirement would draw \$413 per month at age 60. As in the Selected Reserve population with over 20 years of service for reserve retirement, there is a rich supply of personnel with 15 to 20 years of credit for reserve retirement.

The retirement provisions (an immediate annuity for those with over 20 years, and the 15 year retirement authority) will aid the National Guard and reserve components in encouraging the voluntary retirement of Selected Reservists who become surplus to requirements, and facilitate the realignment of personnel among remaining billets as Guard and reserve units are downsized to maintain a better balance between youth and experience.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision.*

**Section 548** would authorize the payment of separation pay to Selected Reservists who have six but less than 15 years of service and who are being involuntarily released from the

Selected Reserve because their units are being deactivated during the transition period. The separation pay authorized would parallel the separation pay being paid to active personnel who are being separated, and be equal to 15 percent of two months of basic pay multiplied by the number of points accrued for reserve retirement divided by 360. Such a formula would yield a lump sum separation payment for a typical reservist with 10 years of service of 6 months of drill pay. For example, an officer with 10 years of service in the grade of O-4 would receive about \$3,400. An enlisted person with 10 years of service in the grade of E-6 would receive about \$1,700.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision.*

**Section 549** would allow Selected Reservists who must leave the Selected Reserve because of the National Guard and reserve downsizing during the transition period to continue to receive Reserve G.I. Bill educational assistance.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision.*

**Section 550** would authorize Selected Reservists who must leave the Selected Reserve because of the National Guard and reserve downsizing during the transition period to continue to retain their eligibility to use military commissary and exchange shopping facilities for one year following the date they leave the Selected Reserve.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision with an amendment that would extend the period of eligibility for the benefits provided from one to two years.*

**Section 551** would provide for the continued coverage, for one year, of Selected Reservists who must leave the Selected Reserve because of the National Guard and reserve downsizing during the transition period under the Service Group Life Insurance program at no cost to the individual.

*\*The Senate Recedes to the House; however, the House bill contained no similar provision so this legislative provision was not adopted.*

**Section 552** would prescribe rules with regard to the applicability and termination of the recommended National Guard and reserve personnel transition benefits.

*\*The House recedes to the Senate provision.*

**\*Indicates Conference Decision**

## Appendix 2

### BRAC Commission Members

- Anthony J. Principi, former Secretary of Veterans Affairs (2001–2005)
- James H. Bilbray, a former Democratic House member from Nevada (1987–95)
- Philip Coyle of California, a former assistant secretary of Defense
- Ret. Adm. Harold W. Gehman of Virginia, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
- James V. Hansen of Utah, a former Republican House member (1981–2003)
- Ret. Army Gen. James T. Hill of Florida
- Ret. Army Lt. Gen. Claude M. Kicklighter of Georgia
- Samuel Knox Skinner of Illinois, a former Secretary of Transportation
- Ret. Air Force Brig. Gen. Sue Ellen Turner of Texas

### Appendix 3

#### ROA's Initial Input to the BRAC Commission

ROA President Maj. Gen. Robert A. Nester wrote a letter to the BRAC Commissioner to notify him of the Association's serious concerns about the negative impact the BRAC recommendations will have on thousands of Reservists and Guardsmen and on national defense if they are approved. Following is the May 16, 2005, letter from the ROA President to the BRAC Commission:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As President of the primary association that represents Reserve officers in the United States Armed Forces, Secretary Rumsfeld's announcement on BRAC conceals more than it tells for *all* Reservists and Guardsmen in this country.

Applying the term "realign" to many of the installations and facilities on Mr. Rumsfeld's list really means "closure" for many Reservists. With their units now 300 to 3,000 miles away, their commuting to monthly training assemblies, or "drills," would be completely impractical. If this list is adopted as published, this would translate into the loss of countless experienced Reservists and Guardsmen to the U.S. military.

The BRAC listing by state was an interesting technique to show DoD's recommendations as the closing and realignment numbers only reflected Reserve Component full-time manning figures for military and civilian specialists. The published numbers completely omitted the citizen-soldier corps assigned or attached to those closed or realigned facilities. Why? Are Reservists and Guardsmen no longer part of the force? And what of other studies, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve? Are not the findings of these important commissions to be included in the decision-making process? Your quoted statement in the *Washington Post* to Secretary Rumsfeld was absolutely correct when you said, let's not make "BRAC the cart before the horse."

If the BRAC list is allowed to stand as recommended, I fear the nation's support for future military efforts will greatly suffer, and the umbilical cord that links the citizens of many communities to the armed forces as is called for in the Abrams Doctrine will be permanently severed. I wonder if this proposed shift is an attempt to change America's citizen-soldier concept by making service as a Reservist or Guardsman so cumbersome that few will join, thereby mandating increases in active duty end strengths. Mr. Chairman, our military and communities must remain linked if we are to have public support. Let us not be guilty of repeating past mistakes by sending our uniformed men and women into future conflicts without strong public support behind them!

ROA is eager to engage in further information with the BRAC Commission. We do this because BRAC is a vital issue to our Reserve Component, and, therefore to our nation's security. ROA's purpose, as mandated in its congressional charter, is to help promote the development and execution of military policy for the United States that will provide adequate national security. Policies made on BRAC and all issues must fairly represent the long-term needs of our nation.

Signed: Maj. Gen. Robert A. Nester, USAFR (Ret.), ROA President

## Appendix 4

### Bills Introduced by Congress Addressing BRAC 2005

The following bills have been introduced in the Congress as of June 2005:

#### **S.1127**

Title: A bill to require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress all documentation related to the Secretary's recommendations for the 2005 round of defense base closure and realignment.

Sponsor: Sen. Snowe, Olympia J., (Maine)

Introduced: May 25, 2005

Cosponsors: 14

Latest Major Action: May 26, 2005. Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 118.

#### **S.1136**

Title: A bill to facilitate the provision by members of the Armed Forces of testimony on the military value of military installations in connection with the 2005 round of defense base closure and realignment.

Sponsor: Sen. Thune, John, (S.D.)

Introduced: May 26, 2005

Cosponsors: 10

Latest Major Action: May 26, 2005. Referred to Senate committee.

Status: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

#### **H.R.2641**

Title: To require the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to take into consideration the homeland security contributions and value of military installations when the Commission conducts its review and analysis of the list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense.

Sponsor: Rep. Slaughter, Louise McIntosh [N.Y.-28]

Introduced: May 25, 2005

Cosponsors: 5

Latest Major Action: May 25, 2005. Referred to House committee.

Status: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

#### **H.R.2667**

Title: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare a report on the homeland security consequences of the base closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense and to require the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to consider the report during their review of such recommendations.

Sponsor: Rep. Fitzpatrick, Michael G. (Pa.-8)

Introduced: May 26, 2005

Cosponsors: 3

Latest Major Action: May 26, 2005. Referred to House committee.

Status: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

**H.R.2733**

Title: To prohibit the closure or adverse realignment of facilities of the Reserve Components that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines have a significant role in homeland defense.

Sponsor: Rep. Slaughter, Louise McIntosh (N.Y.-28)

Introduced: May 26, 2005

Cosponsors: None

Latest Major Action: May 26, 2005. Referred to House committee.

Status: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

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## Appendix 5

### ROA White Paper Recommendations, Talking Points

1. Two main recommendations:
  - Separate RC re-alignments from other closures until completion of the QDR and Commission on the National Guard and Reserve reports
  - Suspend C-130 and C-135 moves
2. The BRAC Commission has the authority to take these actions.
  - Sec. 2903 (d)(2)(B) "...the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c) (1)..."
  - The "force structure plan" cited by DoD is based on the previous Quadrennial Defense Review – a plan that DoD is currently working to change and bring current. DoD's BRAC recommendations cannot be consistent with a plan that does not yet exist.
  - Many of the airlift (C-130/C-135) realignments depend on changes in Air National Guard basing and force structure, actions taken without the approval of State governments. These actions are the subject of numerous legal challenges.
  - Previous BRAC Commissions have not been reluctant to change DoD recommendations.
3. Reserve Component actions received so little attention in DoD's BRAC process that they were not even mentioned in the announcement of the Secretary's report. No assessment of the supportability of the recommendations from a personnel standpoint has been made.
  - Reserve Component personnel who travel from their homes to their units must pay their own travel expenses. This situation then leads to the question, "Will there be enough trained people who are willing to fill the ranks at new locations?"
4. Since BRAC actions are not required to be completed for six years [Sec. 294 (a)(4),] there is sufficient time to wait for the Quadrennial Defense Review and Commission on Guard and National Guard Reserve reports, and then create "enclaves" where necessary to bring Reserve Component re-alignments in line with current strategy and force structure.
5. The Services have separate (non-BRAC) authority to realign force structure

